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The Place of the Person in Social Life

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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Preface

George F. McLean

In retrospect, it appears that the constant, pervasive theme of the last half century has been the progressive discovery and emancipation of the person in society.

In the 1940s World War II constituted an unprecedented human effort to break free from the repressive, depersonalizing and dehumanizing forces of Fascism.

In the 1950s this was followed by an end to subordinate colonial status for other parts of the world.

In the 1960s Vatican II's reformulation in terms of the person of the self-understanding of the church was followed by an analogous, if more raucous, call for reshaping society by the students and workers in the streets of Paris.

The 1970s were characterized by the call for civil and minority rights and by a pervasive effort to expand participation in decision-making--whether in school, church, government or industry.

The 1980s concluded in Central and Eastern Europe with a velvet revolution which matched the overthrow of totalitarian Fascism by a dramatic rejection of communism.

To achieve a deeper understanding of this dynamism of our times with a view to rediscovering the nature and place of the person in society and to making it possible creatively to rebuild social life for the XXIst century, a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary team of scholars joined in an extended project of cooperative research. The present volume is the result of their work.

To develop a vision of the place of the person in future social life required four steps which constitute the four parts of this volume. The first looks at the notion of the person (Part I), followed by studies on the problem of the place the person in society (Part II). These two sections constitute an analysis of the person-society problem in our time. To respond it is necessary to uncover the experience of the multiple cultural traditions and their resources of humane understanding (Part III), and to bring these forward for the task of social reconstruction (Part IV).

Part I, concerning the person, it begins with a study by G. McLean which analyzes the evolution of the notion of person through time from that of a particular role to that of a self-conscious and free subject. The person is seen as developing through a process coordination of values and virtues in a life that is correlatively and indivisibly both personal and communitary. G. Nodia shows how this process has received vital coordinates and impetus from modern enlightenment values and relates the present dilemma to the failure of philosophy adequately to ground and integrate these. This points to the need both for a deeper personal center and for a correlative absolute or transcendent; both of these must be protected from being discounted or reduced through human limitations. J. Anderson focuses upon the recent dilemmas of the contemporary mind as it searches adequately to conceptualize the related forms and structure, and shows how these very dilemmas point to the deeper reality of the person as unique and free.

Part II which concerns the relation of person and society begins with J. Kromkowski's statement of the present challenge, namely, how to recover from the consequences of the privatization of life suggested by Voltaire in his acerbic critique of all social institutions and forms. Is it possible to keep such new sensibility to personal freedom from becoming self-centered and even solipsistic? R. Graham suggests a positive response by examining cross-cultural studies of personal development. These show person and development to be oriented essentially beyond an earlier mere avoidance of personal reprimand and pain, through a sense of equality or fairness in social interchange, to an open and creative pattern of social concern predicated upon transcending

values and principles. This overall process can be described as the personal assimilation and redefinition of the social values of one's culture.

There are, however, serious problems in this relation of person to society, as is pointed out by the following three chapters. The first by P. Peachey shows how modern sociological thought, reflecting broader sensibilities, has tended to substitute the more subtle communitary sense of the person by a rather abstract, formal and rigid sense of social structure, thereby transforming an open and creative self into a closed and empty ego. He suggests that the real sense of person lies precisely in its openness to the transcendent in terms of which the self precedes even its own self-consciousness. This is illustrated in two critiques of the ideologies of this half century. B. Kuzmickas, presently Second Vice President of Lithuania, shows the oppressive character of a Marxian ideological society, pointing thereby to the priority of personality as value oriented and free over role, of person over citizen, and of society over state. S. Schneck analyzes M. Scheler's critique of the formalistic character of liberalism reducing persons to individuals whose motivation is limited to needs and utility.

From this there emerges the depth of the contemporary crises, namely, that in the present half century as the importance of the person has come to be felt more acutely the enlightenment mode of scientific clarification and the resulting technically rationalized structures of society have progressively eroded the very reality of the person, eviscerating personal life itself. Indeed, it is perhaps more true to say that it is this evisceration which, by brutal negation, has made manifest the radical importance of the personal life it has destroyed. Paul Tillich would describe this as a borderline situation similar to that in war time when a bombardment, having eliminated sports, business and art by forcing the person to confront the basic fact of life opens attention to the previously obscured question of the radical meaning of human life and meaning. From this emerges the need to rediscover a sense of the person which is not a mere function of society but a being in one's own right, essentially, open responsive and creative in relation to one's envioning nature and community of persons. This points to a double search: toward the past and toward the future.

Part III looks for the contribution which tradition can make. If as a person I am truly open to society then I can expect that the tradition, which has emerged from the experience of society over the ages, will have something to say to me about what it is to be a person in community. How this can be understood, drawn upon and applied in our day is the subject of the study of hermeneutics and tradition by G. McLean.

The following three studies concern the concrete sense of person and community in African cultures. The first, by I.M. Onyeocha reflects the deep sense of frustration generated by the destructive impact of colonialism on a people and their social interaction. The paper of Atomate Epas-Ngan looks richly into the communitary character of African culture with the expectation that this can be realized in modern form through evolving African socialist political structures. Valuing the tradition no less, K. Wambari holds a more sober assessment of present structures, seeing liberation as having achieved thus far only national freedom and statehood. Future progress will depend upon the emergence of a stronger sense of the person while retaining its sense of being as active member of the community.

The Chinese tradition, as presented by Yang Fenggang, shows considerable tension between the classical Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist traditions with their emphasis upon harmony on the one hand, and on the other, efforts since 1911 toward liberation. The reconciliation of freedom with responsibility in theory and practice constitutes a central continuing challenge. The study of Turkish culture by O. Bilen manifests something of the same dilemma. This is illustrated by the

impact of modern transformation upon the self-understanding and the social perception of the role of the intellectual as keeper of the tradition.

From Part III two things become apparent. The first is that the tradition has rich, essential and indeed indispensable resources regarding the dignity and social character of the person which are essential for any response to the contemporary problems of person and society seen in Part II. The second is the extent of the challenge involved in translating these cultural resources into terms which are viable and creative for our times.

The response to that challenge is the focus of Part IV. The effort there has three steps. The first is to attempt to build the relation between person and society not simply upon abstract principles or common ideals, but upon the mutual engagement to which persons are called in their life in the physical world, namely, upon labor. This is studied by two authors: A Davidov, presently Vice President of the dissident Socialist Party of Bulgaria, builds upon the humanist phase of Marx; John Farrelly of De Salles School of Theology draws upon the Encyclical *Laborem Exercens* of Pope John Paul II. That is perhaps most surprising is the degree of convergence between the two. Both stress the importance of founding the life of the person in his or her engagement in transforming their environment, and both show how this is essentially a social action. In this way both attempt to bridge the division of person and society which would make one of these either of first and the other second. The person is essentially social because as body and mind the person is one who sustains him or herself by work. This is the concrete realization of their sociality. Work then is a process of humanization and in this light property and its uses receive their proper destiny.

The difficulty comes, of course, when the national ideal of efficiency overshadows the personal and social character of work, or when management by state or private industry becomes exploitive and destructive of the environment, the physical life, the human dignity or the social freedom of the persons and societies involved. The papers of Nodia and Kuzmickas spoke strongly to the destructive reality of this threat. By opening the horizons in ways that transcend what man can do to man the paper of J. Farrelly provided foundations for human dignity and for the requisite social interaction in order that labor be able to exercise its truly humanizing role. The sobering paper of D. Hoge shows, however, that the tradition of scriptural texts alone cannot fulfill this function. Indeed, their literal reading can and has been used as justification for attacking and suppressing nature. It is important then that the tradition be read creatively, that new and even more enlightened question be asked and that its deeper sense be plumed and unfolded in new ways. This work was described in Chapter I by G. McLean regarding the application of tradition. What has been discovered and roundly affirmed in the past must live in new ways in our day as a basis for human progress.

The second step in Part IV is to consider how this sense of person and society can be articulated for the actual development of the person. This is a matter of education and the paper of A. Carandang provides an overall schema for integrating the multiple dimensions to be considered. But if education requires a theoretical understanding of the person, it is above all a challenging social process. The study by T. Ready looks at this challenge at one of its most extreme points, namely, the education of children who come recently from another culture, often are economically disadvantaged and who must establish some stable basis for learning and growing in a new environment often without the support of their traditional extended family. His work of isolating the factors of successful education under these extreme conditions identifies as well the key factors for the relation: person-society.

The third step in Part IV is to take the experience of this relation beyond the school to the international community. The study by P. Murray in the laboratory situation constituted by the development of an international agency (FAO) makes it possible to distinguish different dimensions of the relation: person-society and to identify their proper characteristics. On the one hand, the persons in the agency need to work in terms of rational, legal structures which are technical in character and to function impersonally. On the other hand, they need to employ all the riches of their own personal heritage, with its cultural and religious resources, in order to make the structures work as modes of engaging and coordinating persons for social rather than merely selfish goals.

From this there emerges a multilevel topography of the requirements of effective social cooperation at a high level of international and intercultural collaboration. The technical and impersonal structures were found to function only when suffused by the humanizing and enlivening content of the multiple cultural traditions. Rather than being impediments to the rationalization of human interaction, cultural traditions appear to bring to life and fruition what would otherwise be deadening bureaucratic structure. In some, what is most deeply personal becomes the keys, rather than obstacles, to social collaboration.

In conclusion, J. Donders works through and beyond the dilemmas of modern scientific theory. His resulting sense of transcendence turns out in its basis to be not about an absolute Other, but about ourselves: as trinitarian theology becomes high anthropology. The ordering and interrelations of persons turns out to be more deeply a *koinonia* or permanent process of active reciprocity. Rather than an hierarchical ordering of persons, this emerges as a *perichoresis*, a 'carol' or circle-dance, in which persons and societies are destined to relate and thereby to find their real selves--to live and to live more fully.

The task is not completed. The last fifty years appear to have removed many oppressive barriers to personal and social life, and the task of reconstructing these in new ways lies ahead. This volume has identified the project and the resources; it has pointed to multiple levels at which the processes of renewing the life of person and society are underway. It is intended as a contribution to the great work of human reconstruction that lies ahead.

Introduction

The Place of the Person in Social Life

Paul Peachey

Human existence, as we know, is inveterately ambiguous. Always the self strives above all for itself, yet also fears the loss of others. The organism's survival instincts may imply that the former urge is more deeply rooted than the latter. Some theories of human nature draw that conclusion. Yet to treat the yearning for the other as secondary or even accidental hardly accords with the reality of experience. In real life self-love and other-love, narcissism and altruism, wrestle incessantly with each other. Shifting endlessly in priority and balance, both are constitutive in human existence.

Tension between "person" and "society" or "social life" is a familiar form of this ambiguity. The problem is reminiscent of that old saw: Which came first, the hen or the egg? Persons and collectivities continuously and reciprocally create each other. The process is never-ending, re-enacting itself in every lifetime, every generation, every society. Choices must be made, and in these choices, personal good and the common good, though inseparable, remain in the end irreducible, the one into the other.

In the modern world this innate antinomy, person and society, intensifies. This is due above all to the complex transformations comprising the modernization of societies over the past two centuries. Our humanly-constructed artificial environment has vastly expanded, removing us ever further from our rootedness in nature. Similarly, increasing social complexity enlarges the spheres of personal autonomy. Human transactions for the most part take place in special purpose settings, extracted from moral community. "Unwilled" ties of kinship and place yield increasingly to "willed" contacts, more focused and efficient, perhaps, but also inconstant, ephemeral. Solidarities, once taken for granted, are subject now to constant renegotiation. And with the dawn of the electronic age, these processes speed up, perhaps exponentially.

The creation of the social sciences over the past century may be described as an important coping response to the new era. Though by now indispensable, these disciplines are also inherently the source of additional problems. On the one hand, they assert that social phenomena are *sui generis*, irreducible to their biological substratum. They seek to account for behaviors and patterns in terms of the "laws" of nature, employing thus the reason and the methods of the natural sciences. While these efforts yield important results, they do not fully fathom the human spirit. Quest and controversy continue to beset the enterprise.

Human nature, however defined, presumably has not changed materially since the appearance of the species. Comparatively speaking, however, personal autonomy, is a modernization emergent. Individuation and agency beyond the pale of clan and place become possible only with the rise of "society," of secondary associations beyond tribe and village. Early protagonists of modernization anticipated homogeneous outcomes. They were mistaken--certain tendencies may be universal, but not outcomes. Societies and cultures differ, and thus routes and destinations as well. Thus societies may modernize--Japan is an outstanding example--while important institutional traditions persist.

Competing paradigms of modernization have emerged, above all those championed by the "market" societies of the "West," and the "socialist" societies of eastern Europe. Global politics during the second half of our century were disturbed by the contest of these two paradigms for the

"ear" of countries only beginning the modernization hegira. Actually the split between the competing conceptions arose in the Western experience and interpretation of its own modernization.

As the global preoccupation with human rights indicates, however, certain tendencies, however variant their forms, are universal. Around the world we ascribe increasingly to the notion that every human being is endowed with certain inalienable rights and dignities. While that "consciousness" is doubtlessly indebted to modern communications, it is tied as well to the structural transformations of modernization.

All the forgoing themes, and many others, reverberate through the papers comprising this volume, and the discussions to which they led as they were introduced in the seminar. Cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary inquiries, it must be admitted, are always frustrating. In academia their reputation rises and falls, more often perhaps the latter. But both enterprises can contribute importantly to the still unfinished quest, well-stated by Emile Durkheim nearly a century ago in his classic monograph: *De la division du travail social*: "Why does the individual, while becoming more autonomous, depend more upon society? How can he be at once more individual and more solidary?"

Rolling Ridge Study Retreat Community, Harper's Ferry, WV.

Chapter I

Notions of Person and Personal Growth

George F. McLean

This paper will search for answers to three crucial questions which concern the nature of the person as the subject of social life.

(a) Is the person only a set of roles constituted entirely in function of a structure or system in which one plays a particular part? If so, one could not refuse to do whatever the system demanded or tolerated. Or is the person a subject in his or her own right, with his or her proper dignity, heritage, goals and standards?

(b) Is there merely a stream of consciousness which becomes a person only upon the achievement of a certain level of self-awareness? If so, it becomes difficult to integrate the experiences of early childhood and the emotions of adult life which play so central a role in moral maturity. Or is the person an essentially free and responsible psycho-physical subject?

(c) Finally, does a person's freedom consist merely in implementing a pattern of behavior encoded in one's nature. If so, there would be little place for the anguish of decision, the pains of moral growth, or the creativity of a moral life. Or is this free subject a creative center whose basic dynamism consists in realizing a unique inner harmony of both values and harmony and outer community of peace for which moral education should contribute both form and content?

To undertake a response to these questions it is necessary to note that the notion of the person has not always had an identical or unchanging meaning. By natural growth, more than by mere accretion, the notion has managed to incorporate the great achievements of human self-discovery for which it has been both the stimulus and the goal. This continuing process has been central to philosophy from its earliest days. Like all life processes, the search for the person has consisted in a sequence of important steps, each of which has resulted in a certain equilibrium or level of culture. In time each has been enriched and molded by subsequent discoveries. It may not be incorrect to say that this search is also at the heart of our personal life.

To look into this experience it will be advantageous to study the nature of the person through reflection on a series of paired and progressively deeper dimensions: first, as a role and as the one who lives out this role; second, as free self-consciousness and as the subject of that freedom; and third, as moral agent and as searching for one's moral development and fulfillment. The first member of each pair is integral to an understanding of the human person and of moral growth, but it requires also its corresponding dimension and evokes the pair on the level that follows.

Role and Subject

Role

One means for finding the earliest meaning of a particular notion is to study the term by which it is designated. As earliest, this meaning tends to be more manifest and hence to remain current. The major study³ on the origins of the term 'person' concludes that, of the multiple origins which have been proposed, the most probable refers to the mask used by actors in Greece and subsequently adopted in Rome. Some explain that this was called a '*persona*' because by 'sounding

through' (*personando*)⁴ its single hole the voice of the wearer was strengthened, concentrated and made to resound clearly. Others see the term as a transformation of the Greek term for the mask which symbolized the actor's role.⁵ Hence, an original and relatively surface notion of person is the assumption of a character or the carrying out of a role. As such it has little to do with one's self; it is defined rather in terms of the set of relations which constitutes the plot or story line of a play.

This etymology is tentative; some would document an early and more rich sense of person in homeric literature.⁶ There can be no doubt, however, that the term has been used broadly in the above ethical sense of a role played in human actions. Ancient biblical literature described God as not being a respecter of persons, that is, of the roles played by various individuals.⁷ The Stoics thought of this in cosmic terms, seeing the wise person either as writing their role or as interpreting a role determined by the Master. In either case, to be a wise person was to be consistent, to play out one's role in harmony with oneself and with reason as the universal law of nature. From this ethical sense of person as role it was by a short step to a similar legal sense. This generally is a distinct and characteristic relation, although, as Cicero noted, it could be multiple: "Three roles do I sustain . . . my own, that of my opponent, that of the judge."⁸

Far from being archaic,⁹ the understanding of person as the playing of a role seems typical of much modern thought. John Dewey in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy* characterized the essence of the modern mentality in just these terms: in the case of ancient or classic usage "we are dealing with something constant in *existence*, physical or metaphysical; in the other [modern] case, with something constant in *function* and operation."¹⁰ The social and psychological sciences focus upon these roles or functions and in these terms attempt to construct, through operational definitions, their entire conceptual field.

This undergirds much of the progress in the social and behavioral sciences. As the same individual can play multiple roles even in the same circumstances, studying the person in terms of roles makes it possible to identify specific dimensions of one's life for more precise investigation and to analyze serially the multiple relations which obtain in an interpersonal situation. William James, for example, distinguishes in this manner the self-shown to family from that which one shows to professional colleagues or to God. Further, determining to pursue this exclusively on the basis of data which is subject to empirical verification¹¹ has made possible an immense collaborative effort to achieve a scientific understanding of human life.

Though much has been accomplished through understanding the person in terms of roles, there may have been a distant early warning regarding the limitations of this approach in Auguste Comte's (1798_1857) *Cours de philosophie positive*. By rejecting psychology as a scientific discipline and reducing all data concerning the person to either biology or sociology, he ignored introspection and the corresponding dimensions of the individual's conscious life. The person was not only one who could play a role, but one whose total reality consisted in playing that role.

More recently Gabriel Marcel has pointed up a number of unfortunate consequences which derive from considering the person only in terms of roles or functional relations, for in that case no account can be taken of one's proper self-identity. If only "surface" characteristics are considered, while excluding all attention to "depth,"¹² the person is empty; if the person can be analyzed fully in terms of external causes and relations one becomes increasingly devoid of intrinsic value. What is more, lack of personal identity makes it impossible to establish personal relations with others. Even that consistency between, or within, one's roles -- which the Stoics as early proponents of this understanding of person considered to be the essence of personal life -- is left without foundation. Life could be reduced, in the words of Shakespeare, "to a tale told by an idiot."¹³

Subject

These difficulties suggest that attention must be directed to another level of meaning if the person is to find the resources required to play his or her role. Rather than attempting to think of a role without an actor, it is important to look to the individual who assumes the role and expresses him or herself therein. Caution must be exercised here, however, lest the search for the subject or the self appear to reinforce the excesses of self-centeredness and individualism. This could be a special danger in the context of cultures whose positive stress on self-reliance and independence has been rooted historically in an atomistic understanding of individuals as single, unrelated entities. This danger is reflected, for example, in the common-law understanding of judicial rulings, not as defining the nature of interpersonal relations, but simply as resolving conflicts between individuals whose lives happen to have intersected.

In this context it is helpful to note that when Aristotle laid the foundations for the Western understanding of the person he did so in the context of the Greek understanding of the physical universe as a unified, dynamic, quasi life process in which all was included and all were related. Indeed, the term 'physical' was derived from the term for growth and the components of this process were seen always with, and in relation to, the others. (Similarly, modern physical theory identifies a uniform and all-inclusive pattern of relations such that any physical displacement, no matter how small, affects all other bodies). Within this unified pattern of relations the identification of multiple individuals, far from being destructive of unity, provides the texture required for personal life. Where individuals are differentiated by the moral tenor of their actions, which in turn make a difference to other persons, distinctiveness becomes, not an impediment to, but a principle of, community.¹⁴

In order better to appreciate the members of a community it is helpful to consider them on three progressively more specific dimensions, first as instances of a particular type, that is, as substances; secondly as existing, that is, as subsisting individuals; and thirdly as self-conscious, that is, as persons. The order in which these three will be considered is not accidental for, while it is necessary to be of a certain definite type, it is more important to exist as an individual in one's own right; for the person, finally, it is important above all that one be self-conscious and free. Hence, our exposition begins with substance and the subsisting individual in order to identify some general and basic -- though not specific or exclusive -- characteristics of the person, whose distinctive self-awareness and freedom will be treated in the following sections.

Substance. It was Aristotle who identified substance as the basic component of the physical order; his related insights remain fundamental to understanding the individual as the subject of moral life. His clue to this first discovery appears in language. Comparing the usage of such terms as "running," and "runner" we find that the first is applied to the second, which in turn, however, is not said of anything else.¹⁵ Thus, one may say of Mary that she is running, but one may not say that she is another person, e.g., John. This suggests the need to distinguish things that can be realized only in another (as running is had only in a runner) whence they derive their identity, from those which have their identity in their own right (e.g., Mary, the runner). Thus, a first and basic characteristic of the moral subject, and indeed of any substance, is that it have its identity in its own right rather than through another; only thus could a human being be responsible for his/her action. Without substances with their distinct identities one could envisage only a structure of ideals and values inhabited, as it were, by agents. In this light the task of moral education would be merely to enable one to judge correctly according to progressively higher ideals. This, indeed,

would seem to be the implicit context of Kohlberg's focus upon moral dilemmas which omits, not only the other dimensions of moral development, but one's personal identity as well. Aristotle points instead to world of persons realizing values in their actions. In their complex reality of body, feelings and mind they act morally and are the subjects of moral education.

Secondly, as the basic building blocks in the constitution of a world, these individuals are not merely undetermined masses. As the basic points of reference in discourse and the bases for the intelligibility of the real world, these individual components must possess some essential determinateness: they must be of one or another kind or form. The individual, then, is not simply one thing rather than any other; he or she is a being of a definite in this case a humankind,¹⁶ relating to other beings each with their own nature or kind. Only thus can one's life in the universe have sense and be able to be valued.

Thirdly, being of a definite kind the individual has its own proper characteristics and is able to realize a specific or typical set of activities. These activities derive from, or are "born of" (from the Latin, *natus*) the person according to its kind--which therefore is called "nature." The determination of what activity is moral will need to include not only the good to be derived from the action, but respect for the agent and for his or her nature.

In the search for the subject of moral education the work of Aristotle has made an essential contribution by directing our attention to three factors, namely: (a) individual beings, (b) who are particular instances of a definite kind, and hence (c) capable of specific types of activities. It should be noted that all three are concerned with the kind or type of the agent.¹⁷

This is important, but it is not enough for moral education, for one can know well enough what kind of thing a unicorn is but, as none has ever existed, they have never acted or entered the field of activity in which morality is found. Similarly, one might know what kind of musician is needed in order to complete an orchestra, but this does not mean that one is available to be engaged for a concert. In sum, in order to consider the field of moral action it is important to take account not only of the nature or kind of agent involved, but also of his or her actual existence and actions.

Subject: Subsisting Individual. Something of the greatest importance was bound to take place, therefore, when the mind expanded its range of awareness beyond the nature of things to what Shakespeare was to call *the* question, namely, "to be or not to be." At that point the mind was enabled to take explicit account not only of the kind, but of the existence of the individual, by which it is constituted in the order of actual, and hence of acting, beings.

From this there followed a series of basic implications for the reality of the person. It would no longer be considered as simply the relatively placid distinct or autonomous instance of some specific type. Rather, it would be understood in the much more dynamic manner of existing. This means not only being in its own right or, as it were, standing on its own two feet (subsisting), but bursting in among the realities of this world as a new and active center (existing). This understanding incorporates all the above-mentioned characteristics of the individual substance, and adds three more which are proper to existence, namely, being complete, independent, and dynamically open to action and to new actualization. Since existing or subsisting individuals include not only persons, but rocks and trees, however, these characteristics, though fundamental for persons, still will not be exclusive to them.

First, a person must be whole or complete. As regards its nature it must have all that is required to be of its distinctive kind--just as, by definition, a three digit number cannot be made up of but two digits. Hence, if humans are recognized to be by nature both body and mind or body and soul, then the human mind or soul without the body would be neither a subsisting individual nor, by

implication, a person for it would lack a complete human nature. This is of special importance in view of the tendency of some to reduce the human person to only the mind, soul, or consciousness or to consider the person to be adequately protected if these alone are cared for. In fact, the essential inclusion of body in the human person is as central to education as it is to human rights. The same, of course, is no less true of the mind or spirit in view of the tendency of others, described by William James,¹⁸ to reduce the person to "nothing but" the inert byproducts of physiology, or to functions of the structure of production and distribution of goods.

Further, the existing individual requires not merely a complete nature, but his or her proper existence. As existing, the individual is not merely an instance of a specific nature or kind, but a concrete reality asserting him/herself and dynamically struggling to achieve his/her fulfillment. In the person this goes beyond merely walking a course whose every step is already charted; it includes all the unique, fully individual choices by which a life is lived. It is subject then to combinations of the precarious and the stable, of tragedy and triumph in its self-realization. These are described by the American pragmatists and Continental existentialists as the very stuff of life, and hence by Dewey as the very stuff of education.

Secondly, as subsistent the person is independent. Being complete in its nature it is numerically individual and distinct from all else. In accord with one's individual nature, one's existence is, in turn, unique; it establishes the subject as a being in its own right, independent of all else. This, of course, does not imply that the human or other living subject does not need nourishment, or that it was not generated by others: people do need people, and much else besides. There is no question here of being self-sufficient or absolute. What is meant by independence is that the needs it has and the actions it performs are truly its own.

In turn, this means that in interacting with other subsistent individuals one's own contribution is distinctive and unique. This is commonly recognized at those special times when the presence of a mother, father, or special friend is required, and no one else will do. At other times as well, even when as a bus driver or a dentist I perform a standard service, my actions remain properly my own. This understanding is a prerequisite for education to responsibility in public as in private life. It is a condition too for overcoming depersonalization in a society in which we must fulfill ever more specialized and standardized roles.

Another dimension of this independence is that the human person as subsisting cannot simply be absorbed or assimilated by another. As complete in oneself one cannot be part of another, for being independent in existence one is distinct from all else. Hence, one cannot be assumed or taken up by any other person or group in such wise as to lose one's identity. In recent years awareness of this characteristic has generated a strong reaction against the tendencies of mass society totally to absorb the person and to reduce all to mere functions in a larger whole--whether state, industrial complex, or consumer society.

As noted above, it is perhaps the special challenge of the present day, however, to keep this awareness of one's distinctive independence from degenerating into selfishness--to keep individuality from becoming individualism. The individual existent, seen as sculpted out of the flow and process of the physical universe, cannot be rightly thought of as isolated. Such an existent is always *with* others, depending on them for birth, sustenance and expression. In this context, to be distinct or individual is not to be isolated or cut off, but to be able to relate more precisely and intensively to others. My relation to the chair upon which I sit and the desk upon which I write is not diminished, but is made possible by the distinction and independence of the three of us. Their retention of their distinctness and distinctive shapes enables me to integrate them into my task of writing. Because I depend still more intimately upon food, I must correlate more carefully its

distinctive characteristics with my precise needs and capacities. On the genetic level it is the careful choice of distinctive strains that enables the development of a new individual with the desired characteristics. On the social level the more personable the members of the group the greater and more intense is its unity. Surveying thus from instruments such as desks, to alimentation, to lineage, to society suggests that as one moves upward through the levels of beings distinctness, far from being antithetic to community, is in fact its basis. This gives hope that at its higher reaches, namely, in the moral life, the distinctiveness of autonomy and freedom may not need to be compromised, but may indeed be the basis for a community of persons bound together in mutual love and respect.

The third characteristic of the subsistent individual to be considered is this openness to new actualization and to interrelation with others. The existence by which one erupted into this world of related subjects is not simply self-contained; it is expressed in a complex symphony of actions which are properly one's own. It is not merely, as was noted above, that running can be said only of an existing individual, such as Mary, who runs. What is more, actions determine their subject: it is only by running that Mary herself is constituted precisely as a runner. This will be central to the next part of this study, the person as moral agent.

It is important too for our relations to, and with, others for the actions into which our existence flows, while no less our own, reach beyond ourselves. The same action which makes us agents shapes the world around us and, for good or ill, communicates to others. All the plots of all the stories ever told are about this, but their number pales in comparison with all the lives ever lived, each of which is a history of personal interactions.¹⁹ The actions of an individual existent reflect one's individuality, with its multiple possibilities, and express this to and with others. It is in this situation of dynamic openness,²⁰ of communication and of community that the moral growth of persons takes place. As subsistent therefore the person is characteristically a being, not only in him/herself, but *with* other beings. About this more must be said below.

To summarize: thus far we have seen the early derivation of the notion of person from mask. For this to evolve into the contemporary notion of person a strong awareness both of the nature and of the existence of independent individuals needed to be developed. The first was achieved by the Greeks who within the one physical process identified basically different types of things. Substances are the individual instances of these specific types or natures. This provides the basis for consciousness of one's own nature and in its terms for relating to others within the overall pattern of nature.

There were limitations to such a project, for in its terms alone one ultimately would be but an instance of one's nature; and in the final analysis the goal of a physical being is but to continue one's species through time. This was true for the Greeks and may still be a sufficient basis for the issues considered in sociobiology, but it did not allow for adequate attention to the person's unique and independent reality. This required the development subsequently of an awareness of existence, as distinct from nature or essence, as that by which one enters into the world and is constituted as a being in one's own right. On this basis the subsisting individual can be seen to be whole and independent, and hence the dynamic center of action in this world.

Still more is required, however, for the above characteristics, while foundational for a person, are had as well by animals and trees; they too, each in their own way, are wholes that are independent and active in this world. In addition to the above realities of substance and of subsisting individual, therefore, it is necessary to identify that which is distinctive of the human subsistent and constitutes it finally as personal, namely, self-consciousness and freedom.

Self-consciousness and will had been central to philosophies of the person in classical times; indeed, at one point Augustine claimed that men were nothing else than will. Descartes' reformulation of metaphysics in terms of the thinking self and the focus upon self-consciousness by John Locke and upon the will by Kant brought the awareness of these distinctive characteristics of the person to a new level of intensity and exclusivity. This constituted a qualitatively new and distinctively modern understanding of the person. It is necessary to see in what these characteristics consist and how they relate to the subsisting individual analyzed above.

Person: Self-Conscious and Free Subject

Self-consciousness

John Locke undertook to identify the nature of the person within the context of his general effort to provide an understanding which would enable people to cooperate in building a viable political order. This concentration upon the mind is typical of modern thought and of its contribution to our appreciation of the person. By focusing upon knowledge Locke proceeded to elaborate, not only consciousness in terms of the person, but the person in terms of consciousness. He considered personal identity to be a complex notion composed from the many simple ideas which constitute our consciousness. By reflection we perceive that we perceive and thereby are able to be, as it were, present to ourselves and to recognize ourselves as distinct from other thinking things.²¹ Memory enables us to recognize these acts of consciousness in different times and places. By uniting present acts of awareness with similar past acts, memory not merely discovers but creates personal identity, for this binding of myself as past consciousness to myself as present consciousness constitutes the continuing reality of the person. Essentially, it is a private matter revealed directly only to oneself, and only indirectly to other persons.

Because Locke's concern for knowledge was part of his overriding concern to find a way to build social unity in a divided country he considered his notion of the self to be the basis for an ethic of both private and public life. As conscious of pleasure and pain the self is capable of happiness or misery, "and so is concerned for itself."²² What is more, happiness and misery matter only inasmuch as they enter one's self-consciousness as a matter of self-concern and hence direct one's activities. The pattern of public morality, with its elements of justice as rewarding a prior good act by happiness and as punishing an evil act by misery, is founded upon this identity of the self as a continuing consciousness from the time of the act to that of the reward or punishment. 'Person' is the public name of this self as open to public judgment and social response; it is "a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit."²³

This early attempt to delineate the person on the basis of consciousness locates a number of factors essential for personhood, such as the importance of self-awareness, the ability to be concerned for oneself, and the basis this provides for the notions of responsibility and public accountability. These are the foundations of his *Letters Concerning Toleration* which were to be of such great importance in the development of subsequent social and political structures in many parts of the world.

There are reasons to believe, however, that, while correct in focusing upon consciousness, he did not push his analysis far enough to integrate the whole person. Leibniz, in his *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, was quick to point out some of these reasons in a detailed response. Centering personal identity in consciousness, Locke distinguished it from that which could be identified by a body of a particular shape. This led him to admit that it is conceivable that

the one consciousness, self or person could exist in different bodies a thousand years remote one from another²⁴ or, conversely, that multiple selves could inhabit the same body.

This is more than an issue of "names illused";²⁵ it is symptomatic of the whole cluster of problems which derive from isolating human consciousness from the physical identity of the human self. These include problems not only regarding communication with other persons for which one depends upon physical signs, but regarding the life of the person in the physical world in whose unity and harmony one's consciousness has no real share, indeed, by contrast to which it is defined.²⁶ Existential phenomenologists have noted the desiccating effect this has had even upon consciousness, while environmentalists have pointed up the destruction it has wrought upon nature.

This implies a problem for personal identity itself. Locke would claim that this resides in the continuity established by linking the past with the present in one's memory.²⁷ But, as there is no awareness of a substantial self from which this consciousness proceeds,²⁸ what remains is but a sequence of perceptions or a flow of consciousness recorded by memory.

Finally, Leibniz would question Locke's claim to have provided even that public or forensic notion of the self through which he sought to provide a sufficient basis for legal and political relations. Memory can deal with the past and the present, but not with the future; planning and providing for the future, however, is the main task of a rationally ordered society. Further, Locke's conclusion that, since the self is consciousness, the same self could inhabit many bodies of different appearances would undermine the value of public testimony, and thereby the administration of justice.²⁹ Though self-consciousness is certainly central and distinctive of the person, more is required for personhood than a sequence of consciousness, past and present.

Another approach was attempted by Kant whose identification of the salient characteristics of the person has become a standard component for modern sensitivity. Whereas Locke had developed the notion of the person in terms of consciousness predicated upon experience, Kant developed it on the requirements of an ethics based upon will alone. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of this approach to the person lay in his effort to lay for ethics a foundation that is independent of experience. He did so because he considered human knowledge to be limited essentially to the spatial and temporal orders and unable to explain its own presuppositions. Whatever be thought of this, by looking within the self for a new and absolute beginning he led the modern mind to a new awareness of the reality and nature of the person.

For Kant the person is above all free, both in oneself and in relation to others; in no sense is the person to be used by others as a means. From this he concluded that it is essential to avoid any dependence (heteronomy) on anything beyond oneself and, within oneself, on anything other than one's own will. The fundamental thrust of the will is its unconditional command to act lawfully; this must be the sole basis for an ethics worthy of man. In turn, "the only presupposition under which . . . (the categorical imperative) is alone possible . . . is the idea of freedom."³⁰

As free, the person must not be legislated to by anyone or on the basis of anything else; to avoid heteronomy one must be an end-in-oneself. It was Kant's self-described goal to awaken interest in the moral law through this "glorious ideal" of a universal realm of persons as ends-in-themselves (rational beings).³¹ The person, then, is not merely independent, as is any subject; he or she is a law-making member of society. This means that the person not only has value which is to be protected and promoted, but has true dignity as well, for he is freely bound by and obeys laws which he gives to himself.³² As this humanity is to be respected both in oneself and in all others, one must act in such wise that if one's actions were to constitute a universal law they would promote a cohesive life for all rational agents.

This "glorious ideal" has been perhaps the major contribution to the formation of our modern understanding of ourselves as persons. At the minimum, it draws a line against what is unacceptable, namely, whatever is contrary to the person as an end-in-him/herself, and sets thereby a much needed minimal standard for action. At the maximum, as with most *a priori* positions, it expresses an ideal for growth by pointing out the direction, and thereby providing orientation, for the development of the person. In Kohlberg's schema of moral development it constitutes the sixth or highest stage, and hence the sense and goal of his whole project--though he notes rightly that this is not an empirically available notion.

Further, this bespeaks a certain absoluteness of the individual will which is essential if the person is not to be subject to domination by the circumstances he encounters. If one is more than a mere function of one's environment--whether this be one's state, or business, or neighborhood--then Kant has made a truly life-saving observation in noting that the law of the will must extend beyond any one good or particular set of goods.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that still more is needed for an understanding of the person. In Part I of his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant correctly rules out anything other than, or heteronomous to, human freedom and will as an adequate basis for ethics, at least as far as using one's own ability to think and to decide are concerned. Nor does he omit the fact that these individuals live their lives with others in this world. As the good is mediated by *their* concrete goods, however, a role for experience must be recognized if right reason is to conform to the real good in things. Further, there is need to know more of the reality of the person in order to understand: (a) not only how will and freedom provide the basis for ethical behavior, but (b) by what standards or values behavior can be judged to be ethical, and (c) how ethical behavior is integral to the project of a person's self-realization. Something more than a postulation of freedom (along with the immortality of the soul and God) is essential to enable the development of the person to be guided throughout by his "glorious ideal."

In sum, Locke and Kant have contributed essentially to delineating the nature of the person for the modern mind. Both have pointed up that which distinguishes the person from other subjects. Focusing upon knowledge, Locke showed the person to be an identity of continuing consciousness which is self-aware and "concerned for itself." Focusing upon the will and its freedom, Kant showed the person to be an end-in-him/herself.

By attending directly to consciousness and freedom, however, both left similar problems of great importance to the present project. The first regards the way in which consciousness and freedom are realized in the person as a unique identity with a proper place in society, and indeed in reality as a whole. It is true, as Locke says, that the term 'person' expresses self-aware and continuing consciousness, as well as its status in the public forum. But, one needs more than an isolated view of that which is most distinctive of man; one needs to know what the person is in his or her entirety, how one is able to stand among other persons as a subject, and how in freedom one is to undertake one's rightful responsibilities. One educates not consciousness or freedom, but conscious and free subjects or persons. Further, it is necessary to understand the basis of the private, as well as the public, life of the person, for a person is more than a role, a citizen, or a function of state. The second problem regards the way in which through time and with others the person can attain his/her goal of full self-awareness, freedom and responsibility, namely, how the person can achieve his or her fulfillment.

In sum, what Locke and Kant discovered about the person by considering self-awareness in the abstract and for the political arena needs now to be integrated with what was seen above

regarding the individual and existing subject in order to constitute an integral person as a rational and free subject.

The Free Subject

While it has been said that ancient thinkers had no concept of the person, a very important study by Catherine De Vogel³³ has shown that there was indeed a significant sense of person and of personality among the ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as a search for its conditions and possibilities. It will be helpful to look at this in order to identify some of the cultural resources for understanding the way in which self-consciousness and freedom are rooted in the subject and constitute the person. Above, we saw a certain progression from the Greek philosophical notion of the individual as an instance of a general type to a more ample existential sense of the subject as an independent whole, which nonetheless shares with others in the same specific nature. It is time now to see how this relates to self-consciousness and freedom.

The Greeks had a certain sense for, and even fascination with, individuals in the process of grappling with the challenge to live their freedom. T.B.L. Webster notes that "Homer was particularly interested in them (his heroes) when they took difficult decisions or exhibited characteristics which were not contained in the traditional picture of the fighting man."³⁴ In the final analysis, however, the destiny of his heroes was determined by fate from which even Zeus could not free them. Hence, an immense project of liberation was needed in order to appreciate adequately the full freedom of the moral agent.

This required establishing: (a) that the universe is ruled by law, (b) that a person could have access to this law through reason, and (c) that the person has command of his relations to this law. These elements were developed by Heraclitus around 500 B.C. He saw that the diverse physical forces could not achieve the equilibrium required in order to constitute a universe without something which is one. This cosmic, divine law or Logos is the ruling principle of the coherence of all things, not only in the physical, but in the moral and social orders. A person can assume the direction of his life by correcting his understanding and determining his civil laws and actions according to the Logos, which is at once divine law and nature. In this lies wisdom.³⁵

This project has two characteristics, namely, self-reflection and self-determination. First, as the law or Logos is not remote, but within man "The soul has a Logos within it"³⁶ -- the search for the Logos is also a search for oneself. -- "I began to search for myself."³⁷ Self-reflection is then central to wisdom. Second, the attainment of wisdom requires on the part of man a deliberate choice to follow the universal law. This implies a process of interior development by which the Logos which is within "increases itself."³⁸

A similar pattern of thought is found in the Stoic philosophers for whom there is a principle of rationality or "germ of logos" of which the soul is part, and which develops by natural growth.³⁹ A personal act is required to choose voluntarily the law of nature, which is also the divine will.

These insights of Heraclitus and the Stoics, though among the earliest of the philosophers, were pregnant with a number of themes which correspond to Kant's three postulates for the ethical life: the immortality of the soul, freedom and God. The first of these would be mined by subsequent thinkers in their effort to explore the nature of the person as a physical subject that is characteristically self-conscious and free. The implications of Heraclitus' insight that the multiple and diverse can constitute a unity only on the basis of something that is one gradually became evident, binding the personal characteristics of self-consciousness and freedom to the subject with

its characteristics of wholeness, independence and interrelatedness. The first step was Plato's structure for integrating the multiple instances of a species by their imitation of, or participation in, the idea or archetype of that species.⁴⁰ This, in turn, images still higher and more central ideas, and ultimately the highest idea which inevitably is the Good or the One.

Aristotle took the second step by applying the same principle to the internal structure of living beings. He concluded that the unity of their disparate components could be explained only by something one, which he termed the soul or *psyche*, whence the term 'psychology.' The body is organized by this form which he described as "the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it."⁴¹ For Aristotle, however, the unifying principle of a physical subject could not be also the principle of man's higher mental life, his life of reason. Hence, there remained the need to understand the person as integrating self-consciousness and freedom in a subject which is nonetheless physical.

Over one thousand years later Thomas Aquinas took this third step, drawing out the implications of Heraclitus' insight for the unity of the person with its full range of physical and mental life. He did not trace the physical to one form or soul and the higher conscious life to another principle existing separately from the body as had the Aristotelian commentators, nor did he affirm two separate souls as did Bonaventure. Rather, Thomas showed that there could be but one principle or soul for the entire person, both mind and body. He did this by rigorously carrying out, under the principle of non-contradiction, the implications of the existence of the subject noted above. One subject could have but one existence -- lest it be not one but two. This existence, in turn, could pertain to but one essence or nature--again, lest it both be and not be of a certain kind. For the same reason the one essence could have but one form; hence, there could be only one formal principle or soul for both the physical and the free self-conscious dimensions of a person. This rendered obsolete Aristotle's duality of these principles for man and founded the essential and integral humanness of both mind and body in the unity of the one person.⁴²

This progression of steps leading to the one principle, which enables that which is complex to constitute nonetheless a unity, points in the person to the one form which is commonly called the soul. By this single formal principle what Locke articulated only as a disembodied consciousness and Kant as an autonomous will are able to exist as a properly human subject. This is physical truly, but not exclusively, for it transcends the physical to include also self-consciousness and freedom. Similarly, it exists in its own right, yet does so in such wise that it exists essentially with others as a person in society.

There are pervasive implications for education in such an integration of the physical with the self-conscious dimensions of the person through a single principle. One does not become a person when one is accepted by society; on the contrary, by the form through which one is a person one is an autonomous end-in-oneself and has claim to be responded to as such by others. Hence, though for his or her human development the person has a unique need for acceptance, respect and love, the withholding of such acceptance by others -- whether individuals, families or states -- does not deprive them of their personhood. One does not have to be accepted in order to have a claim to acceptance. (Hence, even in circumstances of correction and punishment, when one's actions are being explicitly repudiated, one must not be treated as a mere thing.) The right to an education is based within the person and needs to be responded to by family and society.

Similarly, it is not necessary that the person manifest in overt behavior signs of self-awareness and responsibility. From genetic origin and physical form it is known that the infant and young child is an individual human developing according to a single unifying and integrating principle of both its physical and its rational life.⁴³ The rights and the protection of a human person belong

to a person by right prior to any ability consciously to conceive or to articulate them. Further, the physical actions of young children through which they express themselves in their own way and respond to others are truly human. Indeed, though the earlier the stage in life the more physical the manner of receiving and expressing affection, the earliest months and years appear to be the most determinative of one's lifetime ability to relate to others with love and affection.

Finally, attempts to modify the behavior of a person must proceed according to distinctively human norms if they are not to be destructive. Despite at earlier life stages greater operational similarities to some animals, only by an abstraction can infants and very young children be said to be small animals. They are human persons, and integrally so, in each of their human actions and interactions. Not to attend to this is to fail to realize who in fact is being educated to the detriment and dishonor of both the person and the educative process.

There is a second insight of great potential importance in the thought of Heraclitus. When he refers to the Logos⁴⁴ as being very deep he suggests multiple dimensions of the soul. Indeed, it must be so if human life is complex and its diverse dimensions have their principle in the one soul. Plato thought of these as parts of the soul; in these terms the development of oneself as a person would consist in bringing these parts into proper subordination one to another. This state is called justice, the "virtue of the soul."⁴⁵ Both the *Republic* and the *Laws* reflect amply his concern for education, character formation and personal development understood as the process of attaining that state of justice. The way to this is progressive liberation from captivity by the objects of sense knowledge and sense desires through spiritual training, as described in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. All this prepares the way for what is essential, namely, the contemplation of the transcendent Good. This alone establishes that inner harmony of soul through which the person is constituted as free and responsible, both in principle and in act. Because this vision, not only of some goods, but of the transcendent Good, cannot be communicated by teaching but remains "an extremely personal interior vision,"⁴⁶ the uncalculating and unmeasured love shared in family, Church and other communities has special importance for moral education.

By the human form or soul the human individual as a person is open in principle, not only to particular states of affairs or events, but to the one source, logos and goal of all. Through this, in turn, one is able to take account of the full meaning of each thing and freely to relate oneself to others in the coordinating virtue of philanthropia, the love of all mankind.⁴⁷ As it is of foundational importance for a truly moral life to have not merely access to some goods, but an ability to evaluate them in terms of the Good, the form or soul as the single organizing and vivifying principle of the person is the real foundation for the person as an end in him/herself.

Correlatively, recent thought has made crucial strides toward reintegrating the person in one's world. The process of identifying the components of the world process initiated by the Greeks was inherently risky, for as analytic rather than synthetic it would turn attention away from the understanding of personal identity and thereby distract from grounding the person in the One. Cumulatively, the intensive modern concentration upon freedom in terms of self-consciousness would generate an isolating and alienating concentration upon self.⁴⁸

Some developments in recent thought have made important contributions to correcting this individualist--even potentially solipsist--bias. One is the attention recently paid to language and to the linguistic character of the person. Our consciousness is not only evoked, but shaped by the pattern of the language in which we are nurtured. In our highly literate culture--many would say in all cultures--the work of the imagination which accompanies and facilitates that of the intellect is primarily verbal. Hence, rather than ideas being developed and then merely expressed by language, our thought is born in language. As this language is not one's private creation, but that

of one's community over a long period, conscious acts, even about ourselves, involve participation in that community. To say that our nature is linguistic is to say that it is essentially "with others."

A similar point, but on another level of insight, was developed by Martin Heidegger and laid the basis for the stress among many existential thinkers on the importance of considering the person as being in community. As conscious and intentional, essentially one is not closed within oneself, but open to the world; one's self-realization depends upon and indeed consists in one's being in the world. Therefore it is not possible to think of persons in themselves and then to add some commerce with their surroundings; instead persons exist and can be conceived only as beings-in-the-world. Here the term 'in' expresses more than a merely spatial relation; it adds an element of being acquainted or familiar with, of being concerned for, and of sharing. At root this is the properly personal relation.⁴⁹

From what was said of being-in-the-world it follows that the person is also being-with-others, for one is not alone in sharing in this world. Just as I enter into and share in the world, so also do other persons. Hence, as essentially sharing-in-the-world, our being is also essentially a sharing with-others; the world of the person is a world in which we are essentially with others. In this light a study of the existence of the rational subject with others or of person and society is a natural extension of the above. For Aristotle this was the study of politics, within which was situated as a first step the domain of personal morality or ethics. Similarly, this study of the person must attend also to its moral growth not only as a matter of personal fulfillment, but in order to lay the groundwork for the ensuing discussions regarding the relation between person and society.

The Person as Moral

Recent advances in understanding the person as moral are being made by interweaving two main streams of thought regarding the person: one considers the subject as existing in his/her own right as conscious and free; the other situates this consciousness and freedom in the person as acting in the world with other persons. Together they provide a context for understanding the development of the person as a moral.

Freedom and Responsibility

In Aristotle's project of distinguishing the components of the physical process, actions and attributes were found to be able to exist and to be intelligible only in a substance which existed in its own right (there could be no running without a runner). Actions, as distinct from the substantive nature or essence, could appear to be added thereto in a relatively external or "quantitative" manner. Subsequent developments in understanding the subject in terms of existence have provided a protection against this externalism. In relation to existence, essence does not merely specify the specific nature or kind of the thing; it is rather the way in which each thing is, that it to say, the way in which each living being lives. For a person, this implies and calls for the full range of activities of a human being. Indeed, essence is termed nature precisely as that from which these life acts derive.⁵⁰ These actions, in turn, cannot be mere additions to the person; they are the central determinants of the quality of one's very life. It is not just that one can do more or less, but that by so doing one becomes a more or less kind, loving or generous person.

A person should be understood also in terms of his or her goals, for activities progressively modify and transform one in relation to the perfection of which one is by nature capable and which one freely chooses. Thus, though infants are truly and quite simply human beings, they are good

only in an initial sense, namely, as being members of the human species. What they will become, however, lies in the future; hence they begin to be categorized as good or bad people only after, and in view of, their actions. Even then it is thought unfair to judge or evaluate persons at an early age, before it can be seen how they will "turn out" or what they will "make of themselves," that is, what character and hence constant pattern of action they will develop.

Further, one's progress or lack thereof can be judged only in terms of acting in a manner proportionate to one's nature. A horse may be characterized as good or bad on the basis of its ability to run, but not to fly. One must be true to one's nature, which in that sense serves as a norm of action; in this new sense I am a law to myself, namely, I must never act as less than one having a human nature with its self-consciousness and freedom. Below we shall see a way in which being true to this nature implies constituting both myself and my world.

Boethius defined classically the person as "an individual substance of a rational nature."⁵¹ In this Locke focused upon self-consciousness. Conscious nature can be understood on a number of levels. First, it might be seen as a reflection or passive mirroring in man of what takes place around him. This does not constitute new being; but merely understands what is already there. Secondly, if this consciousness is directed to the self it can be called self-knowledge and makes of the subject an object for one's act of knowledge. Thirdly, consciousness can regard one's actions properly as one's own. By concerning the self precisely as the subject of one's own actions, it makes subjective what had been objective in the prior self-knowledge; it is reflexive rather than merely reflective.

This self-conscious experience depends upon the objective reality of the subject with all the characteristics described above in the section on the self-conscious and free subject. This, in turn, is shaped by the reflexive and hence free experiences of discovering, choosing and committing oneself. In these reflexive acts the subject in a sense constitutes oneself, being manifested or disclosed to oneself as concrete, distinct, and indeed unique. This is the distinctively personal manner of self-actuation of the conscious being or person.

The result for the person is a unique realization of that independence which was seen above to characterize all subsistent individuals. Beyond mirroring surrounding conditions and what happens to one, beyond even the objective realization of oneself as affected by those events, the person exists reflexively as the subject and source of actions. As a person one has an inward, interior life of which he/she alone is the responsible source. This implies for the person an element of mystery which can never be fully explicated or exhausted. Much can be proposed by other persons and things, much even can be imposed upon me, but my self-consciousness is finally my act and no one else's. How I assess and respond to my circumstances is finally my decision, which relates to, but is never simply the result of, exterior factors. Here finally lies the essence of freedom, of which the ability to choose between alternatives is but one implication. What is essential for a free life is not that I always retain an alternative, but that I determine myself and carry through with consistency the implications of my self-determination--even and at times especially, in the most straightening of circumstances. In this the person finally transcends that growth process originally called the *physis* or the physical, and is considered rightly to be not only physical but spiritual as well.

This, of course, is not to imply isolation from one's physical and social world; rather it bespeaks in that world a personal center which is self-aware and self-determining. More than objective consciousness of oneself as acting, in inward reflexion at the origin of my action I freely determine⁵² and experience myself as the one who acts in freedom. The bond of consciousness with action that derives from self-determination is crucial for a full recognition of subjectivity. It

protects this from reduction to the subjectivism of an isolated consciousness which, being separated from action, would be more arbitrary than absolute.

Self-determination in action has another implication: in originating an action the person's experience is not merely of that action as happening to or in him, but of a dynamism in which he participates efficaciously. As a self I experience myself immanently as wholly engaged in acting and know this efficacy to be properly my own, my responsibility. Hence, by willing the good or evil character of an action, I specify not only the action which results, but myself as the originator of that action.

Finally, I am aware of my responsibility for the results of my actions which extend beyond myself and shape my world. The good or evil my actions bring about is rooted in good or evil decisions on my part. In making choices which shape my world I also form myself for good or evil. By their subjective character actions become part of the person's unique process of self_realization.⁵³

Action then manifests an important dimension of the person.⁵⁴ On the one hand, the need to act shows that the person, though a subject and independent, is not at birth perfect, self-sufficient or absolute. On the contrary, persons are conscious of perfection that they do not possess, but toward which they are dynamically oriented. The person is then essentially active and creative.

On the other hand, this activity is essentially marked by responsibility. This implies that, while the physical or social goods that one can choose are within one's power, they do not overpower one. Whatever their importance, in the light of the person's openness to the good as such one can always overrule the power of their attraction. When one does choose them it is the person--not the goods--who is responsible for that choice.

Both of these point to two foundations of the person's freedom, and hence of one's ability to be a self-determining end-in-oneself. First, one's mind or intellect is oriented not to one or another true thing or object of knowledge, but to truth itself and hence to whatever is or can be. Second and in a parallel manner, the person's will is not limited to--or hence by--any particular good or set of goods. Rather, because oriented to the Good Itself or to God, it is freely open to any and all goods.

Moral Growth: The Convergence of Values and Virtues

Values. In view of this it is time to look more closely into the relation of the person to the good, for it is there that one finds the drama of the self-realization of the person and the development of one's moral life. The good is manifest in one's experience as the object of desire, namely, as what is sought when absent. This implies that the good is basically what completes a being; it is the "perfect," understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through. Hence, once the good or perfection is achieved it is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing. The most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else; we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree given the right conditions grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life--fiercely if necessary and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to animal's realization or perfection, is in this regard an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection, are the basis for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good

is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one's fulfillment upon its attainment. Goods then are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.

The moral good is a more narrow field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to our own perfection and to that of others--and indeed to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence many possible patterns of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved. Others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of the persons or things, are objectively disordered or misordered.

Because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete. However broad or limited the options, the act as responsible and moral is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is important not only to examine the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the persons, actions, and things involved. In addition one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who in the context of his/her society and culture appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term 'value' here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity by which it attained a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term 'axiology' whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." It requires an objective content--the good must really "weigh in" and make a real difference. But the term 'value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.⁵⁸ Thus, different groups of persons or individuals, and at different periods, have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to and prizes a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing it delineates among the limitless order of objective goods a certain pattern of values which, to an extensive degree, mirrors its corporate free choices and constitutes a basic component of its culture.

By giving shape to the culture this constitutes as well the prime pattern and gradation of goods which persons born into that culture experience from their earliest years. In these terms they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through a lens formed, as it were, by their family and culture, and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history, often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses it does not create the object; but it does focus attention upon certain of the goods involved rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for one's affective and emotional life. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action; in turn, these reinforce the pattern of values.

Virtues. Martin Heidegger describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern. In this one projects outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others, for whom one cares and is concerned. In this process one constitutes new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. In relation to these goals certain combinations of possibilities, with their

natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one's world of meaning. In this light freedom becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination in the sense of causing oneself to act as described above. It shapes -- the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes -- one's world as the ambit of one's human decisions and dynamic action.⁵⁶ This is the making of oneself as a person in a community.

To see this it is necessary to look more closely at the dynamic openness and projection which characterize the concrete person, not only in one's will, but in one's body and psyche as well. In order truly to be self-determining the person must not merely moderate a bargaining session between these three, but constitute a new and active dynamism in which all dimensions achieve their properly personal character.⁵⁷

Bodily or somatic dynamisms, such as the pumping of blood, are basically non-reflective and reactive. They are implemented through the nervous system in response to stimuli, though generally they are below the level of human consciousness, thereby enjoying a degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, they are in harmony with the person as a whole, of which they are an integral dimension. As such they are implicit in my conscious and self-determined choices regarding personal action with others in this world.

At a second level, dynamisms of the psyche are typified by emotivity. In some contrast to the more reactive character of lower bodily dynamism and in a certain degree to the somatic as a whole, these are based rather within the person. They include, not only affectivity, but sensation and emotions as well. These feelings range from some which are physical to others which are moral, religious and aesthetic. Such emotions have two important characteristics. First, they are not isolated or compartmentalized, but include and interweave the various dimensions of the person; hence, they are crucial to the integration of a personal life. They play a central role in the proximity one feels to values and to the intensity of one's response thereto. Secondly, they are relatively spontaneous and contribute to the intensity of a personal life. This, however, is not adequate to make them fully personal for, as personal, life is not only what happens in me, but above all what I determine to happen. This can range beyond and even against my feelings.

It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish two directions or dimensions of one's personal transcendence. The first relates to one's world as the object of either one's knowledge or one's will. This might be called horizontal as an activation of a person inasmuch as he or she relates to other things and especially to other persons. This relation would be poorly conceived were it thought to be merely an addition to a fully constituted person. On the contrary, the person as such is essentially transcendent, that is, open to others. One requires this interaction with others in order to have a language and all that this implies for the formation of thought, to have a moral code to assist one in the direction of one's will, and above all to have a family and community, and thus the possibility of sharing in the hope and anguish, the love and concern, which gives meaning to life.

The other, or vertical dimension of transcendence follows the sequence of levels of personal reality. Personal actions are carried out through a will which is open and responsive to The Good and as such able to respond to, without being determined by, any particular good or value. Thus, it is finally up to the person to determine him/herself to act. One is able to do this because personal consciousness is not only reflective of myself as an additional object of knowledge, but reflexive or self-aware in its conscious acts.

If such actions derived merely from my powers or faculties of knowledge or will, in acting I would determine only the object of my action. Instead, these actions derive from myself as subject

or person; hence, in acting I determine equally, and even primarily, myself. This is self-determination, self-realization and self-fulfillment in the strongest sense of those terms. Not only are others to be treated as ends in themselves; in acting I myself am an end.

This process of deliberate choice and decision manifests a dimension of the person which transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. Whereas the somatic was extensively reactive, the person through affection or appetite is fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values. These not merely are known by the mind, but evoke an active response from the psychic dynamisms of the emotions in the context of responsible freedom.

It is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral dimension of life. For in order to live, oneself and with others, one must be able to know and choose what is truly conducive to one's good and that of others. To do this the person must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth both in itself and in relation to others. This is moral truth: the judgment whether the act makes the person good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfillment or the contrary.

In this as person I retain that deliberation and voluntary choice whereby I exercise my proper self-awareness, self-possession, and self-governance. By determining to follow this judgment I am able to overcome determination by stimuli and even by culturally ingrained values, and to turn these instead into openings for free action in concert with others. This vertical transcendence in one's actions as willed enables the person to shape him/herself, as well as one's physical surroundings and community.

This can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of one's actions. By definition only morally good actions contribute to the fulfillment of the person, that is, to one's development and perfection as a person. As it is the function of conscience as man's moral judgment to identify this character of moral good in action,⁵⁷ moral freedom consists in the ability to follow one's conscience. This must be established through the dynamisms within the person, and must be protected and promoted by the related physical and social realities. This is a basic right of the person--perhaps *the* basic social right--because only thus can one transcend one's conditions and strive for fulfillment. Moral education is directed particularly at capacitating the person affectively to exercise this right.

The work of conscience is not a merely theoretical judgment, but the development and exercise of self-possession through one's actions. In this one's reference to moral truth constitutes one's sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which I ought to do. When this is exercised or lived patterns of action develop which are habitual only in the sense of being repeated. These patterns are modes of activity with which we are familiar; in their exercise--along with the coordinate natural dynamisms they require--we are practiced; and with practice comes facility and spontaneity. Such patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of our life. For this reason they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to or, as is often said, "amount to." Since Socrates the technical term used for these specially developed capabilities is 'virtues'.

Personal Convergence of Values and Virtues. It is possible to trace abstractly a general table of virtues required for particular circumstances in order to help clarify the overall terrain of moral action. As with values, however, such a table would not articulate the particulars of one's own experience nor dictate the next steps in one's project toward personal realization with others in relation to The Good or God. This does not mean, however, that such decisions are arbitrary; conscience makes its moral judgments in terms of real goods and real structures of values and

virtues. Nevertheless, through and within the breadth of these categories, it is the person who must decide, and in so doing enrich his or her unique experience of the virtues. No one can act without courage and wisdom, but each exercise of these is distinctive and typically one's own. Progressively they form a personality that facilitates one's exercise of freedom as it becomes more mature and correlatively more unique. Often this is expressed simply as 'more personal.'

A person's values reflect then, not only his/her culture and heritage, but within this what he has done with its set of values. One shapes and refines these values through one's personal, and hence free, search to realize the good with others in one's world. They reflect, therefore, not only present circumstances which our forebears could not have experienced, but our free response to the challenges to interpersonal, familial and social justice and love in our days.

In the final analysis, moral development as a process of personal maturation consists in bringing my pattern of personal and social virtues into harmony with my corresponding set of values along the vertical pole of transcendence. In this manner we achieve a coordinated pattern of personal capabilities for the realization of our unique response to The Good.

Though free and hence properly personal, as was seen above, this is done essentially with others. For this reason the harmony sought within oneself for moral development must be mirrored in a corresponding harmony between modes of action and values in the communities and nations in which persons live. (Thus, Aristotle considered his ethics of individual moral action to be an integral part of politics.) If that be true then the moral development of the person as a search for self-fulfillment is most properly the search for that dynamic harmony, both within and without, called peace.

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Notes

1. An integrated study of the person as moral agent is found in G. Mc Lean, F. Ell rod, D. Schindler and J. Mann, eds., *Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, 1986), from whose concluding chapter the present paper has been drawn.

2. For a psychological reconstruction of the person see Richard Knowles, ed., *Psychological Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, 1986).

3. Adolf Trendelenburg, "A Contribution to the History of the Word Person," *The Monist*, 20 (1910), 336_359 (published posthumously). See also "Persona" in *Collected Works of F. Max Muller* (London, 1912), vol. X, pp. 32 and 47; and Arthur C. Danto, "Persons" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), VI, 110-114.

4. This was pointed out by Gabius Bassus. See Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, V, 7.

5. *Prosepeion*. This explanation was given by Forcellini (1688-1769), cf. Trendelenburg, p. 340.

6. C. J. De Vogel, "The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought," *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), II, 20_60.

7. "That accepteth not the persons of princes." *Job* 34: 19. See also *Deut* 10:17; *Acts* 10:34_35; *Rom* 2:10_11.
8. Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 28 and 31; *De Orator*, II, 102; and Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, ch. 17.
9. A. Danto. See n. 2 above.
10. (Boston: Beacon, 1957), p. 61.
11. Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath, "The Scientific World View: The Vienna Manifesto," trans. A. E. Blumberg, in *Perspectives in Reality*, eds. J. Mann and G. Kreyche (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 483.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existence*, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, 1956), p. 14.
14. See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper, 1959); Wilfrid Desan, *The Planetary Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1961).
15. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, 4 73 a 3_b 25.
16. René Clair "La statut ontologique du concept de sujet selon le metaphysique d'Aristot. L'aporie de *Metaphy.* VII (Z) 3," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 59 (61), 29.
17. *Metaphysics*, VII 4-7.
18. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), ch. I.
19. See also Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 181ff.
20. Gabriel Pastrama, "Personhood and the Burgeoning of Human Life," *Thomist*, 41 (1977), 287-290.
21. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, ch. 27, n. 11 and 9_10, ed. A. C. Grassier (New York: Dover, 1959), Vol. I, 448_452. The person is "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself."
22. *Essay*, n. 17.
23. *Ibid.* nn. 18 and 26.
24. *Ibid.* n. 20.
25. *Ibid.*, n. 29.
26. G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, ch. 27, 9, trans. A. G. Langley (Chicago: Open Court, 1916).
27. Locke, *Essay*, ch. 27, n. 15.
28. Leibniz, *New Essays*, II, ch. 27, n. 14. This consequence was recognized and accepted by Hu me who proceeded to dispense with the notion of substance altogether.
29. *New Essays*, nn. 20-66.
30. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, III, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 80.
31. *Foundations* III, p. 82.
32. *Foundations* II, pp. 53-59.
33. C. J. De Vogel, pp. 20-60.
34. T.B.L. Webster, *Greek Art and Literature, 700-530 B.C.* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood, 1986), pp. 24_45 (cited by C. De Vogel, p. 27, fn. 17a).
35. Heraclitus, fns. 2, 8, 51, 112 and 114 (trans. by C. De Vogel).
36. Heraclitus, fn. 115 (trans. by C. De Vogel, p. 31). See also fn. 45.
37. Heraclitus, fn. 101 (trans. by C. De Vogel, p. 31).
38. Heraclitus, fn. 115 (trans. by C. De Vogel, p. 31).

39. Diog. L. VII 136; Marcus Aurelius IV 14, VI 24.
40. Plato, *Republic*, 476, 509-511: *mimesis*.
41. Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 2 412 a 28-29.
42. George F. McLean, "Philosophy and Technology," in *Philosophy in a Technological Culture*, ed. G. McLean (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1964), pp. 14-15. The same Heraclitean line of reasoning is reflected by structuralist insights regarding the need which structures have for a single coordinating principle. Inasmuch as the structure continually is undergoing transformation and being established on new and broader levels this principle must be beyond any of the contrary characteristics or concepts to be integrated within the structure. It must be unique and comprehensive in order to be able to ground and to integrate them all. Jean Piaget, *Structuralism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 139-142. Cf. also George F. McLean, *Plenitude and Participation* (Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1978), pp. 12-15.
43. For a detailed consideration of the first weeks after conception and of the point at which an individual life is present see André E. Helligers, "The Beginnings of Personhood Medical Consideration," *The Perkins School of Theology Journal*, 27 (1973), 11-15; and C. R. Austin, "The Egg and Fertilization," in *Science Journal*, 6 [special issue] (1970).
44. Heraclitus, fn. 45.
45. Plato, *Republic* I 353 c-d; IV 43 d-e, 435 b-c, and 441 e-442d.
46. *Republic*, VI 609 c. See De Vogel, pp. 33-35.
47. De Vogel, pp. 38-45.
48. Different cultures, of course, are variously located along the spectrum from individualism to collectivism.
49. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 52-57 and 118; see Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Martin Heidegger* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 24-25 and 56-57.
50. H. Rousseau, "Etre et agir," *Revue Thomiste*, 54 (1954); Joseph de Finance, *Etre et agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas* (Rome: P.U.G., 1960).
51. Boetius, *De duabis naturis et una persona Christi*, c. 3.
52. Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 48-50; "The Person: Subject and Community," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1979-80), 273-308; and "The Task of Christian Philosophy Today," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 53 (1979), 3-4.
53. Wojtyla, pp. 32-47.
54. This goes beyond Piaget's basic law that actions follow needs and continue only in relation thereto. Jean Piaget, *Six Psychological Studies* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 6.
55. Ivor Leclerc, "The Metaphysics of the Good," *Review of Metaphysics*, 35 (1981), 3-5.
56. Mehta, pp. 90-91.
57. Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, p. 197.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

Chapter II

Humanism and Freedom

Ghia Nodia

We live in an epoch in which it is very difficult--or too easy--to be a man. In the sixties "the death of man" and an era of "theoretical anti-humanism" was declared, thereby making it very paradoxical to be a man, rather than merely an element in a non-human structure. Nevertheless, that doctrine contained some answers to the question implied by our theme: "The Place of the Person in Social Life," namely, that our "place" is that of an element. Our destiny then is to be a good element: one that is functional rather than dysfunctional; one must be in rather than out of fashion altogether: to "be in" and not to "be out," because "being-out" means "non-being."

Admittedly, theoretical anti-humanism is not a practical stance. Being theoretically anti-humanist does not prevent one from being human in everyday life. That one's consciousness works within a given structure does not prevent one from enjoying personal freedom and feeling the burden of personal responsibility. Still I do not regard theory--and philosophical theory in particular--as some sort of a play for intellectuals, for the theory of man and his place in society reflects his real fate or is a presentiment of his future fate. Being from a country which arose as an embodiment of a philosophical doctrine, I take philosophical doctrines very seriously.

To understand the present position of the human person we must understand how it arrived there. By this I do not mean an empirical investigation of actual history, but a short survey of theoretical statements of the *human condition*, of the theoretical understandings of the human being, which are nothing but expressions of one's real being-in-the-world.

Humanism: Replacement of the Transcendent by the Human

My point of reference will be the tradition of humanist understandings of man, which begins with the Renaissance and reaches its summit in the doctrines of Hegel and Marx. This tradition implies a movement towards the autonomy of man, towards understanding man as "standing on his own two feet."

This movement is rooted in Christianity, which at the same time it rejects. It sees Christianity as the religion which looks upon human individuality as possessing something divine: the individual human soul bears in itself the "spark of divinity" and is part of the universal divine Light. Because God himself has taken on the flesh of Man, it provided a personal way to the Truth. For this reason Christianity is the religion of personal dignity and personal freedom.

However, that very aspect of Christianity from which its greatness derives can at the same time be the basis of its greatest temptation. If human personality contains something divine, may one not attempt to obtain the Truth without the help of God, relying solely upon one's own spiritual and intellectual strength? This is the temptation of human competition with God which would appear to constitute the principal spiritual content of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This is not to say that every thinker, or even most of them, *meant* that they were competing with God. Many felt themselves profoundly Christian and such blasphemy would be shocking to them, but it is a matter, not of feelings, but of a common spiritual movement.

One can single out two main fields in which the competition took place and in which man gained his greatest victories: Art and Science. As an artist the Renaissance Man called himself Creator, a predicate which earlier could be ascribed only to God. This was not just a linguistic

game, for just as God was the Creator of the real world we live in, Man was now considered to be the Creator of an unreal world confined in the limits of aesthetic conventions. *Inside* that world, Man could regard himself as a genuine God, for he created out of nothing or as if out of nothing. This might seem a playful competition, but still it was competition.

Even the name of Man the Artist changed so that especially after Romanticism he was no longer an ordinary "man," he was called "Genius." This is not a conventional name for a very good artist, a man doing his job in the best possible way. The connection of this word to the pagan Roman pantheon was not accidental. Genius was understood as superhuman: more than man, but still less than God: semi-God or partial God, omnipotent in a certain field of activity. He possesses enough ontological energy for it to flow out in the creation of things which are perfect in themselves. Of course, they are far lesser and more simple than the Universe created by God, but inside the limits which he sets himself the Artist lacks nothing. In that field of human activity God was no longer needed--or was no more necessary than a beautiful woman is for mere inspiration. For a long time art remained the sole mode of human occupation where man could be called Creator or Genius. But in the XIXth and especially the XXth century scientists, politicians, sportsmen and people of various other professions too could be called by this name, leaving ever less room for God as a universal superhuman instance giving significance and hope to human affairs. Geniuses stand on their own two feet.

Still, geniuses are rare, and a more democratic form of competition with God was found in rational thought or science. In this field too, God had a great advantage: He knew everything all at once with a perfect knowledge. But in the New Times it was discovered that, although man could not know everything and all at once, still some part of his knowledge could be perfect too. Descartes found the basis of that realm: *Cogito ergo sum*. I can doubt about everything, but there is one thing completely beyond doubt: that I doubt, that I think, that I exist as a doubting or thinking creature. My knowledge of myself existing as a thinking creature is perfect and I need no one else to help me obtain it. Thence, Descartes begins to demonstrate the existence of God, which he does only after he has shown his own existence. My knowledge of myself precedes that of God, and is more perfect. The *Cogito* is the beginning of European philosophy and of modern European thought altogether, for it provided a reliable fulcrum for maintaining the autonomy of human theoretical thought. The best proof of this autonomy was provided by mathematics as the most glorious achievement of human rationality. It presented a world of perfect harmony that shows itself to Man--or is *constructed* by Man--with no help from a superhuman power. Natural science could be almost as great as that if it were safely based upon mathematics. All this did not mean a mere theoretical triumph of man; because scientific truth was the greatest force ever possessed by a creature, through it Man could become the *real* Master of Nature and use its strength to his advantage. By science and technology he completely changed his life, and made it easier and more convenient. All this was achieved by Man himself, without help from anyone else.

The acme of his movement was, as I have said, Hegel's philosophy, according to which the historical development of philosophy is the way the human mind proceeds in striving after absolute truth. This aim was thought to be obtained finally in the doctrine of Hegel himself which claims to have attained a synthesis of every possible manner in which the Absolute Being has shown itself to Man: art, religion, science and philosophy itself. This synthesis leaves nothing obscure in that Being; from now on Divine Providence is absolutely transparent for Human Insight: Man knows everything that God knows, or at least everything essential--and who needs God for unessential things? Hegel says his Absolute Spirit is just another name for God, but in his doctrine God melts

away and his non-existence needs only to be *declared*, as was done by Nietzsche. Since God is dead, the whole Universe lies open before Man to show his creative strength.

This is the true triumph of humanism, and Marx's doctrine is the best instance of this triumph. For him, atheism and humanism are, as a matter of fact, the same: "atheism, being the suppression of God, is the advent of theoretic humanism."¹The Divine Order does not exist; we need no longer await the Day of Judgment, for our only hope lies in our own creative force. Man can and must conceive himself as the Universal Being--not merely as Artist or thinker, but as the Universal Creator of Being--for he has to do, not with God, but with Nature, and this no longer is a hostile force but a totally transparent being: his "inorganic body." His task is to create a New World worthy of being a dwelling place for such a Universal Creator. On the other hand, he must transform the human body and soul in such a way that every individual human person would be worthy of his own intrinsic universal creative essence: he must of himself create the New Man. Alienated man (alienated from his true essence) and alienated world (alienated from its destiny to be the home of free and universal persons) must be left behind. The New World worthy of the New Man is called "communism," which is the real Kingdom of Man. The human race takes the place of God once and for all: it is impossible to be more humanistic. It is significant that the main pathos of another great optimistic criticism of Christianity, by Nietzsche, was also the pathos of the New Man, which in his language was called *übermensch*.

Theoretical Anti-Humanism: The Death of Man

After Marx and Nietzsche the common movement split in two. One stream was practical: the great endeavor to build the New World and the New Man. These experiments have shown that the striving of the human race for absolute self-affirmation leads to the emergence of totalitarian regimes and turns out to be ruinous for a great number of individual human persons. Another stream, modern Western philosophy, has led to "theoretical anti-humanism." Thus we are left with a choice between a practical and a theoretical anti-humanism.

Before considering the latter I want to draw some conclusions about the lessons of classical humanism for our theme, "The Place of the Person in Social Life." I understand our task to be to answer the question: "What kind of person is needed for a decent society"? or "How must we conceive the essence of man in order to humanize society"? We must reject as wrong classical humanism's absolute self-affirmation by man. When the human essence is declared the absolute mode of being, when it is suggested that potentially man can understand everything, that the whole world can become material for his intellectual or practical activity and that he has no absolute point of reference outside himself--this doctrine of the omnipotence of the human race leads inevitably to a non-humanistic society that is hostile to concrete empirical human persons. Absolute humanism is not the doctrine of man we need.

Another humanistic current of thought gave up the idea of the strong, active, harmonious, self-reliant Man as the real or possible Master of Being and attempted to save some remnants of the classical humanistic ideal. Let Man be weak--weak man will do lesser evil--but his uniqueness, his personal freedom and the mystery of his individual inner life must be rescued and provided with a proper philosophical foundation. The best examples of this attitude are the philosophy of dialogue (e.g., Dilthey) and Sartrean existentialism. Having lost its inner fulcrum, the subject of Dilthey's hermeneutic seeks it in another man, whose inner life ("Innerlichkeit") he reaches through interpreting the products of one's creative activity, the objects of human science. Thus, the dialogue between "I" and "you" becomes the highest value, an end in itself. My salvation is to understand

you or to understand myself through understanding you. But what do I understand in this way beyond the bare capacity for understanding? What can I communicate to You besides the mere sign of recognition that we are in the same predicament? That is why Buber speaks about the third member of dialogue--God, who gives significance to the dialogue between I and you. But this means that man cannot even understand the other man without outer help, that dialogue alone cannot suffice for humanism. Hence, Sartre's was the most consistent: Man is Nothingness. We cannot say anything positive about man's being beyond its manifesting itself as some lacuna of being: Man is, but his being is the being of nothingness. From here there is but one step to "theoretical anti-humanism," namely, the same step needed after Hegel. This is the declaration of the death of Man made by Foucault.

The Death of Philosophy

The death of Man is, however, the death of philosophy as well. After the sixties we are more interested in *methodology*: the most influential trends of thought, such as hermeneutics, structuralism and critique of ideology are no longer philosophies in the proper sense, but different methodologies of the human sciences. They do not say what man can or must do, but how he must look at what is already done without him. What is more, those different schools have not arisen from the need of concrete human sciences for a proper method, but have philosophical origins. They do not discuss the concrete means of attaining given ends of scientific study, but the significance of the humanities for man and, finally, the total meaning of the world which form the object of study of the humanities. Hence, these recent discussions properly are neither philosophical nor methodological, but prolong the fundamental philosophical discussions in the field of methodology.

The three doctrines mentioned can be regarded as products of the disintegration of the classical humanistic ideal. Structuralism (including structural-functional analysis) is the most direct offspring of Enlightenment rationalism. It is completely based upon the power of scientific thought and its attempts to the degree possible to integrate into the rational schemes objects which traditionally were regarded as "irrational" because of their connection with human subjectivity. It is able to obtain this end, however, only at the expense of the abolition of the dimensions of metaphysics and life, i.e., of history. Man, with his individual soul and creative faculty, is erased like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea,² as Foucault puts it.

But if the annihilation of man were merely a matter of the expansion of the positivistic mode of thinking we could not speak of a total crisis of humanism, for still we could hope that the humanist ideal would be rescued by the other, anti-positivistic trends of thought. We see, however, that the humanist ideal is destroyed by them as well. Gadamer includes his phenomenological hermeneutics within the "humanist tradition," but his attitude towards being has nothing in common with the active position of man in traditional European humanistic thought. Paul Ricoeur, in speaking about the discussion between hermeneutics and critiques of ideology as a prolongation of the dispute between Enlightenment and Romanticism, is right in what concerns the critique of ideology but wrong in what he says about hermeneutics.³

Heidegger's and Gadamer's criticism of romantic hermeneutics is a truly radical turn, for though Romanticism and phenomenological hermeneutics have common opponents in the apologists for rational thought, they oppose it from different positions. Romanticism contributed most of all to the cult of the Genius--the highest glorification of the creative force and autonomous energy of the human subjectivity. Combatting this is the main purpose of hermeneutics. Hence,

before Gadamer begins the systematic account of his doctrine in "Truth and Method," he fiercely criticizes Kantian aesthetics and first of all its theory of genius.⁴ The inner sense of the enthusiasm for history differs in Romanticism and hermeneutics. The romantic subject needs history for distanciation from dull everyday life--it helps him to have a look at the world from the viewpoint of the totality of being. In hermeneutics, the eminent position of tradition and history opposes the autonomous ambition of the individual: I belong to history before I belong to myself; I stand in tradition and not upon my own mind.

Thus, the discussion between Enlightenment and Romanticism seeks the main foundation of human power in either rational understanding or in intuition, phantasy and irrational creativity. Hermeneutics rejects the individualistic anthropocentrism and humanism represented by both of these schools. Its ideal is not activity but passivity, not making but listening, not the autonomy of the subject but breaking through the shell of subjectivity in order to get out of it and to join in the dance of Being as the only way to Truth.

The last island of humanism is the critique of ideology. The end toward which it strives sounds quite traditional: "the emancipation of man," but emancipation from what? The main enemy which critical theory combats and unmasks is repressive rationality. But, according to the classical work of Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectics of Enlightenment*,⁵ from its very beginning human rationality has been oppressive with regard to nature, because in the beginning of history there was nothing else to oppress. "Nature" implies not only external forces represented by mythological figures, but also the inner nature of man, his emotional and sensual essence. Rationality arises as a counterforce to nature not only whose intentions, but whose structure and schemes are intrinsically oppressive. Thus, even the most noble projects for building the world of human happiness, when they stem from reason, lead finally to strengthening social and spiritual repression. When our language becomes repressive communication between men is perverted, but the repudiation of reason and the foundation of a "new mythology" is still worse, since it is the way to fascism.

