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Globalization and Identity

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INTRODUCTION

THE CHALLENGE

Upon entering this millennium, humanity found itself in a phase of its existence so new that it could hardly have been prepared for. In the past, life was lived in small local communities, in tribes and villages; at times these were stitched together by mega-empires, which were nevertheless constituted of local and largely self-enclosed peoples. In the last century there arose the conception of the autonomous nation state constituted of a homogeneous people with sovereign rule. There were difficulties for minorities within such states and there were conflicts across borders, but it was clear who and where the powers were, both great and small.

Today we are moving beyond this divided world as the walls between nations and blocks of nations are torn down, as the media create and share experiences, and as a newly global horizon opens before us.

In these circumstances a number of questions arise:

- first, how to think about oneself in order to appreciate from within the realities of one's creative freedom and responsibility;
- second, how over time these have constituted cultural identities as ways of living with others in community;
- third, how their cultures and civilizations can relate globally to others and to all humankind in a way that respects, promotes, and engages the distinctive reality of its many cultures.

These dimensions of cultural identity and globalization now emerge as fundamental to the challenges we face. Philosophically, it might be said that this is an issue both of ways of thinking and of ways of being as we enter the third millennium.

Ways of Thinking: Earlier, life seemed rather more patent and simple. Being was taken to be there before us in an objective manner and our mind simply corresponded to it. Now we are becoming more aware of the significance and nature of human intentionality, of its ability to be both sensitive and insensitive to others, and of the corresponding manner it responds to others. Our mind can be selective in its work and it can operate under multiple impulses – from defense against others whom we cannot dominate to vain hopes for utopian social orders that can never be. As a result, not only do we find ourselves in a world with which we must cope, but in shaping this world we are both responsible and extensively challenged. In this world without partitions we are no longer protected by old divisions. Instead, in order to cope, it is necessary to develop new

modes of thinking so that we can take into account the whole in which even our identity is extensively a matter of relation to others.

Moreover, as we venture into the new millennium we are becoming more aware of the cultural heritage we carry with us. Horizontally, this includes the great human accomplishments of the past in organizing nature and facilitating human life, from prenatal care to hospices. Vertically, however, this is more problematic, for it includes also the deeper levels of the great civilizations by which people shape their lives and the religious traditions that undergird them. Yet for the last four centuries modernity has been marked by an exclusive focus upon the human that has cut loose from its metaphysical and religious moorings in being and set upon an ultimately frustrating quest for happiness as a purely artificial construct. This was expressed classically by the figure of Prometheus in ancient myth and by Milton's aptly entitled *Paradise Lost*. Not incidentally, we now speak of the "post-modern" – "modern" having come to stand for an increasingly incoherent rationalist individualism and a corresponding totalitarian communalism.

This calls insistently not so much for more abstract analysis as for a recuperation of personal freedom and cultural creativity, and for synthesis to integrate and relate the many cultural identities. It recognizes the need then to supplement the highly centralized, top-down manner of the past, whether in reasoning or in action, by a bottom-up process of community discovery and responsible self-formation. As this cannot be realized by a chaotically atomized humanity, attention turns to the natural human communities of family and neighborhood, and even further to the global relations between the cultural identities according to which they live. These constitute, in the expression of Samuel Huntington, civilizations as the largest "we."

Ways of Being: This is not only a way of thinking, however; globalization is the contemporary mode of being – that is, "to live" for a living being. As with the term "development," globalization first was taken in a merely economic sense, for that is what is tangible. But it now manifests itself to be also political and, more deeply, cultural. We live today with a sense of other peoples and of their distinct approaches to the problem of life. Correspondingly, we are able to look more penetratingly into ourselves, our hopes, and our aspirations as the terms in which we direct our commitments and striving. Hence, our attention and efforts are directed now to the unique cultural identities of peoples, understood etymologically as their way of cultivating the human person.

This deepening ability of human consciousness makes it possible and natural to be aware of the ways in which our freedom, and especially that of our ancestors, has responded to the challenges and opportunities of life. This has meant not only a specific sequence of historical actions, but also – and perhaps more decisively – a process of selecting and prioritizing (or valuing) certain modes of responding, such as courage, patience, and love. The development of a corresponding pattern of capabilities, called

virtues, constitutes the character or even the identity of a people. This is their culture – the way in which they cultivate or shape the growth of their offspring and enable them, in turn, to respond to the challenges of life.

At bottom, this constitutes the way in which peoples express and articulate their ultimate concern for life and being; it is their commitment to life itself both temporal and eternal. This is also religious commitment, based as it is upon Absolute Being. Nothing could be more pervasive and meaning-giving, more complete or definitive.

In the past, these commitments by peoples who were geographically widely separated naturally differed in mode. Seen in themselves as both definitive and diverse, they appeared to be mutually exclusive and conflictual, thereby leading to religious conflict.

Now, as peoples increasingly communicate with one another, it is not only possible but also urgently necessary to see how several cultures and their religious bases share deep common concerns. Beyond mere tolerance, they are called upon to work in a complementary manner to ground cooperation between the peoples of the world.

It is necessary then to go beyond economic and political concerns, to investigate the nature of cultural identities and civilizations, to uncover the character and role of their religious roots, and to work out how these can be positively related and complementary to one another. This is the search to overcome mutual fear and antipathy, and to develop a cooperative global world.

Part I, “Cultural Identity.” Chapter I, by George F. McLean, “Thinking at the Crossroads: The Enrichment of Objectivity by Subjectivity,” makes the strong case that western civilization must now push beyond its centuries-long confinement to “objective knowledge.” Rediscovering the long-forgotten reserves of purpose, will, harmony, and beauty in its latent tradition, there is a need to initiate a new trajectory that is more celebratory of all aspects of consciousness. Such a project can open dialogic vistas among all the world’s cultures in the place of a “clash of civilizations.”

Chapter II, by Jean Bertrand Amougou, “Psychological and Philosophical Dimensions of Identity,” appropriates both Freudian and existential psychoanalysis to (1) psychoanalyze the world’s “globalizers,” that is, the financial and cultural imperialists of the “developed” countries, and (2) uncover the traumata inflicted on the “globalized,” that is, to the technologically “undeveloped countries.” Amougou proffers existential “logotherapy” to expose hypocritical rhetoric on the part of “hyperimperialism” and initiate movement towards a healing and liberating equality in the world.

Chapter III, by Mihaela Czobor-Lupp, “Rethinking Liberalism as Political and Metaphysical: Richard Bellamy’s View of ‘Liberalism’ against Itself, and of its Reconstruction,” addresses efforts to introduce into liberalism the vision of its critics in order to broaden the conceptual sphere

of liberal theory along with the scope and impact of liberal institutions. This rethinking of the conceptual nature of both classical liberalism and democracy seeks to reintroduce a sense of universalism into liberal democracy. The goal is to find ways to recreate a sense of civic virtue, which is an issue of decisive importance for liberal democracies as well as post-communist countries.

Chapter IV, by Zsuzsana Bögre, “Religion and Identity,” uses the method of “life-history survey” to research the effects of Hungary’s Marxist state on religious Hungarians (1948-fall of Marxist regime). Bögre uncovers two basic types of “religious” reaction: one which goes “underground” – that is, it retains traditional identity by belonging to a clandestine Church-structure, even at the price of economic and civic disenfranchisement; and another which adapts by living “two lives,” one public and one private (called the “balancing-identity” type).

Chapter V, by Andrew Blasko, “Fault Lines Within Fundamental Ontology and Beyond: A Few Suggestions for Further Discussion of Heidegger’s Thought,” addresses the controversial relationship between Martin Heidegger and the Nazi regime, debunking the notion that Heidegger in the late 1930s repudiated Nazism. Blasko argues that Heidegger’s disillusionment with the Nazis turned upon the view that they merely clung to a “metaphysics” of being, in Heidegger’s technical sense, and did not undertake a true ontology or “Thought” of Being. Heidegger also shows no sensitivity to the suffering of victims, quite possibly, says Blasko, because his philosophy is a philosophy without religion even though his thought is deeply inspired by the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Part II, “Globalization.” Chapter VI, by Abdillahi Hassan Jama, “Models of Globalization: Approach to Globalization and Identity,” explores the complexity of globalization in connection with modernization and the crisis of modernity, namely, the exacerbation of the contradiction between instrumental rationalism and normative rationalism. This is a crisis not of reason itself, but of a particular form and stage of reason itself. Furthermore, insofar as reason is contextual both historically and culturally, we must speak of a number of different globalizations rather than one all-encompassing process. Although the author identifies today’s dominant model of globalization as one-sided, highly conflictual, and anti-environmental, he expresses the optimism that it can and will be corrected with time.

Appendix to Chapter VI, by Makoto Utsumi, “Globalization, Regionalism and the Nation State: An Asian Point of View,” acknowledges that globalization seems to mean “the imposition of the Anglo-Saxon rules of the game upon every part of our globe.” Yet he argues for the progress of the global “market economy” as long as individual cultures succeed in retaining their own identity and nation-states are permitted financial “safety-nets” so adjustment can become less brutal. Utsumi shows how economic “regionalism,” relatively effective in NAFTA and in Europe, is more

difficult in Asia because of the latter's enormous cultural and economic diversity. He describes the tentative successes of APEC and the "Chiang Mai initiative."

Chapter VII, by Victoria Levinskaya, "Globalization and Sustainable Development," argues that the world community must learn to coordinate sociological development and the demands of the environment (ecology) if sustainable globalization is to be achieved. This coordination can be achieved, Levinskaya maintains, only if the gulf between rich and poor nations is narrowed significantly and if an "ethics of sustainability" is inculcated into the world's population from early school-age onwards.

Chapter VIII, by Tom N. Namwambah, "Reason and Globalization," maintains that "critical thinking" can ameliorate the ongoing process of globalization by helping the so-called "first world" nations come to terms with their stereotyping and abusing of the technologically less-advanced nations. In turn, the technologically less-advanced nations can derive from "critical thinking" the rationality they need to better represent their own interests. Namwambah supplies lists of rational "do's" and "don'ts", paying special attention to emotionalism and the manipulation of propaganda.

Chapter IX, by Sebastian Velassery, "The Mantra of Globalization and the Horizon Within," regards globalization ideally as the supplying of jobs, public services, and opportunity for development to *everyone everywhere*. Velassery reviews the recent history of India under Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Vajapayee, noting that Vajapayee and his right-leaning religious party have "streamlined" the Indian economy along "liberal capitalist" lines. This reconfiguration has boosted India's annual GNP, but also occasioned social disruption and moral decline. Globalization must be accompanied, indeed triggered, by spiritual transformation lest social deterioration ensue.

Chapter X, by George Pattery, S.J., "Globalization of Protest and the Search for Identities," interprets fundamentalist terrorism as the reverse side of transnational politics and economics, even in its use of technological means. The more a people's traditional identity is assaulted by dehumanizing agencies, the more it tends to demonize the attackers. Since religion plays a large role in identity, Pattery asks how authentic religion can lessen dehumanization and demonization. He sees global cooperation among religions as a crucial instrument in this regard.

Part III, "The Interrelation of Globalization and Cultural Identity." Chapter XI, by Gong Qun, "On Global Culture and Cultural Identity," cites Habermasian sociology to argue for the value of a new "global identity." But he points out that the viability of Habermas' "world citizenship" depends on a common foundation of world governance and justice, a foundation yet to be established. Indeed, Gong Qun lists virtually insurmountable obstacles: in the case of mainland China, for example, the exaltation of nationalism and one-party politics; in international finance, the

opposition of multi-national corporations, which find it to their advantage to pit regional interests against one another.

Chapter XII, by Taras Dobko, “Universal and Local Cultures: The Limits and Horizons of Appreciation,” questions whether globalization necessarily means homogenization or loss of individual cultures. Dobko wields four perspectives – phenomenological, empirical, personalistic, and sociological – to argue that globalization can represent universal values which transcend individuation. This does not mean, for Dobko, that local cultures should be homogenized: a successful culture is a combination of the local and the universal.

Chapter XIII, by Tadeusz Buksinski, “Globalization and Regionalization: The Case of Europe,” sets forth the benefits and disadvantages that globalization can bring to micro-regions (such as individual countries) and macro-regions (such as the European Union). Buksinski argues that the European Union is being fashioned by financial élites so that the Continental economy can better compete with non-European corporate blocs. The resultant “downsizing” of employment rolls, the pruning of social welfare, and so forth, will be destructive to cultural identities in the long run.

Chapter XIV, by Pham Van Duc, “Some Challenges of Globalization and Modernization in Contemporary Vietnam,” examines the modernization process in his country from the beginnings of the *Doi Moi* (“Renewal”) onwards. Granting that integration into the world economy has become a necessity, Pham Van Duc takes inventory of the economic, social, and cultural upheavals that have accompanied programs to make Vietnamese industry and agriculture more competitive in the world market. He remains steadfastly optimistic, however, pointing out that Vietnam is enlisting its own traditional culture in the process of development, and that its strides in education, health care, and GNP growth have been among the best in the region.

Chapter XV, by Lucy Y. Tien, “The Golden Rule as an Ethical Foundation in Globalization,” proposes “Do unto others what you would have them do unto you” as an ethical foundation for globalization. Tien argues that the ancient provenance of the Golden Rule, coupled with its widespread acceptance, makes it a more practicable foundation than more abstract formulae. She reviews the several well-known philosophical objections to the Rule and refines its formulation accordingly.

Chapter XVI, by George Pattery, S.J., “Challenges and Opportunities for South Asia Today,” exemplifies the theological and pastoral developments now made possible by the interplay of globalization and identity in South Asia.

Chapter XVII, by George Pattery, S.J., “Radhakrishnan and Post-Orientalist Religious Studies,” enriches the previous chapter by a case study of the thought of Radhakrishnan.

PART I

CULTURAL IDENTITY

CHAPTER I

THINKING AT THE CROSSROADS: THE ENRICHMENT OF OBJECTIVITY BY SUBJECTIVITY

GEORGE F. McLEAN

FROM OBJECTIVITY TO SUBJECTIVITY

In the context of the dilemmas now being generally experienced at this point of transition between the millennia it is dangerous to raise the question of the role of philosophy. For if, with Aristotle, philosophy is something to be taken up when the basic needs of the times are cared for, then philosophy is in danger of being shelved for the present generation. On the other hand, philosophy may have to do with our nature and dignity – with what we are, and with what we are after – and hence, the terms in which we live as person and peoples. If so, then philosophy may be not the last, but the first consideration, or at least, the most determinative for life in our most trying circumstances.

It is the contention here that the role of philosophy today has shifted from being a work of deduction by specialists working in abstraction from the process of human life, to deep engagement under the pressure of life's challenges at the center of human concerns. What is this difference philosophically, and what difference does it make not only for work in philosophy but also for human hope?

The Crisis of Objective Reason

The first millennium is justly seen as one in which human attention was focused upon God. It was the time of Christ and the Prophet Muhammad, and much of humanity was fully absorbed in the assimilation of their messages.

The second millennium is generally seen as shifting to human beings. The first 500 years focused upon the reintegration of Aristotelian reason by such figures as Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas.

The second half of the millennium, from 1500, was marked by a radicalization of reason. From its beginning human reason always had attempted to draw upon the fullness of human experience, reflect the highest human and religious aspirations, and build upon the accomplishments of the predecessors – philosophers sensed themselves as “standing upon the shoulders” of earlier philosophers. A certain Promethean hope now emerged, however. As with Milton's *Paradise Lost*, it was claimed that humankind

would save itself – indeed, that each person would do so by his or her power of reason.

For this purpose, Francis Bacon¹ directed that the idols which bore the content of cultural tradition be smashed; John Locke² would erase all prior content of the mind in order to reduce it to a blank tablet; René Descartes³ would put all under doubt. What was sought was a body of clear and distinct ideas, strictly united according to a mathematical model.

It was true that Descartes intended to reintroduce the various levels of human knowledge on a more certain basis. However, what he restored was not the rich content of the breadth of human experience, but only what could be had with the requisite clarity and distinctness. As a result, of the content of the senses that had been bracketed by doubt in the first Meditation, only the quantitative or measurable was allowed back into his system in the sixth Meditation. All the rest was considered simply provisory and employed only to the degree that it proved useful in so navigating as to avoid physical harm in the world.

From this perspective, the goal of knowledge and of properly human life was radically curtailed. For Aristotle, and no less for Christianity and Islam through the first half of the second millennium, this had been contemplation of the magnificence and munificence of the highest being, God. For the Enlightenment, however, this was reduced to the control of nature in the utilitarian service of humankind. And where the goals of human life were reduced to the material order, the service of humankind in reality became the service of machines in the exploitation of physical nature. This was the real enslavement of human freedom and the loss of truly human hopes:

One of the most significant aspects of our current situation, it should be noted, is the “crisis of meaning.” Perspectives on life and the world, often of a scientific temper, have so proliferated that we face an increasing fragmentation of knowledge. This makes the search for meaning difficult and often fruitless. Indeed, still more dramatically, in this maelstrom of data and facts in which we live and which seem to comprise the very fabric of life, many people wonder whether it still makes sense to ask about meaning. The array of theories which vie to give an answer, and the different ways of viewing and of interpreting the world and human life, serve only to aggravate this radical doubt, which can easily lead to skepticism, indifference or to various forms of nihilism.

In consequence, the human spirit is often invaded by a kind of ambiguous thinking which leads it to an ever-deepening introversion, locked within the confines of its own immanence without reference of any kind to the transcendent. A philosophy which no longer asks the

question of the meaning of life would be in grave danger of reducing reason to merely accessory functions, with no real passion for the search for truth.⁴

First, with reason looking only to itself, religion was reduced to the service of the human rather than of the divine, and as such was given the status of a superstructure built parasitically upon the new reductively physical reality, or even that of a superstition. The religiously contextualized philosophical traditions not constructed in terms of modern enlightenment reductionism were not understandable within that more restricted horizon. Hence, the great Hindu and Islamic traditions were dismissed as mystifications and, for reasons opposite to those of al-Ghazali, the medieval tradition of Scholastic philosophy was denigrated.

Second, by the beginning of the twentieth century humanity felt itself poised for the final push to create a utopia through the power of science not only by subduing and harnessing the physical powers of nature, but by genetic human engineering and social manipulation. Looking back from the present vantage point, we find that history has proven to be quite different from these utopian goals.

Third, the power of science was diverted to two destructive World Wars and to the development of nuclear weapons capable of extinguishing the entire human race.

Fourth, Hegel's and Josiah Royce's ideals and idealism would give way to William James' and John Dewey's concrete, pragmatic goals that could be achieved by human effort.⁵ Or at least this would be so until it came to be recognized that it was not possible to articulate such social goals in positive or empirical terms. At this point positivism would succeed pragmatism. But in its own turn, and after only two decades, it would have to admit that its controlling "principle of verifiability" (and then of "falsifiability") was not intelligible in its own positivist terms.⁶

Fifth, Marxism as a scientific history and organization of society proved to be cruel and dehumanizing beyond belief, finally imploding from its own internal weakness. Suddenly, the ideology on which meaning was conceived and life was lived by half of humankind was extinguished. It was as if the sun went down never to rise again.

Sixth, the consumer society on the other side of the Cold War has shown itself incapable of generating meaning for life. But it is capable of exploiting everyone until at last the people realize that the ideology of a totally free market is destructive of the weak majority of the world.

In sum, the twentieth century was marked by poverty that could not be erased and exploitation ever more widespread, two World Wars, pogroms and holocausts, genocide and "ethnic cleansing," emerging intolerance, family collapse, and anomie. In the end, it was indeed right to ask whether and on what basis hope could survive.

This situation recalls the great meteorite which struck the Yucatan Peninsula eons ago, sending a cloud of dust around the world that obscured

the sun for years, killed off the flora, and thus broke the food chain. Life of all sorts was largely extinguished and had to begin to slowly regenerate itself once again.

In this light, these negative forces are misnamed “postmodern,” but they are rather the final critical period of modernity as it progressively collapses. Having become conscious of its own deadly propensities, modern philosophy begins to attack these evils with the only tools it possesses – that is, in terms of power and control. Knowing that it must arrest its inherent destructive urges, reason destroys its own speculative foundations, all notions of structures and stages, and, of course, all ethical norms. Everything must be discarded as worthless because the hubris of modern reason closes off any sense that it itself is the real root of its problem. In a paroxysm of despair, like a scorpion trapped in a circle of fire, it commits its own *auto da fe*.

If there is to be truly a post-modern world — or, in the words of Jesse Jackson, if we can “keep hope alive” — it will need to be in other terms.

Subjectivity: A New Agenda

However, to read this history negatively, as we have been doing, is only part of the truth. It depicts a simple and total collapse of technical reason acting alone, as if it were self-sufficient, but there may well be more to human consciousness and, consequently, to philosophy. This could be considered in analogy to the replacement of a tooth in childhood, where the more important phenomenon is the strength of the new tooth, not the old tooth being lost. Certain philosophers did point to these other dimensions of human awareness. Shortly after Descartes, for example, Pascal’s assertion “Que la raison a des raisons, que la raison ne comprend pas” would remain famous although unheeded, as would Vico’s prediction that the new reason would give birth to a generation of brutes – intellectual brutes, but brutes nonetheless.⁷ Kierkegaard would later follow Hegel with a similar warning. None of these voices would have a strong impact while the race was on to “conquer” the world by a supposed omni-sufficient scientific reason. But as human problems mounted, the adequacy of reason to handle the deepest problems of human dignity and transcendent purpose came under sustained questioning, and more attention was given to additional dimensions of human capabilities.

One might well ask which comes first, the public sense of human challenge or the corresponding philosophical reflection. They may, in fact, be one, the philosophical insight being the reflective dimension of the human concern. In any case, one finds a striking parallel between social experience and philosophy in the twentieth century. In response to the extreme totalitarian and exploitative repression of the person by fascism and communism in the 1930s, there arose a progressive liberation: from fascism in World War II, from colonial exploitation in the 1950s and 60s, from

minority oppression in the 1970s, and from Marxism in the 1980s. Like a new tooth, the emergence of the person has been consistent and persistent.

There has been a strikingly parallel development in philosophy. At the beginning of the last century, it appeared that the rationalist project of stating all in clear and distinct objective terms was close to completion. This was to be achieved in either the empirical terms of the positivist tradition of sense knowledge, or in the formal and essentialist terms of the Kantian intellectual tradition. Whitehead wrote that at the turn of the century, when with Bertrand Russell he attended the First World Congress of Philosophy in Paris, that it seemed the work of physics had essentially been completed except for some details of application. To the contrary, however, the very attempt to finalize scientific knowledge with its most evolved concepts made manifest the radical insufficiency of the objectivist approach and led to renewed appreciation of the importance of subjectivity.

Similarly, Wittgenstein began by writing his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*⁸ on the Lockean supposition that significant knowledge consisted in constructing a mental map corresponding point to point with the external world as perceived in sense experience. In such a project the spiritual element of understanding, that is, the grasp of the relations between the points on this mental map and the external world, was relegated to the margin as simply “unutterable.” Later experience in teaching children, however, led Wittgenstein to the conclusion that this empirical mental mapping was simply not what was going on in the development of human knowledge. In his *Blue and Brown Books*⁹ and his subsequent *Philosophical Investigations*¹⁰ Wittgenstein shifted human consciousness or intentionality, which previously he had relegated to the periphery, to the very center of concern. The focus of his philosophy was no longer the positivist, supposedly objective, replication of the external world, but the human construction of language and of worlds of meaning.¹¹

A parallel process was underway in the Kantian camp. Husserl’s attempt there to bracket all elements in order to isolate pure essences for scientific knowledge forced attention to the limitations of a pure essentialism and opened the way for his understudy, Martin Heidegger, to rediscover the existential and historical dimensions of reality in his *Being and Time*.¹² The religious implications of this new sensitivity would be articulated by Karl Rahner in his *Spirit in the World*¹³ and by the Second Vatican Council in its Constitution, *The Church in the World*.¹⁴

For Heidegger, the meaning of being and of life was unveiled and emerged – the two processes were identical – in conscious human life (*dasein*) lived through time and, therefore, through history. Human consciousness thus became the new focus of attention. The uncovering or bringing into light (the etymology of the term “phenomenology”) of the unfolding patterns and interrelations of subjectivity would open a new era of human awareness. Epistemology and metaphysics would develop – and merge – in the very work of tracking the nature and direction of this process.

For Heidegger's successor Hans-Georg Gadamer, the task thus becomes the uncovering of how human persons, emerging as family, neighborhood and people through the exercise of their creative freedom, weave their cultural tradition. This is not "history" as a mere compilation of whatever humankind does or makes, but "culture" as the fabric of the human consciousness, the symbols by which a human group unveils being in its time, and the way in which it cultivates hope and, indeed, its very soul.

The result is a dramatic inversion. Where before all began from above and flowed downward – whether in structures of political power or of abstract reasoning – attention has instead come to focus at the beginning of the new millennium upon developing the exercise of the creative freedom of people in and as civil society taken as a new and responsible partner with government and business in the continuing effort toward the realization of the common good. This is manifest in the shift in the agenda of the United Nations from the Cold War debates between economic systems and their political powers to the great conferences in Rio on the environment, in Cairo on the family, in Beijing on women, in Johannesburg on sustainability, and in Istanbul on human settlements. The agenda is no longer reality as objectively quantifiable and conflictual, but the more difficult and more meaningful one of human life as lived consciously with its issues of human dignity and hope, of values and cultural interchange.

This more integral human horizon situates the objective issues of power and profit in a context of human value, creative human freedom, and cultures – in a word, in the terms of human subjectivity. This calls upon philosophy most urgently to develop new ways of thinking and interpreting that can enable people to engage life more consciously, freely, and responsibly as new dimensions of human existence. Done poorly, this can produce a new round of human conflict and misery, but done well, it can be an historic step ahead for humanity and the real basis for hope.

FROM SUBJECTIVITY TO EXISTENTIAL FREEDOM

Thus far, we have seen how the work of philosophers is fundamental to the great social changes of our day from totalitarian ideologies, in which decisions are made from the top down, to civil society, in which power runs up from the responsible freedom of people organized in multiple groups in patterns of solidarity and subsidiarity. The challenge here is how the actions of these groups will be directed so as to provide the broad convergent action required for complex times.

On the one hand, to depend for such direction upon the state would be to return to the previous top- down pattern. It is thus necessary to see how this convergence can result from the pattern of values and virtues that constitute the cultural tradition of a people. On the other hand, if these be merely matters of preference and life style, they cannot provide the governance required by a society. Hence, it is necessary to trace these to their roots – the exercise of human freedom must be seen precisely as the

existential issue of being in contrast to non-being, that is, as the basic drive toward human fulfillment. In these terms cultures are paradoxically matters of human freedom which, beyond mere options, are matters of passionate commitment, such as that of a mother to the care of her sick child.

In this light, we shall look first at the emergence of awareness of existence and its meaning for freedom as personal commitment. We will then proceed to examine values and virtues in these terms, that is, as they constitute patterns of effective hope which guide our lives as cultures and cultural traditions. We can then look at the meaning of spiritual values in respect to the hope for social progress, and more grandly in respect to civilizations as the largest human unities.

Just as Aristotle evolved the formal structures of Plato in a more active sense, thought takes an additional step ahead here, moving from the relatively passive level of essence to existence as that by which essences are made to be. Moreover, if for living things “to be” is “to live,” then “to be” for conscious, free, and social human beings is to live in a conscious, free and, socially responsible manner. Existence is then the place to begin in order to be able to understand the renewal in our days of the existential sense of human freedom and the possibilities of social progress which this opens.

This existential sense of freedom can be initially seen in the Greek Church Fathers; it took on systemic form in the Islamic and Christian medieval syntheses of Ibn Sina and Aquinas; and it became an object of special attention in the twentieth century with the development of phenomenological methods for bringing to light human intentionality. Here we shall look at the first and the third of these, that is, at the classical Greek component and at its contemporary implications.

Let us begin with the Greek Fathers. Insofar as the earlier Greek philosophers had supposed matter to be eternal, the issue was merely by which form matter was specified. The issue of existence in contrast to non-existence did not emerge. Forms were eternal, and however much things changed or were moved by a final goal, they remained in a fixed cycle of eternal return. Changes took place, but there was no radical role for hope. But by applying to the Greek notion of matter the Judeo-Christian heritage regarding the complete dominion of God over all things, the Church Fathers opened human consciousness to the fact that matter, too, even if eternal, also stood in need of a causal explanation. This shortly preceded Plotinus, who was the first philosopher to provide an explanation of the origin of matter.¹⁵

This enabled philosophical questioning to push beyond issues of form, nature, or kind to existence and, as a result, to radically deepen the sense of reality. If what must be explained is no longer merely the particular form or type of beings, but matter as well, then the question becomes not only how things are of this form or of that kind, but how they exist rather than not exist. In this way the awareness of being evolved beyond change or form — to be real would mean to exist and whatever is related thereto.

Quite literally, “To be or not to be” had become the question, and all the meaning, goodness, and beauty that could be was now a matter of human concern.

By the same stroke, our self-awareness and will were deepened dramatically. They no longer were restricted to focusing upon choices between various external material objects and modalities of life — the common but superficial contemporary meaning of freedom — nor even to Kant’s choosing as one ought. All this remains within the context of being as nature or essence. The freedom opened by the conscious assumption and affirmation of one’s own existence was instead a responsibility for one’s very being¹⁶ based upon a sense of others as an infinite good literally emptying into time. This is the basis for real hope.

One might follow the progression of this deepening awareness of being by reflecting upon the experience of being totally absorbed in the particularities of one’s job, business, farm, or studies — the prices, the colors, the chemicals — and then encountering an imminent danger of death, the loss of a loved one, or the birth of a child. At the moment of death, as at the moment of birth, the entire atmosphere and range of preoccupations in a hospital room shifts dramatically. Suddenly they are transformed from tactical adjustments for limited objectives to confronting existence — in sorrow or in joy, in despair or in hope, in terms that plunge to the center of the whole range of meaning. Such was the effect upon philosophy when the awareness of being developed from attention to merely this or that kind of reality to focus upon the act of existence in contrast to non-existence and, consequently, to human life in all its dimensions and, indeed, to life divine.

Cornelio Fabro goes further.¹⁷ He suggests that this deepened metaphysical sense of being in the early Christian ages not only opened the possibility for an enriched sense of freedom and hope, but that it itself was catalyzed by the new freedom proclaimed in the religious message and the hope that derived therefrom. That message focused not upon Plato’s imagery of the sun at the mouth of the cave, from which external enlightenment might be derived, but upon the eternal Word, Son, or Logos through and according to which all things received their existence and which enlightened their conscious life.

Moreover, the Christian *Kerygma* views redemption as having been achieved in principle by the cross, but also as needing to be accepted and affirmed in a personal act of freedom by each person. The radical character of this hope, namely, that of a passage from death to life, is symbolized in baptism by immersion in water and resurgence.

Thus the new hope that accompanied the new sense of existence was that of being bursting into time:

- it rejects being considered in any sense as non-being, or being treated as anything less than one’s full reality;
- it directs the mind beyond the ideological poles of species and isolated self interest;

– it centers instead upon the unique reality of the person as a participation in the creative power of God – a being bursting into existence, who is and cannot be denied;

– it sees life as sacred because it is lived in the image of God – one is sanctified in sharing this with one’s neighbors in what is now termed civil society, and with all humankind in what is fast becoming a global society.¹⁸

It took a great deal of time for the implications of this new appreciation of existence and its meaning to germinate and find its proper philosophical articulation. Over a period of many centuries the term “form” was used to express both the kind or nature of things as well as the new sense of being as existence. As the distinction between the two was gradually clarified, however, proper terminology arose in which that by which a being is of this or that kind came to be expressed by the term “essence,” while the act of existence by which a being simply is was expressed by “existence” (*esse*).¹⁹ The relation between the two was under intensive, genial discussion by the Islamic philosophers when their Greek tradition in philosophy was abrogated, as described by al-Ghazali in his *Munqidh*.

This question was resolved 150 years later in the work of Thomas Aquinas through his notion of the real distinction between essence and existence. Paradoxically, this rendered more intimate the relation of the two principles, which as principles of being are related as act and potency. This provided a new and uniquely active sense of being.

This also made it possible to carry Aristotle’s insights regarding the structure of civil society to the existential level and to see this as a self-creative work of human freedom in the third or existential sense of freedom cited above. Although this perspective remained in the terms of objective knowledge, it was able to identify the exalted importance of the human exercise of freedom, the need for all to exercise it, and even the hope for eternal salvific implications.

When this understanding opened to inner subjectivity, freedom and hope could be lived consciously. This is the heart of religion as loving response to God and neighbor, and thus the motivation of civil society and of the willingness to work out its challenges. This enables one to take full account of the differences between cultures in terms of which freedom is exercised, of the unique sacrifices and creativity of each person and people, and, therefore, of the ways in which peoples can relate most deeply even in being most distinct. All of this has now become newly possible by a phenomenological effort articulated in terms of values, virtues, and cultural traditions.

Should we say that this philosophical capability has been developed in response to the new sensibilities to these issues, or that these new sensibilities have developed as a result of this philosophical insight? Probably the two are yet more intimately related such that the philosophical work is the reflective dimension of the broad contemporary evolution of

human sensibilities enabling it to be better understood and more responsibly oriented.

In any case, our effort here will focus on an examination of values and virtues as the cumulative exercise of the responsible freedom that is at the heart of civil society. In these terms we shall seek to uncover afresh the conscious and hopeful exercise of existence as lived over time by persons and peoples in, and as, civil society.

FROM EXISTENTIAL FREEDOM TO CULTURES AND THEIR TRADITIONS

Values

The drama of free self-determination, and hence the development of persons and of civil society, is most fundamentally a matter of being as an affirmation or definitive stance against non-being implied in the work of Parmenides, the first Greek metaphysician. This is identically the relation to the good in search of which we live, survive, and thrive. The good is manifest in experience as the hoped for object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. It is basically what completes life — it is the “per-fect,” understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through. Hence, once achieved, it is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing. The most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else; we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree, given the right conditions, grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life — fiercely, if necessary — and seeks out the food needed for strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to an animal’s sustenance and perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner, things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the well-being of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting or hoped for when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one’s fulfillment upon its achievement. Hence, goods are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense, all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.

The moral good is a narrower field, for it concerns only one’s free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to one’s own perfection and to that of others — and, indeed, to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of

actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or misordered. This constitutes the objective basis for what is ethically good or bad.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless, whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete.

However broad or limited the options, an act as responsible and moral is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the things involved. In addition, one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, hopes for and chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term “value” is of special note here. It was derived from the economic sphere, where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is also reflected in the term “axiology,” whose root means “weighing as much” or “worth as much.” It requires an objective content — the good must truly “weigh in” and make a real difference — but the term “value” expresses this good especially as related to wills that actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.²⁰ Thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to, prizes, and hopes for a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in its hopes or the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing, it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values that in a more stable fashion mirrors the corporate free choices and hopes of a people.

These hopes constitute the basic topology of a culture — as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, they build a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. They constitute, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods or values that persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through lenses formed, as it were, by their family and culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history — often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses, values do not create the object, but rather focus attention upon certain goods rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for the affective and emotional life described by the Scots Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith as the heart of civil society. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action that, in turn, reinforce the pattern of hopes and values.

Through this process a group constitutes the concerns in terms of which it struggles to advance or at least endure, mourns its failures, and

celebrates its successes. This is a person's or people's world of hopes and fears in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, their lives have moral meaning.²¹ It is varied according to the many concerns and the groups which coalesce around them. As these are interlocking and interdependent, a pattern of social goals and concerns develops which guides action. In turn, corresponding capacities for action or virtues are developed.

Indeed, Aristotle takes this up at the very beginning of his ethics. In order to make sense of the practical dimension of our life, it is necessary to identify the good or value for which one hopes, toward which one directs one's life, or which one finds satisfying. Aristotle terms this happiness, and he then proceeds systematically to see which goal can be truly satisfying. His test is not passed by physical goods or honors, but by that which corresponds to, and fulfills, our highest capacity, that is, contemplation of the highest being or divine life.²²

Virtues

Mehta describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward in hope as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and about whom one is concerned. In this process, one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. In relation to these goals, certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one's world of meaning.²³ Freedom then becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and even more than self-determination in the sense of determining oneself to act as described above. It shapes — the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes — one's world as the ambit of human hopes, decisions, and dynamic action.

This process of deliberate choice and decision transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. Whereas the somatic dimension is extensively reactive, the psychic dynamisms of affectivity or appetite are fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values. These, in turn, evoke an active response from the emotions in the context of responsible freedom. But it is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral and social dimension of life. For, in order to live with others, one must be able to know, to choose, and finally to realize what is truly conducive to one's good and to that of others. Thus, persons and groups must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth, both in itself and in relation to others. This is moral truth: the judgment regarding whether the act makes the person and society good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfillment, or the contrary.

Deliberation, hope, and then voluntary choice are required in this regard in order to exercise proper self-awareness and self-governance. By

determining to follow this judgment one is able to overcome determination by stimuli, and even by culturally ingrained values, and to instead turn these into openings for free action in concert with others in order to shape one's community as well as one's physical surroundings. This can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of one's actions. By definition, only morally good actions contribute to personal and social fulfillment, that is, to the development and perfection of persons with others in community.

It is the function of conscience, as one's moral judgment, to identify this character of moral good in action. Hence, moral freedom consists in the ability to follow one's conscience. This work of conscience is not a merely theoretical judgment, but the exercise of self-possession and self-determination in one's actions. Reference to moral truth here constitutes one's sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which I ought to do.

When this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual in the sense of being repeated. These are the modes of activity with which we are familiar. We are practiced in their exercise, along with the coordinated natural dynamisms they require, and with practice come facility and spontaneity. Such patterns of hopes and capabilities constitute the basic, continuing, and pervasive shaping influence of our life. For this reason, they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to, or, as is often said, "amount to." Since Socrates, the technical term for these especially developed capabilities has been "virtues" or special strengths.

But, if the ability to follow one's conscience and, consequently, to develop one's set of virtues must be established through the interior dynamisms of the person, it must be protected and promoted by the related physical and social realities. This is a basic right of the person — perhaps the basic human and social right — because only thus can one transcend one's conditions and strive for fulfillment. Its protection and promotion must be a basic concern of any order which would be democratic and directed to the good of its people.

Cultural Traditions

Together, these values and virtues of a people set the pattern of hopes for social life through which freedom is developed and exercised. This is called a "culture." On the one hand, the term is derived from the Latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (*cultura animi*), for just as good land will produce only disordered vegetation of little value when left without cultivation, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained or educated.²⁴ This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (*paideia*) as the development of character, hopes, and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (*Bildung*).²⁵

The emphasis here is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a people and their ability to work as artists, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political. The result is a whole life, characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and, thereby, sharing deeply in meaning and value. The capacity for this cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education. More recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation.²⁶ This leads us beyond self and other, beyond unity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

On the other hand, “culture” can also be traced to the term (citizen, civil society and civilization).²⁷ This reflects the need for a person to belong to a social group or community in order for the human spirit to produce its proper results. By bringing to the person the resources of the tradition — the *tradita* or past wisdom produced by the human spirit — the community facilitates comprehension. By enriching the mind with examples of values that have been identified in the past, it teaches and inspires one to produce something analogous. For Klemm, this more objective sense of culture is composite in character.²⁸ E. B. Tyler defined this classically for the social sciences as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits required by man as a member of society.”²⁹

In contrast, Clifford Geertz focused on the meaning of all this for a people and on how a people’s intentional action went about shaping its world. He thus contrasts the analysis of culture as an interpretative science in search of meaning to an experimental science in search of laws.³⁰ What is sought is the import of artifacts and actions, that is, whether “it is, ridicule or challenge, irony or anger, snobbery or pride, that, in their occurrence and through their agency, is getting said.”³¹ As a result, this requires that we take heed of “the imaginative universe within which their acts are signs.”³² In this light, Geertz defines culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of intended conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”³³

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time, and it hence depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. The culture which is handed on, or *tradita*, comes to be called a cultural tradition. As such it reflects the cumulative achievement of a people in discovering, mirroring, and transmitting the deepest meanings of life in terms of which they shape their hopes. This is tradition in its synchronic sense as a body of wisdom.

This sense of tradition is very vivid in pre-modern and village communities. It would appear to be much less so in modern urban centers, undoubtedly in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life in large urban centers. However, the cumulative process of transmitting,

adjusting, and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as this is passed on in new ways. Attending to tradition, taken in this active sense, allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which Socrates sought, but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own hopes and life project actively toward the future.

FROM CULTURAL TRADITIONS TO SOCIAL PROGRESS

Because tradition has at times been interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a democracy, it is important to note that a cultural tradition is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community or civil society. Indeed, it enables succeeding generations to shape their hopes and realize their life with freedom and creativity.

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. One's consciousness emerges, not with self, but ontogenetically in relation to others. In the womb, the first awareness is that of the heart beat of one's mother. Upon birth, one enters a family in whose familiar relations one is at peace and able to grow. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence which undergird or undermine one's capacities for subsequent social relations. There one encounters care and concern for others independently of what they do for us and acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.³⁴ Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. As persons we emerge by birth into a family and neighborhood from which we learn and in harmony with which we thrive.

Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. He sees this life in the varied civil society as the new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is in life as lived in the family and in the progressively wider social circles of civil society into which one enters.

If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition as that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. In fact, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history, the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and

reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life and, accordingly, make pragmatic adjustments.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too uni-dimensional. While tradition can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms and might seem merely to concern how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances and constructing and defending one's nation. Moreover, this wisdom is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we hope to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, that is, what is truly to be hoped for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted.

This points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history and directs our attention vertically to its ground and, hence, to the bases of the values which humankind in its varied circumstances hopes to realize.³⁵ It is here that one searches for the absolute ground of meaning and value of which Iqbal wrote. Without that all is ultimately relative to only an interlocking network of consumption, then of dissatisfaction and finally of anomie and ennui.

The impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such great epics as the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, hopes, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition, then, is not, as is history, simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. It is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life; that is, what is hoped for. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and progressively passed on generation after generation. The content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, emerges progressively as something upon which personal character and civil society can be built. It constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it is accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forebears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from

experience and the cumulative hopes and free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community.³⁶

Ultimately, tradition bridges from ancient Greek philosophy to today. It bears the divine gifts of life, meaning and love, uncovered in facing the challenges of civil life through the ages. It provides both the way back to their origin in the *arché* as the personal, free and responsible exercise of existence and even of its divine source, and the way forward to their divine goal, the way, that is, to their Alpha and their Omega.

Traditions and Progress

This is a daunting challenge: It is necessary to avoid losing the civilizing heritage from all of the above civilizations, yet to establish a clear and firm identity which distinguishes the new nations to revive the religious roots of their identity, yet without falling into, or falling prey to, a fundamentalism which would impede progress; to develop the economic base, yet not at the cost of a new servitude; and to take one's place politically in the world, yet to retain and promote one's proper independence.

While moving from a centralized to a more open economy, nations are engaged not only in balancing all the great forces of the world, but in integrating them into a new and viable whole. In this sense, here the future of civilization is in play. Truly humane progress will be possible only to the degree that peoples are able to find ways of inspiring their disparate elements with spiritual values in a way that promotes both the dignity of the human person and the social cohesion and cooperation of its peoples.

Prof. S. Shermukhamedov of Uzbekistan provides us with an excellent description of spiritual culture. This is "the system in which the values of human society and humankind are reflected, impressed and incarnated with their needs, wishes, interests, hopes, beliefs, persuasions. This is the world of emotions, sensations, aspirations, views, wills, impulses and actions, as impressed upon the internal world of man and realized through the interaction between society and nature in which man is the subject of national and common values. Man is the highest value and his life, goodness, interests, harmony, happiness are the goals of society." These words reflect an important shift taking place in contemporary culture.

Previously, in fact from the time of the great trio of Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, thought had shifted in an objectivist direction. Concern was centered upon the way things were, rather than upon the human person who knows and engages them. This orientation was radicalized at the beginning of modern times which came thereby to be characterized by rationalism.

It is then of epic moment that in our day we should become aware of not only the achievement of this orientation, but also of its limitations and of the way in which it has held us captive. Now the concerns rightly

underlined by Prof. Shermukhamedov have come to the fore. They are reflected in the new hopes and aspirations of peoples. This provides orientation for our search further into the nature of spiritual civilization, its foundations and its significance for social progress.

One of the most important characteristics of human persons and societies is their capability for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural — quite the contrary is true. Within, as well as beyond, our social group we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities which we, as individuals and communities, need for our growth, self-realization and fulfillment.

This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to the will of others, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension — whether this be the doctor's professional skill in healing or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others.

Further, this is not a matter of universal law imposed from above and uniformly repeated in univocal terms. Rather it is a matter of corporate learning developed by the components of a civil society each with its own special hopes and concerns and each related to the other in a pattern of subsidiarity.

All of these — the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience regarding the horizontal and the vertical axes of life and meaning, and the grounding of dependence in competency — combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages. This is varied according to the different components of tradition and their interrelation.

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent, prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation on any terms, with no sense of the value either of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision, the result would be devoid of existential content.

The fact that humans, no matter how different in culture, do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute — even bitterly — the direction of changes hoped for their community reflects that every humanism is committed actively to the realization of some common — if

general — sense of perfection. Without this, even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions and, hence, no debate or conflict.

Through history, communities discover vision which both transcends time and directs life in all times, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values and hopes which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and, thereby, orient life.³⁷ Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time. It is also normative, because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged; it presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. What begins to emerge is Heidegger's insight regarding Being and its characteristics of unity, truth and justice, goodness and love. These are not simply empty ideals, but the ground, hidden or veiled, as it were, and erupting into time through the conscious personal and group hopes of free human beings in history. Seen in this light, the process of human search, discussion and decision — today called democracy — becomes more than a method for managing human affairs; more substantively, it is the mode of the emergence of being in time, the very reality of the life of persons and societies.

One's cultural heritage or tradition constitutes a specification of the general sense of being or perfection, but not as if this were chronologically distant in the past and, therefore, in need of being drawn forward by some artificial contrivance. Being and its values rather live and act in the lives of all whom they inspire and judge. In its synchronic form, through time, tradition is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it — just as it belongs to us. Traditions are then, in effect, the ultimate communities of human hopes and striving, for human life and understanding are implemented not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity — which Gadamer describes as flickerings in the closed circuits of personal consciousness³⁸ — but by our situatedness in a tradition. By fusing both past and present, tradition enables the component groupings of civil society to determine the specific direction of their lives and to mobilize the hopes and mutual commitments out of which true and progressive community life is built.³⁹

Conversely, it is this sense of the good — or of hopes and values — that emerges through the concrete, lived experience of a people throughout its history. This constitutes its cultural heritage and enables society, in turn, to evaluate its life in order to pursue its true good and to avoid what is socially destructive. In the absence of tradition as the continuity of hopes and values, present events would be simply facts to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence. This, in turn, could be restrained only by some abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of modern rationalisms. Such elimination of all hopes and expressions of democratic freedoms is the archetypal modern nightmare — *1984*.

All this stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative expression of meaning and hopes evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Martin Luther or a Mother Teresa. Various terms "charismatic personalities" (Shils),⁴⁰ "paradigmatic individuals" (Cua),⁴¹ or characters who meld role and personality in providing a cultural or moral ideal (MacIntyre),⁴² they supersede mere historical facts. As concrete universals, they express in the varied patterns of civil society that harmony and fullness of perfection which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing — in a word, liberating.

Nor is it accidental that the founders of the great religious traditions come most spontaneously to mind as examples. It is not, of course, that people cannot or do not form the component groups of civil society on the basis of their concrete concerns for education, ecology, or life. But their motivations in these respects as fully human goes beyond pragmatic, external goals to the internal social hopes and commitments that in most cultures are religiously based.

Civilizations in Global Dialogue

We now stand not only at a change within a system as with a substitution of political parties, but at a point of revision of the very nature of world ordering itself. Earlier the issue was about the possession of territory under the leadership of great emperors or about physical resources and the military-industrial power these entailed. More recently we have seen the world divided by ideologies into great spheres. Since the end of the Cold War, however, it is suggested famously in the work of Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*,⁴³ that the world order is being remade on the basis of the pattern of civilizations.

This reflects a deep transformation in interests and epistemology. Before, attention was oriented objectively, that is, to things as standing over against (*ob*-against; *ject*-thrown) the knowing subject. From that perspective their quantitative characteristics were particularly salient and were given major importance. Now the subject and its intentional life or subjectivity and values have come to the fore, and phenomenological methods have been developed for their identification and interpretation. In any case, it is suggested that the new world order will be based not on the resources we have, but on the civilizations we are: not on having but on being.

Huntington maintains that the notion of civilization appears to have developed in the eighteenth century as a term to distinguish cultivated peoples from the barbarian or native populations being encountered in the process of colonization. In this sense it was a universal term used in the singular and implied a single elite standard of urbanization, literacy and the like for the admission of a people into the world order. When the standard was met the people was "civilized"; all the rest were simply "uncivilized."

In the nineteenth century a distinction was made between (a) civilization as characterized by its material and technological capabilities or by a more elaborate political and urban development, and (b) culture, which was the hopes and values and the moral qualities of a people. However, the two terms have tended to merge in expressing an overall way of life, with civilization being the broader term. Where culture focuses on the understanding of perfection and fulfillment and the evaluation of what leads thereto; civilization is more the total working out of life in these terms. Hence civilization is culture, as it were, writ large.

This appears in a number of descriptions of civilization where culture is always a central element: for F. Braudel civilization is “a cultural arena,”⁴⁴ a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena; for C. Dawson: the product of “a particular original process of cultural activity which is the work of a particular people”;⁴⁵ for J. Wallerstein it is “a particular concatenation of worldview, customs, structures, and culture (both material culture and high cultures) which form some kind of historical whole.”⁴⁶

Taken as a matter of identity it can be said that a civilization is the largest and most perduring unit or whole — the largest “we.”⁴⁷ The elements included are blood, language, religion and way of life. Among these religion is “the central defining characteristic of a civilization,”⁴⁸ as it is the point of a person’s or peoples’ deepest and most intense hopes and commitments, the foundation on which the great civilizations rest.⁴⁹ Hence, the major religions (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism) are each associated with a civilization, the exception being Buddhism which came as a reform movement, it was uprooted from its native India and lives only in diaspora among other nations.

Civilizations endure over long periods of time. While empires come and go, civilizations “survive political, social, economic even ideological upheavals.”⁵⁰

International history rightly documents the thesis that political systems are transient expedients on the surface of civilization, and that the destiny of each linguistically and morally unified community depends ultimately upon the survival of certain primary structuring ideas around which successive generations have coalesced and which then symbolize the society’s continuity.⁵¹

But this does not mean that they are static. On the contrary, it is characteristic of a civilization to evolve; and the theories of such evolution have been attempts to achieve some understanding of the process, not only of the sequence of human events, but more deeply, of the very transformation of human self understanding and hopes. Famously, Toynbee theorized that civilizations are responses to human challenges; that they evolve in terms of establishing increasing control over the related factors,

especially by creative minorities; that in the face of troubles there emerges a strong effort at integration followed by disintegration. Such theories vary somewhat in the order of stages, but generally move from a preparatory period, to the major development of the strengths of a culture or civilization, and then toward atrophy. In any case these imply extend cycles, extend over very long periods of time.

It is significant that in the end, however, Huntington is not able to give any clear definition of civilizations, whereas Descartes would request just such characteristics for scientific knowledge. Huntington notes that civilizations generally somewhat overlap, and that while no clear concept can be delineated, civilizations are nonetheless important.

Civilizations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes of civilizations change over time. The cultures of peoples interact and overlap. The extent to which the cultures of civilizations resemble or differ from each other also varies considerably. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.⁵²

In this light it can be seen that a shift of world order to a pattern not of empires or commercial blocks, but of civilizations bespeaks a great development in human consciousness and hopes beyond the external, objective and physical to the internal, subjective, spiritual and indeed religious. In contrast to Descartes, it appears that what is most significant in the relations between peoples, indeed what defines them as peoples, is not a matter accessible by scientific definition, but is a matter of more inclusive aesthetic appreciation. It is in these terms that one's life hopes and commitments, personal relations and interaction between peoples are realized.

Again we could ask whether this is the result of philosophical advances in opening, for example, the dimensions of phenomenological awareness, or, these philosophical advances are the result of social history. My sense is that the two proceed together with the philosophical advances providing the reflective dimension to the social process, just as the cultures provide the sense of perfection and hopes in the progress of civilization. In any case this reflects the present crisis of objective reason and its enrichment by subjectivity as the new agenda.

CONCLUSION

We have followed the efforts of the human mind to break beyond the long Western project of objective knowledge, especially in its increasingly rationalist strictures, in order to embrace long forgotten

elements of purpose and will, of harmony and beauty. As a result, aesthetic syntheses of values and culture, of civilization and globalization, have become newly possible and increasingly central to human life and meaning.

To restrict the mind to its older confidence in the object seems at first view to be safer, but, as human awareness expands and people move on, the merely objective world appears to crumble. To hold exclusively thereto is the key to hopelessness, bitterness, and despair.

Nevertheless, to recognize the new dimensions of subjectivity is not to assure our hopes, for human freedom is classically subject to abuse and the new sense of freedom brings with it new and urgent responsibilities. These will require all that the heritage of objective knowledge, both speculative and practical, can provide. But to this there must be added an ability for personal and social creativity. In our global times the challenge and the opportunity is to draw together the broad heritages of the many cultures in a new cumulatively cooperative manner. This is the path forward that we need to construct.

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³⁴ Caputo, John (1992) "A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Emotion." In George F. McLean and Frederick Ellrod (eds.) *Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development: Act and Agent*. Washington, D.C.: CRVP, pp. 199-222.

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CHAPTER II

**PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF IDENTITY**

AMOUGOU JEAN BERTRAND

IMPLICATIONS OF THE QUESTION

The concept of identity must be understood as both an opening and a closure. The former concerns each person's ability to recognize and find the values of his/her own culture, which is human self-possession *par excellence*. The latter comprises the rejection of all impulses from within to negate the other. It is here that man's existential difficulty – in man and for man – appears, for it is a question of safeguarding one's "humanity."

The concept of humanity indicates the being of man, that is, his essence or nature. This is a foundational issue that arises as the point of departure in all decisive research. But where does it lead us?

This approach, in the light of the challenges we face today, demands that we understand the highly existential implications of the problem of identity in today's new world space. Stated otherwise, the current situation of globalization demands that we comprehend the problematic of identity in terms of both fact and language.

The question of globalization and the identity of each people – the reality of the new global village – require us to confront the idea of identity and life in relation to our present life as well as our destiny. From a hermeneutic point of view within the Heideggerian model, the aim of the philosophical endeavor is to show that human understanding and its foundation do not lie within the ideas of history but, on the contrary, that those ideas themselves are in "relation to life and destiny".¹

Huntington (1996) thus emphasizes that

People and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions... People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know whom we are against.²

However, Huntington's cultural identity approach is both controversial and contradictory in relation to the new global context of

globalization, in respect to which the question of identity seems to be outdated. It is not that this question has disappeared, but rather that the issue of identity has become newly intensified within the context of fundamentalism, ultra-nationalism, hyper-terrorism, the renewed concern with American national security, and with Western regional security more generally.

The cries of the peoples of the world, the anguish preying on humanity, and the fear afflicting the world, especially the West, not only confirm the clash of civilizations (Huntington), but determines the crisis of our epoch in its meaning and depth as a most critical period in human history. And insofar as the idea of crisis involves malady or disorder, we are justified in saying that our contemporary social, political, economic, and cultural space is diseased in that we no longer understand ourselves, to say nothing of the world in which we live.

The common question here is to know how to find meaning and direction. This has two levels for a philosopher, namely, Why have we lost both meaning and direction? and Why must we rediscover meaning, which may now include new shades of meanings? In terms of our basic question, this may be restated as Why are we fighting a war for the expansion or protection of cultural identity? The answer to this “why” implicitly forms the key to any possible and necessary reconstruction.

Inasmuch as such issues bear upon a dimension of life that is presently in crisis, my thoughts below are based systematically and concomitantly on the evolution of both psychology and philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE QUESTION OF METHOD

Scientific and philosophical inquiry demands that we have a structure of thought for ourselves as well as for those who wish to follow us. To enter upon the path of thought means knowing where to begin and how to proceed. Concerning the present discussion, we may begin with an exposition of the psychological and philosophical dimensions of identity by using a psychoanalytic approach.³ This approach makes use of specific explanatory terms, as do other scientific methods, that are results of the various meanings of “analysis” and are based on heuristic hypotheses derived from observation.⁴ We can also draw upon the material implications between psychoanalysis and phenomenology, utilizing Lambert,⁵ Hegel,⁶ and especially Husserl.⁷ Many psychoanalysts, including Binswanger and H. Maling, have continued the method Husserl elaborated, which has also been carried forward in aesthetics, most notably by M. Dufrenne.

Another reason for choosing the psychoanalytic method is that cultural identity is a function of mental schemas. Inasmuch as the behavior of specific human groups is characterized by many mental factors, we can and must analyze the latter in order to help various human groups cleanse themselves of numerous prejudices. These constitute a great barrier to

harmonious and peaceful relations between human groups, whether they reside in the same or in widely separated political spaces.

All in all, the psychoanalytic approach provides points of reference that make possible a better comprehension of interactions between the individual, the group, their culture, other groups or cultures, and between civilizations. This will certainly enable us to uncover the role of cultural identity in such interactions.

On the basis of psychoanalytic theory, coupled with a dynamic approach, I wish to establish that there is a fundamental unity of cultures and civilizations. This will necessarily involve bringing out both the causes and the limits of the desire for domination, along with the manner in which identities respond to this challenge.

But in order to do so, it is necessary to, first, situate ourselves and, second, probe the questions that concern us. These are Who are we? Where are we? and What are we speaking about?

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL IDENTITY: THEIR REALITY AND INTERACTION

The identity from which we speak resides in culture, which includes, as Hegel observes, every facet of consciousness.⁸ The first stratum of consciousness in the ontological rather than the chronological sense is oriented towards oneself, not towards the world. We may say, furthermore, that *subjectivity is like a corridor that gives access to objectivity*.

The lesson to be drawn from the long critique of knowledge that was finally radicalized by Kant is that subjectivity and objectivity are two sides of the same coin.⁹ It is not what is looked upon that is objective or subjective, but rather the attitude or position of the one who looks. Consequently, the foundation of identity must be described in terms of the requirements of self-comprehension and self-affirmation, which includes autonomy. The recurrent term here is “self” or “auto,” which is rendered as “ego” in the Romance languages. It is thus clear that there is a connection between psychology and philosophy in the psychoanalytic approach to the issue of identity.

It is obvious that many psychologists have used the term “ego,” but here we are particularly interested in the Eidelbergian perspective, where “ego” is defined as that part of the personality which controls morality and serves as an honest broker between the id, the superego, and the external world, seeking a reasonable compromise between their respective needs.¹⁰ Following this line of reasoning also enables us to see the important place granted to the “I” by Descartes, the Founding Father of modern rationalism.

However, in basing my analysis of identity on Eidelberg’s suggestions concerning the “ego”, it is important to emphasize that identity can be divided into four parts:

- 1) The external identity evoked by the living external environment.
- 2) The bodily identity, such as different skin colors, by which differences can be represented, particularly genetic issues.
- 3) Political and economic identity, which are cross-referenced to the recognition of one's moral authority (state), political organizations, and economic structures.
- 4) The organization of religious life, including religious identity.

The cultural identity of an individual or a human group is composed of all these elements. Consequently, the main philosophical question here is to know whether everyone and all peoples feel their presence in the same way.

But the answer to this question is assuredly negative. Recognition of this fact enables us to better understand the import of the philosophical, moral, and aesthetic thought expressed in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*,¹¹ to which we will return below in the discussion of "Logotherapy" in respect to the aesthetic as it deals with the challenge of identity.

Today, what are the main lines taken by people to assert their cultural identity in the new global context?

Identity as a Response to Hegemony

Freud maintains that the transformation of both individual and social life depends on the "Ego," which can either develop (become) or regress.¹² Furthermore, the life of a people provides history and location as the specific framework within which the "Ego" (individual or collective) asserts itself through its expressive presence in the world. What is this self-affirmation in individual and collective understanding?

The great Prophets and Jesus Christ, in whom the Word became flesh, may be regarded as the greatest examples of self-affirmation in this respect. It is certainly of great significance that the "I think" and the "I am" prevail over the "We think" and the "We are" in the transcendent impact of these great figures, which means that the singular prevails over the plural. We thus can begin to see the significance of the hitherto unsuspected consequences of the change opened up by Descartes.¹³ On the basis of psychoanalysis as our methodological stance, the hidden (but hideous) face of self-affirmation is revealed not only as narcissism, but also as hegemony over and the negation of others.

Descartes' "Cogito" appears as the modern philosophical sublimation of self-affirmation. I describe this as hegemony because the "Cogito," far from being solely a metaphysical experience, constitutes the greatest source of concrete physical existence as well. Descartes affirms his individuality on the basis of the Cogito, and his defenders argue that he

resolved the problem of individuality in general by allocating “common sense” to everyone. But this does not solve the difficulty insofar as his *Discourse* confirms that even though all possess common sense, not everyone has the capacities necessary to use it well.¹⁴ Only a privileged few, such as Descartes, can construct the way and provide us with the necessary signs.

However, this so-called privilege has often led people towards dominating others in the course of history. Descartes’ “*Cogito ergo sum*” may indeed be regarded as a psychological symptom pregnant with inequalities and prejudices among persons, peoples, nations, cultures, and civilizations. It is otherwise not possible to understand the collective appropriation of this “privileged” psychology by all Western nations, where certain persons believe that they possess the exclusive rights to, and rules for, the proper use of consciousness and Truth.

This question takes us to another stop in our itinerary, namely, the examination of the relation between identity and hegemony on the one hand and, on the other, the relations among identity, hegemony, and interaction in the new global context.

GLOBALIZATION AND IDENTITY: AN IDEOLOGY OF DECULTURATION

Globalization involves the idea of a process of action upon disordered things that reshapes them into a homogeneous whole. This means that globalization cannot be understood only in terms of its goal or destiny since it is also necessary to emphasize the agency that globalizes. The latter constitutes itself as the centrality of the world and as different from other points or spaces located outside it. However, that which constitutes the centrality of the West is its culture, which has its roots in science and technology. These culminate in industry and in what is characterized in the market by capital.

Globalization, in spite of any good will that seeks to unite people in one and the same political world space, is far from being a type of cultural dialogue. It rather appears as a *monster* raging against “peripheral cultures,” which appear as “non-scientific” or “non-technical” in respect to the standardized models that have been clearly thought out by many “major” modern thinkers. Western peoples have become aware of their main role in making the future of other peoples, realizing that they are able to “enlighten” them. This is the self-image of the West, and this self-consciousness has become the “center” of the world beginning in the 12th and the 13th centuries. As a result, “world civilization” can be created and asserted only if the world is “westernized.” That is to say that “In the course of European expansion, the Andean and Mesoamerican civilizations were effectively eliminated, Indian and Islamic civilizations along with Africa were subjugated, and China was penetrated and subordinated to Western

influence.”¹⁵ This suggests the influence of Western thinkers on the whole, not in ontological terms, but rather in ontic or existential terms.

This recalls the main thrust of Hegel’s affirmation that mind is spiritual essence impregnated by self-consciousness, which knows essence as self-generative and Being itself directly present as a presence to itself.¹⁶ Hegel thus conveys the primary duty of the Occidental subject, namely, to pass itself on in the world and, from the projective realm, to effect a realization, materialization, and concretization.

Consequently, if technology changes political relations, there is no doubt that technology, along with ideas and ideology, transforms entire cultures, which integrate “languages, law, religion, administrative practice, landholding and perhaps kinship as well.”¹⁷ Therefore, if we confine ourselves to the current Western cultural expansion, in which civilization means Western civilization, the question of the future of non-Western civilizations becomes unavoidable. Globalization challenges them in terms of rights, as Pholo Bala¹⁸ and Preston¹⁹ note. It is an ideology that by design undermines other world forms, other ways of life, and other ways of production in a standardizing cultural, mental, and anthropological modeling process.

The ultimate consequences of globalization in both theoretical and practical terms may thus be stated as follows:

- 1) The globalization of firms in a planetary integration of productive processes.
- 2) The globalization of commercial exchanges in connection with the explosive expansion of merchandise and investment exchange.
- 3) The globalization of technology through the internationalization of research activities and the import and expansion of technical revolutions, leading to world-wide standardization.
- 4) The globalization of culture subsequent to the planetary standardization of new information technology.
- 5) Finally, financial globalization through its own internal dynamic and upon the basis of its disconnection from real production.

On another level, peoples within states are traumatized by the host of uncertainties that their political spaces present to them. In this regard, the globalization of meaning has introduced a transnational paradigm that is accompanied by a lack of sovereignty, the weakness of the state, and the consequent deficit of citizenship. Is it possible to think seriously of a new global society without reconsidering the protection of the state to the degree necessary?²⁰ This collapse of the power of the state – especially in developing countries – is far from comprising a guarantee of human rights or the serenity of citizens in their local political spaces. The collapse of

states and nations on the international political scene at the turn of the 21st century confirms the cynicism of the current global hegemony. One aspect of such cynicism evident everywhere is the narcissism whereby a one-way conversation prevails such that one who defends (his) international capital also claims to defend the rights and interests of the very others under attack from ultra-liberal international capital.

It is also necessary to emphasize the mass “de-citizenization” imposed by the present version of globalization. This gives rise to the philosophico-political problems of social responsibility in the new global order. Moreover, if the social responsibility of the state has become deficient, and if guaranteeing rights is no longer characteristic of the state, can we still speak of the state, citizenship, and the rights of man? What becomes of the former “citizen” in such circumstances? Can he/she still hope?

But in dealing with such questions, it is necessary to emphasize that citizenship and human rights are possible only within a sovereign political space that is capable of guaranteeing them.²¹

GLOBALIZATION AND IDENTITY: THE SHOCK AND THE RESPONSE

The picture presented above depicts how Western culture and identity are hegemonically expanding such that they have come to appear as universal culture and identity. This dominance of Western cultural identity provides food for thought concerning, on the one hand, the causes for the emergence of violence in the world and, on the other, the possibilities for survival of non-Western cultures and civilizations.

It is undeniable that the threat of death which Western civilization brings to bear upon other civilizations drives the latter to search for the resources necessary to resist. However, the “Ego” in these non-Western civilizations is in a crisis of meaning not only because its traditional resources have dried up, but also because of the unknown future it faces. As a result, it wanders before determining to resist. From the psychoanalytic perspectives of Bovald²² and Scoth,²³ this may be termed “cultural and identity stress” due to the impact of hyperculture on the other forms of sensing and representing the world. This identity crisis, like all crises, may be viewed from many different angles, including genetic, biological, psychological, social, and cultural perspectives.²⁴ Here we shall emphasize the psychological dimension, which apparently is joined to the others.

It indeed appears to be the case that the rejection of, and reactions against, Western culture on the part of other cultures arise from the frustrations bred by the tone of scorn, insolence, and haughtiness of the globalists, or at least of Westernizing logic. In the light of Freud’s argument that every frustration breeds aggressiveness, we can grasp the brutality that has been solicited by nationalisms, fundamentalisms, and global violence in violation of God’s law.

Do these crises of distress – these desecrations of the “norm” and “law” – express simply the difficulties encountered in adapting to the new global context and in realizing a political utopia? This question must be understood in two ways.

- 1) Do these responses to, and rejections of, globalization comprise one way of conceiving the contradictions between human societies? Stated otherwise, do these contradictions reside in bursts of machine-gun fire, and do the falling bombs prove that global well-being is impossible? If so, the thesis of global identity is well on its way to history textbooks.
- 2) Or, do these rejections and identity responses call into question political action itself? How can one ensure global well-being when distrusts those who somehow integrate combat into the course of historical events? We see here that both geo-political and global strategies, along with their respective theologies, must move in new directions.

We can undoubtedly regard the rejection of the Western cultural paradigm, the fundamentalist and ultranationalist responses to it, as well as insurrections within states and non-Western civilizations against the local authorities and other agencies that serve as intermediaries for this expansion, as political action. But they also have very important psychological implications. They convey 1) the negative consciousness that other peoples and civilizations have of Western cultures and 2) the self-awareness of these peoples that it is necessary to struggle against the absolute death of their identities.

We can thus grasp the influence of our common past upon our present. History teaches us that Westerners have undertaken the subjugation of other peoples over the course of many centuries. Huntington has clearly asserted this, as was remarked above.²⁵ There is no question that the memories non-Western peoples have of Westerners are memories of violence, exploitation, infantilization, and dehumanization.

I conclude on the basis of certain fundamental strata of Freudian psychoanalysis that although non-Western cultures and civilizations have the right to protect themselves against endless aggression, the influence of historical events make them aware of their situation and *afraid of dying*. The psychoanalytical strata include: the great influence of the past on the development of the personality or identity; the impact of aggression (by the external world) on the behavior of groups; the dangers generated by repression in the formation of identity. I also consider the behavior of individuals and peoples.

In discussing an analogous situation, Hegel prefers the terminology of servitude to that of death in his master and slave dialectic.²⁶ He thereby views the slave as having the possibility of reversing the course of historical

events through a new projection of himself or his “Ego” in the world by means of his work and his identity. This brief reference to Hegelian thought might thereby enable us to entertain the possibility that the “Clash of Civilizations” which Huntington describes might take place without any great upheaval, and take place to the advantage of slaves over the masters who have long ruled over them. In fact, some positive changes have already appeared, including semantic transformations and an alteration in various infantilization practices.

