Religion in Public Life
Volume I

Religious Inspiration for Public Life

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Introduction

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The issue of religion in contemporary life is marked by three major related problems, one is the perennial struggle to choose between God and Mammon, another is the struggle to broaden the horizons of one's concerns beyond self to God, a third is the manner of relating one's own religious commitment to that of others. As foundational decisions for life, they must be faced in every effort at modernization and indeed in all deeply human accomplishments.

The present form of the first problem—the choice between God and Mammon—has its roots in the individualistic character of modern culture, traceable to the disintegrative effect to nominalism from pre-modern times. Locke's attempt to fit individualism for modern democratic dialogue by limiting such speech to what was publicly available through the senses pointed inevitably in the direction of a materialistic self-centeredness. The result has progressively evolved into a consumerism which is consuming the very person—a kind of human black hole.

Against this stand the strong, if never unambiguous, concrete religious traditions of the people and of public life, as well as the basic fact that in the end mammon destroys all who enter its service. Faced starkly, as in the 20th century experience of Eastern Europe and Asia, a choice for the foundational importance of the spirit is clear. This is reflected as well in less overtly tragic circumstances on other continents by the emerging sense of the need for values.

The second problem – the struggle to broaden one's concern beyond self to God — compounds the first. The correlate of the above path from individualism to sensism, and thence to consumerism, is the claim that the intellect cannot reason to God and hence that religion is solely a matter of feeling or heart. Such faith without knowledge—in reality a voluntaristic fideism—can be lived authentically only by renouncing the relevance of faith to life in this world and in our times. Life then becomes secular in the fully negative sense of isolation from religion.

The third problem – the manner of relating one's religious commitments to that of others – has been responded by proposing removal of religious considerations from public life, thereby constituting a secularism.

These foundational challenges to religion in our culture—individualism, consumerism and secularism—need to be faced jointly, in depth, and on an interdisciplinary basis. This should be done with a view not only to diagnosis, but to resistance. Indeed, if life is dynamic and progressive, the overriding concern must be not only to resist disintegrating forces, but to unleash the transforming power of being as the living unity or being, truth or consciousness and goodness or bliss—the Christian Trinity and the Hindu *Saccidananda*—which characterize the religious grounding of life.

Hence, for some time it was thought that religion was atrophying and that the world would be reduced to a secular state. This in fact seemed to be the project of modernity, to develop human control of all by employing only ideas clear to the human mind. Religion would be put in the separate category of faith, speculatively looked down upon, or even crudely repressed—all in the name of human enlightenment.

More recently, however, this has begun to be reversed. The modern period has employed its technical successes not only for, but against, human dignity and well being. The fascination with objective facts has left us without standards, meaning or dignity. People now speak of entering a

post modern period in which meaning and motivation succeed pragmatic know-how as the main interests.

Samuel P. Huntington in his *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* points to the dynamic whereby Islamic students coming to the university do not abandon their religion in the face of the changes they experience around them, but are driven to take new interest in the religious bases of their identity. This, he sees — after the title of a work by Gilles Kepel — as the *Revenge of God*. As in Aesop's fable of the wind and the sun competing to get the traveler to remove his cloak, the more things change the more essential becomes the religious foundations of one's identity and the meaning of one's life.

One finds then an opening of mind and heart. What is important is not so much mechanical inventions, but nature and the environment with its beauty and variety; not the clear and limited, but the transcendent and infinite; not legal precision and rights, but harmonious coexistence.

Thus we return to the ancient question. The religious or proto religious was the earliest mode of living together — the thesis. That bond was broken in the modern search for power and control — the antithesis. What then is the proper mode of understanding the renewed role of religion in public life today, the synthesis?

Poorly understood this can generate a religious fundamentalism forgetful of man, replacing the earlier secular fundamentalist forgetfulness of God. When religious commitment substitutes rather than reinforces ethical and political concerns it injects energy without direction, thereby driving all to disaster. But to attempt to avoid this by excluding religion from public life shrinks all to a focus on conflicting human interests without meaning, norm or inspiration.

Hence, it is not enough to rejoice that the long secular night is passing. We must reflect carefully in order to be able to direct the religious sensibility capable of inspiring both a Mother Theresa and an Osama bin Laden. The present volume begins this task by treating the nature of religion as foundational to the relation between persons and peoples in which human life is lived. It will be followed by a second volume: *Religion and Political Structures: From Fundamentalism to Public Service*.

Part I, "Religion, History and Narrative," concerns the deep role of religion in the history of a people.

Chapter I by George F. McLean, "Religion and Public Life," traces humankind's religious sensibility from the totemic to the mythic, to the properly philosophical; and then applies Paul Tillich's existential dialectic: episodes of human nonbeing (brokenness, meaninglessness) precipitate episodes of Divine revelation. Being thus steers history towards authentic liberation and thus Itself.

Chapter II by Lázló Tengelyi, "A Place for Universalization," argues against an absolute cultural relativism by extrapolating from Charles Taylor's 'narrative theory of personal identity' to a shared human identity making 'moderate universalism' possible.

Chapter III by Jadwiga-Malgorzata Rakowska, "Different Ways Of Being Religious," provides an analysis of religion using the tools of the social sciences. This begins from religion as a human sensibility and examines its various modes from the totemic, to the mythic, to the systematic. The analysis follows the history of the secular separation of religion from public life, which it counters by a phenomenological analysis of religion as the foundation of public live.

Part II, "Religion and Communication between Peoples," introduces a major issue for our day for if, as Samuel Huntington would hold in his *Clash of Civilizations*, each religion is at the base

of a great civilization, then the possibilities of living together in global times depends on the ability to communicate and cooperate between religions.

Chapter IV by Robert P. Badillo, "On Surpassing Artificial Consensus in the Public Sphere: Complementarity of Habermas and Aquinas," develops a critique of Habermas' purely formal character of discourse ethics and then compares Habermas and Aquinas in order to see both how the latter can provide real content to move beyond the formalism of communicative ethics and how the former can complement the classical transcendental properties of being as unity, truth and goodness with, in addition, emancipative and communicative. The appendix, "The Christian Hermeneutic Horizon and Philosophical Foundations for Public Discourse," adapts Jürgen Habermas' theory of public discourse to a Christian hermeneutic grounded in Transcendent Being, enabled Habermas' emancipatory/communicative model to surpass 'regulated self-interest' and take on a new dignity and long-range optimism.

Chapter V by Florencio R. Riguera, "Central and Peripheral Elements of Group Identity: Exploring into the Phenomenon of Religious Inquirers," treats the special character of religion as integrated and in turn integrating a holistic approach to life. The experience of presenting such a vision to an inquirer coming from a different wholistic vision provides something of a template for religious inspiration in a pluralistic society.

Chapter VI by Christopher J Wheatley, "Rhetoric and Social Change," looks into the motivational dimension, the search for social justice, and the rhetoric required in order that this be true. It contrasts the capitalist and Marxist approaches, but concentrates on the post-modern dilemma and Burke's rhetorical theory. The conclusion summarizes the contributions and limits of rhetoric for social change.

Chapter VII by Zbigniew Tyburski, "Polish Immigrants and the Church," focuses upon recent immigrants and notes concrete and new cultural environments, some of the specific points of inaptitude which need to be overcome in order to live effectively in the new situation, and even the points of inconsistency in the same person's responses to the challenges of their new life. The author calls for special support groups and engaging some new immigrants in the parish councils.

Chapter VIII by Vassil Prodanov, "Ethnic and Religious Revival: Religion as a Ground of Ethnic and National Identity," critiques the history of 'national' and 'ethnic' religions, and 'nationalism as a religion'. Prodanov reviews in detail the situation in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Islamic countries, India, and the modern West.

Part III, "Religion and Morality in Public Life," concerns the ways in which religious values struggle to play a role in public life both by bringing diverse peoples together, giving meaning, and inspiring the personal responsibility which a free society requires.

Chapter IX by Theophilus Okere, "Religion and Morality: Private and Public," argues that the Church's 'privatization' of ethics conveniently frees global corporatism from moral surveillance. The Church must rebound from this 'bad faith' and genuinely foster the implementation of Vatican Council II's call for economic and social justice.

Chapter X by Heinz Holley, "Value Consciousness and Understandings of Freedom in Austrian Society," researches discrepancies between Austrian society's acceptance of democratic values at a constitutional or legal level and the realization of these values in everyday life.

Chapter XI by Wladyslaw Zuziak, "Christian Values in Public Life," analyzes the relationship of the Catholic Church to the State during the post-Communist era. Zuziak cautions the Church not to identify with political factions, but rather, to cultivate 'truly-formed consciences' so that the laity can produce a just society.

Chapter I
Religion and Public Life

George F. McLean

Introduction

In approaching any topic it is important to reflect upon the premises and presuppositions which might be operative in one's own mind or in the corporate psyche of one's science, culture or age. This is especially true as regards issues relating to religion, for whereas all other issues concern either humankind or lesser realities at the disposition of humankind, religion alone concerns formally that which transcends any individual or community and their relation thereto. Thus, the etymology of the term religion is the binding back of the human to the Transcendent, and as a virtue religion concerns the conscious and free response of humankind to the foundational reality of human life and the world in which it is lived.

Classically, this was the most obvious reality: "We hold these truths to be self-evident...that all men were created equal..." Religion was appreciated as founding all dimensions of reality from the cosmic to the human, from the physical to the spiritual. Indeed the greater the transcendence the greater the immanence or presence of the divine in all, the more exalted the more pervasive and penetrating its effects, and hence the greater the works of humankind the greater the glory of God.

In our era and in the North American culture religion has come to be separated from the human and social life. In the pattern of Milton's *Paradise Lost* man conceives himself as creating and saving himself, in which supposition religion is at least superfluous and more probably disruptive. In this perspective to the degree that God is recognized as transcendent he is an other, indeed Barth's totally other. In the "Humanist Manifesto"1 religion comes to be opposed in the name of man. God comes to be seen as the ultimate alien against whom no "Wall of separation between Church and State" could be too high, too long or too impervious and the POAU has no difficulty in rallying an army to man its barricades.

This sense of a world without religion does not characterize only those who oppose religion. In the middle of the secularization debate, the religious series, *Concilium*, developed a volume "Sacralization and Secularization"2 of which the supposition, if I read it correctly, is that there is nothing inherently religious about the physical or social world, that the process of the sacralization of life is a merely human product, excessive in character and now in the process of correction. This has become the basic operating presupposition of our times which creates the problem of the role of religion in public life.

But if in the midst of an unequaled assemblage of our human resources we come now to the close of our most violent century, there may be reason -- indeed desperate need -- to question the supposition of closed human self-sufficiency upon which the century was built, to take new account of the immanence of the Transcendent and the radical importance of the unity, the truth and justice, and the love this implies. In other terms, we must see whether God and religion are undocumented aliens to be recognized only to the degree that they can be enlisted as servants of humankind3 -- which would amount to either an atheism or an idolatry -- or are foundational, essential and transforming for human life in all of its dimensions both public and private.4

Hence it seems important to examine this issue in order to be able to proceed with our investigation.

Religion as a Primary Human Sensibility

It seems mistaken to consider religion an arbitrary construct for from earlier times human thought has always and everywhere had a sacred center. It is possible to track the evolution of this constant awareness by relating it to the three dimensions of the human mind. The first dimension is the external senses of sight, touch and the like, by which one receives information from the external world. The second is the internal senses of imagination and memory by which one assembles the received data in a manner which enables it to represent the original whole from which the various senses draw their specific details, to rearrange these and other data in various combinations, or to recall it at a later time. Finally, beyond both of these dimensions of the senses is the intellect by which one knows the nature of things and judges regarding their existence.5

Not surprisingly, upon examination it appears that the actual evolution of man's awareness of the sacred follows this sequence of his natural capacities for knowledge. In all cases it is intellectual knowledge that is in play for it concerns not the characteristics or shapes of sensible objects but existence, indeed the one who gave his name as "I am Who Am." But this awareness is articulated successively, first in terms of the external senses in the totemic stage, then in terms of the internal sense in the mythic period and finally in properly intellectual terms as the origin of philosophy or science.6

To follow this evolution, it should be noted that for life in any human society as a grouping of persons there is a basic need to understand oneself and of one's relation to others. It should not be thought that these are necessarily two questions rather than one. They will be diversely formalized in the history of philosophy, but prior to any such formalization, indeed prior even to the capacity to formalize this as a speculative problem, some mode of lived empathy rather than antipathy must be possible. Plato later worked out formally and in detail that the unity of the multiple is possible only on the basis of something that is one, but the history of social life manifests throughout that there be present in the awareness of the early peoples and a according to their mode of awareness something that is one in terms of which all are related.

Totemic Thought

In the earliest form of thought and society this understanding by people of themselves and their unity with others was carried out in terms, such as an animal or bird, marked by their external senses. These peoples spoke of themselves by simple identity with the animal or bird which was the totem of their clan. Levy-Bruhl expresses this in a law of participation, namely, that in the primitive foundational mode of thinking of the earliest peoples their root identity was that of the totem. It was not that such persons saw themselves as in some manner like, or as descendent from, their totem, e.g., lion; instead, they said directly: "I am lion." It is in these terms that they founded their identity and dignity, considered themselves bound to all others who had the same totem, and understood by analogy of their totem with that of other tribes the relations between their two peoples for marriage and the like.7

The totem, in turn, was not simply one animal among others, but was in a sense limitless: no matter how many persons were born to the tribe its potentialities were never exhausted. Further, it was shown special respect such as not being sold, used for food or other utilitarian purposes which

would make it subservient to the individual members of the tribe or clan. And whereas other things might be said to be possessed, the totem was the subject of predication by direct identity: one might say that he had a horse or other animal, but only of the totem would one say that he is, e.g., lion.

The totem was then the unique limitless reality in terms of which all particular people and things had their being and interrelation. It was the sacred center of individual and community life in terms of which all had meaning and cohesion. This made possible the sense of personal dignity and the interpersonal relations which were the most important aspects of human life and did so with a sense of direct immediacy that would be echoed, but could never be repeated, in subsequent stages of more formally religious thought.

Whether this be seen as religious or proto-religious what it shows is that religion is not something added to a secular universe, but the basic and essential insight of even the simplest forms of human community. The issue then is not whether there be room for religion alongside public life or how to protect one from the other, but how it functions as the root of human meaning and community.

Mythic Thought

Though the totem was able to provide for unity and meaning while the life of all members of the tribe remained similar, its manner of expressing unity became insufficient as society became more specialized and differentiated. Then the bonds between members of the tribe came to depend not merely upon similarity and sameness, but upon the differentiated capabilities of, e.g., hunters, fishers and eventually farmers. At that point, with the ability to look upon others as both united and differentiated and distinct came an appreciation of the special distinctiveness of the sacred center as above the many individuals of which it was the principle and center. What in totemic thought had previously been stated simply by identity could now be appreciated as greater than and transcending the members of the tribe. This is reflected in the development of priesthoods, rituals and symbols to reflect what was no longer seen simply as one;s deepest identity.8

Such a reality could no longer be stated in terms immediately present to the external senses, but rather was figured by the imagination in terms drawn originally from the senses, but now redrawn in forms that expressed life that was above men and stood as the principle of their life. Such higher principles, as the more knowing and having a greater power of will, would be personal; as transcendent persons they would be gods. It would seem incorrect then to consider this, as did Freud and Marx, to be simply a projection of human characteristics. On the contrary, the development of the ability to think in terms shaped by the imagination released the appreciation of the principle of human life from the limitations of animals, birds and other natural entities available to the external senses and allowed the real transcendence of the principle of unity to be expressed in a more effective manner. This did not create the sense of transcendence, but allowed this implication of the unique and essential foundation of human meaning to be expressed in an explicit manner.

But expression in terms of the forms available to the internal sense of imagination had its temptations; these limitations were pointed out by Xenophanes. He noted that by the time of Homer and Hesiod a perfervid imagination had gone from expressing the transcendence of the gods to attributing to them as well the many forms of evil found among men.9 These principles of meaning and value thus pointed as well to their opposites. Thinking in terms of value thus pointed as no longer sufficient; the intellect needed to proceed in its own terms in order to enable the true sense of the gods as well as of nature to be expressed and defended against confusion and corruption. As

the intellect proceeded to operate in proper intellectual terms rather than in terms of the images of mythic thinking, science and philosophy emerged to replace myth as the basic mode of human understanding.

Paul Tillich points out that the mythic mode of thinking never completely disappeared and that its contribution of imagery and its evocation of responses from all dimensions of the human personality remain essential components of human awareness. No ethical treatise will ever equal the power and penetration of the *Illiad* or the plays of Sophocles in penetrating the human condition. But once the intellect was able to conceptualize things in their own terms, rather than in terms of anthropomorphic gods, mythic thinking would no longer be taken as the literal truth. It became what Tillich would call "broken myth" in the sense that it helps and enriches human awareness and response without being the sole or basic mode in which all is appreciated.

First Philosophy

At this point the way is opened for philosophy and in its terms spectacularly rapid progress was made. Within but a few generations, the human intellect had worked out a structure of the physical world using basic categories of hot and cold, wet and dry available to the external senses, along with mechanisms of vortex motion.10 Mathematical reason worked with the internal senses to lay down the basic theorems of geometry.11 In brief, by developing properly intellectual terms the Greeks had revised and perfected the thought processes of the totemic and mythic ages, elaborating with new and hitherto unknown precision insights regarding physical reality.

But that had never been the root human issue. Totemic and mythic thought were not merely ways of understanding and working with nature, although they did that as well. The fundamental issue was rather what it meant to be, what life was based upon, and in what terms it should be lived. After the work of others in conceptualizing the physical and mathematical orders, Parmenides was able to take up the most basic questions of life and being in the properly intellectual terms of metaphysics.

How could this be understood?? First, he bound the work of the intellect directly to being: "It is the same thing to think and to be" (Fragment 3).12 Hence, the requirement of thinking would manifest those of being. Second, he contrasted being with its opposite non-being as something to nothing at all (Fragment 2). This principle of noncontradiction was a construct of the mind; like *pi* in geometry it was something that is good to think with, for it enabled the mind in reflecting upon being to identify its requirements and avoid anything that would undermine its reality.

The proemium of Parmenides famous poem had described a scene in which he was awakened by the goddesses and sent in a chariot drawn by a faithful mare along the arching highway that spans all things. In this process he moved from obscurity to light, from opinion to truth. When at last he arrived there the gates were opened by the goddess justice as guardian of true judgements and he was directed to examine all things in order to discern the truth.

Parmenides then images himself proceeding along the highway13 until he comes to a fork with one signpost pointing to a way toward being as essentially beginning. Here Parmenides must reason regarding the implications of such a route. If to begin means to move from nonbeing or nothingness to being, if to be meant essentially to begin being would include within its very essence nonbeing or nothingness; there would be without meaning; the real would be nothing at all. Conversely, if from this notion of beginning nonbeing is removed then being emerges as essentially not beginning, but eternal. This is a first requirement of being, the possibility of taking

the fork which would have being as essentially beginning is excluded; being is seen to be eternal and the chariot moves on along the highway of being.

The procedure is analogous at the two subsequent forks in the road where the signposts point to being as changing or multiple. Each of these, Parmenides reasons, would include non-being within being thereby destroying the character of being. Non-being is contained in the notion of change, inasmuch as a changing being is no longer what it had been and not yet what it will become. When, however, one removes that non-being being emerges as unchanging. Similarly, non-being is essential to the notion of multiplicity, inasmuch as this requires that one being not be the other. When, however, that non-being is removed what emerges is one. These then are the characteristics of being: infinite and eternal, unchanging and one.

Such being transcends the multiple and changing world in which we live and is realized in a manner more perfect than could be appreciated in the graphic terms of the internal senses of imagination which defined the nature of man's capabilities in the stage of myth.

In this way Parmenides discerned the necessity of Absolute, eternal and unchanging being, whatever be said of anything else. Neither being nor thought makes sense if being is the same as non-being, for then to do, say or be anything would be the same as not doing, not saying or not being. But as the real is irreducible to nothing and being is irreducible to non-being, as it must be if there is any self-sufficiency expressed by Parmenides' notion of the absolute One.

People can refuse to look at this issue and focus upon particular aspects of limited realities. But if one confronts the issue of being it leads to the self-sufficient Being which as the creative source of all else, without which all limited beings would be radically compromised -- not least, man himself. It is not surprising, therefore, that Aristotle would spoon conclude his search for the nature of being in his *Metaphysics* with a description of divine life.14

The issue is not how the notion of the divine entered human thought; it has always been there, for without that which is one and absolute in the sense of self-sufficient man and nature would be at odds, and humankind would lack social cohesion. Indeed, thinking would be the same as not thinking just as being would be the same as non-being. The conscious task of classical philosophy was how effectively to assure the openness of the methods of philosophical thought to the full range of reality, including its divine source and goal, and to implement the search for meaning in a way that enables a vigorous itinerary of the human heart and hence enlivens temporal life. This centered Plato on contemplation of the One of the Good; all else was seen to have its meaning by participation therein. The view was as radically holistic as that of the totemist, though it was able as well to articulate an internal diversity of the many participants. For Aristotle being was precisely a *pros hen* or order to that One which lived the divine life. This was what Plotinus systematized, what Islam contemplated and what the Scholastics systematized.

Religion Separated from Public Life: Humanism as Secularism

It is not surprising that the convergence of a number of factors -- medicinal and demographic, social and political -- in the 15th century AD led to the breakdown of the old order and the emergence of the new life called the Renaissance. Such is the case with all deep movements; indeed, the Buddha predicted -- correctly -- that his Sangha would last but 1000 years. What is significant is the direction given the ebullient new life of the Renaissance when these forces began to be shaped in the subsequent centuries.

This has been broadly stated as a shift of focus from God to man. That much is certainly clear from the history of the last five centuries. What is important in view of our project is to see how

this implied not only attention to man and progress in human development, but how this in fact entailed an intentional separation of public life from its religious foundations.

At the beginning of the modern stirrings for democracy John Locke perceived a crucial condition for the people's taking into their own hands the power previously vested in emperors and kings. If decisions were to be made not by the king but by the people, the basis for making these decisions had to be equally available to all. To achieve this Locke proposed that we suppose the mind to be a white paper void of characters and ideas, and follow the way in which it comes to be furnished. To keep this public he insisted that it be done exclusively via experience, that is, either by sensation or by reflection upon the mind's work on the materials derived from the senses.15 From this David Hume concluded that all objects of knowledge which are not formal tautologies must be matters of fact. Such matters of fact are neither the existence or actuality of a thing nor its essence, but simply the determination of one from a pair of sensible contraries, e.g., white rather than black, sweet rather than sour.16

The restrictions implicit in this appear starkly in Rudolf Carnap's "Vienna Manifesto" which shrinks the scope of meaningful knowledge and significant discourse to describing some state of affairs in terms of empirical sets of facts. This excludes speech about wholes, God, the unconscious or entelechies; the grounds of meaning and all that transcends the immediate content of sense experience are excluded.

In such terms it is not possible to speak of appropriate or inappropriate goals or even to evaluate choices in relation to self-fulfillment. The only concern is which objects among the sets of contraries I will choose by brute, changeable and even arbitrary will power, and whether circumstances will allow me to carry out that choice. Such choices, of course, may not only differ from, but even contradict the immediate and long range of objectives of other persons. This will require compromises in the sense of Hobbes; John Rawls will even work out a formal set of such compromises.17 Throughout it all, however, the basic concern remains the ability to do as one pleases.

This includes two factors. The first is execution by which my will is translated into action. Thus, Locke sees "freedom as being able to act or not act, according as we shall choose or will";18 Bertrand Russel sees it as "the absence of external obstacles to the realization of our desires."19 The second factor is individual self-realization understood simply as the accomplishment of one's good as one sees it. This reflects one's personal idiosyncrasies and temperament, which in turn reflect each person's individual character.

In these terms one's goal can be only that which appeals to one, with no necessary relation to real goods or to duties which one ought to perform.20 "Liberty consists in doing what one desires,"21 and the freedom of a society is measured by the latitude it provides for the cultivation of individual patterns of life.22 If there is any ethical theory in this it can be only utilitarian, hopefully with enough breadth to recognize other people and their good as well as one's own. In practice, over time this comes to constitute a black-hole of self-centered consumption of physical goods in which both nature and the person are consumed; it is the essence of consumerism.

This is reflected in the contemporary sense of choice in North America. As a theory this is underwritten by a pervasive series of legal precedents following Justice Brandeis' notion of privacy, which now has come to be recognized as a constitutional right. In the American legal system the meaning of freedom has been reduced to this. It should be noted that this derived from Locke's political concern for open discourse based upon sense experience open to all. This entailed not merely focusing upon empirical meaning, but eliminating from public discourse any other knowledge. Its progressively rigorous implementation which we have but sampled in the

references to Hume and Carnap, constitute an ideology in the sense of a selected and restrictive vision which controls minds and reduced freedom.23

In sum, in the context of the Enlightenment and in order to make possible universal participation in social life, Locke limited the range of meaning to what was empirically available. This assured one sense of freedom, but limited it to choices between contrary qualities. The effort was well intentioned, but he would seem to have tried too hard and compromised too much in single-minded pursuit of open discourse. As a result, the very notion of freedom has not been able to sustain itself, but over time has turned gradually into consumerism.

This is echoed on other levels as well. Comte would indeed give the name positivism to such a philosophy and make it the key to the development of the social sciences to which all else would be subordinate. Inevitably, they would need to be value free and humanistic in a reductive sense.

The same would be true of William James' pragmatism in which religion might serve some useful purpose, but only as subordinate to the service of man. Carnap would be more rigorous. For him the unified science -- unified in terms not of content, but of a single method which opens collaboration between the researchers -- would have no room for talk of God or religion.

But this is not all, for if this new attitude of public collaboration is built upon holding to empirical evidence and excluding all else, and if this in turn implies not allowing insights of a unitive or transcendent nature into the public discourse about civic affairs then religious assertions are not only omitted and ignored, but are seen as antithetical and subversive of public order in a democracy. Liberalism has reached the limits of its epistemology and as with all other philosophies which are not in principle open to whatever is, whether infra or supra human, at this point becomes intolerant and suppressive of what is cannot permit.

Hence modern times have focused upon the light of human reason to such a degree that they have been characterized as an age of rationalism and manifest corresponding strengths, achievements, and eventually weaknesses. By focusing upon reason, especially as delimited by Descartes to ideas that are or can be made clear and distinct to the human intellect, rationalism channeled inquiry into processes of scientific discovery, and human freedom into processes of legal codification. Through the development of the resulting sciences it has been possible to make the earth more fruitful, and thus capable of supporting and protecting much larger populations. The development of education and communication expanded the horizons of human life and intensified interaction between peoples. The appreciation of responsible freedom as characterizing the person provided for the development and codification of legal rights before the power of the state and for democratic participation in government. Indeed the modern state, as instituted by its citizens, came to be seen as ruling at their discretion and consequently as accountable thereto. Physically, intellectually and politically humankind made swift and dramatic progress.

There was, however, also a reductionist dimension to the Enlightenment according to which it not only provided new levels of rational clarity, but also closed off other dimensions of human meaning. The letters "ism" which conclude the term rationalism reflect this unfortunate restriction. Thus, for many, Descartes' notes of clarity and distinctness became more than positive goals to be achieved to the degree possible according to the matter at hand. They were attributed valuational and normative power as well, in such wise that whatever of human knowledge could not be formulated in clear and distinct scientific ideas was not considered trustworthy, and whatever of human freedom could not be subject to clear legal formulation by the state was to be excluded from public life. The effect of this in both communitarian and liberal states was an aggressive secularism.

In its communitarian (communist) form all that transcended the state was denied so that there remained only what the state might aspire to control, namely, this world -- implying secularism. Correlatively, the whole civic order of public social life was either suppressed or absorbed by the state which became all -- implying totalitarianism.

Liberalism took another route, but to the same end. By rejecting in the name of humanism all that surpassed man it too processed to exclude religion from public life, which thereby was rigorously secularized. As liberal, however, through its emphasis upon individual freedom, it left a private realm where religion could find refuge -- as long as it remained a willing prisoner therein.

Phenomenology: Unveiling the Religious Foundation of Public Life

At the end of the 20th century and indeed of the first half of the millennium which began the Renaissance we observe a renewal of an awareness of the religious grounding of social life. This is manifest in Islam, in post-communist Eastern Europe and in the strength of the evangelical modes of Christianity in the First as well as the Third Worlds.

To understand this it is necessary to bear in mind that by the end of the first third of this century a devastating war had left a chaotic Europe sliding precipitously toward a second World War. Science had provided weapons of mass terror and would soon produce the atomic bomb. Liberal capitalism had subjected vast regions to colonial service of other nations. Some countries had fallen into Fascist totalitarianism; others, along with vast numbers of the working class, were calling for a communist version of the same.

Before this Armageddon it became clear that something very essential had been forgotten in the modern enlightenment project. This appreciation generated the seeds of a new search, phenomenological in method, for the dimensions of reality which rationalism had omitted, namely, for personal self-consciousness, freedom and responsibility. Eventually this would lead to a shift from fascination with vast impersonal human constructs to a renewed attention to personal dignity and responsibility; the search for social cohesion would shift from external material forces to the interior spiritual bases of human commitment. Thus, the way would open to awareness of the cultures men freely create through the complex of their free decisions and the pattern of values and virtues these decisions entail.

In turn, this awareness would point further to the deeper virtues of love and religion as the basic orientations from which a culture derives its cohesion and engages the constant and persistent commitment of its people. Thus, one notes recently across the vast expanse of the world, from Indonesia in the East, through Asia, Africa and Europe, to the West Coast of the Americas, joint processes of de-secularization, on the one hand, and of renewed emphasis upon religious foundations, on the other. These processes are found at the same time in such diverse places and cultures as those of Islam and Christianity (constituting concurrent contemporary process of re-Islamization and re-Christianization); they emerge through such dramatic revolutionary change as those at work in the liberation of Eastern Europe and in the revitalization of Islam.

Philosophy and Human Consciousness: Phenomenology

In addition to rationalism, especially in their empiricist forms as noted above, there is another line of modern thought which is less external and more interior. Rather than looking for ways to throw up barriers and exclude them, it turns to the human and in particular to his/her self-consciousness by which he/she is distinguished from the other animals, has the power of self-

determination and must therefore undertake responsibilities for one's world and especially for one's relations with others.

This was present in Descartes, but hidden by his project developing the concatenations of clear and distinct ideas of simple natures which would enable him to walk with confidence in this world. That goal of human control over knowledge -- whether in terms of reason among the rationalists or on the senses among the empiricists -- translated into power over nature. But when persisted in as the exclusive method, which empiricist and rationalist alike consider to be the key to success, becomes oppressive of all that is not contained within its purview.

There is, however, another strain of thought which appears in Descartes, namely, that of attending only to the contents of its thinking or ideal of extended or unextended substances, but to the very self precisely as conscious or thinking being and when this is obtained the ideal of perfect being he articulates the self as image of God whom it manifest in its ability to conceive, the absolute with its intellect and to decide absolutely with its will. Here he sees the human person him/herself as the manifestation of God and invites us to stop to meditate.

It would be a long time before the self rather than the contents of its knowledge, would be given direct attention, for like the eye of the beholder it is the only reality in a room not available to direct sense observation. Pascal and Kierkegaard would point to it but in the face of the more simplified, clear and distinct patterning of ideals they would not be able to command primary attention.

The situation would begin to change during this century. In Central Europe Mazaryk in the midst of the process of creating the new nation of Czechoslovakia would refer the young Husserl on his way to Vienna, not to Carnap and the logical positivists of the Vienna Manifesto, but to Brentano for his sense of the rational intelligibility of matter and interior intentionality of human consciousness. In time this would generate a new phenomenological approach to uncovering the essences of things and, with Heidegger, their being. The human, the dasein or conscious being in time, would become the place of the manifestation of the being of beings and in the later Heidegger the mediator to the Being that is manifested or unveiled therein. In this process the very defeats of the modern effort to assert the human being without God become significant and providentially helpful. The crosses of human life which we have become so proficient at constructing become the way to salvation.

This can be seen in the thought of Paul Tillich who developed in some continuity with the Continental rationalist tradition a dialectical understanding in terms of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. But he understood this neither as the triumphant march of progress as in Hegel (and the pragmatic humanists), nor as the violent struggle of classes for exclusive dominance. Rather, the antithesis in truly contradicting the thesis served to unveil or reveal the divine as the originating and limitless depth of all meaning and the ultimate concern of authentically human life.

The Divine Depth of Meaning as Thesis

In addition to the rationalist reconstruction of reality as thesis through reasoning back from the multiple to the one logos which alone can explain the correspondence between thinking and reality, Tillich develops a second, phenomenological, approach to the thesis. This approach notes that we are never indifferent to things, simply recording the situation as does a light or sound meter. Rather, we judge it and react according as it reflects or falls away from what it should be. This fact makes manifest essence or logos in its normative sense. It is the way things should be, the norm of their perfection. Our response to essence is the heart of our efforts to protect and promote life;

it is in this that we are basically and passionately engaged. Hence, by looking into our hearts and identifying their basic interests and concerns -- our ultimate concern -- we discover the most basic reality at this stage of the dialectic.

In these terms Tillich expresses the positive side of the dialectical relationship of the essences of finite beings to the divine. He shows how these essences can contain, without exhausting, the power of being, for God remains this power. As exclusively positive these might be said to express only the first elements of creation, that they remain, as it were, in a state of dreaming innocence within the divine life from which they must awaken to actualize and realize themselves.24 Creation is fulfilled in the self realization by which the limited beings leave the ground of being to stand upon it. Whatever we shall say in the negative section about this moment of separation, the element of essence is never completely lost for "if it were lost mind as well as reality would have been destroyed in the very moment of their coming into existence."25 It is the retention of this positive element of essence that provides the radical foundation for participation by limited beings in the divine and their capacity for pointing to the infinite power of being and depth of reason. As mentioned in the first section, such participation in the divine being and some awareness thereof is an absolute prerequisite for any religion.

In this first or positive stage in Tillich's dialectic, by placing the divine as the point of identity beyond both subject and object he has introduced both elements according to which he evaluated previous religious philosophies. The element of participation so necessary for any religion has appeared, and along with it the element of individuation. We must now look at Tillich's attempt in the second or negative stage of his dialectic to see both of these in existential dissolution through a unilateral process of individualization. It will remain for the third phase of the dialectic, the synthesis, to develop a contemporary understanding of the restoration of person and society as free participations in the divine.

Human Tragedy as Antithesis

Tillich turns to the second phase of his dialectic in order to analyze the basic infinite-finite structure by a form of individualization. Its contemporary nature lies in its particular relation to nonbeing. Nonbeing is had in God, where it dialectically drives being out of its seclusion to make God living. But in God it is dialectically overcome, thus placing being itself beyond the polarity of the finite and the infinite negation of the finite.26 In beings less than God this nonbeing is not overcome. The classical statement *creatio ex nihilo* means that the creature "must take over what might be called 'the heritage of nonbeing',"27 which has along with its participation in being, its "heritage of Being," "Everything which participates in the power of being is 'mixed' with nonbeing. It is being in the process of coming from and going toward nonbing."28 This finite being.

The radical realism of this view contrasts starkly with all social utopias. Not only are these man-made and hence subject to objectifying the subject, but they fail adequately to recognize the essential character of nonbeing in human life. This cannot be encountered and overcome unless it is first recognized, and it is characteristic of the dialectic of Tillich, in contrast to the of Hegel and the utopic goal of Marx, that nonbeing pertains to the human condition, and even to the divine. To deny it is to be subject to it; whereas to recognize it first and then reconcile it is the path of liberation. The second stage of Tillich's dialectic, the antithesis, is this recognition.

It is interesting that when Descartes wished to drive home his highly intellectual analysis of the self he followed up with the imaginative example of the ball of wax. Tillich draws on the biblical myth of the Fall to do the same for his notion of nonbeing, thereby enabling one to see its

concrete meaning in the struggle to realize human freedom. He shuns the Hegelian understanding of the antithesis as nonbeing dialectically expressing being, for then existence would be simply a step in the expression of essence. In contrast, profound observation of the modern world, especially of the cataclysm of the first world war, forced home the point that reality is also the contradiction of essence. Some such distinction of essence and existence is presupposed by any philosophy which considers the ideal as against the real, truth against error or good against evil.29

This has been expressed by the concept of estrangement taken from Hegel's earlier philosophy and applied to the individual by Kierkegaard, to society by Marx and to life as such by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In fact, since the late period of Schelling it has been commonplace for a whole series of philosophers and artists to describe the world as one of fragments, a disrupted unity. This implies that individualization has become excessive and led to a loneliness of the human before one's fellow people and before God. This, in turn, drives one into inner experience where one is still further isolated from one's world.30 The presupposition of this tragic nature of the human is his transcendent Fall.31

How is this Fall with its existential estrangement to be understood? First, its possibility is traced to human finite freedom. In this state in which a finite human is excluded from the infinity to which one belongs, freedom gives one the capacity to contradict oneself and one's essential nature. Furthermore, the fact that one is aware of this finitude, of the threat from nonbeing, adds the note of anxiety to freedom, producing a drive toward the transition into existence. Rooted in one's finitude and expressed in one's anxiety, once this freedom is aroused the human experiences the threat either of not actualizing one's potencies and thus not fulfilling oneself, or of actualizing them knowing that one will not choose according to the norms and values in which one's essential nature expresses itself.32 In either case one is bound to lose oneself and one's freedom.

The finite nature of human freedom implies an opposite pole, called destiny, which applies even to the freedom of self-contradiction. Freedom "is possible only within the context of the universal transition from essence to existence" and every isolated act is embedded in the universal destiny of existence.33 This means that the estrangement of the human from one's essential nature has two characteristics, the one tragic coming from destiny, the other moral (guilt) coming from freedom. Of itself, destiny connotes universality for the Fall is the presupposition of existence and there is no existence before or without it.34 Hence, everything that exists participates in the Fall with its twin character of tragedy and guilt. This applies to every human being, every act of humans and every part of nature as well.

The conciliation of the absolute universality of the Fall with the freedom it presupposes is one of those problems which are never really solved because it is part of the human condition which it enlightens. The extension of guilt to nature seems reinforced by evolutionary theories and depth psychology, but how the inevitability and the freedom of estrangement are to be reconciled remains an enigma. In one statement Tillich affirms the necessity of something in finite freedom for which we are responsible and which makes the Fall unavoidable. In another work he considers estrangement to be an original fact with "the character of a leap and not of structural necessity."35 Despite these difficulties, in explaining how human estrangement is free Tillich clearly presents it as the ontological realization of the Fall of humankind.

This negative phase in the dialectic is mediated to the level of consciousness by the general, and presently acute, phenomenon of anxiety which arises from the nonbeing in finite reality. "The first statement about the nature of anxiety is this: anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing."36 It is, in fact, the expression of finitude from the inside. As such it is not

a mere psychological quality but an ontological one, present wherever finitude and its threat of nonbeing are found. Anxiety is then simply inescapable for finite beings. Were it a particular object it might be feared directly, attacked and overcome. But as nothingness is not an object there is no way for the finite to overcome nonbeing. Thus anxiety lies within the human at all times. This omnipresent ontological anxiety can be aroused at any time even without a situation of fear, for the emotional element is but an indication of the perverse manner in which finite being is penetrated by the threat of absolute separation from its positive element of infinity, that is, with the threat of annihilating nothingness.37

The nonbeing of finitude and estrangement is present on each level of being and in three ways: onti, spiritual and moral. This produces three corresponding types or characteristics of anxiety. Ontic anxiety is the awareness that our basic self-affirmation as beings is threatened predominantly by fate, the decided contingency of our position, and ultimately by death. Spiritual anxiety is the awareness of the emptiness of the concrete content of our particular beliefs and even more the awareness of the loss of a spiritual center of meaning resulting in ultimate meaningless in which "not even the meaningfulness of a serious question of meaning is left for him."38 Moral anxiety is the awareness that in virtue of that very freedom by which one is human one continually chooses against the fulfillment of one's destiny and the actualization of one's essential nature, thus adding the element of guilt.39

All three elements of anxiety -- death, meaninglessness and guilt -- combine to produce despair, the ultimate or boundary situation. One element or another may stand out more clearly for various people or in various situations, but all three are inescapably present. It is guilt that seals Sartre's *No exit*, for if there were but the nonbeing of death and meaninglessness, the human could affirm both one's ontic and spiritual meaning by one's own act of voluntary death. but guilt makes all this impossible. "Guilt and condemnation are qualitatively, not quantitatively, infinite."40 They point to the dimension of the ultimate and the unconditional from which we have become estranged through our own responsible actions. In this way Tillich's contemporary understanding of the situation of loneliness and despair is ultimately pervaded by a sense of guilt.

Nonbeing extends beyond being to knowledge. After recognizing that existence is both the appearance and the contradiction of essence, he adds that "our thinking is a part of our existence and shares the fate that human existence contradicts its true nature."41 Reason is effected by the nonbeing of finitude and estrangement. Under the conditions of existence it is torn by internal conflicts and estranged from its depth and ground.

Another note of the existential situation of knowledge is its inclusion of actualized freedom. This not only separates thought and being, but holds them apart. There results a special kind of truth, one which is attained, not in an absolute standpoint at the end of history, but in the situation of the knower: subjectivity becomes the hallmark of truth. Its contemporary tragic character is due to the fact that it results from separation and despair. "Truth is just that subjectivity which does not disregard its despair, its exclusion from the objective world of essence, but which holds to it passionately."42

Throughout this negative stage of the dialectic there remains the original positive element, the bond to the divine. "Man is never cut off from the ground of being, not even in the state of condemnation,"43 for really to lose the foundation of one's being would be utter annihilation. This essential insight of Hegel regarding sublation44 would appear to have been tragically omitted by Marx who in his concern for social transformation understood all in terms of technical reason focused upon negation. But if what is negated is the power of being upon which a human life and a people's culture have been based then the possibilities of reconstruction are radically undermined

and left without foundation. With no source of meaning life not only loses meaning but is condemned to remain thus. Neither negation nor negation of negation will suffice. The tragedy which Tillich brings to light is that despite the presence of the power of being, in this state of existence the human does not actualize but contradicts the essential manifestation of one divine ground.

This is more than individualization; it is the tragically guilty estrangement of being and knowing from the divine, and from ourselves as images of the divine. Thus Tillich's systematic analysis of the predicament of modern human beings manifests the true dimensions of the exaggeration of individualization experienced as a sense of loneliness and expressed theologically as the Fall of the human. It does this in the contemporary context of meaninglessness by questioning not only the supports of the previous generations, but the very meaning of support. If this questioning is sufficiently radical it may open the way to a rediscovery of the basis not only for a reordering or restructuring, but for radical reconstruction.

Synthesis as Revelation of the Divine and Restoration of Human Life, Public and Private

The first stage of Tillich's existential dialectic had presented the essential or potential state of finite reality in union with the divine. The second or negative moment of this dialectic placed individualization in its present context of meaninglessness. This is a powerful and profound expression of the difficulty in actualizing human dignity, which is identically the element of union or participation in the divine which is the essence of religion. Let us see how the third stage attempts to provide this element in a contemporary fashion.

Since existential separation and disruption leaves the human opaque to the divine, Tillich will not allow the divine to be derived from an analysis of human experience: the human cannot save him/herself.45 If God is to be the answer to the existential question of the human, He must come "to human existence from beyond it";46 the divine depth must break through in particular things and particular circumstances. This is the phenomenon of revelation in which the essential power of natural objects is delivered from the bondage of its existential contradiction so that the finite thing or situation participates in the power of the ultimate.

In this way revelation provides more than a mere representation of the divine; it opens levels of mind and of reality hidden till now and produces the experience of the divine which is the most profound of these levels. The appearance of the divine varies according to the particular situation. Experienced in correlation with the threat of nonbeing, God has the form of the infinite power of being resisting nonbeing," that is, he is Being Itself. As the answer to the question in the form of anxiety, God is "the ground of courage."47 Each is a form of the particular participation in the divine which takes place in this situation. As this same participation bases symbols of the divine, their diverse types and continuance differ depending upon the situation.

For a better understanding of the contemporary nature of Tillich's religious philosophy it is necessary to investigate further his development of the situation of revelation in the context of meaninglessness. As cognitive this encounter includes two elements. One is objective and termed a miracle or sign-event; the other is subjective and named ecstasy and inspiration. The objective and the subjective are so strictly correlated that one cannot be had without the other: revelation is the truth only for the one grasped by the divine presence.48

Miracle does not mean a supernatural interference with the natural structure of events. To make this clear Tillich prefers the term "sign-event" as signifying that which produces numinous astonishment in Otto's sense of that which is connected with the presence of the divine. Such a

sign-event can be realized in the context of meaninglessness because it presupposes the stigma of nonbeing, the disruptive tensions driving toward human complete annihilation. In particular situation this stigma becomes evident and manifests the negative side of the mystery of God, the abyss. However, such situations also imply the positive side of the mystery of God, for their very reality manifests the driving ground and power of being over which nonbeing is not completely victorious.

This explains the characteristics which Tillich attributes to a miracle. He speaks of a miracle as "an event which is astonishing, unusual, shaking, without contradicting the rational structure of reality; ... an event which points to the mystery of being, expressing its relation to us in a definite way; ... an occurrence which is received as a sign-event in an ecstatic experience." 49 The subjective element pertains to the very nature of a miracle. Thus, even a person who later learns about the sign-event must share in the ecstasy if one is to have more than a report about the belief of another. An objective miracle would be a contradiction in terms.

This subjective element of ecstasy or "standing outside one's self" is the very etymology of the term itself. It indicates a state in which the mind transcends its ordinary situation, its subject-object structure. Miracle was seen to be negatively dependent on the stigma of nonbeing. In the mind what corresponded to this stigma was the shock of nonbeing, the anxiety of death, meaninglessness and guilt. These tend to disrupt the normal balance of the mind, to shake it in its structure and to force it to its boundaries where it openly faces nonbeing. There it is thrown back upon itself.

This might be useful in the interpretation of the history of the last century. For in facing the structural contradictions of his time Marx took just this route. Seeing them as a call to the human to save oneself, he turned against all else as an opiate, and thereby opened the way for a new radicalization of the conflict of subject and object. Once objectified in his work, now the human would be totally objectified by society; family bonds would be intentionally subverted; and the sense of personal dignity would be annihilated before the state which wished to be all. Tillich's dialectic points to the fact that when forced to its extreme situation, to the very limit of human possibilities, the mind experiences an all pervading "no." There, fact to fact with the meaninglessness and despair which one must recognize if one is serious about anything at all, one is grasped by mystery. To acknowledge meaninglessness even in an act of despair is itself a meaningful act, for it could be done only on the power of the being it negates.50 In this way the reality of a transcending power is manifested within the human.

In a radically contemporary mode this is the expression within human consciousness of the classical theme of the non-ultimacy of that which is limited and contingent. Anything perceived as object opposed to subject must be limited and not all-sufficient; but this very perception bespeaks as its basis that which is self-sufficient and absolute.

This is not natural revelation whereby reason grasps God whenever it wills. Tillich takes an extra step noting that the object-subject dichotomy which characterized the human mind enables it to recognize its contradictions, but not to resolve them. Natural knowledge of self and world can lead to the question of the ground of being and reason, but as estranged in the state of existence it cannot answer the question. For this God must grasp the human,51 which is revelation. The power of being is present in the affirmation of meaninglessness and in the affirmation of ourselves as facing meaninglessness; it affirms itself in one in spite of nonbeing.52

In true ecstasy one receives ultimate power by the presence of the ultimate which breaks through the contradictions of existence where and when it will. It is God who determines the circumstances and the degree in which one will be participated. The effect of this work and its sign

is love, for when the contradictions of the state of existence are overcome so that they are no longer the ultimate horizon, reunion and social healing, cooperation and creativity become possible.

Tillich calls the cognitive aspect of ecstasy inspiration. In what concerns the divine he replaces the word knowledge by awareness. This is not concerned with new objects, which would invade reason with a strange body of knowledge that could not be assimilated, and hence would destroy its rational structure. Rather, that which is opened to the human is a new dimension of being participated in by all while still retaining its transcendence.

It matters little that the contemporary situation of skepticism and meaninglessness has removed all possibility of content for this act. What is important is that we have been grasped by that which answers the ultimate question of our very being, our unconditional and ultimate concern. This indeed is Tillich's phenomenological description of God. "Only certain is the ultimacy as ultimacy."53 The ultimate concern provides the place at which the faith by which there is belief (*fides qua creditur*) and the faith that is believed (*fides quae creditur*) are identified.

It is here that the difference between subject and object disappears. The source of our faith is present as both subject and object in a way that is beyond both of them. The absence of this dichotomy is the reason why Tillich refuses to speak of knowledge here and uses instead the term "awareness." He compares it to the mystic's notion of knowledge God has of Himself, the truth itself of St. Augustine.54 It is absolutely certain, but the identity of subject and object means that it is also absolutely personal. Consequently, this experience of the ultimate cannot be directly received from others:55 revelation is something which we ourselves must live.

In this experience it is necessary to distinguish the point of immediate awareness from its breadth of content. The point of awareness is expressed in what Tillich refers to as the ontological principle. "Man is immediately aware of something unconditional and object, both theoretically and practically."56 The human being has no doubt about the certainty of this point, although non symbolically one can say only that this is being itself. However, in revelation one has experienced not only its reality but its relation to him/her. One experiences the combination of these in the metaphorical terms of ground and abyss of being, power of being, ultimate and unconditional concern.