What then can the philosopher do? He cannot put forward any positive program, but he can criticize and unmask the enemy, thus preparing the way for human emancipation. For example, by exposing the fetishistic character of ideology which has penetrated our thinking and our language, critical theory makes possible the unperverted, normal communication between men. Reason remains the main tool of the philosopher, but it is only destructive and never constructive. From omnipotent Hegelian reason only the negative energy of spirit, its "anxiety" (*Unruhe*), is preserved. But critical pathos must imply some positive outlook as well.

If reason is a necessary though negative force, then the positive ideal can be only non-rational: this is "naturalness" (*Naturwüchsigkeit*) which Gadamer rightly qualifies as an uncritical vestige of Romanticism.⁶ But whether a vestige or not, the main point is that such *Naturwüchsigkeit* cannot serve as a positive ideal, a source of light and ontological energy and a foundation for understanding the world and for a system of values. It can be only a limiting concept, devoid of any intrinsic essence and implying nothing more than being the victim oppressed by wicked rationality. Were "nature" understood as a positive principle, it itself would become a rational concept, i.e., a tool of repression and a figure of false ideology. Nature must remain only a witness for the prosecution in the trial over repressive rationality, where critical reason is the only real hero.

This is best expressed in Hegel's terms: the consciousness represented by "critical theory" is an "unhappy consciousness" that does not want to admit its misfortune. The "unhappy consciousness" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is unhappy because it knows the existence and

necessity of the positive ideal, but does not know the way which leads to it; that is why it becomes passive and gives in to despair. "Critical theory" is active and offensive; it behaves as if it has spiritually obtained its ideal, but this turns out to be a quasi-ideal consisting in an ability to reject any ideal. The "emancipated man" proves to be an obscure mythological figure, the essence of which lies somewhere between futile "naturalness" and total negativity.

The ontological outlook of this theory is best described by the "unsubstantiality of goodness" in contrast to the traditional Christian principle of the "unsubstantiality of evil." Repressive rationality becomes a kind of satanic metaphysical force which has no real opponent in the Universe, for "nature" is just a limiting concept, while critical reflexion can only unmask Satan without opposing anything real to his omnipotence. As soon as man tries to do something positive, irrespective of his good intentions he turns out to be a servant of Satan, because any real action presupposes some adoption of satanic rules. Hence, critical theory cannot pass beyond the patch of social territory accessible to satanic forces--that of barely theoretical critique.

This, however, still is not an absolute guarantee of sinlessness, because passivity can be considered as acceptance of the satanic rules of play. This is not just a theoretical contradiction, but a real one, which has put an end to the Frankfurt School: at the end of the sixties its pupils revolted against the passive position of their teachers and Adorno had to call the police against them. This was a logical end: you can be a very radical critic but you have to admit that your existence as a critical subject is possible only thanks to definite social institutions, and not every social system would tolerate this kind of criticism. So you must either involve yourself in the real fight against this system or openly adopt it.

Contemporary Total Critique

I speak about critical theory more than other schools of modern philosophy because this mode of thinking is quite well represented in my country. By this I mean, not the very severe criticism of our life appearing in the era of "openness" (*Glasnost*) in the Soviet press, but an unofficial critical attitude in past and present informal communication. The political orientation of this criticism is directly opposite to that of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, but the ontological model at its foundation is the same: the principle of the "unsubstantiality of goodness." Its scope is not as wide as that of critical theory, but is limited by the boundaries of the Soviet Union or the countries of the communist system. This part of the Universe is considered an unrestricted reign of Satan: the more concrete names for Satan being "the party," "the bureaucracy," "the KGB" and so on.

The main point of this mode of thinking is that any real action inside this system, irrespective of the kind intentions of its subject, are doomed to be utilized by the satanic force for its benefit, because any real action inside the system presupposes the adoption of the rules on which the system is based. It is evident, then, that Satan himself cannot be the subject of good deeds and is not to be believed if he pretends to do something good. That is why, according to this attitude, in the present moment of "reconstruction" (*perestroika*) or of progressive reform proposed by the government the mission of independent thought is not to help those reforms and explicate their progressive character, but on the contrary, to preserve a sober outlook, remembering that Satan always remains Satan, and to "unmask" his new and especially sophisticated ruse named "*perestroika*." This is not a merely "pessimist" outlook or a sober social scepticism: one may yet think *perestroika* will fail and for some quite strong reasons. But, I refer to a kind of metaphysical fetishism in which, like "repressive rationality" in critical theory, the KGB takes on some mystical quality.

Unlike critical theory, our total critique admits quite a real and definite kind of positive ideal, which is that of Western democracy. The doctrine of the omnipotence of Satan here is nearer to the Manichean outlook of an opposition of two independent forces, absolute goodness and absolute evil. The difference is that the benevolent force is transcendent in the most trivial sense of existing beyond the boundaries of the empirical state.

Nevertheless, irrespective of the existence of this not-so-transcendent source of hope, our radical critic is no less tragic than is Western critical theory. For according to his own theory of the omnipotence of the satanic force, the radical critic is intrinsically spiritually bound to the reality he criticizes and can do nothing other than oppose it: both are of one flesh and blood. He hates his enemy, but the hating becomes the sense of his life. Western democracy is not something real; it is not his flesh and blood, but just a limiting concept (precisely analogous to that of "naturalness" or "the emancipation of man" in the critical theory); it is an abstract idea whose only meaning is to be opposed to that of "totalitarianism." The best proof of this may be the "empirical transcendence" of political emigration. In the American film, "Russians Here," about Russian emigrés in the USA, one writer nostalgically recalls his life back in the Soviet Union. "Here in the USA I can publish my books," he says, "but who needs them? In the Soviet Union I could not see them printed, but I had such an attentive reader--the KGB. Life had meaning."

Conclusion

But let us not lose sight of our main problem. My criticism of structuralism, hermeneutics or critical theory did not mean that I have anything against structuralist investigations of any cultural or social object, or against "understanding" in the sense of conceiving oneself as belonging to some cultural or historical tradition, or against criticizing any social reality or false ideological consciousness as radically and sharply as it deserves. I oppose only philosophical doctrines (or perhaps ideologies) which exclude human activity itself; I can study such a world only as something dead or alien to which I do not belong. I oppose hermeneutics because according to it I am obliged to accept the reality in which I live; I oppose critical theory because according to it I can only reject that same reality. Neither of these doctrines has room for the free, independent person who in any given instance can choose what he will accept, what he will reject, and what will be the object of his barely scientific interest.

In all the three doctrines very succinctly surveyed here man is bound intrinsically to outward reality: to social and cultural structures, to language, to ideology, to forces that oppress him. The collective portrait of the three can be called a portrait of "theoretical anti-humanism." This is a quite logical end of the route chosen by European humanism several centuries ago: the way of absolute self-affirmation of man at the expense of abolishing the self-sufficient meaning of any being transcending human subjectivity. This led to the greatest achievement of a democratic public order based upon the idea of formal personal freedom.

But such "theoretical anti-humanism" leads also to the dangerous state in which the world of human freedom is conceived without the human person itself. This is possible if we regard human freedom, in Nietzsche's terms, as "freedom from" and not "freedom for." "Freedom from" does not presuppose any inner source of meaning and value: it leaves only free space for such a source. To fill that free space by some social theory is the road to slavery; to leave empty that inner space, however, is the road to loneliness, unhappiness and suicide, or to a new kind of slavery--to impersonal structures or impersonal ideology.

Only when "freedom for" is achieved, when that empty space of personal freedom is loaded with metaphysical meaning, can the person be also socially free and responsible in the full sense of the word. This requires not merely the legal or real possibility of choosing, but conditions in which his choice is meaningful. This implies an intrinsic relation to some Absolute Being which is something more than human subjectivity.

It would seem natural to conclude with some concrete interpretation of this "absolute being," for that really would be a solution of the problem. But the point of this paper is that the problem of human freedom has no solution--or the solution is that it should not be solved. There is more to say about it: if one has run up against a problem that has no solution this means that one has found a philosophical problem. Philosophical problems are never solved, though they also cannot avoid being raised. The most that can be done about them is to get inside them or, in other words, to elucidate them. This insolubility has not only an epistemological, but also an ethical sense. The point is not that one merely cannot solve the problem of human being, but that one *should not*, for solving the problem implies going out of the problem, i.e., going out of the human condition. It means *melting* the human mode of being either into God, or into a community blessed by tradition, or into a man-made totalitarian regime, or into some impersonal structures of culture or society.

Man is a natural and social creature who wants to satisfy his natural and social demands. But this is not enough: he strives also for Truth, for Beauty, for Goodness. This striving is irreducible to his natural and social demands; it goes back to some independent ontological source that is Absolute in Itself. The human person lives in a tension between these two, the Natural and the Absolute, which are unexplainable one from another. It can be a quite painful experience to live inside this permanent tension or permanent problem.

Thus it is very enticing to *solve* the problem once and for all and to escape the tension either by rejecting any kind of Absolute and relying solely on one's natural self and social structures, or by claiming that one has found the direct way to the Absolute and can now speak on His/Its behalf. Both ways may lead toward relaxation or happiness, but not toward freedom, not toward being human. I would call it an ontological sin in the sense of being a rejection of the human condition, the mode of being of the human person.

So, perhaps it is better to conclude in a Socratic manner not with an answer but with a question. I think we must somehow correct the question we want to answer. It is not the problem of *what* place the human person can or must have in society. The problem is *that* in society he have *some* place, namely, the place of an independent and free person who can make a meaningful choice and fight for it.

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Notes

1. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Martin Milligan, trans. (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 187.

2. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 387.

3. Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 65-68.

4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1982), pp. 39-73.

5. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, translated by John Cumming (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972).
6. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik," in: *Kleine Schriften I. Philosophie, Hermeneutik* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1967), p. 126.
7. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated by J.B. Baille (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1949), pp. 251-267.
8. *Spiegel* (n. 4, 1977), p. 117.

Chapter III

Anthropological "Person", Some Methodological Turns

Jon W. Anderson

The topic of this seminar, the place of the person in social life, and particularly its problematic motives and means, lies squarely within the contemporary social sciences' own problematic aspect as modern moral inquiry. Mine is a report from the methodological trenches, where these doubts link questions about "what" to questions about "how." In methodological terms, these questions take shape under the banners of variously so-called post-structuralist inquiries, and I shall be interested here to examine that turn in method as the practitioners' encounter with the broader cultural phenomena of post-modernism.

That is, I am interested in the engagement of the social sciences generally and my own discipline of anthropology particularly with the moral discourse of our culture which throws up the place of the person in society as a problem. At this point, the anthropologist normally has recourse to a body of research findings that call this discourse into question: these include diverse concepts of and about persons, humanity, individuality, and so on, of which ours are historically circumscribed and peculiar to but one historical experience among many. In that larger world, our concepts of person, lodged as they are in a discourse that is also about society in relation to which it emerges historically, frankly do not travel well. When transported to other cultures, they retrieve a limited slice of experience and are reshaped in unpredictable ways--modernization theory notwithstanding--in other historically specific relationships. This is the anthropologist's caution about the social sciences' version of what A.O. Rorty has called "distinctions that are often lost in the excess of zeal that is philosophical lust in action: abducting a concept from its natural home, finding conditions that explain the possibility of any concept in that area, and then legislating that the general conditions be treated as the core essential analysis of each of the variants."¹ The universe constituted by that transportation comes to be one of family resemblances only, and the transportation itself a form of critique, a partial fitting that can show others only as failed versions of ourselves or usually of an idealization about our selves. Such a critique occasionally is brought home with equally unpredictable results. Professional discourse at this point usually stands on relativism, or more precisely on a weak historicism known in my trade as particularism and nowadays hopefully cast as enlarging the universe of human discourse.² Ever hopeful, anthropology is the "yes, but . . ." discipline of the social sciences, and to a considerable extent its message has gotten out. In fact, I would argue, it occupies much the same moral space populated by alternative systems of personal belief and practice from popular Zen to imported gurus, culture "cafeteria-style" in a universe less of discourse than of consumption.

Anthropology contributes to this culture in another, more analytical and less appetitive way, however. At the level of production rather than of consumption of its findings, where its own database is expanded, it is also method-driven. This level is what I want to examine by focusing on the context it shares with motives and means in our culture for examining the place of person in society. These are assembled from materials as old as anthropology's are wide and which Marcel Mauss, who could deal with both, limned in the characteristic form of a journey:

D'une simple mascarade au masque, d'un personnage à une personne, à un nom, à un individu, de celui-ci à un être d'une valeur métaphysique et morale, d'une

conscience morale à un être sacré, de celui-ci à une forme fondamentale de la pensée et de l'action, le parcours est accompli.³

That context, Mauss's "parcours accompli," was introduced in our discussion of Voltaire's *Candide* as a benchmark of the sensibility called "modern." For its classic formulation of Enlightenment, this 1759 work stands in what Michel Foucault has called the archaeology of our knowledge⁴ as, in proper archaeological terminology, a type-site. It contains not only the fully articulated form, but also its setting against the decadence of and transition from aristocracy as a ruling principle. It records this moral transition as a fable of journey, modernism's enabling trope of reformation through movement. Contemporary with both Kant's more professorial "Wasist Aufklärung" (1784) and Franklin's more popular *Poor Richard's Almanac*, it offers the same vision as those, of personal responsibility, and makes thematic, even dramatic, the optimism of that vision. This perspective is bracketed at its other end by the most perceptive chronicler of its development, Max Weber, who at the conclusion to his examination in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* remarked pessimistically that what its early formulators had strived so hard to construct had become in its own success an Iron Cage.⁵

Weber was not writing only about capitalism but much more, as was Voltaire, about the culture of its context, inscribed as a journey, its own metaphor of reform, and the particular historical experience both sedimented in it and to which it gives the shape that social scientists have come to call modernity. And on this subject, Weber still speaks to us as a contemporary. While modernism had further to go, he was ahead of his time in pessimistic assessments from within it, as opposed to mere opposition from without. We are, in this sense, late Weberians confronting a very Weberian problem and trying, hopefully perhaps, to become post-Weberian, to see with Weber

whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance.⁶

At this point, Weber backs off, as he elsewhere says the social scientist must,⁷ from the realm of values and from adjudicating those, into questions of method. In so doing, he exposes the point of their articulation.

This articulation of method and value is always problematic and never a simple reflection. Methodology responds to imperatives not shared with values at the same time that they both share something of the same space and contribute to its evolution. How we limn the world since Weber depends in part on the way in which how we see contributes to what we see in it. Contributing to that vision, Weber stood at the cusp of where we are now, in the traverse to a post-"modern" world.

Post-modernism implies something being left behind in a number of projects and ambitions whose singular characteristic is a rejection or departure from some form of modernism and most particularly from notions such as "form follows function" to something more broadly imitative, historical, and contextualizing. It includes turns to embellishment in architecture, to neo-realism in painting, to simultaneity in literature. James Joyce is the touchstone of post-modernism, with his flooding prose carried by lists in place of categories, the imitation of real time, and other techniques for presenting a reality more immediate than the "realism" that modernism sought to re-present. The signature of the post-modern that initially appears as eclecticism, as departure from the re-presentationalism of functionalisms, emerges across a number of projects as more than grab-

bag eclecticism, however, and as more than a concern, such as that traditionally of phenomenology, with immediacy. It is imitative, with the twist of simultaneity of subjects in place of the monolithic one-rule-for-all that has come to be the critique of modernism. After all, after "modernism," which in its various manifestations also proclaimed similar values and similarly claimed moral import for them, post-modernism is less a break with, than an enlargement of, those.

The project to which post-modernism seems to lay claim takes shape in terms of a methodological reading of modernism as re-presentational. That is, in this view, the projects and conceits of modernism, whether in art and architecture, or in society and social science, have been framed in terms of the re-presentation of one thing in terms of another, and over and over, vulgarly in a sort of neo-Platonism of formalist essentialism. In sociology, its great themes have been bureaucratization and modernization, or more generally the rationalization of all realms of life in terms of the pattern or rule of one, such as Weber described. Driven in the examination of our own society by consensus theories and by notions of culture as shared understandings, modernist themes are driven in the examination of other societies by a sort of convergent evolutionism in "modernization" theory. The conceit of the latter, slightly better hidden in the former, is that persons in society and societies in the world become all more alike, and that the process is somehow essential.

Against this reductionism, post-modern sensibilities assert the vernacular, its immediacy, potential infinitude and temporality. Shifting priority from form to content, post-modernism proceeds methodologically through an emphasis not on reproduction, but on production, on presentation over representation, and by insistently calling attention to itself.

The first methodological step from modernism is, perhaps, the dawning realization that its views are self-constituting or, in the more conventional discourse of social science, amount to self-confirming hypotheses. Modernization theory is another transformation of imperialism (we are repeatedly told by the supposedly modernizing), or another ethnocentric projection of Western experience, an attempt to generalize the world in our own terms, as much to justify those terms as to generalize the world in what amounts, as Marshall Sahlins has put it,⁸ to a derivation of ontology from methodology. It is this claim of modernism to linearity that gets criticized first, then its monomania: more parsimonious than life, more orderly than experience, it is too spare to contain those and particularly too spare to contain any sense for, or of, growth and changing, multiple points of view. But the more effective, because more penetrating, critique is methodological. Modernism depends on a method of re-presentation to be linear in the first place, and under this method too many anomalies or residues accumulate in a world refractory to its brand of functionalist reduction. Too much data are left over, or left out of account; and that, among the social sciences, is the point of departure for their post-modern versions.

In these terms, anthropology has always been, at least latently, post-modern. The one abiding lesson of anthropology is that other ways are, from first to last, other and multiple; and for this, anthropology stands as a perduring form of cultural critique. But it is also cultural, and not less prone than other social sciences to redactions of the common sense. Usually we call these "tests," generally of conventional understandings, which can be shown to be particular to times, places and social structures. In practice, they also can be, and often are, engaged as projects of refining more inchoate intuitions into more precise formulations. They are, after all, not absolutely detached but deeply "interested." If knowledge has value, precise knowledge has precise value; and most of us are precisionists most of the time. But empirical precision discloses how others are really other, and coming to catalogue and describe that discloses how it is true also in the last instance. You have to learn another culture. It cannot be generated or redacted from a partial

account of our own any more than from first principles, except as a failed version of our own or, more often, of some idealization about our own. Taking a larger world as its field, anthropology thus escapes the lack of common sense and the project of its refinement or enhancement in which the more immediately political of the social sciences engage because the core of its data are the anomalies that make categorical understandings problematic.

At least some of the time it escapes, although probably no more than the others in actual practice, for while some prizes go for detecting anomalies, the bigger ones are reserved for resolving anomalies. It is not in the rest of the world that anthropology has its home: we call that "the field" in un-self-conscious recognition that world is no more safe for or from anthropology than for or from any other social science. The difference is that anomalies there are not mistakes or pathologies; they are by virtue of distance "natural" and command attention as such. Theories and methods have to be stretched to these "facts," and particularly to facts not constituted in those terms. The current state of these theories is in a general sense "post-modern" or in a more specific, methodological sense post-structuralist.

Structuralism, in its many varieties across all the social sciences, more and more appears to be their version of modernism. Not because of its emphasis on order and form, or its mistakenly so-called high level of abstraction, but more fundamentally methodologically because it is at base theoretically re-presentational. Structuralism's objects are re-presentations of one thing or process in another thing or process: language in speech, institutions in behavior, social structure in interaction, each of which structuralist views have sought to penetrate to realms of pure form stripped of exigencies treated as accidental. What this does is to reduce things to fewer dimensions and problems than they have in experience. Its much criticized emphasis on system is an emphasis on subjective re-presentation decoded into systems of relations whose counters don't count but are merely counted with. Function is all. Against this, post-structuralist methods focus on and attempt to conceptualize presentation. I would emphasize the "pre-," for the move is not only a dialectical reaction to structuralism, but is also motivated to recover the anomalies I mentioned. What is "left over" by structuralist methods is not just enactment, but antecedent and enabling conditions *and* how those are immediate; that is, in its strong form *all* the data of context are "left over."

As the positional terminology of post-modernism and post-structuralism would suggest, these methods and their focus are not well worked out. There is a lot of experimentation, particularly with presentational technique, much of which looks like reinventing the wheel. Anthropologists are turning to autobiography, to literary criticism, and to various other forms of extensive discourse to capture or recapture presentation. This activity is as eclectic, and as seemingly *ad hoc*, as its counterparts in architecture and literature. I have my own counterparts for false fronts, chippendale skyscrapers and the atrium motif that turns public buildings inward to a void at the center. But mimicry that calls attention to itself is part of this method, simultaneity its signature, and capturing those its obsession. Post-structuralism in method is given to listing what it cannot typologise, or will not categorize and thus reduce to fewer dimensions than real life. And it is intensely self-absorbed.

The self, and the context of the self that we call "person," particularly as that concept is problematically related to "society," is a centerpiece of this attention. Theoretically, this is in part a response to perceived excesses or excessive narrowness in structuralism, as exemplified in Lévi-Strauss's famous comment on his monumental study of Amerindian mythology that he has not thought through the myths so much as they have thought themselves through him.⁹ In the dialectics of theory, it is partly also a response to other disappearances of active selves from social thinking,

or perceived disappearances, such as exemplified in mid-century structural-functionalism,¹⁰ or in structural linguistics' focus on the language behind the speaker, or in the New Criticism's exclusive focus on the text, obliterating the writer.

This has happened before in anthropology, and appears to be part of a cycle between the polar concepts of Enlightenment philosophizing that at once separated and sought to join concepts of individual and society. The first time was in anthropology's first synthesis. So called "evolutionary," its project of enlarging the concept of culture to include, as E.B. Tylor put it, "any . . . capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society,"¹¹ took as its root metaphor not population biology but the individual life cycle and sought phylogeny in ontogeny. Cultures were seen to develop by shedding mistaken notions and to progress toward true knowledge of things such as Kant had admonished a century earlier. What was for Kant personal responsibility became a necessity in the thought of those for whom it was, indeed, necessary personally. Individualism was seen as the trend and goal of this process, and societies were seen as individual moments in a stratified history of societies, some more advanced (enlightened) along this path than others, and all capable of, even destined to, follow it. This conception foundered upon accumulated empirical investigation and reporting of diversity that could not be fitted into an ontogenetic model, but more significantly upon a more sophisticated conception of society that divorced it from individual phenomena.

Durkheim's delineation of social phenomena and that, as he put it, "we are two beings,"¹² might have put the matter to rest had not the methodology developed from his discovery concentrated largely on one, on society, and left over the individual, which social scientists repeatedly tried to reintegrate. That methodology was, broadly, structuralism which in turning to social, collective, shared phenomena of society, culture, or language turned away from their vehicles in persons, actions, and speech. Thus, preserving those as vehicles residues for which the methodology had only a weak account invited their reconsideration in their "own" terms, that is, in the terms of their Enlightenment formulation.

Put differently, the structuralist synthesis was not comprehensive enough to be proof against end runs, returns actually, to equally holistic conceptions of the individual. Resistance to structuralist method has always been put in such terms: it ignores the individual configuration for the system (in language, culture, and society) by stressing plan over enactment (in speech, belief, and behavior) and flattening time and diversity. But most prominent among its methodological residues was the Enlightenment notion of the autonomous self, the center of consciousness, with collateral histories, upon which was founded the alternative conception of society as a contract, culture as choices (or distinction), and language as intentional (e.g., Port-Royal grammar). Each of these is variously reintroduced as shorter cycles within the longer cycle. The 1920s and 1930s saw a turn to culture and personality that reversed the emphasis and treated culture as personality,¹³ almost in a return to the evolutionists' root metaphor, refracted significantly through Freudian psychology. The 1950s and 1960s saw a turn to choice, driven by games theory, and there are numerous, more subtle and shorter cycles. Hervé Varenne for instance has described with elegant economy how holistic sociological perspectives such as Durkheim's and those descended from this are peculiarly vulnerable in Anglo-American anthropology and social theory not just to individualist critique but to individualist redaction that squanders the Durkheimian gain.¹⁴ Victories of the Scottish Enlightenment over the French?

To the extent that this describes the long cycle in anthropology, shorter cycles within its overall oscillation take shape around tensions between history and structure, diachrony and synchrony. In this, broadly speaking, structure has won: the social person is covered, no longer

truly problematic. A more serious--at least for social science--because more methodological assault arises less from inchoate *amour propre* redacted as theory that squanders the Durkheimian gain. It arises in the most technical and, for some, most micro-sociological level of anthropological inquiry, where anomalous and left-over data problematize temporal and situational dimensions of action and consciousness that go beyond capabilities to performance.

Much as the modernist, structuralist turn was to data unaccounted by and anomalous in terms of its predecessors, to that in society which was not already in individuals, so the post-structuralist turn in sociology, anthropology and linguistics has been to this residue which will not fit, and to modifying the theories to which it will not fit. These are data of performance, of instantiation, of particular historical conjunctures, and of variables not accounted in structuralism proper. Attending to them shows structuralisms to be limited case theories of the referential aspects of language, the prescriptive aspects of society, the conventional aspects of culture, which approach movement not through their operations but in terms of their various operators.¹⁵

The opening in this regard for anthropology comes in linguistics with Dell Hymes' identification of "breakthrough into performance."¹⁶ Casting for the terms of authenticity of cultural expression, Hymes catalogued three ways in which performance breaks through report, or direct speech breaks through indirect: the speaker forgets the audience, and particularly that it may be inappropriate for saying sacred things; continuities between genre make it difficult to keep them apart; and what is spoken is so deeply believed as to have a reality that description can't touch or convey. Upon this discovery is founded the ethnography of communication, and particularly of speaking,¹⁷ as a holistic account not only of linguistic resources, but also, and with equal weight, of situational factors of intent, occasion, audience and roles assumed in performance.

The discovery is not unique. It replicates the emphasis at the base of the symbolic interactionist focus on other-responsiveness against overly inner-directed conceptions of social action from G.H. Mead to Herbert Blumer to Erving Goffman.¹⁸ Much of the ethnography of speaking draws on this contrarian sociology for elaborating the performative surroundings of speech events. But the significance of this sociology for anthropology is less than the significance of linguistics itself because of the privileged place occupied by language as the model for, and type-site of, the most cultural of phenomena. In this context, Silverstein developed a more radical critique of the place of language phenomena in theorizing about culture by delineating how the semantic-referential core of language provides only special and limited samples of the means and properties of communication.¹⁹ Asking, in terms of rule-governed views of language, how one knows when and how to apply, use, and manipulate its rules, Silverstein pointed to "shifters" that convey meaning quite outside of language or even its avatars such as gesture.²⁰ A key example is tense: nothing in grammar or syntax itself identifies particular elements as marking past-ness, only the position of an utterance in a stream of utterance. The markers, once identified, may signal, but nothing in the markers contains the signal. The signal belongs, he argued, to the pragmatics as well as to the syntagmatics of language, to its performative surrounding rather than only to its internal structure.

What these views do is shift emphasis to the residues left by structuralist method. Structuralist emphasis on the ultimate arbitrariness of relations between signifier and signified, and its focus upon signifiers as determined wholly in relation to each other, has perhaps not entirely solved the problem of the signified, as Anthony Giddens claims.²¹ But it does leave over the problems associated with the signified, including temporality and situation (space), and it failed to reconstitute the acting subject. To reconstitute the full range of this subject, Giddens opens some methodological room between full discursive consciousness and the unconscious with his notion

of "practical consciousness." In that, he includes not only knowledge not put into words, but a range of intermediate phenomena such as motives and values which partake of both discursive consciousness and the fully unconscious. Like other praxis theories, his views point to what actors know but cannot (or will not or are not permitted or inclined to) put into the limiting form of words or discursive statement. This move is designed to rescue that residue, though less to claim a privileged status for it than to put it into perspective with discursive consciousness as its limiting case.

Of contemporary social theorists, Pierre Bourdieu seems to push this perspective furthest without turning consciousness (and the unconscious) into epiphenomena of pure experience with his conception of "habitus" as the actor's total stock of knowledge and practice, implicit as well as explicit, situational as well as general.²² By emphasizing implicit and unformalized knowledge embedded in practices, Bourdieu avoids Giddens' need to posit a potentially all-knowing, if not all-conscious, acting subject. Placing discursive consciousness as "doxa," including heterodox as well as orthodox consciousness, within a totality of habitus, Bourdieu attempts to contextualise the acting subject not within its own subjectivity but within its activity, and thus to bridge the paradox that while humans are made by society (culture, language), they also make society (culture, language) and do not merely reproduce it.

Put differently, in more methodological terms, each of these positions attempts to incorporate apparently contradictory data which one or the other major streams of post-Enlightenment thought consigns to residues. Each departs from structuralist methods which freed subjects from objects, and each aims to break out of contradictory claims and evidence about the priority of one over the other, or that would assimilate one to the other. Where they seem to arrive is a concept of the person as neither immutable essence nor social reflex, but as actively constituting and constituted—that is, on activity.

This conception of activity, not the *actus purus* Durkheim sought but a continuing stream such as Weber saw, is the post-structuralist version or portion of post-modern sensibilities for foregrounding subjectivity through such presentational devices as the intrusion of the author into the text, quotation that calls attention to simultaneity and immediacy, and mimicry of those by extensive over intensive narrative.²³ It does not reconstitute an autonomous subject, nor dissolve subject into object, but directs attention to the traffic as the reality that constitutes and is constituted by that activity.²⁴ The message of post-structuralist method, like that of post-modernism with which it shares a cultural space and time, is that there is no place to stand outside this activity—more radically, that there is no standing, only the activity. At this point, it rejoins the culture which spawned it and of which it would provide an account.

I cannot help that the account is counter-intuitive. It is well-grounded in fuller accounts of communication, and it accounts in a unified frame for data heretofore generated by opposed perspectives. I can say that only some anthropology and sociology is done today in terms of this more subtle historicism of deconstructing systems of signification into their praxis, sometimes in self-conscious experiments with techniques for calling attention to acting in webs of significance woven both by and for the person which mimic that process. And I am intrigued to note what appears to be a convergence of moral philosophers upon activity for more comprehensive understanding of the person.²⁵

Returning to Weber's question at this point, where his own analysis ran up against its moral significance, I would only point out that such ideas have been around for some time now. The moral question is their jurisdiction, a matter of taking responsibility. Although some in the social sciences with which I am familiar see a return to external determinism in turns to praxis, the circle

seems to me to have gone elsewhere--on, not back--in turns to temporality, to the vernacular, and to devices not so much for re-presenting as for presenting the ambiguity of immediacy and simultaneity in the multidimensional quality of consciousness that both constitutes and is constituted by activity. Far from describing a situational or any other determination prior to action, Charles Taylor has argued that as practice this "engages my whole self in a way that judging by a yardstick does not,"²⁶ that it is in fact more open, and uncertain rather than contingent. Seeing this early, Weber deserves to be the touchstone for post-modernism in the social sciences; his own practice already opposed description to categorization, temporality and the vernacular to system and analytically privileged points of view. My own view is, if not exactly cautious like Weber's, then certainly conservative. Post-modernism and post-structuralist method have roots in modernism and in structuralist method: they begin as changes in, rather than as breaks with, modernism and structuralist method; as additions to those,²⁷ they proceed to recover a sense for movement with which modernism began by focusing on its devices. If the synthesis to which I think post-structuralist methods point seems inconclusive, I would suggest that in part this is because it is still emerging in the ways it leaves behind both mechanism in conceiving of society and biologism in conceiving of individuals, after these methods had passed from being hopeful Enlightenment philosophies into mere doleful common sense.

In this sense we seem to be all late-Weberians struggling to become post-Weberian.

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Notes

1. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, "A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals," in *The Identities of Persons*, A.O. Rorty, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 301.

2. The phrase is Clifford Geertz's, in his seminal manifesto of this view, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3-30.

3. Marcel Mauss, "Une catégorie de l'esprit humain: la notion de person, celle de 'moi'," in *Sociologie et Anthropologie*, edited with an introduction by Claude Lévi-Strauss (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), p. 362.

4. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970).

5. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribners, 1958 [orig. 1904-5]), p. 181.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

7. "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949 [orig. 1904]).

8. Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 95.

9. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked. Introduction to the Science of Mythology*, Vol. 1 (New York: Harper, 1969), p. 13. Compare: *The Naked Man. Introduction to the Science of Mythology*, Vol. 4 (New York: Harper, 1981), "Finale."

10. E.g., Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 183-193.
11. E.B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London: John Murray, 1871), p. 1.
12. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated by Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Free Press, 1965 [orig. 1915]), p. 298.
13. E.g., Ruth Ben edict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1934).
14. Hérve Vare nne, "Collective Representations in American Anthropological Conversations," *Current Anthropology*, 25 (1984), 281-299.
15. The concept of operators that link systems of signification is adumbrated in Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 20ff; for a further elaboration, see James A. Boon, "Further Operations on Culture in Anthropology," in *The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences*, L. Schneider and C. Bonjean, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 1-32.
16. Dell Hymes, "Breakthrough into Performance," in *Folklore: Performance and Communication*, D. Ben- Amos & K. Gold stein, eds. (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), pp. 11-74.
17. Hyme's list is elaborated in more formal detail in, e.g., Richard Bauman, "Verbal Art as Performance," *American Anthropologist*, 77 (1975), 290-311.
18. George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspectives and Method* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969); Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959); *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). This perspective also spawned the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967) and the cognitive sociology of Aaron Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology: Language and Meaning in Social Interaction* (New York: Free Press, 1974).
19. Michael Silverstein, "Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description," in *Meaning in Anthropology*, Keith H. Basso & Henry A. Selby, eds. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), pp. 11-56.
20. The concept was originally coined by Roman Jakobson for how pronouns point to subjects and objects. Silverstein broadens that usage beyond dialectic function.
21. Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
22. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
23. See Stephen A. Tyler, *The Unspeakable: Discourse, Dialogue, and Rhetoric in the Post-Modern World* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
24. E.g., Ivan Karp's sustained attention to activities that exemplify problematic simultaneities of social life in "Beer-Drinking and Social Experience in African Society: An Essay in Formal Sociology," in *Explorations in African Systems of Thought*, Ivan Karp and Charles S. Bird, eds. (2nd Edition; Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980), pp. 83-119; T.M.S. Even's development of E.E. Evans-Pritchard's notion of ideas imprisoned in action in "Mind, Logic and the Efficacy of the Nuer Incest Prohibition," *Man*, (n.s.) 18 (1983), 111-133; also, Frank Dubinkas and Sharon Traweek, "Closer to the Ground: a Reinterpretation of Walbiri Iconography," *Man*, (n.s.) 19 (1984), 15-30.

25. Amelie O. Rorty, ed., *The Identities of Persons* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Michael Carrithers, et al., *The Category of the Person* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Charles Curran, "Catholic Social Ethics: A New Approach?" *The Clergy Review*, 70 (1985), 2-3.

26. Charles Taylor, "Responsibility for Self," in *The Identities of Persons*, A.O. Rorty, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 298.

27. For example, in Rodney Needham's essays *Against the Tranquility of Axioms* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); T.O. Beidelman, *Moral Imagination in Kaguru Modes of Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).

Chapter IV

Recovering from the Consequences of the Private Life

John Kromkowski

Introduction

The proposed analysis of person and society suggested by the convenors of this seminar is driven by the claim that various societies have developed exemplars which appropriately portray and constitute the relationship among persons and between persons and society. Of course even the smallest societies in all regions and periods of history are complex realities which include diverse activities. Not the least important of such activities that relate to the issue of person and society are the creation and communication of accounts, ritual representations and stories which in a variety of ways explain or at least provide credible answers to primordial questions of personal and social meaning within the welter of activities that constitute the personal and social mystery of human existence. All societies by and through their ongoing existence transmit accounts, ritual representation and stories which order the flow of personal and social experience. The real and/or mythic founders of a society provide efficacious ways of revolving personal questions and societal issues. "From what and Toward what is this society changing?; Who am I and Who are we?" are universal questions about the origins, purposes and material and form of social reality and persons. The plethora of answers to such questions constitute the issue addressed in this seminar.

Such questions in themselves as well as the multiplicity of answers and the efficacy of various attempts to relate person and society seem to generate creative activity. The formation of meaningful renditions of order within a society constitutes the symbols and forms of existence that maintain personal and social being. Such forms and symbolizations of personal and social existence generally include coherent accounts of relationship among the gods, nature, persons and society. Moreover, the character of the relationship of persons to the gods, nature and society constitute the range of differences that exist among societies and the manifold of variety that both historically and contemporaneously constitute the human condition and the great philosophic conversation about the plethora of forms and symbolization of existence.

Among this plethora of social efficacious symbolizations, certain text in various genres appear to be clustered into canons of socially and personally powerful accounts of exemplary relationships among persons and exemplary forms of society. The marking and analysis of change in such canons constitutes the history of socially efficacious symbolization of existence. For example, within the Mediterranean, European tradition among the ancients, the Homeric tales are challenged by Sophocles, Aeschyles, and Euripides. These dramatists are challenged by the sophists and philosophers. In the ancient Middle East, Genesis is a substantive reworking of other cosmologies. In this vein, *The Aeneid*, *The Divine Comedy*, *Canterbury Tales* and The Shakespearean corpus, *Paradise Lost*, *Don Quixote* and *Faust* could be read as an authoritative set of powerful and persuasive European symbolizations that portray a varied register of relationships and exemplars of person and society.

Has Voltaire's *Candide* become part of this and, can the contemporary American social practice and personal aspiration for privacy be related to Voltaire's prescription for personal and social well-being found in *Candide*? European canon? *Candide* is a particularly interesting and provocative text. Its complete title is *Candide or Optimism, translated from the German of Doctor Ralph with the additions which were found in the Doctor's pocket when he died at Minden in the*

Year of Our Lord, 1759. This slim volume is proposed as an initial common reading for this multicultural seminar on person and society because it is a serious account of person and society that is especially relevant to periods of significant change and dislocation. *Candide* raises basic questions about social order and reflects the intellectual practice of critique which lies at the core of the problematic posed by the convenor of this seminar. The text title (and every text) of course, masks the truth of personal and social realities in many ways. This central irony of all representation of person and society ought not be ignored. The implication of this warning will be developed in this paper and raised repeatedly as we examine the issue of person and society in various traditions. In this regard the role and practice of intellectual critique and the example of Voltaire and *Candide* are proposed as archetypes with heuristic significance for understanding the process of changing relations between persons and society.

The connection between person and society rendered in Voltaire's *Candide*¹ argues that in his generation the traditional common ground of person and society has been shattered. The order of experiences traditionally conveyed in customs, families, religion and government have lost meaning. And even the philosophic enterprise has degenerated into mere words. The Panglossian answer that all is well in the best of all possible worlds, is a vision of personal and social reality that at bottom equates order and chaos. *Candide* is a seminal work because Voltaire's imagination and contemporary life are united in the success of the enlightenment intellectual as an exemplar of personal and social excellence. The enlightenment *critique* of monarchy, nobility, lineage, military recruitment, slavery, the savaging of the new world by Europe, and even the quest for wealth and happiness culminate in Voltaire's vision of a new garden and a new human mission. The consequences of these modern achievements are the shallow roots derived from or at least suggested by Voltaire's diagnosis, critique and especially the therapy found in the closing chapter of *Candide*. In this vein, Voltaire's recommendation to cultivate one's garden is a prototypic modern maxim. At bottom its normative thrust is that the evils of boredom, want and vice in community all here to existing need to be transcended. A new settlement and form of existence that *Candide* and associates hope to create will yield well being.

Voltaire's critique of pre-enlightenment society is fashioned in an altogether comical and humorous collection of loosely connected episodes that comprise *Candide*. Voltaire's entertaining rhetoric and inviting literature-of-engagement mark the devastating critique of eighteenth century practices and reveal ongoing features of the enlightenment notion of person and society.² Voltaire's dramatic narrative raises basic questions about persons and societies and basic methodical issues that have plagued the intersection of art and philosophic discourse. Philosophy and art have had an ancient argument which has been mutually intensified by the skillful use of literary tropes by philosophers and the insightful representation of probing philosophic questions by artists. In *Candide*, Voltaire's picaresque novel and satire, though almost formless and seemingly aimless because of the totality of its satire is an especially good example of the conflict between the philosophical and the artistic approach to the problematic of person and society. An interesting expression of the relation between person and society can be found in the final chapter of *Candide* which implies that a reasonable and decent person ought to reject urban life and *a fortiori* abstain from the cause of human misery found in political society and ecclesial community. For pedagogical purpose I propose reading *Candide* along with a variety of journalistic accounts of suburban life. In this paper I shall focus on Two contemporary journalistic articles by Betsy Morris, titled 'Shallow Roots'. These and other contemporary reports on the consequences of rejecting urban life and attendant issues of new settlements in previously rural environments are the texts and contexts which prompt the following reflection on person and

society.³ Juxtapositioning *Candide* to contemporary journalistic accounts--the who, what, when, and how of commonsense and true-to-experience representation found in Morris' description is proposed as a methodological and pedagogical experiment designed to illustrate the mutual importance of grounding of philosophic reflection in lived experience of persons and the practices of society and the relevance of bringing the lenses of literary expression and imagination to focus on contemporary experiences of person and society.

Voltaire's tale contains thirty short chapters--fittingly truncated, i.e., more than a third shorter than *The Divine Comedy*. The chapters are often radically unconnected. Curiously both like and unlike the flow of experiential time and the processes of becoming expected from commonsense personal and social existence. Thus the reader is transported into form of consciousness which is for its celebration of the private and its critique of urbanity, civility and the public arena. This literary expression prefigures and is related to a form of consciousness and its social manifestation in American suburban settlements portrayed in Betsy Morris' report. Exploring this form of consciousness and its bearing on person and society as found in texts and social reality is the primary thrust and pedagogy.

The significance and ongoing interest in *Candide* and its inclusion in the Modern European canon as well as its standing as the critique of the canon is well established. The explication of Voltaire's therapy requires an authoritative guide to Voltaire. Peter Gay, provides the following textual summary and historical grounding of the opus:

young Candide, innocent and naive, is expelled from a miserable chateau in Westphalia by the baron who owns it, and propelled into a series of grotesque adventures. Candide is imbued with love for Cunegonde, the baron's daughter, and with the famous optimistic metaphysics of D. Pangloss, the tutor of the house, a cruel caricature of Leibniz. In the end, Candide wins Cunegonde and loses his optimism; his adventures have taught him to see through the doctrine that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Candide's experiences, which are the matter of the tale, are fantastic and horrible, but *Candide* is not simply a being tricked into joining armies, flogged mercilessly in the course of what was euphemistically called "military training," maltreated by the Inquisition, robbed by greedy merchants, fleeced by unscrupulous courtesans, maligned by venal scribblers, subjected to the grand, silent indifference of nature and the cruelty and selfishness of men. One lesson in eclecticism, Candide builds his world of experience from his visits to South America and the English coast, Paris and Venice, from talks with kings and prostitutes, savages and philosophers. Voltaire's immediate environment--the world of Christian Europe--is confronted from the critical perspective of the Utopia Eldorado, which lives happily without knowing much either of Christianity or of Europe. To draw the contrast as sharply as possible, Voltaire makes Europe's least prepossessing representatives its most prominent spokesmen: rapacious merchants, boorish Barons, worldly Jesuits with eyes for pretty boys, and fanatical Inquisitors are the instruments of Candide's education. By valuing each of them equally, Candide with his democratic curiosity is the very model of the tolerant cosmopolitan. By making him decent, eager for knowledge but a little slow, Voltaire was not merely trying to spin out his tale: he was slyly conceding that even the purest of men has only a precarious hold on reality.⁴

Peter Gay goes on to indicate the implications of Voltaire tale. He claims a wholly modern perspective and argues that *Candide* moves is a wholly disenchanted world. Gay views *Candide* as a secular morality tale. He writes:

there are no harpies here, so gorgons: the causes that move the story are within nature. Some, like the earthquake, are inexplicable but no more miraculous for that. Others find their explanation in social institutions or in human nature as such. Candide leaves Eldorado, at least partly because it is human to boast at home of travels abroad, and also, quite simply, lovely as it is there, human life is not like that; innocent victims are burned at an auto-da-fe in Lisbon after the earthquake because superstitious men reason stupidly and give their hostile impulses free rein; the Westphalian chateau of Baron Thundertentronckh is razed, its residents are violated and disembowelled, because men at war are beasts; M. Vanderdendur tricks Candide out of his gold because men in general, and merchants in particular, trample on all moral scruples in their lust for gain. All this is not because men are damned or God is harsh. Nor can it be changed through prayer, pilgrimages, or appeals to the world beyond nature. Change can come from recognition of limits and concentration on realities--this is the moral of the famous last sentence: *Celaest biendit, mais il fautcultiver notre jardin.*⁵

Gay is not alone in his claim that *Candide's* is a modern, secular classic. No one would disagree with Gay assessment that such a classic work has a multi-layered texture that is inexhaustible with power to suffer prosaic interpretation. Thus, G ay endorses an invitation to enter the world fashioned by Voltaire which this paper proposes as an opportunity to encounter primordial or archetypal problematics fashioned by an artful, humanist and amusingly entertaining guide and creator: a world class creator of illusion.

The modern practice of illusion and artifice begins with the very title. The long title of the work is an amusing misdirection. The reader will soon discover that Voltaire is not *Candide* nor is *Candide* utterly frank; the work is not a translation from German; the work is not written by D. Ralph; the text has no additions nor was it an unpublished manuscript found in a dead man's pocket; etc., etc. Yet, Gay rightly dispels attention of Voltaire's philosophic mosaic creative trickery by noting the historicity and reality.

Gay argues that what *Candide* undergoes in his travels all too many people were undergoing in Voltaire's time--Voltaire could document most, perhaps all, of *Candide's* adventures from the journals of his day.

Voltaire's realism is so pointedly topical that the modern reader needs a key to grasp the specificity of his allusion: when *Candide* is made to run the gauntlet in the Bulgarian army, Voltaire is reproducing, almost down to the last detail, a scene that he himself had witnessed at the court of Frederick of Prussia. When Voltaire makes Frederick appear briefly, as king of the Bulgarians--that is, of the *bougres*--his sardonic realism reaches the height of impudence: Voltaire is hinting that the great warrior-philosopher-king of the Prussians may not be a lover of women.

Obviously, Voltaire is not writing a realistic story but a morality tale, and he violates verisimilitude when it fits his didactic purposes. *Candide's* disasters occur at so rapid a speed--characters are hanged, stabbed, disembowelled so casually and healed so quickly--that no blood seems to flow and the reader has time neither to be horrified nor to be deeply sympathetic. This quality of *Candide*, far from being a flaw, is deliberate: Voltaire draws his characters as stick

figures, presents them as marionettes to be manipulated, in order to keep the reader distant and thus alert and rational. *Candide* is not called a philosophical tale for nothing: the reader is purged, not through pity and terror, but through reason, and hence aroused to rational action. Thus the reality of detail is an essential quality of the fable: only the land of Eldorado, where men live in peace, despise riches, have no jails or priests, and are all deists, is obviously, ironically--alas, inevitably--a fiction.⁶

Gay stakes out the essential characteristics of Candide's experience and the implications of his observations of painful reality. Gay argues that Candide witnesses

the Lisbon earthquake and the superstitious reactions of the Portuguese; he happens upon the execution of the British admiral Byng, shot by his fellow citizens in a solemn ceremony *pour encourager les autres*; he visits the Jesuit "kingdom" of Paraguay; he has a sympathetic conversation with a Negro slave from the Dutch sugar plantations who has been brutally mutilated by his owner.⁷

Gay extends his case and claims that such experiences are the ground the *Candide's* interpretation of his existence. Gay writes that *Candide's* thirst for conversation is never slaked.

All this talk (much like the philosophers' talk in the salons) is to some purpose. Voltaire transforms *Candide*, sprung from the genre of picaresque tales, into a *Bildungsroman*, the story of an education. Candide comes to reject the metaphysical system called "optimism," not by discovering an opposing metaphysical system, but by allowing life to act upon him. He moves from the greedy, heedless, childish pleasure principle to the acceptance of reality. He is slow to learn, and like the typical metaphysician in the Enlightenment's caricature, he continues to parrot "All is for the best" in the midst of rapine, shipwreck, and slaughter. But eventually experience conquers doctrine: in this sense, *Candide* is propaganda in behalf of empiricism, a dramatization of Newton's methods.

It is significant that Candide does not simply receive and record impressions, but talks them out. In this sense, *Candide* is a dialogue, and on several levels. There is Candide's unending debate with Pan gloss, carried on whether Pangloss is present or absent. Each new horror is pitted against the doctrine that all is for the best: "O Pangloss," Candide will exclaim, "if you were only here..." or, after some light has broken through his blinders: "If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like?" This central debate is surrounded by subsidiary dialogues. Everyone serves Candide as a foil, as a companion in the painful exploration of experience: Cunegonde; her maid; Martin, the cool-headed Manichean whom he meets on his travels and chooses as a friend because Martin is willing to talk philosophy with him; the disillusioned Venetian patrician Pococurante, whom he seeks out to discover whether wealth and cultivation bring happiness. Even cannibals about to eat him are made to debate international law with him. Voltaire was aware of this aspect of his tale: the twenty-first chapter has what must be one of the most expressive chapter headings of the century--"Candide and Martin Approach the Coast of France and Argue." And, indeed, *Candide* is a dialogue in still another respect: it was part of Voltaire's own evolution into an aggressive social reformer. In the late 1750s when he wrote *Candide*, Voltaire still defined action as thoughtful resignation to reality; a few years later, after and partly through *Candide*, resignation gave way to tireless polemical action--just as the Enlightenment itself was moving toward overt and bellicose radicalism.⁸

Thus selected experiences and the interpretation of existence proceed toward an agenda of action which is located in the new garden which proposes a fresh beginning of the problematic of

person and society. Voltaire's new garden presents a restatement of the sources of unhappiness and evil. His recipe for action includes a program of social transformation based on the avoidance of cities, churches, boredom, urban vices and want. Thus Voltaire offers a remedy to the human predicament and proposes that work and resettlement are effective strategies and therapies for the avoidance of unhappiness and its sources.

The world thus fashioned by Voltaire implies the need for a radical action--Voltaire makes this clear when he completes the story with the founding of a new settlement on twenty acres outside of Constantinople. The human conditions portrayed leads the reader to Voltaire's recipe and prescription.

In the final Chapter of *Candide* the readers should be convinced that experience "demonstrates" the futility of existing conditions and that there is no possibility of happiness and common good in the depraved structure of heretofore existing personal existence and social order. Voltaire argues that the evils of the human condition are boredom, want, and vice and that each of these can be avoided by a life characterized by and located for rural production. Thus Candide's perception and Voltaire's model for persons and society is to--work on the outskirts of a city, i.e., a life of attunement of the cycles of the orchard and garden, with produce taken to and traded in the city. This formulation of human activity and society is shaped through and by the need for a total negation of Candide's experience. The settlement of four old persons--no children, no travel, no church, no state, no adventure, etc., etc. is amazingly attractive and seemingly necessary course for a reasonable person seeking to avoid an evil world. Its attractiveness is contagious and invites action to imitate art. The power of this Voltairean critique of existing relationships among persons and the evil of existing society and the sympathy and sentiment evoked for Candide as an exemplar for a new mode of happiness, i.e., the decent private life still resonates in the souls of sensitive persons yearning for freedom, fairness, liberty, and opportunity. Voltaire's social therapy includes the utter privatization of relationship between persons. Such privatization would support and thus constitute an exemplary social order--a peaceful, safe, work-filled new world. What Voltaire fashioned first in art 200 years ago now seems to be imitated in the privatization of social reality that Betsy Morris, Staff Reporter of the Wall Street Journal, portrays in a series entitled, *Shallow Roots*⁹. The implications of this enterprise are especially interesting because they suggest the limits and the consequence of Voltaire's recipe.

These reports on Gwinnett County, Georgia and other New Suburbs reveal aspects of social reality that are related to the image of reality proposed by Voltaire. They are worth pondering as we analyze and reflect on the experiences of persons and societies that Betsy Morris found in contemporary America.

Betsy Morris finds that Gwinnett County, Georgia is a brave new world driven by the very forces which shaped Voltaire's critique. But the reality of limited space is certain. Gwinnett--this sprawling suburb--has been one of the fastest growing counties in the U.S. since 1984. Anchored more by the Gwinnett Place Mall than by Atlanta's downtown which is 10 to 35 miles away, Gwinnett County is a striking example of a new breed of suburb restructuring the American landscape from Phoenix and Denver to St. Louis and Baltimore. However, unlike the expected new world these suburbs are marked by alienation and ambivalence.¹⁰

For example, one resident loves her country-English dream house, but at the same time is determined to redesign her back deck around a street sign from her older, less glamorous former neighborhood in Ohio. Her ambivalent discourse is found in her comments that nothing makes sense, names change, streets plans are not coherent and nothing is convenient or close.

These new suburbs are bigger and more insular than their earlier counterparts, with less emphasis on community and more on the self. People drive alone to work, alone at home and then turn on the VCR in their own private garden. Despite the shift away from community and the homesickness, residents are still captivated by the sense of being on the edge of something new and exciting.¹¹

What drove planners to the lovely wooded vistas and smokeless industries with their immaculately landscaped grounds could have been the recollection of primordial American visions of rugged individualism and the pioneering spirit. The immigrants, pioneers, and suburbanites and even *Candide* all come as individuals to cultivate their new garden, yet humanity inevitably replaces the transition from ancient hunter/gatherer to farmer/cultivator because humans want community.

Ambivalence between past and present is not only part of the new suburbanites but is part of the county itself. Gwinnett County, named for a signer of the Declaration of Independence has been forgotten. Gwinnett is a sea of mall goers who sport T-shirt professing allegiance not to the Atlanta Braves but to the Chicago Cubs, Boston Celtics and San Francisco Giants. Rootless corporate nomads see houses as assets rather than homes and most have beige carpets so that resale is possible. Despite the chance to make a real estate killing, these rural paradise seekers feel short-changed by the pace of change--one day a virgin forest, the next day a waffle house. Without buses, sidewalks or street lights, traffic dictates life. Families find themselves giving up music lessons for children and civic activities because of the traffic.¹²

Although, other factors including working couples and fragmented families add to the sense of isolation, the county truly lacks the previous underpinnings of poor urban community. There are no neighborhood grocery stores, doctors who know the neighborhoods, or even grandmothers.

While schools and churches are at the scene, a tension remains between the old and the new residents. Older residents rebel against minor development. Newer residents have surprisingly attempted to encourage their extended families to move here. Children, who won't be shattered if the family were to again uproot, wonder which new comers can be trusted.¹³

Even the pre-development residents fighting off being pushed out, echo the ambivalence and alienation of the lovely garden of Eden:

Mr. Dutton sees things differently. He has been offered \$40,000 for his little slice of land, which he paid \$125 for. He agrees that that would be a good profit in dollars and cents, but the way he looks at it, it would still leave him short. "I got everything in the world I want here," he says. My dogs, my chickens. A good shop I can go in at night if I want to fool with an old lawn mower."

He marvels sadly at a county he believes has sold its soul. It's getting to the point around here," he says, where you're going to have to hire somebody to cry at your funeral."¹⁴

Shallow Roots are not restricted to Georgia. Betsy Morris reports that:

Real estate ads in Fairfax County, Virginia outside of Washington, D.C. imply visions of "fox hounds running through your backyard" with their bucolic promises of "a way of life as old as the tall oak trees." However, the reality of the new world of suburbs is a mini-city with five different skylines, plans to develop more office space than Philadelphia, rush hours worse than Washington and sky-rocketing rents. People moving away from the city to become country gentry find "city" all

around. This scenario is the same across the country where it is increasingly difficult to tell the urban from the suburban from the rural.¹⁵

Information and service economies as well as cheap truck transport and flexible telecommunications have turned the notion of a dominant county into a city ringed by servient suburbs depending on its care. All roads no longer lead to Rome. In the new landscape where sidewalks literally end, all roads seem to lead to traffic jams.

This shift has created an even increasing balkanization of government. For example, Metropolitan Atlanta and Denver each have about 50 separate governments. Yet, these localities are faced with a voracious demand for public facilities--from trash removal to school. In one fast-growing county outside Atlanta 90 new children arrive a week, making school look like trailer parks. The new residents are upscale migrant workers, corporate gypsies, and entrepreneurs following their jobs to way stations rather than new homes. Often the businesses moving these career-oriented under-focused workers are so intent on bottom line that once traditional encouragement of civic boosterism is becoming a thing of the past for the time being. The sense of community in "Progress Centre, U.S.A." is unraveling. Devoid of serious leadership, governing is also hampered by fragmentation of interests. The driving political party is neither Republican nor Democratic but the homeowners association.¹⁶ Growth and traffic now whip up the fairly docile citizenry.

Relations between traditional cities and outer suburbs is also strained over fights over shopping mall tenants deciding between efforts to revitalize downtown and the call of the campus-like corporate parks. Fears of resegregation are rekindled as the poorer and blacker inner cities wonder who will pay for the public libraries, indigent health care. Moreover, older cities feel as if they are providing the museums, zoos, botanical gardens and performing arts for the entire metropolitan area. New suburbanites don't care to kick in money for these services when they are trying to create their own.¹⁷

However, the fragmentation, duplication and inefficiency may be setting up these suburbs for their own bust. Recent hot spots are already losing out to newer and hotter spots. Fears linger that greed and exuberance will cause these places to be used up in five years instead of a generation of 30 to 40 years.¹⁸

Given this contemporary experience perhaps derived from Voltaire's ideal, it is not surprising that the activities of churches on this new world goes unreported. Perhaps it's time to commission another great literary and to petition a fresh philosophical genius to craft a new and meaningful symbolization of existence from the wreckage reported. Perhaps, the new work could begin with additional chapters about Candide and his children and their children's grandchildren which could challenge the moral imagination and develop a theology of work, a sense of civic participation, and learning linked to action so that a more wholesome relationship between person and society could emerge. Perhaps reflections on suffering and misery are essential to the work. Perhaps the notes of other chroniclers unlike Betsy Morris could provide the missing experiences that record the making over of old neighborhoods or extent videotapes of the remembered songs of Candide's great grandchildren could be appended to the text. One could imagine such a work beginning:

Frankly, I'm pessimistic, but I still have a great banner inscribed with prophetic words: "Don't Leave Town. Here's Still Hope!" that my friends gave me as I left South Bend.

I've kept this banner in my briefcase so that I could carry it with ease as I traveled from city to city and neighborhood to neighborhood singing a song of liberty and justice for all, that affirms community, citizenship, friendship, sharing and shaping the burdens of changing, enhancing the

tradition and legacy of inherited wisdom, building on the foundation of community participation and contributing to the common-shared reservoir of trust that must be passed from generation to generation.

.....

While we wait for the elaboration of such an imaginative work, a few analytical, descriptive and prescriptive accounts of community revival can be suggested.

The work of Jane Jacobs, especially *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* makes the beginning of the American recovery from the consequences of an excessively private notion of human settlement. Chronicles of this revival abound.¹⁹ But the full recovery from the consequences of Voltaire's celebration of the private life requires more than examining the record of community organizations. It's time to reread *Candide* with a fuller appreciation of its irony and existential contradictions. Such insight and wisdom of experience are found in an imaginary diary of one of *Candide's* great grandchildren, titled, *Lotsa things depend on lotsa things: A Grammar of Discontent in Search of Social and Personal Well-Being, Liberty and Justice and the Best Intersection of the Public, Private and Community Sectors*. This work may provide an alternate, albeit provisional approach to the dichotomous worlds of optimists and pessimists which have divided traditions, nations, politics, parties and generations and persons since the publication of *Candide* two hundred years ago.

The experience of the "post-*Candide* era" revealed the inadequacy of his vision. Yet, the consequences of social innovations and projects designed to free persons and societies from boredom, vice and want as well as political and ecclesial community derived from that vision need not be utterly abandoned. A fuller and more differentiated theory and/or artistic vision of the vitality of 'the private' as a co-equal sphere of human experience to the political and ecclesial spheres of human sociality could be affirmed and ironically traced to the last chapter of *Candide* and to the preceding images of activities of the political and ecclesial spheres that are bereft of justice and liberty. The development of such a theory of spheres of human action and their relationship to each other and to the experiences of the deepest and highest dimensions of our humanity is an ongoing obligation and responsibility of persons interested in the problematic posed in this seminar. To find the balance points among the public, private and community dimensions of existence is to discover the relationship between the person and the society. The experiences of significant social, economic, religious, intellectual, and cultural change which prompted Voltaire's work are even clearer today. The ongoing task of linking the philosophic gaze on the process of change may be painful, but the silence of contemplating other objects is neither responsible nor possible. Philosophy and art have the mutual mission of providing symbols of existence which shape our consciousness of person and society. In this vein, *Candide* is an important text which deserves to be extended by way of critique of consequences of excessively privatization and toward a fuller treatment of the personal and social answers to the mystery of human existence.

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Notes

1. The translation of *Candide* and edition of criticisms by Robert M. Adams, *Candide* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966), includes a previously inaccessible array of literary, social and philosophical criticism and historical background. Especially valued are works by A.O. Lovejoy and Andre Morize. Articles by Georges Ascoli, Rene Pomeau, I.O. Wade, J.G.

Weightman and Robert Adams include literary as well as philosophical issues of providence, pessimism and absurdity. Adams has arrayed the Voltaire controversy around the following topics: faith, coherence, humanity, bourgeois or nihilist, style and greatness of Voltaire's work. Some measure of *Candide's* importance is indicated by the following best of commentators: Paul Valery, Nova les, Hine, Taine, Flaubert, de Stael, de Maestre, Blake, and Victor Hu go. The edition also includes the assessments of Anatole France, William Bottiglia and Ludwig W. Kahn.

2. See Peter Gay's *The Enlightenment* (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1966). The exhaustive scholarship in this work built of his early analysis of Voltaire's political thought is an invaluable background on the intellectual climate and intellectual sleight of hand mastered by Voltaire. Other secondary analysis can be found in the following studies:

Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1964). Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). Lester G. Croker, *The Age of Enlightenment* (New York: Walker and Co., 1969). Paul Hazard, *The European Mind (1080-1715)* (London: Hellis & Carter, 1953). Frank E. Manuel, *The Age of Reason* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1959). R.J. White, *The Anti-Philosophers* (Edinburgh: R & R Clark LTD, 1970).

3. The immediate origins of American anti-urban mentalities are ably traced in Thomas Bender, *Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Institutions in Nineteenth Century America* (Baltimore & London: The JHU Press, 1975) and the popularity of *Candide* is attributed to its regular inclusion in dramatic form in repertory theater and its high cultural niche has been vaunted through Leonard Bern stein's operatic score.

4. Peter Gay, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-200.

5. *Ibid*

6. *Ibid.*, pp.198-200.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. See Betsy Morris, "Young and Old Alike Can Lead Lonely Lives in the New U.S. Suburbs," and "New Suburbs Tackle City Ills While Lacking a Sense of Community," Jeffrey M. Elliot, ed. *Annual Edition: Urban Society*, 4th edition (Guilford, Conn.: The Duskin Publishing Group, 1989). These articles were regularly published in the *World Street Journal*, March 26 and 27, 1987.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, p. 55

13. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

19. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1963); See Harry C. Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980); Harry C. Boyte, *Community Is Possible: Repairing America's Roots* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); James V. Cunningham and Milton Kotler, *Building Neighborhood Organizations* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1983); Ed. Marciniak, *Reversing Urban Decline* (Washington, D.C.: National Center for

Urban Ethnic Affairs, 1981); Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).

Chapter V The Traditional Self in a Changing Society

Richard A. Graham

There tends to be a difference between East and West and between the free market and the socialist societies, on what the place of the person in society should be. It stems from a difference in emphasis on whether individuals create societies or whether societies create individuals. In both East and West and in both kinds of societies, there is now an issue of great urgency: how can individuals be educated for the modern world without loss of cultural identity? It is closely akin to the question: how can a diversity of cultural traditions be preserved while, at the same time, a sense of a multi-cultural nationhood is strengthened?

These issues have become salient in hundreds of traditional societies now undergoing rapid social change. Traditional social values are changing rapidly in most of the world's societies and, because of it, great numbers of persons now feel uprooted. They sense both a weakening of authority in their society and insufficient authority within themselves. Many of them sense a need for greater authority from cultural traditions or from religion but are wary of increasing the authority of the state.

In the small group of philosophers that came to Catholic University from around the world to consider those issues, there was general agreement that a society does much to provide a kind of authority that helps to shape an individual and that individuals, through shared beliefs that guide or constrain the leaders of a society, preserve and, to some degree, shape society. There was little agreement however on whether societies tend to progress, or tend to maintain a fixed character or whether they tend to respond to some kind of cycle, some kind of ebb and flow of civilization.

Although the participants in this semester-long discussion came from quite different cultures, the methods of analysis were much alike. They tend to re-sort the thought of prominent philosophers in the light of history and anthropology and of slowly changing religious doctrine.

I want to speak from a different perspective, the perspective of human development as it is viewed in light of developmental psychology. I want to look to recent research, most of it naturalistic, some of it experimental. I want to suggest how this work can provide insights on the reasons for the perception that many of the world's cultures are now threatened and that a great number of individuals in these societies sense themselves uprooted. I believe that this research may help to show why in time more individuals in more societies throughout the world may come to find a more integrated sense of self in a more lawful society of humankind and why progress is a more likely descriptor of the future of persons and societies than is a fixed human nature and a fixed character of a society. I hope to show why progress is a more likely metaphor for societies and civilizations than cycles or the swings of a pendulum. I would like to go on to give reasons for believing that the changes that are occurring in the place of the person in societies throughout the world tend to represent progress and that the changes are mostly for the good. This then is an essay in three parts. The first a weighing of evidence, from a psychologists' perspective, of what the individual has been in society, is now, and is in the process of becoming. The second part is a resorting of philosophical conjecture about what individuals and societies ought to be and the third develops the conclusion that individuals and societies are gradually becoming what they ought to become.

I will draw in large part upon studies of the ways that individuals in each of some forty societies throughout the world have been found to develop their judgment about what is fair

between persons¹ and hence, what is the just way to act as an individual in society. I will draw as well upon hundreds of studies, stimulated by Lawrence Kohlberg and his colleagues at Harvard University on the step-by-step process by which an individual develops moral judgment. I believe that this growing body of research helps to explain why most people in most societies have looked to their cultural traditions for guidance on what is right and why increasing numbers of people no longer do so. I believe that the research helps to explain what happens when individuals or their societies decide that their traditions are not an adequate basis for judging right and wrong, but have not yet settled on a better basis of judgment.

Over the past thirty years Kohlberg and others² have noted that in each of the societies where longitudinal studies were conducted an individual's judgment progresses in an invariant stage-by-stage sequence. This progress in reasoning takes place without skipping a stage and without regression to a lower stage, but also without assurance of continuous development to the higher stages. Development of judgment, it turns out, can be arrested at any stage and in all societies, for all but a few individuals, it is arrested. But it is arrested before it reaches the highest stage for which reliable measures have been worked out. But the development of reason is arrested not for want of a person's inherent mental ability, rather for want of education and experience.

The stages of judgment are presented at greater length in Table I but, with considerable simplification, the sequence can be described as beginning for individual in every society at a stage where what is right is to do what the powerful command or to suffer the consequences. This reasoning is characteristic of young children, of some adults in primitive societies, and of a few adults like Adolph Eichmann even in modern societies. Right resides in the power of kings, fuhrers, general secretaries and presidents; or in unforgiving gods or nature.

Next, judgment develops to "do unto others as they do unto you," tit-for-tat or fair exchange. It is a pattern of judgment that is characteristic of children in the early elementary grades in modern societies and of many adults in primitive societies. An individual's judgment then progresses to "be guided by your cultural traditions" or "do what the members of your group or society expect of you" and next, to "do what your laws require."

These two latter stages of reasoning, taken together, are characteristic of the great majority of adults in modern nations throughout the world. But the judgment of increasing numbers of individuals in modern societies continues to progress beyond "do what your laws require" and, when it does, their reasoning begins to be guided by the principles of justice that are set forth in most constitutions of most constitutional democracies. It is upon these principles of justice that the laws of modern nations are ostensibly based.

This fifth stage of reasoning is often referred to as autonomous in that it is based not on social convention or cultural tradition or the laws of the state but rather upon the principles of justice arrived at through an individual's own reason. Generally, it is a stage of judgment arrived at after realization that the conventions and the laws of one's society all too frequently are in conflict with principles of justice.

The research data indicate, perhaps as strongly as social science research can that, in political terms, judgment develops in this sequence of five stages for everyone, everywhere, from (1) "raw power," to (2) "equal exchange," to (3) "cultural traditions and the expectations of associates," to (4) "legal nationalism," and, if judgment continues to develop, to (5) autonomous judgment that is congruent with "principled constitutionalism."

However, as an individual's judgment progresses to a new stage, it does not wipe out the content of thought that made sense at the previous stage. At the new stage of judgment the same content of information that has been acquired through education and experience is reorganized in

a new structure of reasoning so as to make greater sense in a greater variety of situations. The new structure of reasoning produces a higher order of fairness in answering the question "What is the truly right thing to do in this particular situation"?

In many situations a person neglects to ask "Is this fair and what should I do about it? He or she does not attend to an issue of fairness, does not exercise his or her own best judgment about what is fair and what he or she should do to make it more fair.

Hence, while the stage of an individual's reasoning can be measured with great reliability, this does not by itself tell much about the individual. There is much more to character than reasoning. Indeed, at the intermediate stages, knowing a person's structure of reasoning, does not tell much about how a person will behave. For those individuals whose reasoning is guided by their society's expectations, the group to which one belongs, the strength of affiliation with the group, the values that the group shares, and the strength with which members of the group hold to the values of their group tells more about how the person will behave. The structure of reasoning may be the same whether one belongs to a street gang or a scout troop. It is differences in the values of the group that largely determines differences in behavior.

The studies on which these findings are based have been conducted throughout the world in many kinds of societies, primitive, developing and modern. The studies, for the most part, have been conducted by psychologists and anthropologists who are native to the society. They have prepared structured interviews that are designed to be sensitive to the mores of the society and they administered them in the language of that society.³

I want to emphasize four things about these findings. First, that the content of knowledge present at an individual's earlier stages of reasoning is not replaced in later stages. The content is however reordered. In a sense, all that an individual has learned takes on a new coherence. For example, in moving from the third to the fourth stage of reasoning, the individual will retain his or her sense of cultural heritage as a basis for personal identity but, when attending to an issue of justice, he or she will judge what is right upon the basis of law as a social compact rather than upon the social conventions of his or her society.

Second, in the period of transition from one stage to another, that is, in the period when one structure of reasoning is sensed to be inadequate but a new structure of reasoning has not yet been consolidated, the individual feels uprooted. His or her underlying basis for both individual judgment and personal identity has been severed.⁴

Third, these are research findings, not just plausible opinions. They are findings from rigorous social science research that can be, and has been, duplicated time and again, research that meets well-established standards for validity and reliability. Further, it is not just empirical evidence. It is, in John Dewey's words, *readjusting intelligence*. The strength of Kohlberg's findings lies not so much in that they have been duplicated in dozens of societies as in their having been tested in practice and the theory refined in the light of that practice.

Drawing on Durkheim⁵, Dewey⁶, Piaget⁷, George Herbert Mead⁸, Vygotsky⁹, and others, Kohlberg helped establish "Just Communities" in prisons¹⁰ and inner city schools¹¹. In these small societies within a society the members develop a sense of community. They develop a sense of "we-ness" and they agree upon rules of conduct that are based upon fairness. In doing so, some of them complete the transition from the second stage of reasoning based upon "instrumental exchange" to the third stage based upon "do what the members of your group or society expect of you." A few, while a member of such a community, will then progress to the fourth stage of reasoning, namely, "do what the laws of your society require."

The fourth point I want to emphasize is that, alongside the sense of uprootedness that most individuals sense as they progress from one structure of reasoning to the succeeding stage, there is also a sense of uprootedness which can stem from rapid changes in the traditions of the society itself. Individuals who look to the culture and traditions of their society for standards of judgment, often sense personal uprootedness when a society has abandoned its traditional conventions but has not yet adopted replacements. Since the research indicates that a majority of individuals in a majority of the world's present societies look to cultural traditions as their basis for judgment of what is right or wrong, and since most of these societies are now undergoing rapid change in their conventions, a large number, perhaps a majority, of individuals throughout the world sense uprootedness. Add to this the growing number of individuals who are beginning to question their cultural traditions as a basis for judgment but have not yet progressed to reasoning based upon social compact or law--college freshman and sophomores throughout the world are typical examples--and add to this the growing number of individuals who are in transition between the stage of social compact and the stage of autonomous judgment--the Bazarovs and Raskolnikovs¹² of this world are extreme examples--and one can account for most of the uprootedness in any society.

If then, the natural course of development of human reasoning can account for much of the current uprootedness in the world, what are the future prospects for a more secure sense of self and purpose for the person in society? There is, according to the research, no turning back of reasoning for an individual though, unlike individuals, societies can regress for a time as they have under despots like Hitler and Stalin--but not for long, at least not theoretically. For there is strong evidence that the education and experience that is necessary for an individual to function well in a technological society also provides the foundation necessary for the development of moral judgment and a sense of personal identity that is less dependent upon the approval of others.¹³ This is not to say that one becomes less concerned about others. To the contrary, it is largely through taking responsibility in a democratic, pluralistic society, that a person gains the experience that promotes the development of greater ability to see things from the perspectives of others and, with it, a foundation for the development of higher stages of reasoning about what is fair.¹⁴

The education and experience necessary to think abstractly in matters of science or administration is however insufficient, by itself, for the development of advanced stages of moral judgment. It is not enough to be able to see things from the perspectives of others who are different. It is also necessary to exercise one's ability to see things from the perspectives of others. It is necessary to sort out duty and justice in ways that organize a new structure of reasoning about what is fair between individuals from a multitude of perspectives. It becomes a mental structure that is well integrated in the sense that it achieves coherence between an individual's rights and obligations and is well differentiated in the sense that it can be applied to a broad range of situations.¹⁵ But even at the stage of autonomous reasoning, an individual's capacity for moral judgment does not, by itself, guide behavior. One has to *attend* to issues of fairness in order to call judgment into play and one's attention is much influenced by one's capacity for empathy or caring and one's sense of responsibility in a particular situation. As studies by Augusto Blasi¹⁶ at the University of Massachusetts and by Klaus Heilkama¹⁷ at the University of Helsinki have demonstrated, a sense of responsibility to act is associated with an assessment that the situation provides reasonable assurance of the ability to act effectively. This includes assessment that external circumstances are sufficiently favorable to permit the individual to prevail in a course of action without neglecting other competing responsibilities.

But if human development research can account for why millions of people throughout the world feel uprooted in their societies, can this research, or some combination of research and philosophy, suggest a way out, a way for an individual to find a better place in society? Given the state of the world, is it likely that the individual will find a more coherent sense of self in a more lawful society of humankind? Are individuals and societies progressing toward greater order and justice? In effect, this is the question that man has wanted to answer above all others. Is the universe friendly to humankind? Is there a loving God? There are several bits and pieces of evidence and much in the way of philosophic thought to support an answer in the affirmative.

For hundreds of years philosophers and, more recently, psychologists, have dwelt upon the idea of a biogenetic law or a theory of biological recapitulation according to which the reasoning of an individual develops stage-by-stage, following the same patterns of normative thought that have developed in societies over the centuries. Physiologically the human foetus appears to develop in a way parallel to the evolution of the human species and, psychologically, the development of children in modern societies appears in some ways to reflect stages in the historical development of human consciousness. There has been little agreement that this rule-governed repetition has bearing on mental and moral development or that, sociologically, the development of societies tends to parallel human psychological development. Yet, around the turn of the century, Leonard Trelawney Hobbes made a case for this idea and Kohlberg has argued that his research supports it. The corresponding argument, that the development of the human species recapitulates the physical and mental development of its most highly developed individuals has not, to my knowledge, been made though some evidence for it might be found in the physical development of the human species and, implicit in Kohlberg's research, is the finding that the species is moving toward the wisdom of Socrates and the moral judgment of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. That there is a natural groping toward greater strength and wisdom seems undeniable.

Philosophers have long seen the human quest as a search for meaning. As Jerome Bruner has observed from his studies of very young children, "From the start, the human infant is active in seeking out regularities in the world about him--behavior from early on is guided by means-end readiness and by search--(that produces) active pleasure from successful prediction."¹⁹ This search for meaning arises, as Spinoza²⁰ perceived it, from the *oonatus*, the tendency to self-preservation which is common to all living things in Nature, human and non-human. But, for humans, preservation of the self and of the species as well, appears to involve a natural and necessary tendency of the human organism to maintain and increase its own power and perfection. As Teilhard de Char din²¹ saw it, it is the drive to the evolution of a progressively more conscious mind.

As indicated by the research on the development of judgment described above, everyone, everywhere is engaged in a search for more reasonable authority. As Kohlberg observed in "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development,"²² the search for authority not only *is* a universal characteristic of the human species, but *ought* to be. It ought to be in that the search, until it is arrested by forces too strong for the individual, leads to a greater sense of the order of things, a greater equilibrium of reasoning. The psychological theory that has been developed from Kohlberg's research as to why people factually *do prefer* a higher stage of reasoning to a lower is broadly the same as a moral theory as to why people *should* prefer a higher stage of judgment to a lower. However, while psychological theory and normative ethical theory are not reducible to each other, the two enterprises are isomorphic or parallel. The *formal psychological* developmental criteria of differentiation and integration, of structural equilibrium, map into the *formal moral* criteria of prescriptiveness and

universality. At the higher stages of reasoning there is greater prescriptiveness about what a person ought to do and greater universality in its application. In effect, the categorical imperative becomes self-developed by an individual.

In his conclusion to "From Is to Ought" Kohlberg claims to have found no better summary statement of the implications of his studies than that made by Socrates:

First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture.

Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.

Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good.

Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.

Knowledge of the good, as Socrates says in the *Meno* is true knowledge, not right thinking and it is based upon reasoning that is autonomous not heteronomous. It is reasoning that approaches a universal perspective.

The development of more prescriptive and universal reasoning is then a major part of the development of the self and of self-realization. And according to Spinoza, self-realization is the fundamental striving of our nature. While we are all slaves to something, we can attain a stronger and more stable state of the self if we attain a stronger and more stable love of something that frees. The way to find it lies in trying to discover it and the discovery is in knowing the union of the mind with the whole of nature. As Teilhard saw it, according to the evolutionary structure of the world, we can only find our person in uniting together.

The search for authority in oneself and in God or nature involves an effort by each and every individual to reconstruct in his or her own mind an order of reasoning that reflects and interprets a pattern of order in nature. At the highest stage of reasoning where rights and obligations are seen as the same, the search leads to authority in natural law.

The findings of the research confirm the conclusions from the logic of St. Thomas Aquinas, that "there is in man an inclination to the good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law."²³

Though it may appear that fewer, not more people in the world are now law-abiding, it can be said, as it has since Plato, that error is always the privation of knowledge of the good. What human development research tells us is that right thinking about the good can be transmitted by cultural traditions or religious doctrine, but true knowledge must be developed by oneself in society.

Still the authority of natural law discovered through reason is, in effect the same as that of natural law revealed and accepted as authoritative by the individual through faith. It is the same because the act of finding authority in reason is itself an act of faith. It is faith in a progressively more lawful universe. It is faith that the record of the world as a speck of matter during an instant of cosmic time is indicative of God's true design.

The search for the place of the person in society is therefore a search for a means, not an end. To find the place of the person in society is to find a means to progress toward union with others. To find authority in the culture and traditions of one's society is one of a series of steps forward, the inescapable stage of the traditional self, which is one of several stages of human development that mark off the inevitable search for self-realization. It is a search that leads to finding authority in natural law.

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Notes

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Chapter VI Structures and Persons in the Modernization of Societies

Paul Peachey

My task is to respond sociologically regarding the place of the person in social life: in what manner and to what degree is the human self determined by social structure? In what manner and to what degree are social structures the products of the human "mind" or agency? Beyond that, is there a "core self," not reducible to its social antecedents? As this is a crosscultural and interdisciplinary study, I will comment first on problems of sociological approaches to the relations of persons and social structures, and then will address the consequences of societal modernization for the person_society nexus.

As we know, the above questions, indirectly if not directly, have engaged human thought from the beginning of recorded history. In the modern era, however, and particularly since the nineteenth century, new possibilities have arisen in our efforts to deal with them. Human mastery of environments, both physical and social, is vastly expanding. Processes and events that hitherto appeared inscrutable are being deciphered and brought under control. Mysteries once interpreted in moral and religious terms yield to empirical analysis. Contrary to older philosophical and religious traditions, the human phenomenon is now explicated in naturalistic terms. "Soul," "mind," and "spirit"--whatever be the referents of these terms--increasingly appear as mere epiphenomena.

These advances, however, come at the cost of profound dislocations in both culture and society. Social attachments, once rooted in kinship and locality, tend to dissolve, as do the values that reinforced them.

