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Moral Imagination and Character Development
Volume III

Imagination in Religion and Social Life

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Introduction

George F. McLean

In this transition between the millennia humankind experiences a series of dilemmas which, paradoxically, derive as much from its long accomplishments as from its failures. Descartes launched the modern age with the call for a unified science predicated upon analytically clear and distinct ideas. Besides opening the way for the developments and discoveries of the modern mind, this created a split between spirit and matter, reflected in his fractured notion of the human person. This was a distant, early warning signal of the many problems which would accompany the achievements to follow. Soon reductivist understandings would generate idealisms and materialisms. In either case rigorous clarity would impose either a notion of community without room for persons or self, or a notion of the individual without bonds of community. Both would suppress or pervert personal freedom, and with it the creativity needed for truly humane life in our day.

In these circumstances, much attention has been directed toward elements of synthesis in order to reunite what had been split asunder. More positively, there is need now to harvest and integrate the insights into spirit and matter which, being developed in separation, had been unfairly burdened with the demand that each respond to all questions. Is it possible to find points of mediation and operational integration of matter and spirit? Could there be room for a free play of ideas to enrich and humanize the necessitarian aspects of structures and systems? Is there room for creativity, freedom and new life in and between persons, national efforts and entire cultures? These are central and deeply felt questions and needs of our times. Their examination is the concern of this three volume series: *Moral Imagination and Character Development*.

New attention, and indeed new meaning, is now being given to the imagination as an integrating and creative center for human life. This was the burden of volume I, *The Imagination*. In the processes of discovering by which a child grows and is educated as a moral person the imagination is most active and remains important in moral life. This was treated in Volume II *Moral Imagination in Personal Formation and Character Development*. The work of adjustment and innovation by which nations face their economic, social and political life; and the effort to build integrating bonds of understanding and cooperation between peoples at the deepest levels of cultural self-understandingm, religious commitment and communication between civilizations is the work of this Volume III *Moral Imagination in Religion and Social Life*.

Part I, "Religion and Moral Imagination," carries the examination of moral imagination forward by looking for the root inspiration of the related classical cultural forms in the religions of the peoples. John Farrelly in Chapter I, "Christian Symbols and Cultural Transformation," begins this work by noting especially the narrative role of the imagination in ordering and reordering givens in order to bring out new insights. In this light he points to the transformative situation of both the Roman and the Jewish worlds at the turn of the epoch in order to illumine the role of the imagination in renewing those narratives in the light of Christ's Incarnation and Resurrection. He examines the implication of this for the search for a just and compassionate human community.

Chapter II by Albert Labriola, "The *Biblia Pauperum* or 'Poor Man's Bible': Moral Imagination in the Middle Ages," shows how this work of the imagination was carried out in the past through the very simple means of the block printed *Biblia Pauperum*. Its message was a

theology of suffering which could offer to some a stimulus to revolutionary reform and to others an ability to transcend this world. Both generated the faith, patience and fortitude needed to face the vicissitudes of life.

Michael Reka in Chapter III, "The Imagination of Death and the Theology of Solidarity," applies this to the present culture of death. His response is through a leap rooted in the image of Christ's suffering and resurrection, and articulated as a theology of solidarity. The core of this theology is its attitude towards 'being-with' and 'being-for' others even in the worst situation. It is active empathy which exists in free interrelationships. Ontologically it is rooted in the event of Jesus' passion on the cross and his solidarity with all human beings. This causes a personal response in man, and "man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself."

Chapter IV by David Blanchard, "A Conversation Between Two Eucharistic Events: The Iroquois Thanksgiving and Going to Mass" reaches out cross-culturally to compare the Christian Mass and Iroquois thanksgiving rite. Here the imagination takes on the role of mediation. It develops a ritual expression of the what is familiar, an imaginative statement of what is not familiar, and a comparison between the two which is not prejudicial to either. The goal here is a deeper understanding of one's own cultural roots and an expansion of one's horizons.

Chapter V by Angelina Pollak-Eltz, "Imagination in the Creation of New Spiritual Cults in Latin America: The Cult of Maria Lionza," studies the genesis of cults as a work of the imagination through an analysis of the origin of the cult of Maria Lionza as a work in process. She emphasizes its utilitarian side by seeing it primarily as a response to particular life problems. However, in such cults the common elements across cultures suggests that they are less responses to particular problems than basic activities of the human person responding to their origin and to the issues of meaning in their life.

This facet of the issue of imagination is taken up by Jean-Michel Heimonet in Chapte VI "Is the Sacred a Fashion? Mysticism and Pragmatism: the Major Trends in Contemporary Theory." He would see these same forces deep in Western thought and breaking forth in Paris in 1968 in opposition to the restrictive rationalism of the Enlightenment. His fear is that this liberation of the imagination will open man to realities he cannot construct and hence cannot control. This places one before the great and awesome human choice of remaining timidly in the terms of control under the sway of technical and analytic reason or opening to limitless being and beauty through the creative use of the imagination. Heimonet's may be the only voice in this work for the former option. Or does he wish to state the need for both, conceiving the former as more in danger of being forgotten and hence in need of explicit affirmation?

Part II turns to the implications of imagination for socio-cultural formation. Chapter VII by Charles T. Rubin, "The Moral Imagination, Ambition, and the Education of Public Servants," argues through Plato and the *Federalist Papers*, for the need for moral imagination in order to establish the moral significance of personal ambition in public administration. He concludes that

whatever the particulars of a curriculum that recognized the significance of the moral imagination, the central fact is that an education in politics that does not teach students that a distinction can be made between what is noble and what is base will leave us with public servants who fall into the modern forms of each of the traps that Alcibiades must avoid. With their ambition misunderstood, unmoderated and unmediated, they will believe that the substance of politics is merely a matter of victories and losses, name recognition and influence, popularity and approval ratings, personal enrichment and advancement. They may come to think that acting morally in politics involves the ruin of the one who attempts it, the pious expression of kind thoughts, or

setting oneself the task of whatever radical reconstruction of human affairs is necessary to bring life into accord with some supposed ideal. Over against these various possibilities, the moral imagination provides a means for teaching public servants how to avoid cynicism and utopianism in their quest to do well.

John Kenneth White in Chapter VII, "Ronald Reagan and the American Imagination," illustrates this, Ronald Reagan was recognizably a man of few concepts and few outstanding foreign policy accomplishments. Yet he used his ability to perceive the power of narratives and pithy examples to fire the country's imagination. He seemed perfectly poised between ideology and practice. This is the mitch which Aristotle reserved between spirit and body for the imagination as participating in each, but as more free than either. From that position he could summon the creative initiative of his people and successfully challenge what he termed the "Evil Empire".

Again Chapter IX by Atomate Epas-Ngan (Armand), "Creativity in Imagination: La Révolution Solidaire, towards African Democratic Socialism," moves cross culturally to situate the work of the imagination in the social reconstruction of Africa. It sees ideology as a symbolic framework in which to think about and react to political problems. Beyond this ideological concern, the purpose of our analysis is an attempt to show that socialism "is nothing if it is not a political theory: a discourse which directs politics toward the construction of definite forms of social relations and in definite ways, a discourse which can construct and evaluate political situations (relative to definite objectives). Political practice cannot dispense with calculation, which, in turn, beyond the politics of preservation of established and opportunist cliques, demands criteria of appropriateness: in a word, an 'ideology.'" Moreover, Atomate looks for a socialism that would be democratic in the sense of attempting not to abolish, but to accommodate diversity "providing an open marketplace in which men of varying beliefs may compete in offering their intellectual wares to the public. Such a marketplace, in order to accommodate diversity, requires freedom of speech and mutual tolerance. This is what we term "democratic socialism," democracy being here the attribution of sovereignty to the people."

Chapter X by Yang Fenggang, "The Decline and Reconstruction of Morality in Chinese Society," expands this cross cultural analysis to China. There he looks for an imaginative pluralism which does not reduce all to one, but allows for, and indeed celebrates, the plurality and complementarity of the three cultures which mark the Chinese context: "Confucianism (taken as the threefold tradition of Confucius, Buddhism and Taoism), Marxism (in its Chinese version) and Western values (in their Christian roots). Any one might be particularly reflected in any single person, but all three might find deep expression in a society that would reflect the combined riches of all: the ever deepening harmonies of the Confucian traditions, serious and yet playful in the spirit of Taoism, worldly and yet detached in the sense of Buddhism; the critical stance and social concerns of the Marxian tradition and the divinely founded personal worth and democratic participation of the Christian traditions of the West."

Finally, Chapter XI by John A. Kromkowski, "Exploring Neighborhood Voices: The Origins and Imperatives of Community-Based Video Documentation of Urban Ethnicity," discusses the work of Geno Baroni as an example of one who employed moral imagination in community transformation and development.

As the promethean hopes and pretences fade that by rigorous scientific reason humanity could resolve all problems, a much broader and more diverse playing field opens before humankind. It is not without great threats, but neither is it without equally great hopes. The key to making the differences between the two lies notably in the human imagination, to the study of which in its many modes this series of volumes is devoted.

Chapter I
Christian Symbols and Cultural Transformation

John Farrelly

Many peoples in our time in different parts of the world are deeply and at times painfully aware of living in a time of transition in which the identity or identities they have inherited from the past are no longer sufficient for the needs of their societies, faced as they are by a new world of a greater consciousness of human rights, an advanced technology and other countries to which they relate and which have an impact on them. On the other hand, many people in the more highly developed countries have been so caught up in the world of change that they have jettisoned their inherited identities and now feel deracinated and without a sense of belonging or direction.

There are many ways to reflect on this situation. One fruitful way may be to examine an instance in past history when many people faced a somewhat analogous situation and to examine briefly how they reinterpreted their identity or identities in the process. Specifically, I wish to take as an instance the way that the first Christians reinterpreted their Jewish identities in a time of transition. And I wish to show that a fruitful use of creative imagination was part of this process. I discuss this as a Christian theologian who approaches this question from the inside as a believer. Though I will not present adequate bases to justify that belief here, I note that there are many millions of people in the late twentieth-century world who are both Christian believers and citizens of our age not, however, without tension. And whether one accepts the Christian belief or not, there are, we shall suggest, some insights that may be drawn from this case study relevant to our own age. We shall (1) recall two different contemporary approaches to the Christian Scripture that can complement one another in our analysis of the texts relevant to our study, (2) recall that, at the period of the founding of Christianity, both Judaism and the Greco-Roman world were living in a period of transition and interpreting the symbols of their past in diverse ways to enable them to face this period, (3) indicate something of how the Christians reinterpreted Jewish symbols in view of their experience of the risen Jesus and the eschatological Spirit and thus shaped the identities by which they faced the larger world, and (4) conclude our brief treatment of these themes by asking what implications it may have for the present.

Contemporary Approaches to the Interpretation of Scripture

Amid the great multiplicity of approaches to the interpretation of Scripture in our time, we would like to indicate two that represent different poles of such interpretation. We do this not to analyze them adequately but simply to indicate something of the present landscape of interpretation that raises a question of how one relates these diverse forms, both of which we will find to be useful for our purposes. The two forms, we will note, are those of the critical-historical method and of literary criticism, in part as influenced by Paul Ricoeur. In our simple recall of these forms, we shall rely on those who have made more thorough study of them than we have.

One very widely used form of interpretation of Scripture can be called an historical model, and it makes large use of the historical-critical method. In this model, the interest is in discovering the source of the text, and the goal is to reconstruct the historical development that occurred. As one Scripture scholar, Luke Johnson, writes:

Despite many minor disaffections, the historical model remains dominant in NT scholarship. The historical model provides a distinctive imaginative construal of the writings and the task of studying them. First, the task: in answer to the question, What are these writings about? this model responds, They are about the history of the primitive Christian movement. The goal set by this model is the description, or possibly even the reconstruction, of that historical development. . . The writings themselves, we see, play a secondary role: they are nothing more or less than sources for the reconstruction. The historian evaluates the writings as historical sources (are they first- or secondhand, authentic or inauthentic?), and asks of them questions that yield specifically historical information. Whether the topic is ideas, rituals, literature, or institutions, the end result is the same: a picture of historical development. This model is neither unsophisticated nor without virtue.1

Rudolf Bultmann made important contributions to the historical critical method through his study of the oral tradition that lay behind the Gospels, the forms in which different aspects of Jesus' words and deeds were handed on in the primitive Church, and the way that the needs and functions or institutional settings of the Church affected these traditions. In Bultmann this resulted in a greater skepticism about the historical value of the Gospels, though many of Bultmann's most prominent disciples (e.g., E. Kasemann, G. Bornkamm) eventually rejected his extreme skepticism because they reacted against the extent to which Bultmann ascribed free creativity of the tradition to the early Church. Also, many exegetes (e.g., J. Jeremias and V. Taylor) used form criticism but with more conservative results than Bultmann or his disciples.

Bultmann articulated a way in which the meaning of Scripture for our own time could be interpreted. Today much literary criticism continues though it modifies significantly his efforts in this regard. After the development of form criticism, more attention came to be given to the authors of the Gospels and their theologies present in their organization of the traditions common to them. This "redaction criticism" led gradually to a more pronounced use of modern literary critical methods in interpreting the New Testament documents, that is, in seeing them as compositions and trying to understand them as such. To take one example here, we can refer to an article by William Vorster on "Meaning and Reference: The Parables of Jesus in Mark 4."2 The meaning of a word (e.g., *lithos* means "snake" in Revelation) and its reference (e.g., *lithos* refers to Satan in Revelation) are not the same. And "reference" itself may be taken in two senses. It may refer to an event in history behind the text (in accord with the historical-critical method), or it may refer to the world-in-front-of-the-text. The parables in Mark's Gospel, for example, are set in the narration of this Gospel, and so their meaning and reference are those that this context indicates. The referent is the Kingdom of God. Vorster suggests "that there is not a significant difference between the ways in which a parable and a Gospel refer both are 'made up' stories, even if not the same genre"(57). Mark's Gospel is indeed embedded in first-century Palestine and thus in a real world. But this does not answer the question of the reference of the text. For example, do the "disciples" of Jesus in his Gospel signify no more nor less than Jesus' original disciples, or do they signify some group claiming to continue the position of the original disciples or some other group contemporary to the writing of the Gospel; or do they occupy a purely informative role? Mark's Gospel is not a copy of reality; "it is reality remade"(58). Parables, too, are narratives. And written history is a "made up" story.

The crux of the problem lies in the nature of narrative itself. Narrative is the remaking of reality (= creating a narrative world) through characterization, plot, and other narrative devices. The storyteller creates a world of his own making with its own time, space, characters, and plot, one which is called a 'narrative world.' Even if one were to be as true to the 'real world' as possible

in presenting part of it in narrative discourse, one will still be creating a 'narrative world'. . . [T]heir significance is not the actuality of events, but their logical structure. . . Narratives are not merely windows, nor are they purely mirrors; they are both. . . . Mark's presentation of the disciples has to do with the narrative world he created. The answer as to how they refer is to be found in the way Mark created his narrative world. The same applies to parables (60-61).

Granted that the Gospels and, for example, the Acts of the Apostles are genuine literary creations of their authors, and that they do not have a one-to-one correlation with what happened in time and space, does this mean that one is restricted to their "narrative world" in interpreting these texts and their reference?

Ricoeur, on whom Vorster in part depends, approaches Scripture as a philosopher. He is a Christian, but he exercises a certain *epoche* in reference to his Christian belief when he analyses religious language. In this context, he sees much of the language of Scripture as modifying poetic language since it redescribes those human "limit experiences," both positive and negative, which make it known to us that our condition is finally not of our making or under our control. Religious language intensifies poetic language to express such experience, and this has implications for the language of Scripture. As one of his interpreters writes:

The referent of the biblical language is in one sense, then, human reality in its wholeness: religious experience does not have to do with a supernatural world separate from or added to human existence in the world, but with authentically human experience. . . .

In another sense the ultimate referent of the biblical texts is God, or the Kingdom of God. For as religious poetic fictions, the world projected by the biblical texts is an intensified, extravagant, 'impossible possible' mode of being in the world. It is a disclosure of possibilities for human existence which are beyond the limit our ordinary experience can imagine.3

In these two approaches to Scripture, we have two modes of the use of imagination on the part of the interpreters and two views of the use scriptural authors made of creative imagination. This raises the question of how indeed the authors of the New Testament did use creative imagination, and, thus, how they should be interpreted.

Judaism in the Changing World of the First Century

The books of the New Testament, we will suggest in the next section, present themselves as an experientially based witness to God's symbolically mediated offer of revelation and salvation through Jesus Christ and the Spirit to a people concerned for themselves and their societies in a period when peoples were being uprooted from a past into confrontation with a world empire and culture that challenged their traditional symbolic worlds and were adjusting their traditions in varied ways to these changed circumstances.4 The texts of the New Testament are religious texts in the sense that they proclaim to people a religious world or a relation to God that is symbolically expressed, and they address Christians who have accepted the Christian message in the midst of the pluralism of that time. These books are addressed to Christians who came from this first-century world, and so it is helpful to say a word about some few aspects of the world in which these texts were written. The interpretation of the texts is aided by some reference to the search of people at that time as a religious search. We will recall aspects of that time from the perspective of peoples' religious search, rather than reductively recalling their economic, political or social

concerns. The data relevant to this question can be found in the New Testament itself (e.g., in the implied reader), and also in what other texts witness of the period.

The reader can find more adequate analyses of that period and place in books easily available.5 Here we simply recall schematically that it was a world in transition, so different from and yet analogous to our own period of change. This was true for the Jewish world, but also for the larger Mediterranean world of Roman power and Hellenistic culture. In fact, these two worlds were profoundly interconnected because a central factor in Judaism's experience at the time was how to face this larger world that affected them so severely and face it in a way that was faithful to their past. We shall first recall something of the larger Mediterranean world and then of Judaism's situation in the first century.

Hellenism had spread through the Mediterranean world from the time when Alexander the Great had conquered much of it and sought to spread Greek culture. This culture was initially centered in the city-states of Greece, but after Alexander the cities became too large for citizen participation, and they were not free but were included in the empire, eventually that of Rome. This Roman rule was preoccupied with power and the efficient use of it to ensure a peace of sorts. Along with the benefits it brought to many people, it also imposed heavy taxes and caused a sense of deracination. Inclusion within the empire gave people opportunity for a new identity, but it also led to a breakdown of local roots and, not infrequently, to alienation and despair.

Religious syncretisms developed from this enlarged political context, some of which led toward monotheism. But many people sensed that their lives were ruled by an alternation of chance and fate. Since individuals often sensed that they did not have control over their lives, both religion and philosophy gave increased attention to the individual. Popular Hellenistic religion tended to emphasize personal religious experience and feed a hunger for revelation, transformation and personal allegiance that would give a sense of identity in an alienating world (e.g., through the mystery religions). Hellenistic philosophy was now dedicated more to the art of living than to metaphysics. For example, the Stoics taught that the universe was rational and that events were governed by divine providence; Cynics were individualistic and stressed freedom; and Pythagoreans emphasized community. Much philosophy called people to the virtuous life as the good life and fostered a religious view of the calling human beings had. Hellenism was characterized by a reinterpretation of its earlier symbols and philosophy to make them suitable for a new age when the social setting and the virtues needed were no longer those of an earlier period.

Judaism, too, was in a period of transition. It offered a consistent framework for self-definition but was not uniform. The Torah was central for the Jews. It implied that they were one with the people of old. God had made a covenant with them, had made them his people, was faithful to his covenant and called them to be holy. But what did being holy mean? On this there was diversity. The Jews, and in a special way those in Palestine, were divided among themselves over the issue of Hellenism and Rome. The presence to them of Hellenistic culture and Roman power challenged them to interpret anew their inherited tradition, concerning the relation between religious and socio-political realities. The tax collectors and the zealots took radically different reactions to Roman hegemony. But between these extremes there were also very marked differences among the Sadducees, the Pharisees, the Essenes and the people of the land (*am-ha-aretz*). They had different interpretations concerning what it was to be God's people, and they transformed their traditional religious symbols in different ways through their experiences and convictions. This had been in process for a long time.

We may note several symbols of Jewish tradition to indicate some diversity in first-century Judaism. Messianism, the expectation of God's promise of a Son of David to liberate the Jews and

fulfill God's promises, was one of these symbols that was central to many Jews' hope in their conflicted world. Another was strongly developed during the time of the persecution of the Jews about 165 B.C. at the time of Antiochus Epiphanes IV's attempt to assimilate the Jews into Greek culture. Apocalyptic literature, in this instance the book of Daniel, was a specifically religious response to the persecution experienced by those faithful to Torah and their need for a deep conviction that God was faithful. In symbolic language, this literature (e.g., Daniel, chapter 7) assured the people that God would soon come and liberate them, that in the age to come, as distinct from the present age dominated by forces of evil, God's universal reign of justice would be given to God's people (symbolized by one like a Son of man), and that the just would experience a resurrection from the dead (Dan. 12:1-3). This led to a new interpretation of history. The rabbinic tradition, on the other hand, did not give an analysis of history but rather of the Torah to apply what had earlier been written for an agricultural people to a people in radically changed circumstances. The Torah "is God's eternal blueprint for creation and for righteous behavior," and the Pharisees sought to "put a hedge around the Torah" for the people.6 While these emphasized the Torah and separatism, the Sadducees restricted the Torah to the Pentateuch and sought accommodation with the Romans. The Essenes had reacted to the imposition of a high priest not of David's line and to other factors by a separatism more severe than that of the Pharisees; they interpreted the Torah and its prophesies as applying specifically to their group and its future. The Temple was a major symbol for all of Judaism, and synagogue services were one central place for the reinterpretation of the Torah. All these groups were interpreting the Torah, its promises and the meaning of holiness for the new circumstances posed by Hellenistic culture and Roman power.

The Jews of the Diaspora, over twice as numerous as those within Palestine, also faced the issue of assimilation or separatism, but they did so "in a setting less colored by religious persecution and political oppression."7 Rome gave the Jews certain rights and privileges so that they could abide by their religious traditions. The Jews were admired by some gentiles for their monotheism, the high moral code of the Torah and their claim to be God's people; but they were also under suspicion by others for their separatism. Though as attached to the Torah as the Palestinian Jews, they interpreted the Jewish tradition differently, because they were in a different cultural setting. For example, the Hellenistic Jews of the Diaspora, as distinct from those in Mesopotamia, read the Torah in the Septuagint translation, and had done so for generations since their native language was Greek. In the efforts of many of these, particularly in Alexandria, to make themselves understood favorably by outsiders, they reflected on their history and its main figures by some use of Hellenistic categories. For example, Philo of Alexandria used allegory to interpret the Torah and he wrote of Moses as the ideal philosopher-king. The Book of Wisdom, written about 50 B.C. in Alexandria, reflected on Wisdom, an emanation from God, as guiding his people, on the virtues that came from Wisdom, on immortality that was its reward, on God's philanthropy, and on the way God makes himself known by his works in creation that manifest Him analogously. The witness of the lives and the words of the Hellenistic Jews was not without its impact in the confused world of that time. There were gentiles who attached themselves to the synagogues, and accepted monotheism and the moral code of the Torah, though they did not accept Jewish law. And it was among these that Christian missionaries first gained gentile converts.

The texts of the New Testament were addressed to Christian Jews, who had come from Palestine; to the Diaspora, seeking fidelity to their tradition while facing the larger world of Hellenistic culture and Roman hegemony; and to Christians, who had come from among the gentiles living in a world culture and empire marked by deracination and by religious and philosophical pluralism. That world bears some resemblance to our own. One major movement in

our time, for example, is the emergence of new states since the Second World War. The people in many of these have their sense of identity tied up with their cultural tradition and yet face a larger world now and new expectations that the state will serve the needs of all and enable the people to be accepted and respected in the larger world. Clifford Geertz, a cultural anthropologist, who has studied this phenomenon, notes that the great tension between these orientations "is one of the central driving forces in the national evolution of the new states; . . . at the same time, one of the greatest obstacles to such evolution."8 He remarks on the "great extent to which their peoples' sense of self remains bound up in the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition, and . . . the steadily accelerating importance in this century of the sovereign state as a positive instrument for the realization of collective aims."9 On the other hand, many in developed countries have lost a sense of tradition, have experienced deracination and, while acclaiming the accomplishments of our pragmatic, scientific and technological age, no longer find its presuppositions and symbols sufficient to give meaning to their lives. Religious fundamentalism and religious liberalism are other examples of responses people make to a period of rapid change.

New Testament Proclamation of the Resurrection of Jesus: Its Impact for Cultural Transformation

We suggest that the transition present in the origins of Christianity may cast some light on the present age of transition or cultural change. To show how this is the case, we can, all too briefly, (1) recall a few texts that contain this proclamation, (2) indicate how both creative imagination and concern for what actually happened in history are found in these texts, and (3) enumerate a few of the ways this influenced the Jewish Christians' sense of identity and stance toward the larger world.

Christian Texts and Proclamation

The texts of the New Testament are religious texts in the sense that they proclaim to people a religious world or a relation to God that is in a large part symbolically expressed. And they address Christians who have accepted the Christian message in the midst of the pluralism of that time. We will reflect particularly on Acts 2:14-41, but we will preface our study of that text with a recall of the prologue to Luke's Gospel. Acts and the third Gospel were originally two parts of one literary work, and so the prologue to the Gospel can give us evidence internal to the text concerning the literary genre of Luke's writings. We wish to take them on their own self-understanding rather than judge or evaluate them by history or literary composition as practiced in our century. The prologue to Luke's Gospel is as follows:

Inasmuch as many have undertaken to compose a narrative concerning the events which have been brought to their fruition among us, as those handed them on to us who were eye-witnesses from the beginning and became servants of the word, it seemed opportune that I, too, having made an accurate investigation of all [the traditions] from the beginning, should write an orderly account for your Excellency, Theophilus, so that you might come to appreciate the certainty of the instruction you have received (Luke 1:1-4).10

Depending on Richard Dillon's study of Luke, we can make several points. This prologue shows us the context of Luke's endeavor. The fact that many have given an account of the events

he will treat justifies his own efforts to compose a narrative of these events. Luke holds an equivalency between narrating and proclaiming (see Lk. 8:39; Mk. 5:19), so if 'narrative' is taken as Luke's literary genre, "it should not be classified as some nonkerygmatic historical reasoning which only modern theological debate could define"(209). The subject matter of his account is, not simply events of the past, but the way they have been brought to fulfillment in a later generation, his own and that of his addressee, through witnesses of these events who became 'servants of the word.' Throughout his writing Luke is interested in events as fulfilling God's prophetic word; this shows God's actions in these events, and it is only by seeing these events in relation to God's word that they can be seen as God's action. The last chapter of Luke's Gospel is crucial for his understanding of the formation of these 'servants of the word', for it recounts how the crucified and risen Jesus interpreted the Scripture to his disciples, explaining to them that it was "necessary that the Messiah should suffer these things and enter into his glory"(Lk. 24:26). It was only then and at the breaking of bread that the disciples recognized him as Jesus. In this way, Luke makes clear how provision was made for the propagation of the original events through a mission modeled after Jesus' own by showing how "the puzzled Easter onlookers [were] made into prospective Easter witnesses" (213).11

The prologue also shows us the procedure Luke takes in his Gospel, namely to present an 'orderly account'. The order he seeks, as the rest of the Gospel shows, is not primarily chronological. Rather he orders the traditions he received to better express "the significance of the events and teachings they recorded" (222). His word 'orderly' indicates a "modality of literary presentation" to bring his readers to "the correct understanding of events"(222-223), that is, in accord with their 'directional thrust,' their contribution to the historical continuum or their place according to the logic of the divine plan. Finally, his prologue shows us the purpose of his composition of both the Gospel and Acts. It is that Theophilus may have 'certainty' (*asphalea*) concerning the instruction he had received, that is, the kerygma or proclamation of God's offer of salvation through Jesus Christ. This term is also used at the climax of Luke's account of Peter's missionary sermon at Pentecost: "Let all Israel know with certainty that God has made both Lord and Christ this Jesus whom you have crucified!"(Acts 2:36). The certainty is not simply about the occurrence of the events, but about "the significance of the reported events as God's action in history . . . that God acted in the events recounted and thereby fulfilled his documented promises of salvation" (223, 225). This was particularly necessary in the second generation of Christians. Their faith was called into question by the fact that most Jews had rejected the message about Jesus, and there was a growing alienation of a predominantly gentile Christianity from Judaism.

How could non-Jews find value in something which had its roots in Judaism but which most Jews repudiated? . . . Luke had to establish the historical nexus between Israel and Jesus on the one hand (the Gospel) and between Jesus and the church on the other (Acts), and thus to demonstrate the full scope of the divine plan in which the church of the present proves to be the proper destination of God's way with Israel.12

We can turn very briefly to Luke's account of Peter's speech at Pentecost for further internal evidence of the relation between composition and history for him. We turn to this text (Acts 2:14-41) because, while this speech and others in Acts should be considered as Luke's composition in accord with his "appropriation of the models of historiography practiced by [his] contemporaries" (724), "the missio" sermons . . . illustrate . . . how the apostolic preaching and its reception carried earliest Christian history toward the outcome intended by God"(724). Many aspects of this speech can be shown to manifest traditions that preexisted the time of Luke's composition; for they are

found in early epistles of Paul, and they reflect the primitive Church's expectation of an imminent parousia.

In Peter's missionary discourse at Pentecost, we have the elements of the basic missionary kerygma: the name, the words, the death and the resurrection of Jesus proclaimed. The core of the climactic verse of the discourse is pre-Lukan kerygma, shown in Pauline passages (e.g., Rom 1:4, 10:9-13): "Therefore let the whole house of Israel know for certain that God has made him both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus whom you crucified" (Acts 2:36). This kerygma was not simply or primarily narrative. It is a proclamation with a kind of sacramental value, insofar as it makes available to the people the saving presence of Jesus. And it can be called symbolic in the sense that it proclaims this through the mediation of events: the death, resurrection and exaltation of Jesus interpreted as manifesting what God has proclaimed Jesus to be — Lord and Christ. Thus the speech has the character of a narrative with a split-reference, namely, reference to acts in space and time by Jesus and concerning Jesus, but these as manifesting God's action declaring him to be Lord and Christ and the implication this has for Israel and for others. They are shown to be such a manifestation through the interpretation of these events by prophetic statements of the Jewish Scripture or Old Testament and of Jesus himself.

We are not attempting here to give an adequate argument to defend our interpretation of the way Luke relates kerygma to history. That can be found in the works we cite. We are simply giving some basic reasons for the position we propose and illustrations of the evidence that exists for it. In reference to Luke's account of Peter's speech at Pentecost, we can note the following: Peter bore testimony to what Jesus had done and what God had done for Jesus (raising him from the dead) as a basis for his proclamation that God had declared Jesus to be Lord and Christ and for his invitation of the people to repentance and baptism.13 Peter attests that "God raised this Jesus; of this we are witnesses" (Acts 2:13). His and the other apostles' witness to the resurrection of Jesus was presented as based on the appearances of Jesus to them, that is, something that had happened to Jesus after his death (namely, his being raised from the dead by God) and to them (namely, his appearances to them). In spite of all the difficulties modern historical criticism may have with this witness, the question remains, Does the apostles' testimony gives us an intelligible account of how the early Church emerged from a group of men cast into depression and profound disappointment by the death of Jesus? We may note that even a non-Christian historian such as Tacitus could acknowledge an event in history that was beyond the powers of nature, for he accepted and recounted the story that the Emperor Vespasian healed a cripple and a blind man in Alexandria.14 James Dunn points out the testimony, common to the early Christians, concerning the origins of Christianity:

After Jesus' death the earliest Christian community sprang directly from a sequence of epochal experiences of two distinct sorts experiences in which Jesus appeared to individuals and groups to be recognized as one who had already experienced the eschatological resurrection from the dead, and experiences of religious ecstasy and enthusiasm recognized as the manifestation of the eschatological Spirit. . . . Above all, the distinctive essence of Christian experience lies in the relation between Jesus and the Spirit.15

According to Luke, Peter recalled Jesus' "mighty deeds, wonders, and signs, which God worked through him in your midst, as you yourselves know"(22), and thus he offered them as God's attestation concerning him. And he and the early Church interpreted God's raising Jesus up by citing Old Testament passages concerning the Son of David who was to be the Messiah (Acts

2:30; see Psalm 16:8-11). Peter distinguished God's raising Jesus up from his exaltation of Jesus: "Exalted at the right hand of God, he received the promise of the Holy Spirit from the Father and poured it forth, as you [both] see and hear"(Acts 2:33). This understanding of Jesus as exalted at God's right hand (a metaphor for the power to save that God gave him) is pre-Lucan, though not all earlier texts distinguished it temporally from Jesus' resurrection itself (see Rom 8:34; Eph 1:20; 1 Pt 1:21). Also, the view that the risen Christ became powerful in the Spirit is pre-Lucan (see Rom 1:4; 1 Tim 3:16). This exaltation and exercising of saving power is in accord with Scripture, for David, who did not go up to heaven, said: "The Lord said to my Lord, 'Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies your footstool'"(Acts 2:34-35). As Dillon writes: "The Exalted is the one whom Israel's prophet-king named Kyrios. . . . The psalm citation brings the argument full circle from its beginnings with the saving Kyrios-name of Joel 2:5 (v. 21), and we are fully prepared for the summation of v. 36" (734).

Peter concludes his speech by calling for the people's repentance or turning away from sin, here repentance for the death of Jesus, and baptism here in the name of Jesus Christ, through which they would receive forgiveness of sins and the reception of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:37-41).

Creative Imagination and History in These Texts

How are creative imagination and a concern for what actually happened in time and space interrelated in this proclamation of the Christian message? We think that the preceding account helps to support the following view: first, Luke's composition of the Gospel and Acts (and the same could be said for the other evangelists) is for the purpose of giving a deeper understanding of the mystery of Jesus and its implications for the Christian community, deeper, that is, than modern historical criticism seeks or, in some of its representatives, allows. Secondly, they do this from the perspective of the post-paschal Christian community that had in the Apostles and first disciples experienced the appearances of the risen Jesus and the coming of the Holy Spirit and that had experienced too the living presence of the exalted Jesus in the community (e.g., in the Eucharist, the proclamation of the word). They wrote, too, from the perspective of the traditions they have received and of the problems they faced in proclaiming the faith in different contexts. They present themselves as writing from faith engendered and matured by these experiences and the living of the Christian life. Thirdly, their fidelity to the task of strengthening and enlightening the faith of Christians through writing the Gospels and Acts depended on their being faithful to what Jesus actually said and did and who he was, but also on their arranging and explicating their account of this so that its deeper meaning and implications could be evident to their readers. It depended on their use of creative imagination, but one that shaped the tradition of the words and deeds of Jesus rather than substituted for this tradition. The Christ of faith and the Jesus of history were the same.16

Thus, there is not an undermining disparity, that some but not all who accept the approach of literary criticism suppose,17 between the kerygma or good news and what actually happened in space and time, nor a dichotomy between the New Testament texts as literature or composition and their concern for mediating what God actually said and did through Jesus Christ. The proclamation of the good news is the basic form of preaching in the primitive Church, and it is basic to such documents as the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. The good news or the Gospel is that God is offering his definitive salvation to the Jews and gentiles through Jesus Christ. This is expressed primarily through narratives of the acts of Jesus and his parables of the Kingdom and accounts of his death and resurrection, understood as symbols of what God was doing and

revealing. The accounts of the resurrection are symbolic in that they point to something else, namely, that God is vindicating Jesus, declaring him to be Messiah and Lord, and offering those who believe in him salvation. The proclamation of this good news calls the hearers and later the readers to a participation in God's new age of salvation as an all-inclusive horizon of life, somewhat as other religious symbols of that time or myths invited people to a relation to the Sacred.

It is true that the Christian proclamation was expressed through symbols. But this is not to divorce these symbols from the order of events and words in history or space and time. The primitive Christian kerygma is presented in the form of an apostolic testimony or witness. It is an announcement of the good news in virtue of events that happened historically and that made known to the Apostles, who claimed to have witnessed them, what God was doing. These events were interpreted events, interpreted through the words of the Old Testament and of Jesus. Of themselves and divorced from such interpretation, they did not make this good news known (were it not a revelation). And indeed, without the inner gift of the Holy Spirit that opened human hearts to the life and logos they offered, they were not the basis of the Christian proclamation. We can say that the message (the-world-in-front-of-the-text) is the kerygma. It is conveyed by the acts and words of Jesus that are organized in the composition of the Gospels and Acts in a way to give us access to that significance and reference. The narratives then have a split reference. They refer to what Jesus said and did, but not out of a primary concern to write history according to the historical model. They refer to this so that the reader, and earlier the hearer, could discern God's acts and words offering salvation through Jesus. The words and deeds of Jesus and the resurrection are presented as symbols through which God is revealed, and they are presented from the deeper understanding and faith that the disciples achieved by way of the death and resurrection of Jesus.

Thus, the reference of a Gospel text or Acts cannot be taken to be restrictedly that which is within the 'narrative world' of the author. We have to acknowledge the text as an intersubjective communication, and so we have to take the world of the reader seriously. The 'implied reader' designates the one who, the author presupposes, is capable of hearing his message and responding positively to it; and we can analyze this from the text itself. It is through the 'implied reader' that the author seeks to reach the real reader. "The implied reader becomes the route by which the author reaches for the heart of the real reader."18 The scriptural author seeks to help the reader see some event as, or in, a particular perspective: "a shift takes place whereby a new perspective is opened on the second referential level" (80). This is a "redescription of reality" (Ricoeur). Although the evangelists and author of Acts treat historical material rather freely in their narratives, this is for the purpose of redescription, so that their readers could see the words and events of Jesus' life and death as the deeper understanding claimed by the Apostles through their experience of the resurrection and as they had implications for the needs of the Church of the time and place of the author's writing. Thus, the authors' redescription is not dissociated from the real world but rather gives access to the real world in this larger sense. We can say that the authors write in this way out of a conviction that the main creative imagination at work is God's, that God has through certain deeds and words revealed a message, such as that Jesus is Lord and Messiah and that human beings can be saved through belief in him.

A New Paradigm and Cultural Transformation

This proclamation of the good news presented a new paradigm to the Jews, the first hearers of what it meant to be a Jew. It brought about a cultural transformation for those who accepted the

Gospel. While other Jews of that period, who sought to reinterpret their sacred texts of the past to articulate their identity for the first century, wrote commentaries on these earlier texts, the Christians did not do this. Rather, they reinterpreted the texts by what they understood God had revealed through and about Jesus, and they presented their reinterpretation through texts concerning Jesus and the early Church. This led them to reinterpret what the expectation of Judaism was; this was what God was making available to them through Jesus and the Spirit. There was a mutual influence between the earlier texts on their interpretation of Jesus and their understanding of Jesus on their interpretation of earlier texts.

For example, many Scripture scholars agree with Ernst Kasemann that "apocalyptic was the mother of Christian theology."19 That is, the first interpretation of Jesus was through categories from the apocalyptic tradition expressed in such texts as Daniel 7 and 12:1-3. God's ultimate vindication for his faithful ones would be shown in his raising them from death to a life of happiness and glory; this had happened in Jesus and would happen soon for those who believe in him. God would give to one like a Son of man "dominion, glory, and kingship; . . nations and peoples of every language. . . an everlasting dominion" (Daniel 7:14). Christians interpreted the resurrection of Jesus and his exaltation to mean that God had given this kingship to Jesus; God declared him to be Lord and Messiah. The first Christians perhaps thought that Jesus would exercise this Lordship to save his people when he came again at the Parousia. But they quickly came to realize that Jesus as exalted Lord was already exercising it in part through the sending of the Spirit, through ministers of the word who proclaimed his message, and other means such as his sharing the messianic banquet with his disciples by the Eucharist. One effect of this was to orient the Christians decisively toward the future of the return of Christ and the Kingdom of God. They sought to make that Kingdom present, already here and now, as they could, but their hope was on the Kingdom to come. And many were willing to suffer death for their belief.

In other matters, too, the experience of Jesus caused a cultural transformation for his followers. This is shown dramatically in the life and ministry of Paul. He came to realize, as Peter had before him (Acts 10), that salvation was not dependent upon observance of the Jewish law of clean and unclean foods, of circumcision, and keeping the Sabbath. It was freely given by God to those who believe in Jesus Christ and receive baptism. These receive the Spirit who enables them to live the New Law, the law of love of God and of neighbor: "Owe nothing to anyone, except to love one another; for the one who loves another has fulfilled the law" (Rom. 13:8).

All of this led to a reinterpretation of the past, what it meant to be the true Israel, and to such a reinterpretation that overcame many things that divided the Jews from gentiles. Through this they could say, "the Gentiles are coheirs, members of the same body, and copartners in the promise in Christ Jesus through the Gospel" (Eph. 3:6). It enabled the Christians to proclaim a message of God's love and salvation and of justice and love among human beings that many gentiles experienced as fulfilling and liberating for them. In the process of this proclamation to the peoples of the Mediterranean world, the Gospel became inculturated in this world. lt was presented in a way that these people, too, experienced that they did not have to deny their roots to accept the Gospel, indeed, that the Gospel opened a world for them that affirmed what was good in their past as it had done for the Jews, while it led them to a larger and more inclusive world.20 This message had, too, implications for the political, social and even economic areas of life, some of which were realized in the first Christian centuries, and some of which are just being better understood in our own times.

Through the early centuries of the common or Christian era, Christianity largely supplanted both Judaism and Greco-Roman classicism in animating what was most creative in that world,

though not without cost of blood and intellectual struggles. Gradually, Jewish self-definition came to involve a great deal of exclusion of others and self-isolation. As one commentator writes: "If rabbinic self-definition effectively meant self-isolation, it is hard not to feel that the rabbis made a disastrously bad choice whose effects Jews still have to live with; and that their Christian contemporaries managed to acquit themselves considerably better."21 And an historian of the fourth century writes as follows of upper class families in Rome:

The ladies were converted [to Christianity] first, but the men long tended to remain pagan. Like the intellectuals of the Greek East. . . their attachment to the past was aesthetic and antiquarian. . . . The bonds of class and wealth were stronger to them than the divisiveness [from the Christian majority at that time] caused by religious differences. . . . The religion of these men expressed a sad conservatism *à la recherche du temps perdu*; it was an idealization of the glory of Rome, with a private mysticism especially fed on speculative Neo-platonic exegesis of Cicero's Scipio's Dream and the sixth book of Virgil's *Aeneid* (the descent to the underworld).22

In conclusion, we can at least raise the question of what this means for our age which in many ways is also one of division between those who have their identities from their past and those who identify themselves with the hopes of the present but at the cost of a deracination or rootlessness. Our age needs a reason for living and hoping that politics cannot offer, but one that, without denying a rightful autonomy to politics and economics, leads people to engage in the struggle for a just and compassionate human community, one that embraces all peoples. A simply secular hope is no more sufficient for this than a simply privatized religion. If Christians think that they have some basics of an answer to the present, they must relate their hope both positively and critically to the cultures with which they are engaged as effectively as the Christians of the early centuries did. This is a greater task in our time because we live in the midst of multiple cultures.

Notes

1. Luke Johnson, *The Writings of the New Testament. An Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), p. 8. Also on forms of New Testament criticism, see John Kselman and Ronald Witherup,"Modern New Testament Criticism," and Raymond Brown and Sandra Schneiders, "Hermeneutics," in Raymond Brown, Joseph Fitzmyer,and Roland Murphy (ed.), *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1990), pp. 1130-1145, and 1146-1165.

2. See Bernard Lategan and William Vorster, *Text and Reality: Aspects of Reference in Biblical Texts* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 27-65. Numbers in the text here are to pages of Vorster's article.

3. Lynn Poland, *Literary Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics: A Critique of Formalist Approaches* (Decatur, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1985), p. 193. We should note that there are philosophical issues involved in interpretations of hermeneutics that we do not treat in this article. For example, the whole question of human knowledge of being, what that means and the possibility of metaphysics can influence a position on the interpretation of religious language. I have treated some of these questions in *God's Work in a Changing World* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985). For example, I analyze Heidegger's position and evaluate it (pp. 194-200), and discuss the possibility of metaphysics in "Developmental Psychology and Knowledge of Being," pp. 287-314.

4. In this I have been helped by Luke Johnson. Also see Marcus J. Borg, *Jesus. A New Vision: Spirit, Culture and the Life of Discipleship* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987); and *God's Work*, pp. 37-38.

5. See, in addition to Johnson, on whom I particularly depend here, Sean Freyne, *The World of the New Testament* (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1980); Bruce Malina, *The New Testament World, Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981).

6. Johnson, p. 56.

7. *Ibid*. p. 67.

8. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 258.

9. *Ibid*., p. 258. He states that, "The new states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachments" (p. 259), and notes in these states a "direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments" (p. 261).

10. See Richard Dillon, "Previewing Luke's Project from His Prologue (Luke 1:1-4)," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 43 (1981), pp. 205-227. The translation in the text is that of Dillon, and the page numbers in the text at this point are to his article.

11. For further analysis of Luke 24, see the article of Joseph Plevnik, "The Eyewitnesses of the Risen Jesus in Luke 24," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 49 (1987), 90-103.

12. Richard Dillon, "Acts of the Apostles," *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary*, p. 724. Our analysis of Peter's missionary speech is basically dependent on Dillon's commentary, and page references in the text are to it.

13. See Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, *Foundational Theology. Jesus and the Church* (New York: Crossroad, 1984) chapter 2, "A Reconstructive Hermeneutic of Jesus' Resurrection," pp. 29-55.

14. See Hugo Staudinger, "The Resurrection of Jesus Christ as Saving Event and as 'Object' of Historical Research," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 36 (1983), 314.

15. James Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), 357, 358.

16. See James Dunn, *Unity and Diversity in the New Testament. An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest Christianity* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), p. 57: "The distinctive feature which comes to expression in all the confessions we have examined, the bedrock of the Christian faith confessed in the NT writings, is the unity between the earthly Jesus and the exalted one who is somehow involved in or part of our encounter with God in the here and now."