Generally this point is experienced in a special situation and in a special form; the ultimate concern is made concrete in some one thing. It may, for instance, be the nation, a god or the God of the Bible. This concrete content of our act of belief differs from ultimately as ultimacy in that it is not immediately evident. Since it remains within the subject-object dichotomy its acceptance as ultimate requires an act of courage and venturing faith. The certainty we have about the breadth of concrete content is then only conditional.58 Should time reveal this content to be finite, our faith will still have been an authentic contact with the unconditional itself, only the concrete expression will have been defiicnet.59

This implies two correlated elements in human act of faith. One is that of certainty concerning one's own being as related to something ultimate and unconditional. The other is that of risk, of surrendering to a concern which is not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as if it were. The risk arises necessarily in the state of existence where both reason and objects are not only finite, but separated from their ground. This places an element of doubt in faith which is neither of the methodological variety found in the scientist, nor of the transitory type often had by the skeptic. Rather, the doubt of faith is existential, an awareness of the lasting element of insecurity. Nevertheless, this doubt can be accepted and overcome in spite of itself by an act of courage which affirms the reality of God. Faith remains the one state of ultimate concern, but as such it subsumes both certainty concerning the unconditional and existential doubt.60

Can a system with such uncertainty concerning concrete realities still be called a reality? Tillich believes that it can, but only if it is specified as a belieful or self-transcending realism. In this the reality real -- the ground and power of everything real -- is grasped in and through a concrete historical situation. Hence, the value of the present moment which has become transparent for its ground is, paradoxically, both all and nothing. In itself it is not finite and the more it is seen in the light of the ultimate power, the more it appears as questionable and void of lasting significance."61 The appearance of self-subsistence gradually melts away. But by this very fact the ground and power of the present reality becomes evident. The concrete situation becomes *theonomous* and the infinite depth and eternal significance of the present is revealed in the ecstatic experience.

It would be a mistake, however, to think of this as something other-worldly, strange or uncomfortable. It is ec-static in the sense of going beyond the usual surface observations and calculations of our initial impressions and scientific calculations, but what it reveals is the profundity of our unity with colleagues, neighbors and indeed with all humankind. Rather than generating a sense of estrangement, its sign is the way in which it enables one to see others as friends and to live comfortably with them. As ethnic and cultural differences emerge, along with the freedom of each people to be themselves, this work of the Spirit which is characteristic of Tillich's dialectic comes to be seen in its radical importance for social life.

One instance might be illustrative. Martin Luther King wrote his doctoral dissertation on the dialectic of Tillich. When doing so, he saw love as the foundational transforming power at work in the heart, but considered it only a personal pilgrimage of the individual soul. Later he wrote that he did not consider this to be a matter of social import until on visiting India he came to see with the eyes of Gandhi that the Christian doctrine of love was indeed "one of the most potent weapons available to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom." Nevertheless, until he faced the struggle for racist dignity in Montgomery this insight remained only at the intellectual level of understanding and appreciation; it was in the actual borderline circumstances of the struggle for freedom when he was forced to the limits of meaning by the threat of nonbeing that his intellectual insight was transformed into a commitment to a way of life.62

This is suggestive for philosophers in our times. Aristotle spoke of philosophy as being undertaken at a time of leisure, after one has taken care of the necessities of life. The example of Tillich and King suggests that Marx was correct in saying that in our times philosophy can, and indeed often must, be done on another more realistic and historical basis. It was in facing the destructive power of the modern totalitarian state that Tillich found the need to transcend technical reason and to go beneath structures to the very ground of being. Through experiencing directly the negativity of an exploitive system in the form of bombings, fire hoses and vicious dogs, Martin Luther King was able to uncover and give voice to the power of overcoming it, and thereby lead his people to new dignity and freedom.

An old Indian proverb has it that when the pupil is ready the teacher will arrive. The example of Tillich and King suggest that the condition for receiving the power "to be" may be the very quandaries and dilemmas of change when old structures by their inadequacies contradict life. If so Tillich's dialectic points out how the more disastrous those structures are manifested to be -- that is, through their very negativity -- a new level of being can be received, life can be transformed and the human spirit can experience resurrection and new life.

Conclusion

In view of this the earlier liberal reading of fundamentalism in simply negative terms of regression into past tribalisms appears itself blind and dangerously unrealistic. The sweeping and urgent desire to return to cultural foundations reflects a much more proximate and pressing concern, namely, the flight from the cataclysmic effects of the cultural uprooting which a secularizing totalitarian rationalism pressed upon the human spirit and the corresponding need to rediscover the bases of a new or renewed sense of freedom. Thus, a vast new effort is underway to mine the resources of human cultures for their deeper religious and humanizing principles needed to reconstruct personal and social life for the third millennium.

First, identifying the task of constructing a political and civic order as proper to the human applies the perennial call for humankind to reflect the divine attributes in all places and circumstances to the work of creative social construction. Second, the lesson of humanism in this century warns against too easily identifying any particular human political creation or action as a direct and proper command of God; this protects the role of religion in criticizing, correcting and inspiring human efforts. At the same time the contemporary culturally oriented context makes attention to the spiritual and religious foundations much more central than had been the case earlier in this century. It renews the call to every person, community and social structure to reflect ever more fully and in their proper manner the divine attributes. If responded to in a combined sense of temporal urgency and spiritual piety this could signal an authentic religious revival and render authentic the aspirations for a human resurgence which have so marked modern times.

This would imply actively fashioning, and participating in a public life that reflects the divine. Concretely, it would call for substituting education for indoctrination in schools, honesty for exploitation in business, suasion for demagoguery, for manipulation or for coercion in politics. This would be an authentic foundationalism -- or in present terms an authentic fundamentalism characterized both by rationality and spirituality.

In this light, one can see how the modern attention to the human turned in upon itself and become a closed humanism. By excluding religion it became a secularism in flagrant contradiction to the originating and founding human convictions of the centrality of the One God and the unity of all in Him. Correspondingly, it is crucial that the renewed appreciation of the human not be dissociated from the religious context and from a metaphysics in which the relation of the human to God, that is religion, is central.

In opening that field of inquiry Parmenides had seen immediately that in order to be able to stand against nonbeing it is necessary that being, in its first instance, be One and eternal, Absolute and unchanging. This strong affirmation of the One imposed upon Plato the challenge of showing how there also could be many beings. His answer was that they were indeed actual and that this could be possible only to the degree that they imaged the One and depended for their being (participated) therein.

Work upon this relationship which is central to every religion is central also to metaphysics and philosophy of religion, which are required for a resolution of the ambiguities opened by each step in human progress -- which is another way of saying, for finding the religious significance of human history.

Thus, the present post-modern situation raises the issue of how, in contrast to a secular humanism, one can finally give authentic limitless and creative foundation to the modern appreciation of the human and thereby be authentically human, of how one can break through entrapment in a closed rationalism in order to access to the sources of truth and meaning required for inspiring and enriching reason in human life, of how one can overcome the intolerant tendency to elevate one's own positions and concerns to absolute and status by instead rediscovering in the

religious foundations of one's culture the truly transcendent context of public life, which imposes humility, spires hope and promises happiness. This is not a weak and flaccid compromise of human dignity but its foundation and fulfillment.

This is the heart of the essentially human search to live according to the truth, to apply its principles to the concrete conditions of one's life and to integrate all within the subtle attractions of divine love, written not in edicts imposed by public force but in the challenge of progress and the promise of peace.

Notes

1. *Humanist Manifestos: I and II*, ed. Paul Kurtz (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1973).

2. *Sacralization and Secularization*, ed. Roger Aubert, Concilium, vol. 47 (New York: Paulist, 1969).

3. William James, *Pragmatism* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), chaps. II and VII.

4. See Martin E. Marty, *The Modern Schism: Three Paths to the Secular* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960); Bernard E. Meland, *The Secularization of Modern Cultures* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); Martin C. D'Arey, *Humanism and Christianity* (New York: NAL, 1960); Bernard Häring, *Faith and Morality in the Secular Age* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973).

5. It was according to this threefold structure that Descartes proceeded step by step to place under doubt all that arises from a source of knowledge once a reason for doubt could be identified and until knowledge from that source could be certified as true. Aristotle's dictum regarding humans as physical and spiritual held that there is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses.

6. Indeed one might define philosophy and science precisely as knowledge of the various aspects of reality in terms proper to human reason and hence expressive of the nature or existence of the things themselves.

7. I Levy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), chap. II.

8. Ibid., chap. XII. See also Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), chap. I; G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 26-32.

9. Xenophanes, Fragments 11, 14-16 in G. F. McLean and P. J. Aspell, *Readings in Ancient Western Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 31.

10. Anaximander, Fragments, see G.F. McLean and P.J. Aspell, *Ancient Western Philosophy: The Hellenic Emergence* (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1971), pp. 22-28.

11. See McLean and Aspell, *Ancient Western Philosophy*, chap. III.

12. Parmenides, Fragments, see McLean and Aspell, *Readings in Ancient Western Philosophy*, 39-44.

13. Fragment 8, see Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Work, Images and Argument in the Fragments* (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1970).

14. *Metaphysics*, XII, 7, 1072b 26-29.

15. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Dover, 1959), chap. I, vol. I, 121-124.

16. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Chicago, IL: Regnery, 1960).

17. *The Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

18. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. A.C. Fraser (New York: Dove, 1959), II, chap. 21, sec. 27, vol. I, 329.

19. *Skeptical Essays* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), 169.

20. Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conception of Freedom* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958), 187.

21. J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, chap. 5, 15.

22. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom*, 193.

23. In this perspective liberalism itself calls for a process of liberation and enrichment.

24. Ibid., 238, 255.

25. Ibid., 83; cf "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Incarnation," *Church Quarterly Review*, CXLVII (1949): 141.

26. *Systematic Theology*, I, 179-180, 188-191. Böhmer's *Urgrund* and Shcelling's "first potency" are examples of dialectical nonbeing in God.

27. Ibid., 253.

28. Ibid., 189.

29. Ibid., 202-203.

30. *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 104-105.

31. *Systematic Theology*, II, 24-25, 45. Cf. *The Interpretation of History* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1936), 60-65.

32. "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," Journal of Religion, XIX (July 1939): 208. Cf. *Systematic Theology*, II, 31-35.

33. Ibid., 32-38.

34. "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Incarnation," 142.

35. *Systematic Theology*, II, 44.

36. *The Courage to Be* (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1962), 35. Cf. *Systematic Theology*, I, 191-192.

37. "The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," 211-214.

38. *The Courage to Be*, 48. Cf. *Systematic Theology*, I, 189; II. 74.

39. "Freedom in the Period of Transformation," in *Freedom: Its Meaning*, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), 123-124, 131-132.

40. *The Courage to Be*, 54.

41. *The Interpretation of History*, 61.

42. Ibid., 63-64.

43. *Systematic Theology*, II, 78.

44. "To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation; it is a nonbeing but as a result which has its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinateness from which it originates." G.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1969), 106-107.

45. This, he says, would be the humanistic-naturalistic or the dualistic approach to God.

46. *Systematic Theology*, I, 64-65.

47. Ibid., 61.

48. Ibid., 111. Cf. "What is Divine Revelation," *The Witness*, XXVI (1943): 8-9.

49. *Systematic Theology*, I, 117.

50. *The Courage to Be*, 176. Despair supposes something positive. "The negative lives by the positive which it negates." *Love, Power and Justice: Ontological Analysis and Ethical Applications* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 38-39.

51. *The Protestant Era* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1957), 79-80. Cf. *Systematic Theology*, I, 114-120.

52. *Christianity and the Problem of Existence* (Washington: Henderson Services, 1951), 30-31.

53. *Dynamics of Faith*, vol. X of *World Perspectives*, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 17.

54. Ibid., 8-11.

55. "The Problem of Theological Method," *Journal of Religion*, XXVII (1947): 22-23.

56. "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* I (1946): 10.

57. *Systematic Theology*, I, 109.

58. "The Problem of Theological Method," 22-23.

59. *Dynamics of Faith*, 18.

60. Ibid.

61. *The Protestant Era*, 18.

62. Martin Luther King, *Strength to Love* (London: Holder and Stoughton, 1964), 149-150.

Chapter II
A Place for Universalization

Laszlo Tengelyi

The following brief essay focuses on two interrelated issues. The first is a position, which might be termed as 'moderate universalism', against 'cultural relativism'; second is the way in which this position can find additional support in a view of moral reasoning which, in contradistinction to an 'analytical' approach, may be best called 'phenomenological'. I hasten to remark that the ideas embraced by the following argumentation are strongly indebted to, indeed to a large extent taken over from, Charles Taylor's excellent book, *Sources of the Self*.1

For a Moderate Universalism

My point of departure is that we are living in an age in which 'multiculturalism' has become an apparently inexhaustible source of major difficulties. I assume that this is so, at least partly, because in our days an extremely intensive intercourse between cultures is, in fact, taking place.

Does this intercourse provide an opportunity for real communication between different cultures? 'Cultural relativism' in the strong sense of the word, according to which different cultures are strictly *incommensurable,* would give a negative answer. I believe, however, that—though cultural incommensurability cannot be ruled out—as a possibility neither can it be considered as an *a priori* necessity or an established fact. Thus, I am arguing here for the *possibility* of a real communication between different cultures. This is what I mean by 'moderate universalism'.

This term seems to be appropriate because a real communication clearly presupposes two kinds of elements accepted as universally valid:

(1) In order that a successful communication between different cultures be possible, certain 'formally universal values' first must be taken for granted by all participants. Thus, for instance, a universal and equal respect for diversity is obviously an indispensable prerequisite of any fruitful—or, indeed, peaceful—peaceful intercourse between cultures.

(2) But another kind of universality, more closely related to the particular contents of the distinct value-systems concerned, must also be necessarily involved in every episode of communication between cultures which deserves this name. What I have in mind is that in such a situation the values which a particular culture has, so to speak, to offer cannot be presented just as 'goods for us', as against 'goods for everybody'.2 Otherwise communication would immediately break down.

Needless to say, values *presented* as 'goods-for-everybody' do not necessarily *qualify* as such. Their formulation marks a *claim* to universality; but this claim may occasionally turn out to be a sheer *pretension.* Attempts to unmask such unjustified pretensions are to be considered as not only legitimate but even progressive moves in the game which I have called 'real communication'. For a 'real communication' between different cultures can only take place if it reveals itself as an ingenious quest for universal values.

A Phenomenological View Of Moral Reasoning

There is an argument which, if valid, could be adduced as a decisive proof of cultural relativism. The argument I am talking about is based upon the assumption that moral reasoning consists in pointing out how lower level evaluative judgments or injunctions are dependent on higher level values or more general prescriptions. Once this assumption is accepted, the conclusion can easily be drawn that the ultimate values and the most general commandments appealed to in a procedure of reasoning like this can never be argued for without circularity; if there are different possible lines of argumentation, there will necessarily be different ultimate values and different highest rules as well between which we must *choose* without being able to find any sufficient rational grounds of why we have chosen thus and not otherwise. One may add that, since different cultures are likely to revolve around different values and different highest rules, the theory of rationally unjustifiable choice, which has just been outlined and which may be best called *decisionism,* seems to apply to any intercultural encounter.

I do not think that in attacking decisionism we could fall back upon attempts to attain *a rational justification of morality* as were first ventured by Enlightenment philosophers like Hume, Diderot, or Kant. I accept MacIntyre's judgement according to which all these projects were, at least in their original forms, doomed to fail.3 But I do not think either that decisionism would be unassailable. On the contrary, it seems to me that this theory has an irreparable flaw. It does not take into account that values and obligations are always imbedded in a way of life. It presupposes an entirely disengaged subject capable of choosing between conflicting values without being always already committed to some of them. In other words: the view of moral reasoning suggested by decisionism is a view from a completely imaginary space—indeed a 'view from nowhere', to appropriate an expression introduced elsewhere in a different context.

To assume such an essentially atomic and isolated situation of choice amounts to the adoption of a contrived and far-fetched conception of freedom. It is incontestable that there is such a thing as a transition from the acceptance of one value to that of another value. But it is an obvious case of misrepresentation if this transition is conceived of as an act of what has been traditionally called *libertas indifferentiae.* Freedom finds itself always already committed to certain values whenever it comes to envisage the possibility of moving towards other values. From this fact it follows that such a transition can only take place if there is, to borrow an expression from the German philosopher Ernst Tugendhat, an *Erfahrungsweg,* 'a way of lived experience', leading from the acceptance of one value to the acceptance of another one.4 Decisionism can rightly be accused of *occluding* this dimension of situations in which changes in accepted values occur.

The eclipse of this phenomenological dimension has its consequences upon the account which decisionism gives of moral reasoning. This account is to be considered as a misconception of the *kind of rationality* which is inherent to our ordinary understanding of our transitions from one value to another. We can undoubtedly *make sense* of these transitions. But this sort of meaningfulness has nothing to do with the 'analytic rationality' peculiar to making inferences, drawing conclusions, or checking the consistency of our beliefs. It is rather akin to the meaningfulness of *coherent narratives.* We can *tell* how and why we moved from the acceptance of one value to that of another. Stories of this kind can have *their own rationale* which is irreducible to what I have just called 'analytic rationality'.

It is the merit of Charles Taylor to point out how important a role this 'phenomenological accountability' of our transitions from one value to another might play in moral reasoning. He stresses, first of all, that to argue in ethical matters means always to have recourse to "a reasoning in transitions". (See *op. cit.* p. 72). As he adds, this reasoning "aims to establish, not that some

position is correct absolutely, but rather that some position is superior to some other" *(Ibid.)*. As we are further told, moral reasoning tries to show, therefore, "that the *move* from Z to B constitutes a gain epistemically" *(Ibid.)*. In describing this kind of argumentation, Taylor does not lose sight of the fact that 'analytic rationality' is an uneliminable ingredient in all moral reasoning. He explains what it means to assent that a move from Z to B "constitutes a gain epistemically" by saying:

This is something we do when we show, for instance, that we got from A to B by identifying and resolving a contradiction in A or a confusion which A relied on, or something of the sort. The argument fixes on the nature of the transition from A to B. The nerve of the rational proof consists in showing that this transition is an error-reducing one. *(Ibid.)*

But he does not confine himself to emphasizing the significance of 'analytic rationality'. He adds:

This form of argument has its source in biographical narrative. We are convinced that a certain view is superior because we have lived a transition which we understand as error-reducing and hence as epistemic gain. (*Ibid*.)

Thereby, Taylor connects his account of moral reasoning with the narrative theory of personal identity which has recently been put forward by Alastair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur. (See *op.cit.,* p. 47). It is this connection which gives proper weight to the requirement of 'phenomenological accountability' of any transition from one value to another proposed in moral reasoning. As Taylor himself puts it very significantly:

You will only convince me by changing my reading of my moral experience, and in particular my reading of my life story, of the transitions I have lived through—or perhaps refused to live through. *(Op. cit.,* p. 73)

We can apply these insights to the problem of whether any 'real communication' between cultures is possible. This is not just a problem arising *between* us but a problem which may arise *within* us as well. We may happen to be 'multicultural' in our roots, in our styles of life, indeed in the very making of our personal identity; and I believe, to a certain degree we all of us are, in fact, 'multicultural' in all these respects. From this perspective the position of cultural relativism with its 'incommensurabiity thesis' appears in new light. Applied to the case of multicultural individuals, it would be tantamount to saying that there is no meaningful transition from the values of one culture to those of another, or, what is even more important, to a third kind of values based upon both cultures at once; the only way to make such moves, on the contrary, is a *total switch* which calls the very identity of the person concerned radically into question. But is this a plausible or even tenable suggestion?

Conclusion

The argument which I tried to develop above against 'cultural relativism' proceeded in two steps. First, I proposed the statement that *if* 'real communication' between cultures is possible, it necessarily involves the acceptance of the universal validity of certain values both of formal and

material kinds. Then, I tried to show that the denial of the possibility of 'real intercultural communication' entails the rejection of the very possibility of personal identity (in the sense of a 'narrative identity'). One might think that the argument is incomplete. It remains, indeed, to be seen whether—and how—personal identity is, in fact, possible.

But I do not think this deficiency would seriously infringe upon the validity and the force of the argument. On the contrary, I believe that the onus of the proof rests with those who want to call into question the possibility of personal identity (in the sense of a narrative identity). for, in spite of all challenges coming, for instance, from psychoanalysis, it belongs to our most inveterate convictions that our search for an integral selfhood is not always in vain.

Notes

1. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self. The Shaking of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 67-75.

2. By using the word 'good' I by no means want to give a 'tacit utilitarian turn' to the argument. By 'good' I do not mean 'useful', as opposed to 'right', that is, to 'morally good'. Instead, I am employing the word in a broad sense, which , I believe, precedes the differentiation of its possible meanings into 'useful' and 'right'. I am relying here upon Bernard Williams's insight according to which 'morality' is "a particular development of the ethical," a particular development that "peculiarly emphasizes certain ethical notions rather than others, developing in particular a special notion of obligation"; and, what is even more important in the context given, it is "in fact *morality,* the special system, that demands a sharp boundary for itself (in demanding 'moral' and 'nonmoral' senses for words, for instance)." See B. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 6-7.

3. See A. Maclntyre, *After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1987, 1981), chs. IV, V.

4. See E. Tugendhat, *Selbsbewusstsein und Selbsbestimmung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), p. 275.

Chapter III
Different Ways of Being Religious

Jadwiga-Malgorzata Rakowska

Religion is not a homogeneous unidimensional construct. A uniform approach does not allow for differentiation of the role of religion in the life of the believer and consequently leaves many important questions unaddressed. Therefore if we are interested in studying the impact of religion on one's life; at both personal and social levels, we need to go beyond asking "Is the person religious?" and move to the question "How is the person religious?"

Origins of the Concept

Much motivation underlying recent typological studies of religion has stemmed from the desire to separate "healthy" religion from "unhealthy" religion. This dates back at least as far as William James (1902), who differentiated between "healthy-mindedness" and "the sick soul." Allport (1950) extended his theory of mature versus immature personality to include the concepts of mature and immature religion.

He draws the criteria of maturity from his theory of personality (1937). The attributes of a mature personality are three in number. First, a variety of psychological interests are required which concern themselves with ideal objects and values beyond the range of physical desire. Unless one escapes the level of immediate biological impulse, one's life is manifestly dwarfed and infantile. A second attribute is the ability to objectify oneself, to be reflective and insightful about one's own life. The individual with insight sees himself as others see him, and at certain moments glimpses himself in a kind of cosmic perspective. A developed sense of humor is an aspect of this second attribute. Finally, a mature personality always has some unifying philosophy of life, although not necessarily religious in type, nor articulated in words, nor entirely complete. But without the direction and coherence supplied by some dominant integrative pattern any life seems fragmented and aimless.

These three attributes of maturity represent the three primary avenues of development: the avenue of widening interests (the expanding self), the avenue of detachment and insight (self-objectification), and the avenue of integration (self-unification). What are the characteristics of an immature religion according to Allport? Allport says:

When immature it has not evolved behind the level of impulsive self-gratification. Instead of dealing with psychogenic values it serves either as wish-fulfilling or soporific function for the self-centered interests. When immature it does not entail self-objectification, but remains unreflective, failing to provide a context of meaning in which the individual can locate himself, and with perspective judge the quality of his conduct. Finally, the immature religion is not really unifying in its effect upon personality. Excluding, as it does, whole regions of experience, it is spasmodic, segmented, and even when fanatic in intensity, it is but partially integrative of the personality. (Allport, 1950, 61-62)

Allport defines a mature religion as:

A disposition built up through experience, to respond favorably, and in certain habitual ways, to conceptual object and principles that the individual regards as of ultimate importance in his own life, and as having to do with what he regards as permanent or central in the nature of things. (Allport, 1950, 64).

While he guards against over-estimating the consistency and completeness of the mature religion, he lists the attributes that distinguish it from the immature religion. By comparison, the mature religion is: 1) well differentiated; 2) functionally autonomous; 3) morally consistent; 4) comprehensive; 5) integrated; and 6) open-ended.

Differentiation

When Allport says that mature religion is differentiated he calls attention to its richness and complexity. He states that the differentiated religion is more complex, more personal than any definition of religion can suggest. He cites Westermarck according to whom religion is: "a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent and to whom he makes an appeal in his worship" (Murray and Morgan cited in Allport, 1950, 65).

Allport also refers to MacMuray's social view regarding the aim of religion as human perfection in relation with others, as realization of fellowship. Allport also cites Whitehead's opposite view defining religion as "what a man does with his solitariness" and as the "longing of the spirit that the facts of existence should find their justification in the nature of existence" (Murray and Morgan cited in Allport, 1950, 65). Allport states that these, and many additional points of emphasis are valid; but it is a presumption to suppose that one formulation captures the completeness or precise emphasis of religion as it exists in any single mature adult.

Allport designates as "differentiations" the multiplicity of interests that fall within the religion. These are interests such as toward the church, divinity, brotherhood, good and evil. These components fall into a pattern. There are dominant and subsidiary designs in this pattern characteristic of each individual's personal life.

Differentiated religion is the outgrowth of many successive discriminations and continuous reorganizations. Beginning in later childhood or adolescence the individual who is on the way to maturity, probably will repudiate both the over-simplified product of his earlier egocentric thinking and his blind conformity to institutional or parental views. He observes that the literal-minded and second-hand faith that he previously held now needs to be reconsidered. He sees the dangers of his original evasions and escapist beliefs. He perceives the short-comings of tradition even while he appreciates its virtues. Whole sections of humanity, he observes, remain immature in their faith through the performance of empty ritual or persisting in a belief in the supernatural which is congruent neither with science nor with experience. He rejects the authoritarianism and conceit of entrenched ecclesiasticism. Religion, now he has to admit, is not necessarily a good thing. He wonders how religion wars, inquisitions, persecutions, and bigotry can come from inherent good. Perhaps he will decide to avoid institutional religion, or just the opposite, he may find an approximately satisfactory expression of his own religion in some existing branch of the church, perhaps that of his own family tradition. According to Allport, the precise ecclesiastical position of the individual is not an index of the maturity of his religion. Adherence to almost any church, or to none at all, may be possible for those who in their maturing personalities have fought through the issues or religion.

A differentiated religion implies a need for some criticism: for a religion would never become differentiated unless the original stage of simple childhood belief had given way to reflective examination and questioning. But differentiation implies more than criticism: it implies an articulation and ordering of parts. There are many objects, many "cognitive poles" involved in the religious orientation. Some cognitive poles are: the deity; the nature of the soul; the ordering values; the issues of freedom, sin and immortality; the attitude toward prayer, work, creeds, and tradition. The issues confronted by mature personalities are not the same in all cultures nor in all individuals.

According to Allport, differentiated organization will somehow fit all these objects into a pattern. Toward each cognitive pole the individual will evolve an appropriate rational and emotional attitude, consistent with the value-structure of his religion. As a result the individual knows with precision his attitude toward the chief phases of theoretical doctrine and the principal issues in moral sphere, while at the same time maintaining a genuine sense of wholeness into which the articulated aspects fit.

At certain moments, those that are called mystical, the sense of wholeness may be overwhelming. Mystical experience, says Allport, is not in itself a token of a mature religion. On the other hand, it is by no means incompatible with such a religion. Advanced religious thinking makes prominent place for mystical states and accepts their occurrence.

Whether or not the religion of maturity includes mysticism, the basic structure is well differentiated, comprising many subsidiary attitudes, critically arrived at, and flexibly maintained as the sphere of experience expands.

Those who have not developed a differentiated religion, often show a kind of uncritical abandon. They may say: "I do not know enough about it to be rational"; "I am accepting my religion on purely emotional grounds"; "I believe what I was taught, and that is good enough for me." There is here no reflective articulation of parts.

The very people who accept religion unreflectively and uncritically tend to react in an equally unreflective way to their parents, to political issues, and to social institutions. Their religion seems uniformly immature. They are found usually to have repressed conflicts. In them, hostility, anxiety, prejudice, are detectable by psychological methods. Allport mentions investigations which have uncovered the fact that among people with strong religion, racial prejudice is often marked. Closer analysis, he adds, indicates that the religion in these cases is blindly institutional, exclusionist, and related to self-centered values. Among people with reflective and highly differentiated religion, racial prejudice is rarely found.

Functional Autonomy

The second characteristic of the mature religion is the autonomy of the energy behind it. The energy that sustains it belongs to it alone. This energy is drawn slightly, if at all, from the reservoir of organic drives - such as the fears, hungers, and desires of the body.

Paradoxically, the origins of religious life lie, partly in these organic cravings, which when blocked, give rise to displaced longings and displaced goals that are expressed in the language of religion. Allport emphasizes that a mature religion supplies its own driving power and becomes dynamic in its own right. He asserts that the most important distinction between the immature and mature religion lies in the difference in their dynamic characters.

Immature religion, whether in adult or child, is largely concerned with magical thinking, self-justification, and creature comforts. Thus it betrays its sustaining motives which continue to be the

drives and desires of the body. By contrast, mature religion is less a servant, and more a master. No longer determined exclusively by impulse, fear and drive, it tends rather to control and to direct these motives toward a goal beyond mere self-interest.

Religious outlook begins in childhood and naturally is immature. It is born of organic unrest, of self-interested desire, of juvenile interpretation ("verbal realism"). In the course of development, it undergoes extensive transformation. It acquires its own vitality which comes to control its original motives. Tracing its evolution from childhood onward, we clearly see that each stage is continuous with the other, and at the same time, a new meaning and a new motive emerge.

A religion that has thus become largely independent of its origins, "functionally autonomous," is no longer subservient to them.

The power of religion to transform lives is a consequence of the functional autonomy that marks the mature religion. Whenever mature religion takes a prominent and active role in the personality, its influence is strikingly pervasive. Many events are religiously coloured: the beauties of nature; the acts of men; songs of good and evil in the world; and birth, life, and death. The response to all these is to a greater or lesser degree determined by the religion. Perceptions and interpretations thought and conduct can be thoroughly permeated by religion.

Though the mature religion thus has an authentic motivational character of its own, and may constitute the mainspring of life, yet it is neither fanatic nor compulsive. Fanaticism is fed by immature urgencies arising from unconscious forces that enter into an uncritical, undifferentiated religion. Rather than admit criticism that would require the painful process of differentiation, such a religion stiffens and fights intolerantly all attempts to broaden it. Compulsive religion defensively rules out disturbing evidence.

The degree of dynamism in the mature religion depends upon how central it is among various psychophysical systems that compose the personality. When religion is a central feature of the personality it keeps its ardor and maintains throughout life an enthusiastic espousal of its objects, and an insatiable thirst for God.

Moral Consistency

The third earmark of mature religion is consistency of its moral reasoning. Mature religion can alter character and make deep changes in the personality. Immature religion lacks the steady, persistent influence of the seasoned religious outlook; it only arises during moral storms, and only sporadically alters conduct.

The relationship between personal religion and morality is admittedly complex. Allport reported a study of college students which found many students outstanding for their sense of decency and consideration for others reported that they felt no need of religion in their lives. While others said that their standards of conduct unsupported by their theological beliefs, would collapse. In a parallel situation during World War II some people expressing high moral standards drifted away from their formal religion. Allport concluded that in both situations moral rectitude was developed in childhood under the steadying influence of family tradition, the discipline imposed by the parents stemming in most cases from their own faith. As adults, they had lost faith that the standards according to which they lived possessed objective validity. Allport states that ethical standards are difficult to sustain without idealism, and idealism is difficult to sustain without a myth of Being.

Allport considers several issues related to faith and social life. He asks the question with respect to democracy itself: "Can democracy sustain its vitality without the wider context of

religion? Does the healthy growth of democracy require metaphysical and religious support?" For many people, the ideals of democracy are related to the religion. For others, this is not the case. He thinks that an increase in war, crime and divorce can be directly traced to decline in religious faith.

Allport states that the way to strengthen religious conviction is to put it into action; religious belief can remain firm only if it leads the individual to act on behalf of the world.

Comprehensiveness

The mature mind demands a comprehensive philosophy of life. Chaos must be brought into some kind of order. It is not only material facts that call for order but also emotions and values. For Allport the effective principle of order is religion.

Allport works with two complementary definitions. William James defines religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual man in their solitude as far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine" (James cited in Allport, 1950, 77). Whitehead defines religion as "the art and theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things" (Whitehead cited in Allport, 1950, 78). Allport addresses some common analogies of religion: humanism, science, communism and the usual list of "isms." Any strongly held beliefs, he states, cannot hold an integrative function completely. Using both definitions he states that for James, secular philosophies would be disqualified because they postulate no divinity; for Whitehead, because they deal only partially with what is permanent in the nature of things.

In either case, the ground covered by any secular interest, however vital, falls short of the range that characterizes a mature religion which deals with matters central to all existence. A cause does not include the whole of a mature individual's horizon. Matters are left over which only religion can absorb.

The demand that one's religion be comprehensive makes for tolerance. One knows that one's life alone does not contain all possible values or all facets of meaning. Other people, too, have their stake in truth. The religion of maturity makes affirmation: "God is," but only religion immaturity will insist: "God is precisely what I say He is." The Hindu Vedas, Allport says, were speaking mature language when they asserted: "Truth is one; men call it by many names."

Integrity

Closely allied to the demand for comprehensiveness is the mature individual's insistence that his religion compose a consistent pattern. Allport says that a modern man brought up in the Judeo-Christian tradition, finds that the theology and ethics of this tradition were written in an era that was pre-scientific and pre-technological. Parables refer to a mode of life remote from his own. Commandments and codes formulated in an age of shepherds and petty kings seem difficult to implement in an age of industry, instant communication and atomic energy. His religion cannot be pre-scientific; nor anti-scientific; it must be co-scientific. It is up to modern man to take the strands of science and bind them with values and purpose. No threads may be rejected, including those that come from psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis. Psychology is particularly important, for to apply the prophetic teaching of past ages to a technical age requires special assistance from the science that deal with personality and human relations. Integrity in religion, according to Allport, requires one to admit the disturbing fact that human conduct, to a large degree, is determined. To

ascribe more free will to man than he possesses destroys the hope for a proper integration of science and religion. On the other hand, Allport states the degree and type of freedom a man has depends in part upon what he believes. If he thinks he is hopelessly bound he will not exert himself, and if he fails to exert himself he will not realize his potential. If, on the contrary, he believes that doors may be opened leading to a fuller realization of values, he will explore, discover, enter. A well-differentiated religion engenders freedom because the possessor finds that though nature and habit may be obstinate, still there are regions where aspirations, effort and prayer are efficacious. A person believing that he is free uses what ability he has more flexibly and successfully than does the person who is convinced that he remains restricted.

An integrated religion must also acknowledge the problem of evil. There are several solutions to the problem. A solution acceptable to one individual may be unacceptable to another, says Allport. One holds that the resolution is to regard God as a finite Being unable to control natural law and man's perversity. Another holds that religion, effectively applied, would eliminate at least the evil and stems from human ignorance and misconduct. Another says that our understanding is inadequate, that what we call evil is a stage in development. However the problem is handled, the suffering of the innocent is for most people the hardest of all facts to integrate into religion. Yet the issue has to be faced and fought through; otherwise, the religion cannot be mature.

Open-endedness

The final attribute of mature religion is its essentially heuristic character. An heuristic belief is one that is held tentatively until it can be confirmed or until it helps us discover a more valid belief. For example, Allport says, the individual fashions his creed and conceives his deity as best as he can. Perhaps he accepts the authority of some revelation. If so, he does it not because he can demonstrate its final validity by events occurring in time and space, but because that which he accepts helps him find better and fuller answers to the questions that perplex him. His faith is his working hypothesis, says Allport. He knows perfectly well that doubt concerning it is still theoretically possible.

It is characteristic of the mature mind that it can act whole-heartedly even without absolute certainty. Probabilities always guide our lives. We are not positive that we shall be alive tomorrow but it is a good hypothesis to proceed on, says Allport. Sometimes the degree of statistical probability can be ascertained; more often, as in the area of religion it cannot. It is not necessary to know the strength of a probability in order to embrace it. Allport quotes Cardinal Newman:

It is faith and love which give to probability a force which it has not in itself. Faith and love are directed toward an object; in the vision of that object they live; it is that object, received in faith and love, which renders it reasonable to take probability as sufficient for internal conviction. (Newman cited in Allport, 1950, 82).

Newman says that though certainty is impossible, the commitment one makes - a fusion of probability, faith and love - engenders sufficient certitude for the guidance of one's life. Such a commitment, even if tentatively held, has important consequences, for all accomplishment results from taking risks in advance of certainties. Only by having expectations of consequences beyond the limits of certainty do we make these consequences more likely to occur. Faith engenders the energy which when applied to the task at hand, enhances the probability of success. The believer knows that he is basically uncertain of his ground but he knows also that optimistic bias and faith

are largely responsible for human accomplishment. The mature believer is often closer to the agnostic, Allport says. Both may concede that the nature of existence cannot be known; but the believer, banking on probability, finds that energy engendered and values conserved prove the superiority of affirmation over indecisiveness.While he knows all the grounds for skepticism, the believer serenely affirms his risk. In doing so, he finds that successive acts of commitment, with their beneficent consequences, slowly strengthens faith and diffuses doubt.

Empirical Development

Allport further developed his distinction between healthy and unhealthy religion in his concept of intrinsic and extrinsic religion (Allport & Ross, 1967). On the healthy-minded side, it is easy to see characteristics of mature religion in his definition of intrinsic religion:

Persons with this orientation find their master motive in religion. Other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as a less ultimate significance, and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that he lives his religion. (Allport, 1967, 434).

Allport's description of extrinsic orientation involves the characteristics of immature religion:

People with extrinsic orientation are disposed to use religion for their own ends. The term is borrowed from axiology, to designate an interest that is held because it serves other than more ultimate interests. Extrinsic values are always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons with this orientation may find religion useful in a variety of ways - to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs. In theological terms the extrinsic type turns to God but without turning away from self. (Allport, 1967, 434)

Perhaps the briefest way to characterize the two poles of subjective religion is to say that the intrinsically motivated person lives by his religion, whereas the extrinsically motivated uses it. Pure types are of course rare; most people fall somewhere in between.

Allport developed a scale to measure intrinsic and extrinsic religion. These two types were originally considered to be ends of a bipolar continuum. But from the beginning of his empirical research he found that situation was more complex. A significant portion of the respondents were "muddleheads who refuse to conform to our neat religious logic" (Allport, 1960, 6). They responded in both intrinsic and extrinsic manner in spite of the fact that Allport had attempted to separate these two types.

Therefore, Allport expanded his original bipolar approach into a fourfold typology: 1) an intrinsically motivated group who agreed only with items reflecting an intrinsic approach to religion; 2) an extrinsically motivated group who agreed only with extrinsic items; 3) an indiscriminately pro-religious group "muddleheads" who agreed with both intrinsic and extrinsic items; and 4) an indiscriminately anti- religious group who agreed with neither.

Two-thirds of Allport's cases could be classified as consistently intrinsic or extrinsic. They supported his initial hypothesis about this distinction. The remaining third of his sample, indiscriminately religious, had obscured the trend.

Allport (1959, 1963, 1966, & 1967) then attempted to relate the intrinsic and extrinsic dimension in religion to prejudice experimentally. He found that:

1. Churchgoers as a group, are more prejudice than non-churchgoers;
2. Among churchgoers, however, the intrinsically oriented are less prejudiced than non-churchgoers;
3. The extrinsically oriented are more prejudiced than nonchurchgoers;
4. The indiscriminately religious are the most prejudiced of all. Furthermore, the more indiscriminate the person, the more prejudiced he is.

Allport explains the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic religion and prejudice. A person whose religion is extrinsic uses it to provide security, comfort, status, or social support for himself. Religion is not a value in its own right; rather, it serves a utilitarian function. Prejudice serves to meet the same needs also in an instrumental way. A person who depends on the support of extrinsic religion is likely to depend on the support of prejudice as well.

Intrinsic religion, however, is not instrumental. It is not a mode of conformity, nor a crutch, nor a tranquilizer, nor a bid for status. Other needs are subordinated to the religious commitment. When someone internalizes the creed of his religion, he also internalizes such values as humility, compassion, and love of neighbor; there is no place left for rejection, contempt, or condescension.

Allport attributes the relationship between prejudice and the indiscriminately pro-religious orientation to a certain cognitive style, "undifferentiated thinking." An "undifferentiated thinker" does not perceive differences. For example, while most people distinguish between Communists and Nazis, the undifferentiated dogmatist has a global reaction, cognitive and emotional, toward "Communazis."

The indiscriminately religious seem to take a superficial approach to religion. He seems to have one wide category "religion is O.K." The same person would agree with all of these contradictory statements: "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life......Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life....Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life....The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships."

The indiscriminately pro-religious person has a distinctive cognitive-emotional style which effects both his approach to religion and attitude toward people. His categories of thought are very wide and he generalizes too freely within them. He uses a single emotional response over far too wide of a category. Thus the same person who agrees with the four mutually contradictory statements above, also fails to distinguish members of a minority group as individuals. Religion as a whole is good; a minority group as a whole is bad. The inconsistently pro-religious have a lower level of formal education than the constantly religious; lack of education is related to the formulation and maintaining of overwide categories.

People with undifferentiated styles of thinking (and feeling) are not entirely secure in a world that demands fine and accurate distinctions. The resulting diffuse anxiety may dispose them to distrust strange ethnic groups.

Both prejudice, and tolerance are deeply embedded in the personality structure and both reflect the cognitive style of the individual. One definable style characterizes the individual who is bigoted in ethnic matters and extrinsic in his religious orientation. A different style characterizes those who are bigoted and at the same time, indiscriminately pro-religious. A third style is found among those who are intrinsically oriented in religious and tolerant in their attitude toward other people.

Further Development

Allport's work on the intrinsic-extrinsic concept was cut short by his death in 1967. Since then, there have been a plethora of studies relating Allport's intrinsic/extrinsic dimension to a wide variety of other variables. It has provided the most widely used and heuristically valuable definition of religion so far. One focus of research has been on the relation between Allport's concept of intrinsic/extrinsic religion and various aspects of mental health, a field reviewed by Masters and Bergin. There have also been two attempts to develop the concepts themselves, one proposed by Hood, and the other by Batson. We will discuss these in turn.

Masters and Bergin (1992) reviewed a number of studies relating intrinsic/extrinsic scales to various mental health indicators. The intrinsically religious were found to be mentally healthier than extrinsics. They had more ego-strength, self-confidence, and emotional self-awareness than the extrinsics; they were more sensitive to the needs of others, more tolerant, and more altruistic; they showed more flexibility of thought, skill in coping, realism, and adaptability; they were more conscientious and expressed more concern for moral standards. Extrinsics, on the other hand, were mentally less healthy; they were more depressed, anxious, obsessive compulsive, and narcissistic; they were more likely to feel insecure and powerless; they were less tolerant and responsible; they had less insight into their feelings and motivations and were given to irrational thought. Masters' and Bergin's review confirms the perception that intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations are an integral part of the total personality.

Masters and Bergin attempted to explain the positive relationship between intrinsic religion and mental health. They concluded that confident commitment to a belief and agreement between beliefs and behaviour leads to positive mental health. They also observed that the studies they reviewed had not considered the content of the beliefs held; this content is unlikely to be a negligible factor. Masters and Bergin,.however, did not ask the "chicken and egg question": Does an intrinsically held religion promote good mental health, or do the mentally healthy spontaneously hold their religion intrinsically?

As if to confirm the analysis of Masters and Bergin, Hood (Ralph & Hood, 1992), investigated the relationship between religion on one hand and self-esteem on the other. When religion was measured globally no relationship was found. However when religion was divided into intrinsic and extrinsic, two distinct patterns emerged. Intrinsic religion correlated with high self-esteem and low sense of guilt, because an intrinsically religious person is able to recognize and relieve guilt. The God image of intrinsic religion is benevolent. Extrinsically religiosity, however, strongly correlated with low-self esteem, high levels of guilt, and a punitive God image.

Hood's (1970; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1978; Hood & Morris, 1981; Morris & Hood, 1981) work was a continuation and conformation of Allport's original bipolar concept. According to Hood's approach, one must accept religion as either part of life (extrinsic) or as the meaning of life (intrinsic). He contends that both the indiscriminates and the nonreligious are experiencing difficulty either in embracing one of these two approaches or in affirming a nonreligious stand

Hood found that the indiscriminately pro-religious were more likely than others to display signs of stress when asked to discuss whether they had had a religious experience, and were often unable to answer. The finding supports Allport's concept and also points toward the practical usefulness of it.

Batson (1976; Batson & Gray. 1981; Batson et al, 1978; Batson & Ventis, 1982) extended Allport's work. Batson called his religious orientation "quest." Batson's concern was that when

Allport moved from his concept of mature religion to his research on intrinsic and extrinsic religion that several major concepts were lost in the transition - complexity, doubt, tentativeness, skepticism towards traditional 'orthodox' religious answers (Batson & Ventis, 1982, 236).

Batson therefore constructed the quest scale, which he presents as an alternative to the intrinsic scale. This scale is designed to measure religious orientation of those who, though:

not necessarily aligned with any formal religious institution or creed...are continually raising ultimate "whys," both about the existing social structure and about the structure of life itself. While it may seem strange to call such an individual religious, there is actually a long history of such a view. (Batson, 1976, 32)

According to Batson, the quest orientation is "an open-ended and questioning" [religion which] "involves honestly facing existential questions in all their complexity, while resisting clear-cut answers" (Batson & Venson, 1982, 150). Batson's quest scale emphasizes doubt (i.e., questions are far more central to my religious experience than the answers), and personal development (i.e., my religious development has emerged out of my growing sense of personal identity).

Most of Batson's research was done with college students. Students normally approach religion with questions and skepticism much as they approach everything else. Furthermore, an examination of the items of the quest scale shows very little conventionally religious content. It was never tested on any group of identifiably religious adults. Although some items would be accepted by a person of mature religious orientation, they would be equally acceptable to iconoclasts who sophomorically and reflexively respond "why" to every answer given. One reviewer call it an agnosticism scale (Donahue, 1985).

Allport's definition of mature religion is a complex integrated system as we discussed above. It is not only tentative but also differentiated, autonomous in its motivational energy, morally consistent, comprehensive, integral. Batson has chosen to discuss one aspect of the whole, isolating it from its rich context. Furthermore, Batson's understanding of doubt is different from Allport's. For Batson, doubt is an intellectual proposition, a question for which there may not be an appropriate answer. For Allport, however, doubt is uncertainty of commitment and is resolved by repeated acts of commitment. Allport then was not the foundation of Batson's work but its provocation.

Nevertheless, Batson's quest concept is an important contribution to psychology of religion. It has raised a central, unaddressed issue in psychology of religion - the necessity for constant spiritual questing and growth. Allport's concept of intrinsic orientation addresses this concern only tangentially. Although questioning is central to such growth, doubt may be an inappropriate label. Batson's quest more likely indicates a phase in the development of a mature/intrinsic religious orientation.

Final Thoughts

For Allport, religion is not a single concept: to know that a person is in some sense religious is not as important as to know the role religion plays in his life.

The person whose religion is intrinsic finds in it a source of life-defining principles which is an end in itself. To measure intrinsic religion, Allport developed a scale which reflects religious commitment rather than religious belief. It is independent of church membership and liberal or conservative theology. Because it avoids doctrinal content and specific definitions of religious

material, it is applicable to any Christian denomination and perhaps even to non-Christian religions.

The extrinsically religious person uses his religion instrumentally: it is a means to obtain psychological or social benefit. Allport says succinctly that the intrinsically motivated person lives by his religion and extrinsically motivated person uses it. The extrinsic scale measures this sort of religion that gives religion a bad name: prejudiced, bigoted, anxiety-ridden, fearful of death, self-centered, and lacking in altruism.

When the distinction is made between intrinsic and extrinsic religion, then religion can be seen in continuity with the personality and entire life.

Allport's great contribution has been a means of conceptualizing religion in a way that explains the experience of religion both within the church and in the context of the whole of society and the total experience of mankind.

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Chapter IV

On Surpassing Artificial Consensus in the Public Sphere: Complementarity of Habermas and Aquinas

Robert P. Badillo

Today, in virtue of a complex web of human, geographic, environmental, economic, political, religious. . . inter-relationships, the peoples of the world are ever more conscious of their mutual interdependence. The emerging realization that no person, culture, community, tribe, nation or group of nations is an "island" finds expression in phrases such as the "human family," the "community of nations," the "global village." Pluralistic societies constituted by a variety of peoples, languages, cultures, religions are generally the norm in economically developed nations. Resulting from this wealth of diversity is a concern for ways of living that foster the dignity of the human person, family and society. Central to this concern is the issue of effective practical discourse based on objective truths so as to guide deliberative bodies, especially legislative and juridical ones, in the task of adjudicating the moral integrity of normative proposals in their endeavor to reach genuine rather than artificial consensus. The term 'artificial' is understood here to mean a consensus achieved within the context of an ethical formalism, i.e., based solely in terms of procedural rules and subjective opinions without regard to the ontological nature of the human person, rooted in and open to the Transcendent, and the rudimentary ethical precepts that follow from this ontological perspective. It in terms of such a perspective in which legislatures and judiciaries, in accord with reason, should conduct their deliberations.

Jürgen Habermas' critical social theory, in part, has explicated processes of communication with the aim of promoting undistorted modes of practical discourse oriented to human emancipation from hypostasized forms of social disequilibria. His discourse ethics, however, proposes to achieve this by means of a formalist conception of practical or normative discourse without reference to a metaphysical grounding in the light of which issues of the true and the good should be examined. Indeed, though his contributions to communication are vast and significant, there is the very real danger in that his proposal, involving a generic ethical formalism, in the absence of ontological considerations, may lead to nothing more than adjudications of what is conceived to be the social good in terms of artificial compromises. This is to say that the agreement achieved at the end of such a discourse may involve flagrant violations to the dignity of the human person, as already, for instance, evidenced in the decision of international bodies to control population growth in economically deprived regions of the world by means of birth control methods, including the practice of abortion and sterilization.