A litany of pathologies plague us--alienation, rootlessness, delinquency, crime, drug abuse, homelessness, broken marriages and families, and the like. Are these phenomena mere growing pains, we are left to wonder, or are they in fact endemic in modern societies? Does "modernization" in the end improve our human fate, or does it simply bring new misery?

The Discovery of Society

The 1989 inauguration of the new President of the United States marked the bicentennial of the first Inaugural. At the same time France observed the bicentennial of Bastille Day. These commemorations remind us that public recognition of the fact that kings do not rule by divine right, that human institutions are made on earth, not in heaven, is a recent and still precarious achievement in human history. However self_evident or inevitable this claim may appear to us today, our world is still in the throes of a turbulent transition from heaven_ to earth_made institutions and rule.

Concretely this transition, for which we now use the umbrella concept, modernization, means the attenuation, even the dissolution, of primordial interpersonal configurations of blood and land into individuals or "citizen isolates."¹ Thus atomized, these units become available for recombination into systems more extensive and ostensibly more rational, orderly and resilient than were the tradition_bound systems that preceded them. Liberty, fraternity and equality, the revolution of 1789 announced, would spring from the ashes of the *ancient regime*. Not everyone agreed, of course, and when disorder following the French revolution persisted well into the nineteenth century, second thoughts about the old order surfaced with increasing insistence.

In retrospect, medieval society came to be idealized for its communal solidarity. Edmund Burke, the conservative English critic of the French revolution, proposed that community, as embodied in medieval society, unites the living with the dead and the unborn. Human institutions cannot be dismantled or established arbitrarily. Auguste Comte, (1798_1857), the French scholar who coined the term 'socio logy' was another who found virtue in medieval society. The medieval order, he observed, possessed an organic solidarity that was violated by the atomistic and rational pretensions of the revolutions, both political and industrial. The task now was to reassemble the Humpty Dumpty that these revolutions had knocked off the wall. Comte himself, however, as a child of the Enlightenment that had sired the revolution, no longer accepted the faith that apparently had inspired and unified medieval society. The "Grand Being," he proposed, is not God, but rather society writ large. To replace the lost revealed faith he offered what he regarded as a demonstrable faith, namely positivism. In that new religion, scientists would replace priests.

Fortunately, Comte's new discipline, sociology, soon shed his extravagant claims, though traces of his illusions still persist. In any event, as sociology crystallized over the next half century, it was nurtured by other intellectual sources as well. These included utilitarianism and contract theory, the very individualism that Comte had sought to combat, as well as various traditions of social reform. Nonetheless a Comtean legacy survived in the postulate that social facts are *sui generis*, not reducible to biological or psychological antecedents. This postulate became the foundation of a new science. Emile Durkheim (1858_1917), heir to the Comtean legacy, made the consideration of "social facts" as "things" the "first rule of the sociological method."² That is, the forms and patterns of social intercourse are socially, rather than individually, engendered; personality likewise is socially constituted. This logic, when pursued unidimensionally, leads to the claim that "society is everything, the individual nothing."

In effect, thus, the overthrow of the *ancient regime* led to the discovery of "society," the discovery of the fact that groups, of whatever size or scale, display characteristics that transcend the individuals that comprise them. Accordingly the activities in which individuals engage are socially determined in ways that the participants themselves do not perceive. Even when individuals "choose," both the possibilities and constraints defining their choices are socially structured. These constraints are seen as irreducible, whether biologically or psychologically. Only in the limiting case can the individual step outside society. Thus, "if one were to ask for an expression, in a single sentence, of the main accomplishment and direction of the social sciences to date, a fair answer would be the progressive substitution of sociocultural explanations for those stressing the determinative influence of physical nature."³

As indicated, sociology, the new discipline that emerged, was nurtured by a variety of sources, including the very individualism that Comte and Durkheim set out to combat. John Stuart Mill (1872), though not an immediate founding father of sociology, made the point succinctly: "Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties . . . Human beings in societies have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man."⁴

How do we best explain human behavior: by moving from groups to individuals, or by moving from individuals to groups? Are persons explicable as functions of the groups to which they belong, or are we on firmer ground to view groups as emanations or functions of the persons that comprise them? Sociology is biased in favor of the former; indeed, strictly speaking, sociology does not deal with individuals as individuals. Explaining individual idiosyncracies is not a sociological task. No doubt, when speaking generally about human behavior, most sociologists would opt for both/and rather than either/or explanations. Operationally, however, it is difficult to

incorporate both perspectives in the same research instrument. Investigations that measure both, along with the interactions between them, are complex and demanding, and hence rare. Moreover, since specific research, by its very nature, is narrowly focused on discrete variables, broader, multidimensional configurations are inaccessible.

Consciousness: Epiphenomenal or Real?

Meanwhile the human self has fared rather badly in the hands of the social sciences. Social formations and patterns are analyzed without reference to human agents or persons. Moreover, the human self, if it exists, cannot be observed directly, and at best can be treated only inferentially. Consciousness, cognition, subjectivity, attitudes and intentions are deliberately excluded from some analytical modes. These categories represent mere epiphenomena, without relevance in causal analysis.

In part, these arguments are plausible enough. The human animal is a biosocial phenomenon, the product, thus, of heredity and environment, of nature and nurture. Sociology carved out its niche between the biological sciences on the one side and the humanities on the other. If, however, the social phenomenon is indeed *sui generis*, it cannot be reducible merely to biological determinisms, on the one hand, or to metaphysical postulates, on the other. Within limits, then, the sociological claim is defensible in both directions.

Similarly, on the biological side, only in limited respects can social analysis be conducted without biological reference, whether to genetic predispositions, bodily drives, or psychic processes. Today, perhaps partly in reaction to onesided sociological claims, biologicistic claims are being reasserted in the social domain, almost with a vengeance. Nonetheless human biology is unique in its anticipation of, and dependence upon, culture.⁵ As we know, Aristotle already aptly defined the human as a *zoon politikon*.

On the humanistic side, in premodern Western thought, reason was said to distinguish the human animal from other species. The metaphysical domain, to be attained only by the contemplative powers of the mind, was thought to be more real than the imperfect world of appearances. Whether one invoked religious or philosophical language—humans created in the Divine image or Plato's ideas—metaphysical rootedness accounted for human uniqueness. Today, as we know, these notions have been reversed. Disciplined empirical observation, not introspection, is the route to understanding. Nothing is in the mind that has not entered by way of the senses, Descartes and even Aristotle declared.⁶ Consciousness is now regarded by many analysts as merely epiphenomenal, "mind" as merely a function of the physiological processes of the brain: mentation as such is not an independent source of variation. The social process, then, is the key to understanding the person, but not vice versa.

This scheme, however, is quite an intellectual feat! For the "real" world, the world of daily life, does not operate in such terms. There we assume that "egos," "selves" and "persons" are real. We make promises and enter contracts, expecting and trusting the parties to fulfill them. We hold people accountable to observe the conventions that order our discourse. We have police to apprehend, courts to prosecute, and prisons to restrain those who violate the understandings on which our common life rests. Our whole artificial (versus 'given in nature') environment is the product of human agency. The fact that we cannot observe the self or account for its genesis does not signify its non-existence. Orderly human social intercourse is possible only if human agency is taken to be real. Admittedly today "medical" explanations of deviant behavior are invoked

increasingly. Though doubtlessly appropriate at times, this practice has also begun to cast a cloud of doubt over the accountability calculus. I will return to this problem below.

Self, Personality, and Social Structure

What does it mean to say that the human is a *zoon politikon*? First, human beings are dependent on others even for bodily survival, both in their prolonged infancy/childhood and beyond. Secondly, the development of the capacities, traits and skills that distinguish the human is a social outcome, initially a byproduct of physical dependency. Language, the vehicle of thought and communication, is socially produced and acquired. So fundamentally is this the case that we possess little information about human characteristics apart from, or outside of, group life or society. Without the company of others, the organism does not evince human traits. Persons normally bear the stamp of their particular social environment. Hence it seems appropriate to look for the antecedents of personality and behavior in the structure of the social setting in which persons live. We anticipate more or less congruence between personality structure and social structure in any given society.

Is this anticipation justified? First, what do we mean by social structure? This question illustrates a problem that bedevils all social research. Social phenomena are configurative and emergent in character; this is reflected in the language of social discourse. Key concepts such as community, society and family, refer to highly complex configurations of social experience. The terms employed are often metaphorical, and in any case are freighted with rich connotations accumulated by long and diverse usage. Scientific operation, on the other hand, is disaggregative, reductionist, and literal. Each variable, each term incorporated into an analytical procedure must be specifiable. While some social objects are readily identifiable and measurable—births and deaths, for example—most observations (and everyday terms) rest on mental constructs that must be decomposed to be empirically usable.

The concept of social structure is typical in this regard, though it also presents difficulties that are peculiar to it. It came into sociology analogically—societies resemble biological organisms. Within these, cells form specialized subsystems, serving entire organisms. Less frequently structural language evoked architectural and even geological imagery. Presumably, of course, any persisting entity, any pattern, any regularity possesses "structure." Regularities or patterns of social interaction thus fall under the general rubric of social structure. There is no single or standard definition of social structure. At that level of generality, several other terms have been used, in effect synonymously, among them notably "social organization," "social order" and, less frequently, "social system."

Social order seems to be used more frequently by writers other than sociologists. Among sociologists, however, structure and organization, when not defined technically, appear needlessly confused. Social organization, while obviously entailing structure, directs attention to the interdependence of dissimilar parts in an entity or system. It is aptly applied, therefore, to the institutional complex of the society. Institutional organization enables groups to act collectively as groups. Structure, on the other hand, refers to regularities generally, and thus includes far more than the mesh of institutions. Practically, this means that, apart from inclusively general uses, the concept of structure needs to be qualified, as when we speak of role or class structure.

Though a widely used conceptual tool, in recent decades "structure" has also been used to designate theoretical schools—"structuralism," originating in French social anthropology, and "structural functionalism," in American sociology. Radcliffe-Brown defined structure as "a set of

relatively stable patterned relationship of units," a definition that foreshadowed the early formulation of Talcott P arsons, the leading exponent of structural functionalism in American sociology.⁷ Survival exigencies in societies generate functional specializations (institutions); hence the term, "structural functional." Structure, for Parsons, was rooted in the normative order. Thus the social and cultural structures were seen as linked. Though functional requirements were universal, concrete structures were seen as situation specific.

Role and Class in Social Structure

Individuals enter groups and society by assuming and performing roles, which are determined reciprocally and systemically in aggregate contexts. Women become wives when they take husbands, and vice versa. Sex is biologically given; wifeness and husbandness are social emergents, as are roles generally. As emergents, roles are ordered rather than randomly related. Ordering is embedded in the distributive processes. Hence the concept of "social structure" has served most effectively in role and (social) class analysis. Order entails functional hierarchy and rank. Hence, when the term, social structure, appears, we are likely to think of stratification and class phenomena.

The point has been dramatized in the legacy of Marx, one of sociology's primary founding fathers, and underscored in other modes of reasoning by human ecologists. Key social positions arise in the adaptive process to constraints in the material environment. These positions are structurally, rather than volitionally, generated. Marx's phrasing is familiar: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." His *opus* endlessly elaborates this postulate. Positions and relations in the productive process determine and shape individual and group chances in the social process generally. But Marx also takes a further step. The "ensemble of social relations," thus constituted, constitute "the human essence" (*Theses on Feuerbach*).

Thus Marx can be read as a radical structural determinist though, proceeding from a humanistic premise, he predicted a humanist outcome: in a classless future the contradiction between structure and freedom will evaporate. Meanwhile, however, in Marxist practice, persons tend to disappear. That, indeed, is the potential outcome of all structural theory. Strictly speaking, if social systems consist of related positions, those systems can be analyzed without reference to the individuals that occupy specific positions. Individuals are dispensable and interchangeable; organizational charts posted in head offices and textbooks illustrate the point. In modern states key government offices are fixed constitutionally, and elections are held periodically, not to create, but to fill, offices. The king is dead; long live the king!

Role theory, as already intimated, when elevated to the level of general theory, quickly leads to an "oversocialized conception of man."⁸ Max Weber, who has been called the "bourgeois Marx," though accepting from Marx the importance of economic determinants, rejected the causal monism that Marx's formula entailed. "Action is social," Weber proposed, "in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course."⁹ In effect, Weber did, what George H. Mead was to demand decades later in his 1963 presidential address to the American Sociological Association: he brought "men back in" to sociological analysis.¹⁰

Human beings are not only objects acted upon by forces outside themselves. They are also subjects, agents, who initiate events. Human beings, in sociological jargon, must be recognized as both "dependent" and "independent" variables. The duality of *homo internus* and *homo*

externus was recognized long before the rise of sociology as a discipline. Martin Luther, for example, wrote: "I said time and time again that one should distinguish official function and person ality."¹¹ That is, neither the role nor the structure in which it is embedded fully embraces nor constitutes the *homo internus*. To the contrary, while structure determines personality, human actions and interactions in turn create and recreate structures.¹²

Sociological reasoning is thus necessarily "dialectical" and perhaps all too often, circular. For example, in the immediate post World War II decades, American cities underwent a "suburban explosion." By the time the explosion climaxed, the metropolis had become the habitat of the model American family. Suburban housing and land use entailed important departures from both urban and small town patterns. Social critics pounced quickly on the social impact of these new environments. Large residential tracts, isolated from the "real world" and monotonously uniform in architecture, were said to produce conformist and superficially cuddly, middle class "life styles." The structure of this environment was seen as having directly negative consequences for the quality of life.¹³

Field studies, however, soon yielded a quite different account. Researchers found that the values and life styles that showed up in the suburbs were not the product of the new settlement (the "structure"), but were brought there by the residents themselves. The new residents continued to live as they had lived before moving to the their new locations. The social patterns or "structures" characterizing the new settlements for the moment appeared as products rather than producers.¹⁴ Admittedly, at another level, the move to the suburbs itself could be described as "structurally" determined. Housing types were grouped by price and style. Incomes determined where people were likely or unlikely to locate. And incomes tended to correspond to other social class variables, notably education and occupation. Whatever the idiosyncratic variables affecting individual family choices to move to the suburbs, structural determinants filtered the population flow, setting both the limits and the chances for the families who nonetheless decided, one by one, whether to move or not.

Modernization and the "Empty Self"

There is little justification today to debate the priority of structure and agency in the social process in either/or terms. As societies, structures and values evolve, the tide ebbs and flows. There will always be fresh analytical work to be done on both sides of the equation. Phenomena become more complex, and research technologies more sophisticated. But the wheel need not be reinvented. We need not demonstrate ever anew the power of the structures that operate behind our backs. Rather, we need somehow to plumb and to order the unstructured void into which advancing modernization has plunged the isolated self. The revolutions that constitute the modern era liberated us from the parochial bonds of kin and place, from the ignorance, want, disease, superstitions, and bigotry that "determined" existence during the "dark ages." But it has left many "citizen isolates," stranded alone, as it were, on a dark windswept psychic desert. Persons thus stranded have reason to wonder whether the cure, modernization, may not be worse than the malady of premodern underdevelopment.

We all owe our freedom, the possibility of choosing our own individual destinies, to the rise of society (*Gesellschaft*). Only with the rise of role_based systems of interaction, overarching the person_based groups of kin and place that characterized pre_modern societies, can we surmount the identities ascribed to us by the accidents of birth.

Impressed by this transformation, some analysts conclude that all communal formations (*Gemeinschaft*), including marriage, family, clans, localities and parishes, are destined to disappear. A few enthusiasts have already come forward with celebrative epitaphs for the passing family.

Such celebration doubtless is premature. Familial, local and religious energies possess regenerative energies that are not to be written off. Nonetheless de_familizing, de_localizing, de_sacralizing, and de_moralizing processes continue unabated, and great numbers of individuals and families find themselves already isolated in the communal void noted above. Whether the communal vitalities now manifest in American society represent a defensive retreat or new growth is hardly clear. In any case, too many people are cursing the darkness, too few are lighting candles.

Personal community, all evidence suggests, is essential to the socialization of the young and, in differing manner and degree, to the stabilization of the adult. Personal communities are in part role_based, insofar resembling such larger, role based systems as associations, corporations and bureaucracies, whether public or private. Families, too, are constituted by system positions: wife-husband, son-daughter, and the like. But families are families by virtue of the fact that the core self is engaged and committed. In role_based systems, on the other hand, the core self remains peripheral. Moreover, in families and all communal configurations role-sets overlap. Because the same people are continuously reencountered in different though overlapping role-contexts, the core self is exposed and committed to a much greater degree than is the case in secondary associations. Any particular transaction is related to, and has consequences for, other networks. The local merchant and his customers are also neighbors, relatives, fellow parishioners and the like. Overlapping obligations hover in the background of any particular transaction, constituting thus a moral fabric that knits the community. This same matrix bestows social location and identities to the young, and hence also framework and meaning.

When the communal fabric weakens, personal identity, social location, meaning and values are no longer bestowed (imposed) by communal groups, whether family or other, but are chosen by individuals from among the medley of alternatives surrounding them.¹⁵ Ego_based networks and "life style enclaves" replace solidary groups. Many, for reasons beyond their control, find the burden of choice overwhelming and fail in the effort. The result, as traced in a recent, widely_cited study, is an "empty self." The empty self is one that is freed from external constraints, ostensibly responsible only to itself. Such a self, Bellah and associates write, "makes sense in a particular institutional context__that of the upward mobility of the middle_class individual who must leave home and church in order to succeed in an impersonal world of rationality and competition." They contrast the "empty self" with a "constituted self" that makes sense in another institutional context, namely, "in the full sense of the word, community."¹⁶ These two self concepts are "analytical constructs," neither extreme appearing concretely in the world. Nonetheless, they conclude that today we all "live somewhere between the empty and the constituted self." Our society, however, pushes us toward the former pole, toward an illusory "quest for purely private fulfillment" that "often ends in emptiness instead." This study, based on surveys and interviews, found much evidence of "empty selves" in American society, selves "socially unsituated," "ever more detached from the social and cultural contexts that embody . . . traditions."

Philip Rieff offers a far more devastating critique in *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*. He outlines as follows a Freudian interpretation of the modern experience:

We have seen that in the classical tradition of social theory the sense of well_being of the individual was dependent on his full, participant membership in a community. The other traditional theory, also powerful and by now equally venerable, was that men must be free themselves from

binding attachments to communal purposes in order to express more freely their individualities. A third view entered at this point: that there is no positive community now within which the individual can merge himself therapeutically.¹⁷

Freud, lacking "a constructive theory and (seeing) no therapeutically effective communities to which he could refer the patient in the post-analytic situation" espoused this third view. Whatever his disagreements with Freud, to Rieff the "triumph of the therapeutic" means "a profound effort to end the primary group moral passion (operating first through the family) as the inner dynamic of social order. Crowded more and more together, we are learning to live more distantly from one another in strategically varied and numerous contacts, rather than in the oppressive warmth of family and a few friends."¹⁸ The "scientific endeavor in its entirety" is committed to the creation of "a non-moral culture," while the scientist, "in the established sense of the word, as such, has no culture."¹⁹ Beyond "the strengthening of the individual ego" (against both id and superego), Rieff concludes, Freud offered little hope.

Renewing Community or Strengthening Egos?

Rieff's is a chilling verdict. If communal decline and rampant individualism are the source of breakdown in our culture, what hope is there in strengthening egos, thus encouraging more individualism? I am not competent to critique Freud, but am prepared to argue that Rieff's conclusion is not to be rejected out of hand. For however implausible his asocial and amoral view of human destiny, he confronts us with what may be the most conspicuous failure of the social sciences, namely our evasion of the self. Though tirelessly stressing the social nature of personality, we regularly evade the core of the self that transcends "the ensemble of our social relations." In sociology, indeed in the social sciences generally, we operate without an adequate, commonly assumed anthropology; that is, a concept of the human person .

Descriptively, Rieff may be right. Modernization dissolves the solidary groups of traditional populations into role-based systems, on the one side, and autonomous individuals, on the other. Already in 1860, Henry Sumner Maine, the English legal historian, wrote that in "progressive societies . . . the Individual is steadily substituted for the Family as the unit of which the laws take account."²⁰ Since then, the social sciences have been fascinated by the vast new role-based systems and organizations, mobilizing these now-detached individuals to fill them. Controlling and transforming these formations is indeed a daunting task, and here information and insights generated by the social sciences are indispensable. Nonetheless, in their preoccupation with these macro systems, the sciences have too little noted the consequences, both positive and negative, of this substitution of the "Individual" for the solidary group in the scheme of things.

How can or will our communal capital be renewed? Currently, in the United States, even at best we are merely "muddling through," marking time, as it were. Rescinding the personalism that has grown over the centuries is clearly not an option. But it is likewise clear that in this country our basic communal cohesion is in jeopardy. Though there are problems requiring structural reform, our problems appear to lie deeper. To return to the language of Bellah, the modern self needs to be reconstituted if the "empty self" is to be overcome. Once the society is individuated, social cohesion becomes a function of responsible selves rather than the converse.

In the American context, as we have seen, the sciences have tended to reduce or assimilate the human self to its biological and/or social constituents. Meanwhile, religion and philosophy remained the principal trustees of the transcendental dimensions of the self. But religious thought has been burdened either by pre-modern idioms in thought and practice, or in the other direction

by too-ready capitulation to fads in these regards. More seriously both religion (in this case, Christianity) and philosophy struggle with the collapse of traditional metaphysics to which I alluded above.

Nonetheless, despite the seriousness of our problems, the outlook is far from bleak. The crisis clarifies issues that previously appeared muddled. To illustrate the possibilities I cite some theological observations offered by Albert Outler, a Protestant scholar who served as observer at Vatican II. Outler, citing Rieff, takes note of the "mercurial shifts in popular opinion in recent years . . . that are functions of the cataclysmic collapse of the moral_demand systems that have guided Western society (more or less) for two millennia." The focal question becomes, "what is the truly human, what are its real origins and grounds, what are its valid ends? If the human person is understood as divine intention, with a transcendental ground and context, this will surely guide our analysis of its origins." But while describing the collapse of 'moral_demand' systems as catastrophic, he nonetheless sees "the deepest confusion in the debate" stemming from "the tradition of body_soul dualism" descending from Persia via Greece through Western philosophy and theology to our own times. "It is confusing, since all its versions involve some kind of invidious comparison between 'lower' and 'higher' levels in the humanum, and it commits one to some sort of 'magic moment theory' as to when and how animal tissue becomes 'ensouled' or 'animated'__and hence some 'magic moment' along the human lifeline when the defenseless finally deserves to be defended."

Outler challenging the adequacy of the notion "that human values are created and validated by social consensus" (merely), affirms theologically and "without embarrassment," that the primal origins, the continuing ground, and final ends of human life are truly transcendental. In the Christian tradition, at least, to be human and personal is to be God's own special creation. Our lives and our potential are ours on trust from God. They are, therefore, never at our own selfish disposal. All our human experiences (identity, freedom, insight, hope, love) are also self_transcending despite their being bracketed in space and time. The humanum is a genuine oddity, differing from its animal congeners not only in kind but in degree as well. . . .

Terms like 'person,' 'personality,' 'personhood,' 'self' are all code words for a trans_empirical reality. Whatever it is that they denote does not 'exist' in space and time or in the causal nexus; all our efforts at introspection are infinitely regressive. 'Personhood' is not a part of the human organism, nor is it inserted into a process of organic development at some magic moment. It is the human organism oriented toward its transcendental matrix, in which it lives and moves and has its human being. The self is 'there' long before self_consciousness or any self_conscious acceptance or rejection of the primal intention which it represents.²¹

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Chapter VII
The Person, Society and the State
Bronius Kuzmickas

In the European cultural tradition it is almost unquestionable that personhood is the essence of the human being, making one a being of moral worth. However, there are innumerable philosophical, psychological and sociological theories or conceptions about what personhood is, that is, what it means to be an individual, a personality, a person.

Philosophies of Individual and Society

In the history of philosophy we can distinguish two main philosophical conceptions of person. Both attempt to interpret an evident fact, namely, that the person, understood as an individual having spiritual life, contains in itself an awareness of self-identity, is capable of performing free acts, and realizes itself as a social agent engaged in various areas of social life in relation to other persons. Representatives of one current of thought emphasize the individual as the primary human reality and affirm that one's social relations have an external or peripheral, rather than an essential, character. As a person each is what he is in his own right as a unique individual or autonomous ego. Relations with other persons, social relations of various kinds, are secondary and can add nothing fundamental to personhood. Supposedly all relationships could be stripped away one after another until all that remained would be the person as pure, indivisible individuality.

According to another current of thought, on the contrary, the essence of the person consists in mutuality, interpersonal relations or involvement in the life of the community or society. One theory sees the primary and fundamental human reality as persons-in-relation. Others see the individual as involved in a variety of social relations, cultural contexts and historicity from birth to death. During their lifetimes all are directly or indirectly interrelated on various levels of social reality--from empirical face-to-face contacts in everyday life to the metaphysical unity of all mankind with God. Interpersonal relationships and relations between the person and community are intrinsic to the personhood of a man, for only through one's interpersonal context can a person express the uniqueness of one's individuality, develop one's individual creative abilities and manifest oneself as a free social agent. Were the relations among people, between the person and the community, to be taken away the person would disappear and individuality would lose its meaning or become "empty."

Both of the above-mentioned points of view reveal essential elements of the human being, but also contain weaknesses; both can become extremely one-sided. Either the person is dissolved into society, loses his autonomy or capability of performing free acts, and is reduced to a passive element in the chain of social determinism; or the person is treated as a unique individual, a subject of limitless free actions, an unconceivable mystery.

Concurrently, there are synthesizing theories which take into consideration both individuality and relationality as essential dimensions of personhood. Nowadays, philosophical theories tend to emphasize the exploration of several interrelated dimensions of human existence:

- subjectivity or interiority, and one's relatedness to the world of other persons and to cultural values;

- the fact that the person manifests him/herself as a self-aware individual, but also that every act of self-awareness implies the awareness of a being-in-the-world;
- being-in-the-world is seen as being-in-community and for-community, as sharing with other persons a situation, historicity, choice and responsibility, and ultimately a common destiny as mortal beings;
- the temporality and historicity of the person, essential incompleteness, and the fact that personal fulfillment and completion is achieved through involvement in various levels of community; and
- every person in his subjective intimacy exists as such, while as a participant of a given culture one is inseparable from the other participants of the same culture.

Theoretical Models and Historical Practice

The matter is not that one or another philosophical theory is better or worse with respect to its consistency and to the extent to which it corresponds to the facts of human reality. Philosophy is an inexact kind of knowing in comparison to scientific knowledge, while human reality, including society and culture, is so complicated and specific that we must reject the desire to have one trustworthy theory which would give most or all of the answers. We must give equal treatment to several theories explaining human reality in terms of realism or nominalism, universalism or singularism, determinism or indeterminism, eternalism or temporalism, and so on.

Most influential philosophical theories of man and psychological personality theories appear more compatible and complementary than contradictory: there are more areas in which they agree than contradict. As always, philosophers speak of the need for an all-encompassing, unified theory of man, but it is questionable whether such a theory is possible or indeed necessary. Other branches of social knowledge, too, lack a single, all-embracing theory of their subjects, yet in spite of this the sum total of these theories appears to be effective and productive for human life.

As a unification of person and society, the human being exists in a concrete historical context. The same could be said of various theories, their applicability and their meaning for real life. Most philosophical theories are not engaged in social reality, nor do they pretend to be, but function rather as abstract models, as phenomena of culture. However, some theories of society do pretend to be effective forces in the reconstruction of social relations and in cultivating a "new man." But solutions to problems of person and society on a theoretical level do not always help to solve problems of persons in actual society. We are confronted with the cases of disillusionment in history, when supposedly good programs, based on humanistic theories, in practice give highly undesirable consequences. Mankind has numerous bitter experiences of this. In such cases we must differentiate strictly the fundamental theoretical models from their political interpretations and practical incarnations. Throughout history these deceptions resurrect old problems, give them new meaning and stimulate new solutions. The practical embodiment of social theories as well as the capability of theoretical thinking to reflect an historical reality requires new theories to treat the relation between theory and practice.

Society is characterized by such attributes as spontaneity, the self-contained social, economic, political, cultural and religious activity of its members, and their capacity to interact and cooperate. One of the essential dimensions of society is its political organization, embodied in the institution of state. Usually, society and the state are connected by mutual relations. The state exerts an influence upon society through a network of governmental institutions--administrative, legislative, political, ideological, etc. The character of the direct or indirect interrelationships between society

and the state determine to a great extent the character of the person's place in society. Notions characterizing the person's life in society as regards rights and duties, just ice, freed om, responsibility, citizenship, as well as individualism and collectivism, acquire different meaning depending upon the character of the relationship between society and state. Therefore, in considering theoretically the problem of the relation of person and society it is very important to pay suitable attention to the concrete historical experience and to specify concretely the society which is being treated.

In the Twentieth century we experience an historical reality which in essence may be defined as "a violent decrease of the contractual relationships in favor of compulsory (mainly) and (to a lesser degree) family forms. The contractual relationships, which functioned so successfully in the preceding era, in the postwar period have been in a decisive and rapid decline."¹ In the history of this trend there emerged a kind of state corresponding to this political theory and aimed at the fundamental reconstruction of society. In this social reality the interaction of society and state is so one-sided, that the state prescribes and controls all important social relationships--all institutions in all the significant fields of social and cultural life. The state exaggerates its own role and practically becomes an end in itself and for itself. Almost no area of relationship between person and society is left to mutual choice and the free contractual decision of the parties involved; all is authoritatively regulated and controlled. The political ideology of the state becomes a kind of state religion. Superior to all other social institutions, it is imposed on all members of society under the severest penalty for unfaithfulness. Ideological solutions are treated as infallible statements, and provide the principles for solutions in all other fields of social life.

Ideological loyalty is a main criterion of civil loyalty. The law itself must obey the state and its ideology. All laws which are not consistent with the superiority of the state are eliminated, as are any such scientific theories, moral convictions or religious beliefs. Therefore, la w loses its validity; it ceases to be a system of norms which assures the free activity of persons, and becomes instead an apparatus of social pressure and constraint. In such a political situation every theoretical proposition concerning the problem of per son and society acquires an additional, at times transformed and perverted sense.

The ideology declares that in this society man is the supreme value; that human life is most precious; that the ultimate end of all social and state efforts is the creation of social conditions which enable everyone to become a well-rounded, developed personality; and that the higher standard of development of one person serves as a precondition for the higher development of others. Here, however, the problem of means and ends arises and the means leading to this great end remains quite vague. The question emerges: to what extent can the life of a common man be sacrificed for the sake of the future? (There seems to be an essential difference between the unavoidable social reality in which man unintentionally becomes the means, versus the deliberate use of man as a means for society, for the state, for the happiness of future generations, or whatever.)

The indistinctness of this question is not merely theoretical in nature. When ide ology has unquestionable supremacy in the structure of a given society, lawfulness is largely neglected. As a consequence, in real life the common man is neglected or even disregarded as a person and citizen. On the ideological level it is supposed that in the face of great historical purposes the needs of today's man are quite insignificant. In this type of society the legal, juridical sphere of a man's life is considered non-essential. While from an official point of view every man is considered to be a builder of the "new life," in actuality to a great extent he is deprived of the possibility of realizing himself publicly as a morally worthy person, a citizen and an active subject of social life.

As a consequence, in reality man has almost unlimited duties imposed by the state, but very few rights which juridically are exactly defined and practically guaranteed. In many cases he is called upon to sacrifice himself, to work hard without adequate payment. People are unlawfully convicted without trial or investigation; many ethnic and national groups have been exiled from their homelands. A great humanistic ideal loses its authentic content and turns into an ideological screen, helping to justify the political omnipotence of the state.

The Depersonalization of the Person

As Marxist philosophy affirms, human reality is essentially social, for man as a personality can be realized only in a social context. One of the practical consequences of this general outlook is an emphasis upon collectivism as a mode of life--as the sole means by which personality can achieve its fulfillment and social integration. But there are different forms of collectivism. In one form it is a social unity of free and worthy persons joined together by general goals and views. Here everyone's interests are respected, the primacy of the person is preserved. However, there is another form of collectivism in which the person is neglected, while the collective interest is considered primary and superior in comparison to those of the person. It is precisely this kind of collectivism with which we are dealing here.

Collectivity of this kind is unable to unite men on the level of their highest aspirations. It reveals itself not to be favorable to personal development, but on the contrary to restrict personal growth. Such collectivity functions as the safeguard of mediocrity; it stimulates and maintains an attitude of conformism, double-facedness and hypocrisy. There is no such thing as effective unity between persons based upon that continuing trust on which a normal community depends. Mutual affection decreases and nearly disappears.

Such collectivism is typical in a society ruled by authoritarian principles. Essentially in such cases the collective itself functions not as an autonomous social unit, but as subdued by the state, just as the individual is subdued by the collective. Therefore, a collective in the true sense of community is almost impossible, for society is so subdued to the state by which it is suppressed that it is near extinction. In a paradoxical way we may speak of a society in which there is no society as characterized by self-contained activity on the part of its members. Here the question arises--what kind of personality is typical in this kind of system?

In a collective which is subjected to state institutions personal features which overstep the standard of mediocrity are hardly tolerated. Any kind of originality, abilities, non-stereotypical opinions, creative aspirations or deep-rooted morality are not encouraged. Personality is identified with the social role of the individual, or with one's official post: the inner man is neglected. Thus, it becomes difficult to develop a personality with an independent and rich inner world, freely manifesting itself in society as an active citizen with a deep-rooted feeling of social responsibility. Instead, there is an official commanding superior, on the one hand, and obedient, submissive subordinates on the other.

Granted that person hood is essential to human existence, we can distinguish in it roughly two dimensions: personality and person. Man is an integral, though multidimensional being, existing at the cross-road of freedom and determinism. As personality, however, one is orientated to the realm of values and is rooted in freedom; as a person one is subject to causation and is rooted in social and historical determinations and conditions. This does not mean that as a person one is excluded from the area of values and freedom, but only that values and freedom are not essential for the person.

As a person man is a rule-following being, a bearer of social roles; he performs free acts only in accordance with concrete social norms and patterns--whether administrative, judicial or political. Personality, however, is the whole of an individual's spiritual life, the center of which is conscience, a feeling of personal identity, freedom and striving for an authentic and meaningful life. Thus, whereas a person one is submissive to the outer world, socialized through social roles, involved in a chain of social determination, and changes with the changes of social reality, personality, in contrast, is "the unchanging in change, unity in the manifold."²

Person and personality to some degree correspond, although not entirely. This depends on such factors as whether the kind of activity is creative or non-creative, the correspondence between aspirations and objective possibilities, and the type of society. In the society described above, where through an authoritarian collective one is subdued to the state, person and personality in most men are mutually alienated; as a rule one's inner world is more or less split into two faces: one official, the other inner or private. This division in man's inner world reflects an alienation of the social life, which "manifests itself as a splitting of the objective conditions for human existence into the public and the private conditions."³ To a certain extent this takes place in every society, but not to such a degree as in the society we are considering. There, man's inner split becomes a profound, if not essential, feature of his existence.

As a bearer of social roles, one manifests oneself as an anonymous individual, without an opinion of one's own, without initiative, without a live feeling of responsibility. In social life one plays a role that is alien to one's innermost self. From this side one is manifest as a full, loyal member of society (loyalty meaning no more than unconditional obedience) and expresses only the official point of view. Hence, according to circumstances, one can easily change one's opinion on public issues; one can extol and glorify an object one day and condemn the same object the next, because one expresses not one's own opinion, but the imposed outlook of such institutions as party, state or the like. When the official point of view is a half-truth, a falsehood or a deliberate lie, submissively one repeats all of this.

The inner face--covering almost the entire spiritual life of a man and including one's opinions, doubts and hesitations, one's conscience and feeling of responsibility--is private, deeply hidden and carefully masked. Also hidden is one's conscience; inner freedom is restricted; and the sense of moral responsibility is suppressed. Man has no possibilities; afraid of publicly expressing his own inner world, one's personality is suppressed.

Of course, one experiences a painful tension; the conflict and contradiction of the two faces bear grave consequences for the development of personality. One person may find it quite useful to be deliberately split, another endeavors to introduce an inner harmony by sacrificing some commitments in favor of others. But in the long run the two-facedness is regarded as something quite normal: the tension between the inner and outer sides of personal life fades, the two sides become closer and finally grow together in such a way that the private face is more and more subdued to the official one. One's spectrum of values narrows as one's capability for free thought, evaluation and action weakens. Personality becomes suppressed by person, or more precisely by the state through imposed social roles. Consequently, by-passing society, the state gains primacy over personality.

In such situations socialization of the individual means in part one's depersonalization, especially when we have in mind socialization on the level of the institutions of the state and its official ideological patterns. The more one climbs in civil service, the more one takes the risk of losing positive qualities of personality and turning into a passive object of manipulation. The state strives for the total ideological socialization of individuals, which means their total

depersonalization. The criterion for the evaluation of human life is found rather in personality: not in the higher values in which personality is rooted, but in the state's organization and ideology. When personality is suppressed, evil spreads uninhibited in society. Persons become only tools of the state, the party or any other political force. When a state disregards and violates humaneness, the person unwittingly becomes a tool of evil. In such social situations in which man becomes so depersonalized, an acute double problem develops: one is the personal fulfillment of the individual, the other is his or her social significance.

The Search for Meaning

As a thinking being one can live a fully satisfied life only if one understands its meaningfulness and thus can answer the fundamental question, "why?". Like other fundamental phenomena of human spiritual life the phenomenon of life's meaningfulness is constituted by the unity of two aspects--the subjective and the historical or objective. On the surface, life's meaningfulness presents itself as a subjective phenomenon, that is, as a feeling of authentic employment of one's abilities, of authentic fulfillment of one's life. In contrast, senselessness or meaninglessness present themselves as feelings of inauthentic and false employment of one's energies, of an inauthentic filling of time. These experiences, with their differing degree of emotional strength, all depend for their content upon the values of a culture, the ideals of a society.

The concept of the meaningful is tied closely to that of value. The employment of one's energies and the filling of one's time with activities which are based upon one's value aspirations is experienced as meaningful. An individual sees his life as meaningful to the degree that he can relate it to certain values, can employ his abilities for the achievement of positive goals and can arrange his time accordingly. Engagement in the pursuit of goals and values of the future and the sense of having done well in the past lend meaning to the present moment by including it within a wider canvas of meaning. Lack of prospect for meaningful activity, together with a conviction of senselessness or barrenness of the time lived deprive the present of value and purpose. The expectation of a future that is more perfect than the present lends a positive meaning to our existence in the present. The conviction that the past was more perfect than both the present and the future makes both the present and the future valueless and meaningless.⁴

A constructive or nonconstructive employment of one's capacities divides the responses to the demand for meaning. Greater meaningfulness for an individual's life is associated with free, constructive and personal engagement in the pursuit of values and higher goals. At the level of concrete social life, for most people the main condition for a meaningful life is constructive engagement in everyday work and interpersonal relations, the possibility to relate the fulfillment of personal life to higher values. A necessary subjective condition for a meaningful life is to overcome the split of the inner world.

It is these conditions that are lacking in the society we have been considering. There, for the most part, the socialization of the individual is on the level of internalization of social roles; it lacks socialization on the level of higher values. A split, two-faced person can hardly satisfy his fundamental need for authentic self-realization.

It is from culture that an individual draws concepts and ideas in the light of which he identifies and rationalizes his own valuational, sense-endowing experiences, and judges the norms and criteria which underlie his behavior and the course of his life. It is participation in a particular context of culture and history that shapes the content and articulation of a man's subjectivity and the orientation of his personality. Through the internalization of the basic values of a spiritual

culture one's personality is constituted and an individual person comes to participate in culture as a whole, to act as a responsible agent in history and to relate his destiny to the culture and history of his nation. This kind of integration into culture is the main condition for the meaningfulness of one's life. Under the influence of all-permeating ideological patterns, and the pressure of a bureaucratic system of education, however, most people cannot normally internalize the values of culture or develop an authentic personal value system which serves one's life orientation and shapes one's quest for a meaningful life.

Having no possibility of socialization on the level of higher cultural values, an individual has a very limited possibility of satisfying his fundamental need for authentic self-realization by the manifestation or objectification of his creative energies in the domain of culture and history. Individual persons, and even some social groups, often find themselves in a situation where the values and goals of their social context produce no positive subjective response: an individual finds no subjectively significant content in the objectively, officially posited values. This might be called a devaluation or "wearing down" of values. This is not merely a case of some officially posited values and ideals losing their sense for some people; it is rather the case of social activity and the sharing in historicity itself turning meaningless and irrational. Since the domain of official values and ideals is in many ways alienated from the actual historical experience of men, it has lost much of its ability to affect their subjectivity. Personal authenticity then is sought beyond social processes which are permeated by official ideology. Lending meaning to one's life becomes a purely private or personal affair, while official values and ideals are treated as false or useless.

Lack of free, constructive employment of a person's abilities makes life less meaningful or even deprives it of any personal value. One who is overburdened, wearied and exhausted by unfree, nonconstructive work feels acutely the lack of an authentic employment of one's abilities or prospects for meaningful activity, for personal engagement in the pursuit of higher values and goals. Because of this a sense of meaninglessness of life, leading to social apathy and moral indifference becomes widespread.

The supremacy of the state over society, of politics over other fields of social life exerts upon society a destructive influence. Society falls into separate parts, becomes atomized and partially paralyzed. When the role of the state is exaggerated, man as personality is ruined. One is reduced to being a passive performer of imposed social roles and one's capacity for social initiative and one's feeling of responsibility is almost extinguished. Without a developed personality deeply rooted in universal values, one can hardly give meaning to what one is doing, to how one's energies are realized; one can hardly be an active and responsible citizen. The society in which personality is diminished is doomed to economic, political and cultural stagnation.

When socially crucial periods of historical development occur persons are caught up in a swirl of events, the social significance of which are not matched by their own conception of meaning. As a result, to a great extent they are left without the possibility of authentic choice and authentic self-fulfillment in an area of historical activity. Lack or scarcity of subjectively significant historical values can be compensated for only by personal spiritual seeking and creative activity. When historical values present themselves in ways that are too indefinite and ambiguous, personal effort is needed.

An individual may not control what happens to him or to the community in which he lives, but the meaning he gives to what happens is subject to his active selection within the limits of his value horizon. An individual decides to which social law he gives priority--to the written, strictly fixed law of his state, or to unwritten ethical laws of a broad human community with which he shares basic values and ideals. The bases for compensatory activity are universal values in their

non-formal, non-ideologized interpretation, the national cultural and historical traditions, and an explicit rejection of the values of one's present social context. In the wake of this kind of activity so-called alternative cultures emerge with their own systems of values and beliefs.

Conclusion

As we have seen, a political situation in which the state or a certain political party dominates as an absolute ruler the rest of the social structure is extremely unfavorable for man as a personality and for personhood in general. However, such a political situation cannot be changed for a more suitable one by a single political act such as a palace revolution. It can be changed only by a long-term process of gradual democratization of a society, during which persons would have real opportunities to revive as personalities and citizens capable of free social--including political--actions.

The first stage of reviving personality in man seems to be an increase in such inward activity as reflection. The social reality is reevaluated by considering notions and concepts incompatible with official patterns: independent thinking induces an independent evaluation of reality.

Free thinking and evaluation can easily evolve into free action. Aside from bodily or physical movement, action "also includes intention (or cognition), sense-perception, choice, motive, and feeling, all of which are integrated with movement to constitute one continuous activity."⁵ Without delving into this matter I seek only to show that the performance of free acts, that is, the falling out of step of a determined chain of social roles is the first stage in becoming a member of the community, a citizen of real value. This, however, presupposes conquering the two-facedness of man, overcoming the alienation of subjectivity and historicity (objectivity), of personality and person.

Personality as the self's capacity for insight into values, for free action, self-initiative and self-determination, becomes so coordinated with concrete social activity that it determines what social roles one chooses and how it fulfills them. Such a way enables a revived personality to be brought into harmony with a person and, because of this, enables a man to be revived as a citizen. This is also the way to restore a priority of society over state, that is to restore a normal society so that society itself has the possibility of deciding what kind of a state it prefers to have.

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Notes

1. P. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. 3 (New York: Porter Sargeant, 1970), p. 118.
2. N. Berdyev, *Slavery and Freedom* (New York: Scribner, 1944), p. 22.
3. D. Kapaciauskiene, "The Moral Nature of Man," in *The Philosophical Understanding of Human Beings*, p. 31.
4. B. Kuzmickas, "The Meaning of Life: Subjectivity and Historicity," *ibid.*, (Vilnius, 1988), p. 44.
5. W.G. Jeffko, "Action, Personhood and Fact-Value," *The Thomist*, XL (1976), 121.

Chapter VII

Max Scheler's Personalism and Bourgeois Liberalism

Stephen Schneck

The legitimacy question facing contemporary political theory is quite different than the question of political legitimacy in past times.* All previous eras were faced with the puzzle of fashioning a polity which was attuned to the character, or the essence, or the end, or the nature of man. The unknown element to be discovered, the missing answer, was the formula for the good, correct and workable polity. To make the chains of political life legitimate, the polity needed only to reflect the soul of the philosopher, or draw together the wills of its citizens, or unite the worker with his artifice.

Today, posing the legitimacy question solely or primarily in terms of the legitimate polity is insufficient. Although the resolution of this question has never been more imperative, it has become obvious in our times that the quandary of the polity rests on a deeper quandary. Who is the person that is the philosopher, the citizen and the worker? What is he? How is he? Where is his place? It might be objected that such questions have been asked of ourselves since antiquity, that such questioning is inherent to human character. Yet the questions have never been asked with the urgency that marks them in our era. The crucial question of today is the question of being human. The dilemma of the legitimate polity, bound up with this crucial question, cannot be answered in abstraction from the deeper query. Rather, every inquiry into the polity must begin with and continually return to the endeavor to clarify our understanding of man.

In agreement with the foregoing, Max Scheler, philosopher, sociologist and cultural and political critic, considered the problematic of the liberal politics in our century. His thought is a rich, but little tilled ground for the social scientist whose concerns turn upon questions of the human situation. Indeed, the question of man--his character, existence and destiny--is the very nucleus about which the whole of Scheler's thinking revolves. Of interest to the social theorist, he rejects outright the individual ego as an acceptable starting point for understanding man, and from the first presents the web of acts which is the person as always and essentially an expression of the intersubjectivity which is the community. It is a sad irony, therefore, that it is only recently--more than fifty years since his death in Weimar Germany--that social and political theorists have begun to consider Max Scheler's works seriously in their own endeavors to comprehend the social and political world. In this vein, the present essay aims at reviewing Scheler's assessment of bourgeois liberalism (the dominant political paradigm of our day) in light of his broader treatment of the more basic question of being legitimately human. On this basis bourgeois liberalism is ultimately revealed to be: 1) untenable as a theory for understanding politics, and 2) normatively unacceptable as a guide for political action.

Scheler's treatment of liberalism is an on-going, peripheral theme throughout the corpus of his works. It is linked tightly with the core theme of his philosophy--i.e., the deeper quandary of contemporary man. While liberalism itself is seldom directly addressed, it nonetheless remains consistently in the background of his thought and writings. Scheler sees liberalism (with capitalism, positivism, scientism, and a host of other "isms") as an epiphenomenon of the emergence of a new type of man during the late Middle Ages, a type he terms the *bourgeois*. This new man, he argues, is the product of a self-inflicted evolution.¹ Christianity is stripped of both its sense of communal solidarity and its teleological linkage and hierarchical structure of world > man > God. Bourgeois man is thus left with irresolvable breaches between himself and others, and

between himself and the world. Recognizing this alienation and fueled by the passion of *ressentiment*, man's attitude becomes one of domination toward both the world and others. He seeks frantically by way of force in this regard to re-establish a semblance, however artificial, of the earlier world-man-God linkage.² The frantic scurrying leads to a boundless acquisitiveness and, with the loss of hierarchy, to a blind and indiscriminate greed for quantities of objects.

Concomitant with this self-inflicted evolution is the emergence of a conceptual, normative framework by which the world view of the bourgeois is rationalized and all questions of self, world and others are resolvable. It is within this framework that Scheler unearths some of the key structural conditions of liberalism. Four of these conditions are of special value for present concerns: 1) formalism, 2) individualism, 3) needs/utility motivation and 4) rationalism.

Formalism

Theoretically, liberalism posits the conception of civil society as a network of contracts, covenants, rules and procedures. Its conception of government is one of laws, not of women and men. That the liberal paradigm of politics in large measure depends upon formal structures is apparent. Early liberal thinkers erected their politics on the idea of the social contract, wherein members of society are bound together in association on the basis of formal *quid pro quo* agreements among themselves. In the theories of later liberal thinkers, where the operation of the polity is in some sense more concrete owing to the consideration of actual utility or pleasure, the process remains in large part formal when the motor of political action is reduced to a formal, mathematical aggregate of individual human desires. Clearly writers arguing for a categorical imperative, to the extent it can be interpreted as a maxim for the political order, can also only be seen as furthering the notion of formalism.³

Practically, liberalism counsels political actions according to a table or formula of methodological principles. Political actions are legitimate, regardless of outcome, if the proper method has been followed. Political practice is considered "good" if it is in accord with such formal principles--a point applicable for society as whole and for individual political actions within the liberal schema. There is no acknowledgement of the legitimacy of social goods or values apart from adherence to formal procedures. Hence, political practice can never be more than *ad hoc* actions and the polity itself is in the last analysis no more than an *ad hoc*, formal tool devised by its citizens as a means toward their separate ends.

Max Scheler's most thorough investigation of "formalism" appears in his masterwork on ethics, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*.⁴ Taking Kant's formalism, "a colossus of steel and bronze," as his starting point, Scheler demonstrates the possibility and necessity of a flesh-and-blood, substantively human approach to questions of normative significance. Despite the impressiveness of Kant's colossus, and while acknowledging much of its conclusion, Scheler finds the colossus to be inadequate precisely because formalism offers no "down-to-earth" value for real men faced with real normative dilemmas.⁵ This inadequacy of Kant's and all formal approaches to normative issues lies in the chasm which is drawn between formal procedures and material facts. Scheler remarks that the character of such procedures (general, abstract, inflexible) is itself illustrative of its inapplicability to the uniqueness of each person and each human situation. More particularly, by way of convincing phenomenological presentation, Scheler reveals that special material "facts" are directly perceived in every normative experience. These facts are values which are immediately given and which offer concrete guidance for action. The proper course of action is that on which lies the "higher" value. When possible, for

example, and all else being considered equal, one ought to pursue the relatively higher value of social welfare over the lower value of individual utility.⁶ Hence, Scheler contrasts the formalism of liberalism with his nonformal, direct perception of values. In place of liberalism's process o

f politics in terms of artificial constructions, it would seem that Scheler holds out the possibility of a politics based on actual, though normative, "facts."

Liberalism is formal, however, in more than merely the manner in which it structures civil society. Beyond the concerns which Scheler voices over the formal methods and procedures of liberal political theories lies a more disquieting implication. In Scheler's estimation, liberalism inevitably reduces actual, human persons to less-than-human abstractions of themselves. The formal character of liberalism requires that unique personal needs and talents be ignored in order that individual women and men might be more efficiently handled by the political process. In a democratic liberalism, people would be treated as radically equal units of political demands and inputs, as identical faceless digits in the counting of numbers which constitutes policy-making, or as interchangeable cogs in the vast machine of civil society. Even a formalism which claims that persons must always be treated as ends and never as means, is in the final regard a depersonalizing construction. Scheler agrees with Immanuel Kant that the person "must *never* be considered a *thing* or a *substance*," and asserts along similar lines that the person must be the "immediately co-experienced unity of experiencing." Nonetheless, he contends that efforts by Kant to overcome the objectification of the other by dutifully considering all others as identical to oneself in regard to possessing the same structures of reason ironically leads to a conception of the other as less than the full person he or she is. Kant's formalism, like all formalisms, ineluctably can conceive of women and men only as "the X of certain powers" or "the X of some kind of rational activity." The depersonalization occurs, therefore, because the X, "that 'something' which is the subject of rational activity, must be attributed to concrete persons--indeed, to all men--in the same way and as something *identical* in all men."⁷ Regardless of its intentions, it seems that formalism unavoidably reduces the human being to a ghostly caricature of his or her full personhood and distorts the possibility of politics by relegating normative decisions to cold-blooded procedures removed from the reality of the world and, especially, from the reality of values.

Individualism

As with formalism, individualism is not so much a causal factor in the development of liberalism as it is an aspect of the conceptual and normative framework of bourgeois man. In that liberalism emerges as the predominant paradigm of politics within this framework, liberalism is by and large erected on the idea of individuals being the elementary particles of society and government. Thus, liberal political theories divide the political community into standardized chunks of rights, liberties, duties and so forth--chunks that are individual men and women. Because liberalism looks at the polity in this fashion, because it seeks to explain politics and guide political practice in accordance with this model, there can be little doubt that liberalism is "individualist."

Scheler himself illustrates the modern notion of individualism and its relationship with liberalism by contrasting the ideal of the liberal society with the dominant ideal of society existing prior to the emergence of the bourgeois type of man.⁸ The previous conception was one of a natural community wherein members partake of social rights and responsibilities proper for each member's determined place in the social order. Much different from this, Scheler's portrayal of the liberal society finds rights and responsibilities relative not to one's proper place in the political order, but to a real or heuristic understanding of one's rights and responsibilities without the

political order--indeed, outside all association with others. In this picture, responsibility for others can only be a secondary consideration that follows and is built on a primary concern for unilateral self-responsibility. In the same way, rights are no longer to be understood as "social rights" (the only manner of understanding them prior to bourgeois man). Rather, rights in the liberal paradigm are understood as wholly lodged in the individual. As a result, the polity is "not a special reality outside or above the individual." It is, in fact, "only the similarity or dissimilarity of *individuals'* interests . . . [a] fabric of *relations* that represent `conventions,' `usage,' or `contracts,' depending on whether they are more explicit or more tacit."⁹

Scheler's response to the concept of individualism is not romantically to hearken back to the so-called natural polity or to an organic community. Individualism in many ways must be seen as an improvement to the stultifying, static hierarchies of the previous medieval conception. Neither, however, does Scheler champion the notion of individualism as it is presented within the framework of bourgeois man. While he acknowledges that both the earlier conception of the polity *and* bourgeois individualism offer valuable insights into the context of our social life, Scheler believes both conceptions ultimately fail to encompass the full range of human sociality and individuality. Both too narrowly delimit the possible relationships between person, other and the community. In addition, Scheler contends that neither the individual nor the community can be entirely understood by isolating one from the other. For Scheler, both are merely separate and incomplete manifestations of man's anthropologically based sociality.¹⁰ Both, moreover, are subject to the destiny of man.¹¹

The gist of Scheler's position is best revealed by turning to his typology of human sociality. He begins in this regard by focusing first on the ontogenetic development of sociality in men. In his work, *The Nature of Sympathy*, Scheler combines empirical studies of child development and linguistics with his most rigorous phenomenology to demonstrate that the earliest experiences do not include an awareness of self.¹² A person's first world, so to speak, is undifferentiated between ego and alter ego, or between self and social whole. Instead, it is "an immediate flow of experiences, *undifferentiated as between mine and thine*, which actually contains both our own and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another."¹³ It is only subsequently--curiously, by means of objectifying his environment--that one is able to detach his individual personality from the social milieu about him.

In what is plainly a parallel analogy, Scheler proposes a typology of sociality in a similar *phylogenetic* sequence of stages. Going beyond Ferdinand Toennies dichotomous division of sociality into *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, Scheler's is a four-tiered typology. As presented in his *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, the bottommost level of sociality is the "herd," at which level the individual is totally submerged in a beastlike social organism.¹⁴ Above this, at the next level, is the "life community," where the barest shadow of the individual can be discerned. What small measure of individuality is afforded in the life community, however, would be an individuality determined as necessary by the community. Scheler describes such individuality as an appendage of the community, much as one's hand has an individual character but is meaningless without the whole body.¹⁵ At the next level of the typology, the "society," which Scheler likens to the individualism of democratic liberalism, more completely differentiated individuals appear. Individuals at this level succeed in transcending the understanding of themselves as only objects or means for the various ends of the community. However, in so doing, the community ceases to exist in its own right and becomes merely a means to the many ends of the individuals. These individuals, similarly, by asserting the primacy of the self, isolate themselves from their fellows who at best become objectified means for the ego's ends.

In denying the community to assert the self, Scheler contends that the individuals of the society surrender a fundamental aspect of true individualism--i.e., the personal dignity and respect for the self which is only freely given in the eyes of one's fellows. By viewing others as objects, the society individual is himself objectified in the perspective of each of his fellows.¹⁶

"Person community," the highest level of sociality, envisions a transcendence not only of the self as an object of the community, but of the community and others as objects of the self. In this instance, the community which disappeared as a separate existence at the level of the society, is reformed and transformed. While accepting the personhood and inherent dignity of others, in one sense, eliminates the subject/object relationship between the self and others, in another sense personal individuality is most deeply affirmed in the acceptance of one's own personhood as it is reflected in the eyes of others and in the embrace of the community. In familiar terminology, Scheler here is presenting an intersubjectivity involving the self, other selves, and the communal self. It is inherently political in that each self freely partakes in constituting the communal self and freely accepts being constituted by the communal self. The person community is a circle of free and individual persons in community engaged in on-going mutual acceptance and respect for the unique personhood of each other as individual and part of the social whole.¹⁷

The parallel characters of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of sociality are reaffirmed in a further, very important respect: a fully developed person is one aware of his everpresent roots in the enveloping community. Despite these same roots, the relationship between person and community is not one of simple dependence. Acknowledging that the community delimits the boundaries of the person, Scheler yet wishes to retain avenues for the expression of some measure of individual freedom. The fully developed person, thus, is one who freely affirms and acknowledges the roots of his freedom in the community, and who as a free individual chooses the community. In the same way, phylogenetically, the individuality of the person community has its roots in the lower types of sociality, but the communality of the person community is not so rooted. This highest communality is reflective of the free choice of the individual person. Man's individualism occurs only in community, in other words, but the highest community is constituted by free individuals. Man's individual freedom is an achievement of his sociality; man's highest sociality is an achievement of his individual freedom.

Returning to the question at hand, three counterpoints to the individualism of liberalism can be derived from the foregoing. First, because the background of the individual is the community, liberal individualism is incorrect in viewing the individual as prior to the community. Although only by order of foundation, Scheler demonstrates that the social experience is primary and the individual, secondary. Liberalism errs in regarding the individual as the theoretical ground and most basic building block of society and politics.

Second, individualism fails to do full justice to the individual. True individuality requires the mutual acceptance of the unique personhoods of the self, the other selves, and the communal self. Because the liberal scheme sees the community as dependent upon the parallel but separate actions of distinct individuals, the dignity of the unique personhood of the others and the community is precluded. Denying the subjectivity of the community and others undermines the possibility of the individual's own subjectivity.

Third, individualism in the liberal scheme is substantively unachievable.¹⁸ Because each individual discovers himself only against the backdrop of the community, any conception of the individual as isolated from the community would be but an illusory abstraction. Although Scheler does not claim that there is a causal dependency between the individual and the community, or even a circular interdependency, he does assert that both the community and the individual are

necessary for a full understanding of the person. As illustrated by these counterpoints, Scheler rejects the simplistic individualism of the liberal paradigm.

Motivation

In the liberal paradigm, two differing explanations for the motivation behind the polity and behind all political action have figured prominently among theorists. Typically, however, the difference between these two explanations of motivation is often blurred by these liberal thinkers. Even at best, distinctions between these motivations are only vaguely noted. Yet, from the perspective of Scheler's phenomenological studies on values, a sharp line must be drawn between liberalism which is motivated by the *negative* value of "need" and liberalism which is motivated by the relatively low, but *positive*, value of enhanced utility or pleasure.¹⁹

Need motivated liberalism would conceive women and men as motivated in their political actions by an effort merely to escape from a present great evil toward a future condition with potentially less evil. In this pessimistic portrait of human existence, the *status quo* is perceived to be forever a situation of woeful circumstances which is tolerated only out of fear of degeneration into a worse situation. There is no tranquil, resigned acceptance reflected in whatever toleration might be granted to the present. Indeed, the circumstances of the present are an eternal goading for individuals to seek progress to predicaments of lesser evil.²⁰ All political actions must therefore be understood as directed at minimizing or blindly avoiding the discomforts of existence. Hobbes, in this vein, sees individuals acting politically due to fear of violent death, Spinoza out of fear of aimless anarchy.

It might be objected that Scheler's identification of a pure needs motivated liberalism is itself an abstraction, that no liberal thinker completely ignores motivation from positive values. Hobbes, for example, might also be cited for his stress on the desire for a commodious life. But, while it will be acknowledged by Scheler that a number of needs motivated political theories also consider some minor positive values in motivation, such positive values are very much secondary motivations for these theories. Moreover, when present in these schemes, such positive values--pleasure, physical satisfaction, etc.--remain values of the lower levels in Scheler's own hierarchy of values. Thus, a needs motivated liberalism might discuss a motivation such as pleasure in the context of values, yet it plays a role of lesser importance in the explanation of motivation than a negative motivation such as fear or anxiety. Indeed, more typically, such thinkers despair of truly positive values and come to name that which fulfills a need as a "positive" value. Whatever the particulars, all needs motivated liberalisms operate according to the principle of ameliorating the deficiencies of existence which can never be wholly overcome.

Scheler, surveying all other theories of liberalism, concludes that what is not definable in terms of needs motivation can be roughly categorized under the general heading of "utility motivation."²¹ Under this heading, political practice is motivated by a recognition of only a narrow range of what for Scheler are the lower, materialistic values. Due to the materialistic nature of such values, motivation in such liberalisms aims toward the amassing of greater and greater quantities of those things which carry these values--i.e., property.²² Unlike needs motivated liberalism, which pictures women and men engaged continually in seeking (though never completely finding) easement of the evils of life, utility liberalism finds the basic motivating factor in human action to be an attraction to perceived values such as "pleasure." They operate not on negative values, therefore, but on positive ones. As with the needs version, however, there are seldom pure examples of this utility based explanation of human motivation. Most liberal thinkers in this

category also admit the negative value of "pain" and assign it a secondary role in the motivation process. Some more complex examples of utility liberalism contend that negative values predominate in the operation of civil society until a certain level of civilization is attained at which point utility values come to dominate.²³ Despite its various guises, utility liberalism remains based upon the notion of "utility-seeking" as the primary motivation of individuals and the purpose for politics.

Scheler's evaluation of these two different explanations for motivation in liberalism, as noted previously, varies with each. In regard to needs motivated liberalism, Scheler begins by investigating the feeling of need itself. He contrasts the feeling of need with instinctual impulses such as hunger, terming it an experience of displeasure which accompanies the perception of a lacking.²⁴ Although such an experience occurs just as well in hunger and thirst, Scheler notes a profound difference in that "needs" are not a physical, natural experience of lacking, but rather are in some sense an artificial product of our minds and cultures. He supports this point by way of very convincing examples, noting that a starving tribe of primitives does not "need" the fish in nearby lakes if their culture has not come to consider fish as food. Similarly, pre-Columbian American aborigines did not "need" the horse, despite the fact that their children's children of the American plains truly, in fact, did have this need. Needs, thus, are not innate, but are developed in psychology and history by human actions.

Scheler's thinking in these regards cuts to the heart of the needs motivated concept of liberalism. If needs are a product of psychology and history--if there are no common "innate" needs--then needs can hardly be taken as the foundation of culture or the motor of historical progress. Needs cannot be the basis for explanation of civilization or political practice when they themselves arise in history and in reference to human acts.²⁵ Furthermore, needs are certainly incapable of explaining true progress. Progress is measured in the attainment of new heights, in the coming to know that which was previously unknown. Yet, as Scheler makes evident, one can only *need* what one has known or experienced before. As negative, reaction-like feelings focused on what are perceived as the deficiencies of the present, needs are unable to truly look forward; they are unable to guide action in anticipation of the new "heights" of progress. Because the needs-driven model of liberalism is characterized by a state of constant agitation due to an individual's continual reaction to the inadequacies of the status quo, such a scenario would result not in genuine forward-looking progress but rather only in aimless, incremental flux. To suppose that the polity arises haphazardly from such a process is to deny it positive purpose and to reduce its existence to the status of "happy accident."²⁶

In opposition to this understanding, Scheler contends that all actions by men have their basis in the perception and subsequent pursuit of positive values. More than this, he argues that the subsequent pursuit of positive values itself has its "source in a surplus of positive feelings at the deepest stratum."²⁷ Human action springs, accordingly, not from need, but from surplus. True progress occurs when the present situation is not only "tolerable," but when there exists in the present a great enough overabundance of positive value so as to begin reaching for that which is greater than the present. Civilizations do not begin where humankind is in greatest need, but instead where there exists a great surplus of resources. Politics do not arise out of needs, but out of vision--vision freed from the ball and chain of necessity. Politics is properly a pattern of human actions, not reactions.

At first glance, utility liberalism would appear to be in concurrence with Scheler's response to the needs variety. The needs model, after all, fails in Scheler's estimation precisely because of its blindness to positive values. In contrast, utility liberalism finds the pursuance of positive values,

in this case utility values, to be both the mainspring and the proper end of human action and progress. Oddly, however, it is exactly because utility liberalism finds *utility* to be both the motive behind individual action and the ultimate ends of human sociality that Scheler utterly rejects such liberalism as an explanation and normative guide for social life and politics. Utility liberalism, he claims, rests upon an "inversion" of man's hierarchy of values. Thereby, Scheler sees it as only a "perversion" of the proper means and end of the social order.

Scheler traces the historical grounds of this inversion in a number of early works to the feeling of *ressentiment* which comes to predominate the constitution of man as he emerges as the *typus* of the bourgeois. Like Nietzsche, Scheler finds *ressentiment* to be a self-poisoning of the psyche issuing from the suppression of the smoldering hatred of a lesser man for one greater.²⁸ *Ressentiment* in time undermines the normative framework of the greater man--lesser man (master/slave) relationship. If only by the weight of their numbers, the masses as filled with *ressentiment*, come to subvert the hierarchy of values which marks the greater, exceptional man as superior to themselves. The common virtues of the multitude are extolled while the secretly-envied virtues of the superior man are held up for ridicule. The proper order of values is overthrown through appeals to the most base values (i.e., "utility") and lower values are placed in ascendancy over the higher. Usefulness is celebrated over nobility, quantity over quality, homogeneity over creative diversity. Moreover, Scheler argues that the art of ruling is thus rendered as "economics"; science becomes "technology"; progress becomes not growth but "gluttony" and truth itself becomes merely "pragmatic truth."²⁹ "But the *most profound* perversion of the hierarchy of values," Scheler writes, "is the *subordination of the vital values to utility values*."³⁰

The significance of this becomes clear in considering the hierarchy of values which Scheler divides into four modal levels: the agreeable (from which utility values are derived), the vital, the spiritual (*geistliche*), and the holy.³¹ From the agreeable as lowest to the holy as highest, each level corresponds to its own distinct sphere of acts and values. At the same time, Scheler implies that there is a covert teleology in this order where the values of the lower levels are to be considered as directional signs pointing toward the highest levels. Utility liberalism, therefore, greatly errs in its consideration of the value of utility (pleasure, agreeableness) as the proper end of the polity or as the ultimate goal of political action. The implicit teleology of Scheler's hierarchy of values requires that every positive action be done in consideration of the highest values, or, as he states elsewhere, in consideration of the "destiny of man."³² Although Scheler certainly does not object to the intrinsic importance and independence of each modal level, in a situation of conflicting values the lower must give way to the higher; the utility values must be subordinated to the vital, the vital to the spiritual and the spiritual to the holy.

Utility liberalism's selection of utility as the means and immediate motivation of political and social action is also rejected by Scheler. Indeed, this is the point of "the *most profound* perversion" mentioned previously, for it is here most clearly that vital values are subordinated to utility values. The nature of utility, explored in phenomenological fashion, is determined by Scheler to be particularistic and individual. Utility is such, he finds, that it can only be privately pursued by men and women as individuals. Even thinkers who subscribe to utility liberalism are able to refer to the "utility of the social order" only as a mathematical majority of individual pleasures. Because the vital values, however, are concerned with the whole of a given life and not the particular pleasure of a specific part, they are seen to encompass the whole of the community's life.³³ On this basis, therefore, the proper motivation for political action is not the pursuit of utility, but rather the pursuit

of the vital values of the whole community--e.g., its commonweal and growth--always, of course, in light of the highest values for mankind.³⁴

Rationalism

According to Scheler, the interpretation and understanding of reason also undergoes profound change with the emergence of the bourgeois man. Where previously reason was somehow understood as very much intertwined with faith, love, man's ultimate values, goods, ends and so forth, with this new type of man reason is stripped and isolated from such heady concepts. Reason being conceived in a much more narrow and restricted sense, Scheler contends that with the bourgeois man it "*emancipates* itself from both emotional and organic-schematic guidances."³⁵ Reason, thus, becomes estranged from the world and others: theory is distanced from nature and practice; facts are thoroughly severed from values.

Two somewhat different but essentially interrelated versions of this new interpretation of reason are evident within the general paradigm of liberalism. According to the first, reason is rendered a mundane, instrumental and calculative tool serving the interests of individual needs and utility. This "reasoning" is, therefore, only an instrument of the underlying motivations which were earlier considered and rejected by Scheler. Indeed, Scheler only sketchily treats this particular version of the new understanding of reason.³⁶ The second version, however, attracts his closest and most engaging scrutiny. Perhaps in awareness of the inadequacies and dangers of establishing ethics and politics on a foundation of utility or need, this second version of the new reason takes the "purified" reason of the bourgeois man itself as a guide and starting point for practical action. Liberal thinkers in this "rationalist" vein would stand approvingly with Scheler in opposition to the claims of other liberals regarding a universal need or utility motivation. Such rationalists contend that needs or utility motivation belong in general to the world of sensible experience. For that reason such motivations and all that is derived from them are subject to individual psychology and experience and thus are dangerous grounds for political principles and untrustworthy bases for the legitimate polity. The rationalist skirts the problems of such empirically-based social and political theories by claiming that "the ground of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is placed, but sought *a priori* solely in the concepts of pure reason" [Kant].³⁷ In other words, Scheler's rejection of those liberalisms which operate on the assumptions of need or utility motivation is inapplicable to liberalisms based on the *a priori* imperatives of universally-shared reason. Rationalism here, a derivation of rules for action from reason itself, becomes the explanation of, and justification for, society and politics.

Operationally, this understanding conceives women and men as molding the sensible world, through the innate processes of reason, into general categories with which reason itself can subsequently work. Rationalism contends that the raw world is unsuitable as a location from which to make social and normative judgments because it is particularized and individuated. Indeed, so much is each bit of experience in the everyday world understood as an individual and unique occurrence, that the world of these experiences is taken to be only a meaningless chaos of disparate phenomena. To make normative decisions in the midst of such an unsettled state of affairs and on the basis of such incoherent data, the rationalists reason, would be folly. To establish a political community on a foundation of this sort--the chaotic, raw facts of the sensible world before reason has digested them--would be absurd.³⁸

Similarly, the rationalist liberal thinker looks to reason for a common frame of reference by which each individual can acknowledge and act in accordance with others. Without reason as such

a frame of reference, the rationalists argue that each individual man, being isolated from his fellows by space and time, would perceive an utterly different world than that of his fellows. It is in this sense that people are individuated. Without reason, they contend, this individuation would be such that every individual would be radically alienated from every other man. Politics and ethics are possible, therefore, only where this radical individuation is circumvented by the possession of the faculty of reason among all women and men. Because both the empirical perception of values and the derivation of the "good" from nature are dependent upon the relativity of human experience in a suspect world, normative choice is seen to require some more firm footing. The rationalists find such "footing" in reason itself; the ultimate ground for norms and action must be found in reason. By reason, therefore, the world can be dealt with, society with others can be possible, and human actions can attain normative significance.

Political institutions and structures for political practice follow upon these rational suppositions. Since politics involves the exercise and conditioning of choice, its domain is that of the will. The rationalist position conceives of will, however, only in terms of it being merely a creature of reason. Reason determines the ground of will, constituting the objects to which choice applies. For politics, reason thus posits practical principles which generally determine the conditions of political practice. Inasmuch as such principles are established on and through reason, the rationalists contend they are valid and binding for every *rational* being--they are, in other words, "universal." The ultimate criterion of the validity of political practice, the ultimate test of the legitimacy of any political institution is therefore the measure of its universality, its generality in regard to all rational beings. In this context, it follows further that there are no political goods in themselves, "good" being only those principles which stand the test of being rendered universal. General rules and procedures would follow from such principles. Yet, the farther such rules and procedures stretch from the universalized principles toward the particular situation in the world, the less valid they become. Hence, an apparently liberal political landscape emerges.

Scheler raises serious objections to this whole process, objections which go beyond his previously considered rejection of the formalism implicit within it. He questions the very applicability of such reason to practical affairs. He claims, first, that the rationalist conception rests upon an antiquated, static understanding of man which wrongly assumes all people in all times possess equal access to reason. Second, he questions whether reason is the secure haven from the world of experience that the rationalists seek. Third, he denies the assertion of the *a priori* place of reason in normative concerns.

Beginning with the first of Scheler's points, he notes that the rationalist pictures mankind to be something firm and stable in its possession of certain faculties. Though most rationalist writers contend that they are concerned not with human reasoning, but with reason itself, their works offer little evidence to support the possibility of reason existing outside of human beings. (Even were artificial intelligence achievable, one would hope the rationalists would not allocate human choice to a computer; here the heart would murmur within them it seems.) With scant exceptions, to be a man is seen to be a rational man regardless of personal development, culture and so forth. As Scheler writes, in the rationalist view "the concept of man was, in a way, involuntarily idealized, and a real species was subsumed under this ideal concept as a correlate, which today seems possible only on the basis of insufficient knowledge of the fact. This resulted in the 'universally human,' 'humanity,' and the 'all too human.'"³⁹

Scheler cites a growing body of empirical evidence which undercuts this rationalist position. People differ from one another across time and space. Mankind evolves genetically and anthropologically. Just as the child grows and changes in reason, so too do men in culture and

mankind as a species. "Mankind is, like any race, people, or individual, changeable in principle, and its constitution is a product of the universal development of life."⁴⁰ Suspicion is therefore warranted for the rationalists' effort to utilize the human faculty of reason as a secure and universal base. Since mankind itself is no unchanging thing in the world, but is instead a dynamic, developing thing, any assumption that access to reason is identical for all men and women is hard to accept. Fire might burn equally in Persia as in Athens, but the rationality of the Persians was suspect even in ancient times, and little imagination is required to speculate on the Persian conclusions regarding Athenian rationality. Scheler rejects, on these and other grounds, any notion of an unchanging, factual unity of human nature and rejects, therefore, any "notion that there is a certain fixed, inborn functional apparatus of reason given to all men from the beginning--the idol of the Enlightenment as well as Kant."⁴¹ There is no fixed and frozen human nature, and rationalism cannot disregard this fact by pontificating on the universality of reason. Reason may or may not itself be always and everywhere the same, but the human faculty of reason is locked with his dynamic and developing character. The mere possession of the faculty of reason does not avail the hopes of the rationalists for finding in reason a ground for norms and actions.⁴²

The second objection which Scheler raises against the use of such reason as the primary guide to practical affairs radicalizes the first. For not only, he argues, does the faculty of reason change, but reason itself changes. The key to Scheler's claim is what he terms the "functionalization of essential insight" [*Funktionalisierung der Wesenseinsicht*].⁴³ As Scheler explains the concept, reason exists much more intimately with man than the rationalists would admit. Reasoning affects reason, on one hand, and the objects of reason affect reason, on the other. Reason itself is pulled and stretched to accommodate both forces. Subjectivity/experience constitutes the conditions of reason; reason becomes what it is required to be by both man and world. It develops and grows. "The *functionalization of essential insight* enables us to understand that there can be an *evolution and growth of reason* itself--growth, that is to say, of its property in a priori rules of selection and function."⁴⁴ Contrary to the hopes of the rationalist, reason is not immune from the flux of experience. Nor is it immune from the actions of men and women. As Scheler puts it, reason "grows and diminishes, 'evolves,' and 'regresses,' because certain of the essential insights by whose functionalization its progress is controlled are attached to this or that particular locus in the concrete world-process and are possible only at those points."⁴⁵ Ironically, adding insult to injury, Scheler concludes that the particular reason upon which the rationalist liberal seizes, is but the peculiar reason of the European Enlightenment and only a *cul-de-sac* in the development of reason in Western civilization.⁴⁶

The third point which Scheler raises against the utilization of reason for practical matters concerns the rationalists' assertion of the primacy of reason. As noted, rationalism utilizes reason as both the guide to action and the justification for action. The will follows reason and depends upon reason for its legitimacy. Reason, for the rationalist conception, is thus the *a priori* source of acts. Scheler, of course, denies this.

Scheler's rejection of the priorness of reason in regard to action and norms does not succumb to the voluntarist charge that a blind, unknowing will is primary. Both will and reason for Scheler are inherently in the domain of the individual ego and, as discussed previously, the individual is itself not primary. He admits freely, concurring with the rationalists, that all willing is a "striving for that which is known." Yet, is the "knowing" which precedes willing a rational knowing? Scheler thinks not. Examples can be imagined which illustrate a "knowing" unknown to reason. Such "knowing" can lend itself to willing and action beyond articulation in terms of rational purpose. The stereotypical hero always exclaims, "I'm really not sure why I did it." The television

reporter on the scene nods in appreciation, retells the unreasonableness of the hero's act, and underscores his interview with a "knowing" glance to the camera by which his "understanding" is conveyed to us. Thus, actions are done, "knowledge" is transmitted, and norms are invoked, all of which can only lamely--and subsequently--be explained by reason. Clearly, in at least this one sequence of events, will and reason follow some sort of prior "knowledge."

Scheler, however, does not establish his rejection of reason's primacy on a single class of examples. He claims that at its deepest root, knowledge is a relationship of being, specifically, the relationship of one being partaking in the essential character [*Sosein*] of another being without incurring any change in the character of either the knower or the known. What is thus presupposed in knowing is a primal act of abandoning the self in order to come into experiential contact with the world. As a relationship of being, knowledge follows the peculiar act of transcending the self in order to reach out for something perceived in the world. At this deepest stratum, the perception which precedes rational knowing is a perception of value. Rather than reason constituting the conditions of will, as the rationalists claim, Scheler convincingly argues that the conditions of reason are constituted by the perception of values.⁴⁷

Even the perception of value, however, cannot be seen as sufficient grounds for reason, for there must be a tendency in the knower to rise beyond itself to participate in the known. There must be an "evaluating" or "taking interest in" that which is becoming known. In the most mundane sense, Scheler refers to this tendency as "interest"; in the highest sense, he calls it "love." It is only by way of this fundamental tendency that man is able to overcome the self, in order to reason. He claims that man "before he is an *ens cogitans* or an *ens volens*, is an *ens amans*."⁴⁸ Reason is, therefore, not as the rationalists see it. The bedrock of our relation with another is always the perception of the inestimable value of the other and the tendency to deny the self to partake in the other's essential character. The root of our relation to the world is always interest. Reason cannot be the primary ground of normative choice and action; reason follows the "knowing" of the heart. The rationalist liberal errs, therefore, by establishing the legitimacy of politics on the priority of purified reason.

Person and Political Legitimacy

Considering the thorough rejection of the conditions of bourgeois liberalism in the foregoing, it may seem puzzling that the historical Max Scheler was something of a liberal in the last years of his life. More oddly, his support for liberal politics waxed while the liberal Weimar republic found its public support being eroded by non-liberal political movements of the right and the left. In his youth and early intellectual life, Scheler clearly opposed liberal political theories. Indeed, while generally supportive of the Reich and Kaiser, he had little liking even for the "mechanizing" of the state which he saw with the Prussians. For the initial engagements of the First World War, Scheler was a vigorous apologist for the German cause, often portraying the struggle in terms of preserving Germany from the forces of liberalism and cosmopolitanism. By 1916, however, Scheler reversed his support for the war. Deploring its brutality and horror, he hoped that its experience--the common, soul-jarring experience of the war shared by all of Europe--would serve as the basis for a unified European community. As with most German academics, the establishment of the Weimar regime saw Scheler lending the republic only lukewarm support. He doubted whether the seeds of England and America--liberal democracy, capitalism and Edisonism--were suitable for German soil.⁴⁹ By the mid-Twenties, however, Scheler's support for the Weimar government was firm. He remained adamantly opposed to any politics based upon materialism,

the lower values, formalism, individualism and so forth; yet it is clear that he was and considered himself a liberal.

It does not seem that Scheler's "liberalism" represents a turning or reconsideration of his theoretical position. In the mid-Twenties, he does attempt to sharply delineate his own philosophy from *Lebensphilosophie* and all blind emotivisms.⁵⁰ Moreover, he does attack the German youth movements (the *Wandervogel*, etc., whose spirit he had previously admired) for their growing mysticism, irrationalism and unquestioning obedience to their leaders. Yet, he continues to applaud the youth's rejection of the bourgeois value system of their parents.⁵¹ Bitterly rebuking the growing influence of radical politics of the left and the right, and critical of the burgeoning mass society which he saw as promotive of such politics, Scheler nonetheless sustains his rejections of the bourgeois conditions of liberalism. Indeed, he contends that the mass society, the breeding ground of fascism and bolshevism, is itself only a consequence of the emergence of bourgeois man.⁵² The more interesting puzzle, therefore, is not why Scheler increasingly accepts liberal politics, but rather how, on what grounds, a liberalism which rejects the formalism, individualism, motivation and rationalism of the bourgeois is itself possible? If bourgeois liberalism is not legitimate politics, then what liberalism could be legitimate?

