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Hermeneutics and Inculturation

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Introduction
Hermeneutics and Inculture

Antonio Gallo

As we enter the new millennium culture has become a privileged issue, more or less consciously serving as the fundamental ground for the interaction and conflicts, large and small, around the world.

A Revolution Emerging from Culture

Our question is whether cultural groups can act as agents of profound transformation. In the seventies, Mao Tse Tung promoted a "cultural revolution." In that case culture was an 'object' which was supposed to be revolutionized, and the people were to be re-educated in the new culture.

Can culture now invert his position: from the position of object can it become a subject and act as a transformative principle or force in the general panorama of the political and national world order? Can cultural identity be elevated to a new theoretical value which would justify a new international set of rights and a new political model?

This question is suggested by the recent improved sense of ethnicity as cultural groups of all dimensions impose their rules upon the already programmed and established world system of states and nations. In fact, the fall of Communism in the U.S.S.R. apparently was due to an upsurge and revitalization of the political states which had existed formerly and were integrated arbitrarily into the one juridical and ideological unity that was the socialist Soviet Union. Such previous historically recognized nations as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc., were the true political and military forces which broke the rule of the police-controlled superpower.

Nor did they remain at rest after they earned independence. Their true significance emerged when the newly liberated states began moving from the inside, dividing themselves into smaller cultural entities, as in the cases of Moldavia, Armenia, the Ukraine, and others within the former U.S.S.R.; in Czechoslovakia, Albania, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia outside of it.

This movement reveals the roots of the true force which overthrew the artificial whole. Despite the seriousness of economic, technological and social problems, ethnic and cultural energies have taken an absolute priority in the race of peoples towards freedom. These are the real constitutive bases for reconstructing the states according to a new concept of peace. Despite the difficulties, the new entities aim to affirm themselves as distinct and autonomous cultures dwelling in the same lands as other ethnic groups who, with or against them, seek to recover their own identities.

The First Glimmer of a Radical Transformation

The case of Yugoslavia, with such different regions and groups involved in a crudely irrational military confrontation (the inheritance of atavistic anger), is the most amazing contemporary example of incompatibility among cultures, and among their respective ethnic identities. At the same time, Yugoslavia is a good example of political manipulation of ethnic movements.

To what extent are ethnic demands acceptable in a contemporary order of nations with its international economic and political world system? There are indeed limits. How can some shared

views be transmitted to the pluralistic set of cultural groups so that they can live together in a political context of peace and of friendly relations while maintaining their own special cultural expressions and freedom? This is the challenge that the growing consciousness of cultural identity and ethnic uniqueness poses to the work of mutual understanding. But this challenge can make it possible for multiple groups to be linked by common concerns, values and some shared social and economic structures.

This is also the principal aim of these essays. The aim is not only to survey bridge-building between different groups which need each other to survive. The aim is also to discover the means by which such bridges can be built.

If, historically, the ethnic revolution is *inevitable*, we must accept and understand it, and make its unwanted consequences more human. No doubt, the ethnic and cultural movement is the most authentically human concrete movement to be found in human history. It is much more human and complete than the theocratic, the imperial, the democratic, or any other sociological or philosophical framework or ideological model employed for organizing humankind.

As is true of all finite human creations, the 'absolutization' of a unique point of view causes severe injuries to neighbors who, from their multiple perspectives, assert their own right to life. It will be necessary to reconcile the conflicts between exclusivity and communication, and between autonomy and the essential qualities of the whole.

This would not be a general and speculative problem if the situation we describe were bound to some special circumstances or region. A rapid survey, however, confirms that Latin America presents largely the same problem as Western and Eastern Europe, as well as Africa, West Asia, etc. Consequently we must state the question in more general form with a view to humanity itself. The problem of 'inculturation' is a general problem of human society. Hence, we need to develop content for this word, not only from the semantic aspect, but from the broader aspect of the activity implied in its living dynamics.

To accomplish this, we must enter more deeply into our contemporary society in its interior movements. The new and impressive mass-media and electronic means of communication apparently have spread an even net of interests over the whole population of this planet, and put all men in easy and immediate access to the news – whether good or bad – of the whole of humankind. Nevertheless, we it would seem that it has not stressed the uniformity as much as it has raised our consciousness of the differences and the personal and collective creativity of the groups. We are not speaking here of causes; it is enough at this point to discern the symptoms.

On the other hand, we are aware that the most important economic centers, such as the big industrial nations of the North American block, the South American cone, the European Market, and the South Pacific market, are progressing toward a great worldwide balance. These global organizations and great systems are so distant from the concerns of each political state and the ethnic personality of the people that it would not be surprising to find a contrary reaction on behalf of *diversity*.

The geographical distances too are great, as can be seen by measuring distances between Montreal and Miami, Vancouver and Gaudalajara, New York and Mexico City, Ocean City and Acapulco,—just to reference the Northern block's own internal antipodes. In fact we witness a process of sharp opposition among the human groups of different cultures who emphasize their own idiosyncrasies, familiar patterns of life, and traditions.

It is notorious that in Guatemala City a community of North Americans (Canadians and U.S.A. Americans) working there, and in control of great economic power, live in units isolated from the surrounding population, and protected by security guards and barbed wire. They have

exclusive clubs, stores, educational and health facilities, newspapers, etc. This situation is not aimed at political domination or the affirmation of some national superiority; it seems to be only a cultural and ethnic phenomenon among themselves for defending their traditional 'American' pattern of life. This example is repeated among the English in Belize, the Americans in Honduras, and the Americans in Panama. Likewise, immigrant groups in America and Europe isolate themselves to protect their own identities. Good examples of this are the community of Salvadorans in Washington, D.C., of Nicaraguans and Cubans in Miami, and so on.

In comparison with the old problem of ethnic ideals among the immigrant groups at the beginning or middle of this century, the current phenomenon is quite different. These new groups scattered in immense and strange territories, in cities with populations of many millions, are not ready to forget their national roots. Not only do they oppose systematic dispersion; they positively fight to stay together and perpetuate their original mode of community life.

Individuals move from one place to another, from one city to another in search of jobs, but once there they immediately relate to a community of their own group. In short, the individuals change place, but not community. Their involvement with the problems of economics, training, jobs and health in the host nation openly declares their recognition and appreciation of the host country's support. But at the same time, the immigrants do not open to the host country's style of relations with is moods, foods and general values. In reality, the immigrants do not change their former identity and traditional culture – what we can call their design of living.

This new phenomenon of ethnicity exploded after the seventies when many millions of people in South-East Asia left Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and reached Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other cities. Even before, in the 1950s, many mainland Chinese had gone to Taiwan to build a new home. Africa too has its own extensive history of similar migrations. These continue even now, as the Eritreans go to Yemen, the Albanians to Italy, and Macedonians to different Balkan nations. No doubt these groups have become conscious of their particular situation and are ready to accept the rules and gifts of the nation who received them, but they bring with them a true 'cultural nationality' which they cannot renounce.

This is not a superficial phenomenon, but concerns the reality of the human being itself as deeply influenced in its daily existence by the experience, mind, tradition and means of expressing itself received from concrete human kinship. Ethnicity signifies the culture, customs, design of life, family links with the group, and the group's roots in another country. These increasingly differentiate every small community from its host-neighbors. Hence the 'cultural pluralism' so emphasized in our contemporary world context.

Ethnicity

One immediate reaction to this situation could be an inevitable ethnocentrism and fragmentation of political states in a progressive process of multiplication of groups in which each defends its particular interests. Each would be set in its original interpretation of the world and in maintaining its exclusive point of view. This is the conclusion drawn by many observers who study the current waves of change. These observers often respond with an understandable attitude of distrust, positive rejection, and even pessimism: they fear that reconciliation among diverse cultural groups will prove become impossible.

But this does not appear to be a reasonable conclusion. If we consider ethnicity in its conscious dimension we must make some obvious distinctions between ethnicity itself and the political actions that can follow. The ethnicity, identity or culture of a group are difficult to conceptualize;

but everyone should understand that they are *not* ideologies. Ideologies refer to a political party, an institutionalized movement, an army, a sociological movement, or a philosophical conception of citizenship.

Sometimes culture can become a flag to attract the support of individuals on behalf of a national cause. In this case, culture is really being manipulated by a political or military party or government. Then it is used as a 'natural' force for competition or aggression against other groups or nations. The natural sense of unity and responsibility towards members of one's own community is twisted into aggression by the corrupt intentions of a powerful elite. A spontaneous phenomenon of auto-defense is then converted into an abstract and inhuman ideological plan.

Ethnicity is not an ideology but a consciousness: it is an historical background which at times can involve ideological elements together with other utopic content, as has been explicated clearly by Paul Ricoeur in his Ideology and Utopia. Culture is only the 'epiphany' of the ethnic consistence; it is a construction of the self and *in se* is not related to aggression or violence. A way of life is much more intense, collective, and dialogical than any ideology. The war in Yugoslavia can be a good (or bad) example of the ideologization of ethnic differences. It was not a fight of one culture against another, nor was it properly a war of one ethnic group against the other. It was a war of one government, a political entity, which wanted to extend its domination over a larger territory. Culture and historical tradition were advanced to provide an (apparent) right to a historically 'justified' retaliation against an inferior and (militarily) weaker population.

This is not the only case of *manipulation* of ethnic rights. There was the bloody fight in the Congo among three great (opposed) ethnic groups, when the Congo was becoming Zaire. And there have been similar struggles in Tanzania, and, more recently, Mozambique. All these are not ethnic struggles, but political ideologizations adopting ethnic colors to launch and unleash particular interests. An ethnic revolution, on the contrary, is a conscious step in life's progress toward 'becoming more human'.

On the foundation of consciousness we can move toward understanding differences, hoping to be able to discover a human dimension which will allow us to seek a more general level for understanding ethnic pluralism. We search for a way to open plurality within unity. In this sense we hope to build a bridge among differences, not as against one another, but as naturally complementary. Authentic national unity is a network which relies upon intellectual, moral and social interchange to reach a higher convergence.

This is the principle concern of this ongoing research project. How can the important cultural, technical, juridical and economic elements of different ethnic groups and cultures be convergent, without that entailing a forsaking of their own values or a betrayal of their own traditions and identity? This question express is negatively what, in a positive manner, we call 'inculturation.' The aim is to enable people to be attracted by universal human principles (at least to some major degree) and, when they accept the attraction, to move into a more complex community sharing more general goods. Such an amelioration must take place, of course, according to *ad hoc* historical, technical, and environmental needs.

Ethnic groups have not been invented. They are there and growing despite all the 'professional' predictions about a general culture and spreading uniformity. Perhaps humankind is strengthening the deeper bonds of their identity in order to protect itself and the meaning of the cultures, to become more acquainted with human interests, etc. The new reality is that the ethnic groups not only do exist, but formally declare themselves, are concerned about their identity, and expect due recognition.

The groups are not more than sets of persons, but they truly do exist and, like persons, are subjects of fundamental human rights. Our task consists in understanding their needs and limitations, their mutual oppositions and continuities, and the mutual cohesion which, through 'inculturation', can enable the weaving of an unbroken pattern. Inculturation has to build over the differences an efficient net of shared aims and connections.

Incultration

Thus inculturation puts us at the frontier between two opposite cultural groups. It focuses upon the action which introduces the values, theoretical principles or simple practical customs of one group to another group through their respective cultures. We must sharply distinguish inculturation from two other processes which also adopt foreign elements or symbols: transculturation and acculturation. The latter two terms are used in social sciences, especially by anthropologists and sociologists, whereas 'inculturation' is usually used by philosophers, and political, religious, ethical or aesthetic entities.

Transculturation. This is considered the natural process of translating a cultural object or an action from one culture to another. The translation is slow, spontaneous, without conflict or reaction, and without consequences for the identity of the people involved. In this category the translated objects can be of many genres. It is like the case of a person learning a second or a third language as an educational complement. Sometimes a working group of a particular culture adopts a new technology from another culture, such as new machinery, for example, in order to obtain better products. In the transculturation the adopted element can be adapted, modified and used in new forms and with new meaning.

The essential thing is that this new cultural object be freely assumed without provoking divisions or pain among individuals and the community. Such was the case, for example, of the 'green revolution' when the Indian people in Guatemala adopted chemicals to raise crops; or when the Indian cooperatives bought the big trucks of a refrigerated-sea-land type to transport their products directly to the United States. Essential then to transculturation is a free assumption of these new cultural objects and the lack of strife for the individual and for the group.

Aculturation. This focuses on contacts among two neighboring groups with frequent dealings and interchanges which cause some uniformity and common appearance as well as the adoption of very similar means of identification. This fact can often provoke injury to the identity of the acculturating group. Despite the free adoption of a few cultural elements of the other group, members of the acculturating group feel themselves hurt and threatened. Their identity can be eroded and the group dissolved through losing their own signs, symbols and self-understanding.

The two terms 'transculturation' and 'acculturation' imply a spontaneous translation of signs of the other culture in a natural interchange of action and reaction through the course of life. Both phenomena can be indicative of a weaker activity and creativity on the part of one of the two groups in the daily confrontation with the other.

Inculturation. In contrast, this is not a spontaneous or natural process because it is intended by someone from outside the group. I may try to inculturate into a neighboring group an ideal of literary conception, an experimental creative activity, an idea or method. In this case individuals or sets of individuals want to introduce to the other group and to the other culture a concept or an

object that they themselves have produced or borrowed from another and made their own. This concept or object (in the mind of the giver) is to be assumed by the new culture with the essential meaning and potentialities of the group which brings it.

From this point of view inculturation becomes a special kind of communication. The general operation of transmitting some thinking or emotion involves an intention. Many types of communication can be found as varieties of intentions—such as invitation, requests, commands, counsel and love, corresponding to the pluralistic functions of the language. Inculturation intends to communicate some cherished value for the benefit of each group in a major political unity and for the union itself. It intends to gather the plurality of subsets into a super-set extending to its components a number of fundamental concepts and principles which produce this union while respecting differences.

In this restricted field of communication inculturation is not alone, and probably could be confused with the current notion of 'propaganda', which also is intended to spread some idea or product among scattered and different people. But propaganda presents its physical objects or ideas, its models of customs, exclusively from the point of view and interests of its author. It is not dialogical and is not committed to the true general interests of the receiving person.

Usually propaganda carries a connotation of some inauthentic, exaggerated, and forced appearance of things; it is not so bad as fraud, but not as balanced as serious reasoning. Thus, we sense as a special character, common to economical, political and sometimes religious propaganda, that it borders on or becomes manipulation. Propaganda uses crafty devices, is tricky and frequently deceives and cheats the true interests of the people in order to sell something to them.

All these characteristics of propaganda pertain to the first face of the inculturation: the activity of the giver. But propaganda fails in its second face as well: that of the receiver. But the most important is the low level of the message in the case of propaganda. Propaganda attempts to transmit superficial things such as material and physical objects or ideological schemes, whereas inculturation is open, dialogical, and aims at the highest of values. Of course the physical and material objects can be also inculturated if they can be converted into answers to the needs of a cultural group. In this case there can be some links between inculturated objects and propaganda but such links are in the field of application and do not imply semantic ambiguity.

In its final sense, 'inculturation' can refer to any type of cultural object, from the most external and material as selling a brand of clothes, typewriters, cars, trucks, refrigerators, computers or working kits, to the most abstract and theoretical such as instilling a life-ideal, a cosmology, social structure or conception of the soul and of human destiny.

In the very recent activity of religious movements many organizations put the accent on inculturation of the faith. For us this is a subset of the general whole of the inculturation itself. Of course faith, as a system of thinking attributed to a divine revelation, introduces a number of new aspects to inculturation. Basically, however, it responds to the same requisite of making acceptable for the new culture a concept or a meaning generated "by" or "in" the other.

Everywhere, in these cases the process begins from inside the emissary culture and ends in the receiving one. Evidently, this translation or 'tra-duction' is not quite a mechanical or simple movement. For authentic 'translation' we have to find a method for actually analyzing and promoting the process if we want to build the necessary connection between peoples and their cultures while preserving the deference due to their identities.

Searching for a Method: Hermeneutics

Another important feature of inculturation is its two-sidedness: the first side looks to the giver and the second side relates to the receiver. Inculturation is not a fierce imposition of something foreign and meaningless for that would be an outrageous or artificial addition to something previously existent and suppose a one-sided approach.

Attentive work and broad creativity by the giver is needed in order to generate the signs and symbols, ideas and objects to be proposed to the next group, so that what is proposed is attractive and accessible to the character of their culture. The second or recipient side needs cooperation from the recipient in order actively and freely to assume the new sign or symbol, with its semantic implications for the thinking and behavior of the community. Without free acceptance by the receiving group, the assumption would be impossible and the inculturation null. A good example could be the existence of the twenty ethnic groups in Guatemala, each in deep possession of its language and thinking even after five centuries of Spanish colonization and many efforts to assimilate their dominated cultures to the one officially dominant Spanish one. Another impressive example is that of the Mascots and Matsuta people in Nicaragua, who outwitted the Sandinista revolution and ideologization in order to survive as independent cultures. The assumption of a new symbol meaningful in the context of the culture gives it a new dimension without contradicting the historical tendencies of the collectivity and the identities of its individuals.

Thus the themes to be inculturated should be the most far-reaching and transcendental human principles, such as justice, rights, dignity, common good, peace, friendliness, responsibility and others related to the specific circumstances and challenges which the people are facing in their historical time-and-space situation.

To resolve, in general, the problem of inculturation we must establish a basic approach which will allow us to proceed to build the character of an encounter between the plurality of cultures and their contrasting meaning and the uniqueness of persons within them. We must select a method of working in terms of the theme to be inculturated. For this we shall choose the basic approach of language and the hermeneutical method, and therefore study inculturation and hermeneutics.

If inculturation works, the result should be the achievement of authentic unity overtopping but preserving multiplicity. This can happen only if it is a double-sided process. On the one hand from outside, from plurality and difference, must come a passage to the construction of a more complex unity. On the other hand, from the inner creativity of the receiver must come the self-orientation through the passage, thus conserving an open line to communication and cooperation with others.

If we conceive ethnic groups not as static blocks but as living bodies, it is easy to understand that because of their internal energies and impulses, cultures tend to diverge from each other in their inner self-consciousness. Authentic inculturation should be a permanent and indispensable labor for creating and conserving the non-violent complexes of people, even in our contemporary context of proliferating multiplicity and ethnic revenge. Inculturation should promote an understanding which emerges from the original roots of human beings previous to any particular and incidental decision of their purposeful wills.

We must find the apparent point where the passage is drawn and the contact between opposite groups is experimentally perceived. We can select an anthropological approach, or the methods of many social sciences, those of economics, education, sociology and politics. But all these focus on mere particles of the whole whereas communication transfers all contents through language as through a universal instrument. We should not take language as a speculative product, or in the sense of just a linguistic analysis. Language is much more than a scientific object. It is the ‘medium’ that encloses every individual and collective personhood; it negotiates their living

interests, and expresses their physical necessities as well as their most spiritual or intellectual conceptions and feelings.

Language is captured, in its very moment, as existential and pragmatic. Language as value not only carries out a reference or some information, but is a force able to move and orient the creativity and the auto-affirmation of both the interlocutors in a cultural 'converstation'. Studied as such, it becomes a method which involves semiotics, epistemology, axiology, and a process of disclosing-the-truth in the Heideggerian sense. Consequently I am proposing a hermeneutic approach, which from the phenomenological experience moves to a reflective and abstractive conceptualization and an effort of conscious appropriation of the other's truth. This authentic construction becomes a *Bildung*, as H.-G.Gadamer calls it, or an "image," to use Clifford Geertz's term.

Hermeneutics is not inculturation, of course, but it is the first step towards an approximation of a neighboring culture or group. Hermeneutics enables the first dimension of inculturation: the struggle to transmit something not merely imposed and strange, but in some degree harmonized and respectful of the recipient culture. As Umberto Eco, "We cannot initiate a dialogue between different cultures dealing with an identical or similar class of problems if we do not first resolve the problem of the symbolic superstructures through which different civilizations represent to themselves the same political and social problems."

Here we take 'hermeneutics' in a broad sense: a method drawn originally from the analysis of texts, and designed to discover the living wealth of a message in its environmental and historical context. This is carried over to interpret not only written texts but actual discourses. And here by discourse I mean living signs, symbols, familiar and social structures, and economic activities. For all these are the 'forms of life' related to inculturation. Again Eco makes clear that "[T]hese signs are not only words or images—they can also be forms of social behavior, political acts, artificial landscapes."

Hermeneutics in its complete signification is also an action transforming the interpreter during his dialogue. The transformation of the interpreter is also part of inculturation. Both the interpreter's giving and receiving promote a new reality in the polar relation of the two cultures. Hermeneutics alone would be enclosed in the 'circle of interpretation' that Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Gadamer variously explain. The movement of appropriation is first projected, through the words, to the meaning or truth found in the other culture; in response, it returns to the subject to improve his knowledge, horizon, and will in a far-reaching and progressive transformation by the truth.

But hermeneutics when joined to inculturation constitutes an open and integrated whole that naturally inserted into the analysis, but conditioned by the active partnership of the other (the receiver) and all his personal and social context. As Levinas points out, many examples of this kind can be found in Franz Rosenzweig, when he tries to rewrite Hebraic thinking and experience into the language and the context of the occidental philosophical community.

A problem of inculturation for discussion here is how to put in terms of meaning and reference the huge series of cultural objects produced by human activity, the semantic values of which are only imperfectly perceived? For "[W]ords and images acquire different meanings according to the cultures which interpret them" (see Eco's *Travels in Hyper-reality*, p. 283).

Through the hermeneutic method we hope to exceed the level of simple 'propaganda', to learn to participate in the true life of the neighboring culture and share with it the signs and the symbols beyond the semantic meaning. We need some existential intuition of both our own and our neighbor's cultural terms. Inculturation requires not only an identification of the subject with the

meaning, but through the last step of the communication, the contact and the reception of this same meaning into an inner ‘ring of understanding’ shared among the members of the community. This, it seems, is the supreme and definitive degree of communication which not only includes the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary, but some more intense activity which will be a consequence of the shared understanding (see Clifford Geertz’s concept of ‘local knowledge’)

Structure of This Volume

Part I, "Existential Socio-Historical Hermeneutics and Inculturation," focuses on interpretation and inter-communion with other cultures. Chapter I, by Antonio Gallo, "Inculturation Through Hermeneutics," shows how existential hermeneutics, because it can approach the deep truths of an ‘other’ culture and then generate a new shared inter-cultural experience, is uniquely suited to the work of inculturation. Taking ‘text’ as ‘cultural textuality’, Gallo proposes a four-step hermeneutical process: (A) a ‘linguistic’ reading [cultural text as ‘object’]; (B) a ‘discursive’ reading [text as subject-object transaction]; (C) an ‘experiential’ reading [vivification of the deep ‘truths’ of a culture]; and (D) a ‘unitive’ reading where hermeneutics and inculturation become the same existential experience [generation of new inter-cultural truths]. Throughout, Gallo demonstrates by way of a delightful story from the ancient oral tradition of the K’ichean Indians of Guatemala. He closes with a discussion of differences between authentic pluralism, which can at higher levels achieve inter-national ‘shared’ meanings (i.e., shared concepts and ensuant ethic); and mere fragmentation, which can at best share concepts but cannot translate these into ethical behavior.

Chapter II, by George F. McLean, "Person and Culture," traces the meaning of "person" from the beginnings of western philosophical history through to the present, showing personhood’s evolving interaction with culture. Hermeneutics becomes the methodology whereby traditions can be properly investigated, appreciated, shared ("inculturation"), and learned from. Examining several crucial pivots in European philosophy, McLean argues that Locke shows "the person to be an identity of continuing consciousness which is self-aware and ‘concerned for itself.’" Kant, focusing instead on the will and freedom, shows "the person to be an end-in-itself." The ultimately religious notion of "being as gift" supplies what the Lockean and Kantian systems lack, namely, (1) the intersubjectivity of persons as gifts-to-each-other, and (2) the transcendence whereby ‘being’ is cherished as a gift of the Spirit. Hermeneutics allows us to uncover and cultivate the true values and virtues, the "authentic wisdom," of cultural traditions. By its existential attentiveness to lived space-and-time, and its care for the human spirit, Hermeneutics can open fruitful dialogue among cultures.

Chapter III, by Vassil Prodanov, "Ethnic Identity, Nationalism, and Culture," deploys the methodology of the social sciences to relate ethnicity to cultural history. It then proceeds to propose the inculturation of new normative modes of ethnicity designed to better avoid inter-ethnic conflict. Prodanov outlines criteria of ethnic identity and several models of ethnic identification, applying their templates to past and present history, especially European history. He examines the interplay of religion, nationalism, and the liberal/socialist opposition to ethnic identification. The contemporary problematic, marked by growing ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe and by multi-culturalism in the developed West, receive special attention, as does the effect of a market globalization. Prodanov proposes a new normative model of ethnicity which balances the demands of trans-cultural equity and ethnic particularity.

Part II, "Language-Based Hermeneutics and Inculturation," examines the communication cultural symbol systems through language patterns. Chapter IV, by Jorge Echavarria, "The Hermeneutics of Signs and the Quest of Otherness in Latin America," fields theories of language associated with Gadamer, Bakhtin, Lotman, Todorov, Serres, Dorfles, and others, in order to show that the moment of inculturation is, at once, a moment of hybridization. These thinkers argue that humanity is "linguistic" both because language permeates all thought and behavior and because language conceals/reveals the codes whereby human beings live. Echavarria argues that the Spanish conquerors never came into authentic dialogic relation with the Latin American Indian; nor did the Spanish come to terms with their own immediate hybridization. He uses records of doctrinal debates, catechisms, and the early Indian account of the Guadalupe apparition, all dating from the early Spanish Colonial period (16th cent.), to make his point. There follows a careful analytic treatment of the contemporary (late 20th cent.) Latin American condition—especially in its city-life—which is likewise hybridized, but which—unlike its colonial antecedents—affirms and celebrates this very heteroglossia.

Chapter V, by R. J. González-Casanovas, "Cultural Discourse in Hispanic Historiography on the Reconquest and Conquest: Historicist Hermeneutics from Alfonso X to Las Casas," finds that a "new historicist" reading of the chronicles of the Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors and the Spanish/Portuguese Conquest of the Americas reveals several significant patterns. (1) The l3th century Christian Iberian narratives are displaced or ‘inculturated’, with appropriate revisions, into the 16th century Iberian narratives. (2) These are both ‘inculturated’, again with the requisite differences, into the Christian Conquest narratives of the Americas. (3) The narratives of all three periods reveal moments wherein their narrators are themselves "historicist," that is, the narrators recognize that earlier narrative versions are "rhetorical," "mythic," and a species of "story-telling." González-Casanovas also demonstrates that for many centuries the Hispanic mythos of conquest, conversion, and empire was designed unconsciously and sometimes consciously to mirror the Islamic expansionism of the 9th through 16th centuries.

Chapter VI, by Shang Zhiyang, "Language and Inculturation," outlines the Wittgensteinian theories of language, focusing on the early phase’s "critique of private language," and the later phase’s model of "language-games" and "forms of life." "Language-games" operate at the societal level of codes; "forms of life" operate at the ontological or "deep-belief" level. Shang argues that inculturation requires "public language," the transfer of "language-games" within the larger context of "forms of life." He maintains that Western-style democracy has not been successfully inculturated into Mainland China because, while the "language-games" of democracy have transferred, democracy as a "form of life" has not yet been integrated into the Chinese psyche.

Part III, "Inculturations: Successes and Failures," ranges further a field to look it concrete instances of inculturation. Chapter VII, by Antonio Gallo, "Culture as a Phenomenon: The Basis of Self-Identity," uses Husserlian methodology to delineate the "supra-personality" which is the cultural group, and to show this process operative in three communities. (1) the Indian villagers of Chichicastenango, Guatemala; (2) the Cuban immigrants of Miami, Florida; and (3) the mestizo Hispanic population of Wheaton, Maryland. The Indians of Chichicastenango formed, centuries ago, a new cultural whole, the result of the mutual inculturation of the indigenous and the Spanish cultures. Gallo describes the durability of their experiential world despite governmental and military opposition. Unlike the Chichicastenango Indians, the Cuban immigrants—faced with very different problems—have changed much more. Gallo examines their new culture, which manages to retain a firmly Cuban core-identity while functioning in the mainstream society at the same time. The courageous mestizos of Maryland come mainly from Central American countries and

are recently arrived: their community is necessarily more fluid and heterogeneous than the Miami Cubans. Their task of inculturation is both greater and smaller: greater because they are less advantaged than the Cubans, but smaller because they return to Central America regularly and their core "homes" remain there.

Chapter VIII, by Liu Fangtong, "The Sixty-Year Samsara of Studies in Pragmatism and the Road of Cultural Development in China," examines the reception of American Pragmatist philosophy (Peirce, James, Dewey) in China from the beginning of the May 4th Movement (1919) to the beginning of the "new Enlightenment" (1979-). Liu argues that because of exogenous and endogenous causes, Pragmatism had little success in China. Exogenous causes included Western economic imperialism and the Sino-Japanese War. Endogenous causes included the stubborn feudalism of the War Lords, the growing anti-progressivism of the Kuomintang, and the eventual opposition of the Communist Party. Liu proposes that in any case American Pragmatism assumes a Western democratic foundation, and lacking that, proves to be too relativist and individualist for China. He closes with several suggestions for a successful inculturation of some Pragmatist motifs in the future.

Chapter I
Person and Culture

George F. Mclean

Introduction

Culture is not merely a set of objects in the sense of physical artifacts or even in the sense of social structures. More radically it is an expression of that which is properly personal in reality, specifically of the creative interaction of persons. In these terms that persons shape their internal identity as persons and groups, and on this basis penetrate with meaning the external objects in, and among which, they live.

In view of this it becomes important, indeed essential, for us to look more closely at the reality of the person with regard to whether it is fixed or creative, closed or open. For any progress in understanding at this point promises great dividends in comprehending cultures and inculturation.

For orientation in this task let us begin by delineating the meaning of person by contrasting it to a number of other notions. These contrasts will serve subsequently as guideposts for a series of positive and progressively deepening insights regarding the nature of persons, their intercommunication, creativity, and hence culture.

In this first and negative effort to delineate the meaning of persons we find that most notably, persons are contrasted to possessions. We object most strongly to any suggestion, whether in word, gesture, or deed, by which a person is treated as a commodity subject to manipulation or as a mere means by which others attain their goals. This, indeed, has become a litmus test for acceptable behavior.1 Secondly, persons are considered to be irreducible to the community. Any structure or situation which considers only the whole without taking account of one's concerns is rejected precisely as depersonalizing. Thirdly and conversely, those who are so individualistic as to be insensitive to the concerns of others are themselves considered impersonal. These exclusions direct our search for the meaning of the human person toward a responsible center which is neither reducible to, nor independent of, the physical and human context in which one abides, but stands in and as creative interrelation to both.

This positive notion of the person has not always had an identical or unchanging meaning. By natural growth, more than by mere accretion, the notion has managed to incorporate the great achievements of human self-discovery for which, in turn, it has been both the stimulus and the goal. This continuing process has been central to philosophy from its earliest days. Like all life processes, the search for the person has consisted in a sequence of important steps, each of which has resulted in a certain equilibrium or level of culture. In time each has been enriched and molded by subsequent discoveries. Indeed, it may not be incorrect to say that a parallel search is the dynamism at the heart of our personal life as well.

Here space is lacking for tracing out fully and in chronological sequence the history of this development, which would be effectively the history of philosophy itself. Hence, we shall follow a more analytic procedure beginning from the more external sense of person as role player and proceeding to a more interior sense of the person as self-conscious and self-determining and thence to the person as self-determining and creative of a culture in and as its life with others.

Clues to the Nature of Person

One means for finding the earliest meaning of a particular notion is to study the term by which it is designated. As earliest, this meaning tends also to be more manifest and hence to remain current. The major study2 on the origins of the term 'person' concludes that, of the multiple origins which have been proposed, the most probable refers to the mask used by actors in Greece and subsequently adopted in Rome. Some explain that this was called a '*persona'* because by 'sounding through' (*personando*)3 its single hole the voice of the wearer was strengthened, concentrated, and made to resound more clearly. Others see the term as a transformation of the Greek term for the mask which symbolized the actor's role.4 Hence, an original and relatively surface notion of person is the assumption of a character or the carrying out of a role. As such it has little to do with one's 'self'; it is defined rather in terms of the set of relations which constitutes the plot or story-line of a play.

This etymology is tentative; some would document an early and richer sense of person in Homeric literature.5 There can be no doubt, however, that the term has been used broadly in the above ethical sense of a role played in human actions. Ancient biblical literature described God as not being a respecter of persons, that is, of the roles played by various individuals.6 The Stoics thought of this in cosmic terms, seeing the wise person either as writing their role or as interpreting a role determined by the Master. In either case, to be a wise person was to be consistent, to play out one's role in harmony with oneself and with reason as the universal law of nature. From this ethical sense of person as role it was but a short step to a similar legal sense. This generally is a distinct and characteristic relation, although, as Cicero noted, it could be multiple: "Three roles do I sustain . . . my own, that of my opponent, that of the judge."7

Far from being archaic,8 the understanding of person as the playing of a role seems typical of much modern and American thought. John Dewey, in *Reconstruction in Philosophy,* characterized the essence of the modern mentality in just these terms: whereas in the case of ancient or classic usage "we are dealing with something constant in *existence*, physical or metaphysical; in the other [modern] case, with something constant in *function* and operation."9 The social and psychological sciences focus upon these roles or functions and in these terms attempt to construct, through operational definitions, their entire conceptual field.

This undergirds much of the progress in the social and behavioral sciences. As the same individual can play multiple roles, even in the same circumstances, studying the person in terms of roles makes it possible to identify specific dimensions of one's life for more precise investigation and to analyze serially the multiple relations which obtain in an interpersonal situation. William James, for example, distinguishes in this manner the self shown to family from that which one shows to professional colleagues or to God. Further, determining to pursue this exclusively on the basis of data which are subject to empirical verification10 has made possible an immense collaborative effort to achieve a scientific understanding of human life.

This suggests that first one look further into this sense of role in order to save it from hiding and then suppressing the ontological reality who fulfills it. This route is suggested by a proposed Etruscan origin of the term 'person' in the mask worn in the cult of the goddess Persephone. While the Latin grammarians seized on this to classify the speakers' voices as first or second person, the original dramatic context was more mysterious based on a vibrant interplay of presence and absence as the goddess manifested herself while remaining absent. The appearance thus became multiple while the unlimited reality of the source remained one and unfathomable. There is here a first suggestion for the central truth about person for culture, namely that the person is an unlimitedly rich and even mysterious source; and hence that in dialogue with its physical and social environment it can be adaptive and creative in its expressions. This holds a key to understanding

the rich variety of cultures. This suggests, in turn, that if this can be adequately understood it may be possible to find on their part endless adaptability both within themselves and in relation to other cultures.

Thus though much has been accomplished through understanding the person in terms of roles, there may have been a distant early warning of one limitation of this approach in Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) *Cours de philosophie positive*. By rejecting psychology as a scientific discipline and reducing all data concerning the person to either biology or sociology he ignored introspection and the corresponding dimensions of the individual's conscious life. The person was not only one who could play a role, but one whose total reality consisted in that role.

More recently Gabriel Marcel has pointed up a number of unfortunate consequences which derive from considering the person only in terms of roles or functional relations. First, no account can be then taken of one's proper self-identity. If only "surface" characteristics are considered, while excluding all attention to "depth,"11 the person is empty; if the person be analyzed fully in terms of external causes and relations one becomes increasingly devoid of intrinsic value. What is more, lack of personal identity renders it impossible to establish personal relations with others. Even that consistency between, or within, one's roles which the Stoics as early proponents of this understanding of person considered to be the essence of personal life, is left without foundation. Life would be reduced as in the words of Shakespeare "to a tale told by an idiot."12

It is essential then that beyond the roles we can play in relation to others we look to the person who is able to play them and to the cultures they construct as ways of life and patterns of meaning and beauty.

Self-Consciousness and Freedom

Important steps have been taken in this direction in modern thought. Classically these have centered upon understanding the uniqueness of the person as consisting in his or her consciousness (Locke) and freedom (Kant). John Locke undertook to identify the nature of the person within the context of his general effort to provide an understanding which would enable people to cooperate in building a viable political order. His concentration upon the mind is typical of modern thought and its contribution to our appreciation of the person. Focusing upon knowledge Locke proceeded to elaborate, not consciousness in terms of the person, but the person to the degree that it was consciousness, considering personal identity to be a complex notion composed from the many simple ideas which constitute our consciousness. By reflection we perceive that we perceive and thereby are able to be, as it were, present to ourselves and to recognize ourselves as distinct from all other thinking things.13 Memory, which is also an act of consciousness, enables us to recognize these acts of consciousness in different times and places. Locke considered that by uniting present acts of awareness with similar past acts the memory not merely discovered but created and constituted personal identity. This binding of myself as past consciousness to myself as present consciousness constitutes the continuing reality of the person. Essentially, it is a private matter revealed directly only to oneself, and only indirectly to other persons.

Because Locke's concern for knowledge was part of his overriding concern to find a way to build social unity in a divided country, he saw his notion of the self to be the basis of an ethic for both private and public life in the following manner. As conscious of pleasure and pain the self is capable of happiness or misery, "and so is concerned for itself."14 What is more, happiness and misery matter only inasmuch as they enter one's self-consciousness as a matter of self-concern directing one's activities. Thus, the pattern of a culture and its public morality, with its elements

of justice as rewarding a prior good act by happiness and as punishing an evil act by misery, is founded upon this identity of the self as a continuing consciousness from the time of the act to that of the reward or punishment. 'Person' is the name of this self precisely as open to public judgment and social response; it is "a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit."15

This early modern attempt to delineate the person on the basis of consciousness locates a number of factors essential for the relation of person and culture: the importance of self-awareness, the ability to be concerned with and for oneself, and the basis this provides for the notions of responsibility and public accountability within one's culture and nation. These are the foundations of his *Letters Concerning Toleration* which were to be of such great importance in the subsequent development of social and political cultures in modern times for many parts of the world.

There are reasons to believe, however, that, while uncovering an important dimension of the person in his focus upon consciousness, he did not push his analysis far enough to integrate the whole person. Leibniz, in his *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, was quick to point out some of these reasons in a detailed response. Centering personal identity in consciousness, Locke distinguished it from the notion of the person as that which could be identified by a body of a particular shape. This led him to admit that it is conceivable that the one consciousness, self or person could exist in different bodies a thousand years remote one from another16 or, conversely, that multiple selves could inhabit the same body.

This is more than an issue of "names ill-used";17 it is symptomatic of the whole cluster of problems which derive from isolating human consciousness from the physical and more deeply the substantial identity of the person. These include problems not only regarding communication with other persons for which one depends upon physical signs, but regarding the life of the person in a physical and especially a social world in whose unity and harmony one's consciousness has no real share, indeed, in relation to which it is defined by contrast.18 Recently, existential phenomenologists have begun to respond to the desiccating effect which this has had even upon consciousness itself; sociologists and economists note the deleterious effects of the consequent adversarial character of human relations; and environmentalists point up the destruction it has wrought upon nature.

This implies a problem for personal identity. Locke locates this in the continuity established by linking the past with the present in one's memory.19 But, as there is no awareness of a substantial self from which this consciousness proceeds,20 what remains is but a sequence of perceptions or a flow of consciousness recorded by memory.

Finally, Leibniz would question Locke's claim to have provided even that public or forensic notion of the self by which he sought to provide a sufficient basis for legal and political relations and for the relation of roles which constitute a culture. Memory can deal with the past and the present, but not with the future which must be the main task of a rationally ordered society.21 Though self-consciousness is certainly central to the development of a culture and distinctive of the person, more is required for both than a sequence of consciousness, past and present.

Another approach was attempted by Kant whose identification of the salient characteristics of the person has become a standard component for modern sensitivity. Whereas Locke had developed the notion of the person in terms of consciousness predicated upon experience, Kant developed it on the requirements of an ethics based upon will alone independent of experience. Considering human knowledge to be essentially limited to the spatial and temporal orders and unable to explain its own presuppositions, by looking to the will for a new and absolute beginning he led the modern mind to a new awareness of the reality and nature of the person.

For Kant the person is above all free, both in him- or herself and in relation to others; in no sense is the person to be used by others as a means. From this he concluded that it is essential to avoid any dependence (heteronomy) on anything beyond oneself and, within oneself, on anything other than one's own will. The fundamental thrust of the will is its own unconditional command (categorical imperative) to act lawfully. In turn, "the only presupposition under which . . . (the categorical imperative) is alone possible . . . is the Idea of freedom."22

As free, the person must not be legislated to by anyone or on the basis of anything else; to avoid heteronomy one must be an end-in-oneself.23 The person, then, is not merely independent, as is any subject; he is a law-making member of society. This means that the person has, not only value which is to be protected and promoted, but true dignity as well, for he is freely bound by and obeys only the laws which he gives to himself.24

This "glorious ideal" has been perhaps the major contribution to the formation of the modern understanding of person. At the minimum, it draws a line against what is unacceptable, namely, whatever is contrary to the person as an end-in-him/herself, and sets thereby a much needed minimal standard for action. At the maximum, as with most *a priori* positions, it expresses an ideal for growth by pointing out the direction, and thereby providing orientation, for the development of the person. In Kohlberg's schema of moral development it constitutes the sixth or highest stage, and hence the sense and goal of his whole project—though he notes rightly that this is not an empirically available notion.

Further, this bespeaks a certain absoluteness of the person which is essential if the person is not to be subject to domination by the circumstances he encounters. If one must be more than a mere function of one's environment—whether this be one's state, or business, or neighborhood—then Kant has made a truly life-saving observation in noting that the law of the will must extend beyond any one good or particular set of goods.

Finally, joining Kant's attention to will with Locke's attention to consciousness—especially if this consciousness be seen in terms not simply of memory but of the imagination as developed in Kant's third critique—brings into focus the creative shaping of diverse patterns of human life in which cultures consist.

But this very capacity for diversity suggests that still more is needed for an understanding of the person. In Part I of his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant correctly rules out anything other than, or heteronomous to, human freedom and will as an adequate basis for human life, at least as far as using one's own ability to think and to decide are concerned. Nor does he omit the fact that these individuals live their lives with others in this world. But if the realization of the good is mediated by the actual concrete good of all in the community, a role for attention to the existential order must be recognized in order for right reason to conform to the actual common good. Further, there is need to know more of the reality of the person in order to understand not only how will and freedom provide the basis for ethical behavior, but how such behaviour can be shaped by a community of persons into a pattern (culture) of actual self-realization. Along with the postulation of freedom there must be the immortal actuality of the soul and the existence of God.

In sum, Locke and Kant have contributed essentially to delineating the nature of the person for the modern mind; both have pointed up that which distinguishes the person from other subjects. Focusing upon knowledge, Locke showed the person to be an identity of continuing consciousness which is self-aware and "concerned for itself." Focusing upon the will and its freedom, Kant showed the person to be an end-in-itself.

But what Locke and Kant discovered about the person by considering self-awareness and autonomous self-determination for the ethical and political arena needs now to be grounded in the life of the person as a rational and free subject living with others in community or in the cultures they jointly create. To do this we must look foundationally to the very being of the person thus engaged. This takes us to the notion of person as substance in Greek philosophy and as subject in Christian metaphysics. These two notions are not proper to persons, but assert the identity and independence which will be required by the person who would create and be promoted by cultures.

Person as Subsistent Individual

Our attention must be directed then to another level of meaning if we are to find in the person the resources it requires as the source of cultures. Rather than attempting to think of a role without an actor or a consciousness without a subject, it is important to look to the one who consciously assumes the role and expresses him or herself therein.

In order better to appreciate persons as members of a community it is helpful to consider them on three progressively more specific dimensions, first as instances of a particular type, that is, as substances; secondly as existing, that is, as subsisting individuals; and thirdly as open to others and communicating what we have been given and by which we reflect the Existence or Being Itself. What is distinctive of the person, namely, self-awareness, freedom and creativity, will be treated in the following sections.

Substance

It was Aristotle who identified substance as the basic component of the physical order; his related insights remain fundamental to understanding the person as the subject of moral social life. His clue to this basic discovery appears from language. Comparing the usage of such terms as "running," and "runner," we find that the first is applied to the second, which, however, is not said, in turn, of anything else.25 Thus, one may say of Mary that she is running, but one may not say that she is another person, e.g., John. This suggests the need to distinguish things that can be realized only in another (as running is had only in a runner, e.g., in Mary) whence they derive their identity (the running is Mary's and distinct from any running that John might do), from those which have their identity in their own right (e.g., Mary and John).

Thus, a first and basic characteristic of a substance, is that it has its identity in its own right rather than through another. Only thus could a human person be responsible for his or her action. Without substances with their distinct identities one could envisage only a structure of ideals and values inhabited, as it were, by agents without meaning or value. In this light the task of ethics and moral education would be merely to enable one to judge correctly according to progressively higher ideals. This, indeed, would seem to be the implicit context of Lawrence Kohlberg's focus upon moral dilemmas which omits not only other dimensions of moral development but personal identity as well. Aristotle points instead to a world of persons realizing values in their actions. In their complex reality of body, affections and mind they interact morally and constitute a community.

Secondly, as the basic building blocks in the constitution of a world, these individuals are not merely undetermined masses. As the basic points of reference in discourse and the bases for the intelligibility for the real world these substances must possess some essential determinateness and be of one or another kind or form. The substance (and hence the person), then, is not simply one

unit indifferently contrasted to all others; he or she is a being of a definite—in this case a human—kind,26 relating in a distinctively human manner to other beings each with their own nature or kind. Only thus can one's life in the universe have sense and be able to be valued.

Thirdly, being of a definite kind the substance (and hence the person) has its own proper characteristics and is able to realize a specific or typical set of activities. These activities derive from, or are "born of" (from the latin, *natus*), the specific *nature* of the thing. The determination of what interaction with others is appropriate will need to include not only the good to be derived from the action, but respect for the agent and his or her nature.

The work of Aristotle then directs our attention to three factors, namely: (a) individual beings, (b) who are particular instances of a definite kind, and hence (c) capable of specific types of activities. All three are concerned with the kind or type that is the person.27 This is important, but it is not enough, for one can know well enough what kind of thing a person is but without attending to its existence one cannot discover its role in creating cultures.

Subsisting Individual

Something of the greatest importance was bound to take place, therefore, when in the early Christian ages the mind expanded its range of awareness beyond the nature of things to what Shakespeare was to call *the* question: "to be or not to be." At that point the mind became able to take explicit account not only of the kind but of the existence of the individual by which it is constituted in the order of actual, and hence of acting, beings.

From this there followed a series of basic implications for the reality of the person. It would no longer be considered as simply the relatively placid distinct or autonomous instance of some specific type. Rather, it would be understood in a radically dynamic manner as existing. This means not only being in its own right or, as is said, "standing on its own two feet" (sub-sisting), but bursting in among the realities of this world as a new and active center (ex-isting). This understanding incorporates all the above-mentioned characteristics of the individual substance, and adds three more which are proper to existence, namely, being (a) complete, (b) independent, and (c) dynamically open to actions and to new actualization. Since existing or subsisting individuals include not only persons but rocks and trees, these characteristics, though fundamental to the person, still will not be exclusive to it.

First, a person must be whole or complete. As regards its nature it must have all that is required to be of its distinctive kind (just as by definition a three digit number cannot be made up of but two digits). Hence, if humans are recognized to be by nature both body and mind or body and soul, then the human mind or soul without the body would be neither a subsisting individual nor, by implication, a person, for it would lack a complete human nature. This is of special importance in view of the tendency of some to reduce the human person to only the mind, soul, or consciousness. The same is true of the mind or spirit in view of the tendency, described by William James,28 to reduce the person to "nothing but" an inert by-product of physiology, or a function of the structure of the production and distribution.