Notwithstanding, Habermas' critical theory, as will be examined within the context of this paper, provides a telling analysis of the human being as emancipative and as communicative. For Habermas, whereas the aim of life is a dynamic tendency toward the realization of emancipation from social disequilibria, the means or method for its realization is critical communication. This paper would like to propose that Habermas' contributions be considered from the perspective of Aquinas' metaphysical horizon. When this is done a wonderful complementarity ensues between their respective orientations. On the one hand, Habermas' understanding of the human being as emancipative and communicative may be taken as amplifying, within a Thomistic metaphysical framework, the comprehension of esse, i.e., of the act of to be or the act of existence, specifically in terms of the latter's teaching on the relative transcendentals. Indeed for Thomistic metaphysics

the incorporation of the notions of emancipation and communication within the context of the relative transcendentals signifies a new optic from which to view not only the human person but also the Absolute Subject, i.e., less in terms of First Mover, Uncaused Cause, Necessary Existence, and more in terms of predicates such as personal, dialogical, communitary, and complementary. On the other hand, to connect Habermas' stated understanding within the context of Thomistic metaphysics provides his ethical formalism with an ontological grounding from which fundamental precepts may be derived that safeguard the inviolability of human life, marriage, family, and the social community, values that nowadays can no longer be considered as an inevitable given. In this respect Habermas' analysis of the human being as emancipative and communicative enriches Thomistic metaphysics while it itself is enriched by going beyond the not-altogether innocuous limitations of its formalist compass.

This study1 will first consider the master lines of Habermas' critical model, i.e., a consideration of the human being as emancipative and then as communicative. This involves an examination of the formalist rules of his discourse ethics by which one tends toward emancipation from social ills, and an explicit disclosure of the limitations of the same. The move will then be made to incorporate Habermas' view of the human being as emancipative and communicative within the context of Aquinas' teaching on the relative transcendentals, that, in turn, furnishes a non-formalist ethical context for practical discourse.

Habermas' Critical Model and Formalist Character of Discourse Ethics

Habermas' critical model may be understood, on the one hand, as articulating an overall orientation of the human being as emancipative, and, on the other, as providing the means for its achievement, viz., a communicative analysis of human discourse with its critical apparatus for adjudicating normative claims within the context of his discourse ethics. This section will summarize Habermas' critical model and then proceed to indicate significant shortcomings of his formalist discourse ethics.

The emancipative dimension of the human being is brought out by Habermas in his theory of human interests. The significance of his analysis of the empirical-analytic sciences consists in disclosing that, contrary to commonly held views, these sciences do not represent a purely formal and hence value-neutral enterprise, but rather operate as a function of a *technical interest* in securing technical mastery over nature.2 This is to operate in terms of a value. Prior, then, to scientific theorizing, there exists a pretheoretical/metatheoretical realm of discourse constituting the linguistic framework which orients the course of scientific investigations in one direction rather than another.3 Once Habermas manages to disengage the technical interest animating nomological science, he argues that the methodology for understanding this metatheoretical dimension of scientific practice, concerned with human interaction and language, cannot be framed within the strictures of empirical-analytic science. The reason is that "*communicative action* is a system that cannot be reduced to the framework of *instrumental action*":4 whereas the latter is concerned with control of external conditions in terms of causally determined relations, the former is directed toward communication in terms of reaching intersubjective understanding.

Habermas, at this point, moves to the historical-hermeneutic sciences whose object consists in elucidating the symbolically structured reality of the social world. Yet, Habermas argues, the hermeneutical aim in understanding texts (persons, cultures, traditions), like that of nomological science, does not consist in a purely value-neutral endeavor, but discloses a *practical interest* in creating, maintaining and promoting effective communication on which human relations depend.

Yet hermeneutics cannot claim a role other than that of clarifying texts by translating/paraphrasing unclear meaning or determining logical consistency, etc. Hence it is unable to distinguish between what characterizes genuine consensus from ideological distortion. At this juncture, Habermas argues for a "depth" or critical hermeneutics.

This capacity to uncover hypostasized disequilibria embedded in communicative structures exhibits an impressive human tendency to live "both actively and reactively, critically and creatively,"5 i.e., in terms of an *emancipatory interest* that endeavors "to restore to men and women a true awareness of their position in history?"6 The role of this emancipatory tendency consists in animating critical cognition in its capacity to unveil the "dogmatic character of both a worldview and a form of life,"7 i.e., to determine "when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed."8 The aim of the emancipatory interest via critical reflection then is the attainment of a state of inner/social transparency as expressed in the words of the Delphic maxim imparted to Socrates: "*Know thyself.*"

This said, for Habermas, the way to achieve emancipation from social disequilibria within the context of normative discourse involves respecting the formalist rules of his discourse ethics. His ethics provide "a form of constrained indeterminateness,"9 which purportedly counters the charge of normative vacuity, i.e., the claim that such an ethics is without objective or material principles for the determination of what is just/right/proper versus unjust/wrong/improper human action in concrete situations. This section will first consider the nature of the constraints of this discursive ethics and then move on to assess its effectiveness as an ethical theory.

Habermas derives two ethical constraints from the structure of communicative discourse, i.e., from the immanent speech-act obligation of reciprocity. The first is that of *reciprocal obligation*, i.e., the obligation upon speakers to justify rationally, if challenged, the claims implicitly or explicitly raised in their speech-act interactions. The pragmatic relationship that the speaker intends to establish with another depends on whether the performative component meets or fails to meet the hearer's expectations. In the event that the speaker fails to meet such expectations, he can satisfy a challenge only by indicating relevant norms or by clarifying misunderstanding. A speaker can therefore rationally motivate a hearer to accept an offer because it is expected that a speaker be prepared to redeem his claim if need be. Thus, for Habermas, it is not possible for a noncognitivist to relinquish this obligation to provide grounds without "throwing his rationality radically into doubt."10

A second constraint, *extension of applicability of a rule*, consists in the reciprocity entailed between dialogical partners such that whoever makes a normative proposal to another must not only provide grounds for his offer, but must also be willing to extend the applicability of the proposed norm so as to include himself. If the relationship between the speaker and hearer involves unequal roles, such as that of an employer and an employee, whatever norms the employer issues to his subordinate must be the same norms that the employer would be willing to apply to himself consistently if the roles between the two were reversed.

This said, the question becomes how one can distinguish between the relative defensibility of a normative proposal as more or less meriting discursive consent. The obligation to offer reasons for normative proposals leads to a consideration of the formal instrument—*the ideal speech situation*, i.e., the unavoidable, pragmatic conditions of argumentation or public discourse. The ideal speech situation serves to indicate still another category of constraint operative in discursive communication, which Habermas understands as the normative core of the modern idea of argumentation which makes "moral insight possible."11

The *participation rule*, the first condition of the ideal speech situation, requires that any subject capable of speech and action be permitted to take part in discourses. The aim of this condition is that all potential voices be heard so as to establish an openness in which all viewpoints have an equal chance for being represented. Indeed, this rule promotes a view of the participants in deliberation as equal dialogical partners, which would ideally set aside, for instance, an individual's name and background when such considerations would deter discourse from anything other than the force of the better argument, the root notion of Habermasian argumentative vindication. The *symmetry rule*, the second condition, requires that all dialogical participants have the same opportunity to initiate and sustain dialogue by proposing claims and counterclaims, asking questions and providing answers. Whereas the participation rule incorporates all potential voices, the symmetry rule provides the participants with an equality of chances to engage in discourse such that no one participant comes to overwhelm the discussion in favor of his proposal at the expense of other views. Finally, the third condition, the *freedom of discussion rule*, demands that discussion advance free from all external and internal influences such that the conclusion may be viewed as proceeding from no motive other than a cooperative search for truth. Hence, not only may all potential dialogue partners engage in discourse and have an equal right to apply speech-act motions, but they are, in addition, expected to participate in the process free from all known internal and external forces that may somehow vitiate the outcome of the discourse. The ideal here is that each participant in dialogue attempt to place himself in the other person's "shoes," and vice versa, for the moral insight and empathy that may thus be achieved in a collective pursuit of norms acceptable from all viewpoints.12

Thus as the participants enter discourse with the aim of determining the validity of a proposed or problematicized claim, they are, according to the formal rules of the ideal speech situation, expected to "render inoperative all motives other than that of a cooperative readiness to come to an understanding."13 The justifiability of practical norms and institutions supposedly can be attained by approximating the conditions of the ideal speech situation. This is to say, that for Habermas, it is when the human person complies with the exigencies of his dialogical, personal and communitary nature that emancipation is approached.

The standpoint of a participant in moral argumentation is one of distance from the "unproblematic cultural givens" deriving from the cognitive, moral or expressive content that shape one's lifeworld. "Under this gaze the store of traditional norms has disintegrated into those norms that can be justified in terms of principles and those that operate only de facto."14 Discourse ethics does not depend on content brought from the inside, as it were, but from content that is brought from the outside. The procedure of discourse ethics then is formal not in the sense that it abstracts from content but insofar as it limits itself to consider the "validity" rather than the "morality" of an existing or proposed norm of action.15 Moreover, Habermas maintains that the actual institution of practical discourse from one culture to another may yield different conceptions of "need interpretations." This amounts to a recognition of cultural variability wherein what one culture identifies as justified needs may not be what another culture may consider as needs.16 Further, there is no guarantee that entering discourse a problematicized or newly proposed norm will be vindicated. Habermas admits that "Particular interests are those that prove on the basis of discursive testing not to be susceptible of generalization and thus to require compromise."17 Though compromises can be put to task via the constraints of practical discourse, they fail to provide "a precise formula or method for unambiguously separating legitimate from illegitimate compromise."18

Stephen White is quick to add that beyond a limited number of interests the determination of generalizable interests does not present itself as an altogether facile endeavor:

. . . when one tries to justify a normative claim, one is obligated to show that the interests underlying it are generalizable rather than merely particular. In some cases this demonstration and an ensuing agreement might come easily. For example, traffic rules and laws against murder can be seen as resting on generalizable interests in the safety and sanctity of persons. But of course most questions in ethics and politics are not so amenable to simple solution. . . . At this point, however, the only thing which it is necessary to emphasize is that the result of such discursive reflection on needs is not necessarily any consensus (much less any revelation about "genuine" human needs).19

These limitations provide a suitable context for considering the issue of the adequacy of the formalism affecting this ethics. On the one hand, Habermas postulates the possibility that a society consisting of free and equal constituents may attain a stage of transparent critical-reflection in which "mythological, cosmological, religious and ontological modes of thought have been superseded and 'rational will-formation' can be achieved, free of dogmas and 'ultimate groundings', through ideal mutual self-understanding."20 On the other hand, it appears that discourse ethics fails to achieve much more than a "partial penetration of a thoroughgoing pluralism."21 This view is supported by Stephen Lukes who considers doubtful that those engaged in practical discourse will be capable of attaining the needed self-transparency for undistorted communication, meaning that the participants will continue to exhibit "prejudices, limitations of vision and imagination, deference to authority, fears, vanities, self-doubts, and so on."22 Lukes is therefore inclined to conclude that Habermas' discourse ethics fails to overcome decisionism.

Yet it does not merely appear to be a question of whether or not those engaged in normative discourse will allow their "actions and choices" to be oriented "only by maxims and norms which pass the test in question." Though not explicitly considered by Lukes, the more poignant and fundamental issue has to do with the question: as a function of what is practical discourse itself to proceed? This is to say that before the question of whether or not the dialogical participants will orient their decisions in terms of the formal principles of practical discourse, the question becomes in terms of what are these principles themselves placed. Habermas proposes that the relevant evidence for the justifiability of a norm is purportedly the consequences and side-effects that its application may have.

The backing that is required here is not (or is not merely) that type of observational and experimental evidence used (inductively) to support hypothetical general laws. The relevant evidence is first and foremost the consequences and side-effects that the application of a proposed norm can be expected to have in regard to the satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of generally accepted needs and wants.23

But can the "consequences and side-effects that the application of a proposed norm can be expected to have" serve as a sufficient condition for the justifiability of that norm? Surely there may be social practices that though they may appear to have no obvious adverse consequences and side-effects may still be ethically reprehensible. For instance, abortion, which is virtually practiced on demand in many economically advanced countries, may appear to have *prima facie* no adverse consequences or side-effects. On the contrary, the disposal of unwanted offspring may appear to have enormous beneficial social consequences and side-effects. By means of a clinical procedure,

it removes the responsibility from the biological parents, their families and the state of having to nurture and cultivate the life and well-being of an immensely complex and demanding enterprise which invariably extracts untold dedication and unbounded sacrifice: a human life. Yet, it may be countered that from Habermas' ethical proposal one may derive the requisite principles of *justice* and *solidarity* such that these may appear to invalidate categorically any social practices such as abortion.

However, Habermas' commitment, in principle, to a formalistic ethics rejects developing a minimal core of concrete moral principles that would, for example, safeguard the rights of the unborn. This opens the possibility that for any number of ulterior motives those persons participating in discourse may determine that the principles of justice and solidarity apply only to those human beings who have survived the maternal womb. The very nature of practical discourse wherein all potential participants have a right to partake in the process of testing proposed norms is such that it will invariably entail divisive debate on such fundamental issues as the rights of the unborn where the only outcome that can possibly be expected is one of compromise.24 Yet how does one compromise the right to life, whether of the born or of the unborn? It is not at all clear then that the formalism that permeates Habermas' discourse ethics with its notion of evidence in terms of the consequences and side-effects of the application of proposed norms can serve as a sufficient condition for the testing of proposed norms of action.

For White, "At the core . . . of communicative ethics is the image of open conversation, that is, a conversation in which one is obliged to listen to other voices."25 Discourse ethics, as it argued, should be understood but "as the continuation of ordinary moral conversations in which we seek to come to terms with and appreciate the other's point of view."26 Yet, it has also been argued that conversation itself needs to be constrained ". . . by the ordinary constraints of everyday life: the pressure of time, the structure of authority, the discipline of parties and movements, the patterns of socialization and education, the established forms of institutional life. Without any constraints at all, conversation would never produce even those conventional (and temporary) stops which we call decisions or verdicts."27

Yet, again, it is still not clear in terms of what the participants of the discourse would ultimately base their normative proposals. One voice in the discussion, Joel Whitebook, would answer the question in these terms: ". . . we cannot defend the project of modernity—which must be defended—at the price of sacrificing the naturalistic tradition that runs through the young Marx and Freud to the early Frankfurt School."28 Another voice in the discussion, this time Habermas, agrees with Whitebook on how to reply to this crucial question:

Over and over again, the necessary conditions for a "good life" are carelessly and arbitrarily violated. It is from this experience that the tradition of thought that unites Marx and Freud draws its inspiration. I am in full agreement with Whitebook in my desire not to give up this form of materialism.29

The materialism here refers to that developed by Western—versus Orthodox—Marxists, as represented by the Frankfurt School. Within this tradition, materialism is not understood as affirming the ultimate reduction of all reality to the movement of elementary physical particles. It signifies an overt concern with the concrete material conditions of life in contradistinction to the purely notional, abstract and idealistic metaphysical speculations of, say, the Hegelian system.30

Given the formalist dimension of Habermas' discourse ethics, he ultimately places or at least suggests that society be understood in terms of a materialist understanding of society. It is safe to

assume that this self-understanding becomes with the passing of time, the paradigm as a function of which the consequences and side-effects of the application of proposed practices are ultimately to be interpreted. It appears that there would be a great possibility that within this worldview the "sanctity" of the person would suffer profound degradation; indeed, the protection of the life of the unborn in economically advanced, democratic societies has already become a categorically deniable—versus inalienable—right. Currently, in the United States the issue of abortion appears to be determined as a function of the party affiliation of the Supreme Court justices. In this respect, notwithstanding possible exceptions, if one has a predominately "conservative" Republican bench, abortion is understood as a violation of the First Amendment right to life; however, if one has a largely "liberal" Democratic bench, abortion is understood as compatible with the First Amendment right to life.

Given that Habermas appeals to a certain worldview as a function of which society is to understand itself, it appears that he not only compromises the formalism that his ethical theory so adamantly, in principle, proposed, but that he also implies that the determination of moral norms demands moving beyond the formalism and into a certain understanding of human society from which one can make ethical determinations.31 Ethical systems then that attempt to articulate practical norms in terms of formal principles and rules are subject in discourse to the worldviews to which those engaged in the discursive process ultimately subscribe.

This paper will now read Habermas' critical model from another optic, viz., that of Thomistic metaphysics.

Complementarity and Contribution of Habermas' Critical Model to Aquinas' Metaphysics

If one turns to the metaphysical system of Thomas Aquinas, there does not appear to be a developed sense of *esse* as *emancipative* and *communicative*. This section then will consider whether Habermas' philosophical notions of emancipation and communication represent a further development of the notion of being as *esse* (as existing). Said another way, the aim here will be to determine whether one may view Habermas' critical model not merely within the purview of a philosophical anthropology, but as indicating an understanding of the human person signifying a clarification and extension of the notion of *esse*. This will involve (1) articulating the criteria of transcendentality, i.e., the metaphysical basis for ascertaining which notions may or may not be metaphysically predicated as properties of *esse*32 ; and (2) applying the criteria of transcendentality to two central Habermasian categories: the emancipatory interest and communication in terms of the ideal speech situation.

The Criteria of Transcendentality

The criteria of transcendentality33 refer to the test that may be employed in determining which terms may be predicated of being as *esse*, deriving from the density of signification of *esse* insofar as it cannot be expressed adequately by any one term. Further scrutiny is thereby needed in order to explicate the intelligible values and implications of *esse*, "each of which 'is the being itself apprehended under a particular aspect'."34 Transcendentals reflect predicates of a metaphysical judgment in which the subject of the same is *esse* while the predicate names represent further explications into the character of the act of to be. Thus the transcendentals, one, true, and good, follow from the act of to be as immediate implications of the notion of *esse* (*unum,*

verum, bonum sequitur esse); they do not add to *esse* but serve to increase our comprehension of the act of to be.35

This said, the criteria of transcendentality involve two requirements. The first aspect of the criterion concerns the question of whether the proposed notions imply limitation to matter and motion, whether they are higher than generic concepts, and whether they are fundamentally analogical.36 The negative judgment of separation serves then to indicate those notions that can exist apart from or that never have existed in matter. The second criterion, however, demands that the proposed notion be predicated analogously of both relative existents and the Absolute Subject. This can be done by considering the problem of convertibility, i.e., whether transcendental predicates have to be said analogously of each and every being without exception. If a proposed predicate meets both aspects of the criteria, viz., that it be analogical and predicable of both limited and the Absolute Subject, then it merits recognition as a transcendental property. This means that although all genuinely transcendental predicates must be said of the Absolute Subject as their source, there may nonetheless be transcendental predicates that may be said of each and every relative existent insofar as it participates in the act of to be and other predicates that may be said solely of some—not all—relative existents. "If a notion could be predicated analogously of the Absolute Subject and some relative existents, the notion would be adequately transcendental."37 This is the basis for the distinction between absolute and relative transcendentals. The former, which include transcendentals such as one, true, good, are wholly convertible with the notion of being as *esse*. The latter, which include such transcendentals as intellect, will, and justice, are not convertible with the whole range of being and may be predicated only of beings capable of cognition, i.e., intelligent being.

Now although the foregoing resolves the question of the extensionality of transcendental predicates, a parallel clarification of the nature of the intentionality of such predicates is needed. The issue here is one of rendering more explicit the character of the intention that is predicated according to an analogy of intrinsic attribution with the distinct end in view of averting the charge of anthropomorphism. This is accomplished via the intellectual method "by which the *res significate* of some thing is seen to be distinguished from the *modus significando*."38 The *ressignificata* is another way of saying that which is signified by a genuinely transcendental predicate, i.e., a notion that not implying any relation to potency, is such that it designates a perfection absolutely and simply. Given that only such intentional significations may be affirmed of the Absolute Subject, the predicates refer to those that would especially be said according to an analogy of intrinsic attribution, wherein the perfections are said on the basis of a relation of likeness between relative existents as effects and the Absolute Subject as cause. Accordingly, what is called wisdom or goodness in limited intellectual beings preexists in the Absolute Subject in an eminent way. The *modus significando*, on the other hand, refers to the mode of signifying predicates which transpires within the context of non-metaphysical predication, i.e., an eminently univocal mode of predicating as would occur before the significance of metaphysical analogy, especially intrinsic attribution, is countenanced. Non-analogical predicates univocally predicated of relative existents would be entirely unsuitable for metaphysical predication of relative existents and the Absolute Subject.39 Moreover, this criterion of transcendentality which has been formulated ultimately in terms of the intellectual method proper to metaphysics is able to provide the metaphysician with the means by which he may ascertain whether or not notions or names other than the one, the true, the good and the beautiful are transcendentals.40

Such an application of these criteria will follow insofar as two central notions in Habermas' model is concerned: the emancipatory interest and communication as a function of the ideal speech situation.

Application of the Criteria of Transcendentality to Habermas' Categories of Emancipation and Communication

The question of the transcendentality of the emancipatory interest is resolved by determining whether it, like the other transcendentals, implies no materiality. Indeed Habermas' theory of human interests provides a basis for a real distinction between an order of *material objects* that, as known in terms of the hypothetico-deductive methodology of the empirical-analytic sciences, are governed by invariant physical laws, and a realm of *communicating subjects* whose distinguishing characteristic consists precisely in their not being fixed to invariant symbolic schemata when interpreted in terms of the emancipatory interest. For sure the emancipatory interest, as a function of consciousness, critical reflection and critical autonomy, emerges as a correction of that which may be obtained by the other two interests working independently of this third unifying interest, concerned not so much with whether needs are being met but, rather, with the more critical question of whether these are being met justly.

Indeed, for Habermas, the thrust of the emancipatory interest toward a form of life in terms of justice resides as a constitutive *telos* in the structure of human communication. This teleonomic thrust propels the volitional faculty, as aided by the cognitive one. in the direction of the actuation of a form of life as a function of justice. Although the *modus significando* of the emancipatory interest, as the vital thrust of *esse*, is understood, within the purview of philosophical anthropology or social philosophy in terms of a continuous "developmental and formative process,"41 as manifested within the context of limited communicating subjects in which it is imperfectly realized, the notion of itself, related to cognition and volition, implies no such limitation. What the emancipatory interest signifies in accordance to its *res significata* is the dynamic thrust of *esse* toward the integration and realization of what is in accordance to nature; the plenitude of this actuation is found in the Absolute Subject, whose nature is precisely the unmitigated consummation of the just life. Thus, the predicate *esse* as emancipative with relative extension may be predicated analogously of limited intelligent subjects and the Absolute Subject.

Now, in applying the criteria to a second Habermasian notion, it should be recalled that the centrality of Habermas' theory of communication in terms of the ideal speech situation was developed in the process of accounting for a speaker's ability to bring about an interpersonal engagement with a hearer such that "the hearer can rely on him."42 The sufficient condition capable of accounting for the binding force of such exchanges is grounded in the notion of rational validity claims (comprehensibility, truth, rightness, sincerity) that although typically implicit are raised and mutually recognized in speech acts (communicatives, constatives, regulatives, avowals, respectively). Yet, the inability to vindicate ethical proposals required moving into the level of discourse where participants suspend all action constraints in order to thematize and thereby question norms, values, ideologies, belief systems naively-assumed in everyday speech engagements.43 Moreover, for the conclusion of the discourse to represent genuine rational consensus it must be constraint-free, i.e., based on no other motive other than the unforced force of the better argument, which consists in meeting the three criteria of the ideal speech situation. Yet, if the formal conditions of the ideal speech situation serve as a North Star orienting the vindication of discursive argumentation, in what may one ask are these conditions based? The

answer to this question will provide the basis for resolving the question concerning the transcendentality of Habermas' notion of communication in view of the ideal speech situation.

The centrality and the difficulty of situating the notion of the ideal speech situation within Habermas' theory of communication is indicated by John Thompson who presents a fairly impressive inventory of possible "referents" for the ideal speech situation. According to Thompson the ideal speech situation does not meet the requirements of a Kantian regulative idea given that such ideas of reason serve to regulate thought and action, whereas the ideal speech situation is "anticipated in every act of linguistic communication," i.e., that speech oriented to understanding serves as the basic mode of communicative action from which others, such as strategic action, are derived. Nor is the ideal speech situation a Hegelian concept given that there is no existing society that embodies the ideal form of life fulfilling the formal conditions of discourse. But neither can the ideal speech situation be identified with a mental construction inferred from experience, an empirical phenomena nor any arbitrary scheme. And what does it mean, then, to say that the ideal speech situation consists in an unavoidable presupposition of discourse?44

Thomas McCarthy asks what does it mean to say that rational consensus and the notion of truth depend on "pure communicative interaction," understood as unlimited discourse conducted free from distorting influences whether in the form of open domination, conscious strategic behavior or self-deception?45 Pure communicative exchange is a form of interaction that requires freedom for the actors to engage in discourse and justice so that their engagement will proceed humanely. In other words, the requirement for participation in pure communicative interaction, as stipulated by the ideal speech situation, is a mode of *esse* in accordance to the good and true life.

Now, although the ideal realization of this form of life as understood *modus significando* is usually and typically counterfactual, nonetheless it is supposed in the very act of entering into discourse with the hope of reaching rational consensus, such that a violation of any of the formal rules of discourse radically throws the rationality of the consensus into doubt.46 Moreover, if the ideal speech situation functions as a guidance model, in a somewhat Platonic sense, of undistorted communication in terms of which claims to truth and rightness are considered, and if it does not appear to be either a Kantian idea, Hegelian concept, a mental construct, or an empirical phenomena, and yet it demands a certain form of ideal life in order that its application may proceed genuinely, it might be useful to consider the communicative model as consisting not in an uninstantiated formalism but as actually realized in the Absolute Subject. The *res significata* of communication understood in terms of the ideal speech situation evokes the very paradigm of undistorted consciousness and as such implies no materiality, although it is only imperfectly realized in human discourse. Thus, the notion of ideal communication, i.e., *esse* as communicative with relative extension may also be predicated analogously of intelligent limited existents and the Absolute Subject.

The Absolute Transcendentals

This section will further explicate the complementary relations that may be developed between Habermas' emancipatory/communicative model and Thomistic metaphysics. This task will be accomplished in three parts: (1) a statement of the three absolute transcendental properties of *esse*, viz., unity, truth, and goodness; (2) the integration of the property of *goodness* with the notion of *esse* as *emancipative*, and the property of *truth* with the notion of *esse* as *communicative*; and (3) a consideration of the problem that arises when comparing the transcendental property of

unity in terms of the classical monological framework and Habermas' dialogical framework. This will be followed by some implications of this integration on the Christian worldview.

According to the classical position on the transcendentals, once the subject of metaphysics is intellectually grasped via the negative judgment of separation, the term—being as *esse*—does not of itself either explicate nor eliminate the modes of perfection contained therein, which may be understood as the properties that immediately flow from the subject. The transcendentals that reflect these modes of perfection are not the product of either apriori/deductive or aposteriori/inductive procedures, but, rather, reflect further intuitions, i.e., immediate insights, into the character of being as *esse*, where the intellect recognizes that essence, as signifying the nature of a thing, is distinct from the act of to be through which a given nature enjoys, as it were, existential integrity. With this realization are added other immediate intuitions, such that the truth and goodness of *esse* is not its essence properly speaking, since this implies limitation, i.e., potential existence, but specifically refers to the act of existence from which other intuitions follow "common to all being."47 Such absolute predicates conserve the same metaphysical formality characteristic of being as *esse* insofar as the non-generic signification of their intention may only be predicated analogously of all relative existents and the Absolute Subject. Further, the transcendentals are not to be comprehended as constituting really distinct elements constitutive of the act of to be but, instead, as logically distinct notional properties that afford an opportunity for deepening one's comprehension of *esse*. Each succeeding transcendental, however, is understood as including the meaning of the one which precedes it while making explicit something additional, such that the property *verum* includes a comprehension of *unum* and that of *bonum* includes the signification of both *unum* and *verum*. This said, what follows will delineate the nature of these predicates in terms of "the intimate connection between the intellectual intuition of being, the transcendentals, and the first principles."48

For Aquinas, once the disengagement of the subject of Thomistic metaphysics—being as *esse*—is achieved from any connotation of materiality, the first insight that such a formulation yields is that being "is-one," *est-unum*, where this first absolute transcendental predicate is understood as consisting in a greater explicitation of *esse*. The term 'one' here refers to the existential indivisibility of an existent such that every being, to the extent that it exists, is one or undivided,49 meaning that every existent is distinct from every other being,50 or, similarly, "a being is an essence exercising the act of to be."51 Moreover, the formulation every being, to the extent that it exists, is one or undivided expresses an analogous relationship predicated of limited existents in accordance to the degree of its participation in esse, and of the Absolute Subject, as *maxima unitas*, in a limitless way.52 Moreover, the transcendental property *unum* provides, for Aquinas, the basis for the principle of identity—being is—understood as the principle of metaphysical wholeness or existential integrity.53 To say that the oneness of being follows its act of to be is "an expressed admission that each existent which is essentially one reveals itself as uniquely individual."54

In the case of the second absolute transcendental predicate, the predicate term "is-true," *est-verum*, as a more lucid explicitation of esse, indicates that every being, to the extent that it exists, is true.55 Whereas the predicate *unum* refers to the relation of the notion of being itself in reference to the existential integrity of *esse*, the predicate *verum* refers to the intellect's ability to know and represent being intentionally, an ability understood as exhibiting the intelligible character of being as *esse*. Truth in a primary sense refers to the notion that all relative existents to the extent that these depend on another for their existence must conform to the representation that the Absolute Subject has of these as their source in its intellect,56 as well as to "the possibility of

conformity of being with the human intellect provided that the latter has first conformed itself to being."57 Further, the formulation every being, to the extent that it exists, is true expresses an analogous relationship predicated of limited existents in accordance to the degree of its participation in *esse*, and of the Absolute Subject, as *maxima veritas*, in a limitless way.58 From the transcendental predicate *verum* an additional principle follows: the principle of intelligibility, which expresses the view that reality as known metaphysically is not refractory to the intellect.59

With respect to the third absolute transcendental, the predicate term "is-good," *est-bonum*, as a further explicitation of *esse*, indicates that every being, to the extent that it exists, is good. In a metaphysical sense the predicate *bonum* expresses a judgment concerning the excellence of *esse* understood as the actuality or the perfection of being:60 "Whence just as it is impossible that there be some being which does not have a to be, so it is necessary that every being be good from this that it has a to be. . ."61 The intelligible nature of being as *bonum* indicates that relative existents has a natural appetency toward the attainment of that good which represents the realization of its nature. The Absolute Subject as the plenitude of existence does not have an end other than the limitless exercise of its *esse*,62 while constituting itself as the s*ummum bonum* of relative existents. Moreover, the formulation every being, to the extent that it exists, is good, i.e., acts on account of an end, expresses an analogous relationship predicated of limited existents in accordance to the degree of its participation in *esse*, and the Absolute Subject, as s*ummum bonum*, in a limitless way. The authentic aim of relative existents cannot only be known in terms of their natural tendencies and inclinations but also by reference to the will and providence of the Absolute Subject understood as a personal God. In the case of the human subject the highest good/end, corresponding to its most profound and deepest longings, does not merely consist in a philosophical contemplation of reality but in the beatific vision of God.

Now that the absolute transcendentals have been considered, what follows will endeavor to integrate these transcendentals with Habermas' relative transcendentals, i.e., the transcendental property of goodness with the notion of *esse* as emancipative and the transcendental property of truth with the notion of *esse* as communicative.

The Absolute Transcendentals and Habermas' Relative Transcendentals

The relationship that obtains when considering the absolute transcendental property of goodness and Habermas' relative transcendental property of emancipation consists in that whereas the former, as understood particularly in reference to relative existents, articulates the universal metaphysical property whereby all relative existents are good as a result of both their participation in the act of *esse* and their tendential inclination toward the fulfillment of that which realizes their nature, the latter may be understood as expressing that mode of goodness as it refers specifically to intellectual beings. This is to say that Habermas' notion of an emancipatory interest encompasses the expression of the tendential notion of goodness understood as the teleonomic thrust present in intellectual beings on behalf of the fulfillment of the *ratio essendi* that is proper to their nature. Such an emancipatory thrust, predicated analogously, would further be understood as absolutely realized in the case of the Absolute Subject and as relatively realized in the case of limited intellectual beings. In this respect the emancipatory dimension of intellectual being is such that although it is synonymous with the absolute transcendental property of goodness as tendency, nonetheless it is characterized as relative in the sense that it refers solely to that distinctive mode of teleonomic drive proper to or restricted to intellectual being. The signification of this perfective tendency then is synonymous with that mode of goodness appropriate to intellectual being such

that by means of the notion of *esse* as emancipative the notion of goodness as it specifically refers to intellectual being is notably clarified and amplified.

The primacy of the emancipatory interest, as regards the technical and practical interest, then emerges as a concern with living life more fully. In the case of the technical interest, whereas this interest evokes a concern with mastery over natural processes, the emancipatory interest surfaces as a concern with procuring that such mastery proceeds within the parameters of a critical comprehension of the interdependence that exists between the material environment and the human community. In this respect, the emancipatory interest fosters a conception of the material world that emphasizes "more reverence or respectfulness,"63 i.e., the development of attitudes and institutions aimed at correcting practices responsible for various patterns of local and global conditions adversely affecting the balance of nature in the form of environmental pollution, species extinction, destruction of the ozone layer, including abuses such as the improper disposal of hazardous waste materials.

In the case of the practical interest, whereas this interest evokes a concern with elucidating and coordinating the communicative structures of the social lifeworld, the emancipatory interest emerges as a concern with whether such linguistic structures "express ideologically frozen relations of dependence." The greater "reverence and respectfulness" fostered at this level by the emancipatory interest would manifest itself then in a profound regard for the dignity of the human person and community expressing itself in all manner of effort to relieve human suffering and to promote a more humane lifeworld by dealing with issues of poverty, health, homelessness, drug addiction, abortion, economic injustice, peace concerns, including eradication of armaments of mass destruction.

Conversely, however, the notion of *esse* as emancipative is itself deeply enriched when considered in light of the classical metaphysical model which views the very existence of relative existents as an expression of the goodness of the Absolute Subject. The importance of this assertion cannot be sufficiently stressed for it essentially represents a move beyond Habermas' restriction of reality to the realms of material objects and that of communicating subjects in the direction of a conception of reality which openly acknowledges the foundational relevance of the Absolute Subject. No longer is the emancipatory interest limited, once considered from the optic of metaphysics, to securing an "enlightened" sense of justice, be it economic, political and/or cultural; but, rather, it expresses a concern with an ontological form of justice in securing that end which is congruent with intellectual being. Indeed, whereas Habermas' emancipatory interest serves to specify the tendential character of the property of goodness as it refers to intellectual being, Thomistic metaphysics serves to clarify notably the very end toward which the emancipatory thrust is ultimately directed, viz., the direct participation on behalf of intellectual being in the divine life of the s*ummum bonum*.

However, one issue that directly relates to the question of goodness as a transcendental property of *esse* is the reality of evil. In Aquinas's metaphysical model the presence of evil may be understood as corresponding in Habermas' communicative model to the presence of hypostasized disequilibria. As privations of the transcendental good, the avoidance, identification and correction of all that interferes with the promotion of the dignity of the human subject and community necessitates a critical instrument which endeavors to foster the conscious promotion of all that is in accord with the nature of intellectual being while deliberately rectifying whatever is found to be not in accord with such a nature. Such an instrument and other implications of this transcendental interpretation of Habermas' notion of emancipation will be progressively clarified in the following consideration of *esse* as truth and as communicative.

This study will further suggest that the relationship that obtains when considering the absolute transcendental property of truth and Habermas' relative property of communication consists in that whereas the former, as understood particularly in reference to relative existents, articulates the universal metaphysical property whereby all relative existents are true as a result of both their participation in the act of *esse* and their intelligible nature, the latter may be understood as specifying the constitutive openness of intellectual being toward truth as a function of the ideal speech situation. This is to say that while the unique relationship of intellectual being insofar as reality is concerned consists precisely in its ability to render what-is intelligible, the notion of *esse* as communicative, derived from Habermas' dialogical model and as understood in this study, specifies that intellectual being via discursive exchanges in terms of the ideal speech situation stands as a source for the potential disclosure of knowable reality. The root insight here moves beyond an understanding of truth as objective fact and, rather, accentuates the notion of truth as living intelligence, as open, expressive and creative, i.e., as the dynamic focal point by which knowledge comes to consciousness. Further, such a constitutive aperture of intellectual being in relation to truth would be understood as absolutely realized in the case of the Absolute Subject and only in a relative sense in the case of limited intellectual beings.

The manner in which the notion of *esse* as communicative enhances the notion of truth may be better grasped by considering Habermas' notion of ideal communication as the incisive criterion for engaging in discourse with a view toward adjudicating problematicized normative claims. Habermas contends that, for such adjudication to represent nothing other than the unforced force of the better argument, it must have been conducted within the context of a logic of practical discourse modeled on or in terms of the formal conditions of the ideal speech situation. The importance of this proposal consists in the *posture* that the participants in the discourse must assume if the outcome of their exchange is to merit rational assent. Within this context human intelligence emerges as living and creative, "conceiving new possibilities, planning new structures, and working out new paths for mankind. . ."64 This would neither be understood as an uncritical, static expression of tradition for tradition sake nor as the aggressive expression of novelty for novelty sake, but, instead, as a responsible exercise of critical cognition aimed at advancing those judgments that safeguard the personal and communal dignity of the human subject.

This said, the most poignant emendation that the notion of truth—as a function of the concept of natural appetency of being as good—offers Habermas' conception of practical discourse is directed toward supplanting his ethical formalism, insofar as the adjudication of questions of normative rightness is concerned, with the moral precepts that follow once the *esse* of reality, particularly that of the human subject, is understood in terms of the Absolute Subject as its source and end. The ends congruent with the nature of the human subject may be articulated in a single principle of practical reason that enjoins all to "*Pursue the good and to avoid evil*." From this principle, follow primary precepts of reason that serve to orient human life to the realization of its good and in avoidance of that which degrades the same. Thus practical reason naturally knows, when not corrupted by other factors, that: (1) One should *preserve and protect human life*, especially that of the most vulnerable, as popularly expressed "from the womb to the tomb,"65 such that proposals in favor of abortion, infanticide, euthanasia can never be adopted by any legislative or judicial body as representing an ethical outcome of their deliberations or decisions. (2) In addition, related to the respect due to human life, one should *honor natural procreative ability* for, when used naturally, it gives rise to new human life. This view would, among other things, for example, prohibit the distribution of condoms to teenagers with the purpose of preventing teenage pregnancies and/or to avoid AIDS. Ethical practice would clearly

condemn extramarital sex and *uphold the stability of the family and marriages of genuine conjugal unions*, where husbands and wives are open to the gift of new human life as essential to the health and well-being of a just society. (3) One should *promote social well-being and harmony* such that, for example, every effort should be made to do away with forms of racial injustice, urban disparities, foreign policies that do not take human rights issues into account but just look at economic trade advantage or gain. (4) Given the rational nature of the human being, one should *uphold religious freedom and tolerance*. Indeed the human being should *pursue the truth to its conclusion* such that one must not go half way in one's search. For instance, to recognize that the spatial-temporal universe is thoroughly relative, finite and contingent and thus cannot serve as an ultimate explanation for its participation in existence, in *esse*, and then to say that there is need for no further explanation is go only half way in one's search for the truth. One should seek the truth to its conclusion.

Moreover to incur in a violation of one of these basic injunctions is not without its consequences. Besides feelings of guilt and even the possibility of distorted personality in the case of one unwilling to recognize the wrong committed, there are other possible immediate and long-term effects. What happens, often, too often, for example, when one fails to confine sexual activity to marriage?

An immediate consequence of violation is injury to the procreative good: one might get pregnant but have no one to help raise the child. Another immediate consequence is injury to the unitive good: one misses the chance for that heightened personal intimacy which can only develop in a secure and exclusive relationship. Many are the long–term consequences of violation: poverty, because single women must provide for their children by themselves; adolescent violence, because male children grow up without a father's influence; venereal disease, because formerly rare infections spread rapidly through sexual contact; child abuse, because live-in boyfriends tend to resent their girlfriend's babies; and abortion, because children are increasingly regarded as a burden rather than a joy.66

This said, for those who would argue that the fundamental moral precepts are not in fact universally known and therefore are not binding, the answer is that it is possible for the precept not to be known whenever reason is perverted.67 This can take place in five ways: (1) corruption of reason by passion, as in the case of the man who strikes the bearer of bad news; (2) corruption of reason by evil habit, as when one fails to pay one's taxes and, though initially experiencing guilt, eventually concludes that there is nothing wrong with this; (3) corruption of reason by evil disposition of nature, as when resulting from a genetic defect—which can nonetheless be controlled with just effort—one is inclined to violence, alcohol, homosexuality; (4) corruption of reason by vicious custom, as when one grows up in a place where bribery is regarded as normal; and (5) corruption of reason by evil persuasion, as when one justifies one's behavior such as using electronic tricks to make free long-distance calls saying that after all one is getting even with the exploiters.68

Practical discourse can be comprehended then as a dialogical exchange in which the human subject endeavors to grasp and creatively apply those norms that signify a progressive discovery, articulation and amplification of all that accords with—and is never in violation of—the dignity of the human person and community. The prudential wealth of this ethical orientation serves legislative and juridical bodies as guides in their deliberations concerning what should be promulgated for the good of the human person and communities and what would be detrimental to genuine human and social flourishing.

Unity, the Traditional Monological Framework and Habermas' Dialogical Framework

At this point it will be necessary to relate the absolute transcendental property of unity with Habermas' dialogical model. The property of unity may be approached as expressing the dynamic integration of the properties of truth and goodness within the context of intelligent existents. Unity here entails the exercise of the act of to be in a manner that ever approaches a form of life modeled on truth and goodness; moreover, this form of life is made available to intelligent being via discourse when one proceeds in conformity to the elementary precepts of practical reasoning. Further, unity, insofar as finite existents are concerned, needs to be comprehended in light of the Absolute Subject, who represents as the source and end of finite existents their maximum expression of unity.69 Indeed, it is the Absolute Subject that, as the plenitude of goodness, truth and unity, bestows the experience of human emancipation as a gift.

The transcendent is the key to real liberation: it frees the human spirit from limitation to the restricted field of one's own slow, halting and even partial creative activity; it grounds one's reality in the Absolute; it certifies one's right to be respected; and it evokes the creative power of one's heart.70

This said, when considering the nature of Unlimited or the Absolute Subject in terms of the traditional notion of unity as developed in traditional metaphysics in terms of the Thomistic notion of *Substantia Separata*, what emerges is a Being whose nature, as understood within the divine life itself, implies no *ad intra* communicative dimension, and, as such, is comprehended in purely monological terms. In the case of the traditional model, an understanding of transcendent ground has been strictly derived by rejecting various forms of potentiality found in relative existents *qua* material, such that the conception or available knowledge of transcendent ground largely is conceived in terms of what results from negating, on the one hand, material predicates implying limitation such as divisibility, mutability, finitude, relativity, while, affirming, on the other, properties such as indivisibility, immutability, infinitude, absoluteity. Within such a conception of the Absolute, the dialogical attributes as reflected in the relative transcendental *communicative* are undeveloped. This is to say that the importance of Habermas' dialogical paradigm may be interpreted as bringing to the fore a needed communicative dimension to the traditional metaphysical understanding of the Absolute. Indeed, Habermas' model of communication exacts a transcendent ground, as interpreted in this study, that is *existential, dialogical*, *communitary*, *complementary*, i.e., constituted by at least two divine persons.71 The communicative dimension of intelligent being has the virtue of bringing to the fore the dialogical and communitary dimension of the Absolute Subject in a manner that renders Thomistic metaphysics more amenable with the Christian notion of God as a Trinity of Persons. Although the Trinity is attaining increasing relevance in contemporary philosophical reflection, for Schmitz the "disclosure into the inherent 'sociality' of the divine life has not yet been cultivated in philosophy to the degree that it needs to be done."72

Conclusion

In sum, this paper has examined Habermas' critical model in the light of Aquinas' metaphysical horizon. Habermas' understanding of the human being as emancipative and as communicative is understood as amplifying, within a Thomistic metaphysical framework, the comprehension of esse, in terms of the latter's teaching on the relative transcendentals. This, in turn, provides Habermas' ethical formalism with an ontological grounding from which

fundamental precepts may be derived that safeguard the inviolability of human life, marriage, family, and the social community. When guided by these precepts legislative and judiciary bodies, in considering normative proposals, find the signposts capable of steering their deliberations in the direction of genuine rather than artificial consensus.

Moreover, in relating Habermas' work to that of Aquinas, in addition to furnishing two additional relative transcendentals to the Thomistic corpus, i.e., *esse* as *emancipative* and as *communicative*, his dialogical model brings to the fore the communicative dimension of the Absolute. In this respect, in the light of the relative transcendental *communicative*, the Absolute Subject comes to be understood less in terms of First Mover, Uncaused Cause, Necessary Existence, and more in terms of predicates such as *personal*, *dialogical*, *communitary* and *complementary*.

Appendix: The Christian Hermeneutical Worldview

This section will argue that a hermeneutical appropriation of the Christian horizon provides philosophical reflection with the resources with which to mitigate the postmodernist challenge against metaphysical principles, and that such resources derived from doing philosophy from a Christian perspective, in turn, provide Habermas's formalist model with a context that is realist, metaphysical and communicative.

The tendency to reason in the light of a certain context has characterized the philosophical enterprise since antiquity, given that its varied reflections have never proceeded by means of the operation of "pure reason" in separation from some orienting framework. Thus, "Russell developed certain of his philosophical views from insights disclosed by mathematics; Quine took experimental science as his paradigm; others have taken law or art or music or social interaction."73 Habermas, in his stead, employs the model of social communication understood within a naturalist conception of society as his own orienting framework for doing philosophy. Yet, it would appear that within the contemporary philosophical thrust for openness, dialogue and conversation, proposals can be put forward as at the very least constituting recommendations worthy of consideration. The view here is that a move to focus on Habermas's contributions from an optic other than the one Habermas provides is indeed congruent with his own view of philosophy as "stand-in and interpreter" that "cannot and should not try to play the role of usher."74 The suggestion here is that Habermas's philosophy of emancipation be examined within the horizon of the Christian worldview, i.e., one that "follows out lines of inquiry suggested by Christian experience.75 If the claim that all philosophizing takes place within the confines of a given context, then a Christian philosophy "is shaped in important ways by Christian faith, life and action."76 However, the incorporation of the Christian worldview should be understood here as safeguarding the distinction between philosophy and theological investigation. This means that insight may be derived from the resources of the Christian worldview for doing philosophy while that which is appropriated philosophically must itself conform to the canons of reasoned evidence and argument.77 In short, a Christian philosophy as understood here is one that "seeks to appropriate *by rational and properly philosophical means* certain insights first disclosed by Christian revelation."78

The reason for considering the Christian horizon from a hermeneutical perspective as the context for interpreting Habermas's communicative proposal derives from its emphasis in delving into a tradition with a view toward disclosing resources in response to new situations. In this respect the emancipatory dimension of the Christian tradition emerges with greater vigor when

examined as a response to the deconstructionist critique of metaphysical principles. In an important article, "From Anarchy to Principles: Deconstruction and the Resources of Christian Philosophy,"79 Kenneth L. Schmitz indicates the sense in which the Christian horizon is not subject to various critical themes emerging from the deconstructionist denunciation of "metanarratives." The bulk of the postmodernist critique is directed against the notion of *principle*(*principium* in Latin; *arché* in Greek) as the source of being, thought and action. A reconstruction of the master lines of Schmitz's analysis follows in two parts: the nature of the deconstructionist critique of Western culture as advanced by Heidegger and Horkheimer-Adorno, and a response to this critique from the viewpoint of the Christian horizon.

Schmitz employs an interpretive study on Heidegger by Reiner Schurmanns80 focal point for the deconstructionist discussion concerning the notion of principles. According to Schurmann's study, Heidegger envisions Western culture as consisting in four *epochs:* the pre-metaphysical epoch, consisting of the age of Greek poets, dramatists, and early philosophers; the classical metaphysical epoch, spanning from Greek philosophy to contemporary scientific technology; and the post-metaphysical epoch, which emerges with Nietzsche. Indeed, the metaphysical epoch itself is further subdivided into four subcategories or *economies,* with each economy distinguished from the other in function of a single *principle* or foundational notion determining a fixed order or worldview. In this respect, the Greek economy or order revolves around the notion of essence or substance *(ousia);* the medieval order proceeds in function of the notion of God *(Theos, Deus, Gubernator mundi);* the modern order revolves around the notion of man *(humanism);* and the contemporary order proceeds in terms of the notion of scientific technology*(technik)*.81 Of these four epochs the metaphysical one has for over two and a half millennia clearly dominated the intellectual formation and orientation of Western culture. It is this supremacy which has become the target of the deconstructionist critique.

For Heidegger, metaphysical principles nullify further thought by fostering a notion of origin as domination that, on the one hand, reduces all things within the cosmos to a uniform unity and, on the other, subjects thought and action to the closure brought about by the origin.82 Heidegger understands the various senses of the term *principle,* as elaborated by Aristotle,83 as precisely signifying such a domineering, reductionistic and limiting notion of origin.84 As Schurmann argues, "Aristotle defines *arché* as that out of which something is or becomes or is known. Indeed the four metaphysical periods reflect three features characteristic of an epoch/economy, viz., closure, necessity and certitude.

For what marks each of these "epochs" or "economies" is that their order rests upon a *single* primary principle; and this foundation provides—for those who live, think and act in terms of its order—first, a selective determination of open possibilities, in a word: *closure;*secondly, stability or regularity, in a word: *necessity;* and thirdly, credibility through repetitive confirmation, in a word: *certitude.*85

Schmitz also introduces the work of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno,86 epresentatives of the Frankfurt School, who, like Heidegger, notwithstanding different orientations, comprehend the history of Western thought in terms of a conception of origin understood as domination with its ensuing closure. In the case of Horkheimer and Adorno, however, they find this notion operative in the West's "technological determination to master nature."87 This mastery proceeds in function of instrumental reason, i.e., in terms of a means-end rationality limited in its employment via impersonal techniques to the inception and attainment of varied objectives, while itself remaining incapable of determining the good of human existence. The end result of instrumental reason at the service of technological advancements is understood

as involving a process of reification that leads to the dehumanization of the subject via greater calculability, bureaucratic efficiency, administrative and economic control. Hence, the technological machine becomes an exploitative mechanism subjecting the human person to dehumanizing relationships that negate authentic individuality.