17. In opposition to the view of William Vorster (cited above), see Bernard Lategan, "Reference: Reception, Redescription and Reality," in Lategan and Vorster, *Text and Reality*, pp. 67-93.

18. *Ibid*., p. 70.

19. See Dunn, *Unity*, chapter 13, "Apocalyptic Christianity," pp. 309-340.

20. See Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition. A History of the Development of Doctrine*. Vol. 1, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 62-63: "Christianity laid claim to all that was good and noble in the tradition of classical thought, for this had been inspired by the seminal Logos, who became flesh in Jesus Christ. This meant that not only Moses but Socrates had been both fulfilled and superseded by the coming of Jesus."

21. David Halperin, in a review of books on "Jewish and Christian Self-Definition," in *Religious Studies Review*, 11 (1985), p. 136.

22. Henry Chadwick, *The Early Church* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 161-162. For an examination of the ambiguities and compromises that occurred once the Christian Church was accepted in the Roman Empire, see Francine Cardmman, "The Emperor's New Clothes: Christ and Constantine," in Thomas E. Clarke, ed., *Above Every Name. The Lordship of Christ and Social Systems* (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), pp. 191-210.

Chapter II

The *Biblia Pauperum* or" Poor Man's Bible": Moral Imagination in the Middle Ages

Albert C. Labriola

Interpretation of Scripture in the Middle Ages was often typological, an outlook whereby persons, objects, and episodes from the Old Testament were viewed as prefigurations of the New Dispensation, usually of Christ's redemptive ministry. An Old Testament prefiguration is called a "type," and its New Testament fulfillment an "antitype." Typological interpretation was initiated by Christ, who likened himself to Moses on numerous occasions, claimed that he fulfilled Old Testament prophecies concerning the Messiah, and was highlighted at the Transfiguration during which Moses, on the one side, and Elias, on the other, were respective prefigurations of his roles as lawgiver and prophet. In short, the typological significance of his redemptive ministry was an explicit lesson that Christ imparted to his disciples, likening himself, for instance, to the brazen serpent of Numbers 21:9: "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that those who believe in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting" (John 3:14-15).

The cross to which Christ refers in John 3 is undoubtedly the richest typological image in Scripture. Its Old Testament prefigurations include, among other examples, Noah's ark and Moses's rod. The respective episodes of deliverance enacted by Noah and Moses – from the Deluge and the Red Sea – enrich our understanding of Christ's ministry of redemption, which liberates humankind from the threat of eternal damnation.

Though "type" and "antitype" correspond, their differences should not be overlooked. In the foregoing example, the Lord, through the sign of the uplifted serpent, restored the physical health of the Israelites who had been bitten by the fiery serpents; but Christ crucified is the means whereby saving grace is made available for the spiritual renewal of fallen humankind. Some typology, in fact, highlights differences, rather than resemblances, between "type" and "antitype." Accordingly, Adam is often perceived as the "old man" who has yielded to evil temptation, whereas Christ is the "new man" through whom redemption is possible. Eve, having failed to resist the seduction of the serpent-tempter, is contrasted with Mary, the so-called "second Eve," who is impervious to the onset of evil.

The Biblical origins and patristic development of typology are complex topics often interrelated with discussions of history, prophecy, allegory and, of course, theology. While such discussions are at the heart of scholarly pursuits and theoretical investigations, they sometimes divert attention from the simple and straightforward conception underlying typological instruction for the common folk, reflected, for example, in the *Biblia Pauperum*. Though literally translated as "books of the poor," the title is more often rendered as "Poor Man's Bible." Other titles were also used to designate the same book: *Typos et Antitypos Veteris et Novi Testamenti* and *Biblia Typico-harmonica*. Though such titles do not mention "poor man," they emphasize how each leaf of the *Biblia Pauperum* contains illustrations of scenes from the Old and New Testaments, scenes in the central horizontal arrangement of three panels called a triptych. Accompanying the triptych on each leaf are Latin texts that cite, paraphrase, and interpret the Biblical passages to which the illustrations pertain.

Technically, the *Biblia Pauperum* is a xylographic book, a blockbook whose pictures and text were produced by impressions from wooden blocks carved in relief. In fact, the paper was pressed onto the blocks after their carved surfaces, facing upward, had been moistened with dye. Though manuscripts of the *Biblia Pauperum* circulated in the Middle Ages, the blockbook editions, begun in the Netherlands where the art of woodcutting flourished, tended to proliferate between 1460-1490. In this period, the blockbook was a transitional form of publication between the production of manuscripts by hand and the printing of books by movable type. Most of the blockbooks in the fifteenth century, such as the *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* (Mirror of Human Salvation) and *Ars Moriendi* (Art of Dying), are religious in nature, but only the *Biblia Pauperum* is entirely Biblical in content.

Despite the popularity of the *Biblia Pauperum*, the origin and use of the blockbook, as well as the source of its title, particularly the appellation "poor man," are matters of conjecture. Perhaps the book was designed by friars and other clergymen who sought to educate the poor and illiterate folk in the unity of Scripture. Not only was the audience for such instruction certainly poor, but also the clergymen whose preaching was aided by the *Biblia Pauperum* were often mendicants or "poor men." Furthermore, the preaching and instruction influenced by the *Biblia Pauperum* may have been directed against one or more of the numerous heresies that were revived in the late Middle Ages. As a resource or reference work to combat heresy, the *Biblia Pauperum* affirms doctrinal orthodoxy, concerning the Trinity, the virgin birth of Jesus, the two natures of Jesus, his Resurrection, the Second Coming and Final Judgment, the damnation of the wicked, the salvation of the sanctified and their union with God in Heaven. To affirm doctrine, the *Biblia Pauperum* uses visual depictions, Biblical proof-texts, and interpretive commentary. Another use of the *Biblia Pauperum* may have been to assist in the conversion of the Jews. If anti-Judaism was characteristic of some segments of the medieval Church and society, other segments, overtly or covertly, sought to win the Jews to Christianity. Doing so was more expeditiously accomplished when the Jewish Old Testament was reconciled with the Christian New Testament.

Not to be discounted is the view that the *Biblia Pauperum* was reproduced rapidly and inexpensively because of the entrepreneurial instinct of printers and booksellers who found a market for their products. Because it was easily produced from engraved blocks, the *Biblia Pauperum* may have been the popular (or "poor man's") counterpart of the illuminated manuscript. A single set of blocks was used indefinitely and even transported from one country to another, so that reproduction proliferated. Complicating the bibliographic history are numerous factors, some of which will be recounted below. When, for instance, blocks became chipped or cracked, replacements were carved. If in such cases an engraver intended to recreate the same images, there were still inevitable variations, though slight. More conspicuous variations resulted when an engraver used these opportunities for deliberate alteration, substituting one Biblical personage for another, adding or eliminating personages, or rearranging visual details. As a result, some of the printed images of the next impression were different. When, moreover, a copy of the book, rather than a set of blocks, was available, an engraver would use the printed images as models from which to carve blocks. His newly created blocks would then print pictures closely resembling though different from his models. Finally, the more popular forty-leaf blockbook is inevitably compared with the later fifty-leaf edition, fewer copies of which are extant. Both editions are essentially the same, the longer one having ten more pages interspersed through the shorter prototype, rather than added on at the beginning or the end.

The design of each leaf is both horizontal and vertical. The central horizontal arrangement is that of an iconographic triptych in which the three panels call attention to interrelationships of the

Old and New Testaments. The panel in the middle is a scene from the New Testament, and the panels at the sides usually depict episodes from the Old Testament, though there are two notable exceptions: the left-hand panel of the twentieth triptych (v) depicts the five foolish virgins of Matthew 25:3, and the right-hand panel of the fortieth triptych (.v.) shows St. John and the angel from Revelation 21:9. The central vertical arrangement involves an upper scene of two prophets or patriarchs, each framed by an arch. A pillar separates the two figures, whose names are inscribed immediately below their busts. Each prophet or patriarch holds the end of a scroll bearing a verse from the Old Testament, a verse related typologically to the subject from the New Testament in the middle panel below. In the spaces alongside the figures are other passages from the Old Testament, usually paraphrases and interpretive commentary. The lowest scene in the vertical arrangement resembles the uppermost scene, though there are some differences. In the lowest scene the names of the Old Testament personages are inscribed on the scrolls with the scriptural passages. In the smaller spaces alongside the figures and below them are brief verses of interpretive commentary. By its interlocking horizontal and vertical design, crosslike in appearance, each leaf calls attention to the New Testament scene of the middle panel. This focus is reinforced by the positions of the four Old Testament personages, two above and two below the New Testament panel of each leaf. The personages, who become virtual witnesses of the fulfillment of their prophecies or of the episodes in which they participated, thus escape the temporal limitations of their own lives, develop a Christ-centered view of history, and acquire insight into the enigmas of the Old Testament.

The design of three panels and four figures on each leaf of the blockbook may be numerologically significant, for the sum and product, respectively seven and twelve, of the two numbers have mystical significance. Forty, the total number of triptychs, has various meanings, including the days in which Noah and his family were protected from the Deluge, the years that the Chosen People wandered in the wilderness, the days across which the Lord was tempted in the desert and the days that the risen Christ remained on earth before his Ascension.

The sequence of middle panels in the blockbook draws attention to Christ's unfolding ministry of redemption and the offer of salvation to humankind. The first triptych depicts the Annunciation, after which Christ's birth, infancy, childhood, and adulthood are depicted in the middle panels. The Passion, Death, and Resurrection of Christ — the events of the Paschal Mystery — are featured in almost a dozen triptychs. Doomsday is pictured in the middle panel of a later triptych, and the blockbook ends with the fortieth triptych, the middle panel of which is the crowning of the sanctified soul in Heaven, the reward of eternal bliss.

While the interaction of textual and visual elements is significant in the *Biblia Pauperum*, the separate consideration of these components is instructive. As a text, the *Biblia Pauperum* is a brief compendium of harmonies and concordances among Biblical texts and a guide to interpretations thereof. By its citation, juxtaposition, and interpretation of Biblical passages, the blockbook epitomizes the technique of medieval commentary compiled in monumental works such as the *Glossa Ordinaria* of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the *Catena Aurea* by St. Thomas Aquinas. Despite its relative brevity, the blockbook provides a frame of reference for understanding Biblical allusions in religious writing, including sermons, hymns, penitential literature, and devotional poetry as late as the seventeenth century.

As a work of visual art, the *Biblia Pauperum* reflects numerous typological details beyond what the Biblical texts and commentaries on each leaf explain. In line with this outlook, the 120 panels of the blockbook constitute a handbook of Biblical iconography and typology, useful in understanding the organizing principles of religious art, notably illuminated manuscripts,

illustrated Bibles, frescoes, painting, sculptures, woodcuts, emblem books and stained glass windows in convents, churches and cathedrals. Even a kinetic art form such as medieval drama uses dialogue, action, scenery, and stage properties that may be interpreted in relation to the iconographic and typological details in the *Biblia Pauperum*. Thus, *The Sacrifice of Isaac* in the Corpus Christi Cycle dramatizes Isaac with a fagot on his back and in the company of his father as they travel to a mount, prefigurations of the way of the cross and the journey up the hill to Golgotha. Finally, the iconography and typology of the *Biblia Pauperum* enrich one's outlook on the mimetic or imitative ritual of sacramental celebration. Accordingly, the triptych (i) that features the Baptism of the Lord — flanked, on the left, by the Red Sea deliverance and, on the right, by the carrying of the stalk of grapes across the Jordan River — presents an enriched interpretation of the baptismal experience. The triptych (s) showing the Last Supper, with Melchizedek at the left and the Israelites' gathering of manna at the right, combines Eucharistic symbolism with suggestions of induction into the priesthood.

Because of its panoramic outlook — from the Annunciation to the Apocalyptic union of the blessed souls with the Lord — the *Biblia Pauperum* develops a view whereby history unfolds *sub specie aeternitatis* or under the eye of God and according to his plan. As such, the series of woodcuts in the blockbook may be likened to other encyclopedic affirmations of the Providential scheme in human history. Medieval plays — the York, Towneley, Coventry and Chester cycles — feature many of the same events, including the Baptism of the Lord, the Temptation of Jesus, and the Transfiguration, that are highlighted in the central panels of the *Biblia Pauperum*. Sequences in medieval stained glass (the windows of King's College Chapel or the lancets under the west rose of Chartres, at times with stone sculptures of prophets nearby) resemble the architectonics of the *Biblia Pauperum*, whose pillars, arches, and onlooking Old Testament personages suggest the arcade or triforium of a Gothic Cathedral.

As a graphic manifestation of the Christian world view in the Middle Ages, the *Biblia Pauperum* is highly representative, if not commonplace, in its iconography, typology, selection of Biblical texts, and interpretive commentary. Little purpose is served by noting antecedents for particular verbal or visual elements in the blockbook. Such annotation would be voluminous, and its use and value questionable. Thus, for instance, the Biblical image of the cross as a fishhook (Job 40:20) in the twenty-fifth triptych (.e.) recurs in the commentary of the Church Fathers — Irenaeus, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory the Great, Rupert Deutz, Honorius of Autun, Rabanus Maurus and others. The image suggests that Christ is the bait to lure Leviathan, while the cross is the means to hook and bridle him. The Old Testament image, its New Testament antitype, the relationship of the passage from Job to other Biblical texts that appear with it in the *Biblia Pauperum*, and the iconographic resemblances of the cross, not only to the fishhook, but to other images in the twenty-fifth triptych (.e.), emerge from an inveterate tradition that spans more than a thousand years. For us, the *Biblia Pauperum* is one example of a popular work in this tradition of visualizing and interpreting Scripture. To examine the origin and development of this tradition, as well as variations therein, is beyond the scope of our present enterprise.

In addition to its selective exposition of Scripture by typology and iconography, the *Biblia Pauperum* also aimed to edify its audience, concerning the life of Christ. Coupled with intellectual understanding, in other words, was an emotional response of devotion and gratitude for Christ's ministry of Redemption, emphasized in scenes of the Passion and Crucifixion. This dual purpose of exposition and edification, effectively commingled and efficiently executed in the blockbook, was aptly suited to the "poor man," not simply to his level of understanding but to his threshold of emotional response.

If, therefore, one were to assess the thrust of the moral imagination reflected in the *Biblia Pauperum*, the dominant outlook was to depict humiliation and eventual triumph — what may be called, in effect, a theology of suffering. Christ's suffering was the prototype after which one's life and even death or martyrdom could be modeled. The effect of such living and dying could have twofold application — to energize the populace toward the revolutionary reform of an oppressive culture and government or to offer a transcendent outlook on one's circumstances, whereby the reward of suffering is perceived as the heavenly kingdom, not the improvement of one's circumstances in the present life. Either way, the heroism exemplified by Christ, involving faith, patience, and fortitude to withstand increasing adversity, is perhaps the foremost assertion of the *Biblia Pauperum* and the principal lesson to be derived from its art, Biblical texts and commentary.

Appendix
Iconography and Typology in the *Biblia Pauperum*: A Brief Commentary

Annunciation

The central subject of the first triptych is the Annunciation, viewed as the moment of Mary's virginal conception of Jesus. In saluting Mary, the archangel Gabriel, emissary of the godhead, traditionally bears a rod with a bud, leaf, or flower, which signifies the fertility that will result from divine insemination. Nevertheless, Mary retains her purity, which is emphasized by the lily that Gabriel holds in the central panel. Images of nature imply a garden setting, specifically the *hortus conclusus* or enclosed garden; the passage from Ezechiel suggests that the gate shall be shut (*porta clausa*). Gabriel's liturgical vestment indicates that the Annunciation, the moment of Christ's entry into the human condition, is commemorated, celebrated, and reenacted in sacred rites, notably the Mass, whereby Christ enters into our midst. In the background, appropriately, is an altar.

In addition to purity, Mary's distinguishing traits include modesty, humility and sanctity. Modesty is reflected in her appearance: she is clothed in simple not sumptuous attire. Humility is signified by her attitude, in which her arms are crossed at her breast. While thus professing unworthiness to be the mother of Jesus, Mary submits to the will of God. The nimbus at her head indicates sanctity. Emanating from the Father, who is pictured resplendently above, are rays that travel toward the Virgin. In the midst of the rays are the Son and the Holy Spirit: the former is a babe who descends headlong while bearing a cross on his left shoulder; the latter is imaged as a dove. The rays and the visible presence of the Divine Persons signify the infusion of grace and the impregnation of Mary by the triune deity, signified by the three-petaled lily held by Gabriel. The verbal counterpart of these visual images is the utterance of Gabriel ("*Ave Gratia Plena*"), which is inscribed on the scroll that he holds. The sanctity of Mary is further indicated by her meditation on an open book, which signifies the imprint of the divine word in her heart. She may also be reading the very passages in the Old Testament that relate to the episodes in the flanking panels of the triptych, typological prefigurations of the events in which she participates.

The left-hand panel depicts the temptation and fall of Eve, with whom Mary, sometimes called the "second Eve," is contrasted. Eve's impurity, immodesty, pride, and sinfulness are opposite vices of Mary's virtues. Impurity is reflected in Eve's willingness to be misled by the serpent-tempter, whose intrusion into Eden suggests the corruption of Eve's *hortus mentis*, the garden of her mind, and a violation of conjugal chastity. In contrast to the Virgin's fully clothed appearance, Eve is naked, a state that signifies her vulnerability to temptation. Whereas the Virgin, while seated, has her arms folded across her breast, Eve is standing, her left arm extended toward the serpent-tempter, a gesture of proud self-assertion. In her left hand is the forbidden fruit, which indicates that she is yielding to the serpent-tempter. Eve expects, having partaken of the forbidden fruit, to become godlike, an expression of pride that is contrasted with the Virgin's humility. Sanctity and sinfulness are thus placed in schematic opposition. Also significant is the appearance of the serpent-tempter, whose slender body, snout, and ears indicate resemblances to the weasel or ferret, animals noted for their wiliness. Likewise conspicuous is the upright posture of the serpent-tempter, whose seduction of Eve is witnessed by the deity, pictured in the Tree of Knowledge of

Good and Evil. God's curse on the beast inhabited by the tempter — "Prone upon the ground thou shalt go" (Genesis 3.14) — is fit retribution for its involvement in the fall of humankind.

In the right-hand panel Gedeon, having divested himself of his breastplate though he is still armed with a sword, prays to God for a sign of victory. Overhead, an angel of the Lord appears, holding a scroll with the following inscription: "*Dominus tecum virorum fortissime*" ("The Lord is with you, the bravest of men"). On the threshing floor is a woolen fleece, moistened by dew while the area nearby remains dry. The fleece of the lamb traditionally represents the flesh or human nature of the Son, whose Incarnation begins at the Annunciation. Thus, the military context of Gedeon's petition, the accoutrements and trappings of battle, and the ensuing victory foreshadow the ultimate triumph of the "second Eve" and her son over Satan. In line with this viewpoint, the wetness of the fleece signifies not only the infusion of grace into the Virgin and her consequent impregnation but also the anointment of the Redeemer, the Messiah to whom she will give birth. In the New Dispensation, moreover, the sacrificial lamb, an emblem of the Redeemer, is moistened with its own blood, distributed, in turn, as a salvific unction to the faithful. After self-sacrifice the Savior will be victorious, his triumph heralded by the image of the lamb or *Agnus Dei* emblazoned on the pennon of the triumphal cross held by the risen Christ. The *arma Christi* or weapons used by Christ against Satan are thus prefigured by Gedeon's military success.

Chapter III
The Imagination of Death and the Theology of Solidarity

Michal Reka

Introduction

The actual condition of man is marked, in every moment, by death, and his humanity and his history, as Hegel states it, is the record of "what man does with death."

The phenomenon of death seems natural when one considers the obvious processes in the universe. But human death has its own unique characteristics. Man's knowledge of death at the natural level comes only from external observations. No one has experienced death and then been able to explain to others the nature and meaning of his experience.1 This means, first of all, that death is a totally personal experience, belonging completely to each individual, which cannot be experienced until the individual dies. Secondly, man can only imagine what death is. This is the reason why death, in a very specific way, belongs to imaginative knowledge and imaginative thought.

All that one might know about one's death is by way of anticipation. This anticipation of death becomes the perspective in which all deliberate free choices are made. Men's decisions are made under this assertion that "Man has created death" (W. B. Yeats). This anticipated presence of the activities of the moment of death in all decisions and choices, which creates the imagination of death, gives also the full understanding of life and the value of life as well.

Contemporary Occurrences of Death and Its Imagination

The socio-cultural modifications of the modern world have significant repercussions for the meaning of death and the dignity and value of life. From general observations, one may note that the design of modern cities and towns locates the cemeteries outside the areas of daily life. The activities of daily life are attractive and desirable, but the expectation of death produces only fear and consciousness of inevitable failure. Therefore, cemeteries are similar to the municipal garbage dumps where the dead are thrown out, removed from the living.

Today, in the "First World," 50 percent of the population are over 75 years old when they die. This will soon be true in other countries, with the development of social and medical care.2 Thus, death is no longer experienced as an event which cuts off young life, but rather as a normal and natural stage in a life which has been used up. Today's man is concerned with the question of whether or not there are grounds for prolonging one's life, or the life of a relative, beyond a certain point, and so subjecting oneself or them to a more or less devalued or degraded level of existence. Medicine offers a longer and better life to younger, "productive" people and adults. But what does it offer to the nonproductive, elderly and disabled? In the U.S., for example, 80 percent of the people die in hospitals.3 Death now has a new, different, social and technical environment. For these 80 percent, the nursing staff and doctors, alone have the responsibility for assisting them during their dying moment. The attitude of the hospital staff is to help and support this "natural" process of passing away.4 For example, in the U.S., 97 percent of the nurses believe that the desire of the terminally ill person to die should be granted even against the will of their families.5 This raises the question of how far society and its rules have rights and duties in matters of life and

death. This social question, concerning rights to euthanasia, alters the way an individual understands his right over his own death (suicide) and the way society understands its duty to require this "private life" to go on living.

Such an imagination of death and a utilitarian and pragmatic view of life in our culture reduce life to a purely biological, natural dimension and allow the free trade and sale of useful organs and, in the case of the latter months of pregnancy, the purchasing of the unborn babies for the sake of the cosmetic industry. This mentality is based on the recyclable usefulness of the human body.

This temptation to take total control over the decision of who shall live and who shall die is obvious in the legal right to abortion. Now, after discussions in Court Houses and National Parliaments, the majority has established by a democratic process that the one who carries the life has full legal authority to destroy that life. Since 1973 when the U.S. Supreme Court established the practical right to abortion, the death toll exceeds 20,000,000. Every year more than 1,500,000 babies are legally killed through abortion.6 In Eastern European socialist countries, approximately one of every three pregnancies is carried to full term. With today's lack of human understanding, competition between death and life comes to absolute absurdity: more babies are killed than born!

This change going through our culture causes man to lose the ability to distinguish between the principles within his competence and those to which he must submit. Instead of submitting to rules, man tries to establish his own human rules and rights in order to free himself from limits — ethical, moral and even rational limits — and slowly moves toward creating his "own nature." Some genetic engineering experiments on the DNA code have made real the myth of Faust. Those who use drugs build an artificial world of imagination in place of rational thought processes. The motto, life equals pleasure, in the last consequence, means use-abuse-death. This is obvious in the destruction of the natural environment in which numerous species have been made extinct. The AIDS epidemic causes panic as a global disease. The absurd preparation of weapons of war, sophisticated and clever technologies to devastate countries, create an atmosphere of terror. All of these frustrate man and convince him of his lack of a future.

What kind of imagination is adequate, for this complex of changes in our culture on such a widespread scale, to express this danger? Man, alone, without strength to repel this danger, afraid to die in the collapse of the civilization which he created, and now having lost control over this civilization, appears to be against his own existence. Man, in the fight with this dangerous civilization which now seeks to kill him, should realize the possibility of his own death in this fight. What risk should he take to save that which is essential and most important?

Creative Imagination of Death and Christ's Solidarity with Us

The myth of Samson seems to be comparable to the deadly threat of our civilization. Samson's story is involved in the history of his nation which is oppressed by a strong enemy, the Philistines (Judges 13-16). His supernatural strength helps him win several battles with his enemy and fulfill his mission of freeing his people from their oppressors (Jdg. 13:5). However, his compromises with his enemies cause him to be enchained in exile, blind and without strength. During the celebration of the triumph of his enemies, he made his decision, the decision to be in solidarity with his nation, to be with them and for them and unified in their fight against the enemy. As a representative of his nation, of its values and its religion, he decided to give, to offer his life for his people's freedom. In this situation a question is raised, What creative imagination and motive must he have to overcome his fear of death? To what type of power must he appeal to make this effort?

Biological existence is "constituted" by two instincts. The first is preservation of the species, which is expressed by erotic love, and is an astounding mystery of existence, concealing the deepest act of communion, a tendency toward an ecstatic transcendence of individuality through creation.7 This instinct extends the existence of the human species. The existence of each being, its individualism and separation are supported by the second instinct, the instinct of self-preservation. The first instinct is a natural necessity and, therefore, lacks ontological freedom. On the other hand, the human being discovers that his attempts to affirm himself and assure his own existence through creating language, speech, art, communion with others, finally lead to separation, individualism and death. "What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body doomed to death?" (Rom. 7:24). The tragedy of the biological constitution of man's hypostasis lies in his tending towards becoming a person through it and failing.8 The failure is sin, and its consequence is death. Victory over death and sin is impossible for man without a transcendence of his biological "hypostasis," without the recreation of the person in a new change in the constitutive mode. However, man cannot do this on his own. He cannot overcome death to live.

Into that situation of death, humankind is addressed an answer: "The virgin will conceive and give birth to a son and they will call him Immanuel, a name which . . . means 'God-is-with-us'" (Mt. 2:23). God loves the world so much that he took the initiative to enter into the history of man, to give everybody his only son, so that man might have eternal life (cf. Jn. 3:16). As a real man, the God-for-us, Jesus Christ, "did not cling to his equality with God but emptied himself . . . became as man" (cf. Phil. 2:6). He came to "seek and to save what was lost" (Lk. 19:10). Even as a friend of tax collectors and sinners (cf. Lk. 7:34) he established his solidarity with marginal people. Therefore, his contemporaries harshly judged his friendships. His response to their lack of compassion was stern: "We played the pipe for you and you wouldn't dance, we sang dirges and you wouldn't cry" (cf. Lk. 7:31-35). He allowed himself to be touched, which means he gave access to himself (cf. Lk. 7:39, 8:44-45, 18:15).

Finally, "being as all men are he was humbler yet, even to accepting death, death on a cross" (Phil. 2:7-8). The cross is that which is most alien to God — sin and death. He did not sin but chose solidarity-with-men. In man's condition, he overcame man's sin and death: "For our sake God made the sinless one into sin, so that in him we might become the goodness of God" (2 Cor. 5:21). The calculation concerning why he should die, as Caiaphas mentioned, was simply: "It is better for one man to die for the people, than for the whole nation to be destroyed" (Jn. 11:51). Therefore, he bore upon himself mankind's fault and sin: "And yet ours were the sufferings he bore and the sorrows he carried. . . Yahweh burdened him with the sins of all of us" (Is. 53: 4, 6). Jesus freely chose this challenge. No one could inflict death upon him against his will. He asserts: "The Father loves me because I lay down my life. . . No one takes it from me: I lay it down of my own free will" (Jn. 10:17-18). On the cross, at the moment of his death Jesus was offering himself to God: "Father into your hands I commit my spirit" (Lk. 23:46). As John observed, "Bowing his head he gave up his spirit" (Jn. 19:30).

Where is the creative meaning of Jesus' death? First of all, Jesus took on the destructive death as separation and individualization and overcame it by creative dying as offering, i.e., as the free gift of his own life. He was not separated but, as a true martyr for God's cause, identified himself with every man. In him and with him, every man was lifted up into Christ's own original relationship with immortal God.9 In this personal act of giving himself, he found himself in the one to whom he has offered himself.10 He found the Father's love, resurrection, eternal life and a

new name given by his father — *kyrios* (cf. Phil. 2: 9-11). In that moment the sin was forgiven because the Father's love was greater than all the obstacles (sin and death) against his love.

On the other hand, this union between the Father and Son has given mankind an everlasting source for communion: solidarity, "being-with." Semitic anthropology describes the emptying out of man in death by concretely picturing it as a going out of the *nepes*, the soul or vital force.11Life manifests itself in breath and death is the departure of breath (Hebrew, *ruah*) from the body.12 In later conceptions, blood was called the seat of life,13 and in the New Testament, the principle of life was the spirit of breath (*pneuma*) given by God (Acts 17:25). Without the spirit the body is dead. (Jas. 2:26).14 Jesus, on the cross, breathed his last" (Lk. 23:46); from his side "immediately there came out blood and water," and in the last moment "he gave up his spirit" (*paredoken to pneuma*) (Jn. 19:30). God's presence — Immanuel, "God-with-us," — was manifested in Jesus' ministry by preaching, teaching, healing and exorcising. In his final "hour," he released his Spirit, he yielded the Spirit to be with us.15 Furthermore, he said, "It is for your own good that I am going because unless I go the Advocate will not come to you; but if I do go, I will send him to you" (Jn. 16:7). This Greek phrase, *paradoken to pneuma* (Jn. 19:30), means the transmission of the Holy Spirit, the giving over of the Spirit of God as a permanent presence of God.16 The unique death and resurrection of Jesus shows how God's presence and work has extended into the Church through the Christ's Spirit. Jesus clearly described it: "I shall ask the Father and he will give you another Advocate to *be with you* forever. . . but you know him because he is with you, he is *in you*. I will not leave you orphans; I will come back to you" (Jn. 14:16-18).

Jesus is, par excellence, the Great "Welcome" through which mankind can meet God-Father. Nicodemus' question, "How can that be possible?" (Jn. 3:9) found its answer in: "Unless a man is born through water and the Spirit he cannot enter the kingdom of God. What is born of flesh is flesh; what is born of the Spirit is spirit" (Jn. 3:5-6). The indispensable birth "from above," by faith and baptism, radically changes the activity of natural man constituted by his own instincts into a new "mode of existence."17 The individual is regenerated in a new "hypostasis." The new hypostasis, "born from the Spirit" in baptism, joins the person with Christ's death and life (cf. Col. 3:1-4). For both Rahner and Ratzinger assert:

The free act by which we give ourselves over into the hands of God's love and mercy is the central mystery of the theology of death; it is the way in which believers enter fully into the dying of Christ. Seen in this way the basic mystery of death is already anticipated throughout life in . . . which we give ourselves over to others and to God in charity.18

The nature (flesh) no longer determines the person, rather the newborn person enables the nature to exist; and a new freedom over instincts is identified with the being of man.19 The consequence of such a newborn person is that man can now transcend his natural, biological exclusivism because he has a new capacity to love without exclusiveness and to do this, not out of conformity with a moral commandment, but out of his new personal constitution. He is not individual and separated, but he is an authentic person who is part of a network of relationships. The Holy Spirit, who is given, is a principium of this unity. That is the mystery of the presence of the One person who dwells in many persons. From the source of Christ's death, the same Holy Spirit is given to many. The receiving is not considered in terms of "things" — categories — but in terms of a personal relationship which reveals man's original likeness to the union of the divine Persons. "This likeness reveals that man, which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself."20

This task is given to man to transcend his own individualism and death, so that he can now build true relationships with God, others, himself, and the environment where he lives. Even that existence is not "completed" here and now but is a potentiality which motivates man to be a more and more authentic person.21

Theology of Solidarity and Polish Experience

The theology of solidarity is based on both the creative imagination of death and the ability to act as a free person, to "being-with" and "being-for." Samson, in his story, anticipates the creative death. His death was not an accident but a freely chosen sacrifice. This sacrifice was grounded on his previous process of maturation in how to overcome the fear of death and dying. As every human being he could not have the experience of death until he died. His overcoming of his fear of anticipated death could be only based on the creative imagination of death (cf. Heb. 11:32-35) and the strong motivation to do this. This motive can only come from valuing being in solidarity with his own nation, with its religion and its worship of Yahweh, the true God. At his moment of dying, God finally gives Samson the Holy Spirit and the strength to sacrifice his life. This act of offering life occurs as the most powerful moment in Samson's life (Jdg. 16:30), and such a choice for his own death changes, finally, the destructive meaning of death into a creative meaning. "Out of the eater came what is eaten and out of the strong came what is sweet" (Jdg. 14:14).

The problem of our "civilization of death" is that this civilization searches for the full life only in the "here and now" and outside of the creative imagination of dying, considered as offering and sacrifice. The domination of biological instincts reduces man to his own immanence — privatization, separation — and causes him to "preserve life." All culture and "spiritual life" in such a conception of life are only a "superstructure" or derivatives of biological existence. This is widely expressed in the modern "sub-culture."

To be an authentic person is characterized by possessing oneself through a free gift of oneself. It is the creative death which gives birth to a new person towards relationships based on attitudes "being-with" and "being-for."22 Only such a "spiritual revolution" can build a new "civilization of love," considered not as a utopian vision but as the only alternative solution for modern man and culture. The Church has this mission which is guaranteed by the presence of God: "I am with you always; yes, to the end of time" (Mt. 28:20).

Some significant events from the recent history of Poland will be useful to define the theology of solidarity. The best description of the historical context of this matter is given by Norman Davis in *Poland-God's Playground*. The Catholic Church has a particular role and position in the Polish nation. This has been a factor integrating the society and a means of national identification, as well as playing a serious role in the preservation and recognition of Christian and national values.23 The new socio-political order established after World War II connected the realization of a secular or even atheistic state of totalitarian character with the idea of "folk democracy." This new order strives to subordinate all aspects of life to cultural discretionary centers, which are at the service of a definite ideology. In this way, different social groups and institutions lose their autonomy. Only the Church, which in spite of a remote Communist ideology, has not accepted an alliance between the altar and the throne. Rather, it opened itself to serve not only the Catholics, but all the Poles in order to integrate people and groups on the national, social and human level. Especially significant is the identification function of the Catholic Church in Polish circumstances. Although discriminated against and oppressed, the Church did not want to limit itself to the defense of its own position but always combined its affairs with those of the nation.24 This specific feature

of "being-with" and "being-for" the nation contributed to the increase of the national ethos and, consequently, helped to create a basic foundation for the values and idea of solidarity. The Church did not lock itself in the vestry but opened itself to the aims and problems of the global society.

The humanistic function consists in initiating, supporting, legitimatizing and motivating those activities which unite all society's members irrespective of their outlooks on life, and which serve more general matters. The Polish church, in spite of the specific character of a socialist State, performed this function, espousing such national and universal values as man's dignity, justice, solidarity, inviolability of the deposit of national culture, peace, etc. These values do not divide people but unite them, and they constitute the basis for the dialogue between people of good will.25

For example, during this struggle in the 1970s, one Catholic movement worked out a new theology of liberation. The principles of that movement lay in the free acceptance of truth and faithful witness. Liberation comes through the truth when people overcome fear, and the fear can be overcome only through faith in Christ and the cross, which means the acceptance of suffering and sacrifice, even one's life, in the defense of the truth. Such a theology of liberation created a program for the "crusade for the liberation of man," not only against alcoholism (its original concern), but against all dimensions of human captivity. The program stressed that "the true Christian must participate fully in the Church and the community, serving as a source of regeneration and joining in the efforts of other opposition groups engaged in the struggle for truth and justice."26

Today, "Solidarity" in the Polish reality is present as a creative element, not only for political and social changes, but also as an idea which promotes the identity and the "soul" of this nation as it struggles to overcome present difficulties. Recently there was a new cooperation in which "national reconciliation" came into practice only through this condition: we have to forgive each other because there is no other way to resolve the crisis. (Many were in jail, killed, relocated in worse jobs, thousands emigrated). The idea of solidarity helps to unify the underground movements which were invited to participate as equal partners in round table discussion. This new cooperation legalized the underground movements which represented the majority of the populace and attempted to establish minimum agreements. For the first time, the populace was able to vote on the members of parliament and thus express their own opinions. On the one hand, the nation forgave the government and, on the other hand, the government resigned not its ideology, but obviously the totalitarian character of its ideology. In this way, legal space opened to present points of view different from the official point of view. Today the imagination of solidarity creates movements against poverty and degradation and in a tremendous way has influenced daily life and human attitudes.

The core of the theology of solidarity is its attitude towards "being-with" and "being-for" others even in the worst situation. It is active empathy which exists in free interrelationships. Ontologically it is rooted in the event of Jesus' passion on the cross and his solidarity with all human beings. This causes a personal response in man, and "man who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself."

Notes

1. J.H. Wright, "Theology of Death" *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. IV, 1967, p. 687.
2. Jacques Pohier, "Editorial," *Concilium* 179 (3/1985): x.
3. *Ibid*.
4. "Treatment of Dying Patients," *Origins* 1 June, 1989: 47-48.

5. Pothir, "Editorial," p. xii.

6. Charles Rice, *50 Questions on Abortion, Euthanasia and Related Issues* (New Hope: St. Martin de Porres Dominican Community, 1987), p. 1.

7. John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion* (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), p. 50.

8. *Ibid*., p. 52-53.

9. J.A. Schep, *The Nature of the Resurrection Body* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1964), p. 179-181.

10. According to this personal dynamic, where the soul goes at death is decided by what the soul loves (cf. F.J. Sheed, *Theology for Beginners* [Ann Arbor: Servant Books, 1979], p. 100).

11. Gen. 35: 18; 2 Sm .1:9; 3 Kgs. 17:21. See H. Koster, "Death in the Bible," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. IV, 1967, p. 685.

12. Ps. 145(146):4; 103 (104):29; Jb. 12:10; Eccl. 8:8 and 12:7.

13. Lv. 17:11; Dt. 12:23.

14. cf. M. Koster, "Death," p. 685.

15. Michael H. Crosby, *House of Disciples: Church, Economics, and Justice in Matthew* (New York: Orbis Books, 1988). p. 87-90.

16. *Ibid*., p. 89.

17. Zizioulas, p. 53.

18. Zachary Hayes, "Death," in *The New Dictionary of Theology*, ed. Joseph A. Komonchak (Wilmington,1987).

19. Zizioulas, p. 53.

20. "The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," *Documents of Vatican II*, 24 c.

21. This should be considered from the point of view of *telos* (cf. Zizioulas, p. 59).

22. cf. K. Rahner, H. Vorgrimler, "Death," *Dictionary of Theology* (New York: Crossroad, 1985). pp. 378-381.

23. Wladyslaw Piwowarski, "The Problem of the Folk Church in Poland," *Concilium 154* (4/1982), pp. 12-20.

24. *Ibid*., p. 17.

25. *Ibid*., p. 17.

26. Grazyna Sikorska, "The Light-Life Movement in Poland," *Religion in Communist Lands* (February, 1983), p. 54.

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Chapter IV

A Conversation between Two Eucharistic Events: The Iroquois Thanksgiving and Going to Mass

David Blanchard

The world no longer seems to be drifting toward homogeneity. Rather, more societies, previously regarded as insular, are becoming pluralistic. Hispanicization has struck the American Southwest; Lima is recoiling from "Andeanization"; Eastern Europe is witnessing the emergence of its ethnic peoples; in Germany, Holland and France, the birthrate of Islamic peoples is on the rise, while the native population is in decline. Pluralism brings its own problems to a society. Pluralistic societies require pluralistic myths, pluralistic education, a pluralistic morality.

While pluralism has only recently attracted the attention of anthropologists,1 it is a familiar problem to the humanities. Consider, for example, the task of teaching the poetry of Robert Frost to inner city students. The fresh scents of a wet New England pasture evoked by Frost are far from the hot and dirty streets of Harlem. Frost's youth, bending the birches on his way home from the village, has little in common with a young black man ducking through alleys and crossing demilitarized gang zones on his way home from school.

Or, are these experiences really that distinct? In his last essay written before his death, Lionel Trilling wrote that this question underlies "the basic assumption of humanistic literary pedagogy."2 Clifford Geertz agrees with Trilling and wrote in his essay on the "social history of moral imagination" that the similarities between people are "more profound" than their differences. Geertz claims that the "imaginative products" of other epochs and cultures "can be put at the service of our moral life."3 Geertz does not promote "an easy, men-are-men humanism." He writes that anthropologists:

pursue their vocations haunted by a riddle quite as irrevocable as it is fundamental: namely, that significant works of the human imagination...speak with consoling piety that we are all like to one another and to the worrying suspicion that we are not.4

Geertz' double edge (consoling piety and worrying suspicion) has its theological corollary in Karl Rahner's formulation of the "anonymous Christian." Rahner presents every pluralistic society with a problem. If God loves all humankind equally well, if the grace of God is what actually makes us human, if the response of the unbeliever to God's grace has merit, then we need to reconsider the worth of a morality that reflects the values of one particular culture.

Rahner sets two propositions before us. First, he writes that:

an individual can already be in possession of sanctifying grace, can in other words be justified and sanctified, a child of God, an heir to heaven...even before he has explicitly embraced a credal statement of the Christian faith and been baptized.5

Second, according to the evidence of the New Testament, the mission of the Church "is in principle universal, i.e. fundamentally it is directed to all men."6 The crucial question, and the practical one that confronts the Christian "is whether these two entities can exist in unison or whether the one removes the other."7

Rahner acknowledges that responding adequately to this paradox requires a contemporary theology of mission that is presently lacking.8 He suggests the goal but eludes the means: to make Christ, the gospel and grace present in the world, "within specific histories and cultures" and thereby help to achieve a "new incarnational presence of Christ himself in the world."9

Anonymous Christianity, indeed any anonymous religion, admits certain dangers. Chief among these is the danger of becoming what Susan Sontag has called "piety without content."10 Sontag is a critic of the modern religious tendency to characterize everything as religious or every religion as the same. This tendency reflects:

piety without content, a religiosity without either faith or observance. It includes in differing measures both nostalgia and relief: nostalgia over the loss of the sense of sacredness and relief that an intolerable burden has been lifted.11

Sontag would have no patience with anonymous Christianity. She understands that religions have historicity. The texture, smell, style, and social organization of a religion are not frills, but religion's essence. Any writing about dogma that ignores the lived experience of religion is vacuous. People express and experience their faith in front of religious statues, in clouds of incense, in ritual celebrations, in myths and storytelling and in the ways that they organize all of these practices. Religion is being for something, and when one is for something, one is against something else. Denying the historicity and the cultural texture of religion is to make religion, and therefore faith, insipid.

Sontag writes that today religions have been changed into religion. For postmodern man, religion has become a museum; "he can pick and choose as he likes, and be committed to nothing except his own reverent spectatorship."12 Sontag's conclusion: "One cannot be religious in general any more than one can speak language in general." Considering the historicity and texture of religion, there can be no such thing as "anonymous Christianity."

I agree with Rahner — and Sontag. It would be easy to live with this contradiction, except that I teach missiology in a Roman Catholic school for ministry. My dilemma is compounded by the fact that my closest friends are Iroquois Indians. Iroquois culture is matrilineal. Iroquois people inherit their names, property and lineage from their mothers. Iroquois women hold important roles in ritual life. Only Iroquois women can vote for chiefs, although only men can be elected to these positions. The Iroquois have managed to strike a balance in their society that guarantees men and women respect, responsibility and power.

The Iroquois faith and Catholicism share many features. They also have significant differences, especially when general values are translated into specific codes of morality and behavior. So essential is the matriline to Iroquois life that we can reasonably conclude that it is not possible to be both an Iroquois and a Catholic. The Church is not prepared to let the Iroquois hear the gospel and then incarnate this good news within Iroquois history using Iroquoian symbols. Given the Church's present, conservative ideology and its self-understanding as a champion of northern European culture, it has little to say to the Iroquois.

Sontag's critique of piety without content also leads to a hopeful resolution of Rahner's paradox. While we may not speak language in general, it is possible to learn more than one language. And, when an English speaker learns Iroquoian, his or her understanding of English greatly improves. Perhaps the Christian missionary's task is to do just that: become immersed in Christianity by learning about others — and, in so doing, be saved.

By "learn," I mean more than acquire knowledge. I mean learn to the point where one can engage in conversation. David Tracy provides a paradigm for conversation in his book *Plurality and Ambiguity*.13 Tracy's book should be on the curriculum of any university that serves a pluralistic population. Tracy tells us how anyone who speaks bears the pre-understandings of one's language. Speech events, be they informal storytelling sessions, formal Eucharistic events, after-dinner conversation or dialogue between friends enculturates the members of a society into a moral universe. The rules of speaking are able to be translated into more general rules of moral behavior.

These pre-understandings become conscious in conversation with a speaker of another language. This is also true when we engage another culture in conversation. According to Tracy, a conversation is not confrontation and it is not debate; "it is questioning itself. It is a willingness to follow the question wherever it may go."14 The rules of conversation are hard:

say only what you mean; say it as accurately as you can; listen to and respect what the other says; . . . be willing to correct or defend your opinions; . . . be willing to argue if necessary, to confront if demanded, to endure necessary conflict, to change your mind if the evidence suggests it.15

It is the listening half of conversation that has been missing from Christian evangelization. When Christianity ceases to listen, it settles for what it knows at the expense of what it still has to learn. We are brought to these frontiers, certainly by the inner impulse to reach out, but also by our conversation partners. In this sense, Christians should engage in conversation with other traditions for the purpose of their own salvation.

Tracy makes a comparison that deserves our attention. He notes that every healthy friendship is characterized by critique. A love that cannot endure a challenge to grow is not love. If this be true of a relationship between two friends, it is equally true of a person's relationship to one's religious tradition. Christianity can endure a dialogue with Iroquois tradition. Such an encounter may help to resolve some of the ambiguities and contradictions that plague Christianity.

I will demonstrate the value of Tracy's proposition by constructing a conversation between two speech events: the thanksgiving of the Iroquois and the Roman Catholic Eucharist. I propose that the rules for performance of these two speech events are easily translated into moral rules for their respective societies. They teach a lesson beyond the act of giving thanks; they comment on the relative importance of sincerity against formalism.