But whether or not Western power declines, the main problem to be resolved remains within one’s own spirit, consciousness, or mind because in many aspects of non-Western cultures the injuries that have been suffered leave frustration behind. Not in the least, the problem pertains to the identity and the definition of man. Freud’s psychoanalytic research on stress and its aggressive effects enables us to listen to, and understand in a new way, the violence that shakes and threatens world peace today.

There may well be a risk of the world imploding after the emergence of a new international order beginning with the First World War insofar as peoples, cultures, and civilizations want to assert themselves. Moreover, those who are subjugated believe that it is necessary to destroy those who have subjugated them. Paradoxically, those who carry out subjugation are certain that they can assert themselves and express their identity only by placing themselves head and shoulders above the others. Thus, actions and reactions in terms of the identity question take place after the emergence of subjectivity in the continuous and ruthless struggle between “ego” and “alter ego”.

Everything goes on as if, following Sartre, the assertion of identity, or salvation, passes through the negation of other identities.²⁷ In this light, common sense directs one to consider the possibility that society and the body politic are coming to an end. But this very conjecture concerning the death of society forces us to grasp the need for a social body comprising family, nation, continent, and the Earth as a whole. Nevertheless, the social convulsions mentioned above give us reason to wonder whether the creation of a social, political, national, or global body is a need experienced by everyone – whether everyone desires to live together in peace from now on. This question itself indicates the overriding philosophical, theological, and political challenge of our epoch, namely, the need to rethink both the world and our presence in the world. To do so means, first of all, to redefine ourselves. However, insofar as all redefinition engages a re-foundation or re-beginning, there is a concomitant need to attend to the implication of Heidegger’s Parmenidean thesis on the need to rethink Being. That is to say that we cannot rethink our humanity without rethinking what supports the world that supports our daily existence. An answer to the question of identity in a global context becomes possible only by rethinking globality and cosmicness themselves.

At the very least, Fukuyama’s *The End of History*²⁸ is questionable; but his notion of the “Last Man” is very problematic since it is very difficult

to disassociate that Last Man from his numerous concrete economic interests. If we must rethink the world in rethinking man, the primary questions are clearly How? and Why?

IDENTITY CONFLICTS AND THE CHALLENGE OF LIVING TOGETHER: THE NEED FOR LOGOTHERAPY

The term “logos” has at least ten meanings in Greek, although only two concern us here. “Logos” in the present discussion will be taken to mean, first, the faculty for knowing and, second, language or word. The concept of “logotherapy” will thus mean not treatment, recovery, or cure by means of words or speech, but rather the treatment of our language as well as of our faculty to judge. Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* proves important in the articulation of this notion.²⁹

The philosophical issues at hand are inseparably intertwined with psychological predilections that have become commonplace in the modern Western world. The chaos threatening the future of the world – and humanity itself – in the twenty-first century derives from psychological problems confounded by a “solipsist complex” that has unfortunately been fostered by the primary metaphysical experience of the “*cogito*” as based on the “ego” rather than on that of the “*cogitamus*” as based on the “*sumus*.” The propensity for hegemonic behavior finds its psychological and metaphysical foundation in this fact.

Freudian psychoanalysis emphasizes this foundation of the ego-hegemonic problematic, which itself serves as the foundation for the idea that human nature is by instinct predisposed to destruction and domination. “Logotherapy” suggests that our socio-cultural and socio-psychological models are flawed with regard to their “egos”. It is in this respect that Margaret Mead,³⁰ Pflanz,³¹ and Leighton³² maintain that we all are suffering from a social illness. This is the context within which one must read, describe, and question ultranationalism, hyperimperialism, fundamentalism, hyperterrorism, and over-defensiveness.

We must ask whether our language is healthy at a time when political rhetoric is based upon logomachy concerning poor/developed, superior/inferior cultures, good/evil, free world/others, as well as a clash of civilizations. Our speech and manner of speaking today are, in fact, diseased – and they must be cured because they divide peoples rather than bring them closer to each other and unite them. We speak, but we do not communicate, even though we believe that we communicate.

From this perspective, the disasters in New York and Washington of 11 September 2001, those orchestrated afterwards by “surgical” air strikes in Afghanistan and elsewhere and the occupation of Iraq, demand a rethinking of self-affirmation taken as the rejection of others and of what differs from oneself. Reason is a cultural creation in its conflict with itself and in its various ways of working out relations in the world and in society. It must be tested and criticized if we want to decisively rethink both the

present and the future of the world.³³ It is in such auto-correction of both our self-understanding and the purity of our daily language that we can succeed in meeting the challenge of bringing humanity into the paradigm of a community constructed upon sound ideals and values. This is a matter of stimulating human beings to communicate, for, as Morin emphasizes,

The reestablishment of communication between cultures requires not only exchange of information or ideas, but especially the formation and elaboration of reflection on the givens and problems of both. This is a matter of restoring throughout the rights, roles and need for reflection. But to reflect means at the same time: (a) to suppose to take up again, to present in different perspectives events, problems and ideas; (b) to take a look at one's own way of seeing, to reflection oneself in reflection.³⁴

Morin's thought can be reduced to the trilogy of auto-criticism, opening, and otherness.

In summary, reflecting upon oneself and rejecting all else breedugly and negative images in public and cultural space, and they reveal the truth and urgency in Delacampagne's call of "back from obscurantism."³⁵ Consequently, the main problem for humanity today as it faces what is taking place in the world is that of the existential relation between ethics and the problem of identity. As Spinoza notes, everything that is beautiful is difficult and rare.

THE ROLE OF AESTHETIC IDENTITY: CONFLICTS IN THE NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT

In Greek etymology, *aisthanesthai* means to smell, taste, or feel, and *aisthetikos* includes that which is related to "sensitivity." The word "aesthetics" in this respect thus means one's apprehension of the world, along with his/her sensations, individuality, and particular tastes.

At first glance, one might think that aesthetics involves the emergence of an individualist culture. However, the example of Descartes counseling Princess Elisabeth, who was traumatized by misfortunes, reveals the therapeutic properties of aesthetics, whereby the passions that haunt us are transformed in a positive sense. It is most significant that the impact of the drive for domination and the response of identity appear at the same time as does the call for the necessary aesthetization of societies. The latter presupposes the existence of an aesthetic language, which may here be understood as that which produces the meanings of symbolic interpretation, politics, religion, and the ethical interpretations of the finite human condition.³⁶

But speaking about language comprises the evoking of speech. This means that the intersections of identities must first give place to silence if they wish to listen and communicate because, from a grammatological perspective, speech is intertwined with what we speak of, namely, that which is thought.³⁷ This understanding enables us to grasp the point where cultures form a unity, beyond their obvious diversities and differences. Taking into account the restoration of aesthetics allows us to attend to the transformation of our individual identity within the fundamental unity of our “differences.” This is the key to legitimizing our hope for eternity, not only as individual bodies, but, above all, as a collective. In this respect, the truth of history will never be bounded by a single cultural identity, but rather, it will consist of the changing whole made up by all peoples in their respective struggles to give – or find – the meaning of their presence in the world.

Aesthetics “universalizes by differentiating” because people cannot have the same sensations, feelings, and tastes – a fact that gives rise to the differences between cultures and civilizations. Each person, people, culture, or civilization has its own ways of grasping the world and ways of expressing this apprehension. This underlies the principle of universality or fundamental unity that pertains to them.

It is this fundamental unity, which is quasi-mystical and spiritual, that Heidegger would call “ethi-cal,” at least, in his phenomenological aesthetics. Aesthetics opens a way to our necessary reconciliation with the transcendent. This is a step that can be taken only by those who are deeply sensitive. Such sensitivity should also give us the grace to be frightened either of death or of that which surpasses our human dimension. This psychological threshold constitutes the metaphysical basis not only of spirituality, but also of any morality or ethics of progress in the strong sense of these terms.

In personal terms, I experienced a deep satisfaction in Philadelphia’s Ashley Gallery on 22 September 2002 as I viewed the masterpieces of the American artist Julia Dzikiewicz. In these works, which symbolized the 11 September attacks on the United States, she succeeded in bringing out the human sensitivity, as well as the feeling of fear, in the bearing of the people depicted. This is something that is hardly visible with respect to such great structures as the Washington Monument, the White House, Capital Hill, the Pentagon, or the National Archives. At the end of our conversation, I could not help asking her whether, from her perspective, totalitarians, hyper-imperialists, and hyper-terrorists also share a sensitivity of their own. We should note that art is undeniably closer to the aesthetic significance beyond disinterestedness about which Kant speaks because it allows man, who has gone blind, to relearn how to become man again in union with the divine. This serves to illustrate the great importance of education in the broadest sense in all cultures today insofar as the changes taking place today require new psychological abilities, new ways of thinking, and, consequently, another way of living together.

* * * * *

In today's decisive stage of history, when man is isolated from and frightened of man, I have sought to illustrate the psychological, metaphysical, and moral significance of the identity question as we face the menace that is looming over all of us. This involved an attempt to outline the philosophical principles of a new public world space that would be more secure and more supportive of the needs of all peoples. We could speak of this as a new civil society that would be open to others and protective of the environment.

To the extent that economic adjustments have always been necessary in order to permit societies and nations to better harness their resources and foster their growth, cultural adjustments have also become indispensable for ensuring that our spirit progresses in creativity. Ultrationalists and hegemonists have, in contrast, defended an authenticity thesis that is obscurantist. Adjusting the logic of identities is a matter that necessarily involves all of us if we wish to rise to the challenge thrown by Gabaude, namely, to lay the foundation for the new world of the future.³⁸ This demands that we create the maximum conditions for "humanization" and thereby affirm rationality as we rethink reason.³⁹

From this emerges a new paradigm of human existence, namely, a culture of adaptation that calls for unceasing efforts to acknowledge and accept the numerous cultures, civilizations, and identities that are present in the world. These remain united, in spite of everything, insofar as they are expressions of the multitude of human faces in the world. As Taylor affirms, however, acknowledgement or recognition is not merely simple politeness, but rather a vital human need.⁴⁰ Thus, strategies for rendering aesthetic experience uniform not only comprise fundamentalism and hyperimperialism – they consecrate the celebration of barbarity. From this perspective, to defend and promote difference within the universal both fosters a critical spirit and defends philosophy as a necessary critical project. In the final analysis, this is to participate in the manifestation of Being in its diversity.

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CHAPTER III

RETHINKING LIBERALISM AS POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL: RICHARD BELLAMY'S VIEW OF "LIBERALISM" AGAINST ITSELF, AND OF ITS RECONSTRUCTION

MIHAELA CZOBOR-LUPP

Richard Bellamy creates the framework for *Rethinking Liberalism* through a combination of historical and conceptual analysis. He brings together the critique of liberalism produced by those who are not "officially" liberals and the disputes between libertarians and communitarians taking place today within "liberalism" itself. The result is a very courageous and constructive theoretical solution that Bellamy calls democratic liberalism. This comprises an attempt to place "liberalism within democracy" through a reconstruction of the meaning of both democracy and liberalism.¹

THE NATURE OF LIBERALISM

Bellamy's integration of the non-liberal critique of liberalism into his rethinking of liberalism takes place in a series of steps. He first retrieves from Hegel the importance of intersubjective modes of understanding for the development of the individual, along with the definition of politics as the explicit recognition of a public dimension. This may be expressed in the notion that the individual exists on a level beyond mere private concern.² Hegel thus challenges the idea of neutral liberalism insofar as "claims of differentiation are underwritten by a fundamental unity."³

Bellamy then deepens the idea of fundamental unity that underlies any claim of differentiation. He does this by means of an attempt to demonstrate that any liberal claim of neutrality, in the name of negative liberty, conceals a commitment to a particular conception of good. Positive liberty is thereby not only unavoidable, but also valid from a liberal perspective. Green explicitly recognizes this, and Bellamy retrieves from him the idea that liberal society is characterized by a commitment to positive liberty in the form of an ideal of self-realization or self-development whereby self-realization is "the development of human capacities through engaging in activity. In so doing, individuals are seeking a personal good, bettering themselves by conceiving what their best self could be like."⁴

The differentiation presupposed by pluralism in fact resides upon unity, or, on equality of respect for individuals to realize themselves. Far from being neutral, liberalism is related to a particular life-style, namely, that of “the self-developing and morally responsible individual.” This indicates that any liberal account of autonomy as the central value of liberalism makes sense only within the context of a common good that comprises shared and intersubjective social and cultural meanings. Consequently, “to cut liberalism off from the common good... is to deprive it of its foundations.”⁵ The foundations of liberalism thus prove to be not “universal,” but rather culturally and socially embedded.

Insofar as the value of individual development is an expression of the shared practices of a given society, Bellamy then seeks to demonstrate that cooperation may well be more important than competition. In doing so, he prepares the ground for a critique of the rights-based argument for liberalism. He is assisted in this task by DeRuggiero’s doctrine of “social liberalism.” We may say that if the first level of this metamorphosis of liberalism consists of the idea that no diversity is possible without an underlying unity, the second level expresses a move towards the content of this unity, namely, the ideal of self-realization.

If sharing social and cultural meanings and practices comprises the manner in which to bestow meaning upon the fundamental liberal value of autonomy, then cooperation might be more relevant to our existence and development as individuals than competition. This is what the third level of the transformation of liberalism reveals. It now becomes possible to conceptually synthesize and reflect this transformation in a change of meanings of both liberalism and democracy. Carl Schmitt and Peter Schumpeter are the two “antiliberals” or anti-liberal minds – as Stephen Holmes would call at least one of them – who contribute to this change.⁶

Stephen Holmes views some of Schmitt’s criticisms of liberalism as “often interesting and sometimes persuasive,” while others “simply miss their mark.”⁷ In contrast, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism has an extremely constructive bearing upon Bellamy’s position. Bellamy interprets Schmitt as indicating that modern democracy undermines liberalism by revealing the latter’s fundamentally apolitical character. Liberalism thus needs to become more political because conflicts “can only be resolved politically, through decision, not metaphysically, through rational discussion.”⁸ Such conflicts become unavoidable once we recognize that the foundations of liberalism are not to be found in a universal, impartial, and neutral reason, but rather in a particular conception of the common good.

The liberal rule of law rests upon a “constitutive political moment.” This entails the contingency of political liberalism and the impossibility of transcendentally vindicating such notions as individualism, discussion, openness, liberty, equality, and progress. The political character of liberalism thereby becomes the ground for a critique of the concept of human rights. That is to say that rights result from political processes, which in their turn are to be viewed as the expression of a duty-oriented

understanding of the concept of citizenship. Any attempt to claim that something is “human” is merely the expression of a particular conception of human agency.

Bellamy reaches this conclusion beginning with the critique of rationalism in politics that is inspired by Schmitt. What he does not see, however, is that “rationalism” might entail more than one meaning. This is a point that Leo Strauss apparently understood when, following Schmitt’s critique of (modern) rationalism, he sought to retrieve classical rationalism as an alternative model for the (modern) understanding of politics. After all, Bellamy also uses a certain meaning of rationalism in his attempted reconstruction of both liberalism and politics, in spite of his claim to rethink the meaning of liberal politics through the rejection of “rationalism.”

What traverses the meaning of rationalism in Bellamy’s terms is a predominantly pragmatic and Burkean attempt to rethink politics along the lines of prudence and compromise. Moreover, Bellamy’s usage of rationalism involves elements of Kantianism (consequent to Onora O’Neill’s concept of the “possible consent of actual agents”), Machiavellian republicanism, and Burkean “principled pragmatism.” This entails prudent behavior that is oriented to compromise, exemplified in his definition of the concept of citizenship as based upon “a set of prudentially motivated political duties.”

But Schmitt was nevertheless mistaken in his opinion of Burke. In his critique of parliament, for example, he identified the core of parliamentary life as open discussion while reducing open discussion to rational persuasion. However, discussion is also oriented towards understanding, which involves finding what is held in common as a condition of informed political calculation concerning the most appropriate decision in the circumstances. Once again, Bellamy’s own option for a certain meaning of rationalism reveals itself as the ground of a particular understanding of the political.

The core of this understanding is a dynamic, process-like vision of democracy and liberalism in which the accent falls upon the construction of justice, the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, the ability to broaden one’s perspective as a citizen of such a polity, the promotion of politics, the lifting of political constraints, and so forth.⁹ However, a question that unavoidably arises in this regard is: Why does Bellamy not use these characteristics of his own understanding of rationalism, as the ground of both democracy and liberalism, to forge a new meaning of the concepts of “universal,” “human nature,” and “human rights” rather than simply declare them to be invalid within the context of liberal politics?

Bellamy’s manner of bringing “the political” back to the core of liberalism entails a rethinking of the meaning of democracy itself, and for this purpose he utilizes Schumpeter’s analysis of classical democracy. Setting off from Schumpeter’s definition of the essence of democracy understood as “a method for the manufacture rather than the execution of the general will,” Bellamy reaches the conclusion that “In the future,

democracy must be conceived not as a form of popular rule but as a mechanism for constraining, influencing and producing government and for facilitating the compromise and rules necessary for the efficient and fair coordination of our lives.”¹⁰

On the basis of these two reconstructions of the meanings of liberalism and of democracy, Bellamy can now present his definition of democratic liberalism as “an equitable *modus vivendi* capable of facilitating a complex mixture of local and general agreements amongst the diverse sections of contemporary societies.” As such, a democratic liberal politics has two aims. One is “to devolve power to a variety of social groups and organizations to allow them to formulate and to apply the norms appropriate to their particular purposes and situation.” The other is “to create a federated institutional structure, of which parties and parliamentary bodies form only a part, to enable the various elements of the social system to regulate their interaction and to resolve their disagreements.”¹¹

THE CRITIQUE

Bellamy has thus prepared the ground to undertake from within liberalism itself, first, a critique of the idea of neutral liberalism (with its counterpart in the concept of a more political liberalism) and, second, a critique of the rights – based argument for liberalism, along with its counterpart in the duty – based argument and the republican understanding of political liberalism. Bellamy can then move on to, third, a critique of the concept of human rights, with its counterpart in the notion that the metaphysical foundations of liberalism have no universal claim. This is the task of the second part of the book, which deals with the issues of “Rights, Pluralism, and the Need for Politics.”

The liberalism that Bellamy opts for is both political and metaphysical. It is not neutral and impartial, but rather an “historically contingent set of practices which cannot be grounded in universally valid principles.”¹² He wants to find a middle point (politics) between libertarians (who are too detached) and communitarians (who are too involved). While libertarians cannot convincingly explain the transition from rational to reasonable, communitarians find it difficult to make an objective claim concerning what makes all human lives worthy of our concern. The type of liberalism that Bellamy views as politically valid is embedded in democracy. As such, it cannot avoid consideration of conflicting ethical viewpoints. This means that it cannot confine them from the very beginning within the limits of some “neutral” and “impartial” Bill of Rights, but is instead forced to approach them politically. They are a genuine source of politics through the creativity and inventiveness of compromise and decision-making. Contingency, understood as both circumstances and difference, thereby becomes a source of politics.

Bellamy is less convincing, however, when it comes to the metaphysical dimension of his conception of liberalism. He argues that the

metaphysical foundations of liberalism are to be found in some form of Kantian universalism.¹³ There is nothing wrong with this. The problem is that if the foundations of liberalism are to be found not only in the common good, but also on a metaphysical level, this by definition implies some form of universalism. It should be noted that Bellamy himself appears to accept this, at least at certain points in his discussion. One cannot help but question how Bellamy can explain in a consistent way that liberalism has certain metaphysical foundations, which he identifies as a form of Kantian universalism, while at the same time claiming that it comprises a contingent and historical set of practices that, as such, cannot be grounded in universally valid principles.

What Bellamy's construction of political and metaphysical liberalism seems to hint at, but which he hesitates to fully and explicitly develop, is the need for a new meaning of universalism. He lays down the premises for a new meaning of universalism by stating that the character of liberalism is both political and metaphysical. The starting point for his metaphysical dimension of liberalism is in fact contingent and practical (!) in the Aristotelian sense, which is to say that it is both political and moral. (This understanding is also presupposed by Bellamy's own republican understanding of politics.) This does not mean that there are no "universally" valid principles, but rather that the latter can be recursively constructed in a movement between the local and contingent starting point, the advancement of what Whitehead terms imaginative generalization, and the confrontation of the latter with local circumstances. This dynamic, which Onora O'Neill describes in *Constructions of Reason*, involves Rawls' reflective equilibrium as well as Kant's reflective judgment

The universal is, therefore, to be constructed, not contemplated and represented. It is not given, but is rather aimed and arrived at. In this dynamic, practices that have a "universal" opening are of great significance. This refers to the readiness of human agents to test the imaginative generalization, or claim of totality, that is embedded within their practices by confronting it with the contingency and variety of the local circumstances, which include difference and otherness as well. Indeed, if Bellamy is to be consistent with his retrieval of Hegel in *Rethinking Liberalism*, he has to accept that sameness, philosophically speaking, needs difference and otherness in order to construct its identity. His rethought meaning of "universal" would thereby denote the capacity to recognize the presence of difference in what is the same and use it constructively to promote politics. The practical context demonstrates its political capacity only to the extent that its metaphysical foundations demonstrate their propensity for universalism and recognize that difference is constitutive of sameness. Liberalism can pass this test. Bellamy maintains in his interpretation of Green that liberalism (transformed and rethought) has a more inclusive capacity than other sets of practices – even in its commitment to positive liberty and to a certain conception of the good – to relate to and accept difference as being constitutive of sameness.

In his attempt to return politics to the core of liberalism, Bellamy, in the spirit of Quentin Skinner's argument for republican liberty, maintains that duties have priority over rights. His argumentation in this regard includes at least two elements. First of all, I am free to enjoy my rights only to the extent that I understand that it is my duty to participate in the collective forms of decision-making and cooperation that ensure me the privilege of being able to do so. Secondly, such participation is my duty by virtue of my vulnerability, which I share with other human beings. This describes individuals as members of commonwealths – in the republican sense, of course – not as members of clubs or communities.

Bellamy wishes to emphasize the need for a responsible understanding on the part of citizens of the connection between their freedom – and their rights – and the society and culture in which they live, which entails the duty to participate in determining the character of their communities. Rights in fact result from such participation, and their limits are the limits of this participation. However, this model of responsible, cooperative, and other-oriented citizenship presents us with certain problems. For example, Bellamy is right to say that “individual freedom is not protected by written statements,” but rather by the concrete practices of political participation in the form of decision-making and compromise. Yet he says nothing about situations in which a written statement (constitution) is powerless and the democratic practices necessary as a framework for liberalism are not part of the contingent history and culture of the community in question. Stated otherwise, how can countries without a tradition of democratic practices as Bellamy conceives of them make a choice for liberalism and for the model of citizenship that is situated at its very core?

The difficulty with Bellamy's model arises from the lack of effort needed to add a universal dimension to it. The idea of vulnerability, which is part of his argument for the priority of duties over rights, could be a promising starting point in this respect, and it is in fact connected to another fundamental idea of Kantian origin, namely, finitude. It is true that we are vulnerable, but this does not stop us from advancing aims we wish to attain as well as plans for this purpose in the spirit of *Zweckrationalität*. We also seek to dominate, somewhat in the spirit of Foucault's understanding of politics. In addition, although we live in communities characterized by contingent and historical practices, we nevertheless make claims to totality and universality when it comes to our own conception of the common good. These two pairs of structural features of the practical contexts of human lives in the modern world – vulnerability and purposefulness, on one hand, and, on the other, finitude and the claim to all-embracing practices, values, and skills – have become increasingly evident in the modern world.

These two pairs of features can serve as a universal background for the definition of what a duty to “mankind” could be. Bellamy apparently does not agree with this point in light of his skepticism concerning the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship. Nevertheless, it would be very useful

from the standpoint of democratic liberalism to endeavor not only to construct a meaning of “universalism,” but also to identify the universal features of the practical contexts of social and cultural life. These would provide the ground upon which to construct something like universally valid principles and criteria for what “human” means across such practical contexts. This is even more the case in a world where politics is concerned with attaining compromise not only on a local or intrasocietal level, but also on a global level.

This issue becomes even more pressing in respect to Bellamy’s critique of the notion of human rights, which turns upon their supposedly false “universality.” He replaces the notion of human rights with that of institutional rights, which are derived from “the particular laws and accords arrived at between citizens participating within the political process, rather than supposedly transcendent normative verities.”¹⁴ The concept of institutional rights is based on a model of citizenship that has as its core a “set of prudentially motivated political duties.” The trouble with this argument is, once again, the fact that even institutional rights presuppose a certain understanding of what is “human,” even though Bellamy notes that he does not idealize a particular form of human agency but is rather concerned solely with how one should act towards others.

This idea of behavior cannot help bringing to mind Burke’s concept of prudence. This refers to the ability to judge events based upon a correct understanding of their circumstances, which involves taking into account both the imperfect character of human “nature” as well as the fact that every individual is caught in a network of contingent situations and in a web of human relationships. We must thus be content with an imperfect design of human affairs and never think that we can express the perfection of some abstract idea of what it is to be human. This is the model of human agency that Bellamy apparently favors, which is more open to otherness insofar as it is more open to the finite, vulnerable, and imperfect character of human beings. This in turn makes possible an argument for the priority of duties and obligations over rights because, as Burke himself remarked, real liberty is social freedom, which is “but another name for justice.”

Guided by this implicit model of human agency as well as the implicit meaning of rationalism that it implies, Bellamy correctly identifies the main problem faced by pluralist liberalism: Is it possible “to steer a middle course between the Scylla of metaphysical rationalism and the Charybdis of moral relativism?”¹⁵ His aim is to find a less drastic solution than Berlin’s radical choice, and his solution reflects the attempt to use difference in a constructive way, namely, as an incentive for the human agent to change practices, identities, and preferences. Pluralism is thus the ground for a constructed agreement as well as an ongoing challenge between identities that are given and taken for granted, both of which serve as sources of politics.

Compromise is the core of this political creativity. In Bellamy’s view, compromise is the crux of a rationally constructed polyphony that is

confined to the limits of a virtual agreement. Its attainment presupposes either an effort to listen to the other side, or an effort to change oneself that comprises a balancing act between two poles. This is due to the fact that competing viewpoints, which are unavoidable from the perspective of a political liberalism in search of its metaphysical foundations, constitute an “incentive for individuals to take a broader perspective.”¹⁶ Political activity is thus both the incentive and the means for constructing and supplying content to the metaphysical horizon.

CONCLUSION

Bellamy’s attempt to constructively introduce into liberalism the vision of its critics is a courageous move to broaden the conceptual sphere of liberal theory and the scope and impact of liberal institutions. His critical, but above all, constructive approach to disputes within liberalism itself makes it possible to forge on a deeper level both the meaning of politics from a liberal perspective and the metaphysical foundations of liberalism. *Rethinking Liberalism* makes it evident that the need to rethink not only the sense of liberal politics but also the meaning of the “liberal” claim to universality is an urgent and pressing task. An example of the former is provided by his analysis of the political implications of the poll tax in Great Britain, which pinpoints that the great task facing the liberal meaning of politics is “How to re-create a sense of civic virtue in modern societies.”¹⁷ In my own opinion, this is also the great task facing post-communist societies as well.

An example of the second need is presented by his analysis of the nature of sovereignty in the political architecture of Europe. Bellamy here points to the same constructive dimension that is reflected by his overall attempt to rethink liberalism, namely, that the European polity should be constructed as a mixed commonwealth. This implies a mixture of principles. These principles have to reflect, at least in part, the political willingness of the agents involved to re-define their respective identities and practices. I would add that this necessitates a philosophical willingness to continuously bring one’s principles in tune with these changing practices and identities. This two-fold willingness – both political and philosophical – thus makes it possible to construct a meaning of universalism that is worthy of consideration in a world of an increasingly global politics.

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NOTES

¹ Bellamy, Richard (2000) *Rethinking Liberalism*. London and New York: Pinter, p. 196.

² Ibid., p. 18.

³ Ibid., p. 12-13.

⁴ Ibid., p. 36-37.

⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

⁶ Holmes, Stephen (1993) *The Anatomy of Antiliberalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁷ Ibid., p. 57.

⁸ Bellamy, p. 78.

⁹ Ibid., p. 199.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 101.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 103.

¹² Ibid., p. 151.

¹³ Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 193.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 199.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 220.

CHAPTER IV

RELIGION AND IDENTITY

ZSUZSANA BÖGRE

INTRODUCTION

Today it is not an easy task to define our identity and answer the question “Who am I?” The answer depends both on the psychological traits and capacities of the individual, and on the surrounding social milieu. The self-identity of the individual is thus doubly determined: identity is influenced not only by inner characteristics, but also by external factors or the social environment. In adopting this approach, the present discussion places a greater emphasis upon the latter.

Within this context, the question of how to study the stories of individual identity arises. Surveying one’s life story, or the course of one’s life, appears to be the most exciting and promising of the various possibilities in this regard. This view is reinforced by the fact that such an approach has become integrated into both international and Hungarian social research over the last twenty years. The theoretical basis for this integration is that a life story comprises the system of how we search for and find ourselves, thereby comprising the system of development of our personal identity. No one today is simply given such a system in an already completed form. Indeed, our identity is often challenged by continuously changing circumstances, and we preserve our identities only through struggle.

In most cases people seek to preserve their identity in all circumstances. This process conceals a particular tension, however, insofar as we want to integrate into society while we also preserve ourselves. We have to adapt to the expectations and behavioral rules of our environment, but at the same time, we insist on our individual goals and the things that we think are important. Indeed, insisting on self-preservation is, at least, as important as our adaptation to society. That is to say that the expectations of the environment and that which is important for the personality are in continuous conflict with each other, and our life stories basically involve finding the balance between the two. If our personal identity is in a continuous flux as a consequence of this search for balance, social changes can influence the development of our identity in very different ways.

We were able to fruitfully address this question by using the life story method. We conducted fifty interviews concerning life stories and then analyzed them. Analyzing these interviews was preceded by a study of the relevant sociological literature involving the general issues of researching societal changes in both international and Hungarian contexts, the relationship between state and Church in Hungary after 1948,

correlations between social and religious changes, the literature of secularization, international and Hungarian research concerning the issue of identity, and the theoretical and methodological problems of life story research.

East-Central Europe was sold out in Teheran (1943) and Yalta (1945) by France, Great Britain, and the United States. It was thus handed over to the Soviet Union and had to live under foreign rule for half a century. Communism sought to destroy not only religion and the Church, but the whole of traditional society and traditional culture. Traditional culture comprised a static, closed, culturally homogeneous society, and a relatively large consensus existed at the level of worldview. The fundamental element of this consensus was traditional Christianity.

Traditions and the expectations of the official (communist) politics confronted each other throughout the 50 years of communist rule. The opposition, which was especially strong in the years immediately following the communist take-over, gradually weakened during this period, but the fundamental contradiction never ceased. The traditional attitude versus the forced-modern attitude, the local-rural community versus the modern crowded city, and traditional identity versus modern identity – the contradiction did not only have a theoretical meaning; it also raised concrete issues for individuals. On the one hand, there was the traditional lifestyle experienced at the individual level, the culture in which the person had been brought up. On the other, there were the official political expectations. The socio-political change that took place in Hungary in 1948 generated tensions and raised issues in very many fields of private life.

This paper focuses on the changes in religious identity under the communist system. The first section deals with the historical context of the issue. The second discusses the sociological dimensions of identity in order to indicate the differences between traditional identity and modern identity. The third then examines the construction of religion and identity under conditions of a changing society. The last section presents features of religious identity that are typical for periods of persecution.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The various churches in Europe reacted to modernization by adopting different adaptation strategies. Protestantism chose to adapt to the opinion of the majority of society, even at the price of weakening its cultural identity,¹ while the Catholic Church sought to create a Catholic sub-culture as an independent milieu. When Altermatt speaks about milieu formation in the case of Switzerland, or when Coleman mentions pillar formation in the case of Holland, both are addressing the same Church strategy.² Beginning in the second half of the 19th century, the Catholic Church sought to create, both throughout the world and in Hungary, an autonomous partial or internal culture through the establishment of a system of Catholic institutions and organizations. Results of this effort included the

setting up of Church schools, the organization of health care, the publication of books and newspapers, as well as the establishment of different Catholic organizations for both youth and adults. These sought to involve the whole of life, from socialization to education and entertainment. This sub-culture was protected by an internal control, which involved the prohibition of mixed marriages and using non-Catholic Bibles, and a strengthening of the Index system. The essence of this process was the creation of a Catholic milieu whose explicit objective was to oppose other religions, non-religious persons, and anti-clericalism.³

This effort at isolation could succeed only so long as social modernization was of a relatively low scale, a certain social and geographical isolation existed, and the mass media remained unable to overcome cultural isolation. In such circumstances access to cultural goods could be limited or, at least, controlled. After World War II, and especially beginning in the 1960s, the situation significantly changed and isolation as a general social strategy became impossible.

In Hungary, for example, possibilities became restricted to a great extent by centralized politics. After 1945, churches were subject to strong political persecution, and church schools, social institutions, and organizations were banned. Even the present incomplete data reveal that intense religious persecution was very widespread. Working permits were cancelled for 631 KALOT institutions (National Body of Catholic Agricultural Youth Societies), 675 KALÁSZ local groups (Alliance of Catholic Girls Societies), and 170 other types of Catholic communities across the country. According to one 1948 almanac, 7,522 local religious groups with a total membership of 708,000 existed in Hungary. These did not survive the communist take-over.⁴

In the autumn of 1948 the party-controlled state forced the Protestant, Evangelical, Unitarian, and Jewish congregations to sign a treaty regulating their respective churches. The Catholic Church initially resisted the pressure, but by the end of the year Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested. The head of the Catholic hierarchy was thus in prison when the episcopacy signed the treaty in the autumn of 1950.

The forced signing of this treaty was merely one of the first steps in the humiliation of the Church, which was unable to satisfy the demands of those in power. The Church, given its historical role and ability to shape opinion, was viewed as a counter-culture that threatened the totalitarian system. Although it was only natural that the dictatorship sought to annihilate the entire institutional system of the Church, the Church's opposition was not ended by Cardinal Mindszenty's imprisonment and the forced treaty. As religious persecution continued, the Church responded in the form of personal inner faith, religious practice, and community building.⁵ Signs of opposition included the continued loyalty of both clergy and believers to Cardinal Mindszenty; the establishment of spontaneously and/or secretly organized small groups for the defence of religion – these

began as early as the late 1940s; and public religious practice, which believers maintained in spite of continuous surveillance by the authorities.⁶

The first period (1948-1956) came to an end with the Revolution and the failed War of Independence in 1956, in the preparation and organization of which the churches played no direct role. While at the local level priests or active secular believers might have assumed responsibility in the national committees or elsewhere, this was generally not the case. The churches had, in fact, raised their voices against bloodshed, trying to persuade people that reconciliation and patience were the better way to proceed.

The period of 1957-1964 is very important for our topic. The first task after Kádár, the new First Secretary of the Party, assumed power was revenge, “putting things in order,” so to speak. He then undertook the task of dealing with a very large number of small agricultural producers, who had become more and more alarming to the communists insofar as the existence of independent peasants could not be harmonized with the Soviet model. Kádár began the urgent collectivization of agriculture in December 1958, which continued in a violent fashion into 1961. With the exception of the time devoted to actual agricultural production, it took only fifteen months to deprive the peasants of the land they had previously owned – at times for many generations. The socialist reorganization of agriculture was thus completed, which meant that approximately half a million people had to leave agriculture between 1959 and 1963, abandon their work culture, and move into a town that was strange to them. Family lives were broken and village communities were split up because large-scale politics needed to realize its goals.⁷

During the same period, a secretarial report at a Central Committee meeting that addressed the political role of the churches expressed satisfaction with the behavior of the bishops and priests, regarding the latter as loyal and co-operative. The fact that the authorities now viewed them in this light indicates that a fundamental change had taken place in the relationship of church leaders to state power. Two questions can be raised in this regard: To what extent can we justifiably consider the church administration to have become “loyal”? If this, in fact, was the case, What were the circumstances that brought about this change?

Learning from the experiences of 1956 and being aware of their own weakness, the churches did attempt to avoid political confrontation. But avoiding confrontation does not mean loyalty and acceptance of power. This was, in fact, more a question of political constraint and lack of action than one of acceptance.

From archival data we know that the direct interference of the state in the life of the churches did not cease after 1956. For example, one 1957 decree of the Presidential Council declared that the consent of the state was needed for all major appointments to the priesthood. This decree amounted to a level of state control even more strict than before insofar as the state felt that its ability to appoint bishops and assistant bishops was no longer

sufficient. The state could now even decide whether a particular person would make a good priest. Within the clergy this inevitably led to a self-reinforcing selection of persons suitable to the state. For this reason we can indeed speak about a “changing behavior of the episcopacy” that the state termed “loyalty.”

In addition, the pragmatic church policy of the state forced church leaders to accept a new role. The state expected them to reconcile with its power and control the lower level of priests according to the will of the state. This, in fact, forced certain church leaders to “co-operate” with the state, although what “co-operation” meant in a dictatorial system and whether the church leaders selected for this purpose actually did so are subject to dispute.

In 1960-61 a large number of religious people were arrested, especially those who were actively involved in organizing the maintenance of religious life. These arrests included those who organized religious life in the congregations, priests of the Regnum Marianum order involved in the education of the youth, and members of the suppressed monastic orders who had kept in touch with each other in secrecy, using private flats. Historians now view the activities of those imprisoned as “not action against the state, but rather for the deepening of the religious life. In the court trials it was religious belief that was persecuted.”⁸ Some of those convicted were able to read the declaration of the Hungarian Episcopacy in connection with their case, dated 15 March 1961, before they were sentenced. This declaration condemned the anti-state activities of the priests who had been arrested in terms that referred to the 1950 treaty; it stated that the careless actions of the priests in question were a detriment to the Catholic Church. The officer interrogating the prisoners showed the priests the condemnation with the remark, “You can see that they are with us!” The priests, who were isolated from all outside information, were informed only after serving their prison terms that the letter in question was written under pressure from the state security agencies and that the bishops did not even see the letter before it was published.

In summary, we may say that state power reached a certain level of consolidation with the Church that amounted to a pragmatic exploitation. “Those who are not against us are with us” were Kádár’s renowned words, and they comprised the basic principle of his people’s front politics. This domestic political principle was asserted when the Hungarian government and the Apostolic See signed a partial agreement on 15 September 1964 concerning the relationship between the Hungarian state and the Catholic Church. This agreement regulated the way in which bishops were appointed and the oath of allegiance of priests, and made it possible to once again utilize the Papal Hungarian Church Institute in Rome.⁹ Underlying this agreement was the fact that, on the one hand, Kádár realized that the system could not eliminate religion and the Church and, on the other, that the Church had lost the very strong social support it enjoyed prior to 1956, which was based on widespread political opposition to the new regime.

This church-state consolidation apparently continued throughout the next period (1965-1990), and the Church paid a very high price for maintaining religious freedom, even if only within church walls. Not only did the moral character of certain Church leaders come to be questioned, but mistrust between those with differing conceptions developed within the Church. This resulted in a fundamental change in the institutional system as a whole. While the Church had not broken up under state pressure during the previous period, it was now clearly split into “two ways” that had separate social functions.¹⁰ The responsibility of the official Church in negotiating with the state was to maintain the operation of the Church with the permission of the state. As it was under pressure from the secret State Agency for Church Issues, it was responsible for disciplining active priests and the laity and mediating the implementation of state sanctions. At the same time, however, there were those who confronted state expectations, among whom the organisation of small communities and the education of religious youth were stronger tendencies. Because of the intent of this second group to renew religion, the state persecuted the latter right up to the end of the communist period. The organizational life of the Church thus became a complex reality burdened by contradictions. There were times when the two groups felt and acted as if they stood on opposing sides of a barricade, but at other times this only seemed to be the case and they, in reality, co-operated closely with each other like brothers.

The result of this process was that the concrete realities of social, economic, political, and religious life made the available answers for what constitutes a traditional Christian identity ineffective and traditional models unworkable. This had serious consequences for society as a whole, since Christian identity after World War II was largely equivalent for most people with their true identity. Multitudes suffered from this problem, but it was especially acute, of course, for those who took their religion with genuine seriousness.

SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF IDENTITY

Erik Erikson defines identity as “a subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity.” He quotes William James that “there is a voice inside which speaks and says: This is the real me!” Erikson uses the notion of identity in two senses, namely, “in the core of the individual” and “in the core of his communal culture.” The model of identity he presents, which addresses such dimensions of identity as sameness, continuity, and change, integrates the various elements of the individual and the communal, the psycho-somatic and the social, and the emotional and the ideological. Nevertheless, it is more psychosocial than sociological in character.

Erikson’s thesis is that the development of an effective adult identity involves the acquisition of an ideology, that is, a relatively comprehensive and unified understanding of the nature and meaning of

oneself, one's role, and one's world. One implication of this thesis is that possible identities depend on the culturally available ideological options. Another is that social changes may produce new types of the various elements mentioned above that the traditional context of identities cannot adequately deal with. This may involve socially generalized identity crises in which large numbers of people cannot make an effective transition to adulthood for similar reasons.

One issue typical of the sociological way of thinking is that identity functions as a bridge between self and society.¹¹ The process of socialization involves finding meanings that individuals must internalize either as others' values or as their own, and each person throughout life has on-going opportunities to construct her/his identity by means of value choices. It is the selection of values that actively creates identities, and identities precipitate patterns of behavior that are congruent with the particular values chosen. Identity subsequently reinforces the meaning of the values that the self selects from both religious and secular sources, and also generates motivations for action. Identities are thereby developed either consciously or unconsciously through the encounter with values, and are expressed through everyday actions. However, they are to varying degrees created by the person and they are products of social institutions (such as families, local communities, and religious-groups) that survive through the societal adaptations of individuals.

In the discussion below I will focus on the function whereby identity is manifested in everyday actions. Insofar as the sociological dimensions of identity involve social roles as well as personal interactions within societal settings, changes in the modes of identity highlight the connections between personal behavior and social role during interaction.

The Traditional Point of View Concerning Identity

Parsons maintained that the stability of society could be maintained by some sameness between role-norms and the meanings of those norms in which the expectations associated with social roles and internalized personal roles are consistent with each other. One implication of this view is that the contents of social roles are self-evident for all members of society. This model presumes, moreover, that all participants play only one role during social interaction, but such a view does not recognize the fact that a given individual may very well play multiple roles. For example, a religious person would possess a religious attitude and be engaged in religious behavior at all times, even when playing so-called purely secular roles.

Parson's model does recognize the existence of role-conflict, but he argues that participants in interaction must always decide between possible alternatives, perhaps compromising on the strongest role at a given moment. His model also presumes that role-partners in an interaction have equal knowledge concerning role-norms, since they would otherwise be unable to make proper decisions regarding them. In addition, those who either do not

know or do not accept the general expectations of role-norms shared with others will be excluded from society by the local community since they will be judged to be deviant.

Such views are characterized by traditional ways of viewing identity, but newer models have emerged after Parsons – models that focus on the construction of modern identity.

The Theory of Balancing-Identity

Krappmann's theory of balancing-identity indicates how self-identity may be viewed as a balancing act in which the individual is able to differentiate him/herself from others' expectations as well as "social identity" such that s/he is able to maintain a particular self-identity.¹² This does not denigrate the meaning of the external world insofar as the individual is not free to reject the expectations brought to bear upon her/him and must manage "personal identity" in a flexible manner. While modern man should refrain from completely fulfilling social expectations since that would mean the denial of personal identity, an individual cannot completely insist on his/her self-identity since that would comprise a failure to adapt to the environment and result in exclusion from society. "Balancing" therefore necessarily involves both the social and individual spheres of identity. In Krappmann's view, a crisis of identity for modern man can be avoided only if and when such balancing between differing expectations becomes a part of identity.

As people in modern society encounter and interact with each other, each with their own different background, the issue of greatest importance to all is to preserve their respective identities. Krappmann states that this can be achieved if all participants reveal how they interpret the given situation. Individuals involved in interactions must express "who they really are" since this is the only way for them to influence the situation of the "here" and "now."

Krappmann denies that contradictions arising from structural inconsistencies place the individual in on-going conflict situations insofar as this issue is resolved by the concept of subjective role-perception, which specifies that each individual can indicate in interaction how s/he perceives his/her own roles. He is thus of the opinion that social roles appear as individual role-perceptions, and that the participants in a given situation seek to express their own perceptions of their roles. The role-perceptions expressed are thereby in competition with each another such that everyone has the possibility to modify to some extent how they perceive their roles.

My position is that the continuity of identity is provided by a person's life-story. In Krappmann's words, "The biggest problem for the individual is how to maintain the balance among these self-perceptions and how to make them understandable for his/her partners."¹³

THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

In relatively “simple” societies the sacred cosmos formed part of objective social reality without any associated specialized institutions. It comprised that part of the worldview which stood in a direct relationship with the social structure, directly determining the entire socialization of the individual. The sacred cosmos was thereby relevant for an individual biography as a whole. There was a low degree of institutional differentiation and a low degree of “autonomy” for separate institutional areas in such simple societies. However, since the sacred cosmos was thus accessible to and relevant for all members of society, there was an incipient differentiation of social roles that was directly linked to it.

In so-called higher civilizations, the sacred universe instead resides upon institutions that are partially differentiated in respect to the institution of kinship. The classical civilizations of the Orient, Europe, and America thereby came to be characterized by a priestly class, with the complete institutional specialization of religion emerging only in the Judeo-Christian tradition of Western European history. Such specialization can be approximated in various modes. For example, Luckman views the Church as representing an extreme and historically unique case in the Judeo-Christian tradition. He states that “The institutionalization of doctrine, the development of ecclesiastic organization and the differentiation of religious community from society was not paralleled elsewhere.”¹⁴

The concrete individual is born into a pre-existing society and an already constructed religious system. The process of socialization is internalized in traditional religion such that an objective coherent system of meaning is transformed into subjective life. In accordance with this system, a pattern of priorities designates certain actions as being “more good” than others for the individual. We can thus say that the objective traditional system of religion becomes the subjective system of orientation for individuals. Church-oriented religion becomes, in contrast, an individual system of religious relevance and a constitutive element of personal identity. Internalized religious representations are characterized by a status of extraordinary significance, the meaning of which affects the routine of everyday life as well as the finality of life for the individual, whereby both of the latter become located within a transcendent context of meaning. The internalized religious system thus forms subjective meaning such that one may say with justification that church-oriented religion develops individual religiosity and forms one’s identity.

Traditional religious identity presumes a correlation between church-oriented religion, individual systems of “ultimate” significance, and individual patterns of priorities. This situation was approximated to a higher degree in the Christian societies of the Middle Ages than in modern societies. In Eastern-Central Europe, however, the effects of church-oriented religion remained essentially unchanged until World War II, even

though they had previously been somewhat weakened. This is the reason why personal religious identity changed when the Christian churches collapsed under the communist system.

At least four elements can be identified in the construction of religious identity: 1) Traditional religious beliefs may provide the standards and models for the construction of personal and social identity, especially the criteria for good and evil behavior. 2) Religious institutions often provide individuals with a social network, that is, a significant reference group, who provide positive or negative reinforcement in identity construction. 3) Such mechanisms as religious traditions serve to sustain identity changes, including the typical changes in an individual life cycle. Religious rituals thus offer people patterns of salvation and action in times of difficult identity changes. 4) Religion provides a system of meaning and security. When life seems to fall apart, religious people can turn for help to the sacred cosmos and find a sense of security in times of crisis and death.

Every traditional religion plays a role in the construction of the individual identities of its adherents. Certain religious communities root individual identity within the community itself, especially in Judaism, Islam, and certain branches of Christianity. Others provide more individual autonomy, such as is the case with Protestant Christianity and the major branches of Hinduism and Buddhism. Early Christianity had a strong community orientation, with its adherents perceiving themselves as members of the Church, while church-oriented religion became the root of personal identity during the period of feudal Christianity. However, Christian identity is also shaped by interaction with the Deity in routine devotional practices, such as prayer. The various Christian traditions have, in general, also substantially influenced both personal and social identity.

LIFE STORY AND IDENTITY

In recent decades the collection and utilization of personal documents has developed rapidly in both Hungarian and international sociology.¹⁵ “Personal documents” here refers to letters, diaries, autobiographies, biographies, life stories, narratives, etc. This use of personal remembrance for scholarly purposes may in general be spoken of as the biographical method.

There has been a certain “re-discovery” of the importance of such sources insofar as they were first used in American sociology as early as the first decades of the 20th century. Thomas and Znaniecki, whose research findings were published in the United States between 1918 and 1920, used diaries and correspondence to survey the correlations between societal changes and the development of the personality.¹⁶ But their method, now considered classic in the field, did not become generally accepted among the social scientists of the time, in spite of the fact that the Chicago School applied it in studies of social deviance and criminality.

The manner in which Thomas and Znaniecki handled personal documents still merits consideration. They viewed the life story as providing the most significant type of data for sociological research, but they also were cognizant of the shortcomings associated with their method. As they stated, "We attribute general value to individual behavior too soon." In order to avoid this problem, they suggested that the "behavior monitored at certain times should be continuously compared to all those behaviors that are part of the story of the same individual and that make the essence of the individual in question." Both the problem and their response remain valid today.

In interpreting personal documents – we now restrict our consideration to life stories – we must take several factors into consideration, not the least of which is the selectivity of human memory. According to psychological, anthropological, ethnographical, historical, as well as sociological research, individuals only remember things that are important to them. When someone speaks about his/her life, they select from their "inventory of stories." Individuals in fact create a specific order of their memories that reflects the importance they place upon them. Furthermore, as new influences affect the individual in everyday life, the already existing system or "order of importance" among stories and memories may change. The life story is an open system, and its chronology and structure are only completed at the time of one's death.¹⁷

Life stories comprise a process in which major changes can always occur, and such major changes as systemic change in society or a crisis in the life of the individual can generate both turning points as well as breaks. I do not mean to suggest that the selective presentation of events is arbitrary in some sense. On the contrary, life stories not only bind isolated experiences together, they also provide a specific structure based upon the individual's "order of importance." Individuals relate their lives depending on the structures characteristic of them.

Today we know that individuals reveal their subjective self-interpretations, or indicate how they see themselves, when they tell their life stories. In many cases it is the research situation that creates the possibility for this self-expression.¹⁸

An issue that must be addressed in this respect concerns the reality of the events related ("Did it really happen this way?"). There is a consensus among those who use this method that what matters is not the credibility of the stories themselves, but rather the subjective opinions they express. A good example of this issue is provided by one of the most successful Hungarian documentary films of recent years that dealt with the infamous Reck labor camp of the early 1950s, in which both prisoners and guards told their stories. Although the former guards, including the one known as "Red," related how they had not physically injured anyone, the camp survivors spoke of how they had been tortured, especially by Red. Those viewing the film loudly expressed their disgust at hearing his recollections since there appeared to be no doubt about who was telling the

truth. While this case is interesting in itself, we use it here to illustrate that life stories do not primarily reveal factual truth, but rather the worldview and identity of the story teller. For example, what we learn in Red's case is that he did not want – or was unable – to admit to his former behavior. His statements are not mainly concerned with whether or not he beat prisoners, but rather with the fact that he thinks it better today not to admit doing so in public.

Life stories and identity are closely related to each other. The story of one's life is a story of searching for and finding identity, that is, the development of a personal identity as it realized in time. Constantly changing circumstances seriously challenge a person who seeks to preserve a harmony with self or with a previous identity. In every walk of life, there is/are one, sometimes two or three, event/s that function as turning points and dramatically change one's previous identity.¹⁹

THE HIDDEN PATHS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

I examined the story of the generation who personally witnessed the violent disintegration of traditional society and the construction of a new type of social system. This period coincided with the smashing of the traditional way of life in Hungary and the establishment of the framework of a modern lifestyle. While this process took centuries in the Western Europe, politics rearranged society in Hungary in only 15-20 years. Individuals in the West thus had sufficient time to learn how to adjust their identities to modern society, or at least this is how it appears from the perspective of a former socialist country.

Western sociology and social psychology have defined the identity model that is characteristic of the modern human individual. This model expects certain things from individuals, such as the ability to preserve oneself, to adapt to social expectations, to evaluate situations, to implement a life-strategy, and so forth, which enables them to find their way through the labyrinth of life until they can construct their identities on their own. The person able to find his/her way through opposing expectations may be said to have a "balancing-identity." The development of this type of individual adaptation has proceeded concurrently with the development of the conditions for democratic societies.

The violent politic situation after 1948 made it very difficult for balancing-identity to appear in Hungary, and religious people found themselves in an particularly difficult situation in this regard. In my research I attempted to discover how the generation brought up in traditional religious culture were able to shape their identities such that they could preserve themselves and yet adapt at the same time to both society and political expectations during the years of dictatorship.

Stated more simply, if we consider balancing to be the foundation of modern identity, what type of identity can we identify in Hungary after 1948 in respect to religious people?

CONCLUSION

Our research findings show that both balancing- and non-balancing-identities were present during the period in question. We also found that although balancing required exceptional abilities, non-balancing resulted unequivocally in an individual's exclusion from society in some way either because s/he rigidly insisted on his/her religious belief and practice, or insisted on meeting social expectations, or because his/her social position was not influenced by the changes in society.

Our concrete research findings can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Political pressure on religious people resulted in an identity crisis which depended on age, occupation, the efforts of the individual to move up in the social hierarchy, and the relation to symbolic power. However, this hypothesis was valid for only a very narrow layer. The lives of persons in only one of the seven groups of the two basic types were burdened by major identity crises because of their religious feelings. They were the group termed "winners in social changes - leavers of religion." As we learned from the life stories, the abandonment or denial of religious practice led to an identity crisis. Those who openly kept religion and those in the balancing groups spoke of no such serious crises. Interpreting the stories told made it clear that these crises of identity did not concern those who kept their faith or balanced in order to keep it. In the case of the evident winners in social changes, however, the identity crisis was so great that it was visible even at the time of the interviews, such as through alcohol addiction.

2. Changes of the identity (for the persons involved in the survey) meant the breaking out of an informal group and being admitted to a formal group. This hypothesis was partly justified and partly refuted, and our research made the assumption more delicate. In the case of religious people, change in religious identity either meant a partial or complete denial of religion, or the return to religion after such a denial. Identity change resulted in breaking out of an informal community in the case of leaving the religion. However, both cases could occur in respect to one and the same person during the period examined. The irreversible loss of the informal group only concerned those who completely gave up their religious beliefs.

3. The price of keeping religion was alienation from the changing society. We also assumed that the individual in such cases would create a religious counter-culture or sub-culture. This hypothesis was partly justified and partly became more subtle. On the one hand, we could see that those who openly kept religion not only turned away from official expectations in faithfully keeping their religion, but also broke away from the wider social processes. The versatility of the world did not touch this group, and they remained "prisoners" in their own sub-culture which they did not want to leave. On the other hand, those who kept their religion in a balancing way neither broke away from the world, nor created a counter-culture or sub-

culture for themselves. Those who balanced tried to participate in the life of society in a way that allowed them to keep their religious identity as well.

4. When we began our research we assumed that choices in political and world views would give rise to four behavior types associated with four identity types within the circle of religious people: a) those who kept religious identity but were separated from society; b) those who gave up religious identity and chose a social career; c) those who balanced between religious belief and social expectations; and d) those who lived at a low level of society and were untouched by the social changes.

However, our research instead revealed a more differentiated picture in which the main line of division lies between balancing- and non-balancing-identities. This was further differentiated by rewarding or disadvantageous participation in the social changes, and by the preservation or abandonment of religion. These aspects allowed the separation of a total of seven groups: a) an abandonment of religion resulting in an identity crisis; b) an abandonment of religion not resulting in an identity crisis; c) an abandonment of social and Church careers resulting in an identity crisis; d) an abandonment of social and Church careers not resulting in an identity crisis; e) identity change not an issue since the changes taking place in society and Church did not concern the lowest layer of society; f) moving up in the social hierarchy was achieved by a temporary putting aside of religious practice, not its denial; g) moving up in the social hierarchy was accomplished while religion was simultaneously practiced in secret.

In summary, the general research findings are as follows:

1. Stricter or more flexible handling of individual identity had very different consequences in respect to social career.

2. The way in which worldview-dependent behavior affected life story depended on both the historical period and the position of the individual.

3. Last, but not least, many types of individual behavior were possible during the party state period in spite of the single overriding political expectation, even for those who attempted to keep their identity or their religion.

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³ Enyedi, Zsolt (1998) *Politika a kereszt jegyében*. Budapest: Osiris.

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⁸ Balogh, Margit (1996) "'Szabadság állami ellenőrzéssel.' Egyházpolitika, 1957-1977." *História* 9-10. pp. 42-45.

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¹⁰ Tomka, Miklós (1990) "A vallás mint változó rendszer." *Szociológia* 3-4. pp. 155-185.

¹¹ Hall, Stuart (1990) "Cultural Identity and Diaspora." In Jonathan Rutherford (ed.) *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference*. London: Lawrence-Wishart.

¹² Krappmann, Lothar (1980) "Az identitás szociológiai dimenziói." *Szociológiai füzetek* 21.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 69. Krappmann's conception of balancing-identity does not address its value content in that he focuses solely on the practical behavioral process of balancing between personal identity and social expectations. His model is significantly different in this regard from Taylor's system of identity. The former is concerned with a pragmatic way of thinking that is widely accepted today while the latter emphasizes the moral force associated with the ideal of authenticity. See Charles Taylor (1988) "Humanizmus és modern identitás." In Krzysztof Michalski. *A modern tudomány emberképe*. Budapest: Gondolat.

¹⁴ Luckmann, Thomas (1967) *The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*. New York: Macmillan. p. 68.

¹⁵ Today's broad use of this qualitative method has been discussed in a number of sources. See, for example: Glen, Elder (1981) "History and the Life Course." In Daniel Bertaux (1981) *Biography and Society*, pp. 77-111. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; Thompson, Paul (1981) "Life Histories and the Analysis of Social Change." In Bertaux (1981), pp. 289-306.; László, János (1998) *Szerep, forgatókönyv, narratívum*. Budapest; Scientia Humana;

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CHAPTER V

FAULT LINES WITHIN FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY AND BEYOND: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT

ANDREW BLASKO

The connection between Heidegger's political sentiments and position and his philosophy is an issue of singular importance. It is fair to say that the combination of a thinker of his stature – perhaps the most influential thinker of the 20th century – with a political movement that can be described as an incarnation of evil itself is without any known historical precedent. This begs examination, not least of all because of Western philosophy's persistent claim, ever since the time of Socrates, that philosophy has a necessary and intrinsic relevance to both personal virtue and the good society.

The link between Heidegger and Nazism has been known, at least in part, for many years. The main discussions of this connection began in France (relatively few writers in Germany have much to say on the subject), where Heidegger's thought has been in steady ascendancy ever since 1946 by virtue of his "Letter on Humanism addressed to Jean Beaufret. The two earlier episodes of this discussion – during 1946-1948 in *Les Temps Modernes* and in the mid-1960s in a number of publications culminating with François Fédier declaring himself to be the defender of the true faith – illustrate the four main strategies that have been taken in subsequent years:

1. The first such strategy turns on the thesis, originally advanced by Karl Löwith as early as 1939, that there is an intrinsic connection between Heidegger's thought and Nazism.

2. The second is the contingency thesis put forward by Alphonse de Waelhens (and long defended by François Fédier) that the connection between Heidegger and Nazism is merely and completely transitory.

3. The third is a more learned form of the second, also articulated by de Waelhens, which emphasizes that only those who fully comprehend Heidegger's thought – the initiated, so to speak – are able to criticize him.

4. The fourth and newest strategy, associated with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and others, including Jacques Derrida, admits that there is an essential connection between the two, but maintains that those philosophers whose thinking is not bound to Heidegger's own are not able to grasp the full importance of the latter's philosophical position.

The “official” version, which is very flattering to Heidegger in light of the seriousness of the issues under discussion, includes the claims that there was no principled connection between Heidegger and National Socialism; that the connection, such as it was, was at most a short-lived compromise; that Heidegger assumed the rectorate in Freiburg in order to defend the German university; that he severed links with the movement when he saw its true character and later criticized it in his writings; that he was never a racist; and that he never abandoned disciplined philosophical investigation for the sake of a political goal. If this were an accurate description, Heidegger would have been at worst naïve. But even so, how could such an undeniably great thinker turn to a social movement of the greatest evil as a means for the realization of his views concerning human existence, history, and the meaning of Being?

The basic position I will adopt in respect to the above question – and it will not be possible here to do more than suggest the general lines of only certain stages of the argumentation – is that Heidegger not only turned to Nazism on the basis of his philosophy, but that an important element in his later evolution was a continuing concern with what he viewed to be the true aims and essence of National Socialism. I do not wish to say that Heidegger’s views conformed to the public face of Nazism. I do wish to say, however, that Heidegger’s Nazism must be understood in terms of his philosophical thought, and that his philosophy must be seen as not only reflecting its own social, political, historical, and philosophical background, but as dependent on it¹. The position that I outline can be shown to be consistent with Heidegger’s philosophy itself, especially in light of his fundamental ontology and the discussion of Dasein as presented in *Being and Time*. There he repeatedly stresses the primacy of existence over cognition and insists that theory is meaningful only in time within the framework of the practical dimension. In addition, the basic concerns of Heidegger’s earlier thought that underlay his turning to Nazism remained consistent into his later writings, and his further development must be read against this background.

As we begin to examine these points, the position of Karl Löwith, a former student and eventual colleague of Heidegger, merits some brief attention in respect to Heidegger’s Nazism even though it is limited to the period dominated by *Being and Time*, including the Rector’s Address. Löwith’s observations are of interest not only because he considered Heidegger to be a friend and was thus not driven by malice, but also because he addresses virtually all of the main points that later come up for discussion concerning the view that there is an intrinsic connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and Nazism.² It is also noteworthy that the statement Löwith was required to make to the French military authorities in 1945 – continuing to feel himself Heidegger’s friend – provided the basis for their decision to confiscate Heidegger’s property, deprive him of the right to teach, retire him from the university, and restrict his pension.³ Löwith’s relevant views may be summarized as follows: *Being and Time*

puts forward, in the final analysis, a theory of historical existence. While the fundamental ontology developed in *Being and Time* does not necessarily lead to National Socialism, it represents principles that can be seen as underlying Heidegger's turning to Nazism in order to realize the authentic existence of human being and show forth the meaning of Being. Primary among these principles that lead to political action, and especially to the turning to Nazism, is Heidegger's understanding of the question of Being in relation to human being, especially the issue of how the notion of the authentic existence of Dasein in time is intrinsically related to the concept of historicity.⁴

AUTHENTICITY AND HISTORICITY

A few words need to be said about the concepts of authenticity and historicity in respect to human being. It is difficult to provide a brief summary of the concept of authenticity in particular, even though we seem to have a certain intuitive understanding of the opposition of the terms authentic and inauthentic in relation to our lives, not least of all because Heidegger's own discussion of authenticity, which draws upon that of Kierkegaard, is spread throughout much of the text of *Being and Time* and is one of its key concepts. We will then try to focus on only those aspects of authenticity which are most relevant for the present discussion, leaving aside the larger structure of the text.

Although Heidegger develops the notion of authenticity in respect to a number of basic traits of Dasein, such as disclosedness, thrownness, projection, and falling,⁵ perhaps the most important issue in respect to Heidegger's political turning is that his aim is clearly not to leave us with a speculative or contemplative view of human nature. The phenomenological description of authenticity as a possibility of Dasein is not a merely abstract consideration, for authenticity is a question of Dasein choosing to be what it is in its own being. It is a matter of concrete existence in the practical world of things, not a matter of philosophical knowledge or cognition in some more general sense.

Authenticity may be spoken of as a conception of self-realization through the choice of oneself.⁶ As Heidegger's says, "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence," or in its possibility to choose itself.⁷ When Dasein determines itself as an essence, it does so in the light of a possibility that it itself is, and which in some sense it already understands.⁸ Moreover, since the essence of Dasein can be spoken of as lying in the future or as a possibility, the issue is whether Dasein will choose to be its essence not only in the here and now, but tomorrow as well, so to speak.⁹ This is a choice which always faces Dasein, from which it can never escape, for Being is always the concern for Dasein through its concern for its own being. And it is clearly a matter of choice. Dasein must decide whether not to realize what it is and take up the possibility of its own being, that is, whether or not to "win" itself or "lose" itself.¹⁰ The issue to be decided is in

fact whether or not Dasein will choose to be what it is: Will human being choose to exist as an authentic person?¹¹

Authenticity thus has a practical role in respect to Dasein's existence. It is forward looking and projects a sense of "what must be done." Heidegger's eventual detailed examination of the beginning of Greek thought is not done for the purpose of looking back into history. On the contrary, we look back to the beginning so that we can retrieve that beginning, rethink that beginning, and retrieve the meaning of Being in Time as we move into the future. Grasping the authentic meaning of the essence of human being is to "prepare the way" for a transformation of human being from its current state of fallenness into existence in the true sense of the term.

And authenticity thus has a political role as well, politics being understood in a larger philosophical sense.¹² The central role of authenticity in Heidegger's fundamental ontology draws him to politics in that Dasein's essence can be realized only in time and in community, issues which are made more explicit in his discussion of historicity in respect to Dasein. But Heidegger's concern lies far from the realization of Dasein's essence for its own sake. His concern rather lies with the realization of Dasein in order that the meaning of Being may be thought. Political activity becomes the order of the day in 1933 because favorable political circumstances promise, first, an end to the despair and fallenness of the German people and, second, the creation of an authentic community in which the meaning of Being can be thought.¹³

It is significant that Heidegger provides no concrete criteria for determining authenticity. As he has moved beyond traditional European Christian philosophy into the world of radical fundamental ontology,¹⁴ so has he left behind any possible discussion of values and standards insofar as they represent mere metaphysical concerns.

For any further indication of what Heidegger has in mind concerning the relation of ontology to politics, particularly revealing is the famous discussion of historicity in *Being and Time*, section 74, "The Basic Constitution of Historicity," which we will now briefly consider.¹⁵ An important issue in this section is the resoluteness of Dasein, whereby Dasein discloses its possibilities for authentic existence "in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over."¹⁶ The possibilities for authenticity are handed down to human being, within the very turning back to itself, from the heritage in which one lives. The good for human being, the possibility for authentic existence, are given only through the tradition in which one lives. This is the fate of Dasein.¹⁷

The fate of human being as Being-in-the-world, which exists "essentially as Being-with-others is a co-historizing as destiny, which is the historizing "of a people." Stated otherwise, the fate of Dasein is that its full authentic existence is given as possible only within the destiny of its people.¹⁸ The Dasein that has-been-there hands down possibilities for authentic existence that are to be realized in the repetition of that which is

given by a tradition. It is thus within the explicit repetition of a particular, given tradition that Dasein finds the possibility for its authentic existence. Dasein inherits the possibility of authentic existence, which appears to it as its historical fate, from Dasein that has-been-there.¹⁹

The notion of the authentic existence of human being cannot be separated from the notion of historicity in that the question of Being only arises in Time through a Dasein existing in community. There is no authentic existence possible for Dasein outside of the history and heritage of a given community. Self-realization is necessarily living within a heritage, and to exist authentically is to carry forward a tradition – “my” tradition or the tradition of “my” people. To resolutely seize the most intimate possibility to be myself in authenticity necessarily means to extend the past tradition of my people and to seize their historical destiny.²⁰

The repetition of tradition as a mode of resoluteness is the mode in which Dasein exists explicitly as fate, and this fate is the authentic historicizing of the future, which appears in a moment of vision. This is also the ground for destiny, which is how fundamental ontology understands Being-with-others.²¹

FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY: IN WHAT SENSE POLITICAL?

It would be most useful at this point to speak at length both about the general situation in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s, and about developments in Heidegger’s personal political stance at that time. However, the difficult and even tragic combination of hope, political weakness, economic crisis, social malaise, and collapse into Nazi rule that the Weimar Republic represented is well enough known for purposes of the present discussion.²² And it suffices to note that there can be no doubt on the basis of the record that Heidegger’s political views reflected the social atmosphere current in the last years of the Weimar Republic’s decline and the strongly conservative political tendencies of the day. Indeed, within the context of the perilous situation facing the German people in the waning years of the Weimar Republic, it is not difficult to read the question of Dasein’s possibility for authenticity in a moment of great need as reflecting the in many ways dreadful conditions in which *Being and Time* was conceived and written. It can thereby be seen to comprise an important precipitating factor in Heidegger’s turning to Nazism.

For example, Heidegger was opposed to the Bolshevik-led developments in Russia and sought an alternative to them. He was also sympathetic to desires for, among other issues, the return of German greatness, the rectification of the weakness of the German government, and finding a “cure” for the degradation of German society. A sense that something needed to be done to save the situation had come to be felt throughout German society, and the university community was no exception. Not only was Heidegger not unique among intellectuals and philosophers in respect to his views, he was apparently more or less typical of a rather large

number of university professors who shared the conservative political tendencies prevalent after World War I.²³ What is unique, however, is that a philosopher of his great importance became involved in the National Socialist movement in an effort to attain the political aims he shared with others.

Perhaps key to understanding Heidegger's turn to National Socialism is that he did so precisely as a philosopher, viewing Nazism as an opportunity to call the German people back to the thought of Being. This stance should be viewed against the background of the European philosophical tradition, which claims that philosophers have a unique role in society by the very fact of being philosophers. Stated otherwise, this tradition concerning the social role of philosophy claims that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely capable of producing an insight into reality which is a necessary condition for the good life. The claim is that the good life is not possible without philosophy, and that philosophers alone are capable of leading human beings forward in the attainment of the good life.²⁴ This is one of the basic pillars uniting European philosophy with politics.

It must be noted that *Being and Time* is not political in the sense of texts that present specific political systems or prescriptions. It rather is political in a much more basic sense, namely, it brings to attention fundamental concerns of existence that must be addressed and fundamental problems that must be rectified in order to "decide what becomes of the earth and of the existence of man on this earth."²⁵ Indeed, fundamental ontology is intrinsically political in the sense that it seeks to demonstrate how and why authentic existence is the good for man. Man must exist authentically, listening to the call of Being, if he is to exist to the fullness of his being. That is to say that concern with the question of Being is indispensable to the realization of human good. *Being and Time* is thus political in the sense that Plato or, better yet, Aristotle uses the term.