Further, the existing person requires not merely a complete nature, but his or her proper existence. As existing, the individual is not merely an instance of a specific nature or kind, but a concrete actuality asserting oneself and dynamically struggling to achieve one's fulfillment. In the person this goes beyond merely walking a course whose every step is already charted; it includes all the unique, fully individual choices by which a life is lived. It is subject then to combinations of the precarious and the stable, of tragedy and triumph in its self-realization. These are described

by the American pragmatists and Continental existentialists as the very stuff of life, and hence by Dewey as the very stuff of education.

Secondly, as subsistent the person is independent. Being complete in its nature. It is numerically individual and distinct from all else. In accord with this individual nature, one's existence is, in turn, unique, and establishes the subject as a being in its own right, independent of all else. This does not imply that the human or other living subject does not need nourishment, or that it was not generated by another: people do need people and much else besides. There is no question here of being self-sufficient or absolute. What is meant by independence is that the needs it has and the actions it performs are truly its own.

In turn, this means that in interacting with other subsistent individuals one's own contribution is distinctive and unique. This is commonly recognized at those special times when the presence of a mother, father, or special friend is required, and no one else will do. At other times as well, even when in playing a social role as a bus driver or a dentist I perform a standard service my actions remain properly my own. This understanding is a prerequisite for education to responsibility in public as in private life. It is a condition too for overcoming depersonalization in a society in which we must fulfill ever more specialized and standardized roles.

Another implication of this independence is that, as subsisting, the human person cannot simply be absorbed or assimilated by another. As complete in oneself one cannot be part of another: as independent in existence one is distinct from all else. Hence, one cannot be assumed or taken up by any other person or group in such wise as to lose one's identity. In recent years awareness of this characteristic has generated a strong reaction against the tendencies of mass society totally to absorb the person and to reduce all to mere functions in a larger whole called the state, the industrial complex, the consumer society, cult, etc.

The third characteristic of the person as subsistent is its openness to new actualization and to interrelation with others. The existence by which one erupted into this world of related subjects is not simply self-contained; it is expressed in a complex symphony of actions which are properly one's own. These actions have twin implications. First, they determine their subject, for by running Mary herself is constituted precisely as a runner. Second, the actions into which our existence flows, while no less our own, reach beyond ourselves. The same action which makes us agents shapes the world around us and, for good or ill, communicates to others. All the plots of all the stories ever told are about this; but their number pales in comparison with all the lives ever lived, each of which is a history of personal interactions.29 The actions of an existent person reflect one's uniqueness with its multiple possibilities, and express this to and with others. It is in this situation of dynamic openness,30 of communication and community, that the growth of persons and cultures takes place. As subsistent then the person is characteristically a being, not only in him/herself, but *with* other beings.

To summarize: thus far, we have seen one level of the notion of person as playing a role in relation to others. This required the capacity for self-consciousness and freedom, which in turn, pointed more deeply to the substance of the person. Were this to mean simply being an instance of a specific nature, however, in the final analysis the goal of the person would be but to continue its species through time. While true for the Greeks and still a sufficient basis for the issues considered in sociobiology, this would not allow adequately for the person's unique and independent reality. That required the subsequent development of an awareness of existence as distinct from nature or essence, and as that by which one enters into the world and is constituted as a being in one's own right. On this basis the subsisting individual can be seen to be whole and independent, and hence the dynamic center of action in this world.

Being as Gift

Given the danger of self-centeredness, however, it would be possible to read what has been said thus far about an existing individual of a specific nature acting in the world, in terms which are simply self-centered. Then one's actions which effect others would be calculated to shape them in terms of 'myself' and for 'my' own interest. Thus, the notions of individual, self and subject remain ambiguous: open to others, but in a way that might yet close in upon itself and attempt to absorb others as well.

Caution must be exercised here, then, lest the search for the subject or the self appear to reinforce the excesses of self-centeredness and individualism. This could be a special danger in cultures whose positive stress on self-reliance and independence has been rooted historically in an atomistic understanding of persons as single and unrelated. This danger is reflected, for example, in the common law understanding of judicial rulings, not as defining the nature of interpersonal relations, but simply as reducing violence through resolving conflicts between adversaries whose lives happen to have intersected.

In this context it is helpful to note that when Aristotle laid the foundations for the Western understanding of the person he did so within the Greek understanding of the physical universe as a unified, dynamic, quasi-life process in which all was included and all were related. Indeed, the term 'physical' was derived from the term for growth and the components of this process were seen always with, and in relation to, others. The individual existent, seen as sculpted out of the flow and process of the physical universe, cannot rightly be thought of as isolated. Such an existent is always *with* others, depending on them for birth, sustenance and expression. In this context, to be distinct or individual is not to be isolated or cut off, but to be able to relate more precisely and intensively to others.

This can be seen at a series of levels. My relation to the chair upon which I sit and the desk upon which I write is not diminished but made possible by the distinction and independence of the three of us. Their retention of their distinctness and distinctive shapes enables me to integrate them into my task of writing. Because I depend still more intimately upon food, I must correlate more carefully its distinctive characteristics with my precise needs and capacities. On the genetic level it is the careful choice of distinctive strains that enables the development of a new individual with the desired characteristics. On the social level the more personable the members of the group the greater and more intense is its unity.

Moving thus from instruments such as desks, to alimentation, to lineage, to society, suggests that, as one moves upward through the levels of beings, distinctness, far from being antithetic to community, is in fact its basis. This gives hope that at its higher reaches, namely, in the realization of a culture, the distinctiveness of autonomy and freedom may not need to be compromised, but may indeed be the basis for a community of persons bound together through mutual love and respect creating a unique culture which in turn opens positively to others.

Within this unified pattern of relations the identification of multiple persons, far from being destructive of unity, provides the texture required for social life. Where persons are differentiated by the moral tenor of their actions which, in turn, make a difference to other persons, distinctiveness becomes not an impediment to but a principle of, community.31

The final resolution of this danger and thereby the mobilization of personal consciousness in interaction with others but dependent on the existence of the person: is this ultimately simply self-affirmation, or is it gift that is received and lived in the very sharing of it with others?

This can be approached through steps of phenomenological reflection on the person and gift. First, our self-identity and interpersonal relatedness are not made by us, but givens with which we work. Second, if we reflect on the character of a gift we note that it has an essentially gratuitous character: to attempt to pay for it in cash or in kind would destroy its nature as gift. A gift then is based primarily in the freedom of the giver, not in the merit of the one who receives.

There is here striking symmetry with the 'given' in the sense of hypothesis or evidence. In the line of hypothetical and evidential reasoning there is a first, namely, that which is not explained, but upon which explanation is founded. Here, there is also a first upon which the reality of the gift is founded and which is not to be traced to another reality. This symmetry makes what is distinctive of the gift stand out, namely, that the gift's originating action is not traced back further precisely because it is free or gratuitous. Once again, our reflections lead us in the direction of that which is self-sufficient, absolute and transcendent as the sole adequately gratuitous source of the gift of being.

Thirdly, as an absolute point of departure with its distinctive spontaneity and originality, the giving is non-reciprocal. To attempt to repay would be to destroy the gift as such. Indeed, there is no way in which this originating gratuity can be returned; we live in a graced condition. This appears in reflection upon one's culture. What we received from the authors of the *Vedas*, from a Confucius or an Aristotle, can in no way be returned. Nor is this simply a problem of distance in time, for neither is it possible to repay the life we have received from our parents, the health received from a doctor, the wisdom from a teacher, or simply the good example which can come from any quarter at any time. The non-reciprocal character of our life is not merely that of part to whole; it is that of a gift to its source.32

This parallels a basic insight suggested in the Upanishads and perhaps the basic insight for metaphysics:

In the beginning, my dear, this world was just being (*Sat*), one only, without a second. . . . Being thought to itself: 'May I be many; may I procreate'. It produced fire. That fire thought to itself: 'May I be many; may I procreate'. It produced water. . . . That water thought to itself: 'May I be many; may I procreate'. It produced food. . . . That divinity (Being) thought to itself: 'Well, having entered into three divinities [fire, water, and food] by means of this living Self, let me develop names and forms. Let me make each one of them tripartite.' (*Chandogya Up.,* 6.1-3, 12-14.)

In a certain parallel to the antinomies of Kant which show when reason has strayed beyond its bounds, many from Plotinus to Leibniz and beyond have sought knowledge, not only of the gift and its origin, but of why it had to be given. The more they succeeded, the less room was left for freedom on the part of man as a given or gift. Others attempted to understand freedom as a fall, only to find that what was thus understood was bereft of value and meaning and hence was of no significance to human life and its cultures. Rather, the radical non-reciprocity of human freedom must be rooted in an equally radical generosity on the part of its origin. No reason, either on the part of the given or on the part of its origin, makes this gift necessary.

Fourthly, the freedom of man is the reflection of his derivation from a giving that is pure generosity: man is the image of God. On the part of the freedom thus received this implies a correspondingly radical openness or generosity. The gift is not something which is and then receives. It was an essential facet of Plato's response to the problems he had elaborated in the *Parmenides* that the multiple can exist only *as* participants of the good or one. Receiving is not something they *do*; it is what they *are*.133 As such they reflect at the core of their being not the

violent self-seeking of the first level of freedom or the passive principles of level two, but the open, active and creative reality of the generosity in which they originate.

The truth of this insight is confirmed from many directions. Latin American philosophies begin from the symbol of earth as the fruitful source of all (reflected in the Quechuan language of the Incas as the "Pacha Mama "). This is their preferred context for their sense of human life, its relations to physical nature, and the meeting of the two in technology.34 In this they are not without European counterparts. The classical project of Heidegger in its later phases shifted beyond the unconcealment of the being of things-in-time, to Being which makes the things manifest. The *Dasein*, structured in and as time, is able to provide Being a place of discovery among things,35 but it is being which maintains the initiative; its coming-to-pass or emission depends upon its own spontaneity and is for its sake. "Its 'there' (the *Da-* of *Dasein*) only sustains the process and guards it," so that in the openness of concealed Being beings can appear un-concealed.36

The African spirit, especially in its great reverence for family, community and culture—whence one derives one's life, one's ability to interpret one's world, and one's capacity to respond—may be uniquely positioned to grasp this more fully. In contrast to Aristotle's classical 'wonder', these philosophers do not situate the person over against the object of his or her concern, reducing both to objects for detached study and manipulation. They look rather to the source from which reality is derived and are especially sensitive to its implications for the mode and manner of life as being essentially open, communicative, generous and sharing.

As one does not first exist and then receive, but one's very existence is a received existence or gift, to attempt to give back this gift, as in an exchange of presents, would be at once hopelessly too much and too little. On the one hand, to attempt to return in strict equivalence would be too much, for it is our very self that we have received as gift. On the other hand, to think merely in terms of reciprocity would be to fall essentially short of my nature as one that is given, for to make a merely equivalent return would be to remain centered upon myself where I would cleverly trap, and then entomb, the creative power of being.

Rather, looking back I can see the futility of giving back, and in this find the fundamental importance of passing on the gift in the spirit in which it has been given. One's freedom as given calls for a creative generosity which reflects that of one's source. This requires breaking out of oneself as the only center of one's concern. It means becoming effectively concerned with the good of others and of other groups, and for the promotion and vital growth of the next generation and those to follow.

Finally, that other cultures are quintessentially products of self-cultivation by other spirits as free and creative implies the need to open one's horizons beyond one's own self-concerns to the ambit of the freedom of others and what they freely would be and would become. This involves promoting the development of other free and creative centers and of the cultures they create and which, precisely as such, are not in one's own possession or under one's own control. No more, then, is the person a thing to be used and or manipulated in the interests of others . . . something we seem finally to have discovered and agreed upon in our hearts.

In this light one lives then no longer in terms merely of oneself or of things that one can make or manage, but in terms of an interchange between free men and peoples of different cultures. Personal responsibility is no longer merely individual decision- making or for individual good. Effectively realized, the resulting interaction and mutual fecundation should reach out beyond oneself and one's own culture to reflect ever more perfectly the glory of the one source and goal of all.37

In sum, the characteristics of identity: autonomy and independence which to the person as subsistent establish his or her inviolability, but this can be diversely understood as closed in upon self or as outgoing according to the character of being of which these are modes. What we have found here is that being comes to the person as gift and calls for open communication by, and beyond, the individual. This combination of autonomy and communication is the heart of the free creativity from which cultures emerge and in terms of which their intersections are shaped responsibly.

For this, however, we need more than Locke's memory of a flow of sensations or Kant's formal universals and categorical imperative. We need to look into the nature of the person precisely as rational and transcending the limitations of matter and its horizons.

Person as Rational and Creative

This provides for a radical insight into what it is to be a person and the implication of this for culture. For now we are able to see that as an existent the person shares according to its nature in the gift of being and hence of love by which it has been created. The person is called to bring this gift to perfection in itself precisely in the passing of it on to others. Self-perfection and realization of others are not two realities, but one. If this be true for all subsistents, it is the more true when realized according to human nature, for it is precisely at this rational level that human life is cut free from the limitations of matter to be able to achieve meaning which can be shared without being diminished.

Classically, Boethius defined the person as "an individual substance of a rational nature."38 But conscious nature can be understood on a number of levels. First, it might be seen as a reflection or passive mirroring in man of what takes place around him. This does not constitute new being, but merely understands what is already there. Secondly, if this consciousness is directed to the self it can be called self-knowledge and makes of the subject an object for one's act of knowledge. Thirdly, consciousness can regard one's actions properly as one's own. By concerning the self precisely as the subject of one's own actions, it makes subjective what had been objective in the prior self-knowledge; it is reflexive rather than merely reflective.

This self-conscious experience depends upon the objective reality of the subject with all the characteristics described above in the section on the self-conscious and free subject. This, in turn, is shaped by the reflexive and hence free experiences of discovering, choosing, and committing oneself. In these reflexive acts the subject in a sense constitutes him or herself, being manifested or disclosed to oneself as a concrete, distinct, and indeed unique being consciously receiving the gift of being and communicating it in love. This is the distinctively personal manner of self-actuation of the conscious being or person.

The result for the person is a unique realization of that independence which, above, was seen to characterize all subsistent individuals. Beyond the mirroring of surrounding conditions and of those things that happen to one, beyond even the objective realization of oneself as affected by those events, the person exists reflexively as their subject and as a source of action. As a person one has an inward, interior life of which they alone are the responsible source. This implies for the person an element of mystery which can never be fully explicated or exhausted. Much can be proposed by other persons and things, much can even be imposed upon me. But my self-consciousness is finally my act and no one else's. How I assess and respond to my circumstances is finally my decision, which relates to, but is never simply the result of, exterior factors.

This is done by me, but not alone, for as self-conscious or aware of my awareness, my mind transcends myself and opens beyond me to nature, especially to other persons who echo this same awareness, freedom and love. Here finally lies the essence of freedom, of which the ability to choose between alternatives is but one implication. What is essential for a free life is not that I always retain an alternative, but that I can determine myself and carry through with consistency the implications of my self-determination and self-donation—even, and at times especially, in the most straightening of circumstances. In this the personal finally transcends that growth process originally called the *physis* or the physical, and hence is considered rightly to be spiritual as well.

Such transcendence, far from implying isolation from one's physical and social world, bespeaks a world of personal centers bound together in communities through bonds not simply of place and time, but of mutual understanding, sympathy, concern, and love.

More than objective consciousness of oneself as acting, the inward reflexion at the origin of my action is that according to which I freely determine39 and experience myself. The bond of consciousness with action as deriving from self-determination in my community is crucial for a full recognition of subjectivity. It protects this from reduction to the subjectivism of an isolated consciousness which, being separated from action, would be finally more arbitrary than absolute.

Self-determination in action has another implication: in originating an action, the person's experience is not merely of that action as happening to or in one, but of the social dynamism in which one participates efficaciously. As a self I experience myself immanently as wholly engaged in acting with others and know this efficacy to be properly my own, my responsibility. Hence, by willing good or evil action, I specify, not only the action and even the culture which results, but myself and my community as the originator of that action.

Finally, I am aware of my responsibility for the results of my actions, which extend beyond me and shape my world. The good or evil which my actions bring about is rooted in good or evil decisions on my part. In making choices which shape my world and especially my culture as the pattern of meaning and values I create, I also form myself for good or evil. By their subjective character actions become part of the person's unique process of self-realization.40

Action then manifests an important dimension of the person and vice versa.41 On the one hand, the need to act shows that the person, though a subject and independent, is not at birth perfect, self-sufficient or absolute. On the contrary, persons are conscious of perfection that they do not possess, but toward which they are dynamically oriented. Hence, the person is essentially active and creative.

On the other hand, this activity is marked characteristically by responsibility. This implies that, while the physical or social goods that one can choose are within one's power, they do not overpower one. Whatever their importance, in the light of the person's openness to the good as such one can always overrule the power of their attraction. When one does choose them it is the person—not the goods—who is responsible for that choice.

To appreciate this it is necessary to look more closely at the dynamic openness and projection which characterize the concrete person—not only in his or her will, but in his or her body and psyche as well. In order to be truly self-determining, the person must not merely moderate a bargaining session between these three, but must constitute a new and active dynamism in which all dimensions achieve their properly personal character.42

Bodily or somatic dynamisms, such as the pumping of blood, are basically non-reflective and reactive. They are implemented through the nervous system in response to stimuli; generally they are below the level of human consciousness, from which they enjoy a degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, they are in harmony with the person as a whole and even with one's physical and

social environment, of which they are an integral dimension. As such they are implicit in my conscious and self-determined choices regarding personal action with others in this world.

Dynamisms of the psyche are typified by emotivity. In some contrast to the more reactive character of lower bodily dynamism and in a certain degree to the somatic as a whole, these are based rather within the person. They include, not only affectivity, but sensation and emotions as well, which feelings range from some which are physical to others which are moral, religious and aesthetic. Such emotions have two important characteristics. First, they are not isolated or compartmentalized, but include and interweave the various dimensions of the person. Hence, they are crucial to the integration of a personal life. They play a central role in the proximity one feels to values and to the intensity of one's response thereto. Secondly, they are relatively spontaneous and contribute to the intensity of a personal life. This, however, is not adequate to make them fully personal for, as personal, life is not only what happens in me, but above all what I determine to happen. This can range beyond and even against my feelings.

It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish two directions or dimensions of one's personal transcendence. The first relates to one's world as the object of either one's knowledge or one's will. This might be called horizontal as an activation of a person inasmuch as he or she relates to other things and especially to other persons. Such a relation would be poorly conceived were it thought to be merely an addition to a fully constituted person. On the contrary, the person as such is essentially transcendent, that is, open to others. One requires this interaction with others in order to have a language and all that this implies for the formation of thought; to have a moral code to assist one in the direction of one's will; and above all to have a family and community, and thus the possibility of sharing in the hope and anguish, the love and concern, which give meaning to life.

The other, or vertical dimension of transcendence, follows the sequence of levels of personal reality. Personal actions are carried out through a will which is open and responsive to the Good or goodness itself and as such able to respond to, without being determined by, any particular good or value.

This points to two foundations of the person's freedom, and hence of one's ability to be a self-determining end-in-oneself. First, one's mind or intellect is oriented, not to one or another true thing or object of knowledge, but to Truth Itself and hence to whatever is or can be. Second and in a parallel manner, the person's will is not limited to—or hence by—any particular good or set of goods. Rather, because oriented to the Good Itself, it is freely open to any and all goods. This awareness of life as received from the divine as absolute truth and love provides the atmosphere within which we live consciously and freely and thereby create our communities. In doing this we gradually shape the patterns of values and virtues which constitute our culture which we receive as tradition and creatively adapt for the present and future. Culture is the task of persons and it is to this that we now turn.

Culture and Tradition as a Pattern of Values and Virtues

Values

For the drama of self-determination and the development of persons and peoples one must look to their relation to the good, the good in search of which we live, survive and thrive. The good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. Basically it is what completes life; it is the "perfect" understood in its etymological sense

as that which is completed or realized through and through; and once achieved it is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing: the most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else, but we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree given the right conditions grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life—fiercely if necessary—and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to animal's realization or perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the well being of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one's fulfillment upon its achievement. Goods then are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.

The moral good is a narrower field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to our own perfection and to that of others—and indeed to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or mis-ordered. This constitutes the objective basis for values and disvalues.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete. However broad or limited the options, as responsible and moral an act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the persons, actions, and things involved. In addition one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term 'value' here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term 'axiology' whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." It requires an objective content—the good must really "weigh in" and make a real difference; but the term 'value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.43 Thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to and prizes a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors their corporate free choices.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes as well the prime pattern and gradation of goods which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which

they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through a lens formed, as it were, by their family and culture, and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history—often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses it does not create the object; but it focuses attention upon certain goods involved rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for one's affective and emotional life. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values. Through this process we constitute our universe of moral concern in terms of which we struggle to advance or at least perdure, mourn our failures, and celebrate our successes. This is our world of hopes and fears, in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, our lives have moral meaning.44

Virtues

Martin Heidegger describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and about whom one is concerned. In this process one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. In relation to these goals certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one's world of meaning.45 Freedom then becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination in the sense of causing oneself to act as described above. It shapes—the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes—one's world as the ambit of human decisions and dynamic action. This is the making of a person or people in a community of persons or of nations.

This process of deliberate choice and decision transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. Whereas the somatic dimension is extensively reactive, the psychic dynamisms of affection or appetite are fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values which evoke an active response from the emotions in the context of responsible freedom. But it is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral dimension of life. For in order to live, oneself and with others, one must be able to know, to choose and finally to realize what is truly conducive to one's good and that of others. Thus, the person must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth both in itself and in relation to others. This is moral truth: the judgment regarding whether the act makes the person good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfilment, or the contrary.

In this I retain that deliberation and voluntary choice whereby I exercise my proper self-awareness, self-possession, and self-governance. By determining to follow this judgment I am able to overcome determination by stimuli and even by culturally ingrained values, and to turn these instead into openings for free action in concert with others to shape myself, as well as my physical surroundings and community. This can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of my actions. By definition only morally good actions contribute to the fulfilment of the person, that is, to one's development and perfection as a person with others in community. It is the function of conscience as man's moral judgment to identify this character of moral good in action.46 Hence, moral freedom consists in the ability to follow one's conscience.

This work of conscience is then not a merely theoretical judgment, but the exercise of self-possession in one's actions. Here reference to moral truth constitutes one's sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which I ought to do. When this is

exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual in the sense of being repeated. These are the modes of activity with which we are familiar; in their exercise—along with the coordinate natural dynamisms they require—we are practiced; and with practice comes facility and spontaneity. Such patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of our life. For this reason they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to or, as is often said, "amount to." Since Socrates the technical term used for these specially developed capabilities is ‘virtues’.

But if the ability to follow one’s conscience and hence to develop one’s set of virtues must be established through the interior dynamisms of the person, it must be protected and promoted by the related physical and social realities. This is a basic right of the person—perhaps *the* basic human and social right—because only thus can one transcend one’s conditions and strive for fulfilment. Its protection and promotion must be a basic concern of any order which would be democratic and directed to the good of its people.

Culture

Together these values and virtues set the pattern of our life through which our freedom is developed and exercised. This is called our "culture." On the one hand, the term can be derived from the Latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. Cicero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (*cultura animi*), for just as even good land when left without cultivation will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained.47 This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (*paideia*) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (*Bildung*).48

Here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a person or people and the ability to work as artist, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political. The result is a whole life characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and thereby sharing deeply in meaning and value. The capacity to do so cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation.49 This will lead us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

On the other hand, "culture" can be traced to the terms *civis* (citizen) and civilization.50 These reflect the need for a person to belong to a social group or community in order for the human spirit to produce its proper results. By bringing to the person the resources of the tradition, the*tradita* or past wisdom produced by the human spirit, the community facilitates comprehension. By enriching the mind with examples of values which have been identified in the past, it teaches and inspires one to produce something analogous. For G.F. Klemm this more objective sense of culture is composite in character.51 Tyler defined this classically for the social sciences as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits required by man as a member of society."52

Each particular complex whole or culture is specific to a particular people; a person who shares in this is a *civis* or citizen and belongs to a civilization. For the more restricted Greek world in which this term was developed, others (aliens) were those who did not speak the Greek tongue; they were "barbaroi" for their speech sounded like mere babble/babel. Though at first this meant

simply non-Greek, its negative manner of expression easily lent itself to, perhaps reflected, and certainly favored, a negative axiological connotation; indeed, this soon became the primary meaning of the word 'barbarian'. By reverse implication it attached to the term 'civilization' an exclusivist connotation, such that the cultural 'identity' of peoples began to imply cultural alienation between peoples. Today, as communication increases and more widely differentiated peoples enter into ever greater interaction and mutual dependence, we reap a bitter harvest of this connotation. The development of a less exclusivist sense of culture must be a priority task.

Tradition

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time and hence depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. The culture which is handed on, or *tradita,* comes to be called a cultural tradition; as such it reflects the cumulative achievement of a people in discovering, mirroring and transmitting the deepest meanings of life. This is tradition in its synchronic sense as a body of wisdom.

This sense of tradition is very vivid in pre-modern and village communities. It would appear to be much less so in modern urban centers, undoubtedly in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life in large urban centers. However, the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as we pass this on in new ways. Attending to tradition taken in this active sense allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which Socrates sought, but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition, and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future.

The recognition of the value of tradition would appear to constitute a special problem for all heirs of the enlightenment and it may be helpful to reflect briefly on why this is so. The enlightenment rationalism idealizes clarity and distinctness of ideas both in themselves and in their interconnection; as such it divorces them—often intentionally—from their existential and temporal significance. Such an ideal of human knowledge, it is proposed, could be achieved either, as with Descartes, through an intellect working by itself from an intellectually perceived Archimedean principle or, as with Locke and Carnap, through the senses drawing their ideas exclusively from experience and combining them in myriad tautological transformations.53 In either case the result is a-temporal and consequently non-historical knowledge.

Two attempts to break out of this have proven ultimately unsuccessful. The one, in order to recognize historical sequence while retaining the ideal of clarity and distinctness, attempted to attain detailed knowledge of each period, relativizing everything to its point in time and placing historicity ultimately at the service of the rationalist ideal. The other, the Romantics, ultimately adhered to the same revolutionary enlightenment ideal even in appearing to oppose it, for in turning to the past and to myths they too sought clear and distinct knowledge of a static human nature. Tradition thus became traditionalism, for all was included in the original state of nature and our only way of obtaining a firm grounding for human life was simply to return thereto.

In the rationalist view any meaning not clearly and distinctly perceived was an idol to be smashed (Bacon), an idea to be bracketed by doubt (Descartes), or something to be wiped clean from the slate of the mind as irrational and coercive (Locke and Hume). Any judgment—even if provisional—made before all had been examined and its clarity and distinctness established would be a dangerous imposition by the will.

This raises a number of problems. First, absolute knowledge of oneself or of others, simply and without condition, is not possible, for the knower is always conditioned according to his or her position in time and space and in relation to others. But neither would such knowledge be of ultimate interest, for human knowledge, like human beings, develops in time and with others.54 This does not exclude projects of scientific knowledge, but it does identify these precisely as limited and specialized views: they make important but specific, rather than all-controlling, contributions.

Secondly, according to Descartes,55 reason is had by all and completely; authority therefore could be only an entitlement of some to decide issues by an application of their will rather than according to an authentic understanding of the truth or justice of an issue. This would be the over-hastiness of Descartes' fourth *Meditation*. Further, the limited number of people in authority means that the vision of which they dispose would be limited by restricted or even individual interests. Finally, as one decision constitutes a precedent for those to follow, authority must become fundamentally bankrupt and hence corruptive.56

In this manner, the choice of clarity as an ideal, first by Plato and then Descartes, has generated an exlcusivist mind-set ruled by a reductivist mechanism. It is not only that what is not clear is put aside as irrelevant but that the dynamism whereby we reflect the love by which we have been made and respond to it with openness and generosity comes to the seen in a negative cognitive light as blind, while freedom appears in a negative affective light as arbitrary. The only way these could achieve a redeeming clarity for the human mind is to be reduced to the unambiguous and simple visceral violence of Hobbes' struggle for survival.

If, on the contrary, the cumulative experience of mankind in living together in peace is to make a contribution to the development of modern life, then it will be necessary to return human knowledge to the ongoing lived process of humane discovery and choice, and to a broad project of human interaction and an active process of reception of each generation from the learning of its predecessors. The emerging consciousness of the importance of this effort has led to broadening the task of hermeneutics from the study of ancient, often biblical, texts to a more inclusive attention to the integral meaning of cultures. There it has found, not a mere animal search for survival, but a sense of human dignity which by transcending survival enables human creativity and encourages a search for ever higher levels of human life.

The reference to the god, Hermes, in the term "hermeneutics" suggests something of this depth of meaning which is sought throughout human life and its implication for the world of values. For the message borne by Hermes is not merely an abstract mathematical formula or a methodological prescription devoid of human meaning and value. Rather, it is the limitless wisdom regarding the source and hence the reality, and regarding the priorities and hence the value, of all. Hesiod had appealed for this in the introduction to his *Theogony*: "Hail, children of Zeus! Grant lovely song and celebrate the holy race of the deathless gods who are forever. . . . Tell how at the first gods and earth came to be."57

Similarly, Aristotle indicated this concern for values and virtues in describing his science of wisdom as "knowing to what end each thing must be done; . . . this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature." Such a science will be most divine, for: "(1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better."58 Hence, rather than evaluating all in terms of reductivist clarity and considering things in a horizontal perspective that is only temporal or totally changing—with an implied relativization of all—hermeneutics or interpretation opens also to a

vertical vision of what is most real in itself and most lasting through time, that is, to the perennial in the realm of being and values; this it does with a view to mobilizing life accordingly.

At the same time, while still echoing Socrates by searching for the permanent structures of complex entities and the stable laws of change, in redirecting attention to being in time, contemporary attention is open to the essentially temporal character of mankind and hence to the uniqueness of each decision, individual and corporate. Thus, hermeneutics attends to the task of translation or interpretation stressing the presentation to the one who receives the message, their historical situation, and hence the historical character of human life. It directs attention not merely to the pursuit of general truths, but to those to whom truth is expressed, namely, persons in the concrete circumstances of their cultures as these have developed through the history of human interaction with nature, with other human beings and with God. It is this human history as heritage and tradition which sets the circumstances in which one perceives the values presented in the tradition and mobilizes his or her own project toward the future.

Origin and Authority of Cultural Traditions

In *Truth and Method*, H.-G. Gadamer, the successor to M. Heidegger, undertook to reconstruct this notion of a cultural heritage or tradition as: (a) based in community, (b) consisting of knowledge developed from experience lived through time, and (c) possessed of authority. In order to analyze the genesis of a cultural tradition, we shall look at each of these in turn. Further, because tradition sometimes is interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a Democracy, attention will be given here to the way a cultural heritage is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community, enabling succeeding generations to exercise their life with freedom and creativity.

Community

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. One's consciousness emerges, not with self, but with its relation to others. In the womb the first awareness is that of the heartbeat of one's mother. Upon birth one enters a family in whose familiar relations one is at peace and able to grow. Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence which undergird or undermine one's capacities for subsequent social relations. There one learns care and concern for others independently of what they do for us, and acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.59

Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work, and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. The phenomenologist sees this life in community as the new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is life in the family and in the progressively wider social circles into which one enters. As persons we emerge from birth in a family and neighborhood from which we learn and in harmony with which we thrive.

Experience: Horizontal and Vertical

If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition as that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. In fact the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life, and accordingly make pragmatic adjustments.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too uni-dimensional. While tradition can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms and might seem to concern merely how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances, and constructing and defending one's nation. Moreover, this wisdom is a not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, i.e., what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted.

This points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history and directs our attention vertically to its ground and hence to the bases of the values which mankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize.60 The historical and prophetical books of the Bible are an extended, concrete account of one people's process of discovering wisdom in interaction with the divine.

The impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such great epics as the *Mahabharata* or in dance. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition, then, is not as in history simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. It is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific historical circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and passed on, generation after generation, progressively over time. The content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, progressively emerges as something upon which character and community can be built. It constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community.61

Authority

Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one's heritage and the enlightenment spirit relates to authority. Is it possible to recognize authority on the part of a tradition which perdures while still asserting human freedom through time? Could it be that a cultural tradition, rather than being the negation of freedom and hence antithetic to democracy, is its cumulative expression, the reflection of our corporate access to the bases of all meaning, and even the positive condition for the discovery and realization of needed new developments?

One of the most important characteristics of human persons is their capability for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural—quite the contrary. Within as well as beyond our social group we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities we, as individuals and communities, need for our growth, self-realization and fulfilment.

This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to the will of others, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension—whether this be the doctor's professional skill in healing or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others. All of these—the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience regarding the horizontal and vertical axes of life and meaning, and the grounding of dependence in competency—combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages.

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation on any terms with no sense of the value either of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision the result would be devoid of existential content.

The fact that humans no matter how different in culture do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute—even bitterly—the direction of change appropriate for their community reflects that every humanism is committed actively to the realization of some common—if general—sense of perfection. Without this, even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions, and hence no debate or conflict.

Through history, communities discover vision which both transcends time and directs our life in all times, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orient the life of a person.62 Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time. It is also normative because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. What begins to emerge is Heidegger's insight regarding Being and its characteristics of unity, truth and justice, goodness and love not simply as empty ideals but as the ground of things, hidden or veiled, as it were, and erupting into time through conscious and free human beings in history. Seen in this light, the process of human search, discussion and decision—

today called democracy—becomes more than a method for managing human affairs; more substantively it is the mode of the emergence of being in our time.

One's cultural heritage or tradition constitutes a specification of the general sense of being or perfection, but not as if this were chronologically distant in the past and therefore in need of being drawn forward by some artificial contrivance. Rather, being and its values live and act in the lives of all whom they inspire and judge. In its synchronic form through time tradition is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it—just as it belongs to us. Traditions are in effect the ultimate communities of human striving, for human life and understanding are implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity, which Gadamer describes as flickerings in the closed circuits or personal consciousness,63 but by our situatedness in a tradition. By fusing both past and present this enables us to determine the specific direction of our lives and to mobilize the consensus and mutual commitments of which true community is built.64

Conversely, it is this sense of the good or of value, which emerges through the concrete lived experience of a people throughout its history and constitutes its cultural heritage, which enables us in turn to assess and avoid what is socially destructive. In the absence of tradition, present events would be simply facts to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence. This, in turn, could be restrained only by some Utopian abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of modern rationalism. Eliminating all expressions of democratic freedoms, this is the archetypal modern nightmare (Orwell's *1984*).

All of that stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative expression of meaning evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius or Gandhi, a Bolivar or Lincoln, a Martin Luther King or a Mother Teresa. Variously termed "charismatic personalities" (Shils65), "Paradigmatic individuals" (Cua66) or characters who meld role and personality in providing a cultural or moral ideal (MacIntyre67), they supersede mere historical facts. As concrete universals they express that harmony and fullness of perfection which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating.

The truly important battle at the present time is, then, not between, on the one hand, a chaotic liberalism in which the abstract laws of the marketplace dictate and tear at the lives of persons, peoples and nations or, on the other hand, a depersonalizing sense of community in which the dignity of the person is suppressed for an equally abstract utopia. A victory of either would spell disaster. The central battle is rather to enable peoples to draw on their heritage constituted of personal assessments and free decisions, and elaborated through the ages by the various communities as the working out of their response to their concrete circumstances. That these circumstances are often shifting and difficult in the extreme is important, but it is of definite importance that this people's response be truly theirs. That is, that it be part of their history, of their free and democratic response to the good, and not simply the imposed effect of another's history, or—worst of all—of abstract, impersonal and depersonalizing structures, slogans, utopias or ideologies.

Adaptation of Traditions

Application and Adaptation

As an active process tradition transforms what is received, lives it in a creative manner and passes it on as a leaven for the future. Let us turn then from the cumulative meaning and value in tradition, its synchronic aspect, to its diachronic or particular meaning for each new time receiving from the past, ordering the present and constructing the future. This is a matter, first of all, of taking time seriously, that is, of recognizing that reality includes authentic novelty. This contrasts to the perspective of Plato for whom the real is the ideal and unchangeable forms or ideas transcending matter and time, and of which physical things and temporal events are but shadows. It also goes beyond rationalism's search for clear and distinct knowledge of eternal and simple natures and their relations in terms of which all might be controlled, and beyond romanticism's attention to a primordial unchanging nature hidden in the dimly sensed past. A fortiori, it goes beyond method alone without content.

In contrast to all these, the notion of application68 is based upon an awareness that "reality is temporal and unfolding." This means that tradition, with its inherent authority or normative force, achieves its perfection in the temporal unfolding of reality. Secondly, it shows human persons and peoples, not as detached intellects, but as incarnate and hence enabled by, and formative of, their changing physical and social universe. Thirdly, in the area of socio-political values and action it expresses directly the striving of persons to realize their lives, and the development of this striving into attitudes (*hexis*) and institutions. Hence, as distinct from the physical order, human action is a situation neither of law nor of lawlessness, but of human and therefore developing institutions and attitudes which do not determine and hence destroy human freedom, but regulate and promote its exercise.69

Certain broad guidelines for the area of ethics and politics serve in the application of tradition as a guide for historical practice and vice-versa. The concrete exercise of human freedom as unique decisions lived with others through time constitutes a distinctive and on-going process. Historicity means that responses to the good are made always in concrete and ever-changing circumstances. Hence, the general principles of ethics and politics as a philosophic science of action cannot be purely theoretical knowledge or a simple accounting from the past. Instead, they must help people consciously exercise their freedom in concrete historical circumstances which are ever changing and new.

Here an important distinction must be made from techné where action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause that is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge (*epistéme*). As in the case of an architect's blueprints, skill, such as that of the engineer, consists in knowing how to act according to that idea or plan; and when it cannot be carried out perfectly some parts of it are simply omitted in the execution. In contrast, ethics and politics, though similar in the possession of a practical guide and its application to a particular task, differ in important ways. First, in moral action subjects—whether a person or a people—constitute themselves, as much as they produce an object: agents are differentiated by their action. Hence, moral knowledge as an understanding of the appropriateness of human action cannot be fully determined independently of the subjects in their situation and in action.

Secondly, adaptation by moral agents in their application of the law, does not diminish, but rather corrects and perfects the law. In relation to a world which is less ordered, the law is imperfect, for it cannot contain in any explicit manner the response to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that freedom and creativity are located. They do not consist in arbitrariness, for Kant is right in saying that without law freedom has no meaning; nor do they consist in an automatic response determined by the historical situation, for then

determinism and relativism would compete for the crown in undermining human freedom. Freedom consists rather in shaping the present according to the sense of what is just and good which we have from our cultural tradition, and in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.

The law is not diminished by its application in the circumstances but corrected and enriched. *Epoché* and equity do not diminish, but perfect the law; without them the law would be simply a mechanical replication doing the work not of justice, but of injustice. Ethics or politics is not only knowledge of what is right in general, but the search for what is right in the situation and the choice of the right means for this situation. Knowledge about the means is not then a matter of mere expediency; it is the essence of the search for a more perfect application of the law in the given situation. This is the fulfilment of moral knowledge.70

Application of Tradition and Human Concern

It is important to note that this rule of the concrete (of what the situation is asking of us) is not known by sense knowledge, which simply registers a set of concrete facts on the horizontal level. In order to know what is morally required, the situation must be understood in the light of what is right, that is, in the light of what has been discovered vertically through tradition with its normative character about appropriate human action. Only in this light can moral consciousness as the work of intellect (*nous*), rather than of sensation, go about its job of choosing the right means.

Therefore, to proceed simply in reaction to concrete injustices, rather than in the light of one's tradition, is ultimately destructive. It inverts the order just mentioned and results in manipulation of our hopes for the good. Destructive or repressive structures would lead us to the use of correspondingly evil means, suited only to producing evil results. The true response to evil can be worked out only in terms of the good as the highest discovery by our people, passed on in tradition and applied by us in our times.

The importance of application implies a central role for the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*) or thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means for the circumstances. This must include also the virtue of sagacity (*sunesis*), that is, of understanding or concern for the other. For what is required as a guide for the agent is not only technical knowledge of an abstract ideal, but knowledge that takes account of the agent in relation to other persons. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as one, in a sense, undergoes the situation with the affected parties living and suffering with them. Aristotle rightly describes as "terrible" the one who is capable of manipulating the situation, but is without orientation towards moral ends, and without concern for the good of others in their concrete situations.

In sum, application is not a subsequent or accidental part of understanding, added on after perfect understanding has been achieved; rather it co-determines this understanding from the beginning. Moral consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal to be known and then applied, but rather through discerning the good for concrete peoples in their relations with others.

Creativity in the application of the tradition in the concrete circumstances of life thus becomes essential. In this context Cua deftly cites J. Pelican's aphorism: "Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living."71

The Roots of Tradition and Creativity

The notion of application can help in sorting out the human dilemma between an absolutism insensitive to persons in their concrete circumstances and a relativism which leaves the person subject to expediency in public and private life. Indeed, the very statement of the dilemma reflects the deleterious aspect of the Platonic view of ideas. He was right to ground changing and historical being in the unchanging and eternal. This had been Parmenides' first insight in metaphysics and has been richly developed in relation to human action through the medievals' notion of an eternal law in the divine mind.

But it seems inappropriate to speak directly in these terms regarding human life, for in all things individual human persons and humankind as a whole are subject to time, growth and development. As we become increasingly conscious of this the personal character even of our abstract ideals becomes manifest and their adapted application in time can be seen, not as their rejection, but as their perfection. In this, justice loses none of its force as an absolute requirement of human action. Rather, the concrete modes of its application in particular circumstances add to what could have been articulated in merely abstract and universal terms. A hermeneutic approach directs attention precisely to these unfoldings of the meaning of abstract principles through time. This is not an abandonment of absolutes, but a recognition of the human condition and of the way in which this continually and in endless marvelous manners unfolds the ultimate richness of the source and principle of social life.

What then should be the attitude of a philosopher in our day to this mode of aesthetics? If it be itself appreciative and conservative, is one who interprets it subject to the same approach and limited to the same content, or can interpretation legitimately open up new meaning in old texts? In other words, must ancient texts be read only with an ancient outlook? Indeed, is it even possible today to have an authentically ancient outlook—to see with eyes long closed—or does the attempt to do so require so much make-believe as to be in effect impossible? Even if one were to succeed in reconstituting the past, would one be faithful to the text which was written as a vital expression of the process of life, or would one instead be rendering lifeless a living text (not unlike the biologist who makes a slide of once living tissue)?

It would seem therefore that our goal should be not simply to reiterate ancient times in reading ancient texts, but to recognize that we come to them from new times, with new horizons and new questions. We should allow them to speak anew to us; in so doing the texts and philosophies are living rather than dead—and therefore truer, that is, *more* true. Texts read in this sense are part of living tradition in which is situated our struggle to face the problems of life and build a future worthy of those who follow.

Some would fear that to give such importance to the horizon of the reader of a text might constitute a relativism and lose the permanent significance of the insights of the author. But this would seem to reflect a material and mechanical model ruled by successive discrete moments of time in which universality is a function only of abstraction. This leaves what is universally applicable relatively vacuous and reduces one to pragmatism as one's only response is concrete and changing circumstances.

Here, the real issue regards one's metaphysics: what is the nature of being, what does it mean to be? If the answer is not that reality is reductively matter trapped in time but at least the human spirit living through time, then to look for meaning in terms of the reaches of the spirit across time is not to lose but to find meaning. This is the sense of being emerging through the consciousness of Heidegger's person as *Dasein*. Being is, not merely what was, but what blossoms ever fresh in the human heart. In the same way, philosophy in reading ancient texts is not archeology but, like

every human act, a creative unfolding of being in time. This creative freedom is the essential characteristic of the person.

What then should we conclude regarding the root of the actuality, the good or the perfection of reality which mankind has discovered, in which we have been raised, which gives us dominion over our actions, and which enables us to be free and creative? Does it come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation's faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. . . . Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought72

Dialogue between Traditions

Thus far, we have treated the character and importance of tradition as bearing the long experience of persons interacting with their world, with other persons and with God. It is made up not only of chronological facts, but of insights regarding human perfection and its foundations which have been forged by human efforts in concrete circumstances, e.g., the Greek notion of democracy and the enlightenment notions of equality and freedom. By their internal value these stand as normative of the aspirations of a people.

Secondly, we have seen the implications of historicity for novelty within the context of tradition, that the continually unfolding circumstances of historical development not merely extend or repeat what went before, but constitute an emerging manifestation of the dynamic character of being that is articulated by the art, religion, literature and political structures of a cultural tradition.

It remains for us now to treat the third element in this study of tradition, namely, the hermeneutic method. How can earlier sources which express the great achievements of human awareness be understood or unfolded in a way that is relevant, indicative and directive of our life in present circumstances? In a word, how can we interpret or draw out the significance of tradition for present action?

Interpretation of a Cultural Tradition

If we take time and culture seriously then we must recognize that we are situated in a particular culture and at a particular time; hence all that can be seen from this vantage point constitutes one's horizon. This would be lifeless and dead, determined rather than free, if our vantage point were to be fixed by its circumstances and closed. This points to the necessity of meeting other minds and hearts not simply to add information incrementally, but to be challenged in our basic assumptions and enabled thereby to delve more deeply into our tradition and draw forth deeper and more pervasive truth. How can this be done?

First of all it is necessary to note that only a unity of meaning, that is, an identity, is intelligible.73 Just as it is not possible to understand a number three if we include only two units rather than three, no act of understanding is possible unless it is directed to an identity or whole of meaning. This brings us to the classic issue of the hermeneutic circle in which knowledge of the whole depends upon knowledge of the parts, and vice versa. How can this work for, rather than against the development of social life?

The experience of reading a text might be suggestive. As we read we construe the meaning of a sentence before grasping all its individual parts. What we construe is dependent upon our expectation of the meaning of the sentence, which we derived from its first words, the prior context, or more likely from a combination of the two. In turn, our expectation or construal of the meaning of the text is adjusted according to the requirements of its various parts as we proceed to read through the parts of the sentence, the paragraph, etc., continually reassessing the whole in terms of the parts and the parts in terms of the whole. This basically circular movement continues until all appears to fit and to be clear.

Similarly, in regard to our cultural tradition and values we develop a prior conception of its content. This anticipation of meaning is not simply of the tradition as an objective past or fixed content to which we come; it is rather what we produce as we participate in the evolution of the tradition, and thereby further determine ourselves. This is a creative stance reflecting the content, not only of the past, but of the time in which I stand and of the life project in which I am engaged. It is a creative unveiling of the content of the tradition as this comes progressively and historically into the present and through the present, passes into the future.

In this light, time is not a barrier, separation or abyss, but rather a bridge and opportunity for the process of understanding, a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The importance of the historical distance it provides is not that it enables the subjective reality of persons to disappear so that the objectivity of the situation can emerge. On the contrary, it makes possible a more complete meaning of the tradition, less by removing falsifying factors, than by opening new sources of self-understanding which reveal in the tradition unsuspected implications and even new dimensions of meaning.74

Tradition and Discovery: di to Being Questioned

Of course, not all our acts of understanding about the meaning of a text from another culture, a dimension of a shared tradition, a set of goals or a plan for future action are sufficient. Hence, it becomes particularly important that they not be adhered to fixedly, but be put at risk in dialogue with others.

In this the basic elements remain the substances or persons which Aristotle described in terms of autonomy and, by implication, of identity. Hermeneutics would expand this to reflect as well the historical and hermeneutic situation of each person in the dialogue, that is, their horizon or particular possibility for understanding. As a horizon is all that can be seen from one's vantage point(s), in dialogue with others it is necessary to be aware of our horizon as well as that of others. For it is precisely when our initial projection of their meaning will not bear up under the progressive dialogue that we are required to make needed adjustments in our projection of their meaning.