For Scheler, as indicated earlier, such questions are perhaps wrongly put. The question of political legitimacy is not merely a question of the political order. His considered rejection of bourgeois liberalism is not simply reflective of it being incorrect or bad government. The failure of the predominant political paradigm of our era does not stem from liberalism itself, but rather from the inadequacy of the bourgeois conception of man and the accompanying conceptual and normative framework within which liberalism finds its source. As Scheler sees it, the bedrock of political legitimacy lies in a more basic legitimacy. To inquire about legitimate politics presupposes an inquiry into legitimately being human. The politics of bourgeois liberalism, in other words, fails to attain genuine legitimacy because the bourgeois man is not himself fully legitimate as a person. In accord with his own counsel, the puzzle of Scheler's own liberalism must find its resolution in Scheler's efforts to clarify the image of man. His image of man, moreover, both begins and finds its end with the concept of the person. Hence, Scheler's own personalist liberalism is inextricably linked with the criterion by which the liberalism of the bourgeois is rejected--namely, with the elusive dynamic, the person, which is truly man.

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Notes

*The author and the editor wish to thank SUNY Press for permission to excerpt elements of this Chapter from Prof. Schneck's book, *Person and Polis* (Albany: SUNY, 1987).

1. A common theme, see "Zur Idee des Menschen" in Scheler's *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 3: *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1955). See also "Man in the Age of Adjustment" in *Philosophical Perspectives*, trans. Oscar Haac (Boston: Beacon, 1958). Note accordingly that the idea of self-inflicted evolution pictures man as possessing at least a moment of freedom in history. Even, however, in the radical sense of self-inflicted evolution, freedom is constrained and conditioned by history for Scheler; cf. "Man and History" in *ibid.*

2. As will become clear subsequently, Scheler is not here urging a romantic return to the medieval world view or community structure. The concepts of self, other and community were equally incomplete in that period, if only in different ways.

3. This point will be considered in greater depth subsequently.
4. Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. Manfred Frings and Roger Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974). See especially his section "Formalism and Apriorism," pp. 45-110, and his section "Formalism and Person," pp. 370-595.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6. N.B. Scheler agrees with Kant that "goods" are relative to the experiences of men. Scheler claims, however, that Kant errs by assuming that goods and values are identical. Values and their order, for Scheler, are the objective and universal basis for ethics because they, unlike goods, are not relative to men's experiences.
6. This is not the place for a review of Scheler's ethics. Suffice it to say that Scheler finds values such as usefulness, nobility, holiness and so forth to be directly perceived by men. In recognizing a value, we also are immediately aware of the relative rank of that value vis-a-vis all possible values. Using "a priori" in an odd manner, it can be said that we recognize man in an *a priori* manner a rank-order of all possible values. Scheler's ethics, thus, demands simply that when possible one ought to choose the higher relative value. The noble must be chosen over the useful, the holy over the noble, and so on.
7. The quotations in this passage are taken from Scheler's *Formalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-72.
8. Scheler, however, goes beyond Toennies to chart a four-tiered typology of sociality, including: the herd, the life-community, society and person community. See *ibid.*, pp. 526-35.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 529.
10. See, among several sources, Scheler's remarks concerning Aristotle's "political animal" in *ibid.*, p. 524.
11. Cf. Scheler's *Gedanken zu Moral und Politik*, edited by Manfred Frings (Bern: Francke, 1973), pp. 5-6; his *Formalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 525; and his essay "Man in the Era of Adjustment" in *Philosophical Perspectives*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
12. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String, reprint, 1970), pp. 244-52.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
14. See his *Formalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 526, and his *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, trans. Manfred Frings (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 48.
15. *Formalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-8.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 529-33.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 533ff.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 531-33.
19. It is tempting to refer to this distinction as one between early and late liberalism, or between classical liberalism and utilitarianism. In his work, *Ressentiment*, trans. William Holdheim (New York: Free Press, 1961), Scheler comes close to making such a conclusion. However, since Scheler does refrain from making such a division, utilitarianism and classical liberalism are treated under the generic term "bourgeois liberalism" in this essay.
20. *Formalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-53. Note also the inherent notion of material progress which is characteristic of liberalism.
21. Scheler does, in fact, argue that utility, pleasure and advantage are all merely different aspects of the same phenomenon. See *Ressentiment*, *op. cit.*, p. 152ff.
22. Scheler in passages such as this seems clearly to be referring to the likes of Bentham who plainly treats all pleasures as equal and additive. One wonders, however, how well Scheler was acquainted with the works of J. S. Mill who proposed that there were qualitative differences between pleasure and that pleasures were not additive at the highest levels where they could only

be truly appreciated by superior people. Also, consider that progress here would be conceived only as a quantitative, continued aggregation of more and more things.

23. J. S. Mill is an example among several. See the introductory chapter to his *On Liberty* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958).

24. *Formalism, op. cit.*, pp. 350-51.

25. In *Formalism*, Scheler claims that the more primary factors upon which needs are based would be the vital, natural impulses of life. As we shall see subsequently, however, these also are unacceptable for other reasons as the cornerstones of civilization and politics.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 351-52.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 349.

28. Scheler does not agree with Nietzsche that Christianity is the result of *ressentiment*. Rather, he believes the *ressentiment* emerges with bourgeois man and subsequently has perverted all modern institutions--including Christianity.

29. See *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*, in Scheler's *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 8: *Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft*, edited by Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1960), pp. 212-39.

30. *Ressentiment, op. cit.*, p. 154.

31. *Formalism, op. cit.*, p. 154.

32. *Gedanken zu Moral und Politik, op. cit.*, p. 5.

33. Space does not permit a complete exploration of vital values; see *Formalism, op. cit.*, pp. 338-42.

34. *Gedanken, op. cit.*, pp. 16-20.

35. *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, op. cit.*, p. 124.

36. See *Formalism, op. cit.*, pp. 274-77.

37. Cf. Kant's preface to *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 5ff.

38. In this vein, see John Rawls' *Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap, 1976), especially the separation from world by way of his veil of ignorance.

39. *Formalism, op. cit.*, p. 275.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

41. *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, op. cit.*, p. 40-41. Note that Scheler is here rejecting two different versions of rationalism. He rejects a rationalism of human reasoning and a rationalism based on an objective and universal reason.

42. See Scheler's *Man's Place in Nature*, trans. Hans May erhoff (New York: Noonday, 1961), pp. 69-70, where he discusses the nature of man as becoming human--i.e., actively participating in the unfolding of being's self-awareness.

43. See *Erkenntnis und Arbeit, op. cit.*, pp. 201-202, 231-33 and Scheler's *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. Bernard Noble (London: SCM Press, 1960), pp. 198-213.

44. *On the Eternal Man, op. cit.*, p. 202.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.

46. *Erkenntnis und Arbeit, op. cit.*, pp. 197-200.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-205. See also "Liebe und Erkenntnis" in his *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 6: *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1963).

48. Scheler, "Ordo Amoris" in *Selected Philosophical Essays*, trans. David Lachter mann (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 110-11.

49. In regard to Scheler's changing position on the war, see his *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 4: *Politische-Pedagogische Schriften*, ed. Manfred Frings (Bern: Francke, 1982), especially the

essay "Der Krieg als Gesamterlebnis." Regarding his doubts concerning German liberalism, see his essays "Christliche Sozialismus als Antikapitalismus" and "Von kommenden Dingen" in *ibid.*

50. Scheler, "Weltanschauungslehre, Soziologie und Weltanschauungssetzung" in his *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 6: *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

51. Scheler, "Jugendbewegung" in *ibid.*

52. Scheler, "The Forms of Knowledge and Culture" in *Philosophical Perspectives*, trans. Oscar Haac (Boston: Beacon, 1958).

Chapter IX Hermeneutics and Heritage

George F. McLean

This paper concerns the relation between cultural heritage and hermeneutics.* Here heritage refers especially to the cumulative sense of human dignity and appropriate social relations which lies at the heart of the culture(s) we inherit. Hermeneutics refers to the understanding of the nature and application of this heritage as well as to its critique.

This raises a cluster of problems:

I. In what does a cultural heritage or tradition consist: how is it constituted; on what basis is it a point of reference for human action?

II. Can a traditional culture have new meaning for these new times: how does it both live through time as a tradition and in each new age make specifically relevant contributions?

III. Can a culture critique the past which it inspired and be a guide to yet unknown pathways of peace: what is the basis for a transforming critique which will enable the culture to be an authentically liberating, rather than an enslaving, force?

This paper will consider each of these questions in sequence.

The Nature and Origin of a Cultural Heritage

It is characteristic of modern times__and possibly foundational to our problematic__that tradition has progressively ceded its standing to technique. This may be traced to Descartes who, at the end of the Renaissance, resolved to sort through its tumultuous accumulation of knowledge, new and old, in order to select and order that which was clear and distinct to the mind's intuition. Further, though a conclusion once clearly seen by someone did not have to be rejustified by that person each time it was used, this dispensation was non_transferable.¹ Hence, the image of the thinker became that of a solitary hero working out the interconnections of ideas. That these are best seen in isolation while life is lived with others forces one to ask whether this understanding has not lost sight of the relevance of thought to life--as Marx was keen to observe.

Correlatively, tradition, as arising from the community, providing an initial sense of the truth, and thereby laying a foundation for insight and judgment--that is, heritage as fore-understanding or prejudgment--gradually assumed the ever more pejorative connotations presently conveyed by the term `prejudice.'² But if our heritage be useless, upon what are we to base our efforts correctly to evaluate and respond to present issues? It has become necessary therefore to rebuild the value, and to assure the reading, of tradition, in part through a major critique of the rationalistic character of modern thought.

This has been undertaken by Prof. Hans Georg Gadamer in continuation of the phenomenological work of Martin Heidegger. In *Truth and Method*, Prof. Gadamer undertook to reconstruct the notion of a heritage as: (a) based in community, (b) consisting of knowledge developed from the experience of living through time, and (c) possessed of authority. Because tradition is sometimes interpreted as a threat to personal and social freedom I would like to focus especially upon the way our cultural heritage is a reflection of our life as free and responsible members of a concerned community.

Community

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes to trust and confidence which undergird or undermine our capacities for subsequent social relations; that one learns care and concern for others independently of what they do for us; and that one acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.³

Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. For the phenomenologist this implies that life in community is a new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is life in the family and in the progressively wider circles into which one enters.

Time and the Building of Tradition

If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition, literally, that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. The wisdom with which we are concerned, however, is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments and over a period of generations. Hence, contemporary interchange needs to be complemented by the historical depth of accumulated human insight predicated upon the full wealth of human experience. This has a number of layers.

First, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to the evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. But this language remains too abstract and limited to method or technique.

Second, while it can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms, what is being spoken about are free acts, expressive of passionate human commitment and sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances, and constructing and defending one's nation. The cumulative result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes the content of a tradition.⁴

Third, the impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and imaginatively configured in such epics as *The Mahabharata* or in dance. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition then, is, not simply everything that ever happened, but what appears significant. It is what has been seen through time to be deeply true about human life. It includes the values to which our forebears freely have given passionate commitment, either in specific historical circumstances or over time in reaffirming a work of literature whose worth has progressively emerged as something upon which character and community can be built. All this constitutes a

rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated. Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that tradition serves as model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and through time passed on the corporate life of the community.⁵

Authority

Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one's heritage and modern liberals relates to authority. Is it possible to recognize authority on the part of tradition and still retain freedom through time; could it be that authority, rather than being the negation of freedom, is the cumulative expression of, and the positive condition for, an authentic human freedom.

One of the most important characteristics of the human person is one's capacity for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural—indeed it is quite the contrary. Within as well as beyond our social group, we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities we lack, but need in the process of our own growth and actualization. This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to their will, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension, whether it be the doctor's professional skill in healing patients, or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed, but is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others. The role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience, and the grounding of dependence in competency combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages.

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation in any terms with no sense of the value of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision, the result would be an idealism devoid of existential content.

In history, on the contrary, one finds vision which both transcends its own time and stands as directive for the time that follows. The content of that vision is a set of values and of human and social goals which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orient the life of a person.⁶ Such a vision is historical because it arises from the life of a people in time and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. It is also normative because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged. The fact that humans do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute bitterly over the direction of change appropriate for their community or shared life reflects the fact that every humanism is committed to the realization of some common--if general--model of perfection. Without this even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of divergent positions. A shared vision of what is desirable for life at least in some broad terms is the condition of possibility for debate and even for conflict.

As the vision of what is desirable one's heritage or tradition is not chronologically distant in the past and therefore in need of being drawn forward artificially. It lives and acts in the lives of all whom it inspires and judges; through time it is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it--just as it belongs to us. Such a tradition is, in effect, the ultimate community of human striving, for human understanding is implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity, but by our situatedness in a tradition. By fusing both past and present this enables us today to determine the specific direction of our lives and to mobilize a community of consensus and commitment.⁷

This sense of the good or of value, derived from the concrete experience of a people through its history and constituting its cultural heritage, enables it in turn to appreciate the real impact of the achievements and deformations of the present. In the absence of tradition as a cumulative lived experience of a people present events would be simply facts of the moment, to be succeeded by counter_facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence, which could be reduced only by a Utopian abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of a modern rationalism. By eliminating all expressions of freedom past and future this constitutes the archetypal modern nightmare:1984.

This stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative vision evolved by men through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius, Gandhi, Bolivar, or Lincoln, a Martin Luther King or a Mother Theresa. Superseding mere historical facts, as concrete universals they express that harmony of measure and fullness which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating.

The truly important fight at the present time is, then, not between, on the one hand, a chaotic liberalism in which the abstract laws of the marketplace determine the lives of persons, peoples and nations and, on the other hand, a depersonalizing sense of community in which the dignity of the person is suppressed for an equally abstract utopia. A victory by either would spell disaster. The central battle is rather to enable peoples to draw on their heritage of personal vision, evaluation and free decision, elaborated through the ages and in their various communities, as a basis for deliberating and working out the response they decide to make to present circumstances. That these circumstances are often shifting and difficult in the extreme is important, but what is of definite importance is that this people's response be truly theirs; that it be part of their history and not simply the automatic effect of someone else's history, or--worst of all--of abstract, impersonal and depersonalizing laws or ideals.

Application: Heritage and the Present

There is a second set of problems regarding tradition. These concern directly, not its nature and origin, but its relation to the present. For, to the degree that one recognizes the validity and even authoritative character of our heritage, one would seem to be in danger of diminishing the significance and even the freedom of present efforts to find answers to the new issues which arise in our personal and especially our social life. Indeed the very reality of novelty is at issue, for if our present life were but a simple repetition of what had already been known life would lose its challenge, progress would be rejected in principle and hope would die. Let us turn then from the construction and content of a cultural heritage to its application in our days through dialogue which grows out of care and concern.

In brief, this is the correlative of the problem faced above. Just as the classical ideal is constituted from the concrete expressions of freedom in the past rather than in abstract depersonalized law, so the challenge of the present is how to understand the application of this ideal in a manner that promotes rather than suppresses the creative exercise of freedom in our day.

Novelty and Application

To understand this we must, first of all, take time seriously, that is, we must recognize that reality includes authentic novelty. This implies that tradition, with its authoritative or normative character, achieves its perfection not in opposition to, but in the very temporal unfolding of, reality. Because persons determine their changing social universe and its values, for an adequate sense of culture one must attend to the truly new elements introduced by historical acts of encounter in community.

As response to the good takes place in concrete circumstances, the guiding principles of human action, even in ethics as a science, must be neither purely theoretical knowledge nor a simple historical accounting from the past, but must provide help toward moral consciousness in one's concrete circumstances. This implies an important difference of ethics from techné. In the latter, action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause which is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge. Skill consists in knowing how to act according to a well understood idea or plan. When this cannot be carried out some parts of it simply are omitted in the execution.

In contrast, in ethics the situation, though similar in being an application of a practical guide to a particular task, differs in important ways. First, in moral action subjects make themselves as much as they make the object; agents differentiate themselves by their actions. Hence, moral knowledge as understanding of the appropriateness of one's actions is not fully determined independently of the persons involved. Thus, the identity of a person or people as constituted through a past (or tradition) and exercised through present free acts are central factors in the determination of what is appropriate. This does not override what can be known in the general terms of one's specific nature; rather from within nature it further specifies the general implications of nature for the actions of those involved.

Secondly, adaptations by moral agents in applying the law do not diminish, but correct and perfect it. In itself the law is imperfect for in a relatively unordered world it cannot contain in any explicit manner responses to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that human freedom and creativity come into play in shaping the present according to a sense of what is just and good. They do so in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.

That the law is perfected by its application in the circumstances is driven home by the experience that a simple mechanical replication of the law works injustice rather than justice. If ethics is to be an instrument of realizing the good it must be, not only knowledge of what is right in general, but also the search for what is right in the situation. For this epoché and equity are required in order to perfect the law and complete moral knowledge.⁸ This is particularly essential in situations of personal and structured inequality in which an ordinary application of general and abstract laws can be expected only to extend and deepen the injustice. Hence, special attention must be paid to the concrete circumstances of persons in their mesh of psychological, economic and social interrelations.

Concern for Others

The question of what the situation asks of us is answered in the light of what has been discovered about appropriate human action and exists normatively in the tradition. This is properly the work of intellect (*no us*) with the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*), that is, thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means in the circumstances. But to be appropriate the means must truly fit all who are engaged in the situation. Hence, it is essential to be finely tuned to other persons, and this precisely as they are persons with their own freedom, feelings and understanding. Such an assessment of what is truly appropriate will require also the virtue of sagacity (*sunesis*), that is, concern for others, for adequately to appreciate the situation one must undergo it with the affected parties. Truly ethical knowledge can be had only by one who is united in mutual interest or love with the other. Such knowledge is profoundly social.

This goes notably beyond simply a concern for justice, that is, for rendering to others what is clearly due them by right. It is true that an ethical or moral situation cannot exist without justice. Nevertheless, justice is based upon persons as distinct. It distinguishes and even opposes one to the other in a mutual relationship of rights and duties as each party tends to look more to their rights and to what others owe them, rather than to their duties and what they owe *to others*. The result of a relationship based only upon justice is more likely to be strife than harmony and peace. This can be overcome and justice rendered only when concern for self is broadened to include others as well, that is, when sagacity (*sunesis*) is added to prudence (*phronesis*).

In sum, the application of the heritage or tradition is not a subsequent or accidental part of its understanding; rather it radically codetermines this understanding. Social consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal which is known independently and then applied to the circumstances, but as related to the concerns of all. In this light our sense of unity with others begins to appear as a condition for applying our tradition, that is, for enabling it to live in our day. Let us look more closely then at the hermeneutic process by which social understanding creatively articulates the meaning of one's cultural heritage in present circumstances.

Hermeneutic as Dialogue of Horizons

Horizon and Historicity

If one's horizon is the totality of all that can be seen from one's vantage point, then the application of a living tradition involves a dialectic of the horizons of different times or groups. One such dialectic is had in reading a 'text' from the past--this could be a document, such as "The Declaration of Independence" or of "The Rights of Man," or even the broad pattern of values which constitutes a tradition or cultural heritage. A similar dialectic of horizons is had in searching with others for the implications of such a 'text' for appropriate social action in a time of crises.

We do not enter upon this task of understanding with a blank mind, as Locke supposed, or proceed to suspend all judgment under a pervasive Cartesian doubt. Instead, we summon up all our resources to construe an initial or prior conception of the meaning of the document or of the words of the one with whom we are in dialogue. Gadamer terms this a 'foreunderstanding', or 'prejudgment', and hence 'prejudice' in a non-pejorative sense. This is a tentative projection of the general meaning of our interlocutor. The content of this anticipation is not an objective, fixed content to which we come; but what we produce as we participate in the evolution of the tradition and thereby further determine ourselves. For our horizon reflects not only the content of the past,

but the sensibility of the time in which I stand and the life project in which I am engaged. This pre-judgment is corrected gradually in the process of reading the text in detail until it corresponds to the meaning the text has in distinctive relation to me. In this manner there is a creative unveiling of the content of the tradition as this comes progressively and historically into the present and, through the present, passes into the future.⁹

In this light time is not a barrier or separation, but rather a bridge and opportunity for the process of understanding; it is a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The contribution of time lies in opening new sources of understanding which reveal unsuspected elements and even whole new dimensions of meaning in the tradition. How does this take place?¹⁰

Horizons are not limitations, but vantage points, for the mind as open or mobile is capable of being aware of its present horizon and of transcending this through the acknowledgement of other horizons and of the horizons of others. Indeed, historic movement implies precisely that we not be bound by one horizon, but move in and out of horizons. It is the very act of becoming aware of one's horizon which establishes historical consciousness, puts one's horizon at risk in dialogue with others, and thereby liberates one from the limitations of his and her horizon. When our initial projection of the meaning of the 'text' or of the other will not bear up under progressive questioning we are justified in making needed adjustments in our projection of meaning and in the horizon from which we were thinking.

Questioning and Openness

It is important then that we retain a questioning attitude. Rather than simply following through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, true openness or sensitivity to new meaning requires a willingness continually to revise our initial projection or expectation of meaning, that is, our horizon. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of the tradition, nor an abandonment of passionate concern regarding action towards the future. Rather, to be aware of our own horizon and to adjust it in dialogue with others is to make it work for us in our effort to discover the new and rich implications of our tradition which are required for our times.

Because such discovery depends upon the questions, the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, whether working alone or in conjunction with others, our effort at finding the answers should be, not to suppress a question, but to reinforce and unfold it. To the degree that its probabilities are intensified it can serve as a searchlight to bring out new meaning. In contrast to opinion which suppresses questions and arguing which searches out the weakness of the others' argument, conversation as dialogue is a mutual and cooperative search for truth. Through eliminating errors and working out a common meaning truth progressively is unveiled.¹¹

Further, it should not be expected that the text or tradition will answer but one question, for the sense of the text reaches beyond what even its author intended. Because of the dynamic character of being emerging into time, the horizon is never definitively fixed. At each step a new dimension of the potentialities of the text is opened to understanding, for the meaning of the text lives with the consciousness, not of its author, but of the many persons living in history and with others. This dialectic of our horizon with that of the others intensifies our ability to ask questions and to receive answers that are ever new.¹²

Finally, this openness consists not merely in receptivity to new information, but in a recognition of our historical, situated and hence limited vision. Real escape from that which has deceived us and held us captive is to be found not through those who are well integrated into our culture and social structures, for dialogue with those of similar horizons opens one only to a limited

degree. Real liberation from our most basic limitations and deceptions comes only with a conscious effort to take account of the horizons of those who differ notably, whether as another nation, or as a distinct culture intermingled with our own, or __still more definitively__ as living on the margins of all of these societies and integrated into none.

Such openness is directed primarily, not to others as persons who are to be surveyed objectively or obeyed unquestioningly, but to ourselves. It opens our horizons, extends our ability to listen to others, and assimilates the implications of their answers for changes in our own positions. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that the cultural heritage has something new to say to us. The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness therefore is not methodological sureness, but openness or readiness for experience.¹³ Seen in these terms our heritage is not closed, but the basis for a life that is expanding, evermore inclusive, and more rich.

Heritage and Critical Hermeneutics

The relation between hermeneutics and social critique is dialectical. The social sciences provide an indispensable element of awareness and hence of emancipation in the world of increasingly technical and convoluted structures. But heritage and tradition must provide an essential context and the basic principles for the critique to which these sciences contribute. Paul Ricoeur has attempted to codify some of the contributions of the tradition.¹⁴

First, critique is carried out within a context of interests which establish the frame of meaning. The sequence of technical, practical and emancipating interests reflects the emergence of man out of nature and corresponds to the developmental phase of moral sensitivity. Habermas studies Kohlberg closely on this and employs his work.¹⁵ To the question of the basis of these interests, however, no adequate answer is provided. They are not empirically justifiable or they would be found at the level of technical interests. Neither do they constitute a theory as a network of working hypotheses for then they would be regional and justified at most by the interest in emancipation, leaving them entrapped in a vicious circle.

The only proper description of these interests as truly all-embracing must be found in the direction of Heidegger's existentials and hence of being itself with its unity, truth and goodness. These are hidden only in being so present that they are in need of being unveiled by hermeneutic method. Thus, Gadamer's hermeneutic project on the clarification of foreunderstandings or 'prejudices' and Habermas' critical work on interests by the social sciences, though not identical, share common ground.

Secondly, in the end, critiques of ideologies appear to share characteristics common to those of the historical hermeneutic sciences. Both focus upon the development of communicative action by free persons. Their common effort is to avoid a reduction of all human communication to instrumental action and institutionalization for it is there that manipulation takes place. The success or failure in extending the critique of interests beyond instrumental action to communicative action determines whether the community will promote or destroy its members. Such critique is unlikely ever to be successful, however, if we have no experience of communication with our own cultural heritage. For in a dialogue distortions can be identified as such only if there is a basis of consensus and this must concern not only an empty ideal or regulative idea, but one that has been experienced, lived and shared. "He who is unable to interpret his past may also be incapable of projecting concretely his interest in emancipation."¹⁶

Thirdly, today communicative action needs more than a model to suggest what might not otherwise occur to our minds, for the rationalization of human life has become such that all of its

aspects are controlled pervasively in terms of instrumental action. Whereas Marx could refer in his day to surplus value as the motive of production, this is true no longer. Instead, the system itself of technology has become the key to productivity and all is coordinated toward the support and promotion of this system; it is the ideology of our day. As a result the distinction between communicative action and instrumental action has been overridden and control no longer can be expected from communicative action .

This raises a new type of question, namely, how can the interest in emancipation be kept alive. Undoubtedly, communicative action must be reawakened and made to live if we are not to be simply subjects—indeed slaves—of the technological machine. But how is this to be done; whence can this life be derived if the present situation is pervasively occupied and shaped by science and technology as the new and now all-encompassing master? It can be done only by drawing upon our heritage in the manner suggested by Heidegger. We need to retrieve or reach back into our heritage—now as never before—in order to find the resources which are radically new because not attended to or developed through the centuries, and now are needed for emancipation in an increasingly dominated world.

Finally, there is a still more fundamental sense in which critique, rather than being opposed to tradition or taking a questioning attitude thereto, is itself an appeal to tradition. Criticism appeals unabashedly to the heritage of emancipation it has received from the Enlightenment. But this tradition has longer roots which reach back to the liberating acts of Exodus and the Resurrection. "Perhaps," writes Ricoeur "there would be no more interest in emancipation, no more anticipation of freedom, if the Exodus and Resurrection were effaced from the memory of mankind."¹⁷

According to the proper norms of communicative action, these historical acts should be taken also in their symbolic sense in which liberation and emancipation express the root interest basic to traditional cultures. In this manner they point to fundamental dimensions of being: to Being Itself as the unique existent in whom the alienated can be reunited, to the logos which founds subjectivity without an estranging selfishness, and to the spirit through whom human freedom can be creative in history. Remembrance and celebration of this heritage provides needed inspiration and direction both for any in power who might be indifferent to the needs of the poor and alienated and for the alienated poor themselves. On this basis they can reach out in mutual comprehension, reconciliation and concern to form a social unity marked by emancipation and peace.

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Notes

*For a more extended treatment of these themes see the author's *Tradition and Contemporary Life: Hermeneutics of Perennial Wisdom and Social Change* (Madras: University of Madras Press, 1986).

1. *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences*, Parts I and II; and *Meditations on the First Philosophy*, Meditation I, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, trans. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969).

2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1975), pp. 241-45.

3. John Caputo, "A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Emotion," George F. McLean, Frederick Ellrod, *et al.*, eds., *Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundations for Moral*

Education and Character Development (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Education and The University Press of America, 1986), pp. 199-222.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 245_53.

5. *Ibid.* Gadamer emphasizes knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the declaration of The Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 278_86.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 261_64.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 267_71, 235_40.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 325_32.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 335_40.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 324_25.

14. Jurgen Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 72_73; *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon, 1971), pp. 196_209; Thomas A. McCarthy, *Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1978).

15. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," in T. Misdell, ed., *Cognitive Development and Epistemology* (New York: Academic, 1971), pp. 151_236.

16. Paul Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology" in J.B. Thompson, ed., *Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 90-97.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 99 and 100.

Chapter X

Africa: The Question of Identity

Izu Marcel Onyeocha

Africa has meant many things to many people: to some it is the land of the noble savage; to others it is a vast reservoir of cheap labor and raw materials for exploitation; to yet others it is a vast continent of jungles and cannibals, remote and exotic, a persistent enigma.¹

It is not easy for an African to talk about Africa without referring to the age-old problems associated with it: poverty, slavery, illiteracy, and the like. But there is also a danger of drifting into apologetics and rationalizations of the events as they stand, and of pointing fingers at some historical development or some common experience². At the risk of sounding pedantic or overly cynical, I would dare to harp, albeit mildly, on the selfsame hackneyed areas of concern since their very pervasiveness can only be indicative of their importance as factors in the life and history of the African.

Abosieh Nicol graphically captures the enigma of Africa and concludes that in the final analysis it is Africans who would say what Africa is:

Africa, you were once just a name to me,
but now you lie before me with somber
challenge . . .
You are not a country, Africa
You are not a concept
Fashioned in our minds, each to each,
to hide our separate fears, to dream
our separate dreams.
Only those within you who know
their circumscribed plot
and till it well with steady plough . . .
(can say), "This is my Africa" meaning
"I am content and happy
I am fulfilled, within, without, and round
about."³

Some have disparaged Africa for its lowly state in the field of science and technology. Some have reveled in the supposed past glories of Africa as though that were sufficient to cater for today's challenges. A recent *Daily Telegraph* report speaks about the excavations in Sudan of a lost city which dates back to between the 8th Century B.C. and the Middle Ages:

The dig has so far uncovered a palace, houses, wall inscriptions, pottery and leather bags which show indigenous monumental architecture and writing systems as well as traces of outside influences such as those of Greece and Turkey.⁴

Reveling in this type of discovery is self-defeating since most industrialized societies have their own share of excavations and lost cities, and yet have kept new cities going. In this regard Fanon's *caveat* is very pertinent:

I am convinced that it would be of the greatest interest to be able to have contact with a Negro literature or architecture of the third century before Christ. I should be very happy to know that a

correspondence had flourished between some Negro philosopher and Plato. But I can absolutely not see how this fact would change anything in the lives of the eight-year-old children who labor in the cane fields of Martinique or Guadalupe.⁵

The image of the African is of one desperately wanting to be heard. Trying to outdo himself to show that he actually belongs in the society of humankind, he would eagerly display his prowess in the fields of culture, of sport, of intellect and of civilization. All these efforts seem to meet with a rather listless audience who, it seems, will always require double evidence to doctor their credulity and would then give a complement more from courtesy than from solidarity. The African knows it. Even their own identity--cultural, political, religious--must await the verdict of a skeptical, stern-faced critics before they could lay any claims to authenticity. [A friend of mine had to be told his family name sounded Italian and was therefore better written AMATI rather than AMADI. Well meaning non-African acquaintances would invariably ask me to translate my name so they could understand!]

Consider the following conversation that went on recently between a friend and myself.

Friend: But what is your real name?

Me: Real name? Do you have any reason to think I bear a false name?

Friend: Not that you have a false name, I mean your official name - your real Christian name.

Me: Well, if I must do it all over again, my name is IZUCHUKWU, IZU for short.

Friend: That HAS TO BE your family name for it sounds rather strange.

Me: My family name is ONYEOCHA.

Friend: What does that mean?

Me: I don't understand your question.

Friend: I mean could you translate it so I could understand?

It is said that African names always have a meaning.

The implications of this innocent and obviously friendly conversation give food for thought. As far as my friend was concerned I did not have a real name until it was either translated or substituted by an equivalent in her own language. Did I have to be a Christian or have a Christian name to be official? And given the fact that I am a Christian, who says Izu could never be a Christian name? Did I have to go around translating my name in order to be better appreciated?

In the political sphere, it took the boundaries arbitrarily drawn at the coffee table for African nations to emerge, irrespective of natural boundaries or cultural differences, and without the slightest regard for the wishes of the people. Along with the political definition came the religious, with a brand new set of moral codes forcibly supplanting the traditional. Traditional piety suddenly became idolatrous and traditional marriage which was polygamous became adulterous. On the socio-cultural level, native languages were outlawed and with them went the folkways.

The African then became by definition an eternal student whose every facet of existence first must be vetted before he could validly adopt it. Thus severed from his roots, the African has not found any sure foothold, either in the received cultures or in his embattled one. Deprived of the use of his mother tongue, he has not quite learned the new ones; yet his destiny is made to hang on this. He is thus conditioned to learn by rote things which are of little significance to his normal life.

On the political scene he is either pro-West or pro-East. Democracy is defined in ways that are incomprehensible to him and he is forced to regard as democratic a system which he would consider as devoid of consensus.⁶ Though the multi-party system may sound democratic, in reality it is the winning party whose determinations along become law for all. It regards even a simple majority as a consensus and only rarely has recourse to referendums.

On the religious plane the story is no more comforting. As Ali Mazrui rightly points out, the African continent has produced no major world religion. Depending on the way one looks at it, this fact may be considered a lack on the part of Africa. The fact is that to universalize any religion whatever some kind of conquest - military, political, ideological - some kind of imposition of values, seems to be the key. African religions have never been in that business of subjugating but of coexisting with others. The result of this tolerance is that foreigners have been able to propagate their own religions unhindered for the most part, especially where confrontation has not been used as a means.

Africa thus became the great arena of frantic missionary activities from the great religions whose interest is served by universalism and the sense of supremacy. Mazrui sums up the situation:

Perhaps no other continent has faced such massive attention by those who have had religions of sacred wares to propagate. In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and much of the twentieth centuries Christianity found its greatest area of voluntary dedication among private agents within the African continent. Europe exported not just administrators and businessmen but also peddlers of religious beliefs. Even before the Christians came, the Muslims had disseminated their religious ideas in various parts of the continent.⁷

We may consider this an enrichment, but the worried piecing together of succeeding events in colonial and post-colonial Africa has led to the exasperated conclusion that this was all an imperialistic, opportunistic gimmick, designed in the first place, not to Christianize or morally uplift, but as a cover for doing the African in. It takes a brave and persistent act of faith to dismiss or an equally energetic new approach to generate a less pessimistic point of view.

Thus in Africa there is this situation of a variety of indigenous religions, coexisting and interacting with Islam and Euro-Christianity. This is the tripartite soul of Africa for which Nkrumah tried to propose a synthesis in his Consciencism: a concept which in the religious plane would amount a federation or confederation:

With true independence regained, . . . a new harmony needs to be forged, a harmony that will allow the combined presence of traditional Africa, Islamic Africa and Euro-Christian Africa, so that this presence is in tune with the original humanist principles underlying African society. . .⁸

In the final analysis it is the African who must define himself. All external parties should spare themselves the effort of always wanting to oversee what the African is about. The attempts to oversee have given rise to all kinds of misconceptions and problematic stereotypes which distort rather than define the true image of the African. Most notorious among all these are race, color and ideology, each of which will be discussed in the subsequent sections of this paper.

The African fares no better from the elements. He is almost an endangered species as a result of drought, pests, floods or famine. Aimé Césaire captures the situation in his inimitable way with the picture of a peasant farmer hand-tilling an arid soil with his hoe or "dabat":

Strike peasant, strike (the soil with your "dabat")
The first day the birds died
the second day the fish ran aground
the third day the animals emerged from the forest

and girdled the towns in a great belt hot and very strong.⁹

Along the same line Leopold Senghor laments the predicament of the African whom he sees in the image of a woman despoiled and disgraced, the hapless victim of an impending cataclysm: "Naked woman, black woman! I sing your passing beauty from that I fix in the eternal before jealous destiny burns you to ashes."¹⁰

The Africa presented by the ethnologist is a legend in which his audience readily believed. The African tradition as it appears in the light of the neo-African culture may also be a legend, but it is one in which the African intelligence believes. It is their perfect right to declare authentic, correct and true those components of their past which they believe to be so. Thus, the conception of the tradition as it appears in the light of the neo-African culture must be considered the most valid, since it is the one which from now on will form the future of Africa. Neo-African culture appears as an unbroken extension, as the legitimate heir, of tradition.

The Question of Africanity

The geographical entity known as Africa cannot be classified as a national community, nor defined in terms of a common language, culture or worldview.¹¹ [It is shocking to Africans to note how very minimal is the actual knowledge of Africa in most of Europe and the United States. Invariably the notion of Africa is that of a country somewhere around Kenya or Rhodesia or South Africa. Africa is known in terms of disasters, wars, famines. The dearth of knowledge of Africa even among academics is nothing short of surprising. The statistics given of Aids or some other occurrence includes, for example, figures for European countries, then the United States and then Africa!]

Ideologically, the northern part of Africa, predominantly Muslim, identifies more with the Arab world more than with Africa. According to Southern Africa's policy of apartheid, whites have not until recently considered themselves as Africans; indeed, the whole idea of apartheid has been aimed at Africans on the basis of color. Whites have their affiliations with Western Europe and the United States as the home of their forebears. Thus, we are left with the sub-Saharan southwest and central Africa, often referred to as the "real" Africa or "Black Africa".¹²

There are the African-Americans (courtesy of the Rev. Jesse Jackson) and the African Caribbeans (so-called "Black Souls in a white world") who by accident or design are black migrants or descendants of former slaves. There are the offspring of intermarriages between Africans and non-Africans.¹³ Who then wears the African badge; is it possible to have in-between Africans or people more or less African than others?

Even the aspect of color does not seem to provide the ultimate answer to the question of African or any identity. There are many light-skinned people in Africa, just as there are so many dark-skinned people in other parts of the world. It is, however, noteworthy that most of the attempts at identifying the African, even by Africans themselves, have never quite succeeded in getting away from the question of color. One possible explanation is the fact that the human mind often tends to work within established categories such that opinions earlier held tend to influence subsequent views. Some of the theories proffered as to the content of Africanity lean heavily on the question of race and color. Negritude is one such theory.

The Question of Race

The African does not pass simply, like any other person, but always is considered minutely with some uncanny curiosity. Frantz Fanon shares his personal experience:

The schema of my normal body experience had dissolved, attacked at several points, gave way and was replaced by a schema that was racial and epidemic. In the train, I was responsible at one and the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I looked at myself objectively, discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics. And I understand all that was being held against me: cultural backwardness, fetishism, slavery, cannibalism. I wanted to be a human being, nothing more than a human being.¹⁴

As a result of this kind of situation, many African Americans wanted to become white to liberate themselves from the burdensome memory represented by a more highly pigmented skin; others wanted to seek their salvation in the acquisition of the African heritage in the new-fangled spirit of Pan-Africanism.

The grand division of humanity as Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid seems to be altogether arbitrary. For instance, the blacks in India or Sri Lanka do not look like those in Africa. Nor can one accurately point to differences in mental and intellectual endowments as criteria since geniuses as well as dunces exist in every camp. Another fallacy, based on an incomplete understanding of the theory of evolution, is the idea that some races have some of what have been termed "primitive" features such as hairiness, thinness or thickness of lips or heels, etc.¹⁵ The point to be made here is that there is no justification to be drawn from history, geography, sociology, anthropology, or anatomy to support the idea of one race being innately superior to another. The percentage of people who assume this state of affairs even among Africans themselves is surprising. One such person is Leopold Sedar Senghor of Ivory Coast.

Rationalizing with Color; Senghor's Negritude

Senghor sees the common factor of Africanity as consisting in the state of being black or Negritude. This is clearly an extrinsic and superficial analysis. He describes Negritude as:

the whole complex of civilized values, cultural, economic, social and political which characterize the black peoples, or precisely the Negro-African world. All these values are essentially formed by *intuitive reason*, which expresses itself *emotionally through self-surrender . . . through myths . . . and above all, through primordial rhythms synchronized with those of the cosmos.*¹⁶

These values, according to Senghor, consist in the sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, and the gift of rhythm. Negritude is community-based: communal and not collectivistic. Though socialist in character, it is founded on spiritual and democratic values.

Senghor's analysis understandably met with criticism in that he, among other things, advocated a process of miscegenation which hopefully would get rid of the dark pigmentation over the generations. He also considers the African as emotional rather than rational: "Emotion is black, . . . reason is Greek."¹⁷

When confronted with these things he was not about to change his views:

Young people have criticized me for reducing Negro-African knowledge to pure emotion, for denying that there is an African 'reason.' . . . I should like to explain myself once again . . . "*European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilization; Negro-African reasoning is intuitive by participation.*"¹⁸

As if to complete his coup de grace, Senghor ventures into the area of epistemology and claims that African epistemology starts from a different basic postulate: "He (the African) does not realize that he thinks; he feels that he feels, he feels his existence, he feels himself."¹⁹ Hence his epistemology begins with the premise (following Descartes?), "I feel, therefore I am."

Senghor never said how he came about this outrageous conclusion and on what basis such stereotypes can claim validity. One would wonder if such conclusions were a result of some careful thought or an attempt to confirm his assertion that Africans feel rather than reason. He, an African of his own construction, lives up then to the stereotype he has created. This approach is all too apologetic; it is like saying aloud that black is *also* good, beautiful, valid and genuine--in a secondary or concessionary sense. Such a position arises out of a kind of inferiority complex, cleverly but not too successfully disguised. In the final analysis it hangs the African identity precariously upon color, while ignoring the ontology which is the root of personal identity.

Among the critics of Senghor is Paulin Hountondji, who describes Negritude as an alibi for evading the larger and more pressing political problems of national liberation.²⁰ Ghana's Kofi Busia dismisses Negritude as a convenient abstraction, a conceptual toll for researchers who are trying to find common cultural traits that will distinguish the Negro African from other races. According to Busia, heightened sensibility and strong emotional quality cannot be claimed as exclusive possession of Negro Africans. Besides, race and culture do not necessarily go together, and historical circumstances have put the Negro Africans into different cultures.²¹ Ezekiel Mphahlele sees Negritude as the unrequited yearning in the heart of alienated or assimilated Africans for the dream Africa of their ancestors. As far as he is concerned, Negritude is bound up with racialism and tends to accentuate Africa's "underdogery".²²

A closer look at Senghor's theory would reveal its vagueness in the use of such terms as *civilized values, intuitive reason, emotion, self-surrender, myths, primordial rhythms*. Civilized, for Senghor, would be synonymous with Westernized, and with that meaning go the other concepts as corollaries: self-surrender to these (Western) values, etc. There is no question of trying to examine more closely for the purpose of understanding, and if necessary changing the *status quo*. Intuitive reason is almost the opposite of deductive, reflective reason, and is more consistent with the emotional than with the rational. Thus in Senghor's theory, the African floats aimlessly with the current on the turbulent waters of the universe and reality; on the flimsy rafts of color, comfortably ensconced on the easy-chair of emotions, bereft of the compass of intentionality, with no provisions against hunger, wind and storm; with no plans, no aim, no target; blissfully relying on random flashes of ideas in order to arrive nowhere but where the tides turn.

Aime C e saire, Leopold Senghor, Leon Damas and a few others had coined the term Negritude, and defined it to mean "the consciousness of being black," the simple recognition of a fact that being black the African refuses to lose himself in the non-black. Returning from the 1963 African Summit Conference, one participant exclaimed: "We have discovered our common identity!"--by which he meant, color. The naivet e of such euphoria is self-evident, since it would seem that the speaker was for the first time discovering his color. Surprisingly enough, philosopher President Julius Nyerere was caught in the fever of this kind of euphoria as can be seen from the following statement he made in a speech in 1960:

Africans all over the continent, without a word being spoken either from one individual to another or from one African country to another, looked at the European, looked at one another, and knew that in relation to the European, they were one.²³

This cryptic observation based on "looking" would tend to suggest that Dr. Nyerere has fallen into the tendency to regard color as the important identification tag for the African, since it, more immediately than anything else, distinguishes him from people of other kinds of color.

Nigeria's Nnamdi Azikiwe wisely warns against the danger of a too-narrow definition of the African along racial lines. To do so would amount to parochialism, and chauvinism, by whatever name it is called, has always been a disintegrating factor in human society. It builds a wall between "Us" and "Them". In daily life, one who is conscious of being or having something peculiar is likely to be eternally recluse, unrelaxed, and always on his/her guard. Being black does not have to divide the African away from the rest of humanity. If anything, it should be a perspective or channel for joining the wider family of humankind.

Nigeria's late Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, promptly distances himself from any such activity:

I do not believe in what some people call the African personality. There is no such thing as African personality. Africans belong to the human race and I can say talk of African personality betrays an inferiority complex. ²⁴

The Ideological Factor: Nkrumah's Consciencism

Kwame Nkrumah believed that the present-day African society has lost its identity as it is buffeted by three rival ideologies: the traditional beliefs and practices which, in turn, are engaged in a tug-of-war with Euro-Christian tenets, on the one hand, and Islamic tenets on the other. This struggle has generated a crisis of conscience in the African since one ideology upholds what another spurns, and the African is expected to cope with all. The resolution of this conflict will be found in Consciencism which Nkrumah describes as: "A philosophical standpoint which, taking its start from the present content of the African conscience, indicates the way in which progress is forged out of the conflict in that conscience."²⁵

The main features of Nkrumah's consciencism include the principle of egalitarianism and the consideration of man as an end rather than a means. Philosophical consciencism therefore forms "the theoretical basis for an ideology whose aim shall be to contain the African experience of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence as well as the experience of traditional African society, and, by gestation, employ them for the harmonious growth and development of that society."²⁶

Nkrumah sounds positive but on a different note from Senghor: He at least recognizes that the African is, and does possess something of value that could be enriched by contact with the Euro-Christian and Islamic values. He is not merely adventitious. Unlike Senghor, Nkrumah is not about arbitrarily to deny the African the gift of analytical and discursive reason. At the inauguration of the University of Ghana, in November 1961, he said: "We have never had any doubt about the intellectual capacity of the African."²⁷

Nkrumah's point of departure in the crisis of the African conscience makes his theory rather reactionary in approaching the African as trying very hard to contain the influence of these three elements. That approach led Nkrumah to assume--without trying to explain--the values proper to the African. He was reacting against colonialism, but forgot the *who* of the African in his pursuit of the *what* that is the Conscience. No identity could be established on the basis of conscience alone.

The situation is rendered more complex by Nkrumah's espousal of materialism on which he bases his concept of egalitarianism. In furtherance of his belief in materialism Nkrumah would deny that matter owes its existence either to thought (Descartes' *Cogito*), or to feeling (Senghor). Weighing both reasonings: *I think, so I am* and *I feel, so I am* he rejects both. But inasmuch as feeling is a more "physical" experience than thought, and therefore a greater concession to the autonomy of matter. Nkrumah would choose Senghor over Descartes.²⁸

Nkrumah asserts the African rational capacity, but is willing to forsake it in order to uphold the primacy of matter. This shying away from the issue of rational capacity is almost tantamount to a denial. Nkrumah's African in the final analysis is no more than a one-dimensional man without spiritual values or telos. Not too many Africans will identify with such an image.

The Socio-Political Factor; Nyerere's Ujamaa

Both Senghor and Nkrumah advocated socialism for Africa, or rather as Africa's best bet. Nyerere advocates socialism in a different light as already operational in Africa and descriptive of Africa's social structure. Senghor points to color, Nkrumah to ideology, and Nyerere here points to society. The Ujamaa concept arises from the need to develop people, rather than things. The person is very important in Nyerere's formulation, who describes the Ujamaa villages as follows:

Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist organizations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from outside, nor governed from outside. No one can be forced into an Ujamaa village, and no official at any level can go tell the members of an Ujamaa what they should do together, and what they should continue to do as individual farmers.²⁹

Nyerere describes the basis of this society as equality and respect for human dignity, sharing of the resources which are produced by common efforts, work by everyone and exploitation by none. Nyerere makes it clear that Ujamaa is not intended as a revival of the old settlement schemes under another name; it is a new conception. No doubt Nyerere is protesting against the injustices of capitalism. But he never trifles with his Catholic religious beliefs.³⁰ (By some coincidence, Senghor himself is a devout Catholic and Nkrumah was brought up a Catholic but later on in his political career was no longer active.)

He tried to uphold the primacy of the person over matter, a compromise Nkrumah would gladly make. Nyerere's theory would uphold the spiritual values of mankind without compromising the demands of justice and equality: his own African has a destiny beyond the material. He was Catholic by religious belief,²⁸ as were Senghor and Nkrumah. However, Nyerere's views are basically idealistic and never fully reckon with the concrete realities of life when ideals fail to be realized, when the operators get disenchanted or disillusioned, when the leaders falter or fail. The Ujamaa experiment has actually experienced severe tests in Tanzania and in many instances has not quite stood up to the tests. There is another important factor to consider, namely, that what Nyerere envisaged in Ujamaa is the image of a well-run society where all citizens are happy and contented. It fits any society and cannot be claimed for Africa alone.

Despite all that has been said above, the issue of African identity is not yet nearly resolved. One may begin to wonder if the whole business of African identity is not a mere intellectual conception with no footing in reality. In any case, since color, ideology and the social factors each taken by itself have failed to give any conclusive lead, this means that the African--or for that matter any person--gets lost in the rubble when reduced to components and each part is studied in isolation. The whole enquiry must be taken up once again and from a different angle.

Africinity: Fact or Fancy

To the question, who is the African, Jacques Maquet responds:

The African is the Yoruba craftsman and the Tutsi Lord, the Nairobi mechanic and the Ibadan professor, the Fulani nomad and the Congolese villager, the hunter of the great forest and the warrior of the high plateau; the woman trader of Dakar and the factory girl of Bouake, the Benin sculptor and the Lumumbashi painter. This list of differences within the sub-Saharan Africa could be extended indefinitely.³¹

Maquet goes on to identify the constants of Africinity as *becoming an African, finding one's place among kin, depending on lineage, going back to ancestors, being in harmony with reality, marrying several wives, making lineage continue, controlling without coercion, ruling alone, being identified with the people, existing for others, fixing inequalities.*

As far as Maquet is concerned, his typical African manifests these characteristics. Put in other words, Maquet's African is always living in the past, a simpleton that never goes beyond the sensory level of existence, godfatherish in government, making sure that no one surpasses others, brutish, and incapable of reflection. So, according to Maquet's listing, wherever you look and find someone satisfying these characteristics, that person *is* an African! Consider the carefully sketched roles listed by Maquet: not one of them involves any intellectual activity! There is this meaningless talk of "being in harmony with nature", which implies a chronic passivity arising from an innate incapacity to subdue nature and make it serve his needs.³²

What we have had to contend with so far have been one abstract, generalized concept after another. No wonder none of them has succeeded in leading to a final resolution to our quest. Each talks about the African in the universal and therefore could not possibly lay claims to a concreteness since the universal African, like the universal man, nowhere exists. Because of the great diversity found in Africa, it would even be difficult to talk realistically of a typical African, even though many traits and characteristics could be considered to be common among the peoples of Africa. When Nkrumah and other Pan-Africanists talk of the African personality, they probably took for granted the principles characteristic of the human personality--self-consciousness, reflective thinking, abstract thought, power of choice, aesthetic appreciation, worship and faith in a higher power, and creativity³³--and situated them in Africa. This was an understandable reaction to the denial of these by some Western writers, particularly Levi-Bruhl and Robert Knox. But they failed to go far enough and were instead trapped in the reductionism that their theories inevitably entailed. The object of the enquiry is neither abstract thought nor a particular thought process, but a person, a self, a thinker, an African. This is where Nyerere has superseded all the others: in giving the pride of place to the person, the individual by himself and as a member of society. The concept African will be understood in this light henceforth. To get at this African, the contributions of the non-Africans are useful and helpful supplements, while the African self-affirmation leads the way.

African Personality/Identity

Apart from identifying documents, apart from traits of color or culture, something remains and perdures, looming larger than life itself. Reflecting on the transcendental qualities of the human personality I have observed as follows:

The human personality is impenetrable, incommunicable and even indestructible. Perhaps it could be frustrated or hampered by circumstances or the sheer bad will of others. It could also be enhanced, helped up and enriched by others through love or education. Even if we explain a man's body or mind, we could never explain his personality--that which makes him himself and absolutely no other. . . . I can lose everything . . . even life itself. But I can never lose my personality.³⁴

In the light of this observation, it seems that it is the African personality that must manifest itself so that the African can take his place on the world scene. Crucial to the question of personality development is contentment with what one is or has, while not giving up on what one should be. The African has been barraged into lack of self- confidence and lack of contentment with himself and his potentials: unwittingly an inferiority complex is his lot. This lack of contentment brings with it envy, irritability and lack of inner peace.

The antidote for lack of contentment is its opposite--self-confidence, that grows from courage and optimism. Mokwugo Okoye is quick to point out that the African has indeed a lot that he can be proud about:

I had thus no need for complexes of contempt, rage or dissembling, and everywhere I moved, I saw myself as the equal or even superior of the people about me --a pardonable sin after emerging, with my country, from a long period of repression and humiliation.³⁵

As has already been pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the African is beset by an identity crisis that is rather difficult to overcome. This crisis haunts him on the socio-political and ideo-psychological levels. It haunts him in the clothes he wears, the food he eats, the language he speaks, the way he worships, the way he rules or is ruled, acts or reacts. The spectre of the slave trade hangs uncomfortably over him with wounds that do not seem to heal. C.L.R. James describes the horror of

whipping, hot wood on the buttocks, salt, pepper, citron, cinders, aloes, and hot ashes poured on bleeding wounds, mutilation of limbs, ears and private parts, burning with wax, being burnt alive, roasted in slow fires, filled with gunpowder and blown up, buried neck-deep in the earth and head smeared with sugar to attract flies and insects to a living feast³⁶

--all in the pursuit of wealth.

The trauma can hardly be exaggerated. Just for the sake of comparison, two decades after the Vietnam war some of its American veterans are still suffering the after-shocks. In Japan the population still bears the after-effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The victims of Auschwitz are still deeply troubled over their terrible experiences, and international outrage has not yet let up on seeking out and dealing with all those who had anything to do with it. By the same token, a situation of trauma and intimidation that built up over several generations is likely to take a considerable while to remedy, given the good will of all parties. All this is on the psychological level.

Ideologically, the African is torn between Western capitalism and Eastern bloc socialism. There is no word of any other possibility; his leaning is adjudged right or wrong according as he leans right or left, conservative or liberal; he rules well or badly according as he follows Westminster/Washington or Moscow/Beijing.

In belief he is either Christian or Communist, perhaps Muslim or otherwise *Animist*. He is expected to be converted to one or several of the options and loyally to conform to their demands. Any wonder then he never quite seems to attain complete "conversion", but rather seems to habitually "depart from orthodoxy"--preferring on many occasions to follow the ways of his fathers. W.M. Ramsey describes this dislocation from his own roots:

You may in outward appearance convert people to a new . . . faith; but if they are not educated up to the level of intellectual and moral power which that higher faith requires, the old ideas will persist in the popular mind, all the stronger in proportion to the ignorance of each individual; and those ideal will seize on and move the people, especially in cases of trouble and sickness, and in the presence of dread of death³⁷

Edwin Smith noted with some horror how some Africans, to mark their conversion, discarded their "handsome, flowing white robes and appeared in khaki shorts and a helmet of khaki."³⁸

From his new mentors the African picked up a goodly amount of scandals, especially in the field of morals. Mokwugo Okoye criticized the Christian churches for making rogues of honest men, self-seekers out of unselfish men, liars and perverts and neurotics out of those free from these defects: "Those who ruled gave the African peasant a fine training in chicanery and petty-fogging so that having rejected his jujus and taboos, he can now swear falsely on the Bible, cheat and steal without qualm."³⁹ Polygamous marriage, which to him were a normal, honorable form of marriage, was censured as illegitimate, yet he sees it practiced by rotation in the form of divorce and remarriage.

There is the exaltation of celibacy as a super virtue within some segments of the Christian (Catholic) religion, but the African now watches as it is being seriously attacked and in danger of being overthrown. Finally, killers who, according to African ethics, are supposed to be killed, walk free due to strange twists in the interpretation of the law and the administration of justice.

William Abraham describes the African as the man of two worlds: belonging to one world, but being fiercely exposed to another. The African has been exposed in no consistent or radical fashion to a milieu which is different from that to which he belongs, though the latter continues to surround him. He is indeed a displaced person. His mastery of the "new culture" is neither comprehensive nor definitive. So his state of confusion is not yet overcome, and this cultural ambiguity is accompanied by misgivings of wide ranging proportions.⁴⁰

The period of loss of independence has entailed for Africa a certain measure of deculturization which fortunately was not total. The cleavage between town life and village life was sufficient to prevent the deculturization from sweeping through. Because the vast majority of the African population belongs to the village rather than to town life, Africans have a clear but decisive choice before them: whether to be as alien to their own people as the government had been, or whether to pose problems and formulate ideals and national objectives meaningfully in terms of the cultures of Africa. Africa is in crisis at various levels, but that is to be expected in a period of decision and transition such as Africa faces at the moment.

The time of transition, whether short or long, will confront the African with an important decision: whether to accept modern civilization at his own expense, or to do so on his own terms, or to reject everything completely and slip back into the limbo of the past.

The Way Out

The best way out of sleep is to wake up, especially if the sleep is time-wasting. No one can be praised forever for failing to get out of sleep, no matter the circumstances that led to the inactivity. Africans have many avenues for "escape," but their embattled situation must be recognized as such by them if they are to make use of the opportunities which present themselves. Nigeria's Mbonu Ojike thinks the way out is to "boycott all boycottables," meaning a severance of all links and a renunciation of anything that is not "home-made" to Africa. That would be like winding the clock backwards. Nkrumah thought the way out of the political quandary was through an armed revolution. That would be suicidal. On the ideological level, he envisages a kind of federated approach whereby the African can rescue for himself what is best in Christianity, Islam and the traditional values. Leopold Senghor would have an intermarriage between the African values and the "civilized values," physically through a process of miscegenation, and ideologically through a process of assimilation. Paulin Hountondji thinks it is not sufficient to study African cultures; they must be lived and practiced and, where necessary, transformed. As to how this could be achieved, Hountondji thinks the best way is to adopt western science.⁴¹ Fair enough, but the question is how this adoption is to be achieved beyond what already obtains. Perhaps he means industrialization. Ngugi Wa'Thiogo hits the bottom line: the African must work to decolonize the mind.

Political independence has been attained, but not cultural, economic and ideological independence. When all these have been attained, then in the words of Frantz Fanon, there will be "not only the disappearance of colonialism, but also the disappearance of the colonized man."⁴²

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Notes

1. Mokwugo Okoye, *African Responses* (Devon Ilfracombe: Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd. 1964), pp. 9-12.

2. An example of this is a famous poem by Mokwugo Okoye entitled "Ompigro" where he gives a catalogue of his grievances against the white man. (See cover page of the above work). Senghor also wrote another poem entitled "God Forgive White Europe" (See Martin Minogue & Judith Moll oy, Ed., *African Aims and Attitudes* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 62. Nkrumah's invectives are all too well known in his books, *Towards Colonial Freedom*, *Africa Must Unite*, etc.

3. Jacob Drachin, *African Heritage* (New York: Collier Books, 1964), p. 119.

4. *The Daily Telegraph*, London and Manchester, Monday, January 4, 1988.

5. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1967), p. 230.

6. A typical example is the idea that democracy consists necessarily in a multi-party arrangement and anything else is contrary to democracy. The fact of the matter is that this ends up in an elected dictatorship whereby the winner constantly spites the loser. Mugabe's one-party arrangement in Zimbabwe drew a particularly bad press from the West, even though the people themselves made the choice and seem happy with it.

7. Ali A. Mazumi, *World Culture and the Black Experience* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 32.

8. *Ibid.*

9. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Paul Bohannon, *Africa and Africans* (Garden City, NY: The Natural History Press, 1964), especially pp. 60-78. See also Hild Kuper's graphic description of actual events where the African is considered with great disdain. For this see Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg, ed., *Cultures and Societies of Africa*, p. 539ff.

10. Jacques Ma guet talks of physical differences between the races, along with profound mental differences both intellectual and emotional, so that individuals of certain races are not capable of achieving the same intellectual development as those of other races, and have a kind of character that makes them unable to command and predisposes them to obey (surely based on Aristotle). See his *Africanity, the Cultural Unity of Black Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 3.

11. I was amazed and shocked to watch a recent Channel 4 TV show "*Family Feud*" where two six-member panels would win ten thousand dollars for answering questions right. One of the questions was: NAME THREE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERICA. Answers: AFRICA! Spain, South Africa! The twelve panelists failed to come up with a list of three countries in South America!

12. See Jahnheinz Jahn, *Muntu: An Outline of Neo-African Culture*, trans. by Marjorie Greene (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1961), pp. 19-21.

13. A study conducted by James F. D owns reveals that 70% of American blacks have at least one white ancestor, and 30% of American whites at least one black ancestor. See his *Cultures in Crisis* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1972), p. 3.

14. Fanon, p. 114.

15. Downs, p. 13.

16. Leopold S. Senghor, "What is Negritude?" in *Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, ed. by Paul E. Sigmund (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 250.

17. Senghor, *Negritude et Humanisme* (Paris, Seuil, 1964), p. 24.

18. Senghor, *On African Socialism* (London, Pall Mall, 1964), p. 74.

19. Senghor, "The Spirit of Civilization, or the Laws of African Negro Culture," address given at The First International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists, Proceedings in *Presence africaine*, special issue (June-November 1956), p. 64.

20. Paulic J. Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality* (London: Hutchinson Univ. Library for Africa, 1983), p. 159f.

21. Mi nogue, p. 239.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

23. Julius Nyerere, *Symposium on Africa* (Wellesley, MA: Wellesley College, 1960), p. 149.

24. Quoted in Al lah-De, "Words, Words Galore," *Sunday Times*, Lagos, May 26, 1963, p. 9.

25. Keame Nkrum ah, *Consciencism* (London, Panaf Books, 1974), p. 79.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-70.

27. See "Ghana's Cultural History," extracts from his speech at the inauguration of the University of Ghana, *Presence africaine* 13, 1962) pp. 7-14.

28. See Ali Maxrui's discussion on Consciencism in his *World Culture and Black Experience* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 16-19.

29. Nyerere, p. 149.

30. By some coincidence, Senghor himself is a devout Catholic and Nkrumah was brought up a Catholic but later on in his political career was no longer active.

31. Maquet, p. 3.

32. Maquet is no doubt basing his position on what Aristotle said about some people born to rule and command while others are only disposed to obey . . .

33. See Minogue, 239.

34. Isu Marcel Onyeocha, "Who are You?" paper presented Owerri Diocese, Nigeria, April 17, 1987.

35. Mokwugo Okoye, p. 19.

36. C.L.R. James, *Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal*, p. 27.

37. See Edwin W. Smith, *Knowing the African* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1946), p. 15.

38. Smith, *The Golden Stool* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1927), p. 264.

39. Okoye, p. 15.

40. W.F. Abraham, *The Mind of Africa* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), p. 35.

41. Hountondji, p. 159.

42. Okoye, p. 250.

Chapter XI

Solidarity, Power and Democracy in Africa

Atomate Epas-Ngan (Armand)

In the last fifty years, the genius of African social life has been that its philosophers, politicians, historians and theologians reconstructed its past with African words, African ideologies and African life histories, thereby moving away from exclusive reliance upon the accounts of European observers.

As a result, Africans have begun to formulate a more authentic theory of the person, one which is attentive to the nuances and complexities of African everyday life. Attention to theoretical and methodological concerns, to the actors as well as to the structures, has enabled us to take each element of the ethnographic present we inherited as primal fact--men, women, families, ethnicity--and to study them as dynamic relationships of solidarity, power, conflict and negotiation.

In focusing our study of solidarity and power upon the *Mbün** traditional culture and through their dialectical interplay moving to African democratic socialism, our concern will be to build upon the achievements of recent years and to create a place where the person can flourish in work, culture, consciousness and everyday African life. In this context, democracy both as a form of government able to ensure human rights and as a shared experience seems to rise to our expectation.

Here, we want to develop an analysis that will move beyond the old analytical categories into a new, rigorous interpretation that encompasses the wide varieties of the African experience in this field. We want to recapture for ourselves the vitality of oral history, not as a body of elite traditions, but as the daily testimonies of the seemingly insignificant; we want to present the social processes and transformations revealed in the remembered experiences of home and work-place. Especially, we want to be attentive to how Africans described their own lives--not as a way to explain the so-called "invisible and inarticulate," but in order to reveal the eloquent articulation discernible in commonplace accounts.

This is why the question of solidarity and power in the *Mbün* traditional culture as a dialectical route to African democratic socialism is to be approached in four ways or with four methods: phenomenologic, analytic, hermeneutic and inductive.

Introduction

The value of solidarity (*Lakwün*) and the value of power (*Emf'm*) played different but complementary roles in the organization and the integrating of *Mbün* traditional culture. These two values represented respectively "ethical value" and "political value." The former aiming at a relationship along a horizontal line, the latter aiming at a hierarchy of power along a vertical line.

Solidarity (*Lakwün*) can be thought of as the horizontal axis, because through this value the person (*Mür*) attached himself to his fellow man, that is, he considered himself to be a member of a new unit. Power can be thought of as being the vertical axis, because through this value the person (*Mür*) was placed in subordinate, but always coordinated, relation with other participants.

The two values of solidarity and power were the two forces which determined *Mbün* social structure. But neither the value of solidarity nor the value of power was the special goal or the *raison d'être* of the community. Rather, it was by satisfying these two values that the person (*Mür*) gained his place in the family (*Ebör*), the clan (*Eyör*) and the tribe (*Edzo*). It was also from

the tension and dialectic between these two values that the person (*Miir*) began to become a personality (*Ngwä-Miir*), in other words, that this psyche was newly integrated and based on the emerging, evaluating process. This integration, originally based on drives and instincts, develops gradually into an integration of values and evaluating processes which constitute the ethical consciousness.

The dynamic of the movement along the horizontal axis represented by the value of solidarity (*Lakwün*) and along the vertical axis represented by the value of power (*Emf'm*), described the dynamic interplay between "ethical value" and "political value" in the organization and the integration of *Mbüin* community: co-operation and co-ordination between the members (*Bär*) were features of solidarity (*Lakwün*). Since it is difficult to conceive of a social group without any power hierarchy, without rules that can be maintained, the *Mbüin* people derived for their internal political system a form of power through which the participants were not subjected to political force and threat, terror and fear, but oriented through love, sympathy, understanding and co-operation. The leader was *Primus inter pares* and the executives were chosen from among the members themselves. This is what we term "democracy."

Democracy is here viewed as more than a form of government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. It is a shared experience between individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own.

Our limited study bears on three points:

1. The value of solidarity defined as inter-relations and inter-action. This implies vital communion and thus a community. It involves the notion of "family" and some of its implications. This solidarity has a specific language.

2. The value of power approached through some of its general characteristics. By way of illustration, a brief analysis of recruitment of personnel for the various roles, access to property, settlement of disputes and the decision-making process will be included.

3. Dialectical interaction as a route to African democratic socialism is articulated through the treatment of three issues: a) an historical survey of democracy to a question, b) the question of how we conceive democracy, and c) an answer to that question.

The Value of Solidarity

Solidarity as Inter-relations and Inter-action

By the value of solidarity (*Lakwün*) in the organization and integration of the *Mbüin* community, the person (*Miir*) relates himself to other persons (*Bär*) in the family (*Ebör*), clan (*Eyör*) and tribe (*Edzö*). Through his tendency to form attachments with others, the person transcends himself and participates in the lives of others. This process generates a series of values such as love, sympathy, friendship, admiration, etc. One feels isolation as both a psychological and a social pressure of unbearable loneliness. One craves companionship and communication with other members, no less than he craves for food. One likes to chat, to joke and to laugh with other participants. In the exchange of impressions and feelings, in playing and working together with other members, in hunting and fishing together with his peers, he is relieved of his loneliness. To understand and empathize with others gives him satisfaction; living with others in harmony makes him happy.

The logic of solidarity in the organization and integration of the *Mbün* traditional culture is loyalty or fidelity.¹ Fidelity in social relationship is based on a consciousness of participating in the same values as another, or even in the consciousness of the value potential of another, in the sense that in helping the other a common value may be realized. Fidelity can also manifest itself in continuous empathy, love and responsibility shown to others in order to realize in them and with them certain constant life values.

In the *Mbün* cultural tradition solidarity (*Lakwün*) manifests itself not only as and in inter-relations (*Oläl/n'däl*) between the members (*Bär*), but also as and in inter-action (*Emv'k*), participation and co-operation with others. The participants (*Bär-Emv'k*) respond to each other and influence each other. The question this raises then is: what makes this inter-action possible? The answer to this question is the more simple for being contained in the question itself.

Where people live together we witness the fact of grouping, that is to say, in order to provide for one's various needs or interests² every individual has regular social relations with several other individuals. These regular and recurrent social relations are possible, and this is the case in the *Mbün* traditional culture, only when social inter-action between the participants in these relations fulfills their mutual needs, interests or values. Viewed from this standpoint, the value of solidarity (*Lakwün*) implies a profound and vital communion between the members.

Solidarity as Vital Communion

In the *Mbün* traditional culture individuals (*Bär*) live in vital communion in virtue of the things they have in common. Communion is the way in which they come to possess things in common: beliefs, aspirations, knowledge. Such things cannot be passed physically from one person (*Mür*) to another, like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons (*Bär*) would share a cake by dividing it into physical pieces. "Vital communion" ensures participation in a common understanding and secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions--such as ways of responding to expectations and requirements.

In the *Mbün* worldview, this "vital communion" exists not only between human beings (*Bär-e-mweng*), but also and simultaneously between them and their ancestors (*Ankiér/Amsr-a-bs*) and with God (*Nzém-a-Mpöng*). This vital communion between these instances can be represented schematically in the chart below.

All these three families live in vital communion. The family of spirits provides the goods, well-being and good fortune to the Family of Persons through the Family of Ancestors. In the same way, the Family of Persons offers sacrifices and holocausts to the Family of Spirits through the Family of Ancestors. This is to say nothing more than that the Family of Ancestors ensures the relay, the mediation between the Family of Persons and the Family of Spirits. There is no other way for whosoever desires to remain alive and healthy and thus in harmony with all these instances.

"I am created by God and I exist by my ancestors" (*Me a sé nkiér a weng mbwè Nzém*) is the most specific *Mbün* proverb expressing the key terms of this inter-communion. It points out the role or function of each instance, as well as the inter-action between them. "I (*Mür-e-mwèng*: person) am created by God (*Nzém*) and I exist by my Ancestor (*Nkiér*): the function of God is to create, that of Ancestor is to fulfill God's will in human existence.

By way of illustration of this inter-communion, which implies also continuity and harmony between spirits, ancestors and human beings, let us take the very common *Mbün* interpretation of a child smiling. In the *Mbün* tradition, when a new-born smiles while he is sleeping, it means that

he is in good communion, in good harmony with God. He participates and rejoices with the new born. However, if he begins to cry while continuing to sleep, that means that the communion is affected, the harmony is broken by something bad he did. In order to restore communion and reestablish harmony, he receives from God and through his ancestors a corrective punishment. This expression *Nzém y'amf'mwen-a-nza ba bobol* is very significant; it means literally: "God and his guardians are beating (correcting) him."

As a result, in *Mbüin* tradition the influence or impact of ancestors (*A-Nkiér*) in one's personal life is deeply stressed. When a person (*Mür*) comes into life, he bears the name of that ancestor through whom God gave him to his parents. That is why in *Mbüin* culture the name of a person represents this person himself: my name is my person; it represents my proper identity. Any outrage to my name is *ipso facto* an outrage to my person, to my identity; it is, therefore, an offense to my ancestor from whom I have derived my name in coming to life and an offense to the family to which I belong. (Let us note in passing that, in Zaire, the political philosophy of "authenticity" is nothing more than a reevaluation of personal identity through the reevaluation of the ancestors' names and values, and, therefore, a reevaluation of his place within the family.

The Notion of "Family" and Its Implications

Mbüin tradition distinguishes three levels within the human family: *Ebör* (small family), *eyör* (intermediate family) and *edzö* (large family). This distinction proceeds according to the criterion of complexity. The minimum number of individuals (*Bär*) in forming a small family is three rather than two as is common elsewhere: *Ebäl* (man) + *Okär* (woman) + *Mwän* (child). This minimum number of three persons is very significant in transforming a mere couple based upon an informal union (*Akàng*) between a man and woman to the level of a family (*Ebör*) founded upon the tie of blood that we term marriage (*Ankwel*).

This is to say, that in the *Mbüin* conception of family a couple is not yet a family because of the presence of two persons only instead of three or more. It may become a family if and only if a child comes into life. Childbirth, as the advent of the third person who fulfills the number three, consequently transforms informal union (*Akàng*) between man and woman into the so-called family (*Ebör*), ensuring thereby the continuity of the family. In other words, in the *Mbüin* traditional culture, the aim of marriage is not pleasure; its principal object is not the union of two beings who are pleased with each other, and who wish united to pass through the pleasures and trials of life. The effect of marriage is the union of two beings by the tie of blood, in order to produce from them a third who will be qualified to continue the family.³ The Roman sacramental formula: "to take a wife for the purpose of begetting children" (*Ducere uxorem liberum quaerendorum causa*),⁴ pronounced in the marriage ceremony parallels these views.

Therefore, the reality of "offspring" is stressed not less, but more as both a social necessity (requirement) and psychological pressure. The reason for this is that in the *Mbüin* worldview no family should become extinct. As in Hindu thought,⁵ the extinction of a family causes its own ruin; the ancestors, deprived of continuity, fall into the abode of the unhappy. In the same way, De Coulanges reports that at Athens the law made it the duty of the first magistrate of the city to see that no family should become extinct.⁶ Parallel to this, the Roman law made provision that no family should fail and become extinct.⁷ We read as well in the discourse of an Athenian orator, "There is no man who, knowing that he must die, is so careless about himself as to wish to leave his family without descendants; for then there would be no one to render him that worship that is due to the dead."⁸ Thus, everyone had an interest in leaving a son after him, convinced that his

immortal happiness depended upon it. It was even a duty towards those ancestors whose happiness could last no longer than did the family.

In the *Mbün* traditional culture, someone who has given birth to children remains eternally alive, even if he has already died. This is comparable to someone who has planted a fruit tree. Even after his death, whoever shall shelter under its shade and taste its fruits will recall the name of the planter and thus his person. In the same way, whoever did not give birth to children when he comes to die shall die forever, breaking thereby definitively the continuity of life.

That is why, in order to remain eternally in living memory, on the one hand, and to ensure continuity of life and the stable equilibrium of the family, on the other hand, it is most necessary that a man not only be married, but also, and even more, that he beget children. Therefore, celibacy was a grave impiety and misfortune; an impiety, because one who did not marry imperiled the happiness of the names of the family. This was a misfortune because he himself would receive no worship after his death, and could not know "what the names enjoyed." Both for himself and for his ancestors it was a sort of damnation, a punishable offense. In the same way, De Coulanges reports⁹ that Dionysius of Halicanassus, who had searched the ancient annals of Rome, asserts that he had seen an old law which required young people to marry.¹⁰ Cicero's treatise on the laws--a treatise which almost always reproduces, under a philosophic form, the ancient laws of Rome--contains a law which forbids celibacy.¹¹ At Sparta, the legislation of Lycurgus deprived the man who did not marry of all the rights of citizenship;¹² and from a passage of Pollux it appears that in many Greek cities the law punished celibacy as a crime.¹³

In accord with these positions, we should conclude with De Coulanges that in the *Mbün* traditional culture man (*miir*) does not belong to himself, but to the family. He is one member in a series which must not stop with him. He is not born by chance, but has been introduced into life in order that he may continue a worship; and he must not give up life till he is sure that this worship will be continued after him. Hence, modern theories of family-planning or birth control certainly will take a long time before they are understood by people deeply rooted in this traditional view. Besides, the husband of a sterile wife (*Okar-ekob*) was compelled--within the strict limits of social norms--to marry a second wife (*Mpäl*) without divorcing his first wife, and this for two reasons: first, to achieve a stable family equilibrium by fulfilling the number "three"; and second, to ensure continuity through offspring. This family was called *Ebör-l-ompäl*, literally "rival wives family."

The *Mbün* attitude regarding a sterile wife differs from the reaction of some other ancient traditions.¹⁴ In the *Mbün* traditional culture, marriage is indeed contracted to perpetuate the family, but it would be unjust for it to be broken if the wife be sterile. Indian religion proscribed that the sterile woman should be replaced by another at the end of eight years.¹⁵ The practice was the same in Greece and Rome, though there is no formal text to prove that. Nevertheless, Herodotus mentions two kings of Sparta who were constrained to repudiate their wives on account of sterility.¹⁶ In Rome, the divorce of Carvilius Ruga is the first mentioned in the Roman annals. Aubus Gellius reports:

Carvilius Ruga, a man of rank, separated from his wife by divorce because he could not have children by her. He loved her tenderly, and had no reason to complain of her conduct; but he sacrificed his love to the sanctity of his oath, because he had sworn (in the formula of marriage) that he took her to wife in order to have children.¹⁷

In the *Mbün* tradition sterility was exclusively the woman's affair: a sterile man was unconceivable. Hence, only the man was authorized by social norms to marry another; the contrary was not only strictly prohibited, but severely repressed. The transgressor, in Klineberg's

words¹⁸ would be so shamed by the laughter of others that she might even be driven to leave the family, and not return until she had in some way redeemed herself. As a result "polygamy" can be explained as the search of stable family equilibrium as well as a social necessity for the continuity of life through offspring.

But sometimes, if it is clearly demonstrated that the sterility of a marriage is due to the husband, as in the case of his death, a brother or some other relative of the husband must substitute in his place. (This is one of the reasons why, as will be shown further, a wife does not belong to one individual. She is always the wife of all the members of the family, she is "our" wife, not "my" wife). The child born of such a relationship is held to be the son of the husband, and continues his worship. Such were as well the rules among the ancient Hindus.¹⁹ We find them again in the laws of Sparta and in those of Athens:²⁰ the widow remains subject to the guardianship of her husband's substitutes--that is to say, of her own sons, if she has any, or, in default of sons, of the nearest kindred.²¹ So complete is her husband's authority over her, that he can, upon his death, designate a guardian for her, even choose for her a second husband.²²

As a result, in *Mbün* tradition, offspring procure for the person both prestige and respect. By giving birth to children, *Ebäl*(man) becomes *Tär* (father) and *Okär* (woman) becomes *Mäm* (mother). These two social denominations are so important that they are attributed only to one who, either man or woman, has given birth to children, even if he be younger. Consequently, to be called *Tär* (father) or *Mäm* (mother) brings prestige, consideration and respect to the person involved. This is the more stressed in the case of fathers and/or mothers of twins (*A-mbwél*).²³

Schematically, the notion of family and some of its implications in the *Mbün* tradition can be represented as below.

Altogether, the small family (*Ebör* or *Ebör-l-ompäl*) is not an isolated unit, and its system of values and norms is not a closed one. It is related to a set of several other small families on the same footing, that is, by vital communion and mutual influence. At the same time, it is a part of the so-called "intermediate family" (*Eyön*), which intermediate family, in turn, is a part of the so-called "large family" (*Edzö*). In constituting an "intermediate family," a minimum of three small families is required while a minimum of three intermediate families is called a "large family." This represented schematically below.

Viewed from this standpoint, *Lakwün* stratification²⁴ is a pyramidal system of culture. At the apex of the pyramid, is situated the largest and most extensive entity; this is *Edzo* (tribe). The smaller the entity the more it approaches to *Ebör* or *Ebör-l-ompäl* (small family). The smaller unit can be called a "subfamily" and the larger a "superfamily" as it embraces an unlimited number of coordinated and subordinated intermediate and small families with various kinds of systems of values and norms. In this we move from an homogeneous family to a heterogeneous family.

In thus moving from an homogeneous to a heterogeneous family, we encounter the conflicted aspect of *Lakwün*. Until now, we have always spoken of this complex totality of values as a paradise with well-defined membership, values and norms, and therefore with well-defined organization, integration and structure. That is true but, in fact, *Lakwün* is a very complicated entity. Conformity to the same system of group values and group norms does not mean that there is only harmony. On the contrary, harmony is maintained through tension and conflicts which manifest themselves from the most unconscious and gentle competition to the most conscious and ruthless strife and animosity.

Nevertheless, tension and conflict, competition and strife are not viewed here in the negative sense as leading to separation and disintegration of the unit, but in the positive sense as representing the very life and development of *Lakwün*. There is, by way of illustration, competition

between lovers (*A'mbän*) and friends (*A'Säm*) in affection, service and sacrifice for each other. Because based on values of solidarity, this kind of positive competition manifests itself in the form of healthy and productive competition resulting in *Lakwün* with high morale or *esprit de corps*.

