Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change
Series VII, Seminars, Culture and Values, Volume 19

Cultural Resources and Historical Responses
Volume II

The Humanization of Social Life

edited by
Ronald S. Calinger, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B. Calabretta, Robert Magliola

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Gibbons Hall B-20
620 Michigan Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20064

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

The humanization of social life : cultural resources and historical responses / edited by Christopher Wheatler…, [et al.].

p.cm. – (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series VII: Seminar on culture and values ; v. 19)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Social values. 2. Social ethics. 3. Humanistic ethics.
I. Wheatler, Christopher J. 1955-. II. Series.

HM681.T58 2004 2004004415
303.3’72—dc22 CIP

ISBN 1-56518-200-6 (pbk.)

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Introduction

George F. McLean and *Robert Magliola*

Ambivalent change — political, social, and technological — has been the outstanding feature of the twentieth century affecting vast numbers of peoples throughout the globe. Whereas the first half of the century witnessed elaborate campaigns of political and economic unification and assimilation culminating in totalitarian systems of suppression, the latter half has been emerging, not without its own contradictions, as a movement toward human freedom buttressed by a newly found sense of the dignity of the human person. This movement, today symbolized by the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, manifests itself politically and economically as generally favoring participatory forms of political organization and free market arrangements. In this respect it has been a period marked by a gradual freedom, first, from Fascism, Nazism, then from colonialism, and, more recently, in Eastern Europe and Asia, from Soviet Communism, as evidenced by a myriad of new independent nations which have arisen after World War II. In the United States this greater sensitivity to human freedom and the dignity of the person has found expression in civil rights movements, in a reversal of the "melting pot" mentality toward a greater respect for racial and ethnic differences as well as a new found appreciation for cultural identity and diversity.

Additionally, technological changes have profoundly altered life in the twentieth century, giving rise to a steady procession of "Ages" such as the Nuclear Age, the Space Age, the Information/Communications Age, and, currently, the Age of Genetic Engineering. The latter will provide the resources for determining, to some extent, the physico-cultural constitution of the human subject, and hence of human communities.

Within this context the present volume raises the question of how the humanization of social life is to be understood?

Many developing nations look to Western "First World" countries as models of political organization and economic development. Humanization, here, is often understood as synonymous with democratic institutions that, while protecting individual liberties, aggressively promote free markets. However, while a progressive process of rationalization, generative of technological breakthroughs, has made possible an unrivaled period of production of goods and services for the satisfaction of individual and communal needs, it has also led to a process of reification, to use Weber's term, wherein efficient means for achieving predefined goals have subject the human person to greater calculability, control, systematic planning, bureaucracy, economic and administrative efficiency. In "First World" countries this has led to a progressive process of depersonalization and desacralization of the natural and the social world. Indeed, the technical rationalization of social life has paradoxically led to a new mode of slavery or unfreedom in the form of consumerism and hedonism, where the possession of goods and the exaltation of the pleasant has tended to replace people with objects and human relationships with the pursuit of pleasure.

Referring to the rapid and extraordinary political change occurring in the world in 1989 and 1990, Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel stated that "history has accelerated."1 This statement appears in his speech to a joint session of the Congress of the United States of America in Washington D.C. on 21 February 1990. The spread and renewal of democracy involving freedom of speech and free elections was central to this change. Its expanding impact has been felt

in Asia, Africa, and South America as well as Eastern Europe. Democracy is, of course, not new. It has existed on our planet for newly 2,500 years. It is, President Havel cogently asserts, a never fully attainable ideal and people must work constantly to perfect it. In East Central and Eastern Europe, fledgling democracies arose after the fall of totalitarian Soviet communism, which was know for its subjugation of peoples, economic hardship, and personal humiliations.

President Havel did not simply record these changes, which he considers mainly irreversible, but offered blueprint on how to avert potential social or ecological breakdowns in the world and secure a better future. He observed that we must recognize that "consciousness precedes being" and through a revolution of the human consciousness learn "how to put morality ahead of politics." Citizens must be personally active in a shared moral responsibility that appeals to the higher authority of the human conscience, and they must disdain passivity. Havel drew inspiration from the American Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights and rejected the Marxist interpretation of history based on materialism and class struggle.

Western democracy and technology are not the magic wands for a more humane world. Indeed, social problems such as poverty, homelessness, indigence, disintegration of the family, the high divorce rate, teenage pregnancy, teenage suicide, AIDS, pornography, sexual promiscuity, abortion, drug addiction, crime, and a growing sense of apathy and disillusionment, as well as ecological abuses, are mainstream problems of the "First World." George F. McLean aptly describes this problematic: "All three worlds appear to be experiencing the same problem: scientific and technical instrumentation — whether in the form of a so-called scientific philosophy of history, a promised industrialization or a new age of information and communication — have come variously to enslave, exploit and/or depersonalize the nations which have taken them up."

This, of course, is not to say that participatory forms of government and free markets do not have much that recommends them, but, that their promises —freedom and material affluence — should be at the service of — rather than at the mercy of — the human person and human community. There is, in short, a need to develop a deeper sense of human personhood, of human dignity, of personal transcendence and ultimate meaning in terms of what it means to be human. A treatment of these issues will clarify, in turn, the question of change in our times and the direction that such change should take. The present volume, *Cultural Resources and Historical Response to The Humanization of Social Life*, endeavors to illuminate these various concerns.

Part I, "Cultural Resources," is concerned with an elaboration of cultural resources in response to the challenge of the humanization of social life.

Chapter I, by (Albertine) Tshibilondi Ngoyi, "The Understanding of the Human Person and Society in Traditional and Modern African Cultures," presents an acute analysis, aware of the Western perspective, of the African view of the process of humanization. The author also considers the "triple organization" which currently characterizes African politics. Treating both change and continuity in traditional African culture according to the Bantu experience, and offering a basic understanding of the differences between Western and African anthropological models, particularly regarding the concept of "self" and cosmic vision, the author constructively challenges Western schemes on social change processes.

Chapter II, by Gytis Vaitkunas, " Social Structure and Cultural Field in the Humanization of Social Life: The Problem of Democracy," offers clear indices for understanding the process of humanization in the First World by developing the distinction between "person" and "society" considered within "cultural fields" and "social structures," and thus of "soft" and "hard" systems, respectively identified as two global preferences in the "Eastern" and "Western" models . The

dichotomy is analyzed within the problem of "democracy" which requires a sufficiently developed cultural field in order for social life to enter into a dynamic of humanization; and is further specified by the spiritual values of the person as a humanizing factor and of the will to power as a dehumanizing factor.

Chapter III, by Ion Bansoiu, " The Ambiguity of a Culture and Its Freedom to Choose," defines briefly the traditional culture of Romania, paying special attention to the person-society relationship based on the traditional values of the family, and therefore of the village communities, that (1) created a sacral lifestyle, (2) interrelated all aspects of daily experience, (3) oriented the individual toward a contemplative experience of life (more than a pragmatic one) and (4) fomented a deep personal internal spiritual peace. Personal dignity and social cohesion were realized together in traditional culture, giving rise to the unity and coherence of its value system. The author also analyzes the process of the breaking up of village communities during the 17th-19th centuries which gave rise to the "individual" who seeks his own well-being, over and above that of the community's.

Chapter IV, by Florencio R. Riguera, " Valid Concepts: A Case of Policy-Oriented Research," explicates the importance of ascertaining valid concepts to be used as the basis for decision-making and public policy. The process of validating concepts requires that the description of a target population be faithful to the self-understanding of the same population in terms of the manner in which they perceive and evaluate their situation, assess their needs, and formulate their standards and norms of acceptable behaviors. In order to illustrate his main thesis, the author describes, in some detail, the process of conducting a research project aimed at deriving a comprehensive profile of the Muslim populations in the southern Philippines.

Chapter V, "The Story of Man: Humanization of Social Life," by Prabhakara M. Rao, treats this collection's theme in three sections: the first considers the question of humaneness understood as the realization of the reality of the human person and community. This is followed by a treatment of the process of how man comes into existence and the nature of human freedom. The final section deals with the humanization of social life as involving the balance between the private and the public Ego. The author also considers a number of related issues such as value inquiry, the criterion of value, levels of experience.

Part II, "Historical Responses," focuses on historical responses that have emerged in response to the call of humanization of social life.

Chapter VI, by Maciej Zieba, O.P., " The Eternal Church in a Changing World: The Relationship of the Church and World in the Thought of John Paul II," provides a reconsideration of the role of the perennial Christian faith in a changing world, especially since the election of the Polish Pope, John Paul II. His analysis of the role of the Christian faith in the Polish family tradition, together with the political maneuvers to undermine its transmission and force, brings one to a deeper awareness of the historical importance of what he calls the "metacritical role" of the Church, a role which should be above and beyond all politicization.

Chapter VII, by Joseph G. Donders, " Transcendence and Social Change: Individualism as a Religious and Theological Issue," presents a treatment of the local Hebrew culture contemporary to Jesus of Nazareth, illuminating the issue of "person" vs. "society." The authors considers in particular Jesus' more deeply intimate relationship with God as "Abbà." From here flows the personal dignity of each individual, enjoining all to love with God's Love. The author presents three necessary factors for transcendency in society - the self, the other and God - surpassing the

conceptual hazards of individualism in everyday lifestyle. The author proposes as point of departure the *perichoresis* of the three Persons of the one and same Divinity.

Chapter VIII, by Roberto J. Gonzalez-Casanovas, " The Hermeneutics of Mediation in Ramon Llull: *Blanquerna* as a Thirteenth-Century Parable," develops a thorough critique of the religious novel *Blanquerna* as an attempt to re-interpret the Gospel for the sake of increasing devotion, perfecting the life of the Church, and preparing missionaries to convert the world to Christ. Llull's presentation of sanctity as a model for preaching and living, in which spiritual and moral authority take precedence over a hierarchical order and the clerical institution of the Church, is analyzed as a hermeneutics for reading, translating and mediating the Gospel in the life of the individual and the community: an interesting approach to the humanization, or conversion to Christ-likeness, of individuals in society.

Chapter IX, by Ronald S. Calinger, "Democratic Revolutions: A Partial Historical Retrospective," seeks to provide a historical retrospective to the current movement in Central and Eastern Europe for multiparty democracies and free market economies, leading his readers through an examination of the European and American democratic developments and revolutions in economy, culture, science and society from 1760-1800.

Chapter X, by Michael W. Foley, "'Coming to Value' vs 'Having Values": Building Democracy in the Contemporary Mexican Peasant Movement," diverges—in its interpretation of social change in Latin America—from the characteristic value-static, stereotypical and, in part, deterministic theories which have long held sway. He proposes to examine three levels of Mexico's independent peasant movement over the past 20 years, drawing (1) on his own case study of democratizing practice in Base Christian Communities, (2) on the Sonora experience of large-scale unity of peasant communities, and finally (3) on the national experience of the structuring of the peasant movement. The discussion pivots around values, political culture, and the development of democratic practice.

Chapter XI, by John A. Kromkowski,. "The Polish-American Experience in Multi-Ethnic America: Exercises in Measuring and Searching for Meaning," presents the empirical case of multi-ethnic America with its recent 1980 Decennial Census that established "new benchmarks" in ethnic consciousness. Within the philosophical reflections of the social, psychological and ecological dimensions of "humanization" and the multidisciplinary analysis of economic and political conditions which foster "humanization,"

Chapter XI, by John A. Kromkowski, "The Polish-American Experience in Multi-Ethnic America: Exercises in Measuring and Searching for Meaning," presents the empirical case of multi-ethnic America with its recent 1980 Decennial Census that established "new benchmarks" in ethnic consciousness. Within the philosophical reflections of the social, psychological and ecological dimensions of "humanization" and the multidisciplinary analysis of economic and political conditions which foster "humanization," Kromkowski analyzes in detail the Polish-American population. He examines the indices of a crucial era of measurable demographic change, though evidence of incompleteness of data brings him to appeal for demographic coherence on the American scene. However, more important is the ethnic pluralism of America in the collaboration with European contemporaries in the search for a fuller understanding of the meaning and measures of the humanization of social life in a multi-ethnic reality. The author offers an alternative of "pluri-formity" of personal and social being.

Chapter XII, by Tamas Toth, "Modernization and the Left," examines the notion of modernization which generally has been taken as westernization with the categories of a liberal capitalistic democracy. In contrast at studies the notion as interpreted and evaluated by thinkers

from the left with a more critical attitude as well as a desire to achieve not only a description but an explanatory capability. This enables one to move beyond theories to the actual process of modernization and with it the ability to fulfill the emancipatory hopes of modernity: in Habermas' terms, how to modernize modernity.

Chapter XIII, by Stephen H. Kendall, "The Renewal of Social Life through Dwelling Environments: Implications for an Ethical Architectural Practice," suggests that questions of the humanization of social life in conditions of change have to do with questions of the "*inhumanization"* of the processes out of which physical settings emerge and evolve. His affirmation that the question of dwelling is an act rather than a commodity, injects a social and cultural dynamism into architectural design and execution which not only expresses a past, but also in certain ways determines a future. If the architectural profession is to remain in the humanist tradition, the need for an ethical stance is needed.

The Epilogue, by Paul Peachey, "War: Inevitable or Now Obsolete?," presents an acute analysis of the war-consciousness of the second half of the XXth century as paradoxically reminiscent of Vegetius's ancient military axiom: "Si vis pacem, para bellum." The author underscores its contrary as a unique reply at the end of this century, a reply that he believes is within the grasp of the international community: "If you do not want war, prepare for peace."

Finally, the editors of this volume would like to express their deepest appreciation to the authors of this study whose penetrating insight and dedication to the cause of the seminar on the humanization of social life have made this volume possible. Grateful acknowledgement is also made to the General Editor of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, George F. McLean, for his many contributions to the organization and realization of this seminar, as well as for his helpful editorial review of the final copy. Appreciation is also extended to Mrs. Linda Perez for the work in preparing the manuscript.

Note

1. *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Mount Pleasant, SC.: City News Publishing Co., March 1990), Vol. LVI, 11-327-330.

Chapter I

The Understanding of the Human Person and Society in Traditional and Modern African Cultures

Tshibilondi Ngoyi

Like many countries African societies are comprised of tradition-laden tribal societies of the past both self-sufficient and almost homogeneous. Tradition has given way to a society characterized by great diversity between groups, traditions and interdependent economies. As a consequence, Africa is experiencing a crisis of socio-economic and political values.

This phenomenon raises even deeper questions of great philosophical interest: the relation between tradition and modernity, identity and difference, individual and society, justice and peace, freedom and law, etc. These are indeed ancient issues in the history of socio-political philosophy which already have arisen in many forms.

Peculiar, however, to the changes in our times, the theme "humanization of social life" situates us in the midst of the issue of the dignity and respect for every human person without exception. We are facing dignity which has been dishonored by the monstrosities committed throughout the world: injustice, inequality, emolument, imperialism, etc.

How should this condition be described from an African perspective? Should one take account of the various self-concepts derived from their ancient traditions? Or should one focus rather upon the present situations and the almost intolerable conditions of contemporary African life?

This culture/condition dichotomy does not seem tenable in contemporary Africa because, despite apparent modernity, tradition remains indeed quite vital.1 Except for a very small minority of Westernized urban inhabitants (who have not at all lost contact with their extended families in their home regions), the African peoples are actually living according to the general patterns characteristic of their traditions. These remain quite alive and have in no way passed away as has been generally thought.2 One cannot speak of archeology in this regard without abusing the term. They are not at all museum pieces; their basic message regarding man, community and life extend beyond all sense data and remain to undergird the social and political economies of more than one African state.

Therefore, while taking into account historical distance as hermeneutics prescribes, particularly regarding Africa one must avoid projecting into an archaic past that which constitutes the real situation of the majority of the people. Hence, it is in the dialogue between tradition and modernity that the real progress of contemporary Africa comes to the fore, reminding us that in truth all crises of civilizations can be resolved only in dialogue with the past. Such a dialogue is important both in resolving present problems and in projecting the future. This bespeaks the importance, even the necessity, of the past: the need to remember in order to understand oneself, to situate oneself in space and time and to walk with assurance toward the future.

Tradition seems to consist of laws which operate as a basic parameter for self-understanding and even for understanding others. Far from being conservative or an obstacle to any change or progress, tradition and the analysis of its dynamics are the condition for integrated change capable of surviving an identity crisis.

It is then in the light of culture, and hence of African identity, that we shall examine the humanization of African social life.

The Dynamism of Tradition

There are no isolated cultures or traditions.3 Tradition is not a fixed body or a lifeless organism; tradition bears and educates the individual who, in turn, transforms it by his or her freedom. From the dialogue between the structured tradition and the freedom by which it is reasserted comes the dynamism of the tradition. Every tradition bears the contributions of others which it has assimilated. Nevertheless, the entrance of a foreign element into a system generates three phenomena: the disorganization of the existing system, the transformation of its components, and their reorganization in a new structure. This constitutes a transformation of the whole.4 The posture of disdain on the part of a tradition regarding a new element springs from the fear of disorganization. This is a threatening moment of danger for it questions and challenges us to renounce ourselves in order to make room for the change which disturbs us.

That resistance to foreign bodies makes the traditionalist the enemy of novelty: tradition can become an obstacle to development. The traditional, while depending upon the old system, opens itself to novelty: with a view toward greater enrichment tradition searches out the new and different in the order both of possessions and sensations. Beyond painful disorganization it envisages a new organization or transformation.

Two attitudes are opposed to development: on the one hand, traditionalism which closes itself in the past and, on the other hand, revolution which would wipe away the past. Traditionalism becomes immobile with age; revolution moves ahead. Authentic development, as noted above, lies between these two.

The difficult challenge to any tradition is the assimilation of foreign elements. For progress in science and technology to be integrated as elements of our culture, this challenge must continually be mastered. The present phase of African development is the attempt to resolve the crisis of the introduction of Western civilization marked by a scientific and technological mentality which constitutes not only an opportunity for enrichment, but also a risk of alienation.

African Culture: An Approach to Development

Not the least of the problems of black Africa today lies in the fact that in the actual process of its development it has ignored its culture. As L.S. Senghor often says, it is necessary to cross-fertilize culturally in order to develop a symbiosis in which the Western contributions will undergo an African baptism rather than simply destroying these cultures by what is termed modernity.

The opposition between tradition and modernity is not so relevant when one compares cultures, because within each culture we find the poles of tradition focusing upon what has been acquired in the past, and those of modernity turned to the present and the future. The relation between two cultures is always one between two traditions. Hence modern Africa, while continuing the synchronic dialogue with other cultures, must draw on the resources in the depths of its own history and allow itself to be instructed by its own traditions.

Across the centuries Africa has accumulated a sum of knowledge regarding the cosmos, man, society and the Transcendent. That knowledge is codified in its oral texts, symbols and myths which help the memory to interiorize the lessons of the past. The proverbs, stories, arts and customs constitute the great book in which that wisdom can be read.

Many technically perfect projects elaborated by development experts have failed because they did not take account of that wisdom. Across the ages Africa has perfected techniques which allow it to draw from nature all that it needed for life: farming methods, weaving, building materials and

medicines. As noted by Jean Marc Ela, it must not underestimate these techniques. The development of Africa can be accomplished more economically and in a more balanced manner if, rather than suppressing these techniques,5 they are perfected. Recent research on appropriate technologies is renewing interest in the simplest technologies.

Nonetheless, we witness today in Africa aberrations in the name of modernity which J.M. Ela rightly calls the cycle of dependence. In fact, "those who once often cured themselves by plants must now depend upon costly pills, manufactured at the other end of the world and bought without quality assurance, in order to be cured of a low fever. Those previously clothed by their own weaving are now completely at the mercy of imported fabrics and distant factories. Those who previously could nourish themselves must now import basic necessities at their own risk.6

Africa Facing Outward

What characterizes many African countries — and, this constitutes one of the principal causes of their so-called underdeveloped status — is the phenomenon of extroversion.7 In effect, the African countryside and its villages are oriented toward the cities to which they look for their health; interior regions are oriented toward the capital, and the capital toward Europe and America.

Today Africa is in need of a painful but salutary "conversion." It should turn toward itself, while remaining open to other continents, in order to take its destiny into its own hands by organizing power, promoting knowledge and managing work. Such a program would be very complex and would demand a long slow process of change both in mentalities and structures.

It may be useful to recall briefly that this ‘extroversion’ took place in three steps: slavery, colonization and new colonialism. Without going into details, let us note that for five centuries Africa was forced into contact with Europe. This was a violent shock both to its spirit and to its culture.

Henceforward, Africa was disoriented — even broken up — while its internal dynamism toward progress was brutally interrupted. Nevertheless if the West bears a large part of the responsibility in this drama, Africa is not completely innocent: the cupidity of the thieves who allowed themselves to be corrupted together with their ethnic rivalries permitted the inroads of the slavers. Progressively, however, the revalorization of the black person is being achieved. This began with a recognition of their qualities and capacities. The negritude movement was accompanied by political protests which culminated in independence.