Interestingly enough, Schmitz's response to the deconstructionist critique of metaphysical principles does not consist in a blanket defense of such principles. Instead he limits his response to indicating in what sense metaphysical principles in function of the Christian horizon are less susceptible to the postmodernist attack.88 He first questions whether it may not be possible to retain a "conception of principle which establishes a certain arrangement of consequences, but deny that the arrangement must be one of domination."89 Speaking of Christian philosophers, Schmitz adds that they were concerned with the very being of things in a manner that raises the question

Why anything at all, why not rather nothing? This question arose out of a freshly charged wonder, prompted no doubt by the Christian disclosure of the generosity of a Creator who sent his only Son to redeem a fallen humanity. So that a Christian philosophy is prompted to look for the primary form of power (and the ultimate meaning and worth of the term) not in domination, but in caring presence.90

Indeed within the Christian horizon, God as the all-encompassing first principle does not lord over his subjects as objects of domination, but rather elevates humanity to a state of filiation in which the human person is dignified with the title of "son": "As you are sons, God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son crying, 'Abba, Father'; and so you are no longer a slave, but a son."91 This view of God is precisely the conception of first principle that understands the creation as a communication—a giving, a sharing—of being.92

To the charge that metaphysical principles reduce all reality to a single unity, one pursuing philosophy within the Christian horizon may counter that, to the contrary, the first principle in referring to the Trinity is understood as a unity permeated with abundance.

The charge that a metaphysics of principles is a means of domination is strengthened by the reductionism of the many to a sheer, univocal unity. But, if the first principle is one, yet not hostile to inner distinction (as theologically and in respect of the Trinity, we speak of the distinct persons and their different processions and missions), then the charge of closure must be reopened for discussion.93

Finally, where the deconstructionists claim that the first principle brings about closure insofar as future possibilities for thought and action is concerned, it should be noted that the *ad intra* constitution of the first principle within itself consists in a "plurification" of persons. Even in terms of its *ad extra* manifestation the "infinite abundance of the first principle will give more room for all possibilities within creation—even, it must be remarked, for the possibilities of evil."94 Indeed, within the Christian worldview, far from a first principle as limiting future possibilities, there is the promise that the believer will perform and even surpass the works of its founder, as Christ himself states, "In all truth I tell you, whoever believes in me will perform the same works as I do myself, and will perform even greater works.95

The manner in which the Christian worldview opens, sensitizes and shapes thinking and living in relation to Habermas's proposal reflects the sense in which such worldview may be understood as providing a real grounding to Habermas's own formalist model. One distinct dimension that may be derived from a consideration of the Christian worldview is its eminently realist outlook, which provides Habermas's formalist communicative structure with a framework, a transcendent ground for human life in contradistinction to a purely materialist one. A second feature,

particularly characteristic of Catholic Christianity, refers to a continuing endeavor to provide metaphysical articulation for its creed, or body of beliefs. A third feature stemming from the Christian worldview concerns its thoroughgoing communicative character in function of a God conceived within and outside its own divinity as communication *par excellence.* Indeed the Christian understanding of God stems from the relational exigencies of the processions that each divine person has with respect to the other. This communicative makeup of the divinity is reflected in its *ad extra* operations such that all reality, particularly as manifested in the case of the human person, is communicative. Now, although the view of this study is that the Christian horizon does present a context for anchoring Habermas's formalist model,

Notes

1. This study liberally reprints, with permission from the publisher, sections of chapters four and five from my book *The Emancipative Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991).

2. Habermas, Appendix, in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 309.

3. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, 308.

4. *Ibid*., 137.

5. Christopher Broniak, "What is Emancipation for Habermas?," *Philosophy Today* 32 (Fall 1988): 202.

6. David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 319.

7. McCarthy, *Critical Theory*, 89.

8. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest,* 310.

9 Stephen White, *The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 74.

10. *Ibid*., 55.

11. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, translated by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 57.

12. *Ibid*., 65.

13. John Thompson, *Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 87; Habermas, "Wahrheitshtheorien." In *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Walter Schulz zum 60, e*dited by Geburtstag H. Fahrenbach (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1973), 214.

14. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," 108.

15. *Ibid*., 103.

16. See White, *Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas*, 69-70.

17. Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," in *Habermas: Critical Debates*, edited by John B. Thompson and David Held (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), 257-58; see also White, *Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas*, 75-77. Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), 331; henceforth *Critical Theory*.

18. White, *Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas*, 76-77.

19. *Ibid*., 75.

20. Steven Lukes, "Of Gods and Demons: Habermas and Practical Reason," *Critical Debates*, in *Critical Debates*, 134; henceforth "Of Gods and Demons"; quotes from J. Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 185 and 184.

21. White, *Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas*, 76.

22. Lukes, "Of Gods and Demons," 139.

23. McCarthy, *Critical Theory*, 313.

24. McCarthy indicates, "As there is no Archimedean point from which to judge whether what democratic majorities regard as the better argument is really better, dissenters can only continue to debate. If minorities regularly fail to convince majorities or to be convinced by them, we may well conclude that judgments of better and worse in this domain are intrinsically susceptible to considerable variation" (*Ideals and Illusions*: *On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory* [Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991], 194-95).

25. White, *Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas*, 82-83.

26. Seyla Benhabib, "In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy," *The Philosophical Forum*, vol. XXI, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter, 1989-90): 22; henceforth "Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy."

27. Michael Walzer, "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation," *The Philosophical Forum*, vol. XXI, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1989-90): 195.

28. Joel Whitebook, "Reason and Happiness: Some Psychoanalytic Themes in Critical Theory," in *Habermas and Modernity*, edited by Richard J., Bernstein (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 160.

29. Habermas, "Questions and Counterquestions," in *Habermas and Modernity*, 216.

30. See Tom Rockmore, *Habermas on Historical Materialism* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1989).

31. "From Hegel's critique of Kant, Gadamer borrowed the insight that all formalism presupposes a context from which it abstracts and that there is no formal ethics that does not have some material presuppositions concerning the self and social institutions" (Benhabib, "Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy," 3). See also Michael Kelley, "Gadamer/Habermas Debate Revisited: The Question of Philosophical Ethics," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 14 (1988): 369-89.

32. Since Aquinas did not systematically develop an existential approach to the metaphysical doctrine of transcendentals, this study will draw on a study conducted by John Edward Twomey titled *The General Notion of the Transcendentals in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1958); henceforth *Transcendentals in Aquinas*. This work explicitly attempts "a recovery of the thought of Thomas Aquinas in terms of a unification of the implications in the scattered references embodying the existential approach to these transcendentals" (*ibid*., ix). The textual analysis of Aquinas's work provides "an approach that underscores the role of these transcendentals as predicates of the metaphysical judgment of existence by and in which is expressed (positively) the intellectual intuition (the notion) of being" (*ibid*.). Such an approach yields *a criterion of transcendentality* which is crucial for determining whether "it may be shown that notions other than the one, the true and the good are genuinely transcendental" (*ibid*., x). This criterion will be applied to Habermas' critical model, specifically his notions of emancipation and communication, in an effort to see whether they may be considered as possible transcendental properties of *esse*. It should be noted that translations of Aquinas's texts

(*Opera Omnia*, 16 vols. [Rome: iussu Leonis XIII edita, 1882-1948]; and *Opera Omnia*, 25 vols. [Parma: Fiaccadori, 1852-1873]) will follow Twomey's.

33. See note above.

34. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 71; quote from Jacques Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948), 66.

35. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 71-73.

36. *Ibid.* Also see Aquinas, *In De Trinitate*, V, 1 c and V, 4 c.

37. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 204.

38. *Ibid.*, 226.

39. The distinction between *res significata* and *modus significando* is articulated by Aquinas in these terms: "Because it is to find every perfection of a creature in God but in another manner, whatever names designate a perfection absolutely, without defect, are predicated of God and of other things: such as goodness, wisdom, to be, and others of this kind. But whatever name of this kind expresses perfections in terms of the mode proper to creatures, cannot be said of God except by way of a similitude and a metaphor. . . . But those [names] which express perfections of this kind in terms of the mode of supereminence by which they are fitted to God, are said of God alone: such as 'the highest good', 'the first being', and others of this kind. However, I say that some of these names mentioned imply no defect with regard to that-to-be-signified in terms of which the name was given: but with regard to the mode of signifying, every name is defective. . . . And thus in every name said by us, as far as the mode of signifying is concerned, there is found an imperfection which is not apropos of God, although the thing signified is apropos of "goodness" and "the good"; for goodness signifies: as non-subsistent, however, the good: as concrete. And with regard to this no name is conveniently fitted to God, but only in terms of that to-which-to-be-signified the name is used. Therefore names of this kind can be both affirmed and denied of God, as Dionysius teaches: affirmed indeed because of the meaning of the name; but denied, because of the mode of signifying" (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 30).

40. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 232.

41. McCarthy, *Critical Theory*, 396, n. 5.

42. Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?," in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, 26.

43. *Ibid.*, 63-64.

44. Thompson, *Critical Hermeneutics*, 93; quotes from Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," 258.

45. McCarthy, *Critical Theory*, 307.

46. McCarthy explains what is involved here in a more plausible manner: "The charges for example, that the outcome of a critical discussion was in some way determined by force or threats of force from the outside, or by a differential distribution of privilege or authority within, or by consciously or unconsciously strategic motivations on the part of any of the participants, or by the inability of any of them to know or to speak their mind or to 'listen to reason', would normally be regarded as a challenge to that outcome. If any such charge could be substantiated, the consensus would no longer count as rationally motivated; it would not have been brought about solely by the force of argumentation but would bear the influence of extra-argumentative constraints" (*Critical Theory*, 309).

47. Aquinas, *In de Trinitate*, VI, 1c.

48. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 89.

49. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 11, 1 c.

50. Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 42.

51. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 95.

52. Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 42.

53. See the discussion on the property of unity in terms of the traditional monological framework when compared with Habermas' dialogical framework below. Fernando Rielo is a contemporary philosopher who, rejecting the efficacy of the notion of identity as a metaphysical principle, proposes a new model in which Christian revelation, including the Trinity and the notion of person, finds metaphysical articulation in terms of his "genetic conception of the principle of relation." See Fernando Rielo, "Hacia una nueva concepción metafísica del ser," in *¿Existe una filosofía española?* (Seville: Fundación Fernando Rielo, 1988); see also "Concepción Genética de lo que no es el sujeto absoluto fundamento metafísico de la ética," in *Raíces y valores históricos del pensamiento español* (Seville: Fundación Fernando Rielo, 1989).

54. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 107-08; cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 6, 3, ad 1m.

55. Aquinas, *Q. D. De Veritate*, 1, 10, ad 5m.

56. Consider the formulation: "Every being, to the extent that it exists, is metaphysically true, as necessarily conformed to the divine intellect, because it depends absolutely upon God for its being" (Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 132).

57. *Ibid.*, 116-17.

58. Aquinas, *In I Sententia*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 c.

59. Twomey, *Transcendentals in Aquinas*, 130; cf. Aquinas, *Q. D. De Veritate*, 1, 1, ad 3m.

60. Here *esse* is comprehended as a desirable good; cf. Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 7.

61. Aquinas, *Q. D. De Veritate*, 21, 2 c.

62. *Ibid.*, 21, 1, ad 1m.

63. White, *Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas*, 137.

64. McLean, "Harmony, Transcendence and Freedom" (1991, unpublished manuscript).

65. It should be noted that the defense of human life here is from the moment of conception to the natural death of the person. It should further be said that this position does not depend on Aquinas' views on embryology (ST, I, q. 76), who holds that the human soul is infused at the moment in which the brain has developed sufficiently to support the operations of the intellect. His position depends on the biology of his day and his dependence on Aristotelian principles of living beings. This is, in contrast, to a more contemporary genetic understanding of human development that would argue that what makes a human being *human* resides not in the brain but in the genes. The zygote is not merely a mass of organic material but a being whose successive development and functioning are in terms of the operations of thousands of genes which are integrally present from the moment of conception and generative of all physiological and psychological structures. Metaphysically, what constitutes the zygote as a *person* refers to the divine constitutive presence of the Absolute Subject in the created element of the human being. For a fuller treatment of this position, see my & Eduardo Rodriguez's "Rights of the Zygote: From a Biological and Metaphysical Perspective, in *The Humanization of Social Life: Change for Our Times*, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Life. Series 1: Culture and Values, Volume 7 (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy), forthcoming.

66. J. Budziszewski, *Written on the Heart* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 75.

67. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 94, a. 4-5.

68. Budziszewski, *Written on the Heart*, 72-73.

69. McLean, "Harmony, Transcendence and Freedom."

70. *Ibid.*

71. See n. 53 above.

72. Kenneth Schmitz, "From Anarchy to Principles: Deconstruction and the Resources of Christian Philosophy," *Communio: The International Catholic Review*, 16 (Spring 1989): 87.

73. Kenneth L. Schmitz, "From Anarchy to Principles: Deconstruction and the Resources of Christian Philosophy," *Communio: The International Catholic Review,* 16 (Spring 1989): 83; henceforth "The Resources of Christian Philosophy."

74. Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter," *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, 2.

75. Schmitz, "The Resources of Christian Philosophy," 84.

76. *Ibid.*

77. *Ibid.,* 83.

78. *Ibid.*

79. Schmitz, "The Resources of Christian Philosophy," 83.

80. Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter," *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, 2.

81. Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter," *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, 2.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.,* 83.

84. *Ibid.*

85. Schmitz, "The Resources of Christian Philosophy," 83.

86. Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter," *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, 2.

87. Schmitz, "The Resources of Christian Philosophy," 84.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid.,* 83.

90. *Ibid.*

91. Schmitz, "The Resources of Christian Philosophy," 83.

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Ibid.,* 83.

94. *Ibid.*

95. Schmitz, "The Resources of Christian Philosophy," 83.

Central and Peripheral Elements of Group Identity: Exploring into the Phenomenon of Religious Inquirers*

Florencio R. Riguera

Introduction

This paper explores the question of group identity by looking into the phenomenon of religious inquirers, i.e., adults who begin a process of considering whether or not to join a particular organized religion. The aim or hope here is to understand basic processes that might be operative when one is confronted with conflicting positions regarding a particular issue, like one where religions hold different positions. Hence, the analysis is not limited to the particular context in which interest in this question arose. It simply uses the Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults (RCIA) in the Catholic Church as the initial context.

In relation to the diversity-unity dynamic, the decision facing the religious inquirer may be appreciated as follows: between the case wherein a political consensus has to be reached by diverse groups and that wherein an individual *freely* chooses to embrace another religion (or, a particular religion—having had none previously), the actions involved take opposite directions. A political consensus is only a partial intersection of positions; that is, only a limited number of issues are involved. There is no uniformity, because the groups' positions may be different with respect to other issues. The direction is from the many and diverse to the one/few and common. If a position regarding a particular issue should be changed for the sake of achieving a consensus, it is possible that the comprehensive view of the one group or another is going to be significantly altered. In other words, a change may be central or peripheral.

When one converts to a different religion, the direction of the action is towards the total and distinct from what might be common to an "organic whole' which would distinguish or differentiate one from others. While religions differ from each other, they do not necessarily do so in everything. Rather, they all address questions which are of importance to mankind—each in its own distinctive way. In fact, they are in agreement with each other with respect to certain issues. If this similarity is carried out in sufficiently abstract terms, the problem of religious pluralism emerges: "a theory that fully acknowledges the vast range and complexity of differences apparent in the phenomenology of religion while at the same time enables us to understand the major streams of religious experience and thought as embodying different awarenesses of the ultimate reality."[1]

But, in spite of the common areas, the religions do not thereby fuse together in a "melting pot". Instead, they maintain and reinforce their respective identities. They reaffirm the elements or views which precisely differentiate them from each other. Agreement between two religions on a few issues does not alter the respective total and organized views, which would shape and influence the life of those who embrace the religions in question. They simply happen to have reached similar positions on the basis of their respective views.[2]

Therefore, for the religious inquirer, the task is to choose between one organic whole and another; as it will be shown eventually, between one identity and another. The inquirer does not have to reconcile differences between conflicting positions: the positions of a particular religion are a given at least, within a particular locality-time context, where variations matter. As far as his

original positions and the relevant positions of the religion he is inquiring into are concerned, the project at hand is to take one and abandon the other where conflict is recognized.

Suffice it to acknowledge that at the level of praxis, views or beliefs which necessarily lead to different actions or behaviors clearly call for an "either/or" decision. In terms of a particular action, the corresponding inspiration, framework of interpretation, or motivation, is itself a determinant of the action. Thus, it may not be the partial agreement that matters, but precisely the differentiating factors, or the distinctive "overall appearance" of the religion which the inquirer looks into.3

In any instance, the choice entails choosing an identity that is shared by others. And the choice necessarily entails both the differentiating and the common—i.e., both the central and the peripheral elements of the identity in question.

Restriction on the Method Used

If empirical data on the motivations of religious inquirers are used in the analysis, it would he feasible to draw relevant trends, determine associations between factors and test for generalized descriptions or explanations. However, using actual data would compromise the privacy of the information shared by inquirers, say, to an RCIA team, this would not be ethical. It could also damage the ministry or service provided by a particular church/religion, this would be pastorally imprudent. In strictly methodological terms, no contemporaneous notes were taken in any of the inquiry sessions—mere insights and impressions can change or be distorted over time, and thus, inaccuracies may have been sustained through the mere absence of a controlled data-gathering technique.

Therefore, the method used here is purely formal or rational. No empirical data will be used at all in the paper. Of course, the following motives can he surmised even without having recourse to empirical data (i.e., anyone who thinks through the problem can arrive at these possible motives). Therefore, these may be used as common sense conceptualization material: (a) mere curiosity; (b) some dissatisfaction with one's current religion (or current absence of religion): the "push" factor; (c) some perceived affinity between one's positions/inclinations beliefs, etc. and those of the religion in question: the "pull" factor; and, (d) expectation that having the same religion as that of one's fiancée/spouse would be helpful for fostering family unity: the instrumental/ utilitarian value.

These or some other motives can lead one to inquire into a particular religion: get the relevant understanding on which to base his decision whether to join or not to join the religion.4

To the extent that the writer's own view can affect the analysis or the problem, the relevant view is explicitated here as a postulate: a decision to join a religion must be well informed and totally free.

Excluded Question

No particular religion need be evaluated here. In fact, no religion can he evaluated, given the context in which the analysis is conducted. Let it be assumed that all religions can have adults who are "newcomers" and, just as well, adults who are "defectors". In this context, evaluating any religion would be inconsistent on methodological grounds.

It is submitted that what follows may conveniently treat identity merely as group identity. Religion, culture, and ideology—all have a more or less organized/comprehensive view. The only

difference is that religions offer a view of life in relation to some absolute, to some ultimate problem or concern; and propose or prescribe guides for a corresponding way of life. Changing one's religion or ideology is a deliberate step; while acculturation is not. Social control is the whole set of measures used to maintain or "enforce" a particular culture. The pressure to conform to an ideology is considered greater than exhortations and persuasions to live according to a particular religion.5

Aside from these differences, a comprehensive view goes hand in hand with a group's identity in each of the above. Thus, although the analysis proceeds from the religious inquirers' standpoint, what is said of group identity is applicable to identities which are based on a shared culture, ideology, as well as other factors.

Identity: Unified Elements; Shared with Others

As the inquirer progresses in his understanding of the religion in question, he gets a better position to evaluate the religion's view of life in comparison to his current views and inclinations, to evaluate the beliefs and practices of the religions. He looks into the questions which the religion addresses, i.e., the problems or areas of concern in life, and those it does not address. He looks into the answers and explanations the religion offers, i.e., the framework or interpretation, the presuppositions, the inspiration, the unifying meanings or themes, and those it does not employ or approve of. The proposed/prescribed practices or behavior and those that are discouraged/ disapproved of are appraised likewise.

If the inquirer eventually decides to adopt the religion at hand, the foregoing will shape and influence the appearance of objective reality. The beliefs will frame incoming information; they will also provide a means for communicating ideas, motives, needs, and sentiments to the outside. The shared frame of vision is, therefore, a "packaging" for both incoming and outgoing symbols of reality. As such, the religion's comprehensive view mediates between the self and the outside. It is a means of contact between the person and others; between man and the world or the "outside of the self" either as object of knowledge/experience, or as object of action. The practices of the religion will have a bearing on the inquirer's behavior after he appropriates the religion. His motivations and deliberations will be influenced by the ideals which the religion preaches or proposes as guides for life. The determination and attainment of his goals, his relationship with others, and the like are at stake.6

Thus, the inquirer is led to visualize his or her life as influenced and shaped by the religion. At this point, he visualizes his life with a particular identity—a particular set of elements which are more or less unified/organized in such a fashion that the "overall appearance" is distinctive. The set of beliefs and practices can be recognized as inspiration or motivation for actions; the individual can recognize his identity through this "package". He can also see that others share it so that he can identify with others (i.e., co-religionists). He can differentiate himself and his co-religionists from those who do not share the identity and he can recognize diverse identities.

Through all these there is externalization or manifestation: the individual can reflect on what he observes about his behavior (motivations and actions); the behavior of his co-religionists and that of those who live by another religion (for that matter, by other identities in general). At a group or community level, there is, therefore, the task or challenge to live up to the identity, i.e., to witness to the beliefs and practices, to the ideals and understandings. Identity can be recognized only in the sphere of action or behavior. Unless it is manifested, it cannot be recognized, and it can be manifested or lived if and only if it is consciously acknowledged as a constituent of behavior.

This conscious acknowledgement means profession, commitment and loyalty. It is not limited or confined to the intellectual sphere, where one can merely agree to the validity of the beliefs and practices in question. On the contrary, there is a commitment to practice the identity; and this practice is at one with that of one's co-religionists. Periodic gatherings can remind the co-religionists of their shared identity. They can deepen their commitment; provide insights or deeper understanding of their way or life. This is especially needed because the general formulation of the beliefs and practices cannot anticipate all specific situations where fidelity to one's religious identity would he called for. Applying the basic message of a particular religion to new situations requires study and discernment. (Obviously, this can lead to changes and diversity within a particular religion.) A sense of belonging and esteem is also developed; bonds based on mutual affirmations can arise.

And the overall result is a degree of convergence with respect to the manifestation of the shared beliefs and practices. Thus, it is possible to speak of "them" even if such naming is not as precise as it might sound—stereotypes may be seen as "symptoms" that a group or community behave by one shared identity.

Central and Peripheral Elements of Identity

Living according to a comprehensive view requires some unifying and simplifying focus. The practice of a community as viewed by an inquirer can provide a non-propositional synthesis of the rich tradition of a religion: how the basic *spirit* of this identity can be lived in ambiguous or even conflicting situations. Sometimes, one element of the identity matters most in a given situation; at other times, another element does. In fact, there may be times when what is "most important" is only a symbol (e.g., to rally support). Central and peripheral elements of group identity is not approached here in this fashion.

Central elements of an identity are those which differentiate the group in question from others. As already mentioned above, religions address problems or areas of concern which are common to humans—"human core" problems; and provide answers. The set of problems which is addressed, that of problems not addressed, and the distinctive answers and their frame of reference/interpretation constitute the central elements of religious identity. The common problem areas do not differentiate religions from one another. They merely "stimulate" the distinctive "answers" which are operationalized—through beliefs and practices.

Peripheral elements fall into two categories. Elements which have meanings only in relation to a central element may be conveniently called 'instrumental peripheral". Symbols, particular expressions or formulations of a teaching or belief, a variation of a practice, elaboration/extension of an interpretation are a few examples. These can be effective means to evoke sentiments of belonging, esteem, and the like among co-religionists. Their differentiating power derives only from the central element in relation to which they acquire their meaning or use.

"Diffuse peripheral" elements would be the set of common human values—i.e., not restricted to any religion, but rather shared by humans.7 These are not differentiating; they are not identity-conferring, but as such are merely "molds" within which the answers to the common "human core" problems can be realized. However, they are critically important in the understanding of religious identity—perhaps, of identity in general. They are the *locus* of the decision—to join or not to join a particular religion.

The common unman values (e.g., justice, truth, good/ virtue, freedom, responsibility, compassion, esteem and dignity) can be shaped and influenced by a particular religion in such a

way that its distinctive vision and ideals make the actualization of these values also distinguishable from their actualization under the influence of another religion. This means that the actualization of these values can be tied to the distinctive 'appearance or spirit" of a particular religion.

This is at the level of action or behavior. Perhaps, social justice is not mere equitableness with regard to basic needs—there might be a vision which enriches it by an acknowledgement of a fundamental dignity of man. Or, it may be viewed as an area where individuals or groups can exercise freedom and creativity in a political context. Still further, it can be viewed as an imperative owing to a recognition of the oneness of the human family precisely as sharers of one and the same source of life. The nuances, the gradation or the depth and richness of a particular action, its resulting state of affairs, the quality with which it is carried out are various ways in which the so-called "diffuse peripheral" elements can be realized in a manner that is distinctive because of the unique vision and ideals of different religions.

This is not to deny the rightful place of practices or traditions which are specifically religious—namely, those which pertain to the relationship between man and the Absolute. These practices or traditions may be seen in worship, or, in confronting ultimate or fundamental questions in life, especially in the recognition of human limits and of innate aspirations. In dealing with an absolute as an entity above and beyond oneself, man can transcend himself by means of what is broadly understood as religious experience.

These elements are definitely central to the identity of a particular religion. But they can he appraised in terms of how they fulfill the innate need for this type of experience. This transcending of one's limits is viewed here as a common human need—although it is understood in various ways.8

Identity, therefore, is recognized through both the central and the peripheral elements; but the central can show their uniqueness only by being "enfleshed" in the peripheral elements. The process of recognizing and appropriating the identity is more of the socialization or inculturation than of the formal instruction.

Value of Identity

Utilitarian considerations obtaining from the fact that one shares a particular group's identity are not a single plane. They are rather diverse. Under some circumstances, a number of benefits or advantages may accrue from joining a community and sharing the corresponding identity. But there are also cases wherein joining a community and sharing its identity entail costs: the testimony of martyrs in various religions (for that matter, cultures, ideologies, political parties, and the like) is too well known.9 Furthermore, there are values which are not monotonic: there are those who seek to be affirmed or be cared for by others; there are those who seek to affirm or care for others.10

Therefore, these are not the grounding for the value of religious identity and, perhaps, of any group identity. The bonds which develop as an individual participates in a community's exercise of its identity can be appreciated in relation to the frame of reference they share.

The shared "mediating frame" enables the community members to communicate with each other their ideas, ideals, hopes, and frustrations, etc. Through the shared identity there is a system of meanings to structure their lives and to enable them to share what is otherwise very unique and very individual. Without a shared frame of reference, communication would not be possible. And man would be "imprisoned" within himself.11

This "imprisonment" or confinement is a fundamental frustration, a violation of something constitutive of man, namely, his transcendence. By transcendence, man is social. He is open to

others; he is solidary with others in the course of attaining his goals.12 If man is not aware that he shares something in common with others at the level of action, there is no adequate reassurance that he is not confined within himself. Frustration of transcendence is frustration at the metaphysical level. And if this is experienced in the area where man is confronting his limits as well as facing the prospect to transcend them, a very basic value is denied its realization.

Herein, therefore, lies the grounding for an identity and specifically, of religious identity. It is no wonder that in spite of suppression or persecution, religions of sorts have managed to survive—even to emerge more vibrant.

Dynamic Toward Diversity

Viewed in this manner it appears that the value of identity provides an impulse toward diversity among groups. Identity caters to the transcendence of man, to his solidarity, which is innate in him. It is in the context of a specific community that man can realize himself with others. And it is only by sharing an identity with others that he can have a meaningful way to be in contact with others.

Unless a shared identity is maintained and reinforced, it cannot fulfill its function as a means of contact with others. But the various steps taken to reinforce a particular identity have the effect of cumulatively accentuating the distinguishing elements of identity, because even the "diffuse peripheral" elements are treated in relation to the central elements. In time, the application of a unique vision to common problems paves the way for the corresponding identity to show, and to be recognizable.

Diversity within a particular religion can also be seen as resulting from the creativity and adaptability of the religion. There can be new ways of linking the central and peripheral elements in new circumstances: new symbols, new elaborations of beliefs, new variations of practices, etc. In relation to what have been referred to as "diffuse peripheral" elements, a deeper understanding of the central beliefs and practices can lead to a more effective or relevant translation of these as guides to a way of life.

Thus, diversity in either of the above senses has its basic impulse from the value of identity: the need for it, the need to practice it and thereby reinforce it even under changing circumstances. In this view, diversity is healthy and desirable in that there is a venue of different identities where man can choose one within which to realize himself in solidarity with others. For as long as the identities are understood as necessarily distinct—i.e., as opposed to unorganized, and thereby not capable of serving man's need for contact with others—diversity will hopefully not lead to destructive divisiveness. "The general trend under heaven is: what are joined must separate after some time; what are separate must join after some time,"13 goes a saying, which can be read to mean that diversity will never go too far, nor will uniformity succeed in the long run. *Octogesima Adveniens* made the appeal that the Gospels shape action to realize justice in the world. Yet, Christians have various options to do this depending on how they discern their situation.14

Religious Freedom

It is difficult to sidestep the question of religious freedom at this point. Heretofore, the analysis has been following the process whereby an adult inquires into a particular religion. In following this process, it can be seen that the choice of one's religion is freely made:

By accident of birth, one is exposed to specific views and is shaped through inculturation, experiences, etc. When one comes across a particular religion which one might like to explore, one basically compares the religion's view of human life and one's current view of it. Insofar as the religion offers a framework in which common values may be molded, it is analogous to the case which the *Summa Contra Gentiles* addresses.15 The will chooses only as the intellect applies the conception of a universal to a particular, because acting deals with particulars, not with universals. Before the application of the concept to a particular, there is no determinate way to act. In the process of inquiry, the inquirer's current view of human life had been acquired in an indeterminate, contingent fashion. The process of determining which view is "better" is necessarily limited by the quality, breadth and depth of the inquiry process—on the side of the inquirer, on the side of those who are presenting the religion to him/her, and, in terms of the concepts and methods used.

The inquirer can decide only on the basis of his or her appraisal of the religion's identity. Whatever he/she decides is the product of deliberation and discernment. One would not be deciding in face of the inexorable power of pure, unmediated reality—but would necessarily view reality through the mediating frame he has already acquired. *Dignitatis Humanae* recognizes that the search for truth "must be carried out in a manner that is appropriate to the dignity of the human person and his social nature, namely, by free enquiry with the help of teaching or instruction, communication and dialogue. It is by these means that men share with each other the truth they have discovered, or think they have discovered, in such a way that they help each other in the search for truth."16 The truth can be enfleshed only in a particular identity.

Veritatis Splendor encourages the use of rational arguments, because among other thing, these are helpful in dialogue—especially in pluralistic societies.17 But arguments may have limitations—this is acknowledged;18 and the search for truth does not stop. Even *Libertas Praestantissimum*19 may be read to have enjoined states to promote the Catholic religion, but only if the states already professed it.

From the Catholic viewpoint, at least, religious freedom can be viewed in its "human form". The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has already recognized this right: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."20

Dialogue and Cooperation

Dialogue between religions can show what they have in common. But these are partial – either in the questions they attempt to answer, or in the common values they endeavor to shape. When it comes to the distinguishing or central elements of their identity, the religions can only reaffirm or deepen their commitment to their identity, or else change it. Only in the "human core" area (philosophy) and in the "diffuse peripheral" area (philosophy and the social sciences) can the different religions find a common frame through which they can communicate their unique "answers" to human concerns.

Cooperation in certain projects and endeavors is as may be expected not some melting pot. Religions contribute—not surrender—their insights and strengths to the solution of problems. In the meantime, they celebrate and deepen their identity so future generations can assume it, and as it were, preserve it.

Identity involves not only propositions, but also a commitment to a set of shared elements, a commitment that fosters bonds among co-religionists. This can be seen in the etymology: *religare* (to bind together); and in Chinese *zongjiao* – ancestors' teachings.21

A Problem to Pursue

An empirical approach to the problem of identity can provide indicators, and sketch processes through which the central elements of a religious identity actually get carried out in the area of common human values. The way a religion actually influences behavior in a social context, and the way the times actually influence religions are some of the questions which may be clarified with data of this sort.

This might yield a glimpse into the process whereby one generation of "believers" might centralize an element, and a later generation "peripheralizes" it. If appeals for tolerance or civility between very distinct frameworks are based only on the shared human core, the uniquely religious dimension is bracketed out. When the phenomenon of converting to another religion is approached empirically, the distinct claims made by the religions will inevitably surface at the level of action or behavior. It would then be difficult to avoid addressing the religious dimension of life, even if only as a datum or as a source of identity.

Conclusion

This exploration into the process whereby religious identity may change suggests that a different way of looking at proof might be needed, at least in treating religious identity. Arguments at the level of particular claims (e.g. doctrines, beliefs, practices) appear to be inadequate in that the unifying role of identity and the element of bonding with a community are not given consideration. It is submitted that these factors proceed naturally from the fact that one's contact with objective reality is mediated. Thus, if dialogue proceeds from a recognition of these, it might he easier to contextualize specific propositions or claims. This way, the riches of the religions can more easily contribute to the solution of human problems, which are increasingly felt at the global level. This hope is understandable if from the very start the identity (as a link to a "living and practicing/professing" community) is affirmed and esteemed.

If only this mode is more welcoming, individuals are offered diverse ways of addressing deep questions without, as a consequence, being isolated from others. Man's constitutive solidarity with others is realized rather than stifled by the delimitation of questions to doctrinal formulations. Man's understanding is limited and the Apostle Paul was all too clear on this: "Now we are seeing a dim reflection in a mirror; but then we shall he seeing face to face. The knowledge that I have now is imperfect; but then I shall know as fully as I am known."22

Quite directly addressing the question of identity, the words and action of Jesus himself are most instructive and appealing:

John said to him, 'Master, we saw a man who is not one of us casting out devils in your name; and because he was not one of us we tried to stop him'. But Jesus said, 'You must not stop him; no one who works a miracle in my name is likely to speak evil of me. Anyone who is not against us is for us.'23

Notes

     * Comments and criticism on an earlier draft are gratefully appreciated. The writer served (1987-1999) with the RCIA team of St. Charles Church in Arlington, Virginia.

     1. *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, Mircea Eliade, ed. (Macmillian Pub. Co., N.Y., 1987) Vol. 12, p. 332.

     2. The convergence between Catholic and communist thoughts on the problem of agrarian reform in the Philippines in the 60's and 70's is a case in point.

     3. Tangential to the scope of this exploration is the "leader-follower" dynamic: it is possible for specialists and/or leaders to have an understanding of a given religion that differs from that which common believers have. From the standpoint of the inquirer, this itself should be an area to look into. The point is that there must be something definitive, otherwise, the inquiry process would be facing a chaos in terms of identity, then, an organized religion is not merely a label which may be manipulated for the purpose of just anyone to justify an individual agenda. There is, on the contrary, a certain degree of "givenness" traceable to the foundations of the religion in question.

     4. The question of religious experience as a possible motivating factor in one's decision to chance his religion is best subsumed under the set of motives given above. This is to avoid getting into the empirical mode of analysis or verification. An empirical approach to the problem would correspondingly have to be based on the different meanings of religious experience, a point which is at the substantive level. Cf.: Note (1), above. Also: The *Encyclopaedia Brittanica* William Benton, 1975, Vol. 15, pp. 647—651. The way to respect those different conceptions of religious experience is to abstract its possible motivational power, and let the different conceptions stand as they do in their original context.

     5. See: *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, David L. Sills Ed., Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968, Vol. 7, pp. 66—85.

     6. See: Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg & David Wong, "Aspects of Identity and Agency', *Identity, Character and Morality*, Owen Flanagan & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Eds.., (Bradford, NIT Press, 1993), pp. 19-36.

     7. In: Laszlo, Ervin, *The Systems View of the World: The Natural Philosophy of the New Developments in the Sciences* (George Braziller, N.Y., 1972) p. 106, it is observed that anthropologists have discovered a set of common human values. Admittedly, an accurate or exhaustive enumeration of these common values is probably impossible. But it is important to recognize that there are such values, which are recognizable at the empirical level.

     8. It is submitted that this awareness *is* virtually inescapable as man experiences the tens ion between fulfillment and frustration in day-to-day living. And, here can be seen the innate openness to a transcendent.

     9. RCIA inquirers are made aware—as they must be—of how their joining the church might make life more difficult for them.

     10. A recent neophyte told the congregation (i.e., publicly) how his desire to help others and a significant religious experience had led him to start the inquiry process with the RCIA. He had been volunteering time and effort to help fix houses for the less fortunate which opened a deeper sense of life.

     11. Once adopted or appropriated, the frame of reference is the only frame within which life can be lived in an integrated or consistent fashion.

     12. Blanco Aznar, Pedro Luis, 'La Trascendencia Humana Como Solidaridad" , *El Hombre: Inmanencia y Trascendencia*, (Univ. de Navarra, 1991), Vol. 1, pp. 311—322: 'Solidarity, therefore, is a universal supposition of man, which is to say: the solidarity of man is naturally universal in the double sense of being constitutive of all men and in that of the universal

transcendence of the individual . . . it is necessary to reaffirm with greater consistency the true human condition of man . . . (which is) prior to any external determination." (p. 319, my translation).

13. This is from the Chinese classic, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms.* It is cited by Li Zhen Zhi in his "Our China Cannot Go On This Way: Viewing Globalization and the Chinese Culture", Qiao Bao, 1994 Sep. 20, p. 20. (My translation)

14. #50. (Translation: The United States Catholic Conference.)

15. Book II, Chapter 48, Argument 4.

16. #3. (Translation: Austin Flannery, O.P.; Costello Pub., N.Y., 1975) p. 801.

17. #74. (Vatican translation).

18. #110.

19. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, Tomus XX, CCXL, pp. 603—605. It is helpful to cite the original, because the general message of the encyclical goes against the line that can be drawn from this passage . "Cum igitur sit unius religionis necessaria in civitate professio, profiteri eam oportet quae unice vera est, quaeque non difficulter praesertim in civitatibus catholicis, agnoscitur, cum in ea tamquam insignitae notae veritatis appareant." (p. 604) ("Therefore, when the profession of [only] one religion in a state is necessary, it is imperative to profess that which is the only true one, and which is not difficult to recognize, especially in Catholic states, when in it [the religion] there appear signs as distinctive of the truth."—My translation) The use of the subjunctive in introducing the condition (*cum sit necessaria*) recognizes the contingency of the situation: if the condition does not hold, the injunction need not hold either.

20. United Nations Organization, 1948. Article 18.

21. There is what appears to be a Western way of doing etymology on Chinese words. The comments of Dr. Sun Shangyang (in the seminar) are greatly appreciated—the point is that this way of tracing the word from the component characters is, in effect, superficial. *The Zhongwen Da Cidian* (*The Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Chinese Language*) the Institute for Advanced Chinese Studies, in cooperation with the National War College, August 1963) Vol. 10, #7249.171 explains the word by means of the substantive factors in early man's ("ancestor") efforts to understand his relationship with what is beyond him. *The Zongjiao Cidian* (*Dictionary of Religion*, Ren Jiyu, Ed. with the Dictionary of Religion Editorial Committee, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1981), pp. 712—713, specifically points to the communal (*renqun*) context of the origin of religion.

22. I Cor. 13,12 (The Jerusalem Bible, Doubleday, N.Y., 1966.)

23. Mark 9, 38—40. (Underscoring mine.) Luke 9, 49—50 has a parallel passage.

Rhetoric and Social Change

Christopher J. Wheatley

Conscience is but a word that cowards use, Devis'd at first to keep the strong in awe: Our strong arms be our conscience, swords our law!— *Richard III,* 5 3.309-311

O sir, we quarrel in print, by the book—as you have books for good manners. I will name you the degrees. The first, the Retort Courteous; the second, the Quip Modest; the third, the Reply Churlish; the fourth, the Reproof Valiant; the fifth, the Countercheck Quarrelsome; the sixth, the Lie with Circumstance; the seventh, the Lie Direct; and you may avoid that too, with an If. I knew when seven justices could not take up a quarrel, but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought of an if, as, "If you said so, then I said so"; and they shook hands and swore brothers. Your if is the only peacemaker; much virtue in If. *As You Like It,* 5.4.90-104

At some point, having determined why change ought to occur and in what direction change should be directed, one needs to consider not merely how change shall be accomplished in the sense of social interventions (such as changes in political and economic structures) but how people are to be brought to accept and work with the means and toward the end desired. This brings us to rhetoric in the broadest sense of the term: the method by which people are brought to identify some particular program with their own interests. I will begin with a discussion of misconceptions about rhetoric and a description of the rhetorical arena. This will be followed by an examination of two faulty rhetorical pleas, and of the dilemma that post-modernist theory, itself largely responsible for the renewed interest in rhetoric, poses for social change. I will then describe contributions to rhetorical theory, and, finally, consider the strengths of Burke's rhetoric and the limits of rhetoric itself.

Rhetoric and Its Area

A brief description of what rhetoric is not may be necessary for some readers who persist in regarding rhetoric as opposed to "the scientific," "the real," and "the true" (every time I use words such as "true," "real," or "fact," they should be read as having quotation marks around them, since, as will become apparent, I regard the use of all such terms as extremely problematic), and who possess the intellectually impoverished notion that rhetoric is merely the use of tropes and figures. These are not mistakes that theoretical scientists tend to make. Thus Steven Hawk (the inventor of black holes) says blithely, "I shall take the simple-minded view that a theory is just a model of the universe, or a restricted part of it, and a set of rules that relate quantities in the model to observations that we make. It exists only in our minds and does not have any other reality (whatever that might mean)."1 This is not a new idea; Locke points out in the fourth book of *The Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that we cannot prove that nominal essence corresponds to real essence, and Kant argues that we cannot know the thing in itself. Nor does such a position generate relativism since we still have the criteria of explanatory force and predictive capacity to distinguish good theories from bad ones. Thus Freud's theories are simply bad *prima facie* because they cannot generate useful predictions, and Marx's theories, while well-formed, are either bad

theory or mis-applied theory because they, as a matter of historical fact, generated predictions that did not obtain. What Hawk's remark does mean is that the assumptions that underlie a theory are something we are persuaded of for various reasons, not something we can demonstrate, if only because an argument cannot justify its own premises.

Some aspects of physical theory are not testable—super string theory for instance. When that is the case, criteria such as "simplicity" and "elegance' lead the scientist to prefer one explanation to another. And Occam's razor is rhetorical to the core. The simplest explanation may well not be the right one, but as a human characteristic, we prefer simplicity to complexity. Thus if two models have equal predictive force or are equally indemonstrable and can equally account for the observed data, our reason for preferring the simpler is emotional—it is easier to retain a simple model than a complex one—or aesthetic and not a function of reality or truth at all. For instance, the argument that the universe cannot be static begins with the observation that the universe looks the same in whatever direction we look and the assumption "that this would also be true if we were observing the universe from anywhere else"(*Time*, 42). Hawking says bluntly, "We have no scientific evidence for, or against, this assumption. We believe it only on grounds of modesty: it would be most remarkable if the universe looked the same in every direction around us, but not around other points in the universe"(*Time*, 42). The use of the word "modesty" indicates the rhetorical dimension. If we did think of man as the center of the universe, and hence were "immodest, this assumption might never occur to us. In other words, the argument begins not with an appeal to fact, or a self-evident claim, but to the audience's sense of fitness, and that puts us in the realm of rhetoric because fitness is a social construct. Of course this does not vitiate the force of the theory, since it retains explanatory force and predictive capacity. I am not claiming that science does not correspond to something real that exists someplace out there, because physics does "work" remarkably well. But the reason we think the model corresponds to something out there is because that is the simplest explanation for why the model works, and hence is something we are persuaded of, not something that can be demonstrated. Pragmatism is a rhetorical philosophy because determining the merit of a theory in terms of its utility is a judgment about expediency rather than a judgment about truth. Moreover, appeals to science as something opposed to rhetoric have to cope with the fact that a huge body of evidence has been accumulated in social sciences such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology which indicates that "rather than being a guiding rule of individual, organization, or scientific life, rationality turns out to be a rhetorical achievement—a symbolic product that is constructed through speech and actions which in themselves are nonrational."2 These social sciences are dependent on their assumptions, but so is philosophy, and neither set of assumptions is demonstrable.

Language itself mirrors the gap between models of reality and reality. Words are not the thing itself, but a symbol for the thing. Many words have no direct referent. Thus, we can point to many examples of courageous behavior but cannot point to courage itself. The noun in such cases is a concept that represents some class of things out there by indicating a set; words cannot adequately describe the set, while there nonetheless remains no substitute for the word. To illustrate this point, look up a word like courage in the dictionary, look up the words used to define courage, and observe how fast the definition becomes circular; i. e., one word defines the other and *vice versa*. Moreover, words come not with just their denotative meaning, but with a baggage of connotative meanings as well; the problem is apparent if one meditates for a moment on Keats' epigram "Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty." Whose truth, and what is beauty? The words cannot be separated from their historical and material instantiations. In the two and a half millennia since the Platonic dialogues, we remain no closer to a definition that all educated people can agree on because we

are looking for the wrong answer; we have been seeking for referents to terms that do not have referents. Thus rhetoric has recently been described as the "art of describing reality through language".3 It follows then that "Scientists, historians, philosophers, and others are engaged in rhetorical activity to whatever extent they assert or imply that reality is as they say it is" (64). Everything we know may not be mediated through language, but everything we can talk about certainly is.

Or, to put it another way, twentieth-century linguistic philosophy has rewritten the Platonic dialogues, although the insight was implicit in rhetorical theory from Aristotle. When the character Socrates asks what the good life is and the rhetors are only able to respond with examples of the good life, Plato presents them as crushed because they have not answered the question. In fact what the rhetors probably responded was that Socrates was asking a bad question based on the faulty assumption that all linguistic constructions have referents out there (because the question, "What are examples of the good life?" can be answered concretely, Socrates is assuming that the question "What is the good life?" also corresponds to some real thing). But there are only culturally, historically, materially instantiated examples of the good life, for the good life separate from those examples is merely a linguistic "address" indicating where in memory those examples are to be found. Or to use another analogy, the good life is just an intellectual holding company, producing nothing itself, but conveniently incorporating multiple stocks into one blue-chipper. If you try to define a term like the good life without the examples, seeking some essentialist definition, you have only the resources of language to fall back on, so the definition rapidly and inevitably becomes circular. The rhetors actually had the firmer grip on reality and a sounder understanding of how language works, but the Platonic dialogues have retained their appeal through their creation of the mystical, ultimate terms, the "forms" of good and beauty, etc.; in short, the appeal of the Platonic dialogues relies on the rhetorical trump card of ultimate terms, not on their arguments.

But even if we waive all of this and claim that there are things that are real and words that refer to them, whatever that might mean, reality is not opposed to rhetoric, for facts are merely one of the materials that the rhetor uses, as well as appeals to emotions and beliefs. For language itself is inherently rhetorical in that there are very few positive terms, and some kinds of adjectives are not among them. The computer I am writing on is real, a solid object. When I say it is a good computer I am now entering the realm of rhetoric, at least if I expect someone to agree with the claim, for any evaluative adjective takes its meaning from a complex network of associations that are different for different rhetors and audiences. What qualifies a computer as being good is a function of what the rhetor and his audiences regard as good, and what my purpose is in saying it is good. The goodness of the computer is not intrinsic to the computer itself, but extrinsic and a function of the set of beliefs that make up goodness. If you have much word-processing to do or many numbers to crunch, the computer is good, whereas "a good computer" is an oxymoron to a Neo-Luddite who regards machines as contributing to the dehumanization of society. In the realm of rhetoric, a thing can be both one thing and another. That is, my claim that the computer is good is a claim about the computer in relation to other computers; the Neo-Luddite response translates the claim into the moral realm and asserts that computers can never be good.

Shortly after Plato and his rhetorical stalking-horse Socrates (and Socrates in the history of thought exists only as his character has been appropriated by Plato and others, and it bears recollection that Aristophanes' dramatization was found more compelling by Socrates contemporaries, who exiled the poor rhetor from the academy). The more practical Aristotle immediately reinstated him. Aristotle distinguishes between rhetoric and dialectic in that the

dialectic, starting also from opinion, dispassionately seeks the true names of things, while rhetoric is an attempt to persuade people of positions using whatever names are likely to be effective.4 Aristotle apparently believed that in some fields (such as ethics) the dialectic provides an adequate method for seeking truth. Since his ethic produces the contemplative man (i.e., Aristotle) as the highest ethical life, we may question whether he was right. And logic too can be involved in rhetoric as an argument may be perfectly valid whether or not we know the premises to be true. We should remember that up until the seventeenth-century when philosophers like Hobbes argued for the fiction that there is some Edenic language that genuinely corresponds to things as they are, logic and rhetoric were not regarded as opposed but as different means of communication that were used with different audiences for different subjects; logic was used to convince the learned in areas of science of some position, while rhetoric was used to convince those who did not know logic and in political and judicial questions. Both, were persuasive and hence, in the sense I am using the term, rhetorical.5 Logic, at least for some (such as Bacon) was not a method of discovering truth, but merely the means by which truths previously established were communicated to a particular kind of audience. This underlies Descartes' rejection of logic at the same time he was rejecting rhetoric: "Mais, en les [philosophy, logic,- and mathematics] examinant, je pris garde que, pour La logique, ses syllogismes et la plupart de ses autres instructions servent plutot a expliquer a l'autrui les choses qu'on sait ou meme, comme l'art de Lulle, a parler, sans jugement, de celles qu'on ignore . . . ."6 The self-evident truths at the top of Descartes' hierarchy are prior to logic rather than a consequence of logical demonstration.