In other words, the most important fact in the conflicted character of *Lakwün* is that, in spite of various tensions and conflicts, *Lakwün* is not reduced to chaos: its social behavior (*o'mür*) and social relation (*o'läl*) do not become haphazard or random. The reason is that underlying the various conflicts there remains within *Lakwün* a common broad frame of reference in the form of a consciously or unconsciously shared system of values and norms. That is why solidarity can also be defined as more than a "group-consciousness;" it is indeed a consciousness in terms of "us".

Solidarity as Consciousness in Terms of "Us"

In *Mbün* traditional culture, solidarity as we-consciousness means a permanent togetherness characterized by a permanent atmosphere of belonging together. Especially in facing other groups, *Lakwün* fellow members feel that they form a unity. This feeling exists only because there are permanent relations among the participants. Therefore, the feeling of belonging together and the development of relations among the participants of a more than accidental (temporary) togetherness inevitably develop into an orderly form of interrelation and interaction among the participants in the togetherness.

Note that this distinction between "permanent" and "temporary" togetherness--and that by so many writers, as shall be shown below, between two types of social behavior and social relations--refers not only to the duration, but also to a basic qualitative difference in human relations and behavior founded upon the make-up of the human psyche. A social and integrated group represents a permanent togetherness, while a "contract"²⁵ among a certain number of people to achieve a certain task in a certain time can be considered to form a temporary togetherness.

By way of illustration, since Charles H. Cooley American sociology has employed the terms "primary" and "secondary" group.²⁶ The first is characterized by close, face-to-face, intimate relationships, while the second is characterized by abstract, rational relationship, directed to a planned goal.

This distinction has been formulated also by Emile Durkheim in terms of "organic solidarity" and "mechanical solidarity."²⁷ MacIver distinguishes between "community" and "association"²⁸ while Robin M. Williams develops the contrast between "informal" and "formal" groups.²⁹

Social groups which have been classified as "primary groups" by Cooley, as "groups based on organic solidarity" by Durkheim, as "community" by MacIver and as "informal groups" by Williams, are termed in the framework of our stratification theory, "permanent togetherness," that is, social groups in which the level of the heart dominates; in other words, group in which the solidarity value based on feeling plays a very important role. On the other hand, the "secondary groups" of Cooley, the "social groups based on mechanical solidarity" of Durkheim, the "associations" of MacIver and the "formal groups" of Williams are termed in the framework of our classification theory "temporary togetherness" or "accidental togetherness," that is, groups in which social behavior and social relations are dominated by the level of the mind. Their social behavior, relations, and aims, not only are more rational, calculated and planned, but also are more conscious.

In short, *Lakwün* can be defined as:

- primary group vs
- secondary group (Cooley)
- organic solidarity vs
- mechanical solidarity (Durkheim)
- community vs
- association (MacIver)
- informal group vs
- formal group (Williams)
- permanent togetherness vs
- temporary togetherness

However, as no man is only heart or only mind, both kinds of mentality are usually discernible in *Lakwün*. The same has been said by Robin M. Williams when he pointed out that every formal organization which continues for any considerable period develops an informal organization alongside the formal one.³⁰ The observation of Stouffner³¹ and others have attested that the clustering of soldiers in small informal groups is the basis of the high morale of a fighting unit. We agree also with Bar nard when he points out that informal association mostly precedes formal organization.³²

Altogether, solidarity as we-consciousness parallels nearly what Robert Redfield terms "the folk community."³³ It is composed of one kind of people who to a certain extent are related to each other, know each intimately and communicate with each other.

Solidarity as Language

It goes without saying that interaction and relations in a social group are possible only if there exists a certain minimum of communication between the members of the social group. Communication³⁴ here is viewed as the transmission of the content of the psychological processes to different individuals, so that these individuals can participate in more or less the same knowledge and experience and consequently be able to influence each other's behavior.

The most important means of communication in *Lakwün*, as in most human social groups, is language. The relevant aspects of solidarity as interaction, vital communion and consciousness in terms of "us" within *Lakwün* are articulated in notions and judgments symbolized in language. But since language represents not only separate notions and judgments, but systems of notions and judgments which continuously come into relationship with each other in a way that is characteristic of a certain language, the total language system represents the whole of the possibilities of conceptualization and thought and their expressions within *Lakwün*. Hence, participating in this complex totality of symbolized notions and judgments, the *Lakwün* fellow-members can understand and influence each other, i.e., they can communicate with each other.

This is to say nothing more, as noted above, than that within *Lakwün* the person (*mür*) himself has an urge to communicate, to empathize and to cooperate with other persons (*Bär*), i.e., to satisfy his solidarity value. Mutual understanding, empathy and cooperation among the members of *Lakwün*, working in a standardized pattern to achieve the values of the family are made possible by communication and usually summarized, as underlined previously by the term *esprit de corps*.

The members of *Lakwün*, or Family with a high morale, experience an *esprit de corps* in their affective relationship, i.e., in their empathy and solidarity with their fellow members and in their loyalty to the values and norms, the symbols and other properties of the family. This latter itself

becomes for them a value which at times can be higher even than the value of their own selves, so that the individual who is isolated from the *Lakwün*, the train of life, regardless of the reasons for the isolation, feels lonely, anxious, frustrated and thus unable to satisfy his value of solidarity. Survival in such a circumstance would be extremely difficult, not merely from an external or physical point of view, as Kingsley³⁵ pointed out, but also from an internal or mental point of view.

By way of illustration, let us proceed by a brief linguistic analysis of the *Lakwün* social unit.³⁶ Relations, interaction, cooperation among *Lakwün* fellow members are not based upon the well known pair *Më-nze*, "I-You," *Je-Tu*, "Ich und Du." On the contrary, they are built on the basis of relation "*Bs-Bä*", "we-they", "*Nous-Ils*".

The result is that in common *Mbün* expression, *Bs* (We, *Nous*) is prior, that is, it comes before "*Me*" (I, *Je*) in relation to "*Nze*" (You, *Tu*). However, : "*Me*" (I), "*Nze*" (you) and "*Nza*" (he/she) are not yet absorbed or sacrificed by *Bs*. They are necessarily and always already (*nécessairement et toujours-déjà*) included in *Bs* in which they move freely and differently in the absolute relation of principles of dialogue. In other words, *Me*, *Nze*, *Nza* remain dialogical partners within *Bs*.

Viewed from this standpoint, it should be noted even *Nzém* (Dieu, God) is anthropologically *Bseistic* (conscious in terms of us, or nouiste ["*Bseist*" and "*nouiste*", which would correspond to "we-istic" in English, are neologisms]). He is not in the *Lakwün* or group solidarity for he is "the totally Other"; yet he is *Anwël* (Emmanuel), that is, *Nzém ye Bs* (God with us, Dieu-Avec-Nous).

Some examples are found in the following chart. From these it results that in both English and French cultures representing here the Western culture, there is only one speaker who communicates to one other, I-You (he, him, she, her), Je-Tu (toi, il, lui), (1, 2, 3), while in the *Lakwün* social group, there is a spokesman or representative of the three persons or more basic small family who reports in the name or on behalf of all the persons involved (*Bs*) in the family to which he belongs that "we work with them"; "we are sick" and for whom your father, brother, child or children are at the same time both for you and for us (1, 2, 3). (Recall, as was pointed out above, that whosoever has given birth to children becomes father (*Tär*) and mother (*Mäm*) for everyone, even though he or she be younger.)

In addition to this, in English as well as in French culture, individual goods (a coat or a wife) are symbolized by the category of "having," which leads to a certain extent to individualism and selfishness (4, 5). In *Mbün* culture, the category of "being" is first so that in the *Lakwün* social group it makes no sense to say "I have my coat" (5) or "I have my wife" (4), but "*Bs eye a n'okes* (*a Bs*)" or "We have our wife" (4) and "*Bs eye a ne kadzak* (*a Bs*)" or "we have our coat" (5).

Taking all this together, we can conclude that within *lakwün* solidarity is really interrelationship, interaction, vital communion and we-consciousness. It manifests itself in *esprit de corps*, it is a permanent togetherness made possible by communication between *Lakwün* fellow members specifically by means of language. The very significance of *Lakwün* depends upon the achievement of this primary value which is its highest value; we may even say its "ethical value." The achievement of all other values, namely, the value of power, is subordinated to it and must implement the achievement of the highest value of *Lakwün*. See the following chart.

The Value Of Power

General Characteristics

It is difficult, as has been mentioned above, to conceive of a social group without power, that is, without rules which can be maintained. Even in friendship, the individuals involved must follow certain rules, although both may have equal weight. The value of power is viewed here as springing from the tendency, not so much towards self-awareness and self-assertion as pointed out by Edward Spranger,³⁷ but rather towards attachment to others.

Indeed, for Spranger, the expansion of self-awareness to the environment creates the social value which he terms the "power value." This manifests itself in self-assertion, competition, the urge for superiority, the desire to dominate, the need for prestige, jealousy, envy, etc. Spranger describes as well the power value as the urge in the individual to defend his own values against the values of others, and terms it the "political value." As a result, power behavior aims at self-aggrandizement and at dominating others, i.e., at imposing one's own values upon others. He identifies the force of the power value with the life-force, with affirmation of one's own essence, and emphasis upon one's own performance and vitality.³⁸

In general, this is the history of the rise of kingdoms as in the feudal period of history in all parts of the world, during which kings affirmed their ascendancy by claiming divine power. The invention of tools and the domestication of animals, etc., placed some of these communities in a stronger position versus other groups, which led to the conquest of the weaker groups by the stronger. The conqueror or usurper installed himself as a powerful ruler, while the conquered became his subjects and were obliged to live according to the rules of the conqueror-elite. A hierarchic social order based upon power then came into being. In modern times, we see this pattern repeated in the coming to power of the Fascists in Italy, the Nazis in Germany, and the Communists in Russia. This is the dictatorial and "totalitarian" type of social group. Nevertheless, from the feudal society, in turn, came the democratic movement which arose after the Renaissance and gained momentum until our time. Today, we see the world divided into these two systems, into the democratic countries, on the one hand, and the communist countries, on the other.³⁹

In the "Individual Psychology" of Adler this value of power is synonymous with the "urge for superiority" which determines the life style of a person. If the individual feels unable to achieve superiority, he acquires feelings of inferiority which play an important role in Adler's theory. Harry Stack Sullivan and Karen Horney stress the negative aspect, the feeling of anxiety: states of anxiety displace feelings of security and self-esteem.

But things do not happen so in the *Mbün* traditional culture. Within *Lakwün*, since the greatest possible power cannot be gained by a momentary superiority, it is necessary to create a stable relationship between oneself and others. Thus, a real will for power is inseparable from a will to regulate and legislate; power and the "political" act of regulation are no less important than the value of solidarity. In other words, within *Lakwün*, the value of power is service, a shared experience based on love, sympathy, understanding, and cooperation, instead of upon force and threat, terror and fear. It is not a struggle among the members to determine which of them will be able to develop themselves more fully according to their value systems by occupying a higher place in the status hierarchy, and consequently be able to take a more important role in determining the life and especially the values and norms of *Lakwün*. Power comes rather through a common consensus.

Viewed from an individual standpoint, however, it is not wrong to see that through the value of power, the individual himself tried to expand his potentialities and capacities. This gives one a feeling of self-esteem and self-confidence; it provides him as well with prestige and status in social relations within *Lakwün*. This attitude, however, was secondary in regard to the essence of power value which was essentially a shared service.

The general characteristics of the *Lakwün* power system were that political authority was held either by one leader (*Mfm*)--not the chief--or by a council of elders (*Eyö*). Normally the leader was the eldest member of the clan, but where such an individual was visibly senile and inept a younger elder was chosen by the consensus of the members of the Council of Elders.

Normally, the elders were the custodians of the clan's or tribe's secrets and traditions. They jealously kept those secrets as sources of their power over the entire social group and especially over the ambitious younger generations. In the name of the clan or tribe the elders also had the absolute control over the tribal/clan property, whether it was for agricultural or grazing purposes or for livestock. The accumulation process, normally minimal, was done by the elders, through various forms of "gifts," free labor, priority in the cultivation and harvesting cycles and so on.

The age-level system worked in favor of these elders because recruitment into higher grades was done on the basis of the age-levels. There was a feeling of fraternity and freedom among the members of the same age-level, and it is probably at that level that we are enabled to talk of democracy in the sense that opinions were aired freely between co-equals.

Succession to authority followed a hierarchical pattern of grades of imitation. From the oldest member of the family and/or clan, authority went to the next dean of the oldest generation, then from the eldest brother to the youngest, from uncle to nephew and so on. The leader or the elder was the custodian of the clan or tribe heritage, and could not dispose of it at his will. Thus, the power system of *Lakwün* socio-political structure⁴⁰ can be classified as decentralized. For more understanding, we shall examine very briefly the four areas of recruitment into the various roles and access to property, dispute settlement and the decision-making process.

Recruitment and Access to Property

How were the members of the Council recruited? As in most traditional political organizations of the Bantu,⁴¹ there were no individuals or bodies which wielded clearly defined political authority entailing explicit rights and duties. Nevertheless, a number of ways existed in which individuals could gain greater prominence than their tribesmen or clansmen and final recognition as leaders by the group within the tribal unit with regard to certain activities. Thus, there were several ways through which individuals were recruited into certain roles.

Primogeniture (O'nswe). The eldest son (*Nswem*) in each family was automatically recognized as head of the family in the absence of the father.⁴² As such, he inherited a larger share of his father's property than that which went to his other brothers, whether it was land or cattle. The father paid his bride-price earlier than for his other brothers and if the cattle were not enough, the others could wait long before marrying. Indeed, when the father died, the eldest son assumed full authority over the entire family and became a member of the Council of Elders of the clan or community. He made his decisions as he saw fit, although he consulted one or two of his brothers and sometimes other elders.

It was thus in the ancient traditions.⁴³ The oldest, said the ancient Aryas, was begotten for the accomplishment of the duty due the ancestors; the others are the fruit of love. In virtue of this original superiority, after the death of the father the oldest had the privilege of presiding at all the ceremonies of domestic worship. He it was who offered the funeral repast and pronounced the formulas of prayer, for the right of pronouncing the prayers belongs to that son who came into the world first. The oldest was, therefore, heir to the hymns, the continuator of the worship, the religious leader of the family.

From this creed flowed a rule of law: the oldest alone inherited property. Thus says an ancient passage, which the last editor of the *Laws of Manu* still inserted in the code: "The oldest takes possession of the whole patrimony, and the other brothers live under his authority as if they were under that of their father. The oldest son performs the duties towards the ancestors; he ought, therefore, to have all."⁴⁴

We see as well that among the Spartans the patrimony was indivisible, and the younger brothers had no part of it.⁴⁵ It was the same among the Athenians in the time of Demosthenes and was called the "privilege of the elder."⁴⁵ This consisted in retaining the paternal dwelling--considerable material advantage, but still more considerable from a religious point of view.

It appears clearly that this lineage system based upon the law of primogeniture generated inequality. The senior members had more material, legal and moral privileges than the junior members in the same lineage structure. Although this did not strike the minds of the ancients, this explains why the inequality of the law of primogeniture was corrected by several of their customs.⁴⁷

Wealth (E'mväm). The second way through which individuals were recruited into certain roles within *Lakwün* was wealth (*E'mväm*). Accumulated either through heritage or trade, wealth could also enable an individual to gain prominence and thus become *Mväm* (a rich man), that is, a rich and influential person, because he could offer lavish feasts to the public who could eat and drink in praise of him.

Personal merit (Bwen). The third way was personal merit (*Bwen*), recognized when one excelled as warrior (*Eyol*) or was endowed with intelligence (*Ayel*) and sharp memory useful for remembering the history and tradition of the *Lakwün*. In this latter case, he was considered as *Tein*, one who presided over the funeral oration of a deceased elder. In this regard, describing the leaders among the Gusii people, William Och ieng writes: "A person who by force of example, talents, or qualities of leadership, played a directing role, wielded commanding influence, or had a following in any sphere of activity or thought."⁴⁸ Here, we can already see the democratic essence: recognition of personal merit.

Age (M'vl). This also counted for much when it came to recruitment for the Council of Elders. The members of the most senior age-group, such as the first two oldest age-groups within *Lakwün*, were generally selected by fellow co-equals already on the Council. All the members of the Council had to be married men with children already circumcised. Members of younger generations (*A'mbél*), even if some of them happened to be very brave at war (*Br*) and/or to be intelligent, were strictly excluded from being members of the Council of Elders. Women (*A'kär*) too were excluded; indeed, women never became members of these councils.

Viewed from this standpoint, the system was inegalitarian and almost despotic; at least it was undemocratic because of the very rigid age-set system which tended to thwart the aspirations of the younger generations who were left out as were women. Inter-age-group relations were the opposite of the equality which prevailed between these of the same age.

Dispute Settlement and Decision-making Process

A quick survey of dispute settlement may bring out this point a little more clearly. At the "nuclear" family level, the father settled the disputes; in his absence, his eldest son by his first wife assumed authority. When the dispute went beyond the "nuclear" family but remained within *Lakwün*, only family heads of appropriate grade, not every family head, were called upon. At the highest clan level, small offenses were generally disposed of quickly by the Council of

Elders. But when someone became a habitual offender who wronged even members of other clans, he could be ostracized and expelled from the clan; in such a case, even if he were murdered the clan did not pursue the matter. The elders usually sat at a particular place to solve disputes or talk about the affairs of the clan. This particular place was called *Epäl* (court) and usually they took their meals there as well. Whatever the crime: theft, adultery or murder, the basic principle underlying the judicial system was compensation.

In case of murder involving two clans, clan-solidarity played a very important role. Every member of the murderer's clan contributed towards the payment of the "blood fine" to the wronged family. If the murderer's clan failed or refused to pay the "blood fine," the wronged clan was entitled to kill a member of the opposite sex of the murderer's clan. Then, elders of the two clans sat together and ordered the members of both clans to stop the feud under the wisdom and judgment of the Council.

The elders sought the opinion of the majority of the people in the community before making a decision. Nyerere has called this procedure "the essence of the traditional African democracy."⁴⁹

Dialectical Route to African Democratic Socialism

The two values, solidarity and power, both point to democracy. The first signifies not only more numerous and varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only more free interaction between social groups, but change in social habit in its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse. These two traits are precisely what characterize a democratically constituted society.

From an Historical Survey to a Question

The idea of rule according to the wishes of the majority of the people is quite ancient in the political history of mankind. The democracy of the ancient Greek city-states consisted not only in rule according to the wishes of the majority of the people, but also in the actual participation of the people themselves. They actively participated in running the affairs of state and government. Through various modes of recruitment, all free adult males, that is, all citizens took turns in running the affairs of the state and in the decision-making processes of the entire government. Governance was in accordance with the general will of all these citizens. It was also a government by direct representation because the leaders were chosen openly from among the entire crowd of citizens by the citizens themselves through the lot system. This was the democracy that prevailed in Athens during the time of Aristotle and Plato. Both denounced it as foolish and argued in favor of a politico-military elite rigorously selected and headed by a philosopher king.

But democracy itself is an idea; as a political movement it has not done well in the history of mankind. The reason is fairly obvious. Ingrained in the concept is an element of subversion against the established order of things: the right of the people to overthrow a ruler or a government (or both) who might go against the perceived general will and to restore the old order. One of the first scholars to express this idea was Marsilius of Padua, who postulated a secular relationship between the sovereign and the government, on the one hand, and the people or ruled, on the other. He argued that the people must give their explicit and deliberate consent to be ruled according to a mutually acceptable secular law before any obligation can be demanded of them. Should the sovereign break the established principle, then the people are free to remove him. His ideas

embodied a fundamental democratic principle, namely, that the people have control over the rulers and the government; and that any of the citizens can be vested with the highest responsibility.

Other scholars who advanced theories along similar lines were John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with their theories of Covenant and the Social Contract respectively. The essence of their argument is that men should not be ruled arbitrarily; but a Covenant or Social Contract should be made on the basis of the general will. The people are the sovereign authority but, since they cannot all rule at the same time, they must elect one from among them who must then rule according to the principles and the terms of the Covenant or the Social Contract. As long as the ruler acts in accordance with these terms, the people have the obligation to obey him and be ruled. But should he break the spirit and terms of the contract, they have the equal obligation to do away with him and his government and install another in its place.

At this time the basis for a liberal state was being established; democracy as such was not yet evident in the character, policies and practices of the state or governments in Europe. Liberalism simply called upon the governments to promote free enterprise among profit-oriented individuals. The state, instead of interfering in economic matters was only to step in to help individual entrepreneurs, the capitalists or new class of owners of the means of production, to achieve more profits and secure their investments. Society was expected to benefit automatically from the accrued wealth.

Macpherson⁵⁰ points out that Western-liberal democracy is a recent development. He states that when the market economy developed to a highly sophisticated level, politics itself became a commodity in society and there emerged the idea of choice between various brands. The multiplicity of political parties with various programs became the order of the day. The only rule of the game to be observed was that the social ideology of capitalism, liberal democracy, was taken for granted as immutable. Parties and candidates had to operate within the parameters of that general philosophy which promotes private enterprise and individual freedoms.

However, the social and political movements in Europe in the 19th century produced another variant of democracy, at least in theory: the proletarian democracy, or what Lenin called "Democratic Centralism." Marx and Engels argued that liberalism and the type of social justice it contained was a one-sided democracy for the dominant social class, the bourgeoisie workers, who were the actual producers of wealth and the numerical majority in society, were excluded from the public affairs of the state and from government. But workers should not simply have a say in the affairs of state; they should control qualitatively those affairs because they are the real economic force, and hence *ipso facto* should be also the real political force. To this end they should carry out a proletarian revolution against the bourgeois state and establish a worker's democracy. Since the workers are numerically the majority in the society, their democracy would be a people's democracy.

Since not all workers can run the affairs of the state, or lead the proletarian revolution, however, the idea of an elite vanguard was invented to cater to the assumed interests of the proletariat. This vanguard was to be the party, which would be the basic organization. It would not be a mass party, but a party of the most enlightened echelons of the workers and would spearhead the movement through propaganda and actual seizure of power. Theoretically the people still would be the supreme authority, but in reality the elite would hold the reins of state power and governmental machinery.

In relation to these divergent orientations in political thought the present-day African situation is compounded by various dilemmas. At the outset, African leaders rejected the Western model of democracy on the grounds that it engendered selfish individualism and set in motion a whole

process of differential accumulation of wealth, creating classes to the detriment of the traditional African philosophy of equilibrium. Africans rejected also the communist democratic centralism as antagonistic to the African classless harmony. African leaders were particularly unhappy with the atheist conception of the world as propounded by the supporters of scientific socialism. For them, the African is basically religious. As Senghor has argued: "Finally . . . we have a choice to make in our final option. Everything in scientific socialism is not to be accepted, especially its atheistic materialism. I do not say its dialectical materialism."⁵¹

Thus, the question may be formulated as follows: after rejecting both the Western and Eastern European models of democracy, is there anything in the African political tradition⁵² that can be called an African form of democracy on which new structures can be built? The answer to this question depends upon the conception of democracy.

How We Conceive Democracy

As mentioned in the introduction, we conceive democracy as more than a form of government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience; it is a sentiment, a spirit and not simply the rule of the many. A government springs from a vast mass of sentiments--many vague, some defined--of instincts, of aspirations, of ideas, of hopes and fears, of purposes. It is their reflex and their incorporation, their projection and outgrowth; without this basis, it is worth nothing.

To say that democracy is "only" a form of government is the same as saying that home is a more or less geometrical arrangement of bricks and mortar. True, it is this much, but this is false, for home is infinitely more. Democracy, like any other polity, has been finely termed the memory of an historic past, the consciousness of a living present, the ideal of the coming future. In a word, democracy is a social--that is to say--an ethical conception, and upon this ethical significance is based its meaning as government; democracy is a form of government only because it is a form of moral and spiritual association.

But so too is aristocracy, one might object. What is the difference; what distinguishes the ethical basis and ideal of one from the other? Aristocracy and democracy both imply that the actual state of society exists for the sake of realizing an end which is ethical, but aristocracy implies that this is to be done primarily by means of special institutions⁵³ or organizations within society, while democracy holds that the ideal is already at work in every personality and must be trusted to care for itself. There is an individualism in democracy which is not in aristocracy; but it is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative toward, and for, the ethical ideal--not an individualism of lawlessness. In one word, democracy means for us that the person (*mür*) is the first and final reality. It admits that the full significance of the person can be learned by the individual only as already presented to him in objective form in society; it admits that the leadership, stimuli and encouragements for the realization of the person must come from society. But it holds, nonetheless, to the fact that personhood cannot be procured for anyone, however degraded and feeble, by anyone else, however wise and strong. It holds that the spirit of personhood indwells in every individual and that the choice to develop it must proceed from that individual.

From this central position of personhood results the other notes of democracy: liberty, equality, fraternity--not mere catchwords for the mob, but symbols of the highest ethical idea which humanity has yet reached--the idea that personhood is the one thing of permanent and abiding worth, and that it lies in every human individual. By way of illustration, let us say that:

- *Liberty* is not a numerical notion of isolation. We conceive of it as the ethical idea that personality is the supreme and only law, that every man is an absolute end in himself. The democratic ideal includes liberty, because democracy without initiation from within--without an ideal chosen from within and freely followed from within--is nothing.

- *Equality* is not an arithmetical, but an ethical conception. Personhood is as universal as humanity; it is indifferent to all distinctions which divide men from men. Wherever you have a man, there you have a person, and there is no basis by which one's personhood may be set above or below that of another. This means that in every individual there lives an infinite and universal possibility: that of being a king or priest. Aristocracy is blasphemy against personhood; it is the doctrine of the elect few applies not to some life in the future, but to all relations of humanity. Hero-worship means man despised. The true meaning of equality is synonymous with the definition of democracy given by James Russell Lowell: it is the form of society in which every man has a chance and knows that he has it. To this we would add, a chance to which no possible limits can be put, a chance which is truly infinite: the chance to be a person. Equality, in short, is the ideal of humanity; it is the ideal in consciousness from which democracy lives, moves and has its being.

We have used these illustrations simply for the sake of showing what we understand the conception of democracy to mean, and to show that the ordinary objections against democracy rest upon ideas which conceive it after the mode of a numerical individualism; we have tried to suggest, however briefly, that democracy is an ethical idea, the idea that every man is a person of truly infinite capacity. To our mind democracy and the one, ultimate ethical ideal of humanity are synonymous. The ideas of democracy, of liberty, equality, and fraternity, represent a society in which the distinction between the spiritual and the secular has ceased, and, as in Greek theory and in the Christian notion of the Kingdom of God, the church and the state, the divine and the human organization of society are one.

This, one can say, is idealism, and indeed it is ideal, but we are among those who believe that the real will never find an immovable basis till it rests upon the ideal. The best test of any form of society is the ideal it proposes for the forms of its life, and the degree to which it finds and realizes that ideal.

An Answer to the Question

The question to which we must answer was formulated as follows: "After rejecting both the Western and Eastern European models of democracy, is there anything in the African tradition that can be called an African form of democracy and upon which new structures may be built?"

Our answer, as might be expected, is in the affirmative. For, with regard to the meaning and practice of solidarity and power values, to our conception of democracy as an ethical idea and to personhood as a truly infinite capability incorporated within every man, we can state that the *Mbün* traditional culture--and, by extension, the African tradition--has been democratic. Solidarity has been the strongest binding factor of the community. Power understood as stable cooperation has--in spite of some undemocratic attitudes--been the determining factors in regulating social life. Thereupon, Julius Nyerere writes: "Despite all the variations and some exceptions where the institutions of domestic slavery existed, African family life was everywhere based on certain practices and attitudes which together mean basic equality, freedom and unity."⁵⁴

Equality, freedom, fraternity and unity--together symbols of both the highest ethical value of solidarity and the highest ethical idea and practice of democracy--have been effectively the nourishing sap of the everyday life of African communities. To the point, Nyerere argues that: "The equality of all members is fundamental to any social grouping to which an individual freely belongs--the ideal society is based on human equality and on a combination of the freedom and unity of its members."⁵⁵

This is to say nothing more than that African traditional communities enjoyed democratic tranquility with a political authority based upon democracy and free discussion among the elders. "They talk till they agree,"⁵⁶ Nyerere writes. This free discussion, which the Francophone call "Palabre," was the "very essence of African democracy."⁵⁷ These were political systems which cherished and practiced "government by discussion." In the same way, Jomo Kenyatta, talking about the existence of democracy among his Kikuyu people and by extension among all African traditional societies before the advent of Colonialism, writes: "Before the coming of the Europeans, the Gikuyu had a democratic regime."⁵⁸

Classless equality and thus democracy in African traditional society were pointed out by other scholars as well, foreign and African, especially by anthropologists and historians. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, writing precisely about the classless African system, argued: "It is possible that groups are more easily welded into a unitary political system without the essence of classes, the closer they are to one another in culture."⁵⁹ These views parallel closely that of Macpherson who, emphasizing the classless nature of the African traditional society, writes: "Colonial countries . . . at the time of the revolution (independence) (had) relatively little internal class division of an exploitative kind."⁶⁰

Leopold Sedar Senghor argues along the same lines. Outlining the weakness and limited scope of dialectical materialism insofar as Marx and Engels did not take into consideration what he calls "the West African realities," Senghor writes:

West African realities are those of underdeveloped countries--peasant countries here, cattle countries there--once feudalistic, but 'traditionally classless' and with no wage-earning sector. They are community countries where the group holds priority over the individuals; they are especially religious countries, unselfish countries, where money is not King.⁶¹

Recognizing some forms of democracy in the African traditional societies, historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo argues that political authority in such societies was vested in the hands of elders who had only the right to deliberate on matters of the "city." He adds, however, that "by and large, these gerontocracies were moderated by 'democratic assemblies' which assisted the head of the family . . . through an advisory role if not a deliberative one."⁶²

From all these selective but convergent opinions, we can conclude in response to the first part of our question, that "there is in the African tradition something--the highest value of African solidarity to which all other values are subordinated--which can be called the African form of democracy. Is it enough to recognize this? Indeed, it is not. But in answer to the second part of our question, nonetheless it constitutes a point of departure, a fundamental basis on which can be built a new structure: African socialism. The features of this African socialism are to be "industrial equality," or in other words a "democracy of wealth."

What is meant by "industrial equality" or "democracy of wealth"? We shall not know until it is more of a reality than it now is. In general, however, by this concept we mean not only the numerical division into equal portions of wealth and its numerical redistribution, but more than this the fact that all industrial relations are to be regarded as subordinate to human relation to the law of personhood. In other words, industrial organization shall be according to "social" function.

This implies "socialism" not in the sense of a form of existence in which all individuality is renounced in favor of an artificial entity created to absorb the rightful activities of the individual, but in the sense of a "family." Thereby we mean that the family is an ethical community and that life in the family conforms to its idea only when the person realizes oneness of interest and purpose with it.

This, in turn, is precisely what is meant when we speak of industrial relations as being necessarily social, that is, they are to become the material of an ethical realization of the person, the form and substance of a community, of good (though not necessarily of goods) wider than any now known, and the realization of personhood through the formation of a higher and more complete African unity.

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Notes

*The Mbün or Ambün are located in Zaïre.

1. Edward Spranger, *Lebensformen* (Forms of Life) (Halle: Niemeyer, 1921), pp. 204-205, termed only these values the "social values" and described the social act as the desire to acquiesce in the value-potential of another. The social act is, according to him, an act of "Treue" (loyalty, fidelity).

2. See Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 356.

3. See Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City, A Study on the Religion, Laws and Institutions of Greece and Rome* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 43.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Bhagavad-Gita*, I: 40.

6. Cicero, *De legibus*, II: 19.

7. *Isaias*, VII : 30-32.

8. *Idem.*, VII : 30.

9. De Coulanges, pp. 42-43.

10. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, IX: 22.

11. Cicero, *De legibus*, III : 2.

12. Plutarch, *Lucurgus, Apoth. of the Lacedaemonians*.

13. Pollux, III : 48.

14. See De Coulanges, pp. 43-44.

15. *Laws of Manu*, IX : 81.

16. Herodotus, V: 39; VI : 61.

17. Aulus Gellius, IV : 3; Valerius Maximus, II : 1, 4.; Dionysius, II :25.

18. See Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: International Publishers, 1946), pp. 192-193.

19. See De Coulanges, p. 44.

20. Plutarch, *Solon*: 20; *Laws of Manu*, IX: 121; Xenophon, *Gov. of the Laced.*

21. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, II : 25; Gaius, I: 149, 155; Aulus Gellius, III : 2.

22. Demosthenes, in *Aphobum*; in *Pro Phozmione*, see De Coulanges, p. 79.

23. To beget triplets or more than three children at the same time was a rare phenomenon.

24. Julian H. Steward, studying the stratification of the different cultural units into different levels of cultural integration, distinguishes three layers in every national culture: the culture of the socio-cultural unit of the nuclear family, the culture of what Robert Redfield called "folk society," and the culture of the socio-cultural unit of the nation. See *Theory of Cultural Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution* (Urbana, IL: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1955), pp. 43ff.

25. "Contract," in the sense pointed out by J.J. Rousseau, and John Dewey as well. The latter writes: "The essence of the 'social contract' theory is not the idea of the formulation of a contract; it is the idea that men are more individuals without any social relations 'until' they form a contract. John Dewey, *The Early Works (1882-1898)*, Vol. I (1882-1888), *Early Essays and Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), p. 231.

26. Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York: Social Science Classics Ser., 1923), pp. 23-24.

27. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* translated by George Simpson (Glencoe, IL.: The Free Press, 1949).

28. R.M. MacIver and C.H. Page, *Society* (New York: Norton, 1949), pp. 8-15.

29. Robin M. Williams, *American Society* (New York: Knopf, 1959), p. 455 passim.

30. *Ibid.*

31. S.A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath*, (Princeton: MA-AH Pub., 1949) Vol. 2, p. 52.

32. C.I. Barnard, *Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), p. 116.

33. Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1953).

34. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. I: *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, translated by Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981).

35. Kingsley Davis, *Human Society* (New York: Ayer Publishing Co., 1949), p. 58.

36. A brilliant analysis of Ujaama social unity from which our own is inspired is Tshimalenga Ntumba, "Language et Socialité. Primat de la "Bisoïté" sur l'intersubjectivité," in *Philosophie Africaine et Ordre Social* (Actes de la 9e Semaine Philosophique de Kinshasa, du 1er au 7 décembre, 1985; *Recherches Philosophiques Africaines*, F.T.C.K (Kinshasa/Limete, 1986), pp. 57-82.

37. Edward Spranger, p. 205.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

39. For the history of these two political tendencies, see Alexander Rüstow, ed., *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart* (Definition of Contemporaneity) (Zurich: Europa, 1950), Vols. I-III.

40. Marion J. Levy, Jr., ed., in *The Structure of Society* (Princeton: University Press, 1952), p. 36, defines "structure" as a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity of action or operation. Action or operation here may be identified with what Radcliffe-Brown has termed "the social life of the community," and is defined by Levy as "the functioning of the social structure."

41. See Wagner Gunter, "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo," in *African Political Systems*, p. 230.

42. The significance of "Father" is here totally opposed to its ordinary signification in Greek, Latin and Sanskrit from which we may conclude that this word dates from a time when the Hellenes, Italians and Hindus still lived together in Central Asia. . . . In judicial language, the title of "pater," or "pater familias," might be given to a man who had no children, who was not married,

and who was not even of age to contract marriage. The idea of paternity, therefore, was not attached to this word. The old language had another word which properly designated the father, and which, as ancient as "pater," is likewise found in the language of the Greeks, of the Romans, and of the Hindus (gânitar, genreter, genitor). The word "pater" had another sense. In religious language they applied it to the gods; in legal language to every man who had a worship and a domain. The poets show us that they applied it to everyone whom they wished to honor. The slave and the client applied it to their master. It was synonymous with the word "rex." It contained in itself not the idea of paternity, but that of power, authority, majestic dignity. See De Coulanges, pp. 81-82.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

44. *Laws of Manu*, IX. 105-107, 126. But this ancient rule was modified as the old religion became enfeebled. Even in the Code of Manu we find articles that authorize a division of the inheritance.

45. *Fragments of the Greek Historians*, Didot's coll., t. II., p. 277.

46. See Demosthenes, *Pro Phormine*, 34.

47. See De Coulanges, p. 76.

48. R. Ochieng William, *A Pre-colonial History of the Gusii of Western Kenya, C. 1500-1914* (Nairobi: E.A.L.B., 1974), p. 197.

49. Julius Nyerere, *Nyerere on Socialism* (Dar es Salaam: O.U.P., 1969), p. 10.

50. G.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (London: O.U.P., 1969), pp. 32ff.

51. Leopold Sedar Senghor, *On Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 83.

52. By means of inductive method we move from a micro entity, *Mbiin*, to a certain universality.

53. There is great disagreement among sociologists and anthropologists on the concept of institution. Bronislaw Malinowski considered "institutions to be synonymous with social groups." Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Dynamic of Cultural Change* (New York: The Free Press, 1944), p. 50. R.M. MacIver and C.H. Page define institution more narrowly, distinguishing between association and institution: "If we are considering something as an organized 'group', it is an association; if as a form of 'procedure', it is an institution," in C. Kluchhohn and H. Mur ray eds., *Society*, p. 60. For H.E. Barnes, institution signifies: "the social structure and machinery, through which human society organizes, directs and executes the multifarious activities required to satisfy human needs." H.E. Barnes, *Social Institutions* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood, 1946), p. 29. The definition by Kingsley Davis is more in keeping with the thought of this work; he defined institution as "a set of interwoven folkways, mores and laws built around one or more functions. It is a part of the social structure, set off by the closeness of its organization and by the distinctness of its functions." Kingsley Davis, *Human Society* (New York: International Publishers, 1949), p. 71.

54. Julius Nyerere, *Nyerere on Socialism* (Dar es Salaam: O.U.P., 1969), p. 10.

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Kenyatta Jomo, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London: Martin Seeker and Warburg Ltd., 1938), p. 131.

59. M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems* (London, O.U.P. 1970), pp. 9-10.

60. C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (London, O.U.P., 1966), p. 3.

61. L.S. Senghor, *On Socialism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 77.

62. J. Ki-Zerbo *Histoire de l'Afrique Noire* (Paris: Librairie A. Hatier, 1972), p. 176.

Chapter XII

Person and the Community

Kaguongo Wambari

During the struggle for freedom from colonial bondage in Africa, three decades ago, Kwame Nkrumah urged Africans to seek political independence, promising that once political independence was achieved all other things, e.g., economic, cultural--even personhood--would be added to them. Today with almost all of Africa having gained political independence, Nkrumah's promise is far from having been fulfilled. The realization that the promise has not been fulfilled has prompted a search for a second liberation among some Africans¹. This is because it has become painfully clear that political independence, though a necessary condition for a people's self-realization, is not sufficient. Equally, it is painfully clear, from the African experience, that national autonomy does not always lead to personal autonomy. Much of the discontent in independent Africa today has to do with the specter of politically independent nations of people who have not yet achieved personal independence.

Frustrated expectations of meaningful free personal involvement in the affairs of one's state and society have caused not only disillusionment, but sometimes also cynicism. The citizenry has missed the experience of sharing power and felt intimidated since "the African state has remained set apart from the populace after political independence because of excessive concentration of power in the hands of a small group of people drawn from a ruling political party, the civil or military service"². "Instead of using their `voice' (option) and registering their opinion, people prefer to use their `exit' option, i.e., to withdraw from public affairs,"³ and thus to become alienated. A second liberation, it seems to me, ought to endeavour to establish a self-fulfilling place for the person in social and political life.

This paper examines the place of the person in community life, evaluates personal self-determination and attempts to clarify conditions which render achievement of selfhood difficult. It discusses the communalism characteristic of pre-colonial Africa vis-a-vis the individualism of post-independence Africa and suggests that the status of the person, the basic unit of the community, is vital in the individual relationship with society. The paper points to the possibility of a coexistence of both personal autonomy and communal responsibility.

The Person

In philosophy we understand a person to be a rational self-conscious being: the person is the only creature that is fully self-conscious. A person has a privileged knowledge of him/herself through experiencing his/her self-consciousness. No one else can experience this consciousness of self except the self. To Descartes the discovery of the certainty and exclusivity of this knowledge of the "I am" marked a breakthrough in epistemology in particular and in philosophy in general; this established him as the father of modern philosophical thought. "My self-awareness is, to myself, the most immediate and indubitable of all realities, because I am self-awareness," writes Theodosius Dobzhansky⁴. It follows similarly by analogy that your self-awareness is for you, the most immediate and indubitable of all realities, because you are your self-awareness. The same holds true for other persons, but because no one can enter another's stream of consciousness this cannot be known indubitably.

Persons are conscious of themselves as unique beings with needs and aspirations that they, more than anyone else, are aware of. They also have their own interests arising from the unique ways in which they experience themselves; in particular, persons have an interest in being identified with their needs and aspirations. Persons endeavour to meet these needs and aspirations themselves by use of rationality (i.e., reason) to enable them to make their social and natural environments habitable and their lives more than mere existence. It is in his or her conscious activities that a person expresses himself or herself uniquely as a member of humanity, if I may parody Karl Marx.

A person is aware of his potentialities and endeavours to actualize his choices among these potentialities. That one is open to his potentialities, and that it is up to him to actualize his choices among them, points to the fact that a person is ever unfinished and always in the process of becoming. In the words of John Macquarrie, a person "is in a process of transition towards new forms of existence, or to put it another way,-- the human being is unfinished and confronts an openness in which he has still to shape himself".⁵ A person cannot therefore be fully known as an object, for any one time he is an unrepeatably *becoming* subject best known to himself.

A person's rationality enables him to direct his social impulses so as to relate to others in harmonious ways. For as a social creature a person is at his best when sharing companionship with other persons. A person has the capacity to distinguish between actions that enhance harmonious relationships with other persons and actions that stand in the way of those relationships. He can distinguish between what is and what ought to be. In other words, a person has moral sensibility and because of this he is capable of preferring the good of the community, of which he is a member to his personal good, especially when the two goods conflict. A person's moral sensibility enables him to prefer long term good to immediate or short term good if the latter stands in the way of the former.

It is evident that a person's rationality is closely connected to his morality; as the guiding principle of thought rationality guides morality. Rationality also guides sociality which in turn depends a great deal on morality. Thus rationality, morality and sociality, all of which figure significantly in the understanding of a person, are closely related and interconnected.

Personal Autonomy

Paul Taylor defines "full personhood" as the "most complete actualization of powers of autonomy and rationality required for choosing one's own value system and for directing one's life on the basis of that value system".⁶ He thus connects the concept of the person and that of autonomy.

Personal autonomy can be understood as "self-direction according to a life-plan which conforms to the individual's long term (dispositional) nature and interests".⁷ This conceptualization of personal autonomy requires that the person be free from any form of manipulation. It also requires that the autonomous person know himself, understand who he is, what he would like to make of his life and how best he can make of his life what he believes it should be. One must also be the originator of one's actions because one's beliefs and values are identified with oneself. In the words of Robert Young, "Self-directedness of one's life is exemplified by the fact that in the main, it is ordered according to a plan or conception which fully expresses one's own will".⁸ An autonomous person is therefore the individual who not only is conscious of who one is, but who also has a clear picture of the life he wished to lead, his place in

his community; he makes carefully reasoned choices that guide him towards realization of the aspired life. Personal autonomy has, therefore, to do with self-understanding and self-expression.

John Benson sees being autonomous also as putting "oneself in the best position to answer for the reliability of one's beliefs"⁹. It is putting oneself in a position in which one is accountable for one's life. Personal autonomy rejects blind conformity to tradition or authority of any sort while accepting that the "burden of proof that departure from the guidelines will be creative and integrative not only for the individual involved but also for the larger community rests with those who make the exception"¹⁰.

Personal development to autonomous status is closely connected with the personal development of rationality and a sense of value. Three stages of such development are broadly identifiable. In the earliest stage a child merely responds to the world around him, repeating behavior that is rewarded by those in his life and discarding behavior that is frowned upon. Approval or disapproval determines to a large extent the way the child responds to his social and natural environment. It is much more a matter of adaptation to the environment than of rationality or conscience, both of which initially are only potential. One is other-directed at this stage because reason as a guide to action and the sense of value as determining of what is worth one's life are at best latent and almost inoperative.

Gradually a person enters a second stage internalizing the values from one's environment. The family, the clan, the school, the church, the club, the party, or whatever social grouping one happens to be affiliated to become the source of one's values. Approval and disapproval are inherited first without questioning; conformity to the group becomes the norm. Reasoning and sense of value are activated at this stage of development, and it is reasoning and sense of value that reflect the society of which one is a member. Rationality and moral conscience emerge, but they do not uniquely and fully set apart a person who determines his own life. Society's beliefs become one's beliefs, society's likes and dislikes become one's own; though more or less passively received. The individual is molded by his society. One's reasoning and valuing, not unlike his language, are no more than acquisitions from one's society. One develops an uncritical traditional conscience which unquestioningly receives values.

The first (adaptive) and the second (heteronomous) stages of individual development share in common other-directedness in contrast to the third (autonomous) stage where one is self-directed and determines one's own values. Personal autonomy is characterized by a critical independent conscience consisting of a combination of cognitive and motivational elements. The cognitive element is responsible for the determination of value while the motivational element functions in a way to incline one's will to pursue what is judged right and eschew what is judged wrong by the cognitive element. Persons at this stage do their own thinking to arrive at choices which they themselves consider correct and are in a position to support rationally. An autonomous person as a member of society sometimes will accept the values of society, but will actively adopt them by choice rather than merely inherit them wholesale.

Community

The term "community" refers to a group of people with common ties, interpersonal relationships and common interests and goals, each member perceiving himself as belonging to the group and participating in its life. Given this understanding, anonymity, impersonality and detachment would characterize absence of community.

Robert Paul Wolff defines a community as a group of persons who together experience a reciprocity of awareness.¹¹ Thus what Wolff calls affective community is the reciprocal consciousness of a shared culture. It is the mutual awareness on the part of each that others share that culture, and through such mutuality we are many together rather than many alone.¹² Affective community could as well be a reciprocal consciousness of shared blood-relation, like the family or kinship; it could be that of shared race or nationality.¹³ Pre-colonial African community was typically affective and based on reciprocal consciousness of kinship. As John Mb iti observes:

The deep sense of kinship, with all it implies, has been one of the strongest forces in traditional African life. Kinship is reckoned through blood and betrothal (engagement and marriage). It is kinship which controls social relationships between people in a given community: it governs marital customs and regulations, it determines the behavior of one individual towards another. . . . Almost all the concepts connected with human relationship can be understood and interpreted through the kinship system.¹⁴

The form of African community is communal. Communalism is understood as the view that the group (i.e., the community) "constitutes the focus of the activities of the individual members of the society".¹⁵ Kwame Gyekye points out that "the doctrine of Communalism places emphasis on the activity and success of the wider society rather than though not necessarily at the expense of, to the detriment of the individual."¹⁶ Communal social order is motivated by the well-being of the community, its solidarity, co-operation, mutual concern and reciprocal obligation, as well as fair distribution of benefits and burdens among its members. African communal social thought is characterized by the outlook of mutual social responsibility, calling upon all members of a community to act in such a way as to enhance the good of the group. The good of the group as a whole is taken to include the good of the individual members so that enhancement of the good of the community implies the enhancement of individual persons. In the words of Nyerere,

provided he is willing to work, no individual within that society should worry about what will happen to him tomorrow if he does not hoard wealth today. Society itself should look after him or his widow, or his orphans. This is exactly what traditional African society succeeded in doing. . . . Nobody starved . . . he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member.¹⁷

African social philosophy has much to recommend it when it comes to discouraging individualism, that is the tendency on the part of the individual to be motivated, in life and action, by one's own interest often at the expense of other members of society or the group as a whole. Writers like John Mb iti¹⁸ and Jomo Kenyatta¹⁹ describe the absence of individualism in pre-colonial African society, showing how allegiance to the community had a significant place in human relations. They see individualism, attributed to western influences, as the scourge of contemporary life in Africa. These and some other writers, however, appear oblivious to individuality, that is, the quality of an individual characterized by independence of thought and action. Reading such writers, one gets the impression that African social thought does not recognize individuality--the quality conducive to personal autonomy.

Kwame Gyekye,²⁰ however, in his analysis of the concepts of communality and individuality among the Akan of Ghana, indicates that their social order is ambiguous manifesting features of both communality and individuality. These two features are expressed in the Akan art motif of the "Siamese" crocodile²¹--a crocodile with two heads but a single stomach. The Akans say that although the two heads have a common stomach they always struggle for food. The crocodile symbol has reference to Akan social thought articulating the uniqueness of the individual and his or her relationship to the society. The head emphasizes unique individuality indicating the will,

tastes, needs, aspirations and interests of the individual and therefore his or her desire for self-expression and determination. The common stomach in the symbol indicates that the basic needs and aspirations of the community are the same. It symbolizes the common good for the group. The individuals contribute to that common good, but they are also the beneficiaries from that common good. The symbol thus indicates compatibility between individuality and communality--reciprocal relationship between the person and the community.

The post-colonial independent African social set up, nevertheless, emphasizes the communal aspects of society at the expense of the individuality, thus thwarting expressions of individuality in the social life. Inevitably, the traditional sense of community has been undermined in pluralistic urban life as kinship can no longer form the basis of reciprocal consciousness. Yet a reciprocal awareness of shared nationality has not developed sufficiently to form such a basis for the national community. The general style of leadership is what Mazrui and Tidy²² have called the Elder Tradition. This follows the pattern of an extended family with the father figure as the head. It is characterized by a suppression of individuality manifested in the avoidance of free debate and open electoral processes. It is highly authoritarian and paternalistic according the leader the status of "father of the nation" with prerogatives of political power and opinion formation. The Elder Tradition has a preference for consensus and the father figure "expects that consensus and has profound distrust for dissent and dispute, even of the kind which is indispensable for a vigorous political and intellectual atmosphere."²³ Intellectual independence and critical political consciousness are seen as evidence of disloyalty in the Elder Tradition, which clearly is incompatible with personal autonomy.

Ideology and the Person

Kwasi Wiredu has discussed belief in the desirability and effectiveness of ideology in present day national life in Africa. He identifies two senses of ideology. The first is positive: a "set of ideas about what form the good society should take."²⁴ In this sense ideology is intended to guide society in the right direction by means of some coherent ideas (emerging from the people) concerning its articulated ideal destiny. In the second sense, considered degenerate by Wiredu, "an ideology is a set of ossified dogmas used as a political weapon in the relentless pursuit of power or, when attained, the determined retention of it at all costs."²⁵

The second sense of "ideology" is degenerate because ideology is not open to analysis, questioning, criticism or reconstruction. Ideology is intended to function (and does function) as a weapon of suppression and coercion in the interest of those in authority. It is meant to suppress any individuals who, perceiving the world differently, might doubt and challenge the leadership by questioning or offering an alternative ideology. Such a doubter automatically is silenced as a saboteur of the *status quo*. Such an ideology is an instrument of coercion forcing blind submission to authority and conditioning the populace to follow the leaders who, by dint of being in authority, can determine how all the rest (the masses of the people) shall live. Ideology in this sense robs the individuals of their individuality and personhood and reduces them to massmen.

A massman is an individual who on an important social issue will express either no opinion or, if at all, the given prevailing opinion. Never, however, will he express never an opinion contrary to the prevailing one for fear of risking the wrath of the authority behind the prevailing opinion. Massmanship is clearly the opposite of personal autonomy. I am compelled to agree with Wiredu that this degenerate sense of ideology is most in conformity with the realities of contemporary African political life. It is also consistent with its Marxist conceptualization as a "system of beliefs

and attitudes which distort, for those held captive by the ideology, their understanding of the world and their positions and possibilities in it, and which result in social forces, characteristic of class societies, which in a persuasive manner tend not to bring ideas in line with reality."²⁶

In Africa ideology tends to be a monopoly of politicians, leaving no room even for thinkers such as philosophers who, in the words of Wiredu, could give it "conceptual preparation and analysis" for purposes of "impact upon basic thought habits".²⁷ It is distorted because it presents a partial, unilateral view of reality paraded as the shared view of the real world. It projects an image of being interpersonal--rather than personal--and concerned about the interests of the whole society rather than of the privileged few. Degenerate ideology is guided most by appetites and less by ideas. Although it purports to be concerned about matters of truth, it will readily substitute factual information by propaganda and slogans. Since the populace is expected to show commitment and loyalty to the ideology it undermines the individual personal freedom to think for oneself. Philosophy, as a critically reflective activity which analyses ideas, beliefs, and attitudes with the aim of reconstructing them as necessary, is clearly at cross-purposes with ideology in this latter sense.

In Africa one finds signs of degeneration even in such "humanistic" ideologies as kaundaism,²⁸ the ideology of the sole political party in Zambia and originated by President Kenneth Kaunda²⁹ himself. Kaundaism as an ideology refers to "the beliefs, ideas or attitudes of an important person (i.e., Kaunda). These may be peculiar to him, but they affect his actions, and what he does has grave consequences for others."³⁰ Kaunda confesses to have "great faith in the power of ideologies to condition people's thinking, to mold their value system."³¹ Clearly Kaunda has a preconceived image of the kind of people he wants Zambians to become and Kaundaism is the instrument to be used to manipulate their "thinking" and "mold their value system". The fact that these people are persons--conscious of themselves as having their own wills, their own ideas, their own aspirations and hopes for the future--does not appear to count. They are to acquire Kaunda's image passively; his ideology is to be imposed on the people who are unfree to think for themselves.

Kaunda's vision misconstrues human nature and is therefore in no position to uplift the people so that they can realize themselves. Little wonder then that "Kaundaism has not developed, nor its appreciation and understanding advanced a whit more during the two decades of its existence." This despite the fact that a government ministry was set up to propagate the ideology and an Institute set up at the national university to research and develop it. As long as an ideology is as personalized as is Kaundanism, it is difficult for other people to find their place in it; it cannot become an institution, and human resources for resisting such an imposition are unlimited.

For the second liberation in Africa to be meaningful, it must free individual persons from impositions of all sorts. To serve the community, an ideology should emanate from the people who dialogue freely to formulate a synthesis mobilizing ideas to approximate what they think an ideal society for them should be. As such an ideology will be fashioned after the people's perceptions of themselves and their aspirations. It should mirror the vision of the community. Only then can it be expected to give direction to people's aspirations and hopes. It needs to be constantly self-reflective in order to be clear what its own credentials are--examining its content, coherence and suitability in meeting the unique task of enabling the community to forge ahead. An ideology must never lose sight of the fact that as a social institution its contribution to the well being of the community and its individual members is its only justification.

One Party System

A prominent feature of independent African nations is the adoption of a one party system of government. While many arguments have been put forth to justify this widespread development in Africa, it is evident that concern for democracy could hardly be the motivating force for the preference. A one-party system of government limits free and open debate as well as an open electoral process because the absence or limited choice of alternatives loops back to further limit democratic opportunities for individual self expression and self-determination.

A one party system is primarily a device in the hands of those in power for controlling conflict and dissension by forestalling opposition from the rest of society. Like ideology in a degenerate sense, it often is used as an instrument of suppression and coercion. It is an arrangement that ensures that the authority and control of those in power is free from any threats by those who might aspire to offer alternative leadership. Establishment of a one-party system of government sees to it that all potential or actual sources of organized or unorganized opposition to the government are brought under the party, which assures an upper hand over other institutions in society and thus overshadowing them. In Kenya recently, the single party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) brought under its wings the giant nationwide women organization--*Maendeleoya Wanawake*,³²--as well as the nationwide Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). In Tanzania too the only party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has brought under its control the trade union movements, co-operative organizations, women organizations, etc. In this position the party controls all other institutions after divesting them of their unique identities and steering them towards party conceived goals.

Individuals in one party states do not have full opportunity to determine the kind of state and society they want perceiving the government of the day as imposing itself on them. A chasm is thus created between those who rule and the ruled and the rulers are seen to use public institutions primarily to perpetuate themselves in office rather than to promote the good of the ruled. The rulers on their part become adverse to any desire by the ruled to express and pursue personal opinions and preferences. The ruled masses in the words of Wanyande, "sensing their inability to meaningfully influence the policies of state and the behavior of those in positions of leadership, tend to develop apathy and to withdraw from participation in the political processes."³³ In many African states expression of contrary opinion or dissension from the party line is sufficient reason for the dissenter to be thrown out of the party and into a political wilderness. A person who fails to toe the political line does so at the risk of becoming a political non-person--an undesirable consequence in circumstances where party membership may very well mean one's livelihood.

Frantz Fanon perceived the dangerous undemocratic nature of the single-party when he wrote:

The political party in many parts of Africa which are today independent is puffed up in a most dangerous way. In the presence of a member of the party, the people are silent, behave like a flock of sheep, and publish panegyrics in praise of the government or the leader.³⁴

He castigated the single party as "the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous and cynical."³⁵

There is a connection between the single party system and degenerate ideology. The one party is used by those in authority to force the adopted ideology on the people, thus creating a false

impression of unanimity among the citizenry. The truth, however, is that there can be no permanent unanimity of ideas among thinking rational beings. It is a "unanimity" bought at enormous price of personhood! The one party system and degenerate ideology are also connected to something which Grace Ibingira³⁶ calls winner-take-all policy, one that allows the winner or winners in a power struggle to monopolize its exercise. This policy manifests intolerance on the part of those in power and unwillingness to share it and all the benefits it brings. The winner-take-all syndrome accounts for the withdrawal from involvement in national life by the vanquished as well as the numerous unconstitutional governmental takeovers. It is a major pitfall of national consciousness standing in the way of national community.

The Person and the Community

As the individual is the basic unit of society, society should be conceived in terms of the individual persons composing it. Individuals in any society contribute their share in molding for better or worse the character of the community, of which for better or worse, they are members. The community or society at large also determines to a large extent what its members become. What the individual person is and what his or her society is affect one another to the extent that neither could be what it is without the other. There is, thus, a mutual dependence between the individual and society, the recognition of which should accord the individual person his or her rightful place in social life. Throughout the ages, as if the individual were antithetic to society, the tendency has been and still is for society to exercise an upper hand over the individual persons, thus curtailing personal individuality or autonomy. As E.H. Carr has pointed out,

It would be dangerous to assume that the power of a modern national community to mould the character and thought of its individual members and to produce a certain degree of conformity and uniformity is any less than that of a primitive tribal community³⁷

Molding the values, thoughts and attitudes of an individual by society seems to require authoritarianism, thus restraining the individual's life to the extent that he is rendered unable to develop and exercise his or her own will. Without freedom to exercise one's will one cannot mature as a real person. Yet, in the end, the kind of society a people creates is determined by the kind of individuals it develops. As Mill has argued,

in proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore, capable of being more valuable to others. There is greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.³⁸

The second liberation in Africa should aim at a greater fullness of life for the individual person in a community which accommodates and reflects his or her personhood.

Affective community based on reciprocal awareness of shared kinship cannot be created or sustained in African nation states composed of many ethnic groupings. In fact, it is this kind of community with its commitment to kinship that is to blame for divisive widespread tribalism and nepotism in African social life. The ensuing conflict and disharmony have undermined any chance for national consciousness and hence national community. Fa non laments such obstacles to national community, referring to them as "pitfalls of national consciousness"³⁹. A community is the better the more it is guided by the principle of equal regard for all persons thus affording each one of them an equal opportunity to develop to the best of one's capacity. A maximum number of people can then develop themselves and participate in determining the society they create jointly while at the same time assuming responsibility for institutions that they are party to bringing about.

An ideal society would appear to be of the sort which Wolff calls rational community, "a reciprocity of consciousness which is achieved and sustained by equals who discourse together publicly for the specific purpose of social decision and action."⁴⁰ It would be characterized by free participatory deliberation upon social goals and free participatory determination of social choices. It would be a community in which persons as rational and moral beings would experience themselves as counting for something in the collectivity to which they belonged as their membership in those societies would make a perceivable difference towards realization of some social good. Through exercise of personal will in such free participation one would realize not only one's good, but also communal well-being indicating harmonization of self-realization with realization of the community.

Conclusion

I have been arguing in this paper that the first liberation in Africa, i.e., political independence, achieved little more than national freedom and statehood. For the individual persons within the politically free states another level of freedom, namely, personal autonomy, is desirable if the person is to realize him or herself as a unique reality. It has been pointed out that effective community based on reciprocal consciousness of shared kinship should give way to an approximation of rational community--a reciprocity of consciousness achieved and sustained by equals who discourse together freely for the purpose of social decision and action. Such a community requires that the individual person, the basic unit of society, be accorded freedom to develop individuality and personhood in order to make possible the creative and constructive contribution of ideas for social change. For if society is to avoid stagnation it must create conditions suitable for the ever unfinished person continually to shape him or herself as a truly rational, moral and social being and to play his or her rightful role as an active member of one's community.

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Notes

1. See "The state and the crisis in Africa: In search of a Second Liberation" in *Development Dialogue* (1988), pp. 4-29.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

4. Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Evolutionary Roots of Family Ethics and Group Ethics," *The World and I: A Chronicle of our Changing Era*, Vol. 1, No. 3, Washington Times Corporation, March, 1986.

5. John Macquarrie, *In Search of Humanity: A Theological and Philosophical Approach* (London: SCM Press, 1982), p. 32.

6. Paul W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 40.

7. Robert B. Young, *Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty* (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), p. vii.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

9. John Ben son "Who is the Autonomous Man?" in *Philosophy*, 58 (1983), 8f.

10. Milton A. Gonsalves, *Fagothey's Right & Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Publishing Company, 1989), p. 333.
11. Robert Paul Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 184-185.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
13. It is conceivable that affective community could be based on reciprocal consciousness of shared humanity thus yielding a global community of *homo sapiens*, the kind of community needed to address problems of environmental concerns.
14. John S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1970), p. 135.
15. See Kwame Gyekye, *An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan conceptual Scheme* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 154-55.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
17. Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 3.
18. See *African Religions and Philosophy*, pp. 293-94.
19. Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya*, intro., B. Malinowski (New York: Random, n.d.), p. 115.
20. *Essay on African Philosophical Thought*, p. 154.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 159f.
22. See Ali Mazrui & Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa* (London: Heinemann, 1984), pp. 187-88.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
24. Kwasi Wiredu, *Philosophy and an African Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 52.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
26. Kai Nielsen "Marx and Moral Ideology," in *African Philosophical Inquiry*, 1 (1987), p. 72.
27. *Philosophy and an African Culture*, p. 58.
28. See Roni M. Khul Bwalya, "On Kaundanism," *An International African Journal of Philosophy* (Lusaka, Zambia), 31.
29. Kaundanism is cited as an example because its originator is a leading African statesman--moderate and progressive--yet even his ideology is not free from degeneration.
30. Khul Bwalye, *op.cit.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. Maendeleoya Wanawake (literally, Women Development) has been simply a social welfare organization that has in the past kept clear of political involvement.
34. Peter Wanyande, "Democracy and the One Party state: The African Experience" in *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa*, eds. W.O. Oyugi & A. Gitonga (Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya, 1987), p. 77.
35. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove, 1968), p. 182.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
37. See Grace Stuart Ibingira, *African Upheals Since Independence* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980).
38. E.H. Carr, *What is History?* R.W. Davies, ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 32.

39. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, Currin V. Shields, ed. (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), p. 76.
40. See the chapter by this title in his book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, pp. 148-205.

Chapter XIII

Responsibilities and Rights: Tradition in Chinese Society

*Yang Fenggang*¹

In this era of historic change Chinese society is confronted with a reevaluation of values. As a whole, Chinese culture needs to be clarified by reason and animated with new vigor. The long history of Chinese civilization gives it a heritage which is both very rich and very heavy. It cannot go forward smoothly without conscientious and sober reflection and re-reflection on the traditions which affect present Chinese society. I choose this topic, responsibilities and rights, for a number of reasons. The first is because this is an urgent problem in the reconstruction of Chinese society: we need badly to construct a new balance between responsibility and right. The second is because the question is unavoidable in this study of "the place of the person in social life."² On the one hand, individuals should have their rights and fulfill themselves as human beings. On the other hand, society always demands that the individual assume responsibility. The balance of these two is a crucial question. Thirdly, both theoretically and practically, this is commonly a crucial problem for societies throughout the world. In this paper, I will attempt a brief description and analysis of the ideas of responsibility and rights in the Chinese traditions, which I will divide into two: ancient traditions: Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism (Taoism); and modern traditions: revolution and enlightenment.

Ancient Chinese Traditions

Chinese culture, before the Xinhai Revolution (1911) which overthrew the last Chinese feudal dynasty and founded the Republic of China, was an organic whole constituted of many traditions or theoretical schools. Among them, Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism were generally acknowledged as the basic traditions (The Trinity of Three Teachings) while Confucianism occupied a dominant position.

The Confucian Tradition

Confucius (551-476 B.C.) was the actual founder of Confucianism, although its origins can be traced back far earlier to the legendary monarchs, Yao and Shun. Confucius lived in the period of Spring-Autumn and the Warring States (770-221 B.C.) when China was being torn apart by constant civil wars and the whole Chinese society was in a state of chaos. At the same time, it was the period of the "contention of a hundred schools of thought." Among these numerous and varied schools, Confucianism was but one. Confronting this chaotic society, Confucius devoted himself to restoring social order. After failing to seek an official position, he concentrated his effort on editing classic traditional literature and teaching what he thought to be the oldest as well as the best tradition. After Confucius' death his disciples continued to spread his teaching. When the first emperor (Shi Hungdi) of the Qin (Ch'in) dynasty (221-207 B.C.) unified China through force of arms, he sought unity in the political and intellectual spheres as well as in other spheres through controlling thought by the notorious decree of "burning all writings and burying alive the scholars." Soon, however, in the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.), Confucianism became the state ideology while all the other schools of thought were banned with the proposition of the great Confucian

Dong Zhongshu (Tung Chung-shu , c. 179-104 B.C.). Henceforth, Confucianism was to be the dominant orthodox ideology of China until the Xinhai Revolution (1911).

The Confucian classics are of two kinds--"The Five Classics," namely, *The Book of Songs (Shi Jing)*, *The Book of History (Shu Jing)*, *The Book of Changes (Yi Jing*, or *I Ching)*, *The Book of Rites (Li Ji)*, and *The Spring and Autumn Annals (Chun Qiu)*, which were edited by Confucius himself; and "The Four Books," namely, *The Great Learning (Da Xue)*, *The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong Yong)*, *The Analects of Confucius (Lun Yu)* and *Mencius (Meng Zi)*, which were collected or written by the disciples or early followers of Confucius. All, especially "The Four Books," were the basic textbooks for the examination through which intellectuals obtained an official position since the Han dynasty.

Since the Han dynasty, Confucianism was not only taught in school, but drilled into the people by every possible means--homes, theaters, proverbs, stories, etc.--until this system of ethical ideas became the people's habits in daily life. As a dominant ideology, Confucianism articulated the ethical or moral feature of almost every sphere. In this paper, I will discuss only the main ideas which concern our subject.

As mentioned before, Confucius worked to restore social order. He thought that order on a large scale would not be maintained unless it existed first in the basic unit of society, i.e., the family, then between one family and another, and so on. Only when one orders his family well can this good order be transferred to his work in public administration. The life of the family was seen as the base of the life of society, indeed, society was seen as an enlarged family. Both in the family and in society people should live in peace and harmony; neither superiors nor inferiors should have any complaints. How could this be possible? The way is to let everyone know what his/her role is and what he/she should do. Generally speaking, the meaning of "person" in Confucianism always has a special designation. Everyone is socialized or stratified and has a particular fixed position: ruler, subject, father, son, etc.

This stratification of "person" was believed to be according to the order of nature (Dao) and everyone must behave according to this Dao, i.e., the Confucian principles and the special norms or rules for each person. Throughout its long history Confucianism stipulated for every role the particular norms or rules: "monarch must behave as a monarch, a subject a subject, a father a father, a son a son." Confucius thought that an harmonious relationship in the family should be maintained by the love (*ci*) of parents and the filial piety of son, and that an harmonious relationship in the state should be maintained by the kindheartedness (*ren*) of the monarch and the loyalty of the subjects. However, Confucianism stresses especially the virtue of filial piety rather than of love, and of loyalty rather than of kindheartedness.

Especially, it emphasizes the virtue of filial piety. First of all this means serving and obedience to one's parents and grandparents. In the Chinese language the words "filial piety" are always combined with the word "obedience" (*shun*). Second, it means protecting one's own body because this is bequeathed to one by one's parents. "When his parents having given birth to his body whole, he returns it to them whole, this may be called filial piety."³ Third, it means bearing and bringing up children in order to carry on the life of the parents. Mencius said, "There are three things that are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them."⁴

Filial piety also commands perpetuating the activities of one's parents and carrying on their uncompleted goals, or to realize something new and become famous so that thereby the names of one's parents will be widely known and they will gain immortality among others. This aspect of filial piety sometimes is seen as more important than others. Zeng Zi said, "There are three degrees

of filial piety. The highest is the honoring of our parents; the second is not disgracing them; the lowest is being able to support them."⁵

Since Confucius regards the state as an enlarged family, filial piety as the virtue of family is regarded as the source of all other virtues.

If a man in his own house and privacy be not grave, he is not filial; if in serving his ruler he be not loyal, he is not filial; if in discharging the duties of office he be not serious, he is not filial; if with friends he be not sincere, he is not filial; if on the field of battle he be not brave, he is not filial. [Because] if he fail in these five things, the evil [of the disgrace] will reflect on his parents.⁶

So "The fundamental lesson for all is filial piety."⁷ "It commences with the service of parents; it proceeds to the service of the ruler; it is completed by the establishment of one's own personality. . . . Yes, filial piety is the Way (Dao) of Heaven, the principle of Earth, and the practical duty of man."⁸

When the basic virtue of family was extended to the society as an enlarged family in which the emperor was the patriarch, officials were the parents, and the ordinary people were the children, filial piety to one's parents and ancestors became loyalty to the emperor and governors who sometimes were regarded as the symbol of the state. Only when someone orders his family well can his good order be transferred to his public administration and thereby produce an ordered and harmonious society.

In an ideal Confucian society, there could be order and a kind of harmony, but the price was human rights and freedom. In such a hierarchical structure and ethical system of family and society everyone had a fixed social role and had to fulfill various heavy duties, but they had little, if any, human rights. Only the duties or obligations cannot be shirked. Confucian identity is had through reducing oneself until one merges into the whole--the family and/or the state. The models in Confucianism are the ones who sacrifice their personal interests to their family and/or state. Almost everything done by an individual was regarded as his/her duty as a son or subject to parents or sovereign. Generally speaking, in Confucianism duty or obligation means that the lower served and obeyed the higher. What was done by the higher--father, sovereign or governor--was regarded as a favor generously bestowed upon the lower--son, subject, or common people--and was regarded as fulfilling their duty to their superior. (Even for the emperor, this was due to his ancestors and to Heaven as the emperor is called the Son of the Heaven). People cultivated in this social context usually have a strong sense of responsibility and mission and are deeply grateful. But appropriate personal interests and rights are neglected or even denied. In Confucianism one often finds the word "power" and "privilege," but there is little room for "right."

The more such a society developed, the more its system of norms became sophisticated, and the more heavily the duties weighed upon individuals. There should be a balance; in ancient China this balance came in the form of Daoism and Buddhism.

The Daoist Tradition

The origins of Daoism (Taoism), like Confucianism, can be traced back very early in Chinese history. Nevertheless, the systematic theory of Daoism did not exist until the Warring States period (476-221 B.C.). Lao Zi (Lao Tzu), a contemporary of Confucius, and soon Zhuang Zi (Chuang Tzu, 369?-286? B.C.) are regarded as the founders of Daoism.

Daoism, which advocates spontaneity and opposes society and artificiality, arose as a rival of Confucianism. When Confucianism became the official ideology in the Han dynasty, the Daoist philosophy evolved into a form of religion and was transmitted continuously alongside the official

teachings. After Buddhism was introduced into China, Daoism absorbed much from Buddhism and became a popular religion. Meanwhile, the ideas of Daoism were learned also by people through art and literary works. Hence, even though its religious form declined in the late dynasties, Daoist philosophy still influences the people.

Among others, the important Classics of Daoism, both as philosophy and religion, are the *Lao Zi* (*Lao Tzu*), also known as *Dao De Jing* (*The Way and the Power, Tao-Te Ching*), and *Zhuang Zi* (*Chuang Tzu*).

The primary meaning of the word Dao (Tao), one of the most important terms used by many ancient Chinese philosophers, is "road" or "way" along which something or someone proceeds. Later it was extended to mean "method," "principle," "truth" and finally "reality." According to the well-known historian of Chinese philosophy, Fun Yu-Lan, before the *Lao Zi* the meaning of Dao "was always restricted to human affairs, whereas when we come to *The Lao-tzu [Lao Zi]*, we find the word *Tao* being given a metaphysical meaning."⁹ The Dao in Daoism is an absolute being, a first principle which is formless, nameless, eternal, all pervading and all embracing, "The thousand creatures owe their existence to it, . . . like a garment it covers the ten thousand things and brings them up, but makes no claim to be master over them."¹⁰ It is through Dao that all things are enabled to be, but "Tao never does, yet through it all things are done."¹¹ So, what Dao accomplishes is not done purposefully, but is simply spontaneous. As the first principle of all things, "Tao produced Oneness. Oneness produced duality (*yin* and *yang*). Duality evolved into trinity (*yin*, *yang* and the harmony resulting from the interaction of these two), and trinity evolved into the ten thousand (i.e., infinite number of) things."¹² This is the Daoist view of cosmos and on this cosmology Daoism builds its entire theory.

Unlike Confucianism which stresses everyone's duties to keep the social order, Daoism emphasizes that everyone should live according to Dao. Man's origin is not in society but in nature, so "man's standard is earth. Earth's standard is Heaven. Heaven's standard is Tao. Tao's standard is the spontaneous."¹³ So man's goal of life is following Dao (the spontaneous) and through Dao to reach Oneness of man and nature (*Tian Ren He Yi*). This is the highest state of human life. When man unites himself with nature to form Oneness, since nature has no beginning or end so too shall man be without beginning and end: the universe is eternal, and so is man. When a man reaches this state--Oneness of man and nature--he can be called a True Man (*Zhen Ren*). This man is happy, because he has the freedom of always and only following his own spontaneous nature. Nothing then can be a bondage for him.

The True Man of old knew neither to love life nor to hate death. Living, he felt no elation; dying, he offered no resistance. Unconsciously he went; unconsciously he came; that was all. He did not try purposely to forget what his beginning had been, or to seek what his end would be. He received with delight anything that came to him, and left without consciousness anything that he had forgotten. This is what is called not preferring the conscious mind to Tao, nor supplementing Nature with man. Such is what we call the True Man.¹⁴

Daoists believe that when everyone follows Dao and pursues Oneness of man with nature (both outside and inside nature), a perfect harmony will be achieved. This is a common goal of Chinese philosophers. Confucianism stresses the harmony in human society through education, morality, politics and all arts of man. But Daoism emphasizes the harmony in the entire cosmos through following Dao: spontaneity, or back to nature. Daoists thought the Confucianist way artificial and incapable of building order and harmony in society; on the contrary, it could only harm the harmony and make things worse. Lao Zisaid, "The people are difficult to keep in order

because those above them interfere. That is the only reason why they are difficult to keep in order."¹⁵

The more restrictions and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer the people will be. The more sharp weapons the people have, the more troubled will be the country. The more cunning craftsmen there are, the more pernicious contrivances will appear. The more laws are promulgated, the more thieves and bandits there will be.¹⁶

So the best way of ruling is to get rid of laws and of the traditional virtue of human-heartedness (*Ren*) and righteousness (*Yi*), and to act through non-activity (*Wuwei*). Non-acting reverses itself to a condition in which there is nothing that is not done (*Wu Bu Wei*).

Obviously, this Daoist view of society is sharply opposed to the Confucian view, but in the Confucian society the Daoist view is only a grievance or grumbling concentrated upon the individual. The Daoist individual should take a detached attitude toward the society and human life. Many Daoists left society and became monks living in out-of-the-way places. The more ideal way, however, is to live in society but not to engage in society. Thus, one retains one's own being despite being overwhelmed by worldly life, just as the water lily grows out of the mud but keeps its beauty pure. So "A small hermit finds seclusion in a deep wilderness, while a great hermit can seclude himself in a city." This does not mean living in solitude, but living in this world while not being engaged in worldly affairs. This way of life does not escape from the world, but is detached from the world and plays with life. No pain or suffering can make one sorrowful. For example, when one receives an injection usually one feels pain, but if with a humorous attitude one observes his pained look in a mirror his pain may be replaced by humor.

Daoism is a rival which challenges Confucianism. A Daoist should cherish no social stratification and take no related duties; he is free by nature. However, as Daoist freedom is so absolute that it must have no conditions it is also impossible to realize in this conditioned world. Freedom can be realized only when it is sought as a right, but Daoism has no idea of human rights. Daoist freedom comes from the training of his own body and mind: only when a person is rid of his desires and needs can he have this free dom. Hence, although Daoism came as a rival of Confucianism, it was so weak and incompetent that finally it came to assist the ruler. Lao Zi said, "Therefore the Sage rules the people by emptying their minds, filling their bellies, weakening their wills, and toughening their sinews, ever making the people without knowledge and without desire."¹⁷ A simple people is easy to rule.

Buddhist Tradition

Buddhism was introduced from India via Central Asia to China around the beginning of the Christian era. At that time the absolute position of Confucianism had just been established and Daoism gradually becoming an institutional religion. The early spread of Buddhism in China met many difficulties, and even was banned officially several times by the state. However, it acquired an ever wider and more profound influence since the Han dynasty and developed many Chinese sects or schools. "Beginning in the fourth and fifth centuries and continuing until the early part of the Sung dynasty (roughly around the year 1000), Buddhism absorbed the best energies of most philosophically minded Chinese, while the native philosophies suffered comparative eclipse."¹⁸ The Chinese not only translated and edited the numerous books of Buddhist *sutra*, canon and essays, but also wrote numerous interpretive books, some of which are even regarded as holy scriptures.

Although there are numerous Buddhist schools the basic doctrine is the same. This is the so-called "Four Noble Truths ": "The Noble Truth about suffering; The Noble Truth about the cause of suffering; the Noble Truth about the cessation of suffering; and the Noble Truth about the path that leads to the cessation."¹⁹

Buddhism concentrates on human suffering. The first Noble Truth indicates that human life is full of suffering: birth, decay, disease, death, union with the unpleasant, separation from the pleasant, etc. The second Noble Truth explains the cause of suffering: craving or desire, i.e., craving for the gratification of the senses, for existence and so on, which leads to rebirth and being enmeshed in the endless *samsara* (transmigration of life and death). The third Noble Truth tells that suffering can be extinguished: man can break down the chain of causation of *samsara* and reach *nirvana*--a state of no suffering. The fourth Noble Truth shows the Eightfold Path to *nirvana*: right views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right mode of livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. Simply speaking, the path to *nirvana* is acknowledging and understanding the Buddhist truth and acting accordingly.

Buddhism insists that everything in this world, including material things and social and human affairs, is transient and illusory; hence, we should not cling to them or crave them which can only cause the various sufferings. This view about society and human life is so passive that the best way is to escape from this world and live in the wilderness. "The Buddha was convinced that suffering overbalanced pleasure in human life so much that it would be better never to have been born."²⁰ Apparently, this pessimistic attitude is sharply opposite the positive attitude of Confucianism. In Buddhism there is no social stratification. As to responsibilities, since everything is regarded as transient and illusory, the relationships of people (ruler-subject, father-son, etc.) are also transient and illusory; hence, we should not cling to them but rather pursue self-enlightenment through the path shown by the Buddha. This is a negation of any responsibility in social life. So Buddhism considers that it is best to leave the turmoil of the world and live in solitude in the deep wilderness.

Although later Buddhism developed a more positive attitude toward the significance for human life, especially in the Mahayana (big vehicle) school which was accepted by the Chinese after amendment, the basic teachings could not be changed. Orthodox Confucian society could not permit the spread of such a negative religion. Buddhism not only was banned by emperors several times because it challenged the regime, but the Buddhist monk's life also was denounced by Confucians as anti-filial piety and anti-loyalty. However, despite all these painstaking efforts by the authorities and the Confucians, Buddhism was never wiped out. Instead, it developed quickly and spread widely, finally becoming one of the popular religions in ancient Chinese society. This is telling proof that Buddhism was a very necessary complement to Confucianism, enabling people to escape from the heavy burden of responsibility in orthodox Confucian society.

A Reflection

These three ancient Chinese traditions: Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, complemented each other and composed as an organic whole the "Trinity of Three Teachings" which ruled China for almost two thousand years. Roughly speaking, Confucianism emphasizes society based on the family as the basic unit, while Daoism and Buddhism emphasize the individual. As a social being (in Confucianism) every person must undertake various responsibilities; but as an individual one is justified in pursuing his/her own objective; for Daoism this is living spontaneously according to the nature, both outer and inner nature; for Buddhism this is extricating oneself from suffering.