I add a cautionary note that must be part of any conversation between two religious traditions. Christian theologians do an injustice to non-Christian religions (and vice-versa) when they use their tradition as the final canon of revelatory truth. The insights of Christian theology must be made to stand with those of other religions and not be used as a guage of their seriousness. The task of a pluralistic theology is not to notice how like or unlike other religions are to Christianity, but for both traditions to learn from one another. This requires a method of controlled comparison that it is not particular to either religious tradition. Linguistic anthropology offers such a method.16

It also offers a few problems. In the essay mentioned above, "Found in Translation: On the Social History of the Moral Imagination" Clifford Geertz identifies one such difficulty: often when anthropologists write for the general public, only the anthropologist has particular knowledge of the particular culture being analyzed. Consequently, it is necessary to present a great deal of exotic and specialized ethnography that seems tangential to the main argument.

In the analysis that follows, I present a summary of the Iroquois creation myth, including an account of how the thanksgiving ritual was instituted. I have relegated original parts of the text to the endnotes. Insofar as style is a part of content, especially in a religious text, I urge my readers

to review these texts. I also present some details on Iroquois morphology in this paper and a summary of John Austen's formulation of a performative or speech act. This linguistic data is necessary in order to appreciate the full meaning of the texts.

The Iroquois Thanksgiving

The Iroquois say that the earth was formed when Tharonhiawakon (Sky Holder) cast Aientsik (Fertile Earth) from the Sky World into the watery abyss below. Fertile Earth gave birth to a daughter, Gusts of Wind. One day, while Gusts of Wind was sleeping in the forest, Sky Holder visited the earth, found Gusts of Wind sleeping and passed two arrows over her stomach; one was tipped with flint, the other was a simple maple shaft. Gusts of Wind became pregnant with twins.

One of these twins was called Okwiraseh (Sapling). The second was called Tawiskaron (Flint). Sapling and Flint represent the creative and destructive powers of nature; they do not represent good and evil. The Iroquois realize that both birth and decay are necessary phases of growth. Both characters have an important function in Sky Holder's plan for life on earth.

When the time came for Gusts of Wind to give birth, Sapling and Flint argued over the best way to leave their mother's womb. Sapling proposed leaving through the vagina, while Flint wanted to leave through the armpit. Finally Flint took the initiative and pierced through Gusts of Wind's side, causing her death. Sapling then followed his brother.

When Fertile Earth discovered her daughter's body, she asked the twins who had done such a thing. Flint quickly blamed Sapling, whom Fertile Earth banished to the forest. Sky Holder noticed Sapling's plight, and he came down from the Sky World to show his son how to survive. Sky Holder gave Sapling responsibility for preparing the earth for the coming of the human beings.

Sapling took this responsibility seriously. He formed the channels of the great rivers and arranged for the currents to run in two directions. This made it easier to travel by canoe from place to place. When Flint saw his brother's work, he became jealous and placed large boulders in the rivers, causing rapids and waterfalls to appear. Flint also changed the courses of the rivers so that all flowed in a single direction. Sapling planted corn. Flint followed his brother, harvested the corn and threw the cobs into a fire. Sapling caught Flint in this act of sabotage and managed to save the corn. But the tips were ruined. This is the reason the end of the corn cob has undeveloped kernels.

When the earth was ready for the human beings, Sapling went to the shore of a great lake, scooped up some mud from its bottom, and formed the image of the human being. He gave the human being his power to see, speak and think. Finally, when he breathed on the human being, it came to life and walked about the earth.17 Then Sapling told the human being that he had created humans so that the earth could "give comfort to their minds." The human beings were charged to continue the work of creation by beautifying the earth and making it more pleasing for their habitation. If they did this, Sapling said, he would continue to bless the earth with the bounty of the seasons and nature.18

After establishing themselves on the earth, the human beings were visited once again by Sapling, who reiterated the importance of always remaining thankful for the good works of creation. These feelings could best be engendered, Sapling advised, through the four ceremonies of thanksgiving: the Great Feather Dance, the Skin-Covered Drum Dance, the Man's Personal Chant, and the Dice and Bowl Game. These four ceremonies were to be performed on four consecutive days at seven times throughout the year. Each ceremony was to be preceded by a prayer of thanksgiving. This prayer has a three-part formal structure that includes a main body with thirteen invocations.

These seven festivals, with their ceremonies and prayers of thanksgiving, emphasize feelings of contentment, satisfaction and gratitude that the people should share for the gifts of Sapling. The ceremonies are held in the mornings while noontime and evenings are devoted to a communal meal and social dancing.

Festivals are held in the longhouse — a wooden structure about twenty feet wide by one hundred feet long. It generally faces east to west with a door at both ends. The men occupy the eastern end of the longhouse and enter through the eastern door. The women occupy the western end and enter through a western door. West of the longhouse is a twenty-foot square cookhouse where the women prepare the festival meals.

People begin arriving at the longhouse at about 7:30 in the morning. Stoves are lit and donations of food are brought to the cookhouse. At nine o'clock the festival begins with a gathering in the longhouse. The chief of the turtle clan calls the people together. Then, approaching a small fire — perhaps in a woodstove — he sprinkles tobacco on the coals and begins the thanksgiving prayer.

I will return to a formal analysis of this prayer after describing the rest of the festival events. One of the four ceremonies follows the thanksgiving prayer. The first day is for the Great Feather Dance. On the second day, the Iroquois perform the Skin Covered Drum Dance. On the third day the men sing their Personal Chant, while the women dance. On the fourth day of the festival, the thanksgiving prayer is followed by a Dice Game between the two moieties. The losing moiety is responsible for the preparations of the next festival.

The ceremonial portion of the festival usually concludes by noon, at which time the participants enjoy a meal that features the particular festival — corn soup during the ripe corn festival, strawberry dishes at the strawberry festival, maple syrup at the maple festival. The afternoons are free, and people return to the longhouse in the evening for additional feasting and social dancing.

Ceremonies are presided over by different chiefs, chosen by the women. Iroquois chiefs do not make their living as ritual specialists. Some are retired. John Currotte, a chief with whom I worked, is a retired ironworker. John is also a farmer. His wrinkled face and calloused hands witness a life of hard work. John is often seen wearing a flannel shirt, coveralls and a cap with a John Deere Tractor emblem on its peak. These are also the clothes that John wears when he conducts a ceremony, except that the cap will be replaced by a small feathered headdress, called a*gostowa*.

At the harvest festival when John expresses his people's gratitude for the corn, beans, squash and other gifts of nature, his expression is sincere and believable. After having spent much of the summer on his tractor and the autumn bent over his fields harvesting the fruits of his labor, John, indeed, feels grateful.

It is almost misleading to call John a ritual specialist because he is first of all a farmer. Yet, *because* he is a farmer, John is a good ritual specialist, at least in an Iroquoian sense. His recitation of the thanksgiving address is not perfect; John is known to deliver it too fast and occasionally to skip a line. Yet, he knows and recalls the original intent of the ceremonies: to spread a feeling of contentment among the people lest they forget their pact with Sapling. During the course of John's recitation of the thanksgiving prayer, he places tobacco on the flames of the wood stove. The smoke of this tobacco carries his words and the feelings of the people skyward.

The Structure of the Text

The thanksgiving prayer has three parts: a prologue, the body of the speech (made up of thirteen individual sections) and an epilogue.

The prologue of the Iroquois thanksgiving prayer is a metapragmatic commentary on the whole speech event. In this prologue, the speaker reminds his listeners why they have gathered and of the intention of his speech.19

In the body of the thanksgiving prayer, the speaker calls to mind the thirteen gifts of Sapling for which the people should feel gratitude. Each of these invocations has three parts: a determination segment, a report segment and a "performative" segment.

The determination segments of the thanksgiving prayer are future tense continuative. "They will be grateful that so many people are happy — contented that their minds have been brought together." The point of view expressed is that of Sapling who assumes the perspective of past mythic time looking toward an indefinite future. This part of the invocation often includes the Creator's decisions regarding a particular spirit force sent to humankind as a gift.20

The report segment includes the people's acknowledgement of this gift. In this part of the invocation, there is usually a shift to indicative forms which signify present or immediate past time or immediate future tense forms.21

Finally, the invocation includes a highly condensed statement, called by most anthropological linguists, a "performative utterance." This final part of the prayer is the most important. It sums up the whole event. Indeed, it exists outside of this context as the most important gathering prayer used by the Iroquois. The performative segment of the thanksgiving prayer, excerpted below, is a typical translation. I dispute the translation of the underlined part, "we thank you for the earth." The reason for my disputation will become evident.

And so, for this whole group of people, let it be our thought first to be grateful; we thank you for the Earth, our Mother, as we are related to her who supports our feet, and so let it still be in our minds.

After expressing thanks for the Earth, the speaker goes on to invoke the other gifts of the creator. Each invocation follows the same structure as for the Earth. Finally, the speaker invokes the epilogue:

And that is how far it was possible for me to bring it out. We directed our voices toward him, he who dwells in the sky, our Creator. And that is the best that could be done. Let it be our thought that we will abide by his word alone.

The Iroquois agree that the key phrase in the thanksgiving prayer is the so-called "performative segment." That phrase is *atetwatnohonyo*. *Atetwatnohonyo* is regarded as key to this segment because it defines the whole speech event.

But how is this word-phrase to be translated? This is a critical question precisely because *atetwatnohonyo* defines the meaning of the whole event. In his study of Iroquois thanksgiving rituals, Michael Foster translates *atetwatnohonyo*, as "we thank you for it," a "performative utterance."22 In order to understand the complex of problems surrounding this word, it is necessary to briefly examine some formal linguistic aspects of Iroquois verb morphology and what is meant by a "performative."

Iroquois Morphology

In the Iroquoian languages, the minimal verb is made up of the following parts: a modal prefix, pronominal prefix, verb root, and aspect suffix. In the case of the Iroquois verb, *atetwatnohonyo*, the verb base is *nohonyo*, meaning "thank." The symbol represents a glottal stop. This glottal stop

is the aspect suffix and, with the verb base, comprises the verb stem. *Tetwa* is the pronominal prefix meaning we-it. The *a* at the beginning of this verb is the modal prefix, in this case conveying the indicative mood. The most complex part of Iroquois verbs is their aspect. This refers to "a set of categories not concerned with temporality as such (i.e., tense), but with the quality of an action or state as completed or not completed, habitual or momentary, progressive or nonprogressive, and the like."23 Foster writes that the "punctual aspect forms such as *o*, *-e*or another are suffixed to the dynamic verbs. They indicate that an action took place at a single moment or single span of time."24 Accordingly, Foster translates *atetwatnohonyo* as "we thank you for it."

Performative Speech

John Austen introduced the concept of performative to linguistics and ordinary language philosophy in his 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard University and later at the 1958 Conference at Royaumont in France. Austen introduced the concept of a performative in order to contrast it with that of the declarative utterance or constantive. Austen writes:

The constantive utterance . . . has the property of being true or false. The performance utterance, by contrast, can be neither: it has its own special job, it is used to perform an action. To issue such an utterance is to perform the action.25

Austen provides some examples of a performative: "I name this ship *Liberté*"; "I apologize"; "I welcome you"; "I advise you to do it." Such expressions are not subject to the canon of truth or falsehood. This is not to say that a performative is free of all criticism. It may be criticized as either happy or unhappy. That is to say, there are conditions under which a performative utterance successfully accomplishes its action.

(A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B. 1) The Procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B. 2) completely.

(C. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(C. 2) must accordingly so conduct themselves subsequently.26

For Austen, there are three conditions of success for a performative, indicated as "A," "B," and "C," respectively.

When "A" conditions are not met by the speaker, we are left with a mis-invocation and the act is not completed.

The same is true of the "B" cases which Austen calls "mis-executions."

In the case of flaws in the "C" category, however, the act is professed but is an abuse of the utterance as it is hollow and insincere. Thus, considering the felicity of a performative, just as we

might consider the truth of a constantive, requires consideration of the "total situation in which the utterance is issued — the total speech act."27

Atetwatnohonyo is considered a performative by Foster because, according to Austin's criterion, *atetwatnohonyo* is an utterance that *does* something: it gives thanks. What Foster fails to point out is that when a suffix appears with the indicative prefix *a*, the verb aspect can either be punctual, as translated by Foster, or continuative. As a continuative, the meaning of the verb changes from "we thank you for it," to "we are thanking you for it," a statement describing a condition and not performing a function. Given this ambiguity, it is necessary to derive the verb's meaning from the context — the mythic, affective and intellectual preconditions assumed by the speakers and exegetes who employ this system in their local communities.

According to Iroquois tradition, when Sapling created the human beings, he charged them always to feel thankful for the good works of creation. The thanksgiving ceremonies were instituted, not as a mechanism for giving thanks, but as a way of reminding each other of their responsibility to be thankful. When they gather together for these festivals, the Iroquois recall their ancient contract with Sapling.

By announcing that "we are thanking him continually for it," the Iroquois claim to have fulfilled their part of this contract and raise the reasonable expectation that Sapling will fulfill his responsibilities by renewing the seasons and providing the earth with the bounty of nature.

An examination of the criteria for a successful ritual of thanksgiving supports this interpretation. A festival with an excellent speaker and a passive audience is not considered a success. Today, in order for a ritual specialist to perform well at the harvest festival, he must also be a farmer. His recitation may not be perfect, but his labor in his garden has made him keenly aware of the original intent and function of the ceremonies: to spread a feeling of contentment among the people, lest they forget their pact with Sapling. In the words of Chief Gibson of Six Nations Reserve, the ceremonies were instituted so that the Iroquois people might "mutually rejoice, congratulate one another, and feel thankful" for creation.

Ritual without a corresponding life-style is meaningless, the Iroquois point out. It becomes a formalized event removed from the feelings of the people. The markers of a successful ritual are: the number of people in attendance, the feelings that are generated and the degree of participation in the singing, dancing and praying that the leaders can effect. People will comment on the clarity of the speaker's presentation, but these remarks wane insignificant compared to comments such as: "There were lots of people at the longhouse," or "We had a nice time, there was so much food," or "No, it wasn't very good. Nobody showed up."

The Roman Catholic Eucharist

Since the second century the Christian celebration of the Lord's supper has been called the *eucharistia*, the thanksgiving.28 The Eucharistic prayer has performative segments. These are spoken in the context of a larger ritual event. They have a history. They are understood in vastly different ways by different Christian churches. The second half of this essay focuses on the celebration of the Roman Catholic Eucharist. I will describe this event as an ethnography,29 situate its present form within some cultural parameters and compare its rules of execution to those that govern the Iroquois eucharist.

The Ethnography of a Catholic Eucharist: The North American Case30

American Catholics do not generally speak about "celebrating Eucharist." Rather, they "go to Mass." This weekly gathering takes place either late Saturday afternoon or Sunday morning, although significant variations exist. Most American parishes provide options for their members. The factors that contribute to one's choice of Mass clearly impact on the experience of the event. These include: varieties of musical style, for example, folk, "high Church," jazz, gospel, etc.; the length of the Mass; the style of the presider (normally this means the homiletic style); and special events that may take place in the context of the Mass, for example, baptism, graduation, special children's events, renewal of marriage vows. Factors entirely outside of the Eucharist itself may impact on this choice, for example, other commitments. These range in seriousness, including the desire to watch a football game on television or to play golf as well as business and travel arrangements. It may well be that the Catholic's experience of the Mass is more heavily determined by these factors than by any concern for execution. For example, a family that goes to the eight o'clock Mass, hoping to miss the baptism and long homily that usually is part of the ten o'clock celebration, will be agitated and distracted to learn that the baptism and loquacious pastor have been moved to the earlier Mass.

Another external factor that influences the Catholic experience of the Eucharist is the commonly held notion (indeed, defined by the law of the Church) that Sunday Mass is obligatory. The element of choice is thus missing from the Mass. One goes to Mass because it is a "mortal sin" to miss it. Not surprisingly, the general attitude of relaxation toward such strictures in the North American Church has contributed to a more active and involved participation of the people in the Eucharistic act. Still, Catholics partially define themselves in terms of this requirement.

"Going to Mass" is often a rite of reentry to the Church for young families in which the husband and wife have slipped away from attendance at weekly liturgy. This is facilitated by the birth and baptism of children and the felt need to raise their children within a religious and moral system. Consequently, many parishes show a lack of participation by young, unmarried adults, more participation by members of young families and elderly people and little active participation by adolescents.

Although the rules of etiquette that govern attendance at Mass have been greatly relaxed in the past twenty years, the whole event is considered a formal affair. While suits and ties may no longer be *de rigueur* for the men, neither are jeans and shorts considered suitable. Men dress in comfortable slacks and collared-shirts while women wear either dresses or suits.

For many families, the weekly outing for Mass is a part of a larger day that includes dinner, a visit to the home of a friend or relative, or some other form of family recreation. For this reason, the Mass has few moments of spontaneity. The Mass is not "liminal time." It is not a time free from the constrictions of social rank and convention. It is a highly structured event that takes place within a structured day.

Indeed, this structure is reflected in the Church's social organization. In the United States, parishes are geographical. They reflect the demography of neighborhoods. There are poor parishes and wealthy parishes. There are Black parishes and Hispanic parishes. As the Secretariat for Hispanic Affairs at the United States Catholic Conference has noted, it is a matter of grave concern to many parishes when the Hispanics within its territory clamor for a Spanish Mass. And when the Hispanics try to erect an image of Our Lady of Guadalupe in the church, open conflict often surfaces. Whatever feelings and religious sentiments a Catholic Mass engenders, they are not of *communitas*. The event is highly structured before it unfolds.

Another factor that contributes to the formalization and structure of the Catholic Mass is the special place reserved for the priest — the ritual specialist. While recent years have seen a great

opening of liturgical ministries to lay men and women, the priest's role remains central, both canonically and in the perception of the vast majority of Catholics.31 Because each Mass must have a priest and because of the declining number of priests in the United States, frequently a priest has to preside at more than one Mass. He is under time constraints to do so. One Mass will follow the next and the style of the speech event takes on a formulaic and mechanical tone.

The Eucharistic prayer is said in a highly structured context. The speech event has two parts, a "liturgy of the word" and a "liturgy of the Eucharist." Parishioners refer to these parts as "the readings and homily" and "the rest of the Mass."

Religion is one of the ways that ethic groups define boundaries. For most of the American Catholic experience and for the vast majority of Catholics, the style of Mass was one that reduced the congregation to spectators. Music was rarely participatory, when, indeed, music was part of the service. With the reforms of liturgy that followed the Second Vatican Council, some music has been translated (much from German) and more music has been produced by American composers. Still, getting American congregations to actively participate in singing is a difficult task and oftentimes requires professional assistance and lengthy periods of catechesis.

The Mass begins with singing an entrance song. It is followed by a greeting offered by the presider and a prayer of reconciliation. The reconciliation is followed by a gathering prayer and the reading of the sacred texts. While Catholic homiletics has advanced a great deal in the last twenty years, it suffers from the structural limitations mentioned above. Only the priest may preach. Whether due to arrogance or a preoccupation with administrative details, many priests do not prepare their homilies. Because of time constraints, the homilies are normally no longer than seven minutes. This does not allow for much narrative development or pedagogy. Still, the focus is not on the "word" but on the "symbol" of the Eucharist that follows.

The ambiguity about the "liturgy of the Eucharist" is significant. In many parishes, the people spend the first part of the Mass seated and the second part on their knees. Many people report that they lose track of time during the "other part of Mass." They look for little amusements to occupy them: they read the bulletin; they read their missals; they daydream. These are not mystical journeys toward the "divine other," but daydreams that help make boring spectacle tolerable.

The laity do have an active role in the offertory. They process to the sanctuary with the sacrificial offerings and the collection of money. The "collection" is placed at the foot of the altar, while the priest offers up the bread and wine in the name of the community. This prayer of offering is seldom heard by the people because of the offertory song that is sung at this time.

The first part of the liturgy of the Eucharist has a dialogue that includes a series of performatives:

1. Priest (Pr): The Lord be with you.
2. People (Pe): And also with you.
3. Pr: Lift up your hearts.
4. Pe: We lift them up to the Lord.
5. Pr: Let us give thanks to the Lord our God.
6. Pe: It is right to give him thanks and praise.

The first five lines of this dialogue are performative. The first two lines offer and respond to a greeting. Line three is a command. Line four accomplishes "lifting up our hearts" by describing what we are doing. Line five exhorts while line six affirms the justice of this exhortation. Line six is a constantive; it describes the act of giving thanks as "right."

This dialogue is followed by a preface which contextualizes the prayer that is to follow within Christian salvation history. The Eucharistic prayer is the heart of the whole speech event. Throughout it are a number of performatives and a number of requests made of God. During this prayer, the congregation kneels. In some parishes, the moment of consecration is highlighted by ringing bells. This custom is becoming obsolete, however, and was not done in any of the five parishes observed to prepare this ethnography.

I will examine the Eucharistic prayer in closer detail later in this essay. After the conclusion of the Eucharistic prayer, the priest and people recite the "Lord's Prayer," which itself contains a number of performatives. Following the Lord's Prayer, the priest invites the people to exchange a "sign of peace" with one another. The sign of peace is similarly a performative — its purpose is to wish the other peace, not to describe an interior disposition. Unlike the other performatives in the "readings and homily" or "the other part of the Mass," the "sign of peace" is not directed toward God, but one another. The experience of this "sign of peace" helps to focus the difficulties of the religious speech in the Catholic Mass.

Many Catholics report that this part of the Mass is the most stressful for them. They are called to reach out to strangers, to shake hands and to wish these strangers "peace." In some parishes (usually with large congregations), people simply make dutiful and uncomfortable nods toward those around them. In many, the exchange is perfunctory and quick. People express annoyance when the priest comes "down from the altar" to greet the parishioners. This practice "delays the Mass" people report; it is "disruptive."

There are exceptions. In small parishes where the worshiping congregation represents a community, in fact as well as in a symbolic sense, the sign of peace is called a "kiss of peace" and oftentimes includes embracing and kissing. The sign of peace in many small communities is often all-inclusive. The priest wanders among the people and greets many. Some Black and Hispanic parishes use ten minutes or more for the kiss of peace. One constraint that operates here is whether there is another Mass to follow and if the community is celebrating under a time constraint.

My point is that when the worshipping community shares goodwill outside of the Mass, the exchange of peace is comfortable. It expresses. When this level of familiarity and community is lacking, the gesture is (in Austen's words) "hollow and insincere." It makes people uncomfortable rather than express a general feeling of goodwill.

The Structure of the Eucharistic Prayer

Their are four Eucharistic prayers. The remarks that follow refer to Eucharistic prayer number two. This prayer has six parts. Parts 1-4 and 6 contain performatives.

1. Invocation of the Holy Spirit

a. The invocation of the Holy Spirit is accompanied by an imposition of hands over the bread and wine. It is a speech act; it does something. "Let your spirit come upon these gifts. . . ."

2. The Lord's Supper

a. The words that consecrate the bread are situated within the mythic context of Christ's last supper. They describe what they perform: "Take this, all of you and eat it; this is my body which will be given for you." These words (with the next set that follows) are regarded by many as the most significant performatives in the Mass. They effect the transubstantiation of the bread into the body of Christ.

b. The wine is transformed into Christ's blood with the words, "Take this, all of you, and drink from it: this is the cup of my blood, the blood of the new and everlasting covenant. It will be shed for you and for all men so that sins may be forgiven. Do this in memory of me."

3. The Memorial Prayer
The memorial prayer contains two performatives:
a. "We offer you, Father, this life-giving bread, this saving cup," and
b. "We thank you for counting us worthy."

4. Invocation of the Holy Spirit
The second invocation of the Holy Spirit effects the unity of the assembled community:
a. "May all of us . . . be brought together in the unity of the Holy Spirit."

5. Intercessions
Next follows a series of intercessions for the whole Church, living and dead.

6. Doxology
The Eucharistic prayer ends with the doxology said by the priest: "Through him, with him, in him, in the unity of the Holy Spirit,
a. all glory and honor is yours almighty Father, for ever and ever." To this the people respond "Amen."

The Rules that Govern the Success of the Eucharistic Prayer

Parishioners report on the "success" of the Mass in terms like Austen's criterion for a successful performative. They report that if the priest is duly ordained and the elements for the ritual are respected, the Mass offers thanks to God — whether the people feel thankful or the priest adequately expresses these feelings in his recitation of the Eucharistic prayer. "It may not be a good Mass," people report, "but it covers the obligation." In Austen's language, the speech event was invoked and executed, although it was an abuse of the performative. It was hollow and insincere. The prayers are performative because they do not describe an interior attitude or disposition. Indeed, the interior state is not a necessary prerequisite, as it is in the Iroquois thanksgiving ritual. The Catholic Eucharistic prayers do not describe; they perform actions.

I do not mean to suggest that people do not find the lack of integrity between interiority and expression stressful. This stress is evident throughout the Mass, particularly at the sign of peace when the speech act is not directed toward God, but to members of the community. The Church has defined the success of the event independently of the feelings and interior disposition of the community.

This was not always the case. As Jerome Murphy O'Connor notes in his study of St. Paul's letter to the Corinthians, Paul "energetically repudiated" any mechanical approach to the sacrament of Eucharist.32 Murphy-O'Connor claims that the performative words spoken at the consecration (2a and 2b above) are only effective when they are spoken by Christ himself. Where is Christ present in an American Catholic Church on Sunday morning? Christ is present in:

an authentic community animated by the creative saving love which alone enables humanity to "live." The power of Christ is released and becomes effective only when the participants

demonstrate a lived realization of the demand implicit in the organic unity of which they are members. The reality of the body is presupposed if the sacramental elements are to become the body and blood of Christ, but in the lived remembering of the supreme act of living the body develops with the growth that is from God.33

I think that it is fair to say that a gathering of people who are reluctant to even acknowledge the presence of neighbors at a Mass can hardly be described as living in the "realization of the demand implicit in the organic unity" of their community. Still, the Church defines such speech events as "successful," if not sincere acts of thanks, when they are properly evoked and executed.

The question remains, Why has the Church interpreted this important speech event in such a formal manner? Like all meaningful acts, the meaning of the Eucharist has drifted from the original intentions of the primitive Christian community — and of St. Paul. This process of distanciation from original intention has been enhanced in the process of cultural translation. The Catholic Church has also linked its decision-making authority to the ordained ministry. The power to create the sacrament has become the *sine qua non* of decision making in the Christian community. Today, it is impossible to talk about the basic social organization of the Christian community without also talking about the ordained ministry. The Eucharist has achieved meaning beyond the original intentions of its author.

The theological study of Eucharist begins by unraveling the temporalities of tradition and interpretation. Anthropologists consider two different questions. How have historically conditioned "interests" influenced the criterion for a successful celebration of the Catholic Eucharist? And, more pertinent to the interests of this seminar, how does the Church's understanding of the rules for this pivotal speech event help form moral standards in the Catholic community?

Human beings are enculturated into a moral universe through myths, symbols and rituals — all situated within specific speech events. Such speech events are real, even though they often deal with the fantastic. Bronislaw Malinowski once observed that sacred speech events are "not merely stories told but a reality lived. . . . not an idle tale, but a hard worked active force."34 These speech events vary in the degree of their importance in a culture. For the American Catholic, "going to Mass" is the most important (and sometimes least satisfying) of these speech events. The rules of sacred speech are rules for life. It is the saying of the prayer and not the prayer itself that introduces the listener to a moral universe. Speaking (and praying is a form of speech) creates a world. It is this world created by the speaker that forms and shapes the community.

The rules that govern the American Catholic's "Mass" have social consequence: say the words, but corresponding feeling is not necessary.

For the Iroquois, the opposite holds true. Have the feelings, the words only serve to support the feelings. Do not say the words if the feelings are not there.

For American Catholics, the invocation and execution is what constitutes a successful "Mass." By extension, proper form is esteemed in social life, not spirituality.

For the Iroquois, form and execution are not important. There is little effort made to train ritual specialists, and more attention is paid to their general disposition and attitude toward life.

I am not able to account for the different approaches assumed by the Iroquois and American Catholics toward their respective speech events that offer thanks. In pursuing this, I hope to investigate the historical linkage between social power and the ordained ministry of the Church. When, in the Church's process of institutionalization, did access to decision making become linked with the ordained ministry and the power to confect the Eucharist? It may prove helpful to describe

the differences between the Iroquois and Catholic rules governing their respective thanksgiving events in linguistic terms.

John Searle distinguishes between two different types of rules that govern speech events like the type I have discussed in this essay. He calls these "regulative" and "constitutive" rules. According to Searle, "regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior."35 Constitutive rules, on the other hand, do not regulate behavior, "they create or define new forms of behavior."36 For example, the rules of etiquette are generally regulative. They regulate how to hold a fork, how to chew food, how to set a table — they do not form the activity of eating. It would be impossible to talk about the game of chess without talking about the rules of the game of chess. The rules constitute the game.

The rules that govern the Iroquois thanksgiving event regulate the expression of the feelings of thanks which must be present for the event to have any meaning. The rules that govern the speech event of the Mass, however, are constitutive. They create the act of giving thanks. It should not be surprising to find Catholic morality heavily preoccupied with rules. This preoccupation is consistent with the rules that govern the most significant ritual speech act — the Eucharist.

I should note, however, that this preoccupation with the use of performative speech and constitutive rules is not found in other Catholic ritual speech events. In the ordination to the diaconate and priesthood, the marriage ceremony, the sacrament of reconciliation, in rites of religious profession and giving vows and blessings, the speech act is invalidated unless there are a corresponding interior attitude and subsequent behavior. The rules that govern the success of a Eucharist are inconsistent with the rest of Catholic ritual speech.

When Catholics encounter the Iroquois and participate with them in the four days of giving thanks, they learn something about the rules that govern their own Eucharistic celebrations. It is possible to come to an understanding of these rules without first encountering another culture, but the process of discovering laws of speech that are normally assumed is easier through this interaction. Such an encounter can only help one to imagine a different way of giving thanks within one’s own culture.

Such a dialogue is helpful to both parties. I have said that the Iroquois do not put a great deal of attention on the formal aspects of giving thanks. The Iroquois also have a difficult time locating somebody to lead these events. The informality of the tradition has threatened the tradition’s very survival. This is particularly evident today when so many young people are subject to the influence of Mass communication and other speech events that are organized according to non-Iroquois rules for success.

A pluralistic Church is not necessarily a syncretistic Church. Sometimes cultural syncretism only serves to weaken both strains. A pluralistic Church is one that respects the integrity of many traditions and allows both to learn from one another — in conversation.

Notes

1. Anthropology has typically betrayed its imperialistic heritage by assuming that cultures "assimilated," became "enculturated," and yielded to the "stronger" conquering culture. Anthropologists did not study pluralism because it was obsessed with recording the last gasps of the dying cultures and then with describing the process of change. It is only of late that anthropologists have noted that change does not occur in a culture without some degree of reproduction, reproduction without change.

2. Lionel Trilling, "Why We Read Jane Austen," *Times Literary Supplement*, March 5, 1976. pp. 250-252.

3. Clifford Geertz, "Found in Translation: Social History of Moral Imagination," in *Local Knowledge* (New York: Basic Books. 1983), p. 41.

4. *Ibid*., p. 41-42.

5. Karl Rahner. "Anonymous Christianity and the Missionary Task of the Church," in *Theological Investigations*, Vol. 12 (New York: Seabury Press. 1974), p.165.

6. *Ibid*., p. 168.

7. *Ibid*.

8. *Ibid*., p. 169.

9. *Ibid*., p. 176.

10. Susan Sontag, "Piety without Content," in *Against Interpretation* (New York: Dell. 1961), pp. 249-255. This essay first appeared as a review of Walter Kaufmann's anthology on *Religion from Tolstoy to Camus*. Sontag takes exception with Kaufmann's treatment of writers such as Nietzsche, Camus, William James and Pope Pius IX as exemplars of religious writing, a modern tendency she characterizes as "religious fellow travelling."

11. *Ibid*., p. 250.

12. *Ibid*., p. 231.

13. David Tracy. *Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987).

14. *Ibid*., p. 18.

15. *Ibid*., p. 19.

16. For the past fifty years, philosophers in England and the United States have increasingly turned to linguistic methods. Carnap, Bergmann, Ryle and others of the ordinary language school have suggested that what linguistics says about the nature of philosophical inquiry and philosophical method offers a criteria for philosophical success that is presuppositionless, that is, dependent upon no substantive philosophical theses for their truth. The linguistic turn in philosophy has been met by a similar turn in theology. This turn is best exemplified in the work of Paul Ricoeur, Philip Wheelwright, David Power and John Macquarrie. By extension, it has influenced David Tracy, Norman Perrin and Gregory Baum.

17. The following text was recorded by John Napoleon Hewitt. I have modified the translation for clarity.

"'Now I shall make what shall be called human beings; they will dwell here on this floating island.' So as soon as he had ended speaking, he began to make the body of the human being. He scooped up a handful of soil and said, 'This earth which I have taken up is alive. Thus it is like the earth present here, and verily, the body which I shall make from this living earth will continue to live.' Then at that time he made the flesh of the human being.

"As soon as he had completed it, he meditated and said: 'That verily will result in good and thus it shall continue to be that he shall have life as much as I myself am alive.' Now, at that time, he took a portion of his own life, and he put it inside of the body of the human being; so also he took a portion of his own mind and he enclosed it in its head; so also he took a portion of his blood and he enclosed it inside of his flesh; so also did he take a portion of his power to see and he enclosed it in his head; so also he took a portion of his power to speak and he enclosed it in the throat of the human being. Now, at that time, too, he placed his breath in the body of the human being. Just then the human being came to life, that is, (this man) arose and stood on the earth here present."

18. "'Now verily, I myself have completed thy body; now it is possible that thou dost stand on the earth present here. So now, behold what the earth present here contains. I myself have completed it all.'

"'Now then, I have made thee master on the earth present here and also over what it contains. It will continue to give comfort to thy mind. I have planted human beings on the earth for the purpose that they shall beautify the earth by cultivating it, and dwell therein.' Now he saw the Elder Brother, the sun, come up over the earth and caused it to be daylight on the earth, and that the daylight was beautiful and the light rays were beautiful, and it was agreeably warm."

19. A translation of a prologue by Chief Enos Williams:

"'And now the time has come. The responsibility has been given to me. From me will come all of our words. Insofar as it is possible, I ask that you please have patience in this matter.' And this is what he himself did, he who dwells in the sky, our Creator.

"He decided, 'I will make some people for myself that will move about upon the earth.' And indeed we are moving about still, those of us who up to the present time remain. And he gave us what we are to do before we take up anything else. For he decided, 'This is the way it will begin. They will thank me. And it need be only in their thoughts that they start in.'

"'And if they should meet one another as they move about, they will have their Thanksgiving Address. And also when people gather from time to time, they will have it before they put a ceremony through. They will be grateful that so many people are happy — contented that they minds have been brought together.'

"'And now today, this day, the time has come, for it is possible that our minds have come together. We are all happy and also we are contented. So let there be gratitude. And it must be so. It must be apparent that everyone in all the families is well. For we have not heard of any family anywhere hit by unhappiness. It is true that some are lying in sickness and in distress, but there is nothing to do about it. We ask only that it might be possible for everyone to be healthy, those of us moving about over the handiwork of our Creator. The responsibility lies with him alone. All that makes us happy was left here by him. And now this group of us is happy, for our minds have come together.'"

20. A typical determination segment follows. It is taken from the invocation that blesses the earth.

"And now we will speak about what the Creator has done. He decided, 'I will create a world below the sky world, and the people I create on the earth will move about on the earth. And there is a way that people will relate to the earth. They will say, "This is the Earth, Our Mother"; she who supports our feet is related to us.'"

21. A typical report segment is as follows:

"And so it is still. It has come to pass that we are still moving about. That was his determination. The Creator decided where we should be moving about. And also all that he left will be contributing to our happiness on the earth. And so it is still. It is possible that it comes from the Earth, this happiness of ours. For all of this, therefore, let there be gratitude."

22. Michael Foster, *From the Earth to Beyond the Sky: An Analysis of Four Longhouse Speech Events* (Ottawa: Museum of Man).

23. *Ibid*.,

24. *Ibid*.,

25. John Austen, *How to Do Things With Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 13.

26. *Ibid*., pp. 14-15.

27. *Ibid*., p. 52.

28. Robert Ledogar, "The Eucharistic Prayer and the Gifts Over Which It Is Spoken," in *Living Bread, Saving Cup*. Edited by Kevin Seasoltz (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1982), p. 64.

29. There are many ways to describe the Roman Catholic Eucharist. The ethnographic approach is different than the theological. For a summary treatment of contemporary ethnography, one informed by hermeneutics, see Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

30. Research for this ethnography was undertaken in five middle-income parishes in the Archdiocese of Chicago from June, 1985 - April, 1986. Three of these parishes were suburban, with an average family income of $56,000. The other two were city parishes with an average family income of $62,000. All five parishes were administered by diocesan priests and contained from 800 - 1,200 families.

31. This perception is contributing to a conservative retrenchment in liturgy as the availability of priests declines. Bishops hesitate to allow the non-ordained to preside over thanksgiving rituals. Indeed, when such events are allowed, they are identified in demeaning and inferior ways: as para-liturgical events or communion services. I recently learned of a religious sister who presides over "acciones de gracias, non-eucharistica" for migrant workers in California. One has to wonder what a non-thanksgiving act of thanks is all about!

32. Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "Eucharist and Community in First Corinthians," in *Living Bread, Saving Cup*. Edited by Kevin Seasoltz (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1982), p. 30.

33. *Ibid*.

34. Bronislaw Malinowski, *Myth, Science and Magic* (New York, 1948), pp. 100-101.

35. John Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 33.

36. *Ibid*.

Chapter V

Imagination in the Creation of New Spiritual Cults in Latin America: The Cult of Maria Lionza

Angelina Pollak-Eltz

This paper does not pretend to be a theological or philosophical study of religiosity, but a simple account of how people cope with their problems in the framework of a new religion. The Cult of Maria Lionza may serve as an example of these new magico-religious movements. It shows how human imagination creates means and concepts to deal with the supernatural world.

In recent years new magico-religious movements and spiritual cults have appeared in cities all over the world. They are often replacing established Churches or traditional religions, but they also may flourish on the margin of Christianity and Islam as supplementary cults to solve the problems of the adherents here and now. They become popular where Christian Churches and established religions have declined due to secularization and modernization, but where people are still searching for guidance, uplifting, emotional experiences and the cure of apparently incurable illnesses. Spiritism is one case in point; messianic movements, such as the cargo cults, are others.

A resurgence of magic has been noted mainly in regions where a rapid socioeconomic change has occurred. Magic is nothing but a psychological process that may serve those who have faith in its techniques. Human imagination has developed and invented teachings and rituals that are most appropriate in this context of religion, or pseudoreligion, and that help those in need of advice. In many of these new movements, the direct contact with the spiritual world is sought, and therefore possession trance is very important. The ingenious invention of cults, satanism, spiritual movements and sects is not limited to the Third World. Certain areas in the USA have always been the breeding grounds for weird cults. Scientology is a typical case in point, yet it serves many people to overcome their difficulties. Many of these cults were exported to Europe; recently shamanism has become popular in certain esoteric circles in Austria. Even within the established Christian denominations, new forms of worship are available, and pragmatic solutions of problems are sought in the charismatic movement in healing rites. Everywhere people are searching for alternate means to cure illnesses and find guidance, security and peace. Usually these new movements are not interested in theology; they do not deal with ethics and morality; they are basically pragmatic methods designed to answers questions in a positive way.

In this paper, I shall give a short account of data collected in Venezuela over the past 30 years among the adherents of the spiritual cult generally known as the Cult of Maria Lionza. This cult may serve as an example of how syncretic cults have been created in Latin America. The paper is descriptive and does not pretend to discuss philosophical implications.

In Latin America, a number of new magico-religious movements were created in the course of the past 50 years that proliferate mainly in urban areas on the margin of folk-Catholic practices and are successful because they do not pretend to change the basic religious attitudes of the people or their moral values. They are supplementary, pragmatic and utilitarian. The practices do not substitute for the rituals of the Church but offer additional support. In contrast, a conversion to Protestant Pentecostalism demands a radical change in attitudes and a complete surrender to the new faith.

The Cult of Maria Lionza is only one of many syncretistic cults that are expanding rapidly over the Caribbean area, Latin America, such as Cuban Santeria, Cahango, Voodoo, Espiritismo

in Puerto Rico and Umbanda in Brazil, and even in North American cities. Structurally and functionally, these cults are all very similar and have their roots in the teachings of Allain Kardec, the famous French spiritist of the past century, in Amerindian mythology and shamanism, West African concepts and folk Catholicism. Religion, magic and medicine are closely entwined, and the rites are geared to the rapid solution of the clients' problems. The elements that make up the Cult of Maria Lionza are rooted in the folk culture of various regions of the country. They combine in different ways, according to the judgment of different leaders, who are usually self-styled. These "*bancos*" are responsible for the creation of new teachings and new practices. The main purpose of the cult is to get in touch with spiritual entities that are summoned to take possession of mediums in trance, so that they may be consulted by the faithful. The spiritual entities are considered to be intermediaries between the Supreme Being (God the Father) and men.

The cult is still in formation, and transformation, new spirits, new rites and new teachings are added spontaneously. There is no consensus among the cult leaders who often compete with each other, and no catechism was ever written.

The cult is rooted in ancient traditions that were transformed to suit the needs of the people today. The West African roots are apparent in the way the spiritual entities are conceived. They are neither good nor evil, and their attitudes towards the faithful depend on the offerings promised to them for a favor conceded. These promises have to be paid immediately. In recent years, the cult became more African due to the influences of Cuban Santeria that is based in the religion of the Yoruba of Nigeria. The Siete Potencias Africanas are the seven most important deities of the Yorubas, and they are now invoked in Venezuela, too. Moreover, animal sacrifices became popular under the influence of Santeria. Drums may be used in rituals, and magic designs are supposed to attract the spirits.

Amerindian beliefs center around shamanistic healing practices, the use of tobacco for cleansing a person from evil and, in order to enter into contact with the spirits of nature, Amerindian mythological concepts have shared the cult in the initial process of development. Genii loci and spirits of nature, guardian spirits and symbols of fertility were summoned, but they are now gradually being replaced by the African orishas.

Allain Kardec taught that the spirits of the departed can be asked to help the living and thus obtain merits in order to improve their own position when they will reincarnate again. The concept of Karma is vaguely understood by the adherents of Maria Lionza. Certain mediumistic techniques are derived from Kardec. Folk Catholicism has greatly influenced the cult. All over the country people implore the saints to help, and when they produce a miracle, they are paid with flowers, candles and precious ex-votos. In the cult of Maria Lionza, Christian prayers are used; candles and the images of the saints decorate the altars; yet true saints are never summoned to take possession of mediums. There are, however, many folk saints, who are invoked and may speak to their adherents through the mouth of a trancer.

The cult, at least in its present form, is of recent origin. It probably developed gradually in the course of the past 50 years but came out into the open in the '50s, when the rural exodus began and the country modernized rapidly during the oil boom. The cult may have its origin in the State of Yaracuy, where the main sanctuary of Maria Lionza is located in the mountains of Sorte near Chiyacoa. According to old documents, the mestizos "dealt with the devil" in this place during the 18th century, which means that some pagan rituals must have taken place. The first centers opened in Valencia, Maracay and Caracas, and it is said that one of the lovers of the dictator General Gomez became the first cult leader. In the '50s the dictator Perez Jimenez had a statue of Maria Lionza erected in the heart of Caracas, and which fact perhaps precipitated its development. In the

‘60s, the cult expanded rapidly over the urban areas in the whole country. Immigrants brought their own versions of folk healing and spirit mediumship, and new practices were imported from abroad. They merged with existing practices. Later the cult expanded to rural areas, and today many folk healers also invoke the spirit of the cult of Maria Lionza or African deities in their work. The cult also expanded to Colombia, and statues of Maria Lionza are found in Argentina and Puerto Rico.

Spirits

The spiritual entities by whom the mediums are possessed are of quite varied origin. Only 20 years ago Maria Lionza, who gave the cult its name, was by far the most important spirit and was always summoned by the mediums, but today she has lost her central position to the African divinities of Santeria. Yet she is still considered very powerful, and her statue stands in the center of the altar in every *banco*’s home. According to legend, she was the daughter of an Indian chief, before the Conquest, who was raped by an Anaconda snake, the guardian spirit of a lagoon. After his violent death, she became the guardian of nature herself, while the Indians of her tribe perished in an inundation provoked by the snake. She also has aspects of the Virgin of Coromoto, the protectress of Venezuela. According to old documents, a parish dedicated to Maria de La Onza del Prado de la Talavera de Nirgua existed in Yaracuy, not far from where the sacred mountain is located today. Although Maria Lionza is considered to be an Indian spirit of nature, she is always depicted as a white woman. The portrait that appeared on lithographs is said to be the picture of the first cult leader, who was the lover of Gomez, mentioned above. Other spirits of nature and genii loci are of Amerindian origin, the so-called Don Juanes, but they are rarely invoked today.

The spirits of the Indian Caciques are still very popular. These were the leaders of Amerindian tribes who fought against the Spaniards during the Conquest. Guaicaipuro is the most important power and his statue always accompanies the statue of Maria Lionza on the altars of spiritists. The third major spirit is Negro Primero, a black man who in his lifetime was a general in the army of Bolivar. Thus, Maria Lionza, Guaicaipuro and Negro Primero (Pedro Camejo) form the Venezuelan "Trinity," which also represents the three races that live harmoniously together in my country, Venezuela.

History

In recent years, the aforementioned Siete Potencias Africanas became more and more popular, to such a point that they gradually are replacing the native spirits. They are summoned for diagnosis and "special work." They are represented on the altar with their special African symbols, such as a double axe for Sahngo, but also under the guise of Catholic saints, with whom they were merged during the time when, in Cuba, Afroamerican cults were persecuted.

Other spirits may be the souls of the departed, whom people considered to be saints. These folk saints may also be worshiped on their graves or in chapels, almost like real saints, but they may send their spirits to possess mediums and then speak to the faithful. They may have been physicians, healers, sorcerers or just simple people like you and me. Others may have been evildoers and *guerrilleros*, but were "humanitarian" in that they robbed from the rich to give to the poor, like Robin Hood. They are usually asked to do special work.