This enables one to adjust one's prior understanding not only of the horizon of the other with whom one is in dialogue, but especially of one's own horizon. Hence, one need not fear being trapped; horizons are vantage points of a mind which in principle is open and mobile, capable of being aware of its own limits and of transcending them through acknowledging the horizons of others. The flow of history implies that we are not bound by our horizons, but move in and out of them and it is in making us aware of our horizons that hermeneutic consciousness accomplishes our liberation.75

For this we must maintain a questioning attitude. Rather than simply following through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, we must remain sensitive to new meanings in

true openness. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of the tradition, nor an extinction of passionate concerns regarding action towards the future. Rather, being aware of our own biases or prejudices and adjusting them in dialogue with others implies rejecting what impedes our understanding of others or of traditions. Our attitude in approaching dialogue must be one of willingness continually to revise our initial projection or expectation of meaning.

The way out of the hermeneutic circle is then not by ignoring or denying our horizons and initial judgments or prejudices; but by recognizing them as inevitable and making them work for us in drawing out, not the meaning of the text for its author, but its application for the present. Through this process of application we serve as midwife for culture as historical or traditional, enabling it to give birth to the future.76

The logical structure of this process is the exchange of question and answer. A question is required in order to determine just what issue we are engaging—whether it is this issue or that—so that we might give direction to our attention. Without this no meaningful answer can be given or received. As a question, however, it requires that the answer not be settled or determined. In sum, progress or discovery requires an openness which is not simply indeterminacy, but a question which gives specific direction to our attention and enables us to consider significant evidence.

If discovery depends upon the question, then the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, in working in conjunction with others, the heart of the democratic process is not to suppress, but to reinforce and unfold the questions of others. To the degree these probabilities are built up and intensified they can serve as a searchlight. This is the opposite of both opinion which tends to suppress questions, and of arguing which searches out the weakness in other's positions. Instead, in democracy understood as conversation and dialogue one enters upon a mutual search to maximize the possibilities of the question, even by speaking at cross purposes, for it is by mutually eliminating errors and working out a common meaning that we discover truth.77

Pluralism and Progress

Further, it should not be presupposed that a text such as a tradition, law or constitution will hold the answer to but one question or can have but one horizon which must be identified by the reader. On the contrary, the full horizon of the authors is never available to the reader, nor can it be expected that there is but one question to which a tradition or document holds an answer. The sense of the texts reaches beyond what the authors intended because the dynamic character of being as it emerges in time means that the horizon is never fixed but is continually opening. This constitutes the effective historical element in understanding a text or a tradition. At each step new dimensions of its potentialities open to understanding, so that the meaning of a text or tradition lives with the consciousness and hence the horizons—not of its author—but of people in dialogue with others through time and history. This is the essence of democracy as a process. It is the process of broadening horizons, through fusion with the horizons of others in dialogue, that makes it possible to receive from one's cultural tradition and its values answers which are ever new.78

In this, one's personal attitudes and interests remain important. If our interest in developing new horizons is simply the promotion of our own understanding then we could be interested solely in achieving knowledge, and thereby domination over others. This would lock one into an absoluteness of one's prejudices; being fixed or closed in the past they would disallow new life in the present. In this manner powerful new insights can become with time deadening pre-judgments which suppress freedom.

In contrast, an attitude of authentic democratic openness appreciates the nature of one's own finiteness. On this basis it both respects the past and is open to discerning the future. Such openness is a matter, not merely of new information, but of recognizing the historical nature of man and his basis in an absolute that transcends and grounds time. This enables us to escape what had deceived us and held us captive, and to learn deeply from new experiences.79

This suggests that democratic openness does not consist in surveying others objectively, obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner or simply juxtaposing their ideas and traditions to our own. Rather, it is directed primarily to ourselves for our ability to listen to others is correlatively our ability to assimilate the implications of their answers for delving more deeply into the meaning of our own traditions and drawing out new and even richer insights. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us.

The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness is then not methodological sureness, readiness for new compromises or new techniques of social organization for these are subject to social critique and manipulation on the horizontal level. Instead, it is readiness to draw out in democratic dialogue new meaning from a common tradition.80 Seen in these terms our heritage of culture and values is not closed or dead, but through a democratic life remains ever new by becoming richer and more inclusive.

Notes

1 For a psychological reconstruction of the person, see Richard Knowles, ed., *Psychological Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, l986).

2 A. Trendelenburg, "A Contribution to the History of the Word 'Person'," *The Monist*, 20 (1910), 336-359. This posthumously published work is now over 100 years old. See also "Persona" in *Collected Works of F. Max Muller* (London, 1912), vol. X, pp. 32 and 47; and Arthur C. Danto, "Persons" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), VI, 110-114.

3 This was pointed out by G. Bassus. See A. Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* V, 7.z.

4 *Prosepeion*. This explanation was given by Forcellini (1688-1769), cf. Trendelenburg, p. 340.

5 C.J. De Vogel, "The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought," *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), II, 20-60.

6 "That accepteth not the persons of princes," *Job* 34:19. See also *Deut* 10:17; *Acts* 10:34-35; *Rom* 2:10-11.

7 Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 28 and 31; *De Orator*, II, 102; and Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, ch. 17.

8A. Danto, see n. 2, above.

9 (Boson: Beacon, 1957), 61.

10 R. Carnap , H. Hahn, and O. Neurath, "The Scientific World View: The Vienna Manifesto," trans. A. E. Blumberg, in *Perspectives in Reality*, eds. J. Mann and G. Kreyche (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 483.

11 *Ibid.*

12 Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existence*, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, 1956), p. 14.

13 John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, ch. 27, n. 11 and 9-10, ed. A. C. Grasser (New York: Dover, 1959), Vol. I, 448-452. The person is "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself."

14 *Essay*, n. 17.

15 *Ibid*. nn. 18 and 26.

16 Ibid. n. 20.

17 *Ibid.*, n. 29.

18 G. W. Leibniz, *Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, ch. 27, 9, trans. A. G. Langley (Chicago: Open Court, 1916).

19 Locke, *Essay*, ch. 27, n. 15.

20 Leibniz, *New Essays*, II, ch. 27, n. 14. This consequence was recognized and accepted by Hume who proceeded to dispense with the notion of substance altogether.

21 *New Essays*, nn. 20-66.

22 Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, III, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 80.

23 *Foundations* III, p. 82.

24 *Foundations* II, pp. 53-59.

25 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, 473 a 3-b 25.

26 R. Claix, «Le statut ontologique du concept de sujet selon la metaphysique d'Aristote» *Metaphy*. VII (Z) 3, *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 59 (61), 29.

27 *Metaphysics*, VII, 4-7.

28 William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), ch. 1.

29 See also Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 181ff.

30 Gabriel Pastrama, "Personhood and the Burgeoning of Human Life," *Thomist*, 41 (1977), 287-290.

31 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper, 1959); Wilfrid Desan, *The Planetary Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1961).

32 Schmitz, 44-56.

33 R.E. Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues," in his *Plato's Metaphysics* (London: Routledge, Keegan Paul, 1965), pp. 43-60.

34 Juan Carlos Scannone, "Ein neuer Ansatz in der Philosophie Lateinamerikas," *Jahrbuch*, 89 (1982), 99-116 and "La Racionalidad Cientifico-Technologica y la Racionalidad Sapiencial de la Cultura Latino Americana," *Stromata* (1982), 155-164.

35 William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 532-535.

36 J. Kockelmans, "Thanksgiving: The Completion of Thought," in M. S. Frings, ed., *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), pp. 175-179. .

37 Schmitz, 84-86

38 Boethius, *De duabis naturis et una persona Christi*, c. 3.

39 Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 48-50; "The Person: Subject and Community," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1979-80), 273-308; and "The Task of Christian Philosophy Today," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 53 (1979), 3-4. pp. 32-47.

40 Wojtyla, pp. 32-47.

41 This goes beyond Piaget's basic law that actions follow needs and continue only in relation thereto. Jean Piaget, *Psychological Studies* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 6.

42 Wojtyla, *Acting Person*, p. 197.

43 Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 48-50; "The Person: Subject and Community," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1979-80), 273-308; and "The Task of Christian Philosophy Today," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 53 (1979), 3-4.

44 *Laches*, 198-201.

45 J. L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), pp. 90-91.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 197.

47 V. Mathieu, "Cultura" in *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), II, 207-210; and Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), II, 273-276, and *Culture and Society* (London, 1958).

48 Tonnelat, "Kultur," in *Civilisation, le mot et l'idée* (Paris: Centre International de Synthese), II.

49 V. Mathieu, *ibid*.

50 V. Mathieu, *Civilita*, *Ibid*., 1, 1437-1439.

51 G.F. Klemm, *Allgemein Culturgeschicht de Menschheit* (Leipzig, 1843-52), x.

52 E.B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London, 1871), VII, p. 7.

53 R. Carnap, *Vienna Manifesto*, trans. A. Blumberg in G. Kreyche and J. Mann, *Perspectives on Reality* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), p. 485.

54 H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1975), 305-310.

55 Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, I.

56 Gadamer, pp. 240, 246, 247.

57 Hesiod, *Theogony*, H.G. Everland-White (Loeb Classical Lib.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), p. 85.

58 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 2.

59 John Caputo, "A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Education," in George F. McLean, Fredrick Elhod, et al., eds., *Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development: Act and Agent* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992), pp. 199-222.

60 Gadamer, pp. 245-253.

61 *Ibid*. Gadamer emphasizes knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries.

62 *Ibid*., p. 254.

63 *Ibid.*, p. 245.

64 *Ibid*., p. 258.

65 Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 12-13.

66 *Dimensions of Moral Creativity: Paradigms, Principles and Ideals* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).

67 *After Virtue*, 29-30.

68 Gadamer, pp. 281-286.
69 *Ibid*., pp. 278-279.
70 *Ibid*., pp. 281-286.
71 Jaroslav Pelican, *Vindication of Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 65.
72 *Ramayana* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1976), p. 312.
73 Gadamer, p. 262.
74 *Ibid*., pp. 263-264..
75 *Ibid*., pp. 235-242, 267-271.
76 *Ibid*., pp. 235-332.
77 *Ibid*., pp. 225-332.
78 *Ibid*., pp. 336-340.
79 *Ibid*., pp. 327-324.
80 *Ibid.*, pp. 324-325.

Chapter II
Hermeneutics as a Path to Inculturation

Antonio Gallo

The Two Processes of Hermeneutics and Inculturation

Inculturation acts to achieve true communication with neighbors beyond one's own culture, through dialogue and personal interchange. In contrast, rough propagandistic pressure in the end works real violence and is a principle of alienation for the members of the group. Inculturation must be linguistic and at the level of consciousness and of shared symbols and their meanings.

Here we shall examine the external areas of cultures, their frontiers or boundaries. For where two ethnic groups live side by side, they interchange through their frontiers or boundaries, which are defined not geographically but culturally. The contrast can be seen in their style of life, external objects, familiar social organization, and mindset.

To engage in interchange, one must overstep one's own boundaries and those of others to reach a zone open to reciprocal understanding. This is the very common case of the Mayan Indians interchange with the Spanish world; of the Miami Cubans in interchange both with the island Cubans and with their American host culture; and of the St. Catherine community in Maryland with its surrounding pluralistic society of people white and black (see chapter VII).

Transculturation and acculturation are natural phenomena, but do not interest us here. Inculturation is aimed at some 'high' reason or common good. Entering the other culture occurs by an appropriation of its meaning. As every culture has created its own world, its own truth or meaning, to go inside a culture is to enter some very special and inward truth produced by communication within the group. The method for reaching this visceral truth is hermeneutics.

We understand hermeneutics as the interpretation of signs, all signs: symbols, words, gestures, voices, body-language, and organizations of people. But the interpretation of signs is still not enough, for hermeneutics is also and primarily a method of reaching the truth behind the signs and symbols. We experience a reality, we read a book, a text, we assist at a ceremony. Of course, at first glance, we discern some meaning: that of a written work, of conduct, or of a fact. This knowledge is immediate and progressive, but it is conditioned by our own culture. Though conscious of my own limitations, this cannot intuitively be overcome; I need a method. Here, hermeneutics guides us to the other culture and through the culture toward a more internal truth than that which we are able to observe by means of our senses.

Observation is not sufficient — we need to possess, take up or identify with the truth of the other. Hermeneutics alone can take us deeply enough within ourselves to approach inculturation. The two successive moments of this process, namely hermeneutics or interpretation and inculturation, are not practiced separately, but we must distinguish them logically in order systematically to achieve our end.

The answers to many questions which inculturation raises for hermeneutics can be supplied as practical guidance for the reader. Then one can experience for oneself the process which leads some to understand and to essentially assume the culture of the *other* and be intensely involved in it.

We divide the process into two steps. The first is properly a process of interpretation or hermeneutics that we can learn from philosophers (Ricoeur, Gadamer, Levinas, and others). The

second step or inculturation is an activity shared together with the other culture, and described in Ricoeur's book, *From the Text to the Action* (1991). These are two opposite sequences.

The first movement or interpretation is directed toward the interpreter himself: the actor is moving to the strange culture to satisfy his own interest in knowing. The second movement belongs to the group, to whom the actor proposes to inculturate something (such as the concepts of democracy, authority, human rights, Christian faith, the worth of individual life, responsibility for common resources, and so on), in order to excite the group and arouse its vitality.

For example, I have my own concept of democracy, as "inculturated" in my own culture as that of my group. I want to offer this to another group. I want to do this not in an abstract or official mode, but as realizable in life (supposing that this concept, democracy, universal, essential and radical for human society). Nonetheless, my concept of democracy is especially mine: it does *not* have absolute worth because it has been nourished with the characteristics of my local culture. The main task is the discovery of the nature and attitude of the *other* culture, its social structure and related contexts.

For that, the first stage is hermeneutics. The pursuit of hermeneutics in order to reach the secret meanings of the neighboring culture (much as, in reading a text, one should reach for more than what can be obtained in an immediate and superficial reading). The second stage is inculturation which, by means of dialogue, seeks a shared concept of democracy which would suit the other society, and be lived by that society with ease. Here I shall try first to develop this general scheme of hermeneutics by considering step by step three levels of examination.

There are many treatises relating to semiology, semantics, semiotics, and hermeneutics; there are also particular disciplines which interpret language from the perspective of different social regions, such as economy, history, aesthetics and politics. Accordingly, interpreters can adhere to varying and diverse models. Sometimes linguistic experts give interpretations that invade the philosophical field, and sometimes the philosophers discuss subjects of a linguistic nature. Then we have to select a broad view of science to make a convenient framework for our task as interpreters. There are the logical positivists, such as Austin, Searle, Hiemsley, Black; linguists, such as Jakobson, Todorov, Greimas, Derrida, and Eco; and philosophers, such as Heidegger, Ricoeur, Gadamer, Rorty, and Levinas.

Hermeneutics in the broadest sense is an analysis of a text, a written thing. We study the words, the meaning of the words, with their relations to the culture which produced them. But there are, too, the environments of the culture which generate significance, and the historical situations conditioning the words. A text is a cultural object and thereby a text of an experience — in the first place a linguistic experience. Thus we have to see it through a linguistic analysis. For this reason, we should consult specialists in linguistics, semiotics, structuralism, anthropology, and more.

Our first experience is the experience of the text: as we read it repeatedly in order to improve our understanding of this text, and achieve some objective and experimental understanding. Next we describe it, we summarize it in a short passage that Eco calls the 'macro-proposition'. This is not interpretation, but a manipulation of the text to focus our attention for an intelligent intuitive reading. We may broaden our horizon around the text to put it in relation with the culture which produced it. And this research of relations improves the wide sense of the text and brings forward new meanings.

After all these, we can begin our more methodical work, the final aim of which is to find a second or third level of meaning not revealed in the empirical approach. The first level of hermeneutic analysis properly speaking is a linguistic reading of the text intended to complete our

knowledge of the text by discovering new meanings. This new extended significance arises from the words and is based on their linguistic values. Therefore we must adopt the schemes created by linguistics, analyze the sense, and find the extended significations.

The First Level of Hermeneutic Examination: Analysis of the Text in Terms of Its Words

At this first level the operative mechanism is a linguistic process in four sections:

Stage A, the first stage, applies three instruments to decipher and to enlarge the sense: Metaphor, Synesthesia, and Indexes (Indices). They all bring forth some increment of meaning. Metaphor of course is quite literary, and introduces us to a world of double sense; it opens the door to the cultural environment. Synesthesia is not as common, but very important in order to manifest the creativity of the author, putting us into new alliances of words and worlds.

Indexes order the crowded kingdom of signs and symbols each of which have a second or third reference. This optic of indexing has been developed mainly by social anthropologists, Van der Leuv, Eliade, Levi-Strauss, Campbell, Calasso. The task in Section A is to make an inventory of metaphors, synesthesias, and indexes, and to access their secondary or tertiary significations.

Stage B establishes the relations of every important word or statement with the linguistic context of the text or of other complementary writings and of the cultural context if necessary. The terms adopted for this further analysis are: Pre-suppositions, Conditions, Implications, Horizon, and Perspective.

This is a new kind of inventory; the words themselves provide the program for this task. Every important statement of the text is an effect of some evident or latent presupposition on which we should focus. Conditions affect the expressions and redirect their sense. There are implications or internal connections to the next development, and to the intended aim. The horizon is the world of things to which the language points and determines the fundamental expression. Perspective is the point of view the author has chosen. This can change as the narration proceeds and thus modify the general content of the message.

The task of stage B is to understand the text against the background of this linguistic environment. The inventory of the five items gives us new connections with the experience of the writer and provides the root for future dialogue.

Stage C enters into the text in search of images and ideas. These images are established by the writer as the center of action and of interest; they are repeatedly shaped and sculptured. The ideas are the guiding lines of his thinking, interwoven with the history, drama, or reasoning. These images and ideas are two main chapters of the linguistic inquiry, the trunk of the tree, the main trail of the journey. They are the body and the soul, the flesh and the spirit in this sacred pilgrimage to the spring from which flows the stream of words as an incarnation of life.

The task of this stage C is also an inventory, but of quality. The images not only correspond to some specific words, but here are inside the words. Our linguistic collection captures both images and ideas, enabling us to follow the mainstream of the intended message, and trace the text in its successive evolution.

Stage D is the unification of the material previously collected through the inventories. It is what Francis Bacon would call the "primal harvest." We use three terms to reach three different syntheses: Monosemia, Polysemia, and Unisemia.

Monosemia is the representation of the first and direct sense as obtained by the three previous sections. This intuitively discovered meaning will not disappear with further analysis, but will acquire new values which will change the whole and reveal the latent truth (Heidegger). The monosemia is not a unique significance, it could be complex, but gathered into a harmonious concert.

Polysemia points to the second sense, the principal path, which guides us to new understanding of the text. It communicates with us through metaphor, synesthesia, and signs and symbols (section B). It is modeled by the historical and linguistic conditions as these are redirected by relations (section C). All the previous inventories are now the "major" and "minor" objectives of possible inferences which we have to consider.

The unisemia (the symbol's unification) organizes all classes of signs and symbols intended by the writer to produce his effect; they are the body and life of the message. The unisemia establishes the ground and roof, the walls and doors, of the theoretical space inside which the text expands in all directions to occupy this vital space. We have to enter this space, and see the consequences for/of the meaning.

There are some cosmic symbols—spiritual, geographical, biological, psychological, vital, emotional, and moral; all the sets of symbols, objectively collected in the inventories, open to us the true world of a culture and enable us to interpret the culture.

How to Work on the First Level

The four sections of this level, as we stated, are essentially inventories. In Section A, we made a list of metaphors, synesthesias, and indexes, each with its special force of signification; the same with Sections B and C. This is empirical work, in some sense scientific. When the text is large, some statistical (counting metaphors, classifying and finding patterns), comparative, and deductive conclusions will be needed.

This is objective work, and its conclusions should be objective as well. This is essential for our analysis, because it opens a passage to some meanings we did not notice in our intuitive reading, and puts us in contact with the true nature of the text. These instruments of analysis (methaphor, synesthesia, etc.) are commonly employed by linguistics. Each analyst can change them according to the matter or linguistic theory; we reduced all of them to a simple word in order to be able easily to process very large texts through computers.

The outcomes of this first level, through the three last items, monosemia, polysemia, and unisemia, signify a first discovery of an objective system of meanings woven together by the writer of the text according to his/her culture, and to be understood by the members of that same culture. This first effect is a step forward sharing these meanings with the other group. For us before they were in darkness, while for the other culture they were bright as the light of day.

We add here a small example of the application of the first level's work. This is put at the end, in some ways in opposition to our phenomenological methodology, because it is not a model, but only a simple experiment. We select a tale of the K'ichean culture. Here is an oral tradition of St. Catherine Ixtahuacan, Guatemala. First, a resume of the narration:

Chabelita is a young girl of a K'iche family, dwelling in the big valley of Ixtahuacan. Her home is a modest shelter of adobe, on the slope of a big mountain. During the day, when her mother is making the tortillas for the men working in the fields of corn, Chabelita goes to the river to wash the clothes of the family. She has fun, she is innocent, and enjoys the flowers on the banks of the river, and the birds around her, and the view of the beloved-mountain. "If I were the lord of the big mountain," thinks Chabelita, "I would take care of the flowers and of the birds." One day, when she is washing clothes, one of the birds speaks out to her, "If you want to be the lord of the big mountain, you have to gather these beautiful flowers along the river. Bring them to your room, and sleep with them; and tomorrow come back at noon. Don't forget to come back at noon."

Chabelita collects flowers and sleeps with them that night. At noon her mother wonders why Chabelita is not working, and starts to scream out for her. But Chabelita is not listening. She is with the flowers and the birds of the big mountain.

This is a K'ichean story. To non-K'ichan it sounds like a child's story — delicate human and tender, but for children. For the K'iche, it is a traditional account which has meaning for the whole group. Why did they transmit it for so many generations? Its language resembles the language of myths: no time, no author, animals speaking with men, the girl loving the mountain. To understand it we need an interpretation.

We begin with the linguistic approach of this first level. For that we cannot use a summary, but must read the real K'iche text which has a number of factors:

1. *Metaphors*. In K'iche expressions there are many metaphors. Day means a welcome person. River means an employer. Birds mean messengers. Flowers mean companions. "To take care of" means "to share the life of/with."

2. *Synesthesia*. The beloved mountain means a person.

3. *Indexes*. The mountain is a center; the river is a link; the washing is a mediation; the house is the human situation; the mother is the established; the young girl is the new/renewal; the sleep is the death and the passage.

Stage A gives us a starting point to seek a second meaning. Then we will gather all these new paths of the life, of a world which wants to speak to or about something: a world of humans, animals, and nature.

In Stage B, we undertake more inventories, studying the relation of the text to many contexts: linguistic, cultural, social, historical.

4. *Presuppositions*. The natural life in the fields. The K'iche family joined by night around the fireplace, hearing old stories from the elders. Other texts of the same culture or similar cultures, tracing new or complementary tales of other aspects of the people.

5. *Conditions*. A temper of mind that perceives the presence of natural forces.

6. *Implications*. An mind open to the world, to change, to be transformed as all the world is being transformed. A unity between all the forms of life.

7. *Horizon*.Very few objects are named: house, birds, flowers, mother, clothes, bed, river, mountain, and these are dissolved in a medium constituting a 'spiritual' atmosphere.

8. *Perspective*. What is the perspective of the composers of the story? Practical, philosophical, psychological? The point of view seems to be that of the community, an educational point of view.

9. *Images*. The brightest form of showing people coming into the world. The girl is optimistic, generous, open to life. Her mother is harsh, rigid, routine. Other images: natural life, as big as a sea, in a wide space: land, animals, . . . but they all need somebody, a person, who can take care of them.

10. *Idea*. The relation between man and the world, between this small personal thing who has consciousness and the world which has some big and beautiful energies, but lacks personality, a center of love. The girl, will love them.

In Stage D we must realize three different kinds of unifications:

11. *Monosemia*. The first meaning of the narration, is of a peaceful and well-ordered family, occupied in the ordinary tasks of existence (and some 'local color' of the K'iche culture surrounds this).

12. *Polysemia*. This is the outcome of the extended meaning. Polysemia drives our attention to the relation between the ordinary people and the whole universe, at least the 'small local universe', without regard for speculative considerations. The young girl and her mother pay attention to their daily work, that of a very simple human community. Their open world is a valley very close to the originary forces of life. But suddenly the external whole of the big universe 'comes' and history starts. Is human destiny individualistic; is the soul a strange dweller from another planet? Or is the soul inseparable from the symbolic elements of water, air, and the earth? Who is the lord of the beloved mountain?

13. *Unisemia*. The unification of symbols recovers the stages A, B, and C in order to compose a systematic order of the different symbolic trends of the tale.

Family symbols: mother, daughter, house, clothes, work.

Biological symbols: birds, flowers, tortillas.

Cosmological symbols: high mountain, profound river, air, sleep.

A cage-work of symbols: A network of significations structuring the human problem; a hall with the earth as ground, with a high roof, and open to a broad horizon; and a language to communicate.

All this manifests an activity of the spirit beyond the level of merely physical movements and the presence of a message from an 'other' culture. As interpreters we may be able to capture this 'first harvest', making contact with the other culture's interior being.

In sum, the work thusfar has been on the first level, that is, the linguistic level. But can a true or real situation be analyzed in the same form? Can a fact, a historical event, a human context, a country, a village or a set of real relations also be interpreted as language? We think so for the structure of an account is not so different from the structure of an existent circumstance. The relations among the linguistic elements are analogous to the relations between objects and persons.

This first linguistic approach aids toward understanding the actions, attitudes and values of other people and other ethnic groups.

The Second Level of Hermeneutic Examination: Analysis of the Text as an Act of Communication

In the second level the text becomes a cultural object which is transmitted or given. It is transferred from one person to another as a discourse crystallized in written pages. A discourse can change position in time and space; it 'comes upon' us. When a tale is recounted, it sounds, moves the air and is heard, as a gesture is seen and a facial expression provokes emotional reactions. As a text, a tale is a paper or a record which can be read or head now and in my circumstance, but it was written in other circumstances and recorded in the past.

The past gives the text the dimension of time, and of its local conditions, conjoining it to the physical space of a culture that is far from me and mine. It speaks from a distant house, and connects with mine; it speaks from a dead script. With the analysis we restore to the text some of the quality or 'size' it lost when it passed over to writing and record. The tale needs to be resurrected, to be 'raised' again.

This is the task of the second level of the hermeneutical analysis. The discourse, developed by the text, is an articulation of pieces, a structure, a dynamic event or process. We can use logic, semiotics, structuralism, literary and historical analysis, to understand the discourse. Each of these classical methods can be useful in reaching the logical and anthropological reality.

We are interested in the connections between images and ideas, actions and issues, forms and patterns, continuity and innovations. A text is seen then as a literary work, as a construction, representation, or drama. All its properties and qualities become pertinent, significant. This kind of analysis has a long tradition, from the Russian Formalists, Saussure, Jakobson, to Greimas and Chomsky. One can read also Sapir and Whorf, Carnap, Panowsky, and Susan Langer.

The tale of Chabelita at this second level is a thread that can guide us as we follow the mazes of a labyrinth. Chabelita is the center of a family; it is a quite conventional painting, with home, daughter, and mother. But the perimeters of the labyrinth go outward and forward, out of the magic circle: from the house to the river, to the flowers, to the birds. The discourse brings her out of the river, all the way to the birds, to the valley, to the mountain. We simply follow the discourse.

Then Chabelita speaks to them, throws to the air her ingenuous reflections. And the birds from the big circumambient world speak too. The process of the tale goes on. Chabelita is involved in the dialogue with the birds, she gathers flowers, she goes to sleep. That is the last mediation. The time is fixed; all the world is waiting as from sleep she goes to the big nature, to the time without time. At noon in the middle of the day, Chabelita is up, over the big mountain, in the air, in the world, far away: the lord of the beloved-mountain.

This is not an analysis. It is only one dimension of the myth, a short excursion from out of the labyrinth. It is a beginning a compass pointing out an interpretation, so that we can reach out to another culture.

How To Work on the Second Level

The second level discloses the contrivances, the mechanics, of the successive parts of the discourse. We ponder the discourse as a body, with members and joints, articulations and static portions, arrangements and series.

All the constituents, all the regions of the speech, have their important expressions and meaning. We will deconstruct, disengage the pieces, and fix the mind on every detail of this human machine: the skeleton, joints, bones and flesh. We will combine some items reported in four parts (A, B, C, D), as on the first level; but within a new frame, the activity of the discourse: Section A is the analysis of the semantic structure: processes of use, grammar and semantic of the action. Section B gives us a space for a literary examination with literary traditions, genres, motives and composition. Section C involves the participation of the analyst himself as member of a dialogue: interlocutor and interpreter; and Section D appreciates the speech from the axiological point of view: expressing and evaluating. At a glance this second level is critical.

Section A opens a new landscape. Here the team of the "formalists": Jakobson and Todorov and structural linguistics have done much that can aid us.

14. *Processes of use*. The relation develops, following some sequence of patterns. We can find some of them in our text: the starting conflict, the subsequent search of a value, the opponents, the aids, the movement, the obstacles, the struggle, the victory, the award, the treasure, the recognizance. The details can be changed but always a structure of forms is there. We can have recourse to 'The Grammar' of the *Decameron*, or 'The Lector' in fables, or similar guides. Every author expresses himself in the text by practicing known patterns we have to discover.

15. *Grammar of action*. This refers to the content of the narration, as modeled by signals. It is a semiological view. The action is developed by unities and a grammatical rhythm, some special model of tips and tokens governs the flow. The great publications of Umberto Eco and of Max Black show it in theory and practice, to these we can add Max Steiner, Gillo Dorfles and Derrida.

16. *Semantics of action*. This stretches the semantic point of view. Not only are the signs distributed with some characteristic pattern, but the meanings as well. The semantic focus directs us to the great stream of the semiotic analysis. From Greimas to Chomsky, we encounter a large debate over the technical means to penetrate the secret structure of the text. One can start with Panowsky's *Icon and Idea*, and continue with Susan Langer's *Feeling and Form*, all the way to the Entreverne Group's *Semiotic Analysis*. All the semioticians can be useful at this point: Greimas, Eco, Desiderio Blanco, not indeed for the logical developments of formulas as abstract schemes, but for their semantic values.

Section B deals with literary criticism of the text, but not in the traditional sense. We will take only some aspect of the literary work to relate the text to its literary context and neighbors through historically connected books ('intertextuality') which can broaden its significance.

17. *Tradition*. We watch the text as an element in the existential literary movement, and find the continuity of tradition as a complement of the discourse. To deal with the historical context and events some historical method from Dilthey, Croce, Cain, and so on, will be necessary.

18. *Genres*. The old conceptualization of the genres is not enough to understand the work. There is need for the apparent intention of the content itself auto-defining the discourse from a specific point of view.

19. *Motifs*. Much likes the ideas we found functioning at the first level, the literary motifs are the pins to support the action, and to make connections, both to the internal flow of concepts, and the external contextual references.

20. *Composition*. Literary composition is taken here as a structure. Structuralism pierces the surface of the tale, and goes into the mind which organized it. We can take as a model Levy-Strauss's *Structural Anthropology*, or many other structuralisms. The logical value of the arrangement of parts can be enlightened by the opposition between nature and culture, as Levy-Strauss established in his theory and developed his commentaries on the "Mythological". It is not a necessary frame, but it opens a wide chapter of activity around the text.

In another sense the approach of Mircea Eliade is useful; it is more psychologically involved with symbols and traditional human cosmology. His emotive suggestions give us a new ways of relating different conceptions.

Section C opens a dialogue between the written text and the interpreter. The discourse is directed to us: we can answer to it, and ask the interpreter more questions. In such dialogue the discourse can develop its full potentialities.

21. *Interlocutor*. We have to see the text as a true member of a dialogue, which gives us some suggestions and awaits difficulties and critics. If we present our difficulties, it will answer. The discourse has many aspects which can be disclosed, but we have to act as inquirers. Why did Chabelita hear the speech of the birds, while her mother did not hear it? "I was washing for a long time and never heard the birds speaking" (said the mother). Why did Chabelita wish to take care of the birds and the flowers? Why did the mother complain when Chabelita was not working at noon? The text will answer our questions. It is not yet a hermeneutical circle, but it is a widening horizon that lets us take a great step toward a neighboring culture in order to interpret it.

22. *Interpreter*. This is the other member of the dialogue. The text not only answers, but also poses questions to which the interpreter must respond. The text intervenes with its form or design, its patterns of life. We have to correspond, to establish forms, to set up a frame and recognize the inventions.

The interpreter has to reflect upon his own circumstances; compare and combine his own circumstances with the discourse; and recognize the differences in thinking, conceptualization, emotional values, and historical prejudices. With this synopsis the dialogue can undertake the sharing of meanings-in-common.

Section D involves global meaning, which can be derived from the specific the details. Sometimes the discourse changes tone and correlatively calls for different skills to specify the particulars.

23. *Expression*. There are many forms of significative expressions. In expression we seek not the poetic or political content, but the character of the expression that changes the reference. Sometimes the discourse becomes ironic, sarcastic, flattering, or jesting. There is not always a linguistic sign of these changes. The irony need not be manifest in a visible sign. The sense can be

contrary to that conveyed by the words, sometimes with subtle sarcasm. This property can affect a specific situation, personage, or moment of the action. We must be ready to fix the mind on this, to disengage it and to disconnect the pieces of the artifice.

Usually irony can surge from a particular condition related to a main fact. The sarcasm is more violent, the joke more sophisticated; but all these mark some portion of the discourse.

24. *Value scale*. As the last step of the second level we must not fail to attend to the values expressed by the text. These can be coincident with, or contradictory to, the interpreter's scale, or simply different. Values move the action, underline the worth of the persons, and contribute character to the body. From Max Scheler to Habermas and Levinas, Ladrière and Hans Küng, we are supported in this axiological view. Paul Ricoeur worked throughout his life on his moral theory about the will and freedom, exploring beyond the 'rational and the irrational will'. Philosophers of hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Gadamer have studied this axiological horizon.

We can now look back upon the whole second level. In some form; it too is a series of inventories, but the objectivity of the facts gathered is new. We have reached a higher level of vision, not restricted to the words, but inherent in the text. We can now superimpose the two inventories of the first and the second level. The task of dis-assembling and reconstructing enriched our understanding with deeper meanings. It freed us from our own culture so that we could better participate with the other in a joint combined conversation. We are ready for a new experience, the hermeneutical experience.

The Third Level of Hermeneutic Examination: Analysis of the Text as Experience

The third or experiential level is the most existential. We are not experiencing only the text; however, but the truth of the text. Above we have experienced the words and the structure: the flow of the discourse; and we have uncovered more meaning. We have, in short, opened horizons. The third level is the 'moment' of perceiving truth. To explain the significance of this 'hermeneutical experience', we shall have to consider speculatively the nature of truth and knowledge.

Truth is not only revealed (moving from darkness to light, Heidegger's process of 'un-veiling' or *aletheia*), but in some form is actually *constituted* (as Husserl maintained) through experience and reflection.

Experience in the phenomenological sense is more than physical or external; it ranges from the sensible to the psychological, intellectual, axiological and emotional. This openness involves, too, the experience of the 'other' as a person, as a subject. The meaning of truth is formally constituted throughout the conversation and the interchanges with the 'other' at the human level and with all its properties.

Objective truth is limited, human and imperfect. But it can be developed and enlightened, or darkened and lost; it is progressive and perfectible. Through conversation, dialogue, research, and interchange among persons, we can improve it, enrich it, fertilize it, and make of it our own substance, property and life.

The truth of the world, of human beings, of time and history, comes to us through this human process. We must now enter this experience of the text, which—as a living interlocutor—effects the truth as an outcome of our interpretation. On the first and the second levels, we had some experience of the text, but it was semiotic and sectorial. Now experience reaches for the truth itself through the text, behind it and beyond its references and meanings. For that, the long and perhaps

tedious labor we undertook previously was a necessary step, conditioning and nurturing this new experiential approach. With this, hermeneutics transcends its earlier merely semantic level to the existential lived where the truth of the text is not something we merely learn, but constitutes a principle of the reality 'to live with'.

How to Work on the Third Level

To realize such a high degree of identification with the truth, we encounter five new elements: coincidence of the horizons, appropriation of the sense, hermeneutical-circle, interpretation and theory, and promotion.

25. *Coincidence of horizons*. This is the beginning of the final stage in our pilgrimage into the truth. We are moving and our horizon moves with us. The boundaries, the perspective, and the whole collection of the cultural objects which define one's own culture are changing their values because I compare them with the text.

The voyage is historical, it moves into the past, to the place of the "other" where the text is situated. A text, near or far, is always a past. We have to bring our present into coincidence with the past of the text. Here it is not necessary to resolve the polemic between Ricoeur and Gadamer on the possibility of such coincidence: both have fair solutions and we can stay with either of them depending on our theory. What is essential is to try the solution, that is, to go on aiming at this identification, because human problems *overflow* history.

Chabelita is going to the river. Is it the river of Paradise? Is it the river of the great civilizations of the past: the Nile, the Tigris, the Tiber, or of some newly historicized one like the Potomac or Mississippi? Or a stream of the modern technological and scientific society? Is an alliance of Indian and occidental horizons possible? What does the river of the K'iche in Ixtahuacan signify for their present life and for their ancient identity?

Everyone has his/her specific horizon, and every interpreter carries his/her own prejudices. Are prejudices so blind that they forbid one to see the other's horizons? Prejudices or pre-judgments (defined as fore-structures derived from previous experience) are necessary mediators of our understanding, as Gadamer affirms. We cannot discard them at will but must conjoin them to the new constituents, penetrate the new mechanisms to reach a new unity, combine and devise new forms beyond the artifices and the inventions. As a result we bear transformed structures or designs: which bring-together and mutually transform two horizons, two lives.

This is the task of the 'coincidence of horizons'. This 'co-inciding' is not a taking of inventory. Rather, it is a creation via mutual contact with regard to the details and character of each participant. It converts a secondary sense into a new piece of the construct.

26. *Appropriation of sense*. This pressing topic refers to the interpreter as a seeker of the truth. The appropriation of sense is a conquest of truth by its being received into the subject. Appropriating the truth makes us different: it forms the subject or in Gadamer's words, *Bildung*(formation, model). It is to create an "image" [*Bild*] of/for ourselves with the truth of the text. It is a process of transformation before a mirror, as Eco and Rorty imply. Which portions of this truth become our own elements for the future? The appropriation is a movement to the future: the past of the text becomes open to our future.

If one assumes the truth of the text the mind of the text and the mind of the interpreter are not independent, but in a process of 'formation'. The meaning of the tale, book, or tradition is

incorporated into the meaning of a new vision, a common understanding of the world, a common sensibility for creation. The *Bildung* becomes an image for living in a bigger world, a transcendental world. As we can see, number 26, "appropriation," is not separated from 25, "coincidence of the horizons." Rather, "appropriation" represents a new movement in the pilgrimage.

27. *The Hermeneutic Circle*. The next step brings us into the hermeneutical circle. With strategies 25 and 26, our pilgrimage does not move along a straight path, but enters into a labyrinth. There is a double movement: we are giving and receiving from the text. Our appropriation is a reception, but it is also a dialogue. In the hermeneutic circle we approximate the truth in the deepest level of the labyrinth.

Taking a new metaphor we will compare it to a mountain, on which we are carving stairs. To carve a new step, enables us to climb higher; the more we carve, the more the rock in turn supplies a higher position. We conquer it and it conquers us, putting us up into the sky. This is the double movement inside the circle. The comparison is not completely true because it is static, whereas the truth of the text is dynamic. Note that the pattern is true because we carve the step with the material of the rock itself. That is, we gain each step with the force of the text.

Or with another metaphor, propellored planes went up into the air with the force of the engine; they consumed the air, and were supported by it. In jets the air is converted into energy in the engine, and pushes the plane higher into the sky. Here the circular form is of the essence. These metaphors can aid us to understand the hermeneutical circle: we are the plane and the truth is the air.

These analyses disclose a portion of the truth not seen before. We combine kindred concepts and take/make a step. We return to the text at a higher level and with a greater force of vision discover a second, a third or fourth aspect to be appropriated; and so on. The circle is moving and the truth is growing. The first step is easier than the second, and the fourth is more difficult than the third. Each step forward is ‘deeper’, but less accessible.

The labyrinth of the truth is not closed; the trail is free, but ever more difficult. Will we ever reach the center, the summit of the great mountain, to become the lord? This is our pilgrimage to the truth. We will reach it, live with it, and possess it . . . gradually, not evenly, statically or completely. The aim is not to dominate it, but only to walk around or circumambulate it.

That prospect should not be frustrating, but positive and human. There is not only the text of Chabelita. There are many many tales and myths which reveal the Ixtahuacan people. We can grow in the truth. The experience of the text is an intellectual and spiritual experience of the other culture. It does not deny our identity, but extends it to understand and learn from other cultures and persons.

28. *Interpretation and theory*. Apparently we have reached the end of the pilgrimage and should be satisfied, but this is not so. There are other hermeneutic theories (in the broad sense) such as those of Habermas, Apel, Rorty or Derrida. We should work through them and adjust our results. Perhaps we can learn some useful practices, or come into some agreement with them. All approaches have their limits or boundaries. Our hermeneutic experience can always be improved and renewed by criticism, including some that are negative. All of which makes one more authentically human.

29. *Pro-motion*. The last step of the third level is not speculative, but practical. Pro-motion is an action, a translation from the text to existence. A truth is not merely seen; but assimilated. When appropriated, it changed our spirit and drove our aims. It is not just theoretical, but more akin to Aristotelian *phronesis*: a skill to be realized so that one can be a better human being.

In this final 'plenitude', hermeneutics passes the boundaries of the understanding to set the basis for the human person: to be wise, prudent, and careful. We are not so far, now, from Heidegger's authentic existence of the *Dasein*: to "be-there to take care." Chabelita was not satisfied by knowing the flowers and the birds. She wanted to "take care" of them. She did not want to go over the big mountain. She wanted to be the lord of the beloved mountain. Interpretation becomes comprehension; comprehension becomes care and power. Our pilgrimage has not finished, but has brought us to the place from which to walk further.

Inculturation as a Task for the Future

Hermeneutics has guided us to inculturation. The two actions (more than conceptions) now meet and merge into one. The long way through hermeneutics discovered inculturation as the continuation of the former. Where did they meet: at the linguistic level, in discourse or at the level of experience? It happened gradually. Beginning from the desire to understand the other culture, the two moments of being inculturated by it and inculturating into it happened together. This next activity develops when we reach hermeneutics at the level of Pro-motion. As we achieve explanation and comprehension, and especially as we reach the existential frame of the life with culture: we are living in it.

The human world, in our days, is becoming ever more pluralistic. Progress towards diversity often drives people to an exaggerated fragmentation of larger units in the same country or political entity; it creates separations and struggles among these peoples. The general or essential values of humankind must be inculturated among the several groups dwelling together in order for relations to become productive and peaceful: unity in the midst of diversity.

As fragmentation occurrs in Latin America, western and eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and even Asia, inculturation in the broad sense becomes the task of the future. An ethnic culture need not in principle fight against other cultures. Misunderstanding and failure to communicate abet mutual hostility. The problem is not simply to share concepts for two ethnic groups can truly accept a concept such as freedom, or democracy , or cooperation, or the common good, but have contradictory definitions of these concepts. Every concept is supposed to make reference to a truth, but the concept or idea is not the truth but only a rational entity.

In the real sense we communicate not by translating a concept, but by co-producing a meaning. We have to bring shared meanings, to build real unity amidst the diversities. This is the real task of inculturation: to generate meanings which are shared by different cultural groups in order to build a peaceful bridge between their understandings and behaviors. A common concept then achieves common meaning accompanied by analogous conduct: one 'international' principle of life.

The aim is that meaning be generated in/with the neighboring culture. Language bestows symbols and images. As Shorter has well phrased the matter, "The images and symbols of a culture are in themselves didactic, and they teach the individual to construct their own categories and also to transcend them." Our world of references ceases to be pure speculation and is converted into the praxis of the community. Shorter concludes, "Culture is made up of intercommunicating ideas and forms of behavior. Beyond the difference of words, a common concept; and beyond the

concept a behavior, which tends to share the common goods." As the bridge is constructed not mere concepts but truth is shared and plurality is made compatible with unity.

Crollius identifies three moments for this process: first, the insertion of the meaning into the community; second, the continued dialogue inside the community and with the neighbors; and third, the cultural system, with its own energies, developing a pattern of conduct. He sums up an important detail: "Inculturation is carried on by individuals who represent the different cultures." They use elements from the local culture to communicate the meaning and to enable their hearers to grasp this meaning according to their own cultural categories. The dialogue is not an exchange between cultures, but between persons.

Truth is the condition for promoting action. There the common grounds—unity, collaboration, justice, common interests, respect—cannot be merely communicated as notions but must be inserted as living truths. Hermeneutics then becomes inculturation, which in turn becomes shared truths.

Chapter III
Ethnic Identity, Nationalism and Culture

Vassil Prodanov

Introduction

As all cultures are cultures of communities and societies, the differences between cultures are differences between communities and societies. Similarly, the interrelationships between cultures, the processes of transculturation, acculturation, enculturation and inculturation are interrelationships among different human groups.

Criteria for the delimitation of various groups and their cultures in modern societies can be quite different. Every more important social characteristic—common language, common territory, profession, age, history, standard of living, income, religion, etc.—might be a ground for the formation of a group of people sharing these characteristics and some activity connected with them. Accordingly, a person could partake in different groups and cultures at the same time. For example, one could be a member of such groups and cultures as a Catholic (a religious group and culture), American (a national group and culture), upper middle class (a class culture or income group), bourgeois, Irish (an ethnic group and culture), philosopher (a philosophical group and culture), etc.

These are groups and cultures of differing levels and orders. It is possible to distinguish three types of criteria and consequently three types of groups (communities, societies) and cultures—horizontal, vertical and intersecting.

Horizontal groups and cultures are divided by one criterion. Being a member of one horizontal culture, a person usually cannot be a representative of another horizontal culture. For instance, horizontal cultures are distinguished by religious criteria—Catholic, Orthodox, Moslem, Buddhist, etc., communities and cultures. In the same way we can define various ethnic groups and cultures differentiated by criteria of ethnicity. In our everyday language when we speak about interrelationships, inculturation, and transculturation, we most often refer to different horizontal cultures. There are some extreme cases when a person can be a part of two horizontal cultures at the same time (to insist that s/he has two religious or two ethnic affiliations, for example), but these are usually transient, transitional states of passage from one culture to another culture, from one identification to another identification.

Vertical groups and cultures have hierarchical and inclusive relationships. The lower levels of a hierarchy are included in the higher levels. For instance, the group (and the culture) of American black people is a part of the American society (and American culture); American culture is part of Western culture; and Western culture is part of human culture. The interrelationships between horizontal cultures are in some sense exclusive; the interrelationships between vertical cultures are inclusive.

Intersecting groups and cultures are those whose mutual interrelationships are neither inclusive nor exclusive, but are distinguished by different criteria. A person could be a participant in different groups and cultures in keeping with his/her social roles. For instance, it is possible that

one is at the same time a member of the culture of English speaking people, of white Americans, of Bulgarian ethnic origin, and Republican party affiliation.

There were no such complex distinctions in primitive tribes and cultures, because there was no

modern division of labour between people. The main, all-embracing culture for these people was their ethnic culture. But in the modern world there are thousands of horizontal, vertical and intersecting cultures. Notwithstanding, the problems of inculturation, transculturation, and acculturation are first of all issues about relations of horizontal cultures distinguished by one exclusive criteria. When we draw a vertical line between some cultures, we look for a distinction between particular and universal, between concrete peculiarities of a culture and features making it part of a larger culture. When we draw a horizontal line between cultures, we look for distinctions between different particular entities; what matters here is the point of mutual influence and change of these different particular cultures.

Undoubtedly, most important are the interrelationships between ethnic groups and ethnic cultures. Here, there are two major considerations:

— Ethnicity, ethnic groups, and ethnic cultures are the most lasting, durable and constant phenomena in human history. The basic human culture is an ethnic culture and the first human group is an ethnic one.