Perhaps the best example of this approach is the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle presents politics as representing the pursuit of good for its own sake as the end of all human action. From this perspective, that which is good for man is the aim of politics in the truest sense of the term, and *Being and Time* has political implications precisely because its main thrust is to demonstrate how human beings can and ought to exist in the fullness of their being precisely as human being. The problem of Being is thus no mere speculative affair since one of the primary goals of fundamental ontology is to bring to light how human being "may be itself, or not be itself."²⁶ We are not to dawdle in some Hamlet-like fashion before the possibility of authentic existence, but rather must realize our essence as human beings by existing in the light of Being. Fundamental ontology demands that we do so.

Fundamental ontology is thereby intrinsically political not only in the sense that it seeks to demonstrate how and why authentic existence is the good for man, but it also seeks the realization of that good. It is true that Heidegger's interest in human being in *Being and Time* is restricted to

showing how it may provide access to Being. However, he develops this interest in a way that is intended to demonstrate that human being must both seek and have access to Being in order to exist authentically (“to be what it is”). This is decidedly not a passive posture in respect to human being for the sake of a speculative grasp of the meaning of Being.

And when coupled with Heidegger’s conceptions of plural authenticity and historicity as they are presented in *Being and Time*, this not only comprises a call to a way of living in the light of Being, it specifies that authentic existence can occur only in a community in history within a given heritage, for Being reveals itself only in time and not to isolated, ahistorical individuals.

Heidegger turned to Nazism in order to realize German authenticity. His resigning the rectorate at Freiburg University and the subsequent turning in his thought means only that he had come to the judgment that the actual leadership of the National Socialist movement was ill-adapted to the task of retrieving the meaning of Being. Heidegger abandoned neither the aim of German authenticity, nor the conviction that philosophy had a privileged role in leading the Germans to that end. On the contrary, Heidegger held fast to his obsession with thinking Being, his concern with the realization of the historical essence and destiny of the German people, and the insistence that his thought was a key to attaining these goals.²⁷

Heidegger’s fundamental ontology drew him to politics in the deepest philosophical sense of the term, and he remained loyal to his political concern with the fate of the German people throughout the subsequent years of his life.

HEIDEGGER’S ATTENTION TO NATIONAL SOCIALISM

In *Being and Time* Heidegger still holds to the idea that an existential analytic of Dasein is necessary to have access to Being. He has not yet “turned” in his thinking such that he attempts to think Being without human being. That is to say that Heidegger has not yet “turned” in his thinking such that he supposedly does not need to be concerned with human being in order to think the meaning of Being.

However, Heidegger’s political turning is not a consequence of his existential analytic of Dasein, which even in the earlier period of his thought is not his primary object of concern. It is his underlying concern with the meaning of Being that leads Heidegger to politics, as well as to the existential analytic of Dasein. And as his concern with Being persisted after the so-called turning in his thought, so too did his concern with the political aims that he understood to be the true aims of National Socialism even after he moved beyond the existential analytic of Dasein. Even after he turned away from the question of Dasein, he maintained a political commitment to Nazism, which he understood in some ideal form as a way to think the meaning of Being.

There is a progression of ideas in this respect which can be roughly summarized as follows: 1) the problem of Being demands the authentic existence of Dasein in time; 2) the authentic existence of Dasein requires the realization of a heritage or tradition; 3) the realization of a heritage is in fact the realization of the essence, or destiny, of the German people; 4) the realization of the essence of the German people – now unrealized, with the German people existing inauthentically – can now take place through National Socialism, which has inherited the promise of the history and tradition that is Germany; 5) Nazism must be led by the genuine thinking of Being, now represented by the philosopher (in the person of Heidegger); 6) philosophy and totalitarian politics, hand in hand, are to lead the German people forward in the realization of their historical essence and destiny so that the meaning of Being can be made manifest.

Discontinuities: Disappointments in National Socialism

Why was Heidegger's turning to National Socialism not successful? In respect to Heidegger, this issue is not to be discussed in terms of the actual policies of the National Socialist government led by Hitler and the S.S., for it is instead a question of metaphysics. It is supposedly to be examined in terms of Heidegger's discussion concerning the withdrawal of Being.²⁸

Heidegger appears to have not regretted his commitment to Nazism for the purposes of 1) realizing the essence of the German people and 2) retrieving the meaning of Being. Heidegger's adherence to Nazism obviously did not lead to the desired results, but within the context of ontology this was not due to the failure of National Socialism itself. It was rather the particular leadership that finally became dominant who failed the National Socialist movement. And since Heidegger's commitment was based on metaphysics, he could say that the leadership failed the movement because of the withdrawal of Being. History consists of the actions or events of Being, which conceals itself as it reveals itself.²⁹ After 1935, Heidegger apparently came to be ever more convinced that we live in an age dominated by the withdrawal of Being, a condition best expressed by Nietzsche's conceptions of the death of God and the Will to Power. It was the fact of the withdrawal of Being that underlay the failure to retrieve the meaning of Being through the (still as yet unrealized) essence and destiny of the German people.

The fate, essence, and destiny of the German people were to have been realized by the historical promise of the National Socialist movement. Historical circumstances had begun to bring together the German people such that their essence would be retrieved in authentic existence at a new stage in history. This possibility was rooted in the heritage that was Germany, and it was reflected in the National Socialist movement. However, Being withdrew and remain concealed, the Nazi leadership did not begin to think the meaning of Being, even with the so-called aid of Heidegger's

fundamental ontology, and the German people did not succeed in retrieving their essence at that given juncture in history. But the aims that were to have been attained through Nazism remained of the utmost concern, and the promise of an authentic Nazism remained rooted in the destiny of the German people.

Against the background of the events of the time, it seems likely that Heidegger's deeper concern with the withdrawal of Being – with the movement of the revealing of Being as a concealing withdrawal – is a reflection of the failure of National Socialism to realize the essence of the German people and think the meaning of Being. The “turning” in Heidegger's thought, with its increased emphasis on the withdrawal of Being and the historical dominance of technological thinking in respect to the metaphysical tradition, would then be one result of a reflection on how and why the promise of the historical moment, as an inheritance of the promise of the German heritage and destiny for the authentic existence of the German people, was in fact not realized.

Continuities in Heidegger's Thought: the Texts

We have indicated certain issues in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, as it was presented in *Being and Time*, that provided a philosophical underpinning for his turn to National Socialist politics. These center on the theory of Being in relation to the authentic existence of Dasein and historicity. It is now necessary to indicate in what respect there is a philosophical continuity on issues relevant to Heidegger's philosophical views between the period dominated by *Being and Time* and the period after the “turning.” Once again, because of the complexity of the issues involved and the copious number of both primary and secondary sources, we can now only suggest how a fully developed line of argumentation might be developed.

For the sake of brevity, we will now consider only certain relevant passages in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, written in 1936-38 and first published in 1989.³⁰ This text is arguably the most important work of Heidegger's later period that has been published to date.

The main issues in *Contributions* in respect to Heidegger's political views are that he maintains the political role of his thought of Being, and that he continues to be concerned with the destiny of the Germans as Germans, although the latter is now clearly subservient to the former. This is against the more practical background of having abandoned transcendental phenomenology, along with the attempt to further his career through National Socialism by serving as the Rector of Freiburg University in a philosopher-king-like fashion. He no longer proposes that National Socialism be grounded in fundamental ontology, and he no longer offers his philosophy to the “movement” in order to provide guidance to the leaders.

But Heidegger does continue to insist that his thought can serve to realize the destiny of the German people, at least indirectly, not least of all

by having uncovered the prophetic role of German poetry. Stated otherwise, philosophy is no longer put forward as the sole means by which the German people will realize their essence and destiny, but it continues to be viewed as an important means to this end. Philosophy is at the very least necessary to grasp the historical deformity of human being as it is epitomized by the legacy of metaphysics, the death of God, the Will to Power, and technological thought. Philosophy also serves as a means by which other useful, and even necessary, means for thinking Being are to be identified and clarified. For example, it was by examining the legacy of metaphysics, especially through a reading of Nietzsche (whom, Heidegger argues, was poorly understood by the Nazis), and encountering the limitations of fundamental ontology for leading social change, in particular through the failure of the Nazi leadership to accept its guidance, that Heidegger was convinced that a more original beginning had to be sought. Heidegger now begins speaking in terms of the grounding of Dasein, and he indicates that there are ways to it other than philosophy, such as poetry and thinking, along with – most curiously, in a period when war was approaching – deed and sacrifice.³¹ However, the end remains the same, namely, retrieving the meaning of Being, and grasping the historical destiny of the German people still remains a means for doing so.

One of the more obvious (if this word can be used in reference to *Contributions*) threads binding together Heidegger's politics before and after the turning in his thought is his concern with the "Volk," with the Germans as Germans. An important difference in contrast to his earlier work is that this concern is not now an end in itself, but rather a way to ground Being.³²

And while there are a number of passages scattered throughout *Contributions* of more or less oblique criticism of Volk ideology as representative of various aspects of metaphysical thinking,³³ it becomes clear that what Heidegger has in mind here is a metaphysical form of Volk that amounts to what he terms "Platonism for the people."³⁴ He is perhaps referring to how Volk ideology was restricted to a mere worldview by the National Socialism leadership instead of having its true meaning retrieved within the framework of fundamental ontology. But, significantly, he goes on to speak of how the crude Nazi form of Volk ideology can be overcome such that man is "allotted an unambiguous place," a return is made to a first beginning, and we are led to an "historical decision of the widest dimension."³⁵

The first presentations of these qualifications are made in a rather Platonic spirit.³⁶ Heidegger speaks, in a rather unsystematic fashion, of how the "last ones," the "mace bearers of the truth of be-ing,"³⁷ will usher in the end of the age of metaphysics. As Heidegger leaves behind his fundamental ontology, it seems clear that he is saying that we must look in some new direction to see the light of Being and listen to new voices.

Most interesting in this respect, however, are the consequences that his new way of philosophical questioning will have for the lesser mortals

who live next to the “ones to come,” for “today there are already a few of those who are to come.” And these consequences include nothing less than the retrieval of the authentic existence of the people. Through the “ones to come,” the people will realize their “ownmost” and Da-sein will be grounded in truth. The decision that must be made in order that this event come to pass is not merely a “moral-anthropological” decision, but rather has a “space-time” essence and takes place in history.³⁸ The knowledge of those who truly know begins in actual historical knowledge, for it is a knowing that is aware of the occurrence that history is actually building.³⁹ This line of discussion may be taken as a restatement of the view, first put forward in detailed fashion in *Being and Time*, that authentic existence takes place in a community, and that the authentic existence of that community, through the realization of its historical destiny, realizes the meaning of Being. While there is here a change in emphasis insofar as the authentic existence of the Volk is not an end in itself, but only a means for realization the meaning of Being, concern for the fate of Dasein and for the destiny of the German people nevertheless remains founded in the theory of Being itself.

Heidegger writes that Germany in the late 1930s is still at the beginning of this movement.⁴⁰ The people still have yet to realize the meaning of their history; they have yet to exist authentically and realize their destiny in greatness.⁴¹ The focus now comes to reside on the need to realize authentically the essence of the Volk after the end of the age of metaphysics, for the historical moment that presented itself in 1933 as a possibility to realize the destiny of the people has not succeeded in thinking the true meaning of Being. Those who followed this historical moment have remained only at the level of worldview and have not retrieved their essence as grounded in truth.

The authentic existence of the people, as Dasein seizes its fate and the people seize their destiny, will come about as they hear the voices of those few who are listening to the voice of Being, whose poet is Hölderlin, speaking across time from the future of the German people.⁴²

These few initial observations concerning *Contributions to Philosophy* should be sufficient to indicate that all comments concerning a turn in Heidegger’s thought such that he broke completely with the political and national concerns of 1933-1934 should be subject to the most careful examination.

Continuities in Theory

The renowned “turning” in Heidegger’s thought lays no basis for any consideration that the later evolution of his thought led him to criticize Nazism in any significant way. Quite on the contrary, there is an obvious continuity in his thought and the turning amounts to a deepening of Heidegger’s theory through the introduction of a new beginning beyond the original beginning. Moreover, there are certain important elements in

Heidegger's thought which remain constant even as it continues to develop, elements that are crucial for an understanding of the link between his thinking and his Nazism. Perhaps the most important of these is the idea of the German Volk as an authentic community. While Heidegger apparently took this over from the popular German Volk ideology, he provided it with a philosophical foundation in *Being and Time* through his conception of plural authenticity.⁴³ Another such issue concerns the view, first clearly stated in 1933 in the rectoral address, that philosophy (later "thinking") possesses a cognitive superiority whereby it alone is worthy to lead society forward into the new future.

These two views come together and mutually support each other through Heidegger's efforts to overcome metaphysics taken as an inauthentic form of ontology. The authentic thought of Being requires authentic existence conceived as the acceptance of one's being as defined by the concern with Being. But since the only metaphysical people are the German people, German *Volks ideologie* becomes merged with the concern for the thought of Being that defines Heidegger's thought throughout his career. Even after the abandonment of fundamental ontology, Heidegger's theory of Being can only be realized by an authentic subject who lives in an authentic community, and the only example of a possible authentic community he ever provided were the German people.⁴⁴ Furthermore, only those who, like Heidegger, give themselves over to the thought of Being are capable of showing the way forward into that authentic community.

In addition, the idea that the *Letter on Humanism* somehow indicates a fundamental break in Heidegger's thought, which Heidegger himself suggested for various reasons,⁴⁵ is fictitious.⁴⁶ For example, the paramount issue continues to be the history of Being, not the lives and histories of human beings; we must be concerned solely with the history of Being.⁴⁷ And this issue has such ontological status that no "metaphysical" approach, such as history or ethics, is capable of grasping it. Such disciplines, which extend over the entire European humanistic tradition, miss the point of thinking, and thereby miss the point of existence itself.⁴⁸ This latter point is seen as carrying such weight that Munier, the editor and translator of the standard French version of the text, declares that not only is it superficial to try to derive any moral sense from *Being and Time*, the "thought of Being" should be spoken of as "against humanism" in any usual sense of the term.⁴⁹ Heidegger himself declares that "Humanism" has in fact lost its meaning,⁵⁰ so much so that he rhetorically asks whether it is really necessary to preserve it at all.⁵¹

Perhaps the most upsetting aspect of this type of discussion concerns not the issue of European humanism itself, which surely is not above critical examination, but rather what appears to be a lack of concern with human well-being and suffering within months of one of the most horrifying periods in modern European history. The tenor of the discussion, with its obvious rhetorical character, seem to mock what Taylor has referred to as the moral imperative associated with, for example, Bacon's

articulation of the new science, namely, How does such an approach make human life better?⁵² The impression is certainly made that Heidegger's thought has no concern with the lives of human beings.

There is no reason on the face of it that we should not listen to the call of Being as it develops itself in Time. But is there any good reason why we should not pay heed to the disclosure/concealment of Being without paying due respect to what we might call the common good, especially in an age of totalitarianism after one of the most evil episodes in recorded human history? If "humanism" in some sense refers to the "human sciences," then does not even a rhetorical attack on humanism amount to an attack on all those disciplines that are traditionally held to be concerned with the events in human existence, both the problems and the achievements, with the aim of understanding human life so that it can be made better? Regardless of Heidegger's intent to focus on deeper, more fundamental issues in order to retrieve the truth of existence, it is difficult not to view his discussion of his own thought in the terms of anti-humanism as amounting to an attack on the traditional means that have long been used by human beings in order to understand themselves and their own communities in a more adequate fashion and thereby move forward in some sense.

And what possible lack of sensitivity and insight could drive Heidegger to do so in 1946, not least of all in the German language? Is it not justifiable to suspect that it was his thought which led him to express such disregard for those mere mortals who do not survey human being from the heights of authentic thinking, such as Heidegger, perhaps alone among philosophers, is capable of doing? Might we in turn not rhetorically state that while Heidegger's thought indeed displays fundamentalism in respect to ontology, it may perhaps also display fundamentalism in relation to politics in the more pejorative sense it has come to be used today in ordinary speech?⁵³

Such considerations raise the suspicion that there is a fundamental flaw in Heidegger's thought, however great it might otherwise be, a flaw that is revealed in the very choice of rhetorical language used in his claim that the authentic thinking of Being is an anti-humanism. This may be particularly true of Heidegger's philosophy after the supposed "turning" insofar as his thought becomes, by virtue of the "turning," ever more firmly rooted in an anti-humanistic subordination of human being to Being. Heidegger himself practiced such subordination to Being throughout his career after his first philosophical turning to radical phenomenology in the form of fundamental ontology.⁵⁴ Moreover, Heidegger's understanding of the question of Being required him to reject any philosophical consideration of values as in principle incompatible with genuine thinking, limited as such thinking must be to the contemplation of Being. In Heidegger's understanding, any concept of values is thoroughly metaphysical in nature and falls below the level needed to attain a genuine thinking of Being. Heidegger's approach to philosophy thereby appears to lack the conceptual resources necessary to both discuss and comprehend human being and

human values, along with the human suffering that arises from the exercise of evil. His limitation of philosophy to a preoccupation with the problem of Being renders his thought conceptually unable to understand the values and concerns of human life, not least of all the pressing social and political concerns that were brought about by the effort of certain people to “think Being” within the framework of National Socialism, even if only in some ideal form.⁵⁵

Perhaps it is more than ironic that Heidegger puts forth the notion that Being conceals itself as it reveals itself. What I mean to suggest is that the way taken by his own thought of Being, beginning with *Being and Time* and continued into his later works, blinded him to the reality of Nazism as it surrounded him and prevented him from ever coming to terms in any meaningful way with his own involvement with National Socialism. The only criticism which he ever directed towards Nazism, such as can be found in his Nietzsche lectures or in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, is restricted to statements describing it as an inadequate, metaphysical thought of Being. Is that indeed all that one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century can find to say, on the basis of his thought, about the National Socialist period in the history of his own people, that it did not attain a genuine thinking of the meaning of Being?

In consequence, might it not be said with some justification that, if we assume the Socratic position that the function of philosophy is to examine life, then Heidegger’s thought fails the test? Not only does it reduce human life to a secondary theme that is to be sacrificed for a deeper concern, it apparently failed to grasp the most pressing concerns of the day for the nation whose destiny was supposedly to realize the meaning of Being.⁵⁶

FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS INSIGHT

One possible critique may be stated as follows: Has fundamental ontology been deprived of religion? It is a fact that Heidegger’s thought has had a great effect on contemporary theology and religious thinking. Perhaps this can provide us with a hint as to where we might look in order to identify those areas in his thought which give rise to troubling political considerations, even if we can do no more here than raise certain general doubts and suspicions about important underlying issues.

I mean to propose that if we view certain basic issues in Heidegger’s thought as arising against a theological background, not least of all in light of his own scholarly background and preparation in medieval Christian philosophy, we may view fundamental ontology, at least in part, as an effort to translate basic concerns of Christian philosophy and theology into new terminology and new concepts.⁵⁷ But what would we accomplish by doing so?

We would then have the motivation to consider fundamental ontology as a type of thinking that longs for the Divine, and which needs the

Divine in order to be fulfilled, but which has been deprived of its necessary religious foundation by virtue of an eventual philosophical turning that left human values behind. We would then be able to consider Heidegger as a concealed religious thinker whose thought perhaps conceals from sight that which is most significant, just as Being conceals itself even as it reveals itself. We could then investigate whether the conceptual structure of Heidegger's thought has in fact been carried far enough in the sense that it has not fully retrieved its own origins, lacking the conceptual apparatus necessary to find the more original source which it seeks. We could ask whether Heidegger has forgotten where the origins of his own thought lie even as it has set off to find a truly first beginning. Is his thought still able to imagine and recollect from where it has truly come?

There are those who would point to Aristotle and then to the earlier Greeks as primary sources of inspiration for Heidegger, and they would seem to be right, with apparent support from Heidegger's own publications. But Heidegger became a Greek, so to speak, by first becoming a Christian. His first entry into the world of Greek thinking came through the world of Christian Aristotelianism as it existed in the 13th and 14th centuries.⁵⁸ Heidegger's seminary preparation made him a citizen of the world of Thomistic theology and philosophy, his close study of Duns Scotus in his Ph.D. dissertation made him a citizen of distinction, and even his entrance into phenomenology came by way of the phenomenology of religion.⁵⁹ His close and direct study of Aristotle himself that was begun in 1921, under whose influence he grasped that Being is presence, in fact came about from a need to address the poor theological preparation of his students.⁶⁰

Moreover, Heidegger's first paradigm for his phenomenological research was religious experience – and it was his own religious experience that was under examination. He turned to the spirit of the first Christian communities in order to find a way beyond the dogmatized words of the Scholastics into a more profound sense of religious faith. He sought to examine the nature of religious belief and practice in light of the fact that it could not be uprooted from the communities and the traditions in which it emerged and grew. He came to the realization that the living spirit of Christian faith could only be grasped through the heritage in which it had come to life and matured.

But it was the ontic reality of his own Christian facticity that gave rise to the questioning concerning the meaning of a more fundamental existence. Heidegger's thought was decidedly not divorced from the concrete concerns of a particular religious being within a given tradition, but was rather an encounter with his own most heartfelt concerns.

This issue should not be taken lightly. It is well documented that Heidegger was deeply concerned with religious thought and practice, on both personal and professional levels, throughout the period in which the basic lines of the future development of his thought were taking shape. Kisiel, for example, describes how Heidegger's conviction with rejuvenating a Christian theology that had become rigid in its dogmatic

expression was one of his most serious concerns during the war years.⁶¹ Heidegger had in fact anticipated for several years being named to the chair of Christian philosophy at Freiburg and was shocked when this had not happened after having prepared his habilitation work.⁶² Perhaps more significantly, he became a “question to himself,” an issue we cannot help but associate with later discussions of Dasein, through biblical studies, and he even taught a course on the dynamics of “becoming a Christian,” drawing inspiration from St. Paul and St. Augustine, as late as 1921, well after his turn to phenomenology.⁶³

These points, merely sketched out as they are, which do no more than show a possible way to study the genesis of Heidegger’s mature thought, can here only pique our curiosity, raising our suspicions, as it were, about the fuller significance of certain statements and ideas. And there is no doubt that Heidegger underwent a genuine philosophical turning in the early 1920s which transformed him from a competent specialist in theology and Christian thought into a revolutionary thinker with one of the most unique and powerful philosophical voices in our times. However, I would still maintain that it is Christian thinking which had at least as great an influence as Greek sources upon Heidegger by virtue of it being an early and continuing source of inspiration through some of the most important periods in his career as a thinker and writer, even into his revolutionary turning. I would suggest for purposes of discussion that important elements of Heidegger’s thought can be opened up to significant criticism insofar as they may be viewed as philosophical translations, or developments, of truths that he had first learned elsewhere.

This in itself is, of course, a fairly commonplace notion. However, it calls forth a great problem that Heidegger was not the first to encounter: Can religious thought, myth, or teaching in fact be adequately and fully translated into rational or secular terms? If not, does fundamental ontology then suffer from having been “deprived” of its religious roots, thereby losing something essential and necessary in the process? If so, what are the consequences for the project of fundamental ontology that Heidegger’s thinking has undergone such a deprivation?

Within the context of the present discussion, the question comes down to this: Are certain “control mechanisms” missing from fundamental ontology? Does fundamental ontology thereby distort the sense of authentic community necessary for the authentic existence of Dasein and transform what should have been the gift of grace into the “destiny” of a people?

Was Heidegger’s thought deprived of an appropriate religious foundation to the extent that it came to look to the wrong source as the source of good? Did it thereby take the call of the German tradition as the voice of Being when it should have taken heed of the call of faith as revealing the need for a type of spiritual renewal that would be meaningless if not shared with other people? Did a deprivation of religious commitment lead a great thinker to put his faith in the destiny of a people rather than in spiritual redemption? Did fundamental ontology in effect, at least to a

degree, amount to an effort to transform a “more primitive” religious reflection into sophisticated ontology, thereby losing in the process a certain mollifying influence necessary to control an arrogance inherent in secularized rationality? Is Heidegger’s thinking a prime example in our time of a rational superstructure that has forgotten its roots in faith (or even in myth)?⁶⁴

Stated otherwise, I propose for consideration that the language and concepts of Heidegger’s thinking of Being lack the means necessary to control a misplaced faith in the historical destiny of a people, a faith which is buttressed by a certain sense of self-importance exhibited by philosophical thinking whenever it presumes that it is uniquely necessary for the good life. This in fact leads to a tendency whereby fundamental thinking would become closed to – perhaps not even allow – an openness to those others who might be considered strangers.

Fundamental ontology in fact has a strain within itself, whether it arises from a faith without God or a faith in the king anointed by philosophy, whereby it functions as a type of “missionary ontology” that disregards the voices which those from other traditions listen to. When authenticity is no longer a state of grace but the destiny of a people, and when it is then coupled with a historicity that calls for the realization of the destiny of “my” people, there is a strong temptation to listen to only what Being speaks in the language and voice of my people.

Sadly, there seems to be no standard within Heidegger’s theory of Being by which to define who “my people” are and where “my destiny” lies. It apparently does not contain the means for me to be open to the possibility that strangers, who are not my people and have another voice, may share a common destiny with me. With what basis am I left, other than my parochialism, other than my “homeland,” upon which to decide where the border lies between those whose ethnos carries the meaning of Being and those whose destiny does not?

Heidegger’s theory calls me to give myself to the destiny of my people, but it does not tell me that my destiny is tied to the destiny of strangers. Indeed, it even excludes the possibility that those who are not “my people” have a destiny to exist authentically since it does not tell me that strangers, that other people, are “my people,” too. The sense of Dasein that has-been-there is restricted to the heritage of a given people. It is not extended to other peoples, and it apparently does not include relations between peoples. It is squarely focused on one particular people, and the focus is apparently never shifted away from this point. This is as true of the discussion in *Contributions to Philosophy* and various texts published in the 1940s, 1950s, and later, as it is true of *Being and Time*. We are not called to think globally, but are rather only shown the way to think in terms of “my own.”

Heidegger’s thinking speaks only in the language of my people, as if exhibiting an inherited selfishness without the sense that sin is possible. But did Heidegger himself not say in the (notorious?) *Der Spiegel* interview,

so carefully crafted to direct attention to his work after his death in a carefully chosen way, that “only a god can save us”?

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NOTES

¹ See Rockmore 1992, p. 5.

² The primary reference here is Löwith's 1946 article in *Les Temps Modernes*, "Les implications politiques de la philosophie de l'existence chez Martin Heidegger."

³ This initial decision was mollified some years later, resulting in restoration of the right to teach, which Heidegger eventually resumed doing on a less than full time basis.

⁴ Rockmore 1992, p. 42.

⁵ *Being and Time*, paragraph 44, provides a detailed discussion of these traits within the context of Dasein's existence in the truth. There is a useful summary on p. 264.

⁶ Rockmore 1992, p. 44.

⁷ *Being and Time*, paragraph 9, p. 67. Heidegger's emphasis.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹¹ Rockmore 1992, p. 45.

¹² This point will be examined below.

¹³ At this point we can only note that there are direct connections between the concept of authenticity and the discussion of alienation in the Marxist tradition. For example, no less a figure than Lukács comments in the "Introduction" to the 1971 edition of *History and Class Consciousness* on the fact that Lucien Goldman understood *Being and Time* to be in part a polemical response to the original edition of Lukács' book, with specific relevance to the Hegelian inspired discussion of alienation. See Lukács 1971, p. xxii.

¹⁴ See the discussion below in the concluding section, "A Possible Critique: Has Fundamental Ontology Been Deprived of Religion?"

¹⁵ See Heidegger 1962, pp. 434–439.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 435. Heidegger's emphasis.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 437–438.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² A great deal of detailed information concerning this period, with an eventual relevance to a philosophical examination of Heidegger's political turning, can be found in Rockmore 1992, Farias 1987, and Ott 1988. These sources also contain abundant bibliographical information.

²³ Rockmore 1992, pp. 31–35, provides a good summary of the social and political tensions of this period in Germany history as they relate to Heidegger in particular.

²⁴ Even without investigating what specific philosophers have written and done in this vein, the very least that can be said is that this general view lends itself to an anti-democratic conception of political life and political action.

²⁵ See Heidegger 1957, pp. 210–211. Within the context of the present discussion, it is worth noting Heidegger wrote these words thirty years after the publication of *Being and Time*. Heidegger obviously never abandoned practical political concerns which were basic to his earlier period and underlay his turning to National Socialism. See also Rockmore 1992, p. 41, for discussion of this aspect of Heidegger's thought, which remains a constant concern throughout the body of works beginning with *Being and Time*.

²⁶ See *Being and Time*, section 4, p. 33.

²⁷ See Rockmore 1992, pp. 120–121 for a further discussion of these issues.

²⁸ Many of the themes associated with these topics are developed in Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures after 1935. The most relevant publication is *Nietzsche* 1961, but various articles appear in other publications as well.

²⁹ See George 1999, p. 224: "Dasein's experience of the world is in fact his experience of Being. The world history experienced by Dasein is the history of Being."

³⁰ We here follow various of Rockmore's (1992) general suggestions for finding a way useful to the present discussion through the challenging territory of the *Contributions*.

³¹ See Heidegger 1999, paragraph 45, p. 66.

³² One example of a discussion at some length of the truth of Being on the ground of Dasein that is typical for Heidegger's later period, with reference to the presentation in *Being and Time*, can be found in Heidegger 1999, pp. 207–214.

³³ See, for example, paragraphs 7 (pp. 18–19), 45 (p. 66), 69 (pp. 93–94), and 72 (pp. 96–98), to name only a few such passages.

³⁴ *Contributions*, paragraph 110, p. 153.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, paragraph 196, p. 224: "This *voice* does not speak in the so-called immediate outpouring of the common, natural, unspoiled and uneducated 'man.' ... The *voice* of the people speaks seldom and only in the few – and can it be made *at all* to resonate?" Perhaps, among other issues, Heidegger is here expressing his disappointment at the failure of his offer of guidance to the Nazi

leadership. See also Section VI, “The Ones to Come,” pp. 277-281, for a number of statements in the same unmistakable spirit of philosophical elitism.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, paragraph 49, p. 71.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, paragraph 250, p. 278.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, paragraph 254, p. 285.

⁴² *Ibid.*, paragraph 252, p. 281.

⁴³ The theme is suggested in *Being and Time* throughout much of “Division Two: Dasein and Temporality,” Section 5 “Temporality and Historicity.” It is most explicit in paragraph 74, “The Basic Constitution of Historicity.”

⁴⁴ Rockmore 1992, p. 287. In addition, there are a number of examples in his publications in which he speaks of the Germans as the only possible authentic community because of their unique connection with the origins of Greek thinking. We assume that one indication of this singular connection across time between the Germans and the Greeks is provided by the body of Heidegger’s own publications and teaching. There is also the remarkable discussion in *Introduction to Metaphysics* concerning how the German language is singularly capable of capturing and expressing the deepest meaning of classical Greek. Heidegger’s unique writing style is thus based on how the truths of metaphysics must be expressed in terms of syntax and grammar.

⁴⁵ The pertinent reference in “Letter on Humanism” may be found in Heidegger 1957, p. 69.

⁴⁶ Rockmore presents a pertinent and insightful discussion of the supposed turning (or lack thereof) in Heidegger’s thought as regards his political views. See Rockmore 1992, pp. 284-285.

⁴⁷ Heidegger 1957, p. 103.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 17.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-51, pp. 116 ff.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

⁵² See Taylor 1992, p. 104.

⁵³ Such doubts are made even more pointed in light of the associated discussion of ethics as a philosophical discipline. Heidegger speaks at some length on the question of the essence and history of ethics in *Lettre sur l’humanisme*, condemning it on the grounds of ontology. This merits detailed consideration in light of Heidegger’s apparently failure to find a place in his thinking for human values, but we will now only direct the reader to the source. See Heidegger 1957, pp. 139 ff.

⁵⁴ Rockmore 1992, p. 290.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

⁵⁷ For example, we might try, at least for the purposes of discussion, to see parallels between authentic existence and living in the state of grace, between the withdrawal of Being and the original sin of Adam and Eve in the Garden of

Paradise (which we have inherited), and between existing in the light of Being and the experience of the Divine.

⁵⁸ Heidegger apparently continued to read sources from this period well into his later years. Andre Schuwer once remarked to the writer that upon a visit to Heidegger's Black Forest retreat in the early 1970s he noticed a well-used edition of Duns Scotus on the writing table.

⁵⁹ Kisiel addresses in detail Heidegger's somewhat torturous path as a thinker during this period – reading Luther, Eckhart, Schleiermacher, Augustine, Reinach, Otto, Bernard of Clairvaux, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Teresa of Avila, to name but a few sources – in order to come to grips with the need to clarify his faith and deepen his understanding of religion. See Kisiel 1993, pp. 69-115, "Theo-logical Beginnings: Toward a Phenomenology of Christianity. "

⁶⁰ See Kisiel 1993, p. 227.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 73.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 71-72.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 218-219.

⁶⁴ Even in *Beiträge* we can find references to thinking the divine being. See, for example, Heidegger 1999, paragraph 254, p. 286.

PART II

GLOBALIZATION

CHAPTER VI

MODELS OF GLOBALIZATION: APPROACHES TO GLOBALIZATION AND IDENTITY

ABDILLAHI HASSAN JAMA

A great many internal and external portents (political and social upheaval, moral and religious unease) have caused us all to feel, more or less confusedly, that something tremendous is at present taking place in the world. But what is it? – *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin*

In the age of globalization, the image of Nelson Mandela may now be more familiar to us than the face of our next-door neighbor. – *Anthony Giddens*

Economics is important. But the notion of honor or dignity is more important. – *Akbar Ahmed Former Pakistani High Commissioner to the UK*

INTRODUCTION

The term globalization has become the buzzword of the last decade. Whether it be referred to as *mondialization* (French), *globalizacion* (Spanish), *Globalisierung* (German), *globalizatsia* (Russian), or *aoulama* (Arabic), there is hardly a human endeavor – whether it involve the natural or social sciences, the humanities, the mass media, business, or everyday language – where the term is not used in some form. Indeed, every school of social, political, ideological, and cultural thought has been forced to register its own understanding of the profound processes unfolding today that are, rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, associated with globalization.

There is not, and so far could not be, a commonly accepted definition of globalization since most schools of thought have defined it from their own perspectives and for their own purposes. This has led many of them to lose sight of the whole insofar as they emphasize only certain particular aspects of the world-wide process of globalization.

The various and at times divergent views of globalization are not merely a matter of epistemology. They also arise from the various perspectives or worldviews of different cultures, civilizations, social groups, ideologies, and schools of thoughts. These political, social, cultural, scientific, and scholarly settings to a large extent condition the different understandings of what globalization is, along with its aims, agents, results,

possibilities, advantages, and dangers to the human race as a whole, including nations, nation-states, peoples, social groups, and nature itself.

The present discussion will highlight the different understandings and articulations of globalization and also argue the thesis that globalization is both a “natural” product and stage of modernization, and also a rupture with the latter to a certain extent. There are consequently different globalizations just as there were/are different modernizations – not just one globalization to which all civilizations, nations, and peoples must, under pain of death and destruction, adjust.

Globalization, as both a theoretical and ideological framework, has to a large extent replaced the Postmodernist discourse of the last thirty years. Postmodernism was characterized primarily by the deconstruction of mega-narratives and by disconnectedness between different cultures and civilizations. In contrast, globalization emphasizes the connectedness of societies, cultures, and civilizations. It may be viewed in a certain sense as a product of the information revolution that has fundamentally transformed the realities of time, space, and text, which has made information instantly available throughout the world. Digital communication technology has created a new situation in which people for the first time feel that they belong to a single global space, which has come to be referred to as Mother Earth or Planetary Consciousness.

This new connectedness and the “discovery” of the global calls to mind the era of the “Great Discovery” of the New World (once thought to be India!), the era of colonization, and world-wide empires. It may well be said that the metaphor of the Union Jack and the Sun heralded the End of History as a New Great Discovery of both history and the planet.

We shall now highlight the various phenomena that underlie the phenomenon of globalization.

GLOBAL CHANGES SINCE 1945

The world has gone through far reaching changes since 1945. These can be grouped into political, military, economic, and socio-cultural issues. It is these changes which have paved the way for the current type of globalization and also for its possible alternatives. These include:

- The large increase in the number of states.
- The formation of international organizations (UN, and so forth).
- The dramatic increase in the world’s population.
- The formation of powerful but ever decreasing in number transnational corporations.
- The growth of world production and world trade to unprecedented levels.
- The formation of major regional organizations.

- The end of the Cold War and the triumph of the uni-multipolar world.
- The communication-information revolution.
- The environmental crisis.
- The global role of a few tycoons, such as Soros, Gates, and Turner, the owners/shareholders of the largest transnational corporations and other organizations.

States continue to be the main actors in international politics, although their role is diminishing with the onset of globalization. For example, while only 51 independent states took part in the establishment of the UN in 1945, their number has since almost quadrupled, leading to a current membership of 192. Such growth in the number of states has complicated the world system, necessitating the speedy development of international laws on trade, state relations, finance, culture, and so forth. This development of an international legal apparatus gradually prepared certain crucial aspects of the current stage and type of globalization.

The world political system has also been dramatically altered in other ways since 1945. Instead of two competing ideologies and political systems, “three waves of democratization” led to the triumph of a liberal-democratic system in virtually all countries,¹ albeit with differing forms of both liberalism and democracy. This has paved the way for a certain “homogenization” of the political system of the world.

The second major change since 1945 is the widespread growth of international and transnational organizations. These organizations are both private and official or inter-state, such as the UN. They are second only to states in terms of their influence, and the number of their members - states, groups and individuals - is indeed remarkable.²

A third factor is the dramatic increase in global population, which has doubled between 1950 and 1997 from around 3 billion to more than 6 billion. UN estimates indicate such growth will continue until 2025, reaching 8 to 9 billion. Of the 6 billion people alive today, 1.2 billion live on less than a dollar a day, another 46 percent of the population live on less than 2 dollars a day, while 20 percent of the world’s population enjoy 80 percent of its total income. This 20 percent includes all those who enjoy a comfortable life – mainly in the developed world, but also in the developing world. The important point in this regard is the increased mobility of the world’s population coupled with the ability of transnational corporations to reach them anywhere, any time.

The fourth major element is transnational corporations, which lie at the hub of globalization. Their number has climbed to 40,000, but only the top 200 are truly global and, moreover, control a growing share (more than a quarter) of world economic activity. The power of these corporations can be seen from the fact that the combined sales of the top 200 corporations are greater than the combined economies of all countries minus the 9 largest

(USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK, Brazil, Canada, and China). Together they surpass the combined economies of 182 countries.³

Such oligopolies are to a large extent behind the development and defense of the current type of globalization, which has fostered the concentration of wealth at one pole and poverty, dislocation, and environmental degradation at the other.

Of the remaining factors, the most important appear to be the end of the Cold War, the information revolution, and the environmental crisis. We will now briefly address the first two.

The end of the Cold War led to:

- The end of the bipolar world and of mutually exclusive ideological doctrines.
- The end of spheres of influence and proxy wars.
- The dissolution of the communist bloc and the expansion of Western “liberalism.”
- The internationalization of crime, terrorism, and local conflicts in many parts of the world.
- The formation for a decade of a unipolar world followed by a uni-multipolar world led militarily, economically, and politically by the United States.

The end of the Cold War paved the way for the rapid inclusion of the former communist countries, especially the former USSR and Eastern Europe, into the global market, including global communication and travel.

The information revolution has changed the face of the earth through the introduction of the Internet and the further telefonization of the world. The era of the legendary Morse has come to an end. The world has been transformed into a village in terms of most people throughout the world being able to watch the direct broadcast of events from any part of the globe. This has cemented the power of the major information corporations.

The danger of environmental crisis on a global scale is something new in the history of humanity. Environmental degradation was previously common to certain areas of particular countries, but it never threatened even a single country as a whole. Today it has become a global threat. The global environmental crisis has not simply taken the place of local environmental degradation, such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, but is rather a qualitatively new phenomenon.

Finally, the global role of few tycoons is also a new phenomenon in world history, emerging during the last 25 years. Their financial power is greater than the economic might of most countries, and they are given an ear by the political elite in every state, large or small, throughout the world.

All these factors have paved the way for the current stage of globalization.

DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

First of all, it is well-known that every era has its own notions, concepts, terms, and self-image, just as every epoch of human history has its own concerns, issues, and preoccupations. Self-images are usually deceptive, tending to color human perceptions of good or bad depending on who has created them. Our era – the new epoch of human history after the end of the Cold War – has come to be known as the era of globalization, although certain authors reject the very notion of globalization as just another chimera or, at best, a new fad soon to be discarded. Such writers are among those recording our self-image for posterity.

Second, any definition by its very nature confines and limits a living reality into some comprehensible form or notion, thereby impoverishing its richness and diversity.

Third, perspectives concerning globalization, as is the case with every phenomenon, are shaped by the vantage points of those viewing it. We should not lose sight of the paradigmatic aspect of every definition of globalization insofar as the paradigm used does not serve to make possible a clear-cut definition, but rather indicates the style of thinking that always remains in the background of every process of discourse.

Different perspectives on globalization produce different results, such as ideas, evaluations, and policy decisions. Those who view globalization in a positive way emphasize that the free market is bound to bring benefits to all, that polarization in the world is in fact disappearing, that growth is good for the poor, and that globalization is creating a new interdependent world in which conflicts and wars will be unprofitable. Others emphasize that globalization creates enormous wealth primarily for transnational corporations, spreads poverty throughout the world, especially the developing world, and poses a danger to the diversity of cultures by creating a global Americanized monoculture. Such views also argue that globalization fosters unilateralism instead of multilateralism in international relations, which has been a hallmark of the Bush Administration. There are other perspectives that analyze globalization dialectically and bring to light both its positive and negative aspects.

We will now endeavor to take all these perspectives into account as we seek to determine precisely what globalization is.

Globalism and Globalization

The study of globalization is not yet considered to be an established discipline. This is a primary reason for why it lends itself to a multiplicity of definitions, even though various authors in fact provide workable definitions. Let us now more closely consider the terms “globalism” and “globalization.”

Many people think that that these two terms are synonymous and refer to the same phenomenon. Joseph Nye maintains, however, that there are fundamental differences between these concepts. He states that,

Globalism seeks to describe and explain ... a world which is characterized by networks of connections that span multi-continental distances. It attempts to understand all the inter-connections of the modern world – and to highlight patterns that underlie (and explain) them. In contrast, globalization refers to the increase or decline in the degree of globalism. It focuses on the forces, the dynamism or speed of these changes.⁴

This definition of globalism underlies Nye's argument that globalism is not a new phenomenon, but instead has ancient roots. The issue would then be not how old globalism is, but rather how "thin" and "thick" it is at any given time. The Silk Road that connected ancient Europe and Asian trade centers is an example of early globalism characterized by "thin" globalization. In short, globalization is the process of moving from thin to thick globalism, and the pace with which we get there is the rate of globalization. At the same time, since globalism does not imply universality, globalization implies neither equity, nor homogenization. Nye in fact concludes that it is equally likely to amplify differences, or at least make people more aware of them.⁵

In contrast to Nye, Anthony Giddens defines globalization as a comparatively new phenomenon inherent in modernity.⁶ He argues that,

The forces of globalization are creating something that has never existed before, a global cosmopolitan society. We are the first generation to live in this society, whose contours we can as yet dimly see. It is shaking up our existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be.⁷

This is important, for it sheds light on the concept of the global. The question then becomes what is the global in globalism and in globalization? From another perspective, in accordance with Jameson, globalization may be viewed as

an untotalizable totality which intensifies binary relations between its parts – mostly nations, but also regions and groups, which, however, continue to articulate themselves on the model of "national identities" (rather than in terms of social class, for example)." The globalized relations, Jameson further says, are predominantly relations of "tension or antagonism when not outright exclusion: in

them each term struggles to define itself against the binary other.”⁸

Globalization is not yet driven by collective human action insofar as it has proceeded in an anarchic fashion carried along by a mixture of influences. This is why many of us feel ourselves to be in the grip of forces over which we have no control. Nevertheless, Giddens argues that we can reimpose our will upon them. Indeed, the powerlessness we experience is not a sign of personal failing, but rather reflects the failings of our institutions, which must then be rebuilt or replaced. Giddens maintains that globalization is not incidental to our lives today, but instead is a revolutionary shift in the very circumstances of contemporary life.

From another perspective, globalization is understood as Westernization in a way similar to how modernization was articulated in the 1960s and 1970s, involving an “acceptance” of Western political, social, economic, and cultural institutions. In the words of Akbar Ahmed, the former Pakistan High Commissioner in the UK, globalization is thus viewed in the non-Western world as “a steamroller on honor and dignity. It just comes and just crushes you and your local community’s identity – and leaves nothing beyond.” The Aga Khan, another Muslim dignitary, philanthropist, and leader of the world-wide Ismailites, who is moreover known to be sympathetic to the West, stated the following concerning Western attitudes in today’s global age towards the Muslim world:

With Islam encompassing such a large area of the world with significant populations, western society can no longer *survive* (author’s italics) in its own interests by being ill informed or misinformed about the Islamic world. They have to get away from the concept that every time that there is a bush fire or worse than that, it is representative of the Islamic world. So long as they make it representative of the Islamic world, they damage both themselves and their relations with the Islamic world itself because they are sending erroneous messages back. There is what I would call a “knowledge vacuum.” It is hurting everyone.⁹

Compare this view of the problems of civilizations with the view of our planet from space. A classic statement belongs to Apollo XIV astronaut Edgar Mitchell in 1971:

It was a beautiful, harmonious, peaceful-looking planet, blue with white clouds, and one that gave a deep sense... of home, of being, of identity. It is what I prefer to call instant *global consciousness* (author’s italics).¹⁰

Globalization and Internationalization

The idea of globalization has its roots in many other concepts that have preceded it, such as world community, world society, international community, international division of labor, “global village,” and so forth. This reflects the fact that many contemporary problems cannot be adequately analyzed and studied at the level of nation-states, countries, inter-national relations, or regional associations. From this it follows that there is need to focus on global processes that, in the final analysis, in fact shape and determine the fate of nation-states and their relations.

Even though the concept of globalization is gaining wide acceptance and the literature that addresses it is rapidly expanding, Leslie Sklair argues that most studies do not distinguish it from internationalization. The latter refers to relations between the existing and even changing systems of nation-states, “while the global signifies the emergence of processes and a system of social relations not founded on the system of nation-states.”¹¹

The era when the nation-state was at the center of global processes is quickly receding into the past. Most globalization theorists argue that the nation-state as a unit is no longer the only important unit of analysis in comparison with such global forces and entities as mass media corporations, transnational corporations, social movements that spread ideas of – and wage struggles for – human rights, environmental responsibility, fair trade, peace, and democracy.¹²

MAIN SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT CONCERNING GLOBALIZATION

There are four main approaches or schools of thought to globalization research in sociology:

1. The world-systems approach.
2. The global culture approach.
3. The global society approach.
4. The global capitalism approach.

World-Systems Approach

This approach is based on the distinction between core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries in relation to the changing roles of countries in the international division of labor dominated by the capitalist world-system.¹³

In accordance with world-systems theory, modernity was predated by pre-modern “inter-regional” systems whose centers at various times included the Abbassid Muslim Empire centered on Baghdad (later the Ottoman Empire), China and the Far East, and Spain as the center of Europe.

The fact that Spain was prevented from sailing east by Portugal compelled her to seek the Baghdad/India center by sailing west. The subsequent discovery of Amerindia changed the balance of forces and shifted the center to Europe, thereby allowing Europe to create the first world-system.

Dussel argues that,

Faced with the obligation to manage the far-flung world-system, Europe found just the right tool in simplification – at every level, intellectual, spiritual, physical. Modernist reform yielded a newly simplified relationship with nature (technological not teleological); a newly simplified subjectivity (understanding of the self in its own right); a newly simplified idea of community (with new intersubjective and political relations); and a newly simplified economic arrangement (capitalism). Put these simplifications together and modernity emerges.¹⁴

But what is “global” in the world-system school? After examining world-system literature, Sklair comes to the conclusion that “There is, therefore, no distinctly ‘global’ dimension in the world-system model apart from the inter-national focus that it has always emphasized.”¹⁵ He goes on to say that any reference to the “global” comes “mainly from the critics, and, significantly, can be traced to the long-standing problems that the world-system model has with ‘cultural issues.’”¹⁶ He furthermore differs from such theorists in his support of the view that globalization is a new phenomenon.

Many critics also accuse this school of being basically economic, whereby it seldom deals with cultural issues in an adequate way. Wolff tellingly comments on the way in which the concept of “culture” has been inserted into this school, stating that “an economism which gallantly switches its attention to the operations of culture is still economism.”¹⁷

Global Culture Model

This second approach to globalization derives from and is based upon research into the “globalization of culture.” It considers the primary characteristics and results to date of globalization to be the homogenizing effect of world mass media and digital communication, the consequent threat to national and indigenous cultures, and the formation of so-called “world culture,” which some have dubbed the “Coca-colonization” of the world. The main aim of this approach, which problematizes culture in the process of globalization, is to encourage the development of a culturalist approach to globalization.¹⁸ Marshall McLuhan famously coined the term “Global Village” in his discussion of this issue.

A sub-set of the global cultural approach is so-called “globo-localism,” which addresses the interconnections between global and local,

the specifics of national cultures, and their fate in the age of globalization.¹⁹ Its main research concern is the dialectics of the local and the formation of global cultures.

Global Society Model

This approach is one of the most influential schools of thought. In one way or another, many diverse schools subscribe to its basic tenet, namely, that a global consciousness will inevitably emerge from the formation of a global society that transcends national borders and national cultural particularities and stereotypes.

This school argues that the emergence of transnational corporations as well as international (global) economic, financial, political, and cultural organizations reflects the emergence of global society. Global awareness, or planetary consciousness, pre-dates and at the same time is a result of the emergence of world society.

Scholars who belong to this school differ from others concerning the epoch or period to which the emergence of globalization can be attributed. For example, Giddens argues that “modernity is inherently globalizing,”²⁰ or that globalization is a phenomenon of late modernity, while Robertson’s view is that globalization predates modernity.²¹ It would thus be a new name for an old phenomenon, and the current phase of globalization would differ from past phases by virtue of its intensity, not its content. In contrast, Sklair emphasizes that globalization is primarily a consequence of post-1960s capitalism and fundamentally a very new phenomenon.²²

Global Capitalism Model

This model emphasizes that globalization is inherent in capitalism as a socio-economic system. It involves the emergence of transnational corporations (TNC) whose financial and cultural power is continuously expanding.²³ Sklair argues that the transnational political practices of TNCs are embodied by the transnational capitalist class (TCC), whose transnational cultural-ideological practices are embodied in the cultural ideology of consumerism.²⁴ He states that “The research agenda of this theory is concerned with how TNCs, transnational capitalist classes and the culture-ideology of consumerism operate to transform the world in terms of the global capitalist project.”²⁵

This position is close to that of the Marxist school, as well as to the positions of others inspired by Marx, inasmuch as they argue that capitalism is a world system.²⁶ Marxists are especially inspired regarding the discourse of globalization by Marx and Engels’ incisive characterization of the capitalist era in the *Communist Manifesto*:

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and his relations with his kind.

GLOBALIZATION AS AN IDEOLOGY

Globalization, usually articulated in terms of economics and mass culture, is nothing less than an elaborate ideology centered on neo-liberalism, which has its roots in the economic liberalism of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and others. The latter maintained that there should be no restrictions on manufacturing, no barriers to commerce, no tariffs, and that free trade was the best way for a nation's economy to develop. Such ideas were "liberal" in the sense of there being no controls, and they comprised an application of individualism that encouraged so-called "free" enterprise and "free" competition. However, the Great Depression of the 1930s led John Maynard Keynes to develop a theory that challenged liberalism as the best policy for both capital and labor. He instead proposed the necessity of government intervention in order to correct "free market rules." The dire effects of the Great Depression, reports that Soviet Five-Year Economic Plans were spectacularly successful, and the social and labor protests that paved the way for Fascism in certain European countries together led the ruling elite in business, government, and other sectors to eventually adopt Keynes' ideas. The subsequent adoption in the United States of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal saved the nation from the deadly grip of the unbridled reign of laissez-faire economic policy. This later took place in 1945 in the United Kingdom as well, when the British unceremoniously voted out of office the Conservative Party led by the war hero Prime Minister Winston Churchill and elected, for the first time, a government led by the Labor Party. The belief that government should advance the common good in fact became widely accepted after WWII.

The main characteristics of neo-liberalism are as follows:²⁷

1. *The Rule of the Total Market.* Private enterprise should be liberated from any restrictions imposed by the state, regardless of the social damage this causes. This is associated with greater openness to TNCs, defeat of the labor movement, and the de-unionization of workers. There should be total freedom of movement for capital, goods, and services as well as no price controls. Such policies have often resulted in the collapse of entire sectors of national economies, leading to de-industrialization.

2. *Intensification of the Market.* This involves the redefinition of market time and space. The ideal of neo-liberalism is that all markets should be open 24 hours a day.

3. *Cutting Public Expenditure for Social Services.* This primarily restricts spending for education, health care, housing subsidies, water supplies, electricity, and so forth.

4. *Privatization and Deregulation.* The aim in this regard is the massive privatization of state-owned enterprises, goods, and services to so-called “private investors,” often at below-market prices and through widespread corruption. In Russia this has had the effect of concentrating wealth in the hands of a few “families,” the term in Russian for the corresponding new group who are close to the political leadership.

5. *Elimination of the Concept of the “Public Good.”* This notion is replaced with “individual responsibility” or the neologism “employability.” Such neo-liberal terminology means that it is the moral duty of private human beings to arrange their lives in such a way as to maximize their advantages on the labor market. The notions of “people” or “community” are thereby done away with.

6. *A New Social-Darwinism.* “Public Good” is also replaced by the belief that humankind exist for the market, not the market for humankind. This absolutizes intense competition among market-participants, and those who fail in this respect are judged to have no place in the market.

7. *Nothing outside the Market.* The ethical precept of neo-liberalism in the era of the total market is that all actions must be in conformity with market forces. One is to choose friends, hobbies, sports, and partners in order to maximize his/her status with future employers.

The following are some of the wide spread “truisms” that globalists accept concerning the benefits of such corporate globalization:

- Globalization comprises the liberalization and global integration of markets.
- Globalization is inevitable and irreversible.
- No one is in charge of globalization.
- Globalization benefits everyone.
- Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world.

In respect to these supposed benefits, Steger’s analysis of the ideology of globalism pertinently asks why the West so vehemently

advances it as the only way to accurately describe the globalizing dynamics that are reshaping today's world.²⁸ In order to provide an adequate answer to this question, Steger utilizes the three conceptual instruments of "ideology," "hegemony," and "critical theory."

The Concept of Ideology

Steger first argues that the ideology of globalism supports the political agenda of neo-liberal globalists in four ways.

- It mystifies globalization as a natural force independent of human will.
- It emphasizes and affirms a standard of normative evaluation, declaring that globalization is good and beneficial for all.
- It functions as a guide for action in support of globalization.
- It simplifies complex reality so that globalization appears in a favorable light.

It is well-known that ideology typically distorts social reality, legitimizes certain authorities, legitimizes particular political, economic, social, and cultural systems, and plays an integrative role in any society. The latter is in fact its most important function. Globalization ideology thus has to convince the majority of humankind that all nations and peoples are part of this process, and that persons should be integrated into the collective identity of the globalizers through "symbols, norms, and images."²⁹

The Concept of Hegemony

The concept of hegemony as developed by Antonio Gramsci is a useful instrument in analyzing the rapidly growing power of neo-liberal globalists. Gramsci understands hegemony as a power relationship between social groups and classes in which one class exercises leadership by gaining the active consent of subordinate groups. This consent is normally not coerced, but rather arises through an acceptance and internalization of "the social logic of domination that is embedded in hegemonic ideology."³⁰

Neo-liberal globalists have gained a hegemonic role in the West, particularly after the Thatcher-Reagan period, and have convinced others, primarily through "soft" power, that their ideology of globalism offers the best hope for the world. Hegemonic globalists proclaim that free market capitalism on a global scale will produce social, political, and technological progress for the majority of humankind. They bestow the market with almost divine wisdom – as if it were the "hidden hand of God." The role of the mass media, such as TV, Internet, and the press, is to cultivate and sustain this image of the beneficent market without becoming an Orwellian Ministry of Truth.

The Concept of Critical Thinking

Steger utilizes “Critical Theory” at this point in order to spell out how the ideology of globalism relates to a hegemonic political agenda. It also enables one to effectively explore the role of ideas as such in the process of globalization. Steger emphatically views the “rhetorical package” of globalism as an active agent in the broader phenomenon of globalization. He emphasizes that “Globalization is also a linguistic and ideological practice,”³¹ and concludes that the very fact people are constantly talking or writing about globalization contributes in no small measure to the development of globalization itself.³²

John Gray, a leading conservative political philosopher who once supported Thatcher’s reforms but later decisively turned against neo-liberalism, exposes the serious flaws in the ideological arguments for global free markets. He correctly emphasizes that “the freedoms of the market are not ends in themselves. They are expedients, devices contrived by human beings for human purposes. Markets are made to serve man, not man the market. In the global free market the instruments of economic life have become dangerously emancipated from social control and political governance.”³³

In summary, the term globalization masks the heterogeneity of processes that need to be articulated. Neither is it innocent and neutral, for it is used as a replacement for such older discourses as “imperialism” and “modernization.” The former was associated with the exploitation and colonization of other countries by the West, while the latter was connected mainly with positive economic, social, and political changes. Modernization was in fact generally taken as an indicator of an upward movement, whereby it had a positive connotation irrespective of its articulation by some as “Westernization.” The term globalization, however, has been somewhat bleached of both the negative and positive aspects of both imperialism and modernization.

Friedman and Geertz: An Encounter Concerning Globalization

Thomas Friedman, a prolific writer and well-known columnist for the *New York Times*, suggests in his *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* that the globalized future is not ensured of success, in spite of what the majority of neo-liberal globalists argue.³⁴ Moreover, not only may the backlash against globalization be too great to overcome, countries and individuals may simply be unable to change sufficiently in response to the rapidly changing conditions.

Friedman raises the following concerns:

- People may not be able to adapt to the fast and hard tide of globalization.

- Alienation between people may arise from the wide-spread use of electronic communication.
- Globalization may involve excessive intrusion into private lives.
- Globalization may have a dehumanizing effect because of its inequitable treatment of many people – perhaps even the absolute majority of human kind.
- Japan, Russia, and China may well fail in adapting to the harsh rules of globalization.³⁵

After raising these negative possibilities, Friedman ends on an optimistic note that is characteristically American, namely, the United States can lead the system of globalization to a successful conclusion. However, this must be preceded by the recognition that the system is incapable of managing itself insofar as a pure market system “is too brutal and therefore politically unsustainable.”³⁶ The world thus requires a “politics of sustainable globalization,” and the US has the leverage needed to lead the world towards this aim. Friedman envisions a “balanced way” of stabilizing globalization by democratizing it, that is, “by making it work for more and more people all the time.”³⁷

In this view, the free market would be balanced by a social safety net for those who otherwise would be done in by the juggernaut of globalized market forces.

The logic of how this balance would work goes as follows: Social safety-net supporters would have to embrace globalization because of its power to raise living standards. But globalizing free marketers would have to support a strong social safety net because without it the peoples of the world would withhold political support for globalization.

Friedman concludes by asserting that the United States has the best tradition of balancing free markets and safety nets, and urges the US to accept its role as the hegemon of this remarkable moment in history. He offers a modified Enlightenment vision of universal progress, believing that Americans have learned how to balance the Lexus and the olive tree and must show the world how to do it.³⁸ Friedman argues that “The challenge in this era of globalization – for countries and individuals – is to find a healthy balance between preserving a sense of identity, home and community and doing what it takes to survive within the globalization system.”³⁹

Geertz, in contrast, view the post-Berlin Wall world as having in a sense become less globalized insofar as the Cold War tension between powerful autocracies cast a net around the world and held in check nationalist and ethnic enmities.

Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* is one person’s attempt to provide us with a general notion of the new heterogeneous world. But its limitation lies precisely in its embrace of a panoptic, homogeneous explanation, namely, the economics of global development. Geertz instead feels compelled to embrace the diversity at hand, and he seems convinced

that it will be a long while before the pieces begin to cohere. In his mind, this calls for “ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities” which nonetheless allow us to derive some “sense of connectedness.”⁴⁰

Geertz goes about looking for such ways of thinking by exploring the confusion that has grown up in the meanings of key explanatory concepts and their interrelationships. He asks:

- “What is a country if it is not a nation?”⁴¹
- “What is a culture if it is not a consensus?”⁴²

Social scientists may once have felt confident in such views, but Geertz explores the reasons why they cannot do so today. Canada, Sri Lanka, and the former Yugoslavia provide examples of the tensions now surrounding the notion of country as nation.⁴³ The people of Indonesia exemplify for him how cultural identity no longer represents a consensus, but rather creates a “field of differences confronting one another at every level.”⁴⁴

Geertz expresses an important axiom in his exploration of the loss of a clear-cut notion of culture as consensus. On the one hand, it deals with the interplay of globalizing cosmopolitanism (the Lexus) and, on the other, parochialism (the olive tree), but he finds these factors to be linked and mutually reinforcing, not oppositional. That is to say that as cosmopolitanism increases, so does parochialism.⁴⁵ Geertz thereby indicates a disintegrative effect of global information technology that Friedman minimizes. While the influx of globalizing modernization on the wings of electronic technology precipitates a reworking and intensification of local cultural demarcations; it does not cause their disappearance.⁴⁶ As Geertz tersely asserts, “The more things come together, the more they remain apart.”⁴⁷

Geertz also makes the succinct observation that the newly independent countries (mainly Afro-Asian countries) have haphazardly collected heterogeneous peoples into their domains. They have thus come to operate not as simple “cultures” or “nations,” but as “modes of involvement in a collective life that takes place on a dozen different levels, on a dozen different scales, and in a dozen different realms at once.”⁴⁸ The aim in such a situation must then be not to discover consensus, but rather “a viable way of doing without it.”⁴⁹

And here Geertz turns the traditional imperial-colonial relationship on its head. He suggests that this new picture of cultural identity as a “field of differences” applies not only to the periphery, but to Western nations as well. Given the flows of people bearing different cultures in all directions, and no longer only from a center to a periphery, the Western nations with their cultural tensions now resemble the usually multinational and multicultural Afro-Asian states.⁵⁰

THE PORTRAIT OF THE GLOBALIZERS

Robert Rosen and his colleagues set out to learn the lessons of leadership in the new globalized business marketplace.⁵¹ They interviewed 75 CEOs of transnational corporations from 28 countries, amplified their face-to-face findings with a written survey of 1,058 executives worldwide, and examined the national cultures of the CEOs in their study. They thereby sought to identify the qualities of leadership evidenced by their subjects in the new business reality. Their claim is that these qualities, which they term “global literacies,” are prerequisites for anyone aspiring to lead an organization in that new reality.

There are four such types of global literacy. These are *personal literacy* (one must understand and value oneself and have a passion for excellence and success); *social literacy* (one must collaborate and transform conflict into productive work); *business literacy* (one must move quickly and flexibly in an ever-changing environment, bringing out the best in competitive people); and *cultural literacy* (one must build bridges and “leverage culture as a tool for competitive advantage”).⁵²

Rosen et al. analyze these findings in order to determine what leaders must understand and orchestrate in 21st century business. In addition, the resultant personal leadership culture operates within business cultures that vary from company to company, each having different priorities and styles. These business cultures in turn operate within many differing national cultures that are defined on the basis of the psychology, economy, politics, religion, geography, and history peculiar to each. Finally, leadership, business, and national cultures are located within the all-encompassing framework of world culture, where transnational organizations conduct their business.

Moreover, culture has evolved out of a combination of forces. These include the explosion of knowledge, the connections and relationships made possible by information technology, the chaos and ambiguity resulting from the unrelenting pace of change, and the new linkages that make it necessary – and profitable – to operate both globally and locally at the same time.⁵³

GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE

Scholars involved with the history of nation-states generally agree that the present system of sovereign states came to be established during the 17th century, especially after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The Peace of Westphalia in fact marks the end of one era and the beginning of another, after which, as states increasingly took the form of nation-states, the development of world politics came to be centered upon “international” affairs.

The concept of sovereignty is inseparably related to the very existence of nation-states. Even though there are varying definitions, the

basic concept of sovereignty boils down to the notion that a state exercises the supreme and exclusive right of control over all affairs within its prescribed territory. This has two key features, one internal and the other external:

- Internally, the state has command over all its subjects.
- Externally, states are subject to no higher authority.⁵⁴

From this conception of sovereignty flows the equality of all members of international society insofar as the latter is conceived of as constituted by sovereign states. The doctrine of sovereign equality means not equal capability, but equal rights.

In what ways does globalization affect the sovereignty of nation-states? More specifically, how can globalization be viewed as undermining the system of sovereign states? Various forces arising from the process of globalization, which have been classified in various ways by various scholars, affect sovereignty through specific mechanisms. Held maintains, for example, that the most significant challenges to state sovereignty arise from the global economy, characterized by the dominant role of multinational companies (MNCs) and global capital markets. A second level is comprised of such transnational bodies as the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and the UN. Two remaining factors are international laws and hegemonic powers.

These four groups are illustrated in the table below.⁵⁵

Table1. Challenges to State Sovereignty.

1. The Global Economy.	Multinational Companies and Global Capital
2. Transnational bodies.	Economic regulatory bodies, such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO, UN, EU.
3. International law.	Legal conventions recognized by national courts and states; UN and EU conventions and charters.
4. Hegemonic powers and power blocs.	NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.

A range of mechanisms has been identified in respect to the roles of MNCs and TNCs whereby these four forces erode and undermine the sovereignty of nation-states. Most important among these are:

- MNCs make decisions on the basis of optimizing their profitability rather than the economic health of particular nations.
- Their decisions concerning investments and flows of resources are made rather independently of the national policies of host countries. This affects national economic growth, employment, industrial structure, and even governmental taxation.

In addition to the actions of TNCs, the development of the global capital market is also widely considered to undermine the sovereignty of nation-states. Speculators and investors can today transfer enormous amounts of money from one country to another in literally a moment using electronic means, and the absolute majority of states have no political and economic power to properly control this movement of funds. The devastating effects of these financial developments upon national sovereignty have been demonstrated in a number of recent cases, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, in which the flight of gambling money is said to have provoked the turmoil. The financial collapse of Russia in 1998 also attests to the power of these market forces. Furthermore, the development of huge offshore bank deposits has caused states to lose sole ownership of another hallmark of sovereignty, namely, the national currency.

International organizations and laws also present a strong challenge to the sovereignty of nation-states. Some of the ways in which this takes place are as follows:

- The EU has established an effective single currency system, replacing the national currencies of its member states.
- The decisions of the UN can often be accompanied by the use of military forces, as was the case in the Gulf War in 1991, when the sovereignty of Iraq was completely ignored by international forces.
- The structural adjustment policies of the IMF are widely viewed to be the most important economic policies in many developing countries.
- The World Bank and the WTO play crucial roles in national economic policies, especially in the emerging markets (mostly former communist countries) and the developing countries.

In addition, it must be noted that NGOs play a growing role in challenging the sovereignty of nation-states and the power of TNCs as well.

But what is far more important for the fate of the nation-state and globalization itself is the emergence and growth of a new transnational capitalist class that seeks to play the role of the new hegemon in world political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs. Although this class is primarily concentrated in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, its US elements currently play the leading role. It is expected that the latter will maintain their position for the foreseeable future since it will take the EU a considerable period of time to emerge as a truly European supra-state that is capable of successfully competing on the same level.

The power of this new class is illustrated in Table 2 below, which may be compared with Table 1.⁵⁶

Table 2. The Transnational Capitalist Class.

TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES	LEADING INSTITUTIONS	INTEGRATING AGENTS
<p>Economic sphere: Transnational capital. International capital. State capital.</p>	<p>Economic forces: Global TNCs. World Bank, IMF, BIS. State TNCs.</p>	<p>Global Business Elite.</p>
<p>Political sphere: TNC executives. Globalizing bureaucrats. Politicians and professionals. Regional blocs. Emerging transnational states.</p>	<p>Political forces: Global business organization Open-door agencies, WTO Parties and lobbies EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, UN, NGOs</p>	<p>Global Political Elite.</p>
<p>Culture-ideology sphere Consumerism. Transnational Neo-liberalism.</p>	<p>Culture-ideology forces: Shops. Media. Think tanks. Elite social movements.</p>	<p>Global Cultural Elite.</p>

GLOBALIZATION AND ISLAM

The danger of the current model of globalization lies in its homogenization – in reality Americanization – of other cultures and civilizations. And this effect usually leads to a serious backlash on the part of other civilizations and cultures, particularly those from the Muslim world. The major reason underlying the negative reaction of Muslims towards

globalization is to a large extent rooted in the history of relations between the West and the Muslim world, which have passed through five major stages.

1. The first stage of the encounter between the two world religions was shaped by the emergence of Islam and its sudden and rapid spread towards hitherto Christian domains in the 8th century, mainly the Middle East, Byzantium, and eventually Southern Europe. Islam from the very beginning claimed to be a religion sent by God that consummated the cycle of Abrahamic revelations (Judaism and Christianity). The Prophet Muhammad (May Peace Be upon Him) was claimed to be the last of God's Messengers.