Among medical doctors, Dr. Jose Gregorio Hernandez is of great importance and is in the process of becoming a real Catholic saint. The process of his canonization was started in the ‘50s,

and he now has the title of "venerable." For the people, he is the greatest Venezuelan saint. He died in 1918, and ever since his grave is visited by the faithful. Pilgrimages are made to the village where he was born, and many chapels are dedicated to his unofficial worship. Frequently, he was summoned for diagnosis or prescriptions, but since he became a "venerable" he no longer possesses mediums but may send another doctor to do the job. Here we can see that people distinguish between saints and folksaints.

Other spirits may be famous historic personalities, such as Simon Bolivar, who is asked to resolve quarrels in families. A new category of spirits are the Vikings, who are depicted like ancient Germans, yet are considered to be powerful African spirits.

In some centers cultists distinguish between different "*cortes*" or "*lineas*" of spirits led by such outstanding personalities as Guaicaipuro who leads the Corte de los Indios, but these categories vary from place to place. There are no limits to the development of new imaginary entities. Recently, East Indian and Japanese spirits were added, and the statue of Buddha is found on the altars.

Rituals

What kind of rituals are practiced? Again there is no rule, and any ritual is good as long as it serves its specific purpose. New practices are borrowed from other cultures or are invented.

Ordinary consultations are held in cult centers once or twice a week. The *bancos* preside over a group of mediums, who may be experienced persons or in the phase of development. Trance is induced by smoking cigars, hyperventilation or body movements. The clients line up as soon as the spirit identifies itself. The diagnosis is made and advice is given: rites may be prescribed. As the mediums work in front of everybody, these sessions may be considered a form of group therapy.

Mediums may pretend that the spiritual beings take complete possession of their body and mind, or they may be conscious of what is happening. They claim that they cannot be responsible for their acts while in trance, which gives them a license to behave often in an inappropriate way and to act out repressed feelings. They believe that their bodies are filled with heat or obtain a sudden illumination. The behavior of spirits is stereotyped and the role is learned by the prospective medium, yet no formal initiator is necessary. The first trance may be violent, but then the person learns to control his or her behavior. The development of mediumic faculties is considered to help a person to overcome mental, emotional and even physical problems. Some mediums meditate, pray or sing; others dance in burning ashes or demonstrate other prodigies.

In other sessions, the rituals prescribed by the spirits are carried out under the surveillance of the *banco* and with the help of persons possessed or nonpossessed. Most rituals consist in cleansing rites and exorcisms, as people believe that most of their problems were caused by evil influences, evil spirits and envious neighbors, whose negative currents must be extirpated. Another set of rites helps the client to be filled with positive forces which are concentrated in charms prepared by the cult leaders. The cleansing rites are made with the help of cigar smoke, rum, water and herbal concoctions. Perfumes and magic soaps are also used. Sometimes the blood of sacrificed animals is used in special ceremonies. The most popular ritual today is a *velacion* that may serve to open up a medium to receive spirits, to cure a disease, to exorcise evil or to invoke positive forces. The candidate is placed on the ground and candles are lit around him. Then he may be sprinkled with water, alcoholic beverages, the blood of a sacrificed chicken, baby powder or

herbal concoctions. Sometimes he himself enters an altered state of consciousness. When the candles burn down, he is lifted up and bathed. The site is cleansed by exploding some gunpowder.

Many rituals are carried out in the urban center, but for others it is necessary to go to secluded places on rivers or in the bush. Every weekend many *caravanas* of pilgrims arrive in Sorte, the main sanctuary of the cult that is now a national park. They prepare their camps along the Yaracuy river and then start their magic practices, exorcisms and *velaciones*. These groups comprise the core members of a center, the mediums and the *banco*, as well as clients who want to undergo special rites. Pilgrims enjoy two days in this region of great natural beauty, the spirit of community and an escape from overcrowded quarters in squalid cities. During Holy Week over 50,000 pilgrims come to Sorte.

Cult centers in the cities are usually situated in or near the home of the leader. Some are small quarters; others are chapels. They contain an altar with star emblems and pictures of the spirits, flowers, candles and offerings of food and rum. The cult groups are loosely organized. Some clients are present only when they need help; others go from center to center in search of assistance; others who meet regularly usually are in the process of becoming mediums themselves. Cu1t leaders usually are ex-mediums, who broke away from another group to venture out on their own. They may be men or women; some practiced as healers while living in the countryside; others may have a long experience in dealing with the general problems of their clients. Most *bancos* pretend to have received a calling from God or from the spirits to work to benefit the community. Some say that they led a bad life and were punished with a persistent illness, which finally was healed by a spiritist or cultist. To thank God for the miracle, they have become the apprentice of such a healer and turned into cultists.

Most leaders have outside jobs and practice only weekends or evenings. Some clients are permanent, others go from center to center in search of assistance, some are just curious. All are accepted. An experienced leader is able to enact many spirit roles and create a positive atmosphere. Many leaders and mediums are women past their youth. They know about the current problems of their clients, as they come from the same class. While the cult was dominated by members of the uneducated classes 30 years ago, today many cult leaders are educated and belong to a new middle class, and so are their clients. These new leaders are great innovators and search for new inspirations in an ample, esoteric literature readily available in the bookstores of cities. They may travel to other countries, attend meetings of spiritualists and become initiated into Santeria. These new ideas are eagerly accepted by their clients, who search for new emotional experiences or for spiritual entities that may better serve their needs. People are willing to pay for the rites, as long as they serve their purpose. A new industry has developed around the *perfumerias*, the stores, called "botanicas" in the USA, where one can buy all the necessary paraphernalia for proper rituals. There are 5,000 such stores scattered throughout Venezuela.

Purposes

What is the purpose of the cult, and why has it become so successful? Belief in the power of spirits is common in Venezuela, and not only in the lower strata of society. People look for ways to solve problems they cannot resolve by natural means. Often physicians are unable to cure a person of a persistent psychosomatic illness, as they do not understand the underlying problems that are rooted in beliefs of magic and the fear of witches. The experienced cult leaders and mediums, however, sharing the same faith, can deal with these problems in their way. Moreover, they often can tell when a person is really ill and has to be referred to a doctor. They then perform

a ritual to protect the person during the operation in the hospital, following which the patient is no longer afraid.

Students ask for charms in order to protect themselves when they have to pass exams. A timid person who seeks a job may present himself to a new boss with greater ease when he is protected by magic. Quarrels in the family may be solved when a spirit makes his verdict. Women, whose husbands have outside girlfriends, may avenge themselves and find peace. Clients learn that other people have the same problems and make an effort to solve them together. A new community may be formed around a cult center of uprooted people, who find their new friends and a substitute for family and kinship left behind. New leaders cater to new clients with slightly different problems, such as luck in business or car accidents. Their rites may be less crude and more in tune with modern thinking.

In spite of some commercialization, there are many positive aspects to the cult. A search to resolve problems through the intervention of spiritual entities may be the most important of these. The cult offers, also, a new feeling of security. Mediumship changes the status of a humble person when he or she becomes the representative of a powerful spirit. The cult is open to new developments, there is no limit to human imagination.

Other magico-religious movements are proliferating today in Latin America. The Umbanda in Brazil developed parallel to the cult in Venezuela and has the same roots as Maria Lionza. It grew out of the poorer section of Rio de Janeiro in the ‘30s, when a group of spiritualists began to purify the African rites of the Candomble — another Yoruba-derived Afro-American religion — from its crude aspects in order to make it more acceptable to a new urban class. Thus, its roots in Africa may still be strong; Kardecism played an important role and is still prevalent in Umbanda. The Umbanistas, also, invoke Amerindian spirits, the so-called Caboclos, and the Pretos Velhos, the old Africans, who were the founding fathers of Afrobrazilian culture. Many other spiritual entities are invoked.

The rites are utilitarian and geared to the solution of problems. Exorcism and cleansing rites are the main features of "working sessions." The Umbanda expanded all over Brazil and, in the course of the past decade, has advanced as far as Buenos Aires and Montevideo, where the cult leaders and their followers are white, middle-class people. Again, no catechism is generally accepted by the leaders, yet there are associations of cult centers on regional and national levels, and their meetings receive great publicity. Today, many members of the professional class, even those who studied the Afro-American: cults, are adherents of Umbanda. The cult is continuously influenced by new esoteric literature and traditional practices derived from the ancient Yoruba and other African religions.

Spiritism in Puerto Rico was a creation of the upper classes around the turn of the century, influenced by the teachings of Kardec. Later, these practices were adopted by the lower strata of society and problem solving became all-important. In recent years, Espiritismo blended with the Cuban Santeria, was brought to Puerto Rico before the Cuban exodus took place. The older *mesas* were replaced by more ecstatic rites.

Afro-American cults were imported to the USA and, in the big cities, were adopted first by blacks in search of their roots, and later by middle-class whites who also search for a solution for their problems through these rites. Recent congresses have stressed the common elements in the Yoruba-derived cults in Brazil, Cuba, the USA and the Caribbean area, in general.

From this paper there emerges a picture of the way in which imagination is used to develop new religious ideas that are expressed in utilitarian cults in tune with modern developments.

Chapter VI

The Sacred: Mysticism and Pragmatism, the Major Trends in Contemporary Theory

Jean-Michel Heimonet

In recent years both in Europe and in the United States there has been a theoretical tendency to reconstitute on the levels of speech and of person the conjoint notions of rationality (or positivity) and of subject. This turn towards an open and unquestioning attitude regarding the classical idea of the subject — as an active, conscious and willing center, which was the ideal of the Enlightenment — is a reaction against the trends which largely dominated the 1960s and 1970s.

Beginning with Foucault these were concerned with carrying out an archeology of knowledge with a view to deciphering the potential for restrictions native to, and reproduced by, Western culture since the classical age. Following the same movement, through the concept of *différence*, Derrida (and at the same time Lacan) pointed out the internal division of the subject between two contrary existential tendencies: the one, centrifugal and directed towards loss and death; the other, centripetal and directed towards conservation and power. Then, in introducing his *Leçon* at the Collège de France, Barthes proclaimed the explosive slogan: "All language is fascist." By this he meant that syntactical and grammatical conventions constitute a constricting structure from which the writer could escape only by "cheating the language" in order to go beyond orthodox usage. What is essential in the text is no longer the content or manifest sense, but the structure of musical and psychological associations which, like a slip of the tongue, manifest the deepest orientations of the writer — generally referred to as a Freudian or pleasure slip. This literary*kamasutra* or "science of the pleasures of language" — which Barthes already had developed in *Le plaisir du texte* — complements on the level of rhetoric the work of Deleuze and Guatari on the psychoanalytic level. Strongly influenced by the Nietzschean idea of "culture," the authors of*L'Anti-Oedipe* call "writing" that "terrible alphabet" or "cruel system of signs" engraved in the flesh of man who, by that very fact, loses his privileges as the *ego scriptor* and become a "Desiring machine."1

In this context Jean Baudrillard's prediction of the subjection of man to the position of a thing gains in force. In *Les strategies fatales* Baudrillard writes:

the subject was beautiful only in its pride and arbitrariness, its limitless willful power, its transcendence as subject of power and of history, or in the drama of its alienation. Without this one is pitiably deficient, the pawn of his own desires or image, incapable of forming a clear representation of the universe and sacrificing himself in an attempt to revive the dead body of history.2

In sum, the insight which would give birth to the revolt of May 1968 destroyed in one stroke the related ideas of conscience, will and autonomy which had constituted the contribution of the Enlightenment; that is, the ability of a subject, besieged by the irrational forces of myth and religion, to give focus to a world in terms of his understanding and will. It is this heritage of the Enlightenment which today is being reaffirmed.

The urgency of this return to enlightened reason under the auspices of the Kantian philosophy of the subject provides the principal themes for the last books of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut. In *La*

*pensée 68: essai sur l'anti-humanisme contemporain*3 and *Heidegger et les modernes*,4 the intention is to warn against the dangerously metaphysical process by which the thinkers of the last decade have practiced — often without being aware of it — a systematic anti-humanism. Ironically, under the pretext of eliminating once and for all the metaphysics of reason centered upon the subject, Foucault and Derrida have found themselves caught in the spiral of metaphysical hyperbole. For the a priori identity they suppose between knowledge and power leads them to place the human ideal beyond all kinds of meaning and in so doing to make it inaccessible, in relation to which the individual can only renounce his or her autonomy. In other words, in the end the excess of thought fascinated by the absolute becomes a form of regression.

Dispossessed of his attributes as a subject (that is, of knowledge and will) on both the speculative and the practical levels, and thus incapable of acting upon "the world," the modern man is subjected to the transcendentalism of another lay, nontheological religion, which leads him to search his salvation no longer in the truth or efficacity of a satisfying answer, but in the effort and tension of an endless questioning. It is as reaction *to* (in the chemical sense) *and against* (in the political sense) this metaphysical hyperbole that one should interpret the desire of Ferry and Renaut to search for the conditions of a *"non-metaphysical humanism*" capable of "conferring coherent philosophical status upon the promise of freedom contained in the requirements (of the term humanism)."5

In a parallel manner Jürgen Habermas wishes to restore to philosophy its true place and function as the "guardian of rationality." Rejecting the erroneous association between reason and power, the author of *Morale et communication*6 attempts to show that the normative rules of linguistic communication, inasmuch as they provide a universal basis for intersubjective exchanges, constitute the best defense against an abuse of power. Although Barthes deduces a fascist character for language from its normative function, Habermas tries to show that this same function is, on the contrary, presupposed intuitively by every subject who takes part in a process of communication. This permits him to state the ethical principle of dialogue: "only those norms can claim validity which are accepted . . . by all the persons participating in a practical discussion."7

Nonmetaphysical humanism and the ethics of communicative action agree that human activities and relationships must be perceived no longer in terms of an ideal of inaccessible purity, but from the pragmatic point of view where conditions of efficacity and utility are understood on the basis of results in daily life.

The significance of this return to practical reason goes far beyond the theoretical. Because it takes place at a crucial moment in the development of modern societies, it gives birth to a new image of the human person. In criticizing the philosophical relevance of the thought of the 1960s, Ferry and Renaut or Habermas are concerned basically with its moral function and value. This extension of the philosophical debate to the domain of the ethical has been the high point in the recent polemic regarding Heidegger and fascism.

Of course, what is at stake is not only the sympathy of Martin Heidegger as an individual for Hitler's Germany, but the fact that this sympathy was an integral part of a philosophy which largely influenced the development of European thought since World War II. In view of this, all theoretical discourse in the Heideggarian tradition — in particular that of the authors associated with the 1968 revolution — in some manner would be suspect of complicity in a fascist ideology. The thesis of Ferry and Renaut, *Heidegger et les modernes*, is clearly that in criticizing the scientific and technical character of the modern world according to the pattern of a "Dialectics of Enlightenment," i.e., the movement in which absolutized Reason engenders its contrary and

prepares a return to barbarism, Heidegger subjects man to a new form of transcendence, which is no longer a magico-religious but ontological form. For, despite a certain amount of failures, scientific rationality remains a factor of personal autonomy and is inseparable from the democratic idea promoted in the 18th century. In pretending to surpass science in favor of a superior reality, Heidegger denies man the means by which he reaches his goals in the empirical order, leaving him alienated before the idea of Being as the full, but inaccessible, realization of existence.

For Ferry and Renaut there is an almost continuous road from the Heideggerian concept of Being, as a metaphysical one which needs no justification, to the Führer, as the incarnation and divinization of an abstract entity (people or nation) in a single person.

Above and beyond its often mediating character, "the Heidegger case" provides a lesson. It allows one to delineate the confrontation between two types of thought: the one secular and immanent, which restricts the human project to the empirical, the other religious and transcendentalist, which sacrifices the realization of this project to the exigencies of a necessity which cannot be reduced to a set of reasons. Undoubtedly, this opposition is as old as our culture. But, in view of its timeliness, we would like to show how, under its abstract appearance, the thought of 1968 remains heir to the touch of irrationality which, as managed on the aesthetic level by surrealism, propagated itself until the Second World War.

About 1935, with regard to the theory of myths and festivals developed by Caillois in *L'homme et le sacré*, Bataille in "La notion de dépense" or "Le probléme de l'Etat" called for the destruction of the "homogeneous" society. These articles (appeared in *La Critique Sociale*) merely translated the conclusion of numerous intellectuals of the period, according to whom any society rationalized to its very marrow and believing itself to have exorcised the least seed of the sacred was politically and socially dead. The theme of a return towards mythic forces, destined to restore to the modern community the affective cement it lacked, was not original. One finds in Hegel the connection with the idea of "the religion of the people" as well as in Nietzsche who, recalls Bataille, "dreamed always about creating Order."8

Nevertheless, in the context of the 1930s this theme had another meaning. Reactivated and actualized by the rise of nationalists movements, i.e., fascism and communism, it became more than a theme; it was a remedy or even a panacea. Return to an *Urzeit* seemed to offer the possibility of giving life to myth here and now in the very heart — even if on the ruins — of a decadent world which was in need of regeneration. In *Ni droite ni gauche*, Zeev Sternhell described the series of oscillations by which ideologists (ideologues being the people who follow an ideology) moved from one extreme to the other. Fascism or communism, it made no difference, for the essential was to find room within a total organism where one could experience oneself in one's entirety as a sort of collective individual which, in transcending particular subjectivities, multiplied their force.

It was no coincidence that this focus appeared also in unprecedented movement of thought and writing. This movement which was outside all political parties has not been interrupted up to the present. Intellectuals convinced by the unfolding of history of the "self-destruction of reason" looked to stop this mechanism through an effort of reflection, i.e., a *return by reason upon and against itself*.9 In Germany the Frankfurt School used certain elements of Marxist theory to deconstruct on a rational basis the triumph of Hitler, but without placing themselves in the Stalinist camp. In a parallel manner, in France the Collège de Sociologie undertook the task of studying the "heterogeneous" (or sacred) phenomena associated with movements of social aggregation or disaggregation, while continuing rigorously to oppose the political policies of the ruling parties.

These groups of researchers were formed with the goal of finding in the midst of critical thought the means of escaping the challenges of the times. Going against the optimism of the

democratic leaders, Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as Bataille and his companions in the Collège de Sociologie, did not consider Hitlerism to be an accident in a history oriented towards progress. In charismatic phenomena and in the manipulation of masses, they recognized fundamental human tendencies which had been repressed by the unidimensionality of reason. In a situation of crisis, which weakened social homogeneity, these reemerged from and under the pressure of this repression. In this manner, the monstrous carnival played by irrationalism built upon the *hyper* trophy of reason erected into a cult. This was the conviction of Bataille when he wrote: "It is the incapacity of a homogeneous society to find in itself a reason for being and for acting which puts it at the disposition of the imperative forces."10

In revenge and translated into terms of logic on the level of discourse, this lucidity regarding the archaic forces which provide the basis for power, place one in an untenable position. This is because the only means and arms available for resisting, *at the same time*, both the Other of reason and the absolutized Reason, is reason itself. If there exists an attitude capable of overcoming the choice between the extremism of the right and the left and the resulting mediocrity of democratic politicians, it consists in maintaining discourse in a state of alert: a state of watchfulness, of tension without relaxation, destined to enlighten reason regarding the potential violence which its apathy shelters. "If reason does not undertake reflection at this moment of collapse," wrote Horkheimer and Adorno in *La dialectique de la raison*, "it will seal its own destiny."11

From our vantage point a half century later, this reflection of reason on and against itself seems to have filled a double function. It had secular, or more precisely a politico-moral function, which through the dynamic of striving and tension led to the deconstruction of the idea or image of totality linked with power. Equally, it also had a religious function with cathartic and sacrificial value through which the presence of an order of reality beyond all positive or empirical form is, in one stroke, affirmed, desired and expiated.

To take up in critical discourse what Bataille, in contrast to "homogeneity," calls the "heterogeneous" phenomena, namely, those linked to the most profound levels of human affectivity, necessarily implies a certain receptivity on the part of those who understand them. Following the principles of German social phenomenology which Raymond Aron introduced in France at that time, such phenomena, as hypnotic action of a leader upon a crowd and the consequences entailed by such action on the social structure, cannot be grasped from the outside by means of conceptual analysis; the only suitable approach is a practical one which, as such, comes from *lived experience*. From this comes the apparently ambiguous attitude of Bataille in "The Psychological Structure of Fascism," an article in which he recognizes that "it is impossible not to be conscious of the *power* which positions *Hitler* and *Mussolini* above men, parties and even laws." But immediately he denounces "the absence of all democracy and brotherhood" in this power under whose constraint "natural and immediate human needs are (denied) in favor of a transcendent principle which cannot be subject to any exact explanation."12 The affective ambiguity in this fascination for fascist leaders implies a double postulate. First of all, it is because it has been physically and/or psychically experienced that the fascination can be analyzed and deconstructed *from the inside* and, hence, without being underestimated. On the other hand, and consequently, the possibility of this experience proves that therein the modern individual strongly resonates archaic forces. This resonance or affinity is all the more possible as one experiences a certain kind of nostalgia.

On the basis of these premises, one is enabled to comprehend the cathartic function of the turn of reason upon and against itself. The torment that reason applies to itself in this self-critical discourse consists in recognizing in every man, and not only on the part of manifest fascists, a

candidate for the self-sacralization. As the main issue this pretended divinity must be expiated, i.e., *expiare* (Latin) is here a key concept and rejected by overcoming this infinite pretension in the middle of language in order to recall man to his proper measure and finitude.

In this ontohistorical perspective, *The Inner Experience,* written during World War II, becomes the equivalent of a *sacrifice* according to the definition given by Bataille some years earlier in *La notion de dépense*: "a production by means of loss."13 According to the etymology of the word *expiare* explained by Caillois in *L'homme et le sacré*, it is an expiatory exercise consisting in "driving out (of self) the sacred (the pious)."14 In the context of experience, this is to strip the subject of the will to "become all," (*ipse*) which shapes and drives by bringing him to the practice of desirous activity, writing symbols of failure and powerlessness since Rimbaud and surrealism. "No longer to will to be all and to question all," as Bataille writes. Disintoxicated, we learn what we are as the subject of this book is the suffering that comes from detoxification.15

Predicated upon the principle of "non-knowledge," as a putting into question and an "infinite interrogation" of the language by which the subject was previously engaged in mastering the world and the other, by the tension of its own critical effort, experience naturally winds up in the ecstasy of laughter or silence, at that "summit" where, writes Bataille, "man is blown out": sacrificed on the altar of language and representation in his will to be all. "The suppression of subject and object," Bataille, writes "is the only means to avoid the possession of the object by the subject, that is, to avoid the absurd rush of the *ipse* wishing to become all."16

If Bataille probably is the one who has carried this autrosacrificial process farthest, it is important to note that it is not unique to him, for such an appropriation and privatization would negate the function and profound value of the inner experience. That intellectual torment is at the end where, beyond the rest and satisfaction of a result, discourse falls simultaneously upon its Other and its own powerlessness as a recall for man to its finitude; this specific movement of thought is at the roots of the modernity of the 1960s.

Indeed from Bataille to Foucault or to Derrida, the historical urgency has dissipated. While *The Inner Experience* responds effectively to a need, on the opposite the subtle play of the *différence* resembles more an abstract philosophical exercise of acrobatic rope dancing. Nevertheless, if one is willing to rethink the nature of the relations which links the world of history to that of symbolic forms, one can understand that what enables us to establish not only a parallel but an authentic solidarity between these writings has in both the form of the same revolt: the same effort to exhaust and pass beyond this type of discourse which instrumental reason conceived as the only one possible. At the same time and by the same act of revolt, the torment the reason exerts on itself does not lead to burst the bonds of discourse and of representation in general; instead, it reinforces them. Writing becomes the ceremony in which the desire of otherness is simultaneously both affirmed and frustrated. Thus, what Foucault discovers at the end of *Les mots et les choses* is that "man is 'finite' and in arriving at the summit of all possible speech he does not arrive at his own heart, but at the edge of what limits him, namely the region of death where thought is extinguished, and the promise of the origin is indefinitely withheld."17

In virtue of this expiatory movement it would be hasty to conclude, as Habermas seems to have done in *Le discours philosophique de la modernité,* that such a process and the writing which expresses it necessarily release reason and engulf it in the metaphysical hyperbole which was fatal to Heidegger.

What defines sacrificial writing, we have said, is above all its tension. Remaining within its limits, it tests out its borders, but without ever breaking them; it exploits the full resources of the language in order to conceive otherness, yet without ever forgetting or alienating itself in it. The

borderline character of this writing has been studied by Derrida who remarks that all supposedly destructive discourse, whatever be its violence, remains "held in a certain circle." "We cannot state any destructive proposition which has not already taken up the form, logic and implicit postulates of that which it wishes to deny,"18 that is the form, logic and implications of discourse as being those of reason itself.

This objective self-awareness of a transcendental reason is inseparable from the language in which it manifests itself, and it echoes this phrase of Bataille: "inner experience is led by discursive reason. Only reason has the power to destroy its work, to throw down what it has built up." Nevertheless, one must not confuse the acceptance — and respect — of that impenetrable limit with a servile attitude. Though solicited by a negation, namely, by the questioning of the identity of the possible and the empirical, the real and the rational, experience remains an affirmation. It is not content to accept the boundaries of language and representations as the ultimate obstacle or check it pretends to be. It returns to that obstacle, is stimulated by it and develops a dialectics of "the blockage." In Horkheimer's and Adorno's terms, this is a negative dialectics whose implosive thrust is sufficient to transform the blockage by injecting it with a productive power. Invisible and difficult to evaluate in pragmatic terms, this produces its effects in the very intensity of the tension. The requirements of the internal conflict give discourse the capacity to destroy the totalitarianisms — the one of concepts as well as the one of acts — by infinitely differentiating the grasp of meaning. "I call experience a voyage to the limits of human possibilities by one (who) considers as eliminated the authorities or existing values which limit the possible."20

Yet, where does this voyage lead, and — the same question — what is the relation between "the limits of the possibility of man" and the negation of authority? The itinerary of the voyage is set, and always has been, in the space within the boundaries. As regards the authority, this must not be set outside of self. It is not the constraint of a being, an institution or of a state of affairs which would be justly opposed. The authority is tautological, inherent in the subject as such and rooted in the structure on the basis of the will-to-be-all. To focus upon power (authority) where it is — not as something which one has, but as something which one *is* — in order to pull it out by its roots is the very purpose of the experience. This cathartic task, which requires a maximum effort of lucidity by the one who writes, by deepening the resources of the awareness language enables itself to appreciate its own finitude. Only at the price of such an effort is experience able to become an act, rather than the flight of a beautiful soul which rejects this lowly world. According to the definition of Bataille, it is a sacrificial act: production occurs by means of a loss. What is lost (sacrificed or expiated) is the will of the subject to become all, *ipse*; on the contrary, what is produced is the inestimatable good bound to the recognition of the others.

For, at the conclusion of the voyage in which one has methodologically explored the circularity of the symbolic world, it is not the Other which the subject discovers, but oneself. It is that "little" other who, before becoming my neighbor or my brother is more essentially my twin in language.

The third, the companion, the reader who makes me, is discourse. The reader is discourse; that is what speaks in me, who on its own night supports in me the living discourse. Undoubtedly, discourse is a project, but even more it is the *other, the reader*, who loves me and already forgets me (kills me), and without whose present insistence I could do nothing, and would have no inner experience.21

Bataille recognizes from his first lines that this procedure is the equivalent of a spiritual *exercise* in the mystical and religious sense of the word; but he does this in order to

underline immediately what distinguishes an interior from a "confessional experience." While positive theology is based on the revelation of scriptures, he writes:

interior experience, not being able to have its principle in either dogma (moral attitude) or science (knowledge cannot be its goal or source) or a search for experientially enriching states (aesthetic attitude), reveals nothing and cannot found or begin from belief. It remains "simply an experience, free from attachments even of origin to whatever confession."22

From this follows an inverse symmetrical attitude regarding authority. Where the mystic recognizes no other power than that of God, the "subject" of inner experience attempts to go beyond all revealed authority, beginning with his own. With regard to the "obscure unknown" reached in ecstasy, God represents, Bataille writes, "a dead object" and "a matter for the theologian to which the unknown would be subservient."23

Hence, one must speak of a negative theology or, like Bataille, of an "a-theology" in which the necessity of transcendence is simultaneously affirmed and denied: affirmed by the power and by intensity of its very negation. Because it is a matter of experiencing, putting into practice in the play of language, the reality of the sacred — as that "which being only beyond meaning, is (also) more than it"24 — while rejecting the distinctive, monumental attributes of its supremacy.

That divergence of attitude as regards authority presents inner and confessional experience as two contrasted activities. One is justified and validated a priori by the presence of God as an object which is to be attained. This leads toward some form of gratification. The other, not being able to stop the thrust of freedom which is its true nature, devoted itself in questioning without end. "What characterizes such an experience, which does not come from a revelation and where nothing is revealed, except the unknown, is that it implies nothing which pacifies." It "leads to no haven but to a place of bewilderment, nonsense."25

This lack of any positive character, of any "revelation" or result whatsoever type, is what assures the continuity of thought from the 1930s to the 1960s. To be convinced of this, it suffices to reflect upon the difficulty which Derrida experienced — not without satisfaction — in defining the meaning of his project: "I would try to write (in) the very space in which is located the question of speech and of wishing to speak. I am trying to write the question: "(what) wishing to speak(s)? Thus it is necessary that in such a space and guided by such a question the detailed lettering in the writing does-not-say- anything."26 Indeed Derrida, like Foucault or Lacan, has banished from his text the semantic arsenal which permitted Sartre to describe Bataille as a "new mystic." Though, notable by its absence, the result is nonetheless the same: it allows one to apply to the work of contemporaries what Bataille wrote of inner experience, namely, that "it leaves one naked, or unable to know anything," so that "ultimately for lack of positive revelation (one) could give neither reason for one’s being nor goal."27 Through the complete destitution attained in the French, inflamationary practice uncannily becomes manifest, i.e., the dark belief in a dimension of human experience freed from the categories of instrumental reason.

The properly religious character of this step has not escaped Umberto Eco, who sees in it the expression of an "atheistic sacredness," the "negative theology" which would respond to "the actual crisis of lay thought." In an article "The Sacred Is Not a Fashion," Eco describes with great relevance the twin face of the divinity which appears throughout the history of the West. On the one hand, it is a revealed and personalized God, "all present and victorious" who is also that of the "armies." On the other hand, continues Eco:

that God "often manifests itself in a contrary fashion: as *that which is no*t . . . (which) cannot be named (or) described *by means of any categories* which we use to indicate things which exist. . . . It is the sum of what one cannot say of him; one speaks of him by celebrating our ignorance and one names him at most as a gulf or abyss, a desert or a solitude, an absence. This God, laicized and infinitely absent, has appeared in contemporary thought under different names and broken out in the renaissance of psychoanalysis, in the rediscovery of Nietzsche and Heidegger, *in the new metaphysics of Absence and of Difference*.27

It is exactly this religious intention — of which the iconoclast thought described above is both vehicle and witness — the present reaction intends to exorcise.

In a significant manner Ferry and Renaut share with Habermas the same expression to designate the movement of modern discourse, the popular expression: *tourner en rond* or "to go a round in a circle"29 By its circular procedure such discourse is bound to betray its initial goal. Pretending to put an end to the metaphysics of reason centered upon the subject, in fact it critically outbids itself, thereby betraying again the "desubjectivized" man to the dark forces from which the enlightment had freed him. As Habermas explains in relation to the "negative dialectics" of Horkheimer and Adorno, this ironic trajectory results from "a performative contradiction," consisting of wishing to deconstruct reason by means of discourse which it organizes.

In order to stop this movement of nonproductive negativity, the pragmatic philosophy undertakes the task of envisaging in the present what it is possible to do in the domains of knowledge and of practice by the means placed at the disposition of man through the progress of reason. Under the inspiration of Kant's revolution in thought, this proposes to substitute the quest for an absolute, considered to be beyond reach, by the more humble but equally more efficient role of carrying forward the heritage of the Enlightenment while adapting it to the conditions and priorities of the actual world. It is within the limits of the program thus defined that philosophy can rediscover its universal value of "guardian of rationality."

Thence, the question necessarily arises of knowing if such an attitude, rooted in a basic realism, is able to satisfy the principle needs for which the sacrificial dynamic has thus far been sufficient. It questions whether or not the requirements of sacrality — which appear in the activities associated by Bataille to notions of "negativity without a task" and of "non-productive expenditure," namely, activities of which literature and theory form only one aspect, privileged but restricted — can be simply and entirely rationalized without their following a reversal of individual and social structures such that it will henceforth be necessary to dream up a new type of humanity. For, the supposition that the sacred is nothing more than a fashion has itself lasted throughout our entire history.

Notes

1. Deleuze and Guatari, *L'Anti-Oedipe*, p. 169.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 165.
3. *La Pensée 68: essai sur l'anti- humanisme contemporain* (1985).
4. In *Heidegger et les modernes* (1988).
5. *Ibid*., pp. 24 and 68.
6. *Moral et communication* (1986).
7. *Op. cit.*, p. 114.
8. Bataille, *Oeuvres completes*, tome XII.

9. Cf. M. Horheimer et T. Adorno, *La Dialectique de la raison*, p. 14.

10. *Op. cit.*, tome II, p. 353. The expression "homogeneous society" corresponds in terms of German social phenomenology to the category of *Gesellschaft*: a society based upon pragmatic reason (science) and ruled by the principle of utility, in which individuals are bound among themselves and contractual relations. By homogeneous "society" Bataille understands the Western democracies, in general, and, in particular, the Third French Republic.

11. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

12. *Op. cit.*, tome I, pp. 348-49.

13. *Op. cit.*, tome I.

14. *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

15. *Op. cit.*, tome V, p. 20.

16. *Op cit.*, p. 67.

17. *Op. cit.*, pp. 394-95.

18. J. Derrida, *L'Ecriture el la différence* (Paris: Le Seuil (Points), 1967), p. 42.

19. *Op. cit.*, tome V, p. 60.

20. *Ibid.*, tome V, p. 19.

21. *Ibid.*, tome V, p. 75.

22. *Ibid.*, tome V, pp. 15-16, 18.

23. *Ibid.*, tome V, p. 16.

24. *Op. cit.*, tome IX, P. 157.

25. *Op. cit.*, tome V, p. 15. "The negative dialectic appears as a continued unfolding of the reasons we should review and even preserve in that *performative contradiction*." (p. 144).

26. J. Derrida, *Positions*, (Paris: Minuit, 1971), p. 23.

27. *Op. cit.*, tome V, p. 25.

28. V. Eco, *La guerre du faux* (Paris: Grasset (Biblio des Essais), 1985),pp. 130-131.

29. L. Ferry et A. Renaut, *Heidegger et les modernes* (Paris: Grasset, 1987), p. 40; et J. Habermas, *Le discours philosophique de la modernité* (Paris: Galliward, 1988), p. 144.

Chapter VII

The Moral Imagination, Ambition, and the Education of Public Servants

Charles T. Rubin

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
-- Lord Acton, *Letter to Bishop Creighton*

The pursuit of power with the capacity and in the desire to exercise it worthily is among the noblest of human occupations. But Power is a goddess who admits no rival in her loves.
-- Winston Churchill, *Marlborough, His Life and Times*

Introduction

The question of what kind of education is most likely to produce excellence in political leadership is one of the oldest and greatest of those addressed by serious students of politics. It embraces nearly all the central concerns of political philosophy, requiring as it does investigation of human nature, the good for human being and citizen, the meaning of excellence, and the teachability of virtue. Situated (as we are told we are by a drumbeat of media attention) in the midst of an "ethics crisis," some considerable portion of which is constituted by the alleged misdeeds of elected and appointed public officials, it is sobering to be reminded that ours is not the first age to be concerned about its ability to make both good men and good leaders. But it is shocking that those professionally employed in the study of politics today, teachers of political science or public administration, are so often woefully unprepared to address this concern in any substantial way.

Such has not always been the case. Traditionally, training for political life consisted of something like a liberal education, loosely understood; at least, it included large doses of history, rhetoric, philosophy, etc. The historical component was particularly pronounced, but for reasons that are often misunderstood. Looking back at such an education, it is often assumed that history was so important because of some supposed ability to teach statesmen from the "lessons of the past." In the crude way this is today understood, it is plainly a problematic enterprise. Circumstances are rarely if ever repeated so precisely that what one individual did or failed to do before can be a reliable guide to what is necessary to do now. If this were all that could be gained from history, then it would make sense to reject it (as it has been rejected) as a key element of a political education.

But the crude understanding is not the only one available; the role for historical studies can be very different. First, and less important for our purposes, it provides an education in human nature, in the characteristics and types that, human beings being what they are, are likely to be found again and again. Second, it gives the student of politics exemplars worthy of praise or blame, models, as we would call them today, of lives to be avoided and lives to be emulated, or not. In short, the study of history activated and educated the moral imagination. While not a seeker after a political career, Jean Jacques Rousseau, speaking of himself as a young man, gives one of the nicest accounts of the lessons of history, properly understood:

Plutarch, above all, became my favorite author . . . From these interesting readings, from the discussions between my father and myself to which they gave rise, was fashioned this free and republican spirit, this indomitable and proud character, impatient with any yoke of servitude, which has tormented me my whole life long . . . incessantly busied with Rome and Athens; living so to speak, with their great men . . . I believed myself Greek or Roman; I became the person whose life I was reading; struck by the narration of traits of insistence and intrepidation, my eyes sparkled and my voice boomed.1

History could be the more easily read this way because historians self-consciously wrote to elevate the reader, as much as to analyze their subjects. Winston Churchill represents a late example of this purpose. Some small indication of his intention is seen in the fact that he prefaces his magisterial account of the Second World War with a "Moral of the Work":

In War: Resolution
In Defeat: Defiance
In Victory: Magnanimity
In Peace: Good Will2

Understanding that no given age or place has a monopoly on immoral and corrupt politicians no matter how educated, and appreciating the ongoing difficulty of understanding the proper virtues of human being and citizen, is it possible that the particular form taken by ethical "crisis" in politics today is attributable in part at least to failures of the education of public servants? If so, we would be foolish to think that some simple return to the past could solve our problems once and for all. But it would be equally short-sighted to believe that there was nothing we could learn from it. In what follows we will examine three related questions, bearing on what may be the role of moral imagination in the education of public servants. How does contemporary political education deal with those aspects of moral development in public servants that were long understood to be central to creating a decent political order? Here we will find that an abstract species of moral instrumentalism has become the order of the day. In light of the failings of this method, we will ask whether an understanding of the *particular* characters of public servants anticipated by United States constitutional structures might be a better guide to approach their moral education. This inquiry will lead us to consider the possibility that personal ambition is not necessarily as opposed to ethical behavior as contemporary thought on the subject would have it. And finally, through an examination of Plato's *Alcibiades*, we will ask how the moral imagination might have a special role in the education and disciplining of just such ambition.

Ethics in Public Life

Acute observers of the education of public servants provided by political science and public administration have been aware for some time of the inability of these disciplines to deal seriously with ethical matters. A relatively recent summary of the situation can be found in Mark Lilla's "Ethos, 'Ethics,' and Public Service." Lilla notes that the moralistic tendencies of American politics have long produced a concern with "the morality of public policies themselves — the decisions to wage war, redistribute income, intervene in other nations, 'restructure society,' etc."3But the "ethics in government movement" has more lately begun to take on the "moral obligations of career public officials" in the context of public administration programs that claim

to produce such career officials.4 Lilla's conclusion, however, is that the means by which this "moral education" is undertaken is more likely to help "*create* a moral vacuum than to fill one."5

To make his case, Lilla compares the teaching of public administration, as it sprang from the reform and good-government movements of the turn of the century, with the discipline as it began to develop in the 1960s. The old public administration, born of a desire to reform and purify American democracy, taught an *ethos* of public service which understood that "the democratic political process remained the legitimate source of policy and moral guidance."6 Thus, when confronted with questions of the duties or responsibilities of public servants, the teachers of public administration "pored over the Constitution and American legal history," that is to say, definitive sources of the framework of American government, in their attempts to understand their proper functions.7

Here we will expand somewhat on Lilla's analysis. The careful inculcation of such principles as could be derived from these studies could serve, it was thought, to moderate and restrain public officials. The corruption of machine and party politics and the consequent denigration of the role of principle in political life seemed to stem from, among other things, the unrestricted personal ambitions of politicians: better to have public servants who were disinterested embodiments of higher goals and aspirations.

The status of these principles and practices of American government was not perhaps of the first concern to these reformers. Clearly some thought them simply reflective of a just political order, while others were content that they were *ours*, and in that way defined the acceptable and the unacceptable. In either case, the restraint on ambition and other passions that could be expected to flow from an educated understanding of these principles depended on their being definitive of a narrow range of acceptable, guiding ideas. But a fateful distinction elaborated by one of the deepest thinkers of the reform movement — Woodrow Wilson, later to be President of the United States — opened the door to a widening of this range and, hence, to a decisive change in the teaching of politics and public administration.

Wilson introduced a now famous distinction between politics and administration. While scholars debate his precise meaning and intention, at its most basic the distinction seems to suggest a division between ends and means. Politicians set the goals, and administrators find the best way of achieving those preset ends. It is in the analysis and comparison of means that reason and the science of administration have their place. What reason can tell us about the ends, i.e., the goals of political life and the principles that define them, is far less clear. In this distinction, there is a strong suggestion that these values belong to the realm of the irrational, i.e., mere covers for ends set by "mere politics": compromise, deals, narrow interests, arbitrary whim and caprice. In short, there is a suggestion of relativism as regards the ends of political life.

The new public administration of the 1960s developed one implication of this distinction. Lilla argues it started with a scientistic methodology that understood itself to be the means by which society and politics could be regulated and rationalized. In some respects this new direction followed up on reform goals, but the definition of good government was decisively narrowed; technical competence and efficiency became ends in themselves. While Lilla admits that econometrics, cost/benefit analysis, statistics, operations research, and the like are today crucial for public officials to understand, he notes that such techniques, which occupy the central place in many programs of public administration and public policy, teach "nothing-explicitly-about democracy" and give the student "no moral guidance at all. He has discretion and can determine the most cost-effective way to achieve a particular end — but what end?"8

As the ‘60s gave way to the ‘70s, the residual fervor of radical political moralism brought policy analysts to the realization that perhaps their techniques did miss something important to the understanding of political things. To fill the gap, they turned to the ethical *theory* then current in departments of philosophy. Lilla presents that turn as happening more or less coincidentally, but we are in a position to see a link between one aspect of the reform argument and the then-current ethical theory. That link is the relativism that seemed implicit in the distinction between politics and administration.

Having characterized itself by a heavy diet of formal analysis and abstraction, this analytic philosophy combined with public administration to form "applied ethics."9 For Lilla, the most salient feature of applied ethics is, paradoxically, its highly theoretical character. That is, it consists in a student’s becoming "well versed in contemporary abstract ethical theories, [at which point] all the teacher is supposed to do is put forward different dilemmas which raise ‘interesting ethical problems,’ and to which the theories must be applied."10 In the course of such application, the main goal seems to be to sharpen analytical skills. While analysis is not a bad thing, here it takes place in "an (almost) value-free environment." The student "is told that he is morally responsible for his own actions and that this is the first day of the rest of his life. Then he is sent to work . . . This may be ethics, but it is not moral education. By turning away from the way men live to higher and higher levels of moral reasoning, philosophers and ‘ethicists’ no longer teach men to be moral, and may make them less so"11 — less so, because the student is, in effect, encouraged to find the abstract principle that justifies any result among the competing paradigms that are presented to him — less so, because a concern with this kind of ethics ignores the development of moral habits and vitiates the conscience. "Applied ethics, as currently conceived, threatens to teach future public officials how to justify their actions with high-flown excuses without teaching them what sorts of duties and virtues make up the moral life of someone in a democratic government, and without turning that understanding into habits."12

When the role of principle is thus relativized, any hope that the reformers might have had about the restraining effects of principle will be dashed. Since no principles are true, and since those that are ours have no claim over those that are not ours, principles are easily placed in the service of just those passions that they might before have served to restrain.

While Lilla may not fully do justice to the theoretical links among the old public administration, the new, and the applied ethics movement, his account remains telling at the historical and descriptive levels. There is ample evidence that Lilla’s future of "high-flown excuses," without a sense of duty or virtue, is upon us. A ready example is to be found in the *Handbook for Public Administrators*, which, among 43 articles on the techniques of public administration, finds room for two articles directly addressing the moral obligations of public servants.

In his article, "Balancing Competing Values," Charles Goodsell delineates five "value orientations" from which public administrators might make ethical judgments. They may assume that they are "the passive tool of a higher authority"; they may look to "moral foundations provided by natural law, the Judeo-Christian ethic, or the founding fathers"; they may see themselves as directly responsible to the citizenry, or to market forces; or they may look to "their own emergent conceptions of the proper missions of their agencies."13

Goodsell’s basic point is that the "administrator should recognize the particular circumstances in which each orientation is appropriate and not insist on always employing the same one, regardless of circumstances."14 Why such "eclecticism" must be the order of the day is not fully clear. On the one hand, each orientation has a "justifiable normative foundation."15 And Goodsell

assumes, in presenting us with a "day in the life" of a public administrator, that it is self-evidently true that he must, in different circumstances, employ each of the orientations. On the other hand, Goodsell knows that the orientations are theoretically incompatible. This fact is not of interest to him as "[t]he task of the administrator is not to debate philosophy but to make practical decisions."16 Since he is also aware that policy conflicts can arise out of just such competing value orientations, this recourse to the theory/practice distinction hardly seems in order. Further, he is not able to demonstrate convincingly that the way out of such conflicts is found in the proper "mix and match" of the given orientations.