On a much simpler level, science, philosophy, religion, and art all participate in the rhetorical even if we allow them to have autonomous components. Thus the theory of evolution may be true science and correspond to reality. But this fact is not self-evident, and simply claiming that evolution is a scientific fact will not convince a fundamentalist; the fundamentalist must be persuaded of this, and that is a rhetorical activity. The salvation that Christ offers may be a reality, but the unbeliever must be convinced of that, and that is why Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas were both concerned with rhetorical questions (Augustine in *Doctrina Christiana* and Aquinas in his commentaries on Aristotle)—although too frequently the rhetorical method may take the form of Saint Olaf's conversion of Iceland and Norway. In other words facts, in whatever form they may appear *never* speak for themselves; people have to be convinced first that they are facts, and second that they mean what the speaker says they mean. You can, for instance, use statistics as a part of an argument, but they are not themselves an argument. Nor are good arguments irresistibly compelling. Suppose Plato's argument banishing the rhetors really is irrefutable. Why did it not convince Aristotle?

Moreover, whenever science, religion, or art appears in another context than its own autonomous realm, it becomes rhetorical. Evolution may be true as a biological fact, but when it is used as an argument about how society should function, it becomes a rhetorical device because it is an analogy rather than something that can be show to be demonstrably relevant. A hierarchy of creation may be a divine fact, but when it is used to justify a particular hierarchical social structure, it becomes a rhetorical device. And the sculptor may create a statue that simply is itself, but when a banker buys it and puts it in front of her building, it becomes a rhetorical statement that says, "We are the Preservers of culture, and we can preserve your money." The point is that rhetoric is an inescapable part of human relationships. Yes, it can manipulate people through lies and emotional appeals that are irrational. It can also be the means by which the truth is spoken most effectively (whatever that might mean). Rhetoric is not good or bad in itself, but good or bad as it is used by the rhetor towards a purpose. Rhetoric is a method of criticism and action, not a

metaphysics (but many contemporary philosophers would argue that metaphysics are no longer possible and that all that's left is the study of rhetoric). It does not supply its own premises, although premises are invariably shaped by rhetorical context, and it does not provide the end toward which it is used, although any end will be limited by what the rhetor judges, consciously or not, will be possible. In other words, rhetoric is not just the figures and tropes of appeal: it is the methods (the kinds of arguments, the selection of tropes and examples, the consideration of semantics), by which people are persuaded to adopt some action or to continue in some state of belief. The chief contributor to faulty rhetorical practice is the failure to recognize rhetoric's ubiquity.

Finally, the rhetorical view for which I am arguing—and it is an extreme view—could be summed up as saying that knowledge is something we construct rather than something we discover, and truth is not something that can be demonstrated, but something negotiated between the speakers. Such a view helps to humanize social change because it makes humanity not contingent on some greater reality, but makes reality something we determine. The recognition that truth is something we are persuaded of leads to an appropriate humility so that the rhetor "will accept it that the pieties of others are no less real or deep through being different from his, and he will seek to recommend his position by considering such orders of recalcitrance and revising his statements accordingly."7 Rhetoric emphasizes the centrality of values, because values are the most important of the rhetor's materials.

Physical coercion is, arguably, a rhetorical device, a method of persuasion. The old canard, that though the pen may be mightier than the sword, the sword speaks more loudly and forcefully at any given moment, hides the central weakness of change that is imposed rather than internalized. The events of the recent past in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union show that however effective violent persuasion may be on a local level and for a limited period of time, the people must consent to political and economic systems, or, rather, must accept, whether consciously or not, such systems as a legitimate rubric within which the narrative of their lives can have meaning. New meaning cannot be imposed; it can only be built out of the strands of meaning that already exist, since new terms and linguistic constructions must take their definitions from the language that we already know or they will be incomprehensible. As any marketing student knows, you can buy in any language you like, but you have to sell in the language of the buyer (the centrality of marketing to capitalism and marketing's close relationship to rhetoric may well be an important factor in capitalism's durability). Anyone who would convince others to change, must know the language, both semantics and deep structure, of those that he would change.

Burke and the Marxists, Blanchard and the Capitalists

Kenneth Burke's interest in rhetoric made him almost unique in American intellectual circles in the 1930s. His first major practical application of that interest made his name an anathema in leftist circles, and was so traumatic for Burke that fifty-five years later, the address has still not appeared in any collection of Burke's writings. At the American Writer's Congress in April of 1935, Burke delivered a paper entitled "Revolutionary Symbolism in America." Gramsci, it should be remembered, was dying in Mussolini's prison, and American Marxists still had a comforting belief in a teleological view of history whereby ultimate socialist victory was inevitable (in their defense, the United States was still in the throes of the Great Depression, so the inevitable breakdown of late capitalism appeared to be going on all around them). Moreover, prior to the *Prison Notebooks* and Althusser's essays, the prevailing view was that "symbolism" was an

element of the superstructure, and hence a purely derivative function of the economic base, a view now associated by smug academics with "vulgar" Marxism. In a passage in *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950) that may refer to the incident, Burke sums up the difficulties of addressing a Marxist on the subject of rhetoric:

Whatever may be the claims of Marxism as a "science," its terminology is not a neutral "preparation for action" but "inducement to action." In this sense, it is unsleepingly rhetorical, though much of its persuasiveness has derived from insistence that it is purely a science, with "rhetoric" confined to the deliberate or unconscious deceptions of non-Marxist apologetics. Thus, we once saw a Marxist (he has since left the Communist Party) get soundly rebuked by his comrades for the suggestion that leftist critics collaborate in a study of "Red Rhetoric." Despite their constant efforts to find the slogans, catchwords, and formulas that will most effectively influence action in given situations, and their friendliness to "propaganda" or "social significance" in art, they would not allow talk of a "Red Rhetoric." For them, "Rhetoric" applied solely to the persuasiveness of capitalist, fascist, and other non-Marxist terminologies (or "ideologies").8

Marxism is thus a "privileged" language, possessing a truth value denied to other kinds of language which are deceptive in that they mask the determining economic base of society with "fictions" of liberty, laws, and opportunities. Such a belief, when combined with a teleological view of history, guaranteed that Burke's address was going to be regarded as "ideologically deviant."

What Burke told the American Marxist writers was that the rhetorical appeal to workers as a heroic, revolutionary class was not working and was not going to work: "There are few people who really want to work, let us say, as a human cog in an automobile factory, or as a gatherer of vegetables on a big truck farm. Such rigorous ways of life enlist our *sympathies*, but not our ambitions."9 Representations of heroic workers do not appeal to Americans because their culture has created in them a desire to escape such a status: "Some people, living overly sedentary lives, may like to read of harsh physical activity (as they once enjoyed Wild West Fiction)—but Hollywood knows only too well that the people engaged in such kinds of effort are vitalized mainly by some vague hope that they may some day escape it (*Symbolism*, 28). The Marxist rhetoric of the thirties was failing, according to Burke, in two ways. First, American workers weren't listening; after a hard day's work their tendency was to want to listen to a radio program or see a movie that presented Fred and Ginger dancing something different from what they lived, cheek to cheek presented a goal, that., however unrealizable, represented an alternative to a life that they knew better than the Marxist intellectuals. The workers were repulsed by images of themselves as heroes because American culture had convinced them that hard physical work was something to escape (and Burke must have really annoyed his audience by implying that was not only a product of social conditioning but an innate characteristic of "humanity"). Second, the machine of American cultural hegemony welcomed representations of deprived workers because that fed into the needs of the system for a populace that measured happiness in material terms: "Adult education in capitalist America, today is centered in the efforts of our economic mercenaries (our advertising men and sales organizations) to create a maximum desire for commodities consumed under expensive conditions—and Hollywood appeals to the workers mainly by picturing the qualities of life in which this commercially stimulated desire is gratified"(*Symbolism*, 29). Burke was standing vulgar Marxism on its head. The glossy fictions of the movies created a desire for more of what capitalism was good at—producing goods. Moreover, it reinforced a belief that one could

transcend one's initial status to achieve that Hollywood lifestyle. In the language of America, as soon as one had material goods one ceased to be a "worker" and that was a consummation devoutly to be wished. Frank Lentricchia sums up Burke's argument: From the American point of view, the rhetorico-syrnbolic weight of the "worker," is burdened with an irrelevant historicity that is put into play every time the word is uttered, for it tends to carry with it an attendant rhetoric, decidedly foreign to our ways—proletariat, *bourgeoisie, ruling-class*: the stuff of European experience, but surely not ours.10

American Marxists, according to Burke, were preaching to the converted and using a language that guaranteed that those who did not want to listen did not have to. Burke's suggestion that Marxism, to succeed in this country, must learn to use the central terms and symbols of *this*country (liberty, self-reliance, responsibility) fell not merely on deaf but hostile ears. The reasons for his failure are implicit within the rhetorical theory that informs his own argument. His audience was convinced that class structures are universal and that culture is purely a product of the economic base. Burke was arguing for an attention to local language under an assumption that the relationship between base and superstructure is dynamic; prior to American Marxists had no framework in Gramsci and Althusser, which to understand such a claim.

Before turning to an explanation of how rhetoric might function in the framework of social change, I would like to use an earlier paper from the seminar to show how a failure to consider the rhetorical context vitiates an otherwise powerful argument. Father Blanchard's paper on El Salvador ends with a plea to Eastern Europeans: These men and women have captured the attention of the West because of their courage and sacrifice. They have "triumphed" over communism. But have they triumphed over oppression or simply replaced an inefficient economic and social system with another yet to be tried? Have they taken a stand for liberty, or will they merely vindicate capitalism, whose equally powerful potential for oppression is yet to be seen in Eastern Europe, but is all-to-evident in Central America. (25)

The disjunctive rhetorical questions propose a dilemma: the reader is invited to regard capitalism and communism as equally unattractive alternatives. Insofar as the reader does so, this is a rhetorically effective device. Communism is left largely undefined (probably rightly, since few audiences remain that find it an attractive possibility) in the paper, but the term capitalism has appeared earlier.

Capitalism appears in the context of a discussion of the opposition between the right wing death squads of ARENA and the Church: "According to ARENA's logic, the Church has chosen to favor the non-producers, the users of national resources over the producers. ARENA regards the capitalist producers as the foundation of Salvadoran society. . ."(16). The explanation of the distinction between producers and users appears still earlier in the essay: "The oligarchy regarded themselves as the "producers" and the Indians as "Non-producers," i.e, as "users" of national resources. The oligarchy maintained that it was their capital and not the labor of the Indians that allowed the plantations to produce crops for export (l4). I think most would grant that as the terms are defined in the essay, capitalism is at least as unattractive as communism.

But is this in fact the way most audiences define capitalism? That is, will an audience accept this appropriation of the term as it is used for polemical effect? The response of one member of the seminar from Poland is instructive; he pointed out that what the author is describing is a sort of dark parody of feudalism rather than what most people would regard as capitalism. If this reflection proves characteristic of Eastern European responses, then one of the primary audiences for the paper has been lost. The dilemma of choosing between capitalism and communism dissolves and the author's position is discredited because of his 'inaccuracy." Many in an American

audience will not be inclined to accept this definition of capitalism either. For instance, President Bush in the January of 1990 State of the Union address, described education as a way of improving "human capital"; i.e., education will increase the value that workers hold in themselves as labor. This, too, is not a particularly attractive formulation, but it illustrates the gap between what the author of the paper regards as capitalism and what highly paid American speech-writers, master rhetors all, regard as capitalism.

But this represents a problem on the level of semantics, which, while not trivial, is less damaging than a rhetorical misperception in the deep structure of the paper where it concerns involvement in El Salvador: Sartre's position that Stalinism was a necessary historical moment invites another, equally frightening interpretation of history and of the contemporary: the excesses of National Socialism were necessary to bring about the triumph of communism. This thesis, transported to Central America by the U. S. State Department is equally chilling: "the saturation bombing of the countryside, disruption of the population, support for the Salvadoran military and, indirectly, for the notorious death squads, is necessary to stop the spread of communism." "This is an obscene suggestion."

One must agree with the author's moral indignation. But if I may use a characteristically Burkean maneuver of punning on the etymology of words, it is not an "obscene" suggestion at all. The State Department's action is not "from or behind' the scene; it's right in the middle of it, and denying that is to deny the language (in its broadest sense) of the audience one wishes to convince. The author, like the Marxists Burke was chastising, is preaching to the converted. If this passage is designed to reaffirm attitudes of a friendly audience, a traditional rhetorical task, then this is excellent technique, but if the desire is to change an attitude, then the passage is a rhetorical disaster. A popular American columnist has within the last few months written a column arguing precisely what the author wishes to dismiss as obscene; that it is preferable to prop up the current government by any means necessary because the FMLN would be worse. If one audience for the paper is American policy makers, or, at least, their constituents who can bring pressure upon such policy makers, then the author must accept their linguistic arena if only to transcend it. The rhetor cannot convince if he refuses to enter the discussion.

The Post-Modernist Dilemma

In *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (1941, rev. 1967), Burke describes the rhetor's arena:

Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion hail already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns himseif against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of your ally's assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress.11

We are, in short, as a matter of necessity, rhetors as a fact of existence. We cannot know all the causes of the historical moment, and consequently are arguing from opinion rather than demonstrating propositions; hence any discussion, other than science (and Burke does allow a little

room for positive terms in science, many fewer than scientists perhaps would like and more than the rigid post-structuralist will allow) is a matter of enthymemes rather than logical proof.

But despite the fact that we must die without knowing how the discussion turned out, or whether what we championed was accepted as a useful step in the discussion, that the discussion is by its nature rhetorical is a positive element for Burke. That almost all use of symbols is necessarily implicated in rhetoric is the guarantee that on some level we are free. In his discussion of Aristotle's rhetoric, Burke says, Persuasion involves choice, will; it is directed to a man only insofar as he is free. This is good to remember in these days of dictatorship and near-dictatorsship. Only insofar as men are potentially free, must the spellbinder seek to persuade them. Insofar as they must do something, rhetoric is unnecessary, its work being done by the nature of things, though often these necessities are not of a natural origin, but come from necessities imposed by man-made conditions. I do not think Burke has realized here the full implications of his earlier parable. The passage on Aristotle continues, "as with the kind of *peithananke* (or "compulsion under the guise of persuasion") that sometimes flows from the nature of the 'free market'.

Even claims about the "invisible hand" of the market imply a need to convince people that the conditions of a free market economy really are responsible for the "necessities" that economic choice forces on one. Or, the claim implies a recognition that the audience could simply reject the claim, whether rightly or wrongly, as being not inevitable but a mask for a particular interest.

Much of *A Rhetoric of Motives* that was original in 1950 is now commonplace, particularly Burke's explanation of how "autonomous" realms like science, religion, and art participate in the rhetorical; that is, they function at least partially as attempts to justify a particular social or political order. Explaining exactly how these realms participate in the rhetorical has been the playfield of post-structuralism since its seminal figure Nietzsche began the game in *A Genealogy of Morals* and *The Gay Science*. I do not mean to discount the contribution of Nietzsche and his merry band; Burke agrees with Aristotle that the rhetor must be a critic of rhetoric, recognizing how it is used by others, explaining how its presence is disguised. Or, as Burke remarks about the New Critics, who insisted on the poem as an artifact independent of author and audience, "so much progressive and radical criticism in recent years has been concerned with the social implications of art, that affirmation of art's autonomy can often become, by antithesis, a roundabout way of identifying oneself with the interests of political conservatism. In accordance with the rhetorical principle of identification, whenever you find a doctrine of 'nonpolitical' esthetics affirmed with fervor, look for its politics"(RM, 28). What is refreshing about Burke, in contrast to others, is that Burke then attempts to construct a positive system of how the rhetor both should construct a rhetoric and toward what ends.

Burke's statement of the post-structuralist dilemma comes in a strong reading of Mannheim as a kind of deconstructionist. Burke's view of the Platonic dialogue is laid out with unusual clarity (for Burke):

1. Mutual exposure of imperfect ideas (ideas bound to the sensory image).
2. Socratic transcending of this partiality.
3. Socratic summarizing vision of the pure idea.
4. Translation of the pure idea into terms of the mythic image.
5. Whereupon enters Mannheim, who proposes to develop a "sociology of knowledge" by treating the first and last steps as if the were of the same nature. Hence, he would perfect a method for discounting the limitations of both ("unmasking" their bias). (RM, 201-202).

The final myth becomes not a transcendent moment but another expression of interest, and, if the machine works properly, there are no transcendent moments, merely expressions of interest. This leaves no reason to act whatsoever: "However, a motivational problem arises, if you treat the mythic motive as on a par with ideological motives. For you find that, if your method for eliminating all such bias were successful, it would deprive society of its primary motive power. For though bias is false promise, it is promise. Hence if you eliminate bias (illusion) from men's social motives, where do you find an equally urgent social motive?" (RM, 200). The key word is social. Motivation still exists but it remains entirely personal. Thus, if mystification were entirely eliminated, all claims of altruistic motives would be reduced to claims of interest.

Most deconstructionists have not understood this point. Yes, the claim that "justice" requires that admissions at a university be based wholly on merit can be a mask for maintaining a dominant social or racial group, and thus an expression of interest. But taken to its logical conclusion, so would the claim that requires retributive elements in order that oppressed "justice groups be given a chance to overcome the uneven playing field caused by oppression. The response by the dominant group can be simply that is an expression of interest too, and there is no available mechanism to determine which particular interest ought to be chosen, because there are no untainted positions from which to choose. There is no longer any reason to want to change anything except that some changes might help a particular individual or group, and that means that those that already have the advantage in trying to get more. Thus post-structuralism does not empower the disenfranchised as its proponents have claimed; it finally removes the last shreds of conscience from those who have power.

In a discussion of Bentham, Burke makes clear the relevance of rhetoric to the humanization of social change. As rhetorical critics, the last two centuries have done a wonderful job of recognizing the presence of masks: "The debunking vocabulary can disclose material interests with great precision. Too great precision, in fact. For though the doctrine of *Zweck im Recht* is a veritable Occam's razor for the simplification of human motives, teaching us the role that *special material interests* play in the "impartial" manipulations of the law, showing us that law can be privately owned like any property, it can be too thorough; in lowering human dignity so greatly, it lowers us all."12

But rhetoric is more than just the methods of criticism, for it seeks to provide a method for action as well. Burke's answer will be that we have to postulate some kind of ultimate terms, whether we believe in them or not, for the rhetor to escape (my example, not Burke's) the final freedom of Nietzsche's *die Uberman* who decides what is right by an arbitrary act of will, and the framework of the ultimate term is a comic vision of the universe.

Burke's Rhetorical Theory

Burke's rhetoric begins with the paradox Of substance developed in *A Grammar of Motives:*

First we should note that there is, etymologically, a pun behind the Latin roots. The word is often used to designate what some thing or agent intrinsically is, as *per* these meanings in Webster's: "the most important element in any existence; the characteristic and essential components of anything; the main part; essential import; purport." Yet etymologically, "substance" is a scenic word. Literally, a person's or a thing's sub-stance would be something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing.13

Burke's point is that the term used to describe what a thing is describes the thing by what it is not. The human, as substance, exists inevitably within a context, and, indeed, cannot be known independently from a context. This does not eliminate substance; it merely forces it into the dialectical (Burke's term is "Dramatistic") ratios of the Pentad: Act, Agent, Scene, Agency, Purpose. From this Burke will generate the rhetorical arena of *A Rhetoric Motives*:

A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is *identified* with B. Or he may *identify himself* with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so.

Here are ambiguities of substance. In being identified with B, A is "substantially one" with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. (RM, 2021)

Burke's key rhetorical term is not persuasion but identity. Broadening his rhetorical field to consider the rhetoric of science, politics, and religion as they participate in identity claims in non-verbal systems requires this move on his part, since a missile factory in one's city is not precisely an act of persuasion, but an unspoken reminder of community interests.

In the context of his defense of the term substance, Burke makes clear that the field of rhetoric involves the establishment of consubstantiality: They [modem philosophers] abolished the *term*, but it is doubtful whether they can ever abolish the *function* of that term, or even whether they should *want* to. A doctrine of *consubstantiality*, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an *act*; and a way of life is an *acting-together*, men have 'common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, that make them consubstantial'. (RM, 21)

Rhetoric is concerned with consubstantiality in its "partisan" aspects, "the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another" (RM, 22). Though identity claims are the central mechanism of rhetoric, identity implies "division": "For one need 'identification' very sharply to turn, its ironic counterpart: not scrutinize the concept of see, implied in it at every division. Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall" (RM, 23).

The problem basically is that identity claims have typically simplest way to achieve unity been based on difference. The between factions is to point out another —action that represents an even greater threat, whether real or not. This can operate consciously, as when the dying Henry IV advises Prince Hall to turn his subjects' minds toward France: Therefore, my Harry, Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels, that action, hence borne out, May waste the memory of the former days.14 This is good, sound advice as Henry escapes, for the most part, the civil wars that darken his father's reign. And, as an Englishman, French deaths probably seemed a small price to pay for English unity to Shakespeare dramatizing the matter nearly one hundred and eighty years later.

But we can see this tendency even in works whose avowed purpose is peace. Thus in *Lysistrata*,15 the Greeks are reminded of their identity through a reminder of their danger: "though you use a lustral urn in common at the altars, like blood-relatives, when at Olympia, Delphi, or Thermopylae-how many others might I name if I took time!—yet, with barbarian hordes of enemies at hand, it is Greek men, Greek cities, you destroy" (35).

Not merely are the barbarians the true threat, they are a more appropriate object for aggression. The characters in the play are tamed through sexual deprivation, but the audience is approached by reference to the "other." *The Late Revolution: or The Happy Change* "written by a person of quality" and produced in England in 1688 is a work that seeks to dramatize the reconciliation of old enemies:

Cavalier: Friend Testimony! Parliament Neighbor Hot-Head—Who thought to've seen you at this end o'th' World? What, for the Prince's Army!
Cavalier: That's impossible! This certain—No—I've done now of fighting with my friends; when I do it next, it shall be with my Enemies—Were not you and I a pair of wise ones, as well as thousands more, to knock out one another little Brains, to make Knaves laugh at us, and wise-men pitty us.
Parliament: I joy to hear thy voice—Now then agreed for ever.
Cavalier: A Curse on him who e're attempts to part us.16

But roundhead and cavalier are united by their common fear and loathing for two groups so despicable that the author assumes any rational reader will see the danger they represent: the Jesuits and the Irish. Father Peters, when the rising starts, says about the English, 'Kill all—the quickest method to convert 'em', and is dissuaded only because "'this not practicable." And the citizens of London are agreed that James fl's greatest crime has been the hiring of Irishmen for his anny, "to set a villain o're his N4aster/ To make a Slave thus Lord it o're his Lord"(11). The Irish are a "Brutal race," quite literally born slaves, and, "Like Toads and Serpents made to be destroy'd"(ll). The irony that the vilified Father Peters and the sturdy honest Englishmen are equally bloodthirsty is almost surely unconscious. The author seeks to show consubstantiality between the English; only the reader of three hundred years later can make the next step up the hierarchy to regard both sides as identical in their lack of humanity.

Of course this claim of identity through difference still exists in Northern Ireland, and shows how difficult it is to disentangle the two. The IRA has frequently shown its willingness to attack soldiers and policemen at great risk to themselves. Nor are they squeamish about bloodshed, killing even their own if they suspect them of helping the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Yet Ian Paisley, on record as believing that the Catholic Church is "The Whore of Babylon,' that John Paul II is the anti-Christ, and that the Irish Catholics are a dangerous sub-human species who must be kept down lest they slaughter all the Protestants in implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an *act*; and a way of life is an *acting-together*; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, that make them consubstantial. (RM, 21)

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An identity claim is an attempt to transcend interests by showing a common higher interest; hence, rhetoric relies on hierarchies. One might wish to argue, as some feminists have, that the problem is the concept of hierarchy itself. That is, the notion that something is "higher" than other things is a consequence of the linear thinking produced by phallocentrism. Unfortunately, Burke is almost certainly right when he argues that hierarchy is an inescapable fact of "systematic thought": "It is embodied in the mere process of growth, which is synonymous with the class divisions of youth and age, stronger and weaker, male and female, or the stages of learning, from apprentice to journeyman to master." (RM, 14l)

The last example shows the abuse to which hierarchy is heir. Though an innocent statement of degrees of skill initially, it "rhetorically reenforces the protection of privilege"(RM,141). That is, this hierarchy is taken out of its own realm and used to justify something in a different realm; greater skill is used to justify perquisites not dependent on skill. As an example, up until the seventeenth-century In England, sumptuary laws ordained what one could wear based on rank and independently of what one could afford.

But since Burke is writing a rhetoric, he reminds us that "To say that hierarchy is inevitable is not to say that any particular hierarchy is inevitable" (RM,141). Moreover, "Though *hierarchy* is exclusive, the principle of hierarchy is not; all ranks can "share in it alike" (RM, 141). That is, the hierarchy suggests that highest and lowest can be reversed, as in the Christian promise that the low shall be high, when the circumstances change. This reversal is at the core of Marxism as well. But the greatest threat of hierarchy is that it involves us in the principle of division that we examined earlier, which Burke will explain by invoking the tragic scapegoat: "The scapegoat is dialectically

appealing, since it combines in one figure contrary principles of identification and alienation. And by splitting the hierarchic principle into factions, it becomes ritually gratifying; for each faction can then use the other as *katharma*, the unclean vessel upon which can be loaded the dyslogistic burdens of vocabulary (a procedure made all the more zealous by the secret that, if not thus morally "protected," each faction might "court" the other)." (RM, 141)

This can perhaps be better understood by reflecting again upon the example of Northern Ireland. Division is inherent in human language as much as identification, and the scapegoat allows us to ease ourselves from this divisive tension by laying the blame upon the other. And if we did not invoke the scapegoat, we would be in danger of being "courted" by the other, or of becoming united with them and of needing to seek division elsewhere. Thus, Paisley and the IRA serve a cathartic function for each other, being the means by which guilt is justified through the rhetorical purgation.

Burke's next step is to argue that the principle of hierarchy, inevitable in thought, is also necessary to a successful rhetoric as a purposive principle. Unlike many modem theorists, Burke accepts the proposition that there are some positive terms: "A positive term is most unambiguously itself when it names a visible and tangible thing which can be located in time and place" (RM, 183). We need not involves ourselves in the argument that this definition, too, is rhetorical; we need merely except that such a term is at least more positive than "the 'fictitious' entities of the law. ('Tree' is a positive term, but 'rights' and 'obligations' are legal fictions)" (RM, 183). "Fictitious entities" exist in the next order of terms which Burke calls the dialectical: "Even insofar as the positive terminology acquires theoretical champions who proclaim the 'principles of positivism,' we are in the realm of the purely dialectical," because positivism is a "titular" term (RM, 184): Titles like "Elizabetanism" or "capitalism" can have no positive referent, for instance. And though they sum up a vast complexity of conditions which might conceivably be reduced to a near-infinity of positive details, if you succeeded in such a description you would find that your recipe contained many ingredients not peculiar to "Elizabethanism" or "capitalism" at all. (RM, 184)

This is pragmatism. The key words are "sum up," for they argue that our ethical, epistemological, and ontological terms are the positional terms for the sum of experience. Thus they emphasize the way in which we construct our reality and the notion that truth is additive rather than something we discover out there. We cannot do without these terms, but they do not in themselves refer to anything in particular. They are a cluster of actions and attitudes rather than positive terms. This, it could be argued, is far enough for the rhetor to go. Once one agrees that many (possibly all) of our value terms are dependent on material and cultural instantiations, the rhetor realizes that what is necessary is conversation and persuasion for social harmony in the absence of certainty because there is an essential component to any value. We can accept some limited number of widely acknowledged, if not universally accepted, rules for behavior (it is wrong to injure others because they might injure me, it is better to tell the truth most of the time because otherwise people will figure Out I am lying and not believe me when I want them to) and agree that values must be a negotiable proposition. In other words, social harmony becomes the end not because it has some essential value but because pragmatically most ~an agree that harmony is better than disharmony; the method for achieving some approximation of harmony is the dialectic of conversation: "Dialectic in itself may remain on the level of parliamentary conflict, leading to compromise. It being the realm of ideas and principles, if you organize a conflict among spokesmen for competing ideas and principles, you may produce a situation wherein there is no one clear choice" (RM, 186-187). This is, of course, the preferred method of government in

western civilization. Its chief advantage is that no one participant, confident of his truth, is allowed to impose it on others violently.

Burke then goes on to a dyslogistic description of the "Parliamentary wrangle" which indicates his dissatisfaction with this as a legitimate end for the rhetor: "Each of the spokesmen, whose ideas are an extension of special interests, must remain somewhat unconvinced by any solution which does not mean the complete triumph of his partisan interests. Yet he may have to compromise, putting through some portion of his program by making concessions to allies whom, if he could get his wishes absolutely, he would repudiate." (RM, 187)

This can be readily regarded as, according to Burke, "demoralization." A major gap here is that Burke does not explain why he regards this as an unsatisfactory terminus. The parliamentary dialogue has the obvious advantage that it is physically non-violent, a result preferable to the actions of many who have insisted on imposing their essential truths upon the world. Yet Burke wants to suggest that some ultimate term is necessary to transcend the dialectical wrangle: The "dialectical" order would leave the competing voices in a jangling relation with one another (a conflict solved *faute de mieux* by "horse-trading"); but the "ultimate" order would place these competing voices themselves in a *hierarchy*, or *sequence*, or *evaluative series*, so that, in some way, we went by a fixed and reasoned progress from one to another, the members of the entire group being arranged *developmentally* with relation to one another. (RM, 188) And Burke's immediate example of the effective hierarchy leading to an ultimate term is the Socratic dialogue where Socrates means by dialectic not merely the step from sensory terms to ideas, but also a hierarchic ordering of steps (RM, 181). This is unsatisfactory on a philosophical level; as we saw earlier, Socrates has a naive assumption about language, that because we can find examples of the beautiful, there must also be an essential referent for beauty. All we need to make sense of utterances about beauty is a view of beauty as a sort of pointer to examples of beautiful things, largely identified by culture, and a rudimentary algorithm that allows us to determine whether new elements should be included. Burke's interest, however, is not in the ultimate term as the end of the series, but in the ultimate term as providing a possibility for a hierarchy of means, "whereby a somewhat formless parliamentary wrangle can, by vocabulary, be creatively endowed with an 'ultimate design" (RM, 188). Burke's argument rests then on the assumption that the inevitably of hierarchy carries with it a desire for design and hence an ultimate term: the principle of hierarchy "includes also the entelechial tendency, the treatment of the 'top' or 'culminating' stage as the 'image' that best represents the entire 'idea"' (l41).

That humanity as a fact of language may require ultimate terms may be Burke's greatest insight. As a practical example of this from the history of science, consider Thomas Kuhn's analysis of why Darwin's *Origin of the Species* was so bothersome in 1859. According to Kuhn, "evidence pointing to evolution, including the evolution of man, had been accumulating for decades, and the idea of evolution had been suggested and widely disseminated before.17 But though many in the scientific community had already accepted some version of evolution they "had taken evolution to be a goal-directed process" (*Science*, 171). Darwin's theory was revolutionary because it suggested "a process that moved steadily from primitive beginnings but *toward* no goal" (*Science*, 172). The doubters simply could make no sense of a. theory that had no ultimate term at the end of the progress of evolution. The still barely hidden assumption of many conservative economists, that the poor are poor because they deserve to be due to personal insufficiencies, is evidence that many still have not understood Darwin and appropriated his theory for rhetorical reasons.

But even if we agree with Burke that humanity *needs* ultimate terms, this presents a difficulty for Burke since I think he, too, does not believe in any ultimate terms. Thus, one of his examples for an effective rhetoric based on an ultimate term, a hierarchical development of competing interests, is Lenin's treatment of the worker as gaining a conscious sense not just of himself as worker but as member of an emergent, revolutionary class: "The worker whose understanding becomes infused with this doctrine then sees himself not merely as an individual joining position with other individuals to improve his bargaining his employer: he sees himself as *member of a class*, the proletariat, which is destined to play a *crucial role* in the unfolding of history as a whole" (RM, 196). Burke now makes it hard on us, remarking "Call it fallacious if you want, but pointing to a notable formal advantage, got by the union of drama and reason, a wholesome rhetorical procedure in itself" (RM, 197).

Not only does Burke not believe in ultimate terms such as 'God', but he clearly thinks that belief in God is a function of the hierarchical tendency in man as the "symbol using animal." *The Rhetoric of Religion*18 ends with an "epilogue" entitled *Prologue in Heaven* where "The Lord" explains to Satan how the idea of God develops out of the logical nature of man. Satan as interlocutor takes that conclusion:

S But when these Word-People are gone, won't the life of words be gone?
TL Unfortunately, yes.
S Then, what of us, the two voices in this dialogue? When words go, won't we, too, be gone?
TL Unfortunately, yes.
S Then of this there will be nothing?
nothing . . .but it's more complicated that that.
TL Yes.

The ending is deliberately ambiguous, as throughout the dialogue Satan has attempted premature summations, and the Lord has responded with "It's more complicated than that," forcing the dialogue to a higher level of summation. But at best, Burke is saying that 'logology' is incapable of finding God in language: "Above all, logology fails to offer grounds for the perfection of promises and threats that theology allows for" (RR, 300). That, of course, is a two-edged sword since theology is composed of words. If we grant the view that an effective rhetoric must incorporate an ultimate term, what are the constraints? All ultimate terms are not created equal on a moral level. Hitler was a brilliant rhetorician in that "One Reich, One Folk, One Furhrer' were ultimate terms to which the Germans responded very deeply. Hitler's rhetoric was also responsible for the deaths of perhaps twenty million Russians, twelve million Germans, and perhaps another six million French and English, as well as six million Jews of assorted nationalities. I think one must go earlier in Burke's career to find the dramatic source of the appropriate world-view for the rhetor. In a passage in *Attitudes Toward History* Burke says about the "comic view" that the progress of humane enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as *vicious*, but as *mistaken*. When you add that people are *necessarily mistaken*, that *all* people are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that insight contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that underlies great tragedy. (ATH, 41)

Frank Lentricchia regards this as Burke's descent into quietism, an excuse for detachment from the arena of rhetorical dispute.19 This, however, overlooks the reason for discussing the world in dramatistic terms at all. Even in *Attitudes Toward History*, Burke is aware of the dangers

of the "debunking" tendency inherent in Marxism, Capitalism, Sociology and Psychology. These alternate ways of making sense out of life center around mechanistic explanations for human behavior; that is, what are the causes of why we behave as we do. These explanations emphasize the contingency of human behavior. The dramatistic view, on the other hand, emphasizes our roles as actors. While not denying the place of scene and agency in limiting our actions, it asserts a role for agent and purpose. Thus Fredric Jameson's critique of the Pentad as allowing too attenuated a role for purpose misses the point of dramatistm, 20 a system that centers around life as a dramatic action can incorporate the mechanistic explanations without eliminating purpose and agent entirely. Since neither system is demonstrably more accurate, the rhetor chooses the more useful.

The dramatic alternatives, waiving farce, satire, the grotesque and melodrama, are comic and tragic views of life. The tragic view assumes that things go wrong in the nature of things. Preceded by the "heroic" where the heroes recognized forces beyond their control, the resignation of tragedy is based upon this same sense of personal limits: but the cultural materials with which the tragic playwright works are much more urban, complex, sophisticated than those that prevailed at the rise of thy primitive epic. Though the same magical patterns of fatality, magnification, and humility are present, they are submerged beneath a more "enlightened" scheme of causal relationships. (PATH , 37)

Thus tragedy is the dramatic mode in which humanity becomes the victim of forces beyond its control, the "causal" factors that lead to destruction. In a sense then, if we choose the tragic mode of viewing life, we fall prey to the same tendency inherent in mechanistic explanations for human behavior.

While the preference for the comic mode is partially moral, it is also justifiable both on practical and theoretical grounds. First, as a matter of praxis, there are two possibilities with both the comic and tragic views: you can be right or you can be wrong. If you are right about the comic view, then you can make a difference if you can get people to recognize their mistakes through rhetorical practice. If you are wrong about the comic view and things genuinely do go wrong because they were always going to, then the result is irrelevant because your mistake has no consequences. If you are right about the tragic view, the result is exactly the same as being wrong about the comic view; nothing you do could have made any difference anyway. Being right in the tragic view has only the positive result of providing a sort of gloomy satisfaction in knowing that disaster is not your fault. But if you are wrong about the tragic view, then things that you could have changed, the world that you could have made better, remains the same through inaction. To sum up, practically one ought to choose the comic view because it cannot cost and is the only formulation in which you could win. The tragic view is antithetical to any rhetoric. As we mentioned earlier, rhetoric assumes the subject has the capacity to choose. If the tragic view of the world is right, then none of those choices make any difference. Hence rhetoric becomes a subject without an object, a technique directed to no end.21

Rhetorics for Social Change, and the Limits of Rhetoric

What, then, is the appropriate rhetoric toward change? President Havel demonstrates a writer's grasp of the issue. First, Havel accepts the role that rhetoric has to play: "Consciousness precedes being, and not the other way around," as the Marxists claim. Second, Democracy provides the ultimate term: "As long as people are people, democracy, in the full sense of the word, will always be no more than an ideal. One may approach it as one would the horizon in ways that may be better or worse, but it can never be fully attained." Democracy is an unreachable but plausible goal to

aim at. Any division is transcended by an appeal to whichever choice seems to move better toward that ultimate term. Notice, moreover, the very undefinability of the term contributes to its efficacy. By that I mean that it would be hard to find an American, for instance, who is opposed to democracy; nonetheless, if you asked the next hundred Americans you passed on the street to define democracy, you would probably receive a hundred different definitions. Yet most of these people can be expected at least to restrain their conflicts, if not work together, in the interests of achieving democracy.

And President Hovel also supplies a hierarchy of means in pursuing the ultimate term. Morality must take precedence: "In other words, we still don't know how to put morality before politics, science, and economics. We are still incapable of understanding that the only genuine backbone of all our actions, if they are to be moral, is responsibility." The proper language of rhetorical appeal will subsume science in ethics. Hence rhetorical plans that emphasize division, that would choose violent or coercive modes of persuasion must be rejected. Again, if constantly reiterated, if constantly appealed to by the rhetor, at least the chances go up of conciliation and cooperation than if no hierarchy of means is provided. This does not eliminate division—that is impossible—but it tames it, and reminds the rhetor that he, too, will be implicated in mistakes.

But rhetoric is not a silver bullet.22 The comic attitude requires a sense of humility in that our rhetorical choices will necessarily be sometimes wrong. Moreover, it is simply true that rhetoric will be sometimes inapplicable. As the song goes, it is difficult "to talk to a man with a shotgun in his hand," and hopeless "to talk to a man when he don't want to understand." Which brings me, at long last, to an explanation of the epigrams with which I began this article. Confronted with the endlessly sliding signifies f ethical discourse, the temptation is to just cut the knot, as Shakespeare anticipated and as Nietzsche lid, and claim that the opposite of the moral is not the immoral but the autonomous, and the further from conventional notions of morality the better. The alternative is the code duello. The duel itself is a movement toward containing human aggression, and, compared with the warfare of earlier times, "a more limited trespass on law and order." Moreover, since the duel recognized the rights of the lesser nobility to challenge the greater, it also functioned as a strategy of identification, "the sign and seal of a dynastic equality between higher and lower, a fraternal bond uniting the whole multifarious class.23 But a number of changes in seventeenth-century personal combat (more attention to skill, a movement away from wearing armor) made the duel an increasingly deadly sort of affair. Thus the code duel lo was not a ~ay to facilitate duels, but a way to tame them, to ensure a kind of orderly sequence of events: in short, in rhetoric. And the fool Touchstone proposes a way that even the final stage may be avoided by an 'if," in ultimate term that transcends even the code duello.

The rhetor must also fear the enormously appealing assumption that in the interest of right, rhetoric is irrelevant. In Robert Bolt's *Man for All Seasons*,24 the devout young Roper wishes to cut through the law to the truth and is opposed by Sir Thomas More:

More: What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get to the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: (*roused and excited*) Oh? (advances on Roper.) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? (Leaves him.) This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast—Man's laws, not God's—and if you cut them down—and you're just the man to do it—d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly.) Yes I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.

Roper: I have long suspected this; this is the golden calf; the law's your God.

More: (wearily): Oh, Roper, you're a fool, God's my God.

(Rather bitter.) But I find him rather too (Very bitter) subtle... I don't know where he is or what he wants.

The law is, in its way, the most sustained achievement of rhetoric. The law is a system for adjudicating disputes, for determining what to do when certainty is impossible. More , with humility, recognizes that if God's justice is the actual foundation for the law, then the manner in which this is so is unclear.

And More's response to Roper's objection that More must not swear the oath affirming the Act of Supremacy because the oath serves immoral ends, is perhaps the best response any rhetor can make when he must defend the methods of the "political barnyard." about the wording, and Roper says that More's first question is they both know what the act means. More replies that the act it means. When Roper objects that that means what the words say is immoral, More defends rhetorical quibbling: God made the angels to show him splendor—as he made animals for innocence and plants for simplicity. But Man he made to serve him wittily, in the tangle of his mind! If he suffers us to fall in such a case that there is no escaping, then we may stand to our tackle as best we can, and yes, Will, then we may clam our like champions.. if we have the spittle for it. And no doubt it delights God to see splendor where he only looked for complexity. But it's God's part, not our own, to bring ourselves to that extremity! Our natural business lies in escaping—so let's get home and study this Bill.(74) Roper's position, against arrogant, a confident belief that we know what is right and need which More argues, is profoundly the niceties of discourse. Burke's *Permanence and Change* places this not concern ourselves with resonant final paragraph in arrogance in perspective:

We in cities rightly grow shrewd at appraising man-made institutions—but beyond these tiny concentration points of rhetoric and traffic, there lies the eternally unsolvable Enigma, the preposterous fact that both existence and nothingness are equally unthinkable. Our speculations may run the gamut, from play, through reverence, even to an occasional shiver of cold metaphysical dread—for always the Eternal Enigma is there, right on the edges of our metropolitan bickerings, stretching outward to interstellar infinity and inward to the depths of the mind. And in this staggering disproportion between man and no-man, there is no place for purely human boasts of grandeur, or for forgetting that men build their cultures by huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of an abyss. (PC, 272).

Notes

1. *A Brief History of Time: from the Big Bang to Black Holes* (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 9. Subsequently referred to as *Time*.

2. *Society as Text* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987), p. 77. For an explanation of how rhetoric functions positively as a source of useful assumptions in the social sciences see Donald N. McCloskey's *The Rhetoric of Economics* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1985).

3. *Rhetorical Epistemology*, (Columbia, South Carolina: U of South Carolina P, 1986).

4. "Aristotle, certainly no epistemological relativist, nevertheless articulated something like a contextual principle by insisting that rhetoric can be properly conceived as an art (as opposed to a set of gimmicks) parallel to the art of dialectic: the basis of such a claim is that there are levels of certitude and exactitude relevant to different spheres of operation"; *A Pragmatic Theory of*

Rhetoric (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987), p. 77. For a comparison of Burkean and Aristotelian rhetorical theory, see L. Virgin Holland's *Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke's and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

5. The reasons for the dismissal of rhetoric as anything other than tropes and "lies" are complex and have to do with Ramist "reforms" and the rise of the new science with its occasionally naive assumption that the empirically observed constituted reality and hence could be discussed with certainty independently of rhetoric. Wilbur S. Howe describes the Ciceronian view of rhetoric commonly accepted up until the eighteenth century: "Grammar sought to establish an accurate and orderly language in which discourse could be phrased for comprehension by all who possessed that language in common. Logic sought to make discourses consistent both in themselves and in their relation to the basic assumptions of their time. Rhetoric sought to make discourses effective with people who must act wisely in concert if civilization is to endure, and who are given to emotionalism, prejudice, ignorance, and stupidity unless they are constantly reminded that these impulses must not be allowed to nullify reason and good sense."; *Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton U P, 1971), p. 77. Even if rhetoric were no more than Tropez, many social scientists use Tropez as an important mechanism for understanding social interaction; see Professor Jon Anderson's paper in this volume.

6. *Discours de Ia méthode* (Paris: Libairie Larousse, 1969), p. 46. Even after rhetoric was discredited, it continued to be taught, although usually with invidious comparisons to the instructive. Thus Adam Smith in his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* contrasts the didactic with rhetoric: "The former proposes to put before us the arguments on both sides of the question in their true light, giving each its proper degree of influence, and has it in view to persuade no further than the arguments themselves appear convincing. The rhetorical, again, endeavors by all means to persuade us, and for this purpose it magnifies all the arguments on the one side, and diminishes or conceals those that might be brought on the side contrary to that which it is designed we should favor. (John M. Lothian, 1963), p. 58. (London: Thomas M. Nelson and Sons Ltd), p. 58. Smith's point seems to be that there are degrees of persuasion, less truthful, not that rhetoric can be avoided.

7. *Purpose* (Berkeley: U of California), subsequently referred to in text as PC.

8. *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1969), p. 101; subsequently referred to in text as RM.

9. As reprinted in Frank Lentricchia's *Criticism and Social Change*.(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983). This incident is derived from Lentricchia's analysis of change.

10. *Criticism and Social Change*, p. 31.

11. *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1973), pp. 110-111.

12. *Attitudes Toward History* (Berkeley: U of California P, 3rd ed., 1984), p. 166. Subsequently referred to in text as ATH.

13. *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1969), p. 22.

14. *2 Henry* IV 4.5.211-215. All quotations from Shakespeare are from *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blake. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin).

15. *Lysistrata*, trans. Donald Suthland, in *Comedy*, ed. Robert W. Corrigan (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1971), p. 38.

16. *The Late Revolution* (London: 1690), p. 55. Au subsequent references are to this edition.

17. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, end ed. 1970), p. 171. Subsequently referred to in text as *Science*.

18. *The Rhetoric of Religion* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1970), p. 315. Subsequently referred to in text as RR.

19. *Criticism and Social Change*, pp. 62-63.

20. Fredric Jameson, "The Symbolic Influence; or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis," in *Representing Kenneth Burke* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1982), pp. 68-91.

21. I am indebted to Stephen H. Brane for this observation.

22. See *Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957).

23. V. G. Kim Jan, *The Duel in European History: Honour and the Reign of the Aristocracy* (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1988), pp. 6 and 52.

24. Robert Bolt, *A Man for All Seasons* (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 39.

Chapter VII
Polish Immigrants and the Church

Zbigniew Tyburski

Introduction

There are now about fifteen million Polish immigrants around the world, about one half of whom live in the United States. Encouraged by a Polish Pope, many Polish immigrants, especially those in the second and third generation, have reidentified with their Polish culture.

Any discussion of Polish immigrants must take account of the political and social background of Poland as well as reasons why they emigrated. Clergy working in a Polish-American community today can expect to encounter three distinct groups: survivors of the great emigrations of the early 20th century and their offspring: post-World War II political emigres; and immigrants from the Solidarity period since l980. While some common threads join all three groups, the first two have been largely assimilated. Ethnic ministry is particularly important, however, for Catholics of the recent Solidarity emigration, which will be the focus of this article.

The Teachings of the Church

Most Polish Catholics recognize the Church as holy. Their faith is based on the existence of Christianity for over a thousand years in Poland. Although Polish Catholicism is still evolving, Polish Catholics who were stronger than the Communist system did not lose their identity with the Church. Whether living in Poland or abroad, they are able to distinguish between a human and divine "level" in the Church. They are ready to forgive the bad habits of Church leaders, but they are disappointed and not tolerant of those they perceive as not being faithful to Church teachings.

To illustrate this, consider a letter which a Polish priest working in northeastern United States received from a Pole living in the same area. The author of the letter asked the priest for help in understanding the teachings of the Church:

Two years after I divorced, I met a single woman, and from that time, I have lived with her. Both my girl friend and I have strong religious backgrounds. We have moral difficulties caused by living together without the Sacrament of Marriage and without God's blessing. My girl friend could not live like this any longer, so last year she wrote to the priest in her parish in Poland asking him if it were possible to receive absolution in her situation. The answer was negative. Before last Christmas we decided to go to confession here without expecting to receive absolution. We went to two different priests and told them the facts of our situation and that we would continue to live together. To our great shock we both received absolution. We were still afraid to receive Holy Communion. A few days later my girlfriend went to another priest in a different city and again received absolution.

Another example was completely the opposite. A man who lived with a married woman had no problems with this way of life, even though he had left his wife and children in Poland. However, he remembered the Church teaching that he should go to confession at least once a year. During confession, he did not promise the priest that he would change his sinful practice. When he heard the priest's decision to refuse absolution, he begged for permission to receive Holy Communion at Easter time.

Most Polish immigrants expect from their priests unequivocal information about moral problems. They believe that the truth of the faith which the Church teaches should be the same everywhere. Yet these are knotty problems.

Polish immigrants are usually not familiar with receiving absolution without the priest's counsel, such as at a Community Penance Service, which is the regular practice at some parishes. Rather, they expect the priest's personal advice, which normally comes through traditional confession, They believe that faith is a goal of God. Growth of faith depends not only upon listening to the Word of God, but also on the believer cooperating with God's grace and on the messenger of the Gospel, especially when he is a witness. In "Evangelii Nuntiandi," Pope Paul VI states that, "Man in our times more willingly listens to witnesses than teachers; if he listens to teachers, it is because they are witnesses."1 The task of the messages of the gospel then is to recognize the social and cultural circumstances of the immigrant group to whom the Gospel is proclaimed.

Polish Immigrants, although living in a multicultural society, usually prize their native heritage, and do not forget their cultural differences. They need to hear this truth from God's messengers so that they will be sure that they can live with Christ in their culture.3 They expect this kind of help from their priests.

The Church in Poland, with Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski as its primate, understood this truth. After World War II Cardinal Wyszynski developed programs of evangelization to protect Catholics from the dangers of atheistic Communism.2 Before the celebration of the Millennium of Poland's Christianity in 1966, Cardinal Wyszynski initiated a nine-year program of renewal of faith and morality. This program was based on the preaching of biblical and moral truths, as well as on the reception of the Sacraments; it took place in every parish and Church community. The miraculous icon of Our Lady of Czetochowa went on pilgrimage throughout the country and was received in parishes everywhere in Poland. At the presence of this miraculous icon every believer and every Catholic family in Poland renewed its commitment to renew their faith and moral life. By receiving the holy icon, this external sign of faith, they promised to be faithful to the Gospel and to the Church. These actions helped save the Polish nation from complete demoralization and secularization.