Domination put on a new face and began to call itself "cooperation" under the title of North-South relations. This was a new way for the great powers in the North to protect their interests in the South. In reality, in the economic sphere, Europe has not seen fit to endow the new countries with the means which would enable them to develop their economy. On the contrary, all has been organized so that Africa cannot industrialize. For the West, Africa remains a reservoir; before for lumber wood, now for basic materials. Profit and exploitation take place at every level: commercial, industrial, technological, etc.

The West (with complicity by African leaders, avid for power and preoccupied with power maintenance and private interests) is the only master of the game in setting prices both for raw materials and for the manufactured product. All is done so as to further impoverish those already poor. Money is loaned, but at high interest. According to North-South agreements Africa must use more expensive technical assistance than that of its national technicians who have received the same training — often in European Universities. Often the sophisticated technology sold is not adapted to the realities of African countries and renders them ever more dependent.

The foreign debt climbs excessively. In order that these debts be paid the international monetary organizations (particularly, the International Monetary Fund) impose measures which amount to a virtual genocide of populations (constant devaluations which raise the cost of living, insufficiency of salaries, etc.). This economic crisis has heavy consequences upon social life.

Evidently, the balance of North-South cooperation in development has been largely negative for Africa.8 The responsibility for this must be shared by both as is well expressed by the title of a work by Carlos Rangel, *L'occident et le Tiers-monde: De la fausse culpabilité aux vraies responsabilités*9. To escape its present crisis there is the need for a twin conversion: on the one hand, that of Africa itself, according to an African proverb: "the worm which eats the bean must be inside," and on the other hand, that of the West. The latter must have the courage to step beyond exploitation towards co-development. This raises a very delicate and complex question of socio-political ethics for the industrialized countries with a capitalist system in which the profit motive and one's interests prevail over other values.

But the most urgent talk is Africa's, namely, to turn toward itself, to take stock of its real natural and human resources, and to take its destiny into its own hands. This struggle must be carried on every level. In this the African elite must play a central role. African intellectuals, politicians and businessmen, instead of focusing upon Europe, must turn toward the *L'Afrique des villages*10 where there are no decent roads and no well-equipped hospitals or schools. They must enter the interior to exchange with the people and learn from them in order to be in position to elaborate programs for internal development which take account of the situation and needs of the people. This requires that Africa be able to organize power, promote knowledge and manage its resources through diachronic dialogue with its past and synchronic dialogue with other people.

A Triple Organization

Politics in Africa is now going through a transition characterized by a breakdown of traditional forms and political turmoil resulting from the struggle for power which followed upon independence which was negotiated but not truly built up from within. To organize power in Africa today it is necessary to find a harmonious synthesis between the unity of the nation and a real decentralization which will make each person responsible within his/her own sphere of action. Africa is making progress in this through a process of trial and error as has been the history of other continents.

Fundamentally two conceptions of power meet in Africa: the spiritual African tradition and the desacralizing outlook from the North or West. For traditional Africa, power is sacred and derives from the transcendent. Traditional chiefs are intermediaries between the living and the dead, between God and his people. One comes to power by heritage or designation, and remains in power till death. By contrast in the Western conception, since ancient Greece and Rome, power comes from the people and for a limited time. African political practice must strive to develop a synthesis of these two conceptions. Transcendent power cannot be efficacious unless guided from within by controls, as is expressed by the Luba proverb: "the people are subject to the chief, but the chief is subject to the people." This is to say that the chief and his subjects have equal and symmetrical rights.

One could cite a large number of oral African proverbs which remind the chief of his rights and duties with regard to the people, and vice versa.11 They remind the chief that without his subjects he is nothing; hence he must not reach beyond his rights or abuse his authority. Others insist that every member of the community has the right to contribute to its construction; that there

is the right to participate in one way or another in decisions which influence the life of all; that the people have the right to be consulted, to dialogue, to give a mandate to the chief, to control and, when necessary, to remove him; the right to claim one's rights and to have them vindicated, etc.

Further, no matter what the form of the power (democracy, single party, sacred, etc.), an effort should be made to ameliorate its structures with a view to enabling the largest possible number of citizens to participate in public affairs. Africa must manage to achieve both unity and decentralization. Without such a reorganization, which will require also an openness in the management of public affairs not unknown to African wisdom, Sub-Saharan Africa will long remain in a state of underdevelopment. As politics constitutes the motor nerve for the development of the entire society, it must play a primordial role in the process of liberation.

The organization of power must go hand in hand with the advancement of understanding and of science and at two levels: modern and traditional science and technology. Africa is now in a paradoxical situation. The more the specialists the greater the decline of the different domains of social life. This signifies, as R. Dumont12 has repeatedly noted, that in Africa science steps at the theoretical level without affecting the concrete life of the people. There is a gulf also between intellectual and physical work.

The division of intellectual and physical work generates the phenomena of both the bureaucratization of the African elite and the marginalization of the majority in the countryside. This reflects the outward or imported character of the educational system as an ideological instrument of cultural dependence and alienation.13

And thus we arrive at a more global problem, namely, the relevance and contribution of scientific research to the transformation of the conditions of social life for the African peoples. To what degree is contemporary African research in philosophy and science, based upon Western thought, and still bound thereto; and is this not, at least in part, responsible for the problems of contemporary Africa? One could go so far as to ask what are the class or caste interests, tendencies and motivations of African intellectuals because despite their objective critique all thought and evolution is bound to the theoretical system grounded in the mental horizons of its authors. This cannot but affect the cultural and social context of philosophy and science in Africa.

Change and Continuity in Traditional African Culture

Regarding "modern" Africa, one must recognize the importance of the changes not in process, and also stress the superficial character of the modernization brought about by changes and the contrasting the permanence of the deeper aspects deriving from the so-called "traditional African mind."14 At the morphological and the institutional levels change appears to be more rapid and extensive than at the third level, namely, that of basic meanings.

At the morphological level new modes of economy, dress and housing seem relatively easier to adopt than new ideas which imply an inversion of the fundamental interpretation of human meaning and destiny. "We discover a little better each year," notes P. Tempels, "that what the European civilization communicated to the Bantus is but an external shell without profound effect on their spirit."15

At the level of institutions there is a superposition of systems: a coexistence of European medicine with African pharmacology whose plants have undoubted efficacy; a coexistence of imported law with the tribunals of customary rights; a superimposition of Western scientific education upon African education rich in symbolism.16 It is important to note that the imported institutions only coexist with traditional African systems, and that the people's customs were

violently assaulted by the missions. With the new administrations the bonds of social cohesion were relaxed and the transmission of the cultural traditions of the ancestors was seriously disturbed.

It should be noted that the speed of change at the level of basic meaning is more moderate than on the levels of morphology and of institutions. Certainly the social structures which should support meaning and transmit it from generation to generation have been dislocated; nevertheless, their meaning has not been suppressed.17

The basic meaning and symbols have not been lost, for one does not change one's lineage as one changes one's clothing. Change does not proceed as rapidly as at the morphological level. The level of "basic or fundamental meaning" appears to be the most resistant to change without being absolutely static; one feels more involved and the security of his position in society and in the universe is more liable to be disturbed by unwise innovations. The main self-understanding of a people corresponds to their "basic culture"; their fundamental character is the dimension expressed by their basic ideas and metaphors, their symbols and the vision they have of man and of the world. Hence the meaning and direction of a people's cultural and spiritual part is of capital epistemological and strategic importance to their project of liberation. Hence, I propose a rediscovery of the basic culture for Africa as regards man and society, for authentic humanization is possible only in terms of such a culture.

The African Conception of Person and of Society as Community

African society understands man as an individual situated in a social body: the person is recognized as such by society with corresponding duties and privileges.

It is not possible here to consider exhaustively the notion of the person in the different African ethnic groups, but many such ethnological studies have been carried out.18 These have raised deeply felt issues regarding the self-awareness of early people regarding their individuality and personal existence. All the studies recognize that the person in those societies have a self-image only as members of their group or community.

It would be mistaken point of view to consider African thought from a strongly individualist metaphysics and social philosophy, which would be completely foreign to it. As noted by G. McLean19 the concept of the person has been diversely defined in terms of rights, religion, customs, social structures and the mentality of various peoples. The evolution of the notion in the Western context can be characterized as an increasing interiorization, consequent upon the individuation of the person and its identification with the ego under a prevalent rationalist emphasis. (Note that the classical Western description of the person, which was derived from reflection upon the Trinity, is as rational, indivisible and individual substance. This concept was developed by Kant who considered the individual conscience to be the sacred center of the person. Fichte interpreted the ego in terms of consciousness.) Nevertheless, the development of studies of the unconscious manifests to our day a persistent irrationality in the Western sense of the ego.

In general, the continuing Western ideology of the person has been centered upon the individual as a particular being in contrast to the fundamental African tradition manifest through its continuingly vital cultural institutions and structures.

In Western culture man is composed of a conscious subjectivity and a perception of difference *vis a vis* the other. It is clearly one of otherness or contrast between the ego and the 'alter'. This is a tragic opposition because the other, whether person or community, appears as a menace which blocks the ego's path, and whose stare reduces one to a mere thing: in Sartre's terms

for one "the other is hell."20 We are far from a philosophy in which the other is perceived as a "person-with-me"(*muntunanyi*),21 that is, as having the same origin and being a brother, sister or travelling companion.

The Primacy of an Original Communion Over Individualist Distinction

In African (Bantu) anthropology the relations which constitute human existence have a certain affinity to Heidegger's existential analytic (without its ontological overtones). One who manifests himself to me as a person is always a "person-with-me" (a *muntunanyi*). He is not a "person-like-me" as if "I" were the point of reference; on the contrary he is "person-with-me" as one who from his origin is both my partner and my ally. In this perspective "I" do not first exist alone and then later discover an "alter-I." The other does not appear first as other but rather in terms of an originary communion of all men: intersubjectivity is an original give and take. The person who appears to me is not "another" contrasted to me as an "other-self," but is a 'co-self,' a "person-with-me." Thus, with all men and in everything, I am a partner sharing a single origin and destiny, they are as my brothers and sisters a "*muan 'etu*," literally "a child — from among us").

The "person-with-me" is also a "person-of-another"; that is, his origin and original reference is not in me but in an otherness mythically called "The Other" ("Bende"), and more radically in an absolute otherness called "*Mvidye Mukulu Maweja Nangila*," "*Maweja"* or God.

Thus one as "person-in-relation-with-the-other" is precisely the "person-with-me" because sacred and inviolable in his freedom and in all his subjective rights. This sacred and inviolable character is traced to one's mythic origin in "*Bende*" and in "God." In this light, I cannot dispose of the "person-with-me" as of something I possess, for my rights and duties are always already those of the "person-with-me; on the contrary "we" must treat each other as original "co-subjects." This implies a rejection of all that would "discriminate" the "person-with-me" in terms of slavery, racism, tribalism, nationalism, cliques or any form of exclusivity or egoism.

It is upon the mythical and/or theological sense of the person, which must be critically reviewed, that one can found the principles of a legal justice and political philosophy. The term "*muntunawyi*," the "person-with-me," who is also "person-with-The Other" (or God) constitutes a matrix whence flow the affirmation of equality, fraternity and freedom among men.

The African does not identify the person in terms of the certitude of a "cogito," transcendental deduction, absolute knowledge or any form of subjectivity. The basic theme which appears to shape the response of ethnic groups or the African continent is intersubjectivity, or better "co-subjectivity." This is not built upon an individual, solipsist self-consciousness but rather flows, as we shall see, from a lived direct relation with The Other (*alter ego*), with the world, with God and with the ancestors.

Hence, through attending closely to the indivisibility of the person from the community it will be possible to grasp how the African views, comprehends and situates himself in the socio-cultural universe. This indissolubility of the twin problems of person and community raises a problem of the personal status of the African, namely, does the African not dissolve into the structure? Is one not lost through dispersion into the group or collectivity? Or does one's status consist in living simultaneously in two irreducible and conflicting dimensions: one's personal history and one's place in society?

It is precisely because the African self-concept is not in opposition to society and its members that his life is not tragic or conflictual. This contrasts to some strains of Western culture whose

philosophy of the subject interpret the other as a menace, giving rise to negativity and ontological pessimism.

To the African the concept of the person is more social than individual. Hence, the other is considered as a necessity without whom daily tasks could not be carried out. The "ego" is to be conceived, then, not as a rigidly structural being totally differentiated from the other to whom I am essentially opposed, but rather as in-relation-with to the other.

The Relation of Man to the World (Cosmos): Persona and Social Community

Attentive analysis of various stories, proverbs, teachings, legends and myths reveals that man is an order within an order. Though a unified point of relations, the human person is not one dimensional with simple or linear relations, but a nucleus or center of relations.

The person is first and foremost in necessary relationships with the world: the texts present him above all as a cosmic being.22 One is not a simple or static reality, but a dynamic project which is both unfolding and achieving oneself: man is neither simply outside the world nor is be simply within the world, but rather is woven, as it were, of materials which come from the world which they constitute.

The world is also other persons, those of one's society of living people (relatives and allies). Further, it is the tradition, that is to say, that which preceded us, notably our ancestors and with them all that is of an absolute or transcendent order. It is also nature, genies and spirits.23 The human person is woven, then, of three factors:

- the phylogenetic, which places one in relation to the Absolute, represented in a dominant manner by the ancestors who instantiated the law: all this constitutes a vertical order;
- the anthropological, which constitutes the person as relation with others, first of all with one's family, lineage and associates. This is the "I" in its relation with the human environment as the milieu of one's life; with the society of living beings both in the biological and social order; with one's elders, with economic, religious and political groups, and with one's relatives: all this constitutes a system of social relations;
- the cosmic as related to the above: the person is situated in a context of spirits and genies, invisible forces that seem to be of human origin like ancestors, but are bound to nature.

In short, the person is in a close interplay of phylogenetic, cosmic and anthropological connections.24 With one's ancestors, one is confronted by the fundamental law which rules society. Yet in reality the ancestors alone are not the law, for social life has its own requirements. Those still in this life refuse to take responsibility for justifying this behavior, however, and appeal to the ancestors. This enables each person to act in relation with their elders without aggression and with ample affection because the superior or elder is not the true "elder," but only represents the true elder who is the absent ancestor. In this context we can situate respect for the elderly considered as wise guardians of the tradition.

With the members of society man is involved in a multitude of relations or structures: family, neighborhood, village, ethnic groups and the like. For an African the notion of "family" has a much more extended meaning than that of the nuclear family. It includes four dimensions: the man or husband, the woman or wife, children and parents in the broad sense. The four dimensions include as well both blood and marriage lines and extend over many generations (Further, the man is not only husband and father as regards his wife and children, but also brother, cousin, uncle, nephew,

grandfather or grandson *vis a vis* his blood relations; at the same time he is brother-in-law, son-in-law, uncle, cousin or nephew-in-law, etc., *vis a vis* his relatives by marriage.)

One cannot conceive of oneself outside of that community which basically constitutes oneself. As has been noted, however, this does not mean that African societies ignore the primacy of the individual over the group.

The Person: An Order or Unity of Many Components

The person is always for oneself. The oral texts in proverbs clearly show the freedom to dispose of his person and goods as he or she intends, the right to personal integrity, to freedom of expression, to justice as an individual, to one's own unique relations with one's surroundings.25

The person is not conceived as a duality composed of body and soul but as a unity of multiple components26: some are fundamental, others are supplementary; some permanent, others provisional or periodical; some can depart, while others arrive; some are immaterial but perishable; others are immaterial and unperishable; some are relative to one's will; others are determined. Each of these components however are relatively specific, but together they constitute a unity, that is, an individual. The person, far from being conceived as absolute by his or her group, is understood to be the contrary: an instance, a source of meaning, an autonomous place of speech, and a source of action. It is not strung together by one's imagination, but constitutes a totality whose unity must be understood as an equilibrium moving towards either more or less being, and total harmony is assured by the type of behavior a person adopts.

P. Tempels was right in saying that for the Africans "All is power,"27 to which one might add: for Africans all is relation. One would be wrong to see the individual as being sacrificed for the mass or group. In the African conception, the individual in himself or as a nomad is only a dead branch cut off from the living trunk of the community in which the individual is not sacrificed, but is called to rise to his stature as person. The route which leads there is one of struggle and conquest; hence authentic personality is required. In traditional societies the rite of initiation enables the individual to become a member of the human community.

Initiation is the great school of life where one learns about life and death, that is, the truth about one's own destiny. Through that rite, characterized by difficult trials, one discovers that life is not a blind determinism or absurdity, but, on the contrary, that it has a destiny and is a continuum in which one constructs oneself and achieves one's existence.

African initiation teaches us that the universe which recapitulates is an immense drama in which life and death meet, and that the vocation proper to the human being is to assure the triumph of life over death. One who has not realized that victory cannot be a person, but only a failing project. Since the world is also a vast battlefield where life and death confront each other, the role of man in the world is to mobilize the allies of life against those of death. Hence even the material world is not impersonal, but a wise and efficacious partner. It would be an error to interpret such an attitude of man before the world in terms of fetishes, idolatry or animism. This is the context of traditional medicine.

Conclusion

To summarize, in the African tradition the human person is considered to be an extremely complex reality. Besides one's multiple relations with all of creation, one is responsible not only for one's own destiny but for the general state of creation as well. Each act has repercussions

throughout the immense field of reality and one's proper vocation is to safeguard the integrity and cohesion of that immense field. In this outlook, an ideology of domination over man is immoral because the manipulation of the human being would lead to the destruction of humanity. The case of nature is not different for, though differing from nature, man participates extensively in that same nature. Certainly, this African conception could slow down scientific and technological progress due to the consideration of nature as a force which one cannot use in just any manner inasmuch as it is an ally with which one must live symbiotically.

This also implies a call for ethical reflection upon the scientific and technological progress which has taken place from 1945 till the present and which constitutes a problem for man's very survival and even the survival of this planet. Correlatively there is also criticism that economic underdevelopment in Africa has oriented the exploration of the possibilities of human life more toward theological and cosmological considerations than toward the achievement of those economic conditions which would raise Africa to the level of other peoples. Here the very concept of development becomes ambiguous. Should one place the development of the spirit before that of matter, or the contrary? Is development reduced only to economic growth? E. Morin clarifies this issue when he notes that there are two poles of underdevelopment. "At the Third World pole there is technological and economic underdevelopment; at the opposite, Western, pole the underdevelopment of soul and of spirit bespeaks a deeper and more radical underdevelopment of being."28 The concept of underdevelopment needs to be considered in such broader terms.

The same is true of African solidarity which often has been criticized as "anti-economic" for favoring parasitism, though this seems to me to be a phenomenon of modern life related to the rural exodus. At the same time, one should note that "positive" solidarity as a characteristic of traditional community life could provide a foundation for economic progress, e.g., in drawing together the people of a region and interesting them in a project.

This bespeaks, on the one hand, the need for critical research on the values of the African cultural heritage. This would be not simply a retrospective look but an ever more penetrating discovery of the destructive character of progress. On the other hand, in order to face up to modernization, it seems equally necessary to evaluate, on the basis of the deep aspirations of the African vision, the impact of modern forms of rationalization upon social and political life, as well the philosophical theories of under-development, in order to elaborate a philosophy to enable progress which will promote what is specifically African. Considerable effort of this type has been undertaken and is in process over the last decade by researchers in all regions of Africa, e.g., in the research project, "Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Life: Foundations of Social Life."

Notes

1. Many ethnologists and anthropologists, both Africans and Africanists, have noted this: we refer particularly to the famous works of Prof. R. Bastide which reveal the survival of African religions in America. Cf. R. Bastide, "Négro-americaines (Religions)" in *Encyclopedia Universalis* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1971).

2. Cf. Njoh-Mouelle, "Les tâches de la philosophie aujourd'hui en Afrique," *Abbia*, 22, (1971), 41-56. Contrary to Njoh-Mouelle's view, who in the early debate over the status of African philosophers affirmed that the African conceptions could not constitute the object of philosophy because they would disappear in time.

3. Culture can be defined as a collection of systems of representations, norms, expressions and actions of the community. Tradition is a collection of facts, speeches, words and behaviors

drawn from the experience of earlier generations. Thus, tradition and culture denote the same reality seen from two different angles: diachronic (tradition) and synchronic (culture). See also G. McLean, "Development and the Unity of Peoples" in *Philosophie Africaine et développement,* Actes de la 8e Semaine philosophique de Kinshasa, Faculté de Theologie Catholique de Kinshasa, 1984, pp. 7-40. Specifically the point concerning: "Culture as Civilization and the Problem of Tolerance," p. 30.

4. See J. Ladrière, *Les enjeux de la rationalité: Le défi de la science et de la technologie aux cultures* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, UNESCO, 1977), which book is dedicated to this problem.

5. See J. M. Ela, *L'Afrique des villages* (Paris: Ed. Karthaka, 1982).

6. O. Nkombe, *Pour une Axiomatique du développement. Essai de la logique existentielle dans une Vision africaine chretienne du développement* (Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve: Naraf, 1986), p. 61. See also J.M. Ela, *op. cit.*

7. Extroversion or dependence.

8. Cf. the report of the AGCD (Belgian organism dedicated principally to General Assistance for Cooperation towards Development, "l'Aide Générale à la Coopération au Développement" in Africa, particularly in Zaïre) on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Belgian-Zairian cooperation. See Museka Ntumba, "Pour un développement inculturé" in this report.