Goodsell's claim to be providing a "practical normative map," therefore, is telling.17 A map tells us how to get where we already want to go. It is of little or no use in the determination of a destination, except to the extent that one can assume a blindfold and stick in a pin. Goodsell's relativism is not quite so random as this, but it seems unlikely that the eclecticism he describes is really intended to help *make* decisions. Rather, the administrator knows that in a climate of moral concern, he will have to be prepared with a multitude of possible justifications for decisions that have already been made. Where once ethics might have been understood to serve the purpose of limiting bureaucratic discretion, the "pluralism" that Goodsell advocates provides the opportunity to justify the widest range of actions, policy choices and interventions.

In the same volume, Ralph Clark Chandler is similarly eclectic with similar results. Chandler presents "ten ethical precepts," two pairs of which are, by his own admission, directly contradictory. He also presents the codes of ethics of two professional administrative societies. His conclusion? "Obviously, one can pick and choose which of the precepts and which of the tenets of the codes form a coherent personal and professional value system."18

If such custom-made codes of ethics are to be the order of the day, we will have to look to something other than moral principles, as such, to achieve that restraint on public officials that was the reformer's goal. One hint of where to look is provided by Chandler, who along with Lilla speaks of the importance of developing the proper "habits of action" in public servants.19 If morality is understood in terms of a menu of principles from which one may choose at will, moral habits are unlikely to develop. Lilla notes instead that such habituation requires a long term process of socialization and education; it requires not unlimited choice but teaching "with authority."20

While it would be an error to believe that the "applied ethics" movement has said the last word about the relationship between moral principles and politics, it seems clear that the instrumental understanding of ethics which it adopts has problematic effects on the education of public servants. When ethical principles become tools, then the use to which they are put can only be as good as the character of those who employ them. But in making abstract ethical principles the locus of the moral education of bureaucrats, it is precisely such questions of character that are lost.

A more finely nuanced picture of the relationship between ethics and politics, and one which is getting increased attention in the study of politics and public administration, has been articulated in an essay by Martin Diamond, titled "Ethics and Politics: The American Way." Diamond writes:

We think of ethics or morality today primarily in the limited, negative sense of 'thou shalt nots,' as Puritanical or Victorian 'no-no's.' Ethics or morality thus narrowed down to a number of prohibitions has indeed a universal status; all men *are* under the same obligation not to murder, steal, bear false witness, and the like. Since morality thus conceived applies to all men as men, all regimes are deemed as obliged to honor it; hence the relationship of ethics and politics comes to be seen only in its universal aspect. . . .

But morality thus universally conceived hampers our understanding of the particular relationship of ethics and politics within each political order or regime. To recover this understanding and apply it to the American case, we have to recapture something of the original broad meaning of ethics as it presented itself in classic Greek political philosophy. For that purpose Aristotle's *Ethics* will suffice. Aristotle deals of course with such universal prohibitions as those against theft, murder and lying. However, Aristotle's understanding of ethics is not chiefly concerned with such prohibitions, but, much more importantly with positive human excellences or virtues in the broadest sense.21

A political order, or regime, will, in its laws, customs, traditions, etc., inevitably encourage some kinds of virtues and discourage others — it will tend to form in its citizens a certain character that may be more or less distinctive. In this respect, the relationship between ethics and politics always has a particularistic side. Aristotle, however, kept in view the possibility that there was an ethos that was most suited simply to human beings, a character best for us and enabling us to be best. Thus, ethics and politics comprehend a universalistic aspect, as well — one that, with its stress on character, avoids the pure abstraction of contemporary ethical theory.

Can we speak of an ethos or character of public officials as it is formed or fostered by political arrangements in the United States? It will be my argument that we can, and that a central aspect of this ethos is to be found in fostering personal ambition in public servants. Thus, the reformers were wrong in distrusting personal ambition to the extent they did. If today we look around us and see highly ambitious public servants, we should neither be surprised nor despair. What we need to recognize instead is that in constituting our regime, the framers of the Constitution made personal ambition the foundation for public service at least at the national level. Such a foundation provides an opening for moral education that is insufficiently understood by today's ethical theoreticians.

Ambition

One of the most authoritative expositions of the thinking behind the Constitution of the United States is the collection of newspaper articles authored to promote ratification of the Constitution in New York by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay and titled *The Federalist*. (Here we will adopt the convention of the authors themselves and employ the pseudonym "Publius" when speaking of the author.) Even a cursory reading of the work shows the centrality of ambition to the framers' understanding of what should be expected to motivate those who seek public office. Indeed, the proper working of the new national government was to depend on this characteristic. We need then to know how ambition was understood, and how it was to work within the constitutional frame.

This is not the place for a complete examination of all references to ambition in the *Federalist*. Suffice it to say, that it is not viewed with the same suspicion that greets it today. Indeed, ambition appears as a check on potential defects in other respects of character. Thus, when trying to explain what will tend to prevent national officials from being imprudent and injudicious in the execution of national laws, Publius notes that "the interests of ambition" would serve to keep officials in line even were they "insensible to motives of public good, or the obligations of duty" [#27].22 Publius tacitly admits that when such defects exist, they can also join in dangerous ways *with* ambition; but in many of those instances where ambition is thus criticized, it is striking how it is qualified precisely in such a way as to distinguish it from a purer form. We are told, as a consequence, of

the dangers of "ungovernable ambition," [#29] "lawless ambition," [#63] "irregular ambition," or even "thwarted ambition" [#72].

But let us turn to two of the most serious discussions of ambition to appear in the work — the one in terms of the structure of the government as a whole, the separation of powers, and the other in terms of the character of the executive. One of the most famous passages in the *Federalist*is found in #51, when Publius is explaining what is today called checks and balances, based on the separation of powers. How is it that the "partition of power among the several departments" that is "essential to the preservation of liberty" will be maintained? Publius answers:

. . . the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection of human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. [#51]

We see here how closely tied the government of the Constitution is to ambition. A major function of the *Federalist* as a whole is to show how the "necessary constitutional means" are in place by which each branch may defend itself from aggrandizing attempts on the part of others.

Publius admits that the stress on ambition is necessary to supply "the defect of better motives." But to say men are not angels is not to say that we are devils; Publius is not making the Kantian argument that even a nation of devils may be ruled justly with the proper institutional arrangements. Those in the national government will be ambitious; it is best to make provision for it. That there are better motives possible than ambition when it comes to public service, Publius acknowledges. In a discussion of the ties that bind representatives to their constituencies, Publius concludes that:

Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? [#57]

We might interpret this passage as presenting two linked pairs: the "self-regarding" pair of interest and ambition and the "other-regarding" pair, duty and gratitude. The link between ambition and holding office in #51 means that a narrowly self-interested aspect of ambition is central to the operation of Constitutional government. After all, holding and keeping office is a way to make a living. Publius' terminology encourages us not to understand this point too crudely. Where we might use the term "ambitious" to describe someone who sought excessive monetary gain from office, that is not what Publius would have us think of since, in his understanding, such a passion

for gain would more properly be called avarice. Still, while a public office should not be viewed as private property, there seems little doubt that the clash of ambitions will involve a significant element of the love of one's own.

On the other hand, when Publius gives a more or less formal definition of ambition, it is not defined in quite such selfish terms. Instead, ambition appears as a passion with particular objects; Publius states that the objects, "which have charms for minds governed by" ambition are "Commerce, finance, negotiation and war." [#27] The objects of ambition necessarily involve the ambitious person in consideration of the interests of others. Further, it is the *mind* that is said to be charmed by these objects; even as a passion, ambition seems here to be related to the more intellectual pleasures of decision making, and not simply to the material concerns of making a living. Are we to conclude, then, that there is a second form of ambition, higher than that confined by the love of office, because in some sense it is more disinterested or other-regarding?

But even here there is room for ambiguity. Commerce, finance, negotiation and war may be attractive for the opportunities to do good for the nation in a disinterested way, but narrower, earning the respect and affection of the people in these areas. Surely the opportunity to exercise power in such important matters is in itself a reward, and one might also think about the standing and influence that go along with this exercise. Nevertheless, it seems fair to conclude that such concerns do take us beyond the merely circumscribed desire for office to a second form of ambition that is of necessity broader and more informed in its view.

The implications of this ambiguity are most fully developed in Publius' account of the executive. As we have seen before, ambition in this context is less a trait to be quashed in the public interest than a possible avenue for attaching public servants to the public good. Here, as has already been noted, when ambition is cited as a danger, it is usually qualified in some way. One of "irregular ambition" or "thwarted ambition" might, having once been President, refuse to lay down the office if it were the case that he would henceforth be entirely excluded from it. For this reason, Publius argues, the indefinite reeligibility provided for in the Constitution (since amended to a two-term limit) is a good idea. This provision likewise allows ambition to control simply harmful passions. One who is avaricious might be tempted, in the absence of reeligibility, to milk the office for as much as it is worth in the brief time he can count on having it. But if the "same man might be vain or ambitious" and "if he could expect to prolong his honors, by his good conduct," the result might be that he would "hesitate to sacrifice his appetite for them to his appetite for gain" [#72].

The notion that the ambitious president would seek to prolong his *honors* is central to understanding the greatest reward of the ambitious. The point is most clearly developed in #72, where Publius speaks of how important it is that Presidents be reeligible to hold office at the end of any given term. Reeligibility is one of the central "inducements to good behavior"; hoping to merit continuation in office, Presidents are more likely to exercise "zeal in the discharge of a duty."

> This position will not be disputed, so long as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct, or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interest coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit . . . would on the contrary deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene, before he could accomplish the work . . .[#72]

The love of honor, Publius is suggesting, is not even in the "noblest minds" a love simply of what is honorable, but rather is connected to a certain "reward," which is fame. If we can take it that the noblest minds exhibit the noblest variety of ambition, it seems that a third form of ambition

is being described, where the attraction to commerce, finance, negotiation and war has to do with a desire to leave behind a certain name or legacy. Even in this context, institutional checks are necessary to keep such ambition under control. The love of honor being a love of fame means one improperly consumed with it may be willing to leave a name for worse instead of for better. For example, it may be that in the conduct of foreign affairs, an ambitious man would "make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents" [#75]. It is just for this reason that a President does not have sole power of concluding treaties but must act with the advice and consent of the Senate.

In sum, for Publius the ambition that is central to the proper operation of the national government established in the Constitution may take at least three forms, but in each case it is likely to remain significantly self-regarding, although the sought-for-good varies widely. The pitting of one ambition against another serves the broadest (yet negative) purpose of preventing the national government from becoming too powerful. It also serves the positive purpose of promoting a certain level of decency in the actions of elected officials, at least in the absence of better motives for self-restraint. To the extent that Publius recognizes that ambition mixed improperly with other passions can get out of hand and become dangerous to the purposes it is to serve, he tends to rely on institutional means for its control. There is no systemic attempt to encourage the ambition of the noblest minds, but neither is the door closed to it.

It is precisely on these last two points that the first of two important lines of criticism of Publius can be made. The first relates to the reform criticism already touched upon, the second is made by Abraham Lincoln. The reform criticism suggests that we might not be satisfied with the extent to which the institutional pitting of ambition against ambition and the reliance on it to elevate the behavior of public servants, have produced the high moral tone we want to see in government. It may appear that by accepting the "defect of better motives," the framers encourage and institutionalize that defect, such that those moved by higher passions or principles find that they have no place, or an uncomfortable place, in the service of their country. Further, as the need for government to solve complicated problems becomes more pressing and as the intrusiveness of its actions in solving those problems becomes greater, we can no longer afford the stalemate produced by opposing ambitions or anything less than the highest moral purposes in our governors. If ambition in public servants is acceptable at all, it must be ambition on behalf of principles, carefully instilled by the correct moral and political education, and not personal ambition.

A full answer to this critique would take us too far afield, given that we are still on our way to the question of the moral imagination. But a few remarks are in order. The reform critique, I would suggest, is a major source of the present variety of distrust of ambition in politics. But it must be admitted that any failures, which we presently find in the behavior of our elected officials, occur in a context significantly influenced by elements of reform — attempts to modify the original Constitutional system. We are now in a position to see reform solutions as part of a larger problem. We return to an earlier point; the stress on principle to the exclusion of character is no guarantee of a high-toned political life when principles are relativized in a way implicit in part of the reform argument itself.

Three potential defects are obvious. When principles are understood relativistically, they are easily transformed into instruments of *any* passion; at the very least, they no longer restrain the behavior of public officials; at worst fanaticism becomes a serious possibility. Second, the politics of principled purity can lead to evasion of personal responsibility; when principles "come to grief" on the rocks of "mere politics," it is obviously not the fault of the one who holds the principles, but rather of a corrupt world. As a result, a third consequence can develop. Public officials accept

mediocrity and drift as a necessary order of things. Purged of a personal ambition that is supposed to be corrupting, and cynical about a political world in which principles are seen to be ineffective, they become prey to momentary passions, their own or those of their constituencies, that are even more problematic than ambition.

Yet the reform critique is not without insight. The spectacle of a politics that consists in the opposition of raw, untrained ambition, with little self-understanding or reflection is hardly ennobling. Such a politics is unlikely even to be effective in the limited realms in which the framers wished to see effective government. Thoughtful men have long questioned whether the institutional structure established by the framers did not depend on some kind of political and moral education which they, perhaps, took too much for granted and thus failed to support (or even undermined) with those institutions. We feel that lack today. Can it be made up starting from the acceptance of ambition, and not by its replacement?

The other criticism of the role Publius ascribes to ambition was made by no less an authority on the American polity than Abraham Lincoln. In his speech, "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions," delivered in 1838 to the Young Men's Lyceum, in Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln notes that in the founding period and immediately thereafter, ambitious men would have found their "fame and distinction" in proving that the Constitution would work:

Their ambition aspired to display before an admiring world, a practical demonstration of the truth of a proposition, which had hitherto been considered at best no better than problematical; namely, the capacity of a people to govern themselves.23

They succeeded, and gained the deserved immortality for their success. But what happens when "the game is caught," when this "field of glory is harvested, and the crop is already appropriated"?24 Will ambitious men still arise among us? Will they be satisfied simply with "supporting and maintaining an edifice that has been erected by others"?25 Some perhaps will,

but such belong not to the family of the lion, or the tribe of the eagle . . . Towering genius disdains a beaten path . . . It scorns to tread in the footsteps of any predecessor, however illustrious. It thirsts and burns for distinction; and, if possible, it will have it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen. Is it unreasonable to expect, that some man possessed of the loftiest genius, coupled with ambition sufficient to push it to its utmost stretch, will at some time, spring up among us? And when such a one does, it will require the people to be united with each other, attached to the government and laws, and generally intelligent, to successfully frustrate his designs.26

Lincoln understands such dangerous, yet extraordinary, ambition to be a perennial human possibility; he cites Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon as exemplars. The system of the framers does not create such people; but Lincoln seems to be suggesting that neither does it make ambition quite so safe. In the creation of a new nation, it may have been possible to liberate that passion, but to continue to accept it as the guiding characteristic of political aspirants may perhaps open the door too readily to opportunism and instability.

We come via this route to the same problem of liberated but untrained ambition that was also the hard core of the reform argument. If it now appears *necessary* within the context of the institutionally promoted character of public servants in the American polity to provide some

education and refinement of ambition for the sake of raising the moral tone of politics, it remains to ask whether and how it is *possible* to do so. And here we at last meet the moral imagination.

The Creation of Order

Ambition was not invented by the framers of the United States Constitution. But it is fair to say that the explicit use they made of it and their understanding of its proper place in politics and of the institutional means by which it could be kept under control represent the development of a novel and distinctly modern strain of thought. As Thomas Pangle has noted in a recent study of the relationship between modern and premodern political thought, when Publius asserts that love of fame is "the ruling passion of the noblest minds," he:

dares to declare openly what the classical theorists and poets only wondered about with caution. The noblest men, those who are presumably most familiar with the beauty of the moral virtues, are not ruled by the love of those virtues but by the love of reward they may bring. No wonder then that a sound regime, as the authors of the *Federalist* envisage it, will avowedly trust less to the high moral quality of its leaders and more to an institutional system that pits the leaders' selfish passions against each other . . . 27

If ambition is a perennially possible human comportment, and if we are interested in investigating the possibilities for a higher moral tone among our leaders, we may find the guidance lacking in the *Federalist* in the realm of classical political philosophy, precisely because the classics are willing to question and wonder about what we take for granted regarding ambition and morality. There is, indeed, at least one work of classic political philosophy which has this question of the relationship between virtue and the rewards of fame as its central theme: Plato's dialogue, *Alcibiades*.

This lovely, short dialogue is traditionally regarded as an introduction to the entire Platonic corpus, which may well represent the most sustained and serious extant body of work on the question of the meaning of ethics. It relates the first, apparently private, discussion between Socrates and that remarkable Athenian, Alcibiades. At the time of the dialogue, Alcibiades is a young man considering his first entry into politics. Socrates begins the discussion by claiming to be the first of Alcibiades' lovers, yet admits that during the "many years" when Alcibiades has been a much-sought favorite, Socrates has merely followed from a distance and has not so much as spoken to him. Socrates attributes his reticence to his famous *daimon* — the voice that tells him when he is about to do something he should not. Yet now, it seems, the prohibition has been lifted [103a-104a].28

Socrates tells Alcibiades that he is a young man who thinks so "excessively" of himself that his supposed self-sufficiency has put all his other lovers to flight [104a]. Alcibiades believes himself to be both beautiful and noble, the ward of a great leader, Pericles, of a great city. He may well wonder what it is that Socrates could possibly have to offer him. Alcibiades admits being puzzled on that point; indeed he had been about to approach Socrates to find out what he was about in "making such a nuisance of yourself, always taking such trouble to be present wherever I happen to be" [104d].

Rather than answer Alcibiades directly, Socrates continues to dissect his character. In short, he describes Alcibiades as a young man of the most overwhelming ambition. Given the choice by a god, to live on with only his current attainments or die, he would choose to die. He seeks rather

to be a "very great power" in Athens, hence in Greece, and hence "also among the barbarians who share the mainland with us." Yet were he told that even this sway was as much as he could ever hold, he would "again be unwilling to live on these terms alone, without being able to fill with your name and your power all mankind, so to speak" [105b-c].

Socrates' response to this extraordinary, one might even say monstrous, ambition is interesting. He does not condemn Alcibiades, he does not moralize about the perils of *hubris*. Instead he says, "It is not possible for all these things you have in mind to be brought to completion without me" [105d]. The first of the three main divisions of the dialogue is taken up by Socrates' attempt to prove this amazing assertion to the understandably skeptical Alcibiades.

As a first step, Socrates and Alcibiades agree that it is indeed Alcibiades' intention to come before Athens to advise it, and that, in placing himself in that position he is asserting that he knows more about the matters in which he will give advice than the Athenians. Two questions are then discussed, How does Alcibiades know what he knows, and what is it that he knows? As to the first, Alcibiades quickly agrees that the things he knows he must know, having been taught them or having discovered them for himself, and that in either case he must have had no knowledge of such things prior to having learned or discovered them. Socrates then reviews Alcibiades formal education in "letters, cithara playing, and wrestling," so that Alcibiades must concede that he will not be advising the Athenians on something he was taught by others [106c-107a].

What then will he give advice about? "When they are deliberating on war, Socrates, or on peace, or some other of the city's affairs" [107d]. In a familiar fashion, Socrates asks Alcibiades what we call such knowledge. If we know better and worse in wrestling through the art of gymnastics, what do we call the knowledge of better and worse in the affairs to the city? Alcibiades has to admit a "shameful" ignorance of the name of this art [108e]. Further pressed on the reasons why cities go to war, Alcibiades realizes that the knowledge of better or worse for the city means knowledge of justice and injustice. Socrates further shames Alcibiades into agreeing that of course he would only be interested in advising the city to do just things [109a-c].

Through a series of arguments Alcibiades is forced to concede his ignorance of justice, and thus his inability to advise the Athenians. Alcibiades has recourse to the argument he was earlier ashamed to make. Cities do not deliberate about the just and unjust, but about what is advantageous [113d]. Socrates first suggests that he could, by the same means already used, demonstrate that Alcibiades knows nothing of the advantageous, but since Alcibiades is "given to luxury and would not find it pleasant to taste the same argument again," he sets out to show that there can be no difference between the advantageous and the just [114a].

It would be an overstatement to say that Socrates proves the equivalence of the advantageous and the just. He certainly does, however, get Alcibiades to admit that he holds contradictory opinions on the subject, and hence cannot have the knowledge he claims to have.

Soc: If you wander about, therefore, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things but suppose you know about them when you do not?

Alc: I'm afraid so.

Soc: Alas, then, Alcibiades, what a condition you have come to be in! I hesitate to use the term, but as we two are alone, I shall say it all the same: it is stupidity, excellent fellow, in its most extreme form, that you are living in the midst of, as the argument accuses you as well as yourself. This is why you are rushing toward the political things before you have been educated. But you are not the only one in this condition — the many among those who practice the things of this city are also, except for a few at any rate, perhaps including your guardian Pericles. [118a-c]

This last comment proves to be a crucial admission for Socrates to make; it gets to the core of Alcibiades' ambition. Alcibiades takes great heart from Socrates concession, for if the many who already run things are so unprepared, Alcibiades wonders why he should have to take any care to "practice and learn" the things to which Socrates seems to be pointing him. Surely he can be victorious against such measly opponents [119b].

Having exposed the love of victory that is at the root of Alcibiades' ambition, Socrates radically shifts gears. We move from the dialectical form, that has characterized the dialogue to this point, to a lengthy speech by Socrates — a speech that has all the earmarks of a fantasy or myth. Socrates earlier made a point of the fact that in answering his questions, Alcibiades was genuinely in control of the argument and responsible for its conclusions. Now, he temporarily abandons that approach. For the moment, his ability to convince Alcibiades by means of reason has reached its limits.

Socrates asks Alcibiades to reconsider with whom his ambition is driving him to compete: merely the local talent, however defective, or the best. Alcibiades must admit that he seeks to compete with the best. In that case, Socrates says, he must look to the Spartans and Persians; it is among the well-born of these regimes that he will find worthy competition. Indeed, Socrates asserts, among these people it is Alcibiades who will be insignificant [120d-c].

The kings of Sparta and Persia, Socrates asserts, are of lineage more noble than that of Alcibiades. Their wives, who produce future kings, are carefully guarded — in Sparta by the ephors, in Persia simply by fear of the great king. In Persia, the day of the birth of the king's first son is a national holiday. Who pays attention to Alcibiades' birthday? The future king is educated by royal tutors chosen as "the wisest, the justest, the most moderate, and the most courageous," not, as Alcibiades, by a slave pedagogue and those who might happen to seek to be his lover [121a-122a].

Socrates admits that much more could be said about the poor quality of Alcibiades' education in comparison with the Persians, the Spartans having for a time dropped out of the picture. But instead, he turns to the way in which Persians and Spartans live in comparison with Alcibiades. The Persians live a life of extraordinary richness, the Spartans of moderation and orderliness. . . coolness, even temper, high-mindedness, discipline, courage, endurance, love of toil, love of victory, love of honor . . ." Neither do the Spartans lack riches, but they do not display riches publicly, hoarding them in private. And the Spartan kings are richest of all, yet these riches are as nothing to the riches of Persia, where the entire product of great provinces is carefully ordered and disposed of just to supply the apparel of the queen [122c-123c].

What, Socrates asks rhetorically, does Alcibiades imagine the response of a wife and mother of Persian kings would be if she were told that Alcibiades intended to range himself against her son? She might wonder what on earth he would be counting on and conclude that he could only be trusting in "taking trouble and wisdom, these being the only things worthy of account among the Greeks." Yet if she heard Alcibiades was unwilling to depend on even these, instead relying on his looks, lineage and wealth, "she would think us mad, Alcibiades, when she looked at all such things in relation to what was available to them" [123e].

The Persian queen would concentrate on Alcibiades' lack of resources; the Spartan queen, Socrates asserts, would wonder how with so little training Alcibiades could hope to "compete against her son." Socrates concludes:

And yet does it not seem shameful that the women of our enemies have a better idea what sort of people we ought to be to make the attempt against them than we do ourselves? Rather, blessed fellow, obey me and the Delphic inscription 'know thyself': these are our opponents, not the ones you suppose, and we will get the better of them by no other thing than by taking trouble and by art. If you fall short in these, you will also fall short in becoming renowned among the Greeks and the barbarians — for which you have a greater love, it seems to me, than anyone has ever had for anything. [124a-b]

At this point, the dialogue returns to its dialectical mode. Socrates proceeds to show Alcibiades that the care he needs to take is above all concern for the proper ordering of his own soul. While our purpose here does not require us to investigate these arguments, two caveats that flow from them should be noted. First, it becomes less and less clear that such care is consistent with Alcibiades' political ambitions — a point that Socrates does not stress but that is nevertheless evident. Second, while Alcibiades' last words are that he will "take trouble over justice," Socrates expresses prophetic doubts about him. These doubts stem not from the defects of his nature, but from fears that "the strength of the city . . . will overcome both me and you" [135e]. Any lessons drawn from Socrates' appeal to the moral imagination in the education of Alcibiades must take these two limitations into account.

The Socratic myth we have recounted is created especially for Alcibiades. Nevertheless, it suggests general problems with unmediated ambition and ways of dealing with those problems. Explicating such a lovely tale to elucidate this content is rather like explaining a joke, for like a joke, the effect on Alcibiades is immediate and unreflective. He is convinced by the images of the tale where he was unconvinced by Socrates' arguments. But the explication is called for as we try to understand better how this exercise of the moral imagination works. Further, such an investigation is in the spirit of Socrates' own employment of the moral imagination, for we note that he brings it to bear only when rational discourse has failed and in order to bring Alcibiades back to a point where dialogue can continue. As all Platonic dialogues are tales it is perhaps paradoxical that one lesson of this story should be that there are limits as well as benefits to the use of myth in moral education.

As we have noted, Alcibiades begins with an ambition that is, at root, the love of victory. Socrates does not seek to eliminate his student's competitive yearning, but he does seek to direct it properly. Hence the first step, introducing the greatest among the Spartans and Persians, serves both to flatter Alcibiades that he might be able to compete with such people, but also to teach him that only certain victories are really worth winning.

What makes a victory against the Spartan and Persian kings worth winning? Given his own sense of himself and his family position, Alcibiades is likely to be impressed first by the merely conventional marks of distinction that traditionally define the best. Foremost among these is the possession of a certain lineage. Socrates undermines this opinion first by a kind of gentle ridicule that suggests anyone can claim such distinguished lines — even Socrates himself — and that as a matter of birth, it is something about which Alcibiades can take no credit for himself. From this point of view, his position, so impressive in Athens and so trivial to the kings, is something that should not be seen as a source of praise or blame if Alcibiades wants to be known for what *he* has done.

In thus directing Alcibiades' ambition to that which he would be by his own making, Socrates opens two closely connected vistas to him. The one would show Alcibiades a view of being loved for what he is; the other, a view of being recognized for what he is. Both are expressions of the

essentially erotic nature of Alcibiades that Socrates appeals to and explicitly exposes for the first time in this tale. We have thus moved from a simple love of victory to a desire for a worthy victory of Alcibiades' own making that is seen as worthy by others.

But the desires for love and recognition, if we may distinguish them at all in the context of Alcibiades' erotic character, are yet problematic. As to love, Socrates, through Plato's ability to foreshadow Alcibiades' subsequent career, which is to include an affair with the Spartan Queen, suggests that even kings cannot be assured of the love of their queens and thus must ensure their fidelity either though fear or through careful guarding. If love is merely another spoil of victory, it will always go to the victor. But this is not the fashion in which the one who wants to be loved desires that love.

The problem with recognition, on the other hand, is the other side of the coin of Alcibiades' own worth. This lesson Socrates teaches by making the Spartan and Persian queens Alcibiades' judges. To be truly shamed in the eyes of these women is only possible if they are especially able judges of what Alcibiades needs to be doing. If they were "merely women," why should he care for their opinion? Other indications in the dialogue support the idea that women are peculiarly astute judges of men [120b]. However literally we are to take this, it is evident that Alcibiades is being encouraged to want recognition only from those who are worthy of recognizing him, a far cry from his initial ambition simply to be recognized by the Athenians and as *many* others as possible.

As Socrates now mediates Alcibiades' ambition through a desire for love or for recognition, however problematic, his initial desire for victory is transformed into a desire for rule. Considered merely as a victor, what does the victor do after victory? Nothing at all, at least until the next challenge comes along. But love or recognition requires constant attention or reaffirmation; however ultimately problematic, they suggest the ongoing care that is required of rule, and at least the *hoped for* results of such care, even if such hopes are likely to be disappointed. Rule thus introduced as an object of ambition must itself be clarified and elevated.

In the examples of Persia and Sparta, two aspects predominate as making rule attractive: the material benefits it offers in the form of wealth and the possibility for the creation of order. We will take up the question of wealth subsequently; for the moment let us look at orderliness. Explicitly praised in the Spartan context, it also arises in the Persian case in a less direct but more profound way. When discussing the wealth of Persia and the way its resources are, as it were, organized around the body of the queen, Socrates describes the queens' furnishings as a*kosmos*. Used as such, the word is the root of our "cosmetic," but it is also the same word as "cosmos," or the order of the world taken as a whole. The suggestion is apparently that, in rule, human beings are seeking to create an orderliness that duplicates, or is consistent with, the order of the whole. At least, this order is what the best rule would seek to accomplish.

But much stands in the way of the achievement of such an order — and above all what stands in the way is the ease with which *kosmos* as furnishings is confused with *kosmos* as natural orderliness. The Spartans believe that order is achieved so long as public displays of wealth are suppressed, liberating their private avarice. The Persians believe that orderliness is achieved when the power of rulers is reflected in their public pomp and magnificence. One can say with confidence, then, that in neither case is the moderation, that is professed by the regime, realized in practice; the position of wealth in each case may reflect a defective understanding of other virtues as well. An appearance of extrinsic orderliness masks a disorder of the soul of the rulers — a disorder that gives the lie to the show of order.

In this way the attraction for rule, as the creation of orderliness that is being cultivated in Alcibiades by Socrates' tale, leads his erotic desire to take seriously just what Socrates will focus on in the remainder of the dialogue: that is to say, the proper ordering of his own soul. We here reach the pinnacle of Socrates' elevation of Alcibiades' tremendous ambition. By the end of this seductive story, Alcibiades is apparently convinced of all those things he fought against conceding in the earlier part of the dialogue. With this new picture of political life before him, he now admits readily his own ignorance about political things, the ignorance of the many, and the need above all to take care to try to learn what he does not know.29

Having thus learned how easy it is to confuse the rewards of virtue with virtue itself, Alcibiades may or may not, had he taken that lesson to heart, have maintained with the same urgency his desire to come before the Athenians and advise them on their affairs. Socrates, at any rate, did not find time to do so in his own quest to know himself. But neither does Socrates ever retract his promise to Alcibiades that only through him will Alcibiades be able to achieve his heart's desire. The relationship between the best to which one can be led out of a concern for political things and the practice of those same things is not explicitly clarified. The question becomes all the more pointed given the life of Alcibiades after he left Socrates' care.

Education of Public Servants

We have seen how the stress on principle in the attempt to find a moral education appropriate to public servants begins from the belief that the proper principles will restrain personal ambition, which today is regarded as highly suspect. But as soon as that dependence on principle is combined with relativism, as it is in the fashion in which ethics and politics are taught in many programs of public administration, the result is an opening for principle to become only a tool of the rawest ambition. I have suggested that the present distrust of personal ambition is rather at odds with the understanding of it that was built into our Constitutional arrangements, and that, therefore, a necessary first step in any improvement of the moral tone of American government is recognition of this central place of ambition. A higher tone requires that ambition be elevated and properly directed, pointed towards an understanding of what makes for personal excellence in human beings. Here the moral imagination can play a crucial role, as exemplified in the tale of Persia and Sparta in the *Alcibiades*. That tale presents how ambition may be directed to higher and finer goals, at each step ascending on the basis of a dynamic *intrinsic* to its own character. The story always accepts ambition but directs it, by calling into question whether each of its plausible objects would really satisfy what ambition most wants.

Can a polity such as ours, in which ambition plays the central role it does, use the Socratic insight in the education of its public servants? The three kinds of ambition that seem to be implicit in Publius' account — ambition to hold office, ambition for the powers of office, and ambition directed toward fame — are, because they seem to be left implicit, allowed to remain in an ambiguous relationship one to another. But in the terms provided by the tale of Persia and Sparta in the *Alcibiades*, they can be seen to recapitulate some of the steps by which Alcibiades is led from his love of victory to his (potential) concern for the excellence of his own soul. Is not ambition for office readily connected with the desire to "do well" in office? And while doing well is susceptible to a variety of interpretations, is it not at root an ambition to do right by and in the office? There seems to be no reason to believe that the moral imagination of today's public servants could not be activated, through the study of history, literature or philosophy, in such a way as to reveal to them a transition from the lower to the more elevated forms of ambition Publius presents.

Such a moral education would avoid the sterile analysis that Lilla sees as the hallmark of contemporary efforts in this area. It also avoids two essentially utopian temptations that could respond to this sterility: a reassertion of the technical utopianism of the social sciences, with their implicit reduction of political issues to questions of methodology and efficiency; and a moralistic utopianism that is blinded by its vision of the good to the implications of human fallibility. In avoiding political utopianism, we build upon the solid foundations of the Constitutional ethos. Recognizing that no foundation is without its intrinsic difficulties, the structure we raise compensates for some of those problems inherent in ambition.

Nevertheless, it is in dealing with the contrast between the highest ambition pictured by Publius and by Plato — a regard for excellence predicated on desire for fame versus on the philosophic concern for self-knowledge — that we see the full significance of Pangle's remark about the differing assumptions of ancient and modern writers on the question of the basis for virtue. If forced to make a choice here, we would have to give full weight to the conflict, suggested in the *Alcibiades,* between love of virtue for its own sake and participation in political affairs. It may thus be best if, for practical purposes, Publius' understanding of what motivates the noblest minds is allowed to be definitive of our expectations for public officials. Bringing them to aspire even "only" to fame may be difficult enough and, as Lincoln pointed out, contain its own dangers. In any case, it is not necessary that all public officials be or aspire to be political philosophers, just as we cannot expect all teachers of public administration to be Socrates.

In short, we should want ambitious people in politics, so long as we understand the moral significance of personal ambition. To make public servants more moral, it is not necessary to purge them of personal ambition; rather they should be properly educated and elevated. This training does not mean teaching the potential public servant to set his sights on some abstract or transcendent good. It involves not an overcoming of self, but rather consists of developing a proper understanding of his own character and the implications of his desire for public office. Ambition can thus be bound up with a proper sense of what makes a worthy human being. If it does not, thereby, become an ambition for virtue precisely speaking, at least it leads to a concern for good repute among those whose judgment can be respected.

The *Alcibiades* suggests that a first step in learning to be worthy is the imagination of what it would be like to be such a person, or to compete with such a person. In the absence of Socrates, a proper reading of political history, for example, provides just such an exercise of the moral imagination in thinking about what we would praise or blame, justify or condemn, but above all emulate or shun. Such a reading almost necessarily raises the questions of what we would like to be, and how we would like to be remembered.

Whatever the particulars of a curriculum that recognized the significance of the moral imagination, the central fact is that an education in politics that does not teach students that a distinction can be made between what is noble and what is base will leave us with public servants who fall into the modern forms of each of the traps that Alcibiades must avoid. With their ambition misunderstood, unmoderated and unmediated, they will believe that the substance of politics is merely a matter of victories and losses, name recognition and influence, popularity and approval ratings, personal enrichment and advancement. They may come to think that acting morally in politics involves the ruin of the one who attempts it, the pious expression of kind thoughts, or setting oneself the task of whatever radical reconstruction of human affairs is necessary to bring life in accord with some supposed ideal. Over against these various possibilities, the moral imagination provides a means for teaching public servants how to avoid cynicism and utopianism in their quest to do well.

Notes

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2. Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. vi.
3. Mark T. Lilla, "Ethos, 'Ethics,' and Public Service," in *Public Interest* (Spring, 1981), p. 4.
4. *Ibid*.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid*., p. 6.
7. *Ibid*., p. 7.
8. *Ibid*., pp. 8-9.
9. *Ibid*., p. 11.
10. *Ibid*., p. 13.
11. *Ibid*., pp. 13-14.
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13. James L. Perry, ed., *Handbook of Public Administration*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989), p. 576-78.
14. *Ibid*., p. 583.
15. *Ibid*., p. 578.
16. *Ibid*.
17. *Ibid*.
18. Ralph Clark Chandler, "A Guide to Ethics for Public Servants," in James L. Perry, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 617.
19. *Ibid*.
20. Lilla, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
21. Martin Diamond, "Ethics and Politics: The American Way," in Robert H. Horwitz, ed., *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic*. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1986), pp. 76-77.
22. All citations in the text to the *Federalist* are to James Madison et. al., *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1967).
23. Roy P. Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* Vol. I, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), p. 113.
24. *Ibid*.
25. *Ibid*., p. 114.
26. *Ibid*.
27. Thomas L. Pangle, *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 110.
28. All citations in the text to Plato are to Plato, *Alcibiades*, trans. Carnes Lord in Thomas L. Pangle, ed., *The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). pp. 175-221.
29. Steven Forde, "On the *Alcibiades*" in *Roots of Political Philosophy*, p. 232.

Chapter IX

Creativity in Imagination: La Révolution Solidaire towards African Democratic Socialism

Atomate Epas-Ngan (Armand)

Introduction: Socialism As Ideology

During the past generation, the public voice of the new African nations has often been one of frustration, resentment and condemnation of the past and the presentation of a vision of the future that often sounds imprudent or at least unorthodox to Western ears. It appears to many that the Third World generally is moving away from a politics that is compatible with that of the West.

Today, one can speak of an "end of ideology"1 in the West as increasing consensus is achieved on the purposes, goals and institutions of the established order. The classic conflicts of conservatives and liberals and of capitalists and socialists dissipate into debates on the amount of governmental direction appropriate to the issues.

In Black African countries, however, political ideology seems far more important in their respective march towards social, cultural, economic and political development than it is in industrial societies. After all, in many Black African nations, the place and purpose of government in society, the role of religion, the social goals to which developmental effort should be directed — all the great issues of Western history — are as yet unresolved.

But what is ideology? The last decade has witnessed the formulation of several different "theories" of ideology, particularly in the English-speaking world. One such theory, that presented by Martin Seliger, is advanced against the background of the "end-of-ideology" debate and is cast within the framework of orthodox political science.

A second account of ideology is developed by Alvin Gouldner. Strongly influenced by Jürgen Habermas, this account views ideology as an historical phenomenon which emerged with the Enlightenment and which is interlaced with the technology of communication.

A third perspective on ideology is one which stems from Althusser, whose views have been forcefully advocated by a number of authors writing in English. Prominent among these authors is Paul Hirst. He has written extensively on Althusser’s theory of ideology and has attempted to incorporate many of its features in a somewhat revised account.

According to Martin Seliger, ideologies are action-oriented sets of beliefs which are organized into coherent systems. These systems are composed of a number of elements: description, analysis, moral prescriptions, technical prescriptions, implements and rejections. On the basis of these elements, Seliger offers an inclusive definition of ideology when he writes:

An ideology is a group of beliefs and disbeliefs (rejections) expressed in value sentences, appeal sentences and explanatory statements . . . [It is] designed to serve on a relatively permanent basis a group of factual evidence and self-consciously rational coherence the legitimacy of the implements and technical prescriptions which are to ensure concerted action for the preservation, reform, destruction or reconstruction of a given order.2

From this definition it follows that politics and ideology are inseparable. All political action is ultimately oriented towards the preservation, reform, destruction or reconstruction of the social order; hence, all political action is necessarily guided by an ideological system of beliefs.

If Seliger regards ideology as a system of beliefs which can be studied by the methods of social science, Gouldner views ideology as a rational project, that is, the organization of social life and advocates public, "rationally grounded" projects of social reconstruction. In *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology*, Alvin Gouldner elaborates a richly historical perspective on the concept of ideology as a call to action and a claim to justify that call by recourse to "evidence" and "reason." Ideology, thus entailed, as writes Gouldner, is:

the emergence of a new mode of political discourse; discourse that sought action but did not merely seek it by invoking authority or tradition, or by emotive rhetoric alone. It was discourse predicated on the idea of grounding political action in secular and rational theory . . . Ideology separated itself from the mythical and religious consciousness; it justified the course of action it proposed, by the logic and evidence it summoned on behalf on its views of the social world, rather than by invoking faith, tradition, revelation or the authority of the speaker.3

In breaking with authority and tradition, ideology submits to what Gouldner calls the "grammar of modern rationality."

While writing from a Marxist perspective, Althusser's approach to ideology differs considerably from that adopted by Gouldner. For Althusser and his followers, ideology is not a specific creation of European culture. But it is a necessary feature of any society, insofar as any society must provide the means to group its members and transform them according to their existing conditions: "Human societies," writes Althusser, "secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their historical respiration and life."4

It is a customary to view ideology as a form of consciousness or a realm of ideas, but this, Althusser argues, is a mistake. Ideology is not a distorted representation of real relations, but rather a real relation itself, namely, the relation *through which* human beings live the relation to their world. Ideological relations comprise a specific part of the social totality which, in a provocative essay, Althusser analyzed under the label of "ideological state apparatuses."5

This way of setting up the problem of ideology is, however, very questionable in the eyes of Paul Hirst. While Althusser's concept of society as a "complex structured whole articulated in dominance" helped to counter the reductionist tendencies of Marxism, nevertheless, his approach to the problem of ideology betrays a latent economy, as Hirst explains:

Althusser's question — how is it that the relations of production are reproduced? — accepts the primacy of the 'economy'. The 'point of view of reproduction' amounts to asking the question, what is necessary for existing class relations to be maintained? . . . Class society is unaffected by the forms in which its conditions of existence are provided. ISAs [ideological state apparatuses] become agencies for the realization of a functional task given by the economy.6

As a result, the three authors succinctly view ideology as a system of symbols or beliefs which pertain, in some way, to social action or political practice. Consequently, they dissolve the connection between the *concept of ideology* and the *critique of domination* — a connection which is certainly part (if not all) of Marx's notion of ideology and which should be "dis-oriented." How such a connection could be reconstructed is our concern in the present paper.

It will be argued that in many emerging nations, particularly those of Black Africa, ideological politics may perform important functions in the process of global development. To support the argument, we will not conceive of ideology as Eric Voegelin explains it:

Ideology is existence in rebellion against God and man. It is the violation of the First and the Tenth Commandments, if we want to use the language of Israelite order; it is the *nosos*, the disease of the spirit, if we want to use the language of Aeschylus and Plato, . . .7

We uphold ideaology as a creative and dynamic force which defines the things we have in common, the purpose of our "togetherness," which may be peculiarly necessary in culturally plural societies. In *Political Man*, Seymour Martin Lipset emphasizes this explanation for the salience of ideology in developing nations. For his part, David Apter stresses the role of ideology in binding a community together.8

Closely related to this is the problem of the legitimation of a new and generally unprecedented order of authority. For the new African states, seeking to replace more traditional forms of political life, ideology seeks to provide a rationale for a new pattern of political obligations.

In the process of development, ideology may be essential to transform traditional values, to establish a "mental environment" conducive to change. J.J. Spengler, in particular, has emphasized this function of ideology in emerging nations when he wrote:

It is my thesis that the state of a people's politico-economic development, together with its rate and direction, depends largely upon what is in the minds of its members, and above all on the content of the minds of the elites, which reflects in part, as do civilizations, the conception men have of the universe. The content of men's minds is looked upon as the potentially dynamic element, as the source whence issue change and novelty, in a world or universe that is otherwise passive. Accordingly, transformation of an underdeveloped society into a developed one entails transformation of the contents of mind of the elite who direct and of the men who man such underdeveloped society."9

In relation to this, the "disorientation" of rapid change may create a need for what Clifford Geertz calls "a new symbolic framework in which to formulate, think about and react to political problems."10

Beyond this ideological concern, the purpose of our analysis is an attempt to show that socialism is nothing if it is not a political theory: a discourse which directs politics toward the construction of definite forms of social relations and in definite ways, a discourse which can construct and evaluate political situations (relative to definite objectives). Political practice cannot dispense without calculation, and calculation, beyond the politics of preservation of established and opportunist cliques, demands criteria of appropriateness: in a word, "ideology."

This is not just any kind of ideology: but an ideology which, instead of undertaking to abolish diversity, seeks to accommodate it, providing an open marketplace in which men of varying beliefs may compete in offering their intellectual wares to the public. Such a marketplace, in order to accommodate diversity, requires freedom of speech and mutual tolerance. This is what we term "democratic socialism," democracy being here the attribution of sovereignty to the people.

How is "democratic socialism" a "revolution" of development for Africa? is the central question which we will attempt to answer in this paper. We will do this by examining two words

that appear over and over again in the ideologies of the African nations: "revolution" and "socialism."

Revolution and Socialism: An Analysis Revolution

History Tells Us . . .

Revolution has long been an ideological theme of new states born of violent conflict. Today revolution, along with democracy and socialism, are basic concepts in the political rhetoric of the majority of the less-developed countries, especially those of Black Africa.

The word "revolution" has been used by secularists and sectarians, Marxists and non-Marxists, modernists and traditionalists, newly independent states and ancient monarchies. Each has defined its respective revolution, but the authors can find no mutually satisfactory definition which encompasses the multitude of situations called "revolutionary."

If revolution means an abrupt and major change in the political and social structure, should we say that a revolution took place in Germany in 1933 under Hitler and in 1945 under the Allies or in Japan under MacArthur or in the Belgium Congo, actually Zaïre, in 1960 or in all newly independent states where a new elite took over from the colonial administration?

The definition in *Webster's Dictionary* would encompass many of these: "[Revolution is] a fundamental change in political organization, or in the government or ruler, and substitution of another, by the governed."11 However, this entire definition would not fit the continuing revolutionary models in Indonesia, Mexico, Ivory Coast and similar systems. It follows that the rhetoric of revolution varies to a remarkable degree from one state to another.