While Confucianism commits people to a strong sense of responsibility and obligation, Buddhist separation and Daoist detachment justify shirking or evading one's duties. So there was a balance between responsibility and irresponsibility. This balance enabled society to maintain itself and develop.

Nevertheless, although both Daoism and Buddhism emphasize individuals, there remains many differences between them. Comparatively, the Confucian attitude toward life and the world is positive and one of participation, the Buddhist attitude is negative and one of escape, while the Daoists stand at the middle and vacillate between these two extremes. By entering further into society a Daoist can become a Confucian, and by withdrawing further from society he may assume the position of Buddhism. It is sometimes difficult to define a person as a pure Confucian, Daoist or Buddhist. In the long co-existence of the three teachings each has absorbed more or less from the other. Also while brought up and educated with Confucian values and ideas, people often took something from Daoism, Buddhism or both.

Although there was a balance in ancient Chinese society between responsibility and irresponsibility, it was unstable and fragile. When Neo-Confucianism was developed in the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) after long and widespread turmoil since the end of the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.), this weak balance was lost. Great Confucians such as the Chen Brothers and Zhu Xi further absolutized the doctrines and rules of the Confucian traditions, while assimilating some doctrines from Buddhism and Daoism. Neo-Confucianism transformed the emphasis on individuals in Daoism and Buddhism into part of the preparation to assume duty and obligation to the family and the state. The goal of human life in Neo-Confucianism should be to preserve one's body, to cultivate one's character and personality, to support and regulate one's family, to administer and govern state affairs and to pacify the world. Here individual persuasion becomes duty.

As soon as Neo-Confucianism was initiated, Daoism and Buddhism began declining. The ideological changes in the Song dynasty reflected the decline of the whole ancient Chinese civilization from its culmination in the Tang dynasty. The reinforcement of duties and social orders in Neo-Confucianism smothered the people's creativity and vitality, as did the society. This situation remained until mid-nineteenth century when Western gunfire smashed the dream of the "Central Kingdom." A new page was turned in Chinese history.

Modern Chinese Traditions

Modern Chinese history is one of liberation; it is full of both pain as well as enthusiasm for in the process of liberation human conflict must be acknowledged. Here I would distinguish two kinds of liberation: that of the whole (nation, people) and that of the individual. The former, in modern Chinese history, was a very urgent task because China was so weak that internal decay and external aggression seriously imperiled the existence of the Chinese nation. The task of the liberation of the whole was fulfilled in revolutionary or violent form. The latter, the liberation of the individual, is a more difficult and more profound liberation which has been in the process of realization through enlightenment thinking. Here I refer to the liberation of the whole as "revolution" and to that of the individual as "enlightenment" in order more easily to distinguish and relate to them.

The Revolutionary Tradition

Revolution, in modern Chinese history, was the only choice to save and rejuvenate the Chinese nation. In the late years of Qing (Ching) dynasty (1644-1911) the Manchu rulers were corrupt; the government suppressed the people in a bloody manner while yielding to foreign powers. Since the middle of the 19th century the Manchu government was impotent to resist the aggression of Western invaders and was forced to sign infamous bilateral treaties with the great Powers, including Western countries, Tsarist Russia and Japan. Though some officials of the Qing government tried to reform, every attempt ended in failure; revolution became an inevitable necessity.

In 1911 the Xinhai Revolution, led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925), overthrew the Qing dynasty and founded the Republic of China. This emancipated the people from the rule of the feudal system. In 1945, victory in the War of Resistance against Japan (World War II) after eight years of arduous struggle through the cooperation of the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Communist Party, marked the liberation of the Chinese nation from the rule of colonialism and imperialism. In 1949, the liberation of the country, led by the Chinese Communist Party headed by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung), and the foundation of the People's Republic of China, emancipated the people of the whole country from an unfair social and economic system. The "Great Cultural Revolution" from 1966 to 1976, although a very complex phenomenon, had among its effects the liberation of the people from the Confucian (feudal) ethical system and worship of the authorities, thereby preparing the way for arousing the individual.

Revolution is a massive movement and "it is common in such a movement to demand from its members surrender of individuality to the movement."²¹ Through all these revolutions in modern Chinese history the sense of the wholeness of the nation, people or class was required. In his analysis of China's situation, Dr. Sun Yet-sen said,

even though we have four-hundred million people gathered together in One China, in reality they are just a heap of loose sand. Today we are poorest and weakest nation in the world, and occupy the lowest position in international affairs. Other men are the carving knife and serving dish; we are the fish and the meat. Our position at this time is most perilous. If we do not earnestly espouse nationalism and weld together our four-hundred million people into a strong nation, there is danger of China's being lost and our people being destroyed. If we wish to avert this catastrophe, we must espouse nationalism and bring this national spirit to the salvation of the country.²²

This nationalism required everyone to be loyal to the nation and the people.²³ During the war the Chinese Communist Party also emphasized the whole, and especially stressed self-sacrifice. In *The Cultivation of Communist Party Members*, Liu Shaoqi, one of the leaders of the Party, provided a "good Communist ethics" for the Party members, namely, that one should "show loyalty and ardent love for all his comrades, revolutionaries, and working people, help them unconditionally, treat them with equality, and never harm anyone of them for the sake of his own interests."²⁴ Also Mao Zedong said,

A Communist should be frank, faithful and active, looking upon the interests of the revolution as his very life and subordinating his personal interests to those of the revolution, . . . he should be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about the individual, and more concerned about others than about himself.²⁵

After the foundation of the People's Republic of China, responsibility to the state and nation, to the people and the so-called "class," and to the Party was stressed again and again. It was not only an ethics for the Party members, but was imbued in the entire people. The official slogans

were: "Work without thought of self"; "Be public-spirited, forget yourself." Many models or pacemakers were held up, among them Lei Feng was particularly praised as a person who devoted himself to the service of the people, forgetting his own interests and never being a rusty screw in the state machine.

Undoubtedly, collectivism played a very important role in the liberation of the Chinese nation and her exploited and oppressed people. But carrying this collectivism to an extreme after the liberation of the whole nation or people seriously damaged present Chinese society.

The Tradition of Enlightenment

While the revolution which required collectivism broke out at the beginning of the 20th century, another orientation arose, namely, the enlightenment which called for more individual rights and freedom.

With the "May Fourth Movement" in 1919 came the New Culture Movement, which was an attempt to destroy what remained of traditional Confucian culture and required a whole new culture. Its slogans were: "Destroy the old curiosity shop of Confucius"! and "Overthrow Confucius and his progeny!" At the same time two Western teachers or ideas were introduced: "Mr. D (Democracy) and Mr. S (Science)." Equal rights, individualism and woman's emancipation became popular. Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu , 1879-1942), one of the most famous leaders of the New Culture Movement, proposed individualism (although he was to found the Chinese Communist Party three years later). In 1918 he wrote:

The civilization and happiness of society are created by individuals and should be enjoyed by individuals; . . . the will and happiness of the individual should be respected. . . . To carry out one's will and to satisfy one's desires (including everything from food and sex to moral reputation) are the basic reasons for an individual's existence.²⁶

"If we are totally to sacrifice ourselves to benefit others, then we exist for others and not for ourselves. This is definitely not the fundamental reason for man's existence."²⁷ By such expressions, the interests and rights of individuals were emphasized. Another leader of the New Culture Movement, Hu Shi (born 1891-?), declared that concepts such as loyalty should be cast aside as useless.²⁸

This awakening of individuality in Chinese society, which had been ruled by Confucianism for almost two thousand years, marked the rising of a modern consciousness. However, the serious crises of the Chinese nation overrode everything else. Revolution or salvation of the whole (the nation and its exploited people) was the pressing matter of the moment. Only after this task was fulfilled, could the Enlightenment be revived; more than half a century later this revival came slowly and haltingly.

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, especially after the nationwide discussion on the "criterion of truth" which emancipated the people from the dogmatism and the absolutism of established authoritarianism, there has been an atmosphere of active discussion about issues of human life and society. In the last ten years (1979-1989), many people have been involved in a series of so-called "hot topics." Among them I will discuss briefly only those concerned with our theme.

The Meaning of Life. In 1980 a letter entitled "Why is the Road of Human Life Getting Narrower and Narrower?" was published in the journal, *Chinese Youth*. This letter resulted in a nationwide discussion about the meaning of human life--the relation between benefitting oneself and benefitting others, the ideal and the real, the individual and society, fame and gain, etc. This discussion justified the individual in pursuing his or her own goal, including material enjoyment and fame.

Humanitarianism and the Theory of Alienation. Humanitarianism had a basically negative meaning before the 1980s in China. But now some scholars have published articles to defend humanitarianism and many novelists have developed this idea in their novels and stories, which have a wide and profound influence. Meanwhile, Marx's early writings such as "Manuscripts on Economics and Philosophy: 1844" were reevaluated and the theory of alienation became an effective weapon to criticize the *status quo*. Although humanitarianism and the theory of alienation were officially criticized under the name of "spiritual pollution" from the beginning of 1984, such ideas as humanitarianism, respect for the individual, and the critique of a depersonalized social system and ideology took root in the hearts of the people.

The "Shock Wave" of Existentialism. In China, J.-P. Sartre's existentialism was introduced and criticized in the 1960s when it swept across Europe and America. But after the madly ruthless struggle among people during the "Cultural Revolution," the statement "Hell is other people" produced wide repercussions, while the proposition "Man's existence precedes his essence" roused the enthusiasm for the pursuit of freedom. Self-design, self-choice, self-determination became popular slogans among college students. Along with this awakening of the consciousness of freedom, the right of freedom was demanded.

Freudian Psychoanalysis. In 1984-1985 many books by and on Freud were translated and published in China as were many literary works employing Freudian theory. This hot topic justified the right to sexual love and criticized social repression of human nature.

Nietzschean Theory. Nietzsche had been regarded as a fascist philosopher and criticized as a theoretical representative of imperialism. However, as his books were translated and published or reprinted, his spirit of critique and reevaluation of all traditional values, his rejection of everything authoritative, and his powerful will for life infected many people, especially young scholars and college students. Since 1985, more and more people have begun to reflect upon and criticize traditional Chinese culture. This discussion of culture continues, although it has been disrupted by the official movement "against bourgeois liberalization" since the beginning of 1987.

Student Movements. Since the early 1980s the consciousness of participation in politics has become universal and strong, especially among college students and young people. All the student movements have demanded political reformation, democracy and such civil rights as freedom of speech, press, etc.

During the 70 years since the May 4th Movement in 1919, and especially in these last ten years, enlightenment has been a very important subject and has become more and more significant. The result has been the emancipation of the individual from the ancient tradition dominated by Confucianism and from the established social system and ideology which emphasized society and the collective while reducing and depreciating the individual. This liberation of the individual has meant the acknowledgement of ever more individual rights and interests.

A Reflection

Modern Chinese history began with a sharp conflict between East and West, involving armed forces, economies, politics and culture; it was also a conflict between the ancient and the modern. Although these conflicts gave the people many painful memories, modernization actually means some degree of Westernization. The theoretical foundations of the modern Chinese traditions of revolution and enlightenment are borrowed from the West. Dr. Sun Yet-sen was taught Western science in a Western context, while the Chinese Communist Party's guiding ideology of Marxism and Leninism also originated from the West. In the process of liberating the whole (nation, people), the revolutionaries found in ancient Chinese tradition some important sense of responsibility, i.e., to the nation, the state and the people. But for the enlightenment since the May 4th Movement, the ancient tradition is almost only an obstacle and target for criticism. Some people have worried about the eclipse of Chinese culture due to this radical criticism. However, the task for the Chinese at present is, I think, still the enlightenment--the liberation of the individual. The ancient tradition, mainly Confucianism and the present social system still strongly restrict individuality. We are living in this cultural tradition and cannot jump out of it, but we can clarify it through thorough criticism, after which a new vigorous and creative Chinese culture must be developed.

As to the relationship of the revolution and the enlightenment, seen as the same liberation of man, there should be no contradiction. Actually, the liberation of the whole (revolution) is the essential prerequisite for the liberation of the individual (enlightenment) for which it has laid the foundation. The liberation of the individual, in turn, is a continuation and deepening of the liberation of the whole. If there was no independence of the nation, how could we speak of the rights of the individual. If the rights of the individual cannot be guaranteed, what is the purpose of the revolution, and how can the society exist and develop healthily?

Present Situation and Problem

In China today every tradition discussed above is functioning in some way, while everyone is in some kind of crisis. This is a period of confusion or chaos, of deconstruction and reconstruction. We look forward to great thinkers and to a charismatic theory which can lead the people beyond the painful conflict of values in everyone's mind. Along with the tradition of enlightenment, human rights and individuality must gain little by little. This is historical progress and probably must be long and painful. However, in many cases, overemphasis upon the freedom and rights of the individual confronts the family, nation and society who often are neglected or even negated and cast aside; irresponsibility has become a quite universal social phenomenon. I think that this is not because people have too much freedom or too many rights; rather, when people cannot balance responsibilities and rights, some have to try to escape too heavy a burden of responsibility by irresponsibility in their search for psychological balance.

With this social crisis comes a crucial theoretical problem: What is a right; What are the personal rights of individuals? What is a responsibility; What are the personal responsibilities; How, if possible, could personal rights and personal responsibilities attain and retain a mutual balance? The theoretical solution of this crucial problem might be implied in a new metaphysical reflection about the relationship between responsibility, human rights and freedom. Such a discussion will require another article.

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Notes

1. Mr. Chen Na helped translate the outline of this paper into English and cooperated in its original presentation.
2. The theme of the study.
3. *Li Ji* , quoted in Fung Yu-Lan , *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, vol. I, trans. by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 385. (Having compared several English editions of Confucian classics and Daoist classics, I prefer to adopt the Fung translation.)
4. *Meng Zi* , quoted in *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 359.
5. *Li Ji*, p. 359.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 360.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Xiao Jing* , quoted in *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, I, p. 361.
9. Fung Yu-Lan, I, p. 117.
10. *The Lao Zi* , quoted in *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, I, p. 177.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
18. Fung Yu-Lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, II, pp. 239-240.
19. *Mahabarinbba-suttanta*, quoted in *Buddhism in the Modern World*, Heinrich Dumoulin, ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1976), p. 13.
20. Hajime Nakamura, "The Basic Teachings of Buddhism" in *Buddhism in the Modern World*, p. 5.
21. Alan P. L. Liu, *How China is Ruled* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), p. 35.
22. Wm. Theodore de Bary , Wing-tsit Chan , Burton Watson, *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963 [1960]), p. 769.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 771.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 916.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 928.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 830-31.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 830.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 832.

Chapter XIV

The Intellectual's Role in Social Change

Osman Bilen

Culture may be described, for the purposes of this investigation, as a system of questions and answers concerning the universe and man's behavior in it. This is a closed system in the sense of its acceptance as authoritative by a human society. In an Islamic society it is the scale of values which decides the relative position and the importance of the individual questions and answers. In the faith the question about the universe finds answers in a transcendent reality. The key is the affirmation of the divine Unity, One God: all follows from this affirmation down to its most remote echoes on the very periphery of existence. Practical questions find expression in the revelation of divine will, in laws and a code of conduct which are religious, not social in origin. The Muslim believes in One God; in his messengers, sent to mankind for its guidance from the beginning of time; that Muhammad closed the circle of messengers so that there can be no further revelation of the divine law after him; and that the Quran is the word of God.

Jurisprudence, not theology, is the principal science in Islam; hence, the *alim* or learned religious scholar is primarily a jurist who tells people what to do, rather than what to believe. For the Muslim there is no problem in knowing what to believe; his concern is with what to do under all circumstances in order to conform to the word of God. The Muslim community owes its cohesion primarily to the faith, not its religious leaders or to the government.

As the experience of the community changes the power to formulate and answer new questions in terms of traditional values and the decisions previously assigned indicate a culture's ability to continue. By acceptance of a new aspiration developed within the community itself a cultural transformation may be brought about. More typically it begins within a group that is somewhat marginal, but by no means alien to the community, before the transformation sets in. These people who assume a central position in this process are, in the broad sense of the word, intellectuals. On the other hand, change and, in more extreme cases, actual transformation of culture, may be stimulated or imposed from the outside. The characteristics of the receiving community and particularly of the intellectuals direct the change.

This paper will deal with the intellectuals' role in the late Ottoman period in cultural transformation. Before entering into the details of this specific issue, it would be appropriate to provide an overview of the situation in which Muslim intellectuals lived at the beginning of this century.

Those in close contact with Muslims will be accustomed to hearing the statement: "we will take the good things from Western civilization, we will reject the bad things." The key term in this statement is 'civilization'. It is a very potent word; even the most ardent revolutionary, whether in the Muslim world or elsewhere, fears being described as "uncivilized." Frithjof Schuon defines "civilization" as "urban refinement in the framework of a worldly and mercantile outlook," hostile both to virgin nature and to religion.¹ In any event, the consequent traumas of this distinction of civilized and uncivilized, which affect the great part of the non-European world, have been intensified among the Muslim people by special circumstances and affects almost every public manifestation of Islam today, whether intellectual or political.

The intellectuals have taken different attitudes. Traditional Muslims, who have escaped the influence of Westernized education, have no understanding of the Western mind; this is as strange to them as it would have been to a Christian of Middle Ages.² Others constructed around

themselves an environment in which faith can seem only out of place. This group includes modernists, revolutionaries and all those whose interest in their religion is limited to its usefulness as a political weapon. Defense of religion depended, they thought, on proving that it contained nothing incompatible with the best contemporary fashion of thought and accorded preferably with the moral and philosophical norms of European civilization. Some of these intellectuals have found themselves obliged to work with instruments with which they are not comfortable.

In attempting to outdo the West at its own game, alien ideas and ideologies were adopted overnight. Political defiance against the West is seen as the most effective way of asserting the invalidity of old values regardless of how deeply these values may have been rooted. Late Ottoman period intellectuals manifest all characteristics of Muslim intellectuals of late 19th and early 20th century.

During the last two centuries, the Turkish people have been in a process of gradual--at times, violent--cultural transformation. This, of course, includes, to a certain extent, their mode of thinking and their general world view.

Perhaps first among the Muslims, it was a group of Turkish intellectuals, fired by the ideals of the French Revolution, who, in the 19th century, sought to Westernize their country while clinging passionately to Islam. Early in this century three schools of Turkish intellectuals were dedicated to improving and glorifying their country. One group, beginning with Namik Kemal (1840-1888), and symbolized by Mehmed Akif, the great poet and friend of Muhammad Iqbal, sought a revival in and through Islam. A second group associated with Ahmed Ri za and Abdullah Cevdet scoffed at traditional religion and culture. They were either free thinkers or believed in what now is called secularism, and called for a wholehearted and prompt Westernization. A third group favored a selective adoption of Western techniques. Ziya Gokalp, the social philosopher, stood for a combination of national elements which he called Turkification and Islamization, which made him essentially one of this third group.³

Context of Social Change

More than one decade after the French Revolution and in relation to an urgent political issue, the Ottoman Secretary of State had been instructed to prepare a report for the executive committee of state on the political situation in France. The interests expressed in this report were to take place in this country whose long tradition differed from that of France.

It is known by all well-informed persons that the conflagration of sedition, and wickedness which broke out a few years ago in France, scattering sparks and shooting flames of mischief and tumult in all directions, has been for many years in the minds of certain accused heretics, and had been a quiescent evil which they sought an opportunity to awaken. In this way, the known and famous atheists, Voltaire, Rousseau and other such materialists, had printed and published various works consisting, God preserve us, of insults and vilification against the pure prophets and the great kings, of removal and abolition of religion and of allusions to the sweetness of equality and republicanism, all expressed in easily intelligible words and phrases, in the form of mockery. . . .⁴

The style and the manner of the statements in these passages may sound strange to a modern mind. But it must be remembered that the author belonged to a tradition based on religious values. In spite of the fact that it was another religion and tradition which had been insulted, he seems to have regarded it as dangerous for all religions. Probably for this reason he did not mention the execution of Louis XVI, which had such an effect on Christian Europe, nor even the abolition of the monarchy. The Ottomans had been familiar for centuries with republican institutions in Venice;

there was nothing in the mere establishment of a republic to frighten them. What now alarmed the ruling circles in Istanbul was the secularism of the Revolution. Their fears were well founded, for the whole subsequent history of the Middle East has shown how great is the seductive power of a Western revolutionary ideology when divorced from Western religion.

What were the main characteristics or consequences of the French Revolution which attracted Turkish intellectuals who in turn overturned the Ottoman Sultanate and the history of the nation? Under the Ottoman Sultans the ruling classes consisted of the military, the civil service and the Ulama (traditional intellectuals). As the classical Ulama lost their position in the decision-making process of state affairs, a new group of intellectuals emerged. They either became ruling elite as the military or civil servants, or provoked and inspired new ideas among educated people.

The ideas of the French Revolution took deep roots in the minds of a group of people who strove to build the country. What is blamed in the above report, gradually became the central themes of the intellectual's agenda; the notions of equality, freedom, constitution and parliamentary system occupied the literature. It should be noted that the first stage, a constitution and a parliamentary system, was achieved in 1876 but did not last long. Before this period there was a preparation stage in which intellectuals played their role as a governing class. They tried to do their duty by imposing upon the system an entirely inappropriate system of government and administration. There may indeed have been no alternative. Since traditional patterns of ruling and social life had, to a large extent, been destroyed, but there was no question of restoring the *status quo ante*.

Social theorists claim that to possess an identity a society must furnish criteria whereby its members can identify with one another, since their actions and attitudes towards one another will be different from those of outsiders. From this point of view citizens of the Ottoman Empire cannot be treated as a unique society in itself. The family of Sultans were Turkish as was the official language; the dominant ruling classes were Turks. At the same time there were peoples of different races, cultures and religions, though the majority were Muslims. The Western concept of the nation as a linguistic, racial and territorial entity was not known to the Islamic community of the Ottoman Empire. The primary basis of group identity was rather the brotherhood of faith within the religious community, reinforced by common dynastic allegiance. For peoples of other faiths the law and traditions of Islam, as well as the practice and polity of the Ottoman Empire, agreed in prescribing tolerance and protection for non-Muslims and in granting them a large measure of autonomy in their internal and personal affairs.

Despite this identity problem the ruling elite were optimistic about creating a common identity for all citizens of the state. The 1839 Rescript of the Rose Chamber proclaimed the principle of equality for persons of all religions in the application of the law. It guaranteed security of life, honor and property. The Declaration of the Rescript was called the beginning of a new era, called reorganization or in Turkish, *Tanzimat*. In the political history of the Empire, *Tanzimat* and the intellectual leaders of that movement mark a sharp turn. *Tanzimat* intellectuals became main representatives of the intellectual life of the country, and even today are the point of reference for whoever criticizes or praises westernization.

It was not the content of the Rescript--since not much in it was new--which intellectuals criticized in the press, but rather that it was not radical or it was made under the political pressure of European countries. In the years preceding *Tanzimat* many structural and visible changes had been made. Western style uniforms for officials become compulsory. State departments were reorganized according to western models. When French commercial law was adopted in its entirety only a weak protest came from the classical Ulama, but the *Tanzimat* movement did not succeed

immediately in putting it into effect. It was accepted, a few years later and in the eyes of the leaders of the movement, 'Holy Law has nothing to do with it.' In Turkey this code was the first formally accepted system of law and judicature independent of Ulama. Despite the facts, in this period the general feeling expressed by the European press was that the ancient institution and structure of the Empire was barbarous and irretrievably bad. Only the adoption, as soon as possible, of a European form of government and way of life would admit Turkey to the rank and privileges of a civilized state.

This attitude urged the ruling class to make more visible reforms, while at the same time it provoked the anger of free intellectuals. Opposition of these intellectuals resulted in their exile by *Tanzimat* leaders. At the core of their opposition were only methodological differences. Leaders of the *Tanzimat* were secularized, and most adopted French thought one-sidedly without reforming and improving the classical education of the Turkish masses. According to some of opposition intellectuals, *Tanzimat* leaders were overly pro-Western and both anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish. It was true that the gulf between people educated in modern schools and classical schools widened. All these factors provoked a severe reaction among other secular and moderate intellectuals, called Young Ottomans.

Before analyzing the role of Young Ottomans in the process of intellectual and structural change in the society it would be worth mentioning the shift in the function of intellectuals. As an institution, traditional Ulama, literally "those who possess knowledge," was a collection of roles servicing a number of diverse social functions throughout the Islamic history. While in principle indivisible, from the early period of the history of Islamic institutions Ulama was differentiated into a number of specialized groups. Generally speaking, jurists (*fuqaha*) who did not receive fees or income from the state, were concerned solely with the study of legal science; the judges (qadis) formed another group concerned with giving legal decisions and administered the law in courts under the authority of the ruling power.

Although this situation might suggest that the legal profession, both theorists and practitioners, was entirely dominated by the civil authorities, we must note that religious law and legal institutions were elevated by the Ottoman Sultans to a position of supreme social eminence. The Ottomans organized the judicial system under a hierarchy headed by the Shaykh al-Islam, whose legal judgement could, in theory, override the will of Sultan. Furthermore, in the Ottoman system the Ulama represented a powerful class of governing authority, for the term designated not only scholars or religious scholars, as it normally did in the Muslim world, but official status as well. Ulama had their own financial sources, indeed all religious institutions had their own revenue producing foundations (*wakf*). These Islamic institutions originally had land or property dedicated to charity or some other pious purposes, such as aid for orphans, the poor, or debtors. A ruler could seize these properties only by disregarding the law and the Ulama. During *Tanzimat* these foundations were centralized and Ulama became officials with fixed salary. The last effect of the Ulama in state affairs was to refuse to accept a legal code adopted from Europe besides the commercial code, and the attempt to codify classical Islamic law--the sole in the Islamic world.⁵

This was the last achievement of the Ulama who had no role in intellectual life because of the general stagnation of traditional thinking and the failure of the institution to develop in response to the changing needs of the society. Besides the Ulama, the Sufi leaders were in the same situation. However, they had more effect upon the public life of the people and later were blamed in the public mind as the cause of the failure of Islam.

The change in terminology used to designate the intellectuals manifests this shift. The singular form of *ulama*, *alim*, means one who has knowledge of both the theoretical and practical aspects

of the life. The term *arif* (which can be defined simply as one who is following the way of knowledge at devotional, intellectual or gnostic levels) designates those who have insight in theoretical and practical matters, regardless of having details of knowledge about it. When one acts he does so properly in moral and social norms, even though he has no systematic knowledge.

These two intellectual types became ineffective and isolated from the great social changes. As intellectuals could not use the traditional names, they took the name 'enlightened' as a translation of the enlightenment movements. Enlightened by what? The answer is reason. All those whose interest in their religion is limited to its usefulness as a practical weapon began to equate sufism with "question" and "fatalism" and to blame it for all the ills suffered by Islam since European power became dominant in the world.

Philosophy and Social Change

The following pages will deal with the thesis that the role of intellectuals in social change is more important than it seems. Intellectual movements are effective in social changes if they are based more or less on some philosophical assumptions. This is exemplified by the Marxist revolution, which is supposed to be the revolution of the working classes. But, whatever may be the reason, it is intellectuals who lead the revolutionary action. The social changes in and through the Ottoman period were characteristically different from that kind of revolutionary movements. However, what is common to changes led by intellectuals is their claim to act on behalf of the people, whether the people approve or not.

Hence, the relation between a philosophical system or systems and social changes is that intellectuals play intermediate roles in transmitting the theoretical assumptions into practice. In fact this phenomenon is not characteristic of the last few centuries, for the spread of religious and moral beliefs also was carried by a limited number of believers.

Late Ottoman intellectual movements were not homogenous. What they had in common was their opposition to the traditional institutions and to a certain extent to their mode of thinking. They represented an effort to understand and explain the problems of society, person and universe in terms of rational or secular thinking. In this respect the new trends resemble the enlightenment; they were not a genuine revival of an aspect of their own traditional thought, but an adoption of Western thought. This begins with dissatisfaction with the interpretations given by traditional thinking concerning the political organization of society. At the very beginning of these movements the main concern was political solutions to the problems faced by the society; later it came to include every aspect of life, from its natural and material, to its religious, interpretation. These materialistic and naturalistic approaches manifest the real breakdown of all forms of traditional thinking, for the over-rationalistic currents in religion were a shift from the older interpretations. In both cases, however, Western thought served as the base. The institutions which were a result of their efforts come into being not through a return to indigenous values on the part of those concerned, but through observation of Western ideas and ideologies, alien and revolutionary as the case might be.

As a matter of fact Islam had encountered other civilizations and cultures during the first centuries of its history in quite different circumstances than this encounter of the West as a newly developed civilization. For instance ancient Middle Eastern and Hellenic materials transmitted to the Islamic community were used for the advancement of philosophical and scientific speculation and for many practical applications in these fields. Men like al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina wholeheartedly devoted themselves to the study of these materials and generations of men toiled

and, sometimes by sheer intelligence, managed to reject error and falsehood.⁶ A series of brilliant and original men had built, on the basis of Greek philosophical thought, a comprehensive and systematic view of the universe and of man, which they were able to synthesize with certain key concepts and doctrines of Islam to their own satisfaction and that of many in the sophisticated Muslim intelligentsia.⁷ This body of thought, called philosophy, gave violent affront to orthodoxy on several issues. In some circles, even skeptics, materialists, naturalists and, most of all, a kind of atheistic philosophy of the time found some supporters. But the orthodox Ulama responded in effective ways, and the shocks were absorbed.

The Ottoman encounter of the West took place when both traditional thinking and state power began to lose their inner dynamism. After a long period of excessive self-confidence before their rivals, they attempted to correct their failures through institutional reorganization. When they recognized that this was not enough they tried to adopt new institutional structures alongside the old ones. These measures caused disintegration of the two systems and resulted in segregation within intellectual life. The need for personnel qualified in European languages excluded the traditional intellectuals from official decision-making posts which were opened to the new intellectuals educated in the modern school system.

Revival Through Islam

The first generation among these intellectuals represents a transformation in the intellectuals' social role. While supporting the reforms they also became critics of these reforms. *Tanzimat* leaders were intellectuals who controlled policy as officials, and encouraged the development of the intellectuals who criticized them. These were the journalists, writers and the men of literature. They were called the Young Ottoman Opposition to the *Tanzimat* movement, which were criticized as dealing only with visible reforms. This resulted in the exile of their leaders as an example both to the intellectuals and the governing classes.

Although the critics of the movement were right in some respects, its changes had great consequences in the preparation of future events. While the Young Ottomans' demands for further reforms surpassed those of the *Tanzimat* movement, the intellectuals tried to justify their position by appealing to traditional values. They were angered also by the European press which insulted the reforms, so that they were forced to defend their traditions against both the Europeans and the *Tanzimat* movement.

The Young Ottomans' movement succeeded in its goal to the extent that a first constitution--first both in the history of the Ottoman Empire and of Islam--was accepted. With the inauguration of the constitution the first political election was held. After the new parliament decided to enter the war against Russia, Sultan Abd al-Hamid closed the parliament and suspended the constitution. These events opened a phase in the intellectual movements which became known as the "Young Turks" movement. Before treating this, however, let us return to the characteristics of the Young Ottoman men.

From about the middle of the nineteenth century the spread of Western ideas and the adaptation of social and political attitudes among Turks gradually accelerated due to the development of a new Turkish literature. This literary movement was quite different in its form and content from classical writings. French literature replaced the old sources of inspiration, and such literary forms as the novel and play were imitated. The political themes were, mainly, a constitution, a parliamentary system, political freedom, etc.

Ziya Pasha (1825-1880) and Namik Kemal, despite their cultural and religious conservatism, favored the reformist ideas. Ziya Pasha, while recommending the formation of a national assembly and a constitutional government, disapproved of the imitation of Western literary models. For him, each civilization had its own genius.⁸ This distinction, which later will become very important for some groups of intellectuals, can be found in the writings of Ziya Pasha and Namik Kemal; upon it their criticism of the *Tanzimat* movement depends.

Namik Kemal deserves to be called the leader of the constitutional movement and is best known as the apostle of freedom and patriotism. The most gifted and literally innovative, in his rich series of essays, novels, plays and poems he brought before Muslim readers two characteristic ideas of the French Revolution: political freedom and patriotism (or fatherland). He adopted these ideas to Muslim traditions and attitudes and throughout his life remained firmly attached to traditional Muslim beliefs. Indeed, he was sharply critical of the men of the *Tanzimat* for their failure to safeguard and preserve the best of old Islamic traditions, and to inspire and direct in those terms the new institutions which had to be imported from Europe.

His arguments have a romantic line. Similar to the return of the European romantics to the ancient Greeks and Romans, he searched for this past in Islamic history. It is true that he was impressed by the success of European civilization. In his view, the backwardness of Muslims was relative rather than absolute, and was not due to any inherent defect in Islam. The Islamic state had to improve and modernize itself, this could not be done by way of imitating Europe and abandoning its own laws and beliefs and traditions. On the contrary, he argued, all that is best in European civilization derived from or could be paralleled in classical Islamic civilization. By adopting these things Muslims were returning to what was deepest in their own tradition.

In all this he seemed not only to criticize the Turkish reformists' abandonment of traditional values, but also some movements in the West. When the French scholar, E. Renan, gave a lecture at the Sorbonne on "Islam and Science"⁹ in 1883, Namik Kemal wrote a response.¹⁰ He criticized Renan's arguments against the place of science in the Islamic tradition as well as his approach to science. Modern science asserts the eternity and immutability of the natural law, but does not leave room for a God who is the creator and the sustainer of the universe and who will destroy it at the approach of the Day of Judgement. Namik Kemal's sees the attitude of science in this as but scientism.

However, this book seems not only romantic, but apologetic for the purpose of winning the respect of Westernizers for traditional Islamic values. His proposals for the political reform reflects an attempt to systematize the political theories. The political theory he exposed is derived largely from Montesquieu and Rousseau, but he tried to show that the ideas of natural law, and natural rights are comparable with Islamic law, *shari'a*. He identifies the natural law of which Montesquieu speaks, with the wise and just rule called for by Islamic law. "The nature of things" is the way God creates things, in other words, natural law means 'divine law' itself. Namik Kemal's approach to the modern philosophical ideas and his interpretation of religious issues in terms of these respectively reflects Islamic modernism represented by C. al-Afghani and M. Abduh. N. Kemal tried also to base his political theory on Islamic traditions. The sovereignty of the people is no more than *baya*, the formal oath of obedience given to the caliph of the Prophet. The principle of government by representation and consultation can be justified by the commands of the Quaran which require consultation among the believers (*Quaran* 3:153). This verse, which he quotes, would become one of the favorite theses of nineteenth and twentieth centuries Turkish and other Muslim liberals.

The effects of his ideas can be seen among the Young Turks. His patriotism for the fatherland reflected a united Ottoman nation and the Young Turks took this passionately as a response to the need for identity among all Ottoman citizens. The Young Ottoman men revolt against old institutions and traditional thinking provided a model for the younger generation.

As regards its intellectual and cultural life, the Young Turk period is quite interesting and most significant. Most of the members of this movement lived in exile after the first constitutional period. The Hamidian regime was strict against intellectual movements which followed revolutionary ideals. With difficulty they were able to send their writings to other countries so that despite censorship and other restrictions of the press in Istanbul, intellectual life became very active in this period. Besides the issues proper to the circumstances of the day, social, philosophical and even, for the first time, religious subjects became topics of debates. The young members of the movement, including members of the military and civil servants, began to organize revolutionary cells. Probably few movements have given rise to such great hopes as that of the Young Turks, which exerted great influence upon the generations which would determine the future of that society.

During the period of exile the Young Turks were divided into two groups. On the one hand, was liberalism promoting a measure of decentralization and some autonomy for the national and religious minorities; on the other hand, was nationalism with a program for ever greater authority and Turkish domination. They formed the "Committee of Union and Progress," a name inspired by A. Comte. They agreed that all should move together on the constitution, and with the help of the army managed to make the Sultan accept the Constitution of 1908. From that time until the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire these intellectuals were the dominant group.

In many ways Young Turks had characteristics quite different from their predecessors. They did not confine their efforts to criticizing the governing powers and to shaping a reform, but tried to abolish the remaining system and take control themselves. At the same time, this policy fed the different interests which resulted in both ideological and methodological divisions. From the philosophical point of view, despite being eclectic and eccentric, the movement showed a far greater philosophical character. Besides French philosophy, which was almost the only source for previous movements, the range of philosophy then known and read widened to include such philosophers as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Spencer. The Materialist philosophy of Buchner and Haeckel also was familiar to these intellectuals; the French sociologists, Comte and La Play, and the historian, Taine, were models for their minds. In literature, the naturalism of Zola and the works of Voltaire and Rousseau had become known. Darwin's evolutionary theory found supporters among them. They knew about Marxism, but expressed no interest in it in their writings.

For the Young Turks, sociology was a philosophy. The positivism of Comte profoundly influenced the subsequent development of radical secularism in Turkey. As the social sciences of the nineteenth century came to dominate the thinking of Turkish reformers, the problems of culture and civilization began to occupy their minds. Many descriptions and solutions of this crisis of culture were propounded, among which three stand out.

a. One school was that of the Islamists which suggested some of the characteristics expounded by Namik Kemal. The new generation of this movement, while following the same line as N. Kemal, developed their own theory of Islamization. At the beginning of this century modernist Islamic intellectuals proposed distinguishing historic from authentic Islam. These attempts were echoed among the Turkish intellectuals, most of whom had some Western education and saw the need for some changes in the traditional understanding of Islam. They tried to achieve this goal without endangering the religious and cultural heritage of Islam, or the unity of Islamic world.

Science and technology could be taken from the West, since Islam does not restrict human progress; but political, social and other solutions already existed in the Islamic heritage; hence such matters as government, law and education should remain dominated by Islam.

The problem of transferring technology and at the same time remaining loyal to their own values has been the main issue among Muslim intellectuals. Many different attempts have been made by the various Islamic countries. The failure to preserve basic human values in both Western and Eastern societies moved some contemporary Muslim thinkers to start a new movement. The advancement of technology in some cases at the expense of some human values, and its misuse in other instances, urged them to search for an Islamic base for a scientific epistemology which would prevent the negative side effects from present scientific epistemology. Most of the leading figures in this movement, such as I.R. al-Faruki and S.H. Nasr, have lived for a long time in Europe and North America. Many of them have a great deal of knowledge in both traditional and modern Islamic thought and modern Western thought.

The Islamization movement at the beginning of this century also preached enthusiastically the cultivation of science and the scientific spirit of the West. Fazlur Rahman summarizes the integral constituents of their reasoning as follows: (1) that the flowering of science and the scientific spirit from the ninth to the thirteenth century among Muslims resulted from the fulfillment of the insistent Quranic requirement that man study the universe--the handiwork of God, created for his benefit; (2) that in the later middle ages the spirit of inquiry had so severely declined in the Muslim world that Muslim society stagnated and deteriorated; (3) that by cultivating scientific studies borrowed largely from Muslims, the West had prospered, even colonizing the Muslim countries themselves; and (4) that therefore Muslims, in learning science afresh from the developed West, would be both recovering their past and fulfilling once again the neglected commandments of the Quran.¹¹

Similar opinions are discernable between the lines of the famous poet, Mehmed Akif (d. 1936), whose collected poems is the best seller of all times. With a unique style he tries to provoke a dynamism in the minds and actions of the people, while at the same time touching slightly the stagnation of the traditional popular religious life. All these themes influenced the thinking of later generations.

Adaptation

So the second school of thought was politically more effective than the first. This movement, called Turkification and represented by the social philosopher, Ziya Gokalp,¹² is still taught in Turkey. It is characterized by a cultural nationalism. Before the 1908 Revolution the nationalistic movement was only romantic; indeed even the Turkish national idea, in the modern sense, first appeared only in the mid-nineteenth century.

Despite its changes through history, due to the language and common cultural sense of the society, a sense of Turkish identity had never been lost. After becoming Muslim, the past history of the society was almost forgotten, but not entirely, as Turks thought of themselves primarily as Muslims. Many factors contributed to the development of the national movement. The young Ottoman writers improved the language, its grammar and clarified its style. European Turcological researcher which uncovered the ancient history and civilization of the Turks also contributed to the development of the national idea. The detachment of some component national groups was another factor, as were the nationalist ideas formulated by some of the Young Turks.

Ziya Gokalp used the sociology of Durkheim as a model for the framework of concepts within which he set up the first elaborated theories of the nationalist movement. Gokalp became a professor of sociology at Istanbul University, where he taught sociology, philosophy and psychology. He elaborated his ideas about social problems more philosophically than his other contemporaries, with his distinction between culture and civilization serving as a point of departure. Turkish society long belonged to Islamic civilization, which contains institutions, political organization, science and the arts. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire this civilization declined.

Culture, however, covers the world view, beliefs, customs, religious and moral values. By distinguishing culture and civilization Gokalp concludes that the Turkish nation could adopt Western civilization but that the society should remain Turkish in its cultural life with its religious and moral values. By providing a common scientific terminology the Muslim world could be a culturally united community, but its civilization must be Western. His solution to the cultural crisis is to preserve the religious tradition as a national cultural element not dominating the governing institutions.

Some ideas current among Islamists, both nationalists and the Westernizers, overlapped one another, and Turkification theory is a synthesis. All these schools of thought defended similar political theories: a democratic, constitutional system of government, and transformation of the technology and scientific spirit of the West. The main differences lay at the core of the responses to questions of cultural identity. Does adoption of technology require adoption of a Western life style and social values? Islamists and nationalists answer no. While the former confines the reforms to technology and science, the latter includes the institutions as well. The Westernizers were far more radical than these two schools.

Westernization

After the 1908 Revolution until the foundation of the Turkish Republic these schools dominated the intellectual life. If one asks which one became more successful, the answer is, probably the Westernizers who considered the only choice to be to Westernize or to be destroyed. Their opinions can be summed up in the phrase; "there is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization," which must be imported with both its roses and its thorns.

The social sciences, especially sociology, were used to formulate the ideas of this school, but the naturalist and materialist philosophies were by far the most influential. For its social theories, Comte's three stages of human intellectual development adapted to the Turkish history provided a model and epistemological framework. Spencer also exerted a great influence. Reading Ottoman history in a certain manner they considered the Ottoman Ulama, identified with the higher clergy of Western Christendom as theocrats, jurists and teachers, to be principally responsible for Turkey's backwardness in the modern time. This determined the historical analysis of the Ottoman Empire for a long time among the scholars. One of the representatives of this school, Celal Nuri Ileri (1881-1937), wrote two volumes on the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Inspired by historians Taine and Spencer, he claimed that the root of decline goes back to the conquering of Istanbul when the Ottomans adopted the Byzantine clerical system.

Although, Celal Nuri¹³ represents the moderate wing of the Westernizers, his ideas were radical for that time. Theories like the evolution of Darwin, the materialism of Buchner, the heroes of Carlyle appear in his writings applied to Turkish history and Islamic religion. One of his books bears the title *History of the Future*. Following the materialism of Buchner, he maintains that in

the near future science will be able to solve the mysteries which occupy the human mind, such as the soul, and spiritual and invisible beings. When the instruments are sufficiently developed it could discover that these things are not different from things of ordinary observable material.

His theory of the origin of religions probably was more radical even than some European thinkers. Combining materialism and the evolutionary theory of the animal life he reduced human rationality to a physical element. When the process of evolution was completed and man became a full-fledged human being, previous generations recounted their experiences to younger generations. These stories, exalted as sublime thoughts and ideas, gradually became the general common sense of society. The prophets, as men of deep insight into the meanings of these stories, recognized the evolution of the human intellect to be complete and formulated the stories as religious beliefs. In doing this they realized the importance of unchangeable ideals, and systematized them by replacing the authority of ancestors with the authority of the unchangeable God. In this way, religions became everlasting truths of humanity. They are useful to the degree that they keep the integrity of the masses.

Clearly his thought follows Schopenhauer and Carlyle, though he does not mention their names. The book on his theory of the origins of religions is titled *The Last Prophet*, which is the name Muslims give their prophet. In 1914 these ideas were extremely radical for the Turkish Muslims. While some critiques were published in the Islamist magazine, it exerted some influence also upon other intellectuals.

Celal Nuri, however, was not consistent throughout his intellectual career. As the author of more than twenty books and as a writer in important journals and newspapers, he was well known and read. He served as reporter for the committee for the Constitution of the Republic. After the 1923 Turkish Republican period he pioneered in the historical and social analysis of the Republican Revolution. His criticism of the policy of the first government caused him trouble and he lost favor. Probably for this reason his writings drew little scholarly attention.

Nevertheless, the Westernizers program of reformation took root in Turkey and for at least two decades their program was discussed: abolition of the traditional law and legal code; abandonment of Ottoman garb; substitution of the traditional calendar and measurements for time, weight and extension; change from Arabic to Latin script; and adoption of secular holidays and of Sunday as the day of rest.

With some modifications these trends continued to occupy intellectual life. But the general impacts of the reforms through the late period of Ottoman and Republican Turkey gave rise to cultural and other social changes. In this process of social changes in Turkish society intellectuals have played an important role. In general, failure was due to political pressure and cultural subversion by the West. The influence of this situation resulted, among the Western educated intellectuals, in denial of the basic beliefs and values of Islam. A European or an American who turns his back on Christianity remains heir to a rich culture and has no reason to feel that he has become a "non-person." In an Islamic society, on the other hand, one who turns away has empty hands and no longer cares who he is. The search for identity will become a new way for affirming the old values. For the most part there is not the culture shock or sense of inferiority *vis-a-vis* the West from which Turkish intellectuals suffered one generation ago. One of the professors who lived in both generations expressed his later thought about the cultural transformation: "when we first encountered the new civilization which has emerged in the West we were not a primitive community. On the contrary, we were carrying a distinct and great civilization."¹⁴ In these sentences the author is probably translating the inspiration of new generations to reaffirm the values which made them great.

Notes

1. Frithjof Schuon, *Light on the Ancient Worlds* (London: Perennial Books, 1965), p. 9.
2. Gai Eaton, *Islam and Destiny of Man* (New York: SUNY, 1985), p. 11.
3. For information about these thinkers see *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, new edition 1960-1986); Sherif Mar din, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962); Bernard Lewis *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford, 2nd ed., 1968).
4. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 66.
5. Prepared by a committee headed by Ahmad Jewdet Pasha. This legal code is known as "majalla" based on Hanafi's, see Majid Khadduv's and Herbert J. Liesbesny, eds., *Law in the Middle East I: Origin of Development of Islamic Law*, Washington, D.C. 1955.
6. Al-Ghazali is famous as one of those who tried to defend the religious orthodoxy against other intellectual movements. For a good monograph see W.M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali*, (Edinburgh: Univ. Press, 1963).
7. Fazlul Rahman, *Islam and Modernity* (Chicago and London: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 157.
8. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
9. Ernest Renan, *L'Islam et la science* (Paris: 1883), Arabic tr. by Hassam Afoudi Asim (Cairo, n.d.) published almost in the same year.
10. He finished it in Myfslene in Sept. 1883; Neman Mulajaanamesi, ed. by Fuad Koprulu, Ankara, 1962.
11. Fazlul Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, p. 50.
12. In English for Gokalp's writings see, Gokalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, ed. and trans. by Niyazi Bahces, New York, 1959.
13. For C. Nuri I depend mostly on my *Celal Nubi Ileri (1881-1939): Hayati, Eserleri, Fihirleri*, (unpublished dissertation) Ankara, 1985.
14. Tahsin Banguoglu, *Kendimize Geleceğiz* (We Shall Recover) (Istanbul, 1986), Preface.

Chapter XV
On The Problem of the Relation `Between' the Person and Society
Asen Davidov

No one *gives* a human being his qualities One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one *is* in the whole. *Fr. Nietzsche*

Only the whole is true. *G. W. Fr. Hegel*

Only the whole is untrue. *Th. W. Adorno*

Of all problems, why should one treat the role of the person in social life? Has it not been clear from the beginning that men always are both self-determined and socially determined; that social life not only concerns human beings and their natural environment, but that it is social as well? Is it not too obvious that every human being is molded from both in accord with the cultural and historical heritage of social life under the influence of the various social groups and communities in which he lives, whether of family, play, worship, labor or love? Indeed, through change in the individuals of which such groups are composed, the groups themselves are changed, and through them the whole society.

On the other hand, has not this problem been altogether typical of philosophy as a specific kind of human orientation as soon as it arose out of the immanently undifferentiated, syncretic, mythological, magical, `life-world' consciousness? Implicitly or explicitly, this problem can be found in the depths of every philosophical meditation. Why then, thousands of years after Socrates, are people asking insistently about man's nature, his role in society, the influence of the latter upon the former, and so forth?

As a matter of fact, the problem in question has had a vast variety of forms during the intellectual history of mankind. Even in those doctrines where in one way or another the problem has been ignored (in so-called "theoretical anti-humanism," functionalism, and the like) we can unearth a quite different answer to such questions as: what is a person, what is a society, and how are the two interwoven. The very avoidance of the problem indicates that such a problem exists--even in its most acute, though latent, form.

Of course, every historical epoch puts its specific imprint upon the philosophical understandings of the `person-society' relation. It had one meaning, for example, in ancient Greece where it appeared as the problem of the relation between the free citizen and the *polis*; there it concerned only the unity of both poles of the relation. It had a quite different meaning through the Middle Ages, where it manifested itself as a moral problem of the comparability between the free will of the individual and Divine Providence. The Renaissance humanist notion of the free individual as the goal, while society was the means, later was transformed into the problem of social and political freedom by Enlightenment ideology. There its typical form was the relation between the `reasonable egoism' of the individual, on the one hand, and the interests of society, on the other.

More recently, in the developed capitalist societies the problem manifests itself as the contradiction between two aspects of the individual, that is, in Karl Marx's words, between *bourgeois* and *citoyen* between the civil society and the political state. In developing socialist countries and the problematics of so-called "scientific communism," the issue concerns the social functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat--factually, the one-party ruling system--on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the development of a relationship such that, according to

the *Communist Manifesto*, "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Some gloomy pages of the recent history of socialist countries bears witness that there *is* a problem.

Being, one way or another, constantly in the limelight, the problem of the person and social life usually is most clearly defined in an age of crisis or during periods of intensive social transition. This is only natural, as it is natural that one does not feel and thus not think of any of one's bodily organs except when a change appears in their functions or when they are impaired.

Today our world is undergoing a great transformation. We should not be overly pessimistic regarding the end of the cold war; nor should we be so overly-optimistic as to believe that, in man's heart at least, the day of the dictator is over, that the totalitarian era and its ideas have passed. But the transition is underway, in any case, and on a global scale. The symbolic demarcation lines, dividing the world into "East" versus "West," "South" versus "North," tend to become obscure as do the traditional enemy-images. Today, some ideologies, declared officially to be atheistic, are openly appealing to values of trans-historical, even transcendental, character, while some allegedly religious movements have turned out to be a sheer means for the powers that be. Almost two decades after the end of the end-of-ideology debate, de-ideologization has become a catchword once again. What is most strange is that the stimuli for the renewal of the discussion came from a side that no one would have expected, that is, from the Eastern European countries.

It would be wishful thinking, however, to declare that our days bring an end of every kind of social calamity and one-sided ideology such as, for example, those of "authoritarian collectivism" and "possessive individualism" in M. Markovic's terms. Of course, one can doubt his ideal of a self-governing community, which of itself could provide the conditions for a real pursuit of common interest by persons who are as free as possible.¹ It is even more dubious now, when the hidden reefs of such an approach to governing have pushed the country in question towards the possibility of a quite undemocratic approach to ruling. Prof. Markovic is much more consistent when he states that "where there are or have been movements, they invariably constitute what Hegel used to call 'abstract negation': expressing demands extremely opposed to official values and aspirations, rather than *transcending* them and differentiating between what is limited and what is historically indispensable in them."² Would that mean that people are doomed to unsuccessful questioning regarding their place and role as parts of society, of mankind or of the Cosmos?

Facing the great number of solutions to these problems, one feels inclined to adopt a skeptical stance or to plunge into an ocean of unlimited relativism. But regardless of the multifarious types of cultures, whether taken synchronically or diachronically, we discover continuity between each and every world view because human beings incessantly try to give meaning to their own lives, as well as to the world and its history. The problem of the person and society, of the individual and community, of the particular and the general, of the concrete and the transhistorical forms the basic structure of human philosophizing. It is quite reasonable, even inevitable, then that this problem should repeatedly become the focus of theoretical analyses. It is, moreover, a valid problem not only for philosophers, but also for sociologists, psychologists, culturologists, political scientists, theologians, etc. The issue has become a crossroads for different intellectual trends, not only in theoretical spheres, but also in various political, artistic, economic and spiritual areas. There is a quite reasonable consensus that the problem of the person as something unique and universal, on the one hand, and as a part of some encompassing entity, community, or society, on the other hand, is one of the most characteristic features of 20th century thought.

It would be unreasonable therefore to give up efforts to approach the problem again and again, taking account of the richness of the accumulated historical experience in this field of research and, of course, trying not to overlook the typical shortcomings of the available attempts to solve the problem. Being far from any absurd pretension to encompass the unencompassable, I would try only to outline the inner logic of the problem. I shall try to do this not so much from an analytic, but from a *dialectical* standpoint; hence, mine will be mostly a *philosophical* attempt.

I am aided in this endeavor by the impressive richness of conceptions regarding the problem of the person and society in the field of philosophy. These include not only vastly informative entries in the most respectable encyclopedias, but also some cogent philosophical analyses of the problem or of some of its parts.³ Whereas most of those focus upon the positive moments in the historical development of the problem and its solutions, I shall try to discover the roots of their common insufficiency.

What Is Wrong about the Problem of the Person-Society Relation?

The empty phrase, Man, distorts man's relation to his society as well as the content of what is thought in the concept of Man.

Theodore W. Adorno

The philosophy of the person-society problem, although always essentially present, has acquired quite specific characteristics at the end of the 20th century. Instead of abstract speculation on such traditional philosophical subjects as the whole and the part, determinism and indeterminism, necessity and contingency, a great many 20th century philosophers deliberately have focused attention upon the human being as concrete, living and dying, happy and suffering, creative and destructive, here and now. Thinkers have been forced to consider the human condition in new ways by the great events of the century, namely, the two World Wars, with the consequent revolutions that have split the world into opposed 'camps'; the quantitatively and qualitatively unprecedented extermination and obliteration of whole social strata and nationalities, through civil wars, gas-chambers, slave-labor camps, artificially invented starvation, demographic migrations, purges and terrors; the progress of 'formal rationality' (M. Weber), 'instrumental reason' (M. Horkheimer) and the pervasive principle of 'all-encompassing utility' (K. Marx); the replacement of 'to be' by 'to have' (E. Fromm); the highly sophisticated propaganda machines and the development of an industry of dreams and mass-culture; and the technological and scientific revolution with its accompanying dangers of ecological and thermonuclear omnicide.

All these crucial problems stem from the new situation of man in society. First, the centuries-long unfolding of history, especially in recent times, convincingly demonstrates that there is no sure protection against the perpetual tendency to 'totalize' social life in a way that promotes the development of all kinds of cults of personality. Correspondingly, there is a continuing tendency to 'atomize' society, to self-isolation by the sectors of society and by individuals themselves. This is due to the fact that, despite powerful processes of integration, equally strong racial, national, religious and cultural forces lead not only to socio-cultural self-identification and progressive development, but also to incomparability and even to hostility.

It is worth noting that for centuries the majority of philosophers have been saved from latent contradictions in the classical solutions of the person-society problem. Such famous definitions as 'zoon politicon', 'imperfect substantiation', 'natural egoist', or the person as only a particular

manifestation of the objective and all-embracing development process, were able to hide their inner contradictions in clouds of theoretical speculations. In various forms this can be seen in the Kantian dichotomy of phenomenon and noumenon, with the respective antinomies between happiness and morality, freedom and categorical imperative; in the Fichtean incomparability between the empirical and the transcendental "I"; and in the Romantic opposition between the arts as the sphere of absolutely free person and mundane reality. Hegel is one of the most significant examples in this respect as the first philosopher to extend the dialectical method to an all-embracing world view.

Fighting against romantic individualism, Hegel tried to explain the incomparability of the personal ideal with reality by the subjective character of the ideal itself. As he wrote in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, the third part of the *Encyclopedia*,

What is *true* in these ideals has been preserved in practical activity; man ought to free himself only from what is untrue, only from empty abstractions. . . . What is substantial is one and the same in all human accomplishments, in the legal system, in morality, and in religion. That is why people can find self-satisfaction and attain respect in all of the spheres of their practical activity.⁴

Hegel understood the person not as an isolated monad, but as a 'moment' of the Whole, as an ingredient of the Totality. That is why for him a person's true goals are not subjective but objective; the less subjective they are the more true they become. Thus, the person is united not with the *genus* only, but with the whole world. As the spirit, the essence of the latter is identical with that of the former; the Spirit is the *concrete concept* of the person. Hence, the dialectical variant of the typically 'Enlightened' conception of freedom is that of acknowledged necessity, whence follows Hegel's well-known totalitarian implications.

Even for Hegel, however, the contradictions connected with the division of labor and alienation will continue to exist in the world. It is only in the sphere of the spiritual, which is the philosophical *par excellence*, that man can become a whole, unalienated person. Even in Hegel's social philosophy there remains the paradox that the State, as the highest incarnation of reason, is the highest incarnation of a person's freedom, so that Hegel's panlogicism turns out to be an apology for 'statism'.

As early as the beginning of the Modern Age, in Pascal, for example, the first hints of the latent contradictions in the classical solutions of the problem of the relation between the person and society begin to appear. However, these forerunners of contemporary existentialism, personalism and philosophy of life attained their significance only later in our age of all-embracing crises of every kind. This revealed the insufficiencies of classical thought in general and, in particular, of its conceptions of the person-society interrelation.

In the post-classical period two main methodological trends, along with their respective world-views, have emerged. Provisionally we shall call these the scientific and anthropological orientations. The most typical of the former is the positivistic style of thinking, while the most typical of the latter is the existential. In the long run, however, in both cases the problem of the person and society is distorted and misinterpreted, either in favor of society, or in favor of the person, both of which are ultimately absolutized. Either the person is dissolved as a functional element of society by being reduced entirely to social roles or even to a specimen of the herd, such as a 'naked ape'; or the person is postulated as being the one and only reality, and proclaimed to be an impossible task or mystery.

If, on the other hand, the solutions propounded by a vast majority of Marxist philosophers for a certain historical period could be regarded as no less satisfactory, one could easily be prone to agree with Hannah Arendt's conclusion, that it is a 'tragic fallacy' to suppose "that there was such

a thing as one human nature established for all times," because history has taught us "that the power of man is so great that he really can be what he wishes to be."⁵ Though seeming almost like a classical 'socialistic-realistic' slogan (cf. Maxim Gorky's credo: "Man--how proudly it sounds!"), in the horrifying context of Arendt's book her conclusion sounds rather gloomy.

Traditionally, the essence of the problem of the relation between the person and society has been sought in the 'functionalization' or 'socialization' of the person. But this could not be fruitful, first of all because of the fact that every reduction of the many-sided relations between the person and society to the socialization processes for the former and to the stabilization processes for the latter results in a rather abstract picture of society itself, no matter how nuanced that picture might be. In addition, the idea of man as *homo sociologicus* is inadequate by virtue of its one-sidedness. Last but not least, this idea is grounded on the thoroughly false latent premise that there could be a person *before* the socialization processes and that it is possible to have society *beyond* the person.

It would be no more adequate, however, to formulate this problem in terms of the total negation of social life by the person, as if in such a case we could speak of a person at all. The model of the so-called 'concrete man' opposed to the material and spiritual (yet objective) structures of social life and alienated from any genetic and functional social connections is no less abstract than was the previous one. As the individuality, uniqueness and autonomy of the person become absolute and self-sufficient the very meaning of the person evaporates, because the person is considered apart from the conditions in which his life actually occurs. As the person can manifest his various features, including his personality, only in relation to the social world, an all-pervasive alienation of the person from society, and vice versa, renders absurd both the social world and the person.

These are, of course, only 'ideal types' of an inadequate formulation of the problem. In addition one could construe also 'mixed' types, which would claim to present an organic unity of the natural, social and personal dimensions of personal and social life.

In some sectors of Marxist literature, after many years of vulgar sociological and class-reductionism regarding the person-society relation, the so-called 'bio-social essence' of man recently has become a catchword. Without dwelling upon the details, premises and fallacies of such a formula, it is sufficient here to note that the eclectic unity of these essentially different qualities in one 'essence' makes the problem even more obscure, instead of elucidating it. Appeals to dialectics as if it were some magic wand are of no use when they violate elementary rules of formal logic. Even in dialectics not everything can be everything or one with everything; at the very least, this leads logically to a kind of 'bad infinity' to use Hegel's term ("*schlechten Unendlichkeit*"). Indeed, there is no good reason to stop at the biological substrate of social life and not to proceed further with the analyses to, for example, the deeper chemical, physical, molecular and sub-molecular levels. But as a matter of principle it is quite reasonable to doubt whether that would make the essence in question any more clear.

It is almost common--and here Marxist literature is hardly an exception--to ask whether the person or society has ontological and logical priority. But the very formulation of the question is incorrect, and leads the investigator to dead-ends. The 'hen-or-egg' problem is a pseudo-problem, and as such is insoluble.

If we use Werner Stark's distinction, basing the first type of solution upon a collectivistic and holistic approach, and the second type upon an individualistic and 'atomistic' approach,⁶ we can hardly reconcile and preserve these two "sound, if one-sided," positions. It is not at all, as W. Stark thinks, a matter of their co-existence "on the heights of human thought," but rather of changing the very approach to the problem.

To begin with, the conceptual difference between 'person' and 'society' does not necessarily mean that their contents are actually opposed in reality. If we begin from the prejudice that there is an essential difference and opposition between the two, certainly we will end up with some kind of one-sided result: either we will favor the one at the expense of the other, or we will simply lump together things already meant as incommensurable and incompatible.

That is why, from the very beginning, we must adopt the position that there is not an absolute, essential difference between person and society, but rather some type of fundamental unity. Inasmuch as every unity implies difference, from the very beginning we must keep in mind both characteristics of this unity: its personal as well as its 'societal' aspects. In its essence the relation between the person and society demands that we regard them as distinct but not mutually opposed, exclusive 'realities'. They exist, in truth, only as two moments of an all-encompassing historical process, which is something 'third' in their dialectic. This also means that both 'moments' of the relation imply each other at every moment of their being and becoming, and that the mediating field for this is the above-mentioned 'third' moment.

We must keep in mind also the fact that the concrete, historical character of both the person and society means that their unity, as their deepest 'essence', can never be an entity 'as such' for it possesses rather a dynamic and historical character. In other words, the concrete historicity of the unity in difference of the person and society means that it is impossible for us as finite, concrete human beings to investigate this problem as if we were able to acquire an absolute knowledge of eternal truth, or the truth of the last instance. Historicity here means that all of our theoretical determinations of this dynamic unity in every moment of its concrete existence have a quite concrete character. This means, finally, that our approach to this problem must be dialectical, for all of these requirements indicate typical characteristics of a dialectical process: unity in difference, negation as the source of the inner dynamics, historicity, concreteness, and so forth.

From the dialectical point of view, the right question here would not be whether the person or society has ontological and logical priority. Instead we should attempt to reveal the nature of the process that makes it possible for the person and society to exist as an undivided whole, to form a totality. That is to say we should aim instead to reveal the meaning of *the dialectic of the person and society*.

Human Activity as the Ground of the Dialectical Relation Between the Person and Society

Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.

Hannah Arendt

The first step towards the dialectical solution of our problem would be to answer the question: How is it possible to unite in an organic, dynamic whole the social and the personal, the objective and the subjective? Or: How is the concrete whole of human personal and social life possible?

Obviously, it is not enough to define society only as "the most universal concept describing the total complex of the relations of man to his fellow man,"⁷ because this still does not prevent us from regarding society in a one-sided, 'purely objective' fashion. If, along with T. Parsons, we define society as "only the complex of social relations as such," then we are unable to give proper consideration to the role that heredity, environment and cultural factors play in the entirety of

human social existence. This is a typically formal approach which regards all the objective, symbolic, communicative and normative structures working in social life only as manifestations of the 'substance' of this life, that is, as distinct from the objective reality of 'society' itself.

On the other hand, if we reduce the essence of social life to its 'grouping' functions only--saying that "society is grouping"--while "culture is the patterning of behavior in groups," if we limit the scope of our vision to society only as the "largest organized social group today,"⁸ we will eliminate the possibilities of comprehending the so-called 'non-additive' effect in social life. That is, we cannot understand how it is possible for society to manifest qualities and features which cannot be deduced from the mere sum total of the features of the groups of which society is comprised. Moreover, the person is related to society through his connections with other persons, being simultaneously a member of various social groups, interacting with various social institutes and integrating all hereditary, cultural, psychological and social factors in the one unit of his own "ego". Society is not an entity composed of a number of smaller social groups, nor is a community simply a sum of a number of individuals. To declare the opposite would mean slipping into a kind of sociological atomism, nominalism and radical individualism, and leaving people unable to grapple with growing problems of community in the broadest sense of that term.⁹

The same can be true for the person. Not only is it impossible to reach by theoretical means some absolutely singular, ultimate meaning for each human being, but the very concept of a 'purely individual' person would be an empty abstraction. Curiously enough, the etymological origin of the term (*Persona*) leads us in a direction quite opposite to personalistic and existentialistic notions. The adventures of 'the person' during the long intellectual history of the mankind,¹⁰ lead to the historicity of the person and the conclusion that the notions of 'substantial individual' and 'personality' are deeply historical in their very nature, for they change along with social life.

The important thing here is that the concept of society indicates the essential interconnections and inter-relations between different human beings to the same degree in which the concept of the person indicates the interpersonal origin and social character of each person. The human being is a person inasmuch as he lives within and through (by means of) his social relations. We can speak of him as a person only in the context of his relations to others. The complex of social relations is not something external to the person. Marx obviously has precisely this in mind, when he notes, *en passant*, in *Capital* that a man is not born with a mirror in his hand, reflecting his self-identical 'ego' in the manner of the Fichtean philosopher's "I=I". Rather one is born looking at another man as if at oneself in a mirror. "Only by means of his relation to the human being, Paul, as his equal, does the human being Peter relate to himself as a human being. By this, Paul, with all his skin and hair, with all his corporeality, becomes for Peter a manifestation of the genus 'Man'."¹¹

This can be grounded even anthropogenetically. As mentioned above, it would be incorrect to speak of the "bio-social essence" of the person. This does not mean that human beings can grow beyond their biological pre-conditions or physiological substratum, beyond their living, natural environment. Being social does not include being naturally destructive; it means only that human corporeality, being a necessary and inevitable precondition for personal existence, cannot be regarded as the *differentia specifica* of a person. There would be a parallel danger in speaking of "a potential universal humanity" as being "genetically built-in," as a kind of "genetic make-up."¹² Vice versa, it would be ridiculous to claim that as a human being the person is a purely spiritual phenomenon, that his essence is a purely spiritual creation. Only God has no need of corporeal structures for His creative activity--and no matter what man thinks of himself, for bad or for good, he is not God. It is impossible, then, for the person to be also a pure subjectivity; through his body he is intertwined with society, from the very moment of his conception and

through the incessant processes of his natural metabolisms. As Marx put it, unobjective being is impossible; it is nonsense (*Unwesen*).¹³

As a natural being, man is an `objective being', that is, one endowed with objective powers, related to real objects, etc. Acting objectively, he "can express his life only in real, sensuous objects."¹⁴ Thus, man is *necessarily* an objective being, although as a person his natural existence is not what differentiates him specifically from other beings (his *differentia specifica*). Nature is a component of man himself inasmuch as he `comes' into, and lives in nature which he appropriates in and through his life. That is why we cannot divide our human world into two self-sufficient, substantial worlds, namely, the world of the relation of men to nature, and the world of the relation of men to each other; or, to put it in other words, the world of the relation of the person to nature, and the world of his relation to society. Later I shall try to articulate this statement in somewhat more detail, but for the time being I wish to stress its following aspect.

Just as there is undivided unity between the natural and the social worlds, of which the contemporary ecological crises are the best witness--a unity that is possible through the specific unity of man as a symbiosis of the objective and the subjective--so too is there an analogous unity in the historical development of the human species. The biological evolution, especially that of the animal world, `prepared' the biological preconditions for the emergence of human beings. The transition from the incidental use of natural things as tools to the specialized production of the very means of production marks the transition to a new qualitative level of the organization of life. Furthermore, it also marks the fact that purely natural being has been sublated by another type of being, that is, by social being. So, the purely natural activity of the animal has been transformed into another, social, type of activity. As a means for the most direct connection with our natural preconditions, *labor* is one of the primary forms of social activity. Precisely by means of labor a human being is able to maintain his life as an individual, to adapt himself to the changes of his natural environment, and to adapt the latter according to his needs. Thus, as a human life activity, labor is rooted in the nature of man--though this is not identical with the essence of man.

The labor process itself is *par excellence* a socializing factor, labor is impossible in absolute isolation. This fact that "to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act,"¹⁵ can be traced back to action as men's most substantial means for sustaining their lives. Action is, indeed, impossible as something completely isolated, but at the same time, it cannot be opposed to "fabrication" (which is characteristic of labor, but not of action, according to H. Arendt). Absolutely isolated *Homo faber* is no less impossible than an absolute *Homo creator*. Labor presupposes interconnections, interactions and intercommunication, not only with nature, but with men. Nature itself, being appropriated by men, becomes *human* nature: this process of transition from the biological type of activity to the specifically human one was at the same time the birth of a new type of relations, social relations. Labor process and socialization are the two sides of one and the same coin. All the specifically human aspects of man's activity such as language, communication and intellection, to mention but a few, in the long run are rooted in labor.

It would be one-dimensional to view labor as merely adaptive, assimilative and consumptive. Labor is first and foremost a creative process which produces a new world, the so-called `world of second order.' This is specifically and entirely human, but is no less objective than the world of the `first order' or nature. In assimilating, appropriating or, in some sense, subjectivizing the world of nature, men objectify themselves. It is neither possible nor necessary to escape the forces of objectivation by means of `continuing metaphysical reflection' as recommended by H. Schelsky or by the ceaseless negotiations from the founders of `critical theory'. H. Arendt noted the

"inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material object."¹⁶

It would seem unfair to blame Marx for overlooking this fact. In spite of his sometimes oversimplified depictions of his own views, the "'web' of human relationships" was not regarded by him, as H. Arendt thinks, as only "an essentially superfluous superstructure affixed to the useful structure of the building itself."¹⁷ His materialism did not cloud his dialectic of objectivation and subjectivation, of alienation and delineation in his Paris Manuscripts of 1844, which were much more Hegelian than those of the 'Young Hegelians' he fiercely opposed. Later, Marx analyzed the deepest roots of these dialectics in terms of economic fetishism, reification, etc.

It is not my task here to dwell upon this highly complicated and special subject, for I would like to stress another aspect of the dialectic. Due to the dialectics of objectivation and subjectivation, the human being, as distinguished from the animal, acquires two interconnected, though not identical, features: *totality* and *universality*. As human beings appropriate the natural world through these dialectics, they also make themselves specifically human, that is, beings who exist in both natural and 'super-natural' fashion, who have a *total* world that is simultaneously objective and subjective, natural and 'supernatural'. Insofar as it is absurd to speak of such a totality beyond human activity, this totality is itself 'activistic', that is, dialectic in character. It undergoes processes of inner differentiation and stratification by virtue of the progressive division of labor, produced by the ongoing development of the means of production. In this way the totality of the human world becomes increasingly self-contradictory.

On the other hand, the dialectics of human activity, that is, the unity and opposition between objectivation and subjectivation, relates man essentially to his *genus*. This is not merely a matter of the plurality of individual human beings, because the totality characteristic of the human world and the creative character of human activity enable human beings to relate to every object in accordance with that object's own 'measure', revealing thereby its potential for further development and creative activity. This is precisely what human universality means.

Universally creating and recreating the totality of his world, man links through his activity the three modes of temporality, namely, past, present and future. Institutions, norms, values, traditions, acquired skills and knowledge, and symbols are brought together by human activity to form a collective 'memory'. This is one of the main conditions for the continuity of human life which, like every life process, flows from the past to the future. Man's historicity stems from this cultural aspect, or sphere of human activity, which distinguishes the human from the inhuman world.

The process of the total and universal appropriation of the world, which is at the same time the process of its cultural and historical recreation, is the specific form of human activity, namely, *practice*. This human practice makes it possible for an individual existence to be human, total and universal. In his comments on Marx's early writings H. Marc use quite rightly states: "It is only now, after the totality of the human essence as the unity of man and nature has been made concrete by the practical-social-historical process of objectification, that we can understand the definition of man as a 'universal' and 'free' species being." In the majority of the Marxist interpretations of *practice* (or *praxis*, as some prefer to call it) the main, if not the only, feature stressed is its objective character. In the study just mentioned, Marcuse himself accentuates precisely this moment of the dialectic of practice, though this is obviously insufficient. For the same reason Habermas reduces historical materialism to an economic theory which he offers to replace by his new theory of communicative action. Some aspects of Marx call for supplementation by something more elaborated and efficient, but as Habermas' own evolution

manifested, in most endeavors of that kind the essential pathos of Marxism, its immanent social criticism, evaporates.¹⁹

In some of his letters of 1890, Fr. Engels makes the bitter confession that he and Marx were to blame for a definite overemphasis upon the material side of the human life (which was quite in a line with their political quarrels with the Young Hegelians). Engels was by then too old to develop a more sophisticated theory of practice. Marx, not only in 1844 but even later in 1857, noted in his draft variant of *Capital* that man appropriates the world through his activity in a many-sided both material and spiritual way, and that the latter could be both theoretical and 'practico-spiritual'. Nevertheless, as long as we keep in mind the total nature of the dialectic of practical activity, we surely agree that practical and social existence are basic traits of man's essential being. Man in his totality which is itself a form of his activity is essentially practical and, thereby, an essentially social being. Moreover, as Marx put it as early as 1844, even human sensuality is social by its nature and human organs of sensitivity are 'theoreticians.'

In the final analysis then, the opposition between the person and society turns out to be unreal, a mere appearance; it is but an abstract postulate which must be subject to critique. Man is an essentially social being. The young Marx wrote that the life of the individual, "even if it may not appear in the direct form of a collective life in association with others, *is* therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. The individual and the generic life of a man are not something different."²⁰ In keeping with this, a year later Marx formulated his famous sixth thesis on Feuerbach, which has been the target of passionate criticism against Marx's alleged social (class) reductionism, namely: "The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its actuality, it is the *ensemble* of social relations."²¹

It is not necessary here to go deeply into the fact that the concept of human essence neither expresses the whole of the human being, nor that human reality cannot be reduced entirely to its social dimension taken in a narrow sense, that is, as a sphere of merely social interactions. It is more relevant here to state that when we 'insert' social relations, labor, work and activity in general into the structure of the person we must not lose sight of the fact that all these phenomena are not so much of a personal as of a social nature. Rather, we must pose the question of how we can relate these to the subjective structure of the person, how they can be relevant at all to the person, and whether they are isomorphic to the various social relations characteristic of general types of human action? Even should this be the case, as it is not the social relations as such which are the components of the structure of the person, there must be some specific 'personal' forms representing these relations at the substantial level of the person.

It is possible to answer all of these questions only through the united effort of such different sciences as, for example, psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, ethics and pedagogy. The proper role of philosophy in this interdisciplinary 'family' consists not in meddling into the fields of research of the other sciences, but in working out the basic world view and the theoretical models and categories which could integrate the whole interdisciplinary movement.

In this respect, it would be of some use to make a more strict demarcation between the contents of the three basic terms by which people usually designate man as a specific phenomenon, namely, 'individual', 'personality' and 'person'.

Here I would note that in the new 1989 edition of the standard Soviet introductory textbook on philosophy a serious step is made in the section on personality towards overcoming the 'sociologistic' aberrations which formerly marred even some most interesting attempts in this field. One reason for such a notable achievement in contemporary Marxist philosophy is that it finally abandoned its formal declarations concerning the importance of the activity principle as a means

of theoretical (social, philosophical, etc.) analyses, and tried to use it instead in the actual analysis of the most fundamental philosophical problems.

In respect to the person-society problem, it based the very distinction between personality and the person upon the *different types of activity* characteristic of the different socially meaningful types of individual. The demarcations run as follows.

Usually, the term *individual* denotes a particular representative of some larger whole. Sociologists use 'individual' quite adequately when they mean some one representative of a given group, community or society. Here, the individual is taken as *exemplary*. Compared with the other terms in question, 'individual' preserves the meaning closest both to its etymological origin (cf. also 'atom') and to its strict scientific designation. Thus the specific features of the individual's concrete life and his activities as a concrete, singular being do not matter for the sociologist, for he treats his subject from a purely sociological perspective. The individual is always 'one of' the group, whether society, community, collective or class. Of course, individuals in society are in no way indistinguishable monads, but the differences between individuals in such a schema are due mainly to the differences between their social groups and to the degree to which they manifest group characteristics.

For the philosopher it is important to analyze the ultimate grounds of the individual's being and, first of all, to reveal the fundamental conditions from which the individual as a phenomenon arose. Dialectical social philosophy studies the ground, the reasons and the very conditions of possibility by which such a differentiated particular unit as the individual is in his essence always meaningful as a social individual. In other words, the sociologist studies *how* the individual is always 'one of' a group; philosophers must study *why* be 'one of' a group and *how this is possible* at all.

But it would be inaccurate to regard man as wholly defined by his social activities. As I mentioned above, the concept of human practice becomes one-sided and unreal if practice is reduced simply to a social, material or objective activity. It is impossible to reduce a human being to his characteristic features--even his most general ones--taken as if his essence were dissected. The impossibility of any kind of reductionism regarding the human being is reflected in the content of the other two terms mentioned above, namely, 'personality' and 'person'. While the 'individual' more closely denotes the objective, conditioned moment of the social dialectic, 'personality' and 'person' denote more closely the opposite, the subjective and conditioning moment of this dialectic. They denote those social qualities by which a human being is an *active* social phenomenon. The term *personality* focuses upon the uniqueness of a given human being--his actual uniqueness--while the term *person* reveals the meaning of a given human being in the system of social relations. The term 'person' denotes primarily, not the various social roles played by an individual, but *his attitude towards* them, his dispositions, his specific intentions in respect to them, as well as his ability to choose freely between them.

We judge *personality* mainly by the results of his activity, while the *person* interests us by his activities themselves. Moreover, we are much more interested in the person's inner motives and in his personal culture as a specific concrete incarnation of cultural universals in their historical dynamics. In this respect, the more socialized an individual the more he is a person. Personality is a precondition of the person, and the person is the individual who has fully developed his personality.

Personality would be regarded and 'measured' by the extent to which an individual's activity is actually original, unrepeatable, unique, many-sided and carried out in a 'natural' and spontaneous way. The concept of the *person* should accentuate the volitional and conscious origin

of the individual's activity. The more an individual is aware of the motives of his actions, the more they can become transparent to him; in turn, the more he is able to control his activity in view of these motives, the greater is his value from the social point of reference and the more he deserves the honor of being regarded as a Person.

The main conclusion of the present study, therefore, can be formulated as follows. We can speak of the *person* so far as the individual acts independently, that is so far as he becomes a real subject. This is not only a matter of his inner, spiritual, and intellectual activity, in which case he would be a personality only. It is a matter also of his external, objective activity, acting in accordance with the appropriate norms and values conveyed to him by the culture in which he was born, by which he was socialized, and which as a person he enriches, develops and continuously creates.

Outside the context of socio-cultural activity as the deepest fundament of social life and human history it is impossible fully to realize, at least theoretically, the dialectics of the person and society. Beyond this dialectics the contradictions in the title of this study and expressed in a paradoxical fashion by three of the greatest thinkers in the history of philosophy undoubtedly will remain unsolved.

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Notes

1. See M. Markovic, "Person as a Unique Universal Social Being," in *Person and Society*, ed. by G.F. McLean and H. Meynell (Washington: International Society for Metaphysics and the University Press of America, 1988), Ch. IX.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

3. See G.F. Mc Lean, "The Person, Moral Growth and Character Development," in *Act and Agent. Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development*, ed. by G.F. McLean *et al.* (Washington: The University Press of America, 1986), Ch. XII.

4. He gel, *Works* (Moscow, 1956), III, 95.

5. H. Arendt, *The Origins of the Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest Books, 1973), p. 95.

6. See W. St ark, *The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1962).

7. T. Parson s, "Society," *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. XIV.

8. See J.L. Gillin and J. Ph. Gillin, *Cultural Sociology* (New York: The McMillan Co., 1948), p. 140; see also E. Bogardus and R.H. Lewis, *Social Life and Personality* (Lexington: Silver, Burdett, 1948).

9. Cf. R.N. Bellah, *et al.*, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).

10. See G.F. McLean, *op. cit.* See also The Frankfurt Institution for Social Research, *The Aspects of Sociology* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 40ff.