— This runs counter to earlier forecasts that ethnicity and ethnic cultures are passing away. The many instances of ethnic revival during the last two decades have had different manifestations—from a combative nationalism and bloodshed in Eastern Europe to a benign and peaceful desire for ethnic diversity in some developed countries. This has placed anew on the agenda issues of the increasing role and place of ethnicity and ethnic cultures in the contemporary world.

Ethnic Identity and Culture

People live within different ethnic communities requiring behavior which has to be consonant with certain injunctions in order to retain ethnicity. The ethnic community is a reference group for the people included in it. People perceive themselves as affiliated with the group and as having their own ethnic identity. A person is included in different groups and plays different roles in these groups. But identity is not just a role: this refers to external behavior in keeping with the patterns of a respective group and is but the "surface" of a person. One’s "depth" characteristics are connected with one’s internal experience, feelings and affections, and these in turn result from affiliation with the group.

To have ethnic identity means not just to play an ethnic role but *to be ethnic*, to have ethnicity as the *essence of your "self."* We "play" our role, *we "are our identities*." People can live without their roles, but they cannot live without their identities, because these identities are their internal feelings, values and meanings. Their loss would mean the loss of meaning or sense of life, of one’s internal essence. Accordingly, people who lose their identities experience many more behavioral deviations, suicides, or a desperate search for new identities.

The Nature of Ethnic Identity

The comprehension of ethnic identity is impossible, however, without a notion of the *content of ethnicity* or of the ethnic group. In 1979, Wsevolod Isajiw reviewed 27 definitions of ethnicity and abstracted twelve characteristics to describe ethnicity.1 The five which appeared most often were, in descending order of frequency, common ancestral origin, same culture or customs, religion, race or physical characteristics, and language. Other attributes are based on feelings or status, such as sense of peoplehood, common values or ethics, *Gemeinshaft* relations, and belonging to an ethnic group not by personal choice but by virtue of being born in it.

A symposium on the theme of ethnic identity held in 1979 under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council in the U.S.A. came up with six criteria of a final working definition, including all the significant features of most contemporary definitions2:

(1) a past-oriented group identification emphasizing origins;
(2) some conception of cultural and social distinctiveness;
(3) the relationship of the ethnic group vis à vis a broader system of social relations;
(4) being larger than kin or locality groups and transcending face-to-face interaction;
(5) different meanings for ethnic categories both in different social settings and for different individuals;
(6) the assumption that ethnic categories are emblematic, having names with meanings both for members and for analysts.

It is difficult to agree that some of these characteristics are essential to the notion of ethnicity. For instance characteristic (3), "relationship of the ethnic group as a component unit of a broader system of social relations," might be peculiar to the ethnic situation in the U.S.A., but not by and large. It is true that ethnic distinctiveness can be understood best in comparison with other identities, but this is a common condition for the apprehension of any entity and for any definition. To say that you are "A" means also that you are not "B," not "C," not "D," etc.

Doubt can also be cast upon the universality of characteristic (4), for sometimes it is possible for an ethnic group to be not larger than kin or a local group, e.g., the "last Mohegans." There are diverse cases of waning tribes, reported by anthropologists, which number only several hundred people.

Nor is characteristic (5) a permanent peculiarity of ethnicity, namely, a situational use of ethnicity according to which individuals can choose, within certain constraints, among a variety of identities. This is a special case when an individual is born in a mixed marriage, for most often people feel their ethnicity to be received by their "birth" in some group. It is true that individuals may be able to choose a nation and state to live in, but this should not be confused with ethnicity.

Characteristics of Ethnic Groups

Accordingly, the following features emerge as descriptions of any ethnic group:

1. A common material and spiritual culture, including some distinctive language, customs, mores, rituals, dress, religious beliefs, dances, cuisine, etc. Not all of these characteristics are present in any particular case, but manifestations of cultural distinctiveness are ever present.

2. Consciousness of a common ancestral origin, common descent, past, or heritage. This common heritage may not be demonstrable, but the belief in it, sometimes shored up by myth or a partly fictitious history, suffices.

3. Prevailing endogamous relations and as a result common physical characteristics. In this sense ethnic affiliation is perceived as being by blood. One is born and raised with some ethnic identity; this is not a result of free choice. It is true that in the contemporary world the number of intermarriages is on the increase, and in the cases of voluntarily or compulsory assimilation some people change their ethnic identity. However, these are extreme cases. An ethnic group keeps its existence as long as it retains a predominant endogamy. Prevailing exogamous relations mean that an ethnic group has disintegrated.

4. The self-identification of people with an ethnic group, their consciousness that they are part of their respective ethnic group, that they belong to this ethnicity, that this is part of their existence which they carry as they do their physical appearance—all this is a process not just of self- but also of other-ascription: individuals are identified as different by others, not just by themselves.

This subjective dimension of ethnicity is very important. One group can share many cultural characteristics with another group, have a common past and common descent, but the subjective evaluation that it has a specific identity divides its members from the other group. A typical such case is the Slav Moslems in Bosnia. Their origins are in common with Serbians and Croatians—a common past and a common language. But several hundred years ago the Ottoman Turks converted them to Islam and they now identify themselves and are identified by others as a specifically different ethnic group.

Ethnic Boundaries

This process of self-identification and identification from without refers to some values and specific ethnic meanings ascribed to different areas of the activity of a group and to the material and spiritual effects of this activity. These values and meanings characterizing ethnic distinctiveness define some *ethnic boundaries*. The ability of an ethnic group to maintain boundaries helps it to survive as a distinct entity. Strong boundaries mean strong group integration and strong ethnic identities.

Ethnic boundaries are both positive and negative:

(1) *Positive dimension*: areas of a group life-activity where ethnic meanings and values are ascribed. For instance, there could be strong ethnic meanings connected with traditional peasant folk culture, but much less concerning the contemporary culture of the big cities. Or some ethnic groups can put strong emphasis on their "great past," while others place the accent upon more recent realities. If most of the activity of an ethnic group is without ethnic meaning, its ethnic boundaries are narrow and presumably its ethnic cohesion is weaker.

(2) *Negative dimension*: Some ethnic boundaries also contrast "we" and "they." These are negative boundaries: we are "what they are not," as one ethnic group defines itself in terms of what another group is not. Usually "they" are the best known neighbors of "us." This means that these

negative boundaries could be very strong between some ethnic groups and relatively weaker between others.

Recent popular models explaining the maintenance of ethnic boundaries and ethnic identity are either general *interaction-based models* or *conflict-based* models. The growing interactions and conflicts of ethnic groups are ways of maintaining ethnic boundaries and ethnic identity. More often ethnic identity is supported, not by isolation, but by increasing interaction between groups.3

A great number of facts and much research maintain that conflicts are a major factor strengthening ethnic boundaries and creating and imposing an ethnic identity. Any danger enhances the group solidarity. "It appears that the oppositional process is the existential factor in the formation and development of the persistent identity system. . . . The oppositional process frequently produces intense collective consciousness and a high degree of internal solidarity."4 Accordingly, persecuted groups, such as the Jews or the Armenians, display unusually strong ethnic identities and abilities for survival. That explains also the increasing ethnic and nationalistic feelings during wars or when some groups are humiliated, rejected or the underdog. The idea of German unity and German identity was in some sense an aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. The insecurity and humiliation of the Russians upon losing the cold war has fed increasing nationalism.

According to Spicer the persistent identity system developed by endangered groups has the following features:5

— well-defined symbols of ethnic identity and an individual's belief in one's personal affiliation with these symbols or, more accurately, with what certain symbols stand for;

— a growing significance of history and of the past for ongoing behaviour; history has a special meaning for the particular people who believe it;

— individual motivation to continue the identity system comes from people's cumulative image expressed in symbols meaningful to those who identify with a particular historical experience;

— the oppositional process produces an intense collective consciousness, a high degree of internal solidarity and moral resources gained from sharing meaningful symbols.

Ethnic boundaries between "us" and "them" are built by means of some stereotyped perceptions of the two. Ethnic stereotypes are the most important mechanisms for drawing borders and reinforcing the contrast between "us" and "them." There are regular patterns in the rise of some stereotypes hinging upon the peculiarities of the relationships between two ethnic groups, according to whether they are stratified, in opposition, or cooperative.6

The first type of stereotypes is between unequal or stratified groups, when one group is perceived as dominant and the other subordinate. If the inferior group does not pose a threat and the relationships are peaceful, it is described by the representatives of the dominant group through such stereotyped characteristics as "child-like," "happy-go-lucky," "irrational," "emotional," "friendly." These are paternalistic attitudes toward peoples who are regarded as in need of guidance throughout their lives. Such kinds of stereotypes toward black people existed among white people in America during the time of slavery. They could be found for some time also as stereotypes in the perception of the gypsies of Europe. These positive paternalistic stereotypes sometimes even ascribe to members of the inferior group such characteristics as physical strength, endurance,

courage and virility, but these traits are ‘safely’ applied because the ‘inferiors’ are regarded as harmless.

When they come to be perceived as dangerous, the adjectives describing them change. They become "cunning," "treacherous," "deceitful," or "dangerous." In stratified situations the dominant group is perceived by the inferior one as having basically good intention. It is characterized as benevolent, tolerant, intelligent, honest and self-controlled. That is the way, for instance, most Bulgarians now perceive Americans. But when suspicions about the good intentions of the dominant group arise, the stereotypes applied by the inferior group turn quite opposite.

The second type of stereotypes arises between groups perceived as being in opposition when both sides are frustrated. In such cases the stereotypes of any group are prevailingly negative, including such traits as "hypocritical," "unjust," "ruthless," "selfish," "cold," "cruel," "arrogant," "exploitive," "deceitful," "brutal," "aggressive," "cunning," "treacherous," "corrupt," etc.

The third type of stereotypes occurs between groups with equal status and cooperative relations, coexisting peacefully. These usually are positive stereotypes of partners, including such characteristics as "trustworthy," "hardworking," "benevolent," "friendly," "strong," "intelligent," etc.

When two ethnic groups coexist for a quite long time through changing mutual inter-relationships, we find different and even opposite stereotypes for perceiving "them." For example, quite opposite stereotypes concerning black people or Native Indians can be found among the white population in America. The same is true between different neighboring nations and ethnic groups in Europe. In Bulgaria the stereotypes regarding the Turkish minority are mixed. They include negative characteristics toward the Moslems created during the five hundred years under the Ottoman yoke; they embrace also positive characteristics of coexistence and cooperation over the last one hundred years; and they comprise as well some characteristics reflecting the attributes of the Bulgarian majority (better educated and with better positions in society, this group looks down upon Turks as a backward minority).

It can be concluded that in any ethnic consciousness different stereotypes exist concerning other ethnic groups. Some of these are more xenophobic; others are more open; some types of stereotypes are popular among one part of the ethnic population; other types are spread more generally among peoples. Which type of stereotype will be dominant depends upon the conditions of an ethnic group. Accordingly, in eastern Germany which is now in a situation of economic crises and frustration, strong xenophobic stereotypes become popular and other ethnic groups are perceived as a danger. The conditions of economic, political, and social collapse in the whole ex-communist world, where people are insecure and feel their life to be built upon sand, generate a search for "scapegoats" and promote the rise of negative ethnic stereotypes. It can be said that the role of Jews as the most important "scapegoats" is now occupied by Gypsies. A recent study of countries found Gypsies to be the most hated group in Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Three in five Germans said they dislike Gypsies; Poles came in second, disliked by 50 percent; Jews were sixth, disliked by 24 percent.7

Ethnic identity is one of the most stable characteristics of individuals and groups. But there are some specific cases in which ethnic identity can change with the result that some ethnic groups dwindle and new ethnic groups are born. When the process of acculturation and transculturation destroys some ethnic culture, conditions are favorable for a loss of ethnic identity. History is the place of the birth and death of ethnic groups through melting and assimilation. Inculturation can be a way of enriching and retaining an ethnic culture, and can be a means of preserving ethnic

identity, but all contemporary "pure" nations are the result of a melting and assimilation of different ethnic groups.

Strategies of Assimilation

(1) *Compulsory strategies*. These were typical in the past and are based on the destruction of some ethnic culture and the maintenance of a new culture. For instance, in the ninth century Bulgarian king Boris I compulsorily imposed the Christian religion on the Bulgarian and Slav populations. One of his goals was to unite them— through a common religion—into a uniform and new ethnic group. Under the Ottoman yoke, Christians in the Balkan peninsula were forcibly Islamicized and then accepted Turkish identity. This has been the policy of Turkey in recent decades with regard to the Kurds. But the spread of democracy in the contemporary world lessens the possibility of compulsory destruction of cultures and the change of ethnic identification.

(2) *Voluntary strategies*. When two ethnic groups are in unequal economic, political and cultural positions the voluntary rejection of some ethnic culture and the acceptance of another through assimilation is quite possible. This could be supported or not by official authorities. In this case the higher ethnic group functions as the reference group for the representatives of the lower ethnic group. Accordingly, they try to change their identity (language, names, religion, symbols, style of life) to get higher economic, cultural and value status.

For instance, during the Ottoman period in the Balkans there were some cases of a change of religious affiliation and voluntary conversion to Islam in order to reach the economic and political status of Moslems and to be relieved of some heavy taxes levied only upon Christians. In the USA during the last century, a "melting pot" policy was approved by government and accepted voluntarily by most of the new immigrants. Among the representatives of many more undeveloped nations in the contemporary world, there is an effort to be like people in the rich nations. They lower the status of many of their symbols, terms and names, readily accepting those characteristic of the ethnic identification of the English-speaking world.

The behavior of ethnic groups in the midst of a severe cultural crisis in their economy, political life and values is quite specific. This is the case in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union. One observes two kinds of extremely opposite behavior concerning ethnic identity. On the one hand, there is an increasing desire to maintain their ethnic identities and growing ethnic nationalism. On the other hand, trapped in the position of losing the meaning of life, and agonizing in economic and political uncertainty and impoverishment, a great number of people are ready to reject their ethnic identity and emigrate to the wealthy West.

(3) *The strategy of voluntarily abandoning one's identity in favor of another, and the reluctance of the host group to accept this change*. In most cases the voluntary change of ethnic identity faces obstacles due to reluctance on the part of the ethnic group to which one wishes to change. Ethnicity is commonly treated as something received by birth, not by choice. Furthermore, the stereotypes of the ethnic group in a higher position regarding members of the ethnic group in a lower position may be so negative that these stereotypes may be impossible to overcome. To convince the representatives of the higher group that the other group has changed its ethnic "nature" can be very difficult. For example, in Bulgaria the official policy of the government from the '60s was to assimilate the Gypsies. It changed their names to Bulgarian names and attempted to improve their economic status and standard of living. Many Gypsies were ready to accept this

assimilation because it meant a better social position for them. But the psychological and the cultural differences with Bulgarians were so great that in most cases these ‘new’ Bulgarians were treated, not as people changing their identities, but as Gypsies. For this reason some tried to change their disadvantaged Gypsy identification into Turkish identification. This was not supported by the government, but was much easier because the Turks who were also a minority were more open to accepting such a change of identification.

Constraints upon a Change of Ethnic Identity

There are a great number of other constraints upon the desire to change one’s ethnic identity—physical distinctions between ethnic groups, political reasons, sociological and psychological influences. As a rule, ethnic boundaries are too strong and it is quite difficult to "jump over" them either from "inside" to "outside," or vice versa from "outside" to "inside." There are three main hindrances to changing ethnic identity:

(1) *Strong group cohesion and ethnic boundaries which are difficult to overcome*. In this case a person trying to change his identity is accepted as "other," "alien," "a foreigner," "a stranger." In recent years when Germany was implementing its policy of accepting as German citizens all people with German origin from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, there were cases in which, for example, some Poles pretending that they had German ancestry attempted to obtain German citizenship and rejected their own identity. When they were uncovered, they were returned: the attitude of the Germans was that one could be German only "by blood," not "by choice."

(2) *Constraints of resources*. In the contemporary world of great economic inequality between the poorest and the wealthiest nations many people starving in their countries might be ready to change, not just their citizenship, but their ethnic identity in order to partake in the distribution of resources among the richest. Nevertheless, these resources are limited and as a result we have growing xenophobia among the wealthy nations, which are increasingly deciding to reject such attempts to change identity.

(3) *The number of people taking part in the interaction* sets limits on the possibility of overcoming one’s ethnic identity. Most of the time, a relatively small number of people with alien ethnic origin dispersed inside a large ethnic group are easily assimilated. When the interaction is between an ethnic majority and an ethnic minority which is concentrated in some territories, their differences are more visible. They interact as ethnic groups with their own symbols and stereotypes and accordingly, change of ethnic identity is much more difficult. Ongoing conditions maintain the distinctiveness and the single individual is seen as symbol of his or her ethnic category. It is much more difficult to escape notice as "other," for one’s "otherness" is reinforced by the presence of one’s ethnic group.

The Dual Concept of Nation and Modernity

Ethnicity, ethnic group, ethnic identity and ethnic culture are notions closely connected but not equal to nationality, nation, national identity, national culture. If one has to formulate in one word the major difference between ethnic group and nation, it would be the word "State." "Nation" refers to some state, either existing or desired. An ethnic group turns into a nation when it begins

to struggle to establish its own state. If the notion of state is not required in the definition of an ethnic group, ethnicity or ethnic identification, it is most important in the definition of nation. "A nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own."8

Some ethnic groups are nations, others are not. Some nations could consist of various ethnic groups, others not. The relationship between nation and ethnicity can be imaged by the following figure.

The Notion of Nation

The nation is a product of modernity. Ethnicity is a primordial phenomenon, changing in human history, included and excluded in different other forms of social life and organization. Nation is one of the historical forms of ethnicity. Admittedly, the rise of nations begins with the French Revolution, the abolition of class privileges and the transformation of the king's subjects into citizens. Subjects could not choose their master or king because that state did not depend upon the will of the people. Citizens, on the contrary, are masters of their state. The idea of nation derives from the modern idea of the people's sovereignty as being the highest sovereignty. When people can define or try to define how to live, in what state and under what rule, they could transform their ethnic group into a nation. But the political idea of the people's sovereignty and self-determination is not the same as the idea of ethnic sovereignty and self-determination. The first notion concerns a political society constituting a nation of fellow citizens living in a shared territory irrespective of race or ethnic decent. The second notion stresses the nation's ethnic character.

In France, the United Kingdom and the USA the notion of nation as based upon liberal and democratic ideas of people's sovereignty and neglecting ethnicity has become popular. In contrast, in German and Slavic worlds the notion of nation as comprehending citizens as members of the same ethnic group is more important. Hans Kohn points out:

German nationalism substituted for the legal and rational concept of "citizenship" the infinitely vaguer concept of "folk," which, first discovered by the German humanists, was later fully developed by Herder and the German romantics. It lent itself more easily to the roots seemed to reach into the dark soil of primitive times and to embroideries of imagination and the excitations of emotions. Its have grown through thousands of hidden channels of unconscious development, not in the bright light of rational political ends, but in the mysterious womb of people, deemed to be so much nearer the forces of nature.9

Accordingly, the notion of nation was divided and displayed its dual, twofold or double nature by appearing with two different "faces." The different understandings of nation were expressed by such contrasting pairs of terms as: the "political" and "cultural" notion of a nation, "Western" and "Eastern," "nation by territory" and "nation by blood," "inclusive" and "exclusive," "French" and "German," "Anglo-Saxon" and "German-Slavic," "open" nationalism and "closed" nationalism, "state nationalism" and "ethnic nationalism," "nation as a product of modernity" and "nation as a primordial phenomenon."

The reason for these different notions of nation as based on ethnicity and on free choice is that ideas of nations and nationalism came from Germany and the Slavic world much before any possibility of their being realized in a political form as a people's sovereignty. "Among these peoples, at the beginning it was not so much the nation-state as the V*olksgeist* and its

manifestations in literature and folklore, in the mother tongue, and in history, which became the center of attention of nationalism."10 Accordingly, nation becomes a state embodiment of ethnicity.

It must be pointed out that the distinction between these two notions of nation is not absolute. Even if some states are based on the political, "open," "territorial," "inclusive" notion of nation, their development is connected more or less with some kind of "melting pot," "assimilation," "ethnic mixture" and maintenance of a common national identity as a kind of ethnic identity. This process has different forms and strengths, but even in the USA where one finds a strong emphasis upon original ethnic identity, people have also their American identity connected with American history, culture, American English, the American mentality, the American "dream," etc. In fact, there are two types of people—those with only an American identity who have lost their ancestor's original ethnic affiliation; and people with a double ethnic identity, American and that of their original ethnic group. When this double identification is lacking or destroyed, the result could be a separatist movement and state disintegration. This is the case in Canada where state policy has always supported ethnic diversity rather than a common Canadian identity. As a result, the population of Quebec has not developed a strong Canadian identity and feels a strong separatist thrust. The same happened in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia when their common Soviet and Yugoslav identities were destroyed and people were left with their original ethnic identities.

Nevertheless, in the contemporary world, the distinction between a political and an ethnic nation continues. As a result, in international policy there can be found support for two contradictory principles: a) the principle of state sovereignty, integrity, inviolability of state borders and territory, and a rejection of any separatist movements; and b) the principle of ethnic self-determination and the right to an ethnicity's own state. These two contradictory principles are applied in contemporary international relations, above all from the point of view of the interests of one or another great power rather than on the basis of some consistent understanding of nation and nationalism.

After World War I, Woodrow Wilson imposed in the Versailles negotiations the principle of self-determination of people. After World War II, as a reaction to German ethnic nationalism, the new order was established irrespective of this principle and first of all according to the interest of the "big powers." This inviolability of the new borders was accepted as an overriding principle. After World War III (the Cold War) there was *no* sufficiently clear principle. The result was the civil war in Yugoslavia and ethnic conflicts within the different ex-Soviet republics. In order to approach this issue, it is necessary to examine the notion of nation.

Characteristics of Nationalism

Some common characteristics for the idea of nation have emerged during the last two centuries:

(1) *Economic features*: The ground of the modern nations was established by the development of market relations imposing social homogeneity on the sphere of public life and undergirding the liberal individualism of the private owner. The capitalist market creates a new form of identity, that of the abstract individual making contracts in the market. This implies mobility and hence a desire for legal equality and freedom of any constraints. It requires a common currency, common regulations in some territory and a search for the power to defend a free market, equality of opportunity, science and industry. This implies the development of all forms of communications

within a territory and the removal of the borders between culturally and economically independent communities characteristic of pre-modern societies. Economic unification is the foundation of a new common identity of the people in the specific territory.

(2) *Common territory, fatherland, motherland*: The nation is strongly rooted in terms of territory. Though for an ethnic group, some ethnic territory is not obligatory, it is impossible for a nation to be without a homeland. This is an inalienable collective property and is imbued with many symbolic meanings in which the national identity is embodied. Defense and sacrifice for this homeland is a first duty of every citizen and is enjoined as a high value.

(3) *Statehood*: A nation is a community but one which has its own state. Radically different from the pre-modern political relationship of prince and subject; it is the subject who legitimizes the state. Irrespective of the concrete political forum of the modern state, the main political principle legitimizing the government is the will of the nation.

The following are the main characteristics of ethnicity and ethnic culture as applied within the borders of a national state:

— A common culture and above all an official state language as the basis for maintaining a common national culture and a conscious unity.
— A common history: if an ethnic group has common ancestors and common origin, the nation has a common history. This is first of all the history of the ongoing state and of earlier state formations in which the existing population groups have existed. This history serves as a source of pride and inspiration.
— A prevailing endogamy within the nation.
— Subjective feelings of national identity. Like ethnic identity, national identity is not just a social role or contractual obligation, but an internal acceptance of a very important social value which in some cases could require even personal sacrifice. Thus, the nation has the value, not of means or instrument, but of an end that is terminal for the individual; it is a value in itself.

The state could be taken in term of *Gesellschaft*, but it must be accepted as *Gemeinschaft*. Accordingly, the nation is viewed in the same terms as family—one's country is one's house, fatherland, motherland; one speaks one's "mother tongue," shares with other people "common blood" and "inheritance," love, and hatreds; peoples are "sons and daughters" of their fatherlands. If the common model of all *Gemeinschaft*-formations is the model of family, then that of *Gesellschaft*-formations is the market and its contractual language.

Premodern Stages of Globalization and the Articularization of Cultures and Societies

The development of an ethnic group as a nation and the rise of ethnic nationalism are connected with changes in human identities and the relationships between global and local culture. As "ethnic," nationalism is a primordial state and feeling; as a manifestation of a nation, it is an offspring of modernity.

In human history there are different modes of interrelationships between social and cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity, universal and local identities, trans-nationalism and nationalism. There are successive stages in the predominance of trans-nationalism or localism in the different

areas of social life. At the same time the content, meaning and relationships of the processes of homogenization and heterogeneization are mutable.

Between the 60s and the 80s, the world entered a new stage of interrelated global and local trends with a predominance of important processes of diversification and nationalistic affirmations. The end of communism is not only the "end of history," but the beginning of a new cycle of nationalistic and ethnic identification. In order to understand these processes, we have to comprehend the foregoing stages of interrelationships between the global and local.

The emergence of the Hellenistic world was the first universal project to overcome local ethnic, political, and cultural borders and to create universal identifications. The driving forces of the process of unification were war and political violence. Hence, this world was short lasting; in the long run the spurs toward heterogeneity were stronger.

The second universalistic and trans-nationalistic circle is connected with the rise of the Roman Empire. Up to now, this was perhaps the greatest effort to set up a politically, culturally, and economically united world without demolishing local religious and cultural differences. But it was impossible to hold together this enormous territory by democratic means without a developed means of communication. This led to the demise of the old democratic republican tradition and gave rise to the Empire. Nevertheless, even a large army and brute force could not hold the Empire together.

Nevertheless, this attempt to establish a united world and culture provided the basis for a new cultural notion of humanity and of person transcending the old particular understanding of the human being. In Aristotle's works, the citizen is a free male—neither woman nor slave. The Roman world gave birth to the Stoic and Christian universal notion of the human being and his or her value, irrespective of his gender, social position, ethnicity, etc. This universal notion of person is the basis of Christianity as first universal religion and culture spanning different states, ethnic groups, social classes. It is a religion and culture for all human beings.

The third circle is the Holy Roman Empire. This was, in fact, a pre-modern version of a united Europe. There were two levels in this united Europe. On the one hand, there was the Empire and the universal Christian religion and culture with a common Latin language, spoken by a small number of educated people. On the other hand, there were an enormous number of closed ethnic worlds with their folk cultures, native languages, psychologies, and more or less economically independent feudal lords and kingdoms. In the condition of a natural economy, self-sufficient agrarian communities and poorly developed markets, a great diversity of weak non-communicating cultures existed.

Similar processes of unification and diversification took place also in other parts of the world under the influence of other world religions—the Orthodox Church and Byzantium, and the Ottoman Empire trying to create a united Moslem world, and different attempts to establish a united Buddhist world by the Chinese Emperors. Such efforts are characteristic of all great empires. However, such types of united worlds are not sufficiently stable, for the closed and isolated nature of their compound units render them too fragile. Hence, the Reformation and the economic and political changes between fifteenth and eighteenth centuries broke down such kinds of pre-modern unification and substituted attempts to establish trans-ethnic and homogeneous worlds.

What were the peculiarities of these successive pre-modern cycles between more homogeneous and predominantly heterogeneous patterns of existence for peoples and ethnic groups? Some political and cultural forces introduced unification, but for the lack of economic foundations, the result was an oscillation between periods of unification and diversification. The

unifying forces were first of all political (wars, coercion, compulsion, violence, and suppression) and then cultural and ideological (common trans-ethnic religions, and the common trans-ethnic languages of these religions—Latin, Greek, Arabic, etc.), but this renewed an economically divided world: there were world Empires, but no world markets,11 and no civil society. Trans-ethnic and universal identity was available for the people of the same religion in an Empire (Christians, Moslems, etc.) or as subjects of a common master, lord or sovereign. But at the same time there was strong local identification with the family, the local territorial group (village), and the economic self-supporting units of prevailing agrarian societies. The masters and the larger political societies in which these closed territorial entities were included could change, but their existence was more or less immutable.

In fact, in this pre-modern world, we find three important levels of identity for people connected with three levels of culture—family, local (the economic and land unit with its master) and universal (religious). The main systems of the European nations, for instance, reflect these levels. Their names have their origin first of all in universal Christian culture, local territory and type of economic units, and common family ancestry.

The Dual Nature of Modernity: The Conflict Between Universal Projects and Nationalism

The emergence of modernity meant a world of thought, culture and mentality filled with antinomies. Kant gave an abstract classical philosophical form to some of these dichotomies. This antinomical mentality is reflected also in the famous title of Kierkegaard's work, *Either/Or*. The modern mind is haunted by the impossibility of "jumping" the gaps between objectivity and subjectivity, facts and values, theoretical and practical reasons, science and ideology, freedom and necessity, public and private, individual and social, mind and body, objectivism and relativism, historicity and historicism, etc.

One finds similar contradictions as regards place and the role of ethnicity. The underlying duality between state and ethnicity: which is the more important reality or higher value—state or ethnicity? Should the state and citizenship provide the ground and principle for the development of ethnicity and ethnic identity or, to the contrary, should ethnicity and the ethnic identity provide the ground and principle for the development of the state? Modernity did not find an exact answer to this question. This duality is expressed in a series of oppositions: political nation v. ethnic nation; state nationalism v. ethnic nationalism; western v. eastern nationalism; state sovereignty v. ethnic self-determination; universal ideologies v. national state; liberalism and socialism v. nationalism.

National State and Nationalism

In modern times the major force for the development of a particular culture and identity became the nation, national culture, and national identity. Ethnicity and ethnic culture were forced to display themselves through nation and national culture. Accordingly, ethnicity confronted the state: either as a ground for the development of the national state (ethnic nationalism) or as matter for transformation (the "melting pot") in a process of assimilation and nation-building which subordinated ethnicity to the state's ongoing national identity. Each alternative implies some form of nationalism, or endeavor to unite ethnicity and state. In the first case, ethnicity, ethnic identity, ethnic culture turn into nationality, national identity and national culture requiring and creating the state. In the second case, the state creates national identity as a modern form of ethnic identity.

But side by side with this tendency of local homogenization in the form of the national state, there was also a universal, trans-national tendency brought about by the ideologies which originated in the Enlightenment. If in the pre-modern world the universal identities and cultures were characteristics of the great Empires and universal religions, in the modern world they are presented first of all in the form of world markets and ideologies which are descendants of the Enlightenment.

Let us take a look at two opposite tendencies in modernity: the particularist tendency in the development of national states and nationalism, and the universal tendency manifested by the main offsprings of the Enlightenment—liberalism and socialism. This is one of the fundamental contradictions of the "spirit of modernity."

During the last two centuries, industrialization, urbanization, mass production and consumption, new means of communication, and mass education have been the bases for the demolition of closed and local peasant communities and the rise of national identities. In the process of modernization, local bonds, stability, meaning and neighborhood have been lost in a quickly changing world. This has generated feelings of alienation in the atomistic individuals of the bourgeois market society and hence a search for identity, stability and the meaning which one finds in the nation. Accordingly, in this age ethnic diversity within the state was not supported; the state attempted to build a united national identity and to include in its borders any ethnic group which claimed to have the same national identity.

This was a period in which the ideology and practice of the "melting pot" was popular in the USA, rapidly fusing different ethnic identities into a common national identity. Diversity was not supported; from the varied raw material of citizens with different ethnic origin and race a totally new cultural blend emerged. Mass society and the market tended to homogenize people in a unified culture and nation.

It is still a prevailing idea that ethnic diversity within a nation has a disintegrating effect and must be submitted to the common rational culture and identity. Paradigmatic of this are arguments that tribalism or any other social and political attachment to a small ethnic, cultural or linguistic group "is a challenge to national integration and that, in contrast, the fully formed, fully integrated nation would be characterized by the sharing of a common language and culture."12 Local ethnic bonds are considered detrimental to nationhood. The expectation is that industrialization will replace in every nook and cranny the old ethnicity with nationality and ethnic groups with nations.

It is commonly held that in a united nation what is more important is not different ethnic groups but various class relations, income stratifications, age and gender groups, etc. Ethnic enclaves, even in states where the political notion of nation prevails, are viewed as time bombs and efforts are directed toward destroying these enclaves or, if their destruction be difficult or impossible, then toward isolating them (as for instance in the U.S.A., Indians were removed to reservations because they were not regarded as good material for assimilation).

The U.S.A. is a specific situation where American citizenship is desired by people who have left their ethnic and national cultures and citizenships and opened positively to accepting a new national identity. This facilitates the "production" of new identities by the "melting pot."

In countries where this kind of motivation is lacking and an ethnic notion of nation prevails, much more rude, cruel and tough processes are underway:

a) *Liberation of compatriots,* or the initiation of wars to include within state borders populations viewed as a part of the nation but settled outside the state. This was the declared goal

of World War I, World War II, the Balkan wars, etc., which were waged for the "liberation of compatriots."

b) "*Ethnic cleansing*" of territories or compulsory relocation of large masses of people beyond the national borders is a common method. Hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians were sent away form Turkey and Greece after the Balkan and First World Wars. Thus, "dangerous" foreign ethnic groups inside the nation were diminished. Millions of Germans were removed from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union after the second World War. And in the civil wars in Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet republics, ethnic cleansing is one of the main goals.

c) *Support for Ethnic Immigration*. The decrease of ethnic diversity within national borders in many countries and the dominance of single ethnic nations is realized by supporting or opening opportunities for emigration by the minority to a state considered as their national state. This is the way millions of Jews from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union left those regions. There was also a voluntary ethnic cleansing as hundreds of thousands of Germans emigrated in past years from Romania, the Soviet Union, and Poland to Germany. Often during this century large numbers of Turks have emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey.

d) *Assimilation*. Great numbers of ethnic minorities were also assimilated, that is, they lost their native identities and accepted the identities of the ethnic majorities in their respective states. This was the fate of thousands of Bulgarians in Romania, Serbia, Greece and Turkey. There are many attempts to assimilate the Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Different means are used: constraints concerning their national culture, language, education and media; economic and political constraints.

e) *Deconcentration*. This involves the deliberate scattering of members of an ethnic minority in different places across the country so that they can be more easily related to the majority, etc. Nationalism is much more developed in the concrete, that is, as a practice rather than as a political philosophy; and it does not have its great thinkers as liberalism and socialism have had.

The Liberal Universalist and Anti-Nationalist Critique

The tendency towards universality or trans-nationalism in modern societies and cultures displays itself philosophically, ideologically, politically, and ethically in two major modernist projects—one liberal, the other socialist. These have different manifestations, some of which in some periods were connected with different versions of nationalism, but their mainstreams are universalistic and anti-nationalistic. From different points of view, they reject ethnic and national particularity and consider nationalism as a transitional situation which they evaluate negatively. Nationalism’s manifestations in ideologies such as fascism, conservatism, racism, and religious fundamentalism are regarded as a great challenge and danger to mankind.

Liberalism is one of the most important outgrowths of modernity and is its most influential universal current. This is a cast of mind at odds with any particularistic emphasis upon a specific community. Nevertheless, at the outset there was no marked conflict between claims of liberal thinkers and nationalist writers. During the nineteenth century the attitude was that liberal principles of individual rights and formal justice can be combined with the demands of national sovereignty and self-determination. But even in this earlier period of peaceful coexistence, liberal thinkers held that a contemporary state could not be democratic if it contained different ethnic groups. John Stuart Mill wrote that "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made of different nationalities," and therefore, "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."13 Here

self-determination is deemed an extension of the liberal idea of people's right, but it might be interpreted also to mean that different identities should not be tolerated in a state.

The extreme displays of nationalism in the twentieth century terrified liberal-thinking people and liberalism developed a strong criticism of any kind of nationalism. The major points of this criticism are the following:

(1) Modern social life is atomistic: the starting point of any liberal thought is the individual as a primary ontological and axiological reality. Any community is a secondary ontological and axiological entity, a construction that is the result of individuals's contract, covenant, agreement. Whereas all non-liberal individuals belong to some communities and as such bear some dimensions of these communities, the most important obligations incumbent upon them are not contractual, but belong to their "essence," their virtues. In contrast, the liberal individual is an abstraction of a market society. He is "abstract" because he is free of any particular identity and obligations to any community. Since such identities and obligations could be only the result of one's free choice and contact, they do not belong to his preliminary essence. Accordingly, from the liberal point of view, ethnicity and nationality are not substantial realities, but secondary products.

(2) "Nation" and "ethnicity" are not primordial entities bur artificial constructions. They do not have their own independent reality, but are "imagined, created, concocted, unreal." Nationalism and ethnicity rely on an illusion and are irrational. Nationalism is not the awakening of nations as pre-existing entities to self-consciousness, but invents nations where they did not exist. Correspondingly, being an "invention," nations and nationalism are "fabrications, false, and false consciousness."

(3) Ethnicity and nationalism are viewed as major dangers to natural rights and the freedoms of individuals. When subjected to some nation or ethnic group, the individual is dissolved therein and loses his or her freedom. As Orlando Patterson points out, ethnicity and "the spurious social philosophy of pluralism which rationalizes it are the new dangers to individuality and personal autonomy."14 Ethnicity does claim to promote individual identity but this claim is just the latest in a series of mechanisms which submerge the individual to the group.

(4) Liberals and liberalism are connected with the progressive views of the Enlightenment. They are future, not past oriented; their obsession is not history and tradition, but science and progress, and liberation from all prejudices. From this point of view ethnicity, nation, and nationalism with their emphasis upon the past and tradition have no place in the future; they will remain behind in the past, destined to dissipate under the influence of the cosmopolitan tendencies of the modern world.

(5) After the two world wars, nationalism was considered especially "barbaric" with its atrocities and bloodshed. It appeared as a threat to democracy and as inseparable from various "third world" dictatorships. It brought division, separations, conflict, tensions and disintegration; and hence must be curbed as a great menace in an increasingly unifying contemporary world.

The Socialist Universalist and Anti-Nationalist Criticism

There are different manifestations of socialism some of which are connected with nationalism, but the real Marxist-Socialist tradition is anti-nationalist. Marxist socialism pretends to be a universal and sees nationalism as one of the main reasons for the contradictions and dissolution of the Second Socialist International before WWI. "Internationalists" headed by Lenin then

established The Third International. Much later in the practice of totalitarian communism we find nationalist manifestations, but these are really deviations reflecting a waning of Marxist socialism.

Original Marxism followed the Hegelian depreciation of nationalism. Hegel was aware of the emergence of nationalism but he held that this is a substitution of feelings in the place of knowledge, and of particularity in the place of a universality that has no future. The following are the main points of the Marxist rejection of nationalism

(1) The most important reality in this philosophy is the class, not the nation. The class is the main subject of history and the essence of man is first of all his class essence. Hence, in order to explain human life we need first of all the notion of class, with which we can explain all other notions and realities. National issues play only a secondary role and are subordinated to class problems.

(2) Nation and nationalism are products of the bourgeois age and are therefore a bourgeois phenomenon: "The Proletariat has no fatherland". The major task of the Socialist movement is to unite all proletarians throughout the world. Nationalism precludes this process and is used by the bourgeois class to divert the working class from its real interests and goals and to introduce a "false consciousness" of some unity between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Hence, socialists must combat any nationalisms.

(3) Marxists share the liberal idea that the movement of human history is toward internationalism, not nationalism. The development of the capitalist mode of production leads the nations toward obsolescence. In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels argue:

In place of the old local and national seclusion of self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible.15

Being remnants of the past, nations and nationalism are destined to pass away.

(4) Marx and Engels tend to neglect the struggle for national liberation because they argue that the highest criteria for the evaluation of social events is the "development of productive forces." That is why they were inclined for instance to justify British colonialism in India as a means for the development of productive forces in this less advanced region. Engels was against the national liberation of Bulgarians from the Ottoman yoke because their independent state would be under the influence of reactionary Russia whereas under Ottoman rule, this region would be under the influence of Britain with its more developed productive forces.

Arguing for the victory of a future non-class society all over the world, Marx sees no place for nations and ethnic groups. This became a problem for Lenin and Stalin when they decided to build "Socialism into one state."

The Modern Critique of Nationalism

In sum, during the last two centuries nationalism has in fact continually contradicted the liberal and Marxist expectation of its demise. Because these expectations have not come true, liberal and

socialist politicians have been compelled either to reject or to find ways to accommodate nationalism.

The spirit of modernity is pervaded by this duality of universal and particular, of trans-nationalism and nationalism. It underlies all tragic events of modernity: wars and revolutions, holocausts and genocide. This spirit haunts us today as national conflicts continue to murder people. But it has turned out that the universal projects with their fundamentalist endeavor could also threaten and kill people, for universality and particularity, trans-nationalism and nationalism, have ever been different parts of the human being. Any attempt to divide them or to collapse them is a tragic division of the human being. This is the real history of human beings.

After the Second World War, the emergence of two trans-national ideological, political, cultural, and economic systems—communism and Western democracy—and the aversion to fascist nationalism grounded the belief that nationalism could be forgotten, that the two universal projects of human development embody all reality. This bipolar thinking underpinned the actions of the most important nations and put pressure upon and limited possible nationalist identities.

The pillars of these two increasingly homogeneous worlds were the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. The two worlds were embedded technologically and economically in a high-level of industrialism or "Fordism," with its patterns of standardization, concentration, specialization, synchronization, maximization and centralization.

But concomitant with and behind these two more or less homogeneous worlds there existed a nationalistic "third world." Since the 60s a nationalistic and ethnic revival has become increasingly important all over the world.

Ethnic Nationalism

The crises of industrialism and modernity in the developed western democracies from the 60s onwards and the collapse of the communist world in the late 80s are connected with a new stage of increasing heterogeneity of the world accompanied at the same time by a deepening of trans-nationalism. The world is becoming an increasingly interdependent whole and the word "globalism" is everywhere. National boundaries and regulations tend to be irrelevant or mere hindrances to the proper function of global companies. In many industries, one must play world chess or get out.

National economies rely more upon one another than ever before. The growing techno-economic interdependence among nations and enterprises has implications for government policy and industrial strategy. Old patterns of sovereignty lose their importance. International institutions and bodies as well as the following of some common rules throughout the world grow in momentum. The world is increasingly intertwined economically, politically, ideologically, culturally, technologically and ecologically. Mass media immediately disseminate information for any important event; they direct attention to facts, and people to troubles-in-common, and are paramount for sustaining and deepening trans-national identities—American, European, Asian, etc.

At the same time, we observe the opposite processes of a breaking down of multi-ethnic states with their common identity. Ethnic revivals and new appeals for ethnic self-determination cause in turn the appearance of new states, and are spreading across the world. Trends toward a growing heterogeneity and the needs for local identities become stronger. These processes are especially apparent in Europe in these days. In Eastern Europe, communism is replaced by nationalism; in

Western Europe we see an outburst of popularist right nationalistic parties and movements which have not been so influential since World War II.

This tendency toward ethnic and national identities could become so strong as to change radically the political map and fate of Europe and the world. There are different but concurrent reasons for this tendency whose united effect could break the trans-nationalistic trend. Here we shall direct attention first of all to Europe because of the terrible occurrences there resulting from nationalistic ‘waves’ during our century.

Here we observe a mixture of modernist and post-modernist industrialist and post-industrialist causes of ethnic revival. The face of this revival in Eastern Europe and the third world is ethnic nationalism, while in some of the most developed western states, its face is ethnic pluralism.

Ethnic Nationalism in Eastern Europe

The demise of one of the largest projects rooted in the Enlightenment, the collapse of the ex-communist block claiming to realize Marxist projections, gave birth to opposite, particularistic, nationalistic ideas and practices. The loss of the old ideological identities and meanings of life and the development of severe spiritual and moral crises launched a search for new meanings, for a common principle on which these people can found the building of their new lives and hold their societies together.

These people are much more atomized than the abstract liberal individuals. Liberal individuals have their right of property and some property. They also have the resulting highly developed market with contractual rights, freedoms and obligations. If the liberal individual is an abstract atom, the post-totalitarian individual is a real atom. He has no property, because overwhelmingly property is governmental, that is, he has no real economic foundation or ties. More or less, all the communities and societies in which he has been included have been dissolved or have lost their meaning for him. The totalitarian state and ideology which were the major forces of cohesion have collapsed. This individual with feverish haste looks for meanings and forces to bring him together with the other people. Three main forces are emerging to play this role—nationalism, religion and the illegal corrupted economic activity of a new mafia, taking advantage of the process of the privatization of unprecedented material wealth of the totalitarian state. Among these, nationalism is one of the strongest forces.

In a time of economic and political collapse, millions of people without democratic culture need "an image of the enemy" and scapegoats. Ethnic and national groups living with them become the most convenient such enemy. Up to now, these people have lived with the image of the "enemy from the West," which now disappears and is replaced by a new kind of enemy. Political mobilization of the masses though nationalistic slogans is inevitable as long as the economic foundations for a civil society in Eastern Europe are not established.

An enormous number of people were marginalized there as a result of compulsory industrialization and urbanization. The old agrarian communities were destroyed, but new local communities were not created. Now, these people do not have enough neighboring groups with which to identify themselves and feel alienated. For people of the post-communist mass society with broken selves, the most obvious group to restore their meaning of life has become the ethnic or national group.

As the newly emerging political forces in Eastern Europe have no deep-rooted traditions and adherents, the easiest way to gain supporters is nationalism. The same is true of the ex-communist parties. When all values are demolished, nationalism becomes the most important factor of

political legitimacy. Anti-communist nationalism replaces communism. This is accompanied with a religious rebirth and the use of religion for nationalistic objectives. This is especially so when Christian faces Moslem or the Catholic Church faces the Orthodox Church; this kind of confrontation is especially strong in the Balkans.

A great number of ethnic conflicts are possible because of the availability of national minorities who identify themselves with an adjacent state—Hungarians in Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; Germans, Russians and Ukrainians in Poland; Bulgarians in Romania; Yugoslavs in Greece; Turks in Bulgaria; Rumanians in the Soviet Union; Greeks in Albania; Albanians in Yugoslavia, etc. . . .

In these conditions, there is a resurrection of the Eastern ethnic nationalism at a different level of intensity in the various countries. Admittedly, the Balkans are a region where one of the most extreme displays of this nationalism has taken place in our century: the term "Balkanization" designating a form of severe ethnic division, conflict and tension is no accident. In order to deepen this analysis, I shall here focus upon one concrete case in the Balkans by following the history of the Bulgarian national problem and Bulgarian nationalism.

The Bulgarian National Problem and Bulgarian Nationalism

Bulgarian nationalism is a typical case of Eastern European nationalism. This nationalism presided, or strove to preside, in ferocious rivalry with similar competitors, over a chaotic ethnographic map. The region had many dialects, ambiguous historical or lingo-centric allegiances, and populations which had only just begun to identify with the emergent national high cultures.16 This led in many cases to population exchanges, more or less forcible assimilation, and sometimes even liquidation in order to attain that close relation between state and culture considered to be the essence of nationalism. This was the case in the Balkans and in Bulgaria during the twentieth century. It was indeed a century of war, population exchanges, expulsions, and more or less forced assimilations.

The so-called Bulgarian national problem consists in the endeavor to include in a common territory all congenial ethnographic and ethnic communities. These communities were divided by the Berlin Congress of the great European political powers in 1879. The Balkan politics of Bulgaria from then till 1944 was marked by one goal of ethnic nationalism, namely, to ensure the congruence of the political and the national unit. All the national catastrophes of Bulgaria have been marked by the attempt to resolve this problem.

Bulgarian nationalism has the typical features of Eastern European nationalism, which could be specified by some additional traits:

(1) In Western nationalism, religion is not so important. The division of the nations is not a religious one. On the one hand, the Catholic Church is not a national phenomenon and its administration transcends any one national state. On the other hand, the upsurge of the Western type of nationalism coincides with the criticism of religion and the domination of a secular liberal tradition.

In contrast to Western Europe, Bulgaria is an area of two quite different religions with their related cultures. The Orthodox Church has its own ethnic or national administration inseparable from the national state which it supports and serves. This implies strong nationalistic functions so that in this region the national (or ethnic) consciousness contains in itself a strong religious moment.