The centers of debate at this stage were Syria in the era of the Umayyad dynasty and later Baghdad. Many Christians, such as St. John of Damascus and others, had first-hand knowledge of Islam as a theological, political, and cultural practice, and they were of course well-versed in Arabic. They viewed Islam as a new Christian heresy that would in time return to the Church. Byzantine authors also wrote much about Islam, mainly in the same vein. It was during this stage of encounter that many images of Islam as a deviation from Christianity came into being.

2. The second stage is primarily associated with Europe's Middle Ages, especially in Andalusia, where a productive, enriching, mutual understanding between the two religions, their communities, and their scholars took place. At the same time, however, this period is characterized by some of the greatest conflicts between the two communities, with the Crusader exploits having long tarnished the relations between them.

3. The third stage is connected with the 17th and 18th centuries, that is, the period after Europe had passed through the Reformation and the Enlightenment, two major periods in its history. The relation of Europe to Islam at that period was prepared to a large extent by the Renaissance, which underscored the importance of Muslim civilization and its cultural achievements, both philosophical and scientific. Muslim scholars such as Al-Farabi (the "Second Teacher," the "First" being Aristotle) were revered, but the Prophet Muhammad was still viewed as a fallen pseudo-messenger. It is revealing to note that Dante, in his graphic account of who belongs where in the "Other World," placed the Prophet in the Inferno.

4. The fourth stage began in the second half of the 18th century and continued till the mid 20th century, marking the era when the West began in earnest to study Islam and the Muslim world. Economic and colonial interests were of course paramount at the time, but there was also a genuine interest on the part of many scholars in unraveling the "enigma" of Muslim civilization and they made serious attempts to understand it. This was also the period when so-called Orientalism began to emerge as a discipline in all major universities in the West, particularly in Europe. The central thesis of Orientalism was – and is – that the Muslim world has undergone neither a

Reformation, nor an Enlightenment, for which reason it is irrational, superstitious, stagnant, and autocratic by its very nature.

Major Muslim scholars have rejected the notion that Islam is anti-scientific and stagnant. One leading figure in this regard was Muhammad Abdou of Egypt, who wrote extensively on Islam and Science.

5. The end of the colonial era and the struggle of most Muslim countries for economic and social development, along with a revival of Islamic studies, has been one of the main reasons for the crisis of Orientalism today. Indeed, we have entered a new stage in our efforts to find commonalities among the Abrahamic Faiths and accept Islam as an inalienable part of that tradition.

At the same time, however, the dreadful events of 11 September 2001 have once again created a dangerous split between the two civilizations. The medieval image of Islam as the religion of the sword – the dangerous, violent, and militant faith of a distant monolithic world prone to all kinds of extremist behavior – is almost becoming the norm in many sectors of Western public opinion. Furthermore, Islam and the Muslim world have virtually become a subset of the violent conflict in the Middle East. The Muslim world is in fact viewed in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and many people in the West believe that the majority of Muslims are Arabs even though the population of one Muslim country alone, Indonesia, is almost equal to the entire Arab population of the world.⁵⁷

Many scholars, especially from the West, argue that Islam needs its own Reformation in order to cope with the challenges of globalization. It does, but not by following the Western way. Islam in fact came into being as a modernizing teaching. The orthodox reading of the Message, comprising a literalist understanding of the Qur'an as a text, came to prevail only after the invasion of Baghdad by the Mongols.

CONCLUSION

Globalization is intimately interrelated to modernity and to its various offshoots, or modernizations. Indeed, globalization is but a new stage of the modernization processes that have been unfolding in the world for the last four to five centuries. As such, to argue as many do that it is a thoroughly new phenomenon is to miss the point, just as is the case with the opposite view that nothing new has happened, and that globalization is but an intensification of the process of internationalization.

The complexity of the phenomenon is underscored when it is tied to modernization and to the crisis of modernity, namely, the exacerbation of the contradiction between instrumental rationalism and normative rationalism.

The crisis of modernity is thus neither the "End of History," nor the transition to a "Post-modern" world, but rather the crisis of a definite form and stage of reason itself. Reason is contextual both historically and

culturally. None of the institutions and norms it has created comprises a universal principle, social laws, or “iron stages” of development that all societies, under the pain of death, must follow in order to become modern. Consequently, reason is obliged to undertake constant reflection and innovation. One can thus talk not of a single modernization process that is, for example, linear in nature with specific stages of growth, but rather of a series of modernizations that are culturally and historically conditioned. In the same vein, neither is there a single, linear, all-encompassing process of globalization, but rather different globalizations, just as there were/are multiple modernities.⁵⁸

The current model of globalization is one-sided, highly conflictual, and anti-environmental. It will be corrected with time.

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NOTES

¹ See Huntington, Samuel (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

² It suffices to consider the roles of Amnesty International, the WTO, the World Bank, Greenpeace, Médecins San Frontières, and many others.

³ Anderson, Sarah and John Cavanagh. *Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power*. Referenced at the website of *Corporate Watch*. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations while only 49 are countries. Wal-Mart is bigger than 161 countries, including Israel, Poland, and Greece. Mitsubishi is larger than Indonesia, Ford is bigger than South Africa, and so forth.

⁴ Joseph Nye, formerly Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, worked at both the State Department and Defense Department. From 1977 to 1979 he served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In recognition of this service he received the Distinguished Honor Award, the highest commendation of the Department of State. In 1993 and 1994 he was chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates intelligence estimates for the President, and was awarded the Intelligence Community's Distinguished Service Medal. In 1994 and 1995 he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, for which he received the Distinguished Service Medal with an Oak Leaf Cluster.

Among his many books and articles, those most relevant to the current discussion include:

The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002); *Governance Amid Bigger, Better Markets* (co-edited with J. D. Donahue) (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001); *Governance in a Globalizing World* (co-

edited with J. D. Donahue) (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (co-authored with R. O. Keohane) (Boston: Little Brown, 1977) (3rd edition, with additional material, New York: Longman, 2000); *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2002); *Global Competition After the Cold War: A Reassessment of Trilateralism* (co-authored with K. Biedenkopf and M. Shiina) (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1991); *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

⁵ Nye, J. (2002) "Globalism versus Globalization." *The Globalist*, April 15.

⁶ Anthony Giddens, Director of the London School of Economics and Political Sciences, is the author of more than 34 books published in 29 languages. In 1985 he co-founded the academic publishing house Polity Press, and more recently was an adviser to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, helping to popularize the ideas of left-of-center politics known as the "Third way."

⁷ Giddens, A. (2000) "Basic Instincts in a Global World." *The Globalist*, December 15. See also Giddens, A. (2000) *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Shaping Our Lives*. New York and London: Routledge.

⁸ Jameson, F. and M. Miyoshi, eds. (1999) *The Cultures of Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, p. xii

⁹ As quoted in Ahmed, Akbar S. (1992) *Postmodernism and Islam. Predicament and Promise*. New York and London: Routledge, p. 97.

¹⁰ As quoted in Dussel, E. (1999) "Beyond Eurocentrism: The World-System and the Limits of Modernity." In Jameson and Miyoshi, op. cit., pp. 3-31.

¹¹ Sklair, L (1999) "Competing Conceptions of Globalization." *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol. V, No.2 (Summer), p. 145.

¹² Although the Cold War immensely distorted the noble mission of many new social movements, including human rights movements, Green movements, and others, the importance of their mission has grown after the collapse of communism. Their central battle-cry is "Think globally, act locally."

¹³ For a good review of this school of thought see Wallerstein, I. (1979) *The Capitalist-World System*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Also see Shannon, T. (1989) *An Introduction to the World-System Perspective*. Boulder: Westview.

¹⁴ Dussel, op. cit., p. 13.

¹⁵ Sklair, op. cit., p. 149.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 150.

¹⁷ As quoted in Sklair, op. cit., p. 150. Original text in A. D. King, ed. (1991) *Culture, Globalization, and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*. Binghamton: Dept. of Art and Art History, State University of New York at Binghamton.

¹⁸ Featherstone, M., ed. (1990) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Identity*. London: Sage; Robertson, R. (1992) *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage.

¹⁹ On this point see Z. Mlinar, ed. (1992) *Globalization and Territorial*

Identities. Aldershot: Avebury.

²⁰ Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequence of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

²¹ See Robertson, op. cit.

²² Sklair, op. cit., p. 155.

²³ See Ross, R. and L. Trachte (1990) *Global Capitalism: The New Leviathan*, Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Also see McMichael, Ph. (1996) *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

²⁴ Sklair, L. (1995) *Sociology of the Global System*, 2nd edition. Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 157.

²⁶ Harvey, D. (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

²⁷ I have witnessed first-hand what neo-liberal economic and social policies are in Russia, along with their deadly results for the nation. The present discussion is, in part, an attempt at a theoretical reflection upon what has happened to Mother Russia and to many other countries as well.

²⁸ Steger, M. (2002) *Globalism: The New Market Ideology*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p. 14.

³² Ibid., p. 40.

³³ Gray, J. (1998) *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*. New York: The New Press, p. 234; Gray, J. (2000) *Two Faces of Liberalism*. New York: The New Press.

³⁴ Friedman, Th. L. (2000) *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Anchor Books.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 409-432.

³⁶ Ibid., p.444.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 475

³⁹ Ibid., p. 42.

⁴⁰ Geertz, C. (2000) *Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 224.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 246.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 238-245.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 255.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 246.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 247.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 248.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 254.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 255.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 256.

⁵¹ Rosen, R., P. Digh, M. Singer, and C. Philips (2000) *Global Literacies: Lessons on Business Leadership and National Culture*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.

⁵⁴ Williams, M. (1996) "Rethinking Sovereignty." In E. Kofman and G. Youngs, eds. *Globalization: Theory and Practice*. London: Pinter.

⁵⁵ Holton, R. J. (1998) *Globalization and the Nation-State*. London: Macmillan, p. 106. Originally presented in David Held, ed. (1991) *Political Theory Today*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.

⁵⁶ Sklair, L. (1999). "Competing Conceptions of Globalization." *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol. V, No.2 (Summer), p. 156.

⁵⁷ Arabs are central to the emergence of Islam and the formation of the Muslim world. But whether they will continue to play a central role in the further development of the Muslim world remains an open question.

⁵⁸ See *Multiple Modernities*, Vol. 129, No. 1 (Winter) 2000.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI

GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALISM AND THE NATION STATE: AN ASIAN POINT OF VIEW*

MAKOTO UTSUMI

The Conquest of the World by the Market Economy

The market economy has been victorious throughout the world. Ten years ago, less than 1 billion people were living in market economies. Today that number is 5 billion. This is the phenomenon called globalization.

To non-English speaking people, the word “globalization” sounds like imposing the Anglo-Saxon rules of the game on every part of our globe. This reminds me of a comic story in a book written by a Zen priest in Japan in the 15th century. Tea was then a very rare and precious drink, and only a limited number of privileged persons could enjoy it. There was a priest at a Zen-Buddhist temple who was accustomed to enjoying tea, cherishing every drop of it. A poor farmer, who from time to time had peeped through the temple window and observed how much the priest was enjoying his drink, one day asked, “Reverend Sir, you taste something very nice. Could you tell me what it is, and could I try it once?” The priest answered, “It is called tea, a precious drink introduced from China, and it has three very important effects on the human body. First, it increases one’s appetite. Second, it keeps one awake. Third, it suppresses one’s sexual desire.” The poor farmer said, “Oh, that is not for me. First, we are allowed only a few things to eat; therefore, it would be a disaster for us to have our appetite stimulated. Second, my only pleasure in life is to sleep well, a pleasure I do not want to be deprived of. Finally, the suppression of my sexual desire would make my wife extremely unhappy and angry.” As this old story shows, what is good for some is not necessarily good for all. This applies to countries, too. On the other hand, no one and no country can live on this globe in total disregard of the globalization of the market economy.

REGIONALISM AND ASIA

In parallel with the globalization of the market economy, there is also a global tendency towards regional integration. It is rather easy to imagine what will happen in Europe or in the Americas. The European countries will become more deeply integrated through monetary unification, and this integration will extend to Central and, eventually, Eastern Europe. In the Americas, it might be considered a natural development that an integrated community be formed beginning with NAFTA and Mercosur that will soon reach AFTA.

Turning our eyes to Asia, however, it is not so easy to draw a portrait of this vast, densely populated, complicated, and highly diversified area in the 21st century – and I might add that the key word to understanding Asia is “diversity.” This diversity first concerns culture, religion, and historical background. Second, it derives from the different stages of economic development of the individual countries. Third, it involves the problem of national security, which is much more complicated in comparison with European countries. In Europe, you have a common heritage, namely, Greco-Roman culture and civilization. You also have a common religion, Christianity, although there are Catholics and Protestants. Your countries have different languages, but almost all languages in Europe belong to the Indo-European language group. And European countries have already experienced periods of unification under the Roman Empire and, later, the Holy Roman Empire.

In Asia, we have no common heritage in the sense that Europeans do. For example, sometimes China, Japan, and Korea are viewed as forming a particular shared cultural zone. But while the Chinese language belongs to the Indo-European language group, Japanese and Korean belong to the Mongolian language group. And there is far more diversity in Asia in terms of religion, such as Hinduism in India along with both Taoism and Confucianism in China. Buddhism was born in India, but now has spread over a vast area including Japan. Islam and Christianity also exist in the region. Such diversity cannot be compared with Europe’s.

There is also geographical complexity, which can readily be seen by looking at a map of the region. The degree of this complexity has hampered communication and exchange among the sub-regions. In addition, for thousands of years there have been two major cultures in Asia, India and China, each having formed a cultural zone. And between these two zones, Thailand, Brunei, Indochina, and Java, have, from time to time, inclined either to the one, or to the other.

The history of colonization by European countries is another factor that complicates this matter.

Let us now consider the differences between Asian countries concerning their stages of development. There might be some truth in the view that when a group of countries which consists of both developed and developing countries is in the process of forming some type of economic community or free trade zone, there is a tendency for industrialization to accelerate in those countries that are already industrialized or advanced, while development in the other countries is delayed. Japan possesses highly developed technology, and Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are making efforts to catch up. The ASEAN countries are also successfully developing their economies, and their level of development is approaching that of the NIES. China is a huge country in respect to which a vast variety of interpretations and perspectives is possible. Finally, at the other end of the scale, we have countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh, which are classified as LDC.

Concerning the problem of national security, we in Asia are in a completely different situation than Western Europe. Western European countries faced the Iron Curtain, and it was their common objective to defend themselves against the threat from the Soviet bloc. This threat potentially existed in Asia as well, of course, but it was not as visible as it was in the European countries. Moreover, the complexity of their political and historical backgrounds made it impossible for Asian countries to establish a NATO-like collective security system.

Consequently, each of the numerous Asian nations has had a bilateral security arrangement with the United States, which continues to be the fundamental security structure in the region. In addition, the Iron Curtain has completely disappeared in Europe, but the Cold War has not yet totally disappeared in Asia, as is evident from the case of North Korea.

THE ASIAN WAY OF INTEGRATION

It is not an easy task to integrate these great diversities into a regional community. I feel that in Asia we will not during the 21st century see an EU-like process of regional integration, with its member countries put under one single treaty specifying their rights and responsibilities. Does this mean that Asian countries will remain “disorganized,” without no common voice to the rest of the world? In the following, I would like to discuss how regional integration can be possible in an Asian way.

APEC, which includes Asian countries, Oceanian countries, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Russia, is a very interesting organization in this regard. Although it is neither a union, nor a community, it could perhaps be defined as an “open economic association” that comprises a variety of groupings with a potential for accelerated integration. I see a possibility in the development of this organization that Asia will assert itself with one voice in the 21st century. A sign of such progress could already be observed at the APEC Summit Meeting in Osaka in November 1995, where the principal issue was how the liberalization of trade among member countries could best be realized. After the discussion, an agreement was finally reached concerning a new approach that would allow each member-country to set and implement its own agenda voluntarily. This was an eloquently demonstration of how Asian countries can work together while maintaining their diversity.

Another typical example of regional co-operation is the “Chiang Mai Initiative,” an agreement aiming at closer financial co-operation that was reached in 2000 by the finance ministers of ASEAN+3. This initiative has a very symbolical structure that clearly shows the “Asian model” in its formulation and manner of operation. While the aim is to create a network of bilateral swap and repurchase facilities, it is not a multilateral framework in the strict sense of the term. It establishes no obligations for the governments and central banks involved in that the participating countries are expected to negotiate with one another on a purely voluntary basis for

bilateral swap arrangements. Japan has so far completed bilateral arrangements with Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines, with negotiations still underway with Malaysia. Korea is negotiating with Thailand and China.

The countries in the region have demonstrated a clear willingness to co-operate against currency speculation. More importantly, the establishment of such an initiative is now promoting a serious policy dialogue, individual co-operation agreements, and mutual understanding in the region. This will rouse the development of common interests.

THE NATION-STATE - SEARCHING FOR IDENTITY

Where are nation-states heading in the 21st century as they drift in the dominant tide of globalization and rationalization? It was during the 20th century that the full list of nation-states became as complicated as it currently is, but in the current circumstances, the *raison-d'être* of each nation-state might well be questioned. In addition, we have begun to observe a trend towards the loss of identity on the part of individual nation-states, particularly since the collapse of the Iron Curtain that had divided our world. The Soviet Union and other Eastern and Central European countries lost their value systems and their identities after the end of the Soviet bloc, and have been forced to search for new. But while the West was inebriated with the victory of the market economy after having witnessed the swift collapse of the socialist economies, a monster was emerging from the innermost depths of the countries of the West. This is the monster of distrust and antagonism towards established political powers and systems; and it has already made inroads among the peoples of these nations.

For example, after many decades of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule in Japan, we saw the birth of the Hosokawa Cabinet in July 1993, which was based on an anti-LDP coalition. It was very short-lived, and the LDP soon recovered power in a three-party coalition. Mr. Koizumi was later victorious over former Prime Minister Mr. Hashimoto in the LDP presidential elections in 2001. Both his victory and subsequent high approval ratings were due to the fact that he distanced himself from the power center of the LDP while Mr. Hashimoto was viewed as the candidate of the old power structure.

Such anti-incumbent sentiment has also been observed in various forms after the collapse of the Iron Curtain in Germany, France, the UK, the US, and Austria as well. It very likely has its roots in the loss of identity in the West that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which for many years had provided the West with an antithesis against which to define itself. The loss of identity has been causing trouble in many countries. Yugoslavia provides the most extreme case of the troubles caused by this loss of identity, but we could add Corsica in France, politicians who supported the claim for independence of northern Italy, the issue of East Timor, and so forth.

It has now become very clear that each nation should strenuously pursue making its identity visible in the globalized market economy, for without it the nation-state will be buried by globalization and regionalism. I stated above that globalization in a certain sense involves the imposition of the Anglo-Saxon rules of the game to the rest of the world. This calls into question the extent to which the market economy can be tolerant of differences in the cultures, value systems, social structures, and, most importantly, the social safety nets of particular nation-states. Unfortunately, we have seen many instances of market intolerance in recent years. One prominent example from the years of the SPD government in Germany involved the Holzmann construction company, a large firm that had encountered serious financial difficulties. The rescue plan decided upon by the government was strongly criticized by the Anglo-Saxon media and pressure on the Euro consequently mounted. This was based on the perception that structural reform was still lagging in Germany, but the decision of the German government in fact had strong popular support. The absence of such a rescue plan might very well have resulted in the loss of more than 60,000 jobs. At the same time, Chancellor Schröder had been in a difficult position politically, but his popularity soared because of his decision to rescue Holzmann. "Holzmann saved Schröder, not the other way round" was what a German friend told me.

In 1999, a rating agency downgraded Toyota Motor Corporation because of the latter's long-term employment system. This, too, resulted from a lack of understanding, for this system is one of the company's strength, not a weakness, if managed properly. It assures a sense of loyalty and devotion among the employees, as well as better co-ordination between management and employees.

In recent years, many important conferences, including the WTO meeting in Seattle, the G8 summit in Genoa, IMF and World Bank meetings, and many others, have been disrupted by NGO demonstrations, sometimes very brutally. If the globalized market economy is not tolerant enough to let each nation-state and its people have their own identity – their culture, value system, and, especially, their own safety net against the market, which can at times be brutal to those who are weak – we will see a further mounting tide against the market economy that might potentially endanger global security.

Each nation-state should succeed in the search for its identity, and the market economy should be tolerant enough to allow each nation-state to be equipped with a proper safety net against the brutality of the market. These two factors are prerequisites for global, regional, and national security in this century.

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CHAPTER VII

GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

VICTORIA LEVINSKAYA

As the global age dawns ... questions linking culture, development and globalization are no less pressing than other vital questions about our common future. – UNESCO *World Culture Report*, 1998

Think globally, act locally.

WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?

The notion of globalization encompasses several dimensions. Some of these are traditional, such as the one provided by a master on the subject, Thomas L. Friedman, in his *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. Friedman observes, generally speaking, that globalization is a dynamic process of integration of the markets of the world through the use of new technologies. The driving idea is free market capitalism, but is not limited to it. It is not just money; beyond the democratization of finances, globalization involves the democratization of information and technology as well. This has made it possible for all countries of the world to share markets, information, and technology within a space marked by equal competition, simultaneously, in a plan of equality and that they may compete in a plan of equality. This process has revolutionized the world, which is radically different from the world a century ago. Countries may be in this process, and progress, or may be out, and left behind.

Alan Moran gives another dimension of the globalization process, as a Rule of Law, where well-understood concepts of honesty and reasonableness govern people dealing with each other. He defines it as a central feature of the growth of the western civilization, as we presently know it. Relatively unfettered trades between different political entities allowed a considerable cross-fertilization of ideas and allowed specialization in production, while replacing competitive pressures of monopolies.

Jan Aart Scholte has argued that at least five broad definitions of “globalization” can be found in the literature:¹

Globalization as internationalization. This perspective views globalization “as simply another adjective to describe cross-border relations

between countries,” descriptive of the growth in international exchange and interdependence. Through growing flows of trade and capital investment, it becomes possible to move beyond an inter-national economy, in which “the principle entities are national economies,” to a “stronger version,” that is, a globalized economy in which “distinct national economies are subsumed and rearticulated into the system by international processes and transactions.”²

Globalization as liberalization. In this broad set of definitions, “globalization” refers to “a process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an ‘open,’ ‘borderless’ world economy.”³ Those who have argued with some success for the abolition of regulatory trade barriers and capital controls have at times clothed this in the mantle of “globalization.”

Globalization as universalization. “Global” is here used in the sense of being “worldwide,” and “globalization” is consequently “the process of spreading various objects and experiences to people at all corners of the earth.” A classic example of this is the spread of information and communication technologies, including computing, television, mobile telephones, and so forth.

Globalization as Westernization or modernization Globalization is understood in this respect as a dynamic whereby the social structures of modernity, especially in an “Americanized” form (capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, bureaucratism, and so forth) are spread throughout the world, typically destroying pre-existent cultures and local self-determination in the process. A paradox of globalization is that local cultures are placed under greater stresses than before, at least in ways that reflect local cultural interpretations of the diverse cultural and economic processes that are part of globalization. While cultural pluralism is increasingly becoming a feature of most societies, people are turning more and more to culture as a means of self-definition and mobilization.

Globalization as de-territorialization Globalization as the spread of supra-territoriality entails a “reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders.” Anthony Giddens thus defines globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”⁴ David Held *et al.* define globalization as a “process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity.”⁵ Within the context of globalization thus understood, we could define the concept of sustainable development as a driving force for global transactions.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The term “sustainable development” was popularized by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in its 1987 report entitled *Our Common Future*. This has also become known as the Brundtland Report after Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Chair of the Commission and former Prime Minister of Norway. The aim of the WCED was to find practical ways for addressing the environmental problems of the world, and it outlined in this regard the following three general objectives:

- To re-examine critical environmental and developmental issues and formulate realistic proposals for dealing with them;
- To propose new forms of international co-operation on these issues that would influence policies and events in the direction of needed changes;
- To raise the levels of understanding and commitment to action of individuals, voluntary organizations, businesses, institutes, and governments.

Sustainable development has been variously defined and described. It in fact is not a fixed notion, but rather a process of change in the relationships between social, economic, and natural systems and processes. The WSED, for example, defined sustainable development in terms of the present and the future: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs.” Other definitions have extended the notion of equity between the present and the future to include equity between countries and continents, races and classes, and genders and ages.

Perhaps the most widely used definitions focus on the relationship between, on the one hand, social development and economic opportunities and, on the other, the requirements of the environment. This may be stated as the need to improve the quality of life for all, especially the poor and deprived, within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems. This does not necessarily set fixed limits on “development,” but rather recognizes that the prevailing notions and definitions of development must themselves evolve in relation to changing requirements and possibilities. Briefly stated, sustainability calls for a dynamic balance between many factors, including the social, cultural, and economic requirements of humankind along with the imperative need to safeguard the natural environment of which humanity is a part. The goal is “human security” for all people.

Sustainability involves, in effect, an equation between environmental requirements and developmental needs. The needed balance can be achieved either by acting to reduce stresses, or to increase “carrying capacities,” with ecologists emphasizing the former and economists underlining the latter. It is evident, however, that both possibilities must be

carefully explored in a period of crisis. For example, such environmental strains as population growth become incompatible at some point with maintaining both the environment and the quality of life. It is projected that there will be an additional three billion people on Earth by the year 2030. Although the task of feeding, clothing, and sheltering them will be enormous, that of providing them with education, employment, security, and a minimum of well-being and satisfaction will be vastly greater still.

These facts of life must not be ignored, but neither should the capacity of humanity to find and invent solutions be overlooked and minimized. Nevertheless, the higher levels of production required by this explosion in population will certainly inflict serious damage upon the environment unless modes of production change significantly in the coming decades. Such change may in fact have already begun. For instance, the introduction of automobiles, buses, and trucks powered by fuel cells or electrical propulsion systems is expected to substantially improve air quality in the large cities of industrialized countries within ten to twenty years. However, it is as yet unclear whether the cost of such new technologies will be affordable to the developing regions of the world in the near future. Although the latter is an issue of central importance, of greater relevance is the fact that major breakthroughs are being made in agriculture that allow farmers to produce more food on less land while reducing the impact on the environment. Moreover, the continuing expansion of the use of new information and communication technologies is ensuring a far more rapid and wider dissemination and application of innovation than was the case even a decade ago.

While such developments are encouraging, it would be imprudent to expect science and technology to find a solution to every problem that humanity is capable of creating for itself. Nor would it be wise to rely on technical solutions alone without considering the capacity of human societies to adjust to the changes and stresses that such solutions will impose. The concept of sustainable development is informed both by the warnings of environmentalists, and by the balance between dangers and possibilities, hopes and fears, aspirations and constraints. Furthermore, the “point of balance” is influenced by many factors and, consequently, subject to constant change.

Yet while there are many definitions of sustainable development, it can perhaps be better understood as an emerging vision rather than as a neatly defined concept. In truth, it is as much an ethical precept as a scientific concept, and is as concerned with notions of equity as with theories of global warming. Sustainable development is widely understood to involve the natural sciences and economics, but it is even more fundamentally concerned with culture – with the values people hold and how they perceive their relations with others. It is a response to the imperative that we imagine and implement a new basis for relationships among peoples and with the habitat that sustains human life.

The strength of the notion of sustainability is that it frankly acknowledges the interdependence of human needs and environmental requirements. In so doing, it rejects the single-minded pursuit of one objective at the cost of others. A needless pursuit of “development,” for example, cannot be accepted at the cost of inflicting irreparable damage on the environment. But neither can the preservation of the environment be achieved at the cost of maintaining half of humanity in the deep abyss of poverty. Stated in the terms in which the debate is sometimes posed, this means we cannot sacrifice people to save elephants, but neither can we save people by sacrificing elephants – at least not for very long. Indeed, this is a false dichotomy that must be rejected. We must imagine a new and sustainable relationship between humanity and its habitat, namely, one that places humanity at center stage, but does not neglect that what is happening in the “wings” may turn the drama of everyday life into an ancient Greek tragedy in which we see a terrible fate approaching, but can muster up neither the collective will nor the common means needed to escape it.

EDUCATION: THE FORCE OF THE FUTURE

It is widely agreed that education is the most effective means society possesses for confronting the challenges of the future, not least because it shapes the world of tomorrow. Progress increasingly depends upon the products of educated minds, that is, research, invention, innovation, and adaptation. It goes without saying, however, that educated minds and instincts are needed not only in laboratories and research institutes, but also in every walk of life. Indeed, access to education is the *sine qua non* for effective participation in the life of the modern world at all levels. Education is clearly not the entire answer to every problem, but it comprises a vital element in all efforts to imagine and create new relations among people as well as foster greater respect for the needs of the environment.

Education in the broadest sense of the term should not be equated with schooling or formal education alone. It also involves non-formal and informal modes of instruction and learning, including traditional learning acquired in the home and the community. Moreover, one also widens the community of educators by defining education broadly. This point is reinforced by the program statement of Education 21 promoted within the United Kingdom, which speaks to “teachers, lecturers, curriculum developers, administrators, support staff, industrial trainers, countryside rangers and staff, environmental health and planning officers, education officers with NGOs, community educators, youth leaders, parent association members, media people, representatives of learners in all contexts – and yet more.” One might further widen this community to include all those who, regardless of their role in society, perceive a need or duty to inform and educate people concerning the requirements of a sustainable future.

Education serves society in a variety of ways insofar as it aims to make people wiser, more knowledgeable, better informed, ethical,

responsible, critical, and capable of continued learning. If all people were to possess such abilities and qualities, both the means and the will to address the world's problems would likely be at hand, even if they would not thereby be automatically solved. Education also serves society by promoting increased awareness, exploring new visions and concepts, aiding the development of new techniques, and furthering a critical reflection on the world, especially its failings and injustices. Education provides the means for disseminating knowledge and developing skills, for bringing about desired changes in behavior, values, and lifestyles, and for encouraging public support for the continuing and fundamental changes that will be required if humanity is to leave the well-trodden path that has led us towards growing difficulties and possible catastrophe and begin the uphill climb towards sustainability. Education is, in short, humanity's best hope and most effective means in the quest to achieve sustainable development.

It is very important in this respect to underline the significance of education in critical and creative thinking. As Tom Namwambah has stated, "Critical and creative thinking processes are combinations of abilities, knowledge, values, attitudes, and skills, which are committed to analyzing and evaluating for oneself beliefs, supposed knowledge, and actions to upgrade them using the criteria of evidence and reason."⁶ This provides an excellent basis for the creation of public awareness and understanding because it uniquely makes it possible to understand the problem at hand, analyze it, and take a proper decision to resolve it.

In democratic societies, action towards sustainable development will ultimately depend upon public awareness, understanding, and support. Common information and a shared understanding are important, however, not only for mobilizing public support, but also for promoting consultative and participatory approaches in all fields.

Public awareness and understanding are both consequences of education as well as further influences themselves upon the educational process. A public well informed of the need for sustainable development will insist that public educational institutions include in their curricula the subjects needed to enable people to participate effectively in the numerous activities directed towards attaining the desired goal. The students who emerge from such courses will, for their part, be alert to the need that public authorities provide adequate allowance for protection of the environment in all development plans. In addition, education is particularly important in developing a "taste for knowledge." It plays a dual role in this regard by both reproducing certain aspects of current society and also preparing students to transform society in the future. These roles are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but curricula have tended in the past, because of society's lack of commitment to sustainable development, to reproduce an unsustainable culture that has led to intensified environmental and developmental problems rather than empower citizens to think and work towards their solution. The role of education in building society is to help students determine what should be conserved in their cultural, economic,

and natural heritage as well as nurture the values and strategies needed to achieve sustainability in their local commitments while at the same time contributing to national and global goals.

CURRICULUM REFORM

In order to advance such goals, a curriculum reoriented towards sustainability would place the notion of citizenship among its primary objectives. This would require a revision of many existing curricula and the development of objectives and content themes, and it would also necessarily involve teaching, learning, and assessment processes that emphasize moral virtues, ethical motivation, and an ability to work with others to help build a sustainable future. Viewing education for sustainability as a contribution to a politically literate society is central to a reformulation of education. It calls for a “new generation” of theorizing and practice in education as well as a rethinking of many familiar approaches, including those within environmental education.

Education for sustainability calls for a balanced approach that avoids undue emphasis on changes in individual lifestyles. It is imperative to recognize that many of the world’s problems, including environmental problems, are related to our ways of living, and that solutions consequently imply transforming the social conditions of human life, not only changes on the individual level. This perspective brings into focus those economic and political structures that cause poverty and other forms of injustice and foster unsustainable practices. It also draws attention to the need for students to learn the many processes involved in solving such problems through broad and comprehensive programs of education directed not only to a mastery of various academic subjects, but also to identifying real world problems and what is needed to change them.

This type of orientation requires that increased attention be paid in the curriculum to philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences. The natural sciences provide important abstract knowledge of the world, but they do not contribute in and of themselves to fostering the values and attitudes that must be the foundation of sustainable development. Even an increased emphasis on ecology is not sufficient to reorient education towards sustainability. Even though ecology has been described by some as the foundational discipline of environmental education, studies in biophysics and geophysics are not a sufficient prerequisite for understanding sustainability, even though they are necessary for that purpose. The traditional primacy of the natural sciences in this regard, particularly in regard to the often apolitical context in which they are taught, does not facilitate learning in a holistic manner about the interactions of ecological processes with market forces, cultural values, equitable decision-making, governmental actions, and the environmental impacts of human activities.

A reaffirmation of the contribution of education to society means that the central goals of education must include helping students learn how to identify elements of sustainable development that concern them and how to address them. Students need to learn how to reflect critically upon their place in the world and to consider what sustainability means to them and their communities. They also need to practice envisioning alternative ways of development and living, evaluating alternative visions, learning how to negotiate and justify choices between such visions, making plans for achieving the choices desired, and participating in community life in order to realize them. These are the skills and abilities that underlie good citizenship and make education for sustainability part of the process of building an informed, concerned, and active populace. In this way, education for sustainability contributes to education for democracy and peace as well.

One example is provided by the Toronto, Canada, Board of Education, which recently undertook a reform of its curriculum through a very large-scale consultation with the community. Thousands of parents, students, staff, and members of the public contributed to day-long community meetings aimed at exploring how education should respond to the demands of the changing world. The focus of the inquiry was the question “What should students know, do and value by the time they graduate from school?” The notion of sustainability emerged as an essential requirement during the subsequent discussion even though it had not been emphasized by the Board. The type of education that parents and the community wanted for their children was in many respects hardly revolutionary or even surprising, with the goals being literacy, an aesthetic approach and creativity, communication and collaboration, information management, responsible citizenship, and personal life-skills, values, and actions. These differ, however, from most traditional curricular objectives in that they are broader and more closely related to the needs and organization of life than to the requirements and structures of schooling. Educational reform, like the movement toward sustainable development itself, requires holistic and systematic thinking; and students will have to be more actively involved in individual and collective activities.

ETHICS, CULTURE, AND EQUITY: SUSTAINABILITY AS A MORAL IMPERATIVE

Sustainable development calls for comprehensive change in the way society operates. Production and consumption must be restructured in ways that better meet the basic needs of all in an ecologically responsible manner. The present disparities between rich and poor – unimaginable wealth at one extreme and desperate poverty at the other – must be reduced. Population growth must be moderated, and ecologically unsound practices need to be quickly reduced and eventually eliminated. These steps call not only for practical action, but also for fundamental changes in perception and

values. This involves nothing less than a renewal of culture that will enable societies to confront the major challenge of the twentieth-first century, namely, the quest for sustainable development.

Ethical values comprise the principal agent for social cohesion and, at the same time, the most effective agent for change and transformation. Achieving sustainability will ultimately depend upon on changes in behavior and lifestyles – changes that can be motivated only by a shift in values and are rooted in the cultural and moral precepts upon which behavior is predicated. Even the most enlightened legislation, the cleanest technology, and the most sophisticated research will not succeed in steering society towards the long-term goal of sustainability without change of this type. Education in the broadest sense will necessarily play a pivotal role in bringing about the deep change required, in both tangible and intangible ways.

Like the notion of sustainability itself, the ethics of sustainability cannot be defined or detailed in a simple way. Indeed, thinking along these lines has only recently begun to emerge as we struggle to combine existing notions in order to develop a new, integrated ethical concept for the future. At present it is possible only to indicate a few new lines of thinking in this respect that are associated with such values as human rights and responsibility, intergenerational equity, solidarity, justice, democracy, freedom of expression, and tolerance.

Recent years have been marked by a thorough assessment of the worrisome trends of our times coupled with the negotiation of international, regional, and national action plans aimed to redress these trends before they become irreversible. We thus have at hand putative diagnoses as well as an outline of a cure for the environmental and developmental ills of the world. However, it is necessary to take corrective action before it is too late, even though it may be costly or unpopular to do so. The need to improve the world is obviously not new, but what is new is the risk of irreversible damage with all that implies for the future of society as we know it. It is now morally imperative to act before we reach the point of no return. But the question is: How long can we wait to adopt a new ethics for the future, an ethics that will drive us to rectify the mistaken direction we have taken and anticipate our future needs, regardless of how broad or how deep the required changes need to be?

Problems related to sustainable development are characterized by their complexity. This complexity must be communicated and understood, even though to do so is not easy or palatable. The simplification of such complex matters – so often observed today – is not only fraudulent in that it misrepresents reality, but also irresponsible on the part of those who understand these issues. It is here that the scientific and intellectual communities bear a particular moral responsibility, namely, to ensure that decision-makers as well as the public are fully cognizant of the multiple dimensions of the problems. The link between ethics and science will be key to solving many of the problems of the future.

Each action today is a step towards the creation tomorrow; this has always been true. However, never before has the weight of today – with the full cognizance of those in charge – been so determinant of humanity's future, for nothing less than the viability of our planet is at stake. Humanity is thus in a position of power as well as responsibility not only concerning the people alive on Earth today, but also generations yet unborn, who will have no choice but to accept the reality that we will have created. Our moral responsibility towards future generations is of primordial importance regarding the ethics of sustainability. In living up to this responsibility, we must strive to achieve balance and continuity between meeting the needs of today without compromising those of the future, and without losing the memory of what history has already taught us. Recognizing the intergenerational dimensions of sustainability is, of course, not new: the report of the Brundtland Commission marked the beginning of thinking about development in terms of the future as well as the present. But we have yet to make a meaningful adjustment in our way of life that reflects this ethical imperative.

In November 1997 UNESCO adopted the *Declaration on the Responsibilities of Present Generations towards Future Generations*, which aims to ensure a viable future for the coming generations through action today. The twelve articles of the Declaration put forward proposals concerning what can be done to safeguard the needs and interests of future generations in the fields of education, science, culture, and communication. For example, Article 4 states in respect to the environment that “present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly spoiled for human activity. Each generation inheriting the Earth temporarily shall take care to use natural resources reasonably and ensure that life is not prejudiced by harmful modifications of the ecosystems and that scientific and technological progress in all fields does not harm life on Earth.” This idea is reinforced in Article 5, which stipulates that present generations must ensure that future generations are not exposed to pollution which may endanger their health if not their very existence. Emphasizing the importance of culture, the Declaration maintained that it was the responsibility of present generations to “identify, protect and safeguard the tangible and intangible cultural heritage and to transmit this common heritage to future generations” (Article 7). This is also the thrust of the articles concerning development and biodiversity. They address the issues of ensuring “the conditions of equitable, sustainable and universal socioeconomic development” (Article 10) and “protecting the human genome, in full respect of the dignity of the human person” (Article 6).

Today people are more aware than ever of global realities. We are beginning to understand the impact of our individual and collective actions upon ourselves and upon the biosphere as a whole. The concept of sustainability is in itself a reflection of this new awareness. Perhaps we have also begun to move towards a new global ethic that transcends all other

systems of allegiance and belief and is rooted in a consciousness of the interrelatedness and sanctity of life. Would such a common ethics have the power to motivate us to modify our current dangerous course? There is obviously no ready answer to this question, except to say that sustainability is unlikely to become a reality without a moral and ethical foundation.

TOWARDS A COMMON ETHICS

Today people are more aware than ever of global realities. We are beginning to understand the impact of our individual and collective actions on ourselves and on the biosphere as a whole, and the concept of sustainability is in itself a reflection of this new awareness. Perhaps we are beginning to move towards a new global ethics which transcends all other systems of allegiance and belief, and which is rooted in a consciousness of the interrelatedness and sanctity of life. Would such a common ethics have the power to motivate us to modify our current dangerous course? There is obviously no ready answer to this question, except to say that without a moral and ethical foundation, sustainability is unlikely to become a reality.

In the early eighteenth century, the basis of the emergent industrial revolution existed neither mentally, nor socially, nor technically. But a vision of society organized in a new way and operating by new rules nevertheless took root. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is clear that societies have begun to consider the concept of sustainable development and, in some cases, to confront the profound changes that it implies. Fundamental social changes, including those required to move towards sustainability, come about either because people sense an ethical imperative to change, or because leaders have the political will to lead in that direction and sense that people will follow them. But although human societies are skillful at estimating risks, dangers, and limitations, they are much less experienced at calculating their own potentialities and capacities to invent, innovate, discover, reorganize, create, correct, and improve. Societies need to be convinced of the need for sustainable development in order to display and exercise their abilities to devise solutions to the problems confronting them.

It is within this context that educating public awareness is seen as essential to bringing about conditions conducive to sustainable development. Ethical values, such as equality, are shaped through education in the broadest sense of the term. Education is also essential in enabling people to use their ethical values in order to make informed choices. Over time, education also powerfully affects cultures and societies, increasing their concern over unsustainable practices as well as their ability to confront and master change. Indeed, the potential of education is clearly not just a means for personal enlightenment but also for cultural renewal. Education not only provides the scientific and technical skills required, it also provides the motivation, justification, and social support needed to pursue and apply them. Education increases people's abilities to transform their visions of

society into operational realities. It is for this reason that education is the primary agent of transformation towards sustainable development. It is also for this reason that society must be deeply concerned that much of the education presently on offer falls far short of what is required. Improving the quality and range of education coupled with the reorientation of its goals towards the recognition of the importance of sustainable development must be among society's highest priorities.

CULTURE AND SUSTAINABILITY

The World Commission on Culture and Development defines culture as "ways of living together." Culture is a factor in development, but it is also the "fountain of our progress and creativity," thereby being a core element of sustainability.

While an adequate definition of culture is elusive, it may be taken to refer to all those mentally generated forms of organization created, preserved, and transmitted within a social group or, within a wider context, the human species. Culture includes our entire system of beliefs, values, attitudes, customs, institutions, and social relations. It shapes the way in which we perceive the world, including ourselves, as well as how we interact with it. To the extent that the global crisis now facing humanity is a reflection of our collective values, behavior, and lifestyles, it is above all a cultural crisis.

For many people around the world, culture is a very practical and concrete determinant of sustainable development. The type of change demanded by sustainability involves each community, each household, and each individual. Successful solutions to problems at this level of society will have to be rooted in the cultural specificity of the town or region if people are to be supportive of and involved in such change.

And yet the cultural diversity of humankind is in jeopardy today. A parallel can be drawn in this respect between biological diversity and cultural diversity, which may indeed be considered as aspects of one and the same phenomenon. Just as the multitude of diverse species and life forms that constitute the Earth's biological diversity have evolved to adapt to different geographical and climatic conditions, so is the adaptability of the human species expressed in humanity's cultural diversity, which has developed in response to local conditions. Cultural diversity may thus be viewed as a form of adaptive diversity and, as such, a prior condition of sustainability. The present trend towards globalization not only threatens the richness of human culture, it has already destroyed many traditional cultures. The arguments that urge halting the loss of species are also applicable to the loss of culture, for the latter diminishes humanity's collective repertoire for survival.

Almost all of the grave threats confronting human and planetary survival have originated in human actions. However, much narrow thinking concerning sustainable development has focused almost exclusively on the

relationships of people to the natural environment – with no consideration given to the people-to-people relationships that lie at the core of a sustainable society.

Fulfilling today's human needs while preserving and protecting the natural environment for future generations requires equitable and harmonious interactions between individuals and communities. Developing cultural values that support these people-to-people and people-to-nature values has traditionally been the role of religion in most societies. Religion remains a major influence in the world today, and it appears to be the case that people in all cultures have a set of beliefs that go beyond both the self and the natural world. We use such beliefs to help provide reasons for human existence and to guide personal relationships and behavior.

Part of the great diversity of humankind consists of the many different religions and belief systems we have developed - Animism, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Taoism, and so forth. Religious beliefs have a strong influence on the culture of a community. Indeed, for many people around the world religious beliefs are central to their culture and provide the moral codes by which they live. Many people in the contemporary world believe that the traditional beliefs of their parents and societies are no longer particularly relevant to their everyday lives. Nevertheless, underlying religious beliefs about human worth and about how to relate to other people and to the Earth continue to be important elements of their lives.

STORYTELLING

Storytelling is currently experiencing a considerable revival of interest. This has led many educators to think about ways in which storytelling can be used to explore important shared themes and visions. The current concern about environmental issues is connected with this revival insofar as folk tales about the relationship between the earth and its human inhabitants have been at the heart of storytelling since earliest times. Not only do such stories offer a source of inspiration, they also contain the potential to understand the many ways in which we value – and devalue – our beautiful green and blue planet. Stories provide us with practical insight into approaches to our most persistent environmental difficulties.

Stories have the power to reach within us, to command emotion, to compel involvement, and to transport us into timelessness. Stories are a way of thinking a primary organizer of information and ideas, the soul of a culture, and the consciousness of a people. Stories are a way in which we can know, remember, and understand.

The stories of indigenous peoples are extremely valuable for a sustainable future because they contain a message different from the stories commonly told on television, in movies, and in advertising. Their emphasis on sustainable living is illustrated by the following extract from the famous speech of the native North American Chief Seattle (c. 1786-1866):

We are part of the Earth and it is part of us. The perfumed flowers are our sisters; the deer, the horse, the great eagle, these are our brothers. The rocky crests, the juices of the meadows, the body heat of the pony, and man - all belong to the same family. What is man without the beast? If the beasts are gone, men shall die from a great loneliness of spirit. For whatever happens to the beast soon happens to man. All things are connected. This we know. The earth does not belong to man, man belongs to the earth. This we know. All things are connected like the blood which unites one family. All things are connected. Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. Man did not weave the web of life, he is merely a strand in it. Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.⁷

We can find similar stories in others cultures as well. In Central Asia, for instance, where many stories concern dying from thirst, one is about a thirsty man who found some drops of water. Instead of drinking alone, however, he waters a withered tree and gives drink to birds and animals.

Such types of stories are of great importance for the process of globalization and sustainable development because they show the almost unbelievable glory of each culture.

MOBILIZING FOR ACTION

While sustainability is a long-term goal for human society and a process that will necessarily take place over time, there is now a sense of urgency to make progress quickly before it becomes too late. We are therefore faced with a tremendous challenge of unprecedented scope, scale, and complexity. We are pressured to act even as we are still working out new concepts and new methodologies. We are forced by circumstances to change structures and mindsets, but there is no obvious path or model that shows the way. Experimentation and innovation are the watchwords as we search for adequate solutions, often through trial and error. And we must find time for this in a climate of sweeping economic, social, financial, and political change, all the while being exhorted to do more with less.

In a global sense we do have an internationally negotiated framework for action, which has been hammered out during a series of United Nations conferences dealing with different aspects of sustainable development, beginning in 1992 with Rio (environment and development), and followed in 1994 by Cairo (population), in 1995 by Copenhagen (social development) and Beijing (women), in 1996 by Istanbul (human settlements), and in 1992 by Johannesburg (sustainability). Each of these conferences, as well as the three conventions on biological diversity, climate change, and desertification, contain explicit recommendations as well as entire sections of the discussion devoted to education and public

awareness. There is an international consensus that such agreements represent a solid and comprehensive basis for moving forward.

The axiom “think globally, act locally” is perhaps more true today as ever. The role of the local community is of particular importance insofar as the movement towards sustainable development cannot succeed on a top-down basis alone. Not only is passive consent needed, but also active involvement on the part of people. Actors at this level include the community, the private sector, the local departments and services of national government, and, of course, people themselves of all ages. In a growing number of communities, local Agenda 21 groups have been established and are taking the lead in mobilizing support for local initiatives. Local needs will evidently determine local priorities and actions. However, it is important for the local community, in consultation with national leaders and national governments, to understand its place in the big picture of national and global action for sustainable development.

The meaning and vision of sustainable development should be disseminated, discussed, and debated in order to promote understanding and garner community support. Such discussions should take place in all community settings and institutions, for the need for sustainable development at the local level must be understood. Practices that not are sustainable need to be identified so that possibilities for correcting them can be discussed and explored. It is critically important that the entire community be involved in such discussion, but the involvement of women is of particular importance since they typically play a key role, especially in rural communities, in economic, social, and cultural life. The local community and the household are important entry points for messages concerning sustainable development, especially for adults and out-of-school children and youth. The educational establishment at all levels also needs to be actively involved in both discussions and action to achieve a sustainable future. Through words and deeds, the local community can demonstrate its support for action at the national and global level in support of sustainability. A willingness to address local problems sends the message that people are ready, and that they expect the government to act.

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¹ Scholte, J. A. (2000). *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. London: Palgrave, pp. 15-17.

² Hirst, Paul Q. and Grahame Thompson (1996) *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 8, 10.

³ Scholte (2000), p. 16.

⁴ Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 64.

⁵ Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton (1999). *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 16.

⁶ Seminar on "Globalization and Identity," September-October 2002, Washington, D.C.

⁷ It is commonly accepted that the speech was made during treaty negotiations on 11 March 1854. A very free rendering of selections of the speech in English by Dr. Henry A. Smith based on notes he had taken over thirty years earlier at the original presentation was first published in the *Seattle Sunday Star*, 29 October 1887. Versions remain widely available today. See, for example, Albert Furtwangler (1997) *Answering Chief Seattle*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

CHAPTER VIII

REASON AND GLOBALIZATION

TOM N. NAMWAMBAH

OBSERVATIONS

There is something wrong in the design, structure, process, and agenda of globalization. Many have observed that an imbalance exists between the globalizers and the globalized. It is also evident that the process of globalization debases the institutions of the globalized communities, be they social, cultural, political, or economic. In addition, many have remarked that the various terminologies used in connection with the process of globalization, such as international trade, globality, free market, and so forth, are both vague and with hidden significance. The many attempts to define globalization and its relationships to identity, – involving indicators of globalization, globalization and cultural identity, the impact of different pockets of globalization on the globalized nations, and the response of recipient nations to the “given” – have all indicated a complete disequilibrium that has led to dissent in many parts of the world.

Here I wish argue that such observations derive from the fact that a wrong plan will always produce wrong results. There are two reasons for why the debate on globalization has attracted so much attention, and for why nations throughout the world tremble at the mention of the word, namely:

- The entire process is designed, promoted, and influenced by a kind of selfish, self-centered egoism on the part of certain nations.
- There is a lack of proper reasoning at both the planning and implementation levels of the process.

As a result of these two factors, it is not uncommon to find that the majority of those discussing globalization, along with their core nation/state cohorts, are so much absorbed in the “rationalization” of their actions that they do not supply the *rationality* upon which their actions are based. This is what I call the irrationality of the rationalized.

I therefore wish to discuss and illustrate the characteristics of an effective way of thinking and indicate how the agents of globalization have abrogated it. At the same time, I will make recommendations concerning an alternative. I intend to do this by outlining the common elements of creative and critical thinking, their uses, how they have been developed, and how

they have become flawed. I will then summarize by pointing to some of the attributes of a critical thinker.

THE COMMON ELEMENTS OF CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING

The tools and resources at the disposal of the critical thinker have vastly expanded by virtue of the history of critical thought. Hundreds of thinkers have contributed to its development, and each major discipline has made some contribution to critical thought. Yet for most purposes of globalization, the summing up of base-line common denominators for critical thinking is ignored even though it is of the greatest importance. Let us now consider that summation.

For example, critical thinking by its very nature requires the systematic monitoring of thought. In order for thinking to be critical, it must not be accepted at face value, but must rather be analyzed and assessed for its clarity, accuracy, relevance, depth, breadth, and logic. Critical thinking by its very nature requires, for example, the recognition that all reasoning occurs within points of view and frames of reference, that all reasoning proceeds from particular goals and objectives and has an informational base, that all data when used in reasoning must be interpreted, that interpretation involves concepts, that concepts entail assumptions, and that all basic inferences in thought have implications. In addition, each of these dimensions of thinking needs to be monitored insofar as problems can occur in any of them.

The result of the collective contributions of the history of critical thought is that the basic questions of Socrates can now be framed and used much more powerfully. In every domain of human thought, and within every use of reasoning within any domain, it is now possible to question:

- Ends and objectives.
- The status and wording of questions.
- The sources of information and facts.
- The methods and quality of information collection.
- The mode of judgment and reasoning used.
- The concepts which make that reasoning possible.
- The assumptions that underlie the concepts utilized.
- The implications that follow from their usage.
- The point of view or frame of reference within which reasoning takes place.

Questioning that focuses on these fundamentals of thought and reasoning constitutes baselines in creative and critical thinking.

Aspects of Creative Thinking

Let us first examine the creative aspect of creative thinking. Creativity is the bringing into being of something that did not exist before, either as a product, a process, a thought, or a re-working of the old with the aim of producing a harmonized new.

Creativity is demonstrated if we:

- Invent something that has never existed before.
- Invent something that exists elsewhere of which we are not aware.
- Invent a new process for doing something.
- Reapply an existing process or product in a new or different market.
- Develop a new way of looking at something (bringing a new idea into existence).
- Change the way someone else looks at something.

Creativity can be used to open up understanding and improve the products of globalization, its processes, and services, not to mention create them in the first place. It is expected that increasing our creativity will help us, our institutions, organizations, and global interactions become more transparent and lead to an improvement in both global time and space as well as in the quality and quantity of our output.

This observation is compelled by the belief that creative thinking is the process that we use when we come up with new and constructive ideas. It is the merging of ideas that have not been merged before, and it may be either accidental or deliberate. At times creative thinking occurs accidentally without the use of special techniques, such as when a chance happening makes one think about something in a different way and thereby discover a beneficial change. Other changes take place slowly and gradually through the pure use of intelligence and logical progression. Using the accidental relies upon chance – which has in fact been quite common in globalization undertakings – whereas the use of logical progression often produces desired products that may be further developed and improved upon. This is obviously advantageous and positive in an accelerating and competitive world.

Deliberate creative thinking can be used to develop new ideas through the use of techniques that force the merging of a wide range of ideas to spark off new thoughts and processes. The development of a balanced and acceptable approach to globalization can occur much more rapidly using these deliberate techniques than by accident and imposition. If such techniques are used during the initial policy-making stage, a balanced approach can be attained at the implementation stage.

In simple terms, creative thinking is generally considered to be involved with the creation or generation of ideas, processes, experiences, or

objects. Most men and women are capable of generating ideas, but the ideas generated may be either biased or even confused depending on the motives involved. The real problem begins when we have to sort them out and make sense of them – when we need to apply them to practical situations and utilize them as a baseline in order to appeal to the greatest number and realize the good. This is when the notion of evaluation, as well as critical thinking, becomes important.

Definition of Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend divisions in subject matter, such as clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness. It entails the examination of those structures or elements of thought implicit in all reasoning. These include purpose, the problem or question-at-issue, assumptions, concepts, empirical grounding, reasoning leading to conclusions, implications, consequences, objections from alternative viewpoints, and frame of reference. Critical thinking – in being responsive to variable subject matter, issues, and purposes – is incorporated into a family of interwoven modes of thinking, among which are scientific thinking, mathematical thinking, historical thinking, anthropological thinking, economic thinking, moral thinking, and philosophical thinking.

As a way of thinking, critical thinking has two components:

- A set of skills to process and generate information and beliefs.
- The habit, based on intellectual commitment, of using those skills to guide behavior.

It is thus to be contrasted with:

- The mere acquisition and retention of information alone, which involves a particular way whereby information is sought and treated.
- The mere possession of a set of skills, which merely involves their continual usage.
- The mere use of those skills (“as an exercise”) without acceptance of their results.

Critical thinking varies according to the motivation underlying it. When grounded in selfish motives, it is often manifested in the skillful manipulation of ideas in service to one’s own, or one’s groups’, vested

interests. As such, it is typically intellectually flawed, however pragmatically successful it might be. However, when it is grounded in fairmindedness and intellectual integrity, it is typically of a higher order intellectually, although subject to the charge of “idealism” by those habituated to its selfish use.

THE USES OF CRITICAL THINKING

Critical thinking:

- Plays an important part in social change. Institutions in any society – courts, governments, schools, businesses – are the products of a certain way of thinking.
- Helps us uncover bias and prejudice.
- Is a path to freedom from half-truths and deception.
- Is the willingness to change one’s point of view as we continue to examine and re-examine ideas that may seem obvious. Such thinking takes time and the willingness to utter three subversive words: I don’t know.
- Underlies reading, writing, speaking, and listening, which are the basic elements of communication.

Critical thinkers distinguish between fact and opinion, ask questions, make detailed observations, uncover assumptions and define their terms, and make assertions based on sound logic and solid evidence. There are two essential dimensions of thinking that we need to master in order to learn how to upgrade our thinking, namely, we need to be able to identify the “parts” of our thinking, and we need to be able to assess our use of these parts of thinking. We must recognize that:

- All reasoning has a purpose.
- All reasoning is an attempt to settle some question or to solve some problem.
- All reasoning is based on assumptions.
- All reasoning is done from some point of view.
- All reasoning is based on data, information, and evidence.
- All reasoning is expressed through, and shaped by, concepts and ideas.
- All reasoning contains inferences by which we draw conclusions and give meaning to data.
- All reasoning leads somewhere – it has implications and consequences.

We may then raise the question “What appropriate intellectual standards do we need to assess the ‘parts’ of our thinking?” There are many standards appropriate to the assessment of thinking as it might occur in this or that context, but some standards are virtually universal, that is, applicable to all thinking. These are clarity, precision, accuracy, relevance, depth, breadth, and logic.

How well we reason depends on how well we apply these universal standards to the elements (or parts) of thinking. When we think, we bring a variety of thoughts together into some order. When the combination of thoughts is mutually supporting and makes sense in combination, the thinking is “logical.” When the combination is not mutually supporting, is contradictory in some sense, or does not “make sense,” the combination is not logical, but rather flawed. Accordingly, there are valuable intellectual traits, such as intellectual humility, courage, empathy, integrity, perseverance, faith in reason, and fairmindedness, which taken together are necessary for a proper and genuinely designed mode of thinking.

Both universal standards and the intellectual traits of mind are relevant and necessary in any worthwhile thought program directed towards globalization. Unfortunately, the infusion of these standards appears not to be the case. Many of the debates, policies, programs, schemes, and undertakings in respect to globalization are in most cases one-sided. The thinking that is characteristic of the process often tends to favor one party against the other. Stated otherwise, the basic tenets of rationality are often flawed and overshadowed by self-interest and egoism. Consequently, the opposition of globalizer and globalized always emerges.

It is true that when the logical structures by which a mind figures out the world are confused, jumbled, or a mere conglomeration, then that figuring out is radically defective. The mind knows not where to proceed, but instead takes things for granted. Without analysis or questioning, it leaps to conclusions without sufficient evidence and meanders without a consciousness of its point of view, thereby wandering into its own prejudices, biases, egocentricity, and sociocentricity. This type of mind is unable to discipline itself by a close analysis of the question at hand, and it ignores the demands that the logic of the question places upon us as rational, logic-creating, logic-using animals.

This observation squares well with the type of mindset characteristic of the leaders of globalization. The globalizing process is in fact flawed with prejudices, biases, Americanism, modernism, and Europeanism to such an extent that the proper focal point and center of concern has been pushed to the periphery. The local values and structures of the recipient nation-states are matters of little concern, if indeed not completely sacrificed.

The problem is even more enhanced by bureaucracies that ignore reasoning and intellectual standards. Indeed, much pseudo-critical thinking derives from the lack of a coherent understanding of the role of reasoning and intellectual standards in disciplined thought. What do I mean by this?

Consider that as soon as we set our minds to the task of figuring anything out – globalization, international trade, free market, a problem in international relationships, or any other subject – we are engaged in the task of reasoning, which can be done well or poorly. It can be assessed. And in order to assess it, we need intellectual standards.

FLAWED THINKING

Examples abound of why it might be that flawed thinking is regularly generated in the globalization program. The blunders and mistakes inherent in globalization represent an example of a typically bad product within a system that, like many others, typically generates bad products.

Consider one way in which the globalization debate invites flawed thinking. Many whose education may in fact have been quite narrow and flawed take themselves to be experts not only in a particular form of knowledge per se, but also in the kind of thinking that has created or discovered that knowledge. These experts – called global leaders and managers – are presumed to be qualified to tell the world not only what to think, but also how to think about, for instance, economics, politics, and scientific, social, and cultural questions. To believe oneself to be an expert in globalization is tantamount to believing oneself to be a “critical thinker,” at least in some intellectual domain. Economists, for example, take themselves to be experts in sound economic thinking. Should politicians also take themselves to be experts in sound political thinking, even when that thinking traverses international boundaries?

Many so-called experts have been mis-educated. Many are poor reasoners. Many confuse issues and questions, being easily diverted from the relevant to the irrelevant. Many lack a comprehensive philosophy concerning international matters. Many do virtually no serious reading. Many cannot speak knowledgeably outside a narrow field. And many are not even up-to-date in their own field. Furthermore, the political environment dominant in their countries is not traditionally conducive either to critical thinking, or to the development of further learning in respect to events in other nations. Much of their in-service is episodic, intellectually unchallenging, and fragmented. There is, at most, very little discussion on or about serious and sensitive international issues within their institutions – and when there is such discussion, it is often simplistic. I maintain that the models for thinking they use are in general deeply flawed, and that the reason for why this is the case is systemic. It is systemic in the sense that it is orchestrated and maintained by the political establishments of the major globalizing states, such as the USA, the UK, and their cousin nation-states.

Unfortunately, however, when one is confused on such a basic point as this, the confusion inevitably spreads to other matters as well. And so we should not be surprised to find a variety of confusion in their work, both at home and abroad. Indeed, a number of characteristics of flawed thinking exist in the global establishment. The general point pertaining to all

of them is that the ill-constructed globalization program is not an anomaly. The mistakes it makes are painfully predictable, with mistakes being made everywhere in any number of ill-designed programs, any number of ill-conceived projects, and any number of ill-thought-through policies.

The current “globalization” program contains all of the following flaws:

- Its treatment of intellectual standards is confused and erroneous.
- It confuses propaganda with knowledge and universal values.
- It confuses subjective preference with reasoned judgment.
- It confuses irrational with rational persuasion.
- Its key terms are often vague.
- Some key terms are dangerously ambiguous.
- It inadvertently encourages “subjectivism.”
- Its scoring in terms of fairness is arbitrary.
- It is both invalid and unreliable.

It is important to remember at this point that the advances in and of globalization can only be achieved not because the mind is capable of memorizing and chatting about what the globalizers say, but rather because the mind can be disciplined to ask probing questions and pursue them in a reasoned, self-critical way. Scholars pursuing knowledge subject their thinking to rigorous discipline, just as the discipline within which they think must itself submit to the broader discipline of more encompassing intellectual standards. In other words, each component of globalization develops special standards by virtue of its specialized concepts, procedures, and assumptions, but each must also submit to general standards that enable it to share its knowledge with others and also enable all genuine knowledge to be integrated comprehensively and tested for coherence and worth. All research must therefore be put into a form of reasoning that is taken seriously within a given field. Moreover, that reasoning must then submit to the reasoned critique of others, both from within that field and ultimately from outside it, who share not only its own standards, but also the standards of good thinking in general. Every field must be intellectually accountable to every other field by demonstrating its commitment to clarity, precision, accuracy, relevance, consistency, depth, and coherence.

Pseudo critical thinking is revealed within globalization insofar as the assessment theory or practice it utilizes – or the subsequent knowledge or approaches to thinking – fails to take into account fundamental conditions concerning the pursuit or justification of knowledge. The result is the unwitting or unknowing encouragement of flawed thinking. What are some of the common ways in which the assessment of thinking might be

flawed? Those listed below are not by any means the only ones, but they are very common, very basic, and very important.

- The lack or misuse of intellectual standards.
- The misuse of the intellect.
- Misconceptions built into the system.
- Conflating reasoned judgment with subjective preference.
- Conflating the recall of past events with knowledge.

What are the attributes of a critical thinker? From the foregoing, the major attributes of a critical thinker may be listed as follows:

- Asking pertinent questions.
- Assessing statements and arguments.
- The ability to admit a lack of understanding or information.
- Having a sense of curiosity.
- Being interested in finding new solutions.
- The ability to clearly define a set of criteria for analyzing ideas.
- The willingness to examine beliefs, assumptions, and opinions and weigh them against facts.
- Listening carefully to others.
- The ability to provide feedback.
- The awareness that critical thinking is a lifelong process of self-assessment.
- The suspension of judgment until all facts have been gathered and considered.
- Searching for evidence to support assumption and beliefs.
- The ability to adjust opinions when new facts are found.
- Searching for proof.
- Examining problems closely.
- The ability to reject information that is incorrect or irrelevant.

COMMENTS ON CRITICAL THINKING

At its root, critical thinking could be viewed as the art of taking charge of our own minds. Its value is simple: If we can take charge of our own minds, we can take charge of our lives and improve them, bringing them under our own self-command and direction. This requires, of course, that we learn self-discipline and the art of self-examination. This involves

becoming interested in how our minds work and in how we can monitor, fine tune, and modify their operations for the better. This requires getting into the habit of reflectively examining our impulsive and accustomed ways of thinking and acting in every dimension of our lives.

All that we do, we do on the basis of various motivations or reasons, but we rarely examine our motivations to see if they make sense. We rarely scrutinize our reasons critically to see if they are rationally justified. As consumers we sometimes buy things impulsively and uncritically, without stopping to determine whether we really need what we are inclined to buy, whether we can afford it, whether it is good for our health, or whether the price is competitive. As parents we often respond to our children impulsively and uncritically, without stopping to determine whether our actions are consistent with how we want to act as parents, whether we are contributing to our children's self-esteem, whether we are discouraging them from thinking, or whether we are encouraging them to take responsibility for their own behavior.

As citizens, too often we vote impulsively and uncritically, without taking the time to familiarize ourselves with the relevant issues and positions, without thinking about the long-term implications of what is being proposed, without paying attention to how politicians manipulate us by flattery or vague and empty promises. As friends, too often we become the victims of our own infantile needs, "getting involved" with people who bring out the worst in us or who stimulate us to act in ways that we have been trying to change. As husbands or wives, too often we think only of our own desires and points of view, uncritically ignoring the needs and perspectives of our mates, assuming that what we want and what we think is clearly justified and true, and that they are being unreasonable and unfair when they disagree with us.

As patients, too often we allow ourselves to become passive and uncritical in our health care, not establishing good habits of eating and exercise, not questioning what our doctor says, not designing or following good plans for our own wellness. As teachers, too often we allow ourselves to uncritically teach as we have been taught, giving assignments that students can mindlessly do, inadvertently discouraging their initiative and independence, missing opportunities to cultivate their self-discipline and thoughtfulness.

And as partakers in globalization, we sit back and wait for orders and programs from the master globalizers, which are quite often tied to stringent conditions. Without thinking and evaluating them, we incessantly fall into traps of unreflectiveness and unthinkingness – and thereby into an abyss of unreasonableness. It is as if there is an ongoing regression of the human faculty of thinking and a diminishing of reason, paving the way for emotion and egocentricity. Follies in our thinking abound, and the acclamation "I wish I knew!" has become an unholy mantra that dominates our vocabulary, daily expressing stupidity as the regressive "badge" of faulty thinking in our system.

RECOMMENDATION

There is thus a need to infuse creativity and criticality into global thinking – there is a need that we think creatively and critically about issues of globalization. The leaders of globalization need to enhance their own reasoning about globalization itself. They need to value knowledge that is definitive of the creative process. They need to think for themselves, yet recognize the limits of individual reflection as well as the need to contribute to and build upon the mutual understanding of social situations and institutions for mutual and harmonious cultural integration. They need to be open-minded and have a rationally-based approach pursuant to the basic tenets characteristic and definitive of what it takes to be good and to do good for both humanity and the universe. They need to be the types of persons who can generate and evaluate a number of alternatives to human problems, sufferings, and contradictory historical and social forces without any bias whatsoever. They need to cultivate a virtue called “appreciation” of and for others.

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CHAPTER IX

THE MANTRA OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE HORIZON WITHIN

SEBASTIAN VELASSERY

Globalization, the new mantra of economic prosperity, is a word on everyone's lips today. Just as interdependence was a buzzword in the 1970s, so globalization is today. But while interdependence refers to one nation-state's dependence upon another, globalization goes further to include the shrinking of the world to the size of a small village due to time-space compression. The world has thus entered into a new paradigm in the geopolitical sphere – a new order in both regional and global settings.

Looking back into Biblical times, we find men were dispersed into various peoples after the fall of the tower of Babel. Human beings have now learned through experience that they cannot continue to destroy one another, but must instead cooperate to build a human community if they want to survive. We will otherwise perish together.

Different people have different understandings of the phenomenon called globalization. Some even consider it to be the intractable and irreversible destiny of the world. Regardless of what it in fact is, it comprises a process in which we cannot retrace our steps (Bauman 1998, 1). There are individuals for whom it is an opportunity to build a paradise, while others view it as a collaborate venture between sovereign nations to build a new vibrant world.

DIVERGENT VIEWS ON GLOBALIZATION

Anne Kruger

Anne Kruger, the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF from 2001 to 2006, writes that “Globalization is the integration of nations through the spread of ideas and the sharing of technological advances through international trade and through the movement of labor and capital across national boundaries” (Kruger 2002, 1). The beginnings of globalization or cooperation between nations can be seen throughout history as nations have sought to accrue increased benefits to their native lands. Globalization is nothing new – it merely requires a change in attitude to give up something for something else. Change is always difficult, however, since one has to move out from a secure and certain ground to an unstable one. It also involves various gains and losses, but the hope is that globalization will open the floodgates of prosperity to humankind. Kruger further states that globalization is “like breathing: we cannot stop it without

harming the human community.” Against this background we must keep in mind that every new growth produces a crisis, and that protests are the birth pangs of the new birth taking place in the world.