11. K. Marx, Fr. Engels, *Works* (Sofia, 1968), XXIII, 65.

12. M. Markovic, *op. cit.*, p. 86-87.

13. K. Marx, F. Engels. *Works* (Sofia, 1983), XLII, 15I.

14. *Ibid.*

15. H. Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 188.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
17. *Ibid.*
18. H. Marcuse, *Studies in Critical Philosophy* (NLB, 1972), p. 25.
19. See T. Rock more, "Theory and Practice Again: Habermas on Historical Materialism," *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 13 (1987).
20. K. Marx, Fr. Engels, *Works* (Sofia, 1983), XLII, III.
21. *Ibid.*, III, 5.

Chapter XVI
Person, Work and Religious Tradition
John Farrelly

In this article, I would like to explore briefly the contribution, both practical and theoretical, that religious tradition and a philosophy of the person can make as we attempt to address the enormous social problems of our time. There are many, of course, who would think that neither has much of value to contribute here. Religious traditions and a philosophy of the person have their roots in an earlier culture, one that had little in common with our age and its problems. In the opinion of many, moreover, social problems in our time should be approached from a pragmatic and procedural point of view, not from a perspective of religion or meta physics. For many people concerned with the problems of our time, then, the view I am suggesting may have little initial plausibility.

Nonetheless, we can all agree that one of the most important problems of our time, perhaps the most important, is the building of genuine communities in which the rights of individuals are recognized. Of all the areas where this problem exists, the world of work is among the most seriously in need. Profound problems concerning the meaning and organization of work disturb and divide our societies and our world. Can philosophy be looked to for reflections that may contribute to the solution of these problems? Might our religious traditions have things to say which could be of help in grappling with such complex problems?

I suggest that as we address these questions we attempt a brief analysis of one recent attempt to use a religious tradition and a philosophy of the person to explore the meaning and organization of work. I refer to Pope John Paul II's encyclical *Laborem Exercens, (On Human Work)*.¹ In citing this document in a community of philosophers, I treat it not as an authoritative religious statement for the Catholic Church, but simply as a notable effort to use the resources of a religious tradition and a philosophy of the person to reflect on work in a way that invites the attention of philosophers and calls for evaluation by them. I can say confidently that in this document John Paul speaks for many who do not share his Catholic or even his Christian faith; he draws on many resources available equally to those of other faiths and different cultures. We may be led to conclude that there is a quality and richness in these resources of value in illuminating the meaning of work and in giving us some norms for its organization. In this brief analysis, I will (1) indicate the context of the document, (2) demonstrate the recourse that John Paul II has to the two sources mentioned and show how he understands them, (3) give several ways in which he uses these resources to help us understand and organize work in our time, (4) reflect on the legitimacy of his use of these resources, and conclude by asking how other religious resources may be so used.

Context

John Paul II grew up in Poland and, while becoming a priest and later a bishop, was also a student of philosophy, in which he received a doctorate and was later to be a teacher. He lived in a communist-controlled country and contested the official interpretation and organization of work on both philosophical and religious grounds. After being elected Pope, he wrote *Laborem Exercens* in 1981, thus commemorating the 90th anniversary of his predecessor Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, the first papal encyclical to treat of modern social problems.

Appropriately, therefore, he looks at the issues involved in the context of a succession of papal documents on these questions.

John Paul reviews, as a context for the document, some of the basic conflicts that have characterized the world of work in the last few centuries. We would do well, ourselves, to glance briefly at this history. In early industrialization, there was conflict between entrepreneurs, owners or administrators of productive property, and the mass of people who shared in the production process by their labor (11). Entrepreneurs sought to maximize their profits; they considered labor purely within an economic perspective as one among many factors in production, and therefore they offered the lowest possible wages and most inexpensive working conditions to their employees. This led to great injustices and to a reaction by many who thought that the root of these evils was in the very system of productive property.

Marxists interpreted the problem in terms of class conflict; they presented themselves as the spokesmen for the proletariat, and sought by various means, including revolution, to seize control in countries which they would then proceed to reorganize along collectivist lines. This however did not assure justice. Rather it led, among other evils, to a bureaucratization of work in which the individual found himself no more than a cog in an immense machine.

Another response to the injustices consequent to industrialization was the establishment of unions of laborers who fought for just wages, decent working conditions, insurance, and other benefits. The practices that had prevailed in early capitalism were significantly changed in the process, but problems remain, although they have undergone a certain metamorphosis.

Today there are widespread unemployment, hunger and homelessness, and the conflict between capital and labor which previously had been primarily a problem within particular countries has now become global in scope. Moreover, recent technological developments, a new realization of the limits of the world's resources and a concern for the damage to the environment that already has resulted from industrial pollution, pose new problems in the meaning and organization of work. This, then, is the context in which John Paul II wrote *Laborem Exercens*.

Resources of Religious Tradition and a Philosophy of the Person

John Paul does not attempt to give technical answers to the problems of the workplace in our time, but rather to uncover the basic human meaning of work and to reflect on this meaning from a perspective of morality. He writes that the purpose of his document is:

to highlight . . . the fact that human work is a key, probably the essential key, to the whole social question, if we try to see that question really from the point of view of man's good. And if the solution or rather the gradual solution of the social question . . . must be sought in the direction of 'making life more human', then the key, namely human work, acquires fundamental and decisive importance(3).

To explore the meaning of work he turns to the resources of religious tradition and to a philosophy of the person. As I here and in the next section accept the interpretation he adopts, in the interests of clarity I will express his views directly rather than reverting to indirect discourse.

In seeking to shed light upon human problems, the Church turns to what it understands to be God's revelation mediated in the Judeo-Christian Scriptures. These Scriptures can, in the same fashion as the sacred writings of other religions in the world, be appreciated by men and women of quite different traditions as a kind of sedimentation of human wisdom. Here we will evaluate them from this perspective. In literary forms appropriate to its time and to the purposes of its author the first book of the Bible gives us an account of the beginnings of the world and of man, and it

does so in a way that leaves no doubt that there is meaning in human persons and in human life. It tells us that "God created man in his image: in the divine image he created him; male and female he created them. God blessed them, saying: `Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it'.² And God gave them dominion over all the earth. One way in which man images God is precisely by the dominion he exercises over the earth, and, although the text refers to much more than man's work, it includes in the gift of dominion the commission to work. This human dominion is a share in that which God exercises over creation; in their work human beings share in the work and purposes of the creator. The range of what God has committed to man's dominion is indeed vast. It includes all the resources of the physical world, and can be taken to extend into the indefinite future, for this commission to the first couple is meant for all mankind. No future development of the resources of the world lies outside the embrace of this commission. In principle, therefore, the physical world is subordinate to mankind and is placed within its dominion to serve the human good.

As we inquire into the meaning of work, let us distinguish its objective from its subjective meaning. Any work, because of its specific nature, has internal goals. Agriculture, for example, has as its goal the production of food; industry is for the manufacture of goods for human use. Goals specific to a certain form of work constitute its objective meaning. Technological developments have enormously increased the scope and, at times, the quality of human work as it fulfills these goals. Technology is thus man's ally, though at times it can seem to be his enemy.

Work can also, however, be considered subjectively, or in relation to man as its agent and goal. As John Paul writes:

Man has to subdue the earth and dominate it, because as the `image of God' he is a person, that is to say, a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of deciding about himself and with a tendency to self-realization. As a person, man is therefore the subject of work. . . . Various actions belonging to the work process . . . must all serve to realize his humanity, to fulfill the calling to be a person that is his by reason of his very humanity(6).

The divine commission to dominate the world is realized not only in relation to the things of the world, but also to the work itself, i.e., through maintaining the priority whereby man is served by his work, rather than allowing himself to be subordinated to its service. "This dimension conditions the very ethical nature of work"(6). It has an ethical dimension because it is the act of a person, "a conscious and free subject, that is to say, a subject who decides about himself"(6). The basis for deciding the value of work is not primarily its objective meaning, but its subjective meaning. There can be varied degrees of objective meaning to work, but the primary basis for the dignity and value of work is "man himself, who is its subject"(6). As John Paul writes:

This leads immediately to a very important conclusion of an ethical nature: However true it may be that man is destined for work and called to it, in the first place work is `for man' and not man `for work'(6).

The objective purpose of any kind of work cannot carry a definitive meaning in and of itself, for "in the final analysis it is always man who is the purpose of work, whatever work it is that is done"(6).

Implications for the Meaning and Organization of Work

Religious tradition and a philosophy of the person reinforce one another in the light they cast on the meaning and organization of work. We will show several implications that John Paul draws from the topic thus illuminated.

The Priority of Labor. A central principle for the organization of work that flows from both religious tradition and a philosophy of the person is the priority of labor. To be given the commission to subdue the earth means that man is to dominate all the resources of the world. These resources are not created by man; they are given to him by nature and so ultimately by the creator. Man can modify these resources, as he does in successive stages of technological sophistication in production through history, thereby providing himself more ingenious and effective 'workbenches', as it were. Through the domestication of animals, through agriculture, through industrialization and through the sophisticated technology of our time, man establishes increasingly effective *instruments* to aid him in his labor. All that goes by the name of productive property, or capital, is really reducible to a collection of such instruments. No matter how sophisticated such an instrument is, it came from resources which God implanted in nature for man to discover and modify. It is the historical product as well of the generations of labor that honed and developed the instruments of production we now have. Further, it is still fruitful because of the work of many people at the present time. Man remains superior to all technology, no matter how impressive it may be; he is to dominate the whole of this order, because he alone is a person, and he was given the commission to subdue the earth.

Thus an opposition between capital and labor does not derive from the production process itself. The opposition comes from a practically materialistic culture, one that tends to view the whole process of production from a perspective of material consequences, of products and money. In this 'economism' man and capital both are considered as 'forces of production'. Labor is considered as a 'merchandise' that the laborers sell to the employers who own and organize productive property. The error of this perspective and the injustices to which it has led come from considering labor and capital as on the same level and as simple parts of an economic equation. Man is treated as an instrument of production, and not as the effective subject of work. In the process of production, however, "labor is always a primary efficient cause, while capital . . . remains a mere instrument or instrumental cause"(12). This instrument conditions man's work, but it does not constitute "an impersonal 'subject' putting man and man's work into a position of dependence"(13). "As the subject of work and independent of the work he does--man alone is a person"(12). The practice and theory of work has to accord with the primacy of the person.

Private Property. John Paul applies his two principles to yet another question, that of the possession of private property. The resolution of the conflict between capital and labor does not lie in a denial of the right to private possession of property, even of productive property. In accord with a continuous Christian tradition, the Pope reaffirms the right to such ownership. Moreover, he asserts, the expropriation of productive property and the transferral of its administration to a collectivity or to the state in no way assures that the human rights of the workers will be respected. Such organization easily can lead to bureaucratization, with the result that the worker feels himself simply a cog in an immense machine who has no sense that he is genuinely furthering his own good through his work. There may be instances when there are sufficient reasons to socialize some productive property, but the basic solution to the conflict between capital and labor is to be found in recognizing that owners of property are not morally free simply to use their property as they wish.

The resources of the world were given to serve the needs of all mankind. Privately owned instruments that facilitate production are in fact the products of work by generations of laborers through the ages. As they are the fruit of many people's work, so their present fruit is in turn indebted to the labor of many. Owners must make use of their property within this context.³ They are to use their property not in a way that obstructs the initial and abiding purpose of the resources

of the world, namely, to serve the needs of all, but in a way harmonious with that purpose. Moreover, property-owners should seek ways to give laborers a more active voice in the productive process and a more substantial share in its fruits. The worker "wishes to be able to take part in the very work process as a sharer in responsibility and creativity at the workbench to which he applies himself"(15).

Work as Humanization. Pope John Paul draws on his fundamental principles for a third application. Through sin man turned away from God, and this turning away is reflected in a certain resistance he encounters within his very work. Scripture says that God told man after his sin: "In the sweat of your face shall you eat bread".⁴ Human work, physical, intellectual, administrative, or parental, usually involves effort or difficulty. Work nonetheless continues to be a good for man. Though work may well, despite its difficulty, be enjoyable, "it is also good as being something worthy, that is to say, something that corresponds to man's dignity, that expresses this dignity and increases it"(9). It is good to transform the world and make it more adapted to human needs.

Through work man also transforms himself and, in a sense, "becomes `more a human being'"(9). Work calls him to exercise such virtues as industriousness, patience and creativity. Work can, it is true, be used to degrade man as when he is exploited or subjected to forced labor; but this is counter to the inherent meaning of work. Moreover, through work man not only shapes himself; through it he is enabled to build a family, for it is work that gives him the means to found a family and raise children. Through work man can contribute to the common good of his society, to the development of a culture and a civilization. By work, indeed, human beings share in God's creative activity. They further his creative plan and continue his work (25). The Pope enlarges on this theme, noting that through their toil men and women can share in the redemptive work that Christians associate with Christ. They thereby contribute to the building of the `Kingdom of God '; it is through human labor that "'human dignity, brotherhood and freedom' must increase on earth"(27). This whole theme merits, of course, a deeper analysis, but what we have said will have to suffice for our purposes.

In this document John Paul also offers us thoughts on the rights of the worker, on the duties of the employer and of what he calls the `indirect employer', i.e. the laws of the political community and the international economic order as they affect the conditions of work and thus the rights of workers. But without exploring these further applications of his principles, let us now turn to the basic principles themselves and reflect briefly on his use of them.

Religious Tradition and a Philosophy of the Person

John Paul II in effect combines these two sources in the use he makes of them, but it is appropriate for us to reflect briefly on each in turn.

Tradition

John Paul's use of religious tradition is, I submit, in line with the work of Hans Georg Gadamer and others who contend, against the philosophers of the Enlightenment and those whom they have influenced, that the resources of our traditions can legitimately and fruitfully be brought to bear upon the present. In my remarks on this topic, I make use of a paper of George M cLean.⁵ Rather than relying on a notion of human knowledge modeled on the physical sciences or on mathematical models that discount the authority of tradition, should we not rather acknowledge the central importance of knowledge which has been passed on as the heritage of a community, and hence as

having an authority based on the community's experience of living through time? Our access to this sort of heritage comes through being born into a family which mediates the language and symbol systems of a people whose interpretation of reality we share. This interpretation has been gained from an experience in history and has been handed down to our generation embodied in a variety of traditional forms.

Such an interpretation of reality affords a vision of the goals of human life which possesses an intrinsic authority and a normative quality for a people--one that contains in germ that people's notion of human excellence as exemplified in its great men and women viewed as paradigms or 'archetypes' of human excellence. The authority of such a past is not so much a limiting as an enabling one. If it is not unnatural to recognize our dependence on others with knowledge and competence such as, for example, a medical doctor, it should surely not be below our dignity to recognize our dependence on "the contribution of extended historical experience" in our cultural heritage. Such recognition can lead us to acknowledge a normative "vision which both transcends its own time and stands as directive for time to come" for our own communities. The active and formative influence of tradition makes it a living influence in our own time, one that enables us "today to determine the specific direction of our lives and mobilize a community of consensus and commitment". It can, as well, enable us to recognize those deformations specific to our own time.

Such a heritage can have particular relevance to new issues that a people faces in the present, particularly in its social life. John Paul's use of tradition is one illustration that our heritage can promote a creative exercise of freedom in our day. To act freely in the present one must know one's identity, which is impossible without an active appreciation of one's heritage. A purely abstract knowledge of humanity will not be adequate. There is, as it were, a dialectic over time in our interpretations of our past. Time can open up new possibilities of understanding our past, and such dialogic engagement with the past can give us access to fruitful possibilities for the revision of meaning.

John Paul finds in Scripture also an important resource for a social critique in our time. Critique is carried on in the context of interests when these are placed within a larger context of such values as unity, goodness and truth. A critique of ideologies presupposes the development of communicative action by free persons. For this to happen in a world controlled as ours is by technology, we have first to search within our own heritage for resources of emancipation. Some modern social critiques look back for these resources to the period of the Enlightenment, but the Western heritage has deeper roots--roots in the Biblical tradition. To recall and to celebrate this heritage is to reopen a channel of inspiration and guidance for social change that speaks directly to the liberation of the poor and the alienated.

The Person

Let us look for a moment at John Paul's philosophy of the person. To what extent will it hold up under, and reward, our scrutiny? Not all philosophers of our time would accept the understanding of the person conveyed in *Laborem Exercens*. Nevertheless, before he was Pope, John Paul wrote a book entitled *The Acting Person* in which he used a phenomenology of the person to argue for the need of a metaphysics of the person.⁶ A number of other contemporary philosophers would also hold that nothing less than such a metaphysics can do justice to our experience of being persons.

To take one philosopher as an example, let us refer to Thomas Tracy's book, *God, Action and Embodiment*.⁷ In it, he seeks to mediate between a classical Thomistic theology and a

Whiteheadian theology, noting that we understand person through intentional agency. That is, we know a person through his or her character traits, the ways in which the person orients himself or herself to action, to self, and to others. This differs from the way we know other things in our environment. It is proper to a person to initiate activity, and thus we know a person not so much by what happens to him or her as by what he or she does and by the intentionality which this action expresses. Unlike behaviorism, Tracy's approach would define as personal action not simply the external event or happening, but that event in relation to intentionality. Far from being seen dualistically, the human person in his or her bodily action is a psychophysical unit. Further, that we are an enduring reality through time is shown by our 'story' and by the responsibility we take for past acts.

Incidentally, the concept of the person as embracing that which is uniquely human in men and women is not confined to a western cultural context. Without implying complete cross-cultural agreement on the understanding of man as person, we may cite Keiji Nishitani, of the Kyoto school of philosophy, who writes: "There is no doubt that the idea of man as a personal being is the highest idea of man which has thus far appeared. The same may be said as regards the idea of God as a personal being".⁸

The distinctiveness of the human being when compared with all other material reality, a distinctiveness expressed by the term 'person', gives grounds for considering man superior to all else in the material order. This distinctiveness constitutes the grounds for our sense of a special dignity that is intrinsic to the individual human being and that deserves the respect of the individual himself or herself, of other individuals, and of those who hold economic and political power. Here we have the crux of John Paul's argument that work is for man and not man for work, and that man and technology cannot be considered as of equivalent moral weight nor man reduced to the status of a tool within his technology. This human distinctiveness underlies John Paul's conviction--one he is far from alone in affirming--that the worker must be considered as a person, and the organization of the social and economic order must be made to accommodate that value.

We may well ask why the results of a hermeneutical reflection on Scripture and the conclusions drawn from a philosophy of the human person coincide to such an extent. Both, it must be pointed out, are grounded in, and reflect, experience. Much that is seen as divine revelation within the religious tradition has been recognized as such precisely because the great depth of human reflection from which it flows has endowed it with wisdom of a calibre hard to encompass within the range of the purely human. At the same time it must be granted that a philosophy will always reflect the culture in which it was born. In the West, philosophical understandings of what it means to be a person could not have escaped the influence of the Judaeo-Christian experience of divinity as personal, and the imprint of the specifically personal names of Father, Son and Holy Spirit ascribed to God in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But religious tradition and the insights of philosophy will, if the depth of their understanding of the human condition is great enough, have relevance for times and places other than those in which they were first elaborated.

In conclusion, let us note that other religious traditions have their own resources both for the humanization of the world of work and as a line of defense against the domination over men that frequently are so readily conceded to technology and science. Vincent Shen makes this quite clear in the case of Confucianism when he writes:

On the theoretical level, Confucianism emphasizes the priority of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity over logical and technological systems. In other words, according to Confucianism, man has to be master and not slave of science and technology. All development of the latter must be in service of the unfolding and the realization of human potentiality.⁹

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Notes

1. Pope John Paul II , *On Human Work (Laborem Exercens)*, Sept. 14, 1981. The translation used is that of the U.S. National Catholic News Service (Washington, D. C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1981). The numbers in the text refer to numeration of the sections of that edition.
2. Genesis 1:27-28.
3. Pope John Paul cites here St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, 66, 2 and 6.
4. Genesis 3:19.
5. George F. Mc Lean, "Hermeneutics and Heritage," in his *Man and Nature* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, 1989).
6. Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Boston: Reidel, 1979).
7. Thomas Tracy, *God, Action and Embodiment* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984).
8. Quoted in Hans Waldenfels, *Absolute Nothingness. Foundations for a Buddhist-Christian Dialogue* (New York Paulist, 1980), p. 80.
9. Vincent S hen, "Confucianism, Science and Technology. A Philosophical Evaluation," *The Asian Journal of Philosophy*, 1 (1987), 75.

Chapter XVII

Judeo-Christian Values and the Ecological Crisis

Dean R. Hoge

In 1967 Professor Lynn White, Jr., a historian at the University of California, Los Angeles, published a paper he had presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, entitled "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis." It struck a sensitive chord, soon evoked a flurry of responses, pro and con, and started a nationwide debate over religion and ecology. Since that time scores of articles and comments have been written. Here I will try to summarize the debate.

In his paper, White states flatly that the world faces an environmental crisis of growing proportions, and he reflects that present-day proposals for action are too superficial. A more basic approach is needed: "Unless we think about fundamentals, our specific measures may produce new backlashes more serious than those they are designed to remedy."¹ The present-day environmental problems arose with the 19th-century fusion of science and technology. Both are products of the Western tradition, which led in both, starting with the 13th or 14th century. The roots of the Western uniqueness are directly traceable to Christianity.

The Judeo-Christian creation story in Genesis told of a loving and all-powerful God who *created* the heavenly bodies, the earth, plants and animals, all out of nothing. Unlike the creation stories in many other religions, Genesis states that nature is not of the same substance as God, nor composed of God Himself. God was outside of nature, apart from it. Next God created man: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness'" (Genesis 1:26, RSV). God spoke to Adam: "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth" (v. 28). Adam's first job was to name the animals--thus establishing his dominance over them.

The message of this passage is that God planned all of creation explicitly for man's benefit and rule; no portion of the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man's purposes. Man is clearly told that he is not part of the animal kingdom, but rather is separate and created in the image of God.

Earlier religions, including those in Antiquity, saw every tree, stream and hill as having its own *genius loci*, its guardian spirit. Before anyone dared to cut a tree or dam a brook he had to placate the spirit in charge. Nature was filled with spirits. Christianity battled pagan animism, ridding nature of its spirits and its sacredness; as Christianity triumphed, the older inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled.

White states that later history introduced additional factors; for example, by the 13th century the Greek East differed from the Latin West, even though both read the same Bible. In the West, natural science gradually developed as an extension of natural theology--seeing science as a realm of further revelation. This never happened in Eastern Orthodoxy, for reasons which White does not discuss. Thus, more than the Book of Genesis is crucial to later history.

Modern Christians, neo-Christians and post-Christians in the West all share the Western attitudes toward nature--that humans are *not* part of the natural process, but are superior to nature, which is for human use.

There are many complications in the centuries-long historical development, partly since the Christian heritage contains diverse strands. White describes St. Francis of Assisi, calling him "the

greatest radical in Christian history since Christ." Francis tried to depose humanity from its dominion over nature and to set up a democracy of all God's creatures, a heresy, punishable by death. In today's ecological crisis Francis' views are badly needed, and White closes his speech by proposing Francis "as a patron saint for ecologists."

Counter Arguments

Dissenting views were soon put forth. I will discuss four main types. First, critics asked if it is empirically true that Judeo-Christian people have despoiled the earth more than anyone else. After all, environmental damage has occurred in specific places since the beginning of recorded times. The Greeks cleared forests off the hills to get timber; the Egyptians totally changed the Nile Valley from swampland to high-intensity cropland: neither was influenced by the Judeo-Christian teachings.²

In a later article White responded by clarifying his contention about the uniqueness of Latin Christianity. In contrast to medieval Greeks, the Latins affirmed technology as God-given and helpful to Christian spirituality. Whereas the Greek church disallowed the new technology in religious rituals, the Latins embraced it--for example, by including the new mechanical clocks and pipe organs in their churches.³ And Latin Christianity generally encouraged new technology. White states:

Men commit their lives to what they consider good. Because Western Christianity developed strong moral approval of technological innovation, more men of talent in the West put more resources, energy and imagination into the advancement of technology than was the case among Greek Christians, or indeed in any other society, including the Chinese. The result was an unprecedented technological dynamism (p. 60).

This is a shorthand analysis of a complex problem, and White does not claim to have done a thorough job. He simply asserts that the modern West had greater dynamism unconstrained by concerns for nature than had any other culture, hence the West stands in the first place as a despoiler of nature. This implies that modern technology permits faster and greater damage per year than was possible earlier, hence even if Western man's doctrines of nature were the same, he possessed the tools to wreak more havoc more quickly. Thus the growth of technology is itself distinguishable as a factor, apart from the Judeo-Christian teachings about dominion over nature.

Second, there are visible variations across time and place in Western history as regards the rate of environmental degradation. The last two centuries have seen the worst, due to more powerful technology and wider private ownership of the means of production--especially private ownership of land. Also, in the United States, attitudes toward the wilderness were somewhat unique. The vastness of the American wilderness caused the belief that it was endless and inexhaustible, also that it stood in the way of human progress and needed to be "tamed." Thus for years no one felt doubts when they cut down thousands of trees to create cropland or killed off large herds of wild animals for no good reason. The movement for conservation of natural resources in the United States came only after about 1890, when the American frontier had largely disappeared and the myth of endless wilderness was no longer tenable. In short, specific attitudes toward nature depend on short-term and local factors which could easily outweigh the Old Testament in their practical effects on behavior. *The Book of Genesis*, 3000 years old and common to all of Western civilization, cannot explain variations in behavior toward nature *within* Western civilization.

Third, environmental degradation has been seen as a by-product of wealth. In this view, poor people demand less of their environment and they can do it less harm. The Western nations, because of their high standards of living, do the most damage--even independent of their worldviews. If non-Judeo-Christian nations were as wealthy, they would be just as bad. In fact, today's technology and life-styles are being borrowed from nation to nation irrespective of underlying views about God, man and nature. "Thus, all White can defensibly argue is that the West developed modern science and technology *first*. This says nothing about the origin or existence of a particular ethic toward our environment."⁴ According to Jean Mayer, a food scientist:

It might be bad in China with 700 million poor people, but 700 million rich Chinese would wreck China in no time. . . . It's the rich who wreck the environment, occupy more space, consume more of each natural resource, disturb ecology more, litter the landscape . . . and create more pollution.⁵

The fourth response to White is more theological. Biblical scholars have investigated the Genesis account and its Old Testament context. They have argued that Genesis has more than one doctrine of man and nature, and if one includes the totality of the Old Testament there is still more diversity. These scholars have not asserted that the principal worldview motivating Judeo-Christian life has been different from the one White emphasizes; there is seemingly no strong argument possible to charge that White distorted history. Rather, these writers have made a theological argument that the tradition offers resources for *another* approach to nature now, and in the future Jews and Christians will be able to draw from the less-utilized Biblical resources in fashioning a different life ethic--one just as true to the tradition.

Let us scrutinize the crucial passages. In Genesis 1:28, God told Adam to "subdue" the earth and to "rule" over the fish, birds, and animals. Some have wondered if the translation into English had hardened these verbs from the Hebrew original, but this does not seem to be the case. The Hebrew words (*kabash* and *radah*) are stronger, if anything. *Kabash* is drawn from a Hebrew word meaning to tread down or bring into bondage, and conveys the image of a conqueror placing his foot on the neck of the conquered; in one passage the word even means "rape." The other verb, *radah*, comes from a word meaning to trample or to prevail against and conveys the image of one treading grapes in a winepress. These words express superiority in the strongest terms.⁶ So the fault does not lie in the translation.

A complication arises in Genesis 2, which has a second creation story awkwardly placed next to that in Genesis 1, and usually conflated with it. Genesis 1:1 to 2:4a is from the "Priestly" or P tradition; the other interpretation of the creation story, from the "Jahweh" or J tradition, begins in Chapter 2, verse 4b. In the second story there is no schedule of creation into six days, and there is no mention of man's being in the image of God. Rather, there is a description of the Garden of Eden and the act of God putting Adam into the garden "to till it and keep it" (v. 15). Here the Hebrew verbs are *abad* and *shamar*. The former is often translated "till" or "work" or "serve." *Shamar* is variously translated "keep," "watch," or "preserve." Here Adam is commissioned to be a gardener to tend and preserve the garden.⁷

The Genesis text makes no attempt to reconcile these differing charges given by God to Adam. There is no explanation of the difference in the directives they contain. Scholars agree that Genesis was pieced together from smaller pieces of oral tradition, and here two pieces are juxtaposed which do not happen to agree very well. One cannot conclude that God's will was a kind of "average" of

the two commissions, or some sort of sophisticated combination which linked the two to produce a unique meaning.

The second directive of God--that Adam was supposed to till the garden and keep it--has the additional difficulty that Adam was later expelled from the garden due to his disobedience. "Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he was taken" (3:22) (referring to Adam's having been created out of dust). God also cursed the ground and told Adam that it would bring forth thorns and thistles, so that raising food would be difficult for him. Therefore the task of Adam is still to till the ground, but no longer is it to nurture and preserve a beautiful garden.

The argument is made by some theologians today that humans were indeed to be *stewards* of the earth, just as God told Adam to be a steward of the garden. In biblical times the role of a steward was to manage the estate for profit while also ensuring its long-term viability. Short-term desires for profit were tempered by the need for long-term survival. That Adam and Eve were expelled from the garden did not change their charge--their job was still to till the soil and (by implication) to preserve it. Thus several theologians have developed theologies of stewardship of the earth as correctives to the overly domination-oriented theology of the past.⁸

These understandings of nature are from the Old Testament. The New Testament, by contrast, has little to say about the natural environment. Its concerns are elsewhere, and the scattered fragments on nature or land do not add up to much. Thus there is little reason for distinguishing Judaism from Christianity in terms of teachings about the earth.

It is also interesting that several scholars have wondered if the modern Marxist societies have different views toward nature than the Western Christian nations. The prevailing view is that no difference exists, because Marx said little about nature and took over directly the bourgeois assumptions about nature found in Germany, France and England at his time.

Relation to the Protestant Ethic Debate

The Christianity-ecology debate stems from practical concerns, not scholarly curiosity. It is an urgent problem due to the threatening environmental situation of the world. For this reason the ties with earlier scholarly debates are not emphasized. Yet this debate is clearly an outgrowth of the debate over Protestantism and the rise of capitalism stimulated by Max Weber's book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.⁹ Weber asserted that the Calvinistic portion of the Reformation spawned a religious psychology which strongly encouraged capitalistic business enterprise, and this is important in understanding the rise of capitalist culture in England and the U.S.A. Dozens of books have been written pro and con, and no closure is in sight since the thesis depends on subtle causal links not easy to estimate or verify convincingly.

One difference is that the White argument speaks of Western Christianity, not just Calvinistic Protestantism. This difference is mitigated by the work of Santmyre,¹⁰ which points to the Puritans as crucial to the development of technocracy and thus to the greatest ravage of the earth. Weber also stressed the Puritans, and other scholars have confirmed the importance of the Puritans in the rise of science and technology in England.

White stated that he had read Max Weber's work and had been influenced by it. Weber had done extensive comparative studies of religion to assess their tendencies to encourage or discourage the growth of capitalism, and had written of the "disenchantment" of nature (meaning the removal of sacredness from natural objects) by the Hebrew prophets battling local gods in favor of Jahweh as a God of the covenant. White stated a conclusion arrived at earlier by Weber--

that when historians look for underlying causation in the development of entire societies they are ultimately driven to the underlying assumptions of religion. White's views are similar to Weber's.

A second parallel is the subtlety of the historical connection. Weber stated that the link between religion and economic life was not in the direct religious teachings about work but in the psychological motivations produced directly or indirectly by the religious worldview. Exegesis of religious texts alone is not enough; information is needed on how the texts encourage or discourage different behaviors by the adherents. Also Weber stated that once capitalism was fully developed it took on a dynamic of its own and no longer depended on religious underpinnings. Modern capitalists, he asserted, are often non-religious but motivated by baser motives of desire for wealth or even a sense of sport. White hinted that the same may be true of technology, that today it is borrowed wholesale from society to society, and that its effects may be equally bad regardless of the religion of the society in which it does its damage.

A third parallel is the pessimism of Weber and White. Weber did not glory in the rise of Western capitalism, but rather saw it as dehumanizing and even out of control. He did not expect it to produce a new heaven and new earth; rather, it has produced an "iron cage" which imprisons the human spirit and demands asceticism and compulsive work from anyone wishing to compete. White is also pessimistic, saying that Western culture is out of control and that pollution cannot be stopped, even though we all know it is killing us.

Empirical Research

I have found five empirical studies testing these theories, and I will report their findings briefly. First, Weigel surveyed citizens in a New England town and found the environmentally conscious persons to be younger, more educated, higher in social class, and less religious--measured by church involvement and belief in the inerrancy of the Bible.¹¹ Second, Han d and Van Liere (in the most extensive and convincing study) carried out a mail survey of a random sample of the population of Washington state.¹² The survey asked various questions about pollution control, population control and conservation. It found that non-Christians (mainly those saying "no belief in God," "agnostic," or "atheist") were more supportive of environmental protection than all the Christians; the least supportive were Baptists, Mormons and conservative Christian sects. In all the groups greater frequency of church attendance was associated with a mastery-over-nature viewpoint.

Third, Rh odes analyzed a nationwide survey done repeatedly between 1974 and 1983, asking if the U.S. government is spending enough money on (among other things) protection of the environment.¹³ He found that persons without a religious preference were the most supportive of more government spending to protect the environment; liberal or mainline Christians were somewhat less supportive, and fundamentalists were the least. In addition, age was a strong predictor, with young people more supportive of environmental protection than older people. Education, church attendance, and region were weaker predictors. A high level of education, a low rate of church attendance, and residence in the Northeast were associated with more support for environmental protection.

Fourth, Shaiko analyzed a survey of members of five American environmental groups and found them much less religiously involved than the overall population.¹⁴ Whereas 6% of the total American population say they have no religious preference, 42% of these members of environmental groups said this. The survey included questions asking about agreement or disagreement with a mastery-over-nature orientation toward the environment. Groups with

greatest disagreement were the Jews and the no-preference people. Those with greatest agreement were the Catholics, followed by the Protestants. This study has a built-in limitation in that it included only members of major environmental groups, hence comparisons of subgroups within it must be accepted cautiously.

Fifth, Eckberg and Blocker made a survey of the Tulsa, Oklahoma area in which they asked about four different environmental concerns. They found that non-Judeo-Christians in the sample had more environmental concerns than Judeo-Christians; the non-Judeo-Christians were mostly secularists. Also beliefs about the Bible predicted environmental concerns, in that believers in Biblical liberalism had lower levels of concern.¹⁵ The strongest predictors of environmental beliefs were not religion, however; they were higher level of education and younger age.

In summary, all existing empirical research generally supports the White thesis. But the research has limitations. The most credible test of the White thesis would compare Christians with non-Christians today; for example, a good study would compare Christians from diverse denominations, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, devotees of tribal religions such as those of American Indians, and secularists. The research should look at both general and specific environmental attitudes, and it should study people's attitudes toward Biblical teachings while controlling other possible sources of bias. Yet the existing research has been unable to do this, so we have only subgroup comparisons within American society, a society which is strongly informed by the Biblical worldview.

The research studies provide only indirect tests of White's thesis, and they leave crucial questions unanswered. For example, the Hand-Van Liere study found that non-Christians were more supportive of the environment, but we lack information on exactly who these people are and why they are different. Are these persons influenced by Eastern religions, or are they former Christians turned agnostic, or what? If they have turned away from Christianity, why?

What causes the relatively stronger mastery-over-nature attitudes in today's conservative Christian denominations? Surely more than the Genesis text is behind the variations in views found by the researchers, since Genesis is common to all Christians and Jews, and it cannot explain variations between Christians and Jews or variations among Christian denominations. Probably factors such as medieval theology are of only minor importance, since medieval thought is common to all Christians (even though rejected by some during the Reformation). The factors most likely to have caused the divergences in American attitudes are teachings in specific denominations in the last century or two. Apparently the mastery-over-nature view is associated with a literal interpretation of the Bible and an eschatological vision of history, while the stewardship-of-nature view is associated with a more scientifically-informed worldview, internationalism, and a longer view of history.

Concluding Comments

No one disputes that the ecological crisis is upon us. Also no one disputes that a religious factor is somehow involved. The dispute is mainly over what kind of factor it is, how strong it is and where it occurs.

The argument that the Old Testament tradition is diverse seems to me beyond doubt. There are more elements in the tradition than White points to, and possibly they can sustain the fashioning of a more responsible ethic. This would appear to be a hopeful endeavor, since it would clarify the issues for the benefit of Christians today and make their views more articulate and informed. An

ethic of stewardship rather than domination can, I believe, be fashioned. At the theological level, this is an important agenda.

At the sociological level, empirical research is needed to assess if specific religious factors played an important role or failed to play any role in actual behaviors of Christian persons in recent times. Empirical studies may help clarify the theological task.

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Notes

1. Lynn White, Jr. "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Science*, 155 (1967), 1203-1207. Quote on p. 1204.
2. Lewis W. Moncrief, "The Cultural Basis of Our Environmental Crisis," in *Western Man and Environmental Ethics*, ed. Ian G. Barbour (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1973), pp. 31-42. Rene Dubos, "A Theology of Earth," in Barbour, *ibid.*, pp. 43-54.
3. Lynn White, Jr., "Continuing the Conversation," in *Western Man and Environmental Ethics*, ed. Ian G. Barbour, pp. 55-65, especially p. 59.
4. Moncrief, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
5. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 41.
6. Loren Wilkinson, ed., *Earthkeeping: Christian Stewardship of Natural Resources* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), p. 209.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 209. Also see Richard H. Hiers, "Ecology, Biblical Theology, and Methodology: Biblical Perspectives on the Environment," *Zygon*, 19 (1984), 43-59.
8. E.g., Gabriel Fackre, "Ecology and Theology" in Ian G. Barbour, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 116-131; Robert L. Shinn, "Science and Ethical Decision: Some New Issues," *Earth Might Be Fair*, ed. Ian G. Barbour (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 123-45.
9. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribners, [1905]1958)
10. H. Paul Santmire, "Historical Dimensions of the American Crisis," *Western Man and Environmental Ethics*, ed. Ian G. Barbour, pp. 66-92.
11. Russell H. Welgel, "Ideological and Demographic Correlates of Proecology Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 103 (1977), 39-47.
12. Carl M. Hand and Kent D. Van Liere, "Religion, Mastery-Over-Nature, and Environmental Concern," *Social Forces*, 63 (1984), 555-70.
13. A. Lewis Rhodes, "Religion and Environmental Concern." Unpublished paper presented to the Society for the Study of Social Problems, 1985.
14. Ronald G. Shaiko, "Religion, Politics, and Environmental Concern: A Powerful Mix of Passions," *Social Science Quarterly*, 68 (1987), 244-62.
15. Douglas Lee Eckberg and T. Jean Blocker, "Varieties of Religious Involvement and Environmental Concerns: Elucidating and Testing the Lynn White Thesis." Unpublished paper, Winthrop College, SC, 1989.

Chapter XVIII Per Son, Society and Education

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The first part of this paper reviews briefly two theories of the self as person. The second contains my own rather extended visual presentation of the constitution of the human person and upon this model, what I see to be the basis of education. On this last point I try not to duplicate what has already been done quite very well by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy with its publication of *Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development*.¹

The third section outlines in broad theoretical terms the nature of the person's education *in* society. This section serves essentially as an introduction to two concrete cases of miseducation broadly described in the remaining two sections of the paper.

Two Theories of Person

My view of the constitution of the individual human person, specifically the "self as person" will reflect largely the theories of Thomas Aquinas and Aurobindo Ghose. Sri Aurobindo (d. 1950) might be considered the 20th-century integrator of Hindu thought. As St. Thomas had done for the 13th century, he endeavored to synthesize East and West.

Sri Aurobindo in his at once mystical, metaphysical and psychological vision of *Atman* ("Spirit" or "Self") sees the individual human person as a composite of a "higher" and a "lower half," that is, of a "divine element" (*Sat-Cit-Ananda*) and "nature" (*prakriti*). No Platonic or Cartesian bifurcation, however, is to be imputed here.

Furthermore, the divine element in each individual human is not the Absolute Divine Self (*Brahmanatman*); rather it is the "individual spirit-self" (*jivatman*) which is the individual's "true, or central being." The *jivatman* is self-existent or subsistent. But besides this self-existent being, it has a "second aspect" or "psychic being" (*caitya purusha*) This is the "self-as-soul," which is "in" and "behind" the individual's mental and vital and material manifestations.² Thus, according to Sri Aurobindo, the individual human person is a composite of "self" which is at once spirit and soul in Aristotle's sense of "form of matter" and vital principle, and of matter itself which is continuously or evolutionarily transformed.

For St. Thomas, the "self" in the strict sense of that which is at the core of the individual human person is the soul that subsists as spirit. Yet that same soul is understood also as the unifying and organizing principle-form which accounts for the body's being existing, living and human. Human materiality, therefore, cannot be identified with the "self as spirit-soul"; but it can be thought of only as a "cofactor," specifically a potentiality for the actualizing spirit-form.

What might be the "self" for Aquinas in the broad sense of that term? I would take it to be the entire human person conscious of itself and its acts. The person-self then is not a spirit in isolation but an "embodied spirit," a complete individual human being whose "spirit-soul" shares at once with its body the very act of existence it receives durationally from a durationless God, inasmuch as there is only one act of existence to each individual human person, despite the temporal unfolding or evolution of multiple operative powers and functions each human individual is truly one being and one "person-self".³

Both Sri Aurobindo and Aquinas would further claim the inner worth of the individual person-self as a distinct--though--not independent value from the social, the cosmic and the divine.

The Person and Education

A visual integration (see Figure A) of these two views would represent the integral human person as a circle whose center, area and circumference stand, respectively, for spirit (*spiritus*, *jivatman*), soul (*anima*, *caitya purusha*) and body. Each part is a distinguishable reality, yet neither the center point, nor the enclosed circular-shaped (formed) area, nor the circumference-line is by itself the entire circle; that is, by itself neither spirit, nor soul-mind, nor material body is the entire human being or whole person.

Just as the circumference as a one-dimensional curved line can move in but one direction at a time, so any formation, education or training of the body would have to respect this space-time limitation of the human person.

The circumference/body cannot be spoken of as the whole circle or even pointed to as a human body without the immediate presence of a shape or form which, like the enclosed area of the circle, gives shape to, supports, animates and is "behind" and "in" the body and its manifestations. This enclosed area or "soul-form" has two dimensions: it evolves in terms of "before" and "after". Thus, whatever cognitive, affective or operative mental formation or education could be effected with each individual person would have to take essential account of chronological order and the roles of memory and imagination.

The encircled area or embodied soul may be viewed also from two directions. Outward from the center, the area/soul is "behind" and immediately one with its circumscribing limit, the body. Inward from the circumference, it comes to the center of the person, which point is the spirit, pure and open, "observant of the whole,"⁴ one and somehow all. Without it there would be no starting point of the circle, no foundation of the person. It is the abiding source of an infinite number of possible, continuous irradiations--both outward and inward--which constitute the fulfillment of the human person within human society and beyond.

There is something paradoxical about this central core, or "spirit-self". As the "true central being" of each person it is a solid point of existence; it is unique and irrepeatable inasmuch as it is the center point of *this* and not *that*, nor of any other temporally and spatially formed or besouled human body. Yet as zero in dimension the center is open to infinity; in fact, it can be viewed as an open "hole" (as would be made by a schoolboy in circumscribing a circle with his compass). This is the center had by each human "circle".

This core opening or emptiness is freedom itself which among other things enables one to relate to beings of one's kind. Thus a society of free persons could be forming anywhere, at anytime, and be of whatever size. Furthermore, education as the individual personal formation of values within any society would be on-going. In any case, freedom appears to be the deepest value for the individual person, though to absolutize that core value could lead to great social evils.⁵

The spirit-center of each person is both an opening and an infinite source of three distinct types of irradiation. If the spirit-center is like a "spark of the Divine Fire," it lights, heats and burns. That is to say, this spiritual core irradiate the light of intellect, the warmth of will (or love) and the burning action of creative power.

Like three equally long hands of an imaginary clock, the spirit-self's infinite capacities of intellect, will and creativity can move indefinitely in any direction, overlap each other, align with one another, etc.; they are limited only in their outreach and their return to self by the dimensions

of space and time. From this metaphysico-psychological perspective a person can thus be defined, not just a being of intelligence and will or a being capable of understanding and loving, but as a being of intellect, will and creative power.

That "creativity" or "creative-ability" is an essential constituent of the individual person might be seen in the significance of the modern developments in the philosophical awareness of *praxis*, especially in Marxism, American Pragmatism, Existentialism and Wojtyla's own philosophy of action.

Furthermore, one might argue that if the human person was created in the image of a Trinitarian God, why should it be surprising if humans should exhibit creative powers along with capacities for wisdom and love? That creative power or force may be used either to "subdue" even "rape" the earth or to work with, "serve" and "preserve" it,⁶ since the created/creative power of every free creature can make a value of the "ugly" or the "beautiful".

In any event, in view of the person's value-formation in society and correspondingly, of society's transmission of its values there would seem to be a basis here not merely for an education that is cognitive and affective, intellectual and moral, but also for one that is practical and operative in content or coaching and motivative in method.

As the three irradiations of intellect, will and creative power seek truth, choose good and effect beauty, respectively, they could pair off in three ways: (a) intellect and will, (b) will and creativity, and (c) creativity and intellect.

When one sees clearly or vaguely that one does not and cannot know all truths and/or that something not directly or totally evident might be true but wills nonetheless to accept it as true, then he or she is laying down the axis for the formation of one's sphere of belief. This broad realm of values would concern education and would include not just religion but would also overlap directly the realms of positive knowledge such as science and history, and of morality.

When one wills deeply enough to affirm one's own being and world and uses one's creative powers to respond to each and any of them with delight, then the individual might be said to be setting down the axis on which the esthetic sphere rotates. This second realm of values is broad enough to include art and overlaps directly morality and work. This too is a concern of education.

Finally, when a Socrates or anyone having genuine fun employs creative power or energy along with intellect he or she may be said to be setting down the axis for the sphere of play. This third realm of values is broad enough to include much of philosophy and directly overlaps science and work. All these are concerns of education.

Furthermore, as the person's three powers of intellect, will and creativity radiate outward and back again to the central "self," various levels and forms of consciousness can be delineated in the "blank area" or "empty slate" which would be the "mind". The intellect with its functions of cognitive insight and understanding, lighting on the data of experience, can line up explicit conceptual and propositional forms of reason. The same light of intellect and range of reason can enlighten one's will to "straighten out" at least the more complex affective feelings and render them well-regulated emotions. An enlightened will and reasonably well-ordered emotions, in turn, can guide the creative use of one's power toward meeting needs and aligning drives.

Such are the psychic formations of conscious rational thoughts, conscious emotive feelings and conscious drives. (In figure A they are represented by the three equal and straight lines that together form a triangle within the big circle.)

At the intersection of intellect and reason, will and emotion, creativity and drive, it is possible to circumscribe, respectively, three other spheres of human values: viz., science, morality and work. "Science" is used here as a general term for the overlapping and concentric circles of

knowledge that deal with the physical and human-social world, use mathematics at the core of their respective methods, proceed by way of discovery and reasoned explanation, and accumulate positive knowledge within history. Morality is the sphere that directly involves volitions and emotions with respect to human valuations of right and wrong. Work is that sphere of human activity which arises from the creative spirit, is carried out by expending physical and mental energy, and is performed within the socio-cosmic framework for satisfying essentially the "survival needs".

Together with the other three major realms of value-esthetic, play and belief--science, morality and work thereby become the concern of education as the lifelong value-formation of the person. Society transmits its values precisely in these basic spheres. The six spheres of values overlap and revolve about the center-spirit of the person while being circumscribed within the spatio-temporal limits of the body. (In figure A they are represented by the six overlapping circles inside the bigger one.)

The body or physical structure, in turn, is represented (also in figure A) in three divisions or three circumferential arcs. First, the cognitive/neural senses (i. generic touch, ii. taste, iii. smell, iv. hearing and v. sight) are subtended within the sector of human cognition by the range of reason. Second, the affective/chemical "senses" (vi. anger,

vii. desire aversion, viii. daring-fear, ix. joy-sorrow and x. hope-despair) are subtended within the sector of affectivity by the range of primary emotions of the same names. Third, the "five senses of action" from Hindu psychology,⁷ (xi. evacuation--here changed to generic "survival sense" or need for air, water, food, waste elimination and rest; xii. locomotion, xiii. manipulation, xiv. procreation and xv. communication all using specifically evolved muscles) are subtended by the full range of drive within the sector of overt human action.

All the "fifteen senses", when operative and well-regulated, are crucial windows, conditions *sine qua non*, means and bases for education to take place. A community that cannot meet even the basic survival needs would not likely advance literacy or any cognitive development; the same applies to moral development and creativity.

Finally, at the junction of deep emotion and drive, opened up by the combined thrust of creativity and will in direct alignment with intelligence, an "angle" is formed that would represent the opening of art (angle "A" in figure A). At the heart of this way of life of a van Gogh is the channel of artistic intuition as a first major expression of the freedom of the spirit.

At the junction of drive and reason, opened up by the combined thrust of intellect and creativity in direct alignment with the moral will, there forms an "angle" that could represent the opening of philosophy (angle "B"). At the heart of this way of life of a Spinoza is the channel of metaphysical intuition as a second major expression of the freedom of the spirit.

At the junction of reason (at its limit) and the high emotion of hope, opened up by the combined thrust of intellect and will in direct alignment with creativity, a third "angle" is formed that could represent the opening of religion (angle "C"). At the heart of this way of life of a Mother Teresa is the channel of religious intuition as a third major expression of the freedom of the spirit.

Art, philosophy and religion as the three angles in the triangle are of no less concern to education, for they are the cornerstones of personal and society's culture and of civilization. The civilization that would survive and replace, dominate or define others is the one that has all of these three approaches to wisdom in their most explicit, distinct and sophisticated forms.

The model of the human person that has been presented so far is not intended to convey a static view and departmentalization of human powers and functions. The model if seen in motion

could as well represent the person as a "dynamic constellation of acts,"⁸ aiming at values of truth, goodness and beauty, just as the physicist's light can be viewed under two reconcilable aspects.

With this model the process of education or personal value-formation can be looked upon as consisting ideally in a balanced employment of one's intelligence, will and creativity. As an individual reaches outward intelligently, willfully and creatively to society and the world at large and then returns inward, values are formed. One is educable insofar as one can become a person of esthetic taste, at creative play and with intelligent belief; and insofar as one can develop a "scientific" head, a moral heart and productive hands. To be fully educated is ideally always to be "loving" wisdom in an artistic, philosophic and religious mode. If art, philosophy and religion are the great cornerstones of civilization, then the educated person is at least open to all of these. Correspondingly, inasmuch as education is society's transmission of its values, it is incumbent upon society to promote not only the intellectual but also the moral and the creative development of its members.

Furthermore, the task of educating on the part of the authority needs to be a work of love itself. Should any of the key ingredients of love, viz., confidence, care and communication with others, the world and oneself be missing or out of balance with the other ingredients, miseducation would result.

Education of the Person in Society

Can an individual be educated without society? If mankind started out and remained with only one individual human, or if after a nuclear holocaust only one were left alive, conceivably that one individual's process of forming, reforming and transforming values by and for oneself still could take place. Theoretically, an individual would be a person exercising intelligence, will and creative power without a community. As a free spirit or opening to infinity at one's core, even in the total absence of a human society the hypothetical single human could still seek communion with the cosmos at large or with an immanent-transcendent Divine, or keep company at least with one's own thoughts.

In reality, however, given human multiplicity, persons form society even while society forms persons. An ideal society might be defined as "a communion of persons seeking to fulfill their need to receive and to give". (A descriptive analysis, not provided here, of the person's "fifteen senses," and the potentially infinite outreach and intake of one's intellect, will and creative power along with Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs could clarify the nature not only of one's need to receive from society and nature, but no less of one's need to give to others and the world.) Thus, social responsibility and individual autonomy are not contradictory.⁹ In fact, the more truly a person becomes an individual, the higher the level attained by society.¹⁰

The process through which society and person shape each other is education. In practice this can only take place within society, whether the private society of husband and wife, the semi-private society of a couple with one child, or the ever broader and broader public society from a clan to a conceivable "family of mankind".¹¹ In each case education, as a lifelong process of personal value-formation and as society's transmission of its values is a complex activity involving interaction with others in a systematic way.

Where a given society is more bent on miseducation, malformation and deformation of the individual, individuals can use their intellect, will and creative energy to re-form or trans-form at least their own attitudes or, to bide their time where circumstances are all too constricting until changes occur or exposure to other societies materializes. No society can be totally a hindrance to

the formation of a person for one can still look upon even hindrance as a challenge to one's enlightened and creative will.

In fact, many, and perhaps most, societies do not, cannot, or would not provide positive conditions for education. Poverty alone in many countries does not allow for basic schooling. Underdeveloped countries barely support the required primary education. Affluent ones which have adopted twelve years of basic schooling may for decades fall lamentably short of carrying out or even planning an ideal program to prepare youngsters for college, let alone for real life education outside and beyond school. To understand these dynamics I would look briefly at two different circumstances from my own experience, namely, the Philippines and Dallas, Texas, where miseducation as malformation and deformation have led, in the words of *Candide*, to the three evils of "boredom, want, and vice,"¹² and where efforts at rediscovering values and renewing education have begun.

The Philippines: Values and Reconstruction

Unlike China and Japan, the Philippines was never a unified nation prior to the 16th-century European colonization. From this point on the diverse inhabitants of the seven-thousand plus islands which the Spaniards named *Las Filipinas* learned too well the role of subservient *persona*. After three and one-third centuries of Spanish rule, feudalism and factionalism were deeply ingrained, although imported Christianity is even now acknowledged as a positive value in this sole Christian country in Asia. The succeeding American tutelage (1900-1946) brought universal education and a democratic form of government, but the colonial mentality, continued factionalism and the absence of a single native language for education, government and commerce all militated against an effective and positive value-formation of the masses. The Japanese occupation of the Islands during the Second World War destroyed, among others, whatever tradition there was of altruistic leaderships in most segments of society. What followed the independence of 1946 was a line of presidents all too beholden to Washington and progressively more rapacious of the country's already abused resources. Inevitably, someone like Marcos would come to promote from the top a near total deformation of Filipino values.

Many Philippine values have turned out to be actually ambivalent. One such value, *utang na loob* ("debt of gratitude")¹³ has led both to lifelong fidelity to others and to nepotism of even the insidious type as Marcos' cronyism. It has taken the form too of customary appointments of well-connected but unqualified public teachers.

Another Philippine value is *bahala na* or *Bahala na ang Maykapal* ("It's up to divine providence.")¹⁴ Often it has devolved from genuine trust in God to careless and irresponsible risk taking, a false sense of resignation and fatalism. This has been the root of national apathy and collective paralysis of action; particularly during the Marcos dictatorship it took the form of national frustration, helplessness and despair. But the same trust in divine providence also steeled the hearts of hundreds of thousands who stopped soldiers and tanks in their tracks with rosaries and flowers during the four days of the February, 1986 "non-violent revolution," and toppled the Philippine equivalent of European autocrats of bygone days.

Along with *bahalana*, another value, *katamtaman lamang* (*In medio stat virtus*; the "Golden Mean") enabled the masses of both rich and poor to learn quickly the lesson of non-violence from Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Benigno Aquino, all martyred educators in their own societies and symbols for the world at large.

Today during the period of Philippine reconstruction, calls are being made for a "value-framework" in the re-education of the people. A Jesuit educator proposes an additional compulsory seventh and eighth grade "education that would develop the human person *as a self* (physical, intellectual, moral, esthetic and religious)...to prepare the Filipino as a person *in community*."¹⁴ Such values as *katotohanan*, *kalayaan* and *katarungan* ("Truth, Freedom and Justice") which were nonexistent during the Marcos regime are the essential value-goals of the human person's intellect, will and creativity within the realms of science, morality, work, and esthetic, play and faith spheres. There are two very distinct words for "we" in the present Philippine national language (1) *kami* ("we," not including "you" and "yours"); and (2) *tayo* ("we" including "you" and "yours"). As *kami* has been overplayed, a national Philippine program of value-formation or re-education does well to start, as in the new Constitution, with this significant linguistic. There is finally a realization that Filipinos, in or out of formal schooling, need to discover the values of *tayo* as a "we" that is an ever enlarging, not terminally factional, "family."

Dallas, Texas

The sixth or seventh largest city in the nation, situated on a low plain several hundreds of miles from the nearest sea or mountain, Dallas is not quite blessed with a geography or climate that invites its inhabitants occasionally to raise their sights higher than the dull, hot, humid plain, or in moments of distress to be lulled by a cool breeze and the undulating rhythm of an ocean. There is essentially only one game played in town; it is business. The protestant work ethic seems to be the only ethic. Even the fundamentalist religion of this "buckle of the Bible Belt" has arguably turned into mere "negotiation with the Lord."

The city population that doubled to one million in some twenty years and the total three million plus that filled the metropolitan area within the same period were mostly newcomers attracted by plentiful employment, and trained, if at all, to do a specialized job. Palpably missing, even now, is a general humanistic education and its ideally developed universal learning skills.

The newly arrived and the newly born have been met with no comprehensive city planning in education at least for the first twelve grades or in creative play. Most had no family tradition of higher education. To plan and provide for their eighteen year-old in college has simply not been a high-priority, if a value at all, among most middle and lower class white citizens of the Dallas County--certainly among the poorer African- and Mexican-Americans who were literally left with the entire jobless southern half of the city. The city is most like a third-world country, for real wealth and power are still in the hands of less than five percent of the people there.

Lately, after the oil bust, Dallas is second only to Washington, D.C. in the rate of murders related to drugs. For several years it has been ahead of all major cities in minority slaying by the police force. The usual academic and disciplinary city school problems are not quite as obvious as those in New York city, when students enter the system of the Dallas County Community College District previous miseducation and mal formation become evident.

The Dallas Community College system of seven strategically located colleges (total enrollment: 55,000 credit students; 50,000 non-credit; open-door admission policy) is almost literally the only mass educator in the county. A few other higher institutions in the area are all generally too small, specialized, elitist or even factionalist to touch the entire local population. In almost every one of the seven Dallas county community colleges one could observe in the concrete the effects of the failure of the U.S. universal twelve-year schooling that Mortimer Adler and his

Paideia Group has bemoaned more systematically and publicly since their Paideia Proposal of 1982.

In an "Introduction to Philosophy" class, for example, as much as ninety-five percent of the enrollees clearly have not attained what Adler outlines as the three goals of basic schooling.¹⁵ Specifically, (a) previous acquisition of the basic information for a citizen, (b) some developed intellectual or learning skills, and (c) some enlargement of the understanding with regard to ideas and values at least of democracy cannot be presupposed. One out of four in the class might be there simply to fill a gap in their schedule. Upon notice of a first exam, or a required paper or reading, twenty-five percent of the class might disappear. A second quarter of the class might think they did not need philosophy, especially if evolution would be discussed, for they already have their answers from their religion. They might thus complain to the wrong people for the wrong reason, and quietly drop out of the course. The third quarter, or as many as half, show genuine interest; but their two jobs, their spouse on the run, a sick child, a job schedule, a change location, a newly-purchased \$10,000 car which keeps them from purchasing the \$20 textbook, or a simply inability to acquire the skills needed to do college work would keep many from completing the course. The one out of four that is "most proximately" educable might still need much assistance to develop intellectual skills (hence the coaching-motivating method of teaching), to acquiring the basic information (hence, the continuing didactic method of instruction), and to deepen their understanding of ideas and values (hence, the maieutic or Socratic method of questioning and discussion).

But it is from this last group that new leaders of the Texas middle class and minorities can emerge. Many have confidently moved on to out-of-town, even out-of-state, universities, have continued to learn from larger and larger society, have reached such professions as law and medicine, or are even now are still striving to become good educators back in town.

Akin to the pursuit of religious values which took Western missionaries in colonization times and lately, to third world countries, education can find in much of Dallas County a veritable mission territory. It is a challenge and a privilege to help provide educational opportunities to those almost as equally deprived as many in third world countries. In such places as Dallas are to be found many of the "paradoxical poor" amidst the show or simply under the shadow, of wealth and the havoc wrought by it on the human--not to mention the natural-resources. Despite the travails of helping bring forth freedom, it is rewarding to be able to assist fellow members of society (and oneself) to the new, or renewed, light of an open religious study, philosophy and of art. The values science, morality and work (and the limits especially of the latter) are further values that can be transmitted, reformed as need be and transformed from generation to generation. It is good to hear or at least hope, that young and old can now temper their personal freedom or rugged individualism, with social responsibility.

A state-mandated program, TASP (Texas Academic Skills) is now being implemented. It is designed to ensure that all students attending public institutions of higher education in Texas have the reading, mathematics and writing skills necessary to perform effectively in college-level coursework. Much debated in previous years, this program has put the necessary pressure on education at lower levels to produce better prepared high school graduates and may now temporarily delay the academically unprepared in enrolling in college until they pass the required tests. All this appears to be a good beginning.

Concluding Summation

The essence of education is the same, whether in the first, second or third worlds. It is the "bringing forth" through, with and in freedom of the person's deepest potentials for truth, good and beauty. It is the process whereby the person and any society, from the smallest to the largest, the most oppressive or the most uplifting, can shape each other. When a perpetual seeker and traveler finally realizes that, given present human nature and the necessary imperfection of anything less than a perfect Creator, there cannot be a best possible world, and that the way of life that makes sense--or the way of wisdom--is not just theory and talk, but through action,¹⁶ then one can initially "lower expectations"¹⁷ and help form a "smaller" and more fulfilling society. Theoretically, if absolutely necessary, one could keep one's own company without thereby ceasing to pursue one's own value-formation or education through interaction with the larger cosmos and a possible Divine Other.

Just because the person's basic concrete interaction with society is work, it does not mean that as a free creative spirit one cannot jump to the sphere of play or any of the six overlapping, moving spheres or realms of value, and in so doing make like one "confluence of action" in a dance (Sanskrit, *lila*). One may glide infinitely around and about the center point of one's concentricity with the cosmos at large and the Divine All. Or at least with respect to ecology one could learn for oneself the value of the "democracy of all . . . creatures,"²⁰ instead of tyranny over all.

On the other hand, the present community of societies could conceivably evolve into a real "family of mankind" at peace, wherein as in an ideal family, every newborn consciousness could more fully become a free person through education or growth in confidence, care and communication, i.e., through love wed to wisdom and action.

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Notes

1. George McLean, Frederick Ellrod, David Schindler and Jesse Mann, eds., *Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundation for Moral Education and Character Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, 1986).

2. *The Teaching of Sri Aurobindo* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1966), pp. 25-26. See also Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1982), pp. 218-239.

3. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, qq. 75-77 (Cambridge, England: Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1966).

4. S. Radhakrishnan, tr., *The Bhagavad-Gita*, ch. 13 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948). Also see S. Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore, eds., "Bṛhadāranyaka Upanishad," *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), p. 84.

5. This theme was developed very well by Gia No dia in his paper "Humanism and Freedom," delivered in the seminar Person and Society, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.: Spring 1989.

6. Dean R. Hoge, "Judeo-Christian Values and Ecological Crisis," Seminar: Person and Society.

7. Radhakrishnan Sarvepalli and Charles A. Moore, eds., "Prasna Upanishad," *A Sourcebook*, pp. 50-51.

8. Stephen Schneck, "Max Scheler's Personalism and Bourgeois Liberalism," Seminar: Person and Society.

9. This was pointed out by Professor Richard Graham in the second meeting of the Seminar: Person and Society.
10. George McLean, "Notions of Person and Self-Realization," Seminar: Person and Society.
11. This idea of an ever widening society was well illustrated in Atomate Epas-Ngan's paper "Solidarity and Power in the Mbun Traditional Culture," Seminar: Person and Society.
12. Voltaire, *Candide* (New York: Penguin Books, 1947), p.143.
13. Vitaliano R. Garospe, S.J., *Filipino Values Revisited* (Manila: National Book Store, Inc., 1988) pp. 30-32.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
16. Mortimer J. Adler, *The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), pp. 22-32.
17. Voltaire, *Candide*, p. 144.
18. This was pointed out by John Kromkowski, in the course of his presentation of "Candide and The Place of the Person in Society," Seminar: Person and Society.
19. This was developed well by Asen Davidov in his paper "On the Problem of the Relation Between The Person and Society," Seminar: Person and Society.
20. Hoge, "Judeo-Christian Values."

Chapter XIX

International Migration to Washington Conflict, Margination or Structural Integration?

Timothy Re Ady

There exists in Washington, D.C. a large and growing population which recently has come to the city from parts of the world that have been upset by war and economic dislocation. Unlike the international elites who are affiliated with the embassies and institutions like the World Bank, the international migration of many of these newcomers largely has been motivated by acute "push factors." Although not always the only motivating factors, the threat of violence and the desperate economic circumstances which often are associated with it have influenced the decisions of many to leave behind family members, friends and the lives they had known in their native countries. These migrants have been forced to create for themselves a new life in an unfamiliar society. By far, the largest number have come from El Salvador in search of a safe haven--virtually in the shadow of the White House.

Upon their arrival, they were faced with many challenges. Among the most difficult were: securing the basic material necessities such as food, shelter and clothing; unfamiliarity with the English language and urban North American culture; adjusting to the absence of loved ones; and, trying to cope with all of the above while (for many) not being recognized as legal residents of the United States. These problems are illustrated by the story of Felipe, who at the age of 14, left his home in rural El Salvador . Felipe, the second of eight children in a family of peasant farmers, did not care about his destination when he left home in 1979. All he wanted was to find a safe place to live. His older sister previously had left El Salvador and had found her way to Houston. When Felipe departed, he already had been out of school for three years because the school had been blown up by a bomb. Below, he describes his recollections of what was happening in El Salvador before he left, and how he was forced to grow up early as he sought refuge in Washington.

Felipe: My father was a farmer. He used to work about seven or eight acres. Mostly he planted beans and corn, and some watermelon. . . . The way that we managed it--to have eight kids and [only my father] working--was to sell some of the beans and corn at the end of the year. We would keep the [food that] we needed for that year and sell the rest to buy stuff for the house. . . . We were poor, but my dad never believed in working for somebody else.

[Back then] I never really thought about coming to the U.S. All I wanted to do was to get out of the country to a peaceful place. I was a young person and a male, and they put all kinds of different threats on me. I wasn't really concerned about being drafted by the guerrillas because I had a little bit more understanding of what was going on in my area with the people. I was more concerned about the army drafting me. I had friends who were with the guerrillas. I knew that unless I wanted to join them, there was no pressure to join them

Basically, I don't think anybody wanted to leave El Salvador or come to the U.S. in the first place. Maybe 5% wanted to get out and go to the U.S., but with the situation that we were being put in at that time, I would say that the majority of the people decided they had to leave. . . . There are so many immigrants here [in Washington] like me who came because of the war. It's not that everyone was persecuted. It doesn't matter whether you were involved or not involved. The truth of the matter is that anytime anybody could start shooting on the street and you could be caught in the crossfire. This was my biggest nightmare because I saw these things happen. This group started opening fire against the police and the police started firing back. Everything went crazy. And then

the police come back and they just go after anybody who looks suspicious. So you see, you don't have to be involved in anything political.

First, I went to Mexico City where I stayed for about three months. There wasn't hardly anything there [for me] at all. I used up all the money that I brought from home. My sister, who was living in Houston, sent me more money down there, but there was no life for me in Mexico. It was like a dead end. I was on my own, so I needed to work. That is why I left Mexico and came [to the United States]. If the war hadn't started, maybe I would have come to the U.S. to visit someday, but not to stay. You are so used to your homeland, it is very hard to leave.

When Felipe left Mexico City, he went to Houston, but soon found that he was unable to find a way to support himself there, either. The only alternative he could think of was to move on to Washington where a family friend, a former priest, was living. When he arrived in the city, the friend put Felipe in contact with others who gave him shelter.

[Not being able to find a way to live] was a shock. I left Houston because there was no work. Then I came up here to Washington and I met this guy. He said, 'I am living in a very cozy apartment with one kid and my wife but I know these people who are trying to help Salvadorans, Central Americans, anybody who is coming from a country that is in conflict. . . .' They wanted to take people who left because of the war situation, but not people who came here just because they wanted to make money. Well, I wasn't working back [in El Salvador and] I didn't come here to look for work either. But I did have to find a way to live. . . .

When I first got to Washington I really needed help. The people that I stayed with took me as a refugee. The situation was that I could stay with them for two months after I got a job, but then I had to move to my own apartment. . . . I found a job the third day after I got here, but with my income, there was no way I could support myself in an apartment. So I needed more time before I could find my own place. I asked them if they knew of someone who could help. They said, 'yes.' They told me about this Christian house. They wanted me to become a member of it.¹ . . .

They said to me, 'We noticed that you are very helpful to these other people here.' Some of them are really down when they come from El Salvador. One of the problems that they have is with drinking. So I tried to . . . find out why they were drinking. I got very involved with their lives trying to help them out. [The members of the house] told me that that is what they did--try to help people out. So they asked me, 'Why don't you stay with us?' That's how I got involved with the house. Once I became a member, I kept my job, paid my rent, my food and everything.

Felipe continued to live there for the next two years and he enrolled in high school at the Multicultural Career Intern Program (MCIP). Although he dropped out of MCIP, he later earned a high school equivalency certificate (GED). He also completed a training program in electronics repair at a public vocational school. Although he was an illegal alien when he arrived in Washington in 1981, like most participants in this study, he later became a permanent resident of the United States. In 1988, Felipe was married, the father of three children, and earning a good income from his job in a company that repairs broadcast-quality video equipment for professional production companies. He was contemplating going into business for himself.

For Felipe, the social support network that he found in Washington was crucial for his ability to establish himself in his new environment. Indeed, as will be described below, the social support of friends, family, community organizations and school was a key factor for the adaptation of virtually all the youths in this study, a finding consistent with many other studies of the psychological and social adjustment of migrants.²

In this paper, we will examine how a group of young Latino immigrants, most of them refugees from Central America, have adjusted to U.S. society since their arrival in the early 1980s.

We will examine the role of social support and access to educational and employment opportunities for the evolution of their personal and ethnic identities as they became accustomed to living in a new environment. The discussion is based on research conducted with 181 Latino youths who were first contacted in 1982 when they were attending a Washington, D.C. high school called the MC IP. The 181 Latino youths were among 250 students from Latin America, Asia and Africa who were attending the school at that time and who participated in a study of the psychological and social adaptation of immigrant adolescents. In 1988, an effort was made to locate and interview as many as possible of the 181 Latinos from the previous study. The purpose of the 1988 project, known as the Crossroads study, was to learn as much as possible about how these youths, over a period of six years, had made the passage from being immigrant adolescents to young adult members of a minority group known to other Washingtonians as Hispanics or Latinos.

Personal Coherence and Sociocultural Change

Human adaptation is a creative endeavor which entails the active involvement of people-psycho-biological beings interacting with each other in small groups comprised of friends and family, in segments of society defined by ethnicity and class, and in society as a whole. Unlike other species that can only react to threats posed by the environment in very limited and biologically preordained ways, human beings have the capacity to respond creatively to the most difficult of challenges. Those challenges may be evaluated as threatening or, alternatively, as stimulating in a positive way. The manner in which people evaluate life challenges is of critical importance for successful adaptation.² How they are evaluated depends not only upon the nature of the challenges, but also upon culturally informed definitions and understandings about them, and the material, social and psychological resources available to respond to them.⁴ When a person understands (or thinks he does) the challenges that he faces, and has available the economic, social, and psych chic resources to address them, then he may be said to have a sense of coherence.⁵

It should not be surprising that people who have been exposed to acute trauma (e.g., warfare, personal violence, natural disaster) or chronically high levels of stress (e.g., family dysfunction, social dislocation, or the presence of ongoing threats to physical security) would be considered "at risk" for a variety of physical, psychological and social disorders. However, many who are exposed to high levels of stress are capable of successful adaptation despite all their adversities. Those who successfully adapt even in the most unsettling of circumstances somehow maintain a coherent understanding of themselves in relation to their environment. The concept of coherence is central to the understanding of how people manage stress.

Healthy human adaptation is characterized by the maintenance of homeostatic equilibrium between human beings and their biological, social and material environments.⁶ Maintenance of this equilibrium largely depends on the intended and unintended consequences of the purposeful human actions of people, individually and as members of larger collectivities. In contrast to the adaptation of other species, the interaction between *homo sapiens* with his environment is regulated by culture. While biology informs other species about the nature of their environments and how to act within them, *homo sapiens* must rely upon his cultural heritage shared with other members of his society.

Traditionally, culture has been understood as all the knowledge that is learned and shared by the members of a society, and passed on from generation to generation.⁷ However, as the political, social and economic interdependence of people in the contemporary world has increased, cultural

boundaries increasingly have become blurred. Cultures always have been susceptible to change due to causes such as environmental pressures, military conflict, changes in the system of production, and inconsistencies between the existing social structure and the cultural framework that legitimizes it.⁸ There is little doubt, however, that the pace of change has accelerated in modern times as peoples of different cultural traditions increasingly come into contact with each other. Contact between peoples guided by different interests and values may lead to conflict or accommodation. The stability of prevailing patterns of social life may be undermined, particularly when parties of differing levels of social power interact.

The changes that have been occurring in Central America and elsewhere in the hemisphere during the 1980s have led many of the inhabitants of that region to conclude that their current way of life no longer was viable or, at best, offered little chance to realize hopes for the future.⁹ Most of the youths in this study were uprooted from their homes in that region. They abandoned the familiar surroundings of their native countries for a strange and distant land. As stated by a twenty year-old single mother from El Salvador in 1982, shortly after she arrived in the United States:

My country is very poor and it is very difficult to make a career. But here, there are many opportunities to achieve something for the future, or survive.

A thesis of this study is that the degree of success that study participants experienced in their adaptation was related to their capacity to reconstruct a coherent image of themselves in their new society. Their school and local community organizations reconstructed for these displaced youths a stable social network within which they learned that they could participate in a sustainable pattern of healthy, productive and rewarding social interaction in their new society.

Personal Identity, Ethnicity and Structural Integration

For the purposes of this discussion, three alternative patterns of participation for economically poor immigrants (and many impoverished members of indigenous minorities) may be described: co-equal participation, marginalization and conflict. In the case of co-equal participation, society's educational, social and economic institutions are structured so as effectively to recruit persons from all segments of society, regardless of their ethnic or cultural identities. Criteria for participation in the core economic and social institutions of a society would not favor, officially or unofficially, one racial or ethnic group over another. In the case of co-equal participation, newcomers and indigenous minorities are likely to conclude that it is in their interest to acquire the knowledge and skills that would allow them to take advantage of the opportunities that exist beyond the boundaries of their own group. In turn, persons of the majority culture would not require them to negate their ethnic identities nor mask distinctive forms of ethnic cultural expression in order to become full participants in the institutions of the society, at large.

In the case of the second alternative, marginalization, members of minority groups find that access to desirable jobs paying adequate wages is difficult, and that, individually and collectively, they face overt or subtle forms of prejudice. The perceived improbability of being recognized as worthy and respected participants in the wider society may lead to the entrapment of marginalized groups in long-term poverty. Because they perceive that their efforts to participate on an equal basis in the institutions of the wider society would be fruitless, they often conclude that efforts to do so would be unproductive. Even if successful, such efforts would be interpreted by others as a rejection of one's peers and denial of ethnic heritage.¹⁰⁻¹² Many marginalized youths may become engrossed in peer based activities yielding immediate gratification, but which are irrelevant to, if

not inconsistent with, their emergence from poverty. Some may become part of an urban underclass, increasingly plagued by crime and other forms of social pathology.¹³

The third alternative form of participation for immigrant and ethnic minorities in the wider society is conflict. Like marginalization, conflict often is the result of the same tendency of social and economic institutions of a society to discriminate or, at best, to be insensitive to the needs and interests of minorities. When members of immigrant and indigenous ethnic group perceive that they have been cut off from opportunities in the wider society, their ethnic solidarity may be reinforced due to common identification with their struggle to promote group interests. Through their participation in the common struggle to improve their group status, individual identities become closely identified with a powerfully politicized and emotionally charged ethnic identity.¹⁴ Indeed, new ethnic identities may emerge in the political process through the coalescence of interests of otherwise diverse peoples.¹⁵ Thus, people come to identify their personal interests with those of the ethnic group as it engages in a principled struggle. The ethnic struggle may be relatively peaceful, as with the civil rights movement in the U.S. under the leadership of Martin Luther King, or violent, as exemplified by the many cases of ethnic warfare that occur all too often throughout the world.

As will be described below, the program design and educational philosophy of MCIP facilitated co-equal participation of immigrant youths in U.S. society. It promoted the structural integration of its students without forcing them to abandon their ethnic identities. Despite the presence of serious political, economic and cultural barriers, MCIP helped to establish a congruent relationship between the students' interests as individuals, as members of variously defined ethnic groups, and as participants in the broader community of metropolitan Washington. By creating linkages between the newcomers and the major economic and social institutions of the city, MCIP facilitated meaningful participation in the host society and enabled most to avoid becoming trapped in the poverty in which most lived when they first arrived in the city.

The School and Its Students

As was the case with Felipe, whose story was previously presented, most newcomers to Washington have been relatively successful in finding employment in low paying service and manual jobs. Most of these jobs pay low wages and offer little prospect for upward mobility.¹⁶⁻¹⁷ It is unlikely that young Latinos growing up in the city would find such jobs attractive as their frame of reference shifts from their country of origin to life in the United States. Unless they get a good education, better jobs will not be available.

Nationwide, nearly 50% of Hispanics leave school before completing high school. The foreign-born and persons whose first language is not English are especially at risk of not receiving an education that is adequate to prepare them to participate in the U.S. economy.¹⁸⁻¹⁹ Recognizing the need to educate the growing population of Spanish speaking and other newcomers, a group of Washington Latinos, with the sponsorship of SER, (Service, Employment and Redevelopment--an organization affiliated with the League of United Latin American Citizens), founded the Multicultural Career Intern Program (MCIP) in 1980. MCIP is a career oriented high school which adopted the Career Intern Program model (CIP) that previously had been developed to serve low income black youths who were considered to be at risk of dropping out of school.²⁰ Originally funded as a demonstration project of the U.S. Department of Labor, MCIP was the first application of the CIP model for recent immigrants, most of whom were Spanish speaking.²¹ In addition to the

Spanish speaking majority, also attending the school were groups of students from countries such as: Haiti, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the islands of the English speaking Caribbean.

When first contacted in 1982, 85% of the 181 original Latino study participants had been in the city less than two years. Seventy-three percent came from Central America, with Salvadorans comprising 77% of the Central Americans and 54% of the study population. The only country outside of Central America represented in the study population by more than four persons was the Dominican Republic. The remaining 17% of the population came from 14 other Latin American countries. Ninety-one percent of respondents indicated that they hoped someday to return to live in their country of origin. By 1988, however, only 7% had done so.

Table 1--Country of Origin

COUNTRY	N	%
EL SALVADOR	98	54%
GUATEMALA	18	10%
NICARAGUA	8	4%
HONDURAS	3	2%
PANAMA	4	3%
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	19	10%
OTHER	31	17%
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	181	100%

As previously indicated, Latino study participants generally were of low socioeconomic status. Fifty-one percent of the students reported that neither of their parents had completed as much as 12 years of schooling. Twenty-four percent indicated that at least one of their parents had completed high school. One fourth indicated that a parent had obtained some post-secondary education. Although most informants came from modest backgrounds in the countries of origin, the parents of some were professionals or business persons. For such persons, emigration usually led to a drastic decline in occupational status. Of students who stated the occupation of their fathers when they still lived in their countries, 25% indicated that their fathers were involved in agriculture, mostly as peasant farmers. Sixty-five percent of study participants responded to this question about paternal employment prior to migration.

Only 31% of the students responded to the question regarding their father's employment in Washington. Of the 57 persons who did respond, most indicated that their fathers worked in construction (13), as busboys (6), chefs (7), or in housekeeping and building maintenance (7). None were involved in business, and only eight worked either as professionals or para-professionals. It was learned through interviews that most of the persons who did not respond to questions about parental employment did so because the parent did not live with his or her child.

Table 2--Father's Occupation in Country of Origin and in Washington

Occupation	Homeland	Washington
Agriculture	29	25% 0 0%
Non-Agricultural		
Labor	33	28% 39 68%

Service 15 13% 10 18%
 Professional 24 20% 8 14%
 Business 17 4% 0 0%

 118 100% 57 100%

Most of the mothers who were involved in business in their countries were small scale retail merchants who sold food or other goods from "puestos" or stands in the local markets. The large number of youths who indicated that their mothers were housewives in their native countries contrasts sharply with the occupational status of the mothers in Washington. Nearly half of the 98 mothers whose occupations were reported were employed as domestic workers in Washington. Many also were employed as domestic workers in Washington. Many also were employed cleaning office buildings and hotels. Seventy-five percent responded to questions regarding their mother's employment in their countries of origin compared to only 54% in Washington.