During several centuries, Christians and Moslems were in conflict; in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this had important ethnic and national dimensions. The conflict between Christians and Moslems is older than that between Bulgarians and Turks. It was not by chance that during the Russian-Turkish war in 1878-1879 large groups of Bulgarian Moslems with no knowledge of the Turkish language nonetheless joined the Turkish troops.

One's religious identity plays a strong part in the process of ethnic identity. On the one hand, the long existence of different religious communities in the present day territory of Bulgaria is a cause for their tolerant relationships and mutual cultural exchange. On the other hand, the peculiarities of national consciousness and the struggle to unite the Bulgarian ethnic communities in the XIXth and XXth centuries led to situations of conflict. The building of a Bulgarian ethnic and national identity takes place in the context of this fight for national liberation from the Ottoman Empire. Here, the opposition of "us-them" underlying the national self-consciousness of an ethnic or national community is first of all "Bulgarians-Turks": Bulgarian slaves against Turkish master. From early times, the Bulgarian national spirit is identified first of all with the life-and-death struggle waged with the Turks, with the massacre in Batac, with the heroes in Shipka, with the April uprising. Even at present, surveys show that Islamic affiliation is the main feature in the common stereotype of Turks among Bulgarians.

(2) Every attempt to solve the Bulgarian national problem has led to a national catastrophe: the Balkan War in 1912-1913, the First World War, the Second World War, and the change of Turkish names between 1984 an 1989. Repeatedly, Bulgarians were humiliated and lost territory in nationalist uprisings connected with suffering by Bulgaria and Bulgarians. Hence Bulgarians now are perhaps less nationalistic than the populations of the other Balkan states.

(3) While Bulgarian nationalism from the XIXth century was that of a backward, traditional agrarian society, this has not been the case especially after 1956. Since then, the emphasis upon the nation and nationalism in the different countries of the "socialist camp" became increasingly a significant means of attaining unity in society and of legitimizing the political regime. This gave rise at the time to the imposing program designed to celebrate the 1300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state: many ideological campaigns were connected with different events and heroes in the history of Bulgaria. But the campaign was specifically a socialist or totalitarian nationalism.

That totalitarian nationalism had two characteristics: on the one hand, it was a one-sided ideological nationalism viewing the whole history of Bulgaria through an ideological prism. In such a light, "the socialist state" inherits "all progressive things" and is the highest stage of development of the Bulgarian nation. On the other hand, it is a state-managed nationalism. Its roots are not in the civil society, but in the government, party politics and policy. It expresses not just ethnic, but state identity; and in turn not just state, but ideological identity—that of the communist state.

A strong manifestation of this type of totalitarian nationalism in Bulgaria was the so-called "resurgence process," an attempt to rename the population which had a Turkish consciousness and to ban the manifestations of Turkish identity. Because this nationalism was without roots and legitimacy in the civil society, it entailed a formalist, state-managed violence and led to inefficiency for the entire system. This totalitarian nationalism was not backed by the Bulgarian ethnic community and evoked a boomerang effect from the population of Turkish ethnic self-consciousness. In reaction against the violence, the opposition "us-them" was strengthened. In fact, intensive development of ethnic and national identities have always characterized times of

violence. In this case, the names assumed an overriding importance as an indication of ethnic differentiation.

There were two consequences of the "resurgence process": because such a revival process was state-controlled and without roots in civil society, it was not supported by broad circles of the Bulgarian population and its "arguments" aroused mistrust. Stronger support from the Bulgarian population was forthcoming only during the so-called "great exodus" in 1989 when several hundred thousand Turks left Bulgaria. Other mechanisms then put in motion the opposition of the two communities,—a resurgence of the image of the "Turk-enemy," of the "fifth column" of Turkey in Bulgaria, of the danger of the "Cyprus variant" in Bulgaria, of "irresponsibly leaving one's country."

This in turn set in motion the strong mechanism underpinning the Bulgarian national identity. But because this nationalism was totalitarian and ideological, it was founded upon the legitimacy of the "socialist state" and "communist ideology." When that legitimacy broke down, the state-controlled nationalism collapsed immediately. All these events have determined the resolution of ethnic troubles in Bulgaria in the post-totalitarian stage and the appearance of what is now known as "the Bulgarian model" of ethnic co-existence in Eastern Europe.

First, in contrast to the other ex-socialist countries, the non-communist and anti-communist forces in Bulgaria were not nationalistic. Opposing the totalitarian regime, they reacted against its totalitarian nationalism. Hence, the collapse of the totalitarian government was accepted as the collapse of the nationalism.

Second, at first after November 10, 1989 the communist and then the socialist party also took up an anti-nationalistic position. Restoration of the old Turkish names and the legalization of the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms were among the most important of its steps. In spite of this, because the communists when they were in power had sponsored the revival of nationalistic feelings, they still carry the blame of the general population.

Third, the fact that Bulgaria is a small country and has always depended on some "Big Brother" or great state gives rise to an attitude that Bulgarian troubles can be overcome only with foreign help, that is, only if Bulgarians follow "the road to Europe," are not nationalistic and closed, but trans-nationalistic and open to the developed world. Hence, the center of its political life and identity has always been directed abroad. The distal reference group is not the Bulgarian nation, but the European dream or the "image of America." This too suffocates nationalism.

Thus, the transition to democracy in Bulgaria is not linked with severe ethnic clashes as in the other ex-communist countries. But such clashes are not excluded in the future should new causes and factors be set in motion.

In conclusion, the main stages through which Bulgarian nationalism has passed are:

(1) peasant (and craft) nationalism between the XIXth century and the first decades of the XXth century,

(2) monarchic (or right-wing authoritarian) nationalism during the Second World War,

(3) communist internationalism from the end of the Second World War until the 60s,

(4) totalitarian nationalism between the 60s and 1989, and

(5) a Bulgarian post-communist model of ethnic co-existence without blood or strong ethnic clashes or separatist movements since 1989.

Xenophobic Nationalism

The ethnic and nationalist revival in the contemporary world is the result of many causes, and brings with it various trends. In Eastern Europe and the Third World there is a trend of old modernist nationalism, above all of ethnic nationalism. Developed democratic countries, international society and world organizations try without significant success to restrain this nationalism, but it influences some groups even in developed western countries.

But in the most developed Western countries, the emerging post-industrial and post-modern conditions place on the agenda new phenomena concerning ethnicity. The modernist dilemma between state and ethnicity, between the political and ethnic nation, and the principles of state integrity and of ethnic self-determination all assume radically new forms. The duality of the post-modernist (or post-industrialist) world is connected with the manifestations of xenophobic nationalism and ethnic diversity.

In a modernist, "Fordist" industrial world, nationalism manifests itself as political and ethnic. In the post-modernist, "post-Fordist," post-industrial world a new kind of xenophobic nationalism comes to the fore. The old nationalism had been connected with foreign expansion, processes of suppression of the ethnic diversity within the state in order to maintain a united national identity, inferior positions for ethnic minorities, and separatist movements. The new nationalism of the developed countries is connected with processes which increase ethnic diversity and xenophobic rejection of the endeavor of the new foreigners arriving from other countries to become citizens or residents of developed states. The old nationalism did not favor people with a national identity who did not fit the congruent citizenship. The new nationalism does not favor people with citizenship attempting to change their identity. Earlier it was easier to take citizenship by choice and more difficult to take ethnicity by choice. Increasingly it now becomes more difficult to take citizenship than to take ethnicity.

Different factors promote the rise of this nationalism:

(1) *Today's Post-cold War Situation* (in reality, post-Cold War or post-'Third' World War). The history of our century shows that after any world war there occur deep changes in the interrelationships between nationalism and trans-nationalism. Before the First World War the world was more open and internationalist. The period after the war was one of fierce nationalism resulting in the Second World War. The emergence of the two world political and economic systems and the tensions in a bi-polar ideologically divided world suppressed nationalism in these worlds and left it to the young states from the "third world."

During four decades since the Second World War the main identifications connected with distal groups were oriented along the axes "West-East," Capitalism-Socialism," "Free World-Totalitarianism." The West had its horrible enemy and needed unity in order to stand up to it. This fundamental division which had been bringing together the Western countries now has disappeared.

A bipolar world is replaced by a multipolar one in which national or ethnic communities become the main distal groups. This basic identification uniting the people underpins new frictions and tensions between different states and within those states. Hence, the multipolar world is much more complex and shaky than was the bipolar one. In terms of nationalism vs. trans-nationalism, I would arrange the successive shifts and change following each world war in the following order:

a) Before W.W.I— more trans-nationalistic than nationalistic; dominance of great empires with varied ethnic populations (Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman, British); the main international principle is the state, not the nation.

b) After W.W.I— more nationalistic than trans-nationalistic; W. Wilson imposes the principle of self-determination by the nations.

c) After W.W.II— predominantly bipolar trans-nationalism; main principle in the First and Second World Wars is the inviolability of state boarders established after the war.

d) After the "Third World War"— multipolar world; ethnic revival; the old universalistic ideological rivals, liberalism and socialism, lose much of their influence, and undergo deep transformations; the lost universalistic ideological identifications are replaced by rising modern and post-modern nationalism and a search for ethnic diversity; many ex-communists and ex-liberals move to more nationalistic positions.

(2) *New technologies* are spurring a widening gulf between developed and undeveloped countries. The dependence of the developed world upon the raw materials and the energy sources of the underdeveloped world diminishes. In a time of high technologies there is a decrease in the need for cheap and unskilled labor forces from the poor countries. Investments change direction toward the most developed countries, leading to growing backwardness in many countries. Their development and survival depend increasingly, not on their own economic development, but on the aid and charity of the developed Western world.

But now the collapsed communist region wants to share in this charity as well. What would happen if China finds itself in the current destitution of the ex-Soviet Union or Yugoslavia and needs humanitarian and other aid? The Western world could not bear so heavy a burden of charity and the would-be tendencies of disintegration, conflicts and civil wars could become very dangerous and destructive for the whole world. In a time of destitution, nationalism is the secure refuge for millions of people.

(3) *Demographic pressures* on the developed world from the ‘outside’ are growing. Poor Eastern Europe and Third World countries become more and more the point of origin of millions of asylum seekers in Western Europe, America and Canada. In the beginning of the first millennium, the great migration of peoples from Asia to Europe changed the history of that continent and led to the fall of the Roman Empire under barbarian attacks. We are witnessing now great new migrations from the poor to the rich countries on the planet, thereby stimulating a renewed nationalism. Alarm over the influx of impoverished foreigners along with distrust of mainstream politicians is propelling a rapid ascent of extreme rightist nationalistic political parties across Western Europe. In some countries, the xenophobic feelings become overriding among the majority of the population. A poll in Germany in 1992 found large and rising anti-foreigner sentiments, including statements that foreigners "abuse our social system" (77 percent of Germans surveyed agreed), "heighten Germans’ housing shortage" (74 percent), "increase unemployment among Germans" (60 percent), and "pose a danger on the streets" (59 percent). This is connected with a decline in the belief in democracy. Another survey found a sharp increase in the number of Germans who say they have grown sceptical of the country’s democratic system. Fifty-two percent of Eastern Germans and thirty-five percent of Westerners consulted said they were dissatisfied with the current political system, up from 42% in the East and 22 percent in the West a year ago.17

So the end of the cold war and the fall of the iron curtain has been followed by the construction of human curtains by the wealthy states to stop the increasing influx of asylum-seekers and destitute people from other parts of the world. It is difficult to forecast the results of such policies. Two thousand years ago the ancient Roman Empire failed to stop the influx of barbarians from Asia and fell apart. A similar destiny can be averted now only if conditions are secured for people

to live decently in their own countries. Otherwise, the growing influx of people to the wealthy countries will give rise to xenophobic nationalism and increasingly severe measures against immigration. These measures and nationalism are now under way in many countries. The wealthy states close their doors to new citizens from outside. They are reluctant to accept, not only economic, but even political immigrants and refugees from the civil wars in the Balkans, Somalia, etc. The right of citizenship increasingly turns into a right received by birth, while ethnic affiliations become increasingly connected with personal choice and behavior. Entitlement of citizenship by birth and entitlement of ethnicity by choice loom as the tendency of the future.

We find here a shift to a new type of division between universal and particular in the contemporary world. On the one hand, the economy and communications are, global. Many global predicaments take on increasing importance. The possibilities for the movement of people, information, goods, technologies across national borders and the notion of the national state comes to appear increasingly obsolete in a trans-national world.

On the other hand, as never before the world is unequal and this inequality is growing. The enormous distance between the poorest and starving countries and the wealthy West is engendering as never before the zeal of millions of people to change their citizenship. The result could be a growing xenophobic nationalism and the building of a "citizenship curtain." Toward this there is need for a decisive response to this predicament in the form of a new world order overcoming the gulf between the rich West and those starving in the destitute "other world."

The danger is that the xenophobic nationalism could be mixed with modern ethnic nationalism reviving in Easter Europe and other parts of the world with a domino effect. National and ethnic identities are inseparable from the opposition "us-them," from comparisons of "my group" with somebody else's. Ethnic consciousness has a relational character so that the growing significance of ethnicity and nationalism in one group or nation gives rise to an ethnic revival of the neighboring groups and nations. The explosion of nationalism in Eastern Europe affects Western Europe and promotes am enhancement of nationalism across the continent and other parts of the world.

It is important to point out that all these factors and currents are evolving with increasing force. There are not enough democratic responses to these new contradictions: the condition of Northern Ireland defeats every liberal device. As a severe economic crisis in the Western world would aggravate these processes, nationalism in our 'high-tech' epoch is much more dangerous than it was, e.g., after W.W.I. This gives great importance to the following possible alternative for the development of the contemporary world**.**

Ethnic Diversity and the New Globalism

In line with xenophobic nationalism, the other "face" of the post-industrial world is ethnic diversity. Industrial mass society and urbanization tended to diminish and erase ethnic distinctions and create common mass culture. That is reflected also on the level of governmental policies to establish national identities, especially in multi-ethnic states. For the last twenty years in the developed world, contrary processes of ethnic revival and ethnic diversity are now under way. If the objective processes of the industrial societies and the governmental policies were directed to subordinate, to reshape ethnicity into national identity and either to unite ethnicity with the state or to erase it, the objective processes and governmental policies of the post-industrial societies are intended to cut the close bonds between ethnicity and nationality, and to concede and promote ethnic diversity and ethnic pluralism within the national state.

Different causes and reasons promote these processes:

(1) The post-industrial and "post-Fordist" technologies provoke not only trans-nationalism, but also particularity across the world. The industrial world is the place of great industries with hundreds of thousands of workers and large administrative hierarchies. As these hierarchies do not fit into the world of high technologies, we observe the old centralized hierarchies vanishing in such varied fields as economy, political structures and management. They are substituted by a more horizontal structure with greater autonomy of the constituent units. This phenomenon is connected with a rising pluralism in all areas, with a growing value for the diversity of goods, styles, cultures, etc.

In different organizations, emphasis upon coordination replaces that formerly put upon subordination. The disappearance of the old concentration of the traditional industrial manufacturing with its centralized management yields many more "flat" managerial structures in the economy. This flatness levels out all other relations. The managerial patterns of the new corporation provide footholds for decentralized power relationships. There is much more place for diversity in this more "horizontal," versatile and pluralistic world.

(2) There is a shift from the great narratives and the old unificatory ideologies of the Enlightenment to more particularistic culturally rooted values, patterns and models of social explanation.

(3) The shift in the values in the developed countries and the increasing significance of post-materialist values promote the growing role of various kinds of ethnic values and national traditions. The economy becomes more symbolic and leads to activist nationalism and ethnicism, not merely in remote places like Armenia and Azerbaijan, Albania and Serbia, but in New York and Nagoya, Liverpool and Lyon.

Under the impact of the new system of production, resistance to the melting pot is rising everywhere. Racial, ethnic, and religious groups demand the right to be and to remain proudly different. Where assimilation was the ideal of industrial society, corresponding to its need for a homogeneous work force, diversity is the new ideal corresponding to the heterogeneity of the new system of ‘wealth-creation’. The ideal of homogeneity (in Japan, for example) or of the melting pot (in the United States) is being replaced by that of "the salad bowl" in which different ingredients keep their identity.18

(4) The changing social structures of developed societies also boost new kinds of distinctions. The demise of the old industries of the industrial world means a decline also of the old class divisions as the main divisions of the modern societies. The situation prompts decline of the old class parties and the growth of new social movements and new differentiation of gender, age, education, etc. The politicians look for support not to traditional parties but to different feminist movements, gay groups, racial or ethnic groups which become the more important identities. The shift to democratization in the world is also an important factor for the re-mapping of social distinctions.

Ethnicity turns out to be one of the most important distinctions because it provides people with a set of roots, of deep past and of affective ties. These feelings and connections cannot be

derived from the liberal state, which by definition is an artificial body of abstract individuals united through a rational covenant. Where there is human need for affective and deeper roots in some community, the abstract individual becomes only an alienated individual in need of identity.

Stages in the Emergence of the New Ethnicity

The rise of the new ethnicity in the developed societies reflects not just the desire of the individual for strong attachments to some group, but is connected with the development of the context, role and place of ethnicity in the society.

We found one type of ethnicity in pre-modern times in traditional societies. This was an ethnicity of different cultures with a higher degree of autonomy; it was a total ethnicity which included all activities and was created by all activities: the individual was submerged entirely in his ethnic culture and in most cases did not belong to different cultures. Ethnic culture was not just one of the different types of culture; it included the entire life activity of an individual. Ethnic community was the place where most of his life took place, and all individual activity was a reproduction and development of ethnic culture.

Until the birth of Christianity, even religion was totally within a particular ethnic culture. In Christianity, for the first time, a religion appeared as the culture for all people, not for just one ethnic community. But in general ethnicity and ethnic groups were strongly connected with some territory reflected in all their products. For lack of writing or because only a small number of people could read and write, the main mode of development and transmission of an ethnic culture from generation to generation was oral. As this is almost entirely connected with tradition and the past, ethnic cultures played a relatively passive role in innovation because the shifts in cultures were too slow.

We find another type of ethnicity in the modern world. To ethnic culture and identity has been added an additional political element, through which they are transformed into a national culture. Thus the national identity of people who fight to live in a state other than their own implies growing conflicts between ethnic groups and states. Of 164 violent disturbances which occurred between 1958 and 1966 in the world, 149 resulted from conflicts between ethnic loyalties and the desires and demands of the state.19 The development of mass communications, mass culture, mass production, mass consumption and mass society tends to do away with ethnic differences within the national state. The attitude that ethnicity is a residue from the past and will remain there is prevalent in some circles. Ethnic cultures appear to concern the old crafts, oral tradition and the creation of songs, tales, myth, etc., that is, to be folklore cultures which can survive only in museums. Ethnic groups and ethnicity lose their value as reference groups and identities, which now are largely by nation and national identity.

We find also new dimensions in the ethnicity of a post-industrial and post-modern world. Its strongest and most typical manifestations can be found in the U.S.A. since the 1960s. It turns out that the melting pot of Americanization and homogenization has its limitations; side by side with a common American identity different ethnic identities retain their existence. National identity does not replace ethnic identity; the two can coexist.

It is noteworthy that until the 60s, the more commonly employed term concerning one’s individual descent in the USA was "nationality." In the U.S.A. people were said to have different "national," not different "ethnic" origins. "Nationality" had more political connotations; it is "ethnicity" only with reference to some state. But during more recent decades this pattern of thinking has been overturned. The turning point would seem to have been in the 1960s and 70s.

At first the most common term in political and social discourse was "civil rights." For despite all the years of the melting pot approach, black Americans had been left aside as a disadvantaged minority. This discourse of "civil rights" was the old political discourse about classical political predicaments: the relationship between majority and minorities and the equality of individuals in their rights. As new pride in ethnic identity rose, the tensions between blacks and whites began to shrink, and "diversity" became the catchword of discourse in the 80s and 90s. The major connotations in this discourse imply: a) not relationships between majority and minorities, but a situation in which in some sense all are minorities; b) if the struggle for civil rights referred to something common for all people (their rights), if it was a struggle against any distinction and discrimination, now the struggle has become to preserve some differences; c) the distinctions, however, are not political but cultural: if political distinctions have depreciated, cultural distinctions are now appreciated.

The Nature of the New Ethnicity

This is the context of the spread of a new ethnicity with the following characteristics:

(1) In modern societies it was not ethnicity, but nationality which had the highest value. The reference group was the nation rather than the ethnic group, which too often hinted at something backward and was poorly valued. Now the situation has changed: and the ethnic group once again has become the important referent group and ethnicity has a higher value.

(2) But this is neither the "total ethnicity" of the pre-modern societies nor "the total nationality" of the modern nationalistic nation. Rather, this ethnicity is partial because it does not embrace all the individual's life, but is one of its social spaces and manifestations. This is ethnicity in a global society with intensive communications. Much of the activities of the individual, especially his work, could be outside his ethnic group and reflect general rather than ethnic conditions. Accordingly, the ethnic identity does not include in itself all of an individual's identity, but is connected first of all within one's private life and one's activity in the civil society.

(3) At a more superficial level this is ethnicity, not of isolated, but of interrelated cultures. People have their own ethnic identity and culture but are continuously in contact with other ethnic cultures. Moreover, not merely are they in contact, they consume different ethnic cultures. One lives not in his ethnic world, but in a world market of ethnic diversity. This means that ethnicity is marketized or supplied as a commodity and can be consumed as a commodity. Different cuisines, dresses and wares with ethnic signs of different cultures are sold. The ethnic past and its symbols become tourist landmarks. One could leave one's ethnic culture and spend one's vacation in some other exotic ethnic milieu. Thus, ethnicity becomes like a dress which can be put on and taken off, used for different goals, to be chosen or discarded.

(4) Most often, however, people have deeper emotional identifications with one culture and use other cultures superficially as ways of entertainment. Accordingly, at a deeper level ethnicity plays the role of the "place" of deep emotional affection that is much more difficult to receive than the identification with the contemporary liberal state and its calls for patriotism. It is also a way to use the past retrospectively, a way to find some stability and insurability in an increasingly changing world. In this is the world of "future shock," of dissolving family ties, of permanent changes of professions, places of residence, things, and attachments, people find in ethnicity the kind of stable attachment that links them affectively with many people in society today and in the past. Often, too, the ethnic group serves as a support group. This is especially true for new migrants

who look to people with the same origin. The ethnic group is the best way to enter, adapt and accommodate themselves in the new society.

(5) The shift to diversity in general and to ethnic diversity in particular changes fundamental notions which had prevailed in the modern liberal theory of democracy. According to those fundamental notions, it was not necessary that all the representatives in different political bodies be of the same origin and personal characteristics as the people whose interests they represented. Their relations were contractual: one was chosen to represent people, not because one carried in one's own nature or essence their demands, interests and predicaments, but for one's readiness to carry out an obligation or public duty. This understanding was part of the liberal individualistic tradition. The new ethnicity, however, brings with it a much more communitarian view about the nature of representation. According to this view, the main abilities and virtues of a good representative are had through belonging to the group or being from the same community. He or she is not an abstract individual or incumbent distinct from his or her obligations as representative, but a concrete individual from the same group, the same community, bearing the main characteristics of that community. He not just represents this community, he is from this community. Accordingly, it is understandable that black people tend to prefer black representatives, the Spanish speaking communities prefer representatives from their milieu, women their own representatives, etc. A very important trend is to elect not just party candidates for different positions, but people from the various communities of a diverse society.

This is true not just for legislative bodies, but for all governmental positions and public bodies. In this regard, the shift in police is noteworthy, namely, in many places there is a desire to recruit policemen according to the composition of the local population.20 Ethnicity brings with itself new communitarian thinking, new normative theory.

Outline of a Normative Approach to Ethnicity

A normative approach to ethnicity must answer not only what people do as regards their ethnicity, but also what they should do. These two aspects are interrelated because it is impossible to search for normative decisions without answers referring to the behavior of real people and to their values. Is it not strange that though there is widespread reaction against nationalism as a "scourge of out time" and against ethnicity as a remnant from the past," there is no consistent normative theory or approach to these phenomena, which have been disregarded by all major normative theories of modernity. Despite the many efforts by states, governments, international organizations, and public authorities, in our time elaborate charts of collective rights of minorities and ethnic groups, all have proved unsatisfactory.

Ethnicity and the Normative

At the same time, it turns out that ethnic identity and nationalism are connected with values which strongly influence people in our time, and with their greatest sacrifice and attachment. Family, kindred, ethnic group, and nation are bound by primary ties and people accept these attachments not just as social roles, but as their own essence. This resurgence of concern shows that ethnicity is not only a residue of the past, but that it can serve in the contemporary context, that it can be edited or adapted to present a new or better image and satisfy new needs, and that it can be included in new sets of values.

Ethnicity and nation are in some sense grounds for the whole value system of individuals and societies, but they are not well investigated. I will lay down only some elements of an agenda for further specific investigation:

- Difference of values between cultures and the universality of values: the role of ethnic values and especially of work ethics for the success or failure of ethnic groups and nations.
- The relationship between "us" and "them," between ethnic groups as boundaries of responsible moral action.
- The morality of relationships between ethnic groups and nations:
- dilemmas of loyalty to ethnic groups and other obligations;
- nationalism as value and normative system;
- criteria for choice between the principle of ethnic self-determination and the sovereignty of the state.

In the diversity of the contemporary world we confront quite different stages of development and a wide variety in the manifestations of ethnicity in the developed and underdeveloped world, in the U.S.A. and in the ex-Soviet Union. Hence, the related investigations become extremely difficult because it can be expected that different models of nationalism and ethnicity require different normative approaches.

The value-normative system of any ethnic group is one of the most important dimensions of its ethnic culture. An ethnic culture exists first of all as a set of values and norms whose core is the sharing of moral values which distinguish this culture from others. It is impossible to understand and to dialogue with other cultures without understanding these values and norms.

All modern and pre-modern history gives evidence that the moral force and the moral relations between different ethnic groups are unequal. There are different sets of standards within and between groups. Given the different economic, political, and military power of the different groups, they are usually in some subordinate ranking: some being accepted as higher, others as inferior. This is a source of tensions and clashes.

In fact, the main pre-modern normative theories were theories of ethnic communitarianism, because in those societies, the ethnic communities were total and comprehensive. When Aristotle spoke about human nature as social and about humans as political beings, he had in mind ethnic communities. In the Ancient Greek city-state these communities were made up of people with the same origin. Accordingly, Aristotle's 'virtue' is applicable to the ethnic communities and in order to be part of the community a citizen had to be educated in qualities which were manifestations of a community and thereby of human nature. It is quite true that this ethic was only for adult free males, not for females and slaves, but nonetheless it can be considered as the normative theory of an ethnic community.

Modernity vs. Normative Ethnicity

The main theories of modernity rejected this approach and the possible normative theory of ethnic group or ethnicity.

1. This is true especially of the different versions of liberal thinking, and first of all of the two main pillars of normative liberal thinking,—utilitarianism and Kantianism. Despite their opposition, they relied on two common premises—individualism (rejection of the social,

collective, communitarian nature of the individual) and rationalism (that real moral thought is rational thought and calculation). There was no place for the normative approach of ethnicity in this context, because ethnicity means some understanding of the collective ethnic nature of the human being and corresponding affective attachments.

Whereas it has been the practice of the liberal national state to enjoin loyalty, patriotism and even sacrifice, meaning in some cases the sacrifice of self-interest, this was finally irrational for there was not much basis for founding such behavior in the main liberal theories which lack a developed normative theory.

2. This was the case as well with socialist normative thinking. Socialism was connected with a communitarian understanding of human nature, but this was understood first of all in terms of class nature. Through the entire Marxist tradition there runs a propensity to reduce nation and ethnic normative issues to the class status of the individual. Any nationalism was considered bourgeois. While it was recognized that at the onset of the bourgeois age nationalism played a progressive role, especially in the form of national liberation movements against colonial and oppressive states, after the development of the workers' movement internationalism became the more important. Accordingly, it was suggested that nationalistic conflicts between socialist states are impossible and when they did occur in the 1960s and 70s there was no basis for an explanation of these events.

3. There is also, however, a third normative tradition which attempts to put the normative theory of nation at the center of its claims. This tradition is made up of quite miscellaneous currents and too often the negative attitude toward one current is transmitted to others. What is common for all of them, however, is that they bring to the fore not just the ethnic group, but first of all the nation. The following are three main currents of this tradition:

a) National movements, especially movements for national liberation whose main normative thinking could be summarized as follows:

— nationality (affiliation to some nation) is the main characteristic of the person.

— Integrating one's ethnic (national) group in a state with another dominant ethnic group entails the oppression of the most important characteristics of the human being.

Accordingly, the struggle for national liberation is the highest moral principle and sacrifice for the nation is a most important moral rule. "Motherland or death" is most often the slogan of these national movements.

b) Authoritarian and totalitarian nationalism is aggressive normative thinking characteristic of non-democratic states which usually develops with a view to annexing some territory. The national identification is considered a higher form of identity underlying the most important moral obligations and virtues and overriding all others. This kind of normative thinking is specific to Eastern nationalism and its salient form was German National-Socialism. Here the normative roots of nationalism are founded biologically in some race and the idea of the inequality, and hence superiority, of some nations.

c) Conservatism is so wide and obscure a tendency and has so many forms that there seems to be nothing in common between them and even National Socialism could be considered as a

rightist totalitarian form of conservatism. The more normative basis of conservatism is the fact that there are communities or groups which are very important, but whose importance could not be explained in the context of the main theories of the Enlightenment. These include family, friendship, neighborhoods, and ethnic and national groups. They require values and identities that are residual or marginal for the normative theories of the Enlightenment, which therefore are unable to elucidate such values. Conservatism's types of identity appear as natural and require that individuals be defined within a framework of relations which are not external, but internal to their essence. Normative requirements are the result of the specific nature of the individual, such as being a mother and a Bulgarian. This kind of thinking is communitarian and rests on some type of 'virtue-ethics'.

Normative Grounds for a Contemporary Ethnicity

What then are the man guidelines for the development of a normative ground for contemporary ethnicity? The afore-mentioned features of the new ethnicity suggest a theory different from those existing thus far:

a) Different from the liberal and socialist projects because it must emphasize the significance of ethnic identity and nature of the individual, which implies some version of virtue ethics.

b) Different from the nationalistic and conservative views because the focus will be, not the nation, but the ethnic group. However, not only the ethnic group is considered the entity which carries and transmits the essence and obligations of the individual. Thus, the following underlying principles of such a normative theory come to fore:

(1) The value of ethnic diversity implies rules for its preservation and the equality of the different ethnic groups. This is the ground for the development of a theory of ethnicity and ethnic groups and for the maintenance of those major rights of ethnic groups which underlie international relations and state constitutions. If after W.W.I, the principle of self-determination of nations was considered most important, and after W.W.II the principle of state integrity and inviolability of state borders was considered most important, now after the Cold War (W.W.III) the main principle must be support for ethnic diversity, equality and rights. This principle has to override the other two under the conditions of the observance of all the rules of democracy. This is the moral basis as well of communication between miscellaneous cultures and their inculturation.

(2) As one of the most important characteristics of human nature, ethnicity implies some virtue ethics concerning relationships between the individual and ethnic group. This virtue ethics sustains group loyalty and hence group existence. It implies also the possibility of a non-liberal theory of democracy in which political representation is not a question merely of contractual obligation between representative and constituency, but also of virtue which results from the common identity of the representative and represented group.

(3) As ethnicity and ethnic group are not the only dimensions of the individual, we must keep in mind all the other social roles and identities. Thus while one's identity is explained by virtue ethics, it is possible that his obligations concerning his social roles should be explained by some contractual rules and liberal normative theory. In this way, a normative theory of ethnicity becomes a synthesis and development of some ideas from the existing normative theories, while being neither merely liberal and socialist nor merely nationalist and conservative. It can integrate and

surpass all of them by taking into consideration the new realities of ethnicity and personhood at this end of the XXth century and beginning of the XXIst.

Notes

1Wsevolod Isajiw, "Definitions of Ethnicity, *Ethnicity*, 1 (1979), 111-124.

2 See Anya Peterson Royce, *Ethnic Identity: Strategies of Diversity* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982), pp.24-27.

3 "Ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which comprehensive social systems are built. Interaction in such social systems does not lead to the liquidation of ethnic distinctions through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence. See Frederick Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p.10.

4 Edward Spicer, "Persistent Identity Systems", *Science*, 4011 (1971) 797-799.

5 See Spicer, o*p. cit.*, and Royce, *op. cit*., pp.44-49.

6 See Royce, o*p. cit.*, pp.163-168.

7 Marc Fisher, "Germany's Gypsy Question," *The Washington Post*, November 1 (1992), F6.

8 Max Weber, "On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Race," in *Race, Ethnicity and Social Change*, John Stone, ed. (North Scituate, MA: Dukbury Press, 1977), p.21.

9 Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Backgrounds*, (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p.331.

10 Hans Kohn, *op. cit*., p. 4.

11 It is not by chance that the Soviet Union was termed "the last Empire." It was connected with a principle characteristic of the Empires—the attempt to create a united, trans-ethnic, homogeneous world based first of all on political force and common ideology and not upon developed economic unity. In fact, the economic lines were based on political and ideological grounds. Accordingly, the political collapse resulted immediately in economic collapse.

12 Karl Deutsin and W.Y. Flotz, eds., *Nation Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1983), p. 6.

13 John Stuart Mill, *Considerations in Representative Government* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), pp 230, 232-233.

14 Orlando Patterson, "Ethnicity and the Pluralist Fallacy," *Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning*; #7 (1975), p. 10.

15 Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol.6 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), p. 488.

16 See: John Pramenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea,* ed. E Kamelika (London: Edward Aruolok, 1973) pp 22-37; E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp 99-101.

17 "Kohl Says Reunification Requires a Tax Increase," *The Washington Post* (Oct. 27, 1992).

18 A. Toffler, *Powershift* (New York et al.: Bantam Books, 1990), pp. 249-250.

19 Abdul Daid and Luiz R. Simmons, "The Ethnic Factor in World Politics," *Society* 12 (1975), 65-74.

20 Even the beleaguered Los Angeles Police Department recruits the same percentage of blacks as the percentage of blacks in the general population there. R.W. Kelly, a police official who in New York City in 1992 launched an aggressive campaign to recruit black, Hispanic and Asian officers, said: "It just makes common sense for a department to mirror as closely as possible

the community it serves." See Laurie Goodstain, "New York Police Fail to Reflect City's Diversity," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 22, 1992, A3.

Chapter IV

The Hermeneutics of Signs and the Quest of Otherness in Latin America

Jorge Echavarria

"What is now proved was once only imagin'd."
—William Blake, "Proverbs of Hell"

After five hundred years of 'Western' history, Latin American cultures have been raising basic questions regarding their "identity." This is an attempt to understand their present role by assuming their cultural tradition. In fact, this is not a new issue, but it now seems quite urgent in the context of a changing and challenging world. My paper will examine what is behind this intellectual and cultural search and point to some critical conceptions of cultural identity. It will suggest the use of an integrative theoretical framework drawing upon diverse sources and disciplinary fields and concentrating upon a more open approach, in a way similar to that of Michel Serres, the French philosopher who explores the role of rationality in informational interchanges, as summarized by Harary and Bell (*Serres*, 1982):

From this point of view, philosophical truth consists in seeing that the universality of a model is not probable. What is evident, is the cohabitation of different systems of thought (hence of multiple models and truths), which form any number of unique discourses, each justified by a set of chosen coordinates and by underlying presuppositions. Rigor and coherence are regional. Thus, universality and the global can only be conceived in a model that recognizes the predominance of regionality and the local. (p. xiv).

In looking at modern Latin American cities and urban cultures, Néstor García Canclini echoed Serres' project:

Social sciences contribute with their different observational perspectives to the difficulties of looking (at urban cultures). Anthropologists came into the city by foot, sociologists drove in on the highway and communication experts arrived by plane. Each one of them registered what they are able to do, and then built a different and partial vision. There is a fourth perspective, that of the historian which cannot be obtained coming into the city, but upon leaving it, moving from its historical center toward its contemporary borders. But the contemporary city center is not yet in the past (1989, p. 16).

This approach may very well move the traditional tensions between disciplinary fields into a dialogical relationship, close to the vitality of cultures themselves.

From Identity to Otherness

T. Todorov and the Emergence of a Semiotic of Otherness

The range of questions apropos of Latin American identity is overwhelming not only in terms of authors, but in terms of vastness of time-frame. Beginning from the very pages of Columbus' journal it is possible to trace the confrontation between the Western Christian self-conception and the emergence of other beings at the edge of its definition of mankind. The Admiral could only compare the natives in order to represent them: "They are of the color of the Canary Islanders, neither black nor white" (11/10/1492). "They are whiter than those of other islands. Among others, he had seen two wenches as white as they might be in Spain" (13/12/1492). But, in spite of this chromatic variation, "They all go naked, men and women, as the day they were born" (6/11/1492). This last fact, nakedness, as Todorov (1984) remarks, symbolizes not another culture but the lack of culture as established in the Biblical tradition: insofar as they do not wear cloths they are savages.

This first recorded Western vision of native American cultures brings us to our first theoretic point of reference, the seminal work of Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America* (1984), which directs our attention to the relationship between the topics of otherness (the conception of alterity) and of semiotic behavior (both in the reception and production of symbols) which takes place in facing otherness. Taking Todorov's view as point of departure, we can build a bipolar scale which gives an account of the encounter and of the different positions which cultures could assume in this event. At one extreme similarity prevails: the other culture is regarded as one's equal and hence as like oneself, as Las Casas regarded the Indians. In this case, the other's identity is denied, either at the level of existence or at that of cultural practices. Here subjection and assimilation of the Indians both reflect the same consideration, that of the Other-as-object (as in Columbus' first descriptions of the landscape and resources of the islands). Progressively, Todorov's analysis moves through chance and unconscious forms of cultural dialogue (as in Bernardino de Sahagún and Diego Duran). Finally, the analysis comes to the other-as-subject, which is 'alike but unlike me', thereby rendering each of us exterior and capable of dialogue. This is the opposite pole, that of otherness, and, as Todorov points out, there is "an infinity of intermediary nuances" between these two extremes.

Thus, the possibility of the emergence of otherness is founded not in radical otherness which could guide cultures to indifference or to irrational panic, but in a shared field where similarity and dissimilarity begin to dialogue: "We can live our lives without ever achieving full discovery of the other—supposing that such discovery is possible. Each of us, in turn, begins the process over again, for the previous experiments do not relieve us of our proper responsibility, though they can teach us the effects of misreading the facts. Yet even if the discovery of the other must be assumed by each individual and eternally recommenced, it also has a history and forms that are socially and culturally determined" (Todorov, 1984, p. 247). These cultural and social determinations can be at three levels according to their historical emergence: (1) an axiological or valuational level according to whether the other is my equal, my superior or my inferior; (2) a praxeological level distancing or approaching the other, going from submission to the other to the other's submission or fall into an undifferentiated neutrality; (3) an epistemic level with "endless gradation between the lower and highest states of knowledge" (Todorov, 1984, p. 185) regarding the other's identity. Here we can realize the paradoxes of the destruction of pre-Colombian empires by the Spaniards: Cortez's letters show that they *did* understand Montezuma's culture, and that thanks to this understanding they destroyed it.

As Todorov goes on to say, there exist relations and affinities between these levels, "but no rigorous implication; hence, we cannot reduce them to one another nor anticipate one starting from the other" (Todorov, 1984, p. 185). This is important because Western civilization tends to

assimilate sympathy with knowledge, resulting most of the time in reduction to a single (Western) value and the imposition of a single way of life which obliterates the strangeness by placing it at one of the infinite possible positions along the scale between the two poles.

Besides these reflections on the conception of the other, Todorov also points to the interlinked hermeneutical and semiotic behavior. On the one hand, there is the emphasis placed by native Americans upon language in the sense of pre-established and fixed meaning. This derives from the ritual hierarchical social order which has no place for indetermination and where language concerns the exercise of power and communication with the world. Stars and planets tell them how to behave and what to do about the already known future. Their world was full of miracles and prophecies which tied their social and cultural actions to a highly deterministic semiotic device. On the other hand, there is the European's conception which regards human communication and language as equivocal instruments which "serve as well for integration within community as for the manipulation of the other" (Todorov, 1984, p. 123). In fact, the character of the Spanish language is such that it can be translated into political action quite close to Machiavelli's, setting the Spaniards free to act according to the exigencies of the circumstances. Both models of hermeneutical behavior render dialogue impossible and enable us to understand why otherness, in whatever sense, could not come into being.

In order to give an appropriate place to Todorov's dialogic recognition of otherness, it is necessary to look at the turn taken by philosophy and philosophy of language. Since Aristotle, the Western philosophical tradition has located the Logos that enhances human language exclusively in the expositive or representative function of propositional statements. The communicative or pragmatic (according to Charles Morris) aspect of the use of language has been considered as non-relevant for the truth, meaning, and intersubjective value of conventional language signs. Attention to self-consciousness gives birth to a philosophy of the subject which could assume two attitudes toward the world: objectivism in terms of knowledge, and mastery in terms of action. Both of these functions define the subject. Habermas in his universal pragmatic and Apel in his transcendental semeiotics (for a discussion of this see De Zan, 1990) had provided the point of departure for a new paradigm opposite the philosophy of the subject: namely the intersubjective model or 'language and communication' approach. In this model, the subject constitutes and defines himself as self-consciousness, not through objectification or action upon or over the world, but in inter-subjective relationships through the communicative use of language. It is dialogic communication and communicative interaction that enables interlocutors to recognize and constitute themselves as subjects. It is inside this communicative community that subjects could reach inter-subjective understanding in relation to things. Through recognizing this they constitute the valid world of meaning and give the social world and its institutions their sense of community or sharing.

Gadamer and Hermeneutic Experience

Apparently, this emphasis upon communication could deflect us from the hermeneutical concern, but as a succinct presentation of Gadamer's work will show, this seems not to be the case. My goal here is to offer a hermeneutical background as related to the conception of otherness. I shall avoid discussing the relation between the theories of Gadamer and Habermas (or Apel) both because of its complexity and because there are recent studies on this topic (see, for example, Silverman, ed., 1991).

Among the forms of knowledge in ancient Greece (namely, *epistéme, techné, phronesis, sophia*, and *nous*), Gadamer emphasizes *phronesis* as the paradigm of hermeneutic understanding:

the non-methodological application of general principles to particular situations in order to remain open to the contingencies of experience. In this way, *phronesis* as practical judgment contrasts to a teleological use of knowledge or productive reason (*techné* in this case). As Aylesworth points out (in Silverman, 1991, p. 72): "Through *phronesis* the self is constituted in its moral character (*ethos*). As the practice of moral reason, *phronesis* involves an other or others with whom I interact, and whose claims upon me cannot be codified into a set of rules or laws. On the contrary, moral judgment is specific to each situation and its application cannot be guided by any scheme or concept (. . .)." This transactional character of *phronesis*, as well as its non-teleological orientation, explain the dialogical model of interpretation in Gadamer' interpretative model. *Phronesis* remains open to the contingencies of life experience.

He characterizes three types of "hermeneutic experience" in terms of three types of relation between the I and the Thou (which, for our purposes, is the relation between the I and the other). This typology strongly resembles Todorov's scale between the same polarity, as exposed above, but Gadamer's model intends the Thou (other) in the sense of tradition, that is, the other as the experience of historicity. The one who has the first type of experience looks at the other (Thou) as an object, and identifies tradition as inherent to "human nature." On the second level, the Thou is acknowledged as a person, but the understanding of the latter is still self-related: imitation, parody or reflection of the other discourse could range from a minimum tension (identification) to a maximum (destructive parody). The third and highest type of experience is openness to the Thou, a commitment to experience the Thou truly as Thou in a conversational mode. Nevertheless, both models would allow one to go from looking at the other as an object (excluding all subjective elements), to an openness to the Thou. They make possible a commitment to experience the other truly as other, "i.e., not to overlook his claim, but to listen to what he has to say to us" (Bialostosky, 1989, p. 116). And although this field is open for discussion, in both authors the dialogical processes are models in terms of a philosophy of intersubjectivity.

Note that hermeneutical understanding is always self-understanding, which implies that subjective identity is to be sought in the intersubjective use of language. "Strictly speaking, then, the moral self has no individual identity. It is an habituated openness that is always in transition" (Aylesworth, in Silverman, 1991, p. 72). Thus Gadamer's hermeneutics develops a dialogical model of interpretation and understanding, conditioned by the affections, practices and conceptual frameworks of a cultural heritage. What is of interest here is that a major aspect of hermeneutical understanding consists directly in cultural interpretation and its relationship to the construction of identity. At the very minimum, this hermeneutic assertion forces a reconsideration of the way identity is negotiated by each generation on an historical basis and by each ethnicity on a territorial basis.

Levinas: Otherness and Complementarity

As Emmanuel Levinas has been considered the philosopher of otherness, here his work must be considered foundational. To review Levinas's doctrine of otherness in detail is beyond present capacities and purposes. But it is important to note some topics that help to deal with the interdisciplinary network needed in order to integrate the process of recognizing otherness into an experience of dialogue. The relationship with otherness which conditions the very possibility of representation and truth is identified by Levinas as an ethical topic. This relationship does not seek appropriation through representation, but is aware of the appeals from the other which make demands on me. "One begins with the idea that duality must be transformed into unity, and that social relations must culminate in a communion. This is the last vestige of a conception that identifies being with knowledge, that is, with the event through which the multiplicity of reality

ends up referring to a single being and where, through the miracle of clarity, everything that encounters me exists as coming from me" (Levinas, 1989, p. 164).

For Levinas as for Gadamer, to a certain extent otherness and singularity are not present, but in the past: the other is different not only from me, but from things and from others. This consideration enables me to understand the double condition of the other as both ego and other in relation to me. The ethical orientation of Levinas's otherness emerges here in all its dimensions: " . . . a mode of being and saying where I am endlessly obligated to the Other, a multiplicity in being that refuses totalization and takes form instead as fraternity and discourse, an ethical relation which forever precedes and exceeds the egoism and the tyranny of ontology" (Levinas, 1989, p. 1). This complementarity and dialogic mode turns identity (which is monologic of itself) into a conversational being, as Gadamer states: "It is characteristic of every true conversation that each opens himself to the other person, truly accepts his point of view as worthy of consideration and gets inside the other to such an extent that he understands not a particular individual, but what he says" (1975, p. 347).

These insights of Levinas enable us to go beyond the limitations inherent in Todorov's three levels of the emergence of otherness, where tensions and ambivalences are the "natural" consequences of a linguistic and semiotic approach. Using such a framework, it should be possible to look at otherness not only as a sociological or semiotic object, but as a frontier or border at which it is possible to pass from one science to another. This is the sense of Serres' claim (1980, p. 18): "The passage is narrow and rare . . . the path does not cross an homogeneous and empty space. Usually the passage is closed . . . and if the passage is open it follows a path that is difficult to gauge."

But more to our concerns here is the fact that each of these authors emphasizes so strongly the complementarity between I and Other which engenders the possibility of transforming the semiotic and hermeneutic topic into an ethical concern. In this way, the social and cultural dimensions of each of the positions of the I and the Other are mediated by an ethical process as in Gadamer's *phronesis*.

Bakhtin and Heteroglossia

Let us now turn our attention toward the last theoretician upon whom we shall draw, Mikhail Bakhtin. The hermeneutic concern of the Russian scholar is well expressed in this quotation: "Truth is not born nor is to be found inside the heart of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of the dialogic interaction" (1984, p. 110). Bakhtin contrasts this dialogic and collective manner of seeking truth to the official monologism, which according to our metaphor of the frontier he sees as tending to suppress the "alien word" (the 'other' in our metaphor of the frontier). In the more socially oriented theory of Bakhtin, the other maintains its otherness in the collective subject. As part of his definition, Bakhtin introduces the concept of "heteroglossia," which goes further in defining the dialogic relationship. Thibault (1989) summarizes this concept as follows:

This concept is Bakhtin's attempt to formulate the diversity of social eaning-making practices and their textual voicings, which are articulated in relation to each other in the social formation. These heteroglossally related discourse varieties (cf. social registers) intersect in relations of alignment, consensus, competition, conflict, collusion, cooptation, and cooperation in particular textual productions" (p. 185).