Joseph Stiglitz

The Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz is not as enthusiastic as Kruger concerning globalization, maintaining that globalization has left many countries poorer than before due to incorrect planning by the World Bank and the IMF, the new structures for international assistance. Some of the more pronounced examples he discusses include such countries as Uganda and Ethiopia, where life expectation is less than 45 in spite of all the enthusiastic noise about the positive effects of globalization, as well as Sierra Leone, where 28 percent of children die before they reach the age of 5. In India more than half of the children are malnourished and go to bed without a square meal, while in Bangladesh most men and women cannot read or write. He calls this “a great human tragedy” and “a sorry situation” in contrast to the buoyant optimism of the rich nations. Stiglitz openly questions the IMF’s understanding of poorer cultures, many of which have components that are simply not conducive to economic success. They often do not have sufficient knowledge and information concerning advanced economic theory or the workings of the free market, something that is requisite for a proper utilization of the assistance provided to them. The IMF’s policy of demanding that these countries implement fiscal austerity, high interest rates, the liberalization of trade, and privatization, which is accompanied by punishment for default, will only bring about negative results. Stiglitz accuses the policy makers of not knowing the facts on the ground (Friedman 2001).

John Gray

Professor John Gray of the London School of Economics believes that globalization is alive and well, and he points to China and India as examples. These two countries have achieved a certain degree of prosperity as a result of globalization even though many other countries are undergoing “globalization fatigue.” He connects their success to the fact that the right institutions are in place in these countries (Gray 2002) Gray quotes Mr. Jairam Ramesh, economic adviser to the Congress Party, as saying that India has been attempting “*glocalization*” – the adaptation of globalization to suit the local situation in order to attain specific goals. The southern India city of Bangalore, often referred to as the Silicon Valley of India, is an example of where India is going. Technology, particularly information technology, has harvested much foreign exchange for India in addition to from the self-confidence and upward social mobility that people have experienced. This short *New York Times* article ends with the reflection that although globalization has both positive and negative aspects,

those countries that approach it with the right institutions and governance can make much headway.

Tony Blair

On September 18th, 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair outlined his vision for Britain in a speech at the Anne Tayler Sure-Start Centre in East London. His words could be taken as expressing the ideal for globalization. He stated that

Our Goal is a Britain in which nobody is left behind, in which people can go as far as they have the talent to go, in which we achieve true equality – equal status and equal opportunity rather than equality of outcome. It must be a Britain in which we continue to redistribute power, wealth and opportunity to the many, not the few, to combat poverty and social exclusion, to deliver public services people can trust and take down the barriers that hold people back.

He went on to emphasize that

Poverty is multi-dimensional. It is not only about money. It is also about jobs, access to public services, environment and ambition. It is about education, housing, the local environment, training, jobs, your home and family life, being free from crime and drugs. So our vision for addressing child poverty is an all-encompassing one, one which straddles income, public services and jobs (*The Guardian*).

These words formulate the ideal that we can build a new heaven and a new earth as envisioned in the Apocalypse. My view is that globalization is a positive step towards building a human community of the varied nations of the world that has the possibility of actualizing the potentialities within us. We have been created in the *Imago Dei* with potentialities that can be actualized by becoming divinized – this may also be expressed by the notion that we can be *Atman*-realized people. Globalization in the right sense creates the environment needed for this realization.

INDIA AND GLOBALIZATION

Indians affectionately call their land “Bharat Mata,” Mother India. It has a culture that dates from 3000 BCE in the Indus valley. The associated baggage of the past – world-view, religions and philosophies, behaviors and customs – cannot simply be cast aside for the sake of

globalization. Welcoming globalization thus has innate problems. Arundathi Roy writes that “India lives in several centuries at the same time. Somehow we manage to progress and regress simultaneously. As a nation we age by pushing outward from the middle – adding a few centuries on either end of [India’s] extraordinary C.V” (Roy 2002).

Globalization: an Indian Experiment.

The Indian experiment with economic development began with the gaining of independence. From 1950 to 1980 the Indian economy began to grow from a rather sluggish 3.5 percent per annum to 6 percent. In the early days the economy fully depended on agriculture, with the contribution of industry being merely 10 percent.

India’s founding fathers envisioned a socialist secular state with a static model of economic development that respected the age-old culture of the country. The actual socialist commitment of the new government under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was rather shallow, however, and the capacity of the leaders to guide the social and economic changes was limited. The leadership eventually began to experiment with public sector policy that focused on heavy industry. But not only was agriculture practically neglected, private investors were thereby alienated.

Indian democracy was in fact a puzzle (Kohli 2001). In an endeavor to resolve the puzzle, the founding fathers committed themselves to parliamentary democracy and mass suffrage. Its backbone was to be a well-trained and well-developed civil bureaucracy.

The Nehru Era. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister, was to direct the young democracy towards its destiny. On the economic front he banked on heavy industry and the public sector, neglecting agriculture and private entrepreneurship. His priority was to stabilize the political democracy. As India gained sovereignty, various ethnic groups demanded greater power, particularly in their local areas. Nehru thus had to agree to the linguistic reorganization of India, which would be formed into a federation. The Indian National Congress, the ruling party, was committed to socialism and discouraged all foreign enterprises and private entrepreneurship following the Russian model. Basically it was a closed economy. In spite of these restrictions, a significant number of entrepreneurs, such as the Tata family, tried their hand in the steel industry, banking, and other economic institutions. Technically-trained manpower was not abundant in the young democracy, nor were there a sufficient number of specialists who were experienced in managing complex modern production. In addition, very little attention was paid to health services and education for the working population, although a modicum of attention was given to electricity, railways, and communications. While agriculture was more extensive than intensive, the lowering of taxes on land and agricultural products helped it survive.

Among private entrepreneurs in the textile industry only C.D. Birlas was able to survive – the textile industry was also concentrated in public hands since India did not support any private enterprise. The *khadi*, or hand woven cotton cloth, that Mahatma Gandhi very successfully used for political mobilization, was suitable only for low-end markets and never became competitive for export. Although some power looms as well as hand looms were used in its fabrication, it was not manufactured in modern textile mills.

The story of industrialization in Nehru's India thus combined notable achievements, such as a very respectable 6 percent annual rate of industrial growth, with some stupendous follies.

The Indira Gandhi Era. Nehru's death in 1964 marked the slow but steady departure of the first generation of nationalist leaders. At this juncture numerous movements and parties opposing the Congress Party emerged, and Congress was consequently forced to either come up with a new winning formula, or give way to the newcomers. Indira Gandhi stepped in and gave the Congress Party the vital shot needed to revive its sagging fortunes.

India under Nehru underwent steady industrialization, which produced modest economic growth but hardly benefited the poor. As a savvy politician, Indira Gandhi understood this state of affairs and capitalized on the political opportunities it presented (Jayakar 1992). She made "poverty alleviation" her new political slogan and swung to the far-left swing ideologically. She consequently became the darling of India's downtrodden and was catapulted to the top of the political pyramid. Indira Gandhi demanded complete loyalty, however. She began placing her loyal friends in responsible positions and labeled the Congress Party elites who opposed as "enemies of the poor." She thus eliminated her challengers, but India's political system thereby became personalistic and the political institutions were left weak.

Gandhi directed her political energies as Prime Minister to maintaining power amidst the various political challenges she had to face, not to economic matters. She generally continued her father's policies, but also made a major shift towards promoting agriculture, calling it the green revolution. Democratic awareness became very pronounced among the various strata of the population, yet her answer to the resulting conundrum was personalism and populism. Moreover, the policies Gandhi adopted after 1970 served to legitimate her populist policies. For example, she removed the privileges granted to Indian princes and nationalized banks. She also made certain efforts at land redistribution. In addition, she established closer ties with the Soviet Union that were accompanied by a parallel distancing from the west and used state resources to buy political support. But her populist politics led to steeper corporate taxes, labor activism, industrial unrest, and higher wages, and, as a result, India's economy did not perform

well from 1967 to 1974. Steel production, for instance, stagnated under Gandhi's governments.

The Vajapayee Era. Following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1974, Indian democracy entered a new phase marked by the decline of the Congress Party's hegemony over India. The period of 1980-1990 was characterized by political instability accompanied by ethnic and communal violence, not least of all the assassination of Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi, Indira's son. This lack of stable government hurt India's economic growth.

The most significant political development was the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a right-leaning religious party that sought to unite the Indian religious majority. This reformulation of Indian nationalism along religious lines paid off when Atel Bihari Vajapayee became Prime Minister. Under his leadership economic policies were liberalized and reoriented in a pro-business direction. He dismantled many state-controlled businesses and began to apply market-oriented solutions to economic development. When the Prime Minister was questioned concerning the "why" of this shift, he replied that "Nehru ji's approach was not at all that successful. Indira ji's was never sincere, what else can we do?" (Kholi 1992) Stated otherwise, the strategies employed in the past had, in his opinion, not paid off and there was no alternative but to liberalize. In addition, Indian capitalism had matured to a certain extent by this time and it became more difficult to maintain a non-capitalist political position – even the Indian Communist party had begun to accept market realities. International pressures also further reinforced these positions. In spite of all such changes, however, Indian political economy still remains statist or nation-oriented to an important degree. Public entrepreneurship remains very significant, although foreign investment has substantially increased and many restrictions on foreign trade have been lifted recently. Capital flexibility still needs further improvement, however.

The changes introduced have led to a great improvement in economic growth after 1980. Both agricultural and industrial development have propelled India into a group of relatively fast-growing nations. Such improved economic performance has roots even in the Nehru era, when India invested in heavy industries and in higher technological education to meet the country's needs. India is now harvesting the entrepreneurial and managerial skills that have accumulated consequent to such earlier decisions. Furthermore, India in recent decades has fortunately enjoyed good monsoons, growing contributions by overseas Indians, better international terms of borrowing and trade, and a better-trained work force. A demand for goods coupled with an increasing emphasis on the production of consumer goods has also contributed to growth. Another important factor is the mental shift that is taking place in India from traditional investment in gold to investment in industry, which is accompanied by a change in attitude and lifestyle from "less is better" to "more is better" that is assisted by media propaganda.

The leadership's shift from an ideology of "poverty alleviation" to a more realistic approach to economic growth has enabled them to liberalize the economy. The 1991 balance of payments crisis in fact necessitated the opening of Indian economy to the world, including the reduction of import-export taxes and duties, at the instigation of the IMF. This has paid off, with the success of India's computer industry and export products being part and parcel of the story. But although the government champions liberalization and the free market, it continues to be interventionist and the Indian economy remains closed to an important degree.

India now has a substantial and diversified industrial base. The state effectively controls the territory it governs, provides a moderate level of political stability, and is able to rely upon a group of publicly-oriented leaders and bureaucrats. Even though the nation's leaders have at times failed to translate the country's enormous economic ambition into reality because of an emphasis on consolidating their own political positions, the government has always included the promotion of industry and economic growth among its multiple priorities.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION IN INDIA

Globalization is a complex phenomenon involving a wide variety of processes, pre-requisites, and positions that affects many different facets of life in politics, society, and the economy. Insofar as globalization is open to various types of interpretations, there is a need to know as clearly as possible what it is all about if one wishes to say anything meaningful about it, including how to respond to it. One indisputable feature is that electronic communications and international air travel have converted the earth into a global village that is dominated by capitalist practices and ideology (Kurian 1997).

Globalization is far removed from the lives of most common people in India. The hope was that the introduction of new technology might increase (or more likely reduce?) employment, but the production of goods has primarily catered to the needs of the few who have extensive purchasing power. Although the impression has been created that there is new economic growth and prosperity for all, the bulk of the population has in fact been left behind or neglected in the process.

Globalization usually benefits people who can play the game, but the situation in India is such that many are uneducated, have no resources, and make their living through traditional production activities. One very important element in this state of affairs consists of various pressures of liberalization and free markets. We need to educate the people so affected on the nature and implications of globalization.

India's embrace of the market economy has led to an unequal distribution of income and wealth. This in turn has led to an unequal distribution of power and, consequently, the exploitation of those who lack sufficient economic power. This has also brought about the over-

exploitation of natural resources and damage to the environment by means of pollutants.

Pitfalls of the Indian Experiment. Mr. Vajpayee welcomed and encouraged foreign direct investment in his inaugural address and praised its benefits. As a result, Coke, Pepsi, and McDonald's came to India, such corporations in fact sucked the capital out of the country and did disservice to the Indian food industry. Many within India became critical of this type of investments since they were speculative in nature and led India to instability in financial markets. Indian telecommunications and power companies also lost out to companies from abroad as India's entrepreneurs could not compete with them as they entered the Indian market (Kenny 2001).

Economic Growth and Social Well-being. Many thought that India's opening to the free market would usher in unparalleled economic growth, but it has not. When such natural disasters as cyclones and earthquakes became coupled with the cyclical booms and busts that are endemic to free markets and capitalist economies, growth was actually reduced to 5 percent per annum. This shattered the dreams of many a person in spite of the export of Indian mental labor to foreign countries and the large investments in software and hardware companies. The often referred to example of the country's new hi-tech companies neither alleviated the unemployment problem, nor kept up with the growing needs of the growing population.

India is one of the most heavily populated countries in the world. The pressure on the land is great and the need for sustainable agriculture and better water management is imperative. These have not been affected at all by the globalization of India. Development for the sake of development brings stress, not satisfaction. Cosmetics and fashion accessories may enhance sensual happiness, but what India needs is *food* for her massive population.

Social Well-being and Quality of Life. The liberalization of the economy has not improved the overall quality of life for the people of India – focusing solely on GDP and GNP cannot do so (Kenny 2001). Most people work hard and spend what they earn on drinks, cosmetics, ice cream, McDonald's, and Bollywood movies. Government must provide education in order to improve people's quality of life. The leadership has to create an environment that motivates people to read good literature; enjoy an inspiring musical concert or a trip to an art gallery, attend the theater, and so forth. India has a rich heritage – these must be placed within the reach of the common man in order to assure him quality of life.

Poverty and Hunger in India. The Indian economist Amartya Sen asks in an article why there is widespread hunger and famine in India.

Although he maintains that there should be no famine in a democracy like India, there is an urgent need for land reform in order to prevent famine. Land must be given back to the farmers, not to big cultivators, but globalization forces corporatization of the arable land. This displaces small farmers, many of whom have been reduced to the point of not having enough money to buy seeds and fertilizers because of the high prices that have resulted from the removal of subsidies. Donor nations must not be able to control the country's agricultural policy, for permitting them to do so will throttle the small people. Vandana Siva (2002) writes in the *Guardian* that "People are starving because the policy structure that defended rural livelihoods and access to resources and markets, and hence entitlements and incomes, is being systematically dismantled by structural adjustment programs, driven by the World Bank and by WTO rules imposing trade liberalization."

Globalization and its Impact on Indian Society. Cultural imperialism has two major goals, one economic and the other political: capturing markets for western cultural commodities and establishing hegemony over popular consciousness. Cultural domination is indeed an integral part of any sustained system of global exploitation (Desreches 2002). As a result, there is a symbolic penetration and domination of cultural life of the popular class in India by a global ruling class, who have changed the values, behavior, institutions, and identities of oppressed people so that they will conform to those of the imperialist class (Paniker 2002).

Indian society is now undergoing drastic changes as a result of globalization. For example, the traditional joint family system has irreversibly changed to the nuclear family system. In addition, professional ambitions and unrealistic expectations have made inroads into commitment in marriage, leading to an increase in divorce because of modern life styles (Shella Raval 1998). There continue to be arranged marriages, but young people in the cities increasingly choose their own partners, which is a positive change. In general, middle class urban people have changed their cultural values as a result of TV and industrialization. Important examples include the rise of consumerism, the spread of fashion, and the erosion of such traditional beliefs and practices as *ahimsa* (non-violence) and *aparigraha* (non-attachment). The latter were long cherished in Indian culture, but many people have now abandoned them. The role of women in society is also changing.

Some of these changes are good, but others, such as the predominance of consumer drives, are not helpful for healthy community life. Such a situation presents a challenge to the nation, not least because the country continues to struggle with diversity. India has over a billion people with diverse cultures, languages, customs, and over 20 political parties. One outstanding issue is linguistic diversity, for while English and Hindi are the national languages, many traditional local languages continue to be used in

the various states. It may in fact be said that Indians live a mixture of both traditional and modern life styles side by side. Against this background, globalization has brought a kind of unity, but it has also fostered social unrest and communal violence. It has created a fierce competition for survival with an increase in ethnic, religious, and linguistic problems (Deschers 2001), for ethnicity and religion assure a place, a story, and a set of relationships that human beings continue to need.

Globalization and its Effects on Youth. The economic, social, and political changes consequent to globalization have had a strong impact on young people (10-30 years of age), who form about 60 percent of the Indian population. Young people in fact comprise the group most vulnerable to the influence of the media, and they can be exploited because of their search for identity, craving for freedom, and emergent sexuality. Statistics show that 31 percent of TV viewers in India are in this age group (Gonsalves 2002), and that it is from such media that they receive their inspiration for their life style, behavior, dress codes, and jargon. In addition, studies conducted by the Church in India reveal that the values of youth are determined by the media, and that their changed values often lead them to reject adult authority. Market-oriented, media-driven western influence has indeed affected India in no small measure. If America has Hollywood, India has Bollywood, and the latter has its own fair share of sex, crime, and violence, determining fashion and life style as well, especially for the youth. Western songs and rhythms influence Indian films and the young ones' taste for music. Buying the latest cars, TVs, electronic gadgets, and trendy clothes has become quite popular.

The high unemployment caused by greatly increased migration from the countryside to the cities has led to the mismanagement of scarce resources, including energy, corruption, malnutrition, and impaired health. The denial of fundamental human rights has increased ethnic conflicts. Such problems, which have a particular effect on young people, have often been misused by political parties for mob action, which in turn leads to crime and violence. The *Dalits* in particular, who along with the scheduled castes are struggling to improve their status, have been adversely affected in many ways due to the lack of opportunities, skills, and education (Pinto 2001).

Poverty and Unemployment. The marginalization of people that accompanies globalization goes hand in hand with poverty, which has reached new dimensions in India. There is no hope of better prospects for millions of poor peasants, rural laborers, slum dwellers, refugees, street children, and other depressed persons as a result of industrialization and other developments. The mechanization of agriculture has displaced labor, driving the already low price of labor even lower (Manohar 1998). Furthermore, IMF rules have mandated sharp falls in fertilizer subsidies, which has further marginalized peasants. Restricted distribution of food grains has negatively affected *Advasis* and *Dalits* in particular, while the

decline in food rations has increased the numbers of those living below the poverty line from 310 million to 355 million. The price of rice has greatly increased in recent years (Vikas report 1997), and it has markedly spiked in recent months. This has especially affected women and children. Health care has also been cut, particularly for preventive disease control programs concerning malaria, tuberculosis, and leprosy. Such problems have been aggravated by the way in which uncontrolled industrialization has intensified the shortage of potable water.

Lack of Technical and Skilled Training. Although technical training centers exist, their capacity is not sufficient for the needs of the country. Moreover, these institutions are degree-centered rather than skill-centered. As a result, a number of perceptive entrepreneurs have opened “School for Survival” programs in order to train unemployed youth in the skills needed for modern jobs. Such programs also provide their students with interest-free loans that enable them to set up snack bars, make pickles, sell fruits and toys, and so forth.

Sex and Morality. Adolescents are in a transitional stage of life in which they need recognition, especially from their peers. This unfortunately raises problems with the use of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. Against this background, globalization has ushered in restlessness among the young insofar as they face greater competition in seeking to make something of their lives. In addition, both parents often have to work and thus hardly have time for their children. The young also experience great confusion concerning sex, especially since parents and elders are reluctant to discuss such matters. Peers talk about it on a special level, and they often project sex and love as being interchangeable. 10 percent of boys by the age of 16 have had sexual experiences or premarital sex, and 2.7 percent of girls younger than 15 have undergone abortions. Abstinence is an Indian cultural value, but globalization has made inroads into this value system.

Young Women: Prostitution, Aids, Abortion, Abuse. Young women looking for jobs often end up working in textile, clothing, electronics, and other assembly-type industries, which cause stress and frustration because of their robot-like nature. Poverty makes rural woman migrate to the cities, where they are often abused. Tourism creates red light districts, and many people contract Aids as a result. Globalization has also caused an increase in women’s dowries, which now often include automobiles, TVs, and other luxury items. Women’s groups have come into existence in order to strenuously oppose such value erosion.

Internal and Foreign Migration. Industrialization, which promises jobs, often develops around cities, and people consequently leave the countryside as they dream of jobs and money. Not only do they have greater educational opportunities in the cities, they can also escape from the

prejudice connected with caste distinctions. But very many educated Indians go abroad in search of greater opportunity and better jobs. There are over 5000 doctors from India in the US alone, and even larger numbers of engineers, professors, teachers, computer specialists, and business people. Although such migrants do well economically and provide help to their relatives in India, the brain drain is nevertheless very great.

GLOBALIZATION AND HORIZONS

Man the Myth Maker. Myths may concern the gods and the origins of things, but myths are not made by Gods. They are rather created by man the myth-maker in his attempt to make sense of the confusing world in which he lives. How can man be anything else but a myth-maker? Are we not driven by some inner urge to create order out of chaos? Perhaps it is then wrong to assert unequivocally that the gods have no part in the making of myths, for is it not the divine image within us that gives rise to our need for order? And could we not say that the myth we create is in fact nourished into fruition by that same divine image?

The Myth of the Mustard Seed. Life grows through struggle, and struggles in life can make us grow into wise persons. Religious Gurus, such as Lord Jesus or Lord Buddha, offer us wisdom through myths and parables. None of us feel comfortable, however, facing helpless situations in the face of unavoidable danger – humans, being sensual, decry situations that challenge them to go beyond to the inner dimensions of life. Globalization offers new challenges for growth, but we need to sit in silence with these challenges so that they will reveal their inner meanings.

Lord Buddha offers us a myth or parable for reflection that may help us deal with globalization. In the parable of the mustard seed a young woman was confronted with unbearable sorrow at the death of her only son. In order to find relief from her sorrow, she went to Lord Buddha and asked him to give her some medicine to bring her son to life. Smiling serenely, the Buddha answered that “It is wise that you have come here.” Go back to your village and fetch some mustard seeds from a house where there was no death ever.” She returned to her village and went from house to house looking for a place where there had been no death to obtain few grains of mustard. Unsuccessful in her search and overcome with feelings, she returned to Buddha. Softly smiling he asked her, “Did you fetch the tiny mustard seeds from a house where there was never any death?” The woman replied to the holy one, “There is not a single house I could find where there was no death. I see now that whoever is born must die and everything must pass away.”

Every individual who is involved in the process of globalization should face the reality of the finitude of human life and turn his/her attention to making this world a global community of concern and care.

The Becoming of Man. The German philosopher Max Scheller developed the theme of the “Method of Immanence” in his *Man’s Place in Nature* (1961). He states that the Infinite is to be found in everything in the universe, for in every creature there is an inherent capacity, need, and upward yearning for the Beyond. And while there is a necessary transcendence in every existence, it exists most of all within man. The beyond is constantly “becoming” in man to the extent that man realizes his/her own spiritual potentialities and transforms our natural resources and vital energies into “products of the spirit.” I strongly believe that not only must we build a better world devoid of poverty in which there is abundance for ourselves and our children; we must be ever conscious in this process of the presence of the spirit within the world and ourselves. It is always our duty to transform matter into products of spirit.

Martin Buber (1946) wrote in *Essays in Religion* that all things

possess concealed sparks which belong to the root of man’s soul and seek to be elevated by him to their origin.... [I]n the era before creation these sparks had fallen into all things and are imprisoned therein and whenever a man uses a thing in holiness he thus liberates the sparks it conceals. The issue here is not to attain a new type of acting which, owing to its object, would be sacred or mystical; the issue is to do the one appointed task, the common obvious tasks of daily life according to their truth and according to their meaning.

Our task as globalizers is to reveal the eternal spark of the transcendent within every reality in this world – to recognize in every creature this Divine spark – as we build a world of prosperity.

HUMAN HORIZON OF GLOBALIZATION

Within the horizon of our human world – the world of meanings – we establish contact with the transcendent. Earth and sky meet at this horizon, which indicates a dynamic orientation since the human subject is not stationary. The human subject moves through many and varied experiences, thereby gaining new insights. Sometimes we are led by experiences to shift the criteria of relevance and evidence that guide our judgment as we attempt to undertake projects that carry our vision into the future.

Horizons are rooted in the past and oriented towards the future. Horizons are the sweep of our interests and our knowledge; they are the fertile source of further knowledge and care, but are also boundaries that limit our capacity for assimilation. Horizons are the parameters of our finitude and the backdrop for transcendence. Within the horizon lies what

we know and love – beyond them lies what draws us to constantly transcend our present knowledge and love (Novak 1967).

CONCLUSION

Bhagavat Gita, the gospel of India, is part of the famous epic *Mahabharata*. It is a dialogue between Arjuna, the ego, and Krishna, the Self, that comprises a singularly great metaphor of the individual in his/her spiritual quest. Arjuna is the warrior and Krishna the charioteer, an incarnation of God and the great Spiritual teacher who shows Arjuna the importance of devotion, self-control, and meditation. Lord Krishna is the Guru who leads the *chelas*, or disciples, into life conflicts that they must face, such as the war facing Arjuna. The Guru cannot fight the *chelas'* battles for them, but can only point out the direction in which they must go.

The problems facing India in the age of globalization are real. India has faced similar problems in the past, found the solutions needed, and moved on like the river Ganges, reaching the ocean of the Eternal. This eternal self is within each one of us.

The human self can never have the esteem of true Wisdom unless it looks within and dies to that which is outward. A so-called wisdom which tells us that our esteem comes from elsewhere – anywhere but within – which claims it resides in fame, material possessions, knowledge, or power, is in every instance *falsehood* disguised as Wisdom Revealed. The list of such claims is endless, but it is always directed outward.

I would like to end these few words of mine with a poem from Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore:

Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high
Where knowledge is free
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments
By narrow domestic walls
Where words come out from the depth of truth
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way
Into the dreary desert sand of dead habit
Where the mind is led forward by thee
Into ever-widening thought and action
Into that heaven of freedom, My Father, let my country awake.

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CHAPTER X

GLOBALIZATION OF PROTEST AND SEARCH FOR IDENTITIES

GEORGE PATTERY, S.J.

This paper surveys the phenomenon of protest as exemplified in the terrorist attack on the WTC and the Gujarat Genocide. Although terrorism and communal violence cannot be classified together, religion appears to serve as a common denominator between them. After analyzing how and why real-world struggles become sacralized, we will discuss the growing globalization of protest. The philosophy of globalization highlights peoples' identities as the key issue. Do religions have a vital role to play in creating identities that do not demonize the Other but instead mediate the Other for mutual enrichment?

TWO DATES: A CONTINUUM

September 11, 2001. The terrorist attack on the WTC and Pentagon was an abrupt act that began and ended in a matter of hours. Within that short period of time, however, it acquired almost trans-historical, trans-temporal dimensions. In that sense, the attack comprises a continuum insofar as it has been memorialized in the lives of people. The *Economic and Political Weekly*, not known as a periodical sympathetic to the United States, had the following to say from far away in India:

What has sent shock-waves round the world, even more than the actual human and physical devastation, terrible as it has been, is the realization how vulnerable even a country as powerful and as well defended against external attacks as the US is to the sort of invisible enemy who struck on Tuesday. And the next time round the enemy might choose to arm himself with chemical or biological weapons or even a crude nuclear device.¹

February 27, 2002 - March, April, 2002. The Godhara violence and the Gujarat genocide had a definite beginning, but they do not seem to have had an end. They, too, appear to be a continuum. The violence and hatred were not quenched by mid-May, but instead seem to have seeped into the lives of people, bringing about an apparent calm that will likely rise up again like a volcano. Indeed, the Gujarat violence exemplifies the continuum aspect of violence. What is disturbing about this communalism is the fact that "Increasingly Indian nationalism has come to mean Hindu

nationalism, defined not through regard for itself, but through a hatred of the Other. And the Other, for the moment, is not just Pakistan, it's Muslim."² Moreover, "The fascists did not create the grievance – they seized upon, upturned it and forged from it a false sense of pride. They have mobilized human beings using the lowest common denominator: religion."³

RELIGION: THE COMMON DENOMINATOR OF VIOLENCE

Religion seems to have been the common denominator of violence in the September 11 terrorist attack and in the Gujarat communal riots. Both are acts of violence, and both are inspired and legitimized by religious ideologies. Osama Bin Laden believes that he has to defeat the United States in order to protect Islamic faith and practice. Hindu fundamentalists maintain that pure Hinduism can survive in this world only through the creation of a Hindu *rashtra*, and that the Muslims in India are the obstacle to this end who must be eliminated if possible. In terms of the act itself, however, the attack on the United States was termed terrorism, whereas the violence in Gujarat was communal and public.

There are significant differences between terrorism and communal violence, and it is not recommended that they be clubbed together. Nevertheless, we may examine them together in order to reflect upon their common religious factor. For example, terrorists and communalists throughout the world perceive their religious ideologies and cultural identities to be under threat, and they both are convinced that what they do is right and ought to be done. This is true with regard to the Palestinian Muslims, the Irish Catholics, the Sikh militants, Christian Identity groups in the United States, and the Zionists in Israel. Since they view themselves as having been violated, they feel justified in violating others. Their main intention thus appears to be an attempt to preserve their religious and cultural identities, and they maintain that it is necessary to fight the "Other" who supposedly threatens them. This ideological base of violence has been sold to the public, who come to approve such reasoning. Terrorists and communalists thereby receive indirect social approval from the public, without which their actions would not be possible. The violence behind terrorism and communalism therefore does not merely arise out of the human propensity for aggression, but rather flows from religious or otherwise internal convictions.

SYMBOLISM IN VIOLENCE

This religious dimension is reinforced by the symbolism that is employed in the acts of terrorism and communal violence. Religious imageries abound in the choice of the location, time, and object of attack, or in the manner in which the terrorists and the communalists comport themselves.

1. For Osama Bin Laden, the WTC and the Pentagon are two “symbolic spaces” that represent the economic and military power of the evil empire – the United States – and it is his divine mandate to attack them. For the Hindu communalists, Babri Masjid represented a violation of the Hindu religion and therefore had to be demolished. For the Muslim fundamentalists, attacking the *Kar Sevaks* in Sabramati Express signified attacking those Hindus who claimed Babri Masjid as their own. Such targeting spreads the message to the public that the mightiest empire is vulnerable, and that neither Muslims nor Hindus are completely safe in India. Juergensmeyer has studied the centrality of the space, time, and audience in terrorist attacks, and his view is that there is a war between the secular and the religious in such events. Stated otherwise, terrorists wish to show that they can control the public space, and that the secular governments are not in control,⁴ while communal riots make it clear to secular authorities that religious ideology must prevail. The public and secular space is to be claimed for the religious space, and it must be made accessible to the sacred.

2. The timing of the attack is significant in that it captures the attention of the public or of religious minded people. The *Kar Sevaks* undertook the journey to Ayodhya precisely during *Ram Navami* so that their actions would strike the desired chord among the public. A terrorist attack involves careful timing so that a dramatic effect can be brought about, as Juergensmeyer has noted. On the one hand, the perpetrators choose an auspicious time for violence in order to draw public attention; on the other, the day chosen acquires a trans-temporal dimension by their actions. September 11 has now acquired a trans-historical significance in the same way as December 6 in India and February-March in Gujarat.

3. “Terrorism will not last without being noticed.”⁵ That is to say that terrorism and communal violence would be pointless without an audience. While the general public is one of the targets, there is also a specific communication directed to a particular community or nation. The United States was the specific audience in the case of the WTC attack, as were the Muslims in Gujarat during the violence there. Stated otherwise, terrorism and communal violence are public performances today, and they are often performed for the screen so that the public may watch. It was reported that Muslim women were raped in front of the camera during the Gujarat riots, with the Hindu symbols of *trishul* and *om* carved onto their private parts, and that people still watched such scenes much later. This public display of horror and violence conveys the message that the “Muslim” space represented by the women has been occupied, and that they remain occupied as long as such marks remain on their bodies. They thus remain in Hindustan only through the concession of the Hindus. The occupation of “the Other” is indeed easily brought about once religious symbols have been marked on their bodies. The *Kar Sevaks* even adorned themselves with the saffron scarf and *trishul* as they went around looting, raping, and murdering Muslims.

4. This way of transcendentalizing space, time, and the action through violence is enhanced by the mediation of religious symbols, which places religion at the service of violence. Ramanathan states that

The worst is that the rich sources of images that move, beautiful images – the Ayodhya group, a blue skinned Krishna in his *tribanga* pose, Siva with the Ganga flowing from the knot of his hair, the eternal Mother whose palms are stretched out to bless (ours to love and cherish but not to fight and kill for) – have been put at the service of irrational anger and hatred only to push electoral gains.⁶

Through the symbolization of space, time, and events, and by employing direct religious symbols, terrorists and communalists ascribe cosmic and eschatological dimensions to their violence. One can perceive a metaphysical duality in the vocabulary of such groups, and the enemy clearly represents the latter. For Bin Laden, the war with America is a war that is fought for God, His Messenger, and all Muslims. For the Christian Identity group in the United States, the Bible presents a God of war who fights the metaphysical conflict between good and evil. For the Hindu fundamentalists, the foreigners or impure ones – Muslims and Christians alike – must be opposed in order to preserve *Sanatana Dharma*. This type of struggle does not last merely one or two days, for it is a millennia-long struggle whose final victory is assured by God. There have been a number of “holy armies” or “soldiers of the cross” in the history of religions, be they *jihadi* groups, the *Dal Khalsa*, or the *Bajrang Dal*, who have been ready to participate in such eschatological warfare. Juergensmeyer observes that “What makes religious violence particularly savage and relentless is that its perpetrators have placed such religious images of divine struggle – cosmic war – in the service of worldly political battles.”⁷

THE SACRALIZATION OF REAL-WORLD STRUGGLES

1. For the present we shall take up the other side of the question, namely, why do real-world struggles involve religions? Juergensmeyer points out in his analysis of terrorism that such struggles become connected with religion when they are perceived as defending the basic identity and dignity of a people or an individual. They acquire a cosmic dimension when the metaphysical struggle in which gods are involved becomes extended into worldly struggle.⁸ The latter is then viewed as spiritual warfare against a sense of humiliation that has been experienced by particular groups, such as the Irish Catholics, the Arab Muslims, the Hindu fundamentalists, and so forth. Furthermore, the struggle is never lost because the goals are reified and deified: the land is God-given for Muslims and Jews; Bharat is the *punybhoomi* (holy land) for Hindus. Once the issue is thus deified, positions become inflexible and struggle is the fulfillment of a holy writ. Once such

contested elements as land or buildings are sacralized, worldly opponents are demonized and the use of violence is justified. This naturally gives rise to the creation of martyrs and demons, sacrificial victims, and satanized enemies.⁹ It should be noted that Juergensmeyer's analysis of the satanization of the United States by Muslim fundamentalists exonerates the United States of all responsibility in the matter, completely ignoring the country's history of complicity with oppressive military regimes in South America, the horrifying Vietnam War, and its support for military and dictatorial regimes across the world in accordance with American interests.

2. Although this appears to be the process by which a real-world struggle becomes sacralized, further inquiry is needed as to why particular violent groups or cultures experience such "identity problems." Although each terrorist attack or communal violence has its own specificity that has to be analyzed from a social science standpoint, one may address these violent acts in terms of their general typologies and raise significant questions in that regard. For example, why at this particular juncture in time – at the birth of the third millennium, when the entire world is racing ahead on the high-tech superhighway – are we witnessing the rise of religious and rightist fundamentalist attacks? Is violence surfacing in spite of globalization and high-tech communication, or is it occurring at least in part because of them? This question in fact comprises the central issue in the present discussion.

3. Advances in communications technology have brought about a heightened world awareness of human rights, environmental problems, and social concerns. As a result, lobbying and advocacy at both national and international levels has increased human solidarity, particularly in times of disaster. But high-tech culture and globalization have their own negativities as well. Today the arms and eyes of technology can invade the privacy of peoples and cultures, rape Mother Earth, denude forests, and create ecological imbalance. Its advance has crushed debate concerning alternate sciences and technologies.¹⁰ At the economic level, financial institutions are rewriting the global landscape, and the movement of market forces renders individual institutions and states helpless and unstable. At the political level, the nation-state is becoming ever more powerless. Decision-making and changes in market trends are subject to the dictates of a dreary network of such agencies as GAAT, WTO, and IMF. Terrorism has ironically become the reverse side of such transnational economics and economics, especially in its invisibility, as is exemplified by the September 11 terrorist attack. Arundathi Roy insightfully comments that "Terrorism has no country. It's transnational, as global an enterprise as Coke or Pepsi or Nike. At the first sigh of trouble, terrorists can pull up stakes and move their 'factories' from country to country in search of a better deal. Just like the multinationals."¹¹

4. Globalization is attempting to homogenize cultures and economies, creating large domains of "exclusion and inclusion" in the process. Local identities and boundaries become blurred as the new mobile elite feels an extra-territorial sense of exhilaration as the invisible hand of the market extends itself everywhere. As a result, the cultures and people

who find themselves excluded are forced to search for identities. In that search for identities they fall back upon their own primordiality, which is specifically historical and geographical and is present in their cultures and religions. Moreover, market forces are unable to compete against it. This turn to primordiality thus provides one of the ways in which religions are drawn into violence as groups fall back upon cultural and religious fundamentalism.

5. High-tech globalized economies have produced a monoculture of consumerism. Eric Fromm states that

to consume is one form of having, and perhaps the most important one for today's affluent industrial societies. Consuming has ambiguous qualities. It relieves anxiety because what one has cannot be taken away; but it also requires one to consume more, because previous consumption soon loses its satisfactory character. Modern consumers may identify themselves by the formula: I am = what I have and what I consume.¹²

Many religious and ancient cultures view such consumerism as anti-religious and anti-human, and they identify modern consumerist culture with Western Christianity, particularly with America. Indeed, the Muslim world views America as anti-God and anti-religious precisely because of its consumerist and capitalist culture. In addition, a segment of Hindu culture believes that modern consumerist culture is a threat to the Hindu way of life, and they hold Western Christianity to be responsible for this danger. The conflict between modernity and tradition, with its various pluses and minuses, forces increasing numbers of traditional societies to the margins, and they fight to maintain their identities – including the use of violent and fundamentalist means. As they search for a space that is truly theirs which is not threatened by free market economic culture, their own religions and cultures become the only resort. Islamic and Hindu revivalism at this point of time, with its upsurges of violence, can be partially explained by this rationale of defending true religiosity and cultural identity.

6. A revolt is taking place in India among the upper middle class and the elite, especially from the business community and the ranks of Hindu nationalists, with the aim of reinventing India in terms of a mono-cultural religious nationalism based on the Hindu majority ideology. They argue that this will help India hit the superhighway of the market economy and transform the country into a nuclear powered nation-state. In this endeavor to make India a self-assertive state on a par with other advanced countries, which over a half century of independence has not yet accomplished, the protagonists fall back on religion and culture since these can never be superseded by other forces – India cannot be defeated in respect to its religious and cultural ethos. The majoritarian and communal violence besetting the country today is the fallout of such efforts.

Furthermore, there is a sense of humiliation that Hindus feel due to centuries of colonialism first by the Mughals and then by the British. Such humiliation and frustration have driven a portion of the population to forge a pan-Hindu base in order to make the presence of Hindu ideology felt at the global level. They reason that a certain amount of violence is inevitable in order to establish such pan-Hinduism, and that it is sanctioned by religious ideology.

7. In the name of building a nation-state, crude violence has been done to peoples and cultures through the displacement of large groups of people, deforestation for the sake of massive dam construction, very large scale mining, and the creation of firing ranges. These so-called national projects have subsumed local cultures and identities. Although the protests that have subsequently arisen have not taken on a religious tone, they have definite cultural underpinnings that will not die off easily.

The sacralization of real-world struggles takes place when they become linked with one's primordiality, namely, culture and religion, whereby they become struggles for identity in which "gods" participate. Struggle is thus transformed into a *dharma yudha*, a *jihad*, or a crusade that legitimizes and sacralizes violence. At least a portion of the public will then support violence directly, while large numbers of people will render indirect and silent support. Terrorism and violence cannot last without such recognition by the public, however small in number they might actually be.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF PROTEST

Terrorist attacks and communal riots can be explained in part as a reaction to a sense of insecurity felt at the dynamics of globalization at various levels. The protest marches against multinational bodies termed anti-globalization actions, beginning with the events in Seattle, are indeed public expressions of resentment against certain logistics of globalization. More relevant for our discussion is the fact that such protests themselves are becoming globalized, and that they now form an element in the dynamics of globalization. A partial list of the features characteristic of the globalization of protests includes the following:¹³

1. Such public acts have brought together protestors from a number of different countries in a single location.

2. Protestors assert their right to go anywhere in the world to stage their protests, and they demand equal rights with a given country's citizens to protest anywhere in the world. This is reminiscent of their counterparts, global capital players, who go anywhere in the world and receive equal treatment with local capitalists wherever they are.

3. Protestors depend upon the global networks provided by the new information and communication technologies.

4. The globalization of protests, even if viewed as anti-globalization, marks a change in the nature of social movements whereby they require ever more advocacy and networking at international levels.

5. Anti-globalization protests differ from previous protest in that they represent the creation of a new kind of protest space, namely, a “transnational sphere.” This transnational space had initially been monopolized by Government representatives and by the heads of such transnational capitalist enterprises as financial institutions.

6. Changes in the mode of protest and the new challenges thereby presented are not only discursive but also physical in character, with global bosses increasingly forced to meet inside modern “fortresses.”

7. The new type of protest movements has spawned the emergence of a global civil society, components of which have already become visible in transnational protests movements concerning gender equality and environmental concerns.

8. But the developing transnational public sphere has its own inequalities as well. The protestors come primarily from Euro-American countries, and they are able to participate by virtue of their incomes and visa privileges.

9. The local residents or citizens where protest events take place have no necessary role to play in them.

10. The old maxim now appears to have changed from “think globally and act locally” to “think locally and act globally.” Articulating the interests of working people in a particular country decries globalization for the ills it causes and demands that states take protective measures.

11. Yet individual nation-states have an increasingly limited role to play.

12. In a system that allows the unrestrained movement of capital, with “capital” receiving equal treatment everywhere irrespective of its origin, there is no escaping the conclusion that a global New Social Contract involving the step-by-step globalization of welfare standards is the only alternative.

Terrorism, communal riots, and dissenting voices have a common feature – they manifest peoples’ “identity questions.” It is important to note that the term “terrorist” itself dehumanizes one’s enemies, and that an element of its usage is to legitimize killing them. South African police who once did just that were later deemed to have committed gross human rights violations. We need to move beyond the good-versus-evil model that underlies the labels of terrorist, communalist, and protestor, but neither can these terms be essentialized into players in the “clash of civilizations,” to use Huntington’s terms. A civilization does not bear a single unique essence of its own, for it is marked by its own struggles and contradictions.

Public acts of protest today endeavor to interrogate the self-definition of globalization/modernization and the logic of a mono-polar world in which the market-principle has taken over society. Such dissenting

voices strive to assert that there are alternate ways of being, acting, relating, and inventing, and they seek to redefine globalization in terms of a pluralism of thinking and acting. Protests and dissent are manifestations of an attempt to reinvent a space for religions, cultures, and ethnic groups that globalization/secularization in its present form seems to disallow or, at best, homogenize. Identity questions emerge out of “exclusions” (either real or perceived as such) that have economic, political, cultural, and religious overtones. A protest against globalization is often a protest against a secular culture that is perceived as alien, alienating, or threatening by a provincial culture that feels itself subject to unwanted influences termed “global” or “universal” that are being forced upon it by a market economy that seems to have no limits.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

In the age of jet planes, satellite dishes, global capitalism, ubiquitous markets, and global mass media, the world has become a “global village” occupying a single space. At the root of this globalization lies the information revolution, which is transforming traditional and ethnic cultures. As Eriksen states, globalization, with its with economic, political, cultural, and ethic dimensions, has come to mean “all the socio-cultural processes that contribute to making distance irrelevant.” Truly global processes affect the conditions of people living in particular localities, creating new opportunities as well as new forms of vulnerability. Not only do economic conditions in particular localities often depend on events that take place elsewhere in the global system, patterns of consumption seem to merge such that people everywhere desire similar goods, from cellular phones to ready-made garments. “The ever increasing transnational flow of commodities, be they material or immaterial, seems to create a set of common cultural denominators which threaten to eradicate local distinctions.”¹⁴

Investment-capital, military power, and world literature are similarly being disembedded from the constraints of space – they no longer belong to any a particular locality.

But a counter-movement has appeared as a result of such developments. Everywhere we see in action an “identity politics” residing upon a commitment to ethnic national identities whose explicit aim is the restoration of rooted tradition and religious fervor.¹⁵ Eriksen observes that “in recent years we have witnessed the growth, in very many societies on all continents, of political movements seeking to strengthen the collective sense of uniqueness, often targeting globalization processes, which are seen as a threat to local distinctiveness and self-processes.”¹⁶ We should admit in all fairness, however, that globalization has heightened awareness among people concerning human rights, natural disasters, and the possibilities of networking together. This in fact is one of the major achievements of globalization, and a new political scene has subsequently emerged that involves separatist national movements, oppressed minorities demanding

equal rights, as well as dominant groups that continue efforts to prevent minorities from gaining access to national resources. These may be religious, ethnic, or regional in character. They may focus on economic issues, fight for access to scarce resources, have political aims opposed to the strategies of exclusion and hatred, or work on the psychological level to foster a sense of dignity.

The phenomenon of identity politics is too complex to be explained by any one of these explanations. Eriksen's position is that

What is clear, however, is that the centripetal or unifying forces of globalization and the centrifugal or fragmenting forces of identity politics are two sides of the same coin, two complementary tendencies which must be understood well for anyone wishing to make sense of the global scene at the turn of the millennium.¹⁷

Stated otherwise, globalization creates conditions for localization and, consequently, gives rise to bounded entities, including countries (nationalism/separatism), faith systems (religious revitalization), cultures (linguistic or cultural movements), and interest groups (ethnicity). Sociologist Roland Robertson thus refers to it as *glo-calization*.

Eriksen identifies the following characteristics of identity politics:

1. It brings about competition over scarce resources (economic and political).
2. It accentuates differences and triggers conflicts.
3. It ensures on the ideological level that similarity overrules equality. Ethnic nationalism, politicized religion, as well as indigenous movements depict the group as homogenous while they gloss over internal differences. As a result, identity politics serves the interests of the privileged segments of the group.
4. It evokes images of past suffering and injustice.
5. It uses myths, symbols, and kinship terminologies to address supporters and downplay differences.
6. It tends to reduce the actual complexity of society to a set of simple contrasts.
7. It demonizes the enemy by recalling selective criteria.

The greater the homogenizing tendencies of globalization, the more prominent is the emergence of identity groups. The challenge of globalization is not to foster a homogeneous worldview and project a uniform socio-political system throughout the world, but rather to evolve mechanisms that affirm pluriformity in acting, being, and thinking.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GLOBALIZATION

The dynamics of the Western system of political liberalism as expressed in the “free market economy” has led to an intense polarization of the globe along the lines of the North-South divide between the industrialized and the “developing” world. The dogma of “profit maximization” of liberal capitalism has replaced and has gradually relativized all other criteria by which economic activity is evaluated. A consequent dogma is that “globalization is an inevitable historical process that cannot be stopped or modified but instead must be embraced by all states and economic players in order to avoid losing out completely in a quasi-Darwinian survival struggle.”¹⁸ One basic aspect of this type of economic activity is the creation of artificial wealth through unproductive, highly speculative financial transactions. In this idolized free-market fundamentalism (to use George Soros’ words) an important philosophical question concerns the moral limits to economic competition on the national as well as transnational levels. If we proclaim the “rule of law” as the supreme goal of a civilized polity, we cannot ignore the need to establish general norms for *economic* activity as well. We should not only avoid applying double standards in international politics, but also promote the universal application of ethical norms in all areas of human activity – political, cultural, and economic. “Even free market ideologues such as the organizers of the World Economic Forum are sensing the social and political frustrations over the negative effects of free market fundamentalism and have now begun speaking of ‘responsible’ globality.”¹⁹

Primacy of the Economy

Economic globalization, with its unrivaled rule of Western industrialized countries over the rest of the world, has become the major challenge to the emergence of an international *civil society*. This is all the more true in the era of *political unipolarity* that has been shaped exclusively by the United States as the major political and military power and cultural trendsetter. Today the choices of citizens – global as well as national – have been limited by the economic constraints imposed by an ever more “competitive” environment. Democratic procedures and workers’ rights are becoming ever more elusive and national sovereignty is being eroded because of the primacy of the economy in the international struggle for power and influence. Moreover, economic decisions are made not through traditional democratic procedures within a given country, but by corporate agencies instead. Politics has in reality become a function of the economy by virtue of the global dynamics of the free market.

Does globalization promote democracy? International democracy in a globalized situation in fact appears to be increasingly absent. As Hans Kochler observes,

Transparency of the decision-making processes and accountability vis-à-vis the public are the pillars of a truly democratic polity in which the exercise of power is strictly regulated and controlled by the participation of the citizens. These basic conditions of democracy and the rule of law are not met in an international setting where an ever larger area of decision-making is being moved away from national governments (whether democratically legitimized or authoritarian) and towards transnational economic actors who are accountable to their shareholders alone... [T]he ethical dimension is alien to the doctrine of the primacy of the market, the freedom of which has more to do with the arbitrariness resulting from pursuit of selfish interests than with goals jointly defined by a community of citizens.²⁰

Insofar as the decisions of international capital and investment groups are immune to any moral scrutiny, globalization gradually leads to a plutocracy of financial oligarchies. That is why the third world today is speaking of a *new phase of colonization*. While the American model of democracy (with its oligarchic rule of the free market) is being prescribed to the rest of the world, the fact is that “Political blackmail and economic sanctions have become the favorite tools in the hands of the self-declared political elite of the Western world for imposing the economic interests of the financial oligarchies upon the unruly Third World.”²¹

The primacy of the economy over politics has serious anthropological implications. Gandhi spoke of a political economy in which human affections are to be taken into account, not simply the maximization of profit. Today the citizen views him/herself more and more as instrumentalized – as being a mere factor of production and a commodity in the global market competition with no influence over the state of affairs. Unfortunately, this minimizes the meaning of citizenship and provokes rejectionist forces that emphasize ethnic, religious, and cultural identities insofar as they provide the only possibilities for defining and safeguarding one’s identity and dignity in a world without borders. These primordial identities will never become commodities in the free market economy. The questions Kochler raises are quite significant within this context:

Does the “dialectics of globalization” consist in the reciprocity, or antagonism, of economic *uniformity* in a world that has become one global market, on the one hand, and the *diversity* of the social, cultural and religious forms of retreat from the “dictatorship of the economy” on the other? Are, in a certain sense, the movements that are polemically characterized as *fundamentalist* a mere function of the process of globalization? Do they

authentically express the frustration of large sections of the population over the fact that the governments of nation-states have been unable in terms of basic human values and of the status of man as an autonomous subject [to protect citizens]?²²

The “Metaphysics of Globalization”

In spite of the rapid spread of information technology and the emergence of the Internet, the world has not evolved into a cultural unipolarity. Kochler utilizes Heidegger to explain the kind of “metaphysical unipolarity” that has instead become the case. For example, Heidegger speaks of the voluntaristic nature of a “lifeworld” (*Lebenswelt*) in which the primacy of the economy is established over all other spheres of life to the point of the “forgetfulness of being-in-itself” (*Seinsvergessenheit*). In the unlimited exploitation of nature within a strictly *technical-functionalistic* context, “metaphysics” becomes the key element in the ever increasing alienation of the human being from the absolute reality (reality-as-such, *Sein*) beyond finite human will. Metaphysics thus comprises a never-ending process of the “mechanization” (*Technisierung*) of nature, that is, the objectification of the lifeworld for the sake of the creation of an illusory quasi-absolute mastery of the natural environment. Heidegger maintains that man as “being-in-the-world” (*in-der-Welt-sein*) seeks to actualize his “drive for power” (*Wille zur Macht*) in economic globalization, which is inherent in the technical approach to reality. Nature thus becomes an object of exploitation in service of the self-realization of the human being. Kochler states that “The objectivistic approach characteristic of technical civilization goes hand-in-hand with the voluntaristic orientation of an economy without geographical borders or moral limits”²³ insofar as the human race attempts to control reality through an economic-materialistic approach to reality in the “metaphysical” epoch of technical civilization (*Technik*). Whereas traditional Greek metaphysics sought to objectivize absolute reality in terms of the conceptual framework of ontology, modern “secularized” metaphysics attempts to replace the merely conceptual mastery of the universe with a virtually unlimited objectivization of the natural environment. But in his attempt to recreate himself through mastery over nature, man unknowingly objectivizes himself as a means of production (individually and collectively).

Globalization articulates this secularized metaphysics, causing in the process extreme forms of the alienation of human beings from reality as such (*Sein*) that comprise the forgetfulness of being-in-itself (*Seinsvergessenheit*). Man becomes the victim of a purely economic drive towards profit maximization that is triggered by free market economy in collusion with technology. We need to overcome this “metaphysics” of globalization through a non-objectivistic metaphysics – through a fundamental critique of civilization instead of speaking of the clash of

civilizations – so that we can recognize the metaphysical futility of any project of “global rule.” It should be noted that Gandhi’s critique of the “machine” could be cited in this context. Is not the *Advaita* philosophy of viewing the world in relation to the Ultimate a healthy form of metaphysics that places every quest under the spell of the search for the Ultimate? The present ideological discourse on globalization has to be exposed for what it really is, namely, global hegemony and the imposition of a neo-colonial order upon the rest of the world. In stark contrast to what the dogma of economic liberalism would claim, the major economic actors do not contribute to the global expansion of prosperity, but are rather *globalizing poverty* in a way that affects, with growing intensity, the working population of the industrialized countries themselves. As William Pfaff said,

To millions in Asia, Russia and Latin America, deregulation of the international economy must look like a vast swindle. It was not, in fact, a swindle. It was something perhaps worse. It was an irresponsible and, in crucial respects, disastrous experiment, inspired by ideology, promoted by Western groups that expected to profit from it, backed by the power of the United States government.²⁴

Habermas was right when he stated that our response to the current forces of globalization demands a coherent re-articulation of society’s political will that conforms to its history of civic association.

GLOBALIZATION, RELIGION, AND IDENTITY FORMATION/PRESERVATION

The global flow of capital generates encounters between lifeworlds and among cultures and religions. This calls for an ethical posture towards the cultural Other that involves respect for the Other’s practices of singularity as well as recognition of the fact that Otherness is a dynamic which creates identity spaces. This also needs to involve a recognition of the contingency of one’s own identity as well as of the interdependencies in global relationships. The uncomfortable implications of encounters with the Other in globalization have drawn the attention of scholars of religion.

Cultural Role of Religion

In a systemic understanding of culture, the cultural function of religion is to inform worldview (tell us what the world is like) and justify *ethos* (tell us how to act). The ability of religion to sustain such functions becomes severely challenged when the equilibrium of this system is disturbed by the invasion of a dissonant worldview.²⁵ It is evident even in the earliest of cultures, however, that it is not in spite of outside influences

but rather along with them that religion operates towards these aims. In the case of globalization, the speed with which social changes take place today, along with the bombardment of peoples all over the world with the competing perspectives of pluralism and relativism, are unprecedented and unsettling, which heightens both anxiety and doubt. In addition, the globalized modern world is marked by a fluidity of boundaries and ideas in respect to which the security of religion seems to have vanished. Geertz distinguished two types of religious person, namely, one whose worldview is derived from a religion in which he/she has no doubt, and another for whom a religion that he/she doubts is aggressively asserted as an ideology and badge of identity. The former person is held by religion, while the latter holds firmly to religious doctrine defensively but is not really held by it. Rapid social change and the subsequent collapse of moral and religious certitude concerning religion are driving fundamentalists towards traditional religious norms as they classify the world outside their circle as evil. In addition, people seek particular identities, with their mythical, primordial, and archetypal elements, as they face the threat of homogenization and absorption into the global fluidity. It is the primordially lived culture that sustains people – not the constructed Orientalism of the colonialists.²⁶ It should be noted in this regard that a globalized modernity is the particular identity for United States citizens, whereas for peoples in Asia, for example, it constitutes an alien culture.

Renewed Role of Religions

Modernism assigned a greater role to reason and relativized the role of religion, especially in the social realm. It was reason and its empirical application in sciences that counted for the Moderns, who felt that human beings had come of age through scientific advancement and the rationalization of life and society. But the logic of globalization appears to have brought religion back to center stage, and it is now attempting a come back through the many dissenting voices that continuously employ religious mediation. Religion's role in the true sense of the word is fundamental in giving "groundings" to peoples, and its apparent role today is to give voice to the endangered identities of peoples. Even if that role at times becomes "fundamentalist" in the negative sense, it is important to note that religion has acquired a role in respect to the fundamentalism of a global free market. The unholy marriage between economic fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism is indeed distressing, however.

How can religions genuinely mediate a space between pluralities that neither alienate nor dominate and identities that neither dehumanize nor demonizing the Other? This will require that religions play a critical role regarding dehumanizing and demonizing agencies and a reconciling role regarding multiplicities, although it is probable that such roles are not the monopoly of religions. Globalization has erased the boundaries between the sacred and the secular among nations, cultures, and religions. This demands

the enactment of a fully altruistic reaching out that may be spoken of as a religion or way of love which is incarnated in particularities and rises to globalities. If globalization is not informed by such a way of life, it can unfortunately end up precisely in the dehumanization and demonization of the Other, regardless of how the latter is defined.

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NOTES

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 - ³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.
 - ⁴ Juergensmeyer, M. (2000) *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 123-143.
 - ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 139.
 - ⁶ Ramanathan, Suguna "Ordeal by Fire". *Seminar*, 513, May 2, p. 25.
 - ⁷ Juergensmeyer (2000), p. 146.
 - ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 162.
 - ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.
 - ¹⁰ Visvanathan, Shiv (2001) "The Problem." *Seminar*, 503, p. 13.
 - ¹¹ Roy, Arundathi (2001) "Algebra of Infinite Justice." *Outlook*, 8, p. 22.
 - ¹² Fromm, Eric (1976) *To Have or To Be*. London: Abacus Books, p. 36.
 - ¹³ DN (2001) "Globalization of Protest." *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW). October 21, 2001.
 - ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 - ¹⁵ Eriksen, T. H. (1999) "Globalization and Politics of Identity." *UN Chronicle*, autumn, p. 1.
 - ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
 - ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 - ¹⁸ Kochler, Hans (1999) *Philosophical Aspects of Globalization: Introductory Statement at the International Roundtable on the Challenges of Globalization*, University of Munich.
 - ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 - ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 - ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 - ²² *Ibid.*, p. 6.
 - ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 - ²⁴ As quoted in Kochler 1999, p. 9.
 - ²⁵ See Geertz, C. (1966) "Religion as a Cultural System." In Michael Banton (ed.) *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*. New York, F.A. Praeger, pp. 204-215.
 - ²⁶ Said, Edward (1978) *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.

PART III

**THE INTERRELATION OF GLOBALIZATION
AND CULTURAL IDENTITY**

CHAPTER XI
ON GLOBAL CULTURE AND
CULTURAL IDENTITY

GONG QUN

INTRODUCTION

Humanity has entered a new phase of its existence upon in the first decade of the new millennium by virtue of the fact that the process of the globalization of commerce, communication, economic production, and finance has torn down the walls separating nations and blocks of nations. We thus no longer live in a world divided into small local communities, tribes, and villages. Although these have been stitched together at various times in history into large empires, the latter were nevertheless primarily composed of local and largely self-enclosed peoples. As a result of global communication, however, the peoples of the earth have today entered to varying degrees into a universal community, and this has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is now felt everywhere. Moreover, each of the thirty largest corporations today, supported by a global network of productive relations operating on a global scale, has an annual financial turnover greater than the gross domestic product of ninety countries represented in the UN.

Thanks to the globalization of commerce and communication, we are creating and sharing in new experiences such that a global culture is emerging on the new global horizon. However, our cultural identity and self-identity remain rooted in our local community or nation. Will we become lost in globalization and global culture if we lose this sense of local and self-identity? Will we have anywhere to go if conflicts arise between global culture and local and national cultures, especially national cultures in countries of the Third World and in Asia? We, as Asian or Chinese, will then have to choose between the two alternatives of refusing globalization or losing our cultural identity. But if there are no such conflicts, will we be able keep our identity while remodeling it in the process of globalization?

STAGES IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION

A global culture characterized by a homogenizing tendency comprised of common cultural characteristics has emerged in the process of the globalization of commerce and communication. As a result, identical elements in life styles, methods of production, and values can now be found throughout the various nations, states, and systems of civilization in the world. Such global culture would not exist without globalization, which

may be defined as the process whereby the relatively separate areas of the globe come to intersect in a single imaginary "space."¹ Insofar as this definition expresses the human desire of and need for communication, globalization may be viewed a process of fusion that arises in global communications between nations.

There have been a number of differing stages in globalization. It may justifiably be regarded as having begun with the discoveries of Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) insofar as Europeans then came to know of the existence of new continents. As they subsequently began traveling throughout the globe in pursuit of their commercial aims, peoples everywhere came into contact with each other and set off on a new course of development. Previous important historical events in ancient times did not have the same effect on global development. For example, even the conquests of Genghis Khan (1155-1227), when the Mongols under his leadership swept across the continents of Asia and Europe like a tornado, did not drive different nations into a process of globalization. After such events came to an end, the nations that had been affected resumed their independent processes of political and economic development that had been interrupted. Even as smaller nations became larger and new nations arose, they remained characterized by a type of isolation.

We know that different cultures and peoples have communicated with each other from the earliest period of human civilization, and that this has resulted in cultural advances and social development. Such events clearly took place for almost a thousand years along the Silk Road, for instance, where time-keeping devices, gun power, printing techniques, and navigational instruments were among the items exchanged between cultures. As these were put to new uses by Europeans, they provided a new driving force to civilizations throughout the world, particularly Western civilization.

Columbus' journeys are of such great significance in world history because the manner in which they changed the scale of economic interaction between nations gave rise to capitalist production. Sadly speaking, it was the possibility of plunder, conquest, and colonization on a world scale that created a world market and gave mankind a truly global history. It was the world market thus created by capitalism that not only drew, but indeed compelled previously isolated nations into a single global economic system.

The second stage of globalization marks the period from the beginning of the twentieth century to the 1960s, in which mankind suffered through two World Wars. The most important event in respect to globalization during these decades was the awakening of national consciousness in countries beyond Europe and America, including the emergence of new countries from European colonial empires after World War Two, primarily in Africa and Asia, whereby the idea of the nation-state gained a global significance. Mankind's response to the catastrophe of global conflict also served to foster an upsurge in globalization as people emphasized the importance of international cooperation in modern society

in order to promote and construct a just world. Perhaps the highlight of this response was the establishment of the United Nations Organization in 1945. It is important to note that all of these events were accompanied by an intensification in global communications by means of ongoing developments in modern technology. The speed of global communications was accelerated to such a degree that peoples in even relative remote societies came to feel closer to other nations than ever before.

The third stage of globalization extends from the 1970s until the present, when the earth has become a global village because of the compression of space and time through the revolution ushered in by new types of information technology and other technical developments. In addition, accelerated economic globalization has ever more tightly integrated economic activity throughout the world. For example, the combination of advanced standardization, digital technology, flexible production, and electronic communications has made possible profitable investment and the ever cheaper production of goods anywhere in the world. This has caused manufacturing to be moved from developed to less developed and developing nation-states, such as China and East Asian countries, where there are lower wages and few restrictions on pollution. New flows of information have transformed the nature of trade and commerce, much of which has become increasingly based on the production of brand name consumer goods and cultural forms. Not least of all, economic troubles can now spread quickly around the globe, such as happened with the Asian-based financial crisis of the late 1990s and the US-based credit crisis today. In short, globalization has begun a new phase within the context of a new economic order coupled with scientific and technological advances. The recent explosion of discussion about the process of globalization indeed reveals that we are engaged in the high tide of the process.

THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL CULTURE

We have now reached a watershed in human history after 500 years of travail and suffering in the process of globalization – a type of global *culture* is finally taking shape that is encountered, felt, and sensed wherever one goes, albeit to varying degrees. By global culture I do not mean merely the familiar culture of consumption, life-style, and mass-mediated popular culture, but also political culture and values. As a result, the theme of globalization will be misunderstood if we think of it only in terms of economic interdependence and the existence of worldwide interconnections, just as Giddens warned.² We must keep in mind that there is another unique and substantial issue that such scholars as Asawin Nedpogaeo have raised, namely, the matter of “glocal [*sic*] culture.” Nedpogaeo writes that

The global-equivalent to the “West” in Thailand’s case is domesticated by and into the local. This is what I term

glocal culture: the concept of the localization of the global, or what Roland Robertson (1995) calls glocalization.³

This means neither what Tadeusz Bukinski has referred to as “micro-regionalization,” nor the localization of the global, but rather the spread of general values and a general culture across the international borders of nation-states and the boundaries of the local, especially outside of Europe and the West.

This global culture possesses shared general characteristics that are expressed in various ways in politics, the economy, and daily life, and these together form a new way of life that is spread throughout the world by means of new developments in communications technology. Global culture is thus a globally *identical* culture in a multitude of social spheres. Although its common characteristics are often found in *glocal* forms, they are global in nature, not local. These may be as mundane as fast-food and the various forms of popular entertainment, or as overarching as the system of market economy, which originated in Western Europe but has become the economic system of most societies after China’s economic reforms and the collapse of the Soviet-style order in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. It goes without saying, however, that the precise content of global culture in a particular time and place is affected by our actions and by the degree of development of globalization.

The greatest positive contribution of globalization to global culture after the 1950s is the notion of democratic politics, including the idea of human rights and the principle that all people and all nations are equal. This has become the foundation of contemporary politics and the common aim of ever more nations. In an age when people are becoming citizens of the world, we all are called upon to respect not only our fellow companions, but all others in the world as well regardless of their race, color and gender.

The establishment of democratic politics is accompanied by the need to build a peaceful world order insofar as we all have become interconnected through economic and cultural globalization. It is true that many of the violent events which have already marked the early years of the twenty-first century not only constitute a challenge to the process of globalization, but can also be viewed as comprising a barbaric and anti-humanist negative tendency that has arisen as an explicit reaction against globalization. Against the background of such problems, the 1993 Parliament of World Religions stated in its declaration entitled *A Global Ethic* that the new world context demands an *ethical* principle of universality to serve as the foundation for world peace and to effectively communicate what we might term the authentic meaning of the “global.” The development of our new global economy and culture requires the formation of a new order of communication because we have indeed become citizens of the “global.”

FORMS AND LEVELS OF IDENTITY

The influence of global culture involves the disruption of native culture to varying degrees in different regions and countries. Insofar as globalization is the process whereby European civilization is expanding to all other areas of the globe, global culture possesses the characteristics of European civilization. As a result, many people in developing and non-European countries are undergoing a crisis in cultural identity and have come to feel homeless in spirit due to modernization and globalization.⁴ In reaction to this type of crisis and loss, many people in the Third World have turned to their native or local cultures in search of a means to revitalize their national existence. It is not difficult to understand that people seek the spiritual roots of their culture in the remote past in an effort to resist the seemingly overwhelming force of globalization, and that the anti-globalization movement turns to local or national culture, including religious culture, for its weapons. One of the ways in which to interpret the anti-globalization movement is that people are seeking to reaffirm their identity through native or local culture in order to resolve or even avoid a crisis of identity.⁵

There are, generally speaking, two types of identities, namely, collective identities and individual or ego identities. The former include, but are not limited to, group identity, class identity, national identity, and cultural identity, while examples of the latter are role identity, status identity, and moral identity. Ego identity is the decisive factor in the formation of personality as such, but collective identity is always necessarily embodied in individuals.

Individual or ego identity is typically defined as “a social-psychological process involving the assimilation and internalization of values, standards, expectations, or social roles of other person(s)...into one’s behavior and self-conception.”⁶ It is also characterized by a history of development, which begins in early childhood as the child learns to distinguish himself from the physical and social environment. Habermas states in this regard that

A child gradually develops his role identity by locating oneself in roles that are originally attached to concrete reference persons and later detached from them -primarily the generation and the sex roles that determine the structure of the family. This role identity, centered on sex and age and integrated with the child’s own body image, becomes more abstract and at the same time, more individual to the degree that the young child appropriates extra-familial role systems up to and including the political order, which is interpreted and justified by a complex tradition.⁷

Habermas further argues that when the development of a child's moral consciousness moves beyond the initial stage, s/he will withdraw behind all particular roles and reconstruct new ego identities. I do not agree with this position insofar as I do not think it is possible to dissolve certain role identities after childhood. For example, the roles of gender and family membership, as well as extra-familial roles founded upon complex social and cultural traditions that have been rooted deep within one's heart through the experiences of early life, do not easily fade away. Moreover, moral consciousness beyond childhood may reinforce such roles insofar as it reflects the construction of the original lifeworld. Although Habermas is without a doubt correct when he states that ego identity is a life-practice that never ceases to develop and change, ego identity nevertheless continues to reside upon early socialization and everyday interaction as well.