Cardinal Wyszynski's inspired program of religion liberated feelings of spiritual unity among thousands of Poles. Pope John Paul II's pilgrimages to Poland strengthened this spiritual power, which eventually found its external manifestation in the Solidarity movement. As a result of the rise of Solidarity and the fall of Communism, the Catholic Church in Poland regained its ownership of Church properties confiscated by Communist authorities - church building, schools, hospitals and orphanages. In addition, the Church in Poland has obtained access to the communications media for religious programming and has regained the right to teach the Catholic religion in public schools.

Human Values and Social Involvement

Polish people are very sensitive to the value of the person because Communism treated human beings like objects. Whoever showed an independent spirit and stepped beyond the limits imposed by the Communist regime automatically became an enemy of the state, The Communist system also attempted to destroy independent thought and the ability to make individual decisions. Despite these degrading conditions, most Poles cherished and protected their human values, especially their dignity. They knew that human dignity is one of the most important Christian values.

Polish people through all their history have defended their dignity. Because of it and other Christian values, they were ready to serve others with love and to endure even the most severe persecution from political enemies. An example is Romuald Traugutt. (1826-1864), a Polish hero who fought with the Russian army for Polish Independence. When Russia's leaders imprisoned him for his underground political activity, they deprived him of all human rights. He could not even see his wife and children before his death. Despite these harsh conditions he retained his dignity even until his last days in prison.4

It is obvious that the source of human dignity is in God. Catholic social teaching states than every human being should be respected in his or her dignity by others, as well as by all economic institutions, in every society: "The dignity of the human person, realized in community with others, is the criterion against which all aspects of economic life must be measured,... all economic institutions must support the bonds of community and solidarity that are essential to the dignity of persons."5

Some Polish immigrants deny their Polish heritage, as well the Church's teaching on human dignity. This usually occurs when they become immersed in the workplace. Many of them started a completely "new life" abroad, overly concerned with work and making money. The Communist regime in Poland paid them not only the lowest minimum for their slavish work, but also purposely demoralized non-party members by unjust taxes. Rigid conformity to the Communist party line, not honest labor, was rewarded in the work place. Because of this, some Polish immigrants started working abroad for sixteen or more hours a day, seven days a week. They wanted to make up for lost time by earning as much as possible in the shortest time. By this avarice they sometimes lost not only their dignity, but also the basic order of human values.

But if we consider the human values which Polish immigrants really prize in their lives, we should understand that we are talking about a heritage of the Christian civilization.6 Many despite very poor economic conditions or poverty, never stop trying to educate their children in the best way, as well as giving them the basic rules of Christianity.

The laity's involvement in social action of the Catholic Church began in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe. When some anti-Christian states such as Prussia during the "Kulturkampf" began a campaign hostile to the clergy, the responsibility for defending the Church was taken over by the laity. Pope Pius XI termed the activity of the laity, 'Catholic Action.'7

The Polish laity were active not only in "Catholic Action." During the years between the two World Wars they were engaged in such organizations as the Apostleship of Prayer, the Sodality of Mary, the Association of Catholic Youth (Odrodzenie), and Scouting. After the end of World War II all these organizations were liquidated by the Communist regime. During this time engagement in Church activity by the Polish laity was very limited. Despite these restrictions, many Poles did not stop serving others, but in most cases they did it privately rather than publicly. Their motivation to perform this kind of service was based on their Christian values.8

Three Challenges

The Polish people have had three basic challenges since the collapse of Communism that are linked with the life of Polish immigrants: a) close cooperation between the clergy, teachers and parents in developing the proper methods of education appropriate for school, Church and family; b) a renewal of the work ethic; and c) coordination of small groups of lay Catholics.

Education

Some families in Poland were not able to withstand Communism, and were manipulated by the regime's propaganda. This situation had a very negative influence on the education of their children. Imprudent parents sought to mold their children into obedient individuals, which in practice meant that they were passive and lacked initiative. If we notice that some Polish immigrants are self-centered and easily accommodate to each new situation by accepting what is most convenient for themselves, we quickly recognize their Communist background.

When during catechism classes the Catholic clergy in Poland educated youth in a spirit different from the Communist system of education, young people often lost their sense of orientation. They did not know where truth was to be found or who was right.9 Upon reaching maturity some young adults in Poland abandoned the influence of their parents and Church and chose their own path, which was not always the best.

Some parents in Poland as well as abroad are not concerned with the education and moral upbringing of their children. Very often the children can watch immoral programs on TV or spend late night hours on the streets. Moral or social conflicts which often occur between parents and children are solved with vulgar words or by emotional and physical violence. These parents forget that the essential element of a proper education is that a person must be treated as a human being, and not as an object. The primary aim of education is to help a young person to be him or herself. Education must always be based on the proper vision of a human being. A person, regardless of age, must have a chance to obtain an independent outlook on life. Outstanding individuals often play a fundamental role in the education process, becoming an inspiration for youth. Christian faith is the fulfillment of spiritual development. When the student realizes that God loves him or her, then the motivation for a religious model of life and social activity becomes a way to friendship with God and others, and not a burden.

Work Ethic

The second challenge for Polish people in their own country or as immigrants is to renew a genuine work ethic, which had been systematically destroyed by Communism for 45 years. Some Poles, demoralized by the Communist regime, wish to live comfortably without hard work. Not only were workers formerly employed by Communist institutions and factories demoralized, peasant farmers also had a warped system of moral values. From generations past, the Polish peasants were praised for hard work, for honesty, for their religion, and for their sense of patriotism. Unfortunately, a substantial percent of these values were eradicated by Communism. The Polish peasant farmer does not always consider the city dweller his brother, but rather a materialistic competitor.

An example of an unjust act occurred recently in northeastern United States between two Polish immigrants. One of lent a considerable sum of money to his friend without a written contract or witnesses. He trusted his countryman, as he usually did in his native country; so they had only a verbal agreement. When the time for returning the money came, the debtor first delayed repayment for two years, then changed his address and finally disappeared. These priest working among immigrants should be aware of the fact that not everything is as obvious for them as for an average American, and that trust at home might be naivety abroad. Therefore, one duty might be instruction about the economic and administrative realities of American society.

Lay Groups

The final area of lay activity is the proper cooperation of Catholic groups which now exist in almost every parish community in Poland and also among Polish immigrants. These include liturgical groups as well as social and charitable organizations. It is essential that the clergy have frequent contact with each member of these groups. In this way both priests and laity can understand the cultural differences which exist. If the\e else to solve this kind of family problem. The best way seems to be to find another friendly family or a parish organization, instead of courts or lawyers. Such a program can build unity and also manifest the Church as a community of communities.

It is obvious that a rather small number of the members of a parish community or immigrants will be able to cooperate with the pastor or parish activists on all these forms of human activity. But quality is important, not quantity. Usually wise individuals lead societies or nations. However, the question remains. How can priests solve the problems of Polish immigrant, especially those with a Communist background, who have become 'cafeteria Catholics.' On the one hand, they loudly manifest their beliefs by participation in the Sunday liturgy, but, on the other hand, they accept a secular and pagan life style. They accept the Sacrament of Baptism, but not the Sacrament of Reconciliation; they expect the Church to support Catholic families, but at the same time they accept abortion and divorce; they criticize educational policy, but at the same time allow their children to be swallowed by a materialism devoid of Christian morality; they complain about their employers and their unjust remuneration, but at the same tune they rob others, or, following Communist habits, they pretend they are really working very hard when they are not.

This kind of people needs a deep form of evangelization to help them rapidly acquire a Christian maturity. Therefore the Sunday liturgy program is the natural way which can lead them to Christ and Christian activity.

If there is already a parish council, the pastor should add some immigrants, to it or establish a small committee of immigrants. This will help him understand the immigrants life and problems. The committee can help the pastor solve particular problems which occur among other immigrants. There is always a chance that this committee can have someone who is a lukewarm Catholic or one having a debased Communist morality. The criterion for choosing members should be based only on 'fiashy' externals, but on social trustfulness and on the Church's documents, such as certificates of Baptism and Marriage or a recommendation from their last parish.

Polish immigrants who esteem their faith and who place the Church first in their hierarchy of values will be happy if the parish committee mentioned above would help them in their real difficulties. The main problem for many Polish Immigrant families is giving their children a good education. As newcomers they often struggle alone with many difficulties. They usually do have not enough money to pay Catholic school tuition, and on the other hand, they are afraid to send their children to public schools.

Another area of concern is the Polish immigrant's concept of human work. Some immigrants realize that they do not know the language well enough to obtain the kind job they had in their own country. Therefore they are ready to do any kind of work, even in the most difficult conditions. But they would still like to be treated as human beings. They fear a slavish relationship in the work place, as they had in Poland under the Communism. The parish committee, with Information about jobs and other social requirements, can establish deeper bonds with immigrants, especially newcomers.

Another important field of cooperation between the pastor or his parish committee and immigrants is activity in various parish organizations and the responsibility for the Church and its

buildings. The pastor or parish committee should introduce immigrants to Church administration in America. Some, without bad intentions, gave only one dollar for the Sunday collection, and they are surprised that the parish thinks it insufficient. They usually calculate the value of this dollar in the currency of their native country, and think they are giving a lot. When we think about parishoner's activities in parish organizations, we should remember the cultural "impact" on some immigrants. In their native country, there were often completely different Church or parish organizations than those they meet abroad.

For example, many Americans serve their local communities or Churches by selling used clothes, distributing food or organizing different kinds of entertainment and fund-raisers such as bingo or card parties. If Polish people do not always participate in these events, especially in the beginning, this does not mean they are indifferent to people in need or to the problems of the parish community. On the contrary, most Polish people have a natural human solidarity with those who suffer, and they have an understanding of the important role the Church plays in human life. Probably they need a good religious motivation to be ready to offer their free time as volunteers.

Summary and Conclusion

The main reasons Polish immigrants went abroad in the nineteenth as well as the twentieth centuries were above all the economic or political conditions in Poland. Some of the most recent immigrants, especially after the Solidarity movement, have negative characteristics as a result of the influence of Communism. These are real problems for government and Church leaders. As Catholics, they were baptized, but they did not fully absorb the thousand years of Polish-Christian heritage. However, the values and way of life of most Polish's immigrants are based on Christ and the Church's teaching. They are looking for spiritual development in their lives and inspiration to build a world based on Christian values. They would like to form their lives and are ready equally to love God and others and to engage in activities of social justice.

John Paul II underlines that, "Today more than ever, the church is aware that her social message will gain credibility more immediately from the witness of actions than as a result of its internal logic and consistency.... Love for others, and in the first place love for the poor in whom the church sees Christ himself, is made concrete in the promotion of justice."11

A person who lives according to his or her human values should be characterized by tolerance. Human beings do not lose their own personal identities as a result of changing social and cultural circumstances. To avoid an erroneous interpretation of the behavior of some Polish immigrants, we must always consider them in the context of their background and culture.

Notes

1. Paul VI, "Evangelium Nuntiandum," nr. 21.
2. Oestreicher, Paul, "Christians as political dissenters," *The Way*, 28 (1988) 2:134.
3. Schreiter, Robert J., "Faith and Culture: Challenges to a World Church," *Theological Studies*, 50 (1989): 746
4. Tyburski, Zbigniew, *My Heart Belongs to You, My Country* (Warsaw: Volumem, 1993), p. 96.
5. "Economic Justice for All," National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington, 1986, p. 15.

6. Hebblethwaite, Peter, "Is the Polish Church a Model for the Universal Church?" *Concilium* (New York. N.Y., The Seabury Press, 1981), p. 33.

7. Zubierber, Andrzej, "Mission of Lay Christians," *In The Way* (Wdrodze) 2 (1989): 32.

8. Ptwowarski, Wladyslaw, "The Problem of the Folk Church in Poland," *Concilium*, (New York. N.Y.: The Seabury Press, 1982), p. 15.

9. Whitehead, James I.D. and Evelyn E., "Obedience and Adult Faith", *Review for Religious*, 49 (1990), 3: 400-403.

10. Haughey, John C., *The Faith that Does Justice* (New York, N.Y., Paulist Press, 1977), pp. 114-116.

11. John Paul II, "Centesimus Annus," nr. 57-58.

Ethnic and Religious Revival:
Religion as a Ground of Ethnic and National Identity

Vassil Prodanov

Though religious, ethnic, national identities appear as different phenomena, but they are interconnected through the participation of the person in their respective communities. These identities are also intermingled and there are rules for their interrelationships. Sometimes the religious identity could weaken ethnic or national identity, but frequently they mutually reinforce each other. This interdependence is especially noticeable from the 1980s and finds expression in a coincidence of two processes of revival—religious and ethnic. The two are intertwined and feed upon one another. The endeavor of ethnic revival or nationalism uses religion as an additional force. At the same time, in its struggle for survival and to regain territory, religion uses ethnic and national identities.

In order to investigate these processes we need some preliminary definitions of ethnic group, nation and religion. Any *ethnic group* has:

1. Cultural distinctiveness. A common material and spiritual culture, customs, mores, rituals, dress, language, dances, cuisine, etc. Not all of these characteristics are present in any particular case, but manifestations of cultural distinctiveness are ever present.

2. Consciousness of a common ancestral origin, common descent, shared history and heritage. This common heritage may not be demonstrable, but the belief in it, sometimes shored up by myth or a partly fictitious history, suffices.

3. Prevailing endogamous relations and, as a result, common physical characteristics. In this sense ethnic affiliation is perceived as being "by blood."

4. The self-identification and identification of the people with an ethnic group with a proper collective name which shores up a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of population.

The nation is a product of modernity. It derives from the modern idea of a people's sovereignty as being the highest sovereignty. A nation is a community which has its own state or is striving to get some form of autonomy or independence on a territory and within borders which are perceived as "fatherland" or "motherland." This is connected with a unified economy and legal code of common rights and duties.

What is the relationship between ethnicity (and nation) so defined and religion? This depends on the definition of religion. According to one type of definition, nationalism is a kind of religion; according to the other type, it is something different.

Functional Model of Religion and Nationalism

Two approaches are well-known to the definition of religion: the substantive approach and the functional approach.1 *The substantive approach* starts from the theoretical tradition of the German phenomenology most notably developed by Max Weber, Rudolf Otto, Gerardus Van der Leeuw, Joachim Walsh, and Peter Berger. According to this model, religion should be defined by *what it is*—by the "meaning content of the phenomenon". Religion is the meaning system that

emanates from the sacred. In principle, the substantive model delimits religion to the range of traditional theisms: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and so on.

The origins of the *functionalist approach* are in French and British structuralism—as found in the works of Emile Durkheim, Branislaw Malinowski, A.R. Radcliff-Brown, Talcott Parsons, Milton Yinger, Robert Bellah, Thomas Luckmann, Mary Douglas, etc. In this model, religion is defined according to *what it does*—its role and its consequences for individual and social existence. In this light, religion is any phenomenon which provides meaning system, delineates moral coordinates of everyday life of the individual and justifies institutional arrangements generating social integration. Defined in this way, religion is largely synonymous with such terms as cultural system, belief system, meaning system, ideology, worldview. In this case a deity is not an obligatory element of religion. This wider approach covers both such well-known "religion-surrogates" as Confucianism and Theravadin Buddhism and all possible new sects, denominations and religious movements which could be considered as "functional equivalents" of religion. This wider approach to the definition of religion was accepted during the last decades by the American legal system in order to be able formally to embrace nontheistic ideologies within the shelter of protection provided by the First Amendment religion clauses.

In his classical essay, *Civil Religion in America*, published in 1967, and in his following writings, Robert Bellah, starting from a functional approach, developed his idea of "civil religion" as a set of meanings uniting the American nation.2 He noted that God has been invoked in every Presidential Inaugural Address, but George Washington's. There is a set of beliefs, symbols and rituals that both legitimate and limit political authority in the United States. "Just as Thanksgiving Day . . . serves to integrate the family into the civil religion, so Memorial Day has created to integrate the local community into the national cult."3 Americans who come from different places in the world desperately need an active symbolic milieu in order to form and further common national identity. The Utopian millennial expectations and the popular conviction that America was God's New Israel were factors contributing to the transformation of the colony into a nation. Thus, the Declaration of Independence and Gettysburg Address loom as sacred political Scriptures, and the rights of the people derive from a transcendent source beyond the state. Ultimately, the last transcendent ground is God and it is no accident that even the most unorthodox Founding Fathers believed in God, described, however, in more general and indefinite terms such as "Almighty Being" or "Infinite Power."

The ideas of R. Bellah have drawn a long string of debates, comments and criticism, but transcendent sources are in fact used to substantiate the notion of American nation and legitimize the activity of the political power. This is done even more openly and actively during the years after the famous article of Robert Bellah. The Inauguration Day of Bill Clinton, for instance, began with an impressive ecumenical prayer service and the President was surrounded throughout the day by religious leaders.4

The similarities between religion and nationalism, the ability of nationalism to stand for religion, were observed long ago. During the secularization process, the traditional religions were pushed away, but secular nationalism took on functions earlier realized by religion. The domain of the sacred was transferred from the traditional gods to the nation. This is seen already in the French Revolution which declared itself against religion considered as fraudulence, but at the same time established a cult to "High Being" in the context of the first steps of a secular nationalism.

There are number of characteristics of nation and nationalism that are similar and implement the same functions as the traditional religions:

1. Both traditional religions and nation play the role of highest and transcendent sources of normative systems, legitimizing both the political power of the authorities and moral behavior of the people. The "will of the nation," the "popular vote" as legitimizing political power, has the same function as did religion earlier in legitimizing the rights of the Kings. At the same time, the duty and loyalty to nation could override all other duties and loyalties. Sacrifice for nation looms even more urgent than sacrifice to God because at least in Christianity Jesus does not demand from people that they die in the name of God while the nation require it.

2. They have similar symbolic and ritual systems connecting everyday profane life with a higher sacred or transcendent reality. The organization of many national holidays resembled traditional religious holidays. The sets of symbols of religion are included in the culture and they interact with all other symbols, including the symbols of national and ethnic identity.

If a religion is strongly rooted in a culture, it could play a larger role in ethnic and national identity. Religion and nation exchange their symbols and mutually support each other. Striving to be inculturated, religion becomes a means for supporting national or ethnic identity. Looking for strong national loyalty and worship of the nation, nationalism could use traditional religious symbols.

But major religions go beyond nations. They are included in the cultures before the rise of nations. In this way, the religions could be the ground for the development of national identity, but not conversely. Religious distinctions and conflicts precede national distinctions and could become the boundaries for different nations.

3. Important religious characteristics such as the notions of "chosen people", captivity, golden age, promised land, etc. are included in the self-perception of nations. A. Smith points out:

In a world of nations, each nation is unique; each is "chosen". Nationalism is a secular, modern equivalent of the pre-modern, sacred myth of ethnic election . . . Chosen peoples were formerly selected by their deities; today, they are chosen by an ideology and a symbolism that elevate the unique and the individual and transform them into a global reality. In former days, peoples were chosen for their alleged virtues; today, they are called to be nations because of their cultural heritages.[5]

So the members of an ethnic group feel themselves members of an unique community with irreplaceable values. Myths of distant origins and memories of captivity and a golden age of former glory nurture a sense of uniqueness and mission, of ethnocentrism and pride. In many cases, this is inseparable for some religious justification. The Jewish idea of "Egyptian captivity" is universal in the process of building nations—"Mongol captivity" of Russians, "Ottoman captivity" of the Balkan Slavic nations, "British captivity" of the Americans, etc.

The Jews were by no means the only people to have believed that they were "chosen." Some versions of this myth could be fund everywhere; it gives a sense of culture superiority to aliens. For instance, after the rift with Byzantine Orthodoxy, the Armenians cultivated pride in being the "first Christian nation." This belief in ethnic election and divine mission was an important factor for the survival of the Armenian ethnic group and diaspora. Russian nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries was nurtured by the idea of Russia as the "Third Rome." The building of Soviet identity and Soviet national pride was grounded on the idea of a nation which had made a unique breakthrough in world history and become the homeland of socialism. The Welsh myth of election

is rooted in the idea of a community of descendants of the lost tribes of Israel. The puritan feeling of being a chosen people and living the sacred history of a "new Israel" had a strong integrative force in the development of the American nation. These are but examples of universal phenomenon.

4. In the classical distinction of F. Tönnies between *Gemeinschaft* and *Geselschaft*, nation and religious community are two larger forms of *Gemeinschaft* transcending the direct relations characteristic of family and kinship. But they resemble kinship relations and offset family and kinship relations. Both the church and nation are presented as large families. They bring with them the warmth of communities of brethren. They have common predecessors, forerunners, ancestors and give prominence to realizing the ideal of fraternity. The discourse of these two communities is a language describing family. Jesus Christ has the Church as his "bride." The Moslem fundamentalists call themselves "Moslem brotherhoods." The form of address between the people during the struggle for national liberation in the Balkans is "brother." Nationalism is a faith in an everlasting life through membership of a continuing nation representing the continuity of the extended family from one generation to the next. In an age of crisis of old kinship and family relationship, when people move into towns and in the process of industrialization lose their traditional roots, in a time of secularization declining religion, with its belief in an after-life, nationalism has a special appeal as a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, and of contingency into meaning, as a way to find again one's deep grounds, to see in the myriads of unknown people of the growing industrial civilization the old kinship relations which are in crisis or have really disappeared.

5. These two communities put strong emphasis on the role of the past, tradition and history as factors for identification. Through them, people live in history and with history. In the 1960s, the idea was very popular that modern societies and persons change their orientations, that their behavior is governed not more by customs rules and images from the past, but by their image of the future. A. Tofler wrote his famous *Future Shock* describing the bewilderment, disorientation and dismay of persons who are overwhelmed by the rush of the future in their life. Between the '70s and the '90s, appeals to the past and to tradition, embodied in religion and nationalism, become ways to treat the "future shock," that is, means to rediscover the lost balance.

6. The major causes bringing about religious revival—disruption of the other communities, social insecurity, the rise of non-material values, etc.—evoke ethnic and nationalist revivals as well.

This replacement of the traditional religions by nationalism and its assumption of functions performed earlier by religion is notable in strongly secularized or multi-religious societies. The "civil religion" of nationalism stands for the old religion or fills in for the lack of a common religion. In Bulgaria in the IXth century, the Bulgarian king Boris I by force introduced Orthodox Christianity in order to homogenize and unite in a single community different Slavic and Bulgarian tribes. With similar goals in the last decades, for instance, in Zaire, the regime of Mobutu tried to inculcate and propagate a common "Zairian" symbolism and religion in a conscious effort to weld disparate *ethnics* and ethnic categories into a new nation of Zaire, free of the earlier ethnic strife.[6]

Viewed through the prism of a functional definition, religion and nationalism could play similar functions. The official secular nationalism could take up function of the traditional religions separated from the state or neglected.

Substantive Model of Religion and Types of Relationships between Religion and Nationalism

The substantive model includes in the scope of religion all traditional deistic religions, but leaves aside nation and nationalism. From this point of view, the issue of the interrelationship between nationalism and religion, between national and religious communities, arises.

Any person has many roles and identities connected with different social groups, institutions and realities—family, gender, religion, territory, class, religion, culture, etc. A national identity also is always multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to only one element. That is why it is so controversial a phenomenon. In one case, one element comes to the fore; in other cases, other elements are important. Accordingly, a religion could interact with a nation's consciousness and nationalism as something different, but it could also become a major element of national identity.

Ethnic and national movements use religious identifications and symbols to strengthen their positions; religion too uses ethnic and national movements to strengthen their positions. This is one of the best available opportunities for their inculturation. But in different periods, different types of relations between religion and nationalism could be formed.

The first type is that of separation. In a secular society and a secular national movement, religion is separated from the state. But the main characteristic of the nation to be a community which desires to support and identify itself by its own state. Hence, nationalism might divide from religion. The case of the father of the modern Turkish nationalism, Kemal Ataturu, is typical: he divided the state and Islam, giving birth to a secular nationalism.

The second type of relationship between religion and nation is one of relative independence and interaction. In some situations and within some limits, religious identity prompts national identity or national identity. When, for instance, a Bulgarian compares his national identity and culture with Turkish national identity and culture, he commonly thinks of himself also as Christian and accepts the "otherness" of the Turks as including, above all, the fact that they are Muslims. In this case, religious identity becomes part of national identity. But when the Bulgarian compares his national identity with that of the Serbs, with whom they share the same Orthodox Christian religion, the religious identity is not included in the national identity; other—then non-religious characteristics will be more important.

In the third type of interrelationship between religion and national identity, religion becomes a foundation for building ethnic consciousness and national identity.

The extent of the involvement of religion in nation building, the coincidence of religious and ethnic identity, the role and place of a religion in the manifestations of nationalism depends upon *five major factors*:

1. *The extent of the coincidence of ethnic and religious boundaries*. This is the case in all ancient societies before the birth of universal and trans-ethnic religions. An ethnic religion is specific to one group and this religious uniqueness and religious history are intermingled with their ethnic and national history. In the most ancient societies, religions of this type were the most important factors supporting ethnic identity. Judaism guarded the Jewish ethnic identity for thousands of years without a common Jewish political unit. Similarly, the Anglican Church has been powerful transmitter of nationality from one generation to the next in the British Isles.

2. *The extent to which a religious community is surrounded by different opposing and conflicting religious groups and involved with them in a protracted war of survival*. In this case,

the opposition "us-them" which is an important factor for the development of group consciousness and group identity is built upon the grounds of religious identity. Religion then becomes a central factor for ethnic and national self-identification. Two cases are possible.

The first is where two intersecting ethnic groups have different religions. The religions then strengthen the ethnic identity and religion plays a major role in the preservation of the ethnic groups and development of its ethnic identity. Accordingly, Poles maintained their Catholic Polish identity in the struggles with the Russian Orthodox Christian state. The case of the Armenians is similar. The unusually strong Serbian nationalism could be explained by the fact that for hundreds of years, the struggle for survival surrounded from one side by Moslems and from the other side by Catholics. Spain's nationhood was built on the basis of the strong Iberian Catholic resistance to Muslim conquests. Moslem-Christian divisions correspond to national divisions in most cases throughout the world, as for example Azeri-Armenian, Abkhazi-Georgian, Cypriot-Turk and Cypriot-Greek.

The second case is where religion becomes a factor either for the unification into one nation of different ethnic groups or a factor for building different nations from one ethnic group. Thus, Christianity was the major force uniting different Slavic and Asian tribes into a single Bulgarian Nation. On the other hand, different religions and their mutual hostility were a basis for the development of different national identities between the people with the same ethnic origin in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their religion was a basis for national separation.

It could be claimed that in areas of contact between different religions, nationalistic feelings are stronger. It is no accident, for instance, that in Europe the strongest nationalistic excesses could be found in the Balkans—the place of encounter of the major religions—Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem. Here also you could find a host of cases where what began as a purely religious community has ended up as an exclusive ethnic community, and this could be seen in many other places across the world. Thus, for instance, over time the Druse, a schismatic Muslim sect, turned into an ethnic community.

The opposition of "us" and "them" between two groups in a situation of conflict has been the most important factor in the process of "national awakening" and nation building for several hundred years. When this opposition takes place between two different religious societies, religion plays the first role in the process of nation building; it maintains national identity and develops specific religio-ethnic identity. In principle, when national and religious identities of two conflicting groups are different, their tensions and strifes tend to be much more severe and harsh. The reason is that we have here a unity of two most important distal identities of the person and one's embrace of these identities is much stronger. If two groups have not only different national but also opposing religious identities the uncertainty, danger or crisis connected with one of them could be replaced by the other. When such an integrated common religio-ethnic identity is built, then the danger of losing this identity is perceived much strongly and the battle to stand up for it is much more furious and bloody. It is no accident that most of the ethnic conflicts and wars in the contemporary world are not "purely" ethnic, but religio-ethnic. The area of coincidence of ethnic and religious identities, where the ethnic communities retain strong religious bonds and emblems are places of enhanced danger of ethnic or nationalist conflicts. The mixture of religious and ethnic contradictions could have the explosive effect of the mixture of different blasts of an atomic bomb.

3. *The relationship between church and state, the extent of secularization of the society*. Any nationalism is a form of strife for the building and preservation of an independent state for some community. Accordingly, closeness between state and church is a condition for the extent of the

involvement of religion in the process of nation building. There are transnational churches and transnational religions: Catholicism is transnational both as religion and as church. This makes matters more difficult for it than for the religions which are connected to and subjected to nationalist goals. It is easier when, in spite of the transnationality of the religion, the church is national and closely connected with the lay political power, with the structures of the state. This is the case with the Orthodox, Muslim and Jewish 'churches'. Then the state uses or could use the church to reinforce the state power and the sense of national identity. Religious leaders often are prominent in nationalist movements.

If the church leaders and authorities coincide with the state leaders and authorities as is the case in the traditions of Moslem countries, or if the religion has a strongly developed legal system as in Judaism and in Islam the state has more opportunity to use them for nationalist purposes.

4. *The relationship between religion and culture*. The ethnic and national identities are inseparable from some ethnic and national cultures. The uniqueness of an ethnic group or nation is first of all the uniqueness of its culture. The ethnic and national specificity and peculiarities are the specificity and peculiarities of different cultures.

Accordingly, the more a religion is rooted in a culture, the more its ability to carry ethnic meanings, to support and confirm the corresponding ethnic and national identity. Any religious revival will be ethnic and national as well; conversely, any ethnic revival will be also religious. Thus, in totally changed circumstances or environment, religion could keep the culture of a community preserving in this way its ethnic identity. This is the case with the Orthodox Church during the five hundred years of Moslem Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

In fact, the major part of the official cultures during the Middle Ages were religious cultures created by people educated in the religious spirit. Any turn to the past could find a connection between religion and culture. Nevertheless, there are differences in the extent of the involvement of religion in cultures. In principle, for instance, in the Christian tradition there is a separation of lay and religious culture, of laymen and clergy, a separation which was widened after the Renaissance and through the process of secularization.

One should distinguish the relationship between religion and three types of culture: traditional folk culture, the high culture of the educated and ruling elites, and contemporary culture as disseminated by the media or mass culture. In principle, religions are separated from contemporary mass culture, but the extent of their involvement in the folk and high culture differs. For instance, the Bulgarian folk culture has nothing to do with Orthodox Christianity, which at the same time is deeply involved in the traditional official culture. At the same time, for instance, the folk musical culture of the American black people is not just permeated by religion, but their gospels hymns are one of the important elements in the identity of the American nation as a whole. Any religion and ethnic group has its specificity which must be scrutinized.

5. *The availability of strong secular ideologies as rivals of religion and as sets of beliefs and values which could be linked with nationalism*. The preponderance of the two major secular ideologies of liberalism and communism during the XXth century paved the way for the proliferation of secular forms of nationalism. Accordingly, even in the Third World the struggle against colonialism for national liberation usually was carried forward under the umbrella of secularized ideologies. In the Muslim world until the '60s also the secular nationalism was in the foreground. The demise of communism and the crisis of the Western liberal and socialist ideologies during the '70s and '80s opened a placed for religion. A religious revival is taking place

as the corresponding atheist or secular ideologies lose their reputation, as effective responses to the urgent problems of the people. This was expressed massively in the substitution of secular by religious nationalism in the Moslem countries and of communism by religiously inspired and supported nationalism in the ex-communist world.

As a result of the interaction between religion and ethnicity between religious and ethnic identities *different types of religio-ethnic identities are possible*.

It could be a *one-sided or a poly-sided religio-ethnic identity*. A nation has a one-sided religio-ethnic identity if this identity defines the nation only in opposition to one or several, but not to all other nations. For instance, Roman Catholicism is part of the national identity of Lithuanians when they compare themselves with Lutheran Germans or Orthodox Russians and Byelorussians, but not when they compare themselves with Catholic Poles.

A nation will have a poly-faceted religio-ethnic identity if its religion is not universal, but specifically ethnic. Their religion will distinguish it from all other nations and make its identity stronger and more closed. Typical are the cases of Japan where most of the people are connected with the old Japanese animist religion, Shinto, or of China where the specifically Chinese semi-religious teaching of Confucianism is most widely spread.

Another distinction which could be drawn is between *partial and complete religio-ethnic identity*. Partial religio-ethnic identity is formed in cultures which are to some significant extent secularized so that the traditional religious cultures do not concur with the cultures as a whole or don't permeate the over-all cultures. There, the national and religious identities will coincide partially: the more a religion is separated from the profane culture, the more partial and non-important will be its role in development and maintenance of national identity.

Complete identity in which the limits of the religious, cultural, and national identities almost coincide means a lack of clear-cut borders, between the sacred and the profane, the religious and the mundane.

From this point of view, we can say that Protestantism could be included in only a partial religio-ethnic identity, which the Muslim religion could be the ground for a complete identity. The Orthodox Christian Church is "in between."

This implies a different role for these religions in the process of the development of ethnic self-consciousness and nation building. The major religions in the contemporary world—Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism have different experiences, traditions and opportunities to be intertwined with ethnic and national identities. Their role and place in the ethnic and nationalist upsurge which plagues the contemporary world should be scrutinized separately keeping in mind the role of the five aforementioned factors for the interaction between religious and ethnic identities.

Catholicism, Ethnicity, Nationalism

For different reasons Catholicism today has a diminished internal potential, compared with other world religions, to endorse ethnic and nationalist identities.

1. It is not an ethnically or nationally confined religion as were most of the ancient religions. It appeals to any human being in spite of racial and ethnic differences. Its birth and development was in the birth and development of universal beliefs overstepping any social, state, group, ethnic or class borders. This nonethnic and nonnational character has two dimensions. One of them is the dimension of the religious creed and beliefs. These are a universal creed and beliefs addressed to

any human being. It is true that it lays claims to universal but exclusive truths, that is to truths which overcome all other truths, being God's final revelation to mankind. But these are truths for everybody who is ready to accept them.

Another aspect of the universality and nonethnicity is the Church and its structure, which present the only world-wide, international organization surviving for two millennia. That makes it much more difficult for a state to use it for limited nationalist goals. It is no accident that in many countries in different times the nationalist forces have looked upon the Catholic Church as anti-national force which could not be kept under the control of the government. Such kind of suspicions could be found even in some periods in United States history.

2. From the point of view of the extent of secularization and the relationship between church and state, Catholicism also demonstrates decreased opportunities to take part in nationalist excesses. Christianity crops up between outcast people who are in conflict with the state, being persecuted by the state. The famous passage in Matthew 22:21 is no accident. In it Christ says: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." It is true that during the Middle Ages, Catholicism was an official religion, but some division between lay and church authorities has always existed. The terrible religious conflict which ravaged Europe between the XVth and XVIIth century gave birth to the idea of secularism: the notion of a state without special privileges, role and place for any specific religion. In 1689, John Locke wrote in his *Letter Concerning Toleration* that "neither Pagan nor Mohammedan nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of his religion."7 This idea was first given legal and constitutional force in the USA. The state did not depend upon the Catholic religion to reinforce and extend its authority. But this means also that it could not use religion to reinforce and extend nationalism as a phenomenon connected with the state.

The separation of church and state is an official position of the Vatican today and this helps it to keep its transnational and universal character.

3. With regard to the relationship between religion and culture as a factor in ethnic and national identities, it could be said that during hundreds of years the Catholic religion acted as an enormous melting pot, homogenizing the population of Europe and other parts of the world.

Christian culture made it possible to overcome the old tribal divisions after the fall of the Roman Empire and to unite the old Jewish, Greek, and Roman cultures with the culture of the barbarians. In this way, there was created not just separate national identities but a common European Judeo-Christian one. Catholicism is the major Western European stream of this identity. In fact, the development of the new nations during the 15th - 19th century in Western Europe is connected with processes of erosion and decline of Catholicism as a universal melting pot of Western Europe and later in Latin America and other places. The "disruption" of the melting pot opened a place for divisions, conflicts, wars, diversity and the building of new nations.

The rise of secular culture after the Renaissance and especially the development of the mass culture of industrial civilization separated religion from culture. The separation of the church from the current culture diminished its opportunity to influence national and ethnic identity. The Catholic religion as a whole carries with it a content which is better able to be part of a Pan-European or a world identity than of local ethnic and national identities.

During the XXth century, however, and especially after Vatican II, in the activity of the Catholic church the principle "unity in diversity" was strongly emphasized. The problem of

inculturation, of the interweaving of Christian faith and local cultures came to the fore and became more urgent. This helps in missionary activity, especially in the process of proselytizing in Africa and Latin America. By way of contrast to the diffusion through the media and all communication of secularized Western mass culture eradicating the local traditions and cultural heritage, the inculturation of the Catholic Church is a way to preserve the tribal cultural heritage. At the same time, evangelization acts as a cultural melting pot for overcoming tribal divisions.

4. The historical fate of Catholicism set it against strong rival secular and other nationalist ideologies. The birth of the nations and of the national ideologies accompanying this process during the last centuries were commonly justified by secular or rival religious forms of nationalism.

The dominant type of nationalism developed in the Western world was connected with the idea of "political nation" ("classical," "liberal Western nationalism," "nation by territory," or "social nationalism").8 The political existence of the population in some territory under the same government is a central requirement of this type of nationalism. This building of nationalism defined by the state and citizenship coincided with the rise of secularism or laicism in Europe and in America.

The crisis and decline of communism and the liberal welfare- ideology during the last decades opened a place for religion. But in developed Western countries, this vacuum is used also by different Protestant denominations and some of them have stronger nationalistic potential in their tradition and actual behavior. Even in America, the emphasis on the mission role and on nationalism is traditionally connected first of all with Protestant denominations, while Catholicism keeps its more universal and transnational spirit.

5. The major participation of Catholicism in the endorsement and development of national identities is in meeting points with rival religions. There during the process of nation-building, strong religious contradictions have taken place, contradictions older than the process of the birth of nations.

Religious differences have been important during this birth. In development of the opposition between "us" and "them" which is important for any identity, religion plays a central role. This happened at the beginning in Spain and Portugal as a result of the *Reconquista*. During the hundreds of years struggle with the Moslem world, Catholicism was the ideology of the liberation of the Iberian peninsula. Then it was used to homogenize the variegated ethnic population in new nations. The opposition "Catholics-Muslims" became a basis for development of national identity.

The same happened in many other cases at the borders of Catholic world communities. In Poland, it was the opposition with the Orthodox Christianity as ideology of Russian nationalism and foreign oppressor. In Croatia, the struggles during the nation building were those of opposition between Muslims and Orthodox Serbs9 ; in Ireland, it was opposition to Protestantism.

Thus, the places of encounter with other religions have been areas where there has been special inclusion and use of Catholic religion as a factor of integration, inspiration and support in the process of nation-building and nation-development. The most important factor here is that the respective Catholic populations have a history of occupation by foreign powers connected with other religions. Accordingly, in the struggles for liberation which play a special role in the process of the birth of nation, the church participated actively. It became a pillar of national consciousness and included its symbols and values in the foundations of the process of nation-building.

The Catholic Church played a specific role during the communist regimes in the countries of Central Europe. On the one hand, its structures were the only autonomous institutions in the state civil society. Because of their independence, they might become centers of opposition and structures for the defense of any dissent. On the other hand, they had the opportunity to reinforce their national role against "socialist internationalism." Their specific role of support for (and unity of) the dissidents, for opposition to the Soviet Union under the cover and umbrella of religion enhanced their political significance and became a basis for a religious revival. Notably, this was strongly manifested in Poland where the struggle against communism was interpreted through the prism of the old attitudes and opposition between Catholic Poles and Orthodox Russians.

The fall of Communism, however, destroyed the opposition which had given rise to the growing role of religion and of the Catholic Church. The Church tries to use the newly won social and political space and to back specific social agenda. As a result, new contradictions have appeared, most strongly manifested in Poland with regard to the ban of abortion. This raises the question of the future role of the Church. Is Poland to become the Ireland of Central Europe, many ask, with Christian values and Roman Catholic dogma enshrined in its laws? Or will it evolve like modern Italy or Spain where Roman Catholicism still seems crucial to the nation's cultural identity, but observance of religious precepts is a matter of personal choice? An answer of these questions depends on the success of economic reform and the many foreign threats which could require a growing nationalism, for a demand for nationalism could support and endorse the role of religion.

At the same time, the rapid development of rude capitalism and new market economy reproduces conditions for secularization which earlier characterized Western Europe. The conclusion of the Polish philosopher Fr. Josef Tischner concerning the role of Catholic religion in Central Europe is notable in this context:

It would be a simplification to work from the premise that in recent decades, it was only these two ideas—Christianity and Communism—which confronted each other on the stage of time. From the beginning there was a third player in this confrontation: the idea of freedom. Admittedly, freedom at first stood on the sidelines in this arena. For a while, it loomed as if it was the communists who should be regarded as the true champions of freedom, and this brought a lot of kind-hearted liberals under their spell. Then the church stepped forward as the mainstay of freedom, and this brought the liberals over to the church's camp. But now doubts are spreading in the church's camp as well. Before our eyes, there is a turning away from the church—both Christianity and religion in general have to accept a sharp drop in the number of followers. Might it be that liberalism will prove to be the only idea that is victorious?[10]

These conclusions find support in developments in some other countries. An expected consequence of German unification in 1990 is that hundreds of thousands of Germans have given up membership in the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches over the last three years because they no longer wanted to make contributions through "church tax" payments administered by the government. The Roman Catholic Church, estimated to have 28 million adherents, suffered a net loss of 143,530 members in 1990, and estimates that more than that left in each of the two following years. Until the mid-1980s, that figure had remained below 75,000.[11]

Facts like these show that being a shelter of dissent and performing additional functions which strengthened national identity, the Catholic Church could play an important role in some periods. But later, when the direct causes and needs of strong national identity lose importance, the church could begin to lose its influence.

It could keep its place if it begins to fight the new, post-communist threats to national identity connected with negative consequences of the market economy, the progressive impoverishment of a large part of population, the collapse of values and new dangers concerning the existence of the nation. That means in some sense keeping the situation of "borderline church," of the opposition "we"-"them", where the "them" are all new threats against the corresponding nations.

Orthodox Church, Ethnicity, Nationalism

The tradition, role and place of the Orthodox Church with regard to ethnicity and nationalism are quite different from those of Catholicism, because of the distinction of the major factors in the interweaving of religious and national identity. The Orthodox Church used to be a much stronger bearer of ethnic and national functions.

1. On the one hand, the Orthodox Church is connected with the universal teaching of Christianity. The specificity of rituals and religious practice also are not ethnic, but characteristic of all Orthodox countries. On the other hand, however, the mediator of the creed—the Church has not the transnational dimensions of the Catholic Church.

2. In regard to the relationship between state and church, it could be said that it is in some sense a "statist" or "etatist" church. This is the most important element predetermining its role in the endorsement of national identity. This has two implications.

a. The borders of church as institution or organizational structure in principle coincide with the borders of the state or nation. The autonomy, independence of the national church is one of the most important criteria of national independence. The church in some sense follows the rise and decline of the state. It is no accident for instance that the struggle for national liberation of the Buglarians under Ottoman rule began as a struggle for an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church. When this independence was achieved, there began as a second stage the struggle for political independence.

b. In spite of its own independent structures, the church is in different ways dependent and subordinated to the state; it serves political goals of the state. The state interferes in the election of the most important positions in the church hierarchy. It requires loyalty: when one of the Medieval Bulgarian kings came to doubt the loyalty of the patriarch, he beheaded him and put another person in his place.

3. There are significant differences between the Catholic and Orthodox churches concerning their relations to ethnic and national culture. By contrast to the Catholic Church, traditionally, the Orthodox churches are much more closely connected with the development of national cultures. On the one hand, the spread of Christianity in Orthodox countries coincide with the spread of their alphabet and the Gospel has always been preached in their national language. In the Catholic Church, by contrast, until the Reformation this was divided from the local languages. So the cultural traditions of the Orthodox countries are an inseparable unity of ethnicity and religion. It is true that large areas of the folk cultures retain older non-Christian or lay customs. Nevertheless, the overall tradition of national culture and education is inseparable from the role of the Church. Even the communist regimes acknowledged that fact. When for instance in Bulgaria from the '60s, the regime began to underline national traditions, history, culture and identity, it used to try to

involve the clergy in this process. In any delegation abroad headed by the Minister of Culture, the daughter of the party leader Ludwila Jivkova, some bishops were included.

4. Traditionally, in most of the Orthodox countries, strong liberal nationalist ideologies have not developed. For a long time, Communism as an ideology marginalized the Orthodox Church, but when it began to put emphasis on national elements and the first manifestations of communist nationalism appeared, it could not get around the role of the Orthodox religion in the endorsement of national identity.

After the fall of the Communist regimes, almost all political forces tried to use Christianity for their goals. Since the demise of Communism, there are no strong secular nationalist ideological rivals to the church. All nationalist forces rely strongly on the church, and even secular political forces try to use Christianity for their goals; for instance, each of the two major opposing political coalitions in Bulgaria, presented in the parliament after the elections in 1991—headed respectively by the Socialist (ex-Communist) party and by the anti-Communist UDF—included some Christian parties or movements.

All of this closely connects the Orthodox Church with any expression of national identity.

5. If when it concerns the Catholic church, only some of the countries are developed in the context of the strong "border" opposition "we-them," the Orthodox churches in all countries have been connected for centuries with this consciousness and with feelings of threat. On the one hand, there is the threat from Islam. All Orthodox countries border with the Islamic world and have the experience, attitudes and prejudices of hundreds of years of struggle in which national history is inseparable from church history. Let us take only two figures in Bulgarian history. The Bulgarian patriarch Evtiwii headed the last Bulgarian defenders of the besieged capital Turnovo before the final fall of the country for 500 years under Ottoman rule. The monk Paisii began the struggle for national awakening almost four centuries after the fall. The growth of the national consciousness is in the context "we-them" where the opposition defining the national identity is inseparable from the opposition Christians-nonChristians.

The behavior of the Orthodox churches is that of institutions which feel themselves menaced from two sides over the ages—from Islam and from Catholicism—and not merely threatened but ages of being in retreat. Millions of Orthodox Christians were Islamized. Hundreds of thousands of others became members of the Catholic or Uniate churches and there is almost no opposite case. The Orthodox Church has ever been on the defeated side and exists with insecurity. Now, after the collapse of Communism, this feeling is growing. Any ecumenical suggestions are perceived as attempts to split off more Uniate parishes, to obtain advantages. It is significant that the meeting of the patriarchs of the Orthodox churches in Istanbul in 1992, passed a tough declaration accusing the Vatican of proselytizing and "agitation" among Orthodox Christians, warning that this will render impossible any inter-church dialogue.

This feeling of siege borne by the Orthodox churches is intertwined with the respective national identities and interacts with them. So menaces to the Church are perceived as menaces to the nations and vice versa, menaces to nations are perceived as menaces to churches.

These peculiarities are expressed in their own way in the different Orthodox countries. Let us quickly survey some of them in ex-communist countries.

Russia. The development of the Russian nationalism is inseparable from Russian Orthodoxy. Even Stalin during the Second World War was compelled to an appeal to the patriotism of the Russian Church. Sergei Lezov, a Russian scholar of religious studies, points out:

I think that our Orthodox Christianity has lost the character of *Evangelium*, that is joyous message, the "good news." Instead, it has become the "core of Russian culture." The fabric of our Orthodoxy is woven of distinctive political, national and spiritual urges. Something very simple has happened after the new forms of self-understanding (for example "communism, internationalism") were smashed, the previous forms of mass consciousness, which had almost been squeezed out, have begun to return: the "religious" and the "national." There was no need to go far to find an ideal: it was at hand and ready to use . . . The "religious" and the "national" in our Orthodoxy have merged to such an extent that it is impossible to "isolate the Christian basis in the pure form" and anyway nobody is trying.12

With the loss of the old communist symbols, the state begins to rely again on the symbols of religious belief. Russian television now may more often broadcast religious Masses than the American. The previous atheist and highest party official, Boris Yeltzin, visits religious services and appeals to the Russian people along with the patriarch. A mass restoration of shrines and monasteries has begun.

At the same time, the separation of new Orthodox countries from the ex-Soviet Union leads to a movement for the separation of the churches that took place in the Ukraine. The division of the Orthodox churches follows simply the division of states and nations.

Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Church is also considered as a chief repository of the traditional national consciousness. In spite of accusations of collaboration with Ceaucescu, it is experiencing now a revival and a strengthening of its unity with the state. The new leadership tries to use it to legitimize and endorse its power. Television often bypasses the news from the rest of the world in order to highlight commemorations of the tours of some Medieval prince or intellectual sage, at which President Iliescu is followed by army chiefs and Orthodox priests in flowing robes.

Typical of the manifestation of the Romanian nationalism is the relationship between the Romanian Orthodox and the Uniate Churches. Three hundred years ago when Transylvania became part of the Hapsburg Empire, a large part of the Orthodox clergy was compelled by the circumstances to swear a new allegiance to Rome. Thus, there appeared and developed the Uniate Church. When the Communists took over power in the late 1940s, they handed over to the Orthodox Church the Uniate religious property, insisting that the faithful convert to the Orthodox Church if they wished to stay within the religious fold. When forty years later at the end of 1989, the new provisional government overturned the ban on Uniates, the Uniates began to demand the return of the property. That, however, gave birth to growing hostility and intolerance from the Orthodox Church which interpreted this as an attack from Catholicism.13

Serbia. For different reasons, the Serbian Orthodox Church is among the most nationalistic churches. It is no accident that during Tito's rule, it was accused of extremely nationalistic sympathies. Any attempt by the Catholic Church to establish ecumenical relations has always been looked upon as attack on Orthodoxy and a threat to the identity of the Serbian people.