In fact, both centripetal (centralizing) and centrifugal (de-centralizing) forces and practices are at work in social heteroglossia, which is constructed through the interplay of these two tendencies. If the centripetal forces rule, the equivalence principle draws together the plurality of forces and meanings into a single (monologic) locus of power and knowledge, reducing multiplicity to an identity that rejects otherness. The centrifugal forces are constituted by those principles of difference "which can articulate points of resistance to the first tendency and, perhaps, re-articulate these to some opposed principle" (Thibault, 1989, p. 185). Once again we find a close relationship with Todorov's theories.

A further dimension of social heteroglossia should be noted, namely, the axiological or evaluative. The axiological dimension articulates value judgments in relation both to its own discourse as well as to the voices of others in a way that every voice, implicitly or explicitly, constructs an evaluative position toward the others. All these authors approach the distinction between "self" and "other" in terms of semiosis (rather than of a transcendent division as in Descartes' dualism of subject and object). They approach distinction as a dialogic interplay, where each one of the positions is defined in relationship *with* the others, i.e., as not radically alien but complementary. Also, these thinkers remark the presence of an evaluative, ethical, dimension in this encounter which provides a model for going beyond theoretical discussion into the practice of cultural implications where hermeneutics, as Gadamer urges, is the exercise of an ethos, the constitution of a world, but not the use of a simple tool. In Gadamer's words: "A text is not a given object, but a phase in the execution of the communicative event." The epiphany of the other, in Levinas' words, or Bakhinian exotopia (the condition for heteroglossia), or the historical emergence of the Thou in Gadamer, do not characterize the situation during the Spanish Conquest. Most Latin American countries now are trying to lay at last the beginnings of societies based upon the full recognition of their radical Otherness, as an antidote against intolerance.

Signs in Collision

"The Dialogue of the Twelve Apostles"

The history of the hermeneutic semiotic clash between Europe and the new world is a tortuous route to follow, and a growing number of studies are mapping it in a very detailed manner. But it will be useful for our purposes to recall three moments in this encounter.

In 1524, an expedition of 12 Franciscan friars, under the direction of Friar Martin cenami, arrived in Mexico. Following the wishes of Bishop Zumárraga, these so-called "Twelve Apostles" attempted to establish a dialogue with the Indians, in order to contribute to an evangelization based upon peaceful doctrinal interchange. From the notes on this colloquia, the pupils of the Colegio de la Santa Cruz de Tlatelolco wrote a manuscript which was lost until the beginning of this century when it was found in the Archives of the Vatican Library.

At the beginning of this dialogue, we can find an effort to translate and articulate some pre-hispanic religious concerns into Christian concepts. "God's word is in the divine book, words of Ipalnemohuani, the one who gives Life." But next the missionaries add: "The One that you had not yet known" (CENAMI, 1989, p. 7). In chapter IV, the missionaries talk about God using Indian names: *In Huell nelli Teotl, Tlatoani* (the One who rules), *In Ipalnemohuani, In Tloque Nahuaque* (Lord of the Next World and of Both Worlds). But, as if returning to doctrinal

orthodoxy, the Spanish priests say that they are there in order to "cleanse your faults by the precious water of Our Lord." In chapter VI, the Indian governors answer:

Sirs, why did you come to rule our city? We take the new word as the heavenly one, that you had said (. . .) but what can we say now? Though we act now as governors, we are really mothers and fathers of the people, and must we destroy the old life-rule to follow you? Must the old rule that was much appreciated by our grandparents and the one that our Lords, the governors, kept with admiration, be destroyed? (CENAMI, 1989, p. 10).

Addressing the demands from the Spanish friars that they change their old religion, the answer of the Indian governors is closely related to the tradition and to the arguments offered in the next chapter for their religion by the *quequetzalcoa* or priest of the religion. These did not diverge, but at the end, their moving words conclude:

In our heart we understand to whom we owe our life, to whom we owe our birth, to whom we owe our growth and development. This is why the gods are prayed to and addressed (. . .). But, do not worry, our Lords . . . that we do not take as truth what you have said despite that being able to perturb you. . . . It is enough that we lost the war and governance. . . . Make of us as you want. . . . This is our answer to your pious words, our Lords. (CENAMI, 1989, p. 13)

The next two chapters conclude with a sermon by the Franciscan friars about God, the Angels and the Demons. It attributes to the old religion a confusion that makes Mexicans "take these devils as their gods," and in this manner explains to them the "true" origin of their religion.

Far beyond anything else, this "dialogue" illustrates well a collision of interpretations and of signs. In the best of cases, the Spanish chronicles speak well *of* the Indians, but, as in this document and with very few exceptions, they do not speak *to* the Indians. The dialogue is, in fact, among the twelve themselves, in spite of the good intentions that underlie their effort. "Now, it is only by speaking to the other (not giving orders but engaging in a dialogue) that I can acknowledge him as a subject, comparable to what I am myself" (Todorov, 1984 p. 132). The failure in communication in this encounter illustrates as well the triumph of centripetal (monologic) forces in the discourse, despite the hopeful signs of openness or centrifugal forces at the beginning. Friar Bernardino de Sahagún in commenting on the identification between the Virgin Mary and the Aztec goddess Tonantzin, sees this as the result of a "satanic invention." Todorov comments that, both in Duran and in the *Dialogue of the Twelve*, "the dialogue of cultures is fortuitous and unconscious. As an act of uncontrollable slippage, it is not (and cannot be) erected into a method" (1984, p. 241).

But I would add that in the very showing of the slippage in the potential dialogue, a rudimentary semiotic and hermeneutic process of otherness-recognition takes place. In some way, the frontiers and boundaries which exclude from a semiotic and hermeneutical system the signs of the "unsayable" or the "unthinkable." have experienced the intrusion of foreign and marginal signs. Spinks (1991) suggested that "when one signifies one thing, one draws a semantic circle around it, which both encloses and excludes. Thus the sign system turns on the marker of difference and its tension with similarity. It highlights the cultural other and gives it the urgency of the ‘here and now’" (p. 136). Duran considered religious syncretism a sacrilege, and his work was written in order to show this: " This is our principal weapon: to warn them (the clergy) of the confusion that may exist between our own feasts and those (of the Indians). Pretending to celebrate the festivities of our God and of the Saints, they insert, mix and celebrate those of their gods when they fall on

the same day. And they introduce their ancient rites into our ceremonies" (quoted by Todorov, 1984, p. 205).

Duran's warning could be understood in the context of the marginal signs he watched in panic. "The marginal sign may not just create and discover, it also misleads and deceives. I suspect that the mark of the marginality of a sign is this exact ambivalence, our inability to determine quite to the satisfaction of our more centrist perspectives whether the particular sign can be marked clearly one way or the other" (Spinks, 1991, p. 7). So, Duran looked only at the "evil" side of syncretic signs, not at the potential dialogue that was emerging through them, and their hidden possibilities for evolving further into a full recognition of the other's otherness.

Fray Pedro de Gante's Explicacion de la Doctrina de los Yndios Mucaguas

Let us look now at some very rare early materials developed for the task of evangelization, where the "queer signs", as Wittgenstein called them (1958, p. 79), appeared besides the "orthodox" signs in a very suggestive mode. In the National Historical Archive from Spain, there is a tiny manuscript whose few pages covered with naive drawings propose the Christian doctrine of the Catholic Church. The book was made in Mexico in the sixteenth century by Indians under the direction of Spanish priests. It has no trace of Western signs, except on the last page the signature of Friar Pedro de Gante. This is not the only volume, because there is another at the National Library with drawings of better quality and another in Mexico.

The text begins with the formula for the Sign of the Cross, followed by the Pater Noster, the Hail Mary, the Credo, some other prayers and a very obscure explanation of the mystery of the Trinity, and other doctrinal concerns. In fact, there are no major differences between this order and that of the written catechisms printed during the early conquest period. Many were based upon the *Cartilla Castellana*, a brief summary of Catholic teaching. A comparison with the first catechism written in Colombia, the 1576 work of Friar Luis Zapata de Cárdenas, reveals no remarkable differences, though the Colombian volume is much more copious in information because of its written character. Perhaps more interesting than the drawings is the way in which the ideas are represented. It is not a hieroglyphic representation, but a kind of mnemonic device, designed to help the Indians in the recitation of their prayers. The drawings themselves are a good example of signs which, in that historical situation, shared a common frontier between two semiotic and hermeneutical systems. These signs provide also an explanation of the tension between two positions in the identification of otherness as they cross back and forth from one polarity to the other, in an asymmetrical mode.

According to Sentenach (1900, pp. 604-607), the sign for the Holy Spirit, the third Person in the Trinity, is one of the figures more closely related to traditional pre-Hispanic design, resembling as it does a gold jewel representing a bird. For death, the sign was a mummy—quite exotic for the Hispanic tradition, but quite common in Mexican life. By contrast, other signs represent in more Western fashion the church, the World, etc. Also, a few signs are adapted from pre-Hispanic origin, like the one that represents a debt or payment. What I want to stress here is the quality of marginality of the signs in this text, and hence, how they push the semantic circle of the meanings of each culture, making changes in their hermeneutic and semiotic behaviors.

Nican Mapohua: An Account of the Apparition

The last example of these marginal or "queer signs" which open the dialogic dimension and make the collision of different cultures a potentially positive contact, is the narration, *Nican Mapohua*, written by the Indian Antonio Valeriano, Montezuma's nephew, in the Nahuatl language, about the apparitions of Our Lady of Guadalupe to the Indian boy, Juan Diego, in 1531. The very word *nahuatl* means harmonic and points to the value that this civilization gave to the words, in a rhetorical tradition of "noble and careful expression." In this text, which missionaries accepted as a proof of their Divine task, are quite common the expressions from the Nahuatl tradition, literary formulas and religious qualifications now referring to another semiotic world: in a typical Nahuatl manner the Divinity frequently is called "The one for whom all is alive." Also, flowers and singing birds are the threshold of the presence of a deity, both in the classical poetic tradition of the Nahuatls and in the narration about the Virgin. The use of the diminutive as a poetic devise is very well known in the poetry of the famous Nezahualcoyotl from the fifteenth century, but not only in poetry, because in the daily life of Nahuatl society this fashion was used in order to make a sweeter and closer relationship between related persons, as well as metaphors. In trying to reject the Virgin's orders, Juan Diego excused himself for being "a little man, a piece of rope, a little wooden ladder, a tail, a leaf, I am little people, and You, My little Girl, the most little one of my daughters, My Lady, You send me to a place where I cannot walk nor stand (. . .)." The Virgin's expressions are also Nahuatl-like: "Juanito, the most little of my children . . . " (all quotations from Seibold, 1992, pp. 26-30).

If, as noted, we cannot find dialogue in the first text, the so-called *Dialogo de Los Doce*, we have here a quite different situation: the signs had crossed the frontiers, and now even the Christian God and His Mother express themselves as Nahuatl- speaking deities. As shown, marginal signs have pressed heavily upon the boundaries of the cultures allowing human beings to find an adaptive road to handle this semiotic and hermeneutic gap by drawing cultural maps that make room for a new dynamic reality. As Michel Serres puts it, "the mission of culture is to break the connection between spaces, and then connect them again" (Levi-Strauss, 1981).

Hybrid Signs

Babel Revisited

Let us begin by presenting a metaphor in order to summarize our ideas: from the Tower of Babel, where the heteroglossia is seen as a punishment, we come to the conception of heteroglossia as a gift, though also a challenge, through the intervention of the Holy Spirit. Gillo Dorfles (1989) called this "a new Babel" and, looking at Derrida's translation theory, he spoke of heteroglossia as "maturity". One of its exigencies is to move away from the center (*Verlust der Mitte*) to look for non-symmetrical pathways to better attain the creative life-environments called for by Rudolph Arnheim (1982).

This marginal search directs our attention again toward "queer signs" and the possibility of integrating them into the body of our hermeneutic and semiotic traditions. Thus, the semiotic encyclopedia of a culture is challenged to include and connect meaning and truth in their semantic and hermeneutic circuits—thereby expanding their enclosure and extending their signification. As in all living systems, there is resistance to this irruption, "because of our intolerance of anxiety, uncertainty, disruption, entropy and because of our need for self-preservation, symbolic orders, and an understandable (not necessarily understood) universe" (Spinks, 1991, p. 71). Contemporary science "has taught us that trajectories can become unstable and that stochastic chaos can become

creative" (Prigogine and Stengers in *Serres*, 1982, p. 153). The counter-need to stop or rule change ("negentropy"), to "resist flow and entopic dissolution," is *also* "genetically evolutionary" (Spinks, 1991, p. 70). Thus cultural systems face culturally, that is, in a *semiotic* and *hermeneutic* manner, the passage from 'being to becoming' (to express this process by using the title of one of Prigogine's works [1980]).

Latin American countries came very late to modernity. Almost all the nations conserved agrarian cultures as the foundation for identifying themselves in the semiotic and symbolic orders. Even the revolutionary processes, whether successful or not, have had as a basic premise the building up of the utopia each one of them offered: land redistribution as a symbolic act to reassume and preserve an agrarian past, and a sign-production devise rooted first in land, and then in other realities. The very revolution that these movements obtained was to move into the cities in a non-stop migration from rural areas. In this way, the segmentation of Latin American countries could be realized as a consciousness.

These nations were not homogeneous, as has been assumed; the Hispanic Catholic heritage had evolved in each corner in unimaginable manners: language, habits and religion all manifested heteroglossic diversity which in most cases States were not able to handle. The tensions between the idea of Nation and the different regions or territories, which in the last century were controlled by military intervention, found in the city a place for expression in an amplified daily manner. At the same time, the cities became not only urbanized but also ruralized. Traditional local and homogeneous rural communities, with strong Indian accents in some places, entered into an ever-changing symbolic network which interacts permanently with trans-national structures of sign production and distribution.

This encounter clashes in many ways with the efforts to achieve the definition of a modern state and the economic and political practices which could fit this goal. National states have dealt with differences by ignoring or repressing them, creating a false nationalistic facade, built upon timeless folklore and xenophobic stereotypes. In fact, this situation generates two representational cartographies: on the one hand is the nation represented by a map and ruled by legal operations; on the other hand is the cartography of territories represented by lived space. But as Garcia Canclini points out: "The affirmation of the regional or of the national has no sense or efficacy in rejecting the exogenous: thought now must be in terms of the possibility for interacting from proper positions with the multiple international symbolic implications" (1989, p. 332). And against all the forecasts, traditional cultures have not disappeared: they have evolved into transformed 'frames'.

In another approach drawn from semiotics, and applied to this struggle, Lotman (1969) delineates two culturally oriented semiotic styles: (1) the textually oriented cultures and the (2) grammatically oriented cultures. In the first style, all socially acceptable behaviour is generated by a set of exemplifications, as in urban societies; by contrast, the grammatically oriented cultures make the rules explicit, as happens in rural unambiguous communities. Further, both individual and social beings become "subjects in a process." This is where the dialogic nature of urban Latin American communities can be discovered at their two levels of identity, social and individual: the communities participate in a negotiated and endless process. The city is the place to face the other as otherness, and to negotiate identity.

What is fundamental here is the turn from rural to urban appropriation, and the production of signs. Even if the city be a setting of conflict, it provides as well a place for the inter-play of the experience of otherness and recognition: "Confrontation is the manner of the interplay of inequity and difference" (Garcia Canclini, 1989, p. 259). This theatrical terminology could be articulated through Gadamer's conception of play as a metaphor for the process of understanding or

interpretation (hermeneutic) itself. For these divergences, the city—far from being destructive—is the possibility in intolerant cultures for each to face the other. Paradoxically, it is in the environment provided by Latin American cities that there develops an ecological consciousness, which is the non-human face of the other.

Colombian philosopher Danilo Cruz Velez attributes urban growth to the Latin-American's feeling toward Nature: "There is no other person with as weak a perception of nature as the Latin-American" (quoted by Silva, 1992, p. 185). It is then in the city that the other, as different territories, and nature, as the non-human side of Otherness, can be faced. Urban lifestyle makes possible the emergence of an environmental consciousness by contrasting the "miseries" and limitations of city life with the surrounding and almost virgin nature. This makes urban experience in these countries quite singular. In fact, even the mass-media play on important role here, quite different from the dubious one attributed to them by Marxist researchers in the 60s and 70s: Monsivais and Martín Barbero (in García Canclini, 1989, pp. 237-238) emphasize the contribution that radio and movies have in showing the Latin-American peoples their differences, ethnic and regional, and the convection of all these differences in the constitution of national identities.

Cultural Heritage and Change

Besides all these possibilities, it is true that citizenship does not erase the conflicts: "They are placed in another register which is multifocal and more tolerant. Cultural autonomy must be thought again, and without the risk of fundamentalism" (García Canclini, 1989, p. 304). This explains the "more liberal" approach to political and social issues in the cities than in the countryside. This is also a "healthier" way to look at conflicts, because they are situated within the perspective of a dynamic and open dialogic relationship. We could take here a hermeneutic approach. Gadamer and Ricoeur agree that interpretation is temporal, and that the best model for hermeneutic understanding is time-experience. In fact, Gadamer suggests that one of the most fundamental experiences of time is that of a discontinuity, or 'becoming other'. According to him, at least three "epochal experiences" enter our self-understanding as temporal discontinuity:

—The experience of old age, which takes place as a sudden revelation, not as gradual progression.

—The transition from one generation to another.

—The "absolute epoch," which Christianity brought to western civilization, but which led to the technological conception of the future as able to be planned and subject to control.

I would situate the possibility of these epochal experiences in the city environment. They are fundamental to understanding how tradition is transmitted and conserved, because it is in the city where the sensibility toward time emerges sharply. Traditional cultures lost their exclusive relationship with territories in moving to the city, but, at the same time, they obtained access to knowledge and communication. In some way, as García Canclini observes, "Now all the cultures are frontier cultures" (1989, p. 325), meaning that transitions between different social and cultural actors take place throughout hybrid sign production and interpretation. In spite of radical differences among cultures, the contact and unconscious dialogue which takes place there creates patterns of interchange and development which are more coherent in explaining cultural life than approaches which emphasize resistance and tradition as a hard core which does not change. Today it is no longer possible to impose oppositional concepts such as cultivated and non-cultivated,

modern and traditional, folk production and artistic production: interchanges and recognition of otherness from one level to another make it impossible to separate them neatly. At a level preceding the theoretization of post-modernism, in our urban-rural cities as in many other places in the so-called Third World, the practice of daily life has been carrying out semiotic hybridization through the exploration of marginal signs (hybridization which in other contexts has been interpreted as the "post-modern" condition). Latin-American urbanization has enabled us to experience otherness, and to accept it by articulating the radical condition of the other in our symbiotic order, sometimes in painful ways.

Cities such as Bogotá, Ciudad de Mexico, Tijuana or Santiago cross through modernization, but "the problem is not whether we have modernized, but [the problem is] in the contradictory and unequal ways to articulate these modern components" (Garcia Canclini, 1989, p. 330). In fact, Latin American cultures are the result of the sedimentation, juxtaposition and mixing of Indian, black and Hispanic colonial cultures, and of educational and political actions undertaken to gain modernity. But in these patterns, which differ in each region, there are no temporal contradictions: temporal heterogeneity which exists as a reality shows that traditions and mass, popular and folk cultures are together assumed by people as a source for creativity and daily living.

To assume one's cultural heritage in theoretical ways is not the mode of access of the common people. They have much more 'in common' with Latin-American artists, who have been celebrating heterogeneity without the abstract discussions of the social theoreticians. Examples include: the tropical and the enigmatic colors and signs of Wilfredo Lam (a Cuban-Chinese); the mythic imagination of Asturias (a Guatemalan) and García Márquez (a Colombian); the tales of exile of Skármeta (a Chilean living in Germany) and Bryce Echenique (a Peruvian who teaches in France); the explosive rhythms of Celia Cruz (a Cuban native who now lives in Miami) and Rubén Blades (a Panamanian). All these, and they are just a small sample, do not reject modern cultures nor remain shackled to tradition: they integrate hybrid signs which make us aware of the dynamic of cultural evolution—a pattern of behaviour already assumed by common people across the whole so-called Third World.

This semiotic network does not know frontiers, either between ethnic or national origins, or between cultivated or folkloric traditions: all the signs are embodied and re-semanticized, connected to other times and readings, interpreted and played in an undifferentiated and heroic process. Cultural Babel is, thus, not only an assumption of difference, of Otherness, but of the living experience of a cultural heritage; it incorporates not only spaces (regions and territories) but times (from the past to the future). The marginal signs which remain for many years as folkloric or popular culture begin to be interwoven, closing the gap between generations and territories. The city, in its dialogic dynamics, pushes the recognition of otherness and its full integration as a part of the cultures.

But to be inside the city it is not enough to develop the dialogic imagination, as Bakhtin calls it. Even inside, there is the display of conflicts which makes possible the awareness of the many processes which were visible but still 'hidden'. In Medellin (Colombia), only after the projection of a film about the conflicts of an adolescent group in the streets of the city (*Rodrigo D.: No Future*) and the release of two or three books on the same topic (*No nacimos pa' semilla* and *El pelaito Que no duró nada*), did people and government, despite their different background and concerns, begin to act to help the popular neighborhoods, for they had been appealed to by a reality that must be "played" (in Gadamer's sense) in order to be understood.

This is not, of course, a formula, but it addresses what is basic: Through creative work, and not merely as aesthetic exercise, culture assumes and links components which had been

marginalized and not seen as part of the cultural symbolic order. Levinas recognizes this in the following observation: "Culture and artistic creation are part of the ontological order itself. They are ontological par excellence: they make the understanding of being possible" (1987, p. 82). Are we, as Sahagún and Duran were, suspicious of hybridization in our contemporary societies?

The process of recognition of other's otherness which had begun in a subtle way in the works of Las Casas, Duran, Sahagún and many others in the distant sixteenth century, now recommences vigorously in urban settings. In fact, as Todorov reminds us, those works remained unpublished until the nineteenth century, and there are thousands more which sleep a dream that has lasted centuries in Madrid's and Seville's archives, holding the cues of our hybrid identity, as Gante's catechism already shows. The research done by Néstor García Canclini in many Latin American countries (1989), or the work by Armando Silva (1992) comparing Bogotá's and Sâo Paulo's semiotic urban production, or Clifford Geertz' insights on local forms of knowledge (1983), sustain the basic assumption presented in this work:— Within the complex semiotic and interpretative interchanges which occur in cities can be mapped our present and future reality, the ways to "invent tradition" and progress in reaching a better life for all. The price we must pay for it is the recognition of our new condition as *heteroglossic cultures.*

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Chapter V

Cultural Discourse in Hispanic Historiography on the Reconquest and Conquest: Historicist Hermeneutics from Alfonso X to Las Casas

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Introduction: Historiography And Historicism

This study examines, from the points of view of the new cultural historicism (according to Michel Foucault, Hayden White, and the critics represented in Veeser's collection, *The New Historicism*), certain parallels between the chronicles of the Reconquest of the Iberian peninsula by the Christians from the Moors and the chronicles of the Conquest of various indigenous peoples of the American continents by the Spaniards. The texts include the histories written or edited by Alfonso X (1221-84, king of Castile 1252-84); Jaume 1 (1208-76, king of Aragon 1213-76); Bernal Diaz del Castillo (1492-1581), and Bartolome de Las Casas (1474-1566). My analysis is based upon the discourse of authority as it is developed in the historiographic terms of narrative, myth, and example. The fundamental critical question concerns the network of relationships among historical authority, historiographic authorship, and historicist interpretation: to the narrative of national expansion correspond a certain textual community and a collective identity; to the myth of heroic ages are related a certain situation of propaganda and a paradigm of formation and transformation; and to the example of legitimate power are united a certain didactic purpose and a rhetoric of apology or polemics. Taking as points of departure the models of European and Iberian expansion in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance elaborated by modern historians (Phillips, Maravall, McAlister, and Elliott), various theories of cultural historicism, myth, and reception (Montrose, White, Frye, and Jauss) are considered in relation to Hispanic historiography, so as to lay the foundations for a critique of the Iberian model of civilization that emerges from the chronicles of Reconquest and Conquest. The phenomena of expansion in Iberia and America are then analyzed in a general and abbreviated way in the following historiographic texts: Alfonso X's *Estoria de Espanna* or *Primera crónica general* (EE, 1270-75), Jaume I's *Llibre dels feits* (LF, 1244-74), Diaz del Castillo's *Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva Espana* (HV, 1568), and Las Casas' *Historia de Indias* (HI, 1527-61). By way of conclusion, it is necessary to return to the theoretical and comparative model of the interpretation of cultural history that emerges from the four chronicles.

As a preliminary step, it is important to underscore certain cultural situations and critical interpretations in the history of the Reconquest and Conquest: on the one hand, from the points of view of the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries these periods of expansion are seen as ages of modernity and enlightenment; on the other hand, one should recall the contributions of critics like Américo Castro and Greenblatt on the phenomena of Iberian cultural history and scholars like Catalan and Mignolo on the models of Hispanic historiography. First, with respect to modernity, what strikes readers of these texts is the central idea of newness or renewal: a new Hispania (as land and people on the way to unification within and beyond the peninsula), a new empire (as a military and political order of an expansionist type and a domination by a ruling class that proclaims itself enlightened), a new world (as a geographic and cultural redefinition that

accompanies the self-consciousness of living in a renaissance), and a renewed Christianity (as militant Church, people of faith, and temporal power in the process of reformation or counter-reformation). Second, with respect to critical interpretations, what stands out is the model of cultural dialectic in historiography. Américo Castro underscores the complex process of social formation and transformation, in terms of the phenomenology of *Convivencia* (*syncretist integration* of cultures, which moves beyond societal *coexistence*) and the ideology of crusade, that characterizes the relations between Christians and Muslims and that defines both the historical reality and the historical fiction of medieval Iberia. Catalan examines the process of literary formation and transformation, in historiography itself, in terms of a progressively poeticized or novelized representation and of a gradually more subjective and reflexive interpretation of Castilian national history. Greenblatt attempts to reconstruct the ways of perceiving an "other" culture and of imagining a marvelous "new world" in terms of strategies of cultural projection and appropriation that are translated into the negotiation and domination of a discourse of power. Finally, Mignolo establishes textual categories and cultural functions of the so-called *relaciones* (official letters or reports from abroad) and *crónicas* of the Conquest in terms of rhetorical traditions that are modified by new experiences, and of textual mediations that are brought to bear upon the ideological problems associated with a conquest. Thus the critical model and the cultural situation both serve to interpret the chronicles' authority.

Hispanic Historiography and Cultural Historicism

The rhetorical questions posed by medieval and Renaissance Hispanic chronicles—about literature and politics, national consciousness, history itself, and exemplarity—call for the methodology of cultural historicists, who, in the words of Louis Montrose, attempt to determine the historicity of texts and textuality of history (Montrose in Veeser 20). Further, such inquiry assumes a fundamental principle of historiography that has recently been fully elaborated by Hayden White (in *The Content of the Form)*: all history is story, that is to say, all historical narrative involves a discursive text, a coherent fiction, an explicatory *mythos,* and an exemplary lesson (White ix-x). A historicist critique of late-medieval and early-Renaissance Iberian historiography offers a way of understanding the dialectic of history and story that is at work in any chronicle, but that grows in complexity in those hybrid genres from transitional periods in which the question of authority itself (as textual interpretation and contextual legitimation) is submitted to revision. What emerges most clearly in such texts at such times is what Roland Barthes has defined as the ideological and imaginary nature of historical discourse (Barthes 20).

As historical narratives these works transcend history-as-fact so as to constitute mythic stories; they serve as emblems of culture and lessons in politics for contemporary society. Here, it is useful to refer to Frye's theory of mythology as it functions within cultural and literary history:

Certain stories seem to have a peculiar significance: they are the stories that tell a society what is important for it to know, whether about its gods, its history, its laws, or its class structure. These stories may be called myths... A mythology rooted in a specific society transmits a heritage of shared allusion and verbal experience in time, and so mythology helps to create a cultural history. (Frye 33-34)

Such a concept of myth can help us understand the importance of the narrative interpretations of the Reconquest and Conquest: these mythographies constitute efforts at creating for their

societies and times a coherent, significant, and exemplary or critical account of what their authors perceive to be the new nation's heroic age of expansion in Europe and the Indies.

In addition to the exemplary function of history as mythography, there exists the exemplarity of its reception. The various forms of historical narrative about the Reconquest and Conquest – the chivalric idealization in the royal chronicles of Alfonso X and Jaume I, as well as the propagandistic, apologetic, polemical, or revisionist versions of Colon's *cartas de relacion* and the various *crónicas de Indias* written by conquistadors, missionaries, and *mestizos*—represent the adaptation of literary traditions to the changing horizons of expectations of new, expanding nation-states involved in the geopolitics of European expansion and the *Realpolitik* of Renaissance power. Such a phenomenon corresponds to the reception-model developed by Jauss:

Through the "beginningness" of a literature newly forming itself in the vernacular languages, its archaic genres provide testimony for the ideal and reality of a unique political as well as cultural-historical world closed in itself, and offer elementary structures in which the socially formative and communicative power of literature has manifested itself. (Jauss 109).

The historical narratives about the Reconquest of Iberia, expansion into the Mediterranean, Conquest of America, and colonization of trans-Atlantic empires correspond to hybrid genres evolving in response to what were the contemporary needs of society—needs to rearticulate its historical identity in terms of communal myths.

What is the impact on the reader of the historical and mythical exemplarity of the Hispanic chronicles? Any historical narrative about reconquest or conquest serves to privilege the discourse of power in terms of what Louis Montrose calls the poetic and politics of culture (Montrose in Veeser 20). The politics (interpretative ideology) and poetics (social rhetoric) of exemplary historical writing comprise not only esthetic and ethical registers but also idealistic and critical evaluations of human order as it evolves in local cultures. As White observes, "The more historically self-conscious the writer of any form of historiography, the more the question of the social system and the law that sustains it, the authority of this law and its justification, and threats to the law occupy his attention . . . " (White 13).

To this concept of the cultural and moral authority of the interpreter of history must be added the complementary concept of the temporal and communal contexts of mythography. A historicist reading of late-medieval and early-Renaissance Spanish texts about the Reconquest and Conquest offers a model of cultural reception that explains the function of their exemplarity in terms of a social rhetoric. This corresponds precisely to Frye's understanding of mythography: "Myth has two parallel aspects: as a story, it is poetic and is re-created in literature; as a story with a specific social function, it is a program of action for a specific society. In both aspects it relates not to the actual but to the possible" (Frye 49). The historicity and narrativity of the Hispanic chronicles are intertwined in such a way as to create exemplary stories of the past that serve for the moral direction, political enlightenment, and social benefit of the present.

Hispanic Civilization and Mission: The Ideology of Reconquest and Conquest

Medieval Iberian historiography presents in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries a model of civilization based on the concept of the Reconquest: it interprets in terms of Romano-Visigothic cultural heritage, Christian crusade, royal mission, and ethnic destiny, the experience of the progressive reintegration over nearly six centuries of the peninsula into Western

Christendom, as the expanding kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal push back the Moors. In this era of nation-building they not only succeed in regaining lost territories and converting other peoples, but they also proceed to extend their power across the Mediterranean. The new historiography in the vernacular develops in this crucial period, which Américo Castro considers the decisive one in the formation of the various Iberian national characters. The Romance chronicles in effect function as mirrors in which to recognize one's own nationhood in terms of a common military tradition, religious profession, political enterprise, and social self-image. It is in this period that Christian territories of Iberia more than double in size and population, as well as come to assimilate some of the most sophisticated centers of Islamic urban culture in the Balearic Islands, Valencia, Murcia, and Andalucia. It is also in this period that a secularization of Iberian Christendom begins to take place as a result of the effort by self-styled enlightened kings (Alfonso X the Wise of Castile, Jaume I the Conqueror of Aragon, and Dinis the Generous of Portugal) to establish cosmopolitan courts that welcome the contributions of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish scholars and professionals from all over Europe and the Mediterranean world. Given these humanistic developments, Romance historiography begins to evolve away from the clerical codes of earlier Latin works by monastic and episcopal chroniclers (such as Lucas de Tuy and Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, who wrote during Alfonso X's youth) and towards the more hybrid interpretations of the so-called schools of translators (at the pluricultural centers of Toledo, Murcia, and Seville) and court chanceries (at Barcelona, Toledo, and Lisbon).

Renaissance Iberian historiography presents in the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries a model of civilization based on the concept of the Conquest: it interprets in terms of a pan-Hispanic cultural heritage, Christian reform, nationalist mission, and imperial destiny, the experience of the rapid extension of European powers beyond the traditional sphere of the Mediterranean and across the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The new historiography of the general European Renaissance and Catholic Reform that now develops serves first to place Spain in the role of protagonist on an expanded world stage and then to challenge its right (and anyone else's) to rule, or rather misrule, the new colonial territories in the Americas. The Hispanic chronicles of the new Spain of the Catholic Monarchs Fernando and Isabel (1479-1504 and 1516) and the Hapsburg Emperor Charles V (1516-56) in effect function as mirrors in which to reevaluate and ultimately question claims to a dominant power and superior civilization in terms of the violence of military action, limits of religious idealism, contradictions of political pragmatism, and problems of social assimilation. But it is important to note that these issues which now confront Hispanic chroniclers, apologists and critics alike, correspond not only to the imperial age of Spain but also to a period of growing nationalist fervor, religious militancy, and reformist critiques throughout all of Western Europe. To a great extent, then, Spanish historiography on the New World reflects a newly self-conscious concept of modern nationhood as well as an ever more self-critical vision of Western power. It is in this very period that attempts are made (by both Catholic and Protestant reformers such as Erasmus, More, Luther, Calvin, and Ignatius of Loyola) to promote a respiritualization of European Christianity and a rehumanization of Western Christendom. What results in the case of Hispanic historiography, in its multiple functions as popular cultural mythography, official literature of propaganda, and critical mirror of contemporary reality, is that history is increasingly seen to represent not true facts or even past acts but rather controversial issues and (especially) present problems that challenge the traditional definitions of civilization (as religious, geographic, ethnic, or ideological distinctions). One begins to think instead in the historicist terms of the poetics, politics, and ethics of culture. The chroniclers increasingly focus on culture, rather than civilization, as a complex human phenomenon that is

ever evolving in opposition to (rather than in domination of) an Other and in comparison to (rather than in reflection of) a utopian model of society. In the contexts of this humanistic movement toward cultural perspectivism and historicism, Hispanic historiography can be seen to play a crucial role in making possible the transition to a reevaluation of the authority and morality of Western European civilization by representatives of the new Latin American cultures (such as the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega), as well as by the reformers of the new Christian commonwealths (such as Las Casas).

It is important to note that the Hispanic chroniclers project an image of Iberia as an enlightened—civilized and civilizing—nation in the mirror of those it conquers. In the medieval period of reconquest and expansion, although the prevailing image consists of a heroic people with an imperial destiny, the code of national virtue and superiority allows for variations which may consist of wise rule based on biblical, Roman, and Oriental models (Alfonso X) or of political pragmatism related to chivalric, civic, and legalistic norms (Jaume I). In the Renaissance era of conquest and colonization, the imperial image is reinterpreted by advocates of geo-economic progress (Colon) and apologists of national superiority (Diaz del Castillo), and then challenged by critics of the contemporary *Realpolitik* who argue from inside (Las Casas) and outside (Inca Garcilaso) the dominant cultural tradition. The latter two authors point to the tensions and contradictions (in both the metropolitan and colonial societies) that come to the surface in contacts with the other culture, yet they base their critiques on the "true" interpretation of Spain or Europe's "civilized" values: each challenges the conventional notions of civilization (cultural superiority as national virtue, power, or progress) from within the dominant system of values so as to redefine the ideology of culture in ways that do not equate political and economic ascendancy with the social and moral order. At the same time, each of these two authors tempers his self-consciously modern (Western European) humanist rationale with more ancient (Judeo-Christian or Incan) traditions of morality. In effect, the didactic, mythic, and propagandistic functions of Hispanic historiography culminate in the works of Las Casas and the Inca Garcilaso, who offer historicist perspectives on the present age of opportunity and crisis as the Old World of Europe and America is transformed into the New World of modern international powers and hybrid cosmopolitan cultures.

Crucial to the understanding of the Hispanic chronicles is the cultural textuality and mythic historicity of what is perceived to be the religious identity and mission of new nation-empires. On the level of cultural ideology, the chronicles on the Reconquest and Conquest have in common the elaboration of a European and Iberian mythography on the rise of a Christian empire which is to reconquer the known world from what is perceived to be the religious, cultural, military, and economic domination of Islam. As is noted by Southern and Menocal about crusading Europe, by Américo Castro and Cantarino about the Reconquest of Iberia (and by Said about the West's cultural imperialism in general), the image of the Muslim Other as mirror of the Christian West (in the ambivalent terms of cultural superior, political rival, and spiritual inferior) involves—during most of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance—the mythic reconstruction of European Christendom as an alter-Islam within and beyond the frontiers of both the former Roman empire and Baghdad caliphate. Iberian chronicles are defined by the cultural parameters of the geographic and mythographic frontier with Islam: it is a physical frontier that stretches from the Mediterranean of Alfonso X and Jaume I to the Atlantic Ocean of Colon and Las Casas; it is also a historical frontier that extends from the founding eras of Christianity and Islam to the new ages of expansion of the Iberian kingdoms and Turkish sultanate. Ultimately, at the heart of the propaganda of Iberian historical narratives in this period lies the ideological and rhetorical ambiguity of the terms

Christendom and Christianity, which parallel those of Islam as universal religion and Dar al-Islam as world civilization. In effect, Iberian chroniclers manifest diachronic and polysemous understandings of the ideology of mission.

Although it is apparent that the Hispanic chronicles, like all medieval and Renaissance historiography, function primarily as propagandistic texts, it is useful to note that the concept of mission which underlies them represents an ideology in the process of redefinition and reapplication in the period from 1250 to 1550. Mission implies a purposeful mode of travel (whether exploratory encounter or expansionist expedition) with clearly identifiable points of departure and arrival that constitute the signifying framework for interpreting whatever phenomena arise during the journey. Within the Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman tradition, mission also implies the human agency for a divine task: true missionaries, whether Old Testament patriarchs or prophets, or New Testament apostles or witnesses, are those who are sent forth into the world of creation and humanity so as to mediate God's providential plan in the midst of the new lands and peoples they encounter.

But the renewal of missionary ideology in medieval and Renaissance Christendom is often cast in the cultural-historical terms of a total, universal crusade rather than in the providential or prophetic terms of a gradually unfolding revelation. For Christian mission in the West is seen to respond in great part to the missionary zeal of Muhammad, who is for Muslims God's last prophet or messenger, and to the missionary successes of the Islamic holy warriors, Qur'anic teachers, and proselytizing merchants who rapidly extend that religious message to half the known world. The Christian mission, both in its biblical-apostolic origins and in its militant-crusading developments, can thus be understood not only as an effort to reconquer the territories and peoples lost by Christendom to Islam since the eighth century, but also as an attempt to eliminate once and for all the threat to Christendom posed by this strangely familiar yet alien faith, which sees in scripture the call to proclaim its message to all the corners of the earth. The Christian mission progressively unfolds in late-medieval and early-Renaissance history as a struggle to survive (especially in frontier areas from Iberia and Sicily to Austria and the Balkans), a program for restoration (of European Christendom and of the Roman Mediterranean), a campaign for ultimate victory over the infidels (with their conversion by force or persuasion), and an ambition for a total domination of the known world (in both material and spiritual terms) to counter that advocated by the Muslims themselves.

It is not surprising, then, that during this period European chronicles of reconquest and crusade (in particular those of the frontier Iberian kingdoms) develop against a background or foreground of Christian mission. This mission is explicitly or implicitly understood, according to religious purpose and political interest, in terms of the discourse of power, the rhetoric of confrontation, the culture of expansion, and the politics of domination. For Iberian chroniclers in 1250 to 1550, any history of Christian restoration, unification, and extension involves a sense of mission: this mission consists of a *mythos* (interpretative communal narrative) about the destiny of a world religion, of the dominant culture associated with that religion's temporal power, and of any nation- state with imperial ambitions. In the late-medieval and early-Renaissance ages of European and Iberian expansion, such a *mythos* can lead to the identification of a nation's hegemony within (and beyond) Christendom with the very universality claimed for Christianity.

Models of Hispanic Historiography: Narrative, Myth, and Example

Various points of convergence and divergence are to be found among the models of historiography represented in the Hispanic chronicles of the Reconquest and Conquest. Among the differences, there stand out those related to the process of composition, especially questions of objective scope and subjective focus. First, there are the contrasts to be observed in the production of the histories. Alfonso X relies upon the complex activity of multiple *scriptoria* (in Toledo, Seville, and Murcia), with a diversity of scholars who represent heterogeneous origins and formations. Jaume I dictates his memoirs to a sole cleric who acts as his secretary. Diaz del Castillo, as one of the surviving conquistadors, devotes a late work to a reconstruction and reevaluation of the true experiences of the conquest of Mexico. Las Casas, as Dominican missionary and Apostle to the Indies, undertakes a vast enterprise of compiling and revising, in the midst of debates on legal reforms for the Indies, all the published histories (as well as all other known and documented experiences) related to the discoveries and conquests of the New World. Second, there are the differences to be recognized in the very subject of historiography. The extensive and ambitious collaboration among the Wise King's scholars, experts, and translators is presented as a diptych that binds the history of Hispania, centered upon the *fecho d'Espanna* (the historical and heroic deeds of the formation and preservation of Spain) as the story of the Christian and Castilian Reconquest, with the history of the world, associated with the *fecho d'Imperio* (the traditional claims to and contemporary struggles for control of Iberian and Western Christendom) as the story of the reunification of Christian Hispania and Europe. The Catalan Conqueror's royal autobiography concentrates, in a linear and anecdotal way, with the new era that he himself has initiated with his expansion towards and into the Mediterranean. The veteran officer and companion of Cortes undertakes a testimony designed to challenge and reclaim history in his retelling of a few exceptional years that others (like Lopez de Gomara) had already treated from more partial or distant perspectives. The clerical chronicler and polemicist commits himself to writing a comprehensive and critical (i.e., scientific and revisionist) history that represents (like the *Historic natural y general de Indias*, a similar, but diffuse and unequal, work written in 1535-37 by his contemporary Fernández de Oviedo) a response to the lack of a complete history of the encounter with the New World and a review of the abundant, conflicting documents (of missionaries and conquistadors) on the good and bad effects of the Spanish conquests. Beyond such differences in composition, which reflect diverse literary and political cultures, it is necessary to recognize the parallels in the hermeneutic models that each chronicle represents: in the four texts one encounters similar questions about interpreting the discourse of authority in the history of the Reconquest and Conquest.

The interpretation of the discourse of power and the discourse of authority in the four chronicles corresponds to a reading of history as narrative, myth, and example. In the *Estoria de Espanna* what is narrated are the origins, prowess, and climax of the Christian and Castilian Reconquest of the Iberian peninsula. What is mythologized are the formation and restoration of the identity of Spain, as this identity is in the process of unfolding (a process that serves to reconstitute and reinterpret the ancient Hispania of Romans and Visigoths). And what is exemplified is the development of unity (as well as division) throughout the past until the present triumph of the politics of Castilianization undertaken in the southern territories and peoples conquered in Andalucia by Fernando III (a politics extended beyond military and administrative spheres into the realms of culture and ideology by his son, the current Wise King). In the *Llibre dels feits* what is narrated is the conquest by the Catalan king and nobility of Mediterranean coasts and islands, which will serve during the next three centuries decisively to reorient the expansionist politics of the Crown of Aragon. What is mythologized are the Catalan people's transformation

and domination of the former Spanish Marches which has now become the axis of a great maritime empire. And what is exemplified is the politics of expansion that is achieved through consensus among king, nobles, and burghers, as well as through the deeds of the new epic warriors (whose epic is not seen as legendary and distant but historical and contemporary). In the *Historia verdadera* what is narrated are the discovery, conquest, and colonization of the Aztec empire by a heroic group of conquistadors, who have later been cast aside by an imperial bureaucracy and manipulated by court intrigues in the mother country. What is mythologized is the invention (encounter and construction) of the New Spain in both the Old and New Worlds. And what is exemplified is the process of civilizing (Europeanizing or Castilianizing as well as Christianizing) the indigenous peoples. In the *Historia de Indias* what is narrated is not only the whole history of the discoveries and conquests that unfold in the new continents, but also the privileged history of the conversion of pagan peoples to the true faith (Christian and Roman Catholic). What is mythologized are the historical and geographic culmination of Christian influence in the world (as temporal power of Christendom and missionary church of Christianity). And what is exemplified is the reform of that Christendom and Christianity in terms of corrective measures on the part of an intelligentsia (militant and critical) composed of Catholic humanists and counter-'Reformers'.

From the comparison of the chronicles of the Reconquest and Conquest, as well as from the interpretation of the discourse of authority with respect to history, can be derived certain analytical and theoretical implications that aid in constructing a hermeneutic model. First, in terms of analysis, one can distinguish in the Hispanic chronicles of the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries (periods that respectively mark the medieval Renaissance of Christian Iberia and the classicist Renaissance of humanist Europe) certain parallels in historical interpretation. These parallels show that the chronicles offer a series of meanings (about the past, present, and future of the community and its elites) that function in relation to cultural tradition, ideological typology, and social reception. In Alfonso X's national chronicle, what is recounted is a corpus of stories derived from clerical Latin sources and oral epic traditions; what is symbolized is the imperial typology based on the ancient Romano-Visigothic period and on contemporary contexts of the Castilian-Hohenstaufen pretensions (through the king's maternal Swabian line); and what is advocated is a national reception, directly and indirectly (through a sort of vertical osmosis), by official communities of elites and subjects. In Jaume I's autobiographical chronicle what is recounted is the neo-epic tradition that he is gradually creating in the present heroic age; what is symbolized is a typology that is both aristocratic (personal achievement through great, famous deeds) and corporative (sociopolitical consensus through *pactisme,* or juridical and administrative contractuality); and what is advocated is a common nationalist reception at the court on the part of the dynastic, bureaucratic, and military interests of the royal house, chancery, and nobility. In Diaz del Castillo's testimonial chronicle, what is recounted is the chivalric tradition derived equally from medieval (literary or fictional) and contemporary (historical or documentary) models; what is symbolized is the typology of true and false conquistadors, as well as true and false chroniclers; and what is advocated is a favorable and just reception at the metropolitan court and among the *hidalgos* (the gentry class of the majority of conquistadors). In Las Casas' critical chronicle what is recounted is the missionary tradition of the "Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church," with its providential basis and millenarian development, as it now relates to preaching the Gospel in new lands and converting new peoples to the true faith; what is symbolized is the evangelical and reformist typology of the Renaissance and counter-'Reformation' humanists; and what is advocated is the trans-Atlantic, world-wide reception by an expanded Christendom of an exemplary message about conversion to the beliefs and practices of a universal, spiritual

Christianity, as well as conversion to the standards of civilization and ethics of a historical, temporal Christianity. In these rhetorical, symbolic, and ideological ways the chronicles serve to interpret the discourse of authority as it is renewed in ages of expansion and revision: authority is recounted from its origins, transferred from one culture to another, redefined for a "modern" era, symbolized anew for a nation in the process of development and expansion, and exemplified for a new ruling community. This is the discourse that accompanies the new history of restored Spain, a greater Catalonia or Aragon, a trans-Atlantic New Spain, and a new Renaissance Christendom and Counter-'Reformation' Christianity.