There are two types of tendencies within ego identity, namely, stability and variability. The former maintains our established personal identity, while the latter enables us to adapt to changing environments. Individuals are consequently both unique and variable. But to what degree can ego or self-identity maintain its stability such that people do not undergo a crisis of identity if they encounter a new culture or a new construction of society? It is first necessary to identify the framework of ego identity before we can answer this question. For example, values (including faith) and moral consciousness comprise the core of identity. When they are supported by religion, one's identity may be so stable that it possesses little variability, for religious belief is in fact the strongest factor among the components of identity. If, in contrast, one cannot preserve his/her religious belief when thrust into new circumstances, one's identity will be changed.

Collective identity constructs the "membership" identity of individuals. That is to say that while ego identity establishes the individual personality as such, collective identity answers the personal question What do I belong to? A person cannot freely choose his or her collective identity insofar as when a person develops into a moral or social consciousness, s/he discovers him/herself to already be a member of a certain group, class, ethnicity, nation, and country. In addition, every group has its own history that extends beyond the historical perspectives of its members. Habermas points out that

a group can understand and define itself so exclusively as a totality that they live in the idea of embracing all possible participants in interaction, whereas everything that doesn't belong thereto becomes a neuter, about which one cannot take up interpersonal relations in the strict sense.⁸

Each of us is a member of some group, and groups often have their own self-interpretations. The collective identity of a group or a nation comprises an ensemble of ideas that persons do not freely choose. People accept these ideas through everyday life and in interaction with other

members, and they find the meanings of social duty and life from the collective identity. The function of collective identity is thus quite different from ego identity, which preserves the continuity of personality. But personal morality, personal faith, and others clearly cannot be divided from the life of the group to which he or she belongs. Every person is a social individual, and each person's identity is formed in relation to other members of the group. I present myself to you, and through you I identify myself and distinguish myself from you. Ego identity and collective identity are thus interrelated and form a complementary relation.

Ego identity and collective identity share a varying number of key elements, such as moral consciousness. For example, if the moral principles specific to any group pertained only to collective identity and did not reside within ego identity as well, they could not take root in one's moral consciousness. Indeed, a crisis of some given collective identity within a person's inner world can trigger a crisis in his/her ego identity as well. Moreover, if I discover that some group to which I belong has no further reason to exist, I have only two possible choices, namely, either give up that identity, or give up my life. An interesting example in this regard concerns the United States taken as a country of immigrants. For people who belong to minority ethnicities, such as non-Anglo ethnic groups, the primary identity problem they encounter upon coming to America involves their ethnic identity. Research has shown that many people are compelled to give up their ethnic identity in such an "immigrant" environment since they otherwise could not learn how to live and work in their new country. Relative distinctions nevertheless persist between ego and collective identities since neither can replace the other.

It has been noted that individual identities have a history of development, but this can also be observed in group or collective identities, within which different stages can be distinguished. Family is the primary, most concrete, and least complex basic collective identity in respect to individual identity, upon which reside more abstract and general units, such as country and nation. These emerge and crystallize through stages of development in a manner analogous to that described above by Habermas in respect to individual development. National identity is, generally speaking, the highest level of identity in the pre-globalized world, and it is comprised of such primary elements as blood, language, and the common heritage of nation history. But can we develop our identity beyond the nation-state? If so, can crises of collective identity emerge in the course of globalization?

Habermas argues that social conditions permitting one to attain the status of "world" citizen have emerged in modern bourgeois society. He states that

emancipated members of bourgeois society can know themselves as one with their fellow citizens in their character as: (a) free and equal subjects of civil law (the citizen as private commodity owner), (b) moral free

subjects (the citizen as private person) and (c) political free subjects (the citizen as democratic citizen of the state). Thus the collective identity of bourgeois society developed under the highly abstract viewpoints of legality, morality, and sovereignty ... these abstract determinations are best suited to the identity of world citizen.⁹

These determinations indeed indicate essential conditions for the identity of world citizen, but they do not yet obtain today in most – if not all – nation-states because of limitations in the level of democratic development. As a consequence, the identity of world citizen exists only as an ideal that has not been realized, and national identity remains the highest level of identity. Again this background, the phenomenon of regional unions, such as the East Asia Union, the Africa Union, and the European Union, beckons our attention. Can these unions, which exist on a level that encompasses nation-states, become an important transitional phase in the transformation from national identity to global identity? This appears not to be the case at the moment insofar as they remained focused on economic relations. As such, they have no foundation in civil society and no common political foundation, which Habermas argues are required for world citizenship.

Of such groupings, the European Union appears to be alone today in having political aspirations in addition to economic aims. There are in fact those who would argue today that it has already begun the effort to create a government that transcends states. The European Union is already the source of 75 percent of the legislation regulating economic activity in Europe and more than 50 percent of laws concerning such other types of activity as criminal procedures. In addition, the member states of the European Union share a common political foundation, a common civil society, and, to varying degrees, the conditions that Habermas indicates are essential to the identity of world citizen. Nevertheless, the European Union is only for those countries it defines, for one reason or another, as European. Even so, it may cast some light on the path that other countries will have to follow if they are to progress from national identity to world identity. Although this eventuality is often obscured today by modern politics, and especially by non-democratic regimes and practices, I am convinced that humanity will someday reach that goal. Globalization provides the political prospect of world citizenship, and its time will come even though the identity of world citizen is not yet a reality.

But while globalization implies development towards truly global citizenship, the collective identities of most countries are still determined by political power. Identities can only be empowering if they are politicized, but the latter demands that they be directly related to power structures. The construction of collective identities thus reflects political constructions. For example, the actual ideology of contemporary China is nationalism, and the highest level of identity in China is the identity of the nation-state.

Whatever is suitable for nationalism is considered acceptable insofar as it constitutes no problem for the identity of the nation-state. But this means that we can anticipate a conflict between nationalism and globalization in China – if not today, then in the future. The historical task thus facing China today because of globalization is how to construct our new nationalism such that it can fuse the horizons of the nation with the tide of global culture. This is an enormous task, not least of all because the Chinese have failed to deal with related issues arising from the process of modernization for over 150 years. A concise review of Chinese culture is in order if we are to view this problem more clearly.

GLOBALIZATION IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT

National identity was generally non-problematic throughout the long history of traditional China. Crises of collective identity did occur when an established ruling dynasty came to an end, but these may be described as crises of *political* identity, not *national* identity. A representative case in point is the transition period between the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), which lasted for a period of some decades. The rapidity of social change at this time constituted an obstacle to the establishment of a new political identity for very many people, especially intellectuals, but Chinese culture remained constant.

The conceptual identity of traditional China was formed from the trio of Tianxian (“beneath heaven”), nation, and culture. Tianxian refers neither to a particular location, nor to the world as such, but rather to China as a culture. The ancient Chinese viewed their culture not only as the best culture possible, but also as the universal culture providing meaning to the world as a whole. It was this perceived excellence of their culture that led the Chinese to believe that they lived at the center of the world.

The Song dynasty philosopher Shi Jie is referred to as saying that “The sky is above, the earth is below, and China is in the middle. At the edges of the sky and earth are foreigners (*yi*). Outside there are foreigners; inside there are Chinese.” The obvious issue here is metaphysical and cultural space, not natural space, and the distinction between Chinese and foreigners does not turn upon differences between races, but rather upon differences between cultures. The Chinese viewed their culture as civilization itself, while foreign cultures were barbarism. That is not to say that we should blame the Chinese for this notion insofar as they did not know that there were other cultures elsewhere in the world on a par with their own, if not more developed. The point to be emphasized is rather that cultural identity was the core of national identity in ancient China. And insofar as cultural identity in respect to national identity comprises an historical heritage in spirit and philosophy, Chinese national identity persisted from its very inception into the nineteenth century, even during periods of mutual influence between China and foreign cultures or powers.

For example, even conquest by foreign nations did not produce a crisis of cultural identity because the foreign groups that came to power in China came to be assimilated into Chinese culture. Such events thereby actually served to strengthen the identity of the nation. In short, there was never a crisis of *culture* in the long history of China, even during political crises of identity brought about by the destruction of an existing dynasty.

The two Opium Wars between 1839 and 1860, when China first experienced globalization as a *disaster* after being forced by military defeat to open herself to British economic interests, marked the beginning of the modern history of China. The Chinese first underwent a crisis of cultural identity – a change that had never before been experienced in their three thousand year history – after encountering Western civilization in this manner. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, China was repeatedly defeated in military conflicts with the armies of Western countries and with Japan, which had already begun to learn from the West. But the Chinese also felt there was no way forward if they did not learn from Western culture, even if the Communists in China insisted, “Learn from the Russians!” Identifying with Western culture in order to save Chinese culture thus became the Chinese rallying call for a new Chinese identity. And learn they did – first material civilization; then social systems; and finally such cultural values as democracy, freedom, and science.

But China’s attempt to learn and implement the Western social system and cultural values was ultimately unsuccessful. The consequence of this failure was the Chinese revolution, and the success of this revolution established for China the new identity of the “nation-state.” (A sense of nationalism has in fact underlain and supported all social movements in China since the time of the Opium Wars.) In the period after the revolution, China subjected traditional culture to strong criticism and then destroyed it, replacing it with socialism and communism as a new *collective* identity. However, the “Great Cultural Revolution” not only led people to view revolution as primarily a tool for the strengthening of China, they also came to see that the continuation of the revolution after victory would radically alter the nature of the tool. “Continual revolution” thus meant a continuing violation of the social order and continuing struggle between people, which perpetuated weakness and caused China to fall even further behind Western countries. This is why China needed to “open and reform,” whereby she resumed her quest for modernization that had been put aside during the revolution.

In the process of seeking modernization, however, we discovered again that political goals were no longer the basis for identity. While modernization for China comprises the establishment of the *nation* as object of identity, this by itself cannot be sufficient in today’s world. Nationalism cannot solve the problem of identity when faced with ongoing globalization and global culture. As a result, the Chinese still have not solved their problem of collective identity, which began taking shape in unsuccessful encounters with Western nations during the nineteenth century.

It was noted above that the identity of the nation-state is the highest level of identity in China. But what shall we include in our conception of nationalism? With what should we identify?

Nationalism has different implications and background assumptions in the different historical and cultural contexts in which it is employed, and given nations interpret it in a variety of ways, particularly during different periods in time. For instance, China was bullied and humiliated by strong foreign powers for over a century in her recent history, and this subjugation to what Chairman Mao referred to as imperialist countries still causes great distress to many people today. In reaction, they view the aim of nationalism as the creation of a strong nation – a great China – in modern times. However, if this dream of a strong nation becomes merely a goal to be achieved through the construction of a Chinese nation-state, it would become necessary to return to the old ways that had been practiced by the imperialist powers against China. Li Dazhao, co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party, pointed to the danger of such ideas as early as the 1920s.

A different view of nationalism that is current in China proposes that traditional culture can become the foundation for the modern identity of the Chinese nation. I do not agree with this point of view. China today is no longer what China used to be, not least of all because both internal and external environments have substantially changed. The social order and structure in which traditional culture originated and thrived no longer exist. Moreover, the period from 1949 to the 1970s was marked by the suppression of traditional Chinese culture, with the latter no longer taught in the educational curriculum on the Chinese mainland. As a result, several generations have no knowledge of Confucianism and Taoism. Although new generations can certainly be re-exposed to traditional thought and culture, the problem nevertheless remains that the times cannot be changed so that they are *suitable* for the re-establishment of traditional cultural forms.

Traditional culture does possess a certain usefulness for modern society insofar as it possesses two types of components. The one, including rules, principles, and values, is closely tied to the social system within which it arose, and it has no reason to persist if that system no longer exists. The other comprises the life experiences of people down through the ages and, as such, is not tied to a particular social order. This is the aspect of traditional culture that can serve as the foundation of national and cultural identity in that people can turn to their nation's history and find answers to such questions as "Who am I?" and "Where do I come from?" Culture as it exists in historical memory thus forms and reforms psychological structure and ethos of a nation. It is necessary to keep in mind, however, that the nature of national culture is not fixed, and it cannot merely be equated with traditional culture as it existed at some period of time in the past. Although we cannot simply abandon traditional culture and our national history in order to construct a new national culture today, the latter must have a new content that is suitable for the times. Consider modernization as a case in

point. It is the central element in Chinese identity construction at present, but modernization and globalization have become two aspects of one and the same reality. The new content of national culture must thus include global culture if it is to respond to the demands placed upon it by globalization and not be merely a negative reaction against it. That is to say that global culture must combine with native and local culture so that a *glocal* culture is established. *Glocal* culture should be our aim in the process of modernization.

Nationalism is today replacing national culture as the core of Chinese national identity. This comprises a transformation of great proportions insofar as national culture has an historical and spiritual essence while the concept of nationalism has a content that depends at different times on different interpretations. We also know that differences between the conceptions of nationalism and patriotism are often deliberately blurred in Chinese propaganda. The result is that the distinction between patriotism and support of the government is eliminated, whereby the political values associated with patriotism are conflated with loyalty to the government and enter into conflict with the values of global culture. Against this background, time and hard work are necessary for the establishment of a new consensus in favor of political democracy and the conception of global culture. A crisis of collective identity cannot be avoided if the construction of Chinese culture is unable to deal with this matter. It is clear that nationalism is a dangerous tendency since it places national interests before all others, yet economic freedom alone cannot transcend nationalism insofar as such a transformation presupposes a different type of political life as well. Social life must be based on an abstract and general condition – on what Habermas referred to as civil society – if we are to establish the identity of world citizen as we transform China into a modern nation.

Collective identity, especially national identity, is a complicated question that cannot be reduced to a single issue – all the difficulties facing a nation, not merely those chosen for various political reasons, must be addressed in the process. This necessarily involves social development, cultural history, as well as the establishment of social and national ideals for the country as a whole. China must establish a national identity that involves a concomitant identity of world citizen if she is to complete her quest for modernization and seize her opportunity to globalize.

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NOTES

¹ Hall, Stuart (ed.) (1995) *Understanding Modern Societies*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, p. 190. See also Zygmunt Bauman (1998) *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press.

² Giddens, Anthony and Christopher Pierson (1998) *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 28. See also Anthony Giddens (1991) *Modernity and Self-identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

³ Nedpogaeo, Asawin (2001) "Glocal Culture in the Thai Media: the Occidental 'Other' in TV Advertisements." In Paul Kennedy and Catherine J. Danks (eds.) *Globalization and National Identities: Crisis or Opportunity?* New York: Palgrave, pp. 99-112. See also Robertson, Roland (1995) "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity." In Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson (eds.) *Global Modernities*. London: Sage. pp. 25-44.

⁴ One could even say that traditional Chinese philosophy has been colonized by Western discourse since the beginning of the twentieth century to such an extent that it has lost its own power of discourse.

⁵ Globalization is a complex phenomenon, and the problems it generates in different countries are many and varied. This is also true of the anti-globalization movement. For example, this issue of identity crisis and a sense of spiritual homelessness, along with the means for dealing with it, do not necessarily apply to those in Western countries who are opposed to globalization. It is perhaps more typical for such countries for people to be concerned with the deterioration in the relationship between mankind and nature that has been brought about by modernization.

⁶ Theodorson, George A. and Achilles G. Theodorson (1969) *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*. New York: Barnes and Noble, p.195.

⁷ Habermas, Jürgen (1979) *Communication and the Evolution of Society*. Translated and with an introduction by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 109. See also Jürgen Habermas (1999) *The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory*. Boston: Polity Press.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

CHAPTER XII

UNIVERSAL AND LOCAL CULTURES: THE LIMITS AND HORIZONS OF APPRECIATION

TARAS DOBKO

INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION AND IDENTITY AS PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

Human nature appears to be constituted in such a way that, with the beginning of any new period in life, we cannot help but build up fresh hopes and experience a new anticipation about the future. We look forward to a temporal “point X” (New Year’s Day, our wedding, the birth of a child, the first day at a new job) from which our life will profoundly change and, as it were, begin anew. This same feeling has accompanied the dawning of the new millennium. That which has perhaps made us most enthusiastic in this regard is a new phenomenon in human existence, namely, globalization as a process that shatters the ideological barriers which divided humanity during the Cold War and promises to establish a new integrated world order.

If we look at the word “globalization” as it is most often used in the contemporary discourse, it seems at first glance to signify a phenomenon that is anything but philosophical in nature. We are, of course, quite familiar with its economic and political applications. We also often refer to it within the context of social, ecological, and cultural discussions. But although we are unfortunately perhaps least inclined to explore its philosophical roots, the term “globalization” is in reality loaded with profound philosophical meaning. Indeed, the issue of globalization is a philosophical topic *par excellence*.

This is even more true concerning the issue of globalization and identity, which is an instance of the perennial philosophical dichotomy between universality and identity. Human thought has always sought to strike a proper balance between these two poles of human existence and thereby do justice to both of them. We find aspects of this issue in the metaphysical problem of the “one” and the “many,” with its alleged solutions of nominalism and extreme essentialism.¹ We are confronted with it in the field of philosophical anthropology, where it serves to distinguish between human nature and the human person. We are faced with it in the sphere of morality, where it defines the terms of the tension between the universality of moral norms and the autonomy of moral conscience. We also encounter the issue in discussions within social philosophy, primarily in respect to the opposition between individualism and collectivism or that between liberalism and socialism. Within the philosophy of culture it

appears in respect to the relationship between, on the one hand, universal human “culture” and, on the other, the cultural values and traditions of local communities, peoples, and civilizations. It also has a religious dimension, which is expressed both in the tension between the universality of religious content and the particularity of its lived experience, as well as in the attempt to safeguard the identity of one’s own religion in opposition to the tendency to create a syncretic religion of humankind. In summary, human existence unfolds within the framework of the tension between universality and identity, which endlessly assumes a myriad of very diverse shapes.

We witnessed towards the end of the last century an enormous increase in our awareness of belonging to a global world. All of us know quite well the price humanity paid in order to learn this truth, which included two world wars, the Cold War, the atrocities of totalitarianism, and a host of ecological crises. This does not mean that we are caught up in wishful thinking, completely unaware of the manifold and intricate problems that the process of globalization entails. On the contrary, enormous efforts have been invested in seeking to discern new moral, social, and political tendencies in the globalizing of the world and to project their consequences.

In the discussion that follows I will provide a rather modest presentation of an issue that is, to my mind, one of the most prominent and pressing problems in respect to the cultural objectives and effects of globalization. The horizon of my endeavor is constituted by such questions as Is globalization by its very definition an anti-cultural phenomenon? Does it necessarily entail an unwelcome and regrettable leveling and homogenizing of local cultures? Are there values that transcend any given culture and hence should be globalized? Do these values form a universal culture as distinct from local cultures? Are they sufficient to establish a flourishing culture; if not, what is their role in cultural communication between different peoples? What message is expressed by a local culture, and what about it should be preserved and appreciated in a world that is increasingly becoming a global village?

It is not my intention to treat all these issues one by one – some of them will be dealt with only indirectly as our analyses proceed. We will begin our discussion with the last point mentioned, namely, a search for the *raison d’être* of plurality and diversity in cultural matters.

GLOBALIZATION AND IDENTITY: APPRECIATING DIVERSITY

Do we need plurality, diversity, locality, and heterogeneity? It is hardly possible to formulate this issue as an open question without implying a value judgment concerning the answer that would be most desirable. It is nevertheless worthwhile to keep in mind that our real point of interest is how things really are, not what we wish them to be.

Each of us sooner or later asks her/himself this question, typically in an encounter with cultures other than our own, with their diverse

languages, religious and moral perceptions, customs, aesthetic and social values, and political and economic traditions. We are often torn between contradictory emotions in the face of such perplexing diversity. On the one hand, we become lost and confused in our understanding and emotions insofar as we cannot penetrate the spiritual world of another culture spontaneously, immediately, and without effort. We have no clue to a universe built upon unfamiliar cultural foundations. On the other hand, we experience a kind of liberation, anticipating that new and as yet unheard of perspectives will open themselves to us and enrich us as we meet a new culture and discover its uniqueness and intriguing qualities. We are thus torn between a need for security and a sense of curiosity, both of which belong to the essence of the human condition and render our lives genuinely human. Success in maintaining our spiritual health depends on the ability to preserve the fragile balance between these seemingly contradictory impulses within human person, as is often the case in many other respects as well.

We begin to appreciate the importance of this ability as soon as we become aware of the distortions that often result from an overemphasis on either security or curiosity at the expense of the other. For example, a person may feel uneasiness and embarrassment when faced with another culture that is not immediately transparent to him, which presents itself as other, foreign, unfamiliar, alien, and perhaps even inimical. Overcoming this first immediate reaction usually requires much effort and time, and some persons never succeed in doing so. In contrast, however, many people would go so far as to reject their original cultural heritage and absorb themselves completely in the new cultural world they have encountered.

But both self-defensive immersion into the safe world of one's inherited culture and unrestricted self-identification with another are extremes that have nothing to do with a genuine appreciation of the message and content of either a native or a foreign culture – both are involved solely with form, not content. One who hides himself in the bosom of what is known and familiar fails to meet the world and begins to perceive his own culture as a continuation and part of his living environment. He approaches his culture as one more tool to enhance the possibility of his self-survival. He does not experience the liberating spiritual force inherent in all human cultures that drives a human person to unfold his highest human (and even supra-human) potentialities. If all of us behaved in this type of way, our native cultures would be doomed to stagnate and wither away.

If we disregard such ulterior motives as the economic or social advantages that may be associated with a new culture, it becomes clear that what often drives one to forget one's native culture and uncritically appropriate a new one is a flight from oneself and one's boredom, that is, an inability to discover and live in the depth of one's own cultural world. Although a genuine and radical cultural conversion implies a shift from a previous set of values to a newer one, and thus presupposes an act of rejection, one typically seeks to retain everything that was experienced as

valuable in the first tradition. That is to say that only a “conversion” to a new ideology that replaces and exploits culture involves a ruthless denial of one’s previous life as a whole. It is impossible to hate what once was truly experienced as one’s genuine home.

I will utilize four approaches to our initial question in the endeavor to develop certain considerations that may help us assess the above mentioned emotional responses and formulate a tentative answer. These are the phenomenological (or epistemological), empirical, personalistic, and sociological perspectives. While these are clearly not the only ones available for carrying out our task, they mutually amplify, complement, and correct each other insofar as they draw upon different constituents of human existence. We will first consider the phenomenological perspective.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL (EPISTEMOLOGICAL) PERSPECTIVE

Historically speaking, phenomenology as a way of philosophizing arose at the beginning of the last century in response to the challenge presented by an intellectual situation in which philosophy was about to irrevocably lose its claim to illuminate the objective reality of things. In the opinion of many original phenomenological thinkers, including Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach, philosophy at the time was characterized by being performed at a very great distance from things themselves. This had taken on a number of different forms, each of which was subject to strong criticism. One example was the Kantian renunciation of the very possibility to reach things in themselves, which could only result in a transcendental and idealist philosophy of consciousness. Much philosophical thinking had also been captivated by the radically and narrowly objectivist views of empiricist schemata, which were deliberately opposed to the highly speculative approach of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. But although empiricism claimed that it was faithful to experience, it in fact separated the human person from the reality of things, closing him in within the immanence of his sensations and sensual impressions by virtue of its highly controversial notion of experience. A kind of escapism into the history of philosophy, or “notional philosophy” as Husserl termed it, was often viewed as the only alternative to these apparent extremes. This was inspired by the widespread view that we were unable in principle to break through the confines of our subjectivity to the reality of things themselves.²

Phenomenology thus perceived itself as an attempt to bridge the distance between consciousness and objective reality, with the key principles in this regard being the notions of “experience,” “intentionality,” and “phenomenon.” It was argued in a certain sense that, strictly speaking, there was nothing to bridge at all. Consciousness is not something “in here” as opposed to objective reality, which is “over there,” insofar as they are intentionally correlated with each other. Phenomenology consequently

maintains that experience in the proper sense of the term (so-called original experience) is not a causal relation to things, but rather an essentially cognitive, spiritual, and immediate contact with them in which they become “bodily self-present” to our consciousness. Phenomenology argues that we are able not only to utter the truth of things in our correct propositions, but to experience it directly. Objects through being experienced shine forth into human consciousness and become phenomena for it. Moreover, these phenomena are not merely subjective entities construed by the human or supra-human transcendental consciousness as intermediaries between mind and reality because experience presents us with the thing itself by virtue of its intentional character. What is given in its self-givenness is not an effect of something else that itself is essentially concealed from human consciousness. “Phenomenon” consequently does not mean mere appearance or semblance, but rather the self-revelation or manifestation of reality itself in and through human consciousness.

Phenomenology argues that the only way in which we can know a particular thing is through the manifold of appearances proper to its being and nature, and that the identity of a thing is given and recognized in and through this manifold of appearances. Everything that belongs to our life world – whether a table or a horse, our own self or another person, values or happiness, social acts or acts of reasoning, culture or tradition – discloses itself to us in and through the manifold of its possible appearances, under certain limited aspects, and from a certain perspective. It must be emphasized that these appearances are the ways a thing is in its being – they are not our arbitrary constructs, but belong to the very being of the thing itself. And although this identity comes to the fore in each and every appearance, it is neither exhausted in nor reducible to either a particular single appearance or to the sum of appearances. That is to say that a thing in its identity not only transcends how it is experienced at any given moment, it always possesses more that can be possibly experienced by any given person. In the course of our lives we come to know things better and better – we discover new relationships obtaining between different objects that were previously concealed from us, we hear the opinions of others about the things in question, we read books about them, we introduce them into new settings, and so forth. We gradually articulate the identity of a given thing in the course of assimilating our different experiences of it, and it thereby becomes ever richer for us.

A tremendous increase in the richness and transcendence of identity occurs when I realize that I am not the only one to whom this same being presents itself in the manifold of its appearances. And since other persons are related to a thing in other ways than I am, there are other possibilities for the thing to manifest itself in its being. Robert Sokolowski succinctly states what crucial implications this discovery has for the intersubjective givenness of a thing:

One of the possibilities that is opened up, for example, is the power to appreciate that an object, say text [as well as artistic and cultural objects, moral situations, and religious identities – TD], can be far better understood by another than by me. I may realize that the identity and the manifold given to me are very obscure and confused compared to what is grasped by my colleague, who brings out of the text things I never seem able to discover on my own.³

Attaining a genuine understanding of a thing involves a lengthy process in which we actualize its truth in evidence and bring forth its presence in its manifestations. Husserl maintains that evidence, and hence understanding, is in fact the experience of truth. However, insofar as it is not an easy task to follow a path that leads us to the truth of a being in its self-disclosure, we often end up in confusion about how things really are. This takes place when we exercise a mistaken type of intending in respect to them, such as when we intend the objects of atomic physics as if they were billiard balls or reach out intentionally to God as if He were a mere part of our universe. The aim of phenomenology is to highlight for us the experience in which the identity of a given thing shows itself most clearly and distinctly. It thus informs us, for example, that a person who is in love with another is in a far better position than one who does not to truly discover and bring to evidence what it means to be an irreducible and unrepeatable personality.⁴

It follows from this description that it is necessary to acknowledge and appreciate cultural diversity in that it reveals the various authentic ways in which people come to perceive, understand, and respond to the common world we share. It is also important to emphasize, however, that genuine appreciation is possible only when we recognize that all of us, regardless of the cultures to which we belong, are concerned about one and the same truth that transcends all cultural boundaries and thereby calls for humility in our claims to gain access to it. Cultures deserve appreciation neither because all are equally hopeless in attaining truth, nor because there is no truth and nothing to attain, as it is often argued. On the contrary, a particular culture warrants appreciation and respect only insofar as it strives for truth, wishes to share its achievements, and is willing to listen to and evaluate the achievements of other cultures. It also follows that fundamentalism of all stripes is an erroneous undertaking that should never be adopted.

The second presupposition concerning a genuine and mutual recognition among cultures – not merely tolerant indifference – is that all must be prepared to acknowledge that discrepancies may exist between them in respect to their success in attaining the primordial truth of things. If phenomenology is truthful to the way things are (and I believe it is), then we cannot avoid assuming that “We do have to wait for the right person [or culture – TD] and the right moment for the truth to appear... Not everyone is equal when it comes to evidence; we must be prepared for it... We are not equal when it comes to bringing out the truth of things.”⁵

Although this does not mean that there are superior or inferior cultures, it does mean that there may be more and less successful ones. Such an assertion may well lead to a great deal of cultural misunderstanding, if not conflict, if not viewed in light of the first presupposition above. It is meaningful solely against the background of our concern for the common truth, which in its identity is fundamentally one even though it appears in diverse manifestations.⁶ Only under such conditions can we avoid the danger of cultural relativism, with its dry indifference and tourist-like curiosity, and thus maintain and preserve cultural diversity and encourage a genuine interest in other cultures.

THE EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

We will now examine the second vantage point indicated above that reinforces our awareness of the need for cultural pluralism and diversity. There are three sets of considerations in this regard.

Finitude of the Human Person

In contrast to trends in philosophy prevalent at the beginning of the last century, phenomenology reasserted with a new force of ingenuity and argumentation an old conviction that had been held by virtually all great minds in the previous philosophical tradition, namely, that man is a being capable of living in the presence of truth and acting in conformity with it. It upheld the view that man is a responsible agent of truth, and that this is what makes him human. Phenomenology also acknowledged the finitude of the human person, which lies at the core of man's self-understanding in Christian terms. The phenomenological understanding of the life of human reason and of mankind's intentional relation to reality thereby made it possible to preserve a mystery that is an essential aspect of reality itself, not merely a temporary limitation that can be overcome in the future. That is to say that truth infinitely surpasses what one man or all humanity can ever attain in their quest for knowledge – being is always richer than we can imagine.

However, our human condition is such that we cannot keep forever manifest a given thing that we have come to know, for a thing is always given to us in the interplay of its presences and absences. Nor can we have the world in all its richness present for us at one and the same time. With every new breakthrough to being – with every new success in evidencing the truth of things – various previous achievements of truth recede into the background and fade away. As one thing emerges to light in our consciousness, another comes to givenness not in its presence, but rather in its absence. We try to “fix” our experiences of truth in propositional form, but many of them thereby become a body of knowledge that is never actualized again. Sokolowski thus refers to phenomenology as “philosophical archeology” in the sense that it views one of its major tasks

as comprising the reviving and re-actualizing of those achievements of truth that have become taken for granted and “frozen” in the depths of human culture. Examples of this are provided by the foundations of mathematical and geometrical knowledge, which function as certain and necessary presuppositions upon which further knowledge is built.⁷

We therefore cannot dispense with the help of others if we are sincere in our thirst for truth and reality. We must include the perspectives of others in our presentation of a given thing if we indeed wish to go beyond our finitude and achieve a more complete and more perfect understanding of the issue in question. Other people and other cultures constantly remind us that however perfect our perspective may seem to be, it is still capable of being perfected through a friendly and critical encounter with the perspectives of others. This will become more clear as we examine another empirical observation, namely, that not only are we finite, we are also seriously flawed in our abilities to live in the light of truth.

Depravation of Human Nature

It is not necessary to have recourse to Christian Revelation or other religious traditions in order to recognize that there is something fundamentally wrong with mankind. We simply cannot escape this awareness, for it inevitably imposes itself on us through the manifold of our daily experiences. As a consequence, we often find ourselves to be strangers in an alien world and seek to save ourselves solely by our own efforts. We endeavor to master reality through our own methods and technologies, but this only reinforces our estrangement and alienation. And if we forget the truth about our deplorable situation, this oblivion strikes back at us, resulting in totalitarian utopias and the massive destruction of human lives.

We need to free ourselves from the illusion of being omnipotent if we would establish a truly human and cultural co-existence – we must acknowledge our finitude as well as our depravity. The catastrophes of our own making that have befallen us stem from the conviction that there is no meaning that can be thought, discovered, and acknowledged in being itself, that we are the creators of all meaning and values, and that we project these creations of ours onto the things around us. Abolishing the principle of truth and denying that it is mankind’s vocation to live in the presence and manifestation of truth have paved the way to the unlimited dominance of the principle of power, whereby might becomes right.

There is no better way to oppose the claim of complete human autonomy than by rediscovering the sacred. Leszek Kołakowski emphasizes the role played by the sacred in human affairs in “The Revenge of the Sacred in Secular Culture,” where he states that

With the disappearance of the sacred, which imposed limits to the perfection that could be attained by the profane, arises one of the most dangerous illusions of our

civilization – the illusion that there are no limits to the changes that human life can undergo, that society is “in principle” an endlessly flexible thing, and that to deny this flexibility and this perfectibility is to deny man’s total autonomy and thus to deny man himself... The utopia of man’s perfect autonomy and the hope of unlimited perfection may be the most efficient instruments of suicide ever to have been invented by human culture.⁸

Let us examine this insight more closely.

The presence of the sacred introduces an infinite perspective into our vision of the world. We then begin to understand that truth not only surpasses our abilities quantitatively, but is also essentially beyond our merely human reach. Truth is not finite, but infinite, and it belongs to God, not to man. The primary truth is not expressed in our own words, but in being itself, and our understanding of truth is always finite and limited – always in need of completion, complementation, and correction. The presence of the sacred introduces a setting within which we begin to realize that we need the presence of others. Insofar as cultural relativism limits us to the finite, it provides no clue for how to approach other cultures as authentic, albeit imperfect, ways to truth. Instead of opening us to the infinite that we share, it denies the setting that is an indispensable condition for perceiving other cultures as capable of enriching one’s own perspective from the treasures of their knowledge. Diversity can be maintained without implying conflict only if it is experienced as a response to a common reality and as a relatedness to the universal all-encompassing point of reference.

I strongly believe that it is vitally important for any cultural appreciation and interchange that we acknowledge the sacred as an essential and indispensable part of our cultural horizons. Only the presence of the sacred can introduce into our perceptions of the world a perspective of truth that is not relative to our desires and wishes, vital needs and organic drives, whims and caprices. Only an awareness that truth is infinite and not finite – that the ultimate meaning of things, man, and the world is revealed only in their relationship to the Uncreated Being, which constitutes an awareness that truth is a way of being rather than a creation of man – is capable of safeguarding humankind against the constant temptation to worship not God Himself, but our culturally and historically determined ideas of God. The latter in fact transform religion into an ideology at the service of secular forces and their unlimited search for power. Let me reiterate: The renunciation of the spirit of truth in human culture clears the ground for the principle of power to become dominant, which leads in the final analysis to the enslavement of man.

The presence of the sacred in human culture should indeed facilitate cross-cultural communication rather than constitute an obstacle to it. The sacred exercises, on the one hand, a conservative function that sanctifies the established ways of living and acting.⁹ In today’s world, however, we

instead need to reassert and emphasize its other function, namely, that it places limits on man's claim to absolute autonomy in determining what is good and evil. The policy of relativistic generosity has become bankrupt in light of the fact that we now have in our hands the power to annihilate humankind. Not only do we no longer have the right to play with the concept of cultural relativism as we once did, we need to reinforce the principle of truth and universal human values with a new vigor in order to counter the destructive forces now at loose in the world. The "principle of power" is both a dominant and organic element in the present political situation, and this situation has brought us to a most serious impasse.¹⁰

It is important to note that the conscious recognition of our own finitude and contingency has nothing to do with self-humiliation and a renunciation of any motivation for progress and development. In negative terms, it destroys the utopian and disastrous idea of man's omnipotence and introduces a sound awareness that every step forward in one direction can very well entail a step backwards in another and perhaps more important direction. In positive terms, it appeals to the need to cultivate an ethos of humility and solidarity rather than one of success and efficiency.

Let us now discuss what this ethical change entails in terms of the human person's relation to the world.

The Ethos of Humility

It is difficult to discuss humility in positive terms today. This can be partially explained by the fact that Christianity has lost its appeal for many people in Western countries insofar as they have been uprooted from their Christian cultural background by the relentless efforts of the secular mode of living and thinking characteristic of Western civilization since the Enlightenment. Because humility was most consistently lived in the atmosphere of Christian culture, it could not help but lose its impact upon the souls of people as its importance was undermined within that culture. Since humility bears the hallmark of a Christian virtue, it shared the fate of Christianity itself.¹¹

Moreover, the image of humility that exists in the minds of many of our contemporaries, not least of all because of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity, is far from attractive. Who would dare to praise humility if it is depicted as servility and compliance? Who would dare to be humble if humility is pictured as an inferiority complex or as a morbid and pathological overemphasis on one's own wretchedness and limitedness? Who would wish to be accused of being a conformist? Who would prefer that his behavior be associated with timidity, faintheartedness, and an escape from accepting any responsibility whatsoever? Who would seek to be humble if that meant being too weak to resist and revolt, too cowardly to take a risk and engage in conflict? Who would aim to be regarded as a person easily and unresistingly manipulated, complacent with trivialities, incapable of great deeds, and lacking all creative power and imagination? If

humility were really something of that sort, Nietzsche would have been perfectly right in calling it the virtue of slaves. But genuine humility has nothing to do with such descriptions.

Yet because of such views, drawing an accurate picture of humility is an extremely challenging philosophical task that is properly the subject of another discussion. It would comprise a contribution, albeit indirect in character, to the articulation of the deepest insights of the Christian mode of thinking about human nature and the human condition.

What then can we say here about the essence of humility? Perhaps the most concise and profound definition was provided by G. K. Chesterton in his *Autobiography*, where he speaks of humility as the abandonment of any sense that one is worthy of any good or kindness s/he receives.¹² This has nothing to do with self-repugnance or a renunciation of one's own dignity and worth, nor does it entail the repression of one's own self along with an awareness of the value of one's own being. Humility rather implies the insight that whatever one has or receives is not something that he/she deserves. A humble person regards everything good that s/he either possesses or is about to possess not as something to which he or she may justly lay claim, but as a gift that has been bestowed.¹³

Contrasting humility with pride may help to cast its nature in greater relief.¹⁴ For example, what is peculiar about the proud, self-complacent person is the conviction that everything positive that happens to her/him is due to his/her own value. The focus is on one's self-glorification, whereby everything positive that happens is viewed as a confirmation and manifestation of the incomparable "preciousness" of one's own self. The good that happens is not regarded as contributing in some way to one's "importance" or "perfection," but is rather experienced as confirming that the latter traits are already present in one's self by definition. The proud person is self-sufficient, and only "his own precious self" is so dear that it could not be replaced by something else. The proud person can thus neither truly appreciate things, nor rejoice over them.

With this in mind, we can appreciate Chesterton's striking statement that only someone who regards her/himself as unworthy of a flower is capable of rejoicing over it. We might paraphrase Chesterton and state that only someone who regards her/himself as unworthy of a flower is capable of even noticing it and paying attention to it in the literal sense of the term. Only someone who regards her/himself as unworthy of a flower is capable of wondering at its presence. Only someone who regards her/himself as unworthy of a flower is capable of viewing it as a gift and being grateful for it. Only someone who regards her/himself as unworthy of a flower is capable of appreciating it for its own sake. Only a humble person is capable of doing such things.

It is humility that enables a person to perceive the world and everything in it as a gift. Only someone who regards anything of positive importance as something s/he does not deserve can experience it as a gift and feel grateful for it. Only such a person can encounter things with the

wonder that is so important for any philosophical inquiry. One then looks at the world with open eyes and not in some restricted fashion that is contingent upon one's self-attachment to the demands of pride or desire. Humility makes a person immune to a merely pragmatic approach to things. One who is humble aspires to leave the environment and enter the world as it is in itself. Humility always entails overcoming the immanence of the environment and the profane everyday appearance of things that it imposes on us. For one who is humble, reality ceases to be "*selbstverständlich*" and becomes interesting. Humility makes a person open, sensitive, and susceptible to those things that s/he may not have noticed before. One who is humble does not experience reality as something typical and ordinary, but always wonders at the riches it presents to one's sight.

Humility heals our mind and soul from the curse of the human race whereby we very often take a notice of a thing only because it is something rare, exclusive, and inaccessible. While we consider ourselves happy and wealthy at the moment we finally possess it, we are bored with it at the very next moment and crave new impressions. We become accustomed to things all too readily and lose the experience of their original freshness and novelty. It happens that we value something only when we first possess it or when we lose it. This is our pride at work.

Pride takes everything in the world for granted – and a person who is proud feels like a beggar precisely for that reason. However much one has, it always seems too little and one behaves as a person who always needs something. One approaches everyone as if they are debtors who owe him/her something. One never seems to have what one should have had and perceives her/himself as never appreciated enough by others.

Only humility can make a person genuinely wealthy since it opens the soul to all possible values in the world. Only one who considers oneself as deserving of nothing and takes nothing for granted is capable of being sensitive to every value, however small and insignificant, and of rejoicing over even the most innocent and elementary things. Only for this type of person does the world deserve wonder and gratitude. But humility is also a virtue of service that implies a certain degree of courage, for one who is humble does not become absorbed with and closed in upon himself, but rather opens himself to everything in the world. Such a person courageously takes the risk of self-abandonment, of confidence and trust in another, of love and sympathy. One cannot live for others without a certain amount of humility in one's soul.¹⁵

Humility implies the ethos of receiving, but the proud and self-complacent person neither wants neither to receive anything as a gift, for this is experienced as making one dependent upon the giver, nor owe anything to anybody. For the sake of a false self-sufficiency, a proud person takes the route of deliberate alienation from reality. In contrast to pride, humility prompts the human person to engage in the course of the world, in a dialogue with reality, and not aspire to manipulate it to serve one's own needs and preferences. Humility flows from a person's trust in and reliance

upon being and God, while the proud person welcomes, or at least tolerates, the existence of evil in the world since it enables one to relish his/her perceived perfection and superiority.

We need humility in order to emerge from the apparent self-sufficiency of our own cultures and become able to appreciate what is "other." We need humility in order to approach being receptively and not aggressively. We need humility in order to let truth to shine forth within our consciousness and our existence and live as responsible agents of truth in the world.

THE PERSONALISTIC PERSPECTIVE

In order to properly address our initial question, it is necessary to take into consideration the issue of the peculiarly personal nature of human beings. What does it mean for a man or woman to be a person? What distinguishes them as persons from the impersonal world as a whole? In answering these questions, we need to take into account the scope of the present discussion and restrict ourselves to as modest a presentation of the problem as possible.

Robert Spaemann, in seeking to delineate what is characteristic of a human being as a person, points to the fact that the concrete human being stands in a quite distinct relation to his human nature, a relation that is utterly different from the relation of a particular dog to its "dogness." He states that "Der Mensch ist offenbar nicht auf die gleiche Weise Mensch, wie der Hund Hund ist, nämlich als unmittelbare Instantiierung seines Artbegriffs."¹⁶ Stated otherwise, the ontological fullness of a particular human being is not explained by merely referring to him/her as one particular exemplar of a universal human nature – s/he is clearly more than a mere instantiation of that nature. But what then is a human person?

We define the personal identity of a human being not through the qualitative characteristics of human nature as such, however much the latter serve as its indispensable foundation. "Whom we are is obviously not simply identical with what we are."¹⁷ For example, if I were asked who I am, my answer would be "I am Taras Dobko." But if I were asked what I am, I would be inclined to answer "I am a man." It is thus my human nature with its qualitative characteristics that defines my identity as a human being and distinguishes me from the stone on the road or the cat on the roof. But my identity, whereby I differ from other human beings, is defined by my person, that is, a personal dimension of my being that is not shared by other people but rather belongs exclusively to me and cannot be taken away from me.

The being of a particular human person cannot be reduced merely to her/his humanity, that is, to that dimension of being which all people share. When we refer to a human person as a person, we emphasize that dimension of his/her being that belongs exclusively to him and to no one else, where s/he is incommunicably him/herself and no one else. This emphasizes that the human person is more than a mere instantiation of the

generic human essence, just one of the many possible cases of that essence. The human person has a human nature and embodies it, but he/she is not that nature in the sense of being dissolved in it in the way a particular dog is a mere instance of its species.¹⁸

In light of this peculiar dimension of our being, Dietrich von Hildebrand introduces the concept of the “Eigenleben” of the human person, which refers to whatever constitutes the incommunicable “personal life of a human person as a self.”¹⁹ von Hildebrand states that “Tua res agitur” is the uniting principle of all that forms the content of a person’s *Eigenleben*.

Jeder Mensch hat ein “Eigenleben” im Sinne aller der Inhalte, die sich auf ihn, auf seine “Angelegenheiten” und insbesondere auf sein Glück beziehen. In diesem Sinne umfaßt “Eigenleben” nur diejenigen Dinge, die ihn (diesen Menschen) als individuelle Person in besonderer Weise angehen, alles das, von dem gilt: “Tua res agitur.”²⁰

Eigenleben neither is a sign or expression of a human person’s alleged egocentricity, nor should it be regarded as something negative and incompatible with her/his being a person. On the contrary, it presupposes being a person or, more precisely, being a personal self. No animal or plant can, by definition, possess such a life, for it is by nature solely the privilege of the person. The possession of an *Eigenleben* is rooted in the personal dignity of the human being, in the spiritual dimension of her/his nature.

Eigenleben brings to evidence the fact that the human spirit cannot live in an undifferentiated abstract space with no point of personal attachment. In cultural terms it means that the identity of a culture emerges as an expression of the personal identity of the human person and has a characteristically anthropological foundation. The diversity of local cultures results both 1) from the irreducible differences in personalities among human beings and 2) from their ability to communicate and share with each other their experiences of truth. Culture with its specific points of attachment arises from people living and acting together in response to the manifestations and challenges of reality around them.

Is such living together limited merely to bodily and spatial proximity? Certainly not. This is evidenced by the emergence of, on the one hand, more inclusive and, on the other, thinner cultural identities (civilizational, national, regional, and so forth) that transcend immediate bodily proximity. Does this mean that a new and even more inclusive culture may arise that in a sense is universal insofar as new means of transportation and communication have made it possible for us to be more intensely present in and presented with the lives of others? This may very well be the case, for there is inherently no obstacle or impediment to such a process. This may in fact be a consequence of the organic development of human life and human interrelations. But this assertion does not imply that the differences between different cultural layers will disappear – differences

in proximity will remain and affect our involvement or “living together” with others. Family should and will forever remain the thickest cultural entity while so-called “universal culture” should and will be the thinnest. The most important issue is rather to provide a setting – both existential and legal – in which the priority of the thicker identities will be safeguarded, the significance of the thinner identities will not be underestimated, and one identity will not be played off against others.

The concept of “home,” which I believe signifies a genuine anthropological and cultural phenomenon, may help us better understand the role that culture plays in human life. To be “at home” with something means to be familiar with it, comprehend it from within, and be intimately connected with it. It means that something presents itself to us as actualizing our unique potentialities, appeals to the irreducible depths of our own personality, and is open, unconcealed, friendly, and good for us. Home means safety, security, stability, order, rootedness, and attachment. And it is our culture through which we build our spiritual home – it is our culture that settles us at home in the world. We may invite someone to visit us in our home and gain an understanding of what our culture is, but this invitation is sincere only when we want our guests to feel at home by displaying on our part an openness and a willingness to understand what it means for them to be in their own homes.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

We often hear the sacramental phrase “All cultures are equal.” Does this imply, as appears to be the case with cultural relativism, that all cultures have an equally poor ability to be authentically related to truth? Certainly not. The only legitimate meaning this phrase has is that there is no culture from which we cannot learn something of value. I have argued above that there is a sense in which we may speak of more and less successful cultures in respect to their abilities to illuminate truths that remain obscure or even hidden within other cultural horizons. We should sharply distinguish, however, between claims to exclusivity and claims to relative success. There is nothing offensive or out of place in saying that a given culture has succeeded in discovering and embodying some universal value in a way that others have not such that it may be realized in other cultural contexts as well. For example, the fact that personal freedom was ultimately discovered and has been most consistently lived in Western culture does not render it a “merely” Western value that is unsuitable in some sense for other civilizations.

The fact that certain truths can appear in their purity only in certain cultural settings does not belittle in any way the messages of other cultures. It only testifies to that phenomenological discovery concerning the human condition which Max Scheler termed the “sociology of knowledge.” All possible circumstances, including historical and cultural ones, both contribute to and account for the fact that some aspect of truth manifests

itself in human history at a particular historical moment. Although truth itself is not contingent on historical or cultural consciousness, the discovery or manifestation of it is. It is then no wonder that certain cultural contexts – when things ultimately shine forth into human consciousness the way they really are – facilitate the emergence of a given truth while others hinder its appearance. The appreciation of a given value may at times require that one’s own culture acquire the sensibilities of other cultural horizons in order to remove obstacles to the discovery, and not mere borrowing, of the value in question for oneself.

The importance of tradition emerges with a new force from this perspective. What one should learn from tradition is not a set of bare facts, but rather ways (methods) of experiencing – of having living contact with – the reality of things. Tradition transmits modes of approaching and experiencing reality, and the dismissal of tradition can block forever the unique sources of experience.

Cultures can be legitimately considered “relative” only in the sense that one renounces claims concerning the exclusivity of their value-perceptions. Can a particular culture go astray in its basic value-perceptions? This can no doubt happen. It is even possible for cultural hallucinations and illusions to occur. Moreover, it has often been the case in human history that a particular culture has been unable to find within its own resources the spiritual energy needed to test and correct its own vision of the world. Consequently, different cultures need each other to remain faithful to their common objective, namely, to enable persons to emerge from their immediate environments and encounter the world, which is always a common world.

Culture is the fruit and expression of the human encounter with the world that all human beings share. We have already noted that it is impossible to appreciate another culture without the presupposition of a common world – otherwise nothing more than the idle curiosity of the tourist is possible. Only under the condition of a common world shared by all human beings can another culture become truly interesting and attractive as a matrix that invites a person to explore the world from a different perspective. Culture arises as the response of a people to the way the world presents itself to them, and it emerges as a spiritual space in which human life unfolds. And this space is informed by the shared religious, moral, aesthetic, political, and economic sensibilities of a particular people.

Cultural interaction and interchange is a necessary condition for any advance in our knowledge of the world. The abundant examples of Jews who achieved outstanding spiritual results within the setting of Western civilization reveal that an “outside” position with respect to a specific cultural milieu – which by definition brings to its inhabitants a feeling of security in dealing with the world – may provide a considerable advantage in respect to discovering new ways of perceiving and understanding.²¹ Viewed from this perspective, globalization in the sense of the

transformation of the globe into a “village” can be of great benefit to the whole of humankind.

GLOBALIZATION AND IDENTITY: APPRECIATING UNIVERSALITY

After having discussed why diversity and heterogeneity are the meaningful categories of a life that is specifically human, we will now proceed to ask similar questions concerning universality and homogeneity. Do we need such values as, for example, universality, globality, commonality, and homogeneity?

Various authors acknowledge to differing degrees the need for some universal cultural horizon or foundation insofar as there must be something that unites people and binds them together in spite of all the differences between them. Fukuyama, for example, looks to the rediscovery of the full import of the human nature as a unifying point of reference.²² He views the democratic values of personal freedom, human rights, civil equality, participation in political power, and economic freedom as grounded in human nature and, as a result, demands that they be globalized throughout the world. Huntington, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of finding commonalities between different people and their cultures in order to establish mutual self-understanding, and he finds the most important of such commonalities to include the universal moral aversion to torture, treason, the sexual abuse of children and women, and the slaughter of innocent people.²³ He seems to believe, however, that these commonalities can be singled out of existing sets of values simply through a comparison of different cultures. Huntington is apparently unwilling to acknowledge that there can be values within a particular culture that may be vitally important to any possible culture as it strives to maintain its truly human character. He would be even more reluctant to admit that such commonalities constitute a kind of universal culture of their own.

In the following I will not address the issue of universality directly, as I did in the discussion above concerning the need for diversity. I will rather proceed indirectly by referring, among other things, to what is and is not “cultural relativism.” I have already touched upon this phenomenon while arguing that, in order to fully appreciate diversity, we must go beyond the framework of cultural relativism and recognize that we all relate to one and the same common world, albeit in different ways.

A series of questions serves to begin a more close examination of certain issues in this regard: How far can the discovery of the “other” go? What entails the recognition of his uniqueness and the appreciation of his cultural identity? How close could we come to agreement about the equality of all cultures? Is there something that all cultures necessarily share if cultural interchange is to be at all possible? Can there be limits to the appreciation of diversity in another culture beyond which we should rather speak of barbarism, not diversity?

We define barbarism as a self-closed, isolated, and thus self-complacent existence that ultimately ends in xenophobia and cultural fanaticism. In contrast, the characteristics of civilized humanity include the capability for self-transcendence, openness to the “other,” the appreciation of differences, a critical attitude to one’s own self and culture, resignation from one’s own exclusiveness, and a readiness to see oneself from the outside perspective of the “other.”²⁴ The real issue for a genuine culture is therefore the following: To what extent can unwillingness to be a barbarian require indifference to one’s own identity and, more importantly in the present context, allow for the barbarism of others? Is it compatible with the spirit of respect for other cultures to tolerate any barbarism that may come to the fore in their expressions? Should we leave them intact in their self-complacency and self-absolutization?

The answer appears to be quite obvious, namely, the culture of civilized humanity as defined here has a justified claim to universality and globalization. Moreover, cultural relativism reinforces the temptation to barbarism, which will remain as a constant threat until man becomes what he truly is.²⁵

Kořakowski discusses in “From Truth to Truth” the criteria that enable us to determine the worth of a specific belief. He states that

There are forms of belief that reinforce hatred and others that strengthen love in humans. Naturally, we all carry the potential for hatred and love in us, and insofar as a belief is able to stimulate in us the energy of love and to weaken or destroy the store of hatred, to such an extent a belief is good.²⁶

This principle should be applied to cultural expressions as well. The fact that we often have ulterior motives concerning others and tend to abuse judgment by declaring them to be misanthropic should in no way discourage us from recognizing that there may be times when we are obliged to pass judgment and face the consequences of doing so. In spite of all our possible limitations, of which we must always be aware, we are nevertheless able to discern what is good and what is evil, what promotes love and what advocates hatred. To renounce this responsibility would amount to paving the way to a new totalitarianism reminiscent of what we painfully witnessed in the last century with the rise of communist and Nazi ideologies.

The problem with the globalization of universal values is that other cultures reach us more often than not as ideologies or objects of aesthetical admiration rather than as something to learn from. Neither is culture a matter of mere taste, as cultural relativism holds it to be, nor is it primarily a hermeneutic matrix that provides us access to reality. What is at stake here is truth, not taste. Every culture must be self-critical and, in a sense, uncertain of its success in order to prevent the transformation of truth into an ideology. It is the task of philosophers, poets, and artists to maintain self-

reflection and this healthy uncertainty, for without these cultural interchange and appreciation are doomed to fail from the beginning.

But a sound and mutually fruitful cultural interchange is only possible when both sides are more or less secure in their identities. Europe, which now appears to be undergoing a problem of identity, provides a good illustration of this point. For instance, the irritation felt by so many people when confronted with American mass culture or with the cultural identities of immigrants is a psychological effect of the long process of gradually losing a specifically European identity, which is in fact rooted in the perversely understood ethics of cultural relativism and cultural egalitarianism. If the overcoming of barbarism is unable to dispense with indifference to one's own culture, then people in Europe will feel that their sense of home – of belonging to an intimate spiritual community – is threatened. More importantly, they might very well lose the ability to resist alien barbarism, whereby they could be forced to adopt a self-destructive attitude characteristic of a person who is devoid of any feeling of his/her own identity.

Through the painful experiences of the distorted forms that both the maintenance of cultural identity (as nationalism) and globalization (as cosmopolitanism) have recently assumed, Europeans have slowly come to rediscover their own cultural roots. Rocco Buttiglione defines European identity as a unity of openness to universal truth and of the concrete experience of such truth, arguing that Europe is a civilization that can open itself to the experience of other peoples without denying its own original culture.²⁷ He thus views Europe as primarily a philosophical or cultural notion not restricted to a certain geographical territory that is grounded in the appreciation of two fundamental human values, namely, truth and freedom. The European cultural space may thereby be regarded as extending far beyond the limits of the European continent and as comprising many other countries and peoples throughout the world that have incorporated the spirit of commitment to objective truth and human freedom into their own original cultures.

The challenge that emerges in this context is that we must strive to maintain a balance between universally valid values and those of particular cultures without falling prey to inhuman universalism and anti-human relativism. Thomas Friedman places the reader at the focal point of this discussion as he argues in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* in favor of a balance between globalization and identity.²⁸ He uses a Japanese automobile brand to symbolize the economic forces that drive globalization, but also brilliantly argues that each person has his own "olive tree" that embodies his/her personal attachments in life, feelings of home and family, and sense of intimacy and belonging to a close community. Friedman decidedly does not view the latter as a relic of some ancient or medieval mentality, but rather appreciates it as an expression of a person's essential particularity and personal identity.

The need to maintain a balance between globalization and identity is perhaps the most important challenge facing the contemporary world. Even the process of economic globalization is doomed to failure if it ignores the fundamental truth of the human person and does not meet the demands of his unique identity, which finds expression in so many things in human life.²⁹ Although Friedman provides a number of examples from his own experience in which the demands of globalization and identity come into conflict, even more important are his revealing examples of how these two sets of demands can be reconciled.³⁰

However paradoxical it may seem, a genuine appreciation of diversity can occur only against the background of universality as it is expressed in an attitude of openness, self-transcendence, critical self-evaluation, and the endeavor to live in the presence of truth. Only from such a perspective are we able to perceive other cultures not merely as accidental encounters, but as partners and companions along our common way.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT

Ukraine is still in the process of discovering her own original identity. Historical circumstances were such that the identity of Ukrainians was largely constituted in opposition to the neighboring Russians or Poles. The Soviet regime not only succeeded in deepening this self-defensive attitude, it also contributed to the development of new sources of resentment against those who seemed different, thought differently, and held different opinions. Unfortunately, however, genuine and trustworthy openness to the world outside is impossible if there is a void within and one does not feel secure in one's own identity.

Ukraine is now in search of her own religious, cultural, economic, political, and international identity. The fact that this search has quite often been painful comes as no surprise in light of the deep divisions in Ukrainian society. For example, there are four traditional Christian denominations, each of which claims to be the most traditional and the most Christian. There is also a wide and historically conditioned division between the eastern and western regions of Ukraine. There is, in addition, no political consensus concerning the direction the country should take, even though Ukraine desperately needs to establish its own self-directed process of globalization. But all talk about developing a Ukrainian national identity will never be more than mere words unless the country develops a culture of dialogue and succeeds in spiritual integration.

Philosophy faces a great challenge within this context that could be described as a profound need for self-understanding – it needs to establish its own identity as an independent and creative field in Ukraine today. The changing circumstances in the post-communist period demand a transition from the monopoly of a single philosophical system (Marxism) to pluralism concerning ways of thinking. Against this background, education in

philosophy must reconsider its aims and forge a new understanding of the value and role of philosophy as a reflective force in society.

Philosophy should open itself to all endeavors for the establishment of social consensus and seek a deeper stratum upon which to develop a love for and a culture of truth. It should motivate people to think about all matters in a spirit of openness, thereby helping us to better understand other opinions, recognize their complementary character, and avoid the dangers of self-complacency and self-sufficiency. Philosophy should work to redirect thinking from an exclusive concern with political or economical problems to a truly human concern that takes into account the person as whole with his/her religious, cultural, and social dimensions. Philosophy needs to appeal to experience in a way that allows people to avoid excessive speculation and bring about an interiorization of the results obtained. Only by being experienced can objective truth become a subjective reality *within*, and a living reality *for*, the human person.

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NOTES

¹ An exemplary treatment of the problem with reference to the issue of globalization and cultural diversity is George F. McLean's article "Cultural Identity and Globalization," which was presented at the *Globalization and Identity* seminar, CRVP, Washington, D.C., October-November, 2002.

² An extended and thoughtful exposition of the intellectual origins of phenomenology is Roman Ingarden's *Einführung in die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls, Osloer Vorlesungen 1967*, hrsg. von Gregor Haefliger. In Roman Ingarden (1992) *Gesammelte Werke*, hrsg. von Rolf Fieguth und Guido Künig, Band 4. Tübingen: Niemeyer. See particularly Erste Vorlesung: *Zur Geschichte der phänomenologischen Bewegung (I)*: 1-31; Zweite Vorlesung: *Zur Geschichte der phänomenologischen Bewegung (II)*: 33-67. Other readings of particular interest for the present discussion are Husserl, Edmund (1982) *Logical Investigations*. Trans. by J. N. Findlay, 2 vols. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Heidegger, Martin (1992) *Parmenides*. Trans. by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; and Scheler, Max (1973) *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*. Trans. by Manfred Frings and Roger Funk. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

³ Sokolowski, Robert (2000) *Introduction to Phenomenology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32.

⁴ An even sharper awareness of this is attained at the moment a loved one passes away.

⁵ Sokolowski 2000, p. 165.

⁶ In this respect, one is often troubled as to how s/he should react to the apparently absolutist position held by Christianity concerning the message of

Christ as the final Revelation of God. How can one reconcile Christ's divinity and the Church's continuous stress on the truth of Christian Revelation with a recognition of the authenticity of other messages and neither abandon the special status of Christ, nor disparage other religious traditions? There is only one possible answer to this dilemma, namely, Come and see for yourself! If you cannot attain the perspective Christ has opened up to us, do what you did when being faithful to the genuine spirit of your own religion. This means that if you search for truth as lovingly and passionately as you can, you will be saved. But although Christians believe that one becomes complete only through Christ's Revelation, this does not mean that one could ever understand it completely. A person is always *on the way* in his/her approach to Christ and His Revelation. Whatever help can be garnered from other cultures and religious traditions is to be welcomed.

⁷ The works of the early German phenomenologist Adolf Reinach contain brilliant articulations of the foundations of physics and mathematics in philosophical terms, including extensive phenomenological treatments of motion, number, and arithmetical operations. Reinach wrote with great precision and clarity and was considered to be one of the most promising thinkers in the field. His life was unfortunately cut short during the First World War, leaving us with only a few flashes of his genius.

⁸ See "The Revenge of the Sacred in Secular Culture." In Leszek Kolakowski (1990) *Modernity on Endless Trial*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, pp. 72-73. Also see Eliade, Mircea (1961) *The Sacred and the Profane*. Trans. by Willard R. Trask. New York: Harper and Row.

⁹ Enlightenment thinkers, who advocated the resolution of all conflict on purely rational grounds rather than through appeal to tradition or religious custom, focused upon this function of the sacred. Paradoxically, renouncing the ability to discover truth for the sake of focusing on our supposed ability to create it led in the long run to something it was meant to avoid, namely, an even greater assertion of the principle of power. What in fact took place after the abolition of the sacred in European culture was merely a shift in the orientation of aggressiveness – instead of being directed inward, it became channeled outward through the process of colonization. Even worse, when the sacred was put into the service of man's worldly interests, it was evoked to justify the increased will to power.

¹⁰ In order to avoid a future of perpetual international conflict in which the United States is hated and threatened with revenge by its enemies, it is necessary that world powers adopt a policy of cooperation and appreciation, thereby abandoning the policy of domination intended to maintain American geopolitical and economic interests that has flourished ever since the onset of the Cold War. Islamic countries are also undergoing a process of transformation as they have become caught up in the temptations of power, albeit for different reasons than the United States. It appears that the emergence of religious fundamentalism in the Islamic countries of the Middle East is in fact a reaction based on resentment to the humiliation experienced at the hands of the West rather than a genuine religious revival and a rediscovery of Islamic spirituality.

It provides a means for opposing the non-religious West and asserting superiority over one's God forsaken enemies.

¹¹ Humility appears to be the virtue that has suffered more than all other Christian ideals under the attack of atheistic culture, and there in fact seems to be a public atmosphere of misunderstanding, ignorance, and even hostility concerning it. One even has the impression at times that Christians themselves are ashamed of humility and do not wish to discuss it as a definitive mark of a truly Christian life. They fear that speaking about humility might constitute an obstacle to someone possibly interested in the Christian style of life. This is perhaps to be expected if Christians themselves now view humility, which has traditionally been a characteristic feature of their identity, as a stumbling block for their own self-understanding.

¹² See Chesterton, G. K. (1952) *Autobiography*. London: Hutchinson, Ch. XVI.

¹³ It is difficult even to imagine how it would be possible to fully appreciate this ideal and live in accordance with it in our predominantly *legalistic* culture.

¹⁴ By a proud person we mean one who is arrogant, haughty, and self-complacent, whose thoughts revolve around her/his own "dear self." We are not thinking of a person who is, for example, proud of his daughter or of his country. This latter type of pride presupposes an appreciation of a given thing in respect to its transcendent value and implies a reversal of attention from one's own self to the object of pride. "Being proud" in this regard indicates a particular mode of admiration in which one finds the object to be admirable in itself. Pride as opposed to humility implies, in contrast, that one is proud of one's country, for example, not because of its developed culture or international stance as such, but solely because it is *one's own* country that is developed and respected. Such a person would never identify with something perceived to be a defect or shortcoming in his/her country. S/he would never be in solidarity with its moments of wretchedness because the pride felt does not flow from self-abandonment to the object as such. The status of one's country would then not be valuable in itself, but would rather function as an ornament for "one's own precious self."

¹⁵ "The humble man regards as a mere consequence of his *position* what the servile man sees as *central*: the *will to rule!* And that which is *central* to him, the servile one regards as a consequence of his *position* only: the *willingness to serve!*" See Max Scheler (1989) "Humility." Trans. by Barbara Fiand. *Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 2.

¹⁶ Spaemann, Robert (1996) *Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen "etwas" und "jemand."* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, p. 16.

¹⁷ "Wer wir sind, ist offenbar nicht einfach identisch mit dem, was wir sind." Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁸ Our everyday experiences of our own person and of those around us, particularly observations concerning the moral life of human beings, reveal a unique being endowed with the unique characteristics of being an "end in himself" or a "whole in himself" who is not merely part of a larger whole. The human person in his selfhood manifests himself as a being who possesses

himself, as a being who is incommunicably his self, who is incommunicably his own. See John Crosby (1996) *The Selfhood of the Human Person*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.

¹⁹ von Hildebrand, Dietrich (1971) *Das Wesen der Liebe. Gesammelte Werke*, III Band. Regensburg: Josef Habel, Ch. IX.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 267.

²¹ “[T]hey (the Jews) were looked upon as alien bodies by the indigenous tribes, and it was probably this uncertain status, the lack of a well-defined identity, which enabled them *to see more and to question more* than those who were satisfied with their inherited and natural sense of belonging. One is even tempted to say that it was the anti-Semites who were to a large extent responsible for the extraordinary achievements of the Jews, precisely because by barring to them the path to *the moral and intellectual safety* of the tribal life they left them in the privileged position of outsiders.” See “In Praise of Exile,” Kołakowski 1990, p. 57.

²² Fukuyama, Francis (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

²³ Huntington, Samuel P. (1997) *The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Touchstone.

²⁴ See “The Search for the Barbarian,” Kołakowski 1990, for a discussion of these issues.

²⁵ “When we extend our generous acceptance of cultural diversity to all the rules of good and evil and aver, for example, that the ‘human rights’ idea is a European concept, unfit for, and unintelligible in, societies that share other traditions, do we mean that Americans rather dislike being tortured and packed into concentration camps, but Vietnamese, Iranians, and Albanians do not mind or enjoy it? ... Or, to put it crudely, shall we say that the difference between a vegetarian and a cannibal is just a matter of taste?” See “The Idolatry of Politics,” Kołakowski 1990, p. 150.

²⁶ “From Truth to Truth,” Kołakowski 1990, pp. 127-128.

²⁷ Buttiglione, Rocco and Jaroslaw Merecki (1996) *Europa jako pojecie filozoficzne (Europe as a Philosophical Concept)*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego.

²⁸ Friedman, Thomas L. (2000) *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Anchor Books.

²⁹ The priority of the human and the spiritual over the economic must be affirmed and restored, and the means for doing so necessarily involve policy changes as well as a sharpening of people’s sensitivity to ethical issues. Solzhenitsyn, for instance, calls us to a culture of ascetic self-limitation in opposition to the culture of consumption, which is clearly driven by both anthropological and social forces. The economy of consumption is further fueled by aggressive advertisement, the mass-media, and the modern life-style. It is thus necessary to release and cultivate those forces within the human person that are capable of counterbalancing the destructive impact of the mentality of consumption. Indeed, the drive for profitability gains force when it compensates for a failure to establish sound human relationships of love, friendship, trust, and so forth. Consequently, the restoration of family values

and the cultural promotion of an ethos of solidarity can empower people's opposition to the destructive effects of excessively economic globalization.

³⁰ One such example is the indication at prayer time of the direction to Mecca on the video displays within the passenger seating area of airliners with a point of arrival in an Arabic country. The observation of religious custom is thus facilitated through the achievements of technology, which is one of the primary fruits of economic globalization.

CHAPTER XIII

GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION: THE CASE OF EUROPE

TADEUSZ BUKSINSKI

THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The philosopher Robert Robertson examined the role of locality in the process of globalization in *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*.¹ He in fact identified two concurrent processes in this regard, namely, global unification, which assimilates the various cultural, political, and social structures, and differentiation, which keeps them apart. Robertson went on to argue that these two dimensions are mutually dependent upon each other, and that global structures and global institutions cannot function effectively without taking into account the role of local structures, institutions, organizations, powers, and cultures. This role has indeed grown in significance in recent decades, just as territorial divisions have tended to grow in number.²

One may view the role of locality and regional spaces in globalization from at least the three perspectives of the small engines of globalization, the middle-sized small ones, and the largest and most powerful ones. Although the policies of the largest corporations and world institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, weaken nation states, they reinforce the small regions that provide good conditions for economic and political activity. The latter include a cheap labor force, a healthy natural environment, and an attractive culture for trade (appropriate customs regulations, enjoyable foods, comfortable hotels, and so forth).

This process of micro-regionalization has at least two types of consequences. First, it is initially profitable for small regions to attract the largest globalizers and their money, whereby their economies develop and society becomes more open. These small regions compete with each other to sell what they have in order to organize the best conditions for investment. But insofar as the most powerful global engines treat small regions in an instrumental way, local spaces are meaningful only as elements or means within global structures insofar as they realize the ends and interests of large globalizers. They thus become increasingly dependent on global forces as their local industries, activities, and cultures change and become involved in processes over which they have no control. Jobs consequently become volatile, daily life becomes insecure, and local cultures are reduced to folklore (customs for sale to foreigners) as their deeper meaning, which had determined local identity, disappears.