9. C. Rangel, *L'occident et le Tiers-Monde. De la fausse culpabilité aux vraies responsabilités* (Paris: R. Laffont, 1982).

10. Cf. J.M. Ela, *op. cit.*

11. See M. Faik-Nzuji, *Les droits de la personne et les méthodes de leur transmission dans les traditions orales de l'Afrique* Centrale (Louvain-la Neuve: UNESCO, 1986). In this study Faik-Nzuji revealed a large number of proverbs about rights and duties of the chief with regard to his people and the people's rights and duties regarding the chief.

12. See R. Dumont and M.F. Nottin, *op. cit*.

13. Cf. J.M. Ela, pp. 86-91.

14. Many authors have underscored this fact and speak of a "differential dynamic" of change both as to its depth and its pace. Cf. G Balandier, "Sociologie des mutations," in G. Balandier, ed., *Sociologie des mutations*: Actes du VII colloque de l'Association Internationale des sociologues de languages française (Paris: 1970). See also L.V. Thomas, "Généralités sur l'éthnologie négro-africaine" in *Ethnologie Régionale*, vol. I, *Afrique océanie*, publié sous la direction de J. Poirier (Paris: Pleiades, 1972), pp. 344-345. O. Bimuenyi Kueshi, *Discours théologiqueafricain : Problémes des fondements* (Paris: Présence africaine, l981).

15. P. Tempels, *La philosophie Bantoue* (Elizabethville: Lovania, l945), p. 114.

16. Cf. Assoi Adiko, «L'Afrique face au reste du monde», in *Tradition et modernisme en Afrique noire* (Colloque de Bouaké, l962).

17. Note that the villages have not been destroyed though the majority of people live in urban centers.

18. Some works in Ethnology:

L. Lévy-Bruhl, *La mentalité primitive* (Paris: Alcan, l934) studied the notion of "primitives" in possession of their own individuality and personhood.

M. Leenhardt, *Do Komo* (Paris: Gallimard, l947) studied person and myth in the Malinesien world.

The most interesting works on this subject are those of M. Griaule and his school who brought out the very complex and often very sage theories of the person in the societies they studied, the Bambara and the Dogon.

M. Griaule, "The Idea of Person Among the Dogon," *Culture* (1970).

G. Dieterlen, "La personne chez les Bambara," *Journal normale et pathologique*, 40 (1947), 45-53.

19. See G. McLean, 'Person, Creativity and Social Change' above.

20. J.P. Sartre, *Huis clos* (Paris: Gallimard, l945).

21. For more details regarding this analysis see Tshiamalenga Ntumba, «Les droits de l'homme dans la tradition ethno-anthropologique luba: Essai de construction analytique» in *Philosophie et droits de l'homme,* Actes Ve semaine philosophique de Kinshasa (Kinshasa, Zaire: FTCK, l982), pp. 301-311.

22. See E. Mveng, «Essai d'anthropologie Negro-africaine. :La personne humaine,» in M. Ngindu, *Combats pour un cristianisme africain* (Kinshasa: CERA), pp. 85-96.

23. See O. Bimuenyi, «Le Muntu à la lumière de ses croyantes en l'au-delà,» *Cahiers de religions africaines*, 2 (1968), 73-94.

24. T.K.M. Buakasa, «L'impact de la religion africaine sur l'afrique d'aujourd'hui,» in Ngindu Mushete, ed., *op. cit*., pp. 21-32.

25. See Faik-Nzuji, *op. cit*., p. 15.

26. See M. Griaule and G. Dieterlen, op. cit. Also, Alassane Ndaw, *La pensée Africaine : Recherches sur les fondements de la pensée africaine* (Dakar: Les nouvelles éditions africaines, l983).

27. P. Tempels, *op. cit*.

28. E. Morin, *Introduction* à un philosophie politique (Paris: Seuil, 19), p. 56. See also A. Tevoedjere, *La pauvreté: richesse des peuples* (Paris: Ed. ouvrieres, 1978).

Chapter II

Social Structure and Cultural Field in the Humanization of Social Life: The Proble of Democracy

Gytis Vaitkunas

There are two principal moments in the present set of problems, namely, person and society. As society is the setting in which the person exists and acts, person and society seem closely interrelated and hence not very problematic. However, apparently there are two goals at which to aim: the humanization of social relations in order to make them acceptable for the human being and favorable to his/her self-realization, and the humanization of the human being himself in order to make one's life really human and spiritualized. Though each of the two tasks initially begins with what seems indifferent, in practice there appear to be different ways for Oriental and Western cultures; each achieves positive results, yet in both cases the goals remain one-sided. The former is undoubtedly successful in perfecting the nature of a human being. Yet, however remarkable the results in governing human nature and building a highly spiritualized personality, it has not prevented the formation of despotic social systems which over time have become rather typical of the East.

The Western world, in turn, was successful in developing and perfecting social structures. In a number of Western countries social relations are sufficiently humanized to ensure a high standard of life as well as social justice, and a genuine humanization of life seems quite possible there. In practice, however, we witness a prevalent consumerist mode of life according to which the self-realization of a person is considered primarily the possibility for a comfortable life, luxury being the ideal. Of course, individual persons and small groups or communities can follow a really humanized way of life, but that is nothing new since the time of Christ onwards.

It is the personality, but not social life, that is being humanized in the Eastern cultural model, while it is social relations, but not human life, that is being humanized in the Western model. The question: "to have" or "to be", to use the terms of E. Fromm, remains valid and proves to be a worldwide dilemma.

Thus, the problem of the humanization of social life, which seemed quite straightforward at first sight, now appears to be rather unsolvable. The components, which seemed complementary to one another theoretically, in practice begin to appear incompatible and to suggest rather pessimistic conclusions for the present state. Can it be changed for the better? In the actual situation can human dignity be harmonized with social cohesion? If not, the problem of the humanization of social life is unsolvable. To be able to answer these questions, however, we are to find out why human dignity has become incompatible with social cohesion in our times. Perhaps the only acceptable way to answer this question in the present situation is to consider the problem from as many different perspectives as possible in order to uncover the set of factors which entail the present social processes.

Hard and Soft Systems of Social Life

The problem under consideration is the most acute of our day, but its roots go back to the very origins of mankind for the whole history of mankind can be considered as its perpetual striving to humanize its life. Indeed, human nature is present in every human being like a substance of which

every human being is formed, and when in each person it develops so as to attain a peculiar configuration, this process can be described as becoming humanized. For the human is an historical being inasmuch as one becomes a human being or is humanized by assimilating the spiritual content of the epoch in which he lives in society. This content includes ideas derived from the cognitive and ideological processes at the disposition of the society at one's historical moment, as well as the values and the corresponding vision of the world which brings them into a system. This means that human nature in a given human being is shaped according to a definite cultural model. It is only shaped but not changed at its roots, however: hence it preserves all its initial and inherent essential characteristics. Human nature is then truly humanized, while including some inherited components.

Apparently programmed into one's living nature is not only a striving for individual survival, but also an aspiration for the preservation of the species. Hence, along with the libido, there is also a specific drive toward competition which assumes a form acceptable to social life or to the model according to which human nature is shaped. Since Nietzsche this component has been called the will to power. Apparently this has some positive social meaning for it plays an active role, at least in the Western mode of life. At the same time, however, it is a powerful destructive factor since its action is contrary to that of the spiritual factors. Being rooted in human nature itself, it is an ineradicable factor constantly influencing social life. If the history of mankind can be considered the ongoing humanization of social life, it can be described also as the continual dehumanization of social life due to the will to power.

Thus, a person may be said to dwell and act in two different systems at the same time. The first is the system of social mechanisms, laws and rules which regulates the flow of social life. One who enters social life looking for self-realization is bound to play his social roles according to strict rules of the game: this is a kind of "hard" system. The second is the cultural system which, although notable in the spheres of architecture, art, etc., as embodiments of the creative power of human beings, is a realm of spiritual and subjective factors, based upon values. This is weakly structured and, compared with the first, can be defined over-all as a "soft" system. It is not without reason that we characterize it by such terms as the cultural "atmosphere," "flavor," etc. I am inclined to use the term "cultural field" for it functions in a manner comparable to that of a gravitational field in which some kinds of trajectories are realized while others are prevented. Though both are possible in principle, more energy is needed to overcome the field's resistance to those which were not realized. Unlike the first system, this is a sphere of the desirable and favorable, but not of the necessary.

Both systems are part of the regulation of society, but act in different manners. In the first, one is the set of roles one plays; in the second, figuratively speaking, one is a personality with an individual system of values, that is, one is an individual human being. Acting through the set of subjective factors, the soft system appears far weaker than the hard one upon which the Western world seems inclined to depend, though the soft systems are no less important than the hard, however, and no hard system is possible until a sufficiently high cultural level has been achieved.

Note that a high cultural field is essential for the existence of a democratic system. Democracy is intended to ensure a broad spectrum of rights for citizens and to make possible effective affirmation of the person in society. Whereas personal dictatorship would enable but one to achieve the latter to the maximum degree, democracy is a social structure intended to balance the opposed strivings of various men and to deaden their will to power. Yet its mechanisms would be ineffective if the energy of its citizens were to be directed mostly to the achievement of personal dictatorship for then a powerful mechanism of suppression (indeed, a dictatorship) would be required to keep

order in society. Hence, social structures seem ineffective unless an inner mechanism, based upon a system of personal values and capable of deadening the will to power, has been built in. It is precisely the cultural field which induces such a system of values.

Indeed, even now groups which are positively without culture, such as criminals, generally come under the almost unlimited power of a gang leader, dictator, or ataman. Though they are in a democratic society, being uncultured they are insensitive to the field of values from which they remain isolated. In principle their order is similar to primitive despotic systems. It is natural then that the history of civilization should have begun with authoritarian systems and that a long historical road had to be travelled before the establishment of stable democratic systems.

The Problem of Democracy

The Greeks already had experienced most of the models of social structure which men have attempted to realize during the subsequent centuries. The idea of democracy was also familiar to them, and in a number of cases was tried as an actual social system. Not all trusted it, however. Plato considered it insufficiently stable as a system, thinking that inevitably it would degenerate into plutarchy and then into tyranny. The most perfect social model, in his opinion, was aristocracy which he saw as rule by the best people. He did not consider elections to be effective means for forming a reliable government and he may not have been far from the truth; even in our times we often do not consider the people we have elected to be the best. One could say that those who had sentenced Socrates to death were not the best, and together with them the social order which had not prevented it.

I would dare to say that, in spite of the high cultural level of the Greco-Roman world, its culture was not sufficiently developed for democracy or for the humanization of social life in our sense of the term. Citizens of the Greek world treated other nations as barbarians, that is, as inferiors. Indeed, most of the population of their own nation was considered inferior and was treated rather as living objects. The cultural field which made this insight natural was not predisposed effectively to suppress the will to power. One could not expect a person whose system of values was formed in this field to be tolerant to slaves, or even to other citizens. Thus, the Greco-Roman world, in spite of the humane character of its culture which apparently made democracy possible in principle, was not sufficiently favorable to a democratic system, and the Roman Empire was its ultimate result.

The cultural field of this world rested upon a pagan religion which apparently was the main force determining its composition. Perhaps because it considered itself as the higher religion whose martial gods steadily demonstrated their will to power, it was more scornful than aggressive in treating other religions and, unlike the religions of the feudal period, was not inclined to impose its faith upon other nations. Like other variants of paganism, it was but a national faith, indifferent to other religions. If we consider the case of Lithuania, we may observe that, due to this peculiarity of paganism in general, traditional Lithuanian religion was able to play an important role in the country. Both forms of Christianity, as well as all other faiths, were recognized as legal in Lithuania, and paganism served as a force balancing the opposing efforts of these various religions. At this time that role could not have been played by either form of the Christian religion. Unlike them, paganism was able to remain tolerant to the other faiths even after becoming an official religion of Lithuania as the faith of the Grand Duke of the Lithuanian Great Principality.

The cultural heritage of the Greco-Roman world had considerable and durable impact on European cultural and social life. Not without reason, Marx considered the Roman social order as

the model for Western social structures. Lasting European ideals appeared in the guise of either the Roman Republic or the Roman Empire. Compared with the subtle and flexible Greco-Roman world, the social structures of feudal Europe in the medieval period seem rather artificial and cumbersome, and, of course, less humane since democracy was simply unthinkable in that authoritarian and rigidly hierarchical world. Yet it was a kind of primary school through which one needed to pass in order to enter modern social life; in a certain sense it was also a preparatory school for democracy.

Feudal hierarchy, with its rigid pyramid-like structure in which the lower layers were strictly subjected to the higher, was highly ritualized both vertically and horizontally. Social life was a game of hard rules to which not only the vassal, but also the lord was obliged. No life was without limits and the arbitrary was prohibited even for the sovereign. Even more so, the social order confirmed by the rules depended upon the mutual respect of the players and was intended to protect the personal dignity of everyone: playing according to the rules was itself considered honorable.

Such a system was unable to exist by itself. Feudalism lacked sufficiently strong economic factors to be able to perdure, although I doubt that any such factors could in themselves guarantee a system, simply because economic factors are based on the quest for prestige, not for honor. At any rate, the only force capable of supporting the feudal system was an authoritative religion affirming a world vision according to which all human beings are of equal value before the face of God. This, of course, could not be done by paganism.

Hence, the turn to Christianity was the decisive condition which enabled European society to enter the feudal stage of development. This turn to a religion based upon love was a great moral revolution and made possible a genuine humanization of human life. In the past this had been realized practically in early Christian communities, which could be considered the primary model of communism. In the future, slogans like that of the French Revolution, "egalité, fraternité, liberté," would call for a renewal of that spirit, but the French Revolution’s descent toward the vanity of a worldly life blocked society from following this route at that stage of social development. At the beginning of the feudal period, paganism was not able to provide an ideological basis for feudal society, though this was not a rule without exception, for Lithuanian paganism was to do this at least for early feudal society. There was an evolution of polytheistic pagan religion toward monotheism which ultimately turned into something like a third form of Christianity.

Hence, monotheistic religion, though not necessarily exactly Christianity, was needed at the moment society was about to enter the feudal stage, for there were various possible monotheisms, including those confirming the idea of a specially chosen nation or, on the contrary, that of an absolutized straightforward universalism. Nor was the model of communism the only possible idea at the dawn of feudalism; despotic models, including fascism, were possible. Thus, the turn to Christianity was greatly important for Europe.

However, the Christian faith should not be identified with the Catholic Church, which is a political reality that used different methods at different times. For instance, those who from the point of view of Christ’s teaching were sheep who had lost their way came to be considered impious from the point of view of the feudal Church. The fight against paganism, in turn meant also the rejection of national traditions which at that time everywhere were pagan, whereas the policy of the Church was rather universalistic.

Yet it was faith rather than policy that was spread by the Catholic Church; and it was the Christian faith that underlay the cultural field of the feudal epoch. The principal lines of this field were oriented towards the highest spiritual values, which made it effective in building a humanized

system of values and in balancing the will to power. In this way the period constituted a considerable step towards the humanization of social life, which in turn prepared Europe to realize in practice a democratic system.

The actual turn towards modern social life and democracy took place in the age of the Enlightenment. This turning point itself and the different variants of modern democratic structure have been analyzed in detail in Ronald Calinger's paper, elsewhere in this Volume. I will but cast a glance at one narrow aspect of the problem concerning the characteristics of the cultural field in the age of Enlightenment and some possibilities hidden therein.

The Enlightenment was a final phase of the processes begun in the Renaissance which had brought about a considerable change of world view. The Renaissance man felt himself at the center of a universe created as man's dwelling by the Lord. In the 17th century he suddenly lost this honorable place, becoming a small grain of dust lost in an endless universe. The lost position was partly regained in the age of Enlightenment when the human being became the Creator of History. This meant that in playing this role he could depend exclusively on his own mind, which implied a loss of the inclination to rely upon God, i.e., a secularization of the socio-cultural system. In a certain sense this might be treated as a humanization of the system of values as they lost their sacred meaning and came to be understood as being purely human. But at the same time the system lost its reliable foundation, and thereafter could rather easily be dismantled and even dehumanized. The process of secularization of cultural life did not mean that humanity was going to turn away from God, but that faith was to become a private affair. In many cases, religion became an object of critique as well, since the Enlightenment thinkers considered all previous periods of history to be a realm of error and prejudice. All prior views had either to pass through the trial of reason in order to prove their right to exist, or they would be rejected.

It must be said that the way of thinking also had changed by that time. A comparison of Tertullian's "credo quia absurdum est" with Anselm's "credo ut intelligo" leads one to conclude that, during the time separating the two, the understanding of the relations between cognition and faith had altered perceptibly. Yet the essential principle remained the same in both cases. Both thinkers uncompromisingly maintained that the process of cognition ought to start with faith.

The change came when Descartes declared doubt to be the starting point of the process of knowledge. This was an important principle which underlay all subsequent developments regarding cognition in the Western World: modern science would simply be impossible without it. Yet it is a dangerous principle since, taken to its limits, it easily transforms into skepticism which, in turn, makes impossible both the progress of science itself and the progress of society. The ancient and medieval traditional ways of experiencing the principles of faith needed to be changed in order for humanity to be able both to practice the principle of doubt and to experience faith, due to Enlightenment reason's very skeptical bent and at the same time its insufficient self-criticism.

Judging history to be a tale of errors and prejudices, the Enlightenment man thought nonetheless that it should be studied in order to avoid repetition of those errors in the future. Studying the past, however, these thinkers constantly repeated its errors. For instance, upon concluding that religion was the result either of an error or a fraud, they attacked the church as responsible for all the failures of humanity. In this way they repeated the usual practice of the past religions, namely, upon finding something to be bad, to conclude someone had to be guilty. Those who became atheists repeated this practice of the church except that, whereas the church had been fighting against paganism, they instead fought against faith in general. Thus their atheism tended to transform into a kind of religion without a deity.

Had the historians of the Enlightenment studied early Christianity more attentively, they would have discovered that understanding the perfection of some way of life is not a sufficient condition for its realization in society (even if it has been proven to be realizable in small communities). In elaborating ideal social structures, Enlightenment thinkers were certain their projects would be realized as soon as society had grasped their expediency: "Enlightenment" was the way to shape a human being as a conscious citizen capable of proposing projects and ready to devote himself to their realization. There was something rational in this insight, but the philosophers of the Enlightenment relied too exclusively on the subjective factors: ideas, speculative projects, etc., which could not be made to work a knowledge of the mechanisms of history. Thus, the result of the French Revolution, which had been expected to lead to a democratic society, was a period of the cruel dictatorship.

The endeavor of the Enlightenment thinkers to analyze the historical processes was not unsuccessful in principle; in fact the foundations of modern historiography were being laid by them. The development of the principles of historical research from Voltaire to Condorcet through the introduction of strict scientific methods showed that history was really about to become a strict discipline akin to science. Yet, at the same time, it in effect ceased to be history, for it came to see the past as but a chain of errors. The historical process would be over as soon as the project of the reasonable society had been realized. Enlightenment reason was successful in destroying prior concepts of history based on imagination and fantasy, but — as immovable and unchangeable — Enlightenment reason was unable itself to come to an historical concept of history.

Hence, the Romantics, while criticizing the work of Enlightenment historians based upon scientific methods, often were inclined to contrast them to the historical novels of Walter Scott. In their opinion, Enlightenment thinkers being incapable of grasping the particularities of prior epochs had been applying to the past the measures of their own time, while Scott was sensitive to the spirit and flavor of the epoch he described. Thus it may be said that, in the person of the Romantics, art (that is, the realm of fantasy and imagination) revolted against science. In general the reaction of Romanticism against the Enlightenment can be treated as the revolt of the heart against reason, and of nature against the concrete civilization coming from the Enlightenment. To this they contrasted the feudal epoch which they idealized; perhaps only Rousseau, the immediate predecessor of Romanticism, went back as far as the natural life of the patriarchal community in his search for an ideal.

As Romanticism declined, the Enlightenment was reborn in the form of positivism. As a kind of minimalistic philosophy it was rather modest and concentrated only on measurable objects. Being close to contemporary science and in position to use the data of economic researches, it was more successful than the Enlightenment. Its positivistic insights regarding social life as a kind of complex mechanism were helpful as a starting point for efforts toward improvement. This was a far more promising way than attempting totally to replace undesirable structures by a more expedient social order. The methods of modern sociology, as far as they remain empirical, are in principle akin to this positivistic methodology.

Nonetheless the positivistic way was not perceptive enough for it was a kind of a philosophical rejection of philosophy as metaphysical speculation. Thus, unlike the Enlightenment, it did not rely on subjective factors which it in effect revaluated. This meant, in turn, a revaluation of the whole sphere of spiritual values. Perhaps it was not accidental that Comte considered dictatorship to be a more perceptive order than democracy. Because Mill considered democracy to be preferable, Comte considered it to have been illogical, but it may be Mill who was being inconsistent. Society under a dictatorship can be better structured by far than democracy and

function better as a mechanism. Of course it will be appreciated as better only if we treat society as a kind of mechanism without taking into account the individual interests of human beings who are bound to be reduced to components of the machine. In effect, however, this was the way the positivists treated society.