Conclusions: Historicist Models of Chronicles of the Reconquest and Conquest

In spite of the considerable insights that result from applying historicist methods to the historiographical rhetoric and propagandistic contexts of the Hispanic chronicles, there still remains the need to construct a hermeneutic model capable of examining and integrating the phenomena of the production, mediation, and reception of history (as text, culture, and ideology) in relation to the Reconquest and Conquest. (Note the summary of theories, problems, and methods in the historicist interpretation of Alfonsine texts and contexts discussed by Gonzalez-Casanovas 1991-92.) The usefulness of this type of study lies in its moving beyond interpretations of historiography that are traditionally based on such concepts as the philological one of national language, literary-historical one of medieval and Renaissance periodization, or canonical one of "classic" chronicles. Instead, the semiotic, typological, and rhetorical functions of historiography are to be studied. By means of historicist perspectives, it is possible to consider what are the key questions of interpretation in the pertaining Hispanic (Castilian or Catalan, peninsular or colonial) historiography. This historiography treats the parallel phenomena of the expansion of power, and the redefinition of national community as well as elite culture, as these develop during the thirteenth-century Reconquest of Iberia and sixteenth-century Conquest of America.

Once this type of cultural-historicist critique of texts and contexts is undertaken, its application to the four works here studied—Alfonso X's great national chronicle with its imperial propaganda, Jaume I's epic chronicle with its royal testimony, Diaz del Castillo's true chronicle with its veteran's revisions, and Las Casas' humanist chronicle with its missionary apology and polemic—serves to show that each represents a series of multiple and complex discourses on history. In these chronicles history is narrated, mythologized, and exemplified in ways that make manifest a diversity of traditions, hybridization of forms, problematization of typologies, ambivalence of rhetorical strategies, and a plurality of receptions. In spite of such complexity, and of the divergences in composition to be found among the works, all four texts share a common interest in the function of history in contemporary society, as history is perceived, enacted, ordered, interpreted, and reformed among the cultural and ruling elites. Hence, these chronicles come to constitute variations on one sole discourse of power: in them are fused the apology for any reconquest/conquest, the self-critique on the part of reconquerors/conquerors, and the appropriation of the conquered cultures. Thus, history as meaningful and exemplary narrative of past deeds (history as document and monument) is seen to be transformed into an imaginative, interpretative, and revisionist discourse on present acts (history as mythical and critical paradigm). It is this historiographic discourse of authority that serves in the Hispanic chronicles of Reconquest and Conquest as guide and support for the agents, mediators, critics, and receptors of power.

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Chapter VI
Language and Inculturation

Shang Zhiyang

Language as Common Ground for Understanding Culture

Man is the being who has language. Language is the most fundamental being, including everything. The magic and the function of language constitute the basic concerns of the ancients in the cradle of civilization. This information is revealed in the Bible. For instance, there is the following prologue in The Gospel of John:

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.1

In my opinion, here, the Word refers to language. That is to say, the world begins with language. Without language, the world in which human beings live and manipulate their environments cannot exist. The fact that we live in the world means we live in the language, and the fact that we possess language means we possess the world. For this reason, language is of ontological import.

On the other hand, language also has a communicative function. The story of the Tower of Babel indicates such a function:

The whole world spoke the same language, using the same words. While men were migrating in the east, they came upon a valley in the land of Shinar and settled there. They said to one another, "Come, let us mold bricks and harden them with fire." They used bricks for stone, and bitumen for mortar. Then they said, "Come, let us build ourselves a city and a tower with its top in the sky, and so make a name for ourselves; otherwise we shall be scattered all over the earth."

The LORD came down to see the city and the tower that the men had built. Then the LORD said: "If now, While they are one people, all speak the same language, they started to do this, nothing will later stop them from doing whatever they presume to do. Let us then go down and there confuse their language, so that one will not understand what another says."

Thus the LORD scattered them from there all over the earth, and they stopped building the city. That is why it was called Babel, because there the LORD confused the speech of all the world. It was from that place that he scattered them all over the earth.2

Man as social being needs communication, and communication needs language. By means of language, human beings reach mutual understanding; with the aid of the mutual understanding, human beings have creative power.

This power, firstly, manifests itself in the creation of culture; therefore, language has cultural meaning. ‘Culture’ as defined by E. Tyler is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."3 Knowledge, belief, art and so on are without exception the symbols which are created by human beings from one generation to another generation. In this case, culture is constituted by

the symbols created by human being. The different cultural phenomena express the different symbols, among which language is the most fundamental. Thus, cultural differences consist of linguistic differences.

In some sense, the different cultures of the different ethnic groups are based on the different languages of these groups. Language represents the history, culture, faiths, games, entertainments, etc., of an ethnic group. Change of language reflects change of culture. Translation between two languages (for instance, Chinese and English) means the exchange of two kinds of culture (for instance, Chinese culture and a Western culture). In sum, the creation of cultures needs language; meanwhile, the continuity of cultures (tradition, heritage, and a body of wisdom), the transmission of cultures, and the integration of cultures also need language. Language provides a ground for interpreting culture.

The transmission of cultures is based on the pluralism of cultures. The transmission of cultures always takes place in the diverse cultures. This transmission causes the "inculturation". "Inculturation" means to transmit the system of faiths, values, customs, of one cultural group into another. In his Introduction, Antonio Gallo rightly points out the two dimensions of inculturation: "In its final sense, 'inculturation' can refer to any type of cultural objects, from the most external and material . . . to the most abstract and theoretical as the human ideal for life, a cosmology, social structure or conception of the soul and of human destiny." What I would like to add is that in the two dimensions, the second dimension (internal and spiritual) is more important. First of all, inculturation refers to the communication of faiths and the transmission of ideas. Successful inculturation should be the integration of the different faiths and ideas, and should build a bridge between the diverse cultures, even the two opposite cultural groups.

It is of importance to note that the different religions set the circumstances in which the different cultures can operate. The history of human civilization witnessed the birth of several of the world's great religious movements: Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism. Each of these religions is deeply rooted in the people, in some aspects determining a special kind of cultural development. The core of Western civilization is Christian civilization. The main goal of evangelization consists in the transmission of Christian faiths through the dialogue of religions. Generally speaking, religion is a special kind of system of faiths, and evangelization is a special type of communication of faiths.

Apparently, there is an intrinsic connection between language and communication. Usually, communication as a cultural phenomenon has various meanings. "We talk as readily of the communication of feelings, moods and attitudes as we do of the communication of factual information."4 Broadly, we define communication as the transmission of cultural symbols by means of language. In this sense, language is the medium of communication:

(either spoken or written)
transmitter ————> language ———> receiver
(medium)

Furthermore, the important character of communication (including inculturation) is its twofoldness: the first side consists of the transmitter (the giver of the information); the second side appears in the receiver. In the course of communication, firstly, transmitter gives the information to receiver through language actively; secondly, the receiver accepts and assimilates the given information and reacts positively on the transmitter through language. In this way, the

communication can be *creative*, and the inculturation can be an *integration*. Thus, the communication has twofoldness (the two sides reacting to each other) as follows:

(either spoken or written)
transmitter ————> language ————> receiver
<———— <————-
(medium)

In general, through language, the old generation can communicate the faiths to the young generation; the different cultures can dialogue; the inculturation can perform. So, the communication of faiths, the transmission of cultures, and the inculturation, fundamentally speaking, are*linguistic* activities.

Wittgenstein requires philosophers to "think in a new way." I think that Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language provides a new perspective for understanding inculturation and the communication of faiths.

Wittgenstein is the first man to determinatively promote the 'linguistic turn' of philosophy in the 20th century. This philosophic revolution is the transformation of a paradigm. Language becomes the focus of the new philosophic paradigm, the linguistic turn of philosophy in the 20th century.

Generally, there are the two dimensions of the linguistic turn: the scientific dimension and the humanistic dimension, and these two form the two main trends of contemporary Western philosophy. From this point of view, the contemporary Western philosophy of language can be divided into two main trends: the British-American philosophy of language (the dimension of 'scientism', in G. Frege, G.E. Moore, and B. Russell), and the Continental philosophy of language (the humanistic dimension, in M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, P.Ricoeur). The major difference between them consists in the fact that the former considers language as an instrument of expression which must be treated by logic (especially, formal logic): it emphasizes the instrumentality and logicality of language, and neglects the ontological and transcendent feature of language. Whereas the latter considers language as the fundamental being of man and as the life-experience of man: it emphasizes the ontological feature of language, and explores the cultural meaning of language.

As is commonly known, there are the two configurations of Wittgenstein: the early Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein. The former period of Wittgenstein is in the situation of contradiction: the conflict between scientism (Frege's and Russell's influences on the early Wittgenstein) on the one hand, and humanism (Schopenhauer's, Kierkegaard's and Dostoyevsky's influences on the early Wittgenstein) on the other. Wittgenstein's transition from his early philosophy of language to his later philosophy of language marks the big shift. Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language lays stress on the ontological feature of language, rejects scientism and pan-logicism, and maintains the life-meaning of language (language-games, forms of life, critique of private language). In this aspect, there are the profound similarities between Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language and the Continental hermeneutical approach: both of them focus on the cultural implications and the life-meaning of language. Therefore, we can research inculturation in terms of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language as well as in terms of 'hermeneutics' in the Continental sense.

Inculturation and Language-Games/Forms of Life/Critique of Private Language

Critique of private language

The phrase "private language" as used by Wittgenstein is misunderstood by many people. It does not mean original and esthetic language, nor a specially devised code, nor slang, nor the private use of ordinary language. Wittgenstein explains:

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves.—An explorer who watched them and listened to them might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.) But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?—Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean.5

For Wittgenstein, "private language" refers to language that can only be known to the person speaking and cannot be understood by another person. Wittgenstein explains that "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."6 And elsewhere Wittgenstein puts his definition this way: "And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a 'private language'."7

Apparently, so-called private language has two characteristics: (1) The words in the private language refer to what can only be known to the speaker himself, that is, they refer to private sensations; (2) Private language cannot be used to communicate *among* people.

Wittgenstein points out that the adherent of private language, if s/he thinks s/he is deploying a 'language' at all, makes three mistakes: (1) Belief in private sensations; (2) Belief in private ostensive definitions; (3) Belief in "obeying a rule privately." Wittgenstein's position is:

(1) One person's inner sensations (inner experiences) cannot be private objects "known" only to him. In other words, there are no private sensations, because one person is able to communicate his sensations to another person:

In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often Know when I am in pain.8

(2) So-called private ostensive definitions cannot be given via private language, whereas they can be given with the aid of public language:

Well, let's assume the child is a genius and himself invents the name for the sensation!—But then, of course, he couldn't make the word.—So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?—But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?—How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose?—When one says "He gave a name to his sensation," one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's

having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shows the post where the new word is stationed.

(3) "Obeying a rule privately" is nonsense, because a rule is always a public rule, and "obeying a rule" is a practice:

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. —To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).9

And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.10

In sum, the concept of private language is an illusion, so "we cannot imagine or invent an absolutely private language which would be able to function as a language."11

As regards cultural phenomena (faiths, values, ideas, pattern of life, etc.), they are also not ‘private’, so they can be transmitted among the people. Just because private language does not exist, it is possible for the inculturation and the communication of faiths in the situation of two different generations and in the situation of two different cultures. In the case of religion, the preacher or missionary can communicate the gospel to the people who are to be evangelized. Furthermore, as to the exchange of Western culture and Chinese culture, through translation of language, through teaching, and other efforts, Western culture can be transmitted to Chinese society, can be accepted by the Chinese people, and can be integrated into the Chinese cultural network.

Language-games

Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language emphasizes that language is a living activity which consists of language-games. Among the new discoveries that the later Wittgenstein makes, theory of language-games is of great importance. The theory of language-games is "a certain way of looking at language. Wittgenstein seems to suggest, not the only way and not even necessarily the best way, but a way to arrive at philosophical clarity."12

Then, what are language-games? Perhaps, we should firstly ask: What are games? Wittgenstein says:

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on.

These and similar things are called ‘games’.13

For this connection, Wittgenstein’s theory of language-games explains language by the analogy of games. He thinks: "I mean the language-game with the word ‘game’."14 Language-game defined by Wittgenstein is "the whole, consisting of language and actions into which it is

woven."15 First of all, language-game is an activity and a practice. To know a language-game means to know a certain kind of language use. Language-games not only are devices for describing language, but also exist in the actual practices of language. So the various practices of language constitute the various language-games. In this sense, language-games cannot be fixed; they always change.

When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of the words change.16

Something new . . . is always a language-game.17

Then, how many kinds of language-game are there? That is, "how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?— There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.18

In section 23 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein gives his list of 15 examples of language-games which are effective and important for understanding language-games:

Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables or diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

To sum up, the theory of language-games emphasizes the two points as follows: (1) the use of language is a social activity and language-game is a human practice; (2) language mixes with social customs and cultural life; it is a basic cultural phenomenon.

Wittgenstein says: "you must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. \ It is not reasonable . . . \It is there—like our life."19 In this sense, religious discourse (for example, the Bible) also consists of some special language-games: story, fable, hymn, prayers and so on. The transmission of religious discourse is also based on the medium of language. When the missionary takes the gospel to the receiver, he is also doing a special language-game. Generally speaking, inculturation and the communication of faiths as social practices can also become special language-games.

Forms of life

The most profound intention of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language consists in his intention to let language return to social life, that is, 'forms of life'. Just as language-games do, 'forms of life' also have a very important position in Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language. In some senses, forms of life become the habitation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language.

J.F.M. Hunter lists the following four interpretations in his paper entitled "'Forms of Life' in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations":

(1) "A form of life is the same as a language-game, and calling a language-game a form of life is saying that it is something formalized or standardized in our life; that it is one of life's forms."

(2) "A form of life is a sort of package of mutually related tendencies to behave in various ways: to have certain facial expressions and to make certain gestures, to do certain things like count apples or help people and to say certain things."

(3) "To say that something is a form of life is to say that it is a way of life, or a mode, manner, fashion or style of life; that it has something important to do with the class structure, the values, the religion, the type of industry and commerce and of recreation that characterize a group of people."

(4) ". . . The sense I am suggesting for it is more like something typical of a living being: typical in the sense of being very broadly in the same class as the growth or nutrition of living organisms or as the organic complexity which enables them to propel themselves about, or to react in complicated ways to their environment."20

The above interpretations explore the meanings of forms of life in various dimensions and are very helpful for our understanding of what Wittgenstein means by 'forms of life'.

Now, let's review what Wittgenstein says. He says: "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life."21

Here, in my opinion, forms of life include the three aspects: (1) the common pattern of behaviors of the people in the given times and in the given culture; (2) what the people can do in the social activity; (3) all practices including the social intercourse, the moral cultivation, the aesthetic action, the religious activity, etc. Generally speaking, "Forms of life are established patterns of action shared in by members of a group." "Any action which is established as belonging to a group and which has a common meaning shared in by the members of that group is a form of life."22

Wittgenstein thinks that action as form of life can appear only through the language-game. For this reason, there is a close connection between form of life and language-game. Apart from form of life, we cannot imagine language, and it is the same the other way round. Whoever discusses human being discusses language, and whoever discusses language discusses human life. Both form of life and language-game are human activities. Therefore, Wittgenstein says:

To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity, or of a form of life.23

On the one hand, form of life is equivalent to language-game. If language exists, then form of life exists, and it is the same the other way round. In other words, language in itself is form of life, and language-games are the main parts of forms of life. In this respect, the significance which Wittgenstein intends to express is very clear: When you imagine language, what you consider is not only the grammar and the rhetoric, but also "what has to be accepted, the given" (form of life); when you do language-games, what you seek is not only the expression of language, but also the form of life shared in by the members of a group (for instance, the same ethnic group in the common culture circle); when you explore the relation between language and human life, what you should pay attention to is not only the expression of life, but also life itself.

On the other hand, language-games and forms of life respectively explain language from differing aspects. The former emphasizes the sociality of language, and the latter emphasizes the ontological feature of language. From the ontological point of view, form of life has a transcendental meaning for human being. Wittgenstein says: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."24

As George F. McLean has noted in "Culture and Religion": "The process of evangelization is not merely one of communicating content regarding the nature of things, but being a leaven to a cultural order that it be brought more fully to life." Evangelization as linguistic activity can become a form of life through language-game. In fact, the communication of faiths (in essence, inculturation is the process of the communication of faiths) is the communication of form of life. The change of faiths means the change of form of life (pattern of value, pattern of action, and so on), and the goal of evangelization is to transmit the Christian form of life. The communication of faiths is a transcendental activity. Thus we have the following frame:

(either spoken or written)
transmitter ————> language ————> receiver <———— <———— (medium)
(form of life)

Now let us discuss the inculturation of democracy in China as an example of inculturation.

The Inculturation of Democracy in China

Democracy has two dimensions or two levels (institutional level and ideational level): (1) institutional level: democracy is a special type of political organization and political system; (2) ideational level: democracy is a special type of political faith and ‘form of life’. As regards the inculturation of democracy, the second level is of more important significance.

Democracy originates from Western civilization. Democracy as a political system is a result of Western civil society. Lincoln’s well-known saying—of the people, by the people, for the people— expresses the main idea of democracy. At the level of institution, democracy is a ‘constitutional’ state.

In another way, democracy is also a political faith and a form of life of people. According to this faith, people shall have the freedom of speech, the freedom of belief, the freedom of association and the freedom of publication; people shall have the right to avoid terror; people shall have the right to expresses their feelings, opinions and will; and people shall have the right to participate and to influence government policy. If democracy becomes the popular feeling and

common aspiration of people, becomes the faith and form of life of people, that is to say, if democracy is integral to the groups and the cultures of the people, *then* the true democratic system can be established.

The democratization of China is a very long and a very difficulty process. Before the revolution of 1911, the imperial Chinese system dominated China. 25 Its only state constitution was despotism. In the traditional Chinese political system and political idea, China lacked democratic norms and the democratic style. The Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution led by Dr.Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Qing Dynasty. Dr. Sun Yat-sen intended to establish a democratic state in China, but he didn't succeed in that. That is, the collapse of the Middle Kingdom didn't mean the establishment of the democratic system.

Dr. Sun's successor, Jiang Jieshi, disliked the idea of moving along a democratic road. During the first half of the 20th century, the Kuomintang government was far from democratization. After 1949, the Communist Party established a new political institution (the dual Communist Party\state government), but this institution seems remote from the true democracy. In other words, up to now, the true political reformation (the promotion of democracy in China), and the true democratic system have not appeared in mainland China. Why?

The reasons are very complicated. In my opinion, a key factor is that democracy never became the faith of the common Chinese people and their 'form of life' (pattern of action). It is important to note that democracy is not only a political system, but also a language system. The democratic idea and faith need to be transmitted not only at the official level of a state constitution, but also in the hearts of the common Chinese people; not only at the level of elite cultures, but also at the level of popular cultures.

In the May Fourth Movement, the progressive Chinese intellectuals introduced the idea of democracy from the West to China. Unfortunately, at that time, the imperialist powers invaded China. The Chinese nation fell into the crisis, so that saving the nation from subjugation and ensuring its survival became the very urgent task which the Chinese people had to carry out. As result, the transmission of democratic ideas was broken down. In view of the above-mentioned facts, at the present time what was called by the progressive intellectuals of the May Fourth Movement "Mr. Democracy" has not come to China. In view of this cultural lag, China needs the enlightenment and the edification of democracy. Only when democracy becomes the faith, the language-game and the form of life of the common Chinese people, can democracy as political system be established in China. But this is a very difficult process. So the transmission of democratic ideas and faith is very important for the Chinese people.

A Chinese idiom says that the future is bright, but the way to the future is winding. For comparative reference, China can look to post-World War II Japan, and to some extent, to contemporary Taiwan, and to Singapore, where in varying degrees the democratic system has been established. There's much in their democratization that the Chinese people can draw on. Among their experiences the most important one is the enlightenment and edification of democracy through the transmission of democratic language. Ultimately, the democratization of China will be carried out by the Chinese people who have received the edification of democracy and have accepted the faith of democracy. As the late President Kennedy said in his inaugural speech:—

"Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country. In this world God's work is man's own."

Notes

1 The Gospel of John, Chapter 1.
2 Genesis, Chapter 11.
3 1871, Vol.1, p.1.
4 J. Lyons, *Semantics*, Volume 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.32.
5 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 243, The Macmillan Company, 1968.
6 *Ibid*., p. 243.
7 *Ibid*., p. 269.
8 *Ibid*., p. 246.
9 *Ibid*., p. 199.
10 *Ibid*., p. 202.
11 Finch, H.L.R., *Wittgenstein: The Later Philosophy* (Humanities Press, 1977), p. 129.
12 *Ibid*., p. 72.
13 *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 66, 69.
14 *Ibid*., p. 71.
15 *Ibid*., p. 7.
16 Wittgenstein, "On Certainty," p. 65.
17 *Philosophical Investigations*, p.224.
18 *Ibid*., p. 23.
19 Wittgenstein, "On Certainty," p. 559.
20 *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (October, 1968).
21 *Philosophical Investigations*, p.226.
22 *Wittgenstein: The Later Philosophy*, p.90.
23 *Philosophical Investigations*, 9, 23.
24 *Philosophical Investigations*, 24.
25 Mao thinks that traditional China was a feudal society. But "Non-Marxists generally agree, first of all, that the gentry were not a mere ‘feudal landlord’ class, because Chinese society was not organized in any system that can be called feudalism, except possibly before 221 B.C. While ‘feudal’ may still be a useful swear word, it has little value as a Western term applied to China." (J. K. Fairbanks, *The United States and China*.)

Chapter VII
Culture as a Phenomenon: The Basis of Self-Identity

Antonio Gallo

Culture is something we can see, count, and describe; it is the object of an experience. When we analyze a culture different from ours, we easily recognize it because it is different, but it is not the difference itself. We see the true form, color, substance, sound, smell, high key and low key of a culture. Here, as philosophers, we are not taking the role of sociologists or anthropologists which we leave to Kroeber, Boas, Levi-Strauss, So Tax or Clifford Geertz. We are not working from the books of social anthropology, physical anthropology, linguistic anthropology (e.g., Whorf or Pike). As Husserl showed, we have the right to make our own experience.

Earlier studies also are elements of our living experience about cultural objects, but the primary object is the world of colors, forms, things, people, thinking and traditions, which a culture of itself shows to everyone who wants to approach it. A culture is visible and conspicuous. We see the clothes, and the shape of women walking or sitting on the earth, their hair flashing. They carry children on their shoulders or put them in the baskets at the super-markets. They walk across the street or drive cars. The culture is something "eidetic"; it appeals to us, encompasses us, embraces us, pierces us, challenges us. We can agree or disagree with it, but generally we disagree.

To its observers a culture says something we understand: the music, the design, the topology, and also something we do not understand: the attitude of the people, their gestures, values, their ways of showing intimacy. Why do we understand some things and not others? It is because every culture is a language: all cultural objects are words, and all cultural customs are discourses. Some words of this language are common to us, or very close, and we understand them; others are inexplicable and bore us.

The previous explanation, though very elemental, is partially true. The culture speaks because it is a language which the group, as an architect, has built through time and history to dialogue with itself and with the world. We can experience a culture because it is a collection of objects. Beyond their practical functions, these objects have a meaning, are signs and symbols: material, artistic, economic, religious. Every object—a door, a chair, a clock on the wall—without any reference to humans is mute, indifferent. However the human community has talked about them, used them, negotiated over them and criticized them: thus it has humanized them, and put them into history.

A thing becomes a link between persons—it assumes a certain weight in the common estimation and a place in the world. It is a witness; it captures many references and sheds light upon the members of the group. It is sufficient to study Marcel Mauss's work on the "gift" to already be impressed. As objects begin to speak, their meanings are public and secret, aloud and mysterious; they acquire some sacrality as the dread of a major mountain, the virtues of a source in the woods, or the specters of a solitary path. The group knows that, is awed by it, but lives with it.

Indeed this is only the most static and superficial level of the culture, but it suffices to introduce us to the implications of the culture in the construction of the personality and self of individuals born in the group, who become men and women, full citizens of the group. To search out a more far-reaching level of the culture, we must note, beyond objects, the role of words. The vocal language is not the only language, but perhaps is the most complete and meaningful. It is sensible too, due to the noise it produces, the rhythm, the tone, and periods, but its potentiality for

significance engages many regions of the human soul and mind. The semantic dimensions are intertwined in the spoken language; they insert us into the very "medium" shared by the human being with his partners for the construction of a civilization and of an intellectual and moral environment.

We will present three examples of community: one very ancient (Guatemala's Indians); the second new, completely submerged in a contemporary and technological world, and fighting there for a higher level of economic and intellectual existence (the Cubans in Miami); the third reflecting an 'emergent' situation in a suburb of Washington D.C., a Hispanic conglomerate of about five hundred families, many from Central and South America, e.g., San Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, Peru and Colombia.

Case I: Guatemalan Indians

The first case transcends the limits of a community. There are, in the same territory, almost twenty different ethnic groups forming a complex of about four million people, who dwell in and possess (with limitations) their own original historical land, language, collective habits and traditions. In the highlands of Guatemala, the Indian people are concentrated in a big region commonly called "the central occidental plateau." They occupy the highest level of the state geography and share the great lake of Atitlan, the Cuchumatanes Mountains, the hills of Coban, and some spots scattered along the south coast. They do not compose a national unity, but they have a name which has been recently adopted to make themselves feel truly unified, with a common historical background: the Mayan People.

Of course 'Mayan People' is not a real nation: the name signifies no more than an ideal backwards projection of the present range of villages into an obscure historical past in order to find a point of encounter inside an icon. The many different ethnic groups communicate with each other, when necessary, through the official Spanish language.

Statistical studies about this population, with 64 percent illiteracy (80 percent among women), poor provisions for public schools, very low per capita income (equalling less than a hundred U.S. dollars a year), could suggest that the Indians 'have no culture'. But this would be mistaken, or worse, a lie. If we add the nutritional deficiency among children, pulmonary sickness, alcoholism, and many more, we have a true "black legend" about a Mayan people primed and ready for 'rescue' by members of the American Peace Corps or NGOs with their salvation plans. But statistics can be manipulated and can easily constitute a scenario of deception.

If, on the other hand, we try to see (literally 'watch') the Indian cultures and make a simple "eidetic" description, the landscape changes and these people become real persons. Chichicastenango is a small Indian city, not so far from Utatlan, the old K'iche city, whose K'iche kings were burned alive by the conqueror Pedro de Alvarado. Tourist attractions converted it into a well-known place. Its market place: the two opposite temples with stairs and little altars, burning incense, reflecting the Mayan model of religious sanctuaries; the candles inside the church, the polychromy of flower petals offered to the saints on the sacred hilltops. All these have created the myth of Chichicastenango.

But this is not sufficient. There is more to see. There are indigenous shamans assisting the faithful, religious servants with incense praying for rain and a good harvest. Authorities in their traditional hand-made clothes, the "cofrades"and the houses of the saints, the images stuffed with brilliant streams of paper, the processions, all plunge us into a mystical cultural mood.

Can all these ‘superficial’ details explain why they still exist, five centuries after Columbus? We must talk with the people selling lime, or pottery, or the colorful blankets. Or perhaps we should read Ruth Bunzel’s *Chichicastenango*; or Ruben Reina’s *The Law of the Saints*; or Robert Carmack’s *Quichean Civilization*. Maybe we can start by learning the meaning of every gesture, ceremony, personal prayer, wedding gift, ritual, myth and cosmic vision. We begin a trip to the interior of this culture to find the human consciousness of the other persons, their interpretation of the world, discovering their "otherness", their freedom, as Husserl in his fifth *Cartesian Meditation*, or Merleau Ponti in *Signs,* phrase it.

The K’ichean Guatemalan Indians world is a square world founded upon the four cardinal points, with four colors (the red for the orient, the yellow for the south, the white for the north and the black and dark blue for the occident); the center is green for man. Their traditional mathematics proceeds by multiples of four to twenty, for calculating the daily small purchases in the market place. Their calendar of eighteen months has a week of thirteen days. A square Guatemalan calendar, not a round Mexican one, with the names of the good days and the "animal-*nagual*"which links it to every newborn child. The shaman calculates the system of space and time which oversees human destiny and stresses the relationship between the earthly zones of life: the underground, the surface, and the sky. The whole community knows the proper ritual to sanctify the fields of maize, to do penance, to beg for permission, to become a friend to the lord of the hills and of the woods.

The present and the future acquire meaning from the yearly cycle and the wisdom of the ancestors, the saints, the forces of nature and the great order of the sky, the sun, the moon, and the life of animals. The book of the creation of the world written by the Pop Vuj is not a book for reading. It is for a people who have forgotten the hieroglyphic writing,— it is a living gospel, coming from the counsel of the ancestors.

This is Chichicastenango from the inside, and it is the culture of a people who for five centuries have protected their form of life against the waves of tourists and the tyranny of governors. They are the heirs of the old K’iche and have recently overrun the last military bastion of the heights along with the other villages of the same culture: Santa Cruz, Santa Maria Chiquimula, Sacapulas, Cunen, Uspantan and Saint Catherine Ixtahuacan. After the war the people of Chichicastenango have fed, for years, the sons of the widows, and cultivated their fields as a community responsible for all its members.

They keep and perpetuate the four stems of the K’iche culture: The first is the "Maize" which is the general basis of nourishment, the social "medium" to share in the family, to negotiate in the square, to dictate economic politics, to give soul to every ceremony. It is the value that symbolizes the continuity and the potentialities of the group; and moreover, it is a divine principle linking human labor and the creative forces of nature and the universe. The formal education of the young people is related to the maize. The father is in charge of training and instructing the children about raising and cultivating the maize; the mother educates her daughters by showing them the skills of preparing in many forms the maize as a food for the man and the community. "As long as the maize endures, the Mayan People will exist," said their recent leader Manuel Salazar Tetzaguic. The second stem of their culture is the consciousness of being part of the whole world. The pantheistic "creation" is a spiritual work that involves their temper of mind and moral attitudes. The K’iche feels himself to be connected with the natural elements, the animals, the plants, the fields, the rain and the fog, the river and the mountain. This estimation of nature is spontaneous and metaphysical: one is Being, one is the order "with all its manifestations"(So Tax). No one among K’iche people can use the natural energies (as we do in the occidental mind, as an

instrument) without venerating them, cooperating with them, asking pardon, praying to the lord each expression of the whole (Falla: *El K'iche rebelde*).

The third stem of the people's culture is the authority of the community. The whole society is supported through many structured levels of office. Step by step, a K'iche man becomes an adult by serving his community. The uppermost level is occupied by elders, the elevated rung of wise and sage men. This training leads a person to true spiritual kinship, and after death, they join the presence and ranks of the ancestors who live their mysterious life by night in the same streets, fields and woods (Betty Saravia, *El ladino me jodio*).

The fourth root in this sublime construction is the unity of all man's activities: life is not divided; the Indian vision is unitarian. This aesthetic value makes a whole of the polychromed pottery, clothes, and linens. Technical labor is nothing but another face of moral being, moral order and social discipline, with its religious cults and poetic imagery. In Chichicastenango, life is not divided between politics and education, fidelity to the family and desire for fame and skill. Perhaps the slow transformation of the external expressions of their culture is due to the difficulty of conserving the proportions of this whole in a modern context.

Even through this general survey, we realize that behind the crowded multiplicity of cultural objects, one can discover a texture of meanings which bind together the vines from the most remote roots of an ethnic identity.

To complete the scene, one must note that there are many other similar Indian units. The K'iche are one of many expressions of the Indian heritage in Guatemala. The twelve villages around Atitlan Lake show a Tzutujil variant of the ancient culture. The Tzutujil and Cackchiqueles people are also relics of conquest; their unchanged customs and skills make them much sought subjects for scholars and tourist photographs.

The Santiago Atitlan provides a more intense perception of space and time through their traditional accounts (collected and translated by Rita Roesh). The sagas and myths around the lake reflect their worldview like a hyper-real mirror with high volcanos and treacherous waves, as in the dimly lit moods of their dreams. The makers of rain, the child who brought us fire, the princess sleeping under the shining waters, the little daughter who became lord of the beloved mountain, are a fulfilling literature. They justify the team of naturally gifted artists (as Sisay, Curruchich and others). One should also not forget their sculptures and paintings, as well as the folk festivals, hand woven cloth, and decorated fabrics. All of this is contrasted with the rocky walls along their slender trails which escort us to the more secret syncretic cult (ancient and modern) of Maximon. They provide a new image enriching the icon of traditional Mayan culture. But let us pass to other regions.

Our travel leads to Coban, where they speak the most attractive though aging language, reflecting the historical debates of Bartolome de Las Casas, Montesinos and Vitoria. The Ixil triangle is dreadedly famous for the repression which took place there. There is also the Mam area whence thousands of men crossed the border into Mexican territory and were crowded into refugee camps in Champoton and Campeche. They are not Mexican; their land is the old Mayan land, and their language (*mam* = 'ancient') is the oldest Mayan language.

The Mayan people in Guatemala, despite their differences, can be considered to constitute a vast Mayan horizon which raises questions about the vital sources of ethnicity and the struggles it has endured for centuries as the guardian of a human community. The Mayan ethnicity has developed its own system of life, and its own meaning of being human.

Case II: The Cuban Community, Miami, Florida, U.S.A.

The second case is the Cuban community in Miami. This community originated mainly in the exodus from Cuba (1959-1961) of many Cubans into the United States and Puerto Rico after the installation of Castro's regime, when his government began its agrarian reform and openly declared itself Marxist. Castro closed Catholic and private schools, the centers of Catholic activities, and banished the priests. Political harassment killed many citizens, thousands were put in jail, and many had to flee. From this date the flight to a free land became a more or less intense series of successive waves even up to the present (1992).

Many reached far countries, such as Venezuela, Canada, Brazil, Colombia, the Netherlands, and Australia, but the larger part were scattered throughout the United States, but most settled in the nearest city, Miami. It is an important fact that through the years, many thousands of Cubans who spread out to the big cities of the northern United States slowly returned to Miami. There, the newcomers not only transformed a relatively minor American city into a dynamic and progressive one, but built a community with strong structures and a distinctive character.

Today, Cubans occupy a broad geographical sector of the city. They hold leading positions in economics, business and technology. The Cubans own a large number of restaurants, hotels, newspapers, broadcasting stations, clubs, educational institutions, supermarkets, drugstores, libraries and museums, and have many churches. This Cuban community has Cuban foods, sings Cuban songs, and buys suits in the Cuban style. They celebrate Cuban weddings and Cuban feasts, and promote political action for their rights. Practically they transformed the drowsy town of old Miami into a main trading center and a major financial force.

Obviously in this period of only thirty years, they have not forgotten their Cuban identity, which they have conserved though their culture has changed greatly. Nevertheless, they continue to identify themselves as true Cubans. To demonstrate this, they keep in contact with their old relatives on the island, and talk about Cuba everyday, criticizing Fidel Castro as a necessary point of reference in their conversations.

But are the Cubans in Miami genuine Cubans? Many speak English fluently and accept American comforts, materialistic views, and consumerism. Their children learn more easily in English than in Spanish and tend to forget the latter. They are involved in American pragmatic thinking in the new-age ideology.

Though many parents, educated in the religious and Catholic traditions of Cuba, are not truly practicing Catholicism, nevertheless their religion is now a part of their renowned identity and is a consistent marker for their being 'true Catholics and true Cubans'. The Catholic religion has become a very influential element in their lives. They support the Church financially and donate their services to the Church. The Catholic faith is not only the spiritual means for saving their souls, but it is a reinforced vision of the world, a cultural and spiritual connection with the past.

J. Alan Winter (1991) studied the religious integration and the cohesion of the community as a changing, pluralistic whole with many dimensions. He investigated the Cuban equivalent of Jewish "Zionism," and found it functions more as an integrating element for the community, than as a control. Gene Levine had established a positive connection between religion and community integration. But is religion an effect of group integration or an instrument for it? If a religious commitment influences the sense of unity, may we talk about an "ethno-religion?" In the Cuban case there is no doubt that the religious element plays a strong role in strengthening the ties which unify the group.

As the relation between the American Jews and Israel has been a basic factor in supporting the continuity of American-Jewish identity, there is a very interesting possibility that the reaction of the Cubans against Castro could strongly support the extraordinary force of their Cuban identity.

Of course, there are more elements we could consider. The Cubans were truly a special kind of emigrant population. As the poll of 1990 demonstrated, more than 51 percent of the people who went out from the island had some university degree or study. Only 7 percent or 8 percent were peasants or factory workers. This intellectual level and educational preparation could explain their rapid success in the host country, how strongly they spun a net of relations with their neighbors, and their intense consciousness of continuity with the past.

Their negative image of Cuba today—the general poverty, the tyranny of the government, the lack of free thinking, and of free associations, the destruction of free enterprise, and the slaughter of cultural and religious expression—is a dark but essential component of their present new Cuban image of ethnic identity.

The "Hermita de la Virgen" of charity, the yearly boat festival in the bay, the founding of St. Augustine as the first settled colony in the United States, are rough materials for the history of a community which does not want to disappear. In their search for their spatial and temporal boundaries, they have created a mythical idea of a utopian country, namely a Cuba without Fidel but with a democratic government, free enterprise, and some socialism to ensure the control of government over the large centers of production and to provide basic services to all citizens. They dream of free educational centers with some teaching of religious subjects when parents request it.

In their axiological scale, the highest value is economy (76 percent), the second place at 73.5 percent is religion, the third (73.4 percent) is education, with great interest in progress. The most important element in their ideal ethnic icon is the Cuban family-relationship, with Cuban music, history, traditions and language.

The younger ethnic generation has developed the content of its own identity, which does not necessarily coincide with that of the Cubans on the island. With time, this identity will be increasingly different as new cultural elements are integrated into their respective identities, for the new factors to be assimilated will be new responses to the challenges of the historical environment. This appears in their own sense of being Cubans: 62 percent defined themselves as "principally Cubans"; but 33 percent said that they mix "Cubanity" and participation with the new land which received them. In fact, 70 percent are now citizens of the U.S. and 46 percent of the others want to be. Many other elements will be changed, but this is not the point. What is important is that this group does exist, fights to conserve itself, and in the last few years has acquired a lasting personality. These special immigrants will call themselves Cubans despite the growing differences between them and the Cubans of the island.

A typical example of this process of differentiation can be found at an international meeting held in St. Augustine, Florida on July 30th and 31st and August 1st and 2nd, 1992. One of the possible confusions of identities came to the fore. The issue of political action against Cuba threatened the balance of the divergent tendencies between Cubans on the island and those who fled. Each party could vindicate for itself the right to be a true Cuban, and in fact there were "two true Cuban" groups or more. But the mingled mentalities could not harmonize their outlooks on the future. Fortunately, the religious element: prayers, rituals, processions, "Cuban Night," which everybody could interpret as "of their own," established the desired unity. Analogous to what Woochar (1986) says about American Jews, the attitude toward the original people performed its basic role of stressing the continuation of Cuban identity in foreign territories. To be Cuban is to

be part of a people rich with glorious traditions and perduring values. The movement of CRECED, encouraged by religious authorities, is welcomed by the community in terms which are both spiritual and ethnic.

Case III: The Hispanic Community in Washington, D.C.

The third case alludes to a small Hispanic community near Washington, D.C., in Wheaton, Maryland. The physical center of the unity is religious too, but this is not the reason for the union itself. The people are not emigrants of one country as is the case of the Cubans above, but they came from many Latin American states, mainly from Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and some from further south, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. The conglomerate is not so homogeneous as are the Cubans: their only common elements are language, the Catholic tradition, and the colonial background. Few of them had any political involvement but they shared a psychological attitude, that of men and women searching for peace, a convenient job, and a promising future.

This first sketch of the group could be interpreted as a heterogeneous contest of individualistic ideals. If we say further that some 10 percent of them constitute a fluid population moving to other suburbs in search of new jobs or more convenient homes, and that many have problems with the authorities because of their legal situations, we can draw an image of a very inconsistent whole.

But that would *not* be their basic reality, for there is a true life of the group. As with many other groups too, this "life" is not quite uniform. A principal and fixed core of the population is constituted of people who emigrated to the Washington area ten or twelve years ago. Their economic and social situation is now improved and well-established. Their relations with their countries of origin are looser; but their support of the group is more effective.

Some of them offer professional services to the Spanish-speaking, regarding jobs, insurance, taxes, contracts, etc. Others are expert in building maintenance, or managing hotels, stores, factories. Women work in offices, travel agencies, and the like. Around this stronger nucleus are grouped more recent immigrants, socially and economically weaker, who seek the aide and collaboration of those of the same language and tradition who are already established. For them the linguistic and cultural barrier is too strong to be broken; they depend on the support of people who can communicate with them in some deep sense. They identify such people, reach them through friends, and trust them.

A strange incomprehensible "gap" separates these Hispanics from the highly technical and developed English-speaking society. The Hispanic community near Washington ignores the internal sensibilities of these well-organized neighbors, of the mass media, art, literature, politics; and understand very little of labor associations. But they do open a space for themselves in the large society, with some protection from the law and nestled within a small human environment similar to that back home in Latin America. In fact not only the language of this little environment is the same; there are also the same religion, the same feasts, friends, and some spiritual conceptions of the life and of the world, much of which derive from the general Latin-American heritage of colonization and the Spanish tradition. Thus these immigrant Hispanics form a fragile web of humanity in a strange land.

Not only is the postal mail the channel for perpetuating contacts with families back home in Latin-America. The main contact is by phone. The telephone calls are the new but effective instrument to connect this small and closed space in the U.S.A. to the living history of relatives back home, and the grand history of the past: in the fun and noise of Salvador, in the foggy

mountains of Peru, or the mythic Mayan cities of Guatemala. Could we say that the phone wires are the threads which nourish the identity of this little immigrant group?

In fact they do not have any problem of identity or alienation. Their land is not lost,— their old house is still there, awaiting their return. And all their family is alive there. Is that a sufficient reason to justify their sturdy attachment to their customs and traditions?

Maybe we have to take account of another component of identity: the race. By 'race' here is not meant the biological concept, which—as is now well-known—does not in itself influence culture in some predetermined way. By 'race' here, we mean the sense closer to what Pitt-Rivers assumes for Guatemala and Mexico. The racial concept in Latin America is that of the "mestizo." This group in the parish of St. Catherine's near Washington knows that they are "mestizos": their dark skin opposed to white and blonde, the short stocky frame opposed to the tall and slender, the warm character opposed to the cold and calculated, and other paradigmatic marks, induce all the members of this group to classify themselves as 'insiders' to their own group and 'outsiders' to others living near them.

The slow but ongoing transformation of St. Catherine's Hispanics is not only due to changes in jobs which move them to other sites in the city. There is also the influence of newcomers streaming into the family. The classical concept of the extended family operates to introduce into the established unities new arrivals from the kinship-network: cousins, aunts, nephews, etc. All these need more and more the support and the cooperation from the community, and this support in turn makes the ties stronger. This is a minor problem for the community but temporarily it shapes the whole, and newcomers seek jobs, homes, contacts, schools, and health assistance.

No doubt the religious factor is the main agent for the birth of a common identity, and in fastening ethnic bonds; especially, among Hispanics, the Catholic religion. In fact, many persons who in their original countries passed to some new sects or fundamentalist congregations, have returned to Catholic practice inside the group.

The Catholic parish of St. Catherine is historically English-speaking, and 'yankee' in style. Fortunately, the parish offered to the Hispanic minority both the physical structure of the building, and human openness. The parish instituted Spanish prayer-teams, Spanish-language Masses, bible schools, preparation for baptism and for marriage, retreats, catechism classes for children; as well as rooms for family celebrations, games, meetings after Mass.

All these activities scheduled during the week and on Sundays, give to all the old and new members of the community favorable opportunities for auto-realization, as well as friendly contacts as teachers, choir members, consultants, trainers, sport directors. These complex activities satisfy the persons of all social class levels, strengthen ethnic bonds, and thwart social stratification. A lot of the new arrivals are speedily incorporated into the life of the group; and aid to the poor members is seen as improving simultaneously the identity of the whole.

These weekly activities, and the closed relations among Hispanics in the working context, orient the marriages toward an in-group phenomenon. In fact a few are celebrated with persons brought specifically from the country of origin, but more ordinarily marriages are among partners of the same group or other Hispanic communities in the Washington area.

Despite living in the same territory, and using the same physical spaces (church, school, "Claridge Room," "Russell Room," convent, rectory), the Spanish community keeps sharply defined boundaries marked off from the English-speaking parishioners, because almost all the community's institutions are different. Most of the members only know the Spanish language well; the 'English' priests (the pastor and others) do not speak Spanish and do not understand Spanish.

Only the community leaders, and the nuns designated for the apostolate, speak and move freely in both languages.

The commitment of the non-Hispanic leaders, deacons, and a good number of lay cooperative people, is consciously inspired by their religious faith, but is not so consciously (or unconsciously) ethnic. They keep some general consciousness of the ethnic spirituality of their ancestors, and do try to maintain values opposite to those of the surrounding materialistic civilization (drugs, car-jackings, run-away youth).

The perception of economic security and amelioration due to responsible behavior in their work and with the laws and the duties of the citizens in the host country, firmly supports their faith; recourse to God and to religious creed are a conscious complement of their principles for life. Inside the community, then, they find a Catholic education for children, new practical courses of training for employment, and more intense knowledge of religious doctrine.

In general we can describe the St. Catherine Spanish community as a people of different roots, but a common Hispanic background, who are too recent to have a history in the U.S.A. and a durable consistency, but who are consciously fighting to become an 'ethnic group' in the technical sense. Taking a broader view, if we try to notice all the similar communities spreading from Washington D.C., to Maryland, to Virginia (from the Catholic perspective belonging to the Washington Archdiocese), and if we suppose present conditions will last, soon these communities will become ethnic entities, with their own language, means of communication, and life-design.

This process is quite different from what has unfolded for the Cubans in Miami. Maybe, it could be compared (only from the ethnic point of view), rather, with our first case, of the Mayan archipelago of groups in Guatemala. The Guatemalan Mayans defied centuries of colonial pressure to conserve their historical identity, and now the Hispanics of Washington are defying a technological superpower to constitute their own new communal way of life.

Group Identity

We have then three different styles of producing culture on behalf of a human set of persons in a quite wide variety of environments. Our eidetic description offers an experience that we have to interpret, explain, and 'reduce' via the phenomenological method of analysis, without forsaking contact with the experience itself.

The three look quite different, but in some true way, they are all groups, human groups. We tried to see the cultures starting from the cultural frontiers: the things produced, the behaviors generated by the people. We saw the objects, circumstances, attitudes of the spirit, the geographical contexts of the tropical mountains or the flat hot plain, or the wonderful woods, and the home's living space. We saw the variety of external colors of the internal thinking, and of the products, homes, machines and offices. Is culture a set of stable, settled objects?

When Hurricane Andrew struck Miami (1992), it left the Cuban people bare-footed, the roofs torn off their houses, their doors sent flying, and their walls broken down. Almost all the cultural objects were dispersed: chairs, tables, tools, plates, dishes, books, disks, cars, beds, shoes, cans, pictures, papers, diaries, records, memories; and the people alone remained. Only a few died, but fifteen thousand houses were destroyed, leaving only their inhabitants desperately seeking for their goods. 'People' still walking, talking, weeping and screaming, but real persons in this immense disaster of 'things'.

Maybe this is a metaphor, 'for what' we need to seek inside: the things are dead, the men are living; but what is the link between humans and things? The humans were crying, because they

lost their useful objects and tools; but what of the people who were deprived of their languages, their customs, their traditions, their thinking, their ideals which they loved? Why could we not sweep away all the things and give to the men a new skin? What about this strange being we call a human *person*? From this frail starting point, we can, probably, develop our reflections about ethnic groups.

Persons can forsake an old house, and build a new house; but can they forsake their culture and adopt another? We have to find the answer beyond the cultural objects, and follow the thread of their significance to reach the interior level, where the meaning is produced and received. We must search beyond the phenomenon of the experience to the transcendental (in the phenomenological sense) world of communication between persons. Persons dwell in the center of the woven icon whence things are denoted, and whither things send their songs. But before the step to individual personhood, we need to achieve an insight into the whole context where the persons flourish and grow; this context is the human group.