Second, local communities defend themselves against such instrumentalization by using the opportunities provided by global processes to strengthen their local patriotism, government, civil society, language, and ethnic identity. They present their own culture to the broader audience as something specific and valuable, as has been the case with Catalonia, Provence, several regions in Poland, and such small countries as Slovakia and Slovenia. However, this type of activity can readily evoke conflicts with other micro-regions and at times with the nation as a whole and with national states. Nevertheless small regions may thereby play the role of small engines of globalization and seek to influence the global forces.

A more important element in the process of globalization is macro-regionalization, in which different countries join together to establish economic, political, and cultural structures. The European Union is a good case in point.

Two classic works on economic globalization are Luttwak's *Turbo-capitalism* and Martin and Schumann's *The Global Trap*, both of which argue that economic globalization has arisen as a consequence of political decisions.³ For example, deregulation was chosen as a way to retain economic dynamism. The subsequent liberalization of economic laws and regulations, at first in the United States, England, and New Zealand, and somewhat later in other Western states, has generated many concessions, lifted constraints on the prices of products, fixed salaries, and assured social security. This has brought about the growing productivity of labor, a lowering of prices for goods and services, and a sharpening of competition. This has resulted in the collapse of many weak firms as well as the growth of large corporations. The latter have quickly become the most important powers in the world – not only economic, but also political. They have escaped political control, and have begun to manipulate, exploit, and weaken governments and states by such tactics as not paying taxes, compelling states to provide increasingly profitable conditions for business, and making the most of legislation or corruption in given countries. But although states seek to defend themselves from the anarchy of the global market, no particular country is able to control or limit large international corporations in an effective and permanent way. The operations of large corporation can be limited and controlled only by means of the political unification of individual states, and this is the way that has been chosen by the European countries.

The discourse that paved way for the Maastricht treaties of 1991 and 1994 included the notion that a "Europe of nations" could not compete effectively against large international and American corporations. Econometric images have in fact been basic to arguments for European integration, including the recurrent notion that "we must compete effectively, retaining profits for our citizens." Integration has been a strategic accommodation to necessity, that is, a response to the requirements of the global economic system on the part of such collectives as states and nations. Insofar as this required political consensus and certain political

structures, political aims and motivations have gained in weight throughout. European countries have begun to unite in one political organism because they wish to control and direct the processes of globalization, and they have consequently implemented new laws and guidelines so that they will be able to regulate economic and political activity. States and elites are thus creating a European macro-regional entity.

The power of the central organs of the European Union has been enhanced by the elimination of internal border controls, the gradual development of a common foreign policy, common aid structures, and the progressive introduction of a European currency. The European Supreme Court, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Commission have come to constitute institutions of European governance. The EU already issues at least 75 percent of laws regulating economic activity in Europe and more than 50 percent of legislation concerning such other types of activity as criminal procedures. Such legislation is even binding in relations with such non-members countries as Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. The success of the unification resulting from such measures is indicated in part by the fact that prosperity in Europe has steadily risen over the last 25 years, nearly doubling.

The project for the political union of the region demands not only common economic and political interests, but also a common culture and mutually interdependent social relations that underpin the creation and reproduction of laws, institutions, and organizations. In addition, intellectuals and elites have sought to build a common civil society and public life throughout Europe as conditions for common political and economic life. Civil society, which comprises the sphere of citizens' non-political and non-profit activity aimed towards the common good, plays an important role insofar as it is the sphere in which political and social culture is created and social solidarity is constituted. We can observe the emergence of a transnational civil society in the form of the Movement of Non-Governmental Organizations, which cooperates across borders, self-organizing relationships of citizens of different countries, as well as in certain discussions and polemics in the public media that serve the creation of a common European public opinion. Step by step, the elites of European politics and culture are developing a common European view of the world in their public discourses. It should be noted in this regard that such leading philosophers and politicians as Habermas, Schroeder, and Giscard d'Estaing have argued that a European constitution is necessary for further progress with political and social integration.

It is evident that differences between the various member states of the EU shrink as each particular nation adopts elements of other nations' ways of thinking and of being, such as behavior, culture, educational style, and ideas of justice and freedom. This is true of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe as well. One specific dimension of Europeanization involves the synchronization of problems and themes of discussions, such as when all countries in Western and Eastern Europe discuss the same topics at

the same time (agricultural subsidies, economic stimulus programs, banking support measures, and so forth).

But this does not mean that differences between nations are disappearing. On the contrary, this process is fraught with many persistent conflicts, and new problems have arisen between the newer member states in general and the older members of the European Community and the EU. Inequalities have grown between capital income and wage income, and there are problems concerning unemployment as well. The gap between the winner and losers of regionalization and globalization is widening throughout the world, but it appears that differences in wealth between particular European states have declined. Nevertheless, the new member states in from Central and Eastern Europe feel that they are being treated unfairly insofar as Western European countries extend privileges to their agriculture and industry at the expense of the former communist countries. Discussions are continuing concerning such problems as: what is the role of nations and states in European Union? Should Europe be a Federation of States, or should we build one state? How can cultural differences be preserved in a new organism? In what way should democracy be changed in order to respond to the new transnational transformation? What ethical and cultural conditions are required needed that make the new political constellation stable?

The process of unification and integration will be lengthy. The national elites of different countries suggest the specific national definitions of Europe and the variety of positions and opinions concerning common problems increases in the nations. But as long as the discursive process takes place there is hope to keep the Union vital and extend it to Eastern Europe. The confrontation of national perspectives tends to produce a nationally specified European view as well as a national view of the world enriched with European aspects. In the future Europe will probably have one government with many nations.

PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

In the face of the weakening of national states and social unity, the question arises concerning the form required for social integration and identity to keep pace with economic and political changes. In addition to common economic and political interests, the notion of a common European identity has led over time to the increasingly common view in both Eastern and Western Europe that belonging to Europe is not merely a question of large-scale political participation. Regional policy and institutions depend on political commitments and social solidarity, which, in turn, depend on a common collective culture and identity. And insofar as the issue of identity generates strong feelings of specific solidarity with other members of the regional community, the effective internalization of certain norms, values, attitudes, and ways of thinking and being is an important prerequisite for political and economic Europeanization.

The notion of European identity remains unclear, however, and it is difficult to determine the types of components it includes. While liberals stress such issues as democracy, human rights, economic prosperity, negative freedoms, tolerance, and moral permissiveness, the so-called man on the street finds images of European identity in marketing, attractive product designs, and leisure activities. But this popular model of European identity attracts people of a liberal orientation while threatening others in Eastern Europe. Although certain groups view Europe as providing the opportunity to live comfortably, others view the expansion of Western European ways of thinking and being as a danger to their traditions, national cultures, religions, and spiritual life. They consequently either oppose Europeanization, or seek to influence and change European identity, complementing it with new elements from Eastern European societies. For example, Polish bishops have sought to introduce into European treaties both the common Christian inheritance of Europe and social solidarity as a shared value.

The trend towards a common Europe has been advanced by elites acting as entrepreneurs, administrators, managers, politicians, intellectuals, as well as youth, and they have succeeded in creating transnational networks, institutions, and various other means of cooperation. Peasants and workers have countered these developments with economic arguments, while traditionalists have put forward cultural and nationalist arguments. Such opponents have regarded Europeanization as part of a globalizing process that is responsible for increasing unemployment along with differences in the material prosperity of social classes. They have argued that unification through transnational structures weakens national and religious identity, which are values in themselves, because one must abandon his/her traditional identity in order to succeed in the new reality. Such traditionalists in Poland have been organized around the private Catholic radio network "Maryja." Radio Maryja had huge clout before EU accession and claimed that 10 percent of the Polish adult population were listeners. However, the audience has shrunk during the last decade to perhaps no more than 2 percent of all radio listeners, primarily among older generations.

Both culture and people in Eastern Europe changed rapidly in the years immediately preceding EU membership, finally resulting in large majorities of the populations supporting unification with Western Europe. For example, over between 77 percent and 84 percent of voters supported the proposal for EU membership in the referenda that were held in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

What I have termed popular European identity, which has attention of many groups, is only one aspect of European identity. More important has been the formation of a new political or constitutional European identity. Although people never much appreciated law and the rules of political systems in the former communist countries, Europeanization means the rule of law, the observation of rights, and strong institutions, which

together serve to regulate public behavior and limit corruption, nepotism, and organized criminal activities in public and political life. Such institutional changes have changed people's mentality in Eastern Europe and brought about the emergence of a new political identity consisting of respect for law, rights, and established public rules. The political system, democracy, laws, and rights have become values as least as important for those who have internalized this type of identity as their national traditions or ethic. Indeed, regionalization provides citizens with new means to fight for their rights insofar as they thereby become able to appeal from domestic or state courts to the European Supreme Court – and they do so. Although people with this type of identity are in general more closely attached to the legal framework and better able to fulfill their functions in institutional life, ideals may nevertheless differ between nations and communities in spite of the convergence of norms and rules.

The third element of this process of identity transformation is rationalization. We are in the process of developing a substantial new rational identity in Eastern and Central Europe. Many components of traditional identity that were always accepted as given and sacred have been called into question and new ones are being intentionally adopted. In this process of exchange spontaneity in behavior has been replaced by calculation; emotional reactions by rational responses; hospitality by self-interest; friendship by kindness; openness to strangers by caution and distance; naivety by cunning; the cult of tradition by striving for a better future; and ever more attention is paid to material prosperity as spiritual development loses importance. Small local cultures and old customs are disappearing, such as these connected with Christmas Eve or Easter. Even the role of the Catholic Church is diminishing in Poland. There is more information about Church life on the TV, but the norms of religious life are not as respected as they were in the communist period, with increasing numbers of people working on Sundays and living together without a formal Church wedding.

The fourth aspect of regional identification may be termed abstractness. The new European identity not only differs substantially from the old in the sense of having a new structure and new components. It is also a new type of identity in the sense of being what Michael Walzer describes as thin and not thick. That is to say that it is more formal and does not play as important a role in the daily lives of individuals and communities as did traditional identity. People were ready during the communist period to sacrifice their lives in defense of religious or national truths. Many lost their jobs or went sent to prison because of their intellectual activities in criticizing communist ideology or the official version of history. This is no longer the case. Traditional identity was inclusive, thick, embraced the entire personality, and touched everything that concerned the nation, and religion was essential for the customs, history, and opinions of persons.

In contrast, identity is now accepted as something intentionally

created by individuals; it is not given but conventional, and is thereby susceptible to free personal change. It exists on the surface of peoples' personalities, is not deeply internalized, and is thus more abstract and universal than traditional identity. This means that the new identity in Eastern Europe shares more characteristics with the identities of people in other Western countries – characteristics which are less concrete than those of traditional identity.

This process of abstraction is also evident in the ideas of equality and justice that have become current. For example, it is typical for the welfare and social state that the idea of equal opportunity – the notion that one has a right to the share one has merited due to his/her individual performance – takes precedence over the notion that one has the right to an equal share in what society has produced. The individual can thereby determine what makes him different from a non-European in a way that is less concrete than differentiation in terms of national or local identities. At the same time, the national and religious elements of the new European identity become more formal and modest, more abstract and weak. Furthermore, we now appear to be witnessing a weakening of collective awareness and strong collective identity. Individuals have a greater possibility to choose new components of identity from a new context and are becoming increasingly independent of native traditional groups. And they are using such opportunities to create new personalities that are more flexible and prepared to adapt to situations than are traditional identities. This means that subjects are changing both substantially and existentially.

The above considerations indicate that speculation concerning the danger of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe, which has been widespread in the West in recent years, is unproductive as well as unjustified. Indeed, the mentalities and identities of nations continue to change faster than any one could expect. Joining the European Union may have been somewhat more difficult for those countries that were once constituent republics of the Soviet Union because of the high value they have placed upon the sovereignty of their restored national states, for which they fought long and hard. On the whole, an uncompromising belief in the value of the state and nation appears to be characteristic of these new states. Perhaps another reason for their strong national feelings and attitudes is that such societies have relied upon nationalism in their transformation from being mere successor states of a former empire into EU members. They were faced with the task of introducing private property and market forces, in some cases for the first time, even as they had to deal with the economic disaster that followed the break up and collapse of the old system. In such a situation, nationalism provided the glue that was needed for solidarity and a sense of common purpose.

THE NEED FOR HOPE

Zygmunt Bauman identifies being local or regional as a sign of

social deprivation and degradation.⁴ He argues that local public spaces lose their power and meaning-generating capacity and become dependent on global institutions and processes, which have the power to give meaning to all actions. The European Union reveals, on the contrary, that relations between “global” and “regional,” or between “global” and “local,” are more complicated than in Bauman’s view. The struggle is not over, and the loss of power and the ability to provide meaning is not inevitable, because macro- and micro-regions are in fact able to defend themselves. They are not merely clients, but also partners of globalization.

In post-communist countries local elites gain more power every year because of the process of decentralization of the central system. There is also a pattern of continuity between the old communist *nomenklatura* and post-communist ruling elites. Political power does not exist somewhere in cyberspace for people in post-communist countries (as Bauman claims), but rather in fixed places that everyone knows. There are in fact three centers of political power apart from local elites, namely, national capitals (Warsaw for Poles), Brussels, and Washington. These three alone have obliged Poland to adapt to the policies of the European Union. In addition, while power was shared between Moscow and national capitals during the Communist period, it has now shifted more to the West and is shared between the three centers mentioned above. For example, Polish soldiers were sent to Serbia and Afghanistan solely at the behest of the United States, who is Poland’s friend and ally.

Economic power is shared in a similar way. Both regulations and subsidies from national capitals, Brussels, and the international institutions located in Washington, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have had a decisive impact on the economy in post-communist countries, including Poland. There are also obvious influences from different companies, interests groups, lobbies, and persons, but these are not anonymous. There is a similar case in respect culture as well, with Brussels increasingly determining national policy. One such example involves the way in which EU states jointly decide how many films each country will import from outside the Union every year.

The result is that just as Eastern European countries were not sovereign during the period of communism, they are not sovereign now. The only difference is that the political options available have changed. Nevertheless, the state has not yet been reduced to the role of local policeman, securing the order required for the conduct of business, even though it has been weakened by virtue of macro-regionalization. It is able to serve as a partner in a dialog with other countries regarding the rules of cooperation between the states of the European Union.

But is this model of regionalization appropriate for other regions of the world? It is difficult to say because regional integration requires a common cultural background and a sense that the common interest must prevail over national differences and egoisms. This does appear to be the proper way for Europe, however.

The final question concerns the relation between regionalization and globalization: Is regionalization opposed to or does it change globalizing processes? I have suggested that regionalization attempts to regulate and control economic processes in order to create the conditions needed for the development of regional cultures, economies, and politics. This could be understood as comprising a step in the process of globalization. It is obvious that no given region can fully control the global market insofar as large corporations can freely move throughout the world. Nevertheless, the replacement of small states and regions by some sort of global legislative and political power would be detrimental to the interests of world markets, and much can be done in this regard to improve the existing situation. Both small and large countries are locked in competition with each other as they seek to assure the conditions required for attracting global business and investment. But they will sooner or later see the negative consequences of their policy, and they will be compelled to open their borders to goods and services from other regions.

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NOTES

¹ Robertson, Robert (1992) *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage.

² Zygmunt Bauman refers to Robertson in his own discussion of globalization. He argues, however, that global markets do not need small countries and local entities in order to share power with them, but rather to deprive them of power and exploit them. See Bauman, Zygmunt (1998) *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. London: Polity.

³ Luttwak, Edward (1998) *Turbo-capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy*. New York: HarperCollins; Martin, H.-P. and H. Schumann (1997) *The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy*. Trans. by Patrick Camiller. London and New York: Zed Books.

⁴ Bauman, op. cit.

CHAPTER XIV

**SOME CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
AND MODERNIZATION IN
CONTEMPORARY VIETNAM**

PHAM VAN DUC

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is not a new phenomenon – after emerging in the fifteenth century, it began accelerating with a quickened pace by the end of the nineteenth. Today, however, it demonstrates new and important characteristics. For example, insofar as it is now aggressively promoted by capitalist nations, especially the most developed ones, certain scholars have defined the present stage of globalization as capitalist globalization.

Today globalization is forcefully exerting its influence upon nations, societies, communities, and each and every individual, but its results have caused widespread concern. The various Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have served to reveal the extent to which the benefits of globalization are spread very unevenly among countries and national, ethnic, and social groups. For example, the HDP global report for 1999 pointed out that the 20 percent of the world's population who lived in the highest income countries commanded 86 percent of the world's GDP, 82 percent of the global export market, 68 percent of direct foreign investment, and 74 percent of the telephones in the world, while the corresponding indicators were only 1 percent for the 20 percent of the world's population who lived in the lowest income countries. The report also demonstrated that this tendency for the unequal distribution of income, resources, and wealth was growing ever stronger. By the end of the 1990s, the 19 percent of world population who lived in the OECD countries controlled 71 percent of total world trade in goods and services, 58 percent of foreign investment, and 91 percent of Internet users. The 200 richest men in the world had doubled their assets between 1994 and 1998. The assets of the three most prominent billionaires were then in fact greater than the total GDP of the 600 million people living in the underdeveloped countries.¹

In recent years, scholars in Vietnam and throughout the world have focused on analyzing the content and nature of the process of globalization. It is an undeniable fact that globalization has created opportunities for economically developing countries to integrate into the world economy and thereby modernize their technology and accelerate their economic growth. Such opportunities have, for instance, enabled a number of Asian nations that had rather low levels of economic growth to attain a record pace of

economic development, but the opportunities presented to different countries and nations are not always the same. Generally speaking, countries that already have higher levels of economic development will enjoy greater opportunities than those that are poor. Globalization will in fact present more challenges than opportunities to poor countries. Vietnam is one of those countries that are confronted with enormous challenges in the process of globalization.

THE CHALLENGES

The Economic Challenge

The biggest challenge facing Vietnam concerns the economy insofar as economic globalization serves as the foundation of the process of globalization in general. Vietnam initiated its open-door policy, involving integration into the regional and world economy, in 1986. Economists have estimated that the Vietnamese economy attained an annual growth rate of 9 percent by the period 1993-1997, which was an encouraging achievement. As early as 1994, however, many Vietnamese economists as well as members of the leadership began speaking about the threat that the country might fall even further behind nations that were economically more developed. The Party and government implemented a policy that promoted industrialization and modernization in order to avoid this threat, but it has encountered significant difficulties over time because of the country's limited infrastructure, low economic starting point, and level of management. For example, Vietnam's economy is still primarily agricultural in structure, and industry is concentrated in the two large cities at the northern and southern ends of the country. The fact that skilled laborers are located mainly in the large cities also means that industrial development in more rural areas becomes increasingly difficult. It also goes without saying that economic integration into regional and global markets results in a downturn in the rate of economic growth, if not economic contraction, when there are international financial crises, as has been case in 1997, 2001, and 2008-2009.

In addition, many government enterprises have suffered prolonged losses because of changes in management mechanisms as well as the obstacles Vietnamese products have met with as the country has sought to enter into competition with regional and world products. This has necessitated a gradual integration into the regional and world economy, one consequence of which is that the threat of falling further behind in economic terms is very real. This demands the careful preparation of the variety of resources needed for success in economic renovation and in the process of integration.

But apart from economic challenges, globalization has also brought about enormous challenges in the social sector as well.

The Social Challenge

There is above all the matter of unemployment and joblessness. The Vietnamese economy became more dynamic with the beginning of integration and a basis was established for the development of various sectors of the economy, but this has generated a high level of competition between economic sectors. This in turn has caused many companies and enterprises to go bankrupt, while others have been forced to streamline their operations. A rapidly expanding army of unemployed laborers and part-time employees consequently appeared, and its numbers had already reached into the millions by the beginning of the 1990s. In addition, there have been about one billion redundant working days in the agricultural sector during the annual agricultural down time, which is equal to five million units of labor per year. Le The Tiem, Vice-minister for Public Security, observed that when these figures are factored together with the number of unemployed in the non-agricultural sector and the number of unemployed newly graduated students, the total number of unemployed laborers had grown to about nine million by the first ten years of economic restructuring.² However, jobs could be provided only for the number of people added to the population through the rate of population growth since the job creation rate during the 1990s was only about one million per year.

The process of integration also led to an increased demand for more skilled labor after the turn of the century, which continues to be the case today. If the Vietnamese labor force does not continue to adopt new technical and managerial skills, not only will the unemployment rate will not be reduced, there will be pressure on it to rise. Unemployment and joblessness cause the split between rich and poor – the axis of social demarcation – which is indeed an inevitable outcome of the market mechanism. The sociological surveys that have been conducted in most of the provinces in Vietnam reveal that the majority of those interviewed consider such polarization to be a normal phenomenon. Some scholars insist that the present polarization in Vietnam is in fact one result of the reestablishment of social equality, but this view is justifiable only if the rich-poor polarization is materialized equitably. Within the context of market economy, this would mean that everyone has an equal chance to gain wealth lawfully, and that the laborer's income would depend on his ability to be skillful, innovative, and dynamic in the workplace.

But in addition to the number of people legally becoming wealthy in Vietnam, many have become rich through corruption, smuggling, and kidnapping. The growth of the latter in particular has caused a great deal of concern, but it was indeed no accident that corruption in general was identified as a danger to the nation. It is clear that lawful ways of acquiring wealth should be encouraged and that those which are illegitimate need to be eradicated as quickly as possible. Such criminal activity not only constitutes a threat to the strengthening of our economy, it also reverses our social values.

World Bank reports have indicated that the gap between rich and poor is widening noticeably in Vietnam. Unfortunately, this gap will increase sharply in the years to come unless corruption is eliminated and the government succeeds in implementing effective measures to help the poor and provide people with more employment opportunities.

Unemployment and the polarization of rich and poor have led to crime and a variety of social evils, which together constitute a significant challenge to Vietnam in the process of integration. Official statistics have in general shown that the growth of social evils has been significant in both scope and numbers since 1986, and that the activities involved have become more elaborate. There has in fact been a complicated criminal development insofar as the rate of serious criminal cases has accelerated even though the total number of crimes has not risen as sharply.

It is noteworthy that the development of international economic relations has been accompanied by the appearance of criminal activities involving foreign elements. Unprecedented crimes of a most serious nature have begun taking place in Vietnam, including the trafficking of women and children across the Chinese and Cambodian borders, international drug trafficking, piracy, hijacking, terrorist activities, kidnapping, and so forth. The expansion of interaction with the world, which has made immigration to Vietnam easier, has created the opportunity for many international criminals not only to escape to Vietnam and hide from law enforcement agencies, but also continue their criminal activities from inside the country. Foreigners of over twenty nationalities have been identified in connection with hundreds of serious criminal cases in Vietnam. In addition, a number of those who have committed serious crimes in Vietnam have sought to escape abroad in order to avoid prosecution by the local authorities, although many Vietnamese who have committed crimes abroad have been convicted and repatriated to the country.

Together with the process of integration and interaction with the world, social vices and crimes have thus proven to be worrying challenges for Vietnam.

The Cultural Challenge

Vietnam also faces a considerable cultural challenge. Indeed, the concern that national cultural identity can be lost is common among developing nations in the present era of globalization. Certain scholars claim that current cultural exchanges are out of balance in the sense that more developed countries tend to impose their values or bring pressure to bear upon developing nations. There are numerous discussions in this regard concerning so-called "weightless goods" that have a significant knowledge content instead of material utility. For example, many economists believe that the largest export industry in the United States is not automobile or airplane production, but rather the Hollywood entertainment industry with its annual income of several tens of billions of dollars. Moreover,

Hollywood products now reach into even remote villages thanks to the global network of mass media and modern means of communication. Human Development Reports have noted that the ubiquitous presence of, for example, Nike and Sony products has established new social standards from Asia, through Europe, to South America. Moreover, such assaults by foreign cultures can very well menace cultural diversity and lead people to lose their own cultural identities.³

Many Vietnamese leaders and scholars have expressed their concern that our national cultural identity is clearly exposed to such threats, and that there is a real danger that it can be eroded and perhaps eventually lost. Vietnam possesses a long-standing traditional culture that has not only accompanied our national history throughout its millennia-long development and maintained its identity, but has also been enriched by various positive elements of foreign cultures, including those of China, France, Russia, and the United States. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the Vietnamese will not lose their identity in the relentless advance of globalization unless every person, institution, and organization adopts the necessary constructive measures. Not only does any given culture exist in a concrete historical context, thereby being a product of a certain socio-economic development, it is also influenced by factors and forces that emerge from within the culture itself.

But calling attention to the challenges that Vietnam has encountered in its efforts to integrate with the world does not mean to say that we should cut off ties with other nations and abandon the program of renovation. Since globalization is unavoidable, a closed-door policy cannot be the optimal decision. We wish to state clearly that any nation which implements a closed-door policy today will cut itself off from the forces driving development in the world. The mistakes committed during the Khang Hi dynasty, the events of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the practices characteristic of the pre-renovation years in Vietnam provide us with many useful lessons in this regard.

As we learn from such lessons and experiences, including those of our own country, we may conclude that active integration is the best way in which to make use of the opportunities and overcome the challenges presented by the process of globalization. To paraphrase Mohandas Gandhi, the doors and windows of our house should not be tightly shut. Cultural breezes from all countries should be able to enter as freely as possible, but we shall not allow anything to shake our feet. The problem is thus how Vietnam should integrate into world development while preserving our own identity and not losing ourselves in the process.

THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS IN CONTEMPORARY VIETNAM

On the Advantages, Difficulties, and Challenges of Modernization in Vietnam

In order to transform our country into a developed nation by 2020, Vietnam has mapped out a course towards industrialization and modernization, which should be carried out simultaneously. Vietnam both enjoyed advantages and encountered certain difficulties as this process was undertaken because of its industrial backwardness, so to speak. The task of analyzing and clarifying these issues concerning the modernization process in Vietnam has proven to be very important for working out appropriate guidelines and standards.

Modernization in the strict sense involves the process whereby an agricultural society is transformed into an industrial society. In the broader sense of the term, it indicates the general process that backward and underdeveloped countries must undergo in order to catch up with more advanced ones. The aim of economic modernization is to raise production forces to a high level of technological development and socialization. As a result, it promotes in particular the overall labor productivity of society, which in turn continually improves people's living standards. However, not only does economic modernization play a prominent role in the comprehensive and multi-faceted process that comprises the modernization of society, it may be viewed as the foundation of the modernization process in general.

What are the favorable conditions and difficulties that Vietnam enjoys and confronts as it deals with these tasks?

The Favorable Conditions

In comparison with Western and certain other Asian countries, Vietnam has clearly been delayed in undertaking the process of modernization. As a result, certain Vietnamese scholars have characterized modernization as an exogenous process.⁴ Regardless of the origins of the process, Vietnam can indeed learn much from the successes as well as failures of other countries in this respect as it endeavors to find its own way of carrying out modernization.

There has been much discussion about the lessons that can be learned concerning unbalanced or "unhealthy" economic growth. This may be defined as a growth in economic indicators that has undesirable social consequences, including consequences for future generations. Five frequently mentioned examples in this regard are growth in joblessness, ruthless growth, voiceless growth, futureless growth, and rootless growth. These examples of unhealthy growth should hopefully provide instructive lessons to countries beginning the process of industrialization and modernization, which must consider and find solutions to the difficulties arising from economic development if they wish to avoid such problems.

The fact that Vietnam has belatedly begun modernizing provides an advantage insofar as there are many clear example of how it should and should not proceed – Vietnam is not obliged to blaze a new trail. In addition, Vietnam is thereby in a position to accelerate certain stages of

modernization since it is able to import already existing advanced equipment and technology to replace and renovate that which it had. Nevertheless, the question of how to make the best use of this type of advantage depends on our developmental strategy and its implementation in concrete policies.

In reality, modernization has been carried out not only in underdeveloped countries, but also in countries at an advanced level of industrial development, which has enabled the process to advance at a quicken pace and attain new heights. In the case of Vietnam, a developing country with an as yet incomplete level of industrialization, the process of modernization should go hand in hand with industrialization. Both of these processes in fact involve mechanization of the national economy, that is, replacement of manual labor by machine-assisted labor and the extensive application of the various achievements of advanced science and technology.

Modernization in Vietnam has also been conducted in a peaceful environment characterized by a tendency towards internationalism. This has given us the opportunity to expand our friendship and cooperation with many other countries worldwide, which benefits us greatly. In particular, economic internationalization has enabled Vietnam to make use of the advanced technologies and capital of developed countries as it industrializes and modernizes.

It should be noted that the historical practice of recent decades has revealed how other Asian countries that were initially underdeveloped in economic terms have been able to pursue industrialization and modernization in such a way that they have rapidly become industrialized nations. Such newly industrialized countries have indeed provided positive lessons for Vietnam. For example, Vietnam's active participation in such international organizations as ASEAN and OPEC as well as ratification of the bi-lateral trade agreement with the United States have enabled the country to take advantage of the new international environment for development. But in addition to favorable opportunities for accelerating the process of modernization, Vietnam also faces certain problems.

The Difficulties

Scholars have identified four general difficulties that developing countries face as they modernize. The first is the very fact of their low level of development as they initiated the process. This factor coupled with the inequitable economic and political order that exists in the world places developing countries in a disadvantageous situation.

Second, developing countries have begun their modernization processes at a time when the world as a whole is undergoing increasing strains on its natural resources as well as serious environmental degradation. Humanity has never before witnessed such serious environmental pollution and destruction.

Third, developed countries began modernizing after a long period of industrialization and growth during which they were able to gradually prepare and accumulate the necessary resources. Stated otherwise, their modernization processes have moved forward through gradual stages in a naturally consecutive order. Developing countries, in contrast, have been forced to reach the same goals within a much shorter time frame and without a sufficient accumulation of the factors and elements needed.

Fourth, the countries that have undertaken modernization belatedly have often suffered from serious imbalances in their development. These include the rapid collapse of traditional institutions versus the difficulties encountered in building new ones, the emergence of new requirements versus the inability to fulfill them, an unusual growth in consumption demands versus the backwardness of production, the speedy development of certain regions versus the lagging behind of others, rapid economic growth versus obsolete legislation, and so forth.

Vietnam has shared such difficulties. In addition, the failure of other attempts at industrialization prior to today's program of Renovation (*Doi Moi*) should be taken into account. It is general knowledge that Vietnam has attempted to industrialize ever since the 1960s, and that industrialization was identified as one of the central tasks of the entire transitional period. The results expected nevertheless failed to materialize for a number of subjective and objective reasons, including unfavorable world conditions, a simplified conception of the building of socialism, and inappropriate policies. Perhaps of the greatest importance were the existence of subjectivism, voluntarism, and a centralized bureaucratic mechanism, which not only led to slow economy growth, but also created a generation of specialists with limited professional skills and a lack of dynamism in business and management.

Thanks in part to an awareness of how subjective factors led to the failure of previous programs of industrialization, Vietnam implemented *Doi Moi* beginning in the mid-1980s, that is, an open-door policy directed to the accumulation of the preconditions necessary for a socialist-oriented process of industrialization and modernization. Vietnam has recorded outstanding achievements in all spheres of social life after twenty successful years of renovation, including the second highest sustained rate of economic growth in the world by region, continuous improvements in people's living standards, and the stabilization of political life. An answer has not yet been found, however, for how we can preserve our traditional national culture and yet successfully modernize. This problem has been encountered by all nations throughout the world, but it is perhaps especially troublesome for countries in the East. It has raised a number of deep concerns for many people in Vietnam, a nation with a cultural tradition more than two thousand years old.

The relations between traditional culture and modernization have indeed been discussed passionately in Asia, and there are many different points of view on this issue. For example, there are those who maintain that

modernization is essentially the process of Westernization insofar as modernization was initiated in the West. This would make it necessary to discard the values of Eastern culture and accept Western cultural values in order to successfully carry out modernization. Eastern nations would then inevitably have to adopt Western ways of thinking, acting, and living as they accepted Western sciences and technologies. This could not help but generate cultural conflict between East and West.

In 1919 Tran Doc Tu claimed that “modernizing China means to throw away everything that is Chinese by nature and implement the system, ideology, and civilization that belongs to Western society; there will be no modernization in China without comprehensive Westernization.”⁵ In contrast to this position, many scholars have attempted to demonstrate the contribution of Confucian culture to the rapid development of, for example, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. From this perspective, Confucian culture has played a decisive role in the modernization process of those countries that came to be known as the “Asian tigers,” providing principles for development as well as comprising the driving force for development.

Apart from these unilateral and rather extreme views, other scholars affirm that there is a dialectical link between modernization and cultural tradition that has been both contradictory and unifying in character at the same time. They maintain that there are certain elements of cultural tradition that would clearly obstruct the modernization process, and that modernization would quickly discard any cultural tradition that has not adapted itself to modern society. Nevertheless, the opposition between national cultural traditions and modernization is rather relative, and processes of adaptation, regulation, and interaction exist between them. We are in basic agreement with this view and in the following only wish to emphasize certain specific points in this regard.

First of all, modernization neither is equivalent to westernization, nor is it a process typical only of Western nations in spite of the fact that it originated in the West. On the contrary, it is a process common to all human societies that each country experiences at one or another point in time. Similarly, market economy is not merely the exclusive achievement of capitalism even though it has been brought to its culmination today by capitalism. The aim of economic modernization is the reconstruction and upgrading of existing material-technical infrastructures, which will eventually lead to the creation of industrial society as a new culture. Industrial culture is thereby a direct product of national modernization.

Furthermore, the industrial cultures and lifestyles of developed countries will be introduced into developing nations through their interactions with the surrounding world, particularly in today’s era of advanced information technology. As a result, culture (or at least certain elements of culture) will likely “surpass” the material conditions of existing societies in given countries.

Cultures and industrial lifestyles have been generated either endogenously or exogenously in the process of modernization. For example, many elements of industrial culture contradict traditional culture by virtue of the simple fact that the former is characteristic of a new type of society, not traditional society. But the relation between the two is relative and contains much mutual adaptation and reinforcement, whereby cultural tradition changes qualitatively. Modernization thus makes possible the continuation and promotion of the rational elements of traditional culture.

Such adaptation, continuation, and mutual reinforcement between traditional culture and modernization are evident in the following points:

First, cultural tradition serves as the foundation, premise, and starting point for modernization. No social transformation can be realized upon bare ground. The realistic foundation and “material” for modernization is nothing other than cultural tradition.

The practices of countries that have successfully modernized demonstrate that the latter is impossible without reliance upon existing national cultural traditions. Even countries that have rather short histories and are less influenced by cultural tradition, such as Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, have not escaped the influence of cultural traditions that were generated during their colonial periods. The success of Japan and the newly industrialized countries in Asia provides clear evidence that the success of modernization is reliant upon national cultural traditions.

Second, national cultural traditions often consist of a large number of rational elements that are appropriate for and capable of promoting modernization. Such elements have functioned as vital expressions of a given nation, and they play crucial roles in modernization processes as nations endeavor to cope adequately and quickly with the requirements of modern society.

Cultural tradition is a driving force of social development in general and of modernization in particular. Cultural tradition creates the living spirit of a nation as it moves forward on its way to modernization.

Modernization, in spite of its contradictions with cultural tradition, does not metaphysically negate cultural tradition – it is in fact nothing less than the continuation and inheritance of national cultural tradition. Cultural tradition itself serves as the foundation, pre-condition, starting point, and driving force of a successful process of modernization.

The position I wish to put forward is that that Vietnam will be able to shorten its process of modernization and address the difficulties facing the country by utilizing the advantages it enjoys as well as the dialectical link between cultural tradition and modernization. Apart from capitalizing on external opportunities and conditions, Vietnam has no alternative to mobilizing and bringing into full play internal forces within the country, in which human resources play a decisive role.

There are both quantitative and qualitative dimensions to human resources. The former is comprised of the labor force and the potential provision of labor forces for the modernization process, and it plays an

important role in socio-economic development. The decisive role of human resources pertains to their quality, however. This fact indicates the reason why certain countries that have enjoyed an apparently unlimitedly supply of labor forces have remained economically underdeveloped. There are, nevertheless, various means and methods available for improving the quality of such resources.

Education and training together comprise the most fundamental way in which to improve quality in this regard. While training is a relatively direct means for rapidly raising the quality of human resources within a period of three to five years, education aims at the preparation of human resources for future generations. More importantly, education and training constitute a very effective means for meeting the demands imposed by the modernization process. In particular, cultural and moral training should occupy an important role in education in addition to the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technology. Only in this way can we develop individuals who are experts in their workplaces and possess moral excellence as well. It is this type of people who will inherit the cultural quintessence of our nation while also having a good command of the achievements of modern knowledge.

The future of a nation depends greatly on the quality and results of its education today. We need to bring into play the intellectual resources and spiritual strengths of the Vietnamese people so that the education we provide will serve not only as the foundation and driving force for industrialization and modernization, but also enable us to find answers to the challenges facing the country. It is noteworthy that although Vietnam is a low-income country, its achievements in education and health care have enabled it to be classified among the group of countries having an average human development indicator (HDI). By the beginning of its second decade of renovation, Vietnam's HDI indicator had already risen to 110th place among the 174 nations that participated in the relevant UN surveys.⁶

CONCLUSION

Society is no more than individuals pursuing their own aims – men and women are both the directors and actors of their own lives. This means that any and all changes and developments in society are determined and brought about by people. In order to make use of existing opportunities and overcome challenges presented by the globalization process, the comprehensive preparation and development of men and women is therefore of the utmost importance in the integration process.

We often mention the role of education and training when discussing what the development and preparation of human resources means. There is, in reality, no single nation in the world that can afford to underestimate the role of education and training today. The question of how to direct education and training depends entirely, however, on the concrete historical conditions of each country. In recent years there has been much

discussion in Vietnam concerning the benefit of education and training in advancing people's intellectual standards as well as in the discovery and development of those who are talented. Within this context, there has been an emphasis upon scientific and technological education in order to create the ability to accept and adapt to new technologies. This emphasis is quite necessary and sound, especially in a country like Vietnam, where the majority of the labor force perform manual tasks.

However, education and training also need to recognize the importance of promoting and enhancing national traditions as well as citizens' awareness of their duties to the homeland. Throughout our national history, particularly in our struggles against foreign invaders, we have successfully brought into play the best of our national tradition, including an awareness of their obligations on the part of each citizen. Unfortunately, however, it appears that proper attention has not been paid to this important aspect of education in recent years.

The problem today is to educate people who are not only capable of having a good grasp of modern technology, but who are also responsible to and for the nation. This is the only strategy by which our country can successfully avoid the danger of lagging behind and match up truly well with other countries throughout the world.

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NOTES

¹ *Human Development Report* (1999). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3.

² Le The Tiem (1994) *Toi pham o Viet Nam: Thuc trang, nguyen nhan va giai phap*. Ha Noi: Nab Cong an Nhan dan, p. 168.

³ See, for example, the 1999 *Human Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5.

⁴ Gu Minggyuan and Gao Yimin (1999). *Hien dai hoa va viec giao duc truyen thong van hoa o Trung Quoc*. Trong "Truyen thong va hien dai hoa van hoa". Ha Noi: Vien Thong tin Khoa hoc Xa hoi xuất bản, p. 197.

⁵ *Tai lieu tham khao cua Thong tan xa Viet Nam*, tháng 3, 1995, p. 20.

⁶ UNDP. *Human Development Report*, 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 260.

CHAPTER XV

THE GOLDEN RULE AS AN ETHICAL FOUNDATION IN GLOBALIZATION

LUCY Y. TIEN

As the world moves towards greater globalization, and there encounters increased cultural conflict accompanied by a greater yearning for mutual respect, the Golden Rule deserves to play a more important role in the global village. It can serve as an ethical foundation that helps to lessen conflict and increase cooperation.

The Golden Rule has been accepted throughout history in nearly every great culture, and it is intimately connected in theory to nearly every significant ethical principle, particularly the important principle of universalizability. It thus seems most appropriate that we consider adopting this revered moral rule as an ethical foundation in globalization.

There have also been many objections to the Golden Rule. We may regard them, however, as comprising a challenge that urges us – and at the same time provides us with a good opportunity – to carefully refine the formulation of this venerated traditional rule and explore its proper nature so that we can better understand its scope of application. My hope is that the present discussion will help serve this purpose.

PHILOSOPHICAL RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION

The Heart of the Issue of Globalization

This discussion, with its focus on ethics, has in a certain sense resulted from reflections on Professor George F. McLean's article "Globalization as Diversity in Unity."¹ In this excellent article, McLean describes how it is inevitable that the process of globalization will transcend regional and local concerns. He goes on to say, however, that

The process of globalization transcends regional concerns not to deny them, but to respond to them from a more inclusive vantage point in terms of which all can have their full meaning and the opportunity to work together to determine their own destiny. This is the heart of the issue of globalization and cultural identities.²

As McLean searches for a deeper insight into this critical issue, he turns to the philosopher who has often been described as "the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns," Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). His belief is

that Cusa's global view can help us to design "the true mega-project for the new millennium, namely, to develop a global community in which all are looked upon with appreciation and progress is evoked by mutual respect."³ McLean argues that the foundation of what he refers to as "Cusa's global view" consists of three primary notions: 1) global thinking, 2) the global structure of unity and diversity, and 3) the dynamic global order.

A Complementary Response to Globalization

I admire McLean's effort to revive a six-hundred-year old philosophical theory and, through insightful interpretation, make it play an important role in contemporary philosophical thinking. But I also asked myself whether I as well could do something to help realize the "mega-project for the new millennium." Insofar as Cusa's philosophical theory is highly abstract and understood only with difficulty by non-specialists, I thought it might be useful to find a complementary or alternative position that might be more accessible. This would be something closer to hand and easier to grasp, or what Michael Walzer would term a more concrete or "thicker" notion.⁴ After some consideration, I came to the conclusion that the widely accepted and ancient moral principle of the Golden Rule could serve this purpose.

There appear to be sound rational grounds for this suggestion. From the perspective of history, for example, the Golden Rule been accepted by nearly every great culture, while from the perspective of theory it has been intimately connected with nearly every significant ethical principle. I shall endeavor in the following to articulate these two points in some detail.

POPULARITY OF THE GOLDEN RULE

The Golden Rule has been accepted by nearly every great culture for over two thousand five hundred years.⁵

The Earliest Masters. The spirit of the Golden Rule was clearly expressed in three of the earliest masters of civilization, namely, Zoroaster, Buddha, and Confucius.⁶

Zoroaster (630-550 BC) states "That nature alone is good which refrains from doing unto another whatsoever is not good for itself" (*Dadisten-I-dinik*, 94,5). Buddha (563-483 BC) teaches us "Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful" (*Udana-Varga* 5,1). Confucius (551-479 BC): asks "Is there one maxim which ought to be acted upon throughout one's whole life? Surely it is the maxim of loving-kindness: Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you." (*Analects* 12:2)

Judaism and Christianity. Both Rabbi Hillel and Jesus Christ regard the Golden Rule as the kernel of their teachings.

Hillel (70 BC-10 AD) admonishes us “Do not to others that which you would not have others do to you. That is the whole Bible. The rest is commentary. Now go and learn it” (*Talmud*, Shabbat 31a). Subsequent Jewish sources include *Tobit* (4:15), Philo of Alexandria, and Moses Maimonides.

Jesus (6 BC-29 AD) teaches us that “In everything do to others whatever you would have them do to you. This is the law and the prophets” (*Matthew* 7:12). The same message is restated as “Do to others as you would have them do to you” (*Luke* 6:31).

Subsequent Christian sources include *Acts* (15:21, 29), the *Didache*, and many later theologians.

Other Major Cultures. The Golden Rule also appears in nearly all the other major cultures, including Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Mormonism, Sikhism, and Taoism. It also appears in such new movements as Urantianism.⁷

For example, we find the message in Hinduism that “This is the sum of duty; do naught unto others what you would not have them do unto you” (*Mahabharata* 5,1517).

The same thought is found in Taoism as “Regard your neighbor’s gain as your own gain, and your neighbor’s loss as your own loss” (*T’ai Shang Kan Ying P’ien*). In addition, “I am good to the man who is good to me, likewise, I am also good to the bad man” (*Tao Te Ching*).

Islam teaches that “No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself” (No. 13 of Imam Al-Nawawi’s *Forty Hadiths* 6).

Philosophers. The message of the Golden Rule is found throughout the history of European philosophy as well.

Aristotle (384-322 BC):

When asked how to behave toward friends, Aristotle replied, “As we should wish our friends to behave to us” (Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, XI, v, 88).

Augustine (354-430):

I suppose one word was added to clarify the matter; so that in the statement: All things, therefore, whatsoever you would that men should do to you, there was inserted the word “good” (*The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount*, II, 22).

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274):

The directive, therefore, All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you do you also to them, represents a certain rule for loving one's neighbour which is also contained implicitly in the commandment, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. Hence it is, in a certain sense, an explanation of this commandment (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae).

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679):

[The laws] have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, "Do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself" (*Leviathan*, Pt. 1, Chap. 15, 121).

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873):

In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility (*Utilitarianism*, Chap. 2).

OBJECTIONS TO THE GOLDEN RULE

History teaches us that it is wise not to be overly optimistic about a widely popular belief, such as was the case with the geocentric theory in astronomy. We thus need to inquire whether the Golden Rule should be accepted in theory by people in the global village. This question is not easily answered because there have in fact been many different objections to the Golden Rule. We will here discuss for present purposes only some of the more typical ones.

Tastes May Not Be the Same

The most famous objection in terms of daily life comes from the Irish satiric writer George Bernard Shaw. In his "Maxims for Revolutionists" he states "Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same."⁸ If the word "tastes" in this sentence is replaced by "situations," thousands of objections to the Golden Rule arise. For example, it is obviously absurd for a patient to extract one of his dentist's teeth, as he wishes the dentist to do for him. The notorious case of the masochist inflicting pain on others also belongs to this type of objection.

It Cannot Be Universal Law

The most noted objection in philosophy comes from Immanuel Kant. His *Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals* contains a famous footnote very critical of the Golden Rule.

Let it not be thought that the trivial *Quod tibi non vis fieri*, etc. [what you do not will to be done to you] can here serve as a standard or principle. For it is merely derived from our principle, although with several limitations. It cannot be a universal law, for it contains the ground neither of duties to oneself nor of duties of love toward others (for many a man would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, if only he might be excused from benefiting them). Nor, finally, does it contain the ground of strict duties toward others, for the criminal would on this ground be able to dispute with the judges who punish him; and so on.⁹

Kant obviously contends that the Golden Rule can be neither a universal law, nor a universal moral standard or principle, for it is at best merely derived from the categorical imperative. The latter reads “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law.”¹⁰

Prior to Kant, both John Locke and Gottfried W. Leibniz, who represented the opposing philosophical standpoints of empiricism and rationalism respectively, refused to grant that the Golden Rule enjoyed the role of the most fundamental universal law.¹¹

It Contains No Ground of Duties

Kant’s criticism of the Golden Rule focuses on the issue that it contains no ground of duties, and that this involves duties to oneself as well as duties to others, particularly the duties of love towards others. More specifically, the Golden Rule contains no ground of such duties to oneself as the duty to cultivate one’s potential towards perfection and the duty to respect oneself in one’s actions. It also contains no ground of such duties to others as the duty to love your neighbor and the duty of a judge to punish criminals instead of benefiting them.

Singer notes that after Kant “the golden rule has been the subject of comparatively little philosophical discussion.... It is usually mentioned, when it is mentioned at all, only in passing.”¹²

A REFINED FORM OF THE GOLDEN RULE

We should regard such fatal objections to the Golden Rule not as obstacles that discourage us, but rather as challenges that urge us – and at the same time provide the opportunity – to more clearly understand this millennia-old principle. In the following, I shall first refine its formulation and then explore its nature with the aim of demonstrating that it has a proper role to play in the global village.

A Popular Form

Perhaps the most popular formulation of the Golden Rule is “Do to others whatever you would have them do to you.” This can be restated more explicitly as “If you want person A to do act B to you, then do act B to person A.” A more terse statement with the same meaning is simply “Treat others as you want to be treated.”

Under the guidance of this rule, if you want Mary to be kind to you, then be kind to her; or if you want Peter not to hurt you, then do not hurt him. While this appears to be good moral guidance, it evokes Shaw’s objection: If you want your dentist to extract one of your teeth, then extract one of his; if you want your diabetic sister to give you sweets to eat, then give her sweets to eat. However, these are clearly examples of bad moral guidance.

This also invokes Kant’s objection, namely, if you do not want others to help (or love) you, then do not help (or love) others; if you as a judge do not want others to punish you, then do not punish others, including criminals. This also amounts to bad moral guidance.

The popular form of the gold rule thus needs to be refined.

Refined Form I

Shaw’s observation that “Their tastes may not be the same” is informative. It reminds us that all people are different, not at all the same as me. Furthermore, people’s situations are also different, and these differences may have important moral significance.

Consequently, the first step in refining the popular form of the Golden Rule is to add the qualification “in the same situation.” The result would then be “Treat others as you want to be treated in the same situation.”

This will circumvent Shaw’s objection because it is you who has a decayed tooth that needs to be extracted, not the dentist; it is your sister who has diabetes, which makes it unwise for her to eat sweets, not you. These are significantly different situations. The Golden Rule thus does not give a masochist the license to cause pain to others insofar as they may simply not enjoy experiencing pain.

This also responds to the situation of Kant’s judge since it is criminals who need to be punished for their crimes, not the judge. The

Golden Rule does not prevent a judge from exercising justice, but it does insist that a judge who commits a crime should himself be punished since he would then be in the same situation as any other criminal.

Refined Form II

The popular form of the Golden Rule has another shortcoming. For example, if you were sick, perhaps lying in a hospital bed, and learn from a TV news report that a murderer is at large, you would be culpable for wishing someone else to help apprehend him although you did nothing. This nevertheless seems to be too harsh a judgment for an ordinary man or woman.

It is thus clear that “You want person A to do act B to you” cannot be the sufficient condition for “do act B to person A” and must be downgraded to be the necessary condition. As a result, the second and final step of refining the popular form of the Golden Rule is to add the qualification “only.” It will then read “Treat others only as you want to be treated in the same situation.”

Gensler formulates this more explicitly as “Don’t combine (1) acting to do A to X with (2) not consenting to the idea of A being done to you in an exactly similar situation.”¹³ Stated otherwise, it is morally inconsistent to treat others in a way you do not want to be treated in the same situation.

THE NATURE OF THE REFINED FORM OF THE GOLDEN RULE

Let us now examine the nature of the refined form of the Golden Rule in order to ascertain its conditions of application, its limits, and its connection with other moral principles.

Application

If we understand the refined form of the Golden Rule as “Treat others only as you want to be treated in the same situation,” then one must put oneself in the other person’s shoes in order to apply it. One must imagine oneself in the other person’s place on the receiving end of the action and understand what effect his/her own action will have on others. That is to say one should perform the action if s/he indeed really wants to be treated in the same way; otherwise, do not do it.

For example, suppose you find your five-year old son playing with fire inside the house. The Golden Rule does not prevent you from stopping him even though it is against his will. You do not become a boy, as it were, and have his knowledge of life as you imagine yourself in his place. You instead retain your adult knowledge while you ask yourself “If I were five-years old and playing with fire, would I want someone to stop me?” This

same way of thinking applies to any case in which someone does not know himself to be in danger.

The Golden Rule is thus “a powerful tool of moral thinking” when properly combined with knowledge and imagination.¹⁴ It leads one to learn the significant moral principles of consistency, conscientiousness, and impartiality.

Limits

But the Golden Rule does have limits. For example, Kant’s criticism is correct in that the Golden Rule provides no ground of the duty to love others – one who does not want another’s love need not love others. The Golden Rule thus cannot replace the principle of “love your neighbor.” Furthermore, it indicates no specific act that we must do, such as “Keep promises,” “Don’t tell lies,” or “Be kind to others.” Consequently, the Golden Rule is not the supreme moral principle from which all other moral principles derive. As Kant would say, it cannot be “a universal law.”

The Golden Rule is not “a universal law” in another sense as well. Since the object of the action is “others,” it does not include the person who uses the rule. This is why Kant criticizes the Golden Rule for providing no ground of duties to oneself. Its scope of application is thus not universal.

Starting Point

Since we now know the limits of the Golden Rule, we know the general way in which our moral thinking can be improved.

For example, since the Golden Rule cannot replace the valuable principle of “love your neighbor,” we should take these two principles to be complementary and combine them in a certain sense. To follow the Golden Rule out of love for others means to follow it because we care about others for their own sake, not ours. The Golden Rule, in turn, provides a workable way in which to clarify the somewhat vague idea of loving your neighbor.¹⁵

Because the Golden Rule is not the supreme moral principle from which all other such principles derive, one who observes it should humbly learn to assimilate other moral principles into his/her moral thinking. In addition, although its scope of application is not universal, referring to “others” and not to oneself, it can clearly be generalized and intimately connected with the principle of universalizability. This is particularly important for the global village.

Insofar as the Golden Rule is so easy to learn, so widely accepted in a variety of cultures, and so open to other significant moral principles, it appears to constitute a good starting point in our moral thinking and, consequently, an ethical foundation for globalization.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As the world becomes ever more globalized, we urgently need an ethical foundation to help us decrease conflict and increase cooperation.

Since the Golden Rule has historically been accepted in nearly every great culture and is theoretically closely connected with nearly every significant ethical principle, particularly the important principle of universalizability, it is suitable for us to adopt this revered moral rule as an ethical foundation for globalization.

The great merit of the Golden Rule is that it can serve as a starting point for anyone's moral thinking, regardless of the particular culture or society in question. One can practice it without previously understanding some profound philosophical theory or believing any abstruse religious creed. It is instead down to earth and easy to grasp, and can also be enjoyable. Even a child can be taught to start practicing it, reinforced by the interesting question "Do adults play the same game?"

One who is sincere in practicing the Golden Rule continuously exercises her/his imagination in order to "put him/herself in the other person's shoes." This serves to expand one's knowledge of the consequences of a given action. This gradually leads one to grasp the true meaning not only of playing fair and being consistent, but also of conscientiousness, impartiality, universalizability, as well as real love and justice. If one is then both sincere and serious about one's own life and those of others, s/he may come to feel that it is both interesting and necessary to investigate the roots of the important moral principles just mentioned. Such an investigation might eventually lead one to appreciate the deeper meaning of "the true mega-project for the new millennium," to use McLean's words concerning Cusa's global view, and help build a much more secure and happy global community "in which all are looked upon with appreciation, and progress is evoked by mutual respect."¹⁶

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¹ McLean, George F. (2001) "Globalization as Diversity in Unity." In O. Blanchette, T. Imamich, and G. F. McLean (eds.) *Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization*, Vol. II. Washington, D.C.: CRVP, pp. 447-65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 448.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

⁴ Walzer, Michael (1994) *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

⁵ The following historical information draws from the work of Wattles, Jeffrey (1996) *The Golden Rule*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Gensler, Harry J. (1996) *Formal Ethics*. London: Routledge, Chap. 5. The term "Golden Rule" seems to have first been used in the late seventeenth century, when at least two books employed it in their titles. See Boraston, George (1683) *The Royal Law, or the Golden Rule of Justice and Charity*; and Goodman, John (1688) *The Golden Rule; or The Royal Law of Equity Explained*. London: R. Clavell.

⁶ Marcus Singer states that "So far as can be determined from available records, it [the Golden Rule] was probably first formulated by Confucius, some five hundred years before Christ." See Singer (1967), p. 365. However, such statements concerning "historical firsts" are usually not without controversy.

⁷ See Gensler, H. J. (1996) *Formal Ethics*. London: Routledge, p. 105.

⁸ George B. Shaw (1903) "Maxims for Revolutionists." In *Man and Superman*. New York: Wm. H. Wise & Company, pp. 217-29.

⁹ Kant, I. (1983) *Ethical Philosophy*. Translated by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett, p. 430.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 421.

¹¹ Locke, John [1690] (1959) *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. New York: Dover, p. 68. Also see Leibniz, Gottfried W. [1765] (1981) *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Translated by P. Remnant and J. Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91-92.

¹² Singer, Marcus G. (1967) "The Golden Rule." In Edwards, Paul (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 3. New York: Macmillan, p. 365.

¹³ Gensler (1996), p. 93.

¹⁴ Gensler, H. J. (1989) *Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction*. London: Routledge, p. 105.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* Augustine had a similar opinion, although he used the more general word "good" instead of "love." See Section 2 above, "The Popularity of the Golden Rule."

¹⁶ McLean (2001), p. 463.

CHAPTER XVI

**CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
SOUTH ASIA TODAY**

GEORGE PATTERY, S.J.

THE CONTEXT OF OUR REFLECTIONS

Opposing Trends: The Global Situation

Two divergent trends are perceptible in these early years of the twenty-first century. One is globalization and homogenization, and the other is the assertion of identities and the plurality of cultures and perspectives. Globalization in turn can be considered in three respects. First, there is *technological globalization*, in which the arms and eyes of technology are capable of reaching any part of the world, bringing about a communication revolution in our times. Second, technology can invade the privacy of peoples and cultures, rape mother earth, and denude the forests, creating ecological imbalance. Third, technological advances appear to be irreversible and inevitable. At the same time, however, a particular type of technological perception has almost destroyed the debate on alternate sciences and technologies.¹

At the economic level, financial institutions are rewriting the global landscape. Production has increased in quantity and quality, and there is greater access to commodities at the international level. At the same time, however, the dynamics of market forces render individual institutions and nation-states both helpless and volatile insofar as they are subject to the operations of the invisible hand of market economy.

At the political level, nation-states are becoming ever more powerless. Vital decisions are being made in accordance with the dictates of a dreary network of such agencies as GATT, WTO, and the IMF. Terrorism, as exemplified in the 11 September 2001 attacks, is ironically becoming “the reverse side of transnational politics and transnational economics,” particularly in its invisibility. Arundathi Roy remarks that “Terrorism has no country. It’s transnational, as global an enterprise as Coke or Pepsi or Nike. At the first sign of trouble, terrorists can pull up stakes and move their ‘factories’ from country to country in search of a better deal. Just like the multinationals.”² Even as globalization attempts to homogenize cultures and economies, it is creating large domains of “exclusion and inclusion.” Local identities and boundaries become blurred as the new mobile elite feels a sense of extra-territorial exhilaration. On the other hand, the more one is exposed to other cultures depicted as global, the more one turns upon oneself and searches for a more primordial and fundamental identity that

can in turn be globalized. More often than not, such a search for identity leads to the formation of fundamentalist groups. In short, one could say that modernism's overarching, objective, and rational grand narrative is continued by means of technology and global economy, while the post-modernist emphasis on particularities and individualities projects pluralistic perspectives.

Many Poor and Many Religions: The South Asian Scenario

The phrase "many poor and many religions" describes the South Asian situation. That there is a close link between the poverty of the Asians and their religiosity has been analyzed both in its positive and negative dimensions.³ What is distressing today is that the globalization of the economy has almost obliterated the "discourse on the poor" even as it has laid increasing numbers of people at the mercy of market forces. For example, reductions in subsidies for social projects have affected the fates of children and women. Furthermore, growing religious fundamentalism, the proliferation of armaments, the mushrooming of terrorist groups, and the threat of nuclear confrontation in South Asia are but the fallout of a market economy that more and more marginalizes peoples and uproots their identities. It should be noted in this context that all the splinter groups of fundamental and evangelical sects in North America have their branches in South Asia, re-emphasizing the post-colonial image of the Asian Church and adding to the communal tensions. As FABC documents point out, "The missionary effort has been seen as an attempt to export to Asia enmities and divisions which have no roots in Asian soil."⁴

Unresolved Polarities: The Indian Scenario

The Indian situation can be described through certain polarities that have been summarized by Corbridge and Harris: 1) On the one hand, India has a feeling of "missing the boat" after 60 years of independence – its state-sponsored Nehruvian model of development and secularization has come to be viewed as an opportunity lost. India is still being reckoned as a developing nation. On the other, India appears to have all the basics of the economy right, ready to take on the world in information technology. 2) On the one hand, peoples and cultures have been violated in the name of nation-building by the displacement of large numbers of people and by deforestation for the sake of massive dams as well as military advancements and mining on an enormous scale. Local cultures and traditions have been subsumed in the onward march of nation-state, and this in turn has weakened the fabric of democracy. On the other, India has a vibrant civil-society, an active and energetic "NGO" sector, civil rights organizations, and vigorous women's and tribal movements that challenge the episteme of the nation-state and the multi-nationals. The common people in India today have a greater voice than they used to, and their bargaining power in the

political realm has increased. 3) There is a revolt underway among the elite classes, business communities, and Hindu nationalists with the aim of reinventing India in terms of mono-cultural religious nationalism on the basis of a Hindu majority ideology so that the country can hit the super highway of market economy and become a nuclear powered nation-state. In contrast, there is also the success story of the greater involvement and participation in Indian political life on the part of the “backward castes” due to reservation policies, land reform legislation, as well as their willingness to assert their claims of difference and universalism. The rural masses, farmers, and regional parties are now contesting the “singular modernity for a singular nation-State” that ignores local variations. 4) There is, on the one hand, a “vernacular India” – the *Bharat* – that has not abandoned its traditions of faith and community identities, an extreme form of which is “saffronized variety.” On the other, an insistent secularization of Indian life has been underway since independence by means of such institutions as colleges, schools, and the mass media. This has affected public debate on the responsibility of the nation-State and on the concept of “secularism” itself. 5) The class-based politics of “industrialization” is being replaced by an issue-based politics of social movements and by ethnicity-based mobilization, both of which lack a coherent form of social change. On the other hand, class-based politics continues to remain important, and the state continues to be the focus of social movements as they are organized by political parties. 6) One could say that India remained “tolerant” of other cultures and traditions because of Hinduism. Due to *Hindutva*, however, India today is facing a fundamentalism and a fanaticism that is taking the nation down a destructive path. It is Hinduism at its worst that is now trying to create an “insider-outsider” syndrome through a convenient minoritization and inferiorization of the inconvenient “other.” 7) One could also say that the defining struggle today is between, on the one hand, the centralizing and singularizing instincts of Hindu nationalism and, on the other, the counter-veiling mobilization of India’s lower orders (especially the lower half of North Indian society) and the poor (the social majority) for a greater share in economic and political structures and resources.⁵

Lack of a Cultural Space: the Church in India

1) Historical “colonial and neo-colonial baggage” appears to weigh the Church in India/Asia down. It has all the marks of a post-colonial Church, and Christians in India are considered a foreign group not only by the militant RSS, but also by otherwise sympathetic Indians. There is control by foreign power centers as well as financial dependence upon them by the government of both the Church and religious orders. The reverse side of this foreign image is that Christians in India have not created a “cultural space” of their own that would be Indian and Christian at the same time. Although they often inhabit the best geographical space in the country, they lack a visible cultural image by which they could be recognized. But

cultural space is related to geographical space. Joseph Sarah observes that “Hinduism is perceived as grounded in the country, its natural features and its history. Therefore, it is stressed that Hinduism is truly national because its sacred places and legends are linked to the territory.”⁶ Christians are consequently regarded as aliens because their imageries refer to other geographical locations. 2) Sebasti Raj observes that several concerns are revealed in the survey of the Church in India, three of which deserve to be singled out. First, “while the Church has money and power, it does not clearly identify with the rich or with poor, though it serves the poor.”⁷ This is a rather intriguing finding – the Church in India seems to have carved out for itself a “neutral space” unreachable by the rich and unclaimable by the poor! How and where does this space exist? Second, Raj notes that “comparatively, the attitude of the people of other faiths towards the Christians is more commendable and more positive than the attitude of the Catholics towards other religions.”⁸ While the official documents of the Church are overly concerned about the correct articulation of “faith in Jesus Christ” vis à vis other religions, the majority of the Christians are in practice not only unaware of such attempts, they do not even have respect and regard for other religious traditions. Third,

It is surprising and even shocking to note that in spite of the long period of formation and spiritual and theological training, at least large numbers of priests of today (diocesan as well as religious) do not possess the inner strength to resist values that are contrary to the gospel values or are against the human values.⁹

That is to say that the consumerist culture has crept into the life of the Church in India.

We could summarize today’s South Asian scenario as follows. The emerging definitional pattern of our context may be described as a polarity between two tendencies. One is to reach out, cross boundaries, and recognize “others”, and the second is to search for roots and identity in one’s own space. The former tends to dominate the latter by homogenizing cultures and peoples, while the latter tends to exclude the former by demarcating boundaries. Is there thus an inevitable tension between genuine plurality and true identity?

THE GOOD NEWS FOR US

What is the Good News that we have to offer to our countrymen and women in this tension between genuine plurality and true identity? How do we understand the “Good News” for ourselves in this context? How do we live this “Good News” today? Does the pedagogy of Jesus offer us perspectives for dealing with this situation? Martin Hengel maintains that Jesus’ own ministry provides a perspective for the thrust of our ministry in

that his Good News was not a gnosis that we can essentialize and present to any context or culture in an ahistorical way. It is rather the “Good News” in the pedagogy in the hands of Jesus that will have relevance for our times. Within the New Testament narrative, it is evident that the *then* life of Jesus is narrated in order to challenge the *now* of a particular community. Similarly, we continue to narrate the story of Jesus in order to challenge ourselves and our times. The pedagogy of Jesus, the way he preached the message, and the totality of his person are determinative of the Good News. The Way of Jesus cannot be separated from the person of Jesus and the content of his proclamations, and conversely. The Way of Jesus is the Good News for Asians today; this way is the newness that we can offer to our people in Asia; this way is the sure guarantee of our identity and relevance today in South Asia. The point of departure in this paper consists of this perspective. In addition, we limit ourselves to answering the question How can the text of the Good News mediate the context of our present situation?

Today biblical scholars agree that the core-message of Jesus’ teaching and ministry was the “Reign of God.” Jesus understood the implications of the kingdom for himself as a process. He sought to enunciate this reign to his people over a period of time, endeavored to enact it through his ministry, and worked accomplish the reign through his death and resurrection. This “Reign of God” perspective was embedded in, and his life was totally determined by, his foundational experience of God as *abba*. That was the well-spring of all that Jesus was. As we keep in mind the plurality-identity pattern of our context in South Asia, let us highlight three perspectives of the reign of God that may be immediately relevant in this regard: 1) the Reign of God as re-defining the people of God; 2) the Reign of God as table-fellowship, and 3) the Reign of God as the way of the Cross.

Jesus Re-defines the People of God by Challenging Social Boundaries

Jesus reconstructs the notion of kingdom by advocating a restructuring of the social and cultural boundaries of the people of God. We realize the impact of his revolutionary actions if we grasp clearly what socio-cultural boundaries are doing to peoples’ lives today.

Social scientists have shown that cultures structure social identities by formulating boundaries around particular areas (e.g. cosmological, social, bodily). Ancient Mediterranean cultures often formulated these boundaries in terms of categories of clean and unclean. As long as an action or event remained within the boundaries of its area, it was clean. When an action or event crossed its prescribed boundaries, it was unclean. Jerome Neyrey has shown that the boundaries of cleanness within Judaism focused on places, people, things, and times. For example, for Judaism, the land of Israel was holier than any other

land; the temple was holier than the land; the Holy of Holies was more holy than the other parts of the temple; the high priest (who alone has access to the Holy of Holies) was more pure than priests, who were more pure than Levites, who were more pure than Israelites. Animals and people with blemishes or deformities were unclean. Body fluids such as spit, blood, and semen were unclean because they belonged inside the body. A woman was unclean through her menstrual period. Lepers were unclean because their bodies broke out in fluid that belonged inside. Most of these boundaries – cosmological (God on earth is located in the Holy of Holies), social (Jew vs. Gentile, male vs. female, orthodox vs. sinner), and bodily (abstinence from certain foods, avoiding contact with certain people, and ritual worship) – were referred to indirectly in Mark. Mark's plot presents Jesus as not only challenging these boundaries, but as erasing them. Jesus thus foregrounds possibilities that were backgrounded or even negated by the system founded upon the socio-religious categories of clean and unclean.¹⁰

The Markan narratives. These indicate that Jesus redefines socio-religious boundaries by means of miracles and by other actions that led to controversies. It is obvious that Jesus' healing miracles involve either those marginalized by society (that is, those who are in some way unclean), or those not in compliance with ritual regulations.

Those not in compliance with ritual regulations	Actions that deviate from socio-religious norms
1: 29-31: Jesus heals Simon's mother-in-law on the Sabbath	2:14: Jesus calls a tax collector as his disciple.
1:40-43: Jesus heals a leper.	2:15-17: Jesus eats with tax collectors and sinners.
3:1-6: Jesus heals on the Sabbath.	Jesus rejects the entire socio-religious system in his defense of not fasting.
5:25-34: Jesus heals a hemorrhaging woman.	2:23-28: the role of the Sabbath is reversed in Jesus' defense of his disciples plucking grain on the Sabbath. A life-situation takes priority over ceremonial norms.
5:35-43: Jesus raises a dead girl.	3:31-35: Jesus redefines the family.
7:24-30: Jesus heals the daughter of a Syrophenician woman, a Gentile.	7:1-23 Jesus disagrees with the Pharisees over the tradition of the elders. He redefines cleanliness in terms of morals rather than in terms of diet.
7:31-37: Jesus heals a deaf man with spittle.	
8:22-26: Jesus heals a blind man.	

Redefining the People of God in terms of Insiders and Outsiders. Mark depicts Jesus as challenging, even eliminating the old boundaries that defined insiders and outsiders among the people of God.