So the Enlightenment humanized the socio-cultural system in the sense of reducing its horizons from God to man. Positivism shows how this can be evolved further to the point of repressing the human being as well. Hence there follows the absurd conclusion that the process of humanization of social life can turn into a process of its dehumanization as a result of the very effort to perfect the social structure. Stalinism shows this to be quite possible, however absurd it might seem.

As we look back and trace the ways followed by humanity in earlier times we are bound to recognize that the problems our ancestors were striving to solve are undoubtedly akin to those on which we are working today. This is natural, for we are experiencing the later phase of the same historical process. Because of this sometimes we are inclined to be dissatisfied with the goals of our ancestors and proud of our own achievements. The results they achieved often seem insufficient, for their goals appeared illusive and their means deadlocked.

At the same time problems which seemed insoluble to our ancestors, often appear quite soluble nowadays. The construction of the flexible democratic systems has been quite successful at least in a number of First World countries. Their social systems are quite sufficient to ensure a wide scale of civil rights for everyone and to enable a person to realize him or herself in social life and to feel free and independent. But it must be remembered that the phase of the social development through which we are passing would not have been possible without the previous phases. The cultural heritage based upon the social experience of our forebears undergirds our social practice and makes possible our remarkable achievements. It could not be otherwise, for our heritage, be it bad or good, is the sole resource we have or could have.

An evaluation of the propositions of the Enlightenment and of positivism for the development of society would perhaps bring us to the conclusion that neither of them is acceptable. The former may seem desirable but unrealizable, at least in the way it was intended: the latter seems quite realizable but hardly desirable. Yet, in fact, we have realized both of them. The idea that all people are equal before the law and that all have equal rights as citizens serves as the basis of the modern democratic systems which are based upon ideas inherited from the Enlightenment. It is the way in which they have been realized during the long process of the construction and reconstruction of social mechanisms that has made them truly democratic, and in effect this way was initiated by positivism. Hence, the principal merit of our times has been perhaps the ability to overcome the one-sidedness of each of the two ways.

Modern society may be considered a result of the development of structures originating in the 18th century. Undoubtedly, in the course of their evolution they lost some elements and gained others. The amount of elements lost may be considerable as they were passing through revolutionary frontiers, at which points there usually are attempts to replace traditional structures by others that are completely new. Extreme cases of total rejection of traditional systems in order to replace them with completely new social structures is possible at that time, but such cases are abnormal.

Inasmuch as they are artificially constructed since natural development is not possible at such times, they are not really viable. They tend to degenerate or collapse rather soon, and as a rule bring on a period of violence and devastation. In the case of normal development the essential elements of the prior socio-cultural systems are preserved and transfigured as integral components

of the posterior structures. In this sense the past remains always present and the new structures, however developed they may become, remain at root rather close to those built by our ancestors.

Some characteristics of modern social systems and some problems that follow therefrom may be described as follows:

1. Modern society in its most developed modes is a society of producers of goods based upon private property. Although there are also other forms of property nowadays, they derive from the same basic root.

Can economic mechanisms be based upon different forms of property? Marxists claimed that they can and in Russia they undertook to realize the idea; but, as we know, they failed. The idea of private property seems to imply a separate owner while that of common property implies a great multitude of owners; in practice, however, it is the other way around. The first has realized itself in a multitude of owners; while the second was realized as one owner system. For the state and then the top structure of the communist party became the real owner, so that in practice the idea was realized as a kind of private property of a depersonalized owner.

As a result, the institution of private property proved capable of supporting democratic systems and, for example, in Sweden even of leading to a kind of socialism. In contrast, the institution of common property led to a rigid dictatorship. Are any other ways possible? Could the entire society in principle realize itself as a set of equal owners of a common property without dividing it into small parts? The questions remain unanswered. According to Marxism, private property implies social injustice for, in principle, it causes the polarization of wealth and poverty. Though this claim is not without reason, the practice of Western countries shows that the negative effects can be limited and regulated. On the other hand, it may be that idea of a combination of properties, which is under discussion in the second world, will appear more perceptive.

2. Modern society has developed an economic structure which has proven highly effective and reliable in the Western world. Its regulation is based mostly on market mechanisms whose activity usually is determined through economical competition. The system of democracy functions through an election mechanism in which competition plays an essential role. Hence, competition is an essential condition for the function of modern society in general.

3. The competitive thrust apparently is hidden in the very human nature and may be considered one of the possible modes of the realization of the personality. Yet, the most active factor in the stimulation of competition is the will to power, which incidentally can be considered also as a mode of self-realization of the personality. Thus, the will to power is always in need of society, where competition serves as the regulator of the economic and political life.

Of course, the social mechanisms of the modern society seem to be structured well enough to keep the will to power under control and to civilize it or even make it cultured so as to be acceptable in human relations insofar as it is allowed to reveal itself. But there is difficulty in keeping balance in those situations in which something is prevented and permitted at the same time. We are never completely sure it will not get out of control and that we won't be witnessing the wild rage of elementary forces; indeed, we witness this more than once in local and international conflicts. Even if the will to power remains quite civilized its revelations are not as harmless as it may seem at a glance. Although not comparable to medieval duels, modern social and economical competition sometimes leads to cruel conflicts which can occasion dramatic or even fatal issues. This means that even in the most civilized form the will to power remains antihuman, while being at the same time necessary for the very existence of the modern social system. Hence, this system has a dehumanizing factor constantly hidden in its very nature.

4. Modern society in its most progressive forms, as realized in the First World, has democracy as a developed mechanism for regulating social life and providing effective self-realization of the person. All the conditions for the humanization of social or at least human life, it seems, are completely provided there. More than that, we often can witness the process in persons to whom self-realization in social life means the activity directed toward high spiritual goals. They devote themselves to serve their people and mankind. They are following a genuine human route and their activity serves to humanize social life. Democracy provides favorable conditions for this way of life and itself may be treated as a humanized social system, for the factors of humanization are hidden in the very nature of democracy. Yet they are passive factors which act by proposing but not imposing so that instances of a humanized way of life, in effect, depend upon individual choice and private initiative.

Of course those who chose it hold a respectable place in modern social life, though perhaps far less than those successful in business or politics. That may be natural due to the fact that a businessman or a statesman is, beyond doubt, a more visible player in the social game than a person striving for human values. This is a logical consequence of the system in which the person is taken as a set of roles (player of social games) rather than as a human being representing spiritual values. The goals of the player are taken into consideration as criterion for evaluating a person, while values and motives are left out of account in this system. Incidentally, the social game is at a loss when compared to games of sports, for the latter requires respect for one's competitor and its rules are based on honor. Perhaps only the social games of medieval times are comparable in this aspect. Of course, the player of the modern social game also is thought to keep the rules and to be an honorable participant in free competition.

Yet this is somehow suspect, for here the unit of freedom and competition, if at all possible, is defective and unacceptable for a man of honor inasmuch as the modern social system ultimately is rooted in market relations, which is a basic element of the will to power. Market is the sphere in which honor is mentioned perhaps more frequently than in any other place, although it seems completely out of place here. As this naturally influences social relations as well, we should not be surprised at the pervasive presence of the poisoned flavor of the market almost everywhere in our life. Even the vocabulary we use in ordinary life reflects its destructive influence as words indicating moral and spiritual values are steadily replaced by such formal but despiritualized equivalents as "prestige," "interest," "benefit," etc. which are more in correspondence with the market's vocabulary. A spiritual person described by three words becomes a dreamer or simply a crazy man as opposed to the "realist" who is seen in positive terms. It is very typical of this point of view that one who treats a sport as a kind of pure art and cultivates it for its aesthetical experience is treated as crazy or at least unrealistic. If he becomes a sports star and makes a kind of business of the game, however, he at once turns into a realist and becomes a person of prestige (the equivalent of honor) in public opinion.

The will to power and the market are then two factors intrinsically inherent in the modern social system. Both are necessary for its existence; both support and at the same time devastate or dehumanize it. Their force can hardly be balanced by the positively humanizing factors hidden in the nature of democracy, for the latter are rather passive representing some kind of dormant forces. Thus modern social systems, however democratic they would be, by themselves can hardly predispose for the processes of humanization. Apparently the possibilities of these processes depend almost exclusively upon the subjective factors of the cultural field.

Yet, we must bear in mind also that democracy, insofar as it provides broad scope for the person to realize himself in social life, may well stimulate personal creative forces and thereby in principle provide favorable conditions for the growth of the cultural field. Unfortunately, this field is also subjected to the influence of the devastative market factors. Hence, rather often we witness art and other creative spheres becoming but ways to achieve social prestige and mass culture becoming the prevailing current of cultural life. Perhaps only religion remains a sufficiently stable component of the modern systems of values so that the influence of the church steadily increases in our times as beyond doubt is very important from this point of view. However, the situation in which religion remains a private affair of the person cannot be considered very optimistic. Yet our situation is not as hopeless as it may seem at first glance. The power of the subjective factors can range along a practically unlimited scale and in principle are capable of becoming sufficiently intensive to evoke essential changes in the present situation.

The above has focused almost exclusively on the processes of the first world. The second and the third world must also be taken into account as we look for ways to humanize life. In particular the second world, although its economic and social systems are by far less developed, may have some possibilities, and the Lithuanian experience should be considered as well.

Chapter III
The Ambiguity of a Culture and Its Freedom to Choose

Ion Bansoiu

Recently in Romania an extremely crude and oppressive dictatorship has been overthrown. During the last decade it had exerted great social pressure upon everyone in a tragic social and cultural experiment. That experiment, however, was not to be the destiny of the country, which now experiences a "renaissance" following its seeming demise. That death was the result of a destructive process in civil society dating from the pre-war period to model the society upon traditional Asian principles of autocratic power exercised over a population which had been homogenized through repressing the civil rights of individuals.

This principle was implicit in the demagogic forms of Stalinist communism in contradiction to the historical developments in modern societies. As a result total social power gradually was forcefully confiscated by a very limited oligarchy which retained exclusive competency in decision-making and the taking of initiatives. The process paralyzed the infrastructure and threatened social collapse.

The threatened society reacted by rejecting the oligarchic nucleus; consistently it rejected also the aberrant demagogic ideology. This resulted in the fall of the totalitarian political structure and the abandonment of communist ideology, though the economic-administrative structures are being preserved temporarily in order to maintain the minimal requirements of production and public order.

This social movement in Romania is in keeping with the political and social events in other East-European countries. Following these events the next step is to rebuild modern civil society, with new social structures which will express the will of the people through democratic forms. Essentially, this means the reinstitution and reinforcement of much desired universal and traditional values. At present the most important social premise is the political vacuum and the absence of social structures for implementing ideologies or group interests.

Consequently, the problematic of this intercultural and interdisciplinary seminar is of the most pressing actuality for Romanian society. All responsible intellectuals are questioning themselves about this problem which is now the acute issue of civic conscience. Scholars at the University of Bucharest and in such scientific and professional societies as The Romanian Society of Metaphysics, The Romanian Society of Cultural Anthropology, and The Interdisciplinary Group of Studies of Traditional Mentalities have stated explicitly their interest in the works presented at this symposium, their admiration for the way in which it was organized and their intention to publish its papers.

Progressive Affirmation of the Person in Social Life

The cultural matrix of modern European Societies is that of Greek individualism as molded by Roman republican corporatism, and the principles for the rationalization of social life, based upon the Roman Code diffused under the rule of the Empire.

After the early Middle Ages marked by the Christian thought, Mediterranean societies and gradually Northern Europe, the New World and the Russian territories in far Eastern Europe began

progressively to restructure their axiological, cultural and organizational levels based upon the person's right to social affirmation In this the most important stages were:

1) the rediscovery of Greek and Roman thought and culture beginning in the 13th century, their gradual assimilation in Italy, France and Spain by the governing aristocracy and higher clergy, and their promotion under the name of "humanism" during the Renaissance;
2) the application of humanistic ideals in political government by the monarchs and their court;
3) the gradual stabilization of economic structures based upon private initiative and the social pressure through governments by people with commercial interests;
4) the British revolution and the model of British imperialist expansionism;
5) the configuration of Enlightenment ideals and the organizational efficiency of enlightened monarchs;
6) the French revolution and the Napoleonic Code of Law;
7) the Democratic revolutions from 1848 and the final stages of "National European Conciliation";
8) the Industrial Revolution's independent initiative in economics, commerce and science;
9) the extrapolation of this model in the form of universal human rights;
10) the identification and functional articulation of a universe of values;
11) the consumer society;
12) the emerging sense of the human person; and
13) awareness of the paradoxical effects of this evolution and the evolution of the human sciences.

Though this historic scheme is somewhat interpretative, it illustrates the direction of the evolution and its terminus in the person in Western society. It is this situation which has become paradoxical and is now opened for discussion.

The Three Worlds and Major Historical Trends

The so-called "three worlds" each entered in different ways and at different periods in this evolution. Each signifies a distinctive person-society relationship and personal response to the problems of social life, yet the coordinating model at the formal level remains Western. This is reflected in the critique of "post industrial" society by theoreticians in the "humanities". The different mentalities of 2nd and 3rd world societies, the particular stage of their economic and social development, their distinctive historical, cultural and social experience, and their individual aspirations all imply different ways of choosing among the options.

In this a common problem of central importance for the 3rd world is the humanization of the social structures. Undoubtedly, the common direction of the aspirations for the three worlds is the change required in order to establish human conditions. The goal is a society centered upon real persons, representing a universe of values, individual needs and aspirations, and cooperative social initiatives and actions. This change consists, finally, in an effort to reconstruct the rational structures of the social order. Their function had become restrictive with regard to freedom and the possibility of personal affirmation in social life; the universe of values and the aspirations each individual carries as part of his/her cultural and social vocation were devastated.. The rationalization of structures upon which the social order is based has different goals, ideologies

and interests in the three worlds, but it remains the constant mechanism which regulates person-society relations. The lack of individual freedom, its excessive formalization with regard to a unilateral set of values, leads to an annulment of the content of life or its restriction within one's personal universe.

It is difficult to discuss this because on the theoretical level it is reduced to aporetic problems while the avenues for achieving fundamental progress in the reconstruction of the social order remain obscure and depend upon the concrete field. Nevertheless, it is essential to develop theoretical as well as practical frameworks. Before we consider this possibility it is necessary to clarify a more general question, namely, does the stage achieved by the industrialized societies, even the paradoxical situation at the beginning of the so-called post-industrial epoch, represent an objective and unavoidable evolution? Indeed, is Fukuianna's projection regarding the end of history to be accepted with fatalism? This question also is very difficult to answer, for in so doing one would define his/her own theoretical position. My personal inclination is to reject any inexorable determinism in history.

Transitional Culture: The Village, Human Activity and Social Cohesion

The cultural heritage of a nation can provide coherent explanations of developments which otherwise would appear surprising. They promise rich and profound insight regarding the relation between human dignity and social cohesion. This is especially interesting with regard to the cultural experience of Romania which has a very old civilization, being the only Balkan country to have been colonized by the Romans. The profound and long lasting consequences of this can be seen in the language which is very close to Latina Vulgata and in the ethnological structures of the surviving traditional civilization.

Romanians lived in the Carpathian and Trans-Carpathian region, limited on the north by the Tisza river, on the west by the Danube, on the south by the Carpathian Pontic hinterland, and on the east by Dnister and the Black Sea. Relatively isolated from the surrounding flow of history, it preserved its traditional culture. The rural culture was extremely stable and was structured archetypically on the coordinates of eternity. The light political domination by the Turks did not mark profoundly the traditional structures and the Christian spirit of the community. Internal peace in the community remained the responsibility of the local prince and landlord who collected the taxes. The Transylvanian population, which was ethnically more heterogenous, organized a state, but the rural communities had sufficient independence to conserve their forms of traditional culture and their Christian beliefs.

The famous Romanian philosopher, Lucian Blaga, in his anthropological-philosophical studies distinguishes two periods in Romanian culture: the "pre-historic" and the "historic" which began rather late at the beginning of the last century.

The traditional culture manifests the profound spirituality of the nation and is the key to understanding its behaviour upon entering into the flow of history. We will attempt to define briefly this traditional culture with special attention to the person-society relationship pertaining to our theme.

The form of communal participation was the village, founded upon the basic family relationships. The fundamental structure of the village, which insured its cohesion, was based upon extensive family relationships, namely "*neam*." Spiritual kinship had special significance in this context; a sacral mentality pervaded every detail of the "philosophical" projection of the world and of human behaviour.

The preferred form in which these communities existed economically and expressed themselves was the "*obste sateasca*" (literally, "the communal village"), based upon a common system of agricultural property. This was quite complex and provided both economic and spiritual cohesion, though the rural population became stratified within the communities relatively late (17-18 century). The private family or households, based upon traditional and economic values accepted by the communal village, remained relatively equally prosperous in this quasi-natural economic form in which most basic goods were produced within the community. A home industry was based upon the cooperative work of women. Along with agricultural activities the crafts too were the responsibility of the community, and even if a craft were attributed for a long period of time to one family its members still considered themselves available for other community duties.

Social mediation through economic interchange, though very active, did not function independently of other cultural interchange. The political structures were not developed in the ordinary European manner. The communal village was led by a council which was elected by consensus. The main decisions were taken by the whole community; customary law was applied by the council. Relationships between the communal villages were peaceful; the governing principle of both inter- and intra-communal life were tolerance and understanding. Relationships with the ruling class were minimal and based especially on the payment of taxes. The rural population, composed of communities, habitually obeyed the ruling authority, which in turn did not interfere in the internal problems of the communities. Thus, the community was effectively autonomous, though the power of the public and ecclesiastical authorities was broad and unquestionable.

The cultural traditions of these communities were very rich in myths, rituals, etc. But, as all these traditions overlaid one another like geological strata, they are very difficult to study in an analytical manner. Customs had quite precise functions in the social life of the family nucleus. One's individual life was structured according to the model of a cyclical universe with eternal return. Christian spirituality was integrated within this cultural vision and practice, though pagan habits continued.

This description of the communitary village is greatly simplified (other entities also existed, e.g., the so-called "*clacasi*" or serfs) and could appear idealized and archaic. To overcome the risk of oversimplifying the issue I have prepared auxiliary studies with richer details and interpretations. These studies illustrate the subtlety and consistency of values in these cultures over a millennium. This description would stress a few basic aspects:

a. The universe of values in the Romanian communities formed a single tightly interconnected whole: all values from the economic and moral to the religious fit within one framework and formed a syncretic structure capable of coordinating each individual life. These values constituted a profound and inalienable spiritual structure. The universe of values was relatively closed, familiar and cohesive; it oriented the individual toward becoming a contemplative rather than toward pragmatic concerns and provided for deep personal and internal spiritual peace.

b. The traditional education ("*paideia*") limited relationships with the outside world; one was limited to the "small world" dominated by such concerns as work, defense and use. The balance between "to be" and "to have" tilted toward "to be."

c. One aspect of this mentality did not function well upon entering into history inasmuch as that step was one of alienation. The following illustrates this.

- great value was placed upon small cohesive structures such as family relationships: there was a very open attitude within the family, but a quite closed one toward the outside;
- the limited interest in the outside world corresponded to a distinctive fatalism.
- there was great resistance against outside pressure, and a great capacity for surviving and resisting within a restricted social and functional context; and
- there was a great capacity for being candid and for assimilating human values profoundly and intimately.

Personal dignity and social cohesion were realized together in traditional culture which was dominated by the unity and coherence of its value system and characterized by the stability and inertia of its ancient cultures.

In the XVIII-XIX centuries the breaking-up of village communities and the development of new individual property forms transfigured the universe of values. The person became the active factor in relation to the community, which respected him and, within the limits of traditional law, respected his freedom of initiative and desire for material prosperity. In this new context, the importance of the family developed and its functions in the community were diversified: family power relationships were centered upon the authority of the man, who became responsible in all external relationships: the *pater familias* represented all. Till recently the community has continued to exercise strong pressure upon individuals, especially in the moral order.

The relation between "to be" and "to have" became more balanced and the universe of values which was restructured accordingly, remained rich in its traditional moral, religious and ritual aspects. Gradually the community opened out to the world, while at the same time remaining an irreducible and basic social and cultural unit.

Post-Traditional Society and the Major Dimensions of Modern Life

The Romanian nation entered the flux of modern history under the impulse of the Central European powers which expanded culturally and economically toward the East in the context of the conflict between Russia and Turkey. The transition to a modern organization of life began through the assimilation of Western cultural, institutional and economic models by the aristocracy, bourgeoisie and intellectual elite. The political and administrative organizational structures and the entire institution of the state were transformed. After the Great Union in 1918 a new Constitution was prepared and instituted by the year 1924. Based upon the Belgian model, it was considered one of the most advanced of its time.

The confrontation between the new models promoted by the political and intellectual suprastructure and the organizational forms in accord with the traditional mentality produced some strategic projections for social development based upon a symbiosis of the two. Many trends in the policy and cultural arenas defended traditional values, attempting to find modes for their survival and for protecting genuine forms of peasant life. These nostalgic and romantic trends had great influence in social and cultural life.