The Studies

We do not find many philosophers discussing the group as thoroughly as they discuss the individual. Only in this contemporary age did the ethnic group raise the issue of identity and beg the attention of speculative analyses. Edmund Husserl anticipated the theme, in his *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* and in his fifth *Meditation*; Heidegger did also. Ethnic groups in our sense did not really gain the widespread attention of philosophers until after the collapse of Communism (1989).

Before that the issue was a field of research for anthropologists such as Gnarl (1969), Barth (1970), and Geertz (1973). It began to be debated mainly in Religious Studies. To cite some: J. Alan Winter (1991), "Religious Commitment, Zionism and Integration in a Jewish Community"; John Webster (1992), "Locality and Catholicity"; James Crispino (1980) "The Assimilation of Ethnic Groups"; Charles Taylor (1989), "The Making of Modern Identity"; Frederick Schick (1992), "Liberty, Equality"; Edward Dixon Junkin (1992), "Up From Grass Roots." Others are more political and ideological such as P. F Knitter (1991), "Pluralism and Oppression"; Rodney Barker (1992), "The Broken Circle"; Diana L. Eck and Susan A. M. Shumaker (1992), "The Pluralism Project"; James Paul (1989), "National Formation and the Rise of Culture."

In the past, philosophers spoke about the personal "ego" and interpersonal relations (Max Scheler, E. Levinas, Hanna Arendt, A. Schutz). They also spoke of the family as a natural entity and fundamental nucleus of the society. But few are acquainted with the group as a super-personality such as Husserl saw it, as "natural" as is the family. From the family, one receives biological life, care and emotions, education, sensible communication, patterns of action, and protection. But who established the rules of the language? The norms of civility? The patterns of conduct? The working traditions? All are products of the group, and all these are fundamental cultural elements.

Every individual person is shaped by the group's daily interrelations, from the beginning of his existence to the fullness of human development and maturity. It is so with the Indians we described from Guatemala, the Cubans in Cuba and in Miami, and the small Hispanic communities in Washington, D.C.

If the group does not exist, the individual does not obtain a definite identity, a scale of values, a set of good manners, a place for him/herself in this world, and many other more profound characteristics or elements supporting identity. As an individual one can acquire much knowledge,

sciences, maybe, skills, but still be a nobody: without roots, without traditions, without a world to share with others, without a structure of intimate communications. Without these, there is no deep and transcendental signification.

The Group Dynamic

To understand the dynamic of life inside the group, we will cross the outer frontier of material or intellectual products which are fixed, and tend to be historical and conservative of their own essence, even though they may be intellectual objects (aesthetic, moral, or political). These are what Paul Ricoeur calls "ideology."

Seen from its boundaries where a group states its differences from others; where the groups project the meaning of their uniqueness, there is no favorable conjuncture promoting change through external influence. We could not, for example, plunder the Cubans of their prolonged discourse about Cuba, their family meetings, or their Cuban food. They find too much significance in these. In Guatemala it would be impossible for the Mayan people to forsake the sacred maize, their process of education inside the community, their concern about the ancestors, and for nature's presence. Nor could the people of St. Catherine's people separate themselves from the weekly meetings, the phone calls to Latin America, and their trust in community members.

Inculturation as we shall describe it will be a reality at a more internal level, at the communication level where an individual evolves in his deep experience and expression.But it is not possible to reach this more authentic and essential center without making contact with the cultural frontier and passing through it. This is the place of hermeneutics as a first step towards the inculturation.

We can distinguish three main regions in this global representation of an ethnic group as a whole or personality. The first region as the most superficial is put at the top: it is external to the group though it is strictly linked to the group by meanings. It is the region of the cultural objects, signs and symbols: words, writings, and material supplies. These are terminal products of the persons inside the collectivity. They cannot be changed or substituted by others more or less different. As products, all these fixed entities are the expressions of a particular moment of the group; but they conserve a link with their authors and project an image of themselves in the consciousness of the group.

The first region could be interpreted as a utopic movement, and the last as an ideological one. The human being as member of the group becomes conscious of the image, and holds it as something of himself, and, of course, as compatible with the utopia. The dialogue between the utopian and ideological movement constitutes the acting-out of the group evolution. This is a human process and consequently follows the natural possibility of changes and adaptations.

The region of the cultural products has a meaning for every citizen born, educated, and undergoing formation in the horizon of the group; the shared meaning becomes a spiritual mood, an image of themselves for all the members. In fact, the Mayan people of Guatemala have a long-lasting image almost five centuries old; their reaction to the natural and historical environment continued producing cultural objects of the same form during all these years. For the Cubans, there is a short but intense history of exile, fight for employment, legal status, and the continuity of their homeland's civilized history of which they are so proud. In St. Catherine's, there is a very weak

and pieced-together history, shared among themselves amidst strange and sometimes hostile circumstances that gather dispersed units in the common horizon of the Latin-American tradition.

We can understand the "polarity" between the two extreme positions, the belt of static objects and the dynamic person; but a polarity results from the unity between the two opposite realities.

The second region of the group is the reciprocal communication between the persons of the group. As many contacts, interchanges, necessary dealings, actions shared by the members, are transformed this effects a more intense, plural, intellectual, affective, and economical understanding. This mediation of the communication is not an aggregate of experiences, but a constitution of the person itself, where the individuals give life to the whole and the living inter-lacing is a natural complement of the unique individuals.

At this point, the subjectivity and the objectivity of the community are not yet abstract concepts, but a woven tissue of life. This situation intensifies the harmony, becoming weighty, thick and mysterious, and excluding other groups. This phenomenon is particularly conspicuous in the relatively tense conditions of St. Catherine's Hispanics. This is the region of inner consciousness, of psychological temper and of the original creativity. Inside the mood of the group every member feels him/herself at ease, free from stiff formality. They can share individual pain or anxiety, and with them individual dreams can find support for creativity. The group understands and seconds; words among the group carry the same meaning.

Inside the Cuban group, the members generate a common attitude of being a true engine of the Miami economy; of being able to generate a strong network of mutual help and collaboration; of great talent permitting them to move into the aesthetic fields of theater and dance; and of social graces permitting a style of gentle and refined sociability. In St. Catherine's, the Hispanics are proud of a high moral level, of a spiritual life gathering powerful individual energies for the common achievement of dignity. In the mysterious second region, the stiffness of the icon becomes smoother, and individual uniqueness develops within collective experience and control.

The third region of the group can be termed, "the ecology"; every group has its ecology. In the modern sense, "ecology" refers not only to the arrangement of nature's resources, but to all the physical, human, and historical contexts around the community. This is the region of the things and of the fundamental experience of knowledge. For the St. Catherine community, "ecology" involves immersion in an unknown and technologically/economically complex situation into which they must insert themselves at the most accessible point. For the Cubans, ecology involves a very improved and sophisticated organization of the work, trade, and production that they effectively understand and dominate. The group reacts to the ecology, interprets it, and makes its world therein.

These three regions we can distinguish for purposes of analysis, but they must be integrated in the life of the group. The third or ecological region is mediated by the group to produce the objects. And the objects are mediated by the group to produce the icon, a significant reality for the region of consciousness. The second region is the central "core" of the group, the region of the dialogue between individual personality and a growing super-personality of the group.

The third region shapes our internal structure through the experience, which is always the essence of our relations. All we think, all we dialogue, has to be confirmed and rejected in terms of experience. We are thinking, but experience will guide us. The group knows it, and reconciles all these experiences, concentrating them in the objects. The mediation of the group is a quite human mediation. "Ecology" is not at all a void word, but rather a sum of experiences.

The Subject: Individual or Group

Let us turn now to some more theoretical considerations. What should be said of the individual being so mysteriously involved with the group? Is the individual really an independent entity, a subject, an Ego? What kind of constituents, elements, forces, and principles dwell in this Ego or subject? Is a "group" more a subject than the subject itself?

A major thinker on the subject was Immanuel Kant. His first *Critique,* too close to the concept of Hume's intuition, reduced experimental activity to the senses and mundane being to the 'mere' phenomenon. With that not only the noumenon became unknown, but the Ego as well which was voided and nullified. The Ego was closed to the world and, instead, opened to the Kantian Categories. Thus the Kantian man's 'understanding' was impoverished of content and crowded with ideas. He eliminated objectivity, and then left the Ego alone, deserted, separated from the challenge of the living human context.

After Kant, the idealistic movement continued this same trend. Hegel reduced all reality to the Reason (Idea, Nature, Spirit) and in this rational world the human Ego was converted to a passing moment of the monistic whole. Then in Marx's utopian humanism the personal Ego was submerged in the struggle of work relations and production forces. At the end of the last century, the 'return to experience' provoked extreme reactions among scientists, and at the beginning of the 20th century the radical attitudes of the Vienna Circle and the 'logical positivism' of Oxford and Cambridge.

Between these two ideological positions cited above came phenomenology with a new methodology which returned to the problem of experience. Ego-reality was firmly recovered in the work of Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Blondel , Sartre, Jaspers, and Max Scheler. The Ego as person became the center and main value of human existence. In the individual's real world it is established by virtue of the community, which is the ethnic group. In the group the person reaches his/her best performance and dignity as an individual among individuals and nested in a network of individuals.

We have to ask, of course: What happens inside the group which makes it so enormously important? To all appearances, nothing happens. But it is in the group that persons speak. Language is the favorite issue among scholars today; it is the 'field' where all the human sciences flow together. But here we are concerned not with the conventional language we can learn by books or lessons, by grammars and dictionaries, but with the true language people use at home, at all ages, in the street and for both material and spiritual subjects, for speculative and practical necessities. This is the language of the group whence it has its many significations. In the group the language is a reflection of the common experience, the communication of internal feelings, generally accompanied by gestures and visible movements. There is no distinction between intensive, extensive, and ostensive definitions for the flow of meaning is complete and alive.

We can propose another scheme to understand it:
constitution of the world
Ego conceptual communication THE GROUP
meanings
experience
ecology and things

The Ego of the person builds or constitutes itself through a personal, individual experience with continuity, change, modification of self, and emotion. Experience is not only sensible experience, but the whole existence in space and time and in contact with things. Every member of the group has one's own lasting experience which perdures. Without experience we are nothing, for experience is life and our form of perduring. Experience is of forms, values, ideas, relations, emotions, and will. These are infinite in variety and always precede our conceptual thinking; experiences found our thinking.

But the experience is nothing more; it does not 'make sense'; it is neither an explanation nor commentary. Among our experiences, that of the other person, of the other ego subject and person is also fundamental. Discovering the other is to communicate to the other. Only a person can speak for this opens a new dimension of being, that towards a different person. Children become adults by speaking, or communicating with persons.

It is this spoken communication which makes the group. Through, language experience becomes spoken and hence shared or common. The group has a common experience and a common explication too; in the group the individual becomes more individual. He becomes a member of the group, and his thinking is the thinking of the group; his world is the world of the group.

The group creates the world. Experience brings the things to us; the group puts us in the world. Then the world appears; it is our world, our space of existence, our dimension of Being. Before the group there is no world, but only things or bare experience (which Sartre calls "nausea"). It is when we reflect, abstract, compare, perceive differences and experience the other as other that we are truly human persons.

This passage may seem quite poetic, but it is not. It is only the simple description of what happens with the group. The people of St. Catherine's know that; they live by it. The Cubans know it too and because they know it, the group is strong, solid, profound. Living in the group is living in the world—not only a physical world but an interpretation, an intellectual view, a cosmology, a semantic world genuine and faithful, a world true to human life.

A group can occupy places in different forms of group. The most complete is, without doubt, an ethnic group. An example is the Israeli people who have a definite general identity, with many subcultures inside. Other examples abound: the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Bavarians in Germany, the populations of the four cantons of Switzerland, the Sardinians of Italy, the Waloons and Flemish of Belgium, and so on. Every real political state, in the contemporary world, is faced with groups. The first struggle among these people involves fundamental human rights; but all the negotiations deal in and with language.

Matters are expressed by all classes of languages: oral, written, gestural, and the 'languages' of dance and of cultural objects. Language is the main channel, the twine and thread that constitutes a free unity of the Egos in the group. The talk and dialogue construct the unity, but change as well. Language guides people between ideology and utopia; this is the field of inculturation.

But there is no language without meaning and not inculturation without life, because the meaning of the group deals with life. We reflect about this when we think about inculturation and about promotion of the group. As inculturation is the production of meaning in the language of the group it is a production of life.

What kind of meaning; what kind of life? All purposeful inculturation promotes the life of the group for it moves the group from its ideology to its utopia. Inculturation then happens only through true and essential human understanding.

Chapter VIII

The Sixty-Year 'Samsara' of Studies in Pragmatism and the Road of Cultural Development in China

Liu Fangtong

The May 4th 'new culture' movement of 1919 is recognized almost unanimously by Chinese scholars as a very significant 'communication' of Sino-Western culture, and the beginnings of the development of contemporary Chinese culture. The development continued in a tortuous process through the subsequent years, until the resumption or 'new starting-point' about 1979. Some Chinese scholars studying the May 4th movement in recent years take the period from the aftermath of 1919 through to 1979 as a 'samsara' [in the sense of 'going around in circles'] of sixty years. I agree with this view generally and see an analogous 'samsara' characterizing the studies of pragmatism and other western philosophy in China during the sixty-year interval. In order to develop a new culture which situates the future development of China in a changing world-structure and to avoid a possible new 'samsara', it is very important to bring to light the 'samsara' and to derive lessons from that experience.

The Introduction of Pragmatism into China during the May 4th Period: Main Characteristics

Pragmatism was introduced into China as early as the beginning of this century. Chinese scholars Zhang Don-Sen and Lan Gong-Wu and others established the Journal *Education* in Tokyo in 1909, wherein they published some papers introducing pragmatism. But it was during the May 4th 'new culture' movement that pragmatism became a main trend of thought with strong influences in China. After returning home from America in 1917, young Hu Shi published a series of articles advocating pragmatism and became a leading figure of pragmatism in China. Tao Xin-Shi, Jiang Men-Lin, Fu Si-Nian and other Chinese scholars who received the theories of John Dewey in America also advocated pragmatism when they returned. John Dewey himself came to China in 1919-1921. He visited almost all the main cities of China and gave a series of lectures on pragmatism. This played a very important role in the spreading of pragmatism in China. During this time, a great many Chinese intellectuals, especially those more enlightened and progressive, were favorably impressed by pragmatism to different degrees. The early Chen Du-Xiu, who became the first leader of the Chinese communist party when it was formed in 1921, received some ideas from pragmatism and admired Dewey's lectures.

Pragmatism was more or less received in common by many intellectuals involved in the new culture movement. Almost at the same time, such western philosophies as the voluntarism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, "Lebensphilosophie" from Germany and France as well as Machism, etc, were imported into China. Besides Dewey, such other famous western philosophers as Bertrand Russell, Hans Driesch, etc, visited China, but their influence was far less than that of pragmatism and John Dewey.

Why did pragmatism have such a powerful influence on China during the May 4th period? Before answering this question we must briefly introduce the main characteristics of pragmatism which were understood in broad terms by Chinese scholars of the May 4th period.

As to the 'definition' of pragmatism, people can derive many distinct but nonetheless justified answers, because pragmatism itself is a conception with various meanings. The theories of three leading American pragmatists, i.e., Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey, differ one from the other. It is very difficult to give a simple but exact definition of pragmatism. Pragmatism as understood by Chinese scholars since May 4th has the following main characteristics.

First, pragmatism rejects traditional metaphysics, both of materialism and idealism, especially the older rationalistic speculative idealism. Pragmatists were all against attempts to find the absolute substance of matter or of mind as well as objective or a priori-necessity and an absolute principle beyond experience. They don't negate the possibility of the existence of a world beyond experience, but insist that the realm of philosophy should be limited to the world which can be experienced. Philosophy should to be a theory concerned with the world of experience, i.e. the life- world of human beings.

Second, what pragmatists mean by 'experience' differs from the definitions of 'experience' characterizing the traditional epistemologies of both empiricism and rationalism. The pragmatists's 'experience' is neither knowledge resulting from a process of cognition, nor subjective consciousness separated from the object; rather, it is human action, life, practice itself, or the united process of subject and object, or mind and matter. Drawing support from Darwin's theory of evolution, pragmatists insist that for the human being as an organism, like any other living being, the most important thing is to live. On that basis, the human constantly must adapt to his environment. This process is just the interaction between organism and environment, i.e., the process of life, action and practice. That humans must adapt constantly to their environment implies that humans must constantly struggle and keep forging ahead, must be in unceasing progress and evolution. Applying this motif to socio-historical problems, people must see their history as a process of constant progress and evolution and must recognize that society must be continuingly reformed.

Third, pragmatism maintains that human adaptation to the environment, i.e., human action, life and practice, is different from the instinctive behaviour of animals. Human beings are born with intelligence; their action and practice are always in pursuit of some goals and are guided by reflection and thought. Therefore, the question of how human action is guided by intelligence, i.e., the question of methodology, turns out to be a central question with which philosophy should be involved. In this sense pragmatism is nothing but a methodology guided by intelligence, i.e., scientific methodology. Pragmatism does not reject any other method as long as it can bring some satisfactory effects: in short, what pragmatism advocates is only the 'scientific method', i.e., what 'works'.

Fourth, pragmatists hold that every idea, theory and doctrine should serve to adapt human beings to their environment, and thus should be an instrument of human behaviour. Therefore, pragmatists reject the 'correspondence theory' of truth and maintain that the criterion of the truth of every idea, theory or doctrine lies in its effects upon human action and practice, that is, its practical value. Truth does not have universal or absolute meaning, but only disjunctive or relative meaning. For this reason all truth is pluralistic, not monistic.

Fifth, pragmatists believe that each acting person is individual. Her or his existence and interaction with the environment is in the end an individual behaviour. In order to live, every individual must struggle by himself. He cannot depend upon anyone else or be controlled by any other or by some superhuman force or authority. Therefore, pragmatists maintain that the personality of every individual must be liberated and his rights to act and to express his own will

freely must be respected. That is, a system of full democracy and freedom must be practiced in society. Nevertheless, pragmatists reject excessive self-will and egoism and emphasize that individual freedom must not harm the legitimate freedom of others: thus individual freedom must be regulated by society. Society, for its part, should avoid both totalitarianism and anarchism.

The above-mentioned characteristics of pragmatism are interconnected and incarnate its cardinal doctrine from diverse aspects. While summarizing their ideas, pragmatists have given it distinctive expression from different points of view so that it can be variously described as a new empiricism, scientific methodology, philosophy of practice and behavior, instrumentalism, humanism, etc. While taking pragmatism as a philosophy of society, they often see it as expressing the traits of democracy and science.

When pragmatism was imported into China at the time of the May 4th movement, a great many progressive intellectuals warmly welcomed it because of the above-mentioned characteristics, especially the spirit of science and democracy. Some of pragmatism's characteristics coincide with several aspects of Chinese traditional culture; others coincide with the demands for science and democracy by the progressive Chinese intellectuals of that time.

Pragmatism and Chinese Traditional Culture

Though the new May 4th cultural movement protested against the old cultural tradition of China, it also grew from the soil of this same tradition. As both the leaders of the movement and the broad spectrum of intellectuals who took part in it had grown up under this tradition and then separated from it, it was only in reference to the tradition that there could be criticism of the old culture or the introduction of anything new. Although some representative figures of the movement proposed a 'stance' and indeed, radical slogans, totally negating the traditional culture, one of the their two 'feet' in this stance always remained planted in the ground of the old tradition. Therefore the movement's introduction to and reception of western cultures in the May 4th period was necessarily limited by a field of vision to an extent controlled by the traditional culture. In fact, the thoughts and ideas introduced and received at that time were first of all those which could coincide with some aspects of Chinese tradition and hence were easier for the participants of the movement to approve and understand. Among various Western trends, pragmatism seems to relate best to such traditional Chinese ideas.

Among others, Chinese traditional culture, especially philosophy, was imbued with the following characteristics. Basically it was ethically oriented, talking about nature, society, etc. Ancient Chinese scholars generally emphasize ethical content. The questions of the development and self-perfection of human beings frequently were the central issues in their discussions, which were thus basically humanistic. Second, as far as the world as object of knowledge is concerned, the ancient scholars stressed the real life world which people faced, not the transcendental world or world-in-itself, i.e., the world separated from human experience. Hence, they did not develop systematic metaphysical or theological theories. Third, Chinese traditional culture emphasized experimental-intuitive knowledge and its practical effects upon human beings. The cardinal principle of knowledge was "study for the purpose of application." It sought truth from facts and checked the validity of a truth through its effects. Compared with their Western counterparts, ancient Chinese scholars did not like to create speculative and abstract theories. Fourth, Chinese culture was pluralistic and all-embracing. Although two thousand years ago Confucianism was officially considered to be the sole learning so that it controlled the whole field of thought and

culture, there still were various trends and tendencies which co-existed or were mixed up into each another. In fact, Confucianism itself was pluralistic and embraced a variety of trends. Fifth, Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, stressed harmony and the mean, avoiding extremes and antagonism. The so-called "doctrine of the mean" has always been considered the most important characteristic of Chinese culture.

Generally speaking, Chinese traditional culture—long based upon the feudal-patriarchal system—was quite different from modern and contemporary western culture, including pragmatism. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned characteristics are to some extent quite similar to some thoughts and ideas of pragmatism. Thus, although the leaders and participants of the May 4th movement had a deep background in Chinese traditional culture, they often objected to 'tradition' and received pragmatism more easily. Note that Hu Shi, the leading figure of pragmatism in China, had already formed a framework for his academic thought which was similar to pragmatism *before* he went to the United States and contacted American pragmatism. What he did afterwards was only a perfecting and systematizing of his original thought.

Pragmatism and the Ideological and Political Background of the May 4th Movement

The most important and even decisive reason why pragmatism had so powerful an influence in China during the May 4th period is that the idea of science and democracy it advocated so suited the ideological and political demands of the 'new culture' movement. The May 4th new culture movement had started from a revolution in literature, but rapidly developed into a political and social revolution which took anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism as its main contents. The banner-slogan "Strive for national rights outside and punish traitors within," which was held high by demonstrating students on "May 4th," and the slogans "Down with Confucianism" and "Welcome Mr. De (democracy) and Mr. Sci (science)" which were put forward by the leaders of the 'new culture' movement were just the concentrated expression of this revolution. Although the political position and ideological tendency of the persons involved in this movement differed from one another, all had in common the following concerns: to re-evaluate the ancient Chinese tradition and culture; to reject feudal autocracy which so cruelly expropriated people's freedom; to abandon the feudal morality fettering people's thought; and to re-establish a new culture with scientific and democratic traits.

These demands coincided with common attitudes to some degree as they were all against feudal forces and the warlords' oppression of the broad masses of the people, and against the privileges of foreign countries in China and the unequal treaties imposed upon China. So to some degree the reformers were able to establish a broader united front. The culture they talked about during that time went beyond the limits of simple literature or culture in a narrow sense, and was imbued with political and ideological meaning. Both the (1) establishment of a new culture characterized by science and democracy and the (2) re-evaluation of the old culture required a drastic overhaul of Chinese society. Pragmatists involved in science sought a new world-view and methodology to replace the traditional unscientific world-view and methodology. Science and democracy represented the ideal of a new society, as well as an attitude and methodology which must be used in order to achieve such an ideal.

Facing the historical mission of "re-evaluation", especially of "re-establishment," many intellectuals imported a successive variety of Western ideas and theories. This made of the May 4th period the most intense Sino-western cultural exchange in the modern history of China. Some radical activists began to receive Marxism via the influence of the October revolution in Russia.

But due to both social and epistemological reasons, the broad masses of the intellectuals could not accept Marxism with its theory of class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat as the keystones of its doctrine. So they tried to find other theories from the West more suitable to their call for democracy and science. To many, pragmatism seemed the most suitable, because it is characterized by science and democracy. Pragmatism advocates constant progress and social innovation, and it promotes freedom and the 'liberation' of personality.

Qu Qui-Bai, one of the early leaders of the communist party of China, said: "It was really not accidental that pragmatism appeared in China around 'May 4th'. The patriarchal society of China had been shaken by the bombardment of international capitalism. China needed a new outlook on the world and life so as to adapt to the new environment of China. Pragmatism with its positive sides has satisfied this need" (Qu Qiu-Bai, *Pragmatism and Revolutionary Philosophy*).

Clearly, the importation of pragmatism gave an active role to the development of the new culture movement at the time of 'May 4th'. Many Chinese intellectuals received pragmatism's "new outlook on world and life" as their conceptual approach for eliminating evils and disadvantage and benefiting politics, destroying the old and establishing the new. Why did the reputation of young Hu Shi rise suddenly, and why were the lectures of Dewey welcomed by a broad range of intellectuals, including even many of the left wing? The main reason is that pragmatism suited the trends of thought in China during the May 4th era.

Limitations upon the Applicability of Pragmatism in China

There were some serious defects in the reception of pragmatism during the May 4th era. For example, people did not adequately understand the one-sidedness and limitations of pragmatism. They did not give adequate attention to the impact pragmatism would have upon the national conditions of China and even the national conscience of China.

Pragmatism is almost generally acknowledged as a philosophy which embodies the national spirit of America. The particular historical conditions of the formation and development of American society gave American culture and national spirit the following traits: an underestimation of the transcendent, but close attention to the world of experience; a devaluation of speculative and abstract theories, but the promotion of practical and concrete actions; disdain for the beaten path, but great effort at innovation and creativity; disregard of every absolute authority, but admiration of all kinds of individual effort; opposition to autocracy, but the promotiom of democracy; rejection of blind obedience and belief, but promotion of intelligence and science, etc. Pragmatism embodies all these traits. Such a philosophy played a very important role for the American people in constructing the world's most developed country on an almost uncultivated soil, in the prosperity of science and culture, as well as in the development of America's democratic system. Such success strongly impressed the Chinese intellectuals striving for social progress and the renewal of culture. The reason why Hu Shi and others received and propagated pragmatism is that they had *idealized* pragmatism. They claimed that once the method of pragmatism was employed, all kinds of problems regarding the re-evaluation and re-establishment of Chinese culture, even the innovation and progress of Chinese society, would readily be solved.

But pragmatism is not a perfect philosophy; still less is it fully suitable for China. As to the theory of pragmatism, although it contains many positive elements which deserve affirmation, it has serious limits. First, under the banner of rejecting metaphysics, pragmatists mention speculative idealism and materialism in the same breath, and negate both of them indiscriminately.

Therefore, they inevitably cancel the objective basis of their own theory. Although pragmatism is not a pure idealism and at times it even opposes idealism, still it comes finally to a subjective idealism. Second, while stressing the activity of human cognition and practice, it often neglects the objective necessities which must be obeyed; the pragmatists's stand on progress and evolution is imbued with some subjective arbitrariness. Third, when opposing dogmatism and absolute authority, as well as separating theory from practice, they negate the existence of objective and absolute truth. Sometimes they confuse the practical test of truth with its value to humans and make truth dependent upon the individual's subjective likes and dislikes. Fourth, having rejected the objectivity of knowledge and practice, even their use of the so-called scientific method loses objectivity. Pragmatism was vulnerable to subjective fabrication and sophistry.

One-sidedness and other limitations of pragmatism were criticized by many philosophers even in Western countries, and especially in its American birthplace. Contemporaries of James and Dewey, such as British philosophers F.H. Bradley and B. Russell, and American philosophers G. Santayana and A. O. Lovejoy, criticized its contradictions, ambiguity, vagueness and one-sidedness. For example, Russell did not agree with William James's view that a belief is truthful insofar as its effects are good. Intellectually, this view has important difficulties because according to it people could not affirm even such a simple matter of fact as that Columbus crossed the Atlantic Ocean in 1492. The effect of the belief does not justify why someone must say that the crossing occurred in 1492 but not in 1491 or 1493. Therefore Russell considered the philosophy of James to be nothing but subjectivist raving.

What is the real interplay between pragmatism and the American system? America is founded upon capitalist principles. These principles do not simply assume pragmatism as their theoretical base. The Declaration of Independence marks the foundation of the United States of America, and its theoretical grounds are the enlightenment rationalistic doctrines of freedom, equality and universal fraternity (concepts coming from Montesquieu and Rousseau). Therefore, although pragmatism declares itself against metaphysics and rationalist systems, it worked on the premise of rationalist systems which undergird the capitalist system and its principles.

Apparently one who pursues pragmatism emphasizes only action, but does not pay much attention to ideals: he or she is interested only in concrete reality and does not care about rational principles. In fact, however, pragmatists base their action and interests upon the above-mentioned ideals and principles. Pragmatism was developed in America during the formation of America when Americans universally accepted their senior thinkers's ideals and capitalist principles and institutions and value system. Without these conditions, pragmatism could not have emerged in America, or even if it did emerge, it would not have been accepted widely. Therefore, one cannot reduce the American world-view and outlook on life to pragmatism, nor can we even trace the development of American society and culture generally to pragmatism.

Due to the essential conditions noted above, pragmatism could play an important role in its birthplace, America, and pragmatism's own one-sidedness and other limitations could be neglected. When pragmatism spread to China, although it played an active role in promoting the May 4th new culture movement, its role was greatly limited from the very beginning. The fundamental reason was that Chinese culture, unlike America's, lacked the social and intellectual premises required for pragmatism to in turn make its own contribution. In short, in China there was no rationalist Enlightenment underpinning 'in place', upon which pragmatism could secretly or unknowingly rely.

China has thousands of years of feudal tradition. This social system is a serious obstacle to the progress of Chinese society and places heavy spiritual shackles upon Chinese thoughts. After

the Opium War in 1840, with the invasion of foreign capitalism, great changes took place in Chinese society and the country sank into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state. During the May 4th era, China was in a very turbulent condition. The establishment of a new social system and intellectual culture was advocated by progressive persons who were still relatively obscure, and whose demands were overshadowed by more pressing and desperate problems. At the time, China had to foreground the most concrete problems, from rickshaws to Presidential jurisdiction, from prostitution to government bribery and the betrayal of the country. China still needed to search for the social causes of these problems and for the principles and direction for their solution. Without the latter, China would be unable to solve the former. The semi-feudal and semi-colonial social system which caused the above-mentioned problems and other types of social malpractice had not yet been at bottom overthrown. Hence, the solutions proposed by Hu Shi's pragmatism could not be put into practice. Actually, before the introduction of pragmatism into China, in Chinese traditional thought and especially in Chinese modern Enlightenment conjecture, it was emphasized that the secret of learning lay in solving practical problems and getting practical effects. However, even these homegrown 'pragmatisms' did not help the Chinese before or during the May 4th movement to solve China's many problems.

Therefore, at the time China's urgent need was for a revolutionary theory which would direct the future way of development of Chinese society: a new culture to replace the dress of the old Chinese cultural tradition, sort out its essence, and guide correctly the changes of Chinese society. The spirit of science and democracy advocated by pragmatism and scientific methodology in certain aspects suited the needs of many Chinese intellectuals and inspired their enthusiasm for destroying the old and establishing the new. But pragmatism did not correctly open a path to China's future mode of development. It couldn't lead the Chinese to a conscious and definite way to follow. Moreover, at that time, many propagators of pragmatism favored 'Westernization' pure and simple. They did not deeply investigate the relation of Chinese and western culture and the problems pertaining to how western culture could be adapted to Chinese soil. So the pragmatism they naively propagated wasn't able to meet China's special needs. When the May 4th new culture movement developed further and met the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the young students, and the broad masses of workers and peasants, Hu Shi and other leading pragmatists in China gradually withdrew from the battle against the old system and tradition. Indeed, some pragmatists even reversed themselves and took the opposite position! Pragmatism in China had lost its active and progressive meaning.

Pragmatism and Chinese Politics since May 4th

After being introduced into China, pragmatism did not play a long and profound role as it did in America. Being an important instrument in political conflicts of contemporary China, it became the victim of these conflicts. People came to identify theoretical pragmatism as an academic ideology comprising scientific method but not always relatable in a direct way to politics.

During the May 4th era, while introducing and propagating pragmatism as well as other western trends, Chinese scholars generally did not distinguish between 'knowledge' and 'value systems'. There was a tendency to search for strategies in pragmatism and other western trends, but usually scholars did not bother to study the more academic side of these western imports. When some Chinese accepted and advocated pragmatism, this was not based mainly upon the recognition of the truth of its theoretical system, but rather, upon the utility it may have for politics and

morality. The enemies of ‘Western’ pragmatism, and they eventually ‘won the day’, tried to show pragmatism is not in fact very relatable to the concrete political circumstance of China.

The pragmatism introduced during the era was mainly John Dewey’s doctrine, especially his political philosophy and theories of morality and education. Dewey’s own lectures in China and the introduction to pragmatism by his Chinese students (Hu Shi and others) all laid particular stress on the ‘surface’, rather than analysis of ‘deep structure’. In the famous polemic on "Problem and Doctrine," Hu Shi promoted pragmatism in terms of its ability to solve the social and political problems of Chinese society. At that time, many people who accepted pragmatism did not have a correct and deep understanding of its academic content. Their reason for accepting pragmatism was mainly that the spirit of science and democracy it propagated corresponded to their political and moral choice at that time. However, when with the further development of the May 4th movement, their political and moral choice changed, some came increasingly to distrust and even reject pragmatism.

During the early days of the May 4th period, China’s old unified tyrannical feudal system was undermined and shaken, but a new unified political pattern had not been formed yet. The pluralist pattern of politics produced by the conflict among warlords and the struggle of political forces provided conditions for a pluralist pattern of ideology. Because it was evidently pluralistic and was accepted to different degrees by people with different political inclinations, pragmatism in particular was prevalent.

Later, after the formation of a Chinese political pattern governed by two opposite forces, the CPC (Communist Party of China) and the KMT (Nationalist Party), research into western philosophy continued along these same lines. Pragmatism had continuing influence in the fields of history, archaeology, education and especially natural science (which has little direct relation to politics). But generally speaking, there was little deep study of pragmatism as an academic theory. The understanding of pragmatism usually remained at the level of utility. Its fate in China was more and more determined by the attitudes of the two above-mentioned political forces.

The political structure of the early KMT was rather complex. Among its members, there were not only conservative forces, but also progressive personages who struggled for a democratic revolution in China. Later, the KMT became increasingly divided, and in 1927, after the breakdown of the cooperation between the KMT and the CPC, the KMT was increasingly governed by rightist forces. Sometimes they neglected or even abandoned the goal of democratic revolution. For example, democracy was replaced by the dictatorship of Jiang Jie-shi [Cantonese: Chiang Kai-shek) and the local warlords. In this case, the study of philosophy, including that of pragmatism, was strongly influenced by dictatorial politics. Around 1935, in the debates over democracy and dictatorship, some persons who advocated democracy during the May 4th period now supported implementation of a new type of dictatorship in the name of the ‘cohesion and unification of the country’ (this after all, is also a ‘pragmatic’ choice). Thus, the propagation and influence of pragmatism still existed, but essentially it had lost its reputation as a progressive theory advocating democracy.

Although during the May 4th period, there were differences in principle between Chinese Marxism and pragmatism, still they formed a united front supporting science and democracy. Even in the famous polemics of problem and doctrine, Li Da-zhao, the representative of Marxism, did not wholly reject Hu Shi’s pragmatism. He even pointed out that some of his own ideas were completely the same as Hu Shi’s but others differed slightly (see Li Da-zhao, "On Problem and Doctrine Again").

After the May 4th movement, because of the radical changes in the political situation, the political divergence between Chinese Marxism and pragmatism became increasingly pointed. The original 'united front' having collapsed, the two took an increasingly negative attitude toward each other. Such changes reached a turning-point in the thirties when Stalin's Leftist Line formed in the USSR. Because Dewey openly took a critical and sceptical attitude toward the Trotsky trial, and even organized an investigative committee on the Trotsky case which acquitted Trotsky of any crime, Dewey earned the enmity of the Stalinists. Dewey, who at first was praised as a distinguished progressive and democratic scholar, now was criticized as a reactionary philosopher of imperialism and the most vicious enemy of the USSR. The pragmatism linked to Dewey's name was declared to be a decadent and reactionary imperialist philosophy. Such changes in the USSR's attitude toward pragmatism soon influenced China. Earlier more objective and practical realistic judgements which led to guarded support of pragmatism were replaced by its overall rejection.

The leftist inclination to judge theories purely by political criteria was developed further in the criticism of Hu Shi's pragmatism by Mao Tze Dong himself in the early fifties. At that time many treatises criticizing pragmatism were issued. They served special political needs, but did not proceed from a deep investigation of pragmatism's academic theory. Many authors did little research, or did not even study the original works by pragmatists. Their arguments were based on the conclusions already determined by persons in authority. They established Marxism as the absolute authority and eliminated any open influence from other trends. But by neglecting learning and basing critiques only on political choices, they also produced serious negative results of an indirect and 'passive' kind. For example, theoretically, the Marxists didn't make a clear distinction between right and wrong elements of pragmatism. For example, when criticizing pragmatism Marxists also criticized some of its active agenda which it had in common with Marxism or could be accepted by Marxism. Ironically, such a 'blanket' condemnation essentially deviated from real Marxism, as it neglected some fundamental Marxist principles involving honesty, practicality, and realism. Unfortunately, such leftist deviations were not overcome but increased with the strengthening of the political left. The blanket condemnations generated a unitary pattern for criticizing the whole 'Western' trend and non-Marxist thought.

The above-mentioned leftist inclination reached its extreme in the so-called Cultural Revolution. It should be noted that while in the name of Marxism the extreme leftist leaders launched a punitive expedition against pragmatism and other Western trends, at that time essentially they were pursuing their own 'pragmatic' line which excluded the spirit of science and democracy! They pursued also an absolutism and dogmatism which reflected a feudal autocracy and were criticized by pragmatism! Thus, they acted arbitrarily in politics, deprived the mass of people of their democratic rights, wantonly trampled on science, and energetically advocated the cult of an individual! All this was not only fundamentally opposite to real Marxism, but differed greatly from pragmatism and other Western doctrines celebrating science and democracy. Thus, the extreme leftists seemed to return the people to the situation of feudal autocracy and obscurantism of the old pre-May 4th China!

Sixty Years of the Pragmatist 'Samsara' and Its Lessons

In the early summer of 1976, the famous April 5th movement took place in Tienanmen Square in Beijing. It expressed the people's extreme hatred of "The Gang of Four" which had played the tyrant in the Cultural Revolution. And it expressed the people's intense desire to cast off the yoke of 'politics and thought'. In the winter of that year, "The Gang of Four" was overthrown, the

Cultural Revolution ended and since 1979, Chinese society took up once again the path of innovation and development. People began again to investigate Marxism which had been distorted and misrepresented; also they began to study once again pragmatism and other Western trends.

This new beginning is just sixty years after the May 4th movement of 1919. As earthshaking changes had taken place in Chinese society over those sixty years, we cannot think of this return as a simple repetition of the starting-point. But surely great similarities exist between 1919 and 1979. For example, both 'beginnings' faced the same national conditions: poverty and backwardness in economics, deficiency of democracy in politics, underdevelopment in science, and ossification in thought. Hence, progressive Chinese intellectuals attempted to promote China's reform by introducing a new academic theory and working out a general plan for husbanding China's wealth-potential and strength. The May 4th movement took science and democracy as its main slogan; now in 1979 the people were calling once again for science and democracy. People regarded the May 4th movement as an 'Enlightenment' in Chinese modern history, and the renewal of thought and ideas since 1979 as a 'New Enlightenment'.

Why did the movement striving for science and democracy in 1919 have to return after 60 years to a starting-point quite similar to its origins? There were manifold reasons: the powerful influence of China's old feudal forces in politics and economics as well as its traditional feudal culture; the interference and destruction by foreign countries, especially the Japanese invasion; the ragged form of the modern Chinese revolution and the many faults committed—all of these had hindered the smooth development of modern Chinese society and its corresponding thought-culture. In addition to these causes, another important reason is that people, mainly the authorities, had not correctly handled the relation between knowledge systems and value systems in thought and culture. In other words, learning was simply taken as an instrument of politics, and politics were always unstable.

Confusing pragmatism's knowledge system with its value system and judging the former's 'truth' a falsity (because it seemed an ideology in the service of particular social and political groups and not the 'people'), generated two passive results. First, it hindered deep research into pragmatism's knowledge system and impeded real knowledge of what was true and false. Second, it hindered the use of a correct theory for guiding action and achieving success. Theory was not allowed to develop its own utility (including political) value. The main lesson of the sixty years experience with pragmatism in China seem to lie in this unfortunate situation.

As has just been described, because people who were for and against pragmatism took its esteem for 'utility' as its dominant contribution, they were unable and unwilling to study fully and deeply its theory. Although it has been over sixty years since the introduction of pragmatism into China, there still is no adequate book which introduces pragmatism fully and objectively. Deliberate misrepresentation can be seen everywhere when people talk about pragmatism. Its theoretical contents do not deserve to be called the "most abstruse" in contemporary Western philosophy. However, because pragmatism was appropriated by politics, and was easily governed by shifting political needs, even scholars had only a dim knowledge of pragmatism's theoretical base. Even in esteemed philosophical circles, many philosophers from beginning to end had no true and definite knowledge of what pragmatism is, especially of its relationship to Marxism. This led to extreme confusion regarding theory. Some leftist Marxist theorists always stressed the contrasts between Marxism and pragmatism. At times they claimed that pragmatism asserts that "Any thought and idea that can make people successful is true"; and then of course they would condemn such an assertion as "bourgeois egoism" and a "philistine approach to doing business."

At other times the Marxists considered the same ideas as profoundly Marxist if expressed in other terms, especially those borrowed from political leaders.

When revisionism was widely criticized in the fifties and sixties, its thought-base was first reduced to "bourgeois pragmatism" and then suppressed. In the last ten years, people have not been criticizing revisionism and what was originally criticized is now regarded as tallying with Marxism. As to the line of demarcation between pragmatism and Marxism there are scarcely any scholars who can give a clear answer.

Confusion in theory leads to confusion in action. Some people repeatedly declare themselves most devout advocates and followers of Marxism. However, because Marxist theory was ossified, dogmatized and divorced from practice it was unable to be used as a guide to practice. Then how was practice to proceed? This depended only upon observing the effects produced, that is, on experience. "Look before every step" was the watch-word, or to use a famous statement of a Chinese leader, "To cross the river feel your way along the riverbed." But such a way of guiding action merely in terms of daily experience and its effect was not Marxist theory, but was close to the parochial empiricism of pragmatism (which in other contexts Marxism had condemned). When the problems to be solved by practice were relatively simple and pure, this empirical method was not without effect, but when the problem was more complex this method was obviously powerless and persistence in using it led only to errors and failure.

The purely political utilitarianism of judging thought and theory, or more broadly culture, leads to simplification, coarseness and vulgarization of theoretical research. Further, it throws knowledge and theory into confusion, and this inevitably leads practice into failure. In order to avoid this, people must study theory once again. If, however, people merely once more take up a short-sighted political utilitarianism as their criterion, another vicious circle shall surely follow. From 1919 to 1979 the ‘samsaric’ phenomenon of culture unfolded in just this manner in China—a big circle of sixty-years consisting of a series of smaller circles.

Pragmatism, Current Problems in Cultural Studies in China, and a Possible Road for the Future

The new Enlightenment starting from 1979 has been in motion now for quite some years. The progress and achievements of cultural studies in China during this time are unmatched by those in the corresponding period after May 4th. But as far as the study of pragmatism and other Western trends is concerned, problems similar to those following May 4th are recurring. Among them, the most striking is that culture studies are still at times controlled by left or rightist short-sighted political utilitarianism.

The leftist deviation has been the main one in recent years. Some people have still attempted to judge the truth or falsity of pragmatism and other Western trends in the light of whether or not they corresponded to present political needs. From such a point of view, pragmatism and other Western trends are non- or anti-Marxist. Research into them is regarded as politically useless, and dangerous insofar as they would produce ‘bourgeois liberalism’. Thus such research must be limited strictly. After the events of Tienanmen square in June 1989, the leftist political forces have been more in the ascendant. The introduction and study of western thought is considered one of the main causes of the turmoil and is limited even more. Since the spring of 1992 the wind of reform and openness has been blowing again and more strongly than ever, while the leftist forces have been going into decline. But this wind seems limited mainly to the economic field. Though the thought-culture field is a bit more flexible the change is not obvious.

On the other hand, a few over-liberal scholars uncritically accept some theories and ideas of pragmatism and other western influences, especially those of Western democracy such as a multiple party system, parliamentarianism, etc. At the same time they neglect the traditional Chinese culture and even more the complex conditions of China's politics and society. They believe that if these Western theories and systems were to be introduced, all kinds of social problems faced by China would be solved naturally. A very few scholars even go far beyond academic studies and attempt to force the Chinese government to practice a scheme of political reform modeled on Western patterns. Such political utilitarianism cannot be successful in present day China; on the contrary, it provides a pretext for the leftists to strengthen their ideological control. It is evident then that both left and right short-sighted political utilitarianism hinders the development and progress of thought-culture studies, including that of pragmatism, in China, and hinders even their possible political function.

Under China's present conditions, how should cultural studies proceed? This subject is in need of discussion from different quarters. I do not intend to discuss it here in detail, but from the experiences and lessons of such studies since May 4th, especially in recent years, the following prospects seem to emerge.

First, thought-culture studies should not be taken simply as instruments of politics, especially of current policies. To be sure, almost every thought-culture trend has its political tendency and the purposes of thought-culture studies are often connected with politics. But this does not mean that thought-culture studies should be subordinated fully to politics. On the contrary, in order to study objectively and deeply, and then disclose the secret of every thought-theory, including its political tendencies, people must extricate themselves from short-sighted political preconceptions. Otherwise, they will not only easily distort or misunderstand the contents they study, but also cause other disastrous effects, as mentioned above. We should not forget the lessons of the period since May 4th.

Second, thought-culture studies should be manifold, even pluralistic, otherwise they cannot prosper. One of the main reasons why the May 4th period manifested the most prosperous cultural developments of contemporary China is just that various trends and schools of thought-culture co-existed, and freely discussed and debated one another at that time. On the contrary, during the period when a leftist political thought line controlled China, all non-Marxist culture studies were considered harmful and were in fact prohibited. Marxism was considered the only truth. There was the declared policy, "Let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend," but due to the over-stress on the Marxist school in all decisions the hundred schools were controlled by this one school. Hence, essentially only this school existed. Without discussing, debating and being enriched by other schools, this school became increasingly ossified and dogmatist.

Third, thought-culture studies should be open. Whether culture studies should be guided by Marxism is a matter of debate among western and Chinese scholars. According to my view, the most important question is not this, but how to understand Marxism and its guiding influence. If people take it as closed, it would certainly become dogmatist, ossified and cultural studies will certainly turn into a blind alley. If people take Marxism as an open theory, it will receive every valuable thought and idea from other trends and abandon any of its own thoughts and ideas which become antiquated or are shown to be wrong. Culture studies under the guidance of such a Marxism certainly will be fruitful.

What of the role Pragmatism Studies could play in the future development of Chinese culture? Judging from the lessons since May 4th, the answer is not difficult. Generally speaking, we should affirm boldly that a number of theories and ideas of pragmatism are valuable in promoting the

innovation and development of Chinese culture. For example, to advocate free inter-disciplinary open study in the thought-culture field, as called for above, is consonant with the emphasis given by pragmatism.

There are two more points to which we must attend. First, the useful ideas in pragmatism are often shared by/with Marxism to some extent, or worth being referred to by Marxism. Second, some ideas in pragmatism are similar to some aspects of Chinese traditional culture, as described earlier. Being based on developments in modern science and society, the ideas of pragmatism frequently are more systematized and perfected. Hence they are able to help as references for innovation and development in Chinese traditional culture. In a word, we should overcome the leftist deviation of simply negating pragmatism and other Western trends, strengthen those studies, and receive everything valuable from them.

On the other hand, we should not forget that pragmatism is not a perfect philosophy, still less a philosophy fully suitable to China. Hence we must also disclose and criticize the one-sidedness and limitations of pragmatism. For if we idealize pragmatism, we shall certainly repeat the errors which in the past have always hindered the smooth development of Chinese culture and society.