In some countries, revolution is a continuing and permanent symbol, furnishing legitimacy to an established regime in which, by itself or with other vital symbols, it provides the foundation of national identity. These countries include Algeria, Bolivia, Communist China, Cuba, Mexico, North Korea, North Vietnam and the United Arab Republic. For these states, revolution is a central facet of the continuing ideology of the nation, not a rhetorical symbol of any single administration or individual. Every new government which attains power must retain "the Revolution" as a central ideological identification if it is to maintain legitimacy. "The Revolution" is constantly used in speeches and public documents to display the continuity of new acts with past ideology, to control disparate elements, or, perhaps, as an actual guide to decision making.

Ultimately, "The Revolution" sanctions the system and has a continuing immediacy in politics not readily apparent in other systems. The difficulty in using this category in the Afro-Asian states is that most are so new that it is often not easy to ascertain whether "The Revolution" has attained a position where it will be necessary for future regimes to accept it as a necessary part of the national ideology. Three examples illustrate this category: Mexico, one of the oldest cases; Algeria, a recent test of the continuing legitimacy of a symbol; and Communist China, probably the most articulate and extreme of contemporary revolutionary regimes.

In some other countries, revolution is a symbol adopted by the present government to indicate reformist intent, but it has probably not been established as a permanent component of the regime or as a basis for national identity. These countries are Chile, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Indonesia, Peru, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. This category must necessarily be speculative. It cannot be stated with certainty that Congo-Brazzaville or Indonesia or a variety of African revolutions have not attained permanency as ideological symbols. The individual observer will probably have his own assessment which only time can vindicate.

Sometimes revolution is a symbol adopted by a military regime as part of its ideological paraphernalia. Such is the case in Brazil, El Salvador, Iraq, Turkey and the United Arab Republic. A growing number of military regimes have come to use both social welfare goals and the rhetoric of revolution to effectuate and legitimize their regimes. Rarely do these military governments successfully establish permanent revolutionary ideologies as they found it difficult to obtain long-term voluntary acceptance of their views.

In other cases, what has taken place was more a coup than a deep-seated, ideologically oriented revolution. Exceptions have been the United Arab Republic and Turkey where action and the ideologies behind it have emphasized major political and economic change so that a discernable ideology has emerged. Emphasis on reformist policies has been part of a changing set of values of the new military which has risen in the Afro-Asian world and to a lesser extent Latin America.

In the Philippines, Thailand and many African states, revolution was an historic act which, although a national symbol, has little place in contemporary ideological rhetoric. A number of countries have as one of their national symbols "The Revolution," the act of independence, an experience which is still honored but which is little used in ideological rhetoric. For example, the United States is a nation born in revolution, but whose ideology no longer emphasizes the fact except on the Fourth of July or in efforts to impress the newly independent states.

Similarly, most Latin American states refer to the historical fact of the independence movement, terming it a "revolution," but the concept does not have the same emotional connotations as the latter-day concept of social revolution. In Cuba, Mexico and Bolivia, there have been more than one revolution since independence, creating a layer-cake effect with one revolution atop another, each accompanied by its own ideological paraphernalia. The original revolution brought independence from Spain, to be followed by palace uprisings of one sort or another and finally by a major economic and political upheaval in a few cases. The final revolutionary concept may be an amalgam of some or all of these experiences.

Some governments in recent years have used the symbol of revolution as a prominent part of their ideological rhetoric, but the symbol did not become permanently legitimized. Among these have been Colombia with Alfonso Lopez, Costa Rica with Figueres, Ghana with Nkrumah and Guatemala with Arévalo. In these nations, various military and civilian leaders attempted to found new systems built upon doctrines with revolutionary themes. However, due to personal inadequacy or to opposition from the military or the church, they failed to solidify their power; this failure, also, ended the paramountcy of their ideology. Succeeding governments did not find it necessary to accept the former revolutionary doctrine. Guatemela provides an interesting problem in assessing the relative "permanence" of the symbol of revolution.12

In many other countries, significant political movements, rather than regimes, more out of power now adopt revolution as a prominent ideological symbol for the nation and attempt to overthrow the established political system. These groups may be communist dominated, attached to a particular leader and his ideology, ethnically oriented, desirous of regional autonomy or independence, or a combination of several of these forces. The point of differentiation here is that none of these groups has succeeded in toppling the political apparatus, and, thus, they remain traitors rather than successful heroes of the revolution.

Who Learns What?

From the rhetoric of revolution presented above, we learn various revolutionary goals.

Revolution as an Anticolonial, Antiimperialist Struggle. The struggle to gain independence from the mother country has often been articulated in terms of revolution. The goal of the revolution is independence, but included are hopes for what independence will bring: economic and social betterment, the rebirth of national culture, psychological rejuvenation of the individual, an end to specific grievances against the colonial regime, etc.

Thus, the goal of independence may be an umbrella for a variety of other desires, articulated and unarticulated, conscious and unconscious, modern and traditional. Regarding the American experience, Seymour Martin Lipset has commented in his *The First New Nation*:

When Americans celebrate their national heritage on Independence Day, Memorial Day, or other holidays of this sort, they dedicate themselves anew to a nation conceived as the living fulfillment of a political doctrine that enshrines a utopian conception of men's egalitarian and fraternal relations with one another.13

During Indonesia's struggle for independence, one of her nationalist leaders asserted the aims of that country's national revolution:

The aim is the unity of the Indonesian people and the realization of social justice and prosperity for our people. Therefore the abolition of the colonial system alone is not enough. We need an economic and political structure which can guarantee the realization of social justice, and this could not be realized in the Dutch time which was colonialistic and capitalistic in nature.14

As a result, the revolution is considered a continuing struggle for independence from the last vestiges of neocolonialism and imperialism, a goal still unfulfilled. This attitude is to be found in the more radical states of Africa and most obviously in Algeria, Communist China and several Latin American nations.

Revolution for Economic and Social Development. Inherent in most of the rhetoric of revolution is the achievement of short- or long-term economic and social goals. It is the rare revolutionary who, like Sukarno, would state, "Indonesia has NOT embarked upon a course of utilizing our newly won independence as the *capital for mainly economic development*."15 More common would be the following demands of Mao Tse Tung:

First, the present government must be remolded into a united front government in which the representatives of the people take part. Such a government should be at once democratic and centralized. It should carry out the necessary revolutionary policies. Secondly, people should be granted freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and of making armed resistance against the enemy, so that the war will take on a masked character. Thirdly, the living conditions of the people must be improved through such assessments, reducing rent and interest, raising the pay of workers, officers of lower level and soldiers, taking good care of the families of soldiers fighting the Japanese, and extending relief to the victims of natural calamities and of war refugees, etc.16

There is a basic difference between the early general statements of Nasser that "these . . . are the aims of the revolution: to end the exploitation of the people, to realize national aspirations and to develop the mature political consciousness that is an indispensable preliminary for social democracy"17 and the aims expressed by M.N. Pak of North Korea:

The leadership of the toiling masses led by the working class, the core of which is a Marxist-Leninist Party, and the carrying out of the proletarian revolution in one form or another, and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one form or another, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and other strata of toilers, and liquidation of capitalist property and the establishment of public ownership for the basic means of production; the gradual Socialist transformation of Agriculture; the planned development of the national economy . . . ; the realization of the socialist's revolution in the areas of ideology and culture and the creation of a numerous intelligentsia, devoted to the working class of other countries — proletarian internationalism.18

Revolutionary Romanticism. In the rubric of romanticism or emotion, revolution is a kind of reminder or demand for the return to past glories. This theme has a number of variations, such as the search for national identity in the case of the African nations, a return to traditional forms like the Mahdi complex in the Sudan, the rise of a particular ethnic or racial group such as the anti-"Arab" facet of the revolution in Zanzibar, the Hutu overthrow of the Tutsi "feudal overlords" in Rwanda or the place of the Indian in Mexico.

This cultural aspect is, to a degree, antimodern and traditional in its position and superficially may appear to be a demand for a reactionary revolution. However, this assessment would miss the other part of the goal, for the "Chosen" — whether they be the Indian, Indonesian or Algerian peasant — is to be led to a better economic and social existence, more compatible with "modern," Western, material values than with traditional, feudal ones.

The purpose of the revolution is to overthrow ethnic or colonially oriented feudal groups which hinder modernization or usurp all its benefits. The harkening back to past glories is not a demand for a reinstatement of the precolonial regimes but a reminder of the greatness that is again possible with the successful achievement of the revolution.

There, also, may be an aspect of pure romanticism in the call for revolution — a feeling of exhilaration with the prospect best epitomized in Sukarno's confession:

Well, frankly, I tell you: I belong to the group of people who are bound in a spiritual longing by the Romanticism of Revolution. I am inspired by it, I am fascinated by it, I am completely absorbed by it, I am crazed, I am obsessed by the Romanticism of Revolution. And for this I utter thanks to God Who Commands All Nature!19

After a survey of what history tells us and what we can learn from it, one of the most fascinating and frustrating questions to be asked would be, Why do some individuals or groups accept the rhetoric of revolution while others do not? To answer this question, it seems necessary to analyze historical, cultural and particularly personal experiences. This is not our task in the present time. Our purpose in the following section is an attempt to give a new content to what we think "revolution" should be.

Ex Nihilo, Nihil Fit!

The word "revolution" is being stretched to almost no end.20 How is one to distinguish a revolution, on the one hand, from uprisings, rebellions, revolts, insurrections, civil wars, and, on the other hand, from palace revolts, coups d'état, and military coups?

Certainly a revolution is not a mere coup; it is also more than an uprising triggered by famine, poverty or intolerable oppression, that is to say, more than a revolt or an insurrection. And while a revolution may bring about a civil war (between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries), in themselves civil wars need not display revolutionary characteristics and may simply end in secession.

In its distinctiveness then, "revolution" is a violent, mass-supported seizure of power that entails a basic restructuring of the polity. This is, to be sure, a strictly political definition of the *revolutionary act*: neither of revolution-and-after nor of revolution as an extended or even near-endless process. Whether the revolutionary event also enforces ex post facto a basic socioeconomic restructuring of society is immaterial to the political definition.21

The one defining property that distinguishes ex ante facto a revolution from other mass — and violence-based occurrences is a belief basis: a revolution is such that it is belief-mobilized and affirms a set of counter-beliefs (vis-à-vis the regime it overthrows).

What then are the characteristics of the revolutionary subcultures of our time in general and of Black Africa in particular? The question specifically addresses the point at which Western perfectionists give up the furthering of democracy and seek a better world in the very replacement of democracy. The divide is, of course, in the mode of enactment, in the advocacy of revolutionary violence. But the revolutionary subculture of our time is also characterized by novel and somewhat unique traits.

Formerly, revolutions were conceived as rebellions against tyranny. Today, they are viewed by the revolutionary *groupuscules* as embodying an intrinsic soteriological value.22 Revolution is beautiful in itself. This type of revolutionary has no need to explain why he revolts; he revolts anyhow, unqualifiedly, on the grounds that revolutionary destruction is in itself *creative*. If so, it becomes unnecessary to inquire into what the postrevolutionary replacement worlds look like and, concurrently, into their feasibility. Are these replacement worlds impossible or possible, utopian or not?

Engels left us with the magniloquent sentence that, after the proletarian revolution, communism "is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom."23 Marx left us with the utopia derived from the Paris Commune. A long time has since gone by, and what was supposed to come "after the revolution" still remains in its configuration a well-kept secret. Mao added to the picture the "cultural revolution"; but this is only the same thing over and over again: the permanence of revolution. And in Mao’s case the Great Leap Forward turned out to be a great leap backward. So, we are left with one discovery: revolution itself in its alleged creativeness. We must, therefore, settle for what we have. But what is it, precisely, that we have? In other words, among the three categories — ideal, utopia, and myth — which seems to fit what we think revolution must be?

We may say that revolution is an ideal, but surely not in the sense in which equality or liberty are spoken of as ideals. Ideals describe a desirable end state and are required to have a positive layout, whereas the notion of revolution unfolds itself in the negative. On the other hand, when we speak of revolution as a utopia, it is clear that reference is made not to revolutions themselves (they occur all the time and everywhere), but to their aftermath and outcome. With respect then to the revolution in itself, the telling category is "myth." The term "myth" is commonly understood as, and associated with, a make-believe that is, also, a belief-reality. However, the term also obtains special, ad hoc meanings, such as the one proposed by Georges Sorel.24

To Sorel, utopia was the last manifestation of faith in reason, whereas myth was the rebellion against reason. Hence, he conceived and advocated the general strike — the self-liberating act of

the proletariat — precisely as a myth. His myth was then a global intuition that coincided with an act of the will. It was to be a truly liberating force because it would enable the proletariat to act without helpers. A myth-driven proletariat would dispose not only of past but also of incumbent masters, namely, of self-proclaimed vanguards.

It may be said that here utopia reenters. It does not matter, for the point of interest is that Sorel's political myth is the collective, deliberate, *willed expectation* of the event that the expectation in fact generates. This is very much the way in which we speak of the "myth" of revolution.

Still, to understand the mythical use, in Sorel's sense, of the notion of revolution does not even begin to demonstrate the alleged creativity of revolution. On what grounds have we come to take for granted, in many intellectual quarters, that revolutions are, as such, "creative"? The answer ends up by being of this sort: It cannot be doubted that the English and, even more, the French revolutions have created the present-day Western civility,25 and that the Russian and some subsequent communist revolutions have generated new worlds. Nothing of the above can be doubted; but the instances in question do not attest in truth to a creativity of the revolutionary act as such. These revolutions exploded the obstacles and removed the impediments to the potentialities that not only gave cause to the conflagration but that subsequently delivered the goods. *Per se, the merit of a revolutionary destruction — for destruction it is — is only to permit a reconstruction. But if no reconstructive potential precedes the revolution, no new positive construction (that is, reconstruction) can follow the revolution. Something must preexist the revolutionary act in order to come into existence after it.* That is why it is relevant to say *ex nihilo, nihil fit* — out of nothing, nothing comes.

The point is then that revolutions are creative not because of an intrinsic creativeness of the revolutionary act as such — this is the myth — but because they liberate creative forces that are otherwise impeded. In particular, revolutions create a better polity if, and only if, somebody has in mind, before the revolution, what is to be done after the revolution. Their political creativity hinges on having a feasible or at least credible, replacement world in sight. This is no longer the case with the present-day revolutionary subculture.

Let us then survey the broad and rather colorful spectrum of movements, forces and intellectual trends that might be identified with democratic socialism as a way of getting a feeling for the heterogeneity of the substance with which we are dealing: exclusive attention to African socialism.

Socialism

It Is Known . . .

One of the most interesting ideological phenomena to come out of the developing world in recent years is African socialism. Considerable effort has been made to delineate the distinctive features of this doctrine. In fact, a conference of African leaders at Dakar in December 1962 sought to arrive at a codification of this ideology. However, the differences between the ideas and approaches of those leaders who identify themselves as African socialists are perhaps more impressive than the doctrines they have established or the commonality of their efforts.

Certainly, there are common themes in African socialism. In a volume, precisely entitled *African Socialism*, William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg26 suggest that three main strands might be unwoven from the complex fabric of ideas and issues. These would include: (1)

"the problem of continental identity,"27 that is, the idea that African socialism must be distinguished from other kinds of socialism and that socialism in Africa is to be modeled more on the communitarian roots of traditional African society than upon the problems that suggested socialist ideas in Europe; (2) "the crisis of economic development,"28 that is, the idea that only through state planning, stimulation and social mobilization can the continent achieve the rapid economic growth which it seeks; (3) "the dilemmas of control and class formation,"29 that is, the search for a doctrine of common endeavor that will meld diversities into a dynamic nationalism and prevent the emergence of class divisivenesses.

In the same volume, Aristide Zolberg describes the main points to emerge from the Dakar Conference as follows: (1) the urgency of development; (2) rationality and planning; (3) the uniqueness of African Socialism; (4) economic modernization without alienation; (5) the dilemma of traditionalism and modernism; (6) mobilization of the masses; (7) the need for world solidarity.30

There is a distinctiveness and uniqueness to African socialist thought. A succinct comparison of Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah, for example, indicates sharply varying interests. Just as there are differences in language, there are differences in primary goals. Nyerere's socialism, which stresses projects that operate mainly at the village level for community development, has been a major preoccupation in Tanzania. Although community development has not been ignored by Nkrumah, much heavier emphasis has been laid in Ghana on the creation of modern economic institutions in which the state plays a preeminent role.

Even though there are differences between the socialists and the nonsocialists on the one hand and between the different socialists on the other, it is important to note that there are significant similarities. Tubman of Liberia may shun the word "socialist," but the fact is that Liberian economic development is similar to that of Guinea, an avowedly socialist country. As the late D.K. Chisiza pointed out in his perceptive *Africa — What Lies Ahead*,31 a pragmatic pattern of development will probably be followed by most African nations. This will entail substantial involvement by the state in economic activities, and, thus, all African nations, whether avowedly "socialist" or "capitalist," will follow a basic pattern.

Not One But . . .

In any event, despite the fact that the ideas of the various African socialist spokesmen converge on such propositions as those cited by Friedland and Rosberg, they arrive at such conclusions by quite distinctive techniques of argument and derive quite different policy implications from their analyses. One can distinguish at least three different approaches to the question of socialism in sub-Saharan Africa.

Radical, Mobilization Socialism. Such leaders as Sékou Touré of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, the government of Congo (Brazzaville) and the officials of the *Union Soudanaise* of Mali share with other African socialists a sense of the cultural distinctivenesses of Africa and hence the need for a distinctive interpretation of socialism. However, each of them tends to place greater emphasis on socialism as a means of marshaling and ordering a society for the purposes of rapid modernization. All four look on socialism as a "scientific" means of social engineering. Although none offers allegiance to any communist power, each shows a greater identification with formal Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet and Chinese experiments than is characteristic of other African socialists.

For these leaders, traditional African society is a value to be considered, but for each of them it appears more as an obstacle or a condition which must modify the straightforward pursuit of socialistic modernization than as a social system which must be preserved and enhanced. In all three examples, the route to development stresses the state's role in enterprise and direction: the part to be played by the private sector, either circumscribed or diminished.

Of course, there are significant differences within the group. Mali is perhaps the most doctrinaire. Sékou Touré, with his emphasis on the imperialistic struggle and the role of the dominant party, seems to assert a form of neo-Leninism which is somewhat unique. In Ghana, the flamboyantly personal style of expression and action of Nkrumah was hardly compatible with rigorous ideological orthodoxy.

In describing these political movements, "socialism" connotes primarily the techniques of mobilizing and organizing a total population for the purposes of rapid development. Socialism implies the unqualified commitment of a people to the purposes of national development, as directed and marshaled by political authorities. Political control through a single monolithic party and a total reorientation of economic and social institutions under state auspices are characteristic ideological imperatives. The process and imperatives of radical mobilization are equated with a unique and militant nationalism, rejecting dependence on any set of presently developed nations.

Communitarian Socialism. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Sénégal, despite the considerable differences between them, both represent a similar emphasis in African socialist thought. Here, stress is placed on the communitarian qualities of traditional African society rather than on the use of socialist doctrine as a prescriptive formula for modern social organization and economic advance.

The essential contention is that Africa has always contained much indigenous socialism. Among the various elements of traditional socialism cited are the communal ownership of land (or the nonownership of land by individuals on a private basis), the egalitarian character of society (or the low degree of stratification) and the extensive network of social obligations that led to considerable cooperation.

The existence of these traditional elements is held to represent indigenous socialism. Not only do they represent a set of roots for African socialists, but it is believed that their existence will facilitate the creation of modern economic institutions on a socialist basis. It is thus held that capitalism is not an appropriate economic form because it is "unnatural" to Africa.32 Charles A. Micaud argues along the same lines when speaking about a typical variant of developmental socialism in Tunisia:

A new conception of national solidarity is being born . . . The struggle will not end in success unless there is full realization that what is at stake is human dignity, without which life is not worth living. Socialism, once adopted as an ideological label, was perfectly "natural"; even the companions of the Prophet (Mahomet) . . . were socialists before the invention of the word, considering themselves members of the same family. They were not individualists; not one among them sought enrichment at the expense of the others. All worked for the common good. By turning back to the sources of Islam, we are to imitate them in their self-sacrifice, their love of their neighbors, and their sense of solidarity.33

Here socialism is identified with the vision of a harmonious social order, of development achieved without the dehumanizing consequences of radical individualism and the furious

competitiveness that seem to characterize the presently advanced nations. In some cases, the model invoked is the social solidarity of the traditional peasant community. In other cases, this sense of socialist society is related to classic Eastern philosophy and religion. In this category, would be included both Léopold Sédar Senghor and Julius Nyerere.

Distinctiveness from Marxism-Leninism and even from European socialism is most clearly drawn, particularly in Senghor's invocation of the "spiritual" qualities of African socialism, in his philosophical identification with Teilhard de Chardin rather than with the conventional socialist theorists and in his stress on the special meaning of *Négritude*. Senghor writes:

In the first phase of nation-building, he writes, we must organize the public powers of the federal state . . . to provide a structure to guarantee their authority and permanence. We must also define the program that will orient the action of these public powers . . . For only this action can make of our various populations a *People*, that is to say, a *Community*, where each individual will identify himself with the collective whole and vice versa. But the unanimity, the *communion*, of souls is not enough. For the people to become a nation, the individual must grow as his standard of living and culture is raised. . . . Our program, inspired by our doctrine (African socialism), will permit the federal State to realize the *Negro-African Nation*.34

For leaders such as Senghor and Nyerere, the action imperatives of socialism are more apt to involve rural development and community action programs with emphasis on cooperation. In such cases, socialism refers to agrarian reform and related programs and to quite specific objectives in the field of economic nationalism. In the modern sector, the path to development is apt to be quite pragmatic and quite flexible in the mix between private and public enterprise that will lead to the creation of an unconventional vision of socialist society.

Moderate, Welfare Socialism. Many African leaders understand socialism as a "middle way" between capitalism (by which they mean complete laissez-faire or the "capitalism" that they associate with imperialism) and communism. Their approach is essentially pragmatic and developmental. They would have the state inspire and direct the process of growth, but within a pluralistic social and economic order. They would extend public services to improve the standard of living of their peoples, but they hardly plan on a total mobilization of the society for the purposes of change.

Such is characteristic of the Kenyatta government's identification with African socialism. In a sophisticated document, *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*, it states: "African socialism must be flexible because the problems it will confront and the incomes and the desires of the people will change over time, often quickly and substantially. A rigid, doctrinaire system will have little chance for survival."35 Speaking about democracy, Sartori argues along the same way when he says:

Nondemocratic systems are *rigid* systems, that is, they dispose of no built-in mechanisms for either changing themselves or responding to demands for change. Rigid systems, therefore, can only be broken; and this means that they ultimately call for a revolutionary overthrow. Democracy is, instead, a characteristically *flexible* system. Above all, or first, democracy is a procedure for processing whatever a society demands, whatever comes up through 'voice' and with 'voice.'36

As a result, this category of moderate, welfare but also reformist socialism includes a wide variety of movements and leaders whose socialist philosophy is basically one of using governmental institutions to direct an essentially private and pluralistic economy and society

toward developmental goals. The process of development is to be gradualist and democratic, achieved without cataclysmic upheaval or coercive regimentation. Although nationalism is an important value for these countries, they are not belligerent toward the presently advanced nations, and they seek either a policy of nonalignment or one of cautious and critical identification with the Western nations.

While major revision of existing economic and social institutions (such as the nationalization of industry or radical agrarian reform) are to be considered alternatives available to movements of this type, they are not ideological imperatives. Rather, such movements would select from the fullest possible arsenal of policy strategies those most appropriate to specific situations and circumstances.

However, such welfare socialism is not at all a matter of merely exchanging the Soviet Union for Scandinavia as the model of the desired society. In spite of the fact that this stream of thought, as someone has put it, "is more apt to reflect the gospel according to Harold Laski rather than Karl Marx," it too stresses the unique grounding of socialism in the African environment, the special needs for state direction of the developmental process, the desire to achieve modernity without undue cost in terms of traditional values. However, for leaders like Kenyatta and Mboya, socialist doctrine appears more as a means of opening up flexible alternatives for action than for narrowing down social complexity through a rigid program for change.

Shortcut to Development

The idea of socialism in Africa is intimately linked to the commitment to economic development. For many leaders, socialism appears to offer a shortcut to development. Their argument is that it is both unnecessary and undesirable for their nations to repeat the slow and painful process of industrialization undergone by Europe and North America. Some would assert that the experiences of the Soviet Union and China prove that an underdeveloped nation can catch up with the industrialized powers in a short period of time. A far larger group, however, simply feel that the presently underdeveloped nations can learn from the experience of the advanced ones, need not repeat their errors and can profit from the ideologies and social innovations that served as correctives to the equalities and inefficiencies that attended early industrialization in the West.

Above all, the faith in socialist techniques of transformation represents an almost supernatural persuasion of the capability of the state and its human armature, the public service, to order and control the economy. Militant developmental socialists appear to be unshakably convinced of the rationality of the political decision-making process. They fail to reckon with unanticipated consequences of political choices: that institution of a nonconvertible currency would lead to large-scale smuggling, that nationalization of the retail trade would lead to a breakdown of the distribution system or that import controls would lead to massive corruption.

Moreover, insistence on socialist development often rests on nothing more than a rather rigid understanding of what capitalism entails. Many developmental socialists are such merely to distinguish themselves from "capitalism," which they equate, as already mentioned, with thoroughgoing laissez-faire policies. They describe themselves as socialists merely to indicate that they intend to follow the Keynesian and welfare state practices that have been characteristic of nearly all Western nations since 1930.

Thus, what a leader means by "socialism" often depends on his definition of "capitalism." José Figueres of Costa Rica and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya have essentially declared that the argument

is meaningless and have declared themselves to be advocates of a "mixed economy." To the point, Figueres writes:

In practice, neither of the two systems have been effected anywhere in absolute form. . . . The nations that call themselves socialist have had to leave at least small commerce in private hands . . . and a good part of the land . . . On the other hand, the great nations called capitalist, and particularly the United States, have organized their industry and large commerce in the form of enterprises whose capital belongs to the public who buy shares. . . . Presently, these very enterprises are helping their employees to buy stock. This is a new form of socialism, stimulated precisely by those men who most fear the word "socialism."37

What has happened is that, while men argue in the newspapers over words and phrases, over 'directed economy' and 'free enterprise,' over 'inviolable property' and 'social necessity,' events have been following, almost by themselves, the only possible road in present-day society: *A combination* of the two systems, capitalist and socialist, that tries to combine the advantages of both and reduce the defects of each. To that synthesis of the two historic tendencies the name *mixed economy* is now applied.38

And the government of Jomo Kenyatta repeats a similar theme:

As predictive models of what would happen to factory system societies, both Marxian socialism and *laissez faire* capitalism have been failures. The economic systems in actual use throughout the world today bear little resemblance to either model.39

For his part, Grégoire Kayibanda, of Rwanda, specifically rejects both capitalism (which he identifies with neocolonialism) and socialism ("the instrument of brutal dictatorship") in favor of *la troisième voie* — the "third way" — which seems to be nothing more nor less than Figueres' "mixed economy." This "plague on both your houses" is also to be found in Julius Nyerere's book *Ujaama,* in which he describes socialism in the following way:

It is opposed to Capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism, which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.40

Hence, the term a leader applies to his development strategy depends a great deal on his perception of the alternatives. He may be a socialist because he believes that capitalism is no more than unrestrained free enterprise. He may also be a socialist to distinguish himself from communism, which he identifies with totalitarianism. Or, he may reject all the orthodox labels either because he feels they are meaningless or because each has negative connotations.

The African nations do not wish to choose between the anomic individualism, "the lonely crowd," which they identify with Western liberalism, and the regimented subordination of individual to society that is the consequence of communism. What to do?

"La Révolution Solidaire" towards African Democratic Socialism

To resolve the equation, we suggest what we term *La Révolution Solidaire* (Solidary Revolution). It is based upon a *communitarian economy* of which Figueres' "mixed economy" is

a part, for the "communitarian economy" envisages many economic forms: public, private, mixed and participative enterprises as well as cooperatives, worker-management and comanagement. But, we insist on worker participation in both the decisions and economic benefits of the enterprise. Characteristically, *La Révolution Solidaire* is dynamized by African *solidarity* and aims at African *democratic socialism*. These two features distinguish it from other "revolutions of development" in Africa.

Democratic Socialism

Historical Background

It is not easy to state when socialism first appeared. Some have asserted that the ideal commonwealth in Plato's *Republic* is socialist, inasmuch as its ruling class has no property of its own and shares all things in common. Others have claimed that the Bible, particularly the Old Testament, constitutes the first socialist code, covering as it does the protection of workers, women and the weak. The early Christians rejected the concept of "mine and thine," and practiced socialism in their everyday lives; in the Middle Ages numerous sects and movements, mostly religious, attacked wealth and commerce as wicked and incompatible with the Christian life. Such sects frequently withdrew into isolation, living an austere existence and sharing poverty in brotherly love as a protest against the prevalent greed in the world around them.

During the Renaissance and the Reformation, there was a revival of protest against inequality based on wealth. The new arguments increasingly combined the older faith with the newer rationalism, as evidenced, for example, in Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516). In the Puritan revolution of the seventeenth century, there arose, side by side with the main movement of middle-class origin, a more radical group — called Diggers or True Levelers — that sought to attain communal ownership of land not currently in use. The movement was short-lived, but its radical protest against private landed property was not to be forgotten entirely.

Yet despite all such illustrations from earlier times, *socialism* as a major political force can properly be said to have originated as the *result of modern industrial capitalism*. To the extent that socialism contains within itself an element of protest against social inequality — and no movement can call itself socialist unless it expresses that kind of protest — it is as old as Western civilization itself. Both Greek and Jewish-Christian thought categorically reject the conception of wealth as the basis of the good life.

Another feature of socialism — the protest against money as the chief tie between human beings — is also not confined to the socialist tradition; many nonsocialists have voiced their disapproval of the "cash nexus." If we thus look to something more specific and historically more concrete than a vague protest against social injustice, we find that socialism as an effective, organized political movement is the product of the Industrial Revolution. Just as communism has happened — and is likely to happen — only in countries *before* they have undergone the full impact of the Industrial Revolution, democratic socialism develops only in societies after they have experienced considerable industrialization.

Wherever industrialization has taken place in societies without deeply rooted liberal institutions, the political adjustment to the resulting tensions is likely to be either some sort of fascism (as in modern Germany, Italy, Japan and Argentina) or communism (as in Russia and China). Because industrialization in these societies is promoted and controlled by an authoritarian state, its purpose is the power of the state, not the welfare of the individual. In contrast, where

industrialization has occurred in relatively liberal societies (as in northwestern Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), the purpose of the economy is the welfare of the individual, and the adjustment to the inevitable tensions and conflicts of industrial capitalism assumes some form of democratic socialism or social democracy, rather than fascism or communism.

This basic distinction between the authoritarian and the liberal society can cut away a lot of confusion. Thus, the question is frequently debated whether a fascist economy is socialistic (because of the complete regulation of economic activity by the state) or capitalistic (because the means of production are left in private hands). Such discussions are endless and insoluble because they are based on a false premise: that the basic distinction in the world's economic systems is between socialism and capitalism. In actuality, the line of division runs differently: between *free market* or *welfare economies* (which operate democratically and aim at freedom, welfare and happiness) and *coercive* or *command economies* (which operate by command and coercion and aim at the power of the state through military expansion). Both capitalism and socialism fall into the group that is dominated by the concept of welfare economics, whereas fascism and communism fall into the second group, the command economy.

Differences among the species within each major group are important, but they are not crucial. Thus, capitalism and socialism disagree on the best method of how to bring the maximum welfare to all the people; the former stresses individual property and effort, the latter puts its faith in collective, productive property and effort.

Fascism and communism do not see eye to eye in every detail on how best to operate an economy in the service of the state. Differences between fascism and communism, however, tend to fade into insignificance if it is recalled that the objective — the power of the state to wage aggressive war — is the same, and that the means — ranging from friendly pressure to slave labor and the concentration camp — are amazingly similar and frequently identical.

In some ways, of course, socialism opposes capitalism, but such opposition is the rebellion of the child against the father, not the total war of stranger against stranger. Just as the rebellious child uses arguments he has learned from his own father, socialism employs, in the controversy with its progenitor, a whole arsenal of capitalist values and attitudes, especially critical rationalism and pragmatic utilitarianism.

As to the specific problem of property, socialism inherits from capitalism one basic goal: *to preserve the unity of work and ownership*. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the early phase of modern capitalism, that unity was a reality. In the England of John Locke or in the America of Thomas Jefferson, the average farm, store or workshop was generally small enough to be owned and operated by one person or family. *Work and ownership coincided*. The chief threat to this unity came from the state, which sought to prescribe, to regulate, to snoop, in short, to play the role of an omniscient busybody in economic matters. This attitude was resented by the individual entrepreneur because he knew that he could run his own business without any unsolicited advice from pompous and self-confident state officials.

As the capitalist economy progressed, however, the individual (or single-family) form of ownership and work was gradually replaced, owing primarily to technological progress, by an economic system in which large-scale enterprise swallowed up the original capitalist-owner-manager. As the size of industrial enterprise grew larger and larger, work became more and more socialized and collective, whereas ownership remained private.

In seeking to restore the classical harmony between work and property, the reformer faces two alternatives — (1) the division of large-scale enterprises into small units so that both work and ownership can coincide again in one person or family, or (2) collective ownership.

The former method is feasible in agriculture where large landed estates can be physically broken up and divided among landless farm workers as was done in France during her Revolution in the eighteenth century in Mexico and Guatemala during this century and on a smaller scale in Italy after World War II. Whether such a breakup of large landed estates is economically sound or not is highly debatable. In many cases, the productivity of dwarf farms following agrarian reform is lower than it was before on large farm units. A reform government, however, may be willing to pay the price of lower productivity for the greater social benefit of having an independent farm class. In any case, the technology of agriculture is still simple enough so that large units can be broken up, and small units can be operated with relative efficiency.

In industry, this solution is physically out of the question. An automobile or aircraft factory cannot be divided up into 10,000 portions, each to be operated by one worker as his personal piece of property. The technological nature of modern industrial enterprise is such that there is no alternative to collective work and operation. Thus, in facing the task of reuniting work and ownership in industry, collective ownership seems to socialists the logical answer, just as the classical liberal deduced the right to individual ownership from the fact of individual work. In both systems — classical liberal capitalism and democratic socialism — there is the underlying assumption that the right to property ultimately rests on work, effort and industry, rather than on formal law, custom or birth.

John Locke, the founder of modern political and economic liberalism, based the right to property on human labor, and the value of property on the amount of labor "admixed" to nature’s resources. The socialists have accepted the Lockean and capitalist rationale of labor. What has changed since Locke is simply the technological character of labor, not its ethical implications. If the logic of capitalism demands individual property for individual work, the logic of socialism demands *collective ownership* for collective work — provided collective work is the only possible form of managerial organization.

Where small property has survived as a technologically efficient unit, as in agriculture, the professions, the arts and some areas of retailing, servicing and manufacturing, socialists generally agree with adherents of capitalism that private ownership should be kept and strengthened. Thus, socialist governments have enjoyed long tenure in predominantly agrarian countries like Denmark and New Zealand because farmers in those countries have been sympathetic to the socialist program of maintaining their economic integrity and individualism by cheap credits, guaranteed parity prices and other policies designed to protect the small farmer against the threat of domination by banks, insurance companies and wholesalers.

Combination Capitalism-Socialism: A New Order

Although "capitalism" and "socialism" may be treated as distinct at the analytical level, the distinction breaks down at the empirical level where the points of articulation between them are possible. An emphasis on what Shils calls the issue of consensus at the macrosociological level leads to a concern for how preexisting values and structures can provide bases for articulation with and commitment to larger social frameworks than those of segmental groups and primordial loyalties. Here socialist symbols and leadership forms can be a vital part of the value bases supporting modernizing, that is, developmental frameworks.

To that possible synthesis or alliance between the advantages of both capitalist and socialist systems, we give the name "democratic socialism," emphasizing common ownership and/or large-

scale planning of production, balancing public and private consumption with public and private investments and ordering competition in the course of industrial development.

By way of illustration, let us take one feature from each system and try a theoretical combination: "enterprise" from capitalism and "solidarity" from African socialism. Looking further into our subject, we find that economists like to stress the absence of the enterprising spirit in traditional civilizations. Elias A. Gannage states, for example, that attachment to traditional values and rigidity of social structures prevent the spirit of enterprise from spreading. They block the emergence of a class whose role is to discover combinations of production factors so that they would be entrepreneurs not only in the private sector but also in the no less demanding public sector.

It is a fact, however, that in some African countries especially the enterprising spirit seems not at all lacking; the same is true of some parts of India and Latin America. But, the spirit of enterprise in these instances is directed to purely commercial ventures and to investment in home businesses which are very limited in their productivity. People avoid getting involved in a long and direct productive process which is spread out over several years. If the enterprising outlook is present in a broad sense of the meaning, it is accompanied by the conviction that profit must be quick and short-term.

Chronic inflation in a number of African countries obliges people to maintain the value of goods already possessed and thus plays a role in the whole question. But, we do not know whether outside the rather perduring climate of inflation the speculative spirit (which now is usually only an instinct for conservation) would be automatically transformed into a true spirit of enterprise. Such a transformation is by no means certain in view of the mentality which forms the global context.

The reason for this lack of enterprise is that the authors see no value except in an individualism which, it is argued, must replace the pronounced spirit of collective solidarity that supposedly is typical of peoples in the Black African countries. In brief, the spirit of enterprise calls for individualism; individualism is missing because of the existing sense of solidarity. Therefore, observers often say there is too much solidarity. Mistake! For our respective societies — our world — suffer not of excess but of lack of solidarity.

Yet, it is at least as necessary to see in the Black African societies a serious lack of the spirit of solidarity and mutual confidence, which are the conditions of any undertaking either individual or collective. For example, economic progress requires a division of labor. This phrase seems to express the idea of separating off, yet it really implies, beyond all else, cooperation of one kind or other. The more detailed the division of labor, the greater and more demanding the cooperation. We may go further and say that cooperation is the law of all modern economy activity. This holds for all forms of company, all partnerships, etc. It holds, on a more technical level, for any enterprise, whether capitalist or socialist. It holds, too, for the establishment of that confidence on which the functioning of the broad market or of interconnected markets depends. Finally, the functioning of every credit system depends on these same elements of mutual confidence and the word "credit" itself expresses this idea.

The attitude of confidence, so necessary for a modern economy, is often missing, however, in the traditional mentality. Or rather, there exist very strong solidarities, much stronger than those we have in any modern society, but they function at the level of units which are too small for development: large families, villages, clans. Beyond these units, on the other hand, between men of different families or ethnic groups, between distinct clans, there is often only distrust and no real obligations based on solidarity. Thus the stronger the solidarity at a certain level and within

limited dimensions, the more likely it is to be weak, infrequent and difficult to establish at a wider level: at wider levels, men are really strangers to each other.

All this is true not only of Africa, Asia and Latin America, but also of many areas of Europe, especially in the South, where solidarity at times does not extend beyond the family. A situation of this kind has been described by the American sociologist, Edward Banfield, who writes of a small section of Southern Italy; he calls it "amoral familiarism." The phrase refers to a withdrawal of the family into itself, admitting no kind of obligation to anyone outside the family. As soon as an individual in the village ventures on some new business which requires cooperation from others, his neighbors are bent only on finding out what plan he has for striking them. Thus, each person lives within his own more or less extended family and acknowledges no moral obligation outside of it.

Despite varying circumstances, analogous situations occur in all civilizations in which the tribe, clan or family is the basis for societal organization. The spirit of solidarity is often weak at the level of the wider community in proportion as it is strong at the level of the small, integrated unit. Here we must quote the essential difference between mutual help, on the one hand, which links those individuals connected by a real or fictive blood relations and which is encouraged and praised by tradition, and, on the other hand, cooperation or collective work for more distant and abstract goals.

In the case of mutual help, the group exists prior to the communal achievement of a communal task, even if the latter may be the occasion for stirring to new life the sentiments in which the community is grounded. In the case of cooperation, the group exists only by virtue of the future goal which is cooperatively planned and sought. Once the goal is reached as specified in the contact which is the group’s unifying principle, the group ceases to exist along with the grounding contractual bond.

In short, "solidarity of the traditional type" is perhaps not the springboard for modern economic development. But if the traditional communities are not such a springboard, it is not for lack of individualism. Rather it is for lack of broader solidarity which can develop among men who are less restricted by the immediate ties of family or neighborhood. The absence of this larger social solidarity, even where local solidarities are present, seems to be as heavy a handicap as the absence of the spirit of individualist enterprise. This spirit of individualist enterprise (characteristic of modern capitalist economy which is lacking in socialist systems) combined with solidarity (which is a feature of the African socialist economy that is lacking in capitalist systems) will give way to a large cooperation and mutual confidence for a revolution of development, marked by the advent of "democratic socialism."

The democratic character of this socialism lies in the fact that instead of trying to abolish diversity by attributing sovereignty to the people, it seeks to accommodate it, providing an open marketplace in which men of varying beliefs may compete in offering their intellectual wares to the public. Such a marketplace, in order to accommodate diversity, requires freedom of speech and mutual tolerance: both expressions of democracy. The value is more one of universalizing a democratic, pluralistic society than that of seeking a utopian, socialist community.

The filial link between socialism and capitalism can be illustrated by the fact that the first modern socialist was a wealthy and successful capitalist. Robert Owen (1771-1858), generally regarded as the founder of British socialism, was the first to use the term "socialism." A self-made capitalist, he had made a fortune by the age of forty. He was a man of sound, practical judgment, and he easily could meet one test of experience frequently described by conservatives as essential whenever a reformer comes forth with some new scheme: "Have you ever met a payroll in your

life?" Owen had. In his *A New View of Society* (1813), he describes himself as a "manufacturer for pecuniary profit." A believer in the individualist principle of *self-help*, Owen started the cooperative movement and supported the incipient trade union organizations springing up throughout England and Scotland. As Owen thus, we believe that *solidarity*, "cooperation" in Owen's terms, is more than "selling milk to housewives"; *producer's solidarity*, "producer's cooperatives" in Owen's words, rather than consumer's cooperatives would establish a new social order: democratic socialism.

Socialism and Democracy: The Question of Compatibility

The most topical and hotly debated of the questions discussed here is whether a socialist society is consonant with democracy. In England and Sweden, this problem has long been in the foreground. It was in these countries that Social-Democratic governments were first established with the support of a majority in the legislature (as the British House of Commons). These were the governments that announced that they would introduce socialist policies. In the British election campaign of 1945, the assertion that a victory for the Labor party, and therefore for socialization and planning, would lead to dictatorship was one of the main arguments used by the Conservative party, especially by its leader. In Sweden, a number of leading politicians in the bourgeois parties have taken a similar line, declaring that more extensive socialization or economic planning would be incompatible with the preservation of political freedom.

Critics of socialism have always insisted that socialism could not be realized except through an authoritarian system, or that in any case it must result in the establishment of such order. At one period, however, the main argument against socialism was the basic liberal assumption that free enterprise was the prerequisite for maximum production. This argument is still credited with considerable significance. But the first of these points — that socialism leads to dictatorship — has gained in importance. The main reasons for this are obvious. The fact that the only state that has carried out the complete socialization of the means of production is the communist dictatorship is thought by many — albeit on inadequate grounds — to be conclusive proof of the connection between socialism and dictatorship. Other dictatorships, primarily that of Nazi Germany, can be called "socialist" according to certain interpretations of this term that stress state control of economic life. These states are considered further proof of the link between socialism and dictatorship: although, because of their nationalist, hierarchical and antisocialist features, these forms of dictatorship won more sympathy in bourgeois quarters than among the Social Democrats.

Another reason why the democratic argument against socialism now dominates the debate is, of course, that only recently have certain bourgeois movements — above all the conservatives in countries such as Britain and Sweden — accepted democracy. So long as they themselves defended an undemocratic system they could hardly attack socialism on this ground even if their system was represented by the privileged state while the socialist one was represented by a dictatorship. An additional determining factor is probably the lack of economic success of the bourgeois order of society in the period between the world wars. Crises and unemployment have discredited the salient economic criticisms of socialism.

A large number of politicians and scholars have concluded that socialism and democracy and, above all, socialism and political liberty are incompatible. We must note, however, that those who present themselves as defenders of freedom against socialism do not always make their concept of freedom clear and are not consistent in their usage of this word. They may adamantly insist in general terms that socialism undermines freedom. This is obvious if freedom is interpreted as the

relative independence of industry vis-à-vis the state. The very concept of socialism implies common ownership and/or large-scale planning of production. To the socialists, freedom is actually enhanced by state intervention since a large number of people are thereby made freer in relation to other segments of the population. In addition, socialists claim that the security and equality of the people are also improved by such intervention.

Conscious of these polemics, we believe that socialism can operate successfully with the majority rule and political freedom. Looking at the history of socialism, it can be quickly seen that *successful socialist movements have grown up only in nations with strong democratic traditions*, such as Great Britain, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand and some African traditional societies. The reason for this parallelism is simple. Where democratic, constitutional government is generally accepted, socialists can concentrate on their specific program, overambitious as that program may seem, namely: to create more opportunity for the underprivileged classes; to end inequality based on birth rather than service; to open the horizons of education to all the people; to eliminate discriminatory practices based on sex, religion, race or social class; to regulate and maintain full employment; to provide adequate social security for the sick, unemployed and aged; to re-plan the layout of towns and cities; to tear down the slums and build new houses; to provide medical facilities for each person regardless of the size of one's purse; and finally to rebuild society on the foundation of *solidarity*, that is, cooperation in lieu of competition, incentive and profit. All these goals of democratic socialism have one thing in common: to make democracy more real by broadening the application of democratic principles from the political to the nonpolitical areas of society.

Freedom of worship and freedom of political association — historically the first liberties to be conquered — are still the most essential foundations of democracy today. Where these foundations exist and, therefore, where democratic principles are firmly rooted in the hearts and minds of the people, socialists can concentrate on the "finer points" of democracy.