Though most involved in business, industry, politics and intellectual pursuits were "*homo novus*," in promoting new social structures and values they acted in accord with the basic mentality formed by their traditional "home education." This sympathy for traditional values essentially shaped the national ideals. The continuing effort at conciliation attenuated the implementation of Western models. Until the Second World War this moderated tendencies toward more radical social reform.

Nevertheless, social life was somewhat divided between two areas: a) the communitary life in the villages (modified in the above manner), and b) modern urban social life built around more individualistic European values. Rural social life, however, came under the pressure of organizational measures promoted by the modern state and its agents. Modern social changes were also promoted by some transfigured villagers, as well as the economic, political and cultural agents of the new style of life. This generated strong inner tensions. The rationalization and structuring of social life which took place in this cultural context had the following characteristics:

a. The process of rationalizing social structures reflected the strategic intellectual ambiguity of passage to a modern organization of social life.

b. Though realized by many, it was coordinated according to a single symbiotic ideal for the whole nation.

c. There were different effects in rural and urban social contents.

d. It was in full swing when stopped by the events and consequences of the Second World War — otherwise, now there probably would be a single synthetic model. This was not fated to be, however, and now the Romanian nation must try to begin to build its world anew.

Urban social life during that period was marked by a slow but massive transfer of population from rural areas. This demographic phenomenon had the important social and cultural effect of generating a profound desire in the person for modern social life. Because the planning of social life was not well-defined and the rationalized social structures of "brutal competition" did not function to the full, the inner human values with which every person was endowed by his or her village or urban education remained alive. Nevertheless the migration of people to urban cultural areas did bring about a change of values according to the conditions of modern social life.

The consequences of these complementary determinations was an emphasis upon human social relationships. As these were continuingly mediated by differing interpersonal relations, social life came to be based less upon the mechanical action of social structures and institutional regulations. However, this phenomenon had also many satellite effects which negatively effected social evolution. In fact, a synthesis and real symbiosis of the different models began to evolve through social interaction not only in the economic, but in the political order and in all such formative spheres as education, literature, philosophy, religion and the humanities: the entire social, political and cultural life participated in this process. Its inner tensions were reflected not only by political contradiction and compromises, but by open confrontation between diverse synchronic and traditional cultural trends.

One Essential Feature: Political and Cultural Syncretism

Most Romanian politicians were university-trained professors and jurists, generally with a humanistic formation as writers. As a rule, the coordinating institutions and state organizations appointed intellectuals to key posts — as was true also in such Western countries as Germany, France and Italy. This was the case at the lower state village levels also where the main functions usually were occupied by the notary, school teacher, tax collector and village priest.

The intellectual, particularly the humanistic intellectual, had the highest prestige in social life: in modern urban life one of the highest goals was "to become a famous intellectual." This overshadowed other more pragmatic goals and gave important value to the thoughts, dreams and will of many idealistic young men. Thus, within a century there appeared a great number of well-

known humanistic intellectuals, artists and scientists, whose reputation extended across Europe. Some, e.g., Eminescu, L. Blaga, C. Calinescu turned out to be "paradigmatic personalities" in the cultural and education life of the nation.

The Romanian intellectual ideal focused upon the realization of a cultural symbiosis in a single national *Paideia*, or formative national culture, comprising values and tradition which could withstand major historical and cultural forces. The intention was that this *Paideia* be able to prevail over permissive social and contrary institutional structures. The common dream was that Romanian culture could be promoted on an equal footing with that of the Europeans, for given her Roman origins and present relations it seemed that she should have a contribution to make and that by supplementing others, she could retain her own identity.

This project was pursued in many different ways, but broke down during the Soviet occupation. The new ideology and political practice shattered all illusions and its first step was to cut off these idealistic and devoted intellectuals. Nevertheless, the ideal survived under the repression. The cultural revival during the "thaw" of 1964-1971 was an important sign for the new generation of intellectuals. In addition, until 1985 no great attention was paid to a surveillance of humanistic intellectual activities and the ideology was permissive with regard to national values. For these reasons between 1965-1985 it was possible to publish most of the pre-war intellectual patrimony and to continue scientific research concerning the ethnographic and anthropological content of the traditional culture. A new intellectuals' generation took up its ideals, but moved in new directions.

Theory

Our seminar theme directs attention to some basic philosophical issues namely, the internal-external distinction and two correlated problems: projective knowledge and the condition of our relations to the external world.

This internal-external distinction was developed late in Greek culture. It is operative only in the analytical thought of great synthetic philosophical systems such as Plato and Aristotle where it is integrated within still other distinctions: *somatikon-asomaton*, *aistheton-noeton*, etc.

Nevertheless, in the poem of Parmenides we find a very interesting reference: in the way of Truth Parmenides rejects all the data of sense knowledge (*aistheton*) as well as analogical knowledge based upon the senses, i.e., "scandalous myths" and "physiology" (philosophy of nature). He puts aside all representations of the external world, and hence this world itself. Nevertheless, in the way of Being, unable to avoid his famous tautology: "it is the same to be and to think . . . ," he proceeds to a "noetic" representation of Being in terms of solid geometry and refers metaphorically to "*spairos*." It is difficult to decide whether this is inconsistent. At any rate, it renders intelligible the atemporal and aspatial character of Being, especially with regard to the keyword "*peirata*" (limits) and the phrase "*peira pomaton*" (finitude) used in correlation with the other descriptive terms "continuous", "fully", "homogeneous" and the most important "*teleion*" (to be fixed, terminated, complete and perfect).

The Paramenidean representation of Being is unique: its form is that of a cosmology built according to a standard logical structure, while at the same time it reflects Parmenides' distinctive spirit and insight, for it constitutes revelation of the features of Being in that logical sequence. Paradoxically, these are presented as physical features, but according to a Physics that is quite different from the traditional animistic, post Euclidian, Aristotelian, stoic or other vision for it is a physics of the whole and undivided. One, at once nonqualitative and descriptive. It describes an

object which can only be thought, but which insofar as it is "thought" can be represented. The final act of Being, thinking, and the initial act of its passive contemplation, is just this representation.

This ever-surprising theoretical invention has the following characteristics: knowledge must suspend the internal-external distinction, for as confirmed by thought about Being, our existence is not distinguished from, but pertains to, Being. In the way of Truth, Being is one with the "noosphere", in the light of Being the sense world disappears. Parmenidean formalization anticipated the modern scientist for whom "The world is one equation" without Being. Scientific conclusions are not truths as such, but creations in a field of uncertainty, while all that occurs beyond the limit of the "noosphere" has only residual reality similar to the Parmenidean world of opinion. After 2500 years Parmenides and the scientists meet in stressing, if not overstressing, the mind. This is our world of "exteriority".

The basic pattern of European civilization, however, is dichotomous, built upon the division between the ego and world. Our world, like the Greek Kosmos, is external and visible. This is why the Oriental relation between ego and the world is for the European practically non-intelligible due to its vision and practice regarding communication between the individual being and whole, dissolving individuality inasmuch as the whole is seen to exist.

In fact, in its abstract form the ego-world relation exists only for philosophers and scientists. For the ordinary man the real world is the cultural scenario transmitted to him by tradition, education and TV as the case may be.

Ordinarily, the human world is represented by the anthropological "*topos*" of one's most intimate and familiar relations, i.e., the community of one's acquaintances: one's extended family, village, town or city. In fact, in the most ancient communities this field of acquaintances is presided over by the mediating idea of a common origin. Their mythology is a projection of the visible world, which otherwise would be completely strange, hostile and incomprehensible. In this way all aspects of the visible world are personalized and provide people a sacrad basis for their social life and familiar universe (see for example, the Homeric epics where the ancient principle of "sympathy" was always at work).

For all these cohesive communities exteriority is the world with boundaries which differentiated them from the next community. Homeric Greek thought has as a series of horizons: first the family and *polis*, then the county and alliances or the pan-Hellenic world, and beyond these limits only the barbarians who did not really belong to mankind. As we move to the Hellenistic period and then to modern times social mediation is made not culturally through religious or lay epics, but rationally through such categories as mankind, human nature, the human condition, etc. Note, however, one important difference: these abstractions were carried initially within the morally revolutionary message of Christianity and have been maintained in the modern period by faith and education.

In the modern times all social structures are clearly defined. Their contents are reducible to the pragmatic order especially to economic structures. These implement the social dynamics and absorb most of a person's capacities for social life while functioning mechanically as a formal information system. (The ultramodern society is at the point of becoming as equation within the process of decision-making.)

For the person in modern society (as in Hellenic times) the world becomes greater while the person shrinks to a hazy schema. In recent decades the great social pressure exerted upon the person has led to solipsism consisting of the person and his or her possessions. This makes it difficult to have broad horizons and to be concerned about life in the universe. Epicureans, Stoics

and Skeptics had many important ideas in this regard; ideals and romantic ideas now attract less attention.

The point of identity *vis a vis* the external world is one's psychological consciousness as a cultural being. Beyond relations of production and consumption, based on a strong but monotonous integration, there are many other cohesive relations which give rise to different social structures in modern life. Freedom, though a strong force, is not equally shared, for its exercise is shaped according to relations of consumption and other pragmatic factors. As a rule the individual adapts to the external social context where the strongest all-pervasive factor is action governed by enlightened self-interest.

Here it is important to distinguish between the rationality that manipulates external relations and the latent capacities of one's stylistic matrix which lies deep within our culture and personality. Excessive exercise of the first inhibits the second which then remains only at the deepest levels of the person. Though somewhat artificial this analytic distinction fits so many cultural dimensions that it seems justified, although it is not central to the present discussion. The theme "humanization of social life" takes on its special urgency in relation to internal and external dynamics and contradictions which affect one's basic humanity or subjectivity. Thus, the humanization of social life has many dimensions.

Chapter IV

Valid Concepts: A Case of Policy-Oriented Research

Florencio Riguera

This paper reviews a policy-oriented research: the way it was conducted and the usability of its results. The central concern here is that which motivated the said research itself, namely, the validity-of concepts which might be used as basis for decision-making. Decision-making at the level of policy impacts people's lives on a social scale. Policies or programs deliberately effect changes or bring about conditions in a shared environment. Since, the conditions affect the behavior of groups or individuals in society, they must be good/desirable. But then, different groups have different views under which they evaluate a program condition: different ways of perceiving and assessing needs to meet; of establishing goals to achieve; of selecting means strategies; of defining the criteria to use in evaluating outcomes — including foreseen unforeseen side-effects.

Action needs an enlightened decision based on valid concepts. And insofar as concepts are produced through a process, the latter needs safeguards for its correctness and integrity. Furthermore, the guiding orientation of the (research) process must be suitable to (if not mold and shape) decision frameworks. Otherwise, the risk of effecting conditions which are inappropriate to the target populations is not responsibly prevented.

Concern for appropriate conditions — i.e., desirable/acceptable under the views of the target populations — is (or, must be) basic in addressing the humanization of social life. At issue is the respect for the unique identify of peoples. A social product, culture provides a setting for social life; and, as such, it is a unique manifestation or version of the underlying universal human character. It is at the level of the concrete manifestations (phenomena) that policies programs operate, even as these strive to be evaluated and therefore grounded on what is deemed to be authentically human.

This review uses the foregoing frame of orientation which was re-grounded by the research experience.1 The review in 1981 was conducted primarily for the purpose of devising a scheme to integrate the results of the different research modules. Other issues were inevitably addressed. And the summary notes of that review provide the bulk of the material for this paper.2

Background

Immediate interest in the research under review arose from a surprising finding in a 1976 briefing material for the Sponsor (i.e., the Administrator of the Southern Philippines Development Administration). The finding applied to a particular section of the Muslim populations in the Southern Philippines. And the Sponsor wanted a broader study on the Muslims in the region. In early 1977 he convened a research Team comprised of several disciplines (Sociology, Political Science, Anthropology, Psychology, Economics, Environmental Planning) to conduct the research. He brainstormed with the Team — providing insights to Islam — to set the research objectives and orientation.

His major concern was the validity of concepts (more accurately, knowledge or understanding about the target populations — taken very broadly to include notions beliefs/theories to describe

or explain problems, as well as data or information) which might be used as basis or assumptions for decision making. In the wake of the surprising finding, the tenor of the questions was: "Is it true that . . .? What else needs to be known or understood? What makes the Muslim tick?" Acquiring a better understanding of the target populations at the initial deliberations included assessing the validity of concepts. Erroneous, inadequate, or inappropriate concepts can lead to "wrong" policies, goals, criteria, etc.

Valid concepts should entail "looking through the eyes" of the target populations; understanding the way they perceive and evaluate their situation, assess their needs; their standards and norms for desirable acceptable conditions or behaviors; their aspirations, and so on. Objectivity and veracity should respect the viewpoint of the said populations, who must be understood in their own right — "as they are," and not merely nor primarily in comparison with other populations. Appropriate policies must respect the uniqueness of target populations; and so should the concepts on which policies are based.

Interpreting the Research Objective and Orientation

These concerns can be appreciated here in a larger context which was probably assumed to be obvious during the discussions. For one thing, a number of distinct ethnic minority groups make up the Muslim population in the Southern Philippines. Together, they are a religious minority vis-a-vis the national population. And although the population of some areas in the region are predominantly of one ethnic group, there are areas whose populations are mixed in terms of ethnicity and or religion. Christians are of different ethnic groups themselves partly on account of the inflow of homesteaders into Mindanao in the early 1950's.

In this challengingly diverse setting, understanding the Muslims was considered exigent. The secessionist movement had already turned into an armed conflict. The Muslims actively maintained their identity, and resisted its suppression in colonial (Spanish and American) times. And Mahmoud had observed that the Muslims were in effect neglected by government programs.3 Hence, peaceful solutions to the conflict — or, more accurately, to the underlying problems — were sought in "Development plans programs" ("quality of life", poverty, education, health and sanitation, employment, housing, etc.). Programs had better succeed — that is, be accepted and participated in by the target populations, diverse as they were.

The national development strategy was another factor. The development of urban centers as alternative growth nodes was a key strategy in the national framework plan, which was adopted before the creation of the Administration in 1975. The nodes were to attract and thereby divert rural-to-urban migration flows from the congested metropolitan areas (i.e., Anita and Cebu).4 Thus, the urban centers in the provinces comprising the two Muslim autonomous regions could become either "melting pots" or denser "enclaves" depending on what migration flows they would eventually absorb.

Communicating to stake-holders can also be interpreted from the research effort. A good basis for policies programs — and not "pure guess" nor simple arbitrariness — tells the target populations of efforts to be responsive to their needs and interests. That is at the local level. At the national and international levels, donor countries or international agencies extending funds or technical expertise could see and appraise concrete steps to improve deliberate and accountable efforts for development.

Questions of Thrust: Semantics and Image

Nevertheless, the Sponsor granted the research to be more epistemological or scientific than practical — i.e., acquiring valid concepts and assessing the validity of the "current stock" so that these could be relied upon as an appropriate, true, and adequate (perhaps, "exhaustive and final"!) basis for decisions. The research was not meant to be used immediately for dealing with any particular task or problem. The mind frame was: ensure valid concepts, and reality would guide decision/action.

To the Team, the research was primarily practical. Unreliable descriptions, explanations, invalid concepts would not be used for decision-making. And because of the practical consequences of decisions — most especially on the target populations (i.e., some wasted funds would be relatively secondary) — correctness, integrity and confidence in the research process should be demanded. The results might be used eventually for policy purposes. Therefore, the results ought to be valid. (Of course, concepts have limitations; and there are ways to minimize flaws in research procedures.)

The Sponsor and the Team resolved the question on the thrust of the research in two conferences. The objective was understood. But it was still necessary to understand the orientation of the Sponsor in order to plan out the research. "What makes the Muslim tick?" — the question was too broad and vague to be answered sensibly. Tick in what context? With respect to what? Relative to what purpose? Acquiring or validating a concept regarding the "ticking" required a defined context or purpose in relation to which a research problem would be relevant and significant. The Team needed a justification for the importance of the problems they would propose to study.

The Sponsor wanted to avoid bias: no hypothesis to be tested; no review of literature — "just look at the reality as it is." The Team would have full freedom to conduct the study, and would not have to worry about funding and timetable constraints. Full support would be given to the project, which was to be administered outside the Administration by agreement. The idea was to "rig another accident" through which new and authentic knowledge concerning the target populations could be stumbled upon again. The researchers were expected to select their problems topics on the basis of their disciplinary framework and their individual perception of the developments in the region in question.

Not even a hint on the likely decisions for which the research results would be used — if any could be identified then — should be given. Such a hint, it was feared, could lead to bias (e.g., justify or oppose what is already given), or to a disregard for what might otherwise be a significant finding. There was no need either to evaluate the proprietary projects of agencies — through which the government played the middleman (e.g., duck raising, indigenous weaving schools). These were doing all right and were being financially monitored.

Policy-relevance and Roles

Thus, the Team assumed the responsibility of specifying the policy-relevance of the research, a responsibility more properly discharged by the Sponsor. This step enabled the practical thrust to predominate in the research orientation. The research would produce results which would be usable for decisions deemed likely to be made concerning development programs in the region of the target populations. Immediacy of use was not the question; rather, it was the eventual use of the results (or concepts based on them). This clarification was not needed; but it had the effect of excluding sensitive political problems (e.g., secession), or, at least, situating them around other

focal problems. With respect to data gathering, interview respondents were expected to "clam up" on sensitive issues, and the required data would not be obtained after all.

Basically, therefore, the research would be the "usual thing." It would describe or explain selected traits, behaviors, conditions, etc., of the target populations. In the process, new ways of looking at the problems might be developed. The results would be usable for various purposes; but, at the same time they would have a specific context. Methodologically, testing hypotheses is the means of acquiring an understanding of a particular problem or phenomenon. Without a starting point — namely a supposed explanation — it would be logically impossible even just to identify what data are to be gathered, let alone analyzed. The Team's approach was to proceed from issues concerns ("development") to problems (poverty, employment, etc.), then on to variables to describe or explain the problems, and finally to data items (i.e., indicators of the variables).

There were distractions due to semantics, image and roles. But in this step, the important point was: in time, the Team recognized the Sponsor's concern that the target populations not be used merely nor primarily for verifying falsifying a theory. (It was not clear whether or not the emphasis on objectivity and veracity, adequacy and appropriateness grew out of some dissatisfaction with the prevailing or past decision-making; but a more adequate basis or concepts were needed.) New findings would be looked into. And literature would be reviewed for comparability (e.g., to determine change, to allocate resources to new areas of study rather than needlessly to duplicate a study). The Team also suggested that an estimate of costs and a timetable be prepared — a self-imposed limit on the Sponsor's largess! The estimates would facilitate the monitoring of the research activities.

Up to this point, the tasks centered on clarifying views, negotiating, trading off and balancing between the desirable and the feasible in order to foster correctness of the procedures. In terms of attitude, the openness and willingness to reexamine positions seemed to add enthusiasm in the undertaking.

The Sponsor approved the Team's approach and suggestions.

Conceptualization – Revision

Once the tasks were entirely within the Team's turf, the research objective was quickly revised for reasons of feasibility and practicability. At this stage, the task was to translate the orientation to a research plan. The deliberations are summarized as follows:

In determining the "entry step," the Team felt that evaluating past decisions or studies was not only sensitive; its feasibility was also doubtful. It was virtually impossible to identify all the concepts (information or assumptions) that influenced a particular decision. Even if good documentation were assumed, only formal data would be in records or proceedings. A lot of tacit notions and beliefs — probably not substantiated — can be used as frames against which information is interpreted or appraised. These notions and beliefs were within the scope of the research orientation, but they could not be adequately identified. With regard to satisfactory/ unsatisfactory decisions, the Team would have to impose their own criteria to sort out decisions; or, at least, adopt an already existing appraisal of such decisions if there was one. Furthermore, the quality of decisions or their outcomes could be fortuitous (flukes, by serendipity, counter intuitive, etc.). It could not be ruled out that the quality of decisions outcomes was due to or in spite of the validity or questionability of the concepts used as basis. (Quickly agreed: recent decisions could not as yet be assessed adequately.)

Other studies — there would be the question of inappropriate criteria if the evaluation went beyond the specific scope and orientation of any given study. "Fair" criteria could virtually boil down to case-to-case judgments! There was also the question of how to identify studies which had (and, for that matter, would have) an influence on a decision — e.g., less publicized studies which nevertheless yielded results (or advanced recommendations) comparable to those found in a reference list.

Explore First. The Team was not willing nor ready to assume the burden of proof in these scenarios. They felt the need for a "groping" exploratory phase. The research could be more confident if it could determine its focus — perhaps, several foci after an exploratory study. Then, in-depth studies, some of which might be longitudinal, would be conducted on the discretion of the individual researcher concerned.

With the adoption of the explore-then-go-in-depth plan, the Team decided to use first-hand data for both the exploratory and the subsequent phases. Survey using a provability sample to be representative would be conducted; but the "in depth" studies might use focused or non-probability samples. Data would be gathered with the use of an interview schedule for ease and accuracy of recording. (College students in the foreseeable sample areas would be contracted to translate/back-translate the interview schedule, and to conduct the interviews.) At this point, safety and accessibility were the main considerations in identifying the prospective sample areas. The areas with good prospects were sections of urban centers — towards the outskirts — where some development program had been implemented, or was in progress.