Orthodox theology of this century gives prominence to two ideas: that Catholicism threatens Orthodoxy; that Serbian Orthodoxy forms the heart of Serbian national identity; and that from a historical perspective, the Serbian nation is under constant threat—from the aspirations of the

Moslems, especially in Kosovo, and from Catholics in Croatia.14 Long before the civil war in Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church leaders issued different declarations alleging discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Islamic fundamentalism was blamed for discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo and the Roman Catholic Church for giving support to what Serbs saw as a neo-Fascist Croatian state. This position is a part of the strong Serbian nationalism. It is noteworthy that the war-zone from 1991 straddled the old fault-line separating Western and Eastern Christendom as established by the IVth century Council of Nicaea. Thus, the civil war became also a religious war. In over one fourth of the territory of Croatia all Catholic churches were destroyed. The destruction of religious property and symbols is heavier on all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina because they are treated as major factors and tools of the nationalism of the rivals. Moreover, all these people really have the same ethnic origin, but then religion has made them parts of different nations.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church also is deeply rooted in the Bulgarian national identity. Between the IXth and XIIIth centuries, it was a major homogenizing factor, creating a new culture and values uniting different tribes and traditions in a common ethnic community. During the Ottoman rule, it was a major factor in preserving the national memory and identities. Priests and monks are among the main participants in the process of national awakening, nation-building and national liberation. The whole symbolic and ritual system of the church is accepted as part of the national culture and identity.

After the liberation from Ottoman rule (1879), the Church retained a very strong position in society and close relations with the state. The priests were treated as state employees and their salaries were paid from the state budget. Church statute ruled all types of family relations and the Orthodox Church was the largest charitable organization.

After 1944, the Church was pushed aside and the atheistic ideology became official. According to the law of religion passed in 1949, religious propaganda and church charity were forbidden and a significant part of church property was nationalized. The director of a special state body, the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs had the right to propose dismissal of any cleric. Religion was seen as a phenomenon which soon would disappear.

From the '60s, however, step by step, a change of attitude toward the Orthodox Church began in the context of a growing emphasis upon national identity and patriotism. The Orthodox religion and church came to be seen first of all through the prism of their cultural and educational role during many centuries of preserving the Bulgarian national identity.

The fall of Communism led to a revival of Orthodoxy and a reestablishment of different types of connections between state and church. Christmas and Easter have became official holidays and all major state rituals and celebrations are accompanied by religious services. The army and the police have made some religious holidays their own official holidays. There are long lines at shrines for different religious services—baptism, wedding ceremonies, etc. The president and the ministers appear in the TV broadcast of solemn Christmas and Easter masses. A host of Christian parties and unions have been established.

By contrast with the American constitution, the new Bulgarian one enacted in 1991, includes a special article highlighting that the Orthodox Christianity is the traditional religion of the Bulgarian people. This reflects not just the fact that according to statistical studies 87.5% of the population defines itself as connected with the Orthodox tradition and identity (10.5% - Moslems, 0.9% - Catholics, 0.5% - Protestants), but a feeling of threat from the influx of different sects from

the West and of Islam from the Southeast. This perceived threat has served as a 'menace to Bulgarian identity'.

At the same time the new government formed by the opposition tried to use the old communist law and practice to replace the patriarch and some bishops with people loyal to it. The President protested this interference of government in church affairs. So the church was divided by a strong political struggle between the old synod and the new one appointed by the government's Director of Ecclesiastical Matters. This has diminished strongly the opportunity of the Church to be an active force in manifestations of nationalism and broadened the chance for the new religious sects and movements. On the other hand, the nationalism in Bulgaria also has not had such excessive extremist and influential forms as in other Orthodox countries. The religious revival has taken more official and external forms while the elements of national identity have weakened.

Islam, Ethnicity, Nationalism

Islamization almost always means a change of national or ethic identity. In the history of humanity, Islam has been the mightiest "melting pot" for the assimilation of different groups, much stronger than the "melting pot" of American civilization during the XXth century. The potential of most of the other world religions to create and support national identity is weaker and the secularization process has weakened it additionally. Accordingly, it would be easier for Islam to use nationalism as a means of Islamization than for Christianity to do this for the purpose of evangelization. The factors determine a mixture of religious and national identity function in a specific way:

1. Like Christianity, Islam is one of the world religions overstepping borders of states and ethnic groups spread on all continents. Most of its approximately one billion adherents are concentrated in Asia and Africa, but their number in Europe and America is fast growing. And while Christians in other cultural milieus are much more easily converted and change their religion, for Muslims this is almost impossible or, at least, much more difficult.

Islam is a trans-ethnic religion, but, at the same time, it has the ability to change and design ethnic identities, to adjust the ethnic consciousness of the people in order to form the identity of the most mighty and influential ethnic or national group in the respective area. So it acts as the most successful in the world, universal ethnic "melting pot."

2. In their origin Christianity and Islam entail different relationships between religion and state. Christ is Messiah and God's son and his actions have nothing to do with the state. His followers are persecuted by the state and consider the state an alien force. This has ever generated within Christianity some kind of division between religion and lay power, between church and state authorities. Conversely, Mohammed is Messiah but, at the same time, he is military leader and statesman. His is an inseparable unity of spiritual and state power so the extension of the state means also extension of the spiritual power. The extension of the spiritual power means widening of the scope of the lay power. That is why war is one of the major means of conversion.

For the Christian, Caesar is a man while Christ is God's son. For the Muslims of earlier times, God was Caesar, while the sovereign caliph or sultan was his vice-regent on earth. Accordingly, the state is God's state, the army is God's army, the enemy is God's enemy, the law is God's law and in principle there could not be another. There was no church as an autonomous institution to be separated from the state, nor any active professional men of religion, no priesthood to be

separated from lay men. Church and state were one and the same. This is why Islam demands from believers not textual accuracy in belief, but loyalty to the community and its leader. There are no authorities to prosecute deviations from beliefs, to punish for schism or heresy. Loyalty to Islam is not loyalty to beliefs but loyalty to the Islamic community. What matters is not crossing the borders between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, but between Islam and apostasy.15

It is interesting that only in Ottoman times as a result of its experience of encounter with Christianity an organization of Muslim religious dignitaries was developed with a hierarchy of ranks and with territorial jurisdictions. This albeit much weaker differentiation of priesthood from lay power made possible the separation which Ataturuk later tried to make between state and Islam and to develop a secular state. But even in Turkey, which for a long time was pointed out as a model of the secularization of a Moslem state, this separation was not like that developed in Western countries. Despite the fact that since 1937 secularism was proclaimed in Turkey as one of the fundamental constitutional principles, the state has retained control over the mosques, over the training, appointment and payment of Moslem prayer leaders and teachers, and over the religious education of Muslim children, while, at the same time, leaving non-Moslem communities to finance and organize their life on their own.16

This traditional unity of Islam and state leads to the fact that today nearly every state with a majority Muslim population have a specific reference to Islam in their constitution as being the religion of the state or (in the case of Syria) of the head of state. The upsurge of the contemporary Muslim fundamentalism is an endeavor to restore the original inseparable unity of state and Islam. The West and the whole traditionally Christian world are painfully compelled to learn that their division of state and church and their model of the secular nation-state is not as universal as it presumes, and other forms of political organization are possible and accepted as valid.

3. The unique assimilative abilities of Islam are most strongly expressed in the relationship between religion and culture. The underlying principle that what is more important is not just faith in some strictly formulated Islamic creed, but fidelity to the Islamic community, brings about the result that Muslim identity is not alignment with a set of beliefs, but identification with a concrete Moslem community. Thus the ethnicity of this community coincides with its Moslem identity and entails a specific inseparability of the religious from the national (or ethnic). To be converted to the Muslim religion means to be included as a part of a new community, and because the Islamic community is inseparable traditionally from the state, religious conversion turns into national conversion or national assimilation.

Evangelization does not mean ethic or national conversion. Islamization means a change of the entire way of life and practically always leads to a change of ethnic or national identity. When converted to Islam a Christian, Buddhist, etc., population tends either to affiliate itself to the identity of the closest Moslem nation or, if the communication between them is difficult, it develops its own specific Muslim ethnic or national identity. This is the identity not just of believers in a religion, but the identity of persons who are inseparable parts of a common community. This is true throughout the world. In Bulgaria and other parts of the Balkan peninsula, Christians who were proselytized into Muslims during the Ottoman rule are inclined to identity themselves as Turks because Turkey is the nearest nation which is Islamic in religion. This is true even for the so-called "Pomaks" who have never known one Turkish word but retain their Bulgarian language and customs just as they were practiced by their Christian predecessors several hundred years ago. At the same time, the Muslim descendants of Christian Serbs and Croatians using the same Serbo-Croatian language identify themselves as a specific Muslim nation. Even if,

as in the case in Bosnia, people are not very religious, religion has left so deep a vestige that with their brother Christians they now wage the most bloody nationalistic civil war in recent European history. To be Bosnian means first of all to be Muslim, and to be Muslim means to be Bosnian. At the same time, in another part of the world, for instance, in Malaysia, many consider it axiomatic to be Malay is to be Muslim.

4. The revival of Islam as a basis of nationalism is connected closely to the decline and disillusionment concerning the rival secular forms of nationalism which have been influential in different countries of the Muslim world since the twenties. Neither models of modernization, which were pro-Western, nor those claiming to be socialist turned out to be sufficiently successful. So Islamic fundamentalists usually take the very programs which the previous nationalist regimes devised but were unable to achieve. They united, however, these programs for modernization with Islamic rule, and translate them into religious terms. In this way, over the last years the growing wave of Muslim fundamentalism in the Middle East and North Africa attracts thousands of militants who had political experience in the nationalist, Baathist, Nassarist, or Mossadeghust parties and who have been disappointed by those parties' inability to keep their promises. Now Islamist activists tend to come from university campuses rather than from among illiterates. Many of them have had some access to a Western-style education, but if, in the first half of the century, this prompted some inclination to liberal secularized thinking, now, however, disenchantment with the current regimes and with the role of the West in the Islamic world promotes looking to Islam as a reservoir of solutions.17 Even in Turkey, which was considered a castle of Kemalist secularism, the military regime in the eighties reintroduced religious education, which has led to a rapid upsurge and an increasing strengthened position of Islam in all areas of social life, as well as a tendency to replace the secular nationalism of Ataturk with a religious nationalism identifying Islam and ethnicity. The long-standing distinction between Turk and Turkish citizen was maintained. Turk means Muslim or descendent of Muslim, while non-Muslims may be treated as Turkish citizens but are not called Turks. So, for instance, a Bulgarian citizen who does not know the Turkish language but practices Islam could be treated as a Turk, but the non-Muslim Turkish citizen is non-Turk.

5. The opposition "we-them" also has an important meaning for the endorsement of Muslim national or ethnic identification. There is, on the one hand, global opposition to the Christian and Western world. For fourteen centuries these are relations of conflicts and wars, attacking and counterattacks, *jihad* and crusade, conquest and reconquest, Islamization of European Christians and colonization of Moslem peoples. The conflict between these two civilizations continues in most cases where they meet today along thousands of kilometers from the Philippines through Armenia and Azerbaijan, to the Middle East and Cyprus, to Bosnja and Herzegovina, Sudan and Nigeria. There are mercenaries and volunteers from Muslim countries on the side of the Bosnian Muslims and from Christian countries on the side of Bosnian Serbs. All this boosts a growing nationalism.

Hinduism, Ethnicity, Nationalism

Hinduism always has been considered quite different compared with the two great monotheistic traditions—Christian and Muslim. By contrast with Christianity and Islam, it is presented as having deeply rooted tolerance and inclusiveness. According to Louis Renoia, in

Hindusim "tolerance, nonviolence [are] considered an active virtue; this is a manner of acting which must be respected—even in the political sphere—*regardless of the attitude of others*. In this perhaps is to be found the most spectacular contribution which India has made to the modern world and the most worthy reply to Marxism and its materialism."18 Gandhi who was a devout Hindu at heart accepted its main ideas and introduced the ideal of nonviolence. India won its independence and secularism, became the basis of the new state, reflecting the plurality of religious and groups, traditions and the attitude of peaceful coexistence. In spite of the fact that Hindus were the preponderant part of the population, secularism and tolerance enshrined in the Constitution spurned the ideal of identifying it as a Hindu country. This brought to the fore the hopes for common economic and social progress.

The events of religious and ethnic conflicts, however, over the last years and the growing moods of opposition to secularism, the outbursts of violence and the predictions even of the disintegration of India, raise questions whether hitherto prevailing opinions that Hinduism is characterized by qualities of tolerance and nonviolence are correct, and whether some new facts have not changed totally its "traditional nature":

1. The number of adherents makes Hinduism one of the three major religions. It is third (719,269,000) after Roman Catholics (1,010,352,000) and Moslems (950,726,000).19 Nevertheless, it could not be considered in the same way as other world and universal religions, not only because its geographic borders are almost totally those of the Indian subcontinent, but also because by contrast to Christianity and Islam it does not claim to be the only true religion. It recognizes the truth of any religion and tries to include that truth in itself. But it has never made an attempt to become a world power.

Being fundamentally polytheistic it allows coexistence of enormously different beliefs and practices changing themselves over the ages. The meaning of its gods in different places and times is different, but they coexist as parts of a variegated whole. The philosophers tried to find something common—belief in one supreme principle sometimes personified as Lord, sometimes conceived as an impersonal deity-Absolute. But the common believers form their own communities with their chosen gods, the diversity and the number of which is enormous. This makes Hinduism a specific unity of great numbers of different sects. These are neither exclusive groups nor hostile denominations because they could not be considered as deviations from a single orthodox version but are parts of a whole.

The coming of the industrial civilization, however, and its homogenizing influence has led to diminishing this diversity. The "revival" of Hinduism at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the gradual growth of Indian national sentiments are the basis of this process. "A necessarily Indian phenomenon, Hinduism could not fail to display both the virtues and the excesses of any nationalism."20

2. Being traditionally preoccupied with the ideas of renunciation, and personal self-development Hinduism seems, at first glance, to be disinterested in the problems of politics and the state. Its conception of relations between religion and state is quite obscure. Precisely because of its pluralism and inclusiveness, it presupposes a state supporting this pluralism. However, from ancient times it has had a characteristic tendency to give primacy to the spiritual power over all others. In the traditional gradation of society into four classes, at the top are the Brahmins who exercise spiritual power, then come Ksatryase, the warriors, who wield secular power, the Vaisyas

who represent the economic power, and then the Vartisons (merchants, artisans, cultivators, etc.). In some sense, the position of Brahmins is above that even of the Kings.

Obviously, the slogans now for creation of a Hindu state raised by the Bharatiya Ganata Party, the major Hindu revivalist political party, are grounded in some sense in this old attitude about the role of the clergy in the Hindu community.

3. Polytheistic and pluralistic character of Hinduism enable its penetration of the whole culture in the form of myths and legends, poetry and novels, philosophy, art and ways of life. The line between the sacred and the secular often is very thin. The host of gods is not isolated in towering cathedrals or remote shrines, but is everywhere and their images are found in shops, taxis, kitchens and offices. Every stage of life is accompanied by sacramental rites—from birth to death. Hinduism presents itself as a way of life prescribing such everyday actions as ablutions, food restrictions (which may extend to fasts), corporal positions and gestures of the fingers, control of breath, etc. Along with the cult of different gods, worship of trees, serpents, special "genies," magic and astrology are included in Hinduism.

It could be said that religion is not just closely connected with culture but include the overall diversity of the culture. But exactly this diversity of different possible tendencies, dimensions, aspects in Hinduism makes possible its mutability, enabling it to shift according to the circumstances and be included in any possible combination, comprising as well unifying tendencies which decrease the diversity. These tendencies become possible with the decline of the old peasant particularism of communications, literary and education, the development of industrialization processes and the related trends to centralization, standardization, massification, and the synchronization of life.

4. Hinduism develops over the ages as a religion attempting to include in itself the other religions and gods. The relation to it from outside, however, is not the same. Millions of Hindus have converted to Buddhism, Islam, etc., and the encounters with other religions often have been distructive.

The lack of a developed Hindu social and political doctrine adapted to the contemporary age and the reputation of modern secular ideologies after the liberation of India moved Hinduism to the margins as a factor in political life. It was expected that secularism could be the "melting pot" overcoming the divisions of religious and ethnic groups in the process of development. As demonstrated by historical experience, even in America, the "melting pot" has not been perfect. This is truer in India. The trends toward the extinction of old structures and way of life and the modernization process make the old contrasts more clear-cut. They marginalize millions of people, throwing them into the competitive relations of a market society, in conditions of enormous shortage of resources. Inexorably, this tends to turn diversities and disparities into contradictions and heavy conflicts. In an immobile and noncompetitive society with weak communications between different communities, higher diversity and tolerant coexistence was possible. But when mobility and communications increase and a competition style becomes predominant, diversity easily becomes or leads to inequality and conflict. Thus has happened in India during the last decades. Moreover, the process of modernization was not so successful as in other Asian countries. The cities became filled with millions of rural poor wanting to have the same opportunities as the higher classes, resentful because of the corruption and hunger, seething with bitterness and frustration. The former secular model and secular ideologies lost their reputation, gave way to a search for political decisions in simplified, unified and nationalistic forms of religion. The

Industrial Revolution in Europe is often cited as an example of what is happening in India now—injustice, mass impoverishment, rioting, violence, religious intolerance, nationalism.21

5. The relationships of market competitiveness, intensive communications and the insecurity of millions of people push them to a vigorous search for their identity, to aggression and strife with others, and to look for scapegoats to explain their desperately poor conditions. In this context the opposition "we-them" manifests itself first of all in the form "Hindus-Moslems." The history offers enough facts for this opposition beginning with the occupation of Indian territory by Islamic rulers over the pass 1000 years, passing through half a million Muslims and Hindus slaughtered in the partition of Pakistan and India in 1947, the permanent hostility between these two countries, and the support from Pakistan to Muslims separatists in Kashmir Valley (Pakistan even grants some privileges to the Muslim minority now in India).

A return to the Hindu identity appears as a medicine for the contradictions, disparities, corruption and lack of effectiveness on the part of the existing political system. In this situation the fundamentalist and Hindu nationalist slogans of the Bharatiya Party gain a growing number of supporters. They feed upon the humiliation generated by the backwardness and second-rate position of the population in a country which could be one of the great powers.

Two Major Types of Religious Upsurge Today and Their Connections with Ethnicity and Nationalism

In order to understand the peculiarities and different mixtures of religious and ethnic revival, the mutual influences in the religious and nationalist upsurge in contemporary world, one should keep in mind that this takes place in the context of two opposite and in some sense mutually exclusive forms of religious revival—*fundamentalism* and *pluralization*.

Fundamentalism is a preponderant form of religious revival, first of all in Third World countries and those of the ex-communist bloc which are in severe crisis. It has manifestations in the developed countries. But there they are not in the mainstream of policy but emerge among social groups experiencing strong insecurity as a result of rapid changes and crises.

Several major peculiarities enable fundamentalism to transmit enhanced feelings of traditional nationalism:

(1) It is connected first of all with the search for support from existing mainstream religions,—Islam, Protestantism, Hinduism, Catholicism, Orthodoxy. That is why fundamentalism always is some form of conservatism and return to the past for solutions to today's problems. The emphasis on past traditions move it in the same direction as nationalism for which the past or "roots" ever have been an important factor.

(2) The effort to desecularize political power in theocratic sates as well as mild forms of desecularization of the culture also are connected with major factors concerning national identity and the active involvement of religion in national identity.

(3) Nationalism is at the center of the social, political and moral agenda of all fundamentalisms today. Religion is proposed as a means to strengthen the nation and to endorse its most important values. Moreover, the sense that the "nation is in danger" is an important reason for proposed fundamentalist measures for moral renovation and the resurgence, resurrection of the nation.

(4) Fundamentalist religious nationalism is highly intolerant, most of its proposed measures being interdictions.22

(5) Religious fundamentalism and nationalism are inclined to uniformity, to diminution of the distinctions at the expense of some general goals and values.

Quite opposite is the tendency connected with *pluralization of religion*, which prevails in the developed countries, especially in America:

(1) Pluralization of religion reflects a new post-industrial trend of the crumbling of the old giant structures and hierarchies in all areas of social life—from economy to cultural life. Organizational structures now have fewer levels and are "flatter."
These processes find expression also in the loss of ground of the centralized churches with their more professional staffs. The long trend studies of the Gallup organization for more than half a century reveal the following tendencies:23

-A growing pluralism and a movement away from a monolithic religious view; not only is America becoming a less while Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation, it is starting to become a somewhat less Judeo-Christian nation.
-A clear increase in the level of interest in religion.

There is a decline in mainline churches at the expense of new denominations. For instance, the United Methodist Church dropped from a high of 11 million members in 1965 to 8,904,824 in 1991; during the same period the Episcopal Church dropped from 3.4 million to 2,446,050.24 The number of Catholic nuns declined from 176,341 in 1968 to 99,337 in 1992. In 1987 alone 5,577 nuns left religious life.25 But the number of believers in America does not drop each year; many new religious groups, sects, movements are born. The increase in the proportion of Americans whose religion is "other" is one of the most significant religious trends of the past 40 years.

(2) The opposition of the old organization and separation between clergy and lay people find expression in the religious realm in looking for new forms or ways of participation—a participatory style including adoption of popular music, emotional emphases in devotion, even the deliberate use of psychological group dynamic techniques, new emphasis upon the welfare function of religious communities, a broadening of their social roles, proliferation of denominations without clear organizational structure, and being religious in the functional rather than the substantial sense of the definition of religion ("New Age" is one of the most well-known examples).
(3) This is connected with growing tolerance between the different religious denominations and sects. The lines of tensions and conflicts in America are no longer between different churches, religions, denominations, which coexist peacefully in spite of growing pluralization. The distinctions which matter are first of all cultural and they cut across different denominations.26
(4) All this is connected with the growing value attached to diversity in all areas. There is a value shift from supporting uniformity to supporting ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, etc., diversities.
(5) Religious pluralism is connected with a growing broader pluralism, including ethnic pluralism. But in developed countries these types of pluralism often do not coincide, and this leads to less tension between them.

What is important is that in spite of the fact that too often the tendencies of fundamentalism and that of pluralism have mingled, they are the result of very different reasons and conditions. That is why their relations to ethnicity and nationalism are different and complicated. It is impossible to transfer models and policy between them if in one case nationalism and religion tend to coincide and in others to divide. The particular cases will demand specific analyses and proposals.

Notes

1. See James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991), pp. 255-262, 378-379; Peter Berger, "Some Second Thoughts on Substantive versus Functional Definitions of Religion" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 13 (1974), 125-33.

2. Robert N. Bellah, *Daedalus* 96 (1967), 1-21; Robert N. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial* (New York: Crossroad Books, The Seabury Press, 1975).

3. *Ibid*., p. 11.

4. See Peter Steinfels, "Beliefs," *The New York Times* (January 23, 1993).

5. Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 84; see also Anthony Smith, "Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (July 1992).

6. *Ibid*., p. 113.

7. John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration with the Second Treatise of Civil Government*, ed. J. W. Gough (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), p. 160.

8. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp. 88-109; Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 54-68; James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 51-54.

9. "It is of course true that Croatian history too provides examples of strong identification between religious and national identity. This was the case both in the regions where Croats lived under the Ottoman regime and in regions within the Hapsburg Empire where from the end of the seventeenth century Serbs and Croats lived together and where religions functioned as a distinctive feature of their respective national identities. It was, however, never to the same degree in the northern (Zagorje) or western (Istria, Dalmatia) parts of Croatia. And although such an identification existed and the Catholic Church was one of the most important elements in the formation of Croatian national identity and its preservation in time of crisis, it is untrue either that Catholicism in Croatia is seen as the fundamental or exclusive basis of the national, or that the Catholic church played or had any intention of playing a decisive role in politics as the ultimate political representative of the Croatian nation." (Geert Van Dartel, "The Nations and Churches in Yugoslavia," *Religion, State and Society*, 20 (1992), 279.

10. Jozef Tischner, "Christianity in the Post-Communist Vacuum," *Religion, State and Society* 20 (1992), 331.

11. See Craig R. Whitney, "Church Tax Cuts the German Fold," *The New York Times* (December 28, 1992).

12. Sergei Lezov, "National Idea and Christianity," *Religion, State and Society*, 20 (1992), 46.

13. "The danger is that the Orthodox-Uniate quarrel may enter a new stage of intensity at a time when relations between these two churches are already badly strained in neighboring Yugoslavia as a result of its effective breakup, putting mainly Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs

in conflict," Tom Gallagher, "Time to Build Bridges in Romania," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* (Autumn, 1992), 272.

This growing tension could be found also in Russia: "The Moscow Patriarchate . . . accused Catholics of proselytizing in the canonical" territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. Orthodox fears and suspicions were fed, and to some extent justified, by the intensive behavior of some over-enthusiastic Catholic groups which saw the collapse of the Soviet system as an opportunity to expand their own field of operation and to recruit Russian members. Metropolitan Kirill, the Orthodox Archbishop of Smolensk and the chairperson of the Russian Orthodox Church's Department for External Church Relations, complained in an article in the *Moscow News* (February 1992), that some of these groups "seems to think that they are among pagans who are to be converted into Christianity, and behave accordingly." In the light of their approach, he questioned, "Are we to continue to believe that the ecumenical principles upheld by the Vatican II Council are still abided by? If two churches are equal before God and are equally teaching sound eternal salvation, then the conversion of Orthodox Christians to Catholicism is pointless," (Oliver McTernan, "Reflections on a Changing Situation—The Religious Divided," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* (Autumn, 1992), 279.

14. See: Geert van Dartel, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-278, 281-283.

15. Here I use the excellent distinctions and comparisons between Islam and Christianity of Bernard Lewis, "Muslims, Christians, and Jews: The Dream of Coexistence," *The New York Review* (March 26, 1992).

16. See Edward Mortimer, "Christianity and Islam," *International Affairs*, 67 (1991), 9.

17. See Ghassan Salamé, "Islam and the West", *Foreign Policy*, 90 (Spring 1993), 22-26.

18. Louis Renou, ed., *Hinduism* (New York: George Braziller, 1962), pp. 55-56.

19. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1993* (New York: Pharos Books, 1992), p. 718.

20. Louis Renou, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

21. See Anita Desai, "India: The Seed of Destruction," *The New York Review* (June 27, 1991).

22. Discussing the role of religion in the American presidential campaign and the behavior of some fundamentalist circles, Bill Clinton stated in 1992: "Like so many Americans I've been appalled to hear voices of intolerance raised in recent weeks. Voices that proclaim some families aren't real families, some Americans aren't real Americans. . . One even said, what this country needs is a religious war," *Journal of Church and State*, 34 (1992), 725.

23. George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Gastelli, *The People's Religion: American Faith in the 90's* (New York: Macmillan; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1989), p. 44.

24. See *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1993* (New York: Pharos Books, 1992), pp. 719-720; John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, *Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990's* (New York: Morrow, 1990), pp. 273-297.

25. Jennifer Steinhauer, "Older and Skilled: New Nuns are Working to Widen Roles," *The New York Times* (Dec. 27, 1992).

26. In this context J. Hunter argues that "the politically relevant divisions in the American context are no longer defined according to where one stands vis-à-vis Jesus, Luther or Calvin, but where one stands vis-à-vis Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, and Condorcet and especially their philosophical heirs (including Nietzsche and Rorty). The politically relevant world-historical event, in other words, is now the secular Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and its philosophical aftermath. This is what inspires the divisions of public culture in the United States today" (James Davision Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* [New York: Basic Books, 1991], p. 132).

Chapter IX
Religion and Morality: Private or Public

Theophilus Okere

This paper is designed to enable us to refocus more practically on the general theme of "Religion in Public Life," while at the same time allowing for some observations from the distinctive standpoint of an African Christian. From this standpoint one perceives almost with the sensitivity of a victim the tragic absence of the religious in the public arena of the global village. At the same time that I explain this phenomenon, I will venture to propose some elements of another culture and religion that could help to make a difference.

In a lecture I delivered in Kumasi, Ghana in September 1989 to the Association of the Episcopal Conferences of Anglophone West Africa, I took a rather pessimistic view of the outcome of Evangelization in the old Christianities judging from:

- the massive losses in the numbers of the faithful
- the massive losses in numbers of priests and religious
- the shrunken numbers in the growth of vocations
- the qualitative losses recorded through the growth in religious indifference, the general decline in the influence of religion in daily life
- the dwindling influence of religion in the decisive areas of interest for humanity.

I expressed the view that since the state of Christianity in places where it was 2000 years old was no inspiring goal to aim at for a young church, our evangelizing methods would have to change if we are not to have the same results 2000 years hence as old churches have today. In a document prepared for the workshops of the 1971 Synod of Bishops, a synthesis of the general debate on Justice in the World reads in part:

How is it that after 80 years of modern social teaching and 2000 years of the gospel of love, that the Church has to admit her inability to make more impact upon the conscience of her people. . . . But it was stressed again and again that the faithful, particularly the more wealthy and comfortable among them, simply do not see structural social injustice as sin. They simply feel no personal responsibility for it and simply feel no obligation to do anything about it. Sunday observance, the Church's rules on sex and marriage tend to enter the Catholic consciousness profoundly as sin. To live like Dives with Lazarus at the gate is not even perceived as sinful.1

This frustration expressed at this level of Christian leadership confirms what historians, sociologists and others have been observing of the great divorce between Religion and Public life.
Let us define our use of terms:

- *Religion*: For the purposes of this reflection we shall understand Religion as the historical, organized religions and more specifically Christianity whose numerical superiority and geographical spread qualifies to ideally typify the other religions.
We could well limit our title to read: The Christian Religion in Public Life.

We need to know if Christianity as a religion has made, makes, or can make a difference in the public life of its adherents.

- *Public Life*: Public life is an ambiguous expression for it can mean (a) the public section of an individual's life, that is, one's relation to others especially beyond the level of family; (b) the entire life of the community itself, whether this community is a village or country, or the world community; (c) the area of intersubjective interaction and the locus of decisions on what touches the whole. Our usage shall include these three levels of meaning while distinguishing them. By Public life we shall mean the moral quality of that life. We ask whether religion makes or has made any difference in the ability of people to act justly toward each other in building a just and peaceful human society.

At the end we shall see that the Christian Religion on account both of constraints imposed on it by the environment and of deliberate choices has tended to have its highest influence on the private lives of its individual adherents, less influence on the public life of the same individuals and the least influence on public life understood as the life of the Community or society.

The Positive Influence of Religion in Public Life

The Influence of Religion

Religion expresses itself in many forms, which include creed, ritual or liturgy and morality. In a well-articulated Theology all these elements can be seen to be interconnected and even integrated, hence an understanding of one element often sheds light on another. However, for the purposes of this essay we may pass over other elements and concentrate on its moral component as the most direct link between religion and society. It is not that the others are less important. For instance, as a belief system, no one will doubt that Christianity has generated and promoted values which are today part of the proud legacy of civilization. This has been made possible because the values so inculcated have been internalized as ideals and models for life. Through scripture reading and spiritual reading, in sermons, retreats, catechisms, pastoral letters and other forms of catechisis, ideals of behaviour have been upheld and models proposed—especially those of Jesus himself, his mother and the various saints—which have had profound effect on people and lasting influence on their private lives. Through such exhortations to virtue and the putting of powerful models and ideals before the people it has indirectly but immensely contributed to setting the moral tone of society. By setting up institutions like monasteries where these ideals are "realized," it has been possible to put a Christian stamp on the surrounding culture. Religion with its emphasis on the other-worldly dimension contains a decisive spiritual element, which accounts for values that are perceived to be lasting and universal. It is these values which often appear in secular garb, such as liberty, equality and fraternity. They keep their meaning and continue to give regenerative energy to the lives of peoples and nations.

In the last hundred years Christianity has most noticeably fulfilled its prophetic role in pleading for social justice in a series of papal encyclicals on the social question, beginning from Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum.*

Nevertheless none of these forms of religious influence or intervention in public life would make up either singly or together for the lack of an appropriate morality or a Christian ethics of public life. Their collective inadequacy has been made painfully obvious as the tragedies of this century oblige us to look for other solutions.

Exhortations to virtue based on gospel values do not carry the same force as commandments against evil. What seem to be decisive in determining the influence of religion cannot be merely ideals, models and exhortations to good behaviour, essential as these are for personal holiness and for instituting a vague religiosity in a culture. It is rather the area of commandments, prohibitions and the prescription of minimally acceptable behaviour backed up with moral sanction, in other words, raising these issues to matters of morality that is matters of conscience, sin and punishment. Beliefs, values, ideals, exhortations must be translated into a binding moral code if they are to influence public life from a moral point of view.

Secondly, modern society seems to be advancing in the direction of greater helplessness on the part of the individual in effecting anything in society. Even as he thinks himself never so free the individual finds out that he can do almost nothing with his freedom. The decisions that matter in public life are taken, most of the time, at the level of corporate and governmental responsibility.

Now, private religious morality has been developed in view of individual action. But if such individual action is proving increasingly irrelevant to public life, then religious morality is also that much irrelevant to public life. This seems to indicate that what may be needed is rather a religious morality of public action, a morality of collective action.

Thirdly, it is debatable whether the aggregate of religiously influenced private lives could add up to a religiously influenced public life; whether a morality designed for the individual's private life is transferable and cumulatively effective at the public level; whether the behaviour of a society as a whole will become automatically and totally good if every individual obeys the ten commandments.

Yet something like such an atomistic view of society and also of morality seems to have inspired the massive optimism by which Christianity has concentrated its moral theological/ethical effort on the individual's life in the vain hope that public life thereby would be sufficiently provided for.

But over and above individual actions, there would still remain in public life, an important residue of actions for which no one individual alone would be liable or could claim responsibility, no one except the corporate persona as a whole. As is often the case, here also the whole seems to be something more than the sum of its parts.

The Failure of Christianity in Public Life

That the Christian Religion has failed to influence public life significantly in the sense and the direction of the Gospel is an understatement. The confession of failure credited to the 1971 Synod of Bishops mentioned earlier is fully borne out by the following random list of acts that have been perpetrated by Christian peoples in recent history.

- The Slave Trade: The degradation of fellow human beings to mere objects of merchandise and property ownership.
- Colonialism: The usurpation of the freedom and sovereignty of weaker peoples, the ethnocides that made colonial occupation possible. The partition and sharing of a whole continent like Africa like a piece of cake among Christian States.
- Racism: The systematic hatred of or non-recognition of the dignity of persons of another race.
- *Machtpolitik*: In the service of politics of pure national interest. War as a tool of foreign policy.

- Unjust Trade Terms which involve the manipulation of prices, debts and currencies and imposition of barriers to perpetuate the impoverishment of the poor.

- Genocide: The Holocaust where Christians systematically organized the physical liquidation of six million Jews and others.

- Hiroshima & Nagasaki: The atom bomb that destroyed life in these two Japanese cities in 1945.

- The Wastage of the World's resources in arms production.2

The indictments of Christian religion on its failure as represented by these evils of the public life is not to say that some Christians or even the Christian leadership were in complicity or did not protest evil. Often enough they did, if often belatedly. Rather, that these crimes took place at all in a Christian dispensation, that they were perpetuated by Christians, people who might pass for saints in their private lives, that is the tragedy. Also, it is bad enough that any one of these crimes took place by way of a strange exception. But that so many and even more happened must indicate a serious absence of the Christian Code at this level of events.

It is not only a list of failures that is alarming, but the general impression of failure of the Christian religion in public life. Speaking in the case of the United States of America, Harold J. Laski's verdict, even if biased, is pertinent:

All in all, it is true to say that the influence of Christianity in the United States is everywhere pervasive without being anywhere generally profound. . . . To this, I think, there must be added the important fact that the pervasiveness of the churches, Roman Catholic as well as Protestant, comes in a large degree from the subtle compromise they have made with the world, rather that from a defiant proclamation of their doctrine. They have not been able seriously to compete with the growing secularization of American life.3

Nearly half a century since Laski's assessment and despite increased visibility—religion being everywhere pervasive—'the subtle compromise' has assured the effective marginalization of Christianity, not only in the U.S., but worldwide.

The Privatization of Religion

Religion has always understood itself to be a way of life, and whenever it is left free to fully express itself encompasses the whole of man's life-private and public, individual and communal. To exclude religion from any major area of life would amount to a major, disabling amputation which would drastically reduce its effectiveness and indeed distort its meaning.

To a great extent this explains the failure of Christianity, that is, the phenomenon of the privatization of religion. This is the gradual reduction of the jurisdiction of religion from the whole of life, private and public, to only the private and individual arena. With the privatization of religion, Christianity became effectively neutralized since its competence was limited to the private life and conscience of its adherents while the public arena, the vast and growing area of social, economic and political affairs that daily touch the lives and shape the destinies of millions remained a prohibited, no-entry area for the Christian conscience. This eclipse of religion from public life created the twilight zone of amorality and set the stage for the compromises and accommodation with the intolerable situations of injustice and inhumanity documented above. Robert N. Bellah aptly remarks: "To the extent that privatization succeeded, religion was in danger of becoming like the family 'a heaven in a heartless world', but one that did more to reinforce that world, by caring for its casualties, than to challenge its assumptions."4

Commentators have variously attributed the privatization of religion—depending on the country—to the enlightenment and the French revolution, to the disestablishment of the churches, to liberal rationalism and secularization, to persecution by atheistic communism, to growing pluralism and relativism, to the modern industrial civilization, to the insidious new religion of materialism, to hedonism and to consumerism.

Without denying these links and causalities, one might yet insist that its ancestry must be traced along a route which goes beyond the enlightenment to take in the settlement of the wars of religion (*cuius regio eius religio* implying a regionalization of religious affiliation) and indeed the Pandora's box of the protestant reformation (*sola scriptura, scriptura sui interprens* allowing for a purely personal competence in the interpretation of Scripture).

It is through these events that Christianity lost its earlier visibility and the ascendancy it had won, for instance, in a Hildebrand or an Innocent III. The gains of the Constantinian revolution were once again reversed and a retreat to the catacombs left the public square once again naked.

The Privatization of Morality

Deeper and older than the privatization of religion is the phenomenon of the privatization of morality itself. Not only was religion denied the right of citizenship in public and put under house arrest in the world of the individual believer, even there the Christian morality deriving from it seemed fatally designed to have no effect on public life. By its own historic option all Christian morality has ever been targeted on the individual conscience. Its laws, and, its commandments, are for the individual to obey, its sanctions, rewards and punishments go to the individual. It is conceived to make the individual holy, not to make society just. In the received tradition of Christian morality the group cannot posit a human act, cannot sin, cannot go to heaven or hell. The group does not exist. And if the major actors in public life today tend, as we have seen, not to be individuals but rather corporate bodies, governments, cabinets, alliances, cartels or multinationals, it becomes clear that the acts of these bodies even though carrying enormous consequences for the destinies of millions, may even be regarded as outside morality, perhaps even as acts of God. In that case Christian morality which is at least useful to the individual in his private religion proves doubly irrelevant to the events of public life.

Thus these events seem both to lack their own specific morality and also to lie beyond the reach of the privatized Christian morality. They are beyond good and evil. From this position it is but one step to bracketing out from morality even the public aspects and consequences of our private life. For instance the authors of "Ethics in a Business Society" commenting on the behaviour of businessmen could say "The part religion plays in decisions taken in business is precious little at least at the conscious level... It was not that they were irreligious. Many of them were churchgoers. It was simply that their religious experience did not seem to be relevant to the problems confronting them in making their living. Religion is something to one side, a social experience that is sometimes consoling and pleasant, but one that does not strike very deep."5

The privatization of morality itself is a more serious problem than the privatization of religion. The latter is something to which religion has been subjected by historical circumstances and seems capable of being reversed if those circumstances are reversed or significantly modified.

But the privatization of Christian morality has been embedded in the pedagogy that transmits this morality from one generation to the next. Aristotle's Ethics and Politics which has contributed immeasurably in shaping the moral thought of Christendom keeps ethics within the realm of

personal individual behaviour and virtue while politics becomes a discourse on the various forms of constitution for civil government. On the merits or demerits of the acts of collectivities whether those acts can be moral or immoral, or even whether these categories have any meaning at that level, Aristotle leaves no clue, and no one seems to have bothered. The very existence of communal or corporate personality or self-hood who could be the subject of responsible acts was barely even articulated in this tradition, except in legal fiction through the concept of moral personality. Now and again popular notions like the guilt of the Jews or that of the Germans or that of the Americans gained some currency and in fact the Germans have followed this up with reparations to Israel, but the ethics of corporate action and responsibility has never developed as such.

The result has been a lopsided development of the Christian moral conscience—a sensitive and often guilt-ridden individual conscience side by side with a collective conscience that is more or less amoral and insensitive. It was especially in this atmosphere that the national sovereign states of the Christian west developed, defining their goals as the pursuit of national self-interest and their sovereignty as non-accountability to any power beyond themselves. Within these states *raison d'etat* made them infallible while interstate relations were marked by rivalry and*Realpolitik.*

Inevitably, war became the means of settling between right and wrong, and might came to be identified with right. It is this morality or the lack of it that explains most of the negative events that mark the history of Christendom.

Against this background I wish to present a different approach to the problem from the point of view of African religion and suggest that if Christianity could graft this element of corporate responsibility into what is a very impressive heritage it could exert greater influence for good in the public life of the world community.

Unfortunately, the history of Christianity in Africa has been only a one-sided history of giving and a disdain of receiving. But as John Taylor has well observed: "There are many who feel that the spiritual sickness of the West which reveals itself in the divorce of the sacred from the secular, of the cerebral from the instinctive, and in the loneliness and homelessness of individualism, may be healed through a recovery of the wisdom which Africa has not yet thrown away. The world church awaits something new out of Africa."6 Now if Christianity can learn from other religions and cultures it will see elements from other religions that cannot only widen its appeal but also help it to improve its ability to meet the problems of relevance to public life. In Africa, religion contains such an element.

Christianity in Africa

The currently surviving Christianity came into sub-Saharan Africa in the 19th century. The historic circumstance was the drive for colonies, the scramble for Africa by European powers in search of raw materials and markets in the wake of their industrial revolution and following the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. After agreeing on a peaceful partition of the continent in Berlin in 1884 the colonial powers dispatched to their respective colonies their administrators, their traders and their missionaries. French, British or German missionaries even of the same congregations followed their own national flags and *cuius regio eius religio* came into operation once more. The missionaries themselves came simultaneously with or immediately followed the brutal military expeditions which were frequently necessary to subjugate a recalcitrant tribe. This compromising association, in addition to his baggage of the reigning evolutionary philosophy and sense of civilizing mission among savages, weighed heavy on his work.

Nonetheless, Christianity generally got a sympathetic hearing and made significant impact among the people if I may use the example of the Igbo of Nigeria. This success it owes especially to the para-missionary strategies it adopted such as investment in men and resources in the educational and medical fields. This was a veritable revolution. Education gave literacy which gave power—the power of book knowledge, of new jobs, of new status. Modern medicine was even more dramatic in its short-term results of restoring good health and checking epidemics and even more effective in the long-term result of surreptitiously undermining the religious theory of disease by the introduction of the germ theory.

Of course Christianity also relied on its own intrinsic appeal as a new message of hope to humanity, but the people were not persuaded by argument that it was a better account of the meaning of life or a better way of relating to God and their ancestors or a better technique for coping with life than their traditional religion. The adult male population remained on the whole faithful to their old religion, while conversions were more numerous among women and children. The schools which were popular as the key to a place in the new dispensation became also the missionaries' paramount instrument of evangelization as they looked forward to Christianizing the future, having despaired of converting the present adults. By and large the Igbo mission became numerically at least perhaps the most spectacular success story of the African missions in the 20th century.

The mutual suspicion between missionaries and the adult population meant that there was no dialogical encounter between the two religions. Rather the missionaries finally took refuge in the massive condemnation and rejection of the traditional religion with all that this implied for the culture with which it had lived and interacted in symbiosis.

The religion to religion encounter that never was, would have shown that African traditional religion was not all witchcraft and sorcery, or the work of the devil.

African Traditional Religion (Igbo)

It is part of the lot of Africa that, even its traditional religion, which is the fruit of ages of complex development is often passed over in silence like another empty leaf in the book of world religions. But that oblivion caused by prejudice and ignorance does not take away its reality.

'African Traditional Religion' is the home-grown religion of the black man in Africa. Since it lacks a scripture it has developed many variant local features, but the basics seem to be the same. A monotheism in the sense of belief in the one supreme God supported by an array of created spirits, God's powerful agents, the ancestors or the spirits of dead forbears form the core of the belief system. Furthermore, there is belief in God's authorship of life and belief in his providence and guidance of human destiny. There is a theory of reincarnation and a moral code which punishes bad behaviour and rewards the good here in this life.

In Igbo traditional religion God himself is remote but frequently uses the spirits to intervene in human affairs and is particularly present in every individual by the in dwelling of the *chi*, God's double or man's guardian spirit and personal spirit of destiny.

A priesthood takes care of worship, sacrifice and festivals. A divination system interprets the wishes of the spirits when they intervene and this is perfected in the oracles that pronounce hidden knowledge and adjudicate justice among litigants where the oath swearing system proves inconclusive.

Morality which almost invariably has a social dimension is in the control of the earth goddess, *ala,*—who is also the goddess of the major social group, the village. She provides the

sanctions of the moral code punishing offenders and certain special offenses are offenses against *ala*.

Morality

The moral code consists of a limited number of prohibitions—murder, incest, marriage within any traceable degree of consanguinity, adultery, theft, sorcery (poisoning), witchcraft.

Positively it is enunciated in the well-known and oft-quoted Igbo equivalent of the biblical golden rule:

Egbe bere ugo bere nke si ibe ya ebela nku kwaaya.
Let the kite as well as the eagle have the right to perch (on the branch). A curse (a broken wing) on whoever denies the right to the other!

This code is protected by the earth goddess and serious infringements are regarded as abominations, requiring ritual cleansing and involving the community whose well-being is thus threatened. Sin and guilt are not seen as the concern of the individual alone. He is the really guilty one but one also *in quo omnes peccaverunt*.

The Dialectic of Individual and Community

The individual is always and in the first place a member of his community, first of the extended family, then of kindred, the village, the town, enlarging conceptually to clan, tribe and nation. Though the Igbo is an extremely republican society, having no feudal-type rulers and though direct democracy reigned in Igbo hamlets for centuries before white colonial rule, the Igbo is a man defined by his community understanding his identity in and through his community and realizing his fulfillment within it. Reciprocally the community regard the individual as their own. They do not leave him alone. His successes and failures are theirs.

John Daly has justly pointed out the relatively recent origin of the exaggerated individualist-personalist thinking which evermore and more seems to characterize Western and Christian Philosophy and Theology. By contrast, he writes:

The great majority of the peoples of the world think in collectivist rather than in personalist terms. It is characteristic of people in collectivist societies that they regard the individual as a differentiated part of society, while the West sees society as a plurality of individuals. "If the foot were to say 'I am not the hand, and so I do not belong to the body' would that mean that it stopped belonging to the body?"

Up to the sixteenth century, even in Europe, writers on society saw it, and not metaphorically, as a body. In Asia and Africa today, man as an individual finds his meaning and identity rather as a member of a group than as an individual. In collectivist societies the life of the individual is so inseparably bound up with that of society as a whole that it has little claim to independent validity. Thought and conduct are to a large extent determined by the community, by its laws and customs. A man tends to be guided by the collective conscience of his group. He is not as conscious of personal guilt as he is of shame. He is less dependent on personal moral decisions and more on the laws and sanctions of the community.[7]

Without derogating from the uniqueness or the personality of the individual, it is fair to say that the community is part of his essential dimension. But it would be as untrue to conclude that the individual thereby loses his identity as to think that the community has no identity at all.

It is in the light of this dialectic between individual and community that Daly reports that in contrast with the practice of secret, auricular confession which the missionaries introduced into the Igbo community, there are traditional public shaming rituals designed to expiate for sins of incest, theft, adultery, etc., with public admission of guilt followed by a sacrifice of reconciliation.8

A "modernized" version of this shaming ritual was used in the late fifties in Owerri Division when sins of theft, and robbery, poisoning and homicide which had been committed in secret even several decades earlier were now voluntarily and openly confessed. This would take place under oath to the *Ofo,* the symbol of truth believed to instantly kill any perjurers and before the entire community numbering several hundreds. This was how the ritual acquired the curious name of *îme vote,* 'voting someone': a crowd gathered as for someone's election to office but really to be witnesses of his disgrace. At the end, however, the culprit/penitent would pay a fine to become finally reconciled to his community. But government saw fit to order a stop to this most effective and purifying law and order institution.

Collective Sin, Guilt and Punishment

Guilt is therefore not only an individual personal affair, but it is shared. The proverb says that if one finger gets dipped into palm oil, all the other fingers are inescapably involved. A community would quite possibly expiate with sacrifice some guilt, incurred long ago by a dead ancestor. The Igbo would have no particular problem with the idea of original sin. Furthermore, group communal punishment was meted to communities that have either collectively offended or condoned serious crimes or were incorrigibly crime-ridden. Ostracism of such a community (or village) by the larger community (town) is not unknown and indeed it is such group excommunications that forced a number of communities to migrate and seek new homes well away from their ancestral homeland.

Conclusion

The example of the Igbo has been taken to give some hint on the working of a non-individualist religious morality. What is important is not the details, but the idea of collective sin and collective guilt committed and incurred by a collectivity, a community that has a selfhood transcending that of its component individuals. And because it alone and not the individual performs certain acts in the public arena, it must be equipped with a conscience to be able to take responsibility for those acts.

Christianity has not exerted the good influence it might have had on public life essentially because as a Religion it has been absent from public life. This absence has been partly due to the increasing privatization to which it was condemned by a series of historical events and its subsequent devaluation as a factor in society. But it was also due to a self-imposed silence in-built in its moral code regarding the public zone whereas morality was precisely the one single Archimedean point whence it could most effectively have gotten a hold on public life. The basic flaw of Christian morality has been the absence of the public sector. By its one-sided preoccupation with personal, individual holiness and salvation—owing to its individualist conception of man—

and by its own individualistic morality, Christianity already abdicated its responsibility to public life long before it was chased out of it by the agents of privatization.