The question one might ask us is, What distinguishes *La Révolution Solidaire* towards African democratic socialism from other 'révolutions of development'?

Solidarity as Humanistic Quality

The answer to the above question ends up by being of this sort: The distinctiveness of developmental socialism is viewed in many different ways. But both Western liberalism and socialism have concentrated too exclusively on the material aspects of human life. They have neglected the humanitarian and "spiritual" side of life, which also can only be realized within the social order. It is thus in its concern for the *humanistic quality* of development (to borrow a word much used by Castro as well as by Senghor and others) that the uniqueness of *La Révolution Solidaire*towards African "democratic socialism" is said to be found. Its originality and authenticity, that is its "Africanity," are based on the fact that, beyond materialistic values, that is, economic factors, *La Révolution Solidaire* is dynamized by an ethical value, the African *solidarity*. Therefore, the society it generates is a *communitarian society* based indeed on the fundamental value of labor in the presence of other economic factors. However, emphasis is placed on the social aspect of production and consumption. People come first: the community before the enterprise or economic/political decision-makers.

At the national level, succinctly said, solidarity among peoples must replace individual egoism in order to create a *new* national order founded on the *democratization* of personal relations, recognition of human rights, the right of all to enjoy freedom and progress, rejection of religious,

ideological and racial discrimination as well as respect for the self-determination of peoples. To achieve this, a more equitable distribution of power is needed, for today information and power are restricted to a few public and private centers of decision. At the international level, the military blocs based on the ideological tensions that followed World War II cannot assure peace and should be transformed, by *contract of solidarity*, into cooperative regional entities contributing to peace. The population explosion represents a fact in a dehumanized world, but a society governed by an aware solidarity will find the means to satisfy the needs of all, equitably dividing work and its products without destroying human life in its origins. In a world of solidarity, the goods produced by mankind serve to benefit all people and countries disposed to work with others for the benefit of all. In short, only the global community can realize the exigencies of a *new* international order: peace, justice and the development of every human being in *human society*. As a result, the idea of the humanistic, that is, spiritual and/or moral goal, of *La Révolution Solidaire* towards African "democratic socialism" is of equal or greater importance than its economic program. Examples abound in the ideologies of many other leaders of developing nations.

To Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala, his own doctrine of spiritual socialism "signifies a true doctrinal innovation for our America, up to now debating between conservatism, liberalism and Marxism." Arévalo would distill the essence of this spiritual socialism as follows:

We are socialists because we live in the middle of the twentieth century. But we are not materialistic socialists. We do not believe that man is above all stomach. We believe that man is, before anything else, a being with dignity . . . Our socialism is therefore not a matter of the ingenious redistribution of economic goods, the stupid leveling of economically different men. Our socialism is going to free men psychologically, to return them to that psychological and spiritual integrity that both conservatism and liberalism have denied them.41

For his part, Sukarno of Indonesia has stated:

Socialism in its essence is a morality, a morality of high standards which demands that men should not quarrel among themselves, that all men should live like brothers, that all men should taste happiness. That is the essence of socialism and that is the essence of our identity, the essence of our Constitution. . . . I could even say that this is the essence of the Message of the Sufferings of the People.42

Quite often, the moral goal of socialism is phrased as a rejection of European culture or perhaps of some of the more abrasive features of modernization and development as expressed in Franz Fanon’s appeal:

Come, comrades, the European game is definitely finished; we must find something else. . . . Europe has acquired such a mad, disorganized speed that it now is out of any control, beyond any reason, and is plummeting at a terrifying pace towards an abysms which we would do well to quickly avoid. . . . European achievements, European techniques, European style must cease to tempt and demoralize us. . . .

When I seek the man in the European technique and style, I see a succession of negations of humanity, an avalanche of murders. . . . Two centuries ago, a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It has so well succeeded that the United States of America have become a

monster where the sins, the sicknesses, and the inhumanity of Europe have reached frightening proportions.43

Often the "spiritual" quality of developmental socialism is linked to the religious or philosophic tradition of the particular culture. Thus, Sampurnanand writes of Indian socialism:

I would like to begin by admitting that Indian Socialism is not a very happy choice as a name . . . Sarvodaya is another name which I might perhaps have used. It is the name chosen by Mahatmaji for what he considered to be the goal of all effort in the field of public work. It means the *udaya* of all, *udaya* standing not only for material prosperity, for spiritual good.44

Quoting Vinoba Bhave, he goes on to say:

Sarvodaya is not content with the utilitarian doctrine of achieving the greatest good of the greatest number, nor does it believe that an inevitable historical process is polarizing society into classes with nothing but conflicting interests . . . Sarvodaya . . . stands for the all-round well-being of all. It believes that institutions and relationships should be fashioned on the twin principles of Truth and Non-violence.45

In a very different religious setting, Manuel Sarkisyanz comments on the goals of U Nu's Buddhist socialism:

His prewar essay 'Kyan-dawbuthama' . . . indicates that already at the beginning of his political career his image of capitalism referred to its underlying utilitarian primacy of the Self, the Self in which Buddhism sees the basic illusion and a cause of suffering. . . . In his election platform of November 16th, 1959, U Nu described his Buddhist socialism, reiterating (as in 1935) that acquisition economy had developed out of the Illusion of Self which Buddhism aims to overcome, and that it obstructs a social order which would make meditation economically possible for all, thereby permitting universal liberation from impermanence.46

And in the Western Hemisphere, José Figueres relates his social democratic ideology to a vision of Christian humanism when he writes:

The Bible speaks of certain men who were *just*; that is, individuals well adapted to community life, being cooperative and not antagonistic, friendly and not aggressive, who cultivated love and not hate . . . I do not want to say that we participate in the belief that the individual is the means to an end, that end being The State of Society. Completely the opposite. Our basic conception, philosophical and political, is that society ought to be the best possible means to [the development of] the most felicitous type of human — the Just Man.47

As a result, there is a permanence, an insistence and a sincerity about the above affirmations of the moral or humanistic dimensions of socialism. It may all seem terribly lofty, vague and impractical to the Western observer, but perhaps he is just too obsessed by the material dimensions of man.

Conclusion

In opening this paper with a reflection on ideology, our concern was to show that socialism (and, also, revolution) is nothing if it is not a political theory: a discourse which directs politics toward the construction of definite forms of social relations and, in definite ways, a discourse which can construct and evaluate political situations. In short, "socialism" and "revolution" are nothing if they are not an ideology.

From this assumption we have conceived ideology in the sociogenetic and cultural context of the new African nations as a creative and dynamic force in binding a community together: ideology defines the things we have in common, i.e., the purpose of our togetherness. We have underlined its role in the process of development of the African countries. It has been argued that, for these nations seeking to replace more traditional forms of political life, ideology seeks to provide a rationale for a new pattern of political obligations. It is essential to transform traditional values and to establish a "mental environment" conducive to change.

In relation to the concept of "ideology" we have analyzed the ideological themes of "revolution" and "socialism." We have urged a redefinition of the two concepts, one which is to be more adequate and more authentic to the African sociocultural context.

To begin with the ideological theme of "revolution," we have noted that its meaning but also its content vary from one leader to another, from one country to another, from one context to another. Therefore, history told us that in some countries revolution is a symbol of legitimacy. In some others revolution is a symbol of political purpose. Sometimes revolution is a symbol adopted by a military regime as part of its ideological paraphernalia. In some cases revolution is a historic symbol. Some governments have used revolution as a potential or continuing political symbol; while others, as an expression of political goals.

From the above rhetoric of revolution, we have learned various revolutionary goals: revolution as an anticolonial or antiimperialist struggle, revolution for economic and social development and revolutionary romanticism, that is, a kind of reminder or demand for the return to past glories.

In any case, "revolution" has been reduced to what the *Webster's Dictionary* calls "a fundamental change in political organization, or in the government or ruler, and substitution of another, by the governed." Therefore, our contribution has been to extend Webster's definition by emphasizing the imaginative character of the revolution, i.e., its creativity. We have argued that per se revolution is a destruction. But, the merit of revolutionary destruction — for destruction it is — is only to permit a reconstruction. However, if no reconstructive potential precedes the revolution, no new positive construction (that is re-construction) can follow the revolution. Something must preexist the revolutionary act in order to come into existence after it: *Ex nihilo, nihil fit*! Out of nothing, nothing comes!

In turning to the ideological theme of "socialism," it has been noted that one of the most interesting ideological phenomena to come out of the African developing nations in recent years has been African socialism. We have acknowledged that in spite of some convergence of the various African socialist spokesmen, they arrive at such conclusions by quite distinctive techniques of argument and derive quite different policy implications from their analyses.

Therefore, there is not one but several understandings of African socialism varying from one leader to another, from one African socialist country to another. Altogether, we have discerned at least three different approaches: (1) radical, mobilization socialism, (2) communitarian socialism, and (3) moderate, welfare socialism.

Behind this classification, emphasis has been put upon the intimate link between the African socialism and the commitment to economic development. It has been said that the African

socialism appears to offer a shortcut to development. To the point, it has been asserted that the values to be realized through the African socialism are to be found in indigenous culture because in the African traditional society there exists a prescientific socialist community. Thus, for Kwame Nkrumah, the African village community "can only be described in its social manifestations as being socialist."48 Fenner Brockway describes a similar theme in the thought of Nyerere:

Nyerere, he writes, emphasizes the basic idea . . . that socialism is a natural expanding development of the traditional tribal system of Africa. Every individual was completely secure in African traditional society. Natural catastrophe brought famine, but it brought famine to everybody. Nobody starved, either of food or of human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. 'That was socialism. That *is* socialism.'49

The argument has been that in the march toward their development the African developing nations do not have to repeat the slow and painful process of industrialization undergone by Europe and North America. However, a choice must be made. The new African nations do not wish to choose between the anomic individualism, "the lonely crowd" which they identify with Western Liberalism, and the regimented subordination of individual to society that is the consequence of communism. What to do?

In search for a new way we have reacted against all attempts to reject both socialism and laissez-faire capitalism under pretext that they are, respectively, an instrument of dictatorship and an expression of neocolonialism or a system "unnatural" or "too complicated" for the African developing nations. Therefore, we have suggested what we have termed *La Révolution Solidaire*. It is a *pragmatic and intelligent change* based on an *economy of labor* which involves public, private, mixed and participative enterprises as well as cooperatives, worker-management and comanagement. But, we have insisted on worker participation in both the decisions and economic benefits of the enterprise.

Characteristically, *La Révolution Solidaire* is dynamized by an ethical value, *African solidarity*, and aims at what we have called *African democratic socialism*. These two features distinguish *La Révolution Solidaire* from other "revolutions of development" in Africa.

We have spoken of the "African democratic socialism" in terms of *combination*, that is, *reconciliation* of socialism and capitalism, on the one hand, in order to accommodate the advantages of both and reduce the defects of each by balancing public and private consumption, public and private investments and by ordering competition in the course of industrial development. The argument was that viewed from its historical background socialism as a major political force can properly be said to have originated as the result of modern industrial capitalism.

On the other hand, the notion of the "African democratic socialism" has evoked the *combination of socialism and democracy.* The democratic character of this African socialism has been related to the fact that instead of undertaking to abolish diversity by attributing sovereignty to the people, it seeks to accommodate it, providing an open marketplace in which men of varying beliefs may compete in offering their intellectual wares to the public. Such a marketplace requires freedom of speech and mutual tolerance, freedom of worship and political association. The value is more one of universalizing democratic, pluralistic society than that of seeking a utopian socialist community. The aim is to make democracy more real by broadening the application of democratic principles from the political to the nonpolitical areas of society.

Finally in answering to the question of the distinctiveness, that is, the "Africanity" of *La Révolution Solidaire*, it has been underlined that it is in its concern for the *humanistic quality* of development that the originality and authenticity of *La Révolution Solidaire* are said to be found. It has been argued that beyond materialistic values, that is, economic factors, *La Révolution Solidaire* is dynamized by an ethical value which is the *African solidarity*. Emphasis has been put on the social aspect of production and consumption: people come first, the community before the enterprise or economic/political decision-makers. In this connection we have suggested that at the national level solidarity among peoples must replace individual egoism for the purpose of creating a *new* national order founded on the democratization of personal relations; while at the international level the global community can realize the exigencies of a *new* international order by means of *contract of solidarity*. As a result, the idea of the humanistic, that is, *"spiritual dimensions"50* of *La Révolution Solidaire* is of equal or greater importance than its economic program.

To assert the values of traditional communitarianism is to qualify the values of modernization and development. It is to suggest that the less-developed African nations do not wish to replicate in detail the experience of the very developed ones. It is also a way of describing the problem of a transitional society that would move toward modernity without wrenching social maladjustments or harsh breaks in cultural continuity.

Notes

1. On the "end of ideology" thesis, see: Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960), pp. 403-417; Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1960); Edward Shils, "The End of Ideology?" in *Encounter*, V (November 1955), pp. 52-58. For a rejoinder, see Joseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and Interpretation," in *American Political Science Review*, LX (March 1966), pp. 5-16.

2. M. Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), pp. 119-120.

3. A.W. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar and Future of Ideology* (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 30.

4. L. Althusser, *For Marx*, tr. Ben Brewster (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969), p. 232.

5. Cf. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an investigation)" in his *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, tr. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), pp. 121-173.

6. P. Hirst, *On Law and Ideology* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 53.

7. E. Voegelin, *Order and History*, Volume One: *Israel and Revelation* (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. xiv.

8. D.E. Apter, in *Ideology and Discontent* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 18 ff.

9. R. Braibanti and J.J. Spengler, eds., *Tradition, Values, and Socio-economic Development* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 4-5.

10. C. Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in *Ideology and Discontent* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 65.

11. *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1973), p. 992.

12. R.M., Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala: 1944-1954* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958).

13. S.M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 75.

14. Quoted in G. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 309.

15. Special issue of *Le Monde*, May 1964, republished by the Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia and entitled "Reflections Upon the Indonesian Revolution."

16. Quoted by J. Ch'en, in *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 226.

17. "The Egyptian Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1955), p. 208.

18. Quoted in P. Rudolph, *North Korea's Political and Economic Structure* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), p. 58.

19. Independence Day Speech, August 17, 1960.

20. For a historical and conceptual analysis, see especially P. Calvert, *Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1970); and C. Kotowski, "Revolution," in G. Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984). The literature is extensive. See T.R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); and H. Eckstein, "On the Causes of Internal War," in E.A. Nordlinger, ed., *Politics and Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Printice-Hall, 1970). See also, in general, C.J. Friedrich, ed., *Revolution* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); C. Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 3; and A.S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction* (New York: Wiley, 1975). For broader sociological considerations, see Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and especially S.N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978).

21. Marxists conceive of revolution as an extended process and thus consider fundamental socioeconomic change as a defining characteristic. If so, it can be argued that (a) the first "true revolution" is the Leninist one; and (b) revolutionary violence is a necessary condition of fundamental change. Both implications are too restrictive (and excessively self-serving). An intelligent exposition of the Marxist approach is Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

22. This element is highlighted especially by J. Monnerot, *Sociologie de la Révolution: Mythologies Politiques du XXème Siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1969). See also L. Pellicani, *I Rivoluzionari di Professione: Teoria e Prassi dello Gnosticismo Moderno* (Firenze: Vallecchi, 1975). A broad, often insightful coverage of related themes is S. Bialer and S. Sluzar, eds., *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age* (Boulder: Westview, 1977), 3 vols.

23. *Anti-Dühring* (Moscow edition: 1959), p. 391.

24. Sorel's best-known work is *Reflections on Violence* (1905; Glencoe: Free Press, 1950). However, his writings are extensive and unquestionably attest to philosophic credentials.

25. Interestingly (as we are reminded by Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* [London: Faber & Faber, 1963]), Cromwell's revolution was not called "revolution," for the notion still maintained in the 1650s its traditional astronomical meaning of circular movement and, thus, of constant orderly recurrence. In this acceptation the "revolution" was the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660. The first revolution to be designated as such by its protagonists was the Glorious Revolution of 1688 — an essentially peaceful event. Our understanding of "revolution" (movement without return, rupture) is, thus, the one established in 1789.

26. W.H. Friedland, & C.G. Rosberg, eds., *African Socialism* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 1-11.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

28. *Ibid*., p. 4.

29. *Ibid*.

30. A. Zolberg, in *African Socialism*, pp. 113-127.

31. D.K. Chisiza, *Africa — What Lies Ahead* (New York: African American Institute, 1962).

32. W.H. Friedland, & C.G. Rosberg, eds., *African Socialism* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 5.

33. C.A. Micaud, *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), pp. 142-143.

34. L.S. Senghor, *On African Socialism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. 25.

35. *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 15.

36. G. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1987), p. 77.

For a major, detailed coverage and investigation see J. Linz and A. Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). Linz's Part I, "Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration" (pp. 1-124), is a truly outstanding analysis. In general, see L. Morlino, *Come Cambiano i Regimi Politici* (Milano: Angeli, 1980).

37. J. Figueres, *Cartas a un ciudadano* (San José: Imprenta Nacional, 1956), p. 14.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

39. *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*, p. 7.

40. Cited in A.F. Brockway, *African Socialism* (London: The Bodley Head, 1963), p. 29.

41. J.J. Arévalo, *Escritos politicos y discursos* (Habana: Biblioteca América, 1953), pp. 127-130. See also DION, M.B., *Las ideas sociales y politicas de Arévalo* (Mexico: Edit. América Neuva, 1958). It is important to distinguish between two stages of Arévalo's thought. "Spiritual socialism" pertains specifically to his presidential administration from 1945 to 1950. With the overthrow of the Guatemalan "Revolution" in 1954, Arévalo has been most identified in his writings with virulent anti-Americanism. This later period of Arévalo's thought may be studied both in his *The Fable of the Shark and the Sardines* (New York: L. Stuart, 1961) and in his *El AntiKomunismo en América* (Mexico: Edit. América Neuva, 1959).

42. Cited in J.S. Mintz, *Mohammed, Marx and Markhaen* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), p. 190.

43. F. Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), pp. 239-240; see also Seydou Badian, *Les Dirigeants Africains face à leur Peuple* (Paris: François Maspero, 1964).

44. Sampurnanand, *Indian Socialism* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 1.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

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Chapter X

The Decline and Reconstruction of Morality in Chinese Society

Yang Fenggang

China is in crisis, *Wei Ji*. According to the Chinese understanding, "*Wei*" means danger and "*Ji*," opportunity. In crisis, danger and opportunity always coexist. If we have a sober realization of the danger and the opportunity we are facing, the future is hopeful.

Introduction

The seven weeks demonstration in Beijing in the Spring of 1989 and the subsequent Tiananmen incident on June 4 are among the manifestations of the present crisis, which permeates many dimensions of society: politics, economy, education, morality, family and others. Objectively speaking, the crisis resulted not only from malpractices or flaws, but also from the progress and developments we have achieved in the last decade. One fact is that the great economic progress in China in this decade has been an important inspiration to peoples elsewhere, just as the progress of other peoples provides founded hope for the people of China. Like all great changes which bring with them great progress as well as great turmoil, China is undergoing a critical as well as historic period of development.

Actually at this time, not only China, not only socialist countries, but the whole world is in crisis which is manifested differently in different societies. However, the confusion does not appear to be the despairing slide into conflict and terror which marked the earlier half of the 20th century and resulted in two World Wars, but it is a more hopeful pattern of change as people strive for new and generally agreed upon goals. All — whether people or governments, East or West, North or South — seem to look for greater peace, democracy, freedom and economic prosperity. The problems concern the means to be used in, and the pace of, moving toward the accomplishment of these commonly shared goals. There is general uncertainty about how to proceed and how fast and about whether people will have the moral staying power to travel the road which in many cases promises to be arduous and taxing. This much is shared among most peoples of the world.

More specifically, the problems faced by the Chinese people are complex and to some degree inevitable facets of the process of modernization. For example, the process of mechanization and bio-technical developments as well as the reforms of management system have greatly liberated the labor force in the countryside. As a result the number of people needed to produce a given quantity of food is dropping. This produces a lack of jobs in the countryside and concomitant pressures to move to the city. At the same time, an unreasonable price system dampens the initiative of farming. Moreover, the development of education and information technologies enable people in the countryside to envisage new modes of life available only in urban areas. More advanced education, medical facilities, recreational activities, new modes of employment and of social life exert a strong attraction to move to the cities. This combination of factors, rather than a simple rise in the number of people or failure of a specific scheme of the reform, would appear to be the basis for the increasing flow of people to the cities which causes a series of social problems. Here I do not mean to excuse the failures of some schemes of the reform or to advocate limiting of the reform thus far, nor do I try to mask the problems. My hope is to consider and to research the problems at a deeper level.

There are many problems or crises in Chinese society today, the one which I consider to be significant, is the decline of morality. Without morality, social turmoil is unavoidable and social change will lose its humane bearings. Historically, it seems that great developments of civilization are often accompanied by a decline of morality, which is evident in Chinese society today. The corruption of officials, degeneration of social mood, disintegration of family, unscrupulousness of manufacturing and commerce, as well as selfishness, egoism, irresponsibility, superficiality and impetuosity, which directly or indirectly seriously imperil society and its healthy development. The situation is precarious in the extreme and requires a major effort expertly to combine all available moral resources in order to counter with an effective response.

At the same time, China need not abandon hope since there is not only danger but also opportunity in the crisis. Our opportunity is provided by our great history, the great people and the progressive world. The abundant heritage of ancient and Chinese modern cultures together with those of other peoples can significantly contribute to present day efforts and to the efforts of mankind.

The moral crisis is here, but the moral problem cannot be solved in itself. We need to think about morality in a wider scope, namely, in terms of values in which morality is a part. Though it is difficult to define values, this may be due not to their inherent lack of clarity, but just the opposite. Just as Aristotle's categories express basically different ways of being and, therefore, cannot be defined one in terms of the other, the same is true of values. Hence, the best approach may be to note that the field of human consciousness contains two dimensions. One is truth which is concerned with stating the facts. In this sense truth is concerned with objects of what is there before us. The other dimension is values, which are concerned not with whether something exists or in what species it falls, but with what human evaluation is given to it and whether it is what it should be or lives up to its nature. This concerns whether an object is good or not, beautiful or not and is something that I ought or ought not to undertake.

We may distinguish at least three dimensions or relations of values: man and himself, man and man, man and nature (*Tian*1) which bound together constitute a value system. Morality basically focuses on one of the relations, i.e., man and man, or relations of persons. So the reconstruction of morality, which is a part of the value system, must be the reconstruction of the value system. First, I shall analyze the mechanism of a value system.

Model of Value System

Values are shaped in the practice of human life. Repeated decisions in the face of difficulties or challenges engender a real capability for such decision making on the part of a person. This is a strength, capacity or power (*virtus*, "virtue"), e.g., courage or fortitude. As these are admired or prized they become valued (values). Further, the imagination enables this process to go beyond the mere appreciation of what already is in order to delineate what we want to be or to realize in human action. Over time these values emerge more clearly, have more weight and become norms according to which we assess concrete possibilities and decide upon courses of action. Historical instances and personages bring out certain aspects of these virtues and thereby shape the specific character of individual virtues and of the complex of virtues which come to form a specific value system. Throughout this process, the work of the imagination in delineating and symbolizing what we value is essential.

Once a value system comes into being, it displays a certain stability. But the living practice of human life and new problems challenge this stability and force it to restructure: to reject the

antiquated and unsuitable, to absorb the new and suitable. If the stability of a value system is so powerful that the restructure cannot be brought about in this system, the fate of it will be destruction, hindering the development of human society and destroying itself. This will lead to a crisis of values (morality), and in the crisis the opportunity is opened to new values or value systems as well as to the older changed value system.

This, of course, is not merely a spiritual affair; value system is carried out by real human persons who as such are social and live their lives with and through theirs. Hence, the pattern of social relations is crucial in this process of the evolution of values. Social persons create, transmit and reconstruct values or value systems. At the same time, the creation, transmission and reconstruction of a value system can only be realized in society through social structures. Social structure chooses transmissive values, and the values necessarily define and determine social structure. Thus, historically the existing value systems fix the specific social structures of value transmission.

Values are not merely received from the past but are foundational in responding to present challenges and must be passed on to the future. In this light the application of values becomes of central importance. As new circumstances evolve they must be evaluated. This is not a process simply of accepting certain possibilities and rejecting others according to a heritage of values received from the past. It is also one of determining what I as a person and we as a people want to become in our new circumstances with the new challenges and opportunities these entail for us. So the existing value systems are due to be evaluated and re-evaluated too. This constitutes a pattern of mutual interaction and interchange between the modification of the value system and the adjustment of social structures.

Cultural Resources for Future Construction in China

In order to face the challenges of the times and build a constructive response, it is necessary to clarify the cultural heritages available to us and to look to the ways in which they can contribute to the growth of a people. It is not merely that without a foundation nothing can be built or that from nothing, nothing comes. To turn away from the entire experience of a people in the name of a hope of something unknown and never experienced is to destroy all and opt for the vacuum of nihilism from which only anarchy can be expected. It also is not merely that a specific culture should be reserved or a specific value system substituted for another. Only man is the end. Cultural heritages should serve man, human society and its future.

Human history has developed to this new era when the boundaries of nations or cultures are broken down and the world becomes a "global village." Every group of people should benefit from other peoples or cultures in this "global village." Thus we need imagination to respond to various challenges.

Considering availability, a constructive approach for China today would suggest rather a threefold approach. First, it calls for rejuvenation of the great traditions of the resources generated in the 5,000-year history of a great people with its Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist components. In doing this, the search would be not to restore the past, but to bring to new life its resources for constructing the future. Secondly, this should be joined with the modern developments of the Chinese people in their struggle to free themselves from various forms of feudalism, imperialism and colonialism and to rebuild their nation anew. From this struggle comes new commitment and further developments of the value patterns of the Chinese people; these too can serve in the construction of the future. Thirdly, one should not allow the colonialist aberrations of the West to

retract from the techniques and values of modernity which constitute the aspirations, means and underpinnings of the modern modes of human dignity, social cooperation and material production. These need to be considered carefully so that they become not merely a substitution for Chinese life, but an implementation of its capabilities and an enrichment of its proper values. At this level, too, the richness of the Confucian tradition and of the Chinese experience can enrich and broaden world horizons in a manner that would make room for full participation by the Chinese people in constructing the world of the future and enriching all mankind.

The Classical Chinese Tradition or Confucianism

The classical Chinese tradition generally will be referred to as "Confucianism" for this is clearly its major component. Here the term will be employed in a broader sense, including earlier roots of the Chinese heritage as well as its Taoist and Buddhist dimensions.

In what does this cultural heritage consist? What element especially does it contain which promises to be important for future construction? One of the characteristic central concepts in the classical Chinese tradition is three-dimensional harmony: the harmony of man and nature (*Tian*), which regards truth; the harmony of knowledge and behavior, which regards good; and the harmony of feeling and scenery, which regards beauty. Let us look at each of these in succession using the first to look also into the broader context within which Chinese culture has developed.

The Harmony of Man and Nature (Tian)

The harmony of man and nature (*Tian*) which regards truth consists of two aspects: the first is focused upon knowledge about nature; the second is a broad attitude toward nature (*Tian*).

In the classical Chinese tradition, *Tian* is understood as external nature (*Ziran*) and the divine heaven. To know *Tian* is to understand the harmony of the cosmos through knowing things in the cosmos. The metaphysical basis of this understanding is the cosmology of Yin and Yang. Cosmologically and ontologically, the origin of the universe is Tao. Tao is the absolute being and the first principle which is formless, nameless, eternal, all pervading and all embracing. Tao is Oneness (*Taiji*), Oneness produces Duality Yin and YangDuality evolves into Trinity (Yin, Yang and the harmony which results from and defines the interaction of Yin and Yang). From this Trinity all things emerge. Human knowledge should go through concrete things to realize the Tao and the harmony. If we trace this cosmology to its source and the importance of the sense of harmony in these two respects in shaping the Chinese outlook in life, one might refer to the geography of the country itself. This is marked by two great rivers, the Changjiang (Yangzi) and the Huanghe (the Yellow River). The civilization of China arose from these two regions, and the constitution of the cultural tradition of China depended upon its success in uniting harmoniously these two civilization. In a parallel fashion, the people of China derive from two tribes or peoples: the Huang and the Yan and their two quasi-mythical original monarchs. The former was symbolized by the dragon and the latter by the phoenix. Both symbols have continued to the present time and the unity of the Chinese people has depended upon bringing the two into harmony one with another.

Harmony then has been a base theme for China as a people and a nation. It is not surprising then to see this as a basic metaphysical theme of the Confucian and Taoist components of its tradition. Both think in terms of an original contrasting pair of forces: yin and yang. Inseparable one from another, the two constitute the third, but more integrating and foundational element of harmony.

In the first aspect of the harmony of man and nature (*Tian*), it includes an epistemological component. As human beings live in this nature, it is necessary to know this nature. Only in the harmony with nature can one know it because harmony is the basic principle of the cosmos and of the relationship between man and nature. Chinese traditional epistemology stresses the whole and synthesis; it regards analysis as damaging or destroying things in nature (*Ziran*).2 This is shown in the well-known book, *The Tao of Physics*.3

In view of this, one can comprehend something of the pervasive character of the value of harmony and of the way in which this should characterize one's attitude toward nature. This is the second aspect of the harmony of man and nature (*Tian*). Man should search for a way to live in harmony with nature. This would rule out hostile attitudes toward nature as an object to be conquered or defeated. This is not a compromise or a mere pragmatic tactic. On the contrary, it is an inevitable expression of the inner harmony of yin and yang of which all consists; it is the only way to be, for it is of this that being internally consists. Externally, nature is not viewed as an alien object with which one is confronted. On the contrary, nature (*Tian*) is pervasive and inclusive; it extends from the material environment to mankind and to heaven. Indeed, nature as a whole, shares the characteristics of heaven and is inclusive and benevolent. In this light, the only realistic attitude is one of harmony; anything else would be futilely out of step and self-destructive. Without harmony, human artifice can destroy human beings as well as nature.

At this point, the classical Chinese tradition is in contrast to the Western focus upon man as one who is to rule and conquer nature and as a detached observer of nature which is considered to be a thing or object to be inspected and precisely calculated. Both attitudes have their importance as well as limitation. The Western attitude toward nature has developed great modern sciences which greatly benefit mankind. However, the crisis of ecological environment is serious, imperiling the life of mankind. In response to this crises, the Chinese tradition has much to contribute, as shown in the great popularity of the work of Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful*.4

In addition, the development of an objective attitude of precise observation and calculation is important in providing for the needs of the populace in modern times. In the past, notable advancement had been made in astronomy and in the calculation of time, stimulated by the desire to understand the harmony of man and the heavens. Today's science has a different orientation with multiple ramifications. For instance, a close attention to precise measurement naturally directs attention to the role of the subject which carries out these measurements. Thus, scientific objectivity is shadowed by the development of awareness of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and this has multiple implications for social consciousness and social relations.

The Harmony of Knowledge and Behavior: Good

In view of this harmony between man and nature (*Tian*), it can be expected that knowledge will have strong moral sense. Rather than being separated from value concerns, the purpose of knowledge is to found appropriate and/or improved behavior. Indeed, knowledge which is not so oriented is considered not merely to be unhelpful or even indifferent, but disruptive. As part of the general harmony of man and nature, knowledge should promote right and harmonious behavior in society. This is not solely a matter of ethics as a branch of knowledge, but of morality as a quality of human action.

For its part the emphasis of the Chinese culture has always been upon the humanities. True knowledge was always considered to be concerned with moral norms and the regulation of behavior. Actually the more important content of knowledge, according to Confucianism, is

knowledge of the humanities, especially history and philosophy, which directly help to shape people's morality. What was shown to be conducive to harmonious relations among people in the past was evidently good; what did not do so was useless or detrimental. This is grounded in the deeper metaphysical sense of harmony described above, for the purpose of morality is to function in such a way as to promote harmony in society. In this sense, it is an extension of the harmony of man and physical nature to the relation of man to other men; more deeply it is the way of integrating the social relations of which human life consists with the great harmony of reality including heaven (*Tian*).

Contemporary pressures, such as social turbulence, conflicts between ethnic groups and nations, the threat of nuclear and chemical weapons, gave urgent contemporary importance to this harmony of knowledge and behavior. Besides, contemporary concern for the destruction wreaked upon the environment by the new scientific and technological capabilities also directs renewed attention to the sense of harmony and moral knowledge which have characterized Chinese traditional culture. In the West, the importance of humanities, especially moral knowledge over and above physical sciences, was implied in the succession of the Kantian Critiques, but this essential insight of Kant has been often underestimated or even neglected.

However, a danger I must point out is that in Confucianism the emphasis on harmony and moral knowledge can be appealed to as a means for manipulating the people, calling for sacrifices in laboring and living standards and postponing personal gratification by people after the need for such sacrifices has passed. This manipulation of the Confucian tradition by modern technologies of power can consider the harmony of knowledge and behavior as a tool for repression, thereby constituting a break upon the dynamism of the people.

Another salient point is the focus of modern Western knowledge upon the objective sciences and thus upon epistemology or the science of knowledge per se. Consequently, the resulting controls over the direction of the human powers of subjectivity has given Western civilization a great capability for dominating the material and physical environment of life. This also has made possible great strides in the social sciences. China appears to be in considerable need of developing this type of knowledge. The ramifications of such sensibilities for all dimensions of life should not be underestimated. As a matter of fact, a wedding of the two is an obvious need, but how can we actualize this wedding?

In comparison to the complex sophistication of modern structures, the Confucian harmony seems too simple and rudimentary. One might think of negating the Confucian harmony by modern social technologies and then returning to the Confucian harmony by a sort of dialectical negation of negation. This is a quite common tendency among Chinese scholars and students. In proceeding through such a series of negations, one may lose precisely the life and life-giving power of the tradition. Even if one were to retain its abstract concept, one would lose its attractive and emotive power. In sum, one would be dealing with tradition in terms of theory but would be insensitive to it as the river of human freedom, personal commitment and popular destiny.

In this light, the image of the river which is popular among contemporary youth may be helpful. This allows for continuity from the early, rudimentary beginnings, through the incremental stages of a great river, onward to ever new and large dimensions. This conveys a sense of identity with novelty, of tradition with change, of continuity with critique; it has the basic value, which is much appreciated in our day, of realism.

Developmental psychology may describe this process. Piaget points out that the correction of flaws at an earlier or more fundamental level must be carried out during that level because later on at a higher level, even more sophisticated corrections are ineffective. In this light, if the affective

revaluation and reappropriation of the Confucian roots, still present in the Chinese sense of personal dignity, the family and social relations, are to be protected from manipulation, this must be done in terms of the deep Confucian level of the Chinese self-identity. At that level it was precisely the Taoist and Buddhist traditions which balanced the human weakness and which made the more personal, paternal responsibilities within the system of harmony susceptible to degeneration into imperial order and eventually repressed or ridiculed Buddhism. In depth, healing of the Chinese, basically Confucian, psyche might then benefit from a freer contribution of its elements of Buddhism and Taoism.

Correspondingly on the structural level, in this century modern social critique is needed in order to correct overbearing social and political structures. Such critiques have been at the heart of the Chinese revolution and now will be considered below.

The Harmony of Feeling and Ambience: Beauty

In one sense this harmony of feeling and ambience might be looked upon as an extension over and above those of man and nature and of knowledge and behavior. This is not something outside of the first harmony with nature (*Tian)* which is all inclusive; neither can feeling be truly outside of the order of social interaction delineated in the second harmony with behavior. Hence it may be appreciated more appropriately as the inmost sensibility at the heart of the second and the first harmonies taken as sets of concentric circles. The harmony of feeling and ambience can also be regarded as a fulfillment of the first and the second harmonies. Only when this harmony is being achieved can all of man's artificiality be in the harmony with nature, *Tian* and Tao. So the life of the human being in a great harmonious way is simultaneously good and beautiful.

The harmony of feeling and ambience composes *jingjie* which can have many degrees or types. Though they are especially important for the fine arts, music and poetry, progression through these is the very process by which man realizes the basic level of unity or harmony with *Tian* and approaches to wisdom. Without some sense of beauty, that is, of unity of feeling and ambience, human fulfillment cannot be achieved.

Harmony for Confucius did not have the depressive, haunting and obediential sense given it in the Sung Dynasty for political purposes. Harmony of feeling and ambience was much more joyous, free and creative. This is not an order imposed from without, but a cumulative sense which wells up from within as people express the goodness of their nature and form a truly happy society.

The social structures for the transmission of Confucianism are to be found both in education and in the family. The task of education was precisely to find the good potential in everyone and to reject the evil in the environment. The family and Confucianism have always interacted in such a way that the family was both shaped by and transmitted Confucianism. These two were related not as cause and effect but more in terms of a correlation so that each proceeded in and by the other. Confucianism might be called the spirit of the family. This was communicated by means of the schools, the families and the official system of exams for advancement in public life. Presently, it is communicated almost only by the family — a special social structure whose roots are in the human heart.

Confucianism has been dying ever since the modern sciences, technologies and gunboats of the West awoke this Oriental people from their age-old dream. Their value system was too stable and too self-enclosed; it could not respond to the challenges of modernity and imperialism. But, the Chinese people were not self-enclosed; and in order to save the nation, China absorbed Marxism as a vital new value system. After undergoing a nearly century-long criticism,

Confucianism was dying; however, death is regeneration. Like the myth of the self-burned phoenix, a new vital phoenix is being borne. When the crises in modern society are aggravated, Confucianism, after being severely criticized, radiated new light.

There are concrete recent indications of the continued importance of this tradition. Internationally, the nations in the cultural circle of Confucianism on the Asian rim — the so-called 'little dragons'5 — have achieved success in technology, advanced industrial production and commerce which has brought the Confucian cultural area into an active role in leadership and participation in the international economic and political order. Despite an almost total lack of natural and physical resources and despite being at the greatest distance from the major commercial markets of the world, the ability of these peoples to be so successful focuses attention precisely upon their human, i.e., their cultural, resources. Meanwhile, some insightful Western intellectuals began to realize and appreciate the significance of Confucianism for the whole of mankind.

From within China there is renewed interest in the classical heritage of the people. New academies have sprung up and been received with considerable interest by people distributed throughout the country. In October of 1989, a colloquium was held in Beijing and Confucius' birthplace, Oufu, Stangdong, sponsored by the Confucius Foundation of China and UNESCO, in memory of the 2,540th anniversary of the birthday of Confucius. More than 200 scholars from within China and other parts of the world participated, and it received great attention by scholars and other people.

In terms of social structures, Confucianism is very favorably placed. As the classical tradition of the people, it not only resonates in the deep sensibilities of the people, but it is reflected in the pattern of family life. Furthermore, because it has focused strongly upon the family and made the harmony of the family its basic concern, Confucianism lives and is communicated to the degree that this Chinese family is not dissolved. It is true that the present crisis of society is also a crisis of the family. But, as people attempt to respond to this crisis by reemphasizing the importance of family life and looking for its underpinnings, they are by that very fact bringing to consciousness once again Confucian values. Hence, the simple people in the villages, concerned for the life of their family, respect and even worship Confucius. Among intellectuals in urban areas, the dynamics of the critique of modern Western values, if it does not lead toward nihilism, directs attention also to the basic Confucian virtues.

Marxism (Maoism)

A second dimension of the present situation in China is Marxism or Maoism born in the revolution it embodies. Hence, it shares in some of the deep emotive commitment by the people to the revolution's goals and hopes. These include:

(a) a new society with equality, freedom and respect for the needs of all, especially the lower-class people;
(b) a threefold social critique: anti-feudalism, anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism.

The first of these are authentic enlightenment values shared by all modern peoples. They are experienced by each people in its own way and time. For the Chinese, this experience came especially at the end of the empire in 1911 and was deeply reinforced by the revolution that began with liberation from the Japanese and other imperialistic occupations. This deep commitment to freedom and equality has been shaped through the Marxist-Maoist analysis of history so that the

thrust of liberation has come to mean also, and in a special way, the liberation or improvement not only of the material but of the social condition of the peasant and worker. The process has come to be seen as the extension of the "long march" and to be invested with its emotion and commitment. This search for social justice and sense of service to the people, especially the exploited and the oppressed, must remain a major element in the social consciousness of China.

The second facet of the Maoism which shapes and applies the first is its emphasis upon social critique. Mao encouraged young people to retain a sense of rebellion, saying that it is right (reasonable) to rebel against the injustice (*Zaofan Youli*). In view of the first goal of concern for the peasant and general Marxist theory, this critique has been articulated in terms of class analysis. Hence, recently some have objected to persons who have been exploitive being admitted to membership in the Communist Party, which it is claimed must be a Party, not of all, but of the working people. Along with the development of human society, in practice the element of class analysis will remain an important factor in social analysis and is being used as such throughout the world. It was the combination of these two goals in the Christian context of Latin America which generated its "theology of liberation."

However, monopoly of a value system will always present some dilemmas. Practically, it appears from experience that some aspects of free enterprise are required. Hence, ten years of reforms which permit limited private enterprise and free market economy have achieved great progress in the economy of China. But encouraging free enterprise is not in conformity with antiexploitation in one policy. How is that to be integrated with society as a whole and expressed politically?

In addition, the emphasis of Marxism upon class or the whole working class can easily lead to repressing individuals. Self-sacrifice of individuals for the whole (class or people) may be manipulated by authoritarians, and the person may become a function of the system and fail to generate personal initiative and creativity required for needed progress.

Nevertheless, new times will require progress at all levels: economic, social, political and philosophical. In this the Marxist heritage of the 20th century with its high goals of liberation, rationally social critique and advancement of the vast body of peasants and workers will be an essential component.

The social structures for the transmission of Marxism (Maoism) are broad: schools, the public propaganda, especially the Party organization at all levels. These social structures as well as the inherent attraction of Marxism (Maoism) will help to transmit this value system. Self-criticism of Marxism and a positive response to the challenges of social crises will play a crucial role in the transmission of Marxism.

Western Values (Christianity)

At the present time in other regions, the Marxist countries are undergoing a process which M. Gorbachev terms "reconstruction" or *perestroika*. One after another — the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, East Germany, etc. — have come to recognize that they cannot make progress, or even hold their own, economically, socially or politically, without finding ways to promote participation and creativity by their people. For this they look to the West. In looking for the value components which can constitute a moral sense adequate for China of the 21st century, looking to the West holds promise. In so doing, the goal should not be to look merely at the particular instrumentalities of Western culture in order to mimic them in another cultural setting, but to search out the basic philosophical underpinnings which provide the exceptionally creative adaptability.

One could look immediately to the enlightenment for its affirmation of the key modern values of freedom, equality and fraternity. To get a sense of the roots of freedom now being sought by the Marxist countries of Eastern European, however, one must look more deeply into the culture of the West to discover its resource of freedom and creativity. This might be thought to be its sense of individuality, but this is susceptible to its negative, antisocial interpretation as individualism in the sense of Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. This is the inverted and extreme mirror image of that of the deadening conformism from which *perestroika* is seeking to escape. At a deeper level, the deadening extremism of both individualism and conformism shares a common origin as modern scientific reductionism.

In order to find the basis for a sense of freedom which is both intensely self-aware and self-determining, intensely social and extensively inclusive, one needs to look more deeply into the Western heritage for the development of its notion of the person. In modern times that took place especially in Kant, but it is rooted in the Christian sense of the person as image of God. This relation to an absolute fullness of existence, consciousness and bliss (to use the Hindu expression) has a number of crucial implications.

First, it grounds the dignity and rights of the person. These are not restricted according to the ever imperfect and inevitably limited state of human social awareness; instead, human society is always challenged to recognize and promote these inviolable God-given rights of the person.

Second, in exercising this freedom the person stands always in relation with others who also are images and equal participants in that same absolute source: they are brothers in a common Father. Hence one's life is always and inherently social, rather than individualistic.

Third, the grounding of the person's will in infinite Good and Love means that to whatever degree anything is it can be attractive, but that no one thing or combination of things can be determinative. The attractive character of reality entails creativity because all things, actual and possible as far as my imagination can go, are of interest and potentially attractive. Nevertheless, through all of this I remain free because nothing or combination of things measures up to the infinite good in which my will is grounded; hence, my will cannot be determined from without.

These insights regarding the person as inviolable, social and creatively free are not without analogues in other world religions, but a number of characteristics of Christianity have been foundational in the development of much of what is called modernity, particularly its sense of the person and its place in society and world. The first is its strong sense of the transcendence of the divine which sets it clearly above all humans and all social creations. In this light, God-given rights of persons such as life and liberty remain untouchable by any social or political reality. As these rights are not given by society, they cannot be removed by society; on the contrary, it is the duty of social institutions to protect and promote them.

This, in turn, has numerous implications for participation in the social order. When joined to the progressive capacitation of humanity proceeding through printing, education and communication, the basic sense of human dignity and freedom calls for even more active participation in the decision making processes regarding social, political, economic and cultural affairs at the local, national and indeed world levels.

Further, if freedom comes to be newly appreciated as the best thing in this and in ever expanding realms, then the abuse of freedom or sin can also come to be appreciated as the most dangerous thing. It will not do to ignore this side of human and social life in a world in which the immense powers of science and technology can be implemented for evil as well as good. In this

situation the Judeo-Christian tradition has much to offer, both through its ancient mythology of original sins and the modern theological elaboration of this in terms of basic alienation. Further, the Christian elements of sacrifice, redemption and resurrection bring out at once both the profound horror or evil as sin and the ability to overcome this in human life.

Finally, the conviction that what was accomplished in principle in Christ can be shared in by all persons and all mankind reinforces the notion of freedom as responsibility. For all are empowered to take real and full account of their own encounters with evil and their own failings, knowing that they can overcome evil, that they can experience forgiveness and share it with others, that they can be about the process of rebuilding the heavenly Jerusalem in this wold. This allows for redemption, healing and new and vibrant life.