Based on maps and population data on the pilot sample area (for the exploratory survey), the sampling design was formulated: stratified systematic random sampling. Stratified to fit the ethnically heterogeneous population, the sample size would be one-third of the total number of households in the communities within the area (i.e., take one, skip two). The interview respondents would be adults — one per household picked for the sample.

Adapting the Objective. After taking the foregoing steps, the Team dropped the objective of assessing the validity of concepts. Other than the current system of independent confirmation/ repudiation of, say, a theory over time, there seemed to be no feasible way of validating-concepts. The research at hand could confirm or repudiate a currently held hypothesis or a statistical figure. The said research itself could be valid or invalid — just one among a number which studied a given problem. A study could only strive for procedural/methodological integrity to support its results — facts, analysis, interpretation, recommendations.

Furthermore, a concept can be rendered invalid by a change in the social reality itself, a broader narrower context of applicability or relevance, or a change in outlook and standards. In this regard, concerns arising from value systems, problems acquiring social significance or recognition as such, and development of new approaches or tools of analysis were mentioned in passing. But the point was: innovations within professional circles — i.e., disciplines characterized by a specialty in terms of subject matter, methods, concerns addressed, among others — could influence ordinary/popular knowledge. A discipline, therefore, may have to make sense not only to cognate fields but also to public opinion or "pedestrian" theories. Educational and mass communications programs can orient the general public to the different disciplines.

It was reemphasized that it should be sufficient to lessen the likelihood of allowing purely arbitrary/baseless decisions to be made, and the research would still be responsive to the Sponsor’s concern for validity. Validity would have to be understood more modestly to mean supportability

with empirical data for some period of time. In this review, it seems that what was in question was the suitability of concepts to support or repudiate decision frameworks — i.e., appropriateness to influence the frameworks or the decisions reached through them. Without the attribute under consideration, the views of target populations could be disregarded or violated. Honest reporting of correctly analyzed data — true/factual (i.e., objective and accurate) and adequate (i.e., not "too many gaps") descriptions/explanations of the relationships between data or variables) — are for the purpose of producing appropriate concepts (i.e., models, even recommended courses of action).

The Team's reference framework was basically dovetailed into the problem-solving type: what concepts would be needed if problem x had to be solved. Accordingly, the reality-will-lead-to-the-decision view was narrowed down: reality as fitted to a framework of concerns and constraints; and the process of fitting might be procrustean in the early iterations. In this light, a good framework was "faithful" to the target populations' viewpoint. It was at this point that the advocacy attitude or inclination of the orientation seemed to crystallize.

The Sponsor appreciated the reasoning and approved the revisions. The Team then visited the pilot sample area, toured the communities; heard briefings by resource persons. This was followed by the drafting of the researchers' individual proposals. Up to this point, there was no clear delineation of the scope a particular researcher would or could cover. It was only tacitly understood that the overall scope and approach would be varied enough to address relevant and important problems pertaining to the Muslims in the Southern Philippines.

The Team recognized the fact that Islam exercised a unifying force among the diverse ethnic groups through religious observances or norms (e.g., the holy fast of Ramadan; interest-free loans; and norms which Islam holds in common with other systems). But the research would not trace specific beliefs or norms to particular behaviors or conditions. Resource persons would have to be consulted regarding specific questions of this sort.

Along with the substantive guidelines, an internal working arrangement was adopted: the chairmanship in the Team would rotate among the most senior members on the basis of "study phases" not quite rigidly understood.

Interfacing the Modules—First Attempt

The most difficult and demanding problems the Team had to resolve surfaced when the individual proposals had to be interfaced or integrated into one coherent orientation and proposal. The individual proposals overlapped with each other in terms of the problems covered (e.g., poverty, satisfaction, aspirations) as well as the variables or data items (e.g., interaction, social structure, sociographics). It was relatively easy for the researchers involved in a particular overlap to resolve matters among themselves: what to maintain, eliminate, or merge; how to format the data items; preferred techniques of analysis. No questions on the selection/inclusion of the problems were raised at this point — the significance of the problems seemed to be "approved as is."

But the streamlined interview schedule was some 430-items long depending on how applicable branching of follow-up items were counted. It was impractical to administer it; one research project, a common interview schedule for the probability sample surveys. If the common interview schedule was to be used in the other sample areas, it would have to be translated to, and back-translated from as many as 6 local languages. But this was tolerable compared to its impracticality. (Each researcher could pick a subset of a sample to respond to a set of items in the in-depth phase — this was a matter of individual discretion, but it was still far ahead.)

In order to shorten the common interview schedule, the Team had to adopt a common frame of orientation within which to evaluate each other's proposal. The need to investigate a given problem should determine the scope of the research — i.e., eliminate the data items which were not badly needed. After all, this was the exploratory survey. By this time, only occasionally did alternative methods and techniques of analysis still suffice to resolve questions. What had been left implicit before the individual proposals were written had, therefore, to be made explicit. It was in this iteration of the bottom-up design effort that the frame of reference was clarified. In fact, the process went a step farther than was expected — that is, based on a reading of the researchers' frame of mind at the deliberations.

Personal Value Orientation

In face of the "mundane" question of what data items should be included in the common interview schedule, the Team addressed and made explicit their personal value orientation/ Position! The scope of the research orientation could not be resolved before the clarification of values was achieved to a reasonable degree.

Fighting poverty at the household level ("everyone having enough for his/her needs"), equitable distribution of benefits to minority groups, and appropriateness of decisions provided the focus for value clarification. The researchers found strong agreement among themselves with regard to the desirability and rightness of equitable distribution of benefits. The grounds which led to the same position could be described conveniently as: (1) social justice imperative (ethico-moral end in itself) (2) political need (instrumental to the attainment of ulterior ends), and (3) *Zeitgeist*. But the researchers agreed not to criticize each other's grounding — it should be enough to recognize the fact that they shared a common value position.

In line with the Sponsor's view, the Team decided to adopt the target population's outlook/ viewpoint as primary and critical input — almost a given or a constraint in the assessment of needs, establishment of goals, devising/revising strategies, programs, and criteria for evaluation. This was to engender acceptability and participation of the target populations in the development process — a more concrete but also more neutral-sounding translation of the value-laden respect or the unique identity of people. Inasmuch as the advocacy-minded attitude of the research did not abandon nor disregard other factors (e.g., those external to the target populations, especially the role of their urban center in the national strategy), but rather tried to mesh, say, the local and the broader view through objective assessment of prospects. Any recommendation would have to have been based on the Team's view of the priorities involved.

Inchoate Substantive Interface

The Team then organized the proposed problems into major clusters. Upon adoption, this set of concerns would serve as the frame of reference. Attention-was shifted back to: what variables to cover, what and how many data items to include (e.g., personal inventory items, scalogram items, open-ended opinion items, etc.), data format, techniques of analysis, and so on.

In this paper's view, the major problem clusters are: (1) target populations' outlook (norms, values; aspirations, self-concept, satisfaction with one's condition; coping behavior); (2) interaction (sociopolitical behavior; ethnic relations; social composition and structure; influential/ leader identification or selection; assessment and articulation of needs); (3) environmental conditions (sociographics, economics, public services/amenities/utilities). It was postulated or

presupposed that these clusters — as it were, dimensions inter-played with and affected each other: outlook (internal) colored the perception of conditions and influenced the manner in which interaction was carried out in the populations; in turn outlook was shaped by social interactions and environmental conditions — with interactions and conditions reciprocally influencing each other. Policies/programs can impact any or all of these dimensions of the target populations either directly or through an interplaying dimension. And the impact on target populations can situated in a broader context (e.g., national/international).

This time, the Team resolved overlaps at the plenary level. Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and Political Science overlapped in varying degrees with respect to the outlook and interaction dimensions; Economics and Demography/Planning, with respect to the conditions. And everyone needed one type of data or another from virtually all the clusters for purposes of closer analysis and interpretation of the results. Sociographics (i.e., demographics, data pertaining to economic activities and to services/conditions in the human settlement) would be explanatory or consider independent variables, at least, in the first round of analysis. In subsequent rounds, some economic conditions could be hypothesized to derive from outlook or interaction variables.

The conceptual organization was not meant to be exhaustive — some "pivotal" model equations could be hypothesized, but toying with relationships between variables would be an exploratory step itself. Each researcher had to choose the "profitable" hypotheses or key relationships/facts which could stimulate further probing. Parsimony and flexibility of data gained acceptance as the criteria for pruning the interview schedule.

Thus, the inchoate scheme for interfacing the individual proposals (not necessarily discipline-segmented) had a substantive orientation. There was a tendency towards the systems approach in the sense that the behavior of the social reality under study was what mattered — the disciplinary framework through which it was pictured or characterized was secondary. (Disciplinary specialty would be seen in terms of quality and confidence.) This was a step to make the orientation interdisciplinary, and the inclination was towards the household viewpoint. Resource allocation, for example, as a factor the government can manage, would have been viewed in terms of its effects on, say, satisfaction, aspirations, services, and the like, which are variables impacting the households.

But the Team did not go very far along this line. There were gaps in the orientation, partly because a number of things still had to be explored. Differences in disciplinary framework, preference for techniques of analysis, and appreciating the usefulness of a particular problem/variable for certain types of decision made the interfacing process very difficult. Adjustments in the timetable had to be made. What seems to have been happening is: the Team was trying to make the orientation suitable to as many decision frameworks or uses as they could. In fact the more tangible accomplishment in this step was the agreement within the Team on the use of already standardized sociographic data, the share-ability of data or analysis, and criticism of reports at the plenary level. The intent was ease in processing the data and correctness of analysis (implicitly presupposing a common logical strategy or method/language to different disciplines).

Constraints and Other Changes

Given the adjustments in the timetable, the Team got to be apprehensive that the local academic institutions might not be able to provide enumeration/interviewing and translation services on time. There was pressure to conduct the exploratory survey soon. Perhaps, the

interfacing scheme, inchoate as it was, could be formally adopted; the impracticably long common interview schedule might be given a chance to work out!

At this point, the chairmanship rotated to another member, who had replaced another researcher earlier. The new chairman formed a sub-group within the Team, and the sub-group "mangled" the impracticably long common interview schedule. Based on their reading of the problem clusters, the sub-group decided on 40 key data items to be included. The chairman's own module (Anthropology) would study the target populations' material culture employing observation, conversation, and slide photography to gather its data. It dropped its section in the common interview schedule — i.e., covering ethnic relations — because after all, interactions were well covered by a number of other modules. (Incidentally, this change was the first definitive step towards a discipline-segmented plan.) There was only a slight likelihood that the module would use the survey results in relation to its findings.

The inchoate scheme for interfacing the modules into an overall coherent framework was thereby partly implemented without having been formally adopted by the Team. The interview schedule was translated and back-translated, then retranslated to the two local languages (Tausug and Samal) for the pilot survey. Despite the simplification, pretest outcomes showed that the instrument would be taxing to the respondents. With fears on the part of the researchers that the data would be inadequate relative to the analysis they originally intended to perform, further shortening of the interview schedule was quickly ruled out. The survey and the data came in.

Unresolved Questions: Evaluating the Interface

The scant data yielded enough descriptive information. And several hypotheses were tested with some counter checking for "mere appearances" (e.g., spurious correlations). There were also probes into why or how an "obvious" or well-based expectation was not borne out by the data. Categorization schemes (e.g., for responses that were content-analyzed before they could be cast on a frequency distribution table) and analytical techniques (e.g., more powerful statistical models, or using non parametric tests instead) were adapted to the quality of the data. Some hypotheses were dropped for lack of data (or poor quality of data). All was done at the level of the individual researcher, or, to some degree, at that of a sub-group with fairly similar approaches.

The Team subsequently critiqued each other's report on the pilot/exploratory survey. The criteria centered on logical consistency or correctness/cogency of inference in the analysis. To some extent robustness of an obtained relationship between variables was addressed. The relevance or usefulness of a particular conclusion or analysis for decision making purposes — as yet not really resolved — was brought out again after the analysis proved to be satisfactorily correct. In a way, questions on plausibility were muted because of the mood of openness to new/ surprising findings, and respect for the reality "as it is." The most that could be done was to critique the method/technique of analysis, or juxtapose a conclusion with another and see if the reality in question had not been "warped" — that is, if the research as a whole was consistent in depicting or explaining one and the same reality. Disparity of analysis should not go beyond what is attributable to differences in "angle of vision."

The individual researcher was then a mere proponent of an analysis; anyone in the Team had the responsibility to scrutinize the procedures and the results. This was the implementation of the agreement on mutual criticism. And most of the exchanges revolved around the presupposed common logical strategy as well as the lure/need of a unified approach or language concerning social reality.

General trends — descriptive and explanatory — could be discerned from the reports on the pilot survey. But due to a lack of a number of data which were needed, there were gaps in the analysis. Or, there were interesting points which could not be readily pursued. There was a general dissatisfaction with the paucity of data, and a corresponding search for feasible ways of gathering the needed data.

The Team presented the summary of the pilot survey results to the Sponsor — along with the evaluation of the phase, and indications of the likely direction of improvements to be carried out. For his part, the Sponsor toyed with the possibility of the research becoming an ongoing and self-sustaining program at some future point. At the time, this probably sounded mostly as a hint of funding difficulties. The Sponsor had little comment on the survey results, and dwelt more on the upcoming surveys or in-depth studies. By hindsight in this review, it is equally (if not more) likely that the Sponsor realized that the magnitude of the research program was much more than originally expected.

Modifying the Interface

The Team had a third chairman to direct the next phase. Another sub-group was designated to work with the chairman on matters to be submitted for plenary action. Modifying the modular interface and adopting attendant methodological adjustments had virtually been decided already because of the evaluation of the preceding phase. More data items were needed to complete the analysis some researchers had planned to do. A long interview schedule was impractical. But, if the data could not be obtained, the research was over. The Team still maintained — correctly or otherwise — that only a probability sample survey could yield the date needed to satisfy the research objective and orientation. First-hand information obtained from probability samples can yield updates or new findings; and these can readily be eventually used for decision making purposes.

In order to balance again between data sufficiency and data-gathering feasibility, the research modules were delineated along disciplinary lines. This step gave more autonomy and responsibility to the individual researcher. But it did not do away with the mutual criticism of reports. The Team gained in terms of ease in monitoring the task accountability of its members.

Expanded Instrument. The re-inclusion for subsequent surveys of a good number of the data items eliminated from the pilot survey interview schedule in effect, and broader exploratory surveys, satisfied the needs of the Sociology, Psychology, and Political Science modules. The Demography/Planning module agreed to the re-inclusion or reformatting of several standard data pertaining to human settlements. The Economics module had only minor modifications in terms of data items. Across the modules which shared the common interview schedule, some data items were rephrased, reformatted; and there were a few minor additions/deletions.

There was greater need for ease and clarity in data-gathering — a range of 250-300 data items in the instrument was considered still workable. The respondents were expected to complete the interview in no less than two sessions with the interviewers.

Partitioned Samples: Trade-offs. In order to avoid overshooting the workable length of the interview schedule without any module lacking the types of data it needed, the proposal to partition any subsequent probability sample was considered. One-third of the respondents would respond to the items from the Sociology module; another third, to those from the Psychology module; the

last third, to those from the Political Science module. Each third — i.e., the whole sample — would, however, respond to the sociographics (demographic, economic, human-settlement type of data).

The main setback of this step was the loss of the interdisciplinary or substantively interfaced orientation at the level of data analysis or variables. With partitioned samples, it was no longer feasible to test or explore for relationships between variables of one module and those of another if each had a different third of a particular sample for its respondents. (The three affected modules could cross-tabulate with the sociographics, but not between themselves.) Concomitantly, the workable frame of reference to resolve apparently conflicting analyses was laid aside. This particular setback would be felt seriously if the research were to recommend a course of action or a decision — no matter how much later that time would be. As a whole, the research lost the only resource within its own framework which enabled it to redeem a validity claim consistently.

The setback was accepted. Exploring by "picking enough pieces of the picture" was thereby adopted at the expense of exploring by finding out which connections were confirmed by the data. The objections to this step raised certain points. Having different disciplinary views complement each other (e.g., one picking up where another stopped to show continuity, completeness, or gaps; or juxtaposition of analyses to create depth in the resulting picture or adopting one analysis at another's expense for reasons of better suitability to a context, like a decision framework) was neither abandoned nor discouraged. But the trade-off was very clear: without adequate data to analyze, the conceptualization would be too hasty, and run the risk of ending up with invalid concepts. Inappropriate explanations, inaccurate analysis, and the like could easily result from a hasty process.

It was also emphasized that the requirements for probability sampling — i.e., the size required for statistical significance testing — were not jeopardized by the reduction of the sample size in the modules affected by the partitioning. If some respondents did not respond to a number of items, their schedule could be excluded, and statistical tests for analyzing small samples' data could be used instead of the techniques envisioned in the original plans.

The other trade-offs were minor compared to these. To facilitate the recording of the responses (or, their summaries), and, supposedly the manual generation of frequency tables, the input data format was made identical to the output format (e.g., age brackets in the interview schedule as well as in the frequency tables). Despite the added ease, the revision introduced an estimating error — e.g., a regression analysis would have only mid-points of brackets. If a sizeable portion of the sample in this scenario were, say, 5 years old, that portion would have been counted as year-olders — a distortion. From another angle: if the interviewers could call back on the respondents to complete the interview, recording "5" was no harder than ticking the "5-9" bracket. Locating the appropriate bracket could have been an additional step to negate the supposed gain in ease.

With regard to the reports, there was no clear decision on the question of presentation — by discipline, by phase (exploratory-1, exploratory-2, in-depth), by sample area, by problem cluster? The inclination then was towards the discipline-module option with an overall introduction to the set of reports. The more significant references in the literature review were annotated, and the sourcebook module ran smoothly to an early completion.5 The more remarkable traits of minority ethnic groups in the Southern Philippines made up the material for the fact-book module, which was completed with comparable efficiency.

The sourcebook confirmed the observed rise in the number of studies on ethnic minority groups in the region in the 1970's, especially on the Muslim groups. The fact-book was discussed

in summary form, and the draft was made available as an aid in the analysis and interpretation of the survey data.

Gaps in the Modified Interface. At the level of the data-gathering instrument, the modified scheme or orientation still had difficulty in assigning a particular variable (and the corresponding data items) to either the exploratory phase or to the in-depth phase: to the common survey instrument or to the follow-up studies' instrument. These were done at the discretion of the individual researchers.

It ended up that the framework provided the user (decision-maker, student of social life) more opportunity or leeway to select the results that fit his/her conception of, or approach to a particular problem, than it would have provided under the substantive-interface framework. As it were, the research pared down its enlightening/guiding role in favor of concentrating on its facts-support role. Thus, the Sponsor's original desire to balance the two — shape the potential user's attitudes with valid approaches and provide correspondingly valid information — was served in its more realistic version.

The Smooth Phase

Two surveys were conducted in a Maguindanaon and a Kalagan area. In this phase, the Political Science and the Psychology modules conducted additional interviews with at least a subset of their respective partitions of the samples. Anthropology continued with observation, conversation and photography on elements of material culture in live settings.

By the third phase — the last two of a total of five surveys (with corresponding in-depth studies) — only a few data items were added deleted/reformatted (e.g., brackets yielded to actual value of the input data — a module would have no problem presenting the same data in brackets in the outputs or reports). Some questions were rephrased to enhance their clarity.

Pretesting the interview schedule for the third phase was still primarily for ensuring clarity. There was less effort to pick discriminent items in a scalogram, for example, and thereby, further parsimony of items was not attempted. Nevertheless, the third phase surveys (in a Maranao and a predominantly Tausug area) were the smoothest. And if the whole effort is viewed, it started the planned exploratory phase and probed into the more important problems; its achievements were modest.

The Results—Usability

The results mostly confirmed the trend of expectations. They merely provided or updated estimates of the levels or rates of certain indicators of the target populations. These were readily usable for problem-solving or decision-making purposes. The analysis also offered an approach or simplifying focus for dealing with certain issues/problems through the descriptions and explanations deriving from the conceptual orientation. Along the way, a few leads and gaps in understanding — i.e., excluding those attributable to lack of data or flaw in the analysis and interpretation — were identified. Occasionally, a qualification or limit to the applicability of a notion or view was shown to some extent. An integrated abstract of the major results focusing on poverty and ethnicity may be used to show the foregoing:6

Poverty was widespread: about 85 percent of the sample households fell below the poverty line, which was based on the Consumer Price Index adjusted for rural areas, the average household

size of 7 in the sample, and year. Income for about two-thirds of the occupational distribution was derived from selling goods in sari-sari stores (i.e., variety stores), farming, fishing and crafts: these were the most unemployed. And household members tended to acquire the same occupational skills as those of the head of household. For a household to cope, children (i.e., younger than 15 years) might work rather than go to school if job opportunities were available in the locality. The elderly (i.e., 65 years and older) might also work.