Peter and the Disciples. In general, Mark describes the disciples as understanding neither the nature of Jesus' messiahship, nor the nature of discipleship within the redefined people of God. Although Peter had expressed his readiness to die with Jesus (14:31) when the moment of truth arrived, he instead ran away. In terms of their understanding the nature of Jesus' messiahship, Peter and the disciples are outsiders. *The Syrophenician woman* in 7:1-23, is an ethnic outsider, but she has more insight into the scope of Jesus' new culture than do the disciples. *The Roman Centurion* is yet another individual who is an outsider, but he, too, has insight into the defining quality of sonship and kingdom. While the small group around Jesus misunderstands the significance of the events and Jesus' words, the centurion concludes "Truly this man was God's son" (15:39b). He does this

seeing the way Jesus breathed his last! That way was the utter cry abandonment. He has seen in the suffering of Jesus – in the absence of God – the essence of sonship. The centurion does not make his statement in response to healing, exorcisms, or any teaching, but solely upon these cries of abandonment. ... [T]he outsider has understood that Jesus' sonship is essentially defined in terms of suffering and death and that such insight is the mark of an insider.¹¹

Jesus redefines the people of God by tearing the family apart. For Mediterranean peoples, a sense of "group" based on kinship and gender was of supreme value (as it is for us in India). Jesus attacks this "familial" relationship (Mk 3:31-35; Lk 11:27-28; Lk 12:51-53). Although the family is a group to which one seems to be irrevocably assigned; Jesus radically questions this kinship and relativizes this belonging-ness in favor of one that is open to all who wish to join it; in terms of "doing Father's will." The radicality of the new approach is visible when contrasted with Lk 11:27-28:

A woman declares Mary blessed because of Jesus, presuming, in splendid Mediterranean fashion, that a woman's greatness derives from mothering a famous son. But that patriarchal chauvinism is negated by Jesus in favor of a blessedness open to anyone who wants it, without distinction of sex or gender, infertility or maternity.¹²

Crossan interprets Lk 12:51-53 in consonance with this radicality. Jesus brings division, not peace. This has been naively interpreted as

“families will become divided as some accept and others refuse faith in Jesus.” Why should faith split people along the generations? Crossan maintains that “The attack is on the Mediterranean family’s axis of power, which sets father and mother over son, daughter, and daughter-in-law.” Family involves use and abuse of power.

His ideal group is, contrary to Mediterranean and indeed most human familial reality, an open one equally accessible to all under God. It is the Kingdom of God, and it negates that terrible abuse of power that is power’s dark specter and lethal shadow.¹³

Jesus Enacts the Reign of God through Table-fellowship

Jesus’ way is vividly exemplified in his table-fellowship. We are told that Jesus loved to be at table! There is indeed a link between enacting the kingdom through table-fellowship and the parables of the kingdom. The setting is familiar to us. The house-holder sends out servants to invite people to the party; when the invited ones do not turn up, he tells his servants to call in people from the highways and thoroughfares. In other words, bring in “whomsoever you find.” The events of eating together reflect the “miniature models for the rules of association and socialization.” “To know what, where, how, when, and with whom people eat is to know the character of their society.”¹⁴ “[E]ating is a behaviour which symbolizes feelings and relationships, mediates social status and power, and expresses the boundaries of group identity.”¹⁵ In the case of Gospels, two things have to be noted: first, Jesus lived out his own parable in his table-fellowship; secondly, in his case, eating together was an open commensality – he did not use the table as a miniature map of society’s “vertical discriminations and lateral separations.” He ate with tax collectors, sinners, and whores. “The kingdom of God as a process of open commensality, of a non-discriminating table depicting in miniature a non-discriminating society, clashes fundamentally with honour and shame, those basic values of ancient Mediterranean culture and society.”¹⁶ In eastern society, an individual sees himself through the eyes of others; honor is given by others. To lose honor means not to exist in the eyes of others and thus for oneself as well. Jesus’ irrational, or rather charmingly iconoclastic, act allows him to lose honor in the eyes of others. Herein lies the radicality of the kingdom.

Eucharist and the Table-fellowship. Francis Moloney holds that the New Testament is consistent in that the Eucharistic narrative is closely related to Jesus’ sharing his table with sinners and outcasts.

According to the Gospels, Jesus’ contemporaries were staggered by his preparedness to share his own table with sinners (Mk 2:15; Lk 15:1-2), to deliberately visit the

tables of tax collectors (Lk 19:5), and to allow a prostitute to attend to him at a table where he was an invited guest (Lk 7:36-38). In these situations, his table fellowship was most unsuitable for a religious leader or a rabbi. He was active in sharing his table with the irreligious.¹⁷

The outcasts, the broken, the sinful, and the unrighteous were no doubt delighted and privileged to share such fellowship. Jesus' parables return to this practice, speaking boldly of God's kingdom as a place where the accepted absolutes of religion, history, and culture will be overturned, and where outcasts and sinners will be welcomed at the table (Lk 14:12-24; Mt 8:11).

That was the in-breaking of the kingdom of God. All the gospel traditions bear witness to Jesus' sharing his table in this manner with the outcasts, the sinners, and the broken as one of the authentic practices of Jesus' public life – a most meaningful practice for his followers and most offensive to his critics.¹⁸

Moloney consequently maintains that it is reasonable to conclude that the understanding of the Eucharist in the early Church was based on the dangerous memory of Jesus' table-fellowship. Through the Eucharistic table Jesus is present to the failing, broken, and outcast disciples of all places and times. It is in our broken-ness that we recognize the Lord of the Eucharist. We thus notice that Jesus' preaching and ministry contained a radicalism that challenges us into a new way of relating. As Soares-Prabhu observes,

The radicalism of Jesus thus invites us to an inter-human concern that sets no limits but reaches out to the undeserving and the unrewarding (Lk 6:32-34) – to the collaborators with the Romans (the "tax collectors") so hated by the Zealots; the "am ha'ares" (sinners, "little ones") despised by the Pharisees; the "children of darkness" (the "lost sheep of the house of Israel") written off by the sectarians of Qumran. The good news is truly for the "poor" for the destitute, the outcast, the sick, the crippled, the illiterate, the exploited, the oppressed (Lk 4:16-21).¹⁹

In openly associating with this "little flock" at his table, Jesus enacts his way.

Jesus Accomplishes the Reign of God through the Way of the Cross

The pedagogy of the cross was hardly understood by the disciples. In the Markan gospel this is depicted in the three passion predictions in 8:34; 9:35 and 10:35. In these three passages Jesus specifically teaches them his way of the cross – that he has to follow the path of powerlessness, of self-emptying and self-effacing love. All three times the disciples not only do not understand the pedagogy, they are also concerned with the values and attitudes that are contrary to his way. Though they in fact belonged to the inner circle of Jesus in the new vision of the kingdom, they behave as outsiders. They are certainly ready to proclaim him as the Lord, the Messiah, and the glorious leader, but are not willing to accept the way. Their definition of him seems to be perfectly true and orthodox, but their perception of him is totally misplaced and lacks any praxis.

The Sacred is with the Secular. The way of the cross culminates in the death on Calvary. This has far-reaching sociological, cultural and theological implications. It is marked by the cry of abandonment, the death of an exile outside the Holy City, and the death of one condemned. Golgotha is the place of infidels, or the secular ones, and the sacred thus pitches his tent among the profane. The God of the margins is now embracing the marginalized on Calvary. The center has moved to the periphery, and this act thereby challenges the powers of this world.

Jesus confronts the *theological establishment* (the scribes) to free people from a burdensome interpretation of the ritual and moral law (Mk:2:1-3:6); the *religious establishment* (the chief priests) and their misuse of the temple, to protest against the exploitation of the people in the name of religion (Mk 11:15-19); and the *political establishment* (Herod) who threaten to kill (a clear sign of the political impact of his ministry) he dismisses with contempt (Lk 13:31-33).²⁰

The Transposition of Power. The path of glory, power, and domination gives way to humility, powerlessness, and abandonment. This comprises a radical reinterpretation of what it means to be God and what it means to be human. This is not an exchange of roles, but rather a fusion of love that defies logic and rationality. “The politics of God was not a politics of sword but the politics of the cross and suffering.”²¹ The “politics of power” is thereby exchanged with the politics of powerlessness, which shifts the basis of Power.

It is the power of mercy, goodness, and love that becomes evident in the demonstration of God’s reign. His kingdom is to be characterized as the power that does good,

manifests mercy, and embodies love. ... In word and in deed he shows that the transformation of the power that oppresses and exploits the poor and the powerless into the power that protects and cares for them is central to his ministry.²²

The way of the cross is the way of kenosis that began at the incarnation, was carried out in his ministry, and is now completed on the cross. It is on the cross that the Sermon on the Mount is lived out, for the plenitude of love is found in total emptying. Easter Sunday reiterates that this way is the divine way, that this way is the salvific way, that this way is the fulfilling way. From now on there is joy in giving oneself away; there is fullness in emptying oneself; there is hope in the despair of life. The Christian joy of Easter morning is not the result of gnostic or ascetic learning and practices, but is rather the praxis of love in its deepest reality.

All this was possible because Jesus lived out of his “foundational experience” of God as *abba*. His ministry was a sustained attempt to evoke this experience in his disciples and in the crowd through word and deed. In his parables, his healings, his concern for the de-communitized (the lepers and the possessed), his table-fellowship with the outcasts, he draws on and communicates his *abba*-experience.²³ Hereafter, a Christian is one who walks in grace, urged on by a power from within that wells up from the experience of God’s unconditional love and produces fruits of love in its turn.²⁴ Joyfully living the Sermon on Mount and walking the way of powerlessness of the cross, empowered by God’s unconditional love poured out on the cross – this is the non-negotiable Christian perspective. The true uniqueness of Christ consists of his pedagogy and his way – the way of critical and prophetic solidarity with people on the margins, the way of enacting a new fellowship of “open commensality,” the way of walking in grace in the powerlessness of the cross. The cross is an assertion that “loving is worthwhile, whatever it may cost in self-giving and even death”²⁵ This is the “*Good News*” that we want to share with our people in South Asia.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOUTH ASIA

In our search for genuine plurality and true identity, how does the way of Jesus challenge us? Does the pedagogy of Jesus present opportunities for us to be “ourselves” as Indians/Asians and as Christians? As we consider these issues, we shall keep in mind that every challenge is also an opportunity.

Challenges at the Global level

Support Alternative Ways of Living. There is a call in the ministry of Jesus to eliminate hegemonizing discourse that attempts to create socio-

religious-cultural boundaries that are oppressive. There is a radical humanism in Jesus. The *humanum* – the human being that belongs to God’s family – can not be essentialized and homogenized. Any economic system that thrives on displacing peoples, any political system that tramples upon peoples’ cultures and transports ethnic superiority, and any technology that depletes the earth and dehumanizes peoples goes against the “logic” of the kingdom

One could say that even as the peoples and cultures of the world have come closer to each other than ever before, the “insider/outsider” syndrome is more visible and re-enforced today than it even has been. There are more people in the world who are marginal, who could be dispensed with in the name of development, who could be experimented with in the name of advancement, who could be instrumentalized in the name of “anti-terrorism.” We in South Asia, with our “colonized self/consciousness,” are suspicious of the neo-colonial traits of globalization. We are thereby justified in perceiving the neo-colonial hands that reach out through the globalizing mechanism. The recent developments of terrorist and anti-terrorist attacks along with the “algebra of infinite justice” (Arundathi Roy) confirm our fears. Globalization by virtue of its technological, economic, and political outreach can be hegemonizing – and homogenizing needs no proof. Yet globalization also offers unprecedented opportunities to cross geographical borders and bring peoples together. We need to associate ourselves with agencies and peoples that are critical of the “hegemony” of multi-nationals; that are trying to evolve alternative technology and ways of living; who advocate an “eco-friendly” style of life. The Asian Church should be visible as the “conscience” of a world that is evolving, that wants to include ever more people. The many poor in Asia/India are now at the mercy of the global economy – even the voice of the leftist movements has gone feeble in taking up the cause of those who are marginal. We should not allow the discourse about the poor to be smothered either by the one-point agenda of globalization, nor by the demonizing strategy of anti-terrorism. The table-fellowship cannot but share bread with those on the margins.

Apology for Past Hegemony: The Catholic Church, with its historical baggage of “colonial missionary adventures,” is indicated by post-colonial narratives as one of the main culprits.²⁶ Both this particular phase of the Church as well as colonialism have been memorialized in the history and geography of South Asia. A major challenge for the Asian Church today is to acknowledge the mistake of trampling upon peoples and cultures in the name of “mission” and ask pardon, thereby creating a public space for herself. Will such an apology heal/reconcile the wounded/embodied memories of the past? Since such an apology is not forthcoming from the Church, it is incumbent upon us Jesuits, with our “missionary past” in India/Asia, to tender such an apology to our people for unwittingly “violating their culture, tradition and dignity” in the name of mission. We Jesuits are credited with the honor of being the first to use the term

“mission” with reference to the spread of the Christian faith among people (including Protestants) who were not members of the Catholic Church.²⁷ We consequently have an added responsibility to seek pardon from our people and bring about global reconciliation. This is our opportunity. Such an apology is to be offered along with wholehearted thanksgiving for the missionary generosity and the gift of faith that we have received from the numerous committed missionaries, both within and outside the Society.

Challenges at the South Asian Level

“Embracing the Other.” The table-fellowship provides a radical and concrete challenge for us in Asia. The Asian situation of the “many poor and many religions” has long legitimized poverty in the name of religion and marginalized the poor by virtue of their “birth.” Poverty in South Asia has ethnic, caste, and linguistic ramifications. The poor are the other that has been marginalized and even demonized. The colonial phase only re-emphasized this ideology of inferiorizing the inconvenient “other” insofar as cultural, racial, economic, and gender differences were defined and presented as “others” in relation to one’s own dominant and privileged categories.²⁸ Such ideologization was appropriated by the Church in its association with the peoples who were colonized. This has been the case to such an extent that we must ask whether it would be an exaggeration to say that the “eucharistic table” is divided today along ethnic, caste, and linguistic lines. The best “Good News” that we could announce to our people is a eucharistic fellowship that binds us together beyond such boundaries.

We in South Asia live with many religions. This fact has constructed a culture of tolerance and a temper of searching for the ultimate. In the spirit of post-Vatican thinking, there has been a major shift in our theological attitude towards other religions. However, as evidenced in the report of the CBCI study, this perspective has not permeated the Church in India. People of other traditions are more eager to learn from us, to respect our ways of worship and gathering, than we are regarding theirs. This indicates that the “spirit of the Council” has not reached the people, but it also reflects the ambivalent attitude that the official Church holds towards other religions. If the eucharistic table-fellowship laid the foundation for the new order of the reign of God, can it help us stretch our boundaries to the religious, cultural and social “other”? In the South Asian context, we envisage a new way of being the Church, modeled on table-fellowship in which the Church becomes a community of peoples on the way, embracing those on the margins, struggling alongside the alienated, and rejoicing and celebrating with the little ones. It should not be seen as another religion in competition for power, status, and strength.

Beyond Orientalism. It should be noted within this context that our enthusiasm for inculturation and dialogue has not grown beyond “post-

colonial orientalism.” Colonial-orientalism is marked by discovering, civilizing, rescuing, and cataloguing traits.²⁹ Oriental-post-colonialism, in contrast, tends to “idealize a lost Golden Age of the past, by monumentalizing a timeless and spiritual India, and privileging the Sanskrit over vernacular, providing it a new language and transporting it to the West.”³⁰ Does much of our enthusiasm for a glorious Hindu past of high philosophy, spiritual techniques, and ashram ways of life smack of an idealization of a “Hindu” past that is essentialized, totalized, a-historicized, and then exported to another tradition or to the west? Little effort is taken to question the socio-political and cultural domination that is embedded in those traditions. There are attempts in that direction from within the Hindu fold, but we have probably not integrated such critical approaches into our “inculturation/dialogue efforts.” The “root-metaphors of purity and pollution” that operate behind that ideology are not only not being questioned, they are in fact being reintroduced in the name of new Indian spirituality. The victims of this totalizing, essentializing, and puritanical spirituality are the vernacular, popular, and little traditions as well as the voices of protest. A totalizing Hindu culture/spirituality blurs the real differences and variations that exist among the various traditions, cultures, and religions in India. There indeed seems to be an unholy marriage between “post-colonialism” and “post-orientalism.” Is the civilizing mission of the colonial mind being replaced by the “spiritualizing mission” of the post-colonial orientalist? The eucharistic-table-fellowship enables us to erase oppressive socio-cultural boundaries and to historicize spirituality in terms of sharing “food and reordering relationships.”

Challenges at the National Level

Religious Nationalism and the “Little Flock.” Jewish nationalism had been quietly challenged by Jesus as he sought to erase the “clean/unclean” syndrome – he paid for this by being crucified outside the Holy City. The Roman political hegemony had been challenged by Jesus in asking to give to Caesar that is his due and to God his due – he paid for this by being termed a political criminal and courting a political death. Jesus in effect rewrote the notion of “religious nationalism” in terms of “human beings” and the notion of power in terms of the powerlessness of God. In both cases Jesus imaged a new and radical community. Lohfink analysed the notion of *anawim* in his study of the concept of “the poor” in the Old Testament. He has demonstrated that *anawim*, with its original strong sociological moorings referring to those who were “bowed down,” eventually came to be associated in biblical history with the “suffering servant” in his powerlessness and dependence on Yahweh. The “little ones of Yahweh” remained an important pedagogical concept in biblical revelation.³¹ Legrand has also shown that the concept of “little flock” is of great significance in Jesus’ teaching and his enacting of the Kingdom.

His “strategic” option was the God of small things. His healing power favors the little ones, the outcast, lepers, blind, lame, deaf and dumb, rejected women. His language is of the little ones, parables rising from the reality of common folk: sowing and fishing, cooking and stitching patches, salt and leaven, sheep and goats, fig trees and vineyards, daily wage earners and women for whom the loss of a coin is a disaster. Not stories about kings or conquest plans. He is the Messiah of the poor, the one who perceives the advent of God and of his rule in the humble pattern the life of the smallest. John takes offence (Mt 11:2-6). Jesus replies by quoting Isaiah.³²

Interrogating Hindutva and “Christian Identity.” What is the significance of the “little flock” construct of Jesus for the national question in India?

A nation is from start to finish an *imagined community*; it exists as an entity in so far as its members mentally and emotionally ‘identify themselves’ with a collective body most of whose other members they will never confront face to face. The nation becomes a mental reality as it is imagined as such.³³

The nation-state has recently acquired greater significance in India. On the one hand, globalization tends to relativize the role of nation-state as the center of economic and political power. Perhaps this is the reason why, however, a section of the Indian polity is trying to project “a nuclear-powered, Hindu-centered, technological advanced nation-state” to counter the western powers. This is accentuated to a degree by the perception that the Nehruvian state-centered developmental project and secularism did not deliver the goods. In order to further the creation of a strong and mono-cultural Hindu *Rashtra* with a singular religious identity, an attempt is being made to minoritize the “others”, including the Muslims and the Christians. Such minoritization has in fact been under way since independence. The tribals, the *dalits*, the women, the vernacular, and local identities have been treated as a “dispensable lot” in the onward march towards nation building.

The recent attacks on Christians should be located within this larger design. Our response in light of the little flock concept should be twofold: to critique the hegemonizing concept of nation-state and to interrogate ourselves concerning our self-perception in respect to our “Christian identity.” The nation-state concept implies, first, that the nation is the intermingling of many and varied identities of peoples, languages, cultures, and religions and, second, that the state refers to the state-craft involved in the administrative boundary-building mechanism. Through our mission style and rescue-paradigm, we have probably unwittingly contributed to

nation-state hegemony and to the minoritization and alienation of the identities of little traditions and peoples. In addition, our perception of ourselves as Christians in India is apparently inconsistent with the “little flock” imagery. The recent CBCI study reveals, once again, that we seem to have created an island mentality whereby we belong neither to the rich, nor to the poor. Our “minority status” does not in itself make us the “little flock.” How shall we create ourselves as the little flock who live the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, walk the way of the powerless, and live the inner joy of the Risen Lord? In multi-religious, multi-cultural, and multi-linguistic India, how shall we tell our people that we are not a religion but a “movement of peoples” who try to build the kingdom? That we have no culture other than the culture of self-effacing presence? That we have no language other than the language of self-sacrificing love? That we have no power other than the power of “empowering the powerless”? The “little flock spirituality” that was the way of Jesus will bestow on us a true identity that will neither be threatened nor absorbed by other religions, ideologies, and philosophies. We will instead thereby discover many different peoples as our collaborators.

Challenges at the Ecclesial Level

Secular/Public Spirituality. For the Church in South Asia, particularly in India, Jesus’ way of the cross constitutes the greatest challenge and provides the maximum number of opportunities as well. That his cross was planted outside the Holy City and that the curtain of the temple was torn means that religious space has been exchanged for or intermingles with the secular. This is but the continuation of Jesus’ radicality of table fellowship, whereby the lines of purity are redrawn and the distinction between sacred and profane is blurred. Henceforth there are no intrinsically sacred places or persons. The *humanum* is the locus of our encounter with God – the human being, as broken, rejected and crucified, becomes the meeting point of the human and the divine. God is henceforth no longer experienced primarily as “holy” (the Numinous and the Wholly Other) in opposition to the profane, but as the “encompassing compassion” of the crucified. There is thus a new script that radically redefines the human and the divine as radical sharing and as total love. However, the Church’s concern for itself as a religion, or its preoccupation with a religious and sacred space, is often not in tune with the Cross planted in the secular space. It is indeed the secular that is the business of the Church – and perhaps certain aspects of the religiosity of the people of Asia need to be corrected with a proper secularity. The kingdom of God is equally a concern about this world: its progress, its achievements, its accomplishments, its pain and its sorrow, its beauty and its wonder. In the wake of anti-Christian sentiments in the country, our efforts should not be directed to projecting ourselves as a powerful religion with an equal status; we instead need to place greater emphasis on the true secularity of the

Christian way. Perhaps at this point of time, when religion is being instrumentalized for the legitimization of a range of ideologies, it is important that the Church shows itself less as a religion and more as a secular concern according to Gospel values. We could indeed consider this as a special call for the Jesuits, that is, to be religious among the secular and secular among the religious.

The dimension of “secularity” is now entering our discourse with a greater urgency through today's ecological concerns. The eco-logical and cosmic dimensions indicate the limits of one particular religious narrative and also call for an inter-textual approach to scriptures and traditions. It is likely an over-statement to say that there is nothing in the Bible comparable to the Hindu experience of the universe as “the body of God.”³⁴ The point to be noted, however, is that ecological are now bringing about a new spirituality that invites the Church out of its “religious/sacred space” and beyond its anthropocentric theology, calling for a new communion with the whole of creation. Perhaps this is a call to all religions that the boundaries of religion are being expanded today by agencies that are not strictly religious.

The Crucified Body. The crucified body became the locus where the vengeance, hatred, and violence of this world were allowed to fall – where pain is inscribed on the body and absorbed into the magnanimity of God's love so that the consequences of sin do not fall back upon humans.³⁵ The fathers of the Church spoke of the birth of the Church from the pierced heart of Jesus. Today the Church is called upon to be the crucified and risen body of Christ, that is, “the public space” where private sorrows and public guilt are remembered, forgiven, and transformed into self-giving love and fruitful joy. “The Church clasping sinners to her bosom, at once holy and always in need of purification, follows constantly the path of penance and renewal” (LG8). This image of the Church is a far cry from the “perfect body” image of the Church that possesses all truths for all times. Two consequences of this conception of the Church in the post-Vatican II period are the feminine and pilgrim images, both of which point to the supple, weak, absorbing, and generating body. Pain and memory are embodied in both, and visibly so in women. The feminine image of the Church thus implies that the Church becomes the *Sita* – the body that absorbs, forgives, heals, generates love, and produces joy. The Church in Asia can never be a militant Church that is waiting to conquer Asia for Christ. It must instead be an embodiment of peoples' pain and memory, joys and sufferings, particularly that of the marginal peoples.

Stations of the Cross of the Ecclesia in Asia. The Ecclesia in Asia cannot become the crucified/embodied self without journeying through the stations of the cross. She in fact has done so in and through her people. Asia has been living the *paschal mystery* in her history, culture, and peoples – in a relentless search for truth from time immemorial, answering the many evasive questions of Pilate, carrying the burden of colonialism for centuries

in spite of and beyond their link with the Christian world, and travelling with peoples in their struggles for independence and identity, be it in Jallianwallabagh, in Noakhali in 1947, in the jails during the emergency, in the Narmada Bachao Andolan, facing the police bullets in Koel-Karo, in the Grameen Bank project in Bangladesh, and in the Sri Lanka peace initiatives. Asia lives the paschal mystery in the never-ending fight against the caste system and untouchability, in meeting with Simeons of Asia in the faces of Kabir, Nanak, Gandhi, and Mother Theresa, in celebrating the Easter joy in the simplicity of her children and in the resilience of her women, along the way-sides, and at her bathing ghats and dharamsalas. The *good news* that we have to proclaim is that the history of our people has been woven out of the numerous stations of the cross.

Disown Fundamentalism of All Kinds. The Eucharistic/table-fellowship formed the archetype of the early Christian community, and the charismatic and prophetic “little flock” around Jesus later formed the core-group of the Church. The radicality of this table-fellowship flowed from the “profound *abba* experience of Jesus.”

The liberative experience of God as *abba* called into being a radically free community, which could respond to the economic plight of the poor by “sharing”; face cultural threat by abandoning defensive encystment for cultural pluralism; overcome the “will to power” through an unlimited readiness to serve; and confront the towering inequalities of a racist, sexist and slavish society by affirming the radical equality of all human beings. The movement was extraordinarily radical.³⁶

Jesus’ movement evolved this radical perspective in the midst of rival ideologies that sought to provide ethnic identity to the highly structured religion of Judaism. We find the Zealots insisting on the *religious prescription* of the Torah, excluding any dealings with foreigners, and the Pharisees and the Qumrans, insisting on the strict observance of *religious and social prescriptions* to the exclusion of people “unlearned in the Law” and the non-Jewish. It is against this background that we find Jesus envisaging a radical community.

There is fundamentalism in the Church and in Christian denominations. However, the gospels invite us to take a definite stand against fundamentalism of all kinds, especially against fundamentalist groups that are sponsored by Christian sects. Acknowledging and distancing ourselves from such groups will give us credibility in our fight against more basic fundamentalism – economic, technological, and social.

The “Little Way”: A Challenge to “Religious Life.” The challenge before us is the very call of Gospel radicalism itself. The history of

“religious” groups within the Church shows that these were “liminal” groups that attempted to live the demands of the Gospel in its radicality. How can we Jesuits live our charism more radically, at the individual and corporate levels, so as to give witness to the eucharistic table-fellowship and be placed along with Jesus as he carries the Cross? Karl Rahner helps us to discern “grace-in-every-day” life when he asks

Can we recall any occasion when we kept silent although we longed to defend ourselves and although we were in danger of being unjustly dealt with? Did we ever forgive someone from whom nothing was expected in return and who would take our silent forgiveness simply as a matter of course? Did we ever obey, not because to do otherwise would have got us into trouble, but solely for the sake of those silent, incomprehensible mysteries which we call God and God’s will? Did we ever make a sacrifice that was thankless and unnoticed and did not even give us a sense of inner satisfaction? ... Did we ever do a kindness to a person from whom we could not expect as much as a shadow of gratitude or appreciation, while at the same time we have not even the compensation of feeling we had acted unselfishly or decently in doing so?³⁷

Can we let ourselves be interrogated in this manner into the “paschal mystery” at the personal, communal, and social levels? The danger is that these questions may be raised in order to legitimize a “misuse” of power and authority. The living of the Gospels is the best way to share the Good News.

To Be Emmaus People. Genuine plurality and true identity call us to be “Emmaus People.” Emmaus people are on the road, on the move. They struggle to make meaning out of the events that happened to them. They are sad; they are broken people; they are searching the scriptures for a “horizon” of understanding. They are a people who recognized the risen Lord as a companion. They have “heart-burning” experiences upon which they fall back; they break bread together in order to recognize the broken one; they have something to announce to their companions. They are quick to return to their place of struggle. They narrate stories of their lives; they listen to similar stories narrated by others; they gather their companions and they form communities; they are given peace; they share together. They recognize “his wounds.” They are “witnesses” of him; they are clothed with the power from on high; they are a joyous people.

The Good News that we have to share with our people is that we are “Emmaus people.” We are not conquerors; we are not rivals; we are not religionists; we want to be a people among peoples – nothing more and nothing less. This makes us mystics who commune with the Lord at the

breaking of bread, who commune with people at the sharing of bread. We are Easter mystics who search the scriptures relentlessly and who walk with people in their search. We are the Easter mystics who make bold to sing the alleluia of joy at the “empty tombs” of our lives, at the seashores of our peoples’ struggles, and at the way-sides of our journey. The spiritual intelligence of Easter Sunday enables us to see God in all things, and in all things, God.

A NOTE ON THE THEOLOGY OF MISSION

Mission and the Colonial Narrative

The trajectory of the history of mission theology cannot always be viewed in a positive light. While “mission” was long used to refer to trinitarian salvific work, it eventually came to be associated with the spread of faith among people who were not members of the Catholic Church. This development had a direct “colonial connotation” in that missionary work in this sense coincided with colonial expansion. As noted above, the colonial paradigm involves discovering, civilizing, rescuing, and cataloguing the “other” in relation to the dominant and privileged categories of a superior culture and religion.³⁸ The Catholic mission theology clearly shared these traits with colonialism. It was intent on rescuing the world as a whole from “paganism,” for which “implanting the Church” in distant geographical areas was essential. This was so much the case that the statement “mission appears to be the greatest enemy of the gospel” cannot be rejected as pure hyperbolism.³⁹ Gandhi echoed these same sentiments as early as 1927 in his critique of Christian missionaries: “[A] missionary goes to people (especially to the *Harijans*) like any vendor of goods. He has no special spiritual merit that will distinguish him from those to whom he goes.”⁴⁰ He stated that the task of the missionary was to “meet true men and women as fellow seekers and to learn from them.” He added, however, that “I miss receptiveness, humility, willingness on your part to identify yourselves with the masses of India.”⁴¹

From Mission to Missions

The previous missionary paradigm simply reflected the dominant rational paradigm of modernism, where “grand narratives” and “totalizing ideas” were in vogue. But there has obviously been a paradigm shift in mission thinking in post-modern times. Post-Vatican missiology, at least at the theological level, has moved away from the imagery of “implanting the Church” to “ushering in the reign of God.” This reflects a post-modernism view whereby “grand narratives” give way to multiple interpretations and representations of evocative images. The official mission teaching of the Church reflects this trend. However, mission theology today is not supported by one “overarching dogma,” but rather by a number of texts

addressing different areas and concerns. Mission touches upon such varied areas as justice, inculturation, dialogue, and proclamation, and the relevant documents range from the decree on mission (*NA*), to the encyclical on inculturation (*EN*), the synod document on justice in the world and social concern (*SRS*), the encyclical on redeemer and mission (*RM*), and the documents *Dominus Jesus* and *Ecclesia in Asia*. *RM* defines evangelization as “proclamation, dialogue, justice, inculturation,” but this paradigm shift this indicates has not yet taken place once and for all. The modernist trend of looking for “grand narrative” is still very much present (as in *Dominus Jesus*), while traces of an imaginative and creative approach are visible in *Ecclesia in Asia* and very evident in FABC documents.

Missiology: A Public Discourse

A healthy tension between genuine plurality and true identity is visible in the Church’s official documents. The “mission” documents of the Church are no longer an “in-group” discourse that is meant for “true Catholics,” but have instead become “public discourse” that is being studied, criticized, and evaluated by the media and the intelligentsia of all cultures and religions. While that is the real challenge for the Church in our times, it is also the opportunity to evolve a discourse style that is receptive and constructive. That is urgent for us in South Asia. Looking at the Good News as the *Way of Jesus* could be a valid mode of reaching out to those on the boundaries and of rooting ourselves in our true identity. Let me end this discussion with a quote from one of the secular columnists in *The Statesman* who stated at the height of the anti-Christian violence that “as long as Christians have a ‘crucified God’ as the epicenter of their life, the crucified of this world will always flock to them; no one can block it.” The crucified and the risen Lord remains the guarantee of our identity and our relevance in South Asia today.

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CHAPTER XVII

RADHAKRISHNAN AND POST-ORIENTALIST RELIGIOUS STUDIES

GEORGE PATTERY, S.J.

A brilliant and original exponent of Neo-Hinduism, an accomplished writer and persuasive orator, a genial diplomat and statesman, a man of vast culture and a philosopher “steeped in the waters of modern thought” Radhakrishnan ranked among the great personalities of 20th century India.¹

During the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, India witnessed a cultural awakening together with a tremendous surge of talents and personalities that was unprecedented – Rajaram Mohun Roy, Devendranath Tagore, Keshab Chandra Sen, Isvara Chandra Vidyasagar, Bakim Chandra Chatterjee Ramakrishan Paramahansa, Swami Vivekanada, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Sri Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi. One begins to appreciate the significance of these names when contrasted with the present state of affairs, whether it be in philosophy, culture, or religion, not to mention politics. This is not to mourn the days gone by, but rather consider them from a distance so as to appreciate them and also place them in a proper perspective. Yesterdays’ awakening is thus viewed from the bewildering pluralities of today.

Such an attempt will be limited in the present discussion to Radhakrishnan’s contributions to “the science of religion,” which is the term we will use instead of “comparative religion” or the “philosophy of religion.” Comparative religion connotes a trade category wherein everything is valued in terms of something else. It presupposes that religions are comparable, that there is a common point of reference, and that we agree on what we mean by comparison and by religion. We shall follow the advice of Gandhi, who said that in matters of religion it is better that we do not enter into comparisons. Nor is the term philosophy of religion satisfactory insofar as it claims to regard religion from a rational point of view. While it is fully justified and also necessary to employ reason in matters of religion, R. Otto has convincingly argued that religious experience contains both rational and non-rational dimensions, and that religion cannot be reduced to either of them. His claim for a numinous faculty of an *a priori* category in human beings may be questioned, but the supra-rational character of religious phenomena cannot be rejected. In contrast, the German term *religionswissenschaft* indicates a science of

religion that could mean a systematic and critical study of religion. This would necessarily mean to locate religion in society and to study religious phenomena in relation to social, psychological, and cultural perspectives. I hope it will become clear in the course of this presentation as to where Radhakrishnan's contribution lies – in comparative religion, the philosophy of religion, or the science of religion. That will help us indicate certain areas for furthering the cause of science of religions.

The present attempt to react to Radhakrishnan's views on religion will necessarily be located within his interest in philosophy. As he acknowledges, "My approach to the problems of philosophy from the angle of religion as distinct from that of science or of history was determined by my early training. I was not able to confine philosophy to logic and epistemology."² He here refers to his orthodox religious family, in which he imbibed a liking for the Vedas and the Upanisads; the early missionary apologetics that questioned many of the beliefs and practices of the Hindus; the very able guidance into Western philosophy that he received from his missionary teachers; and the total absence of Indian philosophy in the curriculum of his time. All this reinforced in him an eagerness to learn Indian philosophical systems and also to interact with Western thought patterns. We thus find that he has a double interest: to relate philosophy to religion, and to bring about a synthesis between Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. As Muirhead put it, Radhakrishnan was "a philosophical bilinguist upon the spiritual wisdom of the world."³

INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE AND INTUITION

It is not possible to present Radhakrishnan's basic philosophical approach in this paper. Let me dwell, however, on some major features of his philosophy that would help our evaluation of his religious thinking, perhaps the most important of which is what he terms integral experience. Within his philosophical argumentation, Radhakrishnan insists on the significance of integral experience and on the role of intuition as opposed to mere intellectualism. Integral experience means:

Besides consciousness in the animal world (perception and action), and self-consciousness in the human (intelligence and will), we have spiritual consciousness or super-consciousness, a level of experience at which new aspects of reality reveal themselves. While in the first case we have a psychological unity between the animal and the environment, in the second we have a logical unity and in the third a spiritual unity. At the spiritual level, the individual becomes aware of the substance of spirit, not as an object of intellectual cognition but as an awareness in which the subject becomes its own object, in which the timeless and the spaceless is aware of itself as the basis

and reality of all experience. The spirit which is inclusive of both self and object is self-subsistent and self-consistent. Nothing in our experience can be said to be real or individual without qualification except spirit. There is nothing within it to divide it, nothing outside to limit it. It alone satisfies our total desire and whole intelligence. It is all that there is, all being and all value.

It is because the universal spirit which is higher than the self-conscious individual is present and operative in self-conscious mind that the latter is dissatisfied with any finite form it may assume. When the self-consciousness knows itself to be finite and limited, it is a greater than self that judges that which is less than itself in its wholeness. The reality of universal spirit is not an uncriticised intuition or a postulate of philosophy but the obvious implication of our daily life.⁴

On the one hand, Radhakrishnan argues that integral experience is of such a spiritual and intuitive character that it is not attributed to all and sundry – is not integral experience as such available only to mystics? On the other, he claims that it is an obvious fact of life. He goes on to emphasize that the means for attaining integral experience is intuition, of which there are such different types as sensory intuition, rational intuition, intuition of facts, valuational intuition, and integral experience as such. Although Radhakrishnan seems to propose several steps for arriving at these intuitions, Browning is of the opinion that Radhakrishnan's intuitionism is one of "stimulation and suggestiveness rather than linear argument or of detailed taxonomy,"⁵ but he nevertheless attempts to classify them under several categories. Starting from sensory perception, we proceed to rational arguments and a grasp of meanings before arrive at intuition. But what is the result of this intuition? Is it an awareness of the ultimate? Is it a union with the ultimate? If it is the former, then does it fall under the category of knowing? Or is it beyond the scope of rationality and knowledge? If it is the latter, is this union a fact? Can that fact be verified as probable or certain? Is this union a source of knowledge or is it a "proved knowledge"? The ideas we attain at the end of rational arguments are also believed to be "random occurrences or chance variations" – where procreative selectivity is implied. Supposing we take that as "knowledge," can we not say that it is a question of fact (to be settled by empirical test or inspection) whether there is intuition of a certain sort or not? In addition, why should we not have a psychological explanation, if we can obtain it, for any and all intuitive powers that are found in some way? These questions that Browning raises are important. Before we construct a metaphysics of our self and intuition, should we not raise epistemological questions and issues of psychological and physical verification, not least of all in that all sciences are relevant to metaphysics? Should one recognize that he "is" beyond the empirical in

order to get beyond it? But how does one get beyond the empirical? Can we accept *samadhi* without verifying it, whether it be telepathy or not?

Radhakrishnan seems to hold that scientific reason is limited in its scope for data and is not autonomous whereas philosophical reason is both unlimited and autonomous. In addition, philosophical reason finds certain data to be more significant and revelatory (such as those found in mystical and religious experience) than others. But how does reason give cognitive status to intuition and integral experience when the latter is said to be beyond reason? Radhakrishnan proposes a threefold classification of moral, aesthetic, and religious intuitions. Intuitions of intrinsic values cannot be fully verified, but recognizing this fact does not really resolve any problems. Do we accept such intuitions by acquaintance, coherence, or beneficiality? How do we really know the Absolute qua Absolute? How does the autonomy and supremacy of reason stand along with the self-sufficient finality of integral experience? Is the infallibility of mystical experience bound up with its ineffability? How do we relate the religious and mystical with intrinsic values? If intuition is beyond "truth and falsehood," how do we distinguish between true and false mystics?

In this regard, the role and function that is given to intuition resembles much of neo-Thomistic philosophy. For example, Thomas Aquinas speaks of the epistemic process, by which the intellect intuits the idea from sensory data, and states that the idea of the Absolute is implied in every judgment. The ultimate point of intellection is intuition, where the knowledge of the Absolute is given implicitly. The uniqueness of the experience of the Whole, of the Horizon of all horizons, is valid for mystics and functions as regulatory data for their partial experiences. The Whole is seen in the partial and the partial is seen in the Whole. Radhakrishnan accepts the authority of the Vedas, and he wishes to assert the reign of religion in the philosophy of radical mysticism. He gives authority to mystical experience, and yet refuses to accept authoritative religion.

IN DEFENSE OF RELIGION

Whether Radhakrishnan succeeds in establishing intuition as a philosophically verifiable mode of knowing or not, he is genuinely interested in establishing religious or spiritual values in modern life. He states that "My one supreme interest has been to try to restore a sense of spiritual values to the millions of religiously displaced persons, who have been struggling to find precarious refuges in the emergency camps of art and science, of fascism and nazism, of humanism and communism."⁶ There is widespread skepticism in modern life due to the influence of the scientific spirit, technological advances, artificial religions, social sciences, and the comparative study of religions. It is significant that Radhakrishnan likes to contrast empirical science with dogmatic religion. Because of its hypothetical findings, the empirical sciences tend to be humble and tolerant whereas religion tends to be intolerant and fanatic. The double role of

religion as civilizing agency (inspiring spiritual life, encouraging arts, and disciplining minds) and as oppressive agent (bringing about wars, torturing souls, and sanctioning violence) reveals the unscientific and unsocial nature of religion, and there are many who do not come to religion because of this negative role it possesses. Our social conscience has indeed been anaesthetized by formal religions many times. In this type of situation, it is skeptics and atheists who have often advanced the cause of religion in the true sense of the term. Radhakrishnan states that

(T)he opposite of religion is not irreligion but a counter religion. When the Buddha denied the Vedic gods, he did so in the name of a higher religion. When Socrates was put to death on the charge of atheism, his offence was the repudiation of an imperfect religion. When Christians were brought into the Roman amphitheatre to undergo martyrdom for their convictions, the pagan mob shouted ‘the atheists to the lions.’⁷

True atheism in fact gives vitality to religion. More harmful is practical atheism, which justifies the poverty, wars, and slavery that have been sanctioned by the so-called religionists.

Radhakrishnan advocates true religion in order to further the evolution of man into his divine stature and develop increased awareness, a sense of inner freedom of mind, and fearlessness. “Religion is the way in which the individual organizes his inward being and responds to what is envisaged by him as the ultimate reality. It is essentially intensification of experience, the displacement of triviality by intensity.”⁸ One of Radhakrishnan’s contributions in the cause of the “science of religion” consists of viewing religion from a philosophical angle, thereby bringing a certain respectability to the discourse on religion. At a time when religion was considered either too pious and personal to be talked about in public, or too dogmatic to be discussed by any decent philosopher, Radhakrishnan maintained that religion was a topic worth talking about and sought a *philosophia perennis*.

PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY AND UNIVERSAL RELIGION

Radhakrishnan holds that “any philosophical account of the universe must consider all known data, our hopes and fears, our efforts and endeavors. While a philosophy cannot take anything for granted, it cannot ignore the testimony of religious experience to the nature of ultimate reality which it also seeks to apprehend.”⁹ He speaks of a perennial philosophy that seeks to unify all cultures under religious experience. But perennial philosophy, the integral experience of the ultimate, is yet to be born.

May we not prepare for the truth of the world's yet unborn soul by a free exchange of ideas and the development of a philosophy which will combine the best of European humanism and Asiatic religion, a philosophy profounder and more living than either endowed with the greater spiritual and ethical force, which will conquer the hearts of men and compel peoples to acknowledge its sway?¹⁰

Radhakrishnan states that such a perennial philosophy will be a spiritual religion.

The mind of the world requires to be pulled together and the present aimless stare of dementia replaced by a collective rational purpose. We need a philosophy, a direction and a hope, if the present state of indecision is not to lead us to despair. Belief may be difficult but the need for believing is inescapable. We are in search of spiritual religion, that is universally valid, vital, clear-cut, one that has an understanding of the fresh sense of truth and the awakened social passion which are the prominent characteristics of the religious situation today. The severe intellectual honesty and the burning passion for social justice are not to be slighted. They are expressions of spiritual sincerity ... doubt and denial of God have often proved dialectical moments in the history of religions, ways by which mankind has increased its knowledge of God and emancipated itself from imperfect conceptions of religion.¹¹

The mandate of all religions is that man must change his own nature in order to let the divine within him become manifest. Religion speaks of the death of man as we know him, with all his worldly desires, and the emergence of the new man. Those who overlook this perennial wisdom – the eternal religion behind all religions, this “sanatana dharma,” this timeless tradition, “wisdom uncreated” – who cling to outward forms and quarrel among themselves, are responsible for the civilized chaos in which we live. Radhakrishnan argues that it is our duty to return to the central core of religion, the fundamental wisdom that has been distorted by dogmatic and sectarian developments. We may differ from each other at the physical and temperamental levels, but we all are like each other at the core, spirit, and ground of our being. In order to achieve this, human beings must grow into completeness, that invisible world which is the kingdom of heaven.¹² Radhakrishnan maintains that this core religion has already been revealed to us by God through the ultimate values of Goodness-Love, wisdom-truth, and beauty.¹³ These are given to us *a priori* and we accept

them on faith, but we have not been able to revere the inner spirit and the eternal spirit due to excessive intellectuality.

He maintains that

[I]n my writings my main contention has been to make out that there is one perennial and universal philosophy which is found in all lands and cultures, in the seers of the Upanisads and the Buddha, Plato and Plotinus, in Hillel and Philo, Jesus and Paul and the mediaeval mystics of Islam. It is this spirit which binds continents and unites the ages that can save us from the meaninglessness of the present situation, and not any local variant of it which we find in the Indian tradition. It is absurd to speak of any Indian monopolies of philosophic wisdom.¹⁴

HINDUISM: THE RELIGION OF SPIRIT

Eternal religion is the experience of the ultimate, the Brahman. It is the experience of the substratum of being, where the subject-object distinction disappears. This absolute is most fully explained in Advaita, and Hinduism represents this perennial philosophy and the eternal religion.¹⁵

Indian culture is not racially exclusive, but has affected men of all races. It is international in feeling and intention. As the typical religion of India, Hinduism represents this spirit, the spirit that has such extraordinary vitality as to survive political and social changes. From the beginning of recorded history, Hinduism has borne witness to the sacred flame of the spirit which must remain for ever, even while dynasties crash and empires tumble into ruins. It alone can give our civilization a soul, and men and women a principle to live by.¹⁶

If Hinduism represents this perennial philosophy, it is the Vedanta and the Gita within Hinduism that epitomizes this alleged universality. "The Gita represents not any sect of Hinduism, but Hinduism as a whole, not merely Hinduism but religion as such in its universality, without limit of time or space, embracing within its synthesis the whole gamut of the human spirit, from the crude fetishism of the savage to the creative affirmation of the saint."¹⁷ Similarly, the Vedanta is not a religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance. "The Hindu thinker readily admits other points of view than his own and considers them to be just as worthy of attention ... Hinduism developed an attitude of comprehensive charity instead of fanatic faith in an inflexible creed! ... Heresy-hunting, the favorite game of many religions is simply absent from Hinduism."¹⁸

Both Radhakrishnan and Vivekananda insist on an inclusivist approach in order to provide tolerance among the various sections of Indian society and maintain the high moral ground against the West. This inclusivism occurs at three levels: 1) It is apparent in the suggestion that the (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy of Sankara (8th C.E.) constitutes the central philosophy of Hinduism. 2) In an Indian context, neo-Vedanta philosophy subsumes Buddhist philosophies in terms of its Vedantic ideology. The Buddha becomes a member of the Vedanta tradition, merely attempting to reform it from within. 3) At the global level, neo-Vedanta colonizes the religious traditions of the world by arguing for the centrality of a non-dualistic position as the *philosophia perennis* underlying all cultural differences.¹⁹ A tolerant Hinduism is contrasted with the polemical dogmatism of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions.

This claim that Hinduism is perennial philosophy and “universal religion” smacks, however, of a totalizing that appropriates all others for oneself. Its portrayal of Hinduism as a single “world” religion centered on mystical theology denigrates heterogeneous Hindu beliefs and practices as distortions of the basic teachings of the Vedanta. Since Radhakrishnan is in fact aware of the heterogeneity of Hindu practices, he advocates a mass education program in the philosophy of Vedanta. He also includes Buddhism in this universal religion of Vedanta, but such vedanticization of Buddhism is highly problematic. Buddhism is not a form of Vedanta and Vedanta is not a form of crypto-Buddhism – in spite of certain similarities, their world-views are different. A close examination of Radhakrishnan’s universal religion shows that other religions tend to function as supplementary truths to the supposed higher-order truth of Advaita Vedanta. Moreover, it is the task of neo-Vedanta to colonize a materialistic and depraved Europe with Hindu spirituality. This is no better than religions claiming absolute truth. In addition, Radhakrishnan keeps referring to other religions as missionary in character while he glorifies Hinduism as universal. Christianity in particular, to which he attributes authoritarianism and dogmatism, is the villain in the game. If so, his vision of a synthesis of the East and West remains problematic. He seeks a synthesis of the great humanism of the West with the Inner Spirit of the East, but such an attempt at synthesis will not go very far if Hinduism is unilaterally accorded the status of universal religion.

ATTEMPTS AT COMPARATIVE RELIGION

Radhakrishnan’s approach to various religions appears to be based on an essentialist understanding of a supposed fundamental character to man’s religious experience. He speaks of religion as the awareness of our real nature in God, which makes for a union of all mankind based on communion with the Eternal. He explains that “The different religions take their source in the aspiration of man towards an unseen world, though the forms in which this aspiration is couched are determined by the

environment and climate of thought. The unity of all religions is to be found in that which is divine or universal in them and not in what is temporary and local. Where there is spirit of truth there is unity”²⁰ Radhakrishnan maintains that although the eternal is given in the visibility of the universe, the latter is only a manifestation of the emergence of a complete consciousness. In this process, the historical religions are to be transcended in order to arrive at eternal spirit. If not, they will fade away. Radhakrishnan’s implicit assumption is that the divine or the eternal is more easily visible and given in so called universal religion, or Hinduism.

Following Bergson’s thinking, Radhakrishnan holds that there is an evolutionary process in which the spirit will come to itself, in spite of and beyond matter. We can observe two tendencies in the emergence of the eternal spirit – an upward movement, when the creative spiritual tendency is in the ascendancy, and a downward one, when the non-creative tendency is. Radhakrishnan states that “The universe from its beginnings in crude matter to its heights in human persons is struggling towards the attainment of the whole. When man gives up his subordination to matter, the spirit will emerge.”²¹ He adds that “This infinite spirit, which though it transcends the self is yet revealed at its fullest in the self, in that deep well of being that remains in dreamless sleep when all distinction of subject and object vanishes and the immortal principle and substratum of Being alone remains.” Radhakrishnan views this as the object of all faith and morality, and he considers this absolute to be most fully and philosophically explained in Advaita Vedanta. Radhakrishnan sees no abiding role for historical religions or for sudden revelations or conversions in this evolutionary process as well, for evolution is gradual. He argues that

A study of comparative religion gives us insight into the values of the various faiths, values which transcend their differing symbols and creeds and in transcending penetrate into the depths of spiritual consciousness, where the symbols and the formulas shrink into insignificance. In the uplifted consciousness of the eternal, in the felt indwelling of the great Spirit, we recognize the relativity of all symbols and definitions and know that the central principles of religion, principles which harmonize all religions are the communion of individual with God and the law of love or charity or kindness.²²

But Radhakrishnan’s understanding of religions is problematic. How do we determine the fundamental character of human feelings? How do we agree upon the eternal or the divine? Is there a common understanding with regard to the eternal, say, between Hinduism and Buddhism, between atheists and believers? How do we decode the influence of thought-patterns and the environment in order to determine what is truly eternal? Is there an eternal religion “pure and simple” apart from the

historical and the temporal? Is there a dichotomy between the eternal and the temporal? Even if one were to grant his evolutionary theory of the emergence of the infinite spirit (of which Teilhard de Chardin spoke in his *Phenomenon of Man*), should one exclude any historical revelation? Does not evolutionary theory itself speak of “qualitative leaps” and “random selection” in the process of evolution itself? Why should that be ruled out in the evolution of the spirit? Radhakrishnan admits revelation through “values,” humans attuned to their state of mind, and inward spiritual revelation. Is he in fact involved in an *a priori* attempt to grant precedence the so-called universalism of Hinduism and exclude any role for historical religions?

HINDU APOLOGIST AND HISTORICAL RELIGIONS

Radhakrishnan is at his best as a Hindu apologist. He presents Hinduism in an eloquent manner, particularly to the colonial and the missionary West with its fascination for “the Orient.” Radhakrishnan speaks mainly of Brahminism and Christianity in his treatment of religions, but also discusses Buddhism. It is surprising that he makes very few references to Islam, especially at a point in time when the Indian subcontinent was beset by religious tensions. Similarly, there is hardly any reference to tribal religions and to various cults and practices. Does this silence mean that he does not grant any significant value to them in this quest for a “universal religion”?

Radhakrishnan and Christianity

Given his family background and his early education with Christian missionaries, it is understandable that Christian thought and religion comprise one of Radhakrishnan’s main concerns. He easily identifies the West with Christianity in spite of his acquaintance with the history of Christian thought, likely because he thereby tends to rationalize religious experience. But in this case he rather selectively applies the intuition-intellect polarity and persists in attempting to attribute anything mystical and innerly in Christianity to the influence of Indian thought. For example, he writes that “Most probably Indian religious ideas and legends were well known in the circles in which the accounts of the Gospels originated. The Jewish religion can only be properly understood if its vast background is taken into account, if the non-Semitic influences on Palestine and Syria are considered.”²³ This is stretching the imagination a bit too far, to say the least. New Testament scholars would certainly contest this claim. And after he introduces the figure of Jesus, Radhakrishnan turns to the Book of Enoch to compare Jesus with Enoch. He gives two reasons for this: first, there are many non-Jewish speculations in it; secondly, some of the central features of Jesus’ consciousness and teachings may be traced to it. This is rather

strange. Roman Catholics do not even include the Book of Enoch in the canonical books of the Bible.

Moreover, scholars are of the opinion after the discovery of the Qumran documents that references to the Son of Man in the Book of Enoch are quite possibly a later Christian interpolation. It would therefore be the Gospels that have influenced the Book of Enoch as it is today, not the other way around (*The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*). Furthermore, after discussing the Book of Enoch at length and drawing similarities with Jesus, Radhakrishnan concludes that “When Jesus manifests his spiritual insight by suffering unto death he inherits the Kingdom. He is the Son of Man and the Son of God. It is the ancient Hindu tradition which Enoch illustrates and Jesus continues.”²⁴ This is simply an unscientific attempt to appropriate everything to a universalizing and totalizing concept of Hinduism. Could there not be an aspect of a profound religious experience of self-surrendering, suffering, and love in the event of Jesus that simply is not found in Hinduism? Radhakrishnan quotes Otto as saying that elements of the concept of the kingdom in Jesus are certainly not of Palestinian origin, but rather point to connections with the Aryan and Iranian East. He then concludes: “While the messianic conception of the kingdom belongs to the Palestinian tradition, the mystic conception is the development of the Indian idea”²⁵

Even if we take Otto as an authority on the New (Second) Testament (which he is not) and accept the Iranian link, the conclusion that Radhakrishnan draws is rather strange. Does he imply that anything that is mystical should necessarily come from India? Does not Judaism have its own mystical traditions? Radhakrishnan discusses Gnosticism and the teachings of Paul at length. He finds links with the Upanisads and Buddhism in the former, and such universalizing elements from Hinduism as sacrifice and “dying to one’s self” in the latter. He argues that “Though his [Jesus’] teaching is historically continuous with Judaism, it did not develop from it in its essentials. The two tendencies, the Jewish and the mystic, were not perfectly reconciled in Jesus’ mind, and the tension has continued in Christian development. We shall see how the Gospel story bears striking resemblance to the life and teaching of Gautama the Buddha.”²⁶ But he does not substantiate his claims that the Gospels are different in their essentials from Judaism, or that the differences with Judaism supposedly suggest that the non-Jewish is essentially Hindu or Buddhist. He also provides a long treatment of texts from Gautama and the Gospels. Such inter-textuality is a welcome approach today, not for attributing certain borrowing from each other wherever similarities are found, but in order to let texts come alive in different settings. Much of Radhakrishnan’s references to the Gospels will be contested by New (Second) Testament scholars such as von Rad, Joachim Jeremais, Martin Hengel, John Crossan, and others. He does not take into account the historical-critical method, form-criticism, and the hermeneutical approaches that are employed in Gospels studies today.

As Joachim Wach has indicated, Radhakrishnan's presentation of Western and Eastern religions does justice to neither. Should not the essence of Hinduism include other aspects than Brahminic and Advaitic philosophies? What about Saivism, Vaishnavism and other popular religious practices? Is not the Hinduism that he presents a rather reconstructed and idealized Hinduism? He also seems to hold that all Western religions are dogmatic, historical, and darkness, while over here it is light.²⁷ Radhakrishnan distinguishes between ideal and empirical Hinduism, especially in referring to the caste system, in order that Hinduism not be harmed in the process, but does he apply the same criteria to other religions, especially the Western?²⁸ Wach objects to Radhakrishnan's statement that "with regard to religions, the question is not of truth and falsehood, but life or death," maintaining that the problem of validity and truth must be faced in matters of religion as well. This is all the more true as Radhakrishnan admits the possibility and the giftedness of revelation.²⁹ He denounces the Catholic religion for its dogmas and rituals, but ignores that dogmas have experiential roots. Not only are they expressions of a living experience, dogmatic statement need not always be exclusive and esoteric.³⁰ D. M. Datta points out that while Radhakrishnan complains that many Western philosophers allow their religious thought to influence their philosophical thinking, he himself is a victim of it in his *An Idealist view of Life*.³¹

Eastern Religion and Western Thought is packed with sickening details of the political, cultural, and religious history of the West, many of which could be contested by historians. According to Radhakrishnan, the real meeting between East and West happened in trade and military expeditions (on both land and sea). Although Indian thinking is found in both Greek and mediaeval philosophies because of this ancient association, he concludes that Western civilization is dominated by Greco-Roman culture. That is why rationalism, humanism, and the sovereignty of state are its foundations, while such values as renunciation, tolerance, and meekness (which are influences from the East) made little impression upon it. This stereotyping of West and East has been questioned by the post-colonial and post-orientalist discourse.

ORIENTALISM AND RADHAKRISHNAN

Universalism

Radhakrishnan's writings on "comparative religion" reveal that he has inherited certain European enlightenment traits and is a victim of colonial orientalism. This becomes even more clear in the light of the many recent studies of orientalism and post-orientalism. Enlightenment universalism held that principles of reason and science (rational procedures, logical rules, and scientific laws) could be applied outside of the European context. As a result, the search for universal and unifying foundations, such as the principle of rationality, a common human nature underlying cultural

diversity, and a neutral methodology, were the marks of Western universalism.³² Radhakrishnan employs the same methodology in order to assert that the Advaitic mystical traditions of Hinduism comprise a universal religion. Furthermore, enlightenment rationality believed in the uniformity of human nature – the fundamental belief that human beings have a common human nature that unites them across social, historical, and cultural boundaries. This notion of rationality makes it convenient for Radhakrishnan to argue for a universal religion beyond the particularities of different religions, especially the so-called historical religions. In addition, Western secularism implied both a social critique of the authoritarian hegemony of the Church within European society and also a rejection of Christian dogma based upon a variety of humanistic and philosophical grounds. Radhakrishnan's one-sided critique of Christian religion, especially his projection of it as "authoritarian and dogmatic," resembles much of the European Protestant anti-clericalism that followed the enlightenment. It must be emphasized that universalism is not neutral – it shares certain common traits with colonialism, such as "discovering, civilizing, rescuing and cataloguing," so that they become accessible to all.³³ In this sense any universalism amounts to a certain "proselytizing and missioning," whether it be in religion, culture or science. Radhakrishnan's arguments for a "universal religion as evidenced in Vedantic religion" thus do not escape the universalist pretensions of Europe.

Orientalism

Orientalism is a child of colonialism. Edward Said identified its three basic features in his seminal study of the issue: 1) It teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient. 2) It refers to a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and "the Occident." 3) It is a Western mind-set for "dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient."³⁴ King maintains that Europe in the wake of colonialism was intrigued by the religious mysteries, cultural diversities, and economic resources it had encountered through that process. Europeans consequently set out to study and catalogue the Orient as part of their rationalizing mission and as a strategy for governance. Such studies showed that it comprised alternate perspectives in a way which displayed an "alterity" in comparison with the normative, Christian, Western perspective that came to be characterized as "mystical." This term was intended 1) to differentiate the East from the West; 2) project mystical India as a spiritual element that was lacking in the West; and 3) qualify the "strange and mysterious Orient."³⁵ This endeavor in fact comprised a power struggle to define European and Christian cultural identity apart from the East.

Academic orientalism and political orientalism are consequently linked. For Europe, the newly discovered East had to be ruled by "civilizing, rescuing and cataloguing it." Europeans constructed religious Hinduism (a

term originally meant to refer to a people who lived in the Indus River region) by “textualizing” Indian religions from Sanskrit sources and defining religion in terms of a normative paradigm of religion based upon a Western understanding.³⁶ Such textualization of Indian religions was initiated by scholars and missionaries with the active support of the Brahminic class. They thus succeeded in formulating an authoritative body of knowledge based on Vedic and Brahminical texts and beliefs as central and foundational to the essence of Hinduism. Moreover, they could thereby bring the whole of Hinduism under one umbrella. But such textualizing, essentializing, and decontextualizing resulted in either ignoring the popular and oral traditions, or decrying them as evidence of a supposed degradation of Hindu religion into superstitious practices that had no resemblance to their original texts. This interpretation not only fitted well with the Brahminic perception of the current deterioration of Hindu civilization in the age of Kaliyug,³⁷ but also enabled the British to deal with one religion known as Hinduism. The Brahminical expertise of language and rituals placed them close to the imperial rulers, and Western orientalist tended to associate Brahminical literature and ideology with Hindu religion in toto.³⁸ Romila Thapar dubbed this process, in which Brahminic views claimed to be sole inheritor of Indian religions, “syndicated Hinduism,” while Veena Das termed it the “semitification of Hinduism.”³⁹

Radhakrishnan: Victim of Colonial Orietalism

Such a textualized, reified, and universalized religion was accepted by the neo-Vedantins, including Rajaram Mohan Roy and Vivekananda. However, this constructed mystical spirituality was also used by such Hindu reformers as Rajaram Mohun Roy and Gandhi to develop an anti-colonial Hindu nationalism.⁴⁰ In the latter regard, the Orientalist discourse was thereby appropriated by the Indian intelligentsia in order to undercut the colonial agenda, and the invention of “Hinduism” as a single and unified world religion helped raise nationalist consciousness in India. Perhaps the most poignant example of subverting the colonial discourse is that of Gandhi appropriating the ideal of the otherworldly *sannyasin* in terms of social activism.

Gandhian cultural resistance depended on an Orientalist image of India as inherently spiritual, consensual and corporate... Otherworldliness became spirituality... Passiveness became at first passive resistance and later nonviolent resistance... The backward and parochial village became a self-sufficient, consensual and harmonious center of decentralized democracy... Gandhian utopia reacts against negative Orientalism by adopting and enhancing this positive image. It therefore ends up with a new Orientalism, that is, a new stereotype,

of India, but an affirmative one, leading to effective resistance.⁴¹

It is evident that representations of the Advaita Vedanta of Sankaracharya as a powerful cultural symbolic provided the necessary tool for the development of an inclusive and nationalist ideology for uniting Hindus in their struggle for freedom. In this process, the Indian Hindu intelligentsia accepted the stereotypical and constructed portrayal of Hinduism and India as universal and one, with the latter serving the domestication and control of the East for both colonizers and colonized. "It is somewhat ironic, therefore, to find that the very Hindu nationalists who fought so vehemently against British imperialist rule themselves accepted the homogenizing concepts of 'nationhood' and 'Hinduism,' which ultimately derived from their imperialist rulers."⁴²

It is quite evident that Radhakrishnan subscribed to this "orientalist, spiritualized, mystical Hinduism" and contrasted it with Western authoritarian and dogmatic religion. What Vivekananda and Gandhi attempted at the cultural and political levels, Radhakrishnan in fact accomplished at the philosophical and religious levels. He was thus indirectly the victim of colonial orientalism. Sugirtharaja explains orientalism as "idealizing a lost Golden Age of the past, monumentalizing a timeless and spiritual India, privileging the Sanskrit over the vernacular, providing it a new language and transporting it to another culture,"⁴³ thereby implying a certain romantic image of India as spiritual, idealistic, and mystical. Against this background, what colonial orientalism did with Indian realities and religions, Radhakrishnan appears to have done with the West in that he stereotypes Western religions as "authoritarian and dogmatic, and Western culture as materialist." In addition, he essentializes Western religion to Christianity (without differentiating between various branches of Western religions) and textualizes it in terms of the Greco-Roman Gnostic philosophy in a manner reminiscent of how his orientalist counterparts dealt with Indian culture. We have noted above that the language of colonialism includes a definition of subordinated cultures and peoples as "the other" in relation to the dominant and privileged categories.⁴⁴ Radhakrishnan also identifies alterity-otherness in relations between the Orient and the Occident, but he seeks to establish the dominance of the East over the West in terms of a "universalized, spiritual and mystical religion of Vedanta." However, by terming the West as completely "Other" (materialist) in respect to the Spiritual East, does Radhakrishnan not adopt a colonial language of alterity and domination instead of negotiating a space together with the West? We must then call into question his "textualist, essentialist and world-religions" approach to the study of religions.

POST-ORIENTALIST RELIGIOUS STUDIES

Let us now consider the prospectus of religious studies in future in the light of Radhakrishnan's contributions to comparative religion. His attempt at a synthesis of East and West no longer appears tenable insofar as the post-colonial world is no longer polarized in such terms. His attempt at a universal world religion based on a perennial philosophy indeed sounds outdated. In addition, globalization does not so much project a world-religion as a plurality of world-religions.

It is evident that decontextualized, essentialist, and ahistorical representations of religion are too simplistic and fail to represent the heterogeneity of human experience. They distort the complexity of the situation, as in the case of Indian and Western religions and cultures, and are in complicity with particular ideological agenda. Moreover, an essentialized, universalized, and ahistoricized Hinduism can become a dominating and colonizing ideology, especially in the hands of fundamentalists. We are likely already witnessing some signs of this. As Gadamer would argue, understanding something implicitly involves the prejudices of one's own "historical situatedness" – one cannot avoid having an agenda or a perspective upon things because everyone has his/her own cultural and historical particularity. As it is said, there is no idea that is from nowhere; and there is no idea that is from everywhere. Knowledge is context sensitive. Peter Berger has shown us that all religious phenomena (including beliefs) are dependent upon social, historical, and cultural factors for their existence in that they are socially constructed.⁴⁵ Religious studies must therefore take into account the cultural, historical, and social conditioning of the belief systems and ideological moorings in which they are expressed. This is particularly necessary in Eastern religions today. In general, Indian religious studies are still very much confined to a textualized, ahistorical, and essentialized approach, which renders a context-based, critical, and historical approach very much needed. In addition, we need to provincialize Westernization, neo-Vedantic Hinduism, absolute Christianity, and so forth, in order to expose their hidden colonial ideologies. But we cannot reduce religious experience to "situatedness," "ideological conditioning," or "social reconstruction." Since religious experience is *sui generis*, as Otto would claim, we need to let religious experience show itself forth in and through critical and analytical treatment. Finally, religious studies need to become ever more cross-cultural. Religions are embedded in cultures. We need to critique the ideological presuppositions of given cultures so that the religious, and therefore the genuinely human, may be made operative.

Let us now conclude our findings. At a critical period in the history of our Indian nation, Radhakrishnan played an important role in articulating the self of the nation in terms of its culture and religions. At a transitional point in the history of the world – from colonialism to post-colonialism – Radhakrishnan advocated a universal outlook based upon a synthesis of

East and West. At a skeptical period in the history of philosophy and religion, Radhakrishnan stood for abiding values based on the experience of the Universal Spirit. At the initial stage of our nation-making, Radhakrishnan brought a certain freshness to politics and governance by giving a new vision for the nation. This is no mean achievement.

His contributions to the study of religions are to be viewed alongside these achievements and located within this period. Radhakrishnan was a child of his times. The colonialist agenda challenged him to enunciate a “universalized and homogenous religion” (albeit constructed) in order to counter that agenda’s designs. In the process he also unwittingly accepted some of its presuppositions and ideologies, which is unfortunate although perhaps understandable. It is unfortunate because there is apparently a concerted effort underway today, I am afraid, directed towards the neo-colonization of different cultures and religions under a “reconstructed Hinduism and reinvented nation-state.” This does not augur well either for the nation, or for the study of religions.

Globalization is here to stay with its two divergent tendencies – it tends to homogenize cultures and nations, but it also brings about a greater assertion of the plurality of cultural identities and perspectives. Nevertheless, the technological, economic, and political dimensions of globalization tend more to homogenization. Within this context, the study of religions acquires a greater significance. The easy solution would be to employ a “colonizing imagination” and assert a nation’s identity through a homogenizing and hegemonizing notion of religion, but the genuine option before us is to instead assert multiple religious identities and pluralities of cultures. In this venture a concerted effort is needed to undertake the critical and creative study of many religions and many cultures in their social realities, beyond textualization, so that the homogenizing tendencies of globalization are countered.

Globalization has also marginalized any discourse on “poverty or the poor” – there are no poor in the discourse of “internet” culture. One defining feature of the South Asian situation is the linkage between “many poor and the many religions.” Not only have religions in South Asia legitimized “poverty and the status of the poor and the outcaste,” they have also played significant role in liberating the poor. The science of religions in South Asia will thus have to address the legitimizing/liberating roles of religions as well as interrogate the poor and the outcast of all shades and colors concerning the totalizing concept of a “timeless religion,” in order to arrive at a sustainable notion of religions in the history of humankind. How do we arrive at a “religions-friendly” religious perception in the climate of the “hegemonizing religions”? That is the challenge we need to undertake to advance the cause of visionaries like Radhakrishnan, who said that he was inspired by Marx in his thinking that the time had come for philosophy (and in our case religious studies) to change life.

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NOTES

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THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one's decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one's culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

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