Indeed, Paul Tillich has developed this in the form of an existential dialectic. It begins from Paradise as a state of basic human goodness lived in a state of dreaming innocence. This thesis is followed as an antithesis by the step into existence, where the exercise of freedom entails negation and fault. Redemption cannot come from man who cannot save himself but is accomplished on the strength of the One Absolute Truth and Love. Nevertheless, this redemption is realized in time and as history where the gradual healing of disrupted structures constitutes a new manifestation of the divine in man. Pope John XXIII spoke of it as restoring the face of Christ. His wounds and cross, now overcome as signs of death, become symbols of the power of good over evil, of battles fought and won, of new life that emerges through our struggle and suffering.

In this light there is hope for overcoming old enmities, for forgiveness and reconciliation, for peace among men. This is not merely an ideal which ignores evil and hence is unrelated to reality. Christ's victorious encounter with evil gives hope that it can and must be overcome. In this perspective, there is no need to suppose that man is a wolf to other men and merely a channel of conflict, nor is there need to abandon personal freedom in order to have social unity. On the contrary, community is built of the personal triumphs of generosity over selfishness and of love over enmity. Society is ever emerging as victories are won in the struggle of human freedom to overcome selfishness and to reach out to others in truth and love.

Another point worth stressing is the modern sciences and technologies which have prospered in the West. This value system provides profound basis for human knowledge and for the development of technology which have benefited mankind greatly.

The social structures for the transmission of Western values in China are colleges and churches. Modern technology makes it impossible to forbid the spread of thought. Active introduction and critique of Western values by the dedicated scholars in universities has been a tradition since the great May Fourth Movement of 1919. Chinese intellectuals chose Marxism in order to rescue the nation and respond to the crises at that time. Today, in order to develop our nation, and respond to the crises today, many intellectuals are seeking more effective values. Western values are naturally attracting to them. More importantly, some scholars begin to emphasize the much deeper level of Western values, namely, Christian values. The interests of college students in Christianity is rising greatly, along with the interest in all of Western values.

At the same time, Chinese Christian (Protestant and Catholic) Churches have developed rapidly in recent years both in cities and in the countryside. These churches are an effective transmissive structure of this value system — to believers and also to non-believers.

Conclusion

In the contemporary world people more and more appreciate pluralism. The need for pluralism is based on the common philosophical recognition: man is finite, human consciousness is limited, thus man's knowledge and values are limited. Every value system has its inherent weakness or limitation. Any monopoly of one value system can only bring misfortune to human society and mankind. It is important then that all cooperate to benefit mankind in a harmonious way. This philosophical understanding calls for real pluralism.

As we look toward the future of China, what are the prospects? In discussing each of the three systems of values, each is seen to be consistent in its own right. Hence, it does not seem that their mere amalgamation or homogenization is probable.

Actually, in China there is a tradition of pluralism. This flourished in the first thousand years of this era, when Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism lived side by side, each complementing and balancing the other. This reflects the Chinese notion that three legs give the strongest support.

It is fully conceivable that the next century may find existing in a mutually complementary relation the three value systems outlined above: Confucianism (taken as the threefold tradition of Confucius, Buddhism and Taoism), Marxism (in its Chinese version) and Western values (in their Christian roots). Any one might be particularly reflected in any single person, but all three might find deep expression in a society that would reflect the combined riches of all: the ever deepening harmonies of the Confucian traditions, serious and yet playful in the spirit of Taoism, worldly and yet detached in the sense of Buddhism; the critical stance and social concerns of the Marxian tradition and the divinely founded personal worth and democratic participation of the Christian traditions of the West.

I believe that individuals are able to construct by themselves their own value system, integrating from available sources, and are able to constantly live up to their faith. Meanwhile, as modern persons, they should be able to acknowledge the general trend of the times and enjoy the pluralistic context of society. One of the present tasks of intellectuals committed to the nation and to man is to clear away the obstacles in the way of a harmony of multiple value systems and to help to give birth to this new era.

Notes

1. *Tian* (Heaven) is one of the important concepts in Chinese intellectual history. The meaning of *Tian* mainly includes nature and supernature which rules the universe. Cf. Zhang Dai-Nian, "Theories Concerning Man and Nature in Classical Chinese Philosophy" and Yi-jie, "On the Unity of Man and Heaven," both in *Man and Nature: The Chinese Tradition and the Future Tang Yi-jie, Li Zhen*, George McLean, eds. (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1989).

2. *Ziran* (nature) originally means "thing-as-it-is" or "spontaneousness."

3. F. Capra, *The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism*, 2nd ed. (Toronto & New York: Bantam Books, 1984).

4. E. F. Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973).

5. "The four little dragons" are Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea.

Chapter XI

Exploring Neighborhood Voices: The Origins and Imperatives of Community-Based Video Documentation of Urban Ethnicity

John Kromkowski

Films1 can provide an experiential texture to the specific topics of ethnicity, immigration and urban industrialization and subsequent economic decline as well as the moral imagination of Geno Baroni which inspirited the action and the filmmakers that documented this remark moment of social, economic and cultural change that transformed America's older industrial cities and catalyzed a new mode of community-based organization and the emergence of urban ethnicity in the language of American politics. Understanding this new epoch of cultural symbolization and its articulation in these films through the parables and pensées of Geno Baroni is the primary level of this research. The origins and imperatives which developed urban ethnic images and self-articulation of neighborhood and community-based culture and politics can be traced in this period to the moral imagination of Geno Baroni who as exemplar helped all Americans to understand certain features of the America condition that had been eclipsed by forms of social analysis and political and cultural power. These ignored and denied the salience and significance of ethnicity and immigration and over emphasized the dominances of industrialization and the monocultural thrusts of consumerism and the anti-urban and anti-ethnic tradition of earlier immigrants that defined and formed the American reality prior to the mass immigrations of the past century.

The production of video/film sources regarding American ethnicity has significantly changed the capacity of archivists and activists and transformed the work of analysts and interpreters of the American reality. Thus, "talking motion pictures," readily produced and disseminated, accomplished much more than a thousand words as well as other forms of documentary evidence and monuments. The technological transformation of the truth contained in the ethnic, traditional wisdom of the proverb linking seeing and writing exposes the problematic that served as a starting point of this presentation and article. Research and writing — critique and clarification of the substance of these three films — are quite different from the experience of these films. Yet, examining and exploring the question posed by this conference are inextricably connected to these films which articulate current aspects and the ongoing presence of ethnicity, immigration, and industrialization. Presenting these films to a scholarly conference is in some respect like publishing a newly found primary source. Clearly, the films as sources must stand on their own, but some aspects of analysis and interpretation found in these films and especially the ongoing relevancy of such topics, as well as the context of these documents and their potential for inter-textuality, may more artfully be written about than graphically portrayed.

This paper refers the speech which finally became this text. So, the ancient tensions between story-telling and literature and between poetics and social analytics raise themselves again in the context of both presenting these films as sources and using these sources as the basis of further inquiry as well as exegesis. At best, the study and understanding of ethnicity, immigration, and industrialization proposed in these films requires an initial awareness and consciousness of the problematic posed in the films. The interpretation of social reality through the experience of, and reflection on, these experiences deepen our understanding of the compound and interwoven

expressions of society, economy and culture which are constructed and reconstructed in these works.

The films, *Metropolitan Ave., The Neighborhood Roadshow,* and *Festivals Are More Than Food and Fun*, are illustrative of the lived community and the interpretative community of neighborhood and ethnic activists joined in the mid-1970s to fashion narratives which would give voice to their cultural endowment and vision to their struggle for survival *vis a vis* the following American phenomena: the decline of urban areas, de-industrialization, the emergence of race and ethnicity as social and political categories, identities, and ideologies. The upshot of these epochal changes include urban-ethnic feminism, the neighborhood movement, urban populism and a critique of large scale institutions, corporations, and impersonal and unaccountable governmental programs and policies. That these films — documentaries and declarations — were completed is partially derived from the availability of public support for the applied humanities sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) especially during the tenure of Dr. Joseph Duffey. In this regard, NEH fostered the research of social historians and ethnographers as well as urban residents to widen awareness of the local cultural expression found in urban ethnic enclaves.

But the fundamental origins of these documentaries can be found in the popular dissemination of technology and the policy impulses initiated by the Bicentennial Ethnic Racial Coalition (BERC) and the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA). These entities, the former an advising board of a federal agency of the American Revolutionary Bicentennial Administration (ARBA), the latter a private non-profit research center, were responsible for catalyzing initial national awareness of the heretofore only local experiences of urban ethnic disaffection and the attendant search for a new narrative which could articulate a neighborhood based approach to social, economic, and cultural justice. Thus, the precursoring experiences of urban ethnic enclaves and lack of attention to their significance as a factor in urban and cultural policy lead to the development and production of these films. Thus the ARBA and NCUEA projects revealed the profound neglect of urban ethnicity in our national urban and cultural policy. The leadership of ARBA and NCUEA located this conflict and its context in social realities which gave rise to the production of the social, economic and cultural narrative found in *Metropolitan Ave., The Neighborhood Roadshow,* and *Festivals Are More Than Food and Fun*. These pioneering social historical films fashioned by community-based organizations document and interpret the experiences of contemporary American urban ethnicity whose current existence is the consequence of immigration and industrialization.

Urban ethnicity of this sort traces its origins to the period of urban development from the 1880's to 1924 and the subsequent period of decline from 1945 to 1976. These 'texts'— *Metropolitan Avenue* (MA), *The Neighborhood Roadshow* (NR) and *Festivals Are More than Fun and Food*(FMFF) are emblematic of the theory and practice of community based critiques of urban and cultural policy that emerged in the 1970's and yielded significant but short-lived public support for the renaissance of urban ethnic neighborhoods that lasted from 1971 to 1982. These films articulate a critique of dominant political and cultural expressions that ignored, demeaned and then eclipsed the meaning, significance, and the very existence of neighborhood-based ethnic culture in contemporary American urban life. Thus these texts are central to an epoch of protest and search for identity and power. They record efforts to establish a neighborhood voice and indigenous interpretation of the intersection of ethnicity, immigration and industrialization. These films are focused on ethnic neighborhoods. They document small-scale, local manifestation of urban ethnic phenomena. These films, as careful micro-level case studies, make it clear that ethnicity, immigration and industrialization are not a single, undifferentiated process. What Frank

Thistlewaite wrote of the pre-World War immigration to America is equally true for present-era ethnic neighborhoods in America:

Seen through a magnifying glass, this undifferentiated mass surface breaks down into a honey comb of innumerable particular cells, districts, villages, towns, each with an individual reaction or lack of it to the pull of migration. This is not simply a question of Scottish Highlanders emigrating in a body of Upper Canada, Rhinelanders to Wisconsin, Swedes to Montana, Northern Italians to France and Argentina, Southern Italians to the United States, though these elementary distinctions are important. We only come to secret sources of the movement if we work at a finer tolerance. We must talk, not of Wales, but of Portmadoc or Swansea, not of North or South Italy but of Venetia Giulia, Friuli, Basilicata and Calabria, not of Greece or even the Peloponnese, but of Tripolis, Sparta Megapolis not of Lancashire but of Darwin or Blackburn not of Norway but of Kristiana and North Bergenhus...only when we examine . . . districts and townships, and trace the fortunes of their native sons[sic], do we begin to understand the true anatomy of migration.2

The social sciences and the applications of their findings in public policy are beginning to recognize that the need for "a finer tolerance" is necessary. The study of the pattern of settlement in the U.S. as well as the study of the emigrant neighborhood level that we create a complete picture of the great immigrations that transformed and continue to recreate America. Thus these films form an archive of contemporary stories which 'intertext' with our knowledge of macro-level processes and explanations regarding immigration, urbanization, and industrialization.

Films

These films are low budget documentaries. They are indigenous social histories and oral-visual statements which portray decades of chronological time, but are grounded in and thus report the events and action of the 1970's. Thus MA, NR and FMFF are a primary source of an especially tumultuous period of urban crisis which include racial-ethnic conflict, populist communitarian organizing, and the coming of age of grass-roots Women's politics. In this respect these films are an evocative data sources related to the thesis argued by Manuel Castells in *City and The Grassroots* (University of California Press, 1983).3 Castells and these films argued that the social practice of the 1970's exposed the bankruptcy of the explanatory power of class and economic factors. Castells and others argue that an honest to experience social theory required additional dimensions: culture, ethnicity, gender, spatial variables, leadership and small scale locus for political organization which initiated action and critique. Thus these films compliment Castells's case studies and illustrate the findings of cultural and urban analysis devoted to exploring the casual impact of neighborhood and ethnicity4 . These films express the latent social theory found in urban ethnic experiences, indigenous narratives, and the political, economic, and cultural explanations derived from the survival strategies of neighborhood persons, most of whom are descendants of the Great Emigrations from Europe and the American Southern States which occur during the last seventy years. These films document the rise of cultural, economic and political activity during the 1970's. These films reveal the issues of cultural-ethnic claims of the poor and the unemployed against the mainstream hegemonic tradition of nativism and anti-urbanism. These films express concern for housing and work in an era of diminishing urban residential construction and the deindustrialization of older cities of the Northeast (New York), Mid-Atlantic (Baltimore) and Mid-West (South Bend).

Are they representative of more than themselves? Do these films represent large, middle and small metropolitan realities? Such questions betray the bias of the macro-level theory: the analysis contested by these small scale, disaggregated enquiries. Each film employs its own style, rhetorical approach and methodological mode. Each tells us about and provides glimpses into a little world of meaning within which human action occurs. The character and origins of the policy and cultural critique expressed in these films will be explored later in this paper. At the outset the films must speak for themselves; at the elemental level their statements are clear:

MA presents the experiences of neighborhood women. The filmmaker, Christine Noschese, allows the National Congress of Neighborhood Women to narrate her story of change, the passing of an era and the techniques of a grass roots 'issue organization' instigated to empower neighborhood people. The theme of personal and family identity and civic participation, the creation of a community congress and the struggle for justice through direct action *vis a vis* corporate and governmental power express the message of *Metropolitan Avenue*. Ethnic women of Greenpoint, Williamsburg and Cooper Park — Polish-Americans, Italian-Americans, African Americans and other ethnics — Hispanic, Irish, Southern immigrants relate the inspirational force of a community that discovers it is not powerless and not divided by race and ethnicity, but that it can be united by convergent issues imposed by government inaction and corporate interests which created a context which required community action.

The Neighborhood Road Show is a series of historical tableaus of seven Baltimore neighborhoods. These mini-dramas are drawn from an oral history archive. The film making is the product under the dual tutelage of a professional theater group and a community coalition of neighborhood organizations which participated in the oral history data collection and an experiment in community-based, action-oriented drama. The presentations were originally performed in various neighborhoods — hence the 'roadshow' in its title — and were used to catalyze neighborhood forums, community organization events and fund-raisers. The authenticity of the tales included in the production was settled through the discussion of authority that was included in such forums. The final products were used to supplement ethnic studies curriculum in Baltimore schools as well as to express the variety of concerns that neighborhoods faced during a period of significant change. For example, the immigration from Europe and the trip from the South to Baltimore; organizing, founding and building of churches, unions and community institutions; the decline and rise of ethnic, racial and religious sensitivities and boundaries; the Civil Rights Movement; the Holocaust; the Ethnic Neighborhood Movement initiated in Baltimore by Barbara Mikulski and Gloria Aull and their struggle against the impact of urban renewal and highway construction and housing projects that were never built; gentrification, neighborhood decline, and suburban growth. *NR* portrays the Black, Italian, Polish, Appalachian, Jewish and Greek experience in the neighborhoods of Baltimore. The film includes indigenous songs, jokes, and dance, but its characterology avoids negative stereotypes. Its populist critique of urban renewal and economic change, especially change which manipulates ethnic-racial fears and development remedies which destroy neighborhoods are the themes which drive the message of these hopeful stories of struggle for justice and community-based development. The film includes the presence and reactions of a live audience which is clearly entertained by the didactic tales of community-based action by Baltimore neighborhoods that deflected the heartless and mindless agendas of planners and bureaucrats. *NR* documents a civic revival and the initiatives of many community-based partnerships designed to improve neighborhoods and sustain urban ethnic cultural diversity.

Festivals Are More Than Food and Fun employs another technique based on a video historical archive. The ethnographic material is developed from the indigenous film archive of stories of thirteen ethnic groups in South Bend, Indiana. Topics in these tales included: settlement, change, community-ethnic-religious values, leadership, and significant local events and art forms. These data were developed by a coalition of ethnic groups and institutions associated with the Institute for Urban Studies at the University of Notre Dame. Presentations of these dimensions of ethnic life, values and artifacts were initiated to indicate that ethnicity was more than food and festivals, hence the title and the juxtaposition of these other substantive cultural expressions and artifices alongside of an ethnic festival and food fair. These conjoined events were orchestrated to coincide with the inauguration of Century Center, a civic and convention facility designed by Philip Johnson and John Burgee. Century Center included an Industrial Historical Museum, Art Center and performance stages. Thus the event which the film portrays and the stories it documents also records a moment of urban passage in the history of South Bend, Indiana. The film marks an epochal change: An industrial era gives way to a hoped-for service economy. A devastating gaping hole in the commercial center of the city (for years sign of decay and decline) is partially filled in by the rise of Century Center—the first new construction in two generations. Century Center establishes the beginning a new city core. The inclusion of the immigrant and industrial past and its reservoir of cultural meaning in Century Center implies a symbolic turning point of a small city racked by plant closings and unemployment. This event yields a combination of nostalgia and expectation. The film and its documentation process create a deposit of self articulated stories of the experiences of the people of South Bend: the Native Americans (Potowatomee) French, German, Irish, Polish, Italian, Greek, Black, Jewish, Belgian, Hungarian, Mexican and Slavish (Southern Slaves whose old world 'name' in German-speaking areas of Austria, they retained and Anglicized in the multi-ethnic industrial neighborhood of South Bend).

Essays

These film-makers and their neighborhood voices and the social theory which drives the problematics explored in these films were initiated in the dialogue and deliberation regarding immigration, ethnicity and older industrial cities which erupted during the 1960s. The essence of this urban, industrial and ethnic crisis was first distilled in two pivotal collection of essays published in the early 1970s.5 Two collections of essays, *Overcoming Middle Class Rage* (1971) and *Pieces of a Dream: The Ethnic Workers' Crisis with America* (1972) reveal the panoply of unresolved cultural and social policy concern of the era which began with the end of WWII and extended into the victories of the Civil Rights Movement and New Immigration Law of 1965. The urban dynamics of the 60s and the plight of the fears and rage of the middle American were analyzed by serious and deeply engaged persons such as Michael Lerner, Daniel Moynihan, Reverend Andrew Greely, Bayard Rustin, David Danzig, and others. It seems, however, that Murray Friedman, later Vice-Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the editor of *Overcoming Middle Class Rage,* captured the sense of the time when he wrote:

What is urgently needed is for some of the brilliance which has gone into fashioning the New Deal and race revolutions to be developed to speak to and for middle class America. This should not be seen as bowing to a reactionary mood now extant in the land. Nor should it be based purely on practical politics, since the aspirations and needs of working Americans are as legitimate as any

other group in our society. The growth of political reaction today is as much due to liberal loss of contact with troubled Americans over the past two decades as to any resurgent, right-wing movement. We have gravitated to a politics of gesture and confrontation rather than a politics of depolarization in which we choose issues and work for those programs which are commonly seen as befitting large groupings of Americans including, of course, the most disadvantaged.6

The other collection of essays, *Pieces of a Dream*, include another illustrious array of concerned theoreticians and activists: Lydio F. Tomasi, Sen. Barbara Mikulski, Geno Baroni, Michael Novak, Sen. Richard Schweiker, Sen. Edmund Muskie, Richard Scammon, John Lindsay, George Meany and others expressed their hopes for the future. Their analysis pointed to the area within which the urban and cultural crisis could be resolved. Tomasi, Director of the Center for Migration Studies, argued and summarizes the case of his colleagues:

There are eighty-two million working class, forgotten and disaffected Middle-Americans. They work hard, are not poor, but feel excluded from the affluent society and in many instances describe themselves as victims of ethnic discrimination. These Middle-Americans make up the $5,000 to $10,000 family income group as reported by the latest Census. Most of them live in the gray urban areas caught between suburbia and the inner city. Nearly 20 million Irish, Italian, German, Polish and Russian origin ethnics, 10 to 15 million non-white minorities and 40 other million persons of mixed religious and ethnic background belong to this income category, a category where economic condition and ethnic awareness seem to reenforce each other.

Ignored in the sixties, Middle-Americans have become the focus of the seventies. Suddenly ethnicity has assumed a new popularity in television programs and the daily press reports without hesitation on the alienation of the ethnic blue collar worker. In fact, the resurgence of ethnic consciousness has affected the Congress of the United States which has recently enacted legislation providing for ethnic studies and for the development of curriculum materials which would adequately recognize America's multi-cultural heritage.

The ethnic factor clearly remains a force in all major social institutions from the nationality parish to the balanced ticket at election time.

To consider the interplay of near-poverty life and ethnic pride is the purpose of this volume. The essays prepared especially for this publication reflect a wide range of experiences and opinions. They deal with public policy and media, politics and taxes, Italians, Jews and Spanish Americans. The language is different, sometimes scholarly and sometimes abrupt and earthy, like the cry of a soul which has been robbed of a part of its humanity.

There is a link, however, binding the various articles and writers, who express here their own views with directness and feeling. All the essays grouped in this book are pieces of a dream. They look at America not as a homogenized society or as a jungle of groups competing for the same meager resources. They envision, instead, an open society where individuals and groups are free to value their different life-styles and are strong enough to accept the differences.7

Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs

The issues raised in both *Overcoming Middle Class Rage* and *Pieces of a Dream* were mediated into the world of community-based practices by the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, founded by Msgr. Geno C. Baroni. The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA) explored the public, private and community-based activities which would enable their 'pieces of a dream' to become the lived experiences of persons and cities. NCUEA worked with local leaders to design and to apply urban revitalization and ethnic diversity strategies. When NCUEA, an affiliate of the U.S. Catholic Conference, funded by the Ford Foundation, began to develop new approaches to urban life its literature regularly cited "A Call to Action," Pope Paul VI's letter of May 14, 1971, on the eightieth anniversary of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. There, the Pope said:

There is an urgent need to remake, at the level of the street, of the neighborhood or of the great agglomerative dwellings, the social fabric whereby many may be able to develop the needs of his personality. Center of special interest and of culture must be created or developed at the community and parish centers, and spiritual and community gatherings where the individual can escape from isolation and form a new fraternal relationship.

To build up the city, the place where men and their expanded communities exist, to create new modes of neighborliness and relationships; to perceive an original application of social justice and to undertake responsibility for this collective future, which is foreseen as difficult, is a task in which Christians must share.8

In 1972, NCUEA convened a Workshop on Urban Ethnic Community Development under the auspices of the United States Catholic Conference and Catholic University of America. At this conference, community spokespersons, ethnic leaders and other interested persons struggled to answer the principle question "Is there an ethnic dimension to America's urban malaise?" A transcript of the arguments indicates two conflicting viewpoints. On one side stood those who rejected the use of the term "white ethnic" and the things that it connoted. They said:

Look the concept of white ethnic is a fiction of the media, most Polish and Italo-Americans do not call themselves white ethnics. They eat kielbasa and spaghetti and speak a few Polish or Italian words, but they are Americans. They have become melted into the great American melting pot. Group discrimination is no longer a serious problem for them. Most are working people and their woes are related to economics and other problems which every other working man in the United States must cope with. To talk about white ethnics and their needs is to promote artificial social distinctions and intergroup discord that will foster polarization.9

Others expressed an opposing view, contending that:

The melting pot is a fiction. Ethnic group loyalties are a fact of life. It is a mistake to suppress ethnic communal ties and values, as the "assimilationalists" have tried to do, for both are necessary to the mental health of the individual and to the stability of the community of which they are a part. It is true that most of us are still working people but whatever our occupation or income we hold our heritage in high regard. We are fearful that our children, stripped of a strong group identity, will become defenseless and will be unable to cope with the pressures which are a

prominent part of our society today. The demagogue exploits the rootless man whose fears compel us to think and act in a manner which is inconsistent with our needs and those of others.

You don't have to tell us we're Americans; we know that and we're proud of it, but don't forget that many of us are reminded of our "ethnicity" when we hear Polish jokes or illusions that any office seeker of Italian descent must be involved in criminal activities. Because stereotypes of this kind have been perpetuated over generations and still thrive, many of our people carry invisible wounds. To recognize our uniqueness is not to promote inter-group hostilities. On the contrary, as long as man is without communal ties of some kind and values which guide him through difficult periods of his life he will be unable to relate to and work with others on the basis of respect and good will.10

As the opposing sides clashed, most of the protagonists began to listen to one another and, in turn, revised some of their earlier preconceptions. Thus, a young organizer with a "working class agenda," after talking to Polish-American and Italo-American spokespersons, began to appreciate that the single most important common bond in many urban communities is ethnic group self-identity. Members of ethnic organizations, on the other hand, were reminded that the issues which were urgent to most of their people were not related to their threatened heritage but to "nitty-gritty" economic concerns, like wages, inflation, unemployment and taxes.

Geno Baroni provided the synthesis when he argued that after decades of the "racial polarization" and valiant but often quixotic urban social legislation directed towards the most disadvantaged blacks and poor white, its past time to realize that no social program or urban recipe is going to go anywhere without the American working class and that overcoming inter-ethnic alienation was an important, but neglected dimension of neighborhood and urban affairs. Baroni was the most visible and vigorous spokesperson for the approach which eventually found specific expression in these films.

The linkages between the local neighborhood and the ethnic experience of Brooklyn, Baltimore and South Bend portrayed respectively in *Metropolitan Avenue*, *The Neighborhood Roadshow*, and *Festivals Are More Than Food and Fun* were facilitated by Geno Baroni who also served as Co-Chair of the Bicentennial Ethnic/Racial Coalition. The local sponsors of these films in Brooklyn, the National Congress of Neighborhood Women; in Baltimore, the Southeast Community Organization (SECO); and in South Bend, the Institute for Urban Studies, were close associates of Baroni and each were funded by the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs and NEH to explore ways of addressing the urban and cultural crisis of older industrial cities.11

During the 1970s Baroni's commitment to urban ethnic Americans brought him into contact with the rich plethora of American ethnic groups. Hispanic, Ukrainian, Polish, Irish, Italian as well as Black American groups called upon the services of the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs for financial and administrative assistance in organizing their neighborhood communities. Baroni's schedule while head of the Center, as evident in his letters and memorandum, became a whirlwind of lectures, meetings, receptions, and workshops. He best articulated the rising hopes of American urban ethnics. Baroni's forcefulness and appeal as a speaker are evident in the praises of the Toledo Board of Communities; they wrote: "You speak with such relevance. The persons in Toledo are singing your praises. If all of them carry your message to their friends, then maybe we can start a movement that will make this a really better place to live in."12

A great deal of Baroni's time in making the ethnic voice known was devoted to educational administrators and institutions. The issue of ethnicity began to appear more frequently in the

classroom, and the beginnings of the notion of the ethnic education became more popular. In 1972, Baroni, an extremely able resident of Washington D.C., was instrumental in the passing of an "Ethnic Heritage Studies Program" as part of HEW to afford students opportunities to learn about the nature of their own cultural heritages and that of other ethnic groups.

By 1974, Baroni along with James O. Gibson, an African-American community leader and close collaborator of Geno Baroni and Director of the Washington, D.C. Bicentennial Commission were named Co-Chair of the Bicentennial Ethnic/Racial Coalition (BERC) by John Warner, the Administrator of the American Revolutionary Bicentennial Administration (ARBA). Thus at the very beginning of the post-Watergate era, Baroni and Gibson and their various networks fashioned one rare instance of racial-ethnic convergence at the national level. This federal initiative engaged all the community-based groups which produced these films. BERC provided a set of themes which later emerged with appropriate local specificity in *Metropolitan Avenue, The Neighborhood Roadshow* and *Festivals Are More Than Food and Fun.*13

Larry O'Rourke's portrait of Geno Baroni's significance to mending the rifts between ethnic and racial groups is captured in his account of a dispute in 1974 between Baroni and George Bush, then chairman of the Republican National Committee and ambivalent heir of Nixon's Southern Strategy and the divisive rhetoric of Spiro Agnew. The prospect of a new national ethnic racial coalition enraged the Republican National Committee staff.

Bush heard complaints about Baroni's performance at the meeting and he sent off a biting letter to Warner. "In selecting Gino (sic) Baroni to chair the meeting," Bush said, "the Commission seems to have cast its lot with the more radical ethnic people—and people with very liberal views who would not represent the matrix of our great ethnic communities."

According to Bush, under Baroni's "direction and insistent leadership," these themes developed:

—"This group would have an ongoing purpose which would not end with the Bicentennial."

—"A lasting racial/ethnic coalition—militant in nature and 'activist' in orientation would emerge. The creation of a new urban 'power bloc' was envisaged."

—Little mention was made of the traditional values which unite the ethnic groups in this country. Rather, a special film was shown which left the impression that the Commission's goal should be putting together racial coalitions for social action."

Warner responded that Bush's complaint put a "shadow" on the "good will and integrity" of the Commission, the participants, Baroni and his co-chairman. Warner said Baroni and co-chairman James Gibson "both discharged their duties responsibly."14 Their duties included fashioning a rational for a new form of racial ethnic cooperation and a new approach to the urban crisis which focused on the community-based initiatives.

Workshops of the Ethnic-Racial Condition

The Conceptual Origins of the Films

The following account15 of the BERC perspective suggests a parallel conceptual expression of the dramatic and anecdotal urban ethnic concerns presented in the films. An understanding of the approach taken by the BERC group which included many of the persons involved in making and funding these films can be gained by reviewing the documents of the workshops held at the

June 1974 BERC meeting. For each of the three thematic areas of Bicentennial planning: Heritage, Festival and Horizons, the BERC group synthesized their concerns and conceptualized their critique:

In the area of heritage and education, the workshop emphasis was on the ethnic experience in American education and the ethnic and racial contributions to the building of America. The statement distributed to the workshops in Heritage and Education read:

History has been made unpopular by persons who would use it to teach a specific lesson. Ethnic and racial Americans must understand their past before they can chart a useful future. This means that they must avoid narrowness while at the same time emphasizing the richness that the ethnic and racial groups have contributed to the American pluralistic experience. This experience of "other ness," which has been a hallmark of the American experiment, must not be feared or shunned, but must be accepted in terms of its contributory role in America's heritage.16

In the area of Festival and the Arts, the workshop groups focused on the need to legitimize the cultural diversity of American life by preserving and developing ethnic and community arts, music and folk ways, and by providing a means of expression for the benefit of diverse communities. The basic statement of philosophy distributed to the Festival and Arts workshop said:

Far from being a cultural melting pot, we are a nation whose diverse and singular blend of cultural expressions yields a different flavor with every tasting. It is a fact of our society that the channels for cultural expression and appreciation of the diverse groups of which we are comprised, are not well developed. our culture is our essence made visible. Whether it is manifested in the mundane or the profound, it adds inspiration, satisfaction, and pleasure to our lives. The extent to which our citizens are limited from a full experience of their right to cultural expression is the extent to which we condemn ourselves to a bland and homogenized national existence.17

The Horizon area workshop focused on the economic and social revitalization of neighborhood. Discussions were held concerning neighborhood restoration and preservation, economic growth and stabilization, and the permanent duty to serve basic human needs of all citizens. The topic statement distributed to the workshops, focusing on economic and social revitalization of neighborhoods said:

Because people's behavior is affected primarily through the surroundings where most of their experiences occur, we believe that economic and social revitalization of racial and ethnic neighborhoods is one is the key means of bridging the existing gap between the two nations which make up this country — that of the rich and that of the poor.18

In each of these three workshops, participants from the more than 21 different ethnic groups were allowed to contribute their own ideas about appropriate agendas for action by BERC. Each of the three workshops independently produced the recommendation that a fully representative advisory body be established to assist ARBA in policy and program development. It was also recommended that this advisory body assist in funding and legislative consultation and review,

and that it be provided with the means to serve as an outreach network for ethnic and racial groups throughout the country.

The BERC initiative quickened the development of a unique political perspective which can be discerned in these films. This perspective establishes a set of criteria from which an interesting and provocative view of the American domestic policy emerges. At bottom, the thrust of BERC and the thrust of these films support a new vision of urban and cultural policy. This concept prompted studies and program recommendations which set out to remedy the malaise in the civic culture of America during the mid 1970s.

The BERC consultations initiated a national dialogue with extended beyond ARBA is no longer a functioning national agency. The concerns first articulated by the BERC are now extended through these films. The serious contradictions documented in these films persist in the American polity.

The concepts developed by BERC and the message of these films argue that our understanding of the city must be reoriented. Cities need not be viewed as loathsome concentrations engendered by selfish desire and holding camps for social pathologies. The alternative vision is that cities are placed where people reside. Too often we have ignored this obvious fact and concentrated our concerns upon the historic economic role played by cities. Recently cities have begun to see this folly. Cities have begun to examine their role in light of the 70s and 80s, with the attendant communication and transportation facilities which allow for decentralization. Decentralization involves business firms and people. Both the economic goals and the residential role of a city are fundamental. Ultimately, one must ask whether this latter purpose can be achieved if a city, any city, loses a significant portion of its standard housing stock. If it cannot, will the city be able to sustain its vitality? All older American cities are faced with decay in housing stock. More importantly, this decay is spreading in ever wider circles. It can be stopped; but to stop it demands a positive, forceful housing program. It demands a housing program that is given equal priority with the economic development programs of the city. Moreover, to regain the political will to build urban housing would require that we must reorient our perception of the city. Only by rediscovering an ancient ideal and unashamedly proclaiming that the city is the cradle of human traditions and or civilizations can drift toward urban and civic collapse be abated.

In 1976 Baroni provided more details of this vision of urban ethnicity and his hope for the American reality. At a White House Conference on Ethnicity and Neighborhoods he argued that:

The American Revolution, which gave birth to our country and was fashioned and fought in the cities and towns. The great American experiment — liberty and justice for all was first experienced by millions of immigrant Americans who came to the cities, and there developed the rich mixture of human spirit which characterizes the form and style of a fully human life - an urban civilization. Only cities offer the possibility for the continuation of this full human life, through the enhancement of urban fellowship and social development. Only the city can aggregate the fiscal and human resources which enable persons to enjoy their life and work in a framework of civic amenities: well tended lakes and rivers, green areas and parks, distinguished buildings, great universities, libraries and museums, outstanding restaurants, fine music, exciting shops, theater, fountains, art in the streets, opportunities for participatory recreation and spectator sports, signs of the past, historic squares and healthy neighborhoods with diverse traditions, styles and tones of life, and finally the governance of these realities through public institutions, i.e., accountable and responsive governments which are carefully attuned to the variety of communities wholly

dedicated to the importance of enhancing these civic amenities and the full flowering of the human spirit in all communities.

The fact remains, however, that over the decades and even today, we have callously abandoned our cities and have thoroughly espoused a Candide-like posture of pessimism, anti-urban privatism, and self-centered familialism. National urban policy has not only threatened our cities with fiscal bankruptcy, but more tragically, our cities have nearly ceased fulfilling their special and unique capacity to enliven the human spirit. Cities are not producing the civilizing influences of work, education, art, music, and fellowship that of necessity must be located and developed in urban settings. These problems are discussed, and much research has been directed towards eliminating the *urban crisis*. Perhaps the failure and frustration of these Efforts can be traced to their lack of focus on the ancient distinction between *urbs*and *civitas*, two words, which while they are both translated city, they were not synonymous for the ancients, nor are they synonymous today. *Urbs* was the place of assembly, the dwelling-place, a sanctuary of the *civitas*. *Civitas* was the religious and political association of families and tribes - the people bound together in civic association. These ancient distinctions are important today. Urban research and urban policy are bankrupt because of their lack of attention to the *civitas* — their lack of attention to *civic* renewal and *civic* development. By focusing on urban concerns, the physical items, to the exclusion of *civic* concerns, national urban policy has nearly destroyed *the civitas* — the various levels of human community which make urban life possible.

National urban policy has ignored and neglected a basic dimension of community life. The *civitas* has been forgotten and nearly has been eclipsed. Of course, we cannot deny that cities have external physical aspects which need attention. However, serious consequences, perhaps fatal results, derive from urban strategies that fail to recognize that a city possesses, in fact, is primarily a "little world of meaning" that is illuminated with meaning by human beings, who continuously create this "little world of meaning" through religious and secular symbols, shared experiences, traditions; and further that this "little world of meaning" is not merely an accident or a convenience, but that it is the locus of fundamental experiences which establish our humanity. In sum, urban policy must be rethought and refashioned into a *civic* policy — a policy which in broadest outline is cognizant of our *civic* life and supportive of the preeminent features of *civic* life which have been thoughtlessly squandered — our rich variety of religious and cultural associations which have been the sustaining structures of our urban neighborhoods.

The fondest of family and community traditions of diverse populations, have been nurtured and protected in our urban neighborhoods. The urban neighborhoods have produced civility, order, and stability. They were sustained by delicate networks of interpersonal, family, cultural, economic, religious, and political relationships. In fact, a good measure of a healthy city is the health and vitality of its various neighborhoods.19

Baroni’s rationale for this position was simply stated. This approach, however, invites and demands more systematic examination. The referent points of the city for most residents can be classified at two levels; city-wide affiliations and the neighborhood living experiences. The great institutions of the cities, with which most people identify, are usually of great scale; stadia, concert halls, museums, universities, and exposition halls. The function and meaning of these large scale institutions are well known; they are shaped to a large degree by mass media. Specialized studies

of these urban institutions have attempted to relate form to function. Our knowledge of the more human scale institutional referent points of the neighborhood is less firmly anchored. We have much more to learn about urban/ethnic churches, schools, political or fraternal clubs, labor halls. Unique ethnic commercial facilities, community centers, and the neighborhood organizations have rarely been studied. These human scale institutions are revealed in these films which chronicle these vital, but human scale institutions. Neighborhoods are usually defined by demographic indicators such as: race and ethnicity, age spectra, income and educational levels, and standard econometric and bureaucratic variables. These indicators are used to describe and measure the health of urban life. Are such measurements clearly conclusive and sufficient? Can the findings of these films complement other sources? The applied humanities may provide answers to such questions.

Culture and Policy

The cultural dimensions of urban life, which include large numbers of embattled ethnic neighborhoods with residents economically able to leave, has yet to be seriously examined. Such neighborhoods are important because they may be a most useful way to begin to understand and enhance urban neighborhood culture. The applied humanities could provide an analysis of the evolution of their institutional life, followed by the development and support of their cultural life and the networks of relationships which constitute and give meaning to their residents. This activity constitutes a — a new arena of research and action which seems as relevant today as it was when it was pioneered by these community-based films which document contemporary urban ethnicity.

These films complain that many healthy neighborhoods have been destroyed — mostly by government action or inaction. Their arguments are clear — a steady procession of good intentioned, but basically faulted programs, initiated by national urban strategies compounded by faulty local initiatives and planning, have ruined many city neighborhoods and all that they have meant for our country. "Our people" — neighborhood and multi-ethnic communities — these films shout, will tragically pass from the scene if this process continues. When this occurs our great American cities will collapse. However, these films also argue that a new civic action and new urban and cultural policies can arrest this breakdown. These films provide models for neighborhood revitalization and the creation of new neighborhoods.

These films expose the limited assumptions of the majority of public programs that have shaped our cities, particularly the older industrial areas of the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic and Mid-West regions. The urban crisis was created and implemented during the postwar II period. These studies also address the serious absence of research on the historical meaning of this crucial period during which the ethnic, racial, and social class composition of our cities was transformed. There have been numerous specialized urban and ethnic studies, but none of a comprehensive and analytic nature which determines the function of scale and the significance of ethnicity and multi-ethnic community in urban planning and development.

The cities during the postwar period were provided with the largest number of Federal programs specifically targeted at particular problems, urban renewal, the housing programs, particularly FHA, community renewal planning, "The War on Poverty," Model Cities, and the highly targeted education, social services, and health programs that proliferated during this period. Since 1968, a new approach — local-level responsibility — has begun to replace the old national strategies "The New Federalism," representing a bloc grant rather than funding by specific

category, general revenue sharing and the Housing and Community Development Act represent the devolution of federal resources and authority to the states and localities. Our current policy includes a mix of categorical and bloc grant approaches. Future policies are uncertain, and, at this point, will be determined on a basis of inadequate knowledge and analysis as well as within a budget context which is considerable less robust than any period of the post WWII era.

These films challenge policy researchers to combine the field experiences of neighborhood-based organizations with the disciplines of economics, planning, and political science to undertake projects which will aggregate and systematically analyze policy outcomes from the human scale perspective. Such analyzes should proceed to collect and to interpret, not only the quantified studies concerned with economic and social indicators and legislative histories, but also Government and privately funded evaluations of Federal programs, with emphasis on local actions in selected cities, including documents of the planning departments and the authorizing statutes. and testimonies of the city councils. Moreover, oral histories of political, planning, private sector, and neighborhood leaders should be taken as an original body of data. Though these data may be simply anecdotal, if not soon tapped, will be lost forever, and no existential framework for understanding this epoch and for testing hard data will be available. The result of such a project would be the analysis of urban policy and program outcomes from the neighborhood perspective and new insight into the salience of human scale as a factor for future urban planning and civic development.

This policy perspective and imperatives of civil renewal are articulated in *Metropolitan Avenue* (MA), *The Neighborhood Roadshow* (NR) and *Festivals Are More than Fun and Food* (FMFF). These films and film makers — indigenous and interpretive communities bound together in action — like prophets of old, exclaim that without a vision the people will perish. These films document community and ethnic experiences with a simple and home-made vigor. These films were part of a process of creating new social inventions — ommunity based organizations — which were inspirited with a vision of cultural pluralism in the urban neighborhoods which were founded in the experience of immigration and industrialization.

And yet like all films, and perhaps every attempt to apply rhetoric to the work of relating the meaning of a culture, they project an imagined, magical and somewhat veritable reality. When each of the films end, the challenge of lived quotidian reality re-emerges. The civil renewal agenda and these exercises in the applied humanities are courageous responses to the challenges of change and the claims articulated by urban ethnics. They are certainly consonant with the original insights which provoked the development of these films.

More explicitly, these films, as their precursors in *Overcoming Middle Class Rage*, *Pieces of a Dream*, and the BERC and NCUEA agendas, challenge us to develop a civic, neighborhood and human development agenda which is grounded in the multi-ethnic fullness of the American reality and cognizant of the cultural, spatial, and economic dynamics which drive the American polity and economy.

These films remind us that the relationship between the associational life of the American people and the public, cultural, and economic order of Americans is really an ongoing process in which the extremes of statism, i.e., public conquest over associational life and of divisive narrowness of ethnocentricity and parochial privatism and corporatism oscillate. These films argue that a public order attuned to the associational life of the American people ought to be our practical normative grounding. The tension provoked by universalistic hopes that our associational life ought to be attuned to the universal constitutional claims of liberty and justice for all reveal the complexity caused by immigration, industrialization and ethnic pluralism. The conjoining of ethnic

consciousness with discovery of neighborhood as the unit of urban analysis has created a new language of urban ethnic politics and policy which at the urban level are clearly more attuned to the complexity of competing claims in American society than is generally expected. The peaceful reconciliation of these claims throughout the nation is a central moral and political challenge of our time.

Notes

1. Christine Noschese, Producer/Director, *Metropolitan Avenue* (National Congress of Neighborhood Women, Brooklyn, New York, 1985), Ted Durr, Producer, *The Neighborhood Roadshow* (Baltimore Voices, Baltimore, Maryland, 1982); Thomas Broden, Director, *Festivals Are More than Food and Fun* (Institute for Urban Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1977).

2. Frank Thistelwaite, "Migration from Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" in Katz and Kulter, *New Perspectives on the American Past: 1877-Present* (Boston: Little Brown, 1972).

3. See Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

4.See Libby Leonard, *Strengthening Volunteer Initiatives* (Washington, D.C. National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, 2nd edition, 1982). This volume includes a comprehensive bibliographic essay on various approaches to defining urban neighborhoods developed by Thomas Broden, Ronn B. Kirkwood, John Roos and Thomas Swartz. Among the most relevant to these films are Roger S. Ahlbrandt Jr. and James V. Cunningham, *A New Public Policy for Neighborhood Preservation* (New York: Praeger, 1979); James V. Cunningham and Milton Kotler, *Building Neighborhood Organizations* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); *Neighborhoods-Their Place in Urban Life* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984); Harry C. Boyte, *Community is Possible: Repairing American Roots* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984) The paucity of work on ethnicity and neighborhoods, however, is documented by the absence of an entry on neighborhoods in the *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). This excellent volume edited by Stephen Thernstrom includes thematic essays regarding all other features of ethnicity: identity, assimilation, folklore, immigration, intermarriage, language maintenance, prejudice, etc., as well as general accounts of over a hundred groups, yet the *locus*, i.e., the place within this texturing of the American reality — the ethnic neighborhood — is ignored and neglected.

5. See Murray Freidman, ed., *Overcoming Middle Class Rage* and Michael Wenk, S.M. Tomasi and Geno Baroni, eds., *Pieces of a Dream* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1972).

6. Freidman, *op. cit.*

7. Wenk, *et al., op cit.*, p. III, IV.

8. Pope Paul VI, "A Call To Action," May 14, 1971 as quoted in NCUEA pamphlet, 1972.

9. *Working Class and Ethnic Priorities: A Report from the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, 1972), p. 4.

10. *Ibid*., p. 4.

11. For documents related to these activities consult, National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs Papers, University of Notre Dame Archives.

12. NCUEA Archives, letter from Toledo Board of Communities, 1972.

13. *NCUEA-ARBA Report*, NCUEA Archives.

14. Lawrence M. O'Rourke, "Geno E. Baroni, Priest and Public Activist," in Madonna Kolbenshlag, ed., *Between God and Caesar: Priests, Sisters and Political Office in the United States* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. 229.

15. See NCUEA-ARBA Report, NCUEA Archives.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19.Geno Baroni, "Neighborhood Revitalization: Neighborhood Policy for a Pluralistic Urban Society," in *Ethnicity and Neighborhood: Proceedings, Whitehouse Conference, May 5, 1976*, pp. 4-5.