The dependency rate (80 non-working-age population per 100 population 15-65 years old) was low compared to that of that of the corresponding cities and provinces for both 1975 and 1980. 70 non-earners per 100 earners, WGS even lower. But in, say, a month, the household income would prove inadequate for their needs: 80 percent of the households needed to borrow money. And the (lucky few) households who had savings had a mean saving rate of only 2 percent of their monthly household income. Most of the expenditure items were for subsistence or for occupational use. With expenditure accounting for income aspirations,7 respondents' estimates of a sufficient household income was roughly 125 percent of the median household income. (The barter trade practiced to a sizeable degree in the sample areas was not studied in adequate detail.) Generally, the sample was dissatisfied with their current condition.

Feelings of insecurity, anxiety, fear, low self-esteem and confidence were attributable to the ongoing war, poverty, or the tsunami of August 16, 1976, which ravaged some coastal settlements. The populations would have to cope with these and recover from the painful experiences. However, their main concern was survival; livelihood considerations rated highest among both the "push" and the "pull" factors for migration. Inadequate conditions for peace and order ranked only second among the "push" factors. Among the "pull" factors, the availability of a relative in an urban center ranked second. Help for a relative could be extended in money; for neighbors, in time service (e.g., free labor). Health concerns did not rank high as a felt need—"self-medication" was generally practiced, with 48 percent of the illnesses categorized as respiratory.

But again, compared to their previous condition residence, the current condition of the migrants refugees was a big improvement. Some 56 percent of the communities were migrants or refugees; and 7 out of 10 of them intended to stay. The rapid and massive movements of populations in the southern Philippines have inflicted a rehabilitation burden on the urban centers. And this burden must be considered in connection with their capacity to develop into growth nodes. The 1980 census shows a trend towards smaller households in the region (city and provincial levels), and this could be due, in part, to relatives acquiring a house of their own. But the urban centers contain the resettlement projects, which absorb a good portion of the migrants refugees. The picture is basically unaltered.

The natural growth rate in the sample was about 0.5 percent a year because of a low birth rate and a high death rate.8 In relation to this is the proportion of the target populations in the national population. There was a decrease in the said proportion between 1960 and 1970 (from 4.9 percent to 4.3 percent); and depending on what ethnic groups are counted, such as "Muslim" in the 1980 household data, the proportion can range from 3.7 to 4.1 percent of national households.9 At issue here is resource allocation: higher benefits per capita or lower levels of allocation?

A clear trend towards female preponderance in the population was established. This preponderance (971 males per 1,000 females) was even greater in the working-age population (i.e., 15-64 years old) — only 943 males per 1,000 females. Between 1975 and 1980, census data show the same trend of change in the sex ratio in the corresponding cities and provinces.

Therefore, even beyond the short run, plans addressing job creation, productivity, adequate wage levels, etc., would have to take this trend into consideration. Women have been earning half

a much as men; and generally had lower educational attainment than men. The proportion of women in the work force might entail changes in the occupational composition insofar as gender might have an effect on the required skills. Appropriate educational-training programs would ease the adjustment process.

Across the sample communities, ethnic, age, and occupational groupings, education was held very important. Higher educational attainment turned out to be the primary criterion in the identification of those considered influential or leaders. And because of this, different leaders may have their own sphere of influence. Thus, a broader opinion base might be expected in the assessment, determination and articulation of needs in the communities.

The foregoing fairly summarizes the trends or conditions which are common to the five sample areas, and are useful in addressing the problem of poverty: perception of needs, wages and occupation, work force, training and the role of the urban centers, allocation of benefits, and so on. But differences within the common-shared conditions and trends must not be disregarded. In various and subtle ways differences between minority groups (i.e., not only between minorities and the majority) can foil programs from the conceptualization to the implementation phase. The sketchy description of the various ways in which ethnic differences might matter can illustrate the point.

In the political sphere: given an issue problem, constituents of a *barangay*10 would consult with someone influential who is of their ethnic group. They would cross official geographic boundaries if necessary. In terms of outlook and interactions: in the ethnically mixed communities, houses would form ethnic neighborhoods; and there could be slight differences in the perception of the norms of behavior. Some popular observations regarding social distance between the ethnic groups were borne out by the data. Social relations can also be affected by social stratification; and in this regard the degree of inequality in the distribution of household income is indicative of the access to, or control of resources that can eventually be a basis for, say, a position of power in the relevant area. Measured in Gini Ratios, the degree of inequality in household income distribution was higher in the sample areas which had a sizeable mixture in terms of ethnicity or religion than in those which were relatively homogeneous.

It has long been known that the ethnic groups have their own language, folklore and beliefs, temperament, crafts, cultural symbols, art, architecture, and others. Sultanates coincide with ethnic affiliation in terms of constituency. The precise impact of ethnicity on a particular decision or program would have to be carefully studied on a case-to-case basis, because of the complexity and subtlety involved. It was relatively easy to infer or conclude on the common trends and conditions in the sample areas. What is needed in the case of differences like the ethnicity-associated is prediction — or, at least, projection; and this is more demanding of the concept validity.

Actual Use

The Administration had a new Administrator by the end of the third year of the research project. And the project was appraised differently. In a few months, the project was ended.

Actual use of the research results was limited to a disciplined discussion of the issues, facts and hypotheses pertaining to the Muslims in the Southern Philippines. The Sponsor, his immediate staff, the Team acquired a closer view — not without gaps or blurs. Some of the researchers used what they could of the results (perhaps of the process experience) in lectures or articles. Thus, as envisioned by the Sponsor, the research was not meant to be used immediately for problem-solving

or decision-making. It was to influence the attitude and approach of potential users, decision-makers, in its own small way.

Discussion

In the foregoing case, respect for the unique identity of ethnic-religious minority groups was emphasized over the desire for successful programs — the latter would depend on the former. The bias for the said groups was so strong that the research orientation had, in effect, an advocacy attitude behind its concern for valid concepts: address issues which are appropriate for the target populations (needs, goals, problems, approaches, views, theories, solutions, criteria, etc.). The task can be characterized here as an effort to fuse the internal and the external; the subjective (actors' or target populations' views and values) and the objective (observers' or researchers'/decision-makers' concepts and programs).

The role of scientific disciplines in reconciling or resolving pertinent differences is precisely appreciable in their capacity to show to the actors populations what might otherwise be inaccessible or imperceptible to them; and to the decision-makers what may not be done without wasting resources or causing harm to the populations outright. This capacity stems from the use of specialized methods of investigation and an appeal to standards of rationality and valuations.11

This appeal postulates an underlying authentically human depth beneath the phenomena — true and truthful, good and right in different cultures. Without such a postulate, it would not be feasible even for the disciplines to communicate their findings and analyses. Neither could they enrich ordinary popular knowledge through educational programs and, for that matter, resolve differences in views. On the other hand, resorting to a monolithic view as the basis for effecting a condition or change in a shared environment would redound to a violation of the unique identity of groups, peoples. A condition or change in this context can impose constraints on the action behavior of the populations — even as there are veritable 'niches" in the environment.

Hence, the need for valid concepts — a supportable basis to justify or reject a proposed decision, policy or program. Valid concepts can serve as a common resource which facilitates the dialogue through which constituents or stake-holders rummage through relativities, versions, appearances (even goals, strategies, and values) in order to reach a workable common frame of reference. Without such a frame, questions on the rightness of a decision or success of a program would be difficult to settle.12

The task is precisely to anchor or ground concepts on the underlying reality, i.e., the human character. But the only access to this character seems to be its own concrete version, namely, culture which mediates social action. This access point should also be the starting point in the validation of concepts, decisions and programs. The relevant criteria to be used in the said process should be reconciled with the views of the target populations. These views are the only framework with which they can appreciate proposals, scenarios, conditions. Thus, the "burden of proof" is on the proponents of change, unless they are representing the target populations, in which case, decision-makers are given a basic input for their own framework. If a proposal cannot reconcile or resolve conflicting views of participating stake-holders, either the proposal is stymied, or it is implementable only by force (and thereby fraught with a higher risk of failing).

As humans interact with their environment — either to exercise their freedom to choose and to create, or to adapt in order to achieve their goals — changes in patterns, versions, views, and the like, are to be expected.13 These are numerous, and so are schemes to sort them out. But these need not stand in the way of deliberate efforts to effect changes which are deemed desirable under

a particular view. Fortunately, "a number of fundamental universal values shared by men everywhere"14 have already been recognized. There is an empirical basis on which concepts and policies can be grounded. It is feasible and meaningful to move in the direction of approximating more closely what is authentically human. Science can show — in a verifiable/falsifiable fashion — how universal values can play a role in concrete situations in the context of a particular culture.

Humanizing social life entails a corresponding process in science. Other than showing what ordinary knowledge cannot perceive, enlightening the "pedestrian" in his day-to-day choices and activities is a way for science to enrich the popular view. If the summation of day-to-day and spontaneous (i.e., as opposed to "socially engineered") activities are accounted for in terms of, say, promoting or threatening prevailing values and norms, then the humane framework of science — reckoning with values — exercises its enlightening role in another way, by directing attention to a problem that has acquired social significance, by forewarning society. Shaping the attitude and orientation of scientists, decision-makers, advocacy groups, minority groups, interest groups, and the general public contributes to the process of bringing about conditions which can be assessed in the context of a shared environment.

Engaging in value questions is connatural to science. Value premises must be made explicit in order to contextualize the analysis.15 In a more direct way, values have to be confronted as they are encountered in research situations. Otherwise, gaps in the analysis will just resurface in the implementation or evaluation phase of a program. In this sense, the dimension of obligation in the role of science indicates responsibility and commitment to human concerns. Insofar as science has privileged access to certain problems through its specialized methods, its power or capacity to legitimize a proposal shows through.

In this respect, the Team had to be pushed to clarify their value orientation. The need to recognize the value premises was prompted by the task of shortening the common interview schedule — from the level of value premise to that of data. Unique to the particular mix of the researchers in the Team was the difficulty to "translate/interpret" plans and concerns with regard to methods and techniques of data analysis. Coupled with this difficulty was the attempt to make the results flexible, that is, suitable to various decision frameworks.

Consequently, there were weaknesses in terms of research coherence: of modular interface with respect to the conceptualization or design; of focus with respect to the results. On the practical side, the results were not easily integrated. If a problem-solving task eventually came up, it would be difficult to show in what different ways and varying degrees a given problem would affect the different dimensions or components of a proposed program. On the theoretical side, exploring for interconnections — i.e., the basis of models usable on the practical side — was hampered by the lack of data when there was some integrated approach, and by the lack of operational inter-compatibility owning to the partitioned samples when there was ample data to use. From another angle, the case missed an opportunity to try unifying the disciplinary frameworks into an integrated orientation towards the selected set of concerns and problems. An attempt of this when there was enough data to "play with" could have been a modest step in the reexamination of the scope and boundaries and frameworks of the disciplines involved with respect to their particular set of concerns.16

Since iterating between the design and the results inevitably demands mutual appreciation of tune methods and techniques of analysis (say, a common "language"), a clearer definition of the context or a narrower project scope could have helped on a phase-by-phase basis. Appreciating the broad concerns was no reason to disregard the basically purposive nature of knowledge at a given time; interconnections come at another time. In the meantime, prepare and provide for the

interconnections; aim for validity in a definite context. After all, a piece of research is only one of many inputs or guides to a particular act of decision-making.17 To the degree that decision-makers or the general public reckon with the several inputs or guides, trends of convergence or divergence will hopefully emerge. Validity of concepts will further be assessed, perhaps with a disciplined sense of humor.

Accordingly one meets the basic need for a reliable basis or valid justification of decisions/factions, a procrustean/authoritarian mood. Such a mood actually belies the concern for validity. After all, there are foundations on which to ground concepts and action.18 And, for humane science, it is clearly imperative — from the foregoing — that, inasmuch as the concepts eventually impact life, they had better be valid.

Notes

1. Citations in the discussion — a critique of the whole case — will come mainly from the first section of the references.

2. Materials included briefs memoranda, discussion or critique of proposals or presentation of results analysis, and conference minutes (with occasional details from the tapes). This author also had his observations and recollections as a Team member. He handled the Demography planning Module; and, at the overall project level, he designed the sampling scheme for the surveys, and coordinated the data processing function across the modules. His involvement in the Fact Book was very minimal.

3. Mahmoud, Mohammed Fatthy, "The Muslim Problem and the Government's Response", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 1974), pp. 215-225.

4. A concept approved by the National Economic and Development Authority. For a discussion, see: E.B. Printilla, "Regional Development and Planning: the Philippine Experience," (Read by R. de Vera at the:) *Conference in Growth Pole Strategy and Regional Development Planning in Asia* (United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan, November 1975), pp. 83-106.

5. I. Romeo Soling and Myra Florendo-Van Vactor, *Annotated Source Book on the Islamized Ethnic Communities in the Philippines* (NCC/SPDA, 1980), 4 volumes.

6. Based on the module report, a profile of the sample areas is presented in: Florencio R. Riguera, "Profile of Muslim Populations in the Southern Philippines", *Dansalan Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (January 1983), (Dansalan Research Center, Dansalan Foundation, Inc., Marawi City) pp. 65-107. All census data used in the analysis are those released by the National Census and Statistics Office, National Economic and Development Authority. The total sample size consisted of 2,190 adults, 92.4 percent of whom were Muslim; 7.2°/o Christian. The major Muslim ethnic groups made up 84.7 percent of the total sample — these are the Maguindanaon, Maranao, Tausug. The statistical level of significance was set at = 0.05 (when the computed value of a statistic Rae a little below the 0.05 level, was adjusted to 0.10 in a few cases; but no further adjustment beyond 0.10.)

7. Compared to other significant but weak correlations, R2=0.30.

8. It was out of consideration for the respondents that the cause of death was not asked.

9. These are based on the appropriate census data from the National Census and Statistics Office. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that in 1985, as many as 90,000 Filipinos in Sabah, Malaysia, could be considered refugees. (*World Refugee Survey*, p. 53.) In the survey regions, the corresponding urban centers generally gained from immigration between

1970 and 1975. This is shown by the sizeable increases in the assumed real cohort of 0-4 year-olds (i.e., 5-9 years old by 1975). The provinces generally lost to outmigration or mortality.

10. The *barangay* is the smallest administrative or political unit in the Philippines. It consists of 200 households, and is headed by an elected Captain.

11. For this segment, the materials by Adler, *Habermas* (especially, Vol. I, pp. 8-42; Vol. II, pp. 113-198), Laszlo, Myrdal, Snyder, and Wiarda, are very relevant.

12. Relevant here is the question of whether a public decision-maker serving/representing a constituency may go against the expressed views of the constituency in favor of his/her personal stand on a particular issue. Persuasion is in order if the constituency lacks access to some information which may be ascertained by specialized method. Or, the constituency ratifies/ repudiates an action taken under pressure.

13. Classification schemes can proliferate rapidly as a little variation occurs. With, say, only 4 dichotomized factors which shape "ways of ticking" (values, outlook, relations, environment) — for illustration — there would be 24 = 16 unique "versions of ticking" if only the combinations mattered. If, however, the permutation of relevant factors mattered, then there would be 24 permutations within each of the 16 combinations — that is, 384 unique versions. At 3 Categories in earn of the 4 factors, there would be 81 unique combinations; 1,944 unique permutations. Snyder (pp. 38-46) uses a natural selection model to explain the persistence of patterns. Kenneth G. Avrow's analysis of impossibilities is particularly helpful; see *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 1963).

14. Laszlo, *op. cit*., p. 106. Cleveland also lists common needs (p. 684). Lauren approaches the inner "character" of the human mind(s) from brain research data. At the ontic level, value may be defined as "perfective good" — it fulfills an innate human imperfection (based on Manuel Piñon, 0.P.). Without oversimplifying things, goals or criteria of acceptability/ desirability that can be seen in behavior; expressions of the inner working of the mind; the ontic feature enables universality to be viewed at different layers, it seems.

15. Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 55-56. Cleveland holds that public responsibility is a dimension of every discipline (p. 685). Myrdal's specifications (pp. 63-64) are helpful.

16. It is well known that Theology uses a philosophical infrastructure. A case in point is: Hans Kung, *Infallible? An Inquiry* (pp. 157-240). Paradigm shifts can be prepared for; see: Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (university of Chicago Press, 1970).

17. See Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, *Usable Knowledge*. The occasional confusion of roles in the research case illustrates the difficulty incurred by compartmentalizing the conceptualization process; even as a disciplinary specialty it provides a unique facet of a reality.

18. From a different mode of knowing, the "law" is already written in the human heart. But to avoid being misled, it is important to test everything (Deut. 30, 11-14; Mt. 24, 24; and I Thess. 5, 21). At the fundamental and general levels, respect for human dignity is professed in such declarations as the United Nations' *Declaration on Human Rights*, and *Dignitatis Humanae*, (the Second Vatican Council's). The focus of the general public's concern for ethics, morality can change from time to time. But in a very tangible way, Peters, et al., report on a decision-making model which was translated into a teaching/learning set of procedures for public administrators in New Zealand, the objective being to improve the accountability of administration along ethical and moral lines.

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Chapter V
The Story of Man: Humanization of Social Life

Prabhakara. M. Rao

Humanness and Value Inquiry

The phrase "humanization of the social life" implies a lack of humanness in social life and necessitates an inquiry into the roots of humanness in man which makes "humanization of social life" possible. It also suggests that man can be inhuman. This leads to a question, namely, if man is a human being then how can he be inhuman? To find the answer it is necessary to determine how humanness is expressed, namely, how and where is humanness realized by people generally in social life?

Though humanness exists within man himself, it is its need to be expressed which renders understandable the notion of humanization of the social life. If man keeps humanness within himself and does not express it, then his humanness may be questionable. Therefore, our major concern should be with the expression of humanness. If one takes humanness as value, that is, as the principle in man which he ought to realize, then it must be realized in relation to an object which receives it. Where does this value exist? Does it exist in the subject, or in the object? If in the object then the same value should be realized and expressed by everyone. But in fact no two persons view the same object in the same manner. This suggests a defect either in the subject or in the object. If we take the position that the defect is in the object then we have to accept the locus of the existence of the value in the object and a defect there obstructing the revelation of its value. Though one may argue reasonably that value exists in the object, it is impossible for one to find there a principle obstructing the revelation of value, for whatever is taken to be an object in knowledge is by nature value neutral, for value inquiry into an object can never reveal the actual value as defined earlier. Therefore, one would have to treat the object as value-neutral: for instance, though different persons view a girl as beautiful, ugly, good, bad etc., she is neither beautiful, nor ugly, nor any of the attributions that viewers make for the view of the subject never affects the actual nature of the object.

There remains the other position, namely, that the defect may exist in the subject in the process of realization of value. If we take up this position then we have to accept that value exists in the subject along with an obstructing principle1 which creates defective expressions of value. If we accept this position then we must have to differentiate value in essence in man from realization of value in relation to object. If we accept that there is a defective principle in the way of realization of value then we have to find how it functions. This depends upon where we realize value. It can be said that value may be realized in the following alternatives: (i) in the subject itself, (ii) in the object itself, (iii) neither in the subject nor in the object but only on the relation between the subject and object, (iv) in the compound set consisting of the subject, object and relation between subject and object, and (v) value can never be realized.

Let us now consider the above possibilities one by one. (i) Value is realized only in the subject: This leads eventually to self-isolation by making the world to be nothing. But if everyone becomes secluded then the unity of the reality cannot be expressed, and the process of the nature2 for unification cannot be carried out. (ii) Value is realized only in the object: If one realizes value thus then the subject will become nothing. This also is not desirable because, then the unity of the realty

cannot be expressed. (iii) Value is realized neither in the subject nor in the object but only on the relation between the subject and object: This is how value is realized when one searches for value as an object. When the defective principle in the subject functions and diverts the natural process of unity, man searches for value sometimes in the relation between subject and object, sometimes in the subject alone, sometimes in the object alone, and even at times he may say that there is no value at all. Probably what we usually do is to realize value in the influence of the defective principle. Therefore, what one ought to do is to correct the defective principle and realize value in a way that it has to be realized. (iv) Value is realized in the compound set consisting of the subject, object and the relation between subject and object: This is how one realizes value when one's defective principle is corrected; it indicates the unity of totality and this is the way of natural process. Therefore, one ought to learn to realize value in the composite set of subject, object and the relation between subject and object. This sort of realization of value emphasizes the realization of reality in the subject as identified with the reality in the object and also with the relation between subject and object. The realization of the identity of reality in the object with the subject leads to personal moral development and self respect. The realization of the identity of the reality in the subject with that of the relation between subject and object leads to the development of social equality, and then freedom and dignity appear in the society. Therefore, one ought to learn to realize value in accordance with unity, which is a course of natural process in reaching its goal, namely, the free expression of the unity of the totality. (v) Value can never be realized: This view is not worth considering because it challenges the very existence of being and eventually might lead to bitter pessimism. All these views are different projections of the defective principle. While this defective principle functions freely on its own, by its very nature it projects the views (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) etc., whereas when it is corrected it projects the view (iv). The important point to note here is that whether it is a defective projection or a correct projection of self- expression, it ought to be projected by this defective principle. As this defective principle causes everything related to man, it is essential always to check this principle and correct it.

The Criterion of Value

Unchangeability as a Criterion: Value, if it be such, should be unchangeable. If value is taken as changeable its realization becomes meaningless. Changing value implies change in the ground reality; it leads ultimately to multiplicity with inequality and leaves no scope for unity. As the goal of natural process, unity excludes inequality and difference in reality. Since change in value opposes the natural process it can be treated as an anti-value—the projection of the defective principle. Therefore, value ought to be unchangeable; one needs to seek such value.