However, reflection since Vatican II has brought to the fore the concept of structured social sin. It is designed to help morality to include those institutions, structures and systems of social organization whose very functioning works to the detriment of some elements in society. Still it remains to locate responsibility for such social sin and to articulate the type of selfhood9 that is able to carry the weight of this moral responsibility. After the recognition of structural sin, it is time also to recognize collective sin as more than just a metaphor—sins in politics and economics, sins committed by governments and companies in the name of peoples and shareholders. It is time to acknowledge collective guilt over past crimes and then to build up a collective conscience that would inhibit the future reoccurrence of these crimes.

The concept of corporate responsibility or conscience, can help Christian morality offset the extreme moral individualism which leaves the most heinous crimes on earth today—most of them corporate crimes—with no acknowledged authors.

Notes

1. J.A. Coleman, ed., *One Hundred Years of Catholic Social Thought: Celebration and Change* (New York: Orbis Books, 1991), p. 306.

2. To mention only some of the weapons systems used in the gulf war: a Tomahawk missile cost 1.5 billion lire [$1,116,000]; the Patriot anti-ballistic missile, 1.2 billion lire [$892,800]; the F-14 Tomcat fighter plane, 60 billion lire [$44,640,000]; a Tornado fighter place, 70 billion lire [$52,080,000]; an AWACS radar plane, 121 billion lire [$90,024,000]; the radar-evading F-117 Stealth fighter plane, 130 billion lire [$96,720,000]; an Apache helicopter, 12 billion lire [$8,928,000]; an Abrams M-1 tank, 5 billion lire [3,720,000]; and a Challenger tank, 10 billion lire [7,440,000]. It is a question of wasting immense wealth that could—and should—be used to eliminate the poverty of the millions of people dying of hunger. Culled from *Modern War and Christian Conscience:* la Civilta Cattolica *in Moral Issues and Christian Response*, edited by P.T. Jersild and D.A. Johnson (Holt Rinehard & Winston, Inc., 1993).

3. Harold J Laski, *The American Democracy* (New York: Viking, 1948), p. 296.

4. R.N. Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 224.

5. M.W. Childs and D. Cater, *Ethics in a Business Society* (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 175.

6. John Taylor, *Primal Vision* (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 108.

7. J. Daly, CSSp., "Caught between Cultures," *African Ecclesiastical Review*, 17 (No. 2; 1975), p. 94.

8. J. Daly, "Incarnation of Christianity in a Local Culture," *African Ecclesiastical Review*, 17 (No. 6; 1975), 328-329.

9. Karen J. Torjesen, "Public Ethics and Public Selfhood, The Hidden Problems" in *Ethics, Religion and the Good Society*, edited by Joseph Runzo (Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), p. 110.

Chapter X
Value Consciousness and Understandings of Freedom in Austrian Society

Heinz Holley

Introductory Considerations on Value Research

It seems easy to define clearly the so-called basic values in our societies. In the West we agree, for example, on a principle of free and democratic society which is a basic value to be respected by the institutions in state and society as well as by the population at large. Our Constitutions precisely state such principles as:

- one man, one vote,
- equality of man and woman,
- freedom of speech and assembly,
- freedom of worship and independence of justice,

Just to mention but a few of them. Discussing values, we must keep in mind, that this is not only a problem of definition at a general or abstract level. The most important values of a society are written down and proclaimed in the constitution, of which legislation more or less reflects a concretisation of these principles within the legal framework of a state. But acceptance of values at a constitutional or legal level is a quite different question from their realisation in the everyday life of individuals and communities in a society. Values appear but also disappear in the actual lifestyle; the connotation of values is subject to specific social and cultural backgrounds and varies accordingly. Although values do not possess the volatile character of fashion, they must be seen in close relation to the dimension of time. At certain times some values become of greater importance than at others. Also the acceptance of values differs in the chronology of the spirit of age. Therefore, values can also be viewed in close relation to the inheritance of the past, the current reality and the future prospects of a society. For value research this means therefore not only discussing the topic at an abstract level, or looking at the substantial values codified in a society's constitution, but investigating also the historical (especially the history of thoughts and ideas) and cultural backgrounds, the actual lifestyles, social patterns, attitudes and behaviour and, last but not least, the social changes in a society.

Analogical to these views, value research requires an interdisciplinary and therefore also a multi-methodological approach. This necessitates the contributions from various disciplines like philosophy, theology, anthropology, law, history, political science, psychology, sociology etc. The involvement of the above-mentioned humanities should guarantee a more or less broad consensus. Apparently the overwhelming majority of the scientific community also agrees that such a multidisciplinary discussion of values should include representatives from different nations and cultures. However, it seems uncertain whether contributions of economists, physicians, physicists, chemists, technicians or architects etc., could be helpful and necessary in such research-dialogue. Related to these sciences, a great number of topics pertaining to values await discussion and evaluation. To demonstrate the importance of a broader network of scientific disciplines for

dialogue, discussion and research a few questions may be formulated in order to outline possible fields of common issues relating to values:

National economy: in modern societies the "value" of a nation's productivity is commonly expressed as the gross domestic product (GDP). But the calculation of the GDP is in fact a process of adding sometimes completely different "values". Real damages caused by accidents or disasters contribute also to an increase in GDP like genuine improvements of productivity of goods and services. The actually created value (i.e., goods and services) is added to the "value" of so-called "goods" which caused individual and even social damage. In other words the products and services which really served individuals and the whole society are added to the so-called "services" where one has to ask what the service actually was. Finally the question: what "value" should be assigned in modern societies to all those goods and services which are not calculated in the GDP, although a lack of these human productions would destroy our social and economic system?

Chemistry, physics or medical science: there is no doubt that the progress in these scientific fields brought relief from disease and suffering. But almost simultaneously with the benefit we derive from this progress we are beginning also to suffer from it. The lonely old patient in the intensive-care unit is an example of this problem. The concerned especially of the younger generation for the environmental balance, which is threatened by the uncontrolled exploitation of natural sciences is another exhibit of how modernity can easily lead to a cul-de-sac. Gene-technologies raise hope and fears as well. Abortion, artificial insemination, surrogate motherhood and euthanasia are notes which refer to the need for a value-oriented discussion.

Architecture and technical sciences: our living space, private as well as public, in residential areas as well as in working areas, is highly determined by architecture and the engineering sciences. There is no doubt that these influences relate to lifestyles, working methods and therefore also to values. Architecture for example can promote the conditions for a good neighbourhood or build up barriers. Technical procedures can take care for the vulnerability of human beings and environment or ignore it.1

The above mentioned dilemma is caused by a juxtaposition of the humanities and natural sciences, each working within the framework of its own notions and connotations, develops its own dynamic, and strives to legitimise its own scientific work by producing results which are expected by its distinctive set of specialists. In other words, the different "worlds of experts" established to a certain degree their own understanding of the question of what is valuable in view of the progress of specific disciplines. Gradually, more and more simple objects came to be regarded as values. What happened in this process with regard to the sciences reflects the development which led to the situation (and also problems) of modern pluralistic, atomising societies each in a similar manner different worlds of values, some of them apart, some of them incompatible to the others and a few of them related to others.

Although he was not a philosopher or sociologist, the Austrian literary figure Hermann Broch has in his famous trilogy "Die Schlafwandler" as early as 1932 mentioned the problem of values and their changes. In a fascinating social-analytic novel he complained that people are living like sleepwalkers and do not realise the changes which occur during their own life. Hence, he envisaged the development of varied rationalities, each of them understanding and committed only to its own rationality. But as Broch mentioned, finally these divided rationalities constitute a great

irrationality, because they make men in their inner conflicts susceptible to ideologies which give the appearance of a social life world, but in fact reduce human nature and freedom.

If in the following pages some of the results of value research in Austria, and whenever possible their comparison with other European countries, are presented and discussed, this is not at all a plea for a strict empirical method to handle the issue. Modern sociology should not be generally regarded as a pure positivistic science in the sense of Auguste Comte. It seems, that modern sociology needs both: a phenomenological approach in order be able to ask the right questions at the right time, the ability of empathise in order to understand the problems behind the surface of facts and figures, and also a theory-based empirical approach which enables us to overcome at least to a certain degree the uncertainity or certainity of speculative or unproven assumptions. Referring once again to Hermann Broch, people in our societies, including decision makers in government, churches, business etc., must not walk through the times like unconscioussleepwalkers; critical sociology can enable them to awake and to become aware of the possibilities as well as the threats to a valuable life. This includes the question of the human sense of community, metaphysic and the divine.

The following pages provide an overview of the most important results of a sociological value research project about the meaning and evaluation of freedom in Austrian society. The results are based on a representative survey by Fessel and GFK in October 1988. A research team (Klaus Zapotoczky, Alfred Grausgruber and Heinz Holley) from the Institute of Sociology, Department of Political Sociology and Development Research of the Johannes Kepler University of Linz were responsible for the research design and for analysing and interpreting the results. The research project was sponsored by the "Jubiläumsfond der Österreichischen Nationalbank".

Change of Values and the Understanding of Freedom

Freedom and Order in the History of Thoughts

Not only in the history of thought, but also contemporary philosophy, one of the most discussed questions had been and still is the quest for the right relation between order and freedom, between individuality and the importance of the whole in community, society and state. The interpretations of freedom as a value changed through history and the contents of the meaning of freedom or liberty can be regarded as an attempt by many philosophers and ancient rulers to respond to the problems and needs in their societies. Orlando Patterson recently emphasized that no other value or ideal in Western countries carries such a heavy intellectual burden[2]. And Robert McIver in 1940 complained that with regard to freedom or liberty, "the greatest sinners against reason have been the reasoners, the philosophers, and the high priests."[3] But in a parallel manner, sometimes more and sometimes less related to the history of thoughts, there is also a history of freedom as ordinary men and women understood freedom or even experienced the lack of this value. Finally, the history of thought and the history of the perception of freedom as a value by ordinary men and women must be seen also in a dialectical context of thought and social action.

In ancient Greek thought we can observe the dialectical process of freedom and its interpretations, influenced and prepared by Solon, who abolished the influence of traditional groups by introducing new non-kin-related political structures. The continuing reforms of Chleisthenes toward the end of the sixth century BC enabled political individualism, democracy and a great flowering of culture which took place in the fifth century BC. As Robert Nisbet noted, these reforms fertilised the ground for the rise of such notions as the nature of the individual and

the role of pure reason as expressed in the philosophy of Socrates. Increasing individuality and personal freedom from the old traditions, kinship and religion also led to a counter-movement reflected in Plato's philosophy of the state.4 Increasing individualism was understood by Plato as a threat both to the stability of society and to the integrity of the individual which was increasingly threatened by the social disorganisation and alienation from morality. Plato believed that the individual human being is overburdened by the spiritual and intellectual consequences living in cultural diversity. Therefore, his ideal state must be seen not only as the creation of a totalitarian type of state, threatening and opposing individual rights or individual freedom, but especially as an attempt to secure individual from other autonomous social groups, religions or cultures within the society. Although Plato's concept was wrong because it denied personal responsibility, it should be understood much less as a direct and suppressive attack against the freedom of individuals, than as an expression of fear and even hostility against all influences upon the individual by groups and institutions other than the state.

In a certain manner, Plato's concept was intended not to harass but to secure individual dignity from such, as he believed, negative influences, by the force of the monistic state. From this point of view, on the one hand, it is understandable that the Austrian born philosopher, Sir Karl Popper could claim that Plato's political program "far from being morally superior to totalitarianism, is fundamentally identical with it."5 But, on the other hand, it should be also considered that Plato's intention was to protect the individual from negative influences, a goal similar to that of present fundamentalist states or ideologies. To put it pointedly: Plato's Ideal State is also an example in history, that not only bloody tyrants but also thinkers or rulers who honestly tried to achieve or to secure the value of freedom reciprocally contributed to a decrease of personal and common freedom or even, consciously or unconsciously, to the emergence of totalitarian, fundamentalist and freedom-suppressing public bodies and states.

There is a close similarity to parents who really believe that they are doing the best for their children by establishing ideal rules of behaviour within the family and protecting the children by not allowing them any deviation from this artificial construct of what an ideal family must be. Any opposing coalitions of the sisters are suppressed and they are not permitted to have contact with children from other families who do not share the same understanding of what an ideal family should be. This very Platonic type of education is an example that the process of raising children to be free and responsible human beings, responsible for themselves and for others, cannot be achieved by establishing an ideal order, full protection from outside influences and the internalisation of obedience to the wisdom of the parents and other authorities.

In history, the dream of ideal and complete freedom as an order within the state was also the driving force not only to reject, but also to abolish all such groups, religions, associations, cultures and subcultures which deviated from the official interpretation of what is supportive of freedom. As we can see in history, Plato's concept of absolute freedom in the ideal state became an ideological metaphor for many later philosophers and rulers.

Although the Roman Empire was alive with many different intermediate associations of whom the Christians were one, it must not be forgotten that there was distrust and even strong hostility by the emperors against such groups. The formula "divide et impera" is not a false catchword for the complex Roman policy, where increasingly central power was affiliated with a process of isolating the individuals from their traditional associations.

During the Middle-Ages, such small social groups as family, guild, village community and even cities were so central that the medieval man's self-consciousness was deeply rooted in membership in such communities. Individual freedom made no sense, because people had no

alternative but to subordinate themselves to the consent of the whole group. Life apart of such communities was almost impossible for the majority of the medieval population. In medieval society not the state, but the Church was the central power; therefore it is quite understandable that the idea of individuality and individual freedom, especially freedom of worship, was introduced by religious reformers like Wyclif, Luther and Calvin. For them it was a commonplace that only in the privacy of the individual soul, could religion remain pure. The protest of these reformers against maltreatment by the Church as the religious community and against external suppression by communities like guilds upon the individual believer is understandable, but one has also to consider the tremendous impact of these reforms caused by the desire for purification. As a result there was a rejection not only of the negative aspect of communities upon religious life, but also of such intermediate communities as a whole. Apart from the Protestant ethic and its impact on the inner-worldly asceticism of early Protestant believers analysed by Max Weber in his famous book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, from the sociological point of view the drive to individualism and the weakening of corporatism was one of the most important results of the religious revolution which not only gave birth to Protestant churches, but also influenced the Catholic Church and Christian societies as a whole.

At the end of the middle ages the desire both for a powerful state and the desire for individual freedom became more and more popular. The French philosopher, Jean Bodin, influenced by the medieval outlook, pleaded for a stronger central power and personal rights, but also insisted that the sovereign should not have the right to rule or intervene directly in local or family affairs6 . In the thought of Hobbes and Rousseau, the role and importance of autonomous intermediate associations were completely absent. Especially in Rousseau's understanding of freedom two entities were dominant: the individual and the state. Rousseau's drastic proposal, as expressed in the idea of a General Will, was a totalitarian banishment of all traditional associations and communities, including the Church. There is no doubt that Rousseau's concept influenced not only the French Revolution but also the later Bonapartist ideology and that of Marx who believed that the associative aspects of human life were mainly expressions of the defunct feudal social order.

We should be aware also that the emergence of the dualistic understanding of society, as reduced to individuals and state, was typical not only of the former totalitarian communist countries, but to a certain extent also of most modern mass societies in the nineteenth century. Alexis de Tocqueville brilliantly analysed this development when he noted: "The will of the man is not shattered, but softened, bent and guided; men are seldom forced by in to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupifies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd."7 It seems, that to a certain extent Tocqueville's assessment could be true to some degree of so called free and democratic societies in the West where, after the breakdown of communism, many people believe that history already has come to an end and that the realm of freedom as understood in the West is on its way to becoming the model for the whole world.8 Instead of such enthusiastic interpretation of contemporary history, probably a much more modest, realistic but therefore not necessarily simple approach is recommended in order to contribute to the never ending process of achieving and securing freedom as a value for individuals, associations and communities within the society, the state and its relations to other states and to the international community as a whole. Such an approach should consider what people experience regarding freedom, which other values or attitudes are affiliated to understandings of freedom, and which shortcomings or even dangers to freedom can be observed within a society. There is no

guarantee at all that, based on such empirical investigations, the realm of freedom can be achieved automatically. But there is a reasonable hope that, with the help of such research results, a society can mobilise additional efforts in order to improve, or in certain fields also to overcome, certain misundertandings or lacks of freedom.

The Understanding of Freedom in Austrian Society

As all countries in the West, Austria too was influenced by the history of thought. Indeed Austria's history mirrors the quest for freedom. Serfdom and dependence upon the feudal system was a chapter in Austrian history as were the struggle for freedom of worship during the time of the reformation and counter-reformation. The ideas of the French Revolution did not spill over directly into the Hapsburg Monarchy; nevertheless these ideas did have an impact upon political life. The process of secularisation in the period of Austrian Enlightened Absolutism also fostered the position of the monarchistic state and weakened the role of the Church and other associations. For example, against the will of the Pope, Emperor Joseph II established new and smaller dioceses and erected on his own a great number of smaller parishes, so that every Catholic would be able to reach a church within one hour's walk. Many monastaries had been disbanded and the buildings had been used for hospitals or prisons. Joseph II was far from being a tyrant, but in his understanding of absolute modern rule there was no place for free and intermediate associations. The omnipresence of a powerful state was experienced through its efficient and strong bureaucracy which had been setup in all the countries of the Monarchy.

But even this enlightened absolutism could not stop the desire of the people for more autonomy and independence or freedom within the state. Till the end of the nineteenth century, Austrian history was marked by local turmoils and attempts of the state to control the Empire. Vienna at the turn of the century became famous because of the tremendous development in the arts and sciences. This flowering, however, was not an expression of a free society but probably a compensating response of educated people who had no chance to influence directly political issues and processes. The Hapsburg Empire was unable to integrate the desire for participation and the new driving forces especially of liberalism, nationalism and socialism.

With the end of the first World War the Monarchy collapsed but the First Republic emerged not as a realm of freedom, but as a period of poor living conditions und political struggles, which led finally in 1934 to a civil war between supporters of the Social democratic Party and the supporters of the Christian social Party. Weakened by this civil war, Austria was unable to respond to the emergence of the totalitarian mass movement of Hitler's national socialism. It is true that many Austrians, especially the jobless masses, had been in favour of Hitler's populist policies. The despair of the masses, the disintegration of the old order and the lack of a new one, was a fertile ground for the ideas of Fascism, which consequently destroyed the ideal of a free society. But in the longer run people had to realize that the German "Reich" was not the Promised Land but a totalitarian monster which wiped out not only autonomous organisations like political parties, trade unions and professional associations, but even fraternal clubs. Associations which had not been forbidden were forced to support the Nazi regime by the policy of "Gleichschaltung" (that is, to bring into line).

In the years after the Second World War, speaking generally, the term freedom had a quite different connotation from today. Freedom at that time meant to be free from hunger, material restrictions, war and political persecution, freedom from a totalitarian regime and later from foreign occupying forces. The term freedom generally was not associated with the sense that one

could choose from a broad spectrum of possibilities and alternatives. But there was a common agreement about the importance of the regained freedom and this played an important role in the reconstruction of the country. After overcoming the greatest needs following the war, the political system was rebuilt and thus freedom of assembly and freedom of speech became an increasing value.

Undoubtedly today Austria belongs to the free and democratic societies, but this does not mean that the basic value of freedom and its protection can be considered to be already realised. The protection of freedom and the cultivation of living together in freedom are indispensable and permanent goals of every free society. It is evident, that the understanding of freedom and the requirements for certain of its aspects and related factors are subject to the social change of a society. Social, economical, and cultural changes result in shifts in individual and public opinion about the connotation of freedom. In Austrian society, in the last few years there are many indications of such a shift. The expectation of more individual freedom in the sense of personal liberties is rapidly expanding, whereas, on the other hand, freedom is threatened by individualist attitudes in some areas of society.

Especially after the fall of communism in Europe, the word freedom has been on everyone's lips and became as well a subject of interest in the social and political sciences. In a representative survey Bonelli, Zapotoczky, Grausgruber and Holley investigated the consciousness of freedom and the freedom-deficits in the Austrian population.[9] The following questions indicate the target-areas of the survey:

(1)Which understandings of the goals of a free and democratic society exist among the Austrian population? Do certain hierarchies of social principles effect the assessment of the importance and the realisation of such principles?

(2)Are there certain understandings of freedom which can be located and differentiated in everyday life? Are there borders to freedom and where do people see such limitations of freedom? Which limitations of freedom are seen as unavoidable in order to be able to live together in a common but pluralistic society? Should individuals have the right, the freedom to decide in certain situations about the life or death of others (abortion, euthanasia)?

(3) As the question about different understandings of freedom is highly correlated with the assessment of the distribution of power and the possibilities of influence in a society, it was necessary to ask also where people sense a biased distribution of power which affects the freedom of individuals or groups in the society.

(4) In which social areas do Austrians feel that freedom is threatened? Are there different sensibilities for freedom and is there a relation to such other values or socio-structural factors as age, sex, education, religion, party-orientation, etc.?

(5) In regard to perceived threats to freedom, is there also a readiness for protest-behaviour?

(6) Are there typical groups or clusters of Austrian citizens as regards their understanding of freedom? What are their characteristics and differences?

Selected Results of This Survey: Importance and Realisation of Social Principles in Austria's Society

Social principles can be understood as an expression or translation of general or common values with regard to particular topics of state and society. In the above-mentioned survey, a representative sample of Austrians was asked the following questions:

"In your opinion how important are the following principles for the existence and the development of a free and democratic society?"

" How much do you think that these principles are realised in Austria?"

The evaluation of these data shows the following results: The independence of courts and social security are seen as the most important principles for the existence of a free and democratic society.

These principles are followed by free competition in economy, a well-functioning social partnership, independence of media and equal treatment of men and women. Only at a lower level of importance does one find principles like parliamentary control of government, the existence of a multiparty system and political engagement of citizens, commitment by all forces supportive of the state to common basic values, and internal democracy within the political parties.

Notes

1. Richard Sennett for example criticizes the planning of modern citites and suburban areas as purifying by destroying community life. See: Richard Senett, *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life,* London: Norton, 1990, pp. 85 - 108.

2. An excellent sociological analysis of freedom in the history of thought was undertaken by Orlando Patterson in his first volume on freedom, *Freedom in the Making of Western Culture,* New York: Basic Books, 1991.

3. Robert McIver, "The Meaning of Liberty and Its Perversions," in Ruth Ashen, ed., *Freedom: Its Meaning*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940, p.280.

4. Robert Nisbet, *The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom*, San Francisco: ICS-Press, 1990.

5. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. 1, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 87.

6. See Robert Nisbet, *The Quest for Community. A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom*, San Francisco: ICS-Press, 1990, pp. 109-135.

7. Alexis de Tocqueville cited in Robert Nisbet, *The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom*, San Francisco: ICS-Press, 1990, p. 170.

8. An example of such an interpretation is Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* New York: Avon Books, 1993.

9. Gerhard Bonelli, Alfred Grausgruber, Heinz Holley, Klaus Zapotoczky: *Freiheitsdefizite und Freiheitsbedürfnis im Bewußtsein der Österreicher: Projektbericht an den Jubiläumsfonds der Österreichischen Nationalbank*, St. Pölten, 1989, and Alfred Grausgruber, Heinz Holley, Klaus Zapotoczky: *Detailauswertung der Studie: Freiheitsdefizite und Freiheitsbedürfnis im Bewußtsein der Österreicher*, Linz, 1991.

Chapter XI
Christian Values in Public Life

Wladyslaw Zuziak

Introduction

Over the last forty years, some nations under communist regimes, fought for independence and liberty. Now that these nations, and specifically Poland, have gained their freedom from communism, a lack of positive social structures has become evident. There is a vacuum which must be filled with some consensual self-definition of values and of social-political structures.

The Poles, as a Christian people in the democratic tradition, will certainly base their legal structure in the common values of the liberty and equality of all people, of justice as their natural duty, solidarity, and brotherhood. They will also base their society less directly on specific Christian values: forgiveness, mercy and love. These have been major guiding principles in the overthrow of the communist regime which was done with remarkably little bloodshed and bitterness. These central values, however, cannot be legislated, nor does the Church ask it. They enter society in a different way: through the teaching, preaching and example of the Church as it proclaims and lives the Gospel.

It must be noted that religion is not a political ideology and cannot be used that way. Neither the doctrines nor the values of any faith can function as a part of a political agenda. Throughout the remainder of this text we will see the importance of this distinction between religious and political aspects of our culture.

Obviously, the situation is very complex. Proposals for the new government range from some type of secular state, religiously neutral or even hostile, to a Catholic "confessional state." I shall respond separately to both liberals and conservatives. My own position will become clear in these responses.

Relationship between the Church and the State

Let us begin with a short historical introduction to the dialectical relationship between church and state.

After the French Revolution (1789) the separation of Church and state was emphasized everywhere in Europe. Since there was agreement on the functions of the state, this new secular concept has served as a pattern for other countries. This principle guarantees the equality of all religions in the eyes of the law. This is a very important principle according to which the state considers itself neutral in all religious matters. In certain countries, although there is institutional separation between Church and state, there is at the same time functional interaction between them.

According to political principle, it is reasonable to accept this separation. But the life of a religious believer must be spent within the confines of some state, and the tenets of faith can, and often do, influence the political life of the citizens of that state. Thus, though the state may preserve its neutrality toward religion, it cannot under all circumstances, remain silent in regard to some activities of a church. The governments in many countries positively encouraged the "free exercise" of religion. When the churches act in religious and charitable ways, they are not required

to pay government taxes, as, e.g., such church-related institutions as hospitals, schools, orphanages, nursing homes, etc.

Although the church's primary job is to preach its articles of faith and not to involve itself in politics, the two often overlap. The essence of the church's ministry is to preach, teach and to foster the bond between Gods and mankind. However, the church does not operate in a vacuum. Political and religious issues occur in the context of real life, with its everyday problems, and conflicts naturally arise between church and state.

Let me explain more fully the role of the Church in the world according to the pastoral constitution "Gaudium et spes," in which the Church examines the relationship between its members and the states in which they live.

The Church, by reason of her role and competence, is not identified with any political community nor bound by ties to any political system. . . . The Church, for its part, being founded in the love of the Redeemer, contributes towards the spread of justice and charity among nations and within the borders of the nations themselves.1

According to the text we reviewed the Church does not claim to place Christians in a comfortable Christian civilization, nor in a privileged Christian state. It would be a bit dangerous for the Church to be involved in world affairs. But, on the other hand, the church may not abandon the world. She must live in the world, within political structures, without being of the world, without being bunched together with these political structures (J.7.15,15-16). The Church should live with the world and, if possible, in peace with it. When the Church comes towards the world she approaches without power, rather in the spirit of service, following the example of Christ as good shepherd.

Keeping in mind the model of the Church as servant and in view of the situation of the Church in Poland after 1989 when she suddenly regained many of her rights, some people, under the influence of Enlightenment and liberal thinking, began to fear the Church's power. It is sufficient to include the following ideas from an article by James E. Wood, Jr., concerning the law on "Guarantee of Freedom of Conscience and religion," 17 May 1989, which gives the right to the Church "to establish schools and other education at institutions . . . and to print and publish newspapers and books. In connection with this legal guarantee there exists 'great skepticism' and fear on the part of non-Catholic denominations that their children may face discrimination."2

The question arises about two possibilities: shall we have a secular state under the influence of the Catholic Church or shall we have a secular state absolutely neutral in its dealings with all denominations? The present debate in Poland on this topic reminds us of the discussion in the United States in the late forties. At that time, John Courtney Murray formulated a theory of the "indirect power" of the Church in socio-political life, suggesting that the Church had the freedom to influence society through the consciences of Catholic citizens. Also he criticized the conservative position that the Church should be given support and preferential treatment by the state.3 Although Murray had written of his American experience, his thinking was based on more universal principles and is relevant to Poland today.

Concerns of Various Polish Groups

In what follows I would like to address the fears of liberals, who might create difficulties for Catholics, who are the absolute majority of the Polish nation; and at the same time, to caution some conservative Catholics who would attempt to introduce "Christian values" in all spheres of public life. The latter group may, on its own initiative, seek to use the Church for purely political aims.

Liberal Concerns

1. Can a state exist which is ideologically neutral? The liberals would answer 'Yes', and are working to create such a state within Polish boundaries. Under the illusion of neutrality they evolve a vision of a totally secularized state in which the role of Church and religion would be reduced to a completely personal matter. In other words, the liberal would see the Church as having no real authority and no influence on human life. The secular state, so conceived, would be completely divorced from the sacred in the name of the state's autonomy and universal tolerance.

Let me now quote from a homily delivered by Pope John Paul II in Lubaczow, Poland:

Faith and the quest for holiness are private matters only in the sense that nobody else can replace a person in his encounter with God and that God cannot be sought and found otherwise than in the context of genuine inner freedom. But God says to us: "Be holy, for I am holy!" (Levi. 11:44). He wants to embrace with his holiness not only the individual person, but also whole families and other human communities, even whole nations and societies.

That is why the postulate of ideological neutrality consists mainly in this, that the State should protect the freedom of conscience and religion of all its citizens, no matter what their religion or ideology. But to postulate that the dimension of holiness should in no way enter social and civic life is the postulate of making the State and civic life godless and has little in common with ideological neutrality. We should have much good will and be well-disposed toward one another in order to determine how the sacred can be assured a presence in social and civic life in a way that will not hurt anyone or alienate anyone in his own country. At the same time, we Catholics ask for our point of view to be taken into account: that very many of us would feel uneasy in a State from the structures of which God has been eliminated under the guise of ideological neutrality.4

We may state that an intentional isolation from the sacred elements of religion and limitation to the purely materialistic and secular worldview is not at all a neutral position, as the liberal parties would proclaim. Indeed, it is a conscious declaration of position in matters of God - it is the negation of God.5 This then leads to intolerance and to a feeling of injustice especially in the case of a nation in whose history religion has played so great a role.

In our discussion of the ideologically neutral state we must consider whether this type of neutrality might be one-sided. It may happen that the majority, to avoid conflicts based on religions matters, acquiesces to the wishes of the minority and then we must state that this is, in fact, a one-sided neutrality. Perhaps, a pseudo-neutrality. Is such a strictly neutral state only an Utopian ideal? In the end, one side must always give in to the other. Furthermore, a modern liberal democratic principle naturally implies religious freedom. This goes beyond simple permission for formal religious ceremonial observances. Basic Christian values such as trust, forgiveness and hope rarely lead to conflicts with civil law. Moreover, Christians are citizens in the same way as their non-Christian neighbors. They marry and raise families, hold jobs and spend their salaries and participate in local and national politics just like anyone lese. If their choices and their motives have a religious basis this is not a concern of a liberal and democratic state, if we are to maintain religious neutrality.

2. Sometimes in the declarations of liberals concerning an ideologically neutral state, no consideration is given to the notion of holiness: such declarations may easily lead to relativism. Contrary to such liberal declarations what the Polish nation needs now, after forty-five years of false communist ideology, is a stable foundation upon which to rebuild social structures. Let us add that such a basis must be truly European and at the same time based on Christian principles. According to the Declaration issued by "The Extraordinary Synod of Bishops for European Matters" (1991), nobody can deny that the Christian faith has been deeply rooted in Europe for a long time and this faith has consequently formed the basis of many European institutions, including its political structures. This statement has nothing in common with so-called fundamentalism or with attempts to found a confessional state. It is a simple reminder of the real basis for democracy, which modern states use as model for political systems.

We must mention that not all democracies are authentic. For a democracy to be truly genuine, it must be grounded upon immutable values which transcend temporary party interests. John Paul II spoke about these matters in his Encyclical Letter, *Centesimus Annus*.

Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person. Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life. Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are considered unavailable from a democratic point of view, since they do not accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject to variation according to different political trends.6

It would seem that each citizen in a free and democratic country wishes to build a democratic state based on law; however, it is important to begin building upon a just basis. Even a pluralistic state cannot renounce ethical norms in its legislation and public life. A liberal democratic society cannot, in fact, be axiologically neutral; its legal system must be automatically controlled by certain basic values external to itself. These values, may be derived from the liberty, equality and fraternity of the liberal Western tradition; or from Christian faith, hope and love; or empirically from the moral convictions of its own people and peoples of other cultures; or they may be rationally derived, as in Kantian idealism or scholastic natural law. In the end these values converge on the same legal principles: respect for the essential dignity of each person, within an orderly society.

Certainly, it is difficult to create a legal system which would be axiologically neutral. Even in the light of ordinary pragmatism the creation of such an axiologically neutral state, sooner or later requires a return to such basic values as freedom, justice and equality, which are also basic human rights. Today we see how important these neglected human rights truly are in building a society. For instance debate about basic values has continued in pluralistic democracies, i.e., Germany, for the last twenty years. Intellectuals and legal scholars seek a basis for cooperation in order to establish a commonwealth. They find such a basis in fundamental principles accepted by the majority of citizens. It must be mentioned that no human society, no state, can exist without basic values. These basic values are the dignity of the human person, human rights, freedom, right to life (also for the unborn), justice, equality and solidarity. Undoubtedly, all these values are also Christian values.

We may speak about the universal character of Christian values because they contain fundamental human values. Therefore, there is no reason to accuse Christianity of particularism. These moral values, as well as truth, are inexhaustible in meaning and realization. These values require us to have an open mind while we deepen our knowledge of them; they challenge human beings to reply to them in their personal life and in the political sphere. The former President of

Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, emphasized the vital role of moral values in political life. He valued the individual over the state and believed in the importance of courtesy, good taste, intelligence and responsibility. He tried to place emphasis upon the spiritual and ethical dimensions of political decision-making.7 The strength of these apparently romantic values is evident even in the graceful manner of the velvet revolution and even of the breakup of Havel's Czechoslovakia.

3. A new Polish law, enacted in 1992, regarding radio and television programming guarantees that in the communication medias Christian values will be respected.8 The guarantee itself has stirred up a stormy discussion in Polish society.

To grasp the intention of this new law, it should be noted that the members of the Parliament, reasoning from Christian assumptions, were motivated by their concern for the development of a national culture grounded in Christianity. Their concern was that a Christian system of values not be destroyed in radio and television programming. That Christian system of values had survived for thousands of years, and was never considered a threat to other religious denominations; on the contrary, it serve as a guarantor of their human rights in the most difficult of times. At the time of the Reformation, for instance, Poland received refugees from many civil and religious conflicts. This tradition still exists, in spite of some failures; and it is hoped that it will persevere.

Respect for Christian values in radio and television need not mean the "Catholicization" of the entire culture. It is intended as a legal protection of human and Christian values which, during the forty years of Communist domination, were systematically denigrated in an attempt to confine the Catholicism of the vast majority of the Polish people and to favor, instead, the Communist subculture.

One complication here is the novelty of the present situation. After forty years of suppression—one complete generation—traditional Catholic observances are being celebrated with great enthusiasm, and occasionally with a lack of tact. Understandably, many non-Catholics, together with some thoughtful Catholics, are concerned about the response of the minority. Both the majority and the minority must understand and accept the right and responsibility of the majority to maintain its' religious traditions. The teachings of the Catholic Church, in themselves, provide a strong guarantee for the minority. The basic Christian value is love, which is perceived as stemming from human free will. From this basic principle there follow, automatically, such other Christian values as "social justice," "the equal dignity of all," "the common good," and "community." These values are shared by Catholics, Protestants and other believers alike; they form the core of traditional, liberal humanism. Such values themselves guarantee the right of the minority.

The approach of the new legislation has great strength, and, at the same time, weakness. On the one hand, it offers no platform to a would-be dictator, whether inside the Church or out of it. On the other hand, it fails to provide definite and concrete programs. Educationally, this openness has great value; but, as law, it is dangerously vague. The Church properly inspires and guides its members. It is the nature of law to act coercively; while justice, in courts, must be tempered by charity.

In the next few years, the Polish population will inevitably redefine itself as a nation. And, inevitably, the Church, with its heritage of traditional values, will have its influence on the process. One of our poets has cautioned: "Do not tear down the ancient altar until you are able to build a new one" (A. Asnyk).

At present, the Church is, in fact, the primary source of the structure and stability of human values in the emerging Polish nation. It would be foolish and irresponsible to deny this! Respect for the values and rights of non-Catholic Poles must be a greater priority by the Church, so that stronger legal guarantees of the freedom of religion are afforded the minorities. In Poland, this will certainly happen under the aegis of the Church, yet, this poses no threat to the minorities since Christian teaching respects their right to be different.

Furthermore, Catholic teaching assumes participation by the minority in the formulation of a Polish government and society. Even though the Church provides the forum for discussion, an important and necessary outcome will be the withdrawal, by the Church, from direct political action. Fidelity to her own teaching will require this. Hence, the Church's role in the Polish nation will be played out in the field of formation, teaching and inspiration.

At this time, the Church's teaching and directive authority are the major source for the stability and identity of the vast majority of the Polish people. As such, they offer the only feasible starting point for discussion. Right from the very beginning, the Church's intention must be to relinquish all coercive authority in public matters. This does not imply that the Church will vanish from public life; but its role will change with the passing of time. It is to be hoped that the Church will be given the grace to move smoothly and securely into its new role.

A word of caution to those liberals who hope to build a secular society, and to remove the Church rapidly from any future significant influence! According to the finding of Serif Mardin,9 an expert in Islamic culture, one phenomenon would be certain. When a society rejects its culture and tradition in an attempt to secularize and modernize too rapidly (e.g., Turkey), there will be a reaction: fundamentalism. Eventually the people will reclaim the lost traditions, with little subtlety or tolerance. As a point of prudence, it is to no one's interest to arbitrarily or ideologically remove a major psychological support from the Polish people during a period of stress and rapid transition. Over all, then, it would appear that the interests of both the liberals and the minorities are well served by the Church at this point in time.

Conservative Concerns

1. In Poland there is a large, vocal minority of Catholics who want the Church to give official support to their conservative political platform, and to employ the coercive power of the State to enforce their understanding of Catholic teachings. They have entered the media debate demanding that the media be legally required to respect "Christian values." Father Josef Tischner10 responded by thoughtfully explaining that the essential nature of Christian values does not permit that they be expressed legalistically. In the first place, the expression of key Gospel tenets changes its emphasis from time to time. Poland has experienced this recently. With the inception of Solidarity, the Gospel read: "bear one another's burdens"; with the murder of Jerzy Popieluszko, it became "overcome evil with good." Just now, it is uncertain where the emphasis must be placed, but we will surely find it. The search for the center must be responsive; the Gospel deals with the good, not with the "correct." Christ Himself broke the Sabbath law in order to heal a cripple. Furthermore, in the process of transition, the Church's catalytic function consisted, in large part, in providing a place where the truth might be spoken and heard in freedom. The Gospel of Christ calls for great openness to the needs of our changing world. Christ invites people to follow Him voluntarily ["if you would be my disciples . . ."]

The requirements for discipleship, in a changing world, cannot be codified by law, nor be exhausted by any philosophical system; they must be discerned by each individual and each group

- by the Church and by the nation. The proposed legislation, the media, and any other attempt to ground civil law directly in Christian values misses the basic point of the Gospel. Christian freedom and salvation are truly historical, and are grounded in day-to-day living. It is the place of the Church to guide and support; not to command in these matters. Joseph Tischner respects the intentions and concerns of those supportive of media laws, but cautions that their methods may prove inappropriate and counter-productive.

To Father Tischner's ideas, I would like to add that in reality the law requiring the media to respect Christian values does not lead to a "confessional" state, nor to intolerance of non-believers. Nevertheless, this danger does potentially exist. Therefore, the Catholic must be sensitive to this concern. "It is, however, only in freedom that man can turn himself towards what is good."11 The Fathers of the Council emphasized this in their *Declaration of Religious Freedom*:

Men cannot satisfy this obligation in a way that is in keeping with their own nature, unless they enjoy both psychological freedom and immunity from external coercion. Therefore the right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective attitude of the individual, but in his very nature.12

I chose to emphasize this teaching because, from time to time, the over-zealous have maintained the opposite. For their sake, for the sake of the entire Church and for the Polish people, it is important to clarify the respective functions of Church and State in the process of salvation. It is the responsibility of both to provide the freedom which is an essential component of faith. It is the responsibility of the church to respect the freedom of Catholics and non-Catholics alike in proclaiming the Gospel, which itself calls for freedom. The appropriate proclamation of the Gospel consists in invitation, in witness by word and life, and in dialogue and discussion.

In essence, the Church is apolitical. This does not mean that the individual Catholic does not exercise his rights and responsibilities as a citizen. But, if the Church, as an institution, acts as a political party, it would be confusing the transcendental with the historical; it would be distorting the proper relationship between Church and State. Jesus Himself clearly distinguished between the two: "Render to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's!"

When this distinction is not maintained, it is the institutional aspect of the Church, rather than the central values of the Gospel, that are enjoined coercively. It is far simpler to require Church marriages or Friday abstinence than to legislate faith, hope and love. Furthermore, if the Church binds herself to any political system, she draws closer to one or the other and thus, loses her universality. It is the Church's nature to proclaim the Gospel at all times, in all places, and under all conditions in which humanity finds itself.

2. The Church's center is transcendent and universal; by contrast by its very nature civil law is finite and particular. As a human creation it is inevitably imperfect and biased, and its necessity is practical rather than absolute. Thus a law at times will come into conflict with moral values and individuals will be confronted with a personal choice. When this occurs, it is well to consider Socrates decision:

Men of Athens, I love and esteem you, but I will obey the god rather than you; and as long as I breathe and have the power, I shall never abandon philosophy nor cease to admonish you . . . [and] saying in my wonted fashion: "My good friend, you are a citizen of Athens, a great city . . . are

you not ashamed . . . [of] caring nothing and taking no thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?13

For Socrates it was more important to be faithful to his own conscience than to change the law. In "A man for all season" Saint Thomas Moore gives the same answer to the same question. The formation of conscience is the Church's primary responsibility. In civic matters it is to form and develop a deep and mature spirituality when the conscience of the people has developed fully. The law will never be perfect and the mature conscience must remain a crucial factor in the civil form. Thus the role of Church in civil affairs is the spiritual and moral formation of the citizen.

Responsibility of the Church in the New Future

A major issue in the current debate is the position of the Catholic Church in the future of the Polish nation. During the communist period the Church was almost the only significant counter-weight to the communist state. As such it received the support of many sincere people who were not committed Christians. But now other alternatives are possible for them. The Church must recognize this and respect their withdrawal gracefully. It would be a mistake to hold them coercively or to attempt to impose on them specifically Christian values which they do not hold.

Furthermore it is not the right of the Church directly to impose her values and teachings on anyone. After the experience of communism the Polish people have had enough of values imposed from without. During that time the Church established herself as the supporter of human rights and the spokesman for human dignity. Now it is the time to build on that foundation. The nation is free and the people know that they have the right to choose. If the Church fails to respect that right, they may well make other choices. However, if the Church respects the adult autonomy of conscience and address as herself to the formation of conscience and spirituality according to the basic message of the Gospel, than the Catholic population is quite capable of managing the political decisions by themselves. The good teacher accompanies the pupil on his journey, but always allows the pupil to make his own discoveries, formulate his own principles and develops his own applications. Truth and values hold their own validation, they themselves persuade, challenge and enlighten the human mind.

Consider the visitor to an art museum. If his perception is not trained, he will see relatively little; but if he has the proper training and experience he will enjoy the intrinsic richness of the exhibition. Similarly someone properly formed in moral values will comprehend more accurately and completely the moral implications of the historical situation. It is the Church's mission to provide that moral and spiritual formation. It is a misuse of the Church's resources to devote too much energy or attention to current debates about the media or any other attempts to concretize Christian values as part of civil law. In reality Christian values meet little opposition; it is the imposition of these values or any others that provokes resistance.

Parenthetically I wish to introduce the distinction of Henri Bergson between open and closed moralities and religion. The closed system provides codified rules and doctrines, while the open system permits the individual to understand a few deep principles and to build upon them. The closed system is characterized by control and defensiveness, while the open system allows for creative participation in both religion and secular society. It is this openness which the Church would wish to foster. Mature morality and spirituality and Bergsonian openness are prerequisites for the dialogue, and dialogue is a prerequisite for a mature civil society. Without dialogue or conversation, namely "without living together and talking together,"14 society becomes a form of

barbarism which lives under fear and force by economic necessity alone, sacrificing the higher values to the lower. When the dialogue is lost, there is general failure of all the components of conversation. The parties of the conversation cease to listen to one to another, they only trade monologues and misperceptions and the rules of rational thought are violated.

During the post war period, the Church in Poland offered the primary refuge from the barbarian clamor and was the major forum for civilized discourse. If this can continue the Church may be a foundation for a truly civilized nation. A word of caution however. Poland is the home not just of Catholics, but also of several kinds of Protestants, Orthodoxies, Eastern White Catholics, Polish National Church, Jews, gypsies, agnostics and non-believers. It is necessary that all these people participate actively in the planning and development of their new homeland. The Church must extend the freedom and openness that the Polish people found within it during the communist period to those who choose to remain outside. This would be a greater gift than any other.

There is no cause for fear in this if we have a basic faith in the Church. As Cardinal Ratzinger says, "When the Church no longer has the courage to remind the people of the Christian vision of man, which is essential for public life, it will cease to be 'the salt of the earth, the light of the world and the city build on the hill'."15

From this there emerge several conclusions. Whereas at first it might appear that Poland has more urgent problems, for example, the economy, the proper formulation of civic and religious values is equally important. In both areas of concern we face decisions in the near future which will determine long range development. In these it will be important to bear in mind a number of things:

1. The relationship even in theory between state and Church is complex. The state is, of course, the instrument of the civil order; it is a means to achieve a good society, not an end in itself (*telos*). The idea of state and law do not lead logically to the founding values of society such as equality, freedom, and justice, but follow from them. A truly neutral state reflecting no values is impossible as soon as it acts in the real world, for actions reflect values. Even a matter as apparently neutral as which side of the street to drive on presupposes such values as order, safety, and respect for life.

2. The separation of Church and state is a fine political principle, but in the real world cooperation and collaboration are essential. The Church routinely works with the State in such areas as the care of orphans, unmarried mothers and unemployment.

3. It is important to the state to recognize the Christian spirituality of the Polish people. Over the past few years the Christian values: love, mercy and forgiveness have been instrumental in achieving a bloodless revolution. The state must do nothing to hinder or undermine these virtues.

4. The Church too must continue faithful to herself and her task which is to preach the Gospel. She must not become entangled in any one political system; her basic nature is apolitical. It is not the case that the obsolete Marxist ideology is to be replaced by Catholicism as some have suggested; the mission of the Church transcends time and history and must not be defined according to the means of a particular situation. To limit the Church in this way would be to abuse her true contribution. The Church does not ask the State for safety, power, and a privileged position; but rather seeks to give her gift to society: the good news of the Gospel, the hope of salvation, and the grace of Christian community. Especially in Poland with its overflowing Catholic majority it is absolutely essential that the rights of the religious minorities are strongly guaranteed and enforced by law; and the Church can only support these guarantees.

With great faith and hope Father Janusz Pasierb16 expressed his vision for the Polish Church:

I do not want 'a Church which still must die for the fatherland' (M. Dabrowska), a Church which must sacrifice universal and Catholic values on the altar of the fatherland. I want a Church which has left political servitude behind, but still remains the consciousness of Polish politics. For this the Church must remain impartial and disinterested; it must immerse itself in the teachings of the great spiritual masters of the past. The Church can and must be the ideal, the model or example for secular society,—this is a political apostolate of the Church. Fortunately, the head of the Church is Christ whose kingdom is based on truth, justice, and love. So both the behavior of Catholics within the Church and their behavior toward the state, which is now our own state, stand as very important witnesses. If we as Catholics teach citizens respect for civic institutions, if we think in terms of society and community, if we give up pride and privilege and domination then we will serve as Christ did.

I fear the opposite values, will give us a Church which is used and manipulated by politicians to serve their own purposes. I fear a Church of only one party which is not a church of all people who seek the kingdom of God.

Notes

1. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the World of Today" (*Gaudium et spes)*, 75; 76.

2. James E. Wood, "Rising Expectations for Religious Rights in Eastern Europe, *Journal of Church and State*, 33 (No. 1, 1991), pp. 4-5.

3. Cf. John Courtney Murray, *We Hold These Truths* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960).

4. John Paul II, Homily delivered in Lubaczow, Poland, June 3, 1991. See: *L'Osservatore Romano* (English Edition; no. 23, June 10, 1991).

5. Marek Jedraszewski, "Szukanie siebie samych" ("Looking for Ourselves"), *W Drodze*, 9, 229; 1992), pp. 25-26.

6. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, 46.

7. Lance Morrow, "I cherish a Certain Hope," *Time*, August 3, 1992, pp. 46-48.

8. Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 v. "O radiofonii i telewizji (Dz. U., 1993, nv 7, poz. 34, art. 21, sut"p 2, pkt 5-9). A new Polish regulation, enacted on December 29, 1992, regarding radio and television, contains among other things, the following rules. In article 21, section 2 we read: "The programs of public radio and television should: . . .. serve to develop culture, science and education with particular regard to Polish intellectual and artistic heritage; 6. respect the Christian system of values, accepting universal ethical principles as a basis; 7. serve to strengthen families; 8. serve to combat social disorder; and 9. take into consideration the needs of national minorities and ethnic groups."

9. Cf. Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey* (New York: SUNY Press, 1989).

10. Joseph Tischner, "Spory przed znakiem drogowym" (Debate Before Roadsign), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, February 21, 1993.

11. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the World of Today" (*Gaudium et Spes)*, 17.

12. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, "Declaration of Religious Freedom" (*Dignitatis Humanae*), 2.

13. Plato, *Socratic Dialogues* (*The Apology*), translated by W. D. Woodhead (New York: Nelson, 1958), 29 D-E.

14. J. Courtney Murray, *We Hold These Truths*, *op. cit*., p. 13.

15. Quotation according to Salij Jacek, "Katolickie pojmowanie klerykalizmu" ("The Catholic Concept of Clericalism"), *W Drodze*, 5 (225; 1992), 15.

16. Janusz Pasierb, "Pragne Kosciota o szerokim, otwartym sercu" (I Desire a Church with a Large and Open Heart), *W Drodze*, 6 (226; 1982), 15.