Table 3--Mother's Occupation in Country of Origin and in Washington

Occupation Homeland Washington

Agriculture 9 7% 0 0%
 Non-Agricultural
 Labor 22 16% 79 81%
 Service 19 14% 9 9%
 Professional 18 13% 4 4%
 Business 13 10% 0 0%
 Housewife 54 40% 6 6%

 135 100% 98 100%

Washington, of course, is not the only city in the United States that experienced a wave of migration from Central America and other parts of the world in the 1980s. Nor is MCIP necessarily unique in regards to the formidable challenges facing its students. What is of interest here is how this school established functional linkages between the newcomers and potential sources of employment through career oriented instruction and internships. In addition, the school facilitated the development of a multicultural ethic and multicultural community. Programmatically, three factors gave MCIP its unique character:

- (1) MCIP made a deliberate attempt through the curriculum and extra-curricular activities to create a multicultural community, thereby engendering tolerance and respect for the diverse linguistic and cultural traditions of the students and others.
- (2) The school maintained a nurturing atmosphere through its counselling program and the empathetic involvement of its multicultural staff in addressing both academic and non-academic needs.
- (3) MCIP emphasized career training and experiential learning through internships.

Multiculturalism and Community Education

As schooling can be considered a subset of general cultural learning or enculturation, and cultures are assumed to be associated with specific communities, societies or nations,²² it is useful to pose the question: What is the social context with which this school is associated? When study participants entered MCIP as students, they interacted primarily with peers of the same nationality. As time passed, however, social interaction more frequently crossed ethnic lines. MCIP, provided the social context in which youths of various cultures and nationalities continually interacted over a period of three to four years. For many of these uprooted youths, MCIP becomes something of a "global village"--a multicultural home away from home. It was more than just an institution charged with the task of formally educating students. It becomes the nexus for the creation of a multicultural community based on an ongoing pattern of enactment of affectively charged roles within the formal and informal structures of the school. Respect and appreciation for one's own ethnic or cultural identity as well as for peoples of other cultures was an implicit premise of the curriculum and extracurricular activities. MC IP communicated an important message to its students that all too often is not received by immigrant and indigenous minorities; that is, that mastery of skills necessary to function in the wider society does not imply the rejection of ethnicity as a core component of personal identity.

One example of how MCIP promoted a multicultural model for participation in society was the school's 1987 commemoration of Martin Luther King's birthday. MCIP students, together with Afro-American youths from an adjacent school, held a workshop in observance of the newly established national holiday. The life and teachings of Martin Luther King were described in the context of the struggle for civil rights in the American South by an Afro-American professor who participated in that struggle. After King's life and work were described, students and adult presenters discussed the relevance of King's message in the context of the countries from which the students migrated (e.g., El Salvador , Haiti, South Africa), as well as in relation to the current circumstances of the youths and their families in the United States. The workshop increased mutual understanding among students of different nationalities about each other, and facilitated the development of empathy for the problems that each faced.

M CIP also put on programs in which the students performed the music and dance of their native countries. The youths performed not only for other students at the school, but for the public, as well. Programs were presented at places such as the headquarters of the U.S. Department of the Treasury before an audience that included the Secretary of the Treasury, at the Commerce Department, and at the Organization of American States. Performances also were held for the public on the grounds of the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. Activities such as these not only helped develop the multicultural community at MCIP but helped to educate the Washington public about the newcomers in their midst.

Nurturing

MCIP placed a heavy emphasis upon guidance services and benefitted from a highly motivated staff of teachers and counselors. As the students attempted to adapt to a strange environment, language and culture as well as to the demands of school and the exigencies of securing the most basic material necessities, teachers and counselors provided psychological, academic and practical assistance. Even students who expressed some dissatisfaction with the school usually mentioned at least one teacher or counselor who helped them or their family find housing or a job, or who otherwise got involved in helping the student in a way which was perceived as extraordinary. The nurturing atmosphere of the school was due, in part, to the fact

that the teachers and counselors were bilingual and bicultural, many having come from the same countries as the students.

Perception of the school as an accessible place in which one could become involved and find camaraderie and personal support in the face of various challenges engendered a sense of loyalty and belonging. Such a climate created a positive incentive for the students to conform to the values that the school promoted and to avoid some of the more dysfunctional attractions tempting urban youth. Below, Jaime describes how an M CIP counsellor helped him through serious adjustment problems.

Jaime: He left rural El Salvador in 1981 at the age of 17, where he had been living with his mother and a younger sister in a town in the southwestern part of the country. His mother was employed by the government as a public health nurse. Because of frequent combat in the area where they lived, Jaime's mother pleaded with him to leave the country. She suggested that he could stay with his cousins who were living in Washington, D.C. Although reluctant to leave, Jaime followed his mother's advice and began the journey north. Travelling alone, he crossed Guatemala, Mexico and 2,000 miles of the United States. In Washington, Jaime stayed for a short while with his cousins, whom he had never met before, and then moved in with some other youths from El Salvador.

Jaime soon found his first job in Washington as a dishwasher at a downtown restaurant. He was paid \$1.20 per hour for a 50 hour week. After a year of work, he told his boss that he wanted to go to school, and would like to work fewer hours. According to Jaime, his boss told him, "Fine, but find somebody else to work your day shift. Instead of \$60 a week, we will only pay you half." Jaime went on to explain:

I agreed. I found someone to take my day shift and they started to pay me \$30 for the 35 hours a week that I worked at night. Then they said that they needed someone to work both days and nights, so they laid me off.

Before he lost his job, Jaime was earning less than a dollar an hour. After a very difficult month in which his roommates bought him food and paid his portion of the rent, he found another job, this time as a busboy, and settled into a routine similar to that followed by many other students at his school. Monday through Friday, he attended classes from nine o'clock in the morning until three o'clock in the afternoon and then went to work from four until eleven o'clock at night. He also worked weekends.

Having worked during his first year in Washington under blatantly exploitative conditions before being laid off, having no close family in the area, (he did not get along with his cousins), and then beginning a grueling routine of school and work that left practically no time for relaxation, it is not surprising that Jaime began having difficulties. Below, he describes some of his problems and the role a school counselor played in helping him make the adjustments that were necessary for him to live in an urban environment in the United States.

Miriam Figueroa is now my friend but she used to be my counselor. She was helpful not only in motivating me and telling me how hard things are, but also that you really have to struggle in order to make it. She helped me a lot when I really got screwed up. I would get on a bus and wonder what all those other people were thinking about me. Like, 'that is just an Indian sitting there--a stupid guy.' Certain prejudices people have, it's true, but I was getting sick because of the things I was seeing . . . things I never saw in my country. We have racial problems [in El Salvador] but not as bad as here. I was seeing things from a racial point of view, but not from other points of view. I used to talk to Miriam about it and she used to understand. She helped me realize that I'm

not the only one here in this situation. That's all I thought of after a while. There are so many other people who may feel like me, Latinos as well as many other nationalities. Now I don't think about it at all. I still notice things, but I just don't think about it. . . .

At one point, I just felt like giving up--that was when my mother was in big trouble. You know the situation in El Salvador. . . . She was riding a bus from one town to another. That bus got massacred. Twenty-five people got killed and about ten people were hurt, wounded. My mother, of all the people, came out OK, with no wounds. My mother said, 'I just prayed to God.' She is not religious, but that's what she did. That's what she thought helped, and that's what I think sometimes, too. See, my mother is big. She is not a person who can move, go on the floor and move this way and that way. She escaped unharmed just by luck. I heard the news and I felt bad, but I said to myself, 'thanks God, it is over.'

But it wasn't over. After that she got moved to another clinic near the border with Honduras. [In her work as a nurse] she had to move back and forth through the mountains to another town--and I heard that the guerrillas wanted to kidnap her. They wanted her to help treat the wounded, the sick in their camps. Well, for a long time I kept hearing that everything was fine--but I was worried. Finally, in 1984, she got kidnapped. They took her to some town. She didn't know where she was because they put a bandage over her eyes. . . . I started thinking about her and my little sister. She was only eight. I got sick, I got sick really bad. Not sick physically, but psychologically, because I didn't know what to do. But I always say that one has to be realistic. I knew they wouldn't kill her. I knew they wanted to have her [nursing] services.

I talked with Miriam, my counselor. But then I began thinking, 'After all, we all die one day or the other.' I felt bad and I cried, and I was mostly worried for my sister. That weekend, two days after I heard the news, I decided to go dancing. Sounds crazy, but I decided to go to a discotheque and dance. I knew my mother was disappeared, but I knew that if I stayed at home, I would get sicker and more depressed. So I went dancing, and I was dancing when my cousin came into the discotheque and told me that my mother was back home. I was criticized a lot for going dancing while my mother was gone. But that was what I felt like doing and that was the only way that I knew I could cope with this.

Jaime graduated from high school in 1985 at the age of 21. He had been a good student. He had participated in internships in health care settings which the school arranged for him. Working with the Red Cross and other organizations, he helped to provide services such as first aid training to the Latino community. Since graduating, he continued to support himself by working as a busboy. He also worked, sometimes as a volunteer and sometimes for pay, in several health and social service programs. Jaime hoped to continue to work in the Latino community and one day to get involved in politics. In 1988, he was enrolled at a local college and was making good progress toward his goal of entering the same profession as his mother: nursing.

Edgar Garza: MCIP was not the only institutional resource available to these refugee youths while they were in high school. Churches and other community based organizations also were important sources of institutional support for many persons in this study. Below, Edgar Garza describes some of the problems that he and other young Latinos faced growing up in Washington, and how his mother, his school, and a church-sponsored youth group enabled him to avoid becoming trapped in a pattern of self destructive behavior. Although he admits making "mistakes," Edgar was one of the most successful study participants in terms of education and employment.

[When I came to the United States, the biggest problem was] trying to be yourself; being who you are; learning who you are. Everybody wants to tell you what to do, what to be. I have a lot of friends out there who at one time I admired. But for one reason or another they got involved with

this or that group of people. After that, they weren't themselves anymore because of what their 'friends' were telling them to be. Like doing drugs, especially. Drugs, alcohol, probably going and robbing somebody. See, people go around and tell you, 'If you want to be a macho man, you got to do this, this and this.'

Coming to this country when you are 14 or 15, a teenager, and finding another group of people who don't think the way you think, it is really tough. You are really confused. You have pressure from your family. Your family is always telling you what to do--especially the Spanish. They are very conservative. They feel that at 15 or 16 they want to put pumps on you, you know? And then you go to school and you find a lot of the 'big' people. They say like, 'Hey man--you're a chicken.' And you say, 'Hey, what the heck. I'm going to shut you all down, *ahorita* (right now).'

And you're going to make a mistake. I made a lot of mistakes before becoming who I am now. Really, I was a lot of wrong things that I wasn't supposed to be. Most of the time I was out there in the street. I did everything--drink, and with my friends, drugs, selling drugs, rob somebody. I'm telling you because that's the way I used to be. Why should we color reality and not tell this to anybody? It wasn't easy for me to live. . . .

Then I started to realize what was happening to me, because my mother had been telling me these things all along--and everything she said was coming true. I came to realize, like, 'Hey, wait a minute. I have to stop here. I'm really going the wrong way.' That's why I am telling you these things. Right now, I'm not a big man. But one day I will be. I'm not saying that I consider myself a nobody. I am somebody. That's what I'm trying to tell [other Latino youths in Washington]: 'Look. I came here like you. I've been doing cleaning jobs. You're not the only one. Don't be telling me that you're the only one, because you can change your life. You can't forget who you are; you have to be a strong guy.'

A lot of the kids that come here--they don't have nobody. They don't have no family. But that's not a reason not to do something with your life. I know a lot of people who lived by themselves--working and going to school, working and going to school. They can do it. There are guys who wish there was somebody to push them to do something--to improve their lives. Somebody out there to say, 'Hey! I'm here! I'm here to help you one way or another. What can I do for you?' A lot of kids just don't have that somebody out there. I'm pretty sure that that's the way it is with 90% of the people out there. They don't have nobody to talk to. That's a problem--finding somebody who you really trust. There are a lot of people out there who you can talk to, but not a lot of people you can trust. For me, the [church] youth group was a big part of my life: my family, the school and the youth group. That's how I've been able to learn how to be myself, trying to know who I am, where I'm going. That's why I haven't left the group. I used to sit down with them and we would reflect about ourselves. That was really important. It is something that too many of us aren't doing. If you don't even know what it is, you don't know how to do it.

Career Training and Internships

MC IP took an unrelentingly pragmatic approach in preparing its students to participate in U.S. society. Career training, with the assistance of federally and locally funded internships for eligible youths was an integral part of the program. This career orientation demonstrated to the students in a concrete way the relevance of education for successful entry into the job market. Without a clear linkage between schooling and employment, many of these youths undoubtedly would have decided that schooling was a luxury they could not afford.

Prior to graduating, all MCIP students participated in two "hands on" career internships. During each of the two internships, students spent two weeks observing and working with persons engaged in occupations in which the students have some interest. These internships provide the students with a more realistic perception of the kinds of work they would perform, and the types of training required to enter specific fields. Upon completion of the internships, students submitted a written report of their experiences to the academic instructor. The "hands on" experiences were preceded by a semester-long "career counseling seminar" in which the students learned such things as appropriate norms of behavior in the work place, how to apply for jobs, and how to fill out applications. Among the federally and locally funded programs based at MCIP which combined career training, work experience, and (sometimes) pay, are the following:

- Bilingual and Vocational Training (BVT); English as a Second Language Instruction combined with computer training;
- Training and Employment Program (TREP); data processing and clerical training;
- On the Job Training (OJT);
- Stay in School (SIS);
- Work Experience Program (WEX);
- Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP).

Fifty-nine of the 112 persons interviewed in 1988 participated in some type of job training program in addition to the career counselling seminar and the hands-on internships while enrolled at MCIP. The programs involved classroom instruction (e.g. in word processing), paid internships at work sites, or both. The effectiveness of the career development program is indicated by the fact that 58% of the youths who received some form of job training from MCIP were employed in positions related to that training in 1988. Nearly half worked as secretaries. Nine of the eleven persons who participated in health related career development activities while in high school were working in medical, dental or nursing settings in 1988. The success of MCIP's career development program must be partly attributed to the strong economy of Washington and a good system of public transportation which provided access to jobs. Nonetheless, the vocational training and internships provided by the school effectively addressed the pressing need of most MCIP students to rapidly develop the skills necessary to earn a living.

Rosalba: The story of Rosalba illustrates the importance of the school's career development program for the long term adaptation of the youths in this study. Shortly after coming to Washington with her family from a rural village in El Salvador in 1981 Rosalba, enrolled in MCIP. While she attended MCIP, she lived in a small apartment with both of her parents and five brothers and sisters. Rosalba's father found work in a restaurant as an "ensaladero" (salad maker) and her mother as a cook. Rosalba was shy in high school and was reluctant to speak English for fear of making a mistake. In 1988, she explained how she twice flunked the Career Counseling Seminar, the MCIP course which she considers to have been most valuable to her, because she would not speak English in class. At the age of 18, while still a student, she became pregnant and soon decided to marry the father of her baby. She had known the father since the days they were in elementary school together in El Salvador. After she married, her husband and others in her family urged her to drop out of MCIP. Although shy, Rosalba was very ambitious and strong willed. Her hope of going to college and eventually becoming a criminal lawyer seemed to be fading away. Ms. Davis, her counselor at MCIP, was the only person she felt that she could confide in. Ms.

Davis urged her to stay in school and not to give up hope. Rosalba graduated from MCIP in 1983, although she was very close to dropping out. A few months later, her baby was born.

Shortly after the baby was born, it became clear to her that her marriage was not working out. In the face of her family's disapproval, she and her husband separated and eventually divorced, leaving Rosalba with the responsibility of supporting herself and her child. Not surprisingly, Rosalba became quite dejected.

At that point I was really down, and I thought that I would never move on and get ahead. But when I saw my child, I said, 'Wait a minute. I have somebody to live for now.' He is my whole wide world, the reason for my living. It's my son that made me.

After the baby was born, Rosalba went to work cleaning commercial buildings, a dead-end job she kept for three years. She also worked as a cashier in a fast food restaurant. During that time she did not return to MCIP, but with the end of her marriage, and feeling trapped in low paying jobs, she returned in 1987 to talk again with Ms. Davis. Ms. Davis introduced her to the school's Work Experience Program (WEX). Although Rosalba would be paid only \$3.50 an hour, \$1.50 less than she was making cleaning buildings, she would receive six months of on-the-job training, and then be eligible to be hired as a regular employee. When she was a student at MCIP, Rosalba had learned word processing and participated in an office management training program coordinated by the school, although she never had worked as a secretary. The WEX program gave her that opportunity and Rosalba began to use the skills that she had learned while in high school.

At the end of her six months of WEX training, Rosalba was hired as a file clerk by the city government. During her first year on the job she demonstrated her capabilities, was promoted to secretary, and given a substantial raise. In addition to working full-time as a secretary, Rosalba also held two other part-time jobs in 1988. She worked in a second clerical position in the evenings, and as a cashier on weekends for a total of 75 hours a week. Rosalba's mother helped her with the care of her son. Although she was working more hours than she would like, she was proud of what she had accomplished. It made her happy that her grandfather, who also lived in Washington, told her that he was proud of her because she was the first one in the family to graduate from high school.

In 1988, Rosalba still hoped to become a lawyer and had regained her optimism that, one day, she would reach her goal.

After all that has happened to me, yes, I am optimistic. Sometimes I can't believe what I have done. I am really proud of myself because there are certain times when I thought that I would stop living. But, thank God, I moved on. I didn't stay there. When I want to do something I go for it--and I work for it.

Patterns of Incorporation into U.S. Society: 1982-1988

In 1988, information was collected on education, employment, cultural identity and social organization in order to assess the long-term adaptation of study participants, who were now young adults. Basic data regarding post-secondary education and employment were gathered for 146 (81%) of the 181 persons from the previous study, and more detailed information was collected in interviews with 112 of the original study participants.

Despite the innovative design of MCIP and the support available from community-based organizations such as Edgar's church youth group, 39% of the 168 study participants whose graduation status was known had not earned a high school diploma or received the GED by 1988. Although every effort was made by the school to keep students enrolled until graduation, even

students who did not graduate benefitted from counseling services, language instruction, social support and career development programs.

Half of the group (73 of 146) had completed a job training program, earned an associate degree, or finished at least one year of college. Women were significantly more likely to have progressed in some type of post-secondary educational program than men. This difference is primarily explained by the fact that nearly twice as many young women completed post-secondary job training programs than men. Eleven percent of study participants had made significant progress toward a Bachelors degree although no one had yet graduated from a four year baccalaureate program. Twelve of 112 persons interviewed were currently pursuing a college degree. Twenty persons had been enrolled in college for less than one year before discontinuing their studies.

Table 4--Educational Achievement after High School
Education Males Females Total

None	46 (61%)	27 (38%)	73 (50%)
Completed job training program	16 (21%)	31 (44%)	47 (32%)
Associate degree (A.D.)	2 (3%)	5 (7%)	7 (5%)
A.D. plus at least one year of college	2 (3%)	1 (1%)	3 (2%)
One or more yrs. college	9 (12%)	7 (10%)	16 (11%)

	75 (100%)	71 (100%)	146 (100%)

By 1988, ten persons had earned Associate Degrees, including three who were continuing their university studies. Most were in health related disciplines such as dentistry, nursing, and respiratory therapy. All but one were first introduced to these fields through internships arranged by MCIP.

The most frequently utilized type of post-secondary education was the job training program. Apart from their high school career development programs, 63 persons enrolled in job training programs offered by public schools and colleges, community organizations, private trade schools, corporate employers and the military. Seventy-five percent of enrollees received certificates of completion. Women were more likely to utilize these programs than men, probably because the better paying jobs that do not require educational credentials (e.g. construction, restaurant waiter) generally were not available to women. Jobs that are available to women (e.g., secretary, health care worker) all require post-secondary schooling. By far, the largest number of job training programs (27) were in office management and secretarial skills. All 27 participants in these programs were women.

Table 5--Jobs Held by Study Participants in 1988
Employment N % *

Clerical	22	16%	Full-Time:	125
Waiter/Waitress	10	7%	Part-Time:	10

Construction 10 7%
 Management 9 7%
 Domestic Labor 9 7%
 Cleaning 6 4%
 Retail Sales 6 4%
 Kitchen Help 5 4%
 Painting 5 4%
 Dental Assistant 5 4%
 Chef 4 3%
 Skilled Worker (misc.) 4 3%
 Medical Assistant 3 2%
 Designer 3 2%
 Unskilled Labor (misc) 2 1%
 Hotel Bellman 2 1%
 Bank Professional 2 1%
 Bank Teller 2 1%
 Community Worker 3 1%
 Computer Operations 2 1%
 Electronics Technician 2 1%
 Housewife 2 1%
 Mechanic 2 1%
 Nursing Assistant 2 1%
 Paralegal 2 1%
 Respiratory Therapist 2 1%
 Teacher's Aide 2 1%
 Beautician 1 1%
 Radio Announcer 1 %
 Courier 1 %
 Real Estate 1 1%
 Parking Lot Attendant 1 1%
 Type Setter 1 1%

 135 100%

* Percent total does not equal 100% due to rounding.

Despite extensive involvement in job training programs, many study participants expressed disappointment about their unfulfilled dreams of college. When informants were asked in 1988 if they had experienced any major disappointments since leaving high school, by far, the most frequently mentioned response (58% of the 66 people who expressed an opinion) related to the inability to continue with their schooling. In contrast, the next most frequently cited disappointments were: marital problems (10); problems with immigration status (10); death in the family (9); finding a "good job" (6); illness or injury (6); and economic difficulties (3).

Although almost all of the high school graduates interviewed had wanted to go to college, two obstacles repeatedly prevented them from enrolling.

1. When they graduated from high school and were ready to enroll in college, many had not yet become legal residents of the United States. Some informants explained that they were afraid that they might be deported if they tried to take college courses. Others said that, without residency papers, they would not be able to afford higher out-of-state tuition.

2. The need to work was a problem in at least two ways. Regardless of immigration status, most people had to work to support themselves and other members of their families. It was difficult to find either the time or the money to take classes. Secondly, as many persons worked long hours--even full-time jobs--while attending MCIP and after graduating, they did not have sufficient time or energy to excel in their studies.

Finding employment seldom was a problem for participants in this study. By 1988, most informants had advanced well beyond the entry level jobs that they held when they first arrived. Although economic problems were seldom mentioned by study participants as a having been a major problem since leaving high school, finding a "good job" was more frequently mentioned. A "good job" was not defined solely by the wages paid. They wanted jobs where they would be respected also for their knowledge and expertise, not just for how hard they worked. Restaurant and construction work generally was not hard to find for male study participants. Neither required a high school degree or job skills to enter, yet both offered the possibility of career mobility. Women without education or job training were limited mainly to employment in such positions as in commercial housekeeping, cafeteria food server, fast food worker, or domestic labor. These jobs paid poorly, were considered the least desirable, and offered little possibility of upward mobility. Most of the women working in such positions were high school drop-outs, had problems with their immigration status, or both. Vocational training, particularly in clerical and health related fields, was crucial to the economic security of female study participants. For both men and women, job skills were required for employment security. Those who lacked them could rely only upon their hard work and maintaining a compliant attitude as means of pleasing their bosses.

Family and Social Life

In 1988, 42% of study participants were currently married. Eighty-one percent married other Latinos, although less than half married persons of the same nationality. Thirty-six percent of women (13/36) who were not currently married were mothers responsible for the care of at least one child. Nine of the single mothers had never been married and four were divorced. Only 43% of women with children (both married and single) had graduated from high school, as compared to 80% of childless women. Seventy percent of childless women had completed some type of post-secondary education, as compared to only 44% of the mothers.

One hundred and forty-six of the original 181 study participants (81%) were still living in metropolitan Washington. Of these, 49% still lived in the District of Columbia where they lived in 1982, with the remainder in the Maryland or Virginia suburbs. Only 41% of the graduates lived in the central city compared to 60% of non-graduates. Sixty-two percent of informants stated that virtually all of their friends were Latinos, although high school graduates were more likely than drop-outs to have friends of different ethnic backgrounds. Forty-six percent of the graduates stated that they had friends who were not Latino compared to only 21% of drop-outs.

The majority of interviewees (63%) belonged to no formal organizations of any kind, whether a church, athletic team, community organization, or other group. There was no significant difference in organization membership between interviewees who were high school graduates and

non-graduates. By far, the most common type of formal organization to which informants belonged were churches. Twenty-nine percent of interviewees reported belonging to a church, slightly more than half of which were Catholic. Most who reported belonging to a Protestant church stated that they had become affiliated with that denomination after arriving in Washington. Nearly all the Protestant and Catholic congregations to which interviewees belonged were predominantly Spanish-speaking. Women reported belonging to a church only slightly more often than men. Several informants (e.g. Edgar) described how membership in a church or church sponsored organization was an important source of social support for them during critical periods during their adjustment to life in the United States.

Challenges and Hopes

By 1988, most informants had become permanent residents of the United States or were applying for residency through the amnesty provision of the 1985 immigration law. Permanent residency was perceived as opening the door to better jobs, more security, and protection from exploitation. After years of working harder than others in order to survive, most study participants were looking forward to taking the next step toward occupational mobility and economic security.

Informants were asked whether there was anything that had made them particularly happy since leaving MC IP. Forty-six percent of the 90 interviewees who responded answered by expressing satisfaction with their current jobs. Other frequently mentioned "high points" were: the birth of a child; getting married; education; travel; and purchase of a home. When asked about their hopes for the future, most informants indicated a desire to settle in, settle down and get ahead. The hopes of most of these Latino young adults conformed to very traditional North American aspirations--an education, a good career, a family, and owning a home. In contrast to the wishes they expressed shortly after arriving in the early 1980s, few hoped to return to live in their countries. The most commonly mentioned hopes for the future were to have a family, to develop a good career, to own a business, and to own their own home.

However, for a small number of informants who could not qualify for legal residency, finish high school or learn a job skill, however, "making it" in Washington was beginning to appear increasingly unrealistic. As the frame of reference by which informants evaluated their circumstances shifted from their native countries to the affluence they saw around them in Washington, the strategy of hard work, accommodation, and deferred gratification for a better future seemed more and more absurd. This is illustrated by the story of Luis.

Luis had dropped out of MCIP in 1984 because, in his view, he had gotten involved with "friends who were not really my friends." During his days at MCIP, Luis had no relatives living in the area, and had been solely responsible for supporting himself. When interviewed in 1988, he stated his belief that having done poorly in school had undermined his self-confidence. One positive experience that he recalled at MCIP was an internship at an auto parts store where he was responsible for filling customer orders. That work made him feel that he could do something well; it gave him a sense of competence. Unfortunately, his internship ended when he dropped out of MCIP, and since that time had been working as a house painter. As for the future, Luis was not very optimistic.

I hope to survive. One of my biggest problems is not having confidence in myself. To make it in this country, you have to have a good education. You need a good job, and you need to have somebody there for you to help you when you need it. A lot of us Latinos have problems with the same things: money and [immigration] papers. Maybe with the new law (1986 immigration law)

the problem with the papers will be taken care of. But for people who came after me (after 1981, the cutoff date for the amnesty provision of the law)--they are going to be living at the same time in this country and in another. That is something that can really screw you up. It can totally confuse you. Education is the only way that you can be somebody here.

Youths like Luis who lack education will continue to rely primarily upon their hard work, a "good attitude," and skills they learn on the job if they are to have any hope of advancing further in their careers. For those who cannot qualify for legal residency, even these attributes may ultimately be of little value.

Informants were asked about challenges facing Latino young adults as they made the transition from adolescence to adulthood. Of the 84 responses to this question, the most frequently mentioned was drug and alcohol abuse. There was a sense that substance abuse was becoming an increasingly serious problem for Washington Latinos, although several noted that this problem was not unique to them. Other frequently mentioned challenges were: getting an education, finding a "good job," setting goals and then working steadily to achieve them, overcoming loneliness, immigration problems, and discrimination against foreigners.

Many of these challenges described by study participants were summarized well by Vicente. As an exceptionally articulate and informed observer of youths on the streets, Vicente had these comments about the attraction of the drug scene:

Every teenager has to go through that (drugs), and it will be up to every teenager to cope with those things. There are guys who get stuck on that and there are guys who go through it. For society, it's bad. It's the worst. But at the time you live through that, it's not bad. I mean, it's fun! Everything is Party! Party! Party! Party, all the time. But you have to realize that you cannot live like that. If that were life, the whole world would be screwed up. But when the world is screwed up for you already anyway, it looks pretty good.

Regarding education and the need to set goals, Vicente stated:

The challenge is to understand that in the United States, you can afford to live and have whatever you want, but with lousy jobs. What people don't understand is that there will come a time when they will need to get more education. There will be a more difficult time when they won't be able to afford a family. It is so easy to achieve better in this country, but people just don't realize that. They are satisfied with less because they are still having their memories of the past--what they couldn't have. Believe me, not everybody in my country (El Salvador) has a color TV. They come over here and don't even finish high school. Especially if they can speak English, they can get a job--maybe a mediocre job--but they get it. They can live by themselves and afford things. They don't realize that in the future they will be needing more. If they don't get an education, they at least need to learn a skill. But there are a lot of people who are satisfied with doing busboy or other lousy jobs.

Co-Equal Participation in a Multicultural Society

The concept of "mediating structure"²³ is useful in describing those institutions that lie at the juncture between the private domain of individuals interacting in small, informal groups, and the

public domain of the bureaucratically structured institutions of the state. In modern societies, personal and group identities are formed primarily within the private domain of family, friends, and the immediate community.²⁴ If this is so, then a question that must be addressed is: How is commitment to the norms and values of the public domain established and maintained? Besides the threat of force, what prevents dysfunctional behavior in the public domain, particularly in heterogeneous, multicultural societies? What prevents the emergence of massive alienation, margination and intergroup conflict?

A key factor in addressing this problem is the existence of small-scale institutions that are geographically and culturally accessible to local communities. In order to function as mediating structures, these institutions must provide a context for social interaction based on values to which individuals and small groups are committed, and which are congruent with responsible citizenship in the wider society. Examples of the types of institutions that *can* function as mediating structures (though they do not necessarily do so) are: neighborhood and civic associations, churches, schools, artistic organizations and self-help groups. Social conflict, margination, and random deviant behavior are most likely to occur in societies where mediating structures are absent or ineffective.

The importance of ethnic based and other voluntary organizations for the integration of migrants into their new environments has been well documented.²⁵ Such organizations meet a variety of needs, including social and emotional support, material assistance, and the promotion of political interests. Settlement houses of the early Twentieth Century, such as Chicago's Hull House,²⁶ although not a voluntary organization per se, engaged migrants in mutual assistance and advocacy projects. They effectively linked the needs and aspirations of ethnically diverse newcomers with available resources, and thereby facilitated their functional integration into society. They did not promote cultural assimilation, however, unless this was not an objective of the immigrants themselves.

Like the settlement houses of a previous era, MCIP facilitated the functional integration of international migrants into the economic and social institutions of the public domain. It prepared Latino and other immigrant youths to participate in the social, economic and political institutions of the city without demanding rigid conformity to the majority culture. Through the coordination of internships in businesses throughout the city, it also functioned to reduce any suspicion and mistrust that may have existed among long-time residents of Washington about the newcomers in their midst. In short, the school reinforced the foundations of a truly multicultural society based on co-equal participation. In doing so, it also lessened the probability of both margination and interethnic conflict.

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Notes

1. The house was part of the Sanctuary Movement, a nationwide effort by a network of churches to assist refugees.

2. See G. Morote-La Torre, *Psychological and Social Adjustment as Related to Perceptions of Cross-Cultural Transition among Young Hispanic Immigrants* (Doctoral Dissertation. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1985). See also R.V. Kemper, "Social Factors in Migration: The Case of Tzintzuntzeños in Mexico City," in B.M. DuToit and H.I. Sa fa, *Migration and Urbanization: Models and Adaptive Strategies* (The Hague: van Gorcum, 1975).

3. R.S. Lazarus and S. Folkman, *Stress, Appraisal and Coping* (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1984).
4. D. Mechanic, "Social Structure and Personal Adaptation: Some Neglected Dimensions," in G.V. Coelho, P.I. Ahmed, D. Hamburg, and J.E. Adams, eds., *Coping and Adaptation* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
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13. W.J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).
14. F. Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).
15. In this paper, the ethnic identifier, "Latino," is used to refer to peoples of Latin American origin living in Washington, although some members of this population might also use the term, "Hispanic." Referring to the emergence of "Hispanic" as a meaningful ethnic identity of otherwise diverse peoples of Latin American origin living in the United States, J. Milton Yinger states: "One can scarcely feel or act 'primordially' as an Hispanic; but those thus defined administratively may find that they have educational, lingual, economic or political interests that cluster more nearly around the Hispanic identity than around any other." See J. Milton Yinger, "Intersecting Strands in the Theorization of Race and Ethnic Relations," in John Rex and David Mason, eds., *Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 20-24).
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Chapter XX

The "International Outlook"

Paul E. Murray

Voltaire's *Candide* anticipates well the experience of dislocation and discontinuity in a world of diverse and often competing and clashing cultural systems.* In a world that is continuously reminded of its interdependence, the search for some commonalities amid the discontinuities takes on a special urgency. The League of Nations and the United Nations represent attempts to chart out and to institutionalize some basis for common action. A major symbolic expression of the hope for unity has been the use of international staffing in the secretariats of these institutions. The bureaucracies of the UN system are among the most intensely and certainly the most intentionally multicultural social settings in existence. But what understandings and practices provide the basis for a shared organizational life among actors of many nationalities, cultures and tongues?

This paper summarizes the findings of ethnographic research I conducted in four UN secretariats of the "food agencies" headquartered in Rome: the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme, the World Food Council and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. This study included nine months of participant observation in the headquarters of these agencies and extensive interviews with staff at directorial, professional and general service levels. An examination of discourse within these settings reveals a recurring interpretive pattern in which "persons" and personalistic constructs are employed as mediating terms in attempts to bridge and to resolve conflicts between the apparently opposed domains of thinking and feeling. These findings highlight an underlying and intractable problem in post-Enlightenment efforts to organize society on the basis of reason, namely, what are the sources of evaluative guidance? The appeal to "persons," which represents only a partial and momentary resolution of this issue, is a strategy that is fundamental to the classic paradigm of international civil service.

From its inception with the founding of the League of Nations, the international staffing of international secretariats has been based on understandings about the personal qualities that should characterize international civil servants. Ideas about these qualities generally remain implicit in organizational charters and designs, although there are allusions to them in organizational oaths and job announcements. Memoirs, speeches, histories and organizational studies are the principal textual vehicles and repositories of these understandings. In an extension of ideals of national civil service as apolitical, objective and disinterested, international civil service is based on the idealized premise that secretariat employees detach themselves from national loyalties and cultural affinities to comply with requirements that are conceptualized at some more rationalized, "international" level of perception.

Notions of international service have been variously presented in terms such as "international loyalty," the "international outlook," "international spirit," and "maturity." Each of these terms focuses attention on "persons" or "personality," indicating a key practice within the cultural system on which international organization is based that mediates in personal terms the presumably separate dimensions of thinking and feeling. Value-laden ideologies and political allegiances (feeling) are to be surrendered in favor of rationally conceived obligations (thinking) to the "international" community. This interpretive framework has set the terms for many of the issues that have been problematic in international organization since the founding of the League of Nations, including what happens to national loyalties, the influence of national, cultural, and political biases, whether employees should have "permanent" contracts or be hired on

"secondment" from national administrations, and the role of the "Secretary-General" or executive head as exemplary international civil servant vis-à-vis the world community. These issues indicate the problematized locus of "persons" within the conventional paradigm of international organization. On the one hand, persons are understood as essential to the resolution of the dilemma of the opposition between domains; shedding inappropriate values, they will presumably adopt new ones ("international loyalty") and behave appropriately in the international arena. On the other hand, this resolution is fraught with dilemmas, since not all actors appear to manifest authentically "international" values and, more profoundly, the nature and sources of these new values remain unclear.

Beginnings

When the United Nations system was established by the victorious Allied Powers in the closing months of the Second World War, its architects invested it with a Secretariat and required that "due regard . . . be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible."¹ Most observers now take some form of international staffing to be the *sine qua non* of international administration. Sir Eric Drummond, first Secretary-General of the League of Nations, was the originator of this method of recruitment for the League's Secretariat. Precedents for permanent, internationally controlled administrations, e.g., the German-French Rhine River Commission (1804), the Universal Postal Union (1878) and the International Telegraphic Union (1868)² generally were staffed by nationals of one of the participating states. International staffing is not a necessary consequence of international organization, but it represents a strategy for international organization that is consistent with Western and, especially, British notions about the relationship of bureaucratic service to personal values, including national and "cultural" ones--in particular, it reflects the notion that it is feasible to have a disinterested, public service to which personally held values, of whatever origin, are irrelevant.

The founding governments of the League gave little collective consideration to its actual administrative structure. The Covenant of the League addresses the subject only briefly (Article 6), calling for the establishment of a "permanent" Secretariat and indicating that it "shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required." These vague instructions afforded Drummond great scope for his own ideas in structuring the Secretariat.

A major feature of Drummond's administration was its adoption of "the secretariat method" which had developed in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,³ first as a method of imperial administration and then in the War Cabinet of Prime Minister Lloyd George during the First World War. According to Jordan⁴ the introduction of the secretariat method entailed a shift in the Cabinet from informal methods of decision-making and record-keeping to formalized procedures for drawing up agendas and recording minutes. The Secretariat of the Cabinet not only assisted in these "secretarial" tasks, but under the direction of Lord Hankey, evolved as a strong, centralized executive body which was responsible for carrying out the Cabinet's decisions.

The secretariat method was first adopted on the international level by the Allied Supreme War Council and the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference.⁵ Hankey, who refused the position of Secretary-General of the League of Nations, disagreed with the notion of an independent, international secretariat for the League and, according to James,⁶ preferred a system modeled after that of international conferences, in which each Council state would be permanently represented at headquarters by its own secretary and staff, with the Secretary-General as coordinator of activities among the separate delegations.

Drummond, however, succeeded in convincing the Organizing Committee to adopt the secretariat method and international staffing.⁷ As Secretary-General, he proceeded to organize the Secretariat of the League along British lines, central to which was the "concept of the disinterested official."⁸ Barros, in his biography of Drummond,

proposes⁹ that Drummond was "too much of a realist to believe" in the ideal of a "non-political international secretariat." Barros' analysis, however, which employs the familiar theory-versus-reality opposition of Western thought, disregards the *cultural* significance of Drummond's actions. While Drummond may have held private reservations about the independence of international secretariats and may himself have acted in ways inconsistent with the theory (always a matter of interpretation, of course), his conceptualization of the League's Secretariat extends definitively to the international arena an approach to organization that ideally separates technical, legal and practical matters (the "thinking" dimension) from various national and cultural interests and values (the "feeling" dimension). Drummond thus set in motion the predominant method in this century for organizing international administration and, in so doing, set the terms even of its problematic dimensions, such as how to be "impartial" and indeed "objective" about value-motivated decisions. The British cultural model of the "disinterested official" which seeks resolution of such oppositions in personality, not only suggests a model of civil service that Drummond sought to introduce, but anticipates an interpretive pattern. This would recurrently turn to "personality" in several ways to explore and resolve the boundaries and contradictions between opposing domains in international life.

The feasibility of a form of bureaucratic administration staffed by persons who presumably separate political, regional, religious or other interests from technical, legal and official pursuits is a relatively modern idea which emerged gradually in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this period there was a progressive adoption of impersonal, bureaucratic ideals in Western countries. For example, several countries shifted from a system of appointments based on patronage (the "spoils system," in the United States), that is, the making of appointments for personal or political motives, to the use of open competition and examinations. This process began in Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century¹⁰ and somewhat later in the United States. With the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1885, Congress attempted to organize the administration of government on the basis of "merit,"¹¹ an ostensibly more rational basis for selecting personnel than patronage. Ideologically, the shift away from patronage to merit was linked to the desire to replace aristocratic models of administration and rule by "notables" with more democratically-based models.¹² This suggests that what mattered was not only getting a job done, but getting it done in a way that is expressive of the avoidance of personal values. A corollary development was the notion that civil servants should be politically neutral, a doctrine that was strongly emphasized in Britain. The meaning of neutrality, as explained by Leonard White,¹³ a United States Civil Service Commissioner, is that civil servants may have "private convictions," but that they must not allow such convictions "to color the impartial advice which it is their duty to give." The opposition between ideas and values is therefore resolved, ideally, in persons who are presumed to have both the ability and the inclination to subordinate personal choice to rational procedures.

The idea of an international civil service, which seemed at the time Drummond introduced it quite novel and to some fairly radical, represented an extension of these administrative principles to the international level. If it is possible to provide impersonal administrative services within nations, why should it not be possible at the international level, which only entails setting aside "national" preferences--another aspect the personal/affective/evaluative side--so as to provide for

the efficient functioning of a rationalized world order? Indeed, the international civil service is arguably the quintessential expression of depersonalized, functional, administrative service.

The presumed logic of this separation structures an unresolvable tension into the notion of international civil service as actors and observers discover the multiplicity of the evaluative aspects of even seemingly innocuous, technical and practical matters of international cooperation. As my ethnographic data¹⁴ on the UN "food agencies" show, the intrusion of "politics" into an organizational life that is ostensibly politically neutral and its bearing on the fulfillment of organizational objectives continues to be a central preoccupation of international civil servants. Concerns about the influence of "politics" exist also in national administrations, as indicated by Hugh Hecló's study¹⁵ of the interface between the US executive service, the top positions in the administration that are politically appointed, and the US civil service, which is presumably protected from "politics" through guarantees of job security. Hecló employs "politics" to designate not only party politics and patronage, but also any use of a public office as "private property."¹⁶ He finds this to be focused on activities at the executive level, whereas my data indicate the awareness of "politics" to be pervasive at all ranks in the UN food agencies. Discourse about the problematic distinctions between politics and internationalism, whether hypocritical or sincere, explores endlessly the implications of the thinking/feeling opposition for international service and searches for mediating terms to explain how it is possible for individuals to provide "disinterested" service at the international level. Notions of "international loyalty," "international spirit" and "international outlook" represent attempts to construct such a mediating or encompassing third term.

International Loyalty

The first generation of literature on international civil service problematized its political dimensions. There were many questions about the meaning and possibility of "international loyalty," a concept first introduced to describe the stance of the League's Secretariat. For example, critics suggested that the stance implied disloyalty to one's own nation.¹⁷ Hill¹⁸ notes concerns that employees "do not lose all sense of nationality or become unaware of the interests of their respective states."

Employees of the League were expected to detach themselves from the interests of their own nations and to work within the framework of the League's apparently neutral and transcendent perception of international requirements. Beginning in 1932, this stance was formalized in a "declaration of fidelity," required of all incoming officials, which committed the individual employee "to discharge my functions and to regulate my conduct with the interests of the League alone in view and not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or other authority external to the Secretariat of the League of Nations."¹⁹ Identical wording is used for oaths in the UN system.²⁰

Van Wagenen observes²¹ that "the loyalty question" now seems dated, given the endurance of the concept. It is important to recall, however, that this notion intentionally links international service with a detachment from national values or perspectives. How this detachment of individuals from their presumed attachment to their cultural and political origins takes place goes unexplained. That which takes the place of domestically oriented values, namely, "international loyalty," is not completely clear. Who defines the "interests" of the League or any other international agency? Governing bodies, which are made up of delegations representing national interests, define policies; but how do representatives of discrete, national governments generate an "international" perspective? The United Nations Charter explicitly gives scope to the Secretary-

General to operate as an independent authority on behalf of international interests and, in effect, to define those interests. This attempts to correct what some perceived to be a constitutional weakness in the League in which, as Jenks observes²² "no officer . . . had an acknowledged continuing responsibility for shaping . . . policy . . . in the interests of the League as a whole"; but leaves unattended what those interests are. The central interpretive responsibility is therefore vested in a person, the Secretary-General, who will presumably bring appropriately "international" values to bear on rational procedures.

"International loyalty" represents an attempt to redefine the political identities of some individuals so that they may, in a sense, enjoy the license to pursue the most rational or reasonable solutions to problems that affect mankind globally or internationally and that defy solution by individual national governments acting independently. Sir Harold Nicolson, a British diplomat, expresses²³ the conviction that by "collaborating constantly together," individuals of differing nationalities "acquire a truly international spirit" which they will then hopefully be able to transfer "to the politicians who attend the Councils and Assemblies." This acknowledges that international loyalty reflects some more profound level of experience than is implicit in the simple fact of individuals from many different nations and cultures working together in common organizational settings.

International Outlook and International Society

Outlook

The corpus of literature on the Secretariat of the League of Nations consists, by and large, of the impressionistic descriptions of former League officials,²⁴ rather than of sociological inquiry. Much of it was written in the mid_1940s with a view toward the creation of a successor organization and is liberally sprinkled with advice on organizational structure, leadership and style, recruitment and other personnel policies. These writings constitute a valuable data base on the League's Secretariat, especially as understood by its senior officials.

These authors optimistically address questions regarding the heterogeneity of the staff: national, cultural, religious and linguistic. That is, the experience of the League is taken as proof that international staffing is feasible; yet, its success depends on recruiting staff who are able to maintain what Jenks, in a famous passage, calls the "international outlook":

an awareness made instinctive by habit of the needs, emotions, and prejudices of the peoples of differently circumstanced countries, as they are felt and expressed by the peoples concerned, accompanied by a capacity for weighing these frequently imponderable elements in a judicial manner before reaching any decision to which they are relevant.²⁵

Not all are presumed able to assume this outlook. Indeed, Ranshofen-Wertheimer insists²⁶ on the rigors of international service as "the most severe test to which a civilized man of the twentieth-century world can be subjected." Such assertions hierarchize the relationship between domains, subordinating value-laden nationalism to rational internationalism.

This literature emphasizes internationalism as an attitude or quality which individuals may or may not have. Loveday's *Reflections on International Administration*,²⁷ widely considered a classic, relies upon a rough, informal psychology to analyze the experiences of international civil servants. While offering little on factors that enable some individuals to obtain an internationalist outlook, Loveday insists that organizational effectiveness requires it. National administrators, as well, need to be tactful and able to promote mutual understanding among others, but what is

required of the international civil servant is an even "greater sensibility to the feelings of others when the persons on whom the art of persuasion is exercised are drawn from different parts of the globe."²⁸

The international outlook represents, then, two major steps with respect to feelings: first, the ability to detach oneself from the presumably natural feelings that incline one to favor the interests of one's own nation; and second, the ability to comprehend and to communicate effectively with persons of different cultures (with their special "emotions," "prejudices," and "feelings").

Society

At times it is not clear whether, when describing intercultural sensitivity, these authors mean the ability to communicate effectively in various countries, or internally, within the organization. Evidently they regard the two situations as integrally united. The international secretariat is seen as providing a kind of "international society" that is implicitly a microcosm of the entire world. When Loveday writes, for example, of the qualities required of international civil servants--"understanding and consequential loyalty," "diplomatic capacity," "constructive imagination," et cetera--he includes the Spanish word, "convivencia," for which he finds no English equivalent. 'Convivencia' suggests, to him, not a mere capacity to "co-exist," but an apparent empathy for others that enables one to work effectively with them, regardless of cultural differences. So in addition to "rationality," the secretariats become models of the specifically international order implementing that "rationality."

It is the presence or absence of such traits in individuals that explains their ability or inability to be a part of "international society." Loveday describes "international society" as a setting that "never affords full scope for the natural development of the individual personality from its own cultural roots."²⁹ Success in this environment, he insists, requires individual resourcefulness in finding ways to give expression to these "suppressed" parts of the personality. Failure to do so results in the "deseccation" of individuals and the risks of this "are greatest among the members of the clerical staff and those more senior officials--translators, precis writers, etc.--who are engaged in repetitive work."³⁰ In addition, Loveday recommends a management style based on "trust," rather than on a system of rigid, hierarchical "control," which he finds in the UN system. He argues that the heterogeneous staffs of international secretariats can develop as "a group with a sense of common purpose" only under a liberal, administrative structure. By introducing "freedom," a frequent companion of "rationality" in Western thought, Loveday restates, but does not resolve, the dilemma about the sources and forms of evaluative behavior within international settings.

Adequate freedom is not ensured by defining with nice precision the functions, responsibilities and mutual hierarchical relations of each individual, but by allowing the personality of each to adjust itself to that of each other, by allowing each to find out for himself from whom he can best obtain the help he is conscious of needing.³¹

Loveday thus attempts to redefine the locus of persons in these environments, based on the view that internationalism is an attitude generated by interpersonal relations in international settings.

Some distinguish the right kind of internationalism or "international loyalty" from the wrong kind. Ranshofen-Wertheimer dismisses³² "members of the cosmopolitan tribe, globe trotters, and persons without a country" as potential recruits, in favor of those who are "most useful for international service . . . combining the best characteristics of . . . national origins with belief in and devotion to the international agency." Jenks, similarly, denies³³ that international outlook entails a lack of national pride or "of attachment to any one country." Effective international

service is, therefore, not radically disconnected from the world of nation-states. "International loyalty," however, remains a self-contradictory term, except in transcendent contexts that are not perceived to exist without it.

Developments in the United Nations System

The Charter of the United Nations makes much more explicit than did the Covenant of the League the role of the Organization's Secretariat, which it presents as one of the Organization's principal organs, together with the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice. Moreover, drawing on the precedent established by Drummond, the Charter insists³⁴ on the Secretariat's "exclusively international character," meaning that officials are "responsible only to the organization" and member states shall refrain from influencing staff "in the discharge of their responsibilities."

The "geographical distribution" of posts (or the "quota system") provides a principal strategy for guaranteeing the independence of UN secretariats from the influence of any one nation. It is a strategy which has been adopted in several versions throughout the UN system as a whole.³⁵ Several observers³⁶ have described the quota system as a recruitment strategy that structures a major contradiction into the heart of international civil service, since staff loyalty is supposed to be directed toward the organization rather than toward any particular government, while nationality plays a key role in recruitment and promotion. This policy, therefore, mitigates against the selection of personnel on the basis of merit alone and, hence, represents one of the clearest indications of how the "governmentalist" bias of the UN system³⁷ structures its bureaucracies. It is a system that continuously reminds staffs that the "constituency"³⁸ of UN organizations is always governments, rather than individuals.³⁹ This represents an escalation of bureaucratic "depersonalization" beyond that of governmental agencies.⁴⁰

The notion that a special ethos is generated by the cultural diversity of a staff appointed according to country quotas has often been expressed by UN system officials and observers. For example, Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the UN (1946_1952), writes that geographical distribution

meant bringing together people of many languages, races, and stages of development, of all the great cultures and religions, from Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. It meant harmonizing all this diversity into an efficient and unified force, with all differences of background and outlook subordinated to the oath of office.⁴¹

This statement reaches beyond governmentalism to a "cultural" pluralism (or multiculturalism) that envisions all cultural orientations, of whatever origin, as subordinate to the rationally conceived obligations of an international civil service.⁴²

Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN (1953_1961), who is widely regarded as the exemplar par excellence of "internationalism," also speaks of "international service" in a way that seeks to encompass cultural and personal diversity.

Far from demanding that we abandon or desert ideals and interests basic to our personality, international service . . . puts us under the obligation to let those ideals and interests reach maturity and fruition in a universal climate.⁴³

"Maturity," a term also employed by informants in the UN food agencies⁴⁴ harkens back to Kant's definition of "enlightenment",⁴⁵ as a state of freedom from intellectual tutelage to authorities, guides and doctrines. This recalls the personalistic dimensions implicit in the paradigm of rationality from which models of international service and life have been constructed.

Hammarskjöld conceives of the "universal climate," where one is presumably exposed to the "ideals and interests" of others, as a training ground for "maturity of mind" which is a kind of transcendence corresponding to that of internationalism.

The second generation corpus of academic literature on international secretariats is, like its predecessor, largely a digest of impressionistic reflections by those who have served as officials or consultants in international organizations. While, with few exceptions⁴⁶ it lacks sociological depth, it does provide an important source of data on participants' views about their organizational life. In it, authors grapple with the intractable contradictions of internationalism and engage in the cultural practice of constructing a series of mediating terms that appear to resolve, momentarily, the contradictions.⁴⁷

Generally, these authors concur that the cultural heterogeneity of staffs "works," that is, it seems not to be a problem in terms of organizational efficiency. For example, Van Wagenen of the World Bank, asserts⁴⁸ that it provides some "advantages." First, it exposes decision-makers to "different viewpoints" (especially about developing countries) that go "beyond mere factual knowledge"; second, it affords staff at headquarters a chance to sharpen their skills in relating to other nationals, which should enable them to be more sensitive in relating to the "field" (developing countries); and third, it provides the social basis for the organization's "credibility" in dealing with different parts of the world. Van Wagenen goes on to reflect⁴⁹ on the social-cultural dimensions of international staffing, noting that the "personal level" of these working relationships requires special attention. He shares administrators' concerns about methods for honing the staff's diversity into a serviceable "conformity." In laying out the problem, he notes that the feeling dimension presents special challenges because "an international staff has no common cultural background and no symbols transmitting emotional voltage."⁵⁰ He quotes a "pseudonymous UN Secretariat member" who wrote that his organization is "an institution derived from an *exclusively rational* recognition of the need for its existence" (emphasis added). Van Wagenen emphasizes⁵¹ leadership and "organizational tradition" as generators of staff solidarity.

Van Wagenen strains to account for the distinctive contribution that international staffing makes to UN bureaucracies, as compared to other types of organizations. He calls it an "extra dimension . . . like a wild card in poker," a chance factor, but comments that "it is tempting to stop at the standard observation that everyone is different and that affinities are made by professional and social interest and matters of taste, regardless of nationality."⁵² He finds this "standard observation" uninformative, but seems unable to go beyond it, adding only the speculation that the busyness and frequent duty travel of World Bank staff members may explain why "the normal rubbing of personalities is not enough to chafe and irritate deeply"⁵³. I suggest that a more productive way of examining such apparently "standard" observations, which I find in wide use in the discourse of UN food agency actors as well, is as a form of cultural practice, a way actors employ to organize ideas about the cultural diversity of secretariats. To initial inquiries about the experience of working with persons of many nationalities and cultures, I frequently received the response that such differences are not a problem or are not even noticed, because everyone is considered only in terms of his or her professional contribution (i.e., the organization exists for technical and professional reasons only). Moreover, if the heterogeneity of nationalities is

considered, it is in terms of its being a potential problem, something that occurs on the "personal" level, where it may erupt in tensions between individuals.

Johan Galtung, a Director of the United Nations University in Tokyo, provides⁵⁴ a sociologically insightful account of UN bureaucratic culture. For example, he describes⁵⁵ the UN's "intellectual style" as "Saxonic," which results in an emphasis on data and an avoidance of theory. Geographical distribution notwithstanding, he finds⁵⁶ that homogeneity is recovered through the "MAMU (middle-aged males with university education) complex" that dominates the system. Galtung concludes⁵⁷ that the effectiveness of the UN system is impaired by the limitations of its organizational culture which removes it too far "from the spaces where true human and social development take place--the inner human spaces, the micro space surrounding any one of us." Once again, then, the UN system is portrayed as a setting where intellectual traditions and empirical emphases (the thinking dimension) somehow subordinate the personal domain (the feeling dimension), resulting in a cultural impoverishment internally and some degree of practical ineffectiveness externally, that is, impaired effectiveness in both organizational and "human" terms. Galtung's observations maintain the hierarchical order of the cultural system by not questioning it, while focusing on its instrumentalities.

The Locus of "Persons"

Data provided by this literature suggest that "international" versions of the conventional paradigm of Western, bureaucratic culture, which intentionally separates thinking and feeling so as to structure organizations as depersonalized, technically efficient "machines," problematize the relationship between these domains in ways that are particular to these settings. My ethnographic study of the UN food agencies demonstrates a continuity of terms and interpretive practice between the conventional paradigm of international organization and the particular setting of these agencies' headquarters. This study shows that actors attempt to organize that paradigm, and their world, by conceptually separating the domains of thinking and feeling. However, as they inevitably encounter in this process contradictions and paradoxes that stem from the problematic place of evaluative behaviors within the system, they deploy a series of mediating terms to idealize the "right" relationship between domains or to account for problems. In each case, the mediating terms center on the place of "persons," or, more abstractly, of "personality," within the paradigm. That these mediating terms fail to resolve in any final sense the conceptual dilemma is suggested by the problematic issue of the locus of "persons" and "personal" behaviors within the UN food agencies.

Actors' recognition of the problematic place of evaluative behaviors in international organizations begin with suggestions that UN secretariats differ from national administrations, suggestions found both in literature on international organization and in informants' testimony. "Rules," "beliefs" and "traditions" are held to be more easily generated within national administrations than they are within the UN system, because (1) dominant national cultures provide guidance (e.g., national ideologies or accepted practices for superior-subordinate relationships) that cannot legitimately exist at the global level among theoretically equal sovereignties; (2) ruling governments provide executive leadership that brings interpretive guidance (i.e., clues to "acceptable" evaluative standards) into the heart of organizational life, while UN secretariats operate always at a remove from their own acephalous governing bodies; and (3) national bureaucrats work within national social settings that have well established expectations, whereas no equivalent social setting exists at the international level, but rather the frequently shifting and competing expectations of governments.⁵⁸

Dilemmas about the relationship between thinking and feeling come into focus very quickly as actors attempt to consider the place of "culture" (of both countries and individuals) within their work and organizational environment. "Culture" is, in their usage, a non-rational, value-laden domain which includes the sets of preferred behaviors ("likes" and "dislikes") that individuals acquire when living in particular societies, most especially their native place. In the ideally impartial setting of international organizations, where some actors, especially "international civil servants," presumably shed culture-based behaviors for the sake of more rational and "international" ones, the processes and structures that enable this process are not delineated, but presupposed. It is presumed that personality *is capable of rightly* mediating between domains, but the folk tradition is silent on how personality accomplishes this. "Persons," then, bearers of personality, become the constructions where the boundaries and connections between thinking and feeling are presented and examined, both to idealize successes and to vilify failures.

In my study I examine "persons" or "personality" in actors' constructions as loci that mediate thinking and feeling in diverse ways. I examine three principal constructions: executive heads, images of the self as "transcultural" and international work as "craft"--as "cultural operators"⁵⁹ that conjoin and confound different conceptual orders. Boon finds "cultural operators" to provide particularly succinct ways of communicating about socially held understandings of the relationships that exist between distinct orders, because they belong to both. He finds⁶⁰ that societies develop particular cultural operators that take on a privileged status because their property of conjoining what is ideally kept separate appears essential to maintaining the proper relationship between orders. Examples of this quality abound in religious settings, where, for example, only designated persons, who represent the "natural" or "secular" order may handle certain sacred objects which represent the "sacred" or "spiritual" order. Such conjoinings of the sacred and the secular are often considered inherently dangerous; but somebody has to do it.

"International loyalty" was an early construct that indicates the pattern of locating the relationship between thinking and feeling in exceptional personality, namely, personality that is capable of subordinating the presumed claims of nationality and culture for the sake of a rationally-based "internationalism." This construct, like the cultural operators that I examine, deploys some category of "persons" or "personality" to mediate between domains. Those who behave "internationally" and "impartially" are persons, however apparently "depersonalized" their conduct, just as priests are persons still, however sacralized their conduct. But persons are also bearers of "feelings" in this construct, i.e., the evaluative standards of cultures, politics, and ideologies which it is the work of international secretariats to neutralize with respect to their own work (see Figure 1).




Figure 1

Central as persons may be to this cultural system, the locus of persons--whether employees or outsiders--is also problematic for it because not all persons exemplify the ideal subordination of feeling to thinking; and, beyond that, because the proper source of evaluative behavior within the system is never addressed. In the UN food agencies these conceptual dilemmas become evident in many ways, including how personnel talk about their relationship to the organization. For example, many employees find themselves precariously situated in UN secretariats. Responsibility for decisions made in one's own area of competence frequently needs to be referred up the hierarchical ladder, even in simple matters such as sending a telex to a field officer. Many find that excellent work is not rewarded by opportunities for advancement, due to the influence of nationality and patronage networks, further problematizing their sense of professional and personal solidarity with their agency. Moreover, as professional work generally is performed in the name of the organization and therefore efforts usually remain "anonymous," which depersonalizes still more the relationship of the individual with an agency. It is possible to publish independently, in one's own name, but few find the time. Practices designed to secure the workplace by requiring the use of building passes which must be relinquished at retirement are mentioned with a touch of bitterness by retirees, who feel that their personal worth and dignity thereby are impugned. Even after many years of service, some employees have only short-term contracts, while those with permanent contracts speak often of going elsewhere to advance their professional careers or, if older, of looking forward to retirement.

The cultural operations that inform constructions of executive heads, transcultural selves and international craft explore the relationships between thinking and feeling in ways that turn in each case on some central understanding about "persons." Such constructions become occasions to locate the place of persons in, and in relation to, these complex organizations, which, more profoundly, means the relation of feeling (the presumably more personal dimension) and thinking (the presumed generator of bureaucratic *organization*) as an interpretive framework (see Figure 2). Here, that framework is applied to identities mediating its oppositions and relating to others those oppositions specific to the organization.

While space does not permit a discussion of these mediators in detail, I will present each of them briefly in order to note some of the continuities and connections with previous literature.

Executive Heads as Cultural Constructs

The executive head of a secretariat is both one of its major emblems and a frequent topic of conversation in the secretariats. Executive heads are structurally positioned at the top of their organizational charts, the only authorized channels of communication on policy and administrative matters between governing bodies and the secretariats. In conversation the personality, nationality, politics and character of executive heads are explored for their meaning in agency life. The executive head provides a juncture where feeling, in an officially sanctioned way, impacts on thinking (and, therefore, politics, or "culture" on presumably rational and legal procedures, character on technical priorities, *et cetera*).

During the interwar period, ideas about the role of executive heads of international organizations were constructed around the contrasting examples of Eric Drummond, of the League, and Albert Thomas, Director-General of the International Labour Organization (ILO) (1920_1932). Whereas Drummond is widely portrayed as the quintessential "civil servant," that

is, a quiet functionary who rarely exercised his right to address the League's Assembly and Council,⁶¹ Thomas is considered the more aggressive leader, seizing the initiative in preparing his organization's budget and in establishing the agenda for the Governing Body and Conference of the ILO.⁶² Both examples employ what Cox terms⁶³ the "great-man theory of international organization," which is based on the "implicit assumption . . . that it is the man who makes the institution." Cox attempts⁶⁴ to go beyond idiosyncratic approaches to construct a theory of executive leadership in international organizations in which the executive head's "personality and style" are accounted for in relation to other "possibly weightier variables."⁶⁵ Examining variables such as the relationship of executive heads with senior staffs and with external "pressures," Cox essentially substitutes "personality" with "leadership," which restates, without resolving, the problem of how personality mediates presumably separate domains in international settings.

If we consider the cultural and social purposes that shape and influence discourse in which the subject of executive heads appears, the "great-man theory" that pervades both academic literature and everyday discourse about executive heads within international organizations may be approached non-referentially as a process of symbolic construction. In these terms executive heads become key symbolic foci that relate impersonal, bureaucratic structures to the evaluative domain that includes culture, politics and ideology in two respects. First, executive heads are able to provide this symbolic function because they alone officially link secretariats to governing bodies and, second, they do so in their *personal capacity*. They "act," a quality of individuality denied, symbolically, to the "depersonalized bureaucrat."

Of all international civil servants, executive heads are uniquely nominated, i.e., called by *name*, by the governors representing the world of nation-states. It is noteworthy that in the Covenant of the League of Nations, only one proper name appears: "First Secretary-General of the League of Nations The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B."⁶⁶ Dag Hammarskjöld stresses⁶⁷ the "personal responsibility" given the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "who is solely responsible for performing the functions entrusted to him for the appointment of all members of the Secretariat." Hammarskjöld notes⁶⁸ that a proposal that had been rejected for the Charter at the founding Conference in San Francisco⁶⁹ was one that called for the appointment of Deputies Secretary-General "in the same manner as the Secretary-General," a rejection rooted in the theory that the "international" perspective of a secretariat is the responsibility and achievement of its executive head, who may develop it only if given sufficient independence from the world of nation-states. This understanding informed the structuring of the League, as well. While the founders of the League rejected the title "Chancellor" for the executive director position, they nevertheless uniquely positioned, whether intentionally or not, the Secretary-General as the one individual who could, as Boudreau states⁷⁰ "hold up before the national representatives the League view, the international aspect of every problem." The language adopted by the Council of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which met in Atlantic City in late 1943 to plan for the League's successor organization, draws on this understanding of the executive director's role: "the vesting . . . of full executive authority and responsibility in the Director General, requires that he act with the greatest possible freedom in the selection of personnel and the establishment of personnel standards."⁷¹

Underpinning the "great-man theory" that the man makes the position, but the position requires the "right" sort of man, is an understanding that the point of convergence between the neutral, impartial, rational perspective and the evaluative domain of culture and politics is found at the personal level, and specifically, in the individual who is uniquely authorized by a governing

body to head up its secretariat and thus to have a "personality." This understanding is reflected both in institutional terminology and by analysts of the position.

The title, "Secretary-General," for the highest executive head and arch-exemplar of the role, emphasizes the secretarial relationship of the executive head to the governing bodies, but does not describe his relationship to the secretariat body⁷²where, as we have seen, broad discretion was left to Drummond to structure the Secretariat of the League as he saw fit. This broad discretion enabled the development of an understanding, now seen throughout the United Nations system, in which the executive head of a secretariat is the only individual who may enact secretariat business with *personal* authority.

The crucial positioning of the person of the executive head within the structure of international secretariats has been noted by several observers. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, for example, writes:

All authority in the Secretariat stems from the Secretary-General. . . . Everything that is done in the Secretariat is done by him, figuratively speaking. The actual day-to-day work is either personally executed by him, done under his direct instructions and control, or delegated by him to others.⁷³

Four decades later, Galtung makes an essentially identical observation. Secretariats, he writes, actually work in his [the `executive director's'] name, papers are published in his name (or at least circulated in his name); his stamp of approval is what matters inside the organisation although he may sometimes delegate it to lesser officials. Thus secretariats tend to become extremely vertical and very steeply so, with just one point at the top: He.⁷⁴

Such observations (see also Symonds)⁷⁵ suggest that in international secretariats the "great-man" not only "makes the institution" but, in some ways, paradoxically *is* the institution. He is more than the voice of the institution. Whatever the personal attributes and styles various executive heads, such as Drummond and Thomas, may bring to bear on their administrations,⁷⁶ what remains everywhere the same is a recurrent structural emphasis on the *person* of the executive head in both organizational charters and in everyday discourse, which reveals this structuring to be a central, cultural practice in these settings. This, I will suggest, is because the executive head mediates thinking and feeling, the paradoxically related terms with which any effort at international organization must come to terms.

The Transcultural Self

The image of the self as "transcultural" is also a frequent construction among actors who believe themselves to be changed, as a result of living abroad, often in many countries, and working in multicultural organizations. In general, the focus of this image is on oneself, including the expanded "self" of spouses and children, although the transculturalism (or "internationalism") of other selves is also explored. This is a second, major theme, one which brings "personality" home to staffs in the UN food agencies. Many actors find that their thinking and attitudes have changed in ways that make it difficult to imagine returning to live in their native countries or to work in national administrations, where they would lack the stimulus of continual exposure to many different nations and cultures.

Constructions of the transcultural self practically mediate paradoxically related aspects of thinking and feeling which arise as tensions between the presumed impartiality of international organizations and the perspectives of persons and nations that are presumed to be determined by national interests and cultural perspectives. "Personality" provides the locus, once again, where

these terms are mediated. This personality is presumed to be exceptional with respect to its independence from any one culture, whether due to innate characteristics or to exposure to the exceptional learning afforded by multicultural milieux. This is a construction that announces the success, to a degree, of international administration as a cultural project; that is, it is a construction that confirms the possibility of an "international outlook," the prerequisite of authentic, international administration. Its construction, over and over, becomes a central cultural practice in these milieux.

Previous ethnographic work on intercultural contact and perception has called attention to the strategic importance of self-presentation in such settings. For example, Lyman and Douglas,⁷⁷ Briggs,⁷⁸ and Barth⁷⁹ researched the strategies for managing ethnic identity (including multiple identities) in settings of ethnic multiplicity. Bateson comments⁸⁰ on the development of an "ethos of pidgin" in New Guinea, in which indigenous peoples, who represent hundreds of distinctive cultures, are nevertheless perceived by Europeans as being "remarkably similar" because of the common "tactics" they have adopted to deal with Europeans. The exploration of "impression management" strategies and tactics, however, does not provide a sufficient method to account for intercultural contact in intentionally international milieux, where individuals find themselves and others to be changed by the setting itself. But they do point to creation, attempted creation and, more interestingly, to recognition of "transcendent" or inclusive identities. Work on organizations as multicultural settings that develop their own "culture"⁸¹ or within which a "third culture" develops between two or more different groups of nationals⁸² confirm the sociological reality of these phenomena, without accounting for their symbolic underpinnings. What require further study are the symbolic structures that inform these emergent cultures. Within the intentionally multicultural settings of the UN food agencies, understandings of the self as transcultural constitute a practice that provides direct access to the structures and symbolic systems that structure interaction.

International Service as Craft

Actors' presentations of work accomplishments and agency competencies feature the technical domain. Forestry studies, loan programs for the rural poor, increases in crop yields and the successful transport of emergency food assistance are among the examples actors provide when presenting the practical results and meaningfulness of agency work. Because of the casting of technicality as a thinking domain within this cultural system, technical excellence is ideally seen as separable from national, cultural, ideological and other evaluative systems. Recognizing that international agencies must perform in a setting that is circumscribed by less-than-rational value choices, actors construct a mediating term, which I designate as "craft," to indicate the personal characteristics that enable technical success to take place in the "real" world of politics and ideology. "Craft" links person to technique.

Successes are conceptualized as representing something beyond technical competence alone; they testify to an adroit handling of various forces and stakeholders in international life, including donors and recipients, corporations and the media. International "craft," as a cultural operator, conjoins and confounds the domains of technicality and feeling by combining a high level of commitment to technical and rational excellence with the diplomatic and other personal skills required to relate this domain to persons enmeshed in value-laden domains. Persons and personality emerge, once again, as key mediators between opposing domains in a manner that defers, rather than resolves, problems that arise concerning how they are related. For this reason,

it, too, is best thought of as an operator for pointing to (a) the problematic quality of the resolution, (b) the continuity of effort involved, and (c) the common problematization of relating thinking to feeling in "real world," yet transcendent, institutions.

The international setting of a multilateral agency is understood both as presenting special challenges (e.g., differing national ideologies) and as affording special opportunities (e.g., freedom to pursue more "rational" approaches to development projects than is possible within national frameworks). Addeke Boerma, the former Director-General of FAO, describes⁸³ the contradictory situation faced by his agency, which is unable to address world problems as rationally as it would like in a world "circumscribed by the limits of political will":

Logic would seem to dictate that, when there are world problems, they require world solutions. But humanity, alas, is all too seldom governed by logic. It generally takes men some time to accept the realities of what needs to be done. And, although there have been some signs recently that the world has woken up to the fact that individual nation-states around the globe are inevitably being forced into conditions of greater dependence on one another, the necessary action, both national and international, to cope with the consequences has so far been much too slow in coming.

"Dedication," "know-how," "balance," "adaptability," "diplomacy" and "coordination" are among the terms that actors employ to present the cultural operation of international craft, to describe executive heads and to recognize themselves. These terms describe the personal qualities that are required to provide technical services at the international level, in a world which, by definition, is less than perfectly committed to rationality. The appeal to the personal locus as mediator between domains begs the question of the evaluative behaviors that necessarily inform technical works, and thus returns to the dilemma. This interpretive dilemma becomes evident to actors, as they admit to resorting, at times, to a certain "craftiness" in "selling" development projects or fabricating statistics to "put a saving face" on a development program. It becomes evident in critical reflection on the executive heads of their organizations, and on requirements on themselves. Narratives of actor craftiness plainly announce the subordination of technical and rational behaviors to value-choices, in an inversion of the conceptual ideal of international administration.

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Notes

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There do arise situations where UN staff are conscious of working as advocates for individuals and groups in ways that undermine the policies of governments within whose boundaries they reside. Galtung finds that a variety of philosophical orientations exists among the various UN organizations, and that such orientations depend largely on the coalition of governments

responsible for founding or controlling them. Thus, the UN system contains both "politically progressive" and "politically regressive" organizations. The political orientation of any given organization may have radical or even revolutionary implications for specific governments, for example, where "development" signifies altering the socio-economic structure of a society by enhancing the situation of a previously disenfranchised group. Even in these situations, then, an organization's advocacy serves the interests of its government constituents. Johan Galtung, "On the Anthropology of the United Nations System," in *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, David Pitt and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986a), pp. 1-22.

The UN's International Civil Service Advisory Board also describes the purpose of geographical distribution in terms of the benefits of multiculturalism: "The Secretariat shall reflect and profit to the highest degree from assets of all the various cultures and the technical competence of all Member States". Weiss, *ibid.*

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29. *Ibid.*, p. 3. (Emphasis added.)
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39. There do rise situations where UN staff are conscious of working as advocates for individuals and groups in ways that undermine the policies of governments within whose boundaries they reside. Galtung finds that a variety of philosophical orientations exists among the various UN organizations, and that such orientations depend largely on the coalition of governments responsible for their founding or controlling them. Thus, the UN system contains both "politically progressive" and "politically regressive" organizations. The political orientation of any given organization may have radical or even revolutionary implications for specific governments, for example, where "development" signifies altering the socio-economic structure of a society by enhancing the situation of a previously disenfranchised group. Even in these situations, then, an organization's advocacy serves the interests of its government constituents. Galtung, *op. cit.*, (1986b).

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Chapter XXI

Dance or Dancer: Another Look at the Relation Person Community

Joseph G. Donders

From the beginning this study did not restrict itself to philosophical resources, but we began with the analysis of a novel. But philosophy and literature are not the only modes of human insights which attempt to shed light upon our existing person-community relation: science and theology also are able to offer some guidance. The issue itself of person and community seems to present itself often in the form of what is *first* and what is *second*. Sometimes the question arises directly, sometimes indirectly as when confronted with the relationship between *personal rights* and *communal responsibilities*. Max Scheler made the interesting remark that 'reasoning' is an attempt to justify a position one has taken before with a faculty other than one's reasoning. This once again poses the question of which is first. The activity by which a person connects to society in the broadest sense in that prior 'moment' is called by him 'sympathy': I am not only for myself, I am for the other and the other is for me. It is a point where the person and other seem to 'melt' into one. Only in a second 'moment' of reflection are the two separated and made into distinct realities each with his or her own verb 'is'.

Schopenhauer, and more recently Joseph Campbell¹, studied the mysterious relation that can bind the contemporary western solidly individualized person to the other and to society by 'compassion.' The 'melting-together,' the 'flowing-over,' the 'fusion' taking place at such a moment deserve our attention.

How is it possible that suffering that is neither my own nor of my concern should immediately affect me as though it were my own, and with such force that it moves me to action". . . . This is something really mysterious, something for which Reason can provide no explanation, and for which no basis can be found in practical experience. It is nevertheless a common occurrence, and everyone has the experience. It is not unknown even to the most hard-hearted and self-interested. Examples appear every day before our eyes of instant responses of the kind, without reflection, one person helping another, coming to his aid, even setting his own life in clear danger for someone whom he has seen for the first time, having nothing more in mind than that the other is in need and in peril of his life.²

It seems that at the moment of such an experience our self consciousness undergoes a shift from experiencing ourselves as an individual to an experience of interconnectedness. We experience ourselves no longer merely as a particularized atom-type of organism, but also as taken up in a wave or field of energy.

In the description of our perceptions of self and other we rely on the models we use. As we can use only the models we know, the discovery of the possibility of a new model changes our perception. Thus when William Harvey discovered the nature of the circulation of our blood and compared our heart to a pump, suddenly our heart beats began to be heard in that sense. Before hearts were in a way not beating!³

There is a kind of reciprocity between the models we use to explain natural phenomena and the way we perceive ourselves. In the different models various cultural groups use to understand nature, we find a key to their self-understanding. Hence, it is important to note that in our not so very ancient Western approach the 'thing' model has been used practically from the very beginning, and though eclipsed for some time, it has remained the underlying theory. This views reality as built up out of atoms. Western medical science has been built almost exclusively on this approach developed by Empedocles who considered every sickness as a lack of proportion between the four chemical elements that compose all reality: air, fire, water and earth. Though the number of elements and their combinations have increased (and are increasing) since the development of that insight, essentially it is still the way in which the West approaches issues of sickness and health.

Perhaps unwittingly such a theory has defined in another way also the nature of self. The person is an atomistic type of reality and society is built up out of those individualized and to an extent personalized atoms.

However, not so long ago a serious difficulty arose as regards this atomistic theory in science. As not all phenomena could be explained (and predicted) working with this atomistic model, a complimentary theory was needed. Forced by the nature of their discoveries scientists began to speak about particles and wave-fields at the same time. They could look at reality from either an atomistic, individualized point or view, or from an energy-field, wave or (w)holistic point of view. In this relation particle/field the question which is first and which is second does not make much sense. Both are facets of the same reality: 'rights and responsibilities'--if we may metaphorically speak of them in this context--seem to harmonize.

Facing this kind of dilemma some Western physicists, pushing their insights further, became not only poetic, but even mystical. They began to speak in terms of a cosmic *dance* as the only way to visualize that particles can, at the same time, be a dynamic *energy field*.⁴ When dancing the dancers remain the dancers, the partners remain the partners, but when well done it becomes difficult to make a distinction between the partners and between the dance and the dancers. It is in this dance that the scientific West meets the mystical East and West.

In speaking about *transcendence* the 'religious person' expresses at the same time the depth of his/her own existence. The word *transcendence* is used here instead of *God* as the term in contemporary Western theology has connotations that do not do justice to its original Germanic meaning. In that original context God is no name, but the expression of not being able to name transcendence. It was the word used to make contact with transcendence and to speak about it. It was the cry "hey" to what looms in our depth and at the horizons of our existence, at birth, death and all points in between. It was in a sense the expression of our helplessness when facing our depth.

Speaking about that transcendence is speaking about ourselves. ~Theology' is anthropology, in a way similar to how our scientific models are anthropological. Discussing God is discussing ourselves: using models when speaking about God we use models defining ourselves. In the Judeo-Christian traditions the discussion on God has centered around the present topic, namely, the person-community question.

This is noticeable mainly in the development of our theological theories on the Trinity as called for by the belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ within an originally strictly monotheistic context, discussions which tore the Christian world apart into a West and an East. Without entering here into the thousand year old 'filioque' question, it is fruitful in our context to recall that the difference between the Eastern and Western Christian Churches is based on this discussion. In the Eastern Churches the Holy Spirit is given first to the community and then to the individual person; in the Holy Spirit is first given to the individual and then to the community. (One might even find this difference in secular terms in the two New Year's speeches given by Reagan and Gorbachev respectively in 1987. Reagan assuring the Russians that his main interest was to assure everyone their own *personal* rights, whereas Gorbachev insisting that '*we together*' are facing our task in the world.)

In both Eastern and Western interpretations the issue of *first* and *second* maintained in the Trinitarian interpretations. The Latin American Liberation Theologian Leonardo Boff suggests that this is due to the fact that both Eastern and Western approaches really remain essentially monotheistic.⁵ The Eastern Church starts from the monarchy of the Father as the principle of all divinity who communicates His essence and substance to the Son and the Spirit. It is a theology centered on the first person only. The Western Church starts from one divine substance internally differentiated in the Three Persons. In both theologies the Persons are constituted by their interrelatedness, but--Boff states--no real justice is done to their co-equality.

Boff then goes back to reflections on the Trinity dating from before the schism between East and West. In that theology the three are seen as co-equal divine persons, and the Greek term *perichoresis* (in Latin *circuminsessio* and *circumincessio*) is used to sum up the essence of the unity in the Trinity. This term means essentially the interpretation of one Person by the others. It is a description of a *koinonia*, a permanent process of active reciprocity, a clasping of two hands: the persons interpenetrate one another in a process of communing which forms their very nature.⁶

It is interesting to note that *perichoresis* can also be translated in another way as *circle-dance*, or to use the old English word for it: a carol. Our destiny seems to be to dance together, This is an experience to which each culture can relate, and is possibly the final answer to our quest for how person and community relate. Scheler's *sympathy*, Schopenhauer's *compassion*, the scientist's *dance of particle and wave* and the *perichoresis* in our description of transcendency, all seem to agree with something we know from experience, namely, that it is in the dance that we find ourselves.

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Notes

1. See Joseph Campbell, *The Inner Reaches of Outer Space* (New York: Alfred Marck, 1986), p. 112.
2. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Beiden Grundproblemen der Ethik, II*, *Über das Fundament der Moral*, (1840) (*Sämtliche Werke*, XII Volumes, Der Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, Stuttgart, 1895-1898).
3. See Dr. J.H. van den Berg, *Het Menselijk Lichaam*, (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1959), Vols. I and II.
4. See, e.g., Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).
5. Leonardo Boff, *Trinity and Society* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1989).
6. Leonardo Boff, "Trinitarian Community," *Cross Currents*, XXXVIII (1989), 189-309.

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