Since man is situated at top of the existing natural process he has capacity of free expression of the self. This potentiality can be taken as humanness. However, as this capacity is blocked and obstructed by the defective principle, there is a problem which is an indigenous product of the natural process. Man faces lot of troubles in his life due to the defective principle. The search for solution outside man is a meaningless and futile exercise. The problem should be solved by man within himself because the problem exists within man. When man corrects his defective principle he will be able to express himself freely in the sense of unity in totality. As is cited in the above discussion it is the expression of the realization of the identity of the reality of one's own self with that of the object, and the relation between subject and object. This way natural process is realized and satisfied. This expression of identity in multiplicity of the self can be taken to be the humanness of man. And thus humanness becomes value. Since humanness is value it is not changeable and

therefore, it is an unchangeable common ground of all human beings. Thus it can be said that all human beings are fundamentally rooted in this ground of humanness. However, by the influence of the defective principle all men are deviated from reality. Now it is our concern to articulate as to how to correct the defect so as to realize the process of nature and live in accordance with it.

Our task here is to trace value in man as identified with humanness. It leads us to inquire about who man really is. As this inquiry is restricted by the knowledge and experience of man, value or humanness or man in essence should fall within the human experience. This necessitates an analysis of human experience.

Three Levels of Experience:

It is a common experience that basically man deals with the material things and all activities through his psycho-physical organism. This experience technically can be called waking experience. Becoming tired from this activity man by transcending the domain of the experience of the psycho-physical organism he gives up this world of activity and enters into another horizon of experience which is unique in nature and different from the experience of activity of psycho-physical organism. That experience can be called dream experience in which man experiences exclusively his own world. After retiring from dream experience man gradually falls into deep sleep. Here man does not find any object or any of his desires or any relations whatsoever. It is a state of absolute calmness, different from both waking and dream experience, technically called dreamless sleep. Thus man's total life experience can be reduced mainly to the three kinds of experiences, namely, (i) waking experience, (ii) dream experience and (iii) dreamless sleep experience. Whatever man usually claims as his experience should fall into one of these three kinds of experiences. The following table shows the factors involved in the three states of experience. The explanation of the same will be continued after this table.

Table

States of Experiences	Factors Involved Functionally					
	Con	Ign	Ino	Fv	Fso	Foa	Phb
WE	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
DE	P	P	P	P	A	A	A
DLS	P	P	A	P	A	A	A
TFO	P	A	A	P	A	A	A

CON: Consciousness, IGN: Ignorance, INO: Internal Organ, FV: Five Vital-Breath, FSO: Five Sense Organs, FOA: Five Organs of Action, PHB: Physical Body, WE: Waking Experience, DE: Dream Experience, DLS: Dreamless Sleep Experience, TFO: The Fourth, P: Present, A: Absent.

Waking Experience: In his waking state man gains experience through the function of his physical body which contains (a) head, trunk, hands and legs, etc., (b) five sense organs, namely, those of sight, smell, taste, hearing and touch, (c) five organs of action, namely, those of speech,

hand, feet, excretion, and procreation, (d) five vital-breath and (e) fourfold functions of the internal organ, namely, mind, intellect, remembering faculty and the "I" or the Ego.

Waking experience begins with the Ego or the "I" which represents the person in waking state. It is very nature of the Ego to exclude others from itself consciously or unconsciously. In this basic condition man's experience of different things of the world makes them as objects. Thus, man becomes the subject in experience and the whole of waking experience consists of a subject-object relation. No knowledge in the waking experience escapes the subject-object relation. Who is this experiencer? Is he the Ego who experiences in waking state using all available faculties explained above, or is he somebody else? This question arises in relation to the continuity of the Ego. If the experiencer is only the Ego then man's experience lasts only so long as the Ego continues to exist. If we can find at least some experience without the presence of the Ego then the question arises that who is the real experiencer? To testify whether the Ego continues all the time in human life we shall examine the nature of other experiences, but so far as waking experience is concerned the Ego exists and is the experiencer.

Dream Experience: In dream experience man experiences the mental images stored from waking experience. Sometimes man even creates his own world by manipulating the mental images in dream and experiences them. While man experiences dream he does not have the function either of the physical body (in dream experience) or the five sense organs or the five organs of action as in waking experience. The only functions remaining are those of five vital-breath and the internal organ which functions as both the experiencer and the experienced (subject and object). This indicates that the Ego continues to exist in dream experience.

Dreamless Sleep Experience: In the dreamless sleep experience there is no object whatsoever; it is absolutely calm and peaceful. Man does not know himself in dreamless sleep state, but experiences a wonderful peace. So long as man is in dreamless sleep experience he does not say that he is in such an experience. However, after coming to waking state one recollects the experience of dreamless sleep and says "I had very good sleep," "I did not know myself," etc. Is the experiencer in dreamless sleep the Ego which continues from the previous experiences, namely, waking and dream experiences or is it somebody else, someone other than the Ego?

Ramanuja is one of the great advocates for the continuance of the Ego in dreamless sleep. Against him the Advaitins advocate the discontinuity of the Ego in dreamless sleep. According to the advaitins, though the Ego acts as experiencer in waking and dream experiences, it does not exist in dreamless sleep where the experiencer is Consciousness itself known as *prajna*. For Advaitins Consciousness is the ground for all experiences—the only factor which continues to exist through all the different states of experiences; the other factors involved in man's experience will fail to exist at least once. This Consciousness is the real experiencer of all experiences. It is by identifying itself with the Consciousness that the Ego acts as the experiencer in waking and dream experiences. For the purpose of strong arguments Ramaraya, the twentieth century Advaita Vedantin, is taken as an advocate of Advaita Vedanta against Ramanuja. Let us examine the polemics of Ramaraya *vis a vis* Ramanuja, beginning with the latter.

The 'I' (The Ego) Exists in Dreamless Sleep

Ramanuja, in his *Sri-bhasya* (1.1.1), especially in *mahasiddhanta,* says that, in deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no Consciousness of outward things; thus

there is no distinct and clear presentation of the "I". All the same, up to the time of waking the self somehow presents itself in one form of the "I" which therefore cannot be said to be absent. According to Ramanuja, the Advaitic assumption that, only Consciousness is manifest in dreamless sleep may be called into question. For a person raised from dreamless sleep never represents to himself his state of Consciousness during sleep in the form, "I was pure consciousness, free from all ego and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing nescience". What he thinks is only "I slept well". From this form of recollection it appears that even during sleep the self, that is, the "I", was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure.

An Advaitin cannot argue against this that the recollection has the following form: as now I feel pleasure, so I slept then also; for the recollection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of recollection. According to Ramamnuja, one cannot say that, owing to the non-permanency of the "I", its perception of pleasure during sleep cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the "I" is permanent as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, such as "I did such and such a thing", "I observed this or that", "I said so or so".

Ramanuja observes that, an Advaitin will perhaps say, that the person who has risen from sleep also recollects, "for such and such a time I was conscious of nothing". If it is so, then Ramanuja asks: "what does this imply?" For him "it implies a negation of everything". "Ramanuja argues that the words "I was conscious" in such recollection show that the knowing "I" persisted, and hence what is negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in "of nothing" includes everything, it would also negate the pure Consciousness which Advaitins hold to persist in dreamless sleep.

For Ramanuja, in the judgment "I was conscious of nothing", the word "I" clearly refers to the "I", that is, the knowing self which persists even during deep sleep, while the words "was conscious of nothing" negate all knowledge on the part of that "I". Ramanuja satirically says that, if now, in the face of this, an Advaitin undertakes to prove by means of this very judgment that knowledge—which is expressly denied existed at the time, and that the persisting knowing self did not exist, the Advaitin may address his proof to the patient Gods who give no reply. But Ramanuja says that, if the Advaitin goes on to urge to form the following judgment also: "I then was not conscious of myself", and from this understand that the "I" did not persist during dreamless sleep. Ramanuja says that the Advaitin does not know that this denial of the persistence of the "I" flatly contradicts the state of Consciousness expressed in the judgment "I was not conscious of myself" and the verbal form of the judgment itself. It is reasonable to ask now: what is denied by the words "of myself"? He answers the question in the following arguments. According to Ramanuja what is negated in that judgment is not the knowing "I" itself, but merely the distinctions of caste, condition of life, etc., which belong to the "I" at the time of waking. One must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the "(me) myself" is the "I" distinguished by class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the object of the word "I" (in the judgment) is that "I" which consists of a uniform flow of self-Consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment "I did not know myself" therefore means, according to Ramanuja, that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of his special characteristics, and so on.

Ramanuja says that the Advaitin's own view is that in dreamless sleep the self occupies the position of a witnessing principle with regard to nescience. But by a witness (*saksin*) Ramanuja understands some one who knows about something by personal observation (*saksat*); for a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in the scriptures as well as in ordinary

language it is knowing subject only, and not mere knowledge, which is spoken of as a witness. Panini also agrees with this when teaching that the word "*saksin*" means one who knows in person3. Ramanuja now says this witness is nothing else but the "I" which is apprehended in the judgment "I know". How then should this "I" not be apprehended in the state of sleep, for that which itself appears to the self appears as the "I", and it thus follows that also in deep sleep it appears as the "I".4

The 'I' (The Ego) Does Not Exist in Dreamless Sleep

According to Ramanuja, the knower (*jnata*) in dreamless sleep state is the 'I' and can be known thus from the post-sleep recollection—"I did not know myself." Ramaraya says that this is not true; the non-existence of the 'I' in dreamless sleep can be determined by the same post-sleep recollection—"I did not know myself."

Ramaraya advances the following arguments against Ramanuja. He asks: can the existence of the "pot" be determined by the experience of the "pot" through such recollection as "I did not see the pot in the house?" Here, Ramaraya's intention is to draw an analogy between the two recollections, namely, "I did not know myself" and "I did not see the pot." As the existence of the "pot" cannot be determined from such a recollection as "I did not see the pot", so also the existence of "myself," that is, the 'I' cannot be determined from such recollection as "I (the Ego) did not know myself."

Ramaraya proves this fact by his argument that, in the example of "pot" recollection, Ramanuja cannot differentiate the "pot" from its "seer" (person), because if "pot" and "seer" are differentiated in the example of "pot" recollection then Ramanuja must also differentiate the "I" (knower) from "myself" in the case of post-sleep recollection, that is, "I did not know myself". If Ramanuja differentiates the "I" (the knower in deep sleep) from "myself" (the ego), then his admission that "the knower in deep sleep is the 'I' or the ego" will become false, because the post-sleep recollection itself shows the non-existence of the 'I' (myself or the ego) which is different from the "I" (the knower in dreamless sleep). Thus, Ramanuja cannot differentiate either the "pot" from the "seer" or the "I" from "myself" (the ego).

Even to argue that the "I" and "myself" (the ego) are not different, Ramanuja cannot say that "myself" in the post-sleep recollection, which is indicated by the word ego, is equivalent to the word which is indicated by the term "I"; because ego exists only at the time of recollection and not at the time of the experience of the non-existence of "myself" (the ego) in deep sleep.

Thus, Ramaraya argues that in the state of dreamless sleep, due to the non-existence of "myself" (the ego) like that of the "pot", *prajna*, the knower in dreamless sleep did not have the experience of "myself". *Prajna* by experiencing himself without the ego becomes *visva* in the waking state and recollects that "I did not know myself."

The argument continues: is it possible to have the experience of the non-existence of oneself by itself? If the knower in dreamless sleep were the ego itself, how is it possible for the ego to have the experience of its own non-existence in dreamless sleep?

Ramaraya asks: he who says that "there is no pot"—did he experience the non-existence of the pot? Or did he not? According to Ramaraya, the first position is correct, because, unless one experiences the non-existence of the "pot", one cannot say "there is no pot". He says that the second position (that is, one did not experience the non-existence of the pot) is not correct; because there cannot be the recollection of the non-existence of the "pot" which was not experienced.

Similarly Ramaraya asks: when one says "I did not know myself"—did he experience the non-existence of "myself" (the ego), or did he not? For the first position Ramaraya points out that, if according to Ramanuja the knower in deep sleep is the ego, then how can the ego experience its own non-existence? According to Ramaraya, here, at the time of comprehension there is non-existence of the object of comprehension and at the time of the existence of the object of comprehension there is non-existence of the knower.

For the second position—the sleeper has not experienced the non-existence of the ego in dreamless sleep—Ramaraya asks: how could there be recollection of something which was not experienced? It implies that, since the non-existence of the ego is not experienced in dreamless sleep, there is no possibility of the non-existence of "myself" (the ego) in the post-sleep recollection.

Therefore, the non-existence of the ego is experienced in the state of dreamless sleep by some factor other than the ego and that experiencer is *prajna*. This is a problem in the state of dreamless sleep, for there is not only the experience, but also the experiencer. Hence, in the state of dreamless sleep, experience as well as *prajna* remains whereas experience alone remains in the state of liberation.

For Ramanuja the ego is the knower (*jnata*), for if according to Ramaraya, *prajna* alone remains without the ego in dreamless sleep, then how can *prajna* be the knower? By way of answer Ramaraya says that the Consciousness remains in the state of dreamless sleep as the knower qualified by ignorance (*ajnana*).

Ramanuja continues his argument saying that, though the ego exists in dreamless sleep, it was not experienced. Ramaraya does not accept this position. He asks: for whom is there no experience of the ego: for the ego (knower) itself or for some other factor?

For the first position - Ramaraya asks whether the ego experiences its own non-existence or not. First, how can the ego experience its own non-existence, while it (the ego) does not have any knowledge of its own or of others in dreamless sleep? How can there be the absence of its own cognition when the ego itself is the cognizer? How can there arise any knowledge for the ego without the knowledge of itself? The implication is that the ego, that is, the alleged knower can never have the experience of its own non-existence. For the second position, that is, the ego does not experience its own non-existence; Ramaraya asks how can there be the comprehension of something which has not been experienced? It implies that the ego cannot comprehend the non-existence of itself. Since the non-existence of the ego is already comprehended in the post-sleep recollection, the alleged knower, that is, the ego should have had the experience of its own non-existence. As it is proved already that the ego cannot have the experience of its own non-existence, the knower in deep sleep must be other than the ego.

Thus according to the aforesaid arguments, Ramanuja has to accept the proved fact that the knower in deep sleep is different from the ego. According to Ramaraya, the content of the object "myself" in the post-sleep recollection, "I did not know myself", is indeed the ego with the characteristics of the waking state such as *jati*, etc., and that of the subject in the state of dreamless sleep is well known.

If Ramanuja claims the experience of one's own self tinged with the ego as the content of the subject in the post-sleep recollection, then this position becomes unacceptable to Ramaraya, for the recollector, the "I" in waking state, is related to several characteristics like *jati*, etc. But, in dreamless sleep as said earlier, there is no existence of the ego.

Ramanuja may say that in dreamless sleep the "I" who is identical with the "experience" did not have the experience of itself along with the characteristics like *jati*, etc. For Ramaraya it is not

so. He naturally asks who is this "I" identical with experience?. Is the "I" identical with the ego or is it different from it?

The position, that is, the "I" which is identical with experience is also identical with the ego, cannot be accepted because both experience and the ego cannot remain in one and the same substratum. The alternative position that the "I" which is identical with experience is devoid of the ego is also not true. For Ramanuja himself admitted that in dreamless sleep, there is no cessation of the ego. Therefore, the view that there is no cessation of the ego of the *Atman*, which is identical with experience, is refuted. According to Ramanuja, there is no cessation of the ego in dreamless sleep, but there is cessation of (qualified) ego in the form of "I am brahmin", "I am man", "I am stout", "I am weak", "I am old", etc. Ramaraya maintains that this is not correct.

If there is no ego in the form of "I am brahmin," etc., in dreamless sleep, then Ramaraya asks Ramanuja to explain in what form the ego exists in dreamless sleep. Whether the ego exists in the form of "I am experience", or in the form of "I am the knower" or in the form of "I am happy", or otherwise in the form of "I do not know myself"? When there is no such ego in dreamless sleep, then how could there be the continuance of the ego in dreamless sleep? Therefore, according to Ramaraya, the ego which is the reflection of consciousness does not exist in dreamless sleep.

If Ramanuja says that, even though there is cessation of the ego in dreamless sleep, there is the knower, and that because of the presence of the witness of the ignorance (*ajnanasaksin*) the witness can be the knower in dreamless sleep, then Ramaraya holds that it is correct. Ramaraya, taking the meaning of "witness" in the Advaitic sense says that it is very often told in all the verbal usages that *Atman*, which is in the form of knowledge, has nescience (*maya*) as its object and assumes the knower hood. It should not be said that the reflection (of consciousness) in the ego is alone the knower; as the reflection (of consciousness) in the ego is the knower, so also *Atman* conditioned by the ignorance (*ajnana*) is the knower. Thus, *Atman* conditioned by ignorance is the knower in dreamless sleep. Unconditioned *Atman* is knowledge alone, not the knower with the non-existence of the object of knowledge. By the condition of nescience (*maya*) *Atman* assumes the object of knowledge.

The central idea concerning the absence of the "I" in dreamless sleep, according to Ramaraya can be stated briefly thus: In reality *Atman* is knowledge alone and becomes the knower because of nescience (*maya*). In the states of waking and dream, as *Atman* is qualified by the ego it becomes the knower; and since there is no ego in dreamless sleep, *Atman* as qualified by ignorance (*avidya*) becomes the knower. Thus, for all practical purposes *Atman* is knower because of the existence of its objects of knowledge. Scriptures also hold the same idea—"witness consciousness", "that alone is the seer", "no other seer apart from that", "(that is) the knower", etc. Thus, the knower hood of *Atman*, which comes out of the superimposition of the identity of not-self (*anatman*) on *Atman* is false. The Scriptures such as "Truth, knowledge, Infinite is Brahman", "Knowledge, Bliss is Brahman" declare that the knower alone is *Atman*. The ego, though inert by its nature becomes the knower by the superimposition of the nature of *Atman*. Thus, Ramanuja’s arguments for the continuance of the ego in dreamless sleep are refuted.5

Continuity of Consciousness

The unity and continuity of our experience is an undeniable fact, but it is not possible to establish this fact without the admission of a fundamental Consciousness. The forms of empirical knowledge such as "I know the pot", "I know the cloth," etc., are said to be personal. In the knowledge "I know the pot", the "I" that is thus known is called our empirical self. This empirical

self is strictly relative to the material objects that are known such as ‘pot’, etc. We cannot have evidence for the empirical self without any object. The empirical self is known only when the internal organ acts upon some object. We cannot have the awareness of the self when the internal organ does not function on any object. Therefore, we can say that the awareness of the self is possible as long as we know the objects, and when we ceased to know the objects we have also ceased to become aware of the self.

Is there any proof for the existence of the self apart from any relation to the objects? If there is no proof for the existence of the self apart from any relation to the objects, then the self is said to be real in so far as it is implied in different cases of knowledge. This argument would be correct if there were no facts within our present experience which went beyond the subject-object relation in knowledge. But, the post-sleep assertion, namely, "I did not know anything", which is the nature of dreamless sleep, can be accepted as an unshakable fact of our present experience which went beyond subject-object relation. The cognition of any object evidently involves two terms, the subject and the object. The non-cognition of the object is, therefore, possible in the absence of either of these terms. This being so, the absence of all cognition during the state of dreamless sleep may be interpreted as the result of the absence either of all objects of cognition or of the cognizer or Consciousness itself. Advaita Vedanta accepts the first view, that is, the absence of all cognition in dreamless sleep is due to the absence of all objects of cognition. Now, the question arises: Does Consciousness continue in the state of dreamless sleep?

Advaita Vedanta proves the continuity of the Consciousness during the dreamless sleep state on the strength of the post-sleep assertion, that is, "I did not know anything". The non-cognition of an object is certainly as possible in the absence of the object as in the absence of the cognizer itself. But the knowledge of the non-cognition of the object is obviously impossible in the absence of Consciousness. The post-sleep assertion of the form "I did not know anything" indicates not only the non-cognition of any object during the period of sleep, but also the awareness of this fact. For, without such awareness the non-cognition in question cannot evidently be asserted.

To put the same argument differently, the post-sleep assertion, "I did not know anything," as the very form of the statement indicates, is a case of memory which must refer to the direct awareness of the non-cognition of any object during sleep itself. If so, the post-sleep statement just referred to, establishes the presence of Consciousness during the state of dreamless sleep by the very denial of anything being known.

If it is supposed that there is no Consciousness in dreamless sleep, then the question arises: "how do we know this?" It cannot be argued that the absence of knowledge during dreamless sleep is inferred from the memory of the state before sleep and the knowledge of the state after it. For, what is to be inferred must have been previously experienced as in some way invariably associated with the ground of the inference. But the simultaneous presence of the two states of waking and sleep being, by the very nature of the case impossible, we cannot associate the two, and, consequently, there can be no valid ground for inference here. The only possible way for such association in our knowledge is through the present experience of the one, namely, the waking state, and the memory of the other, that is, of the dreamless sleep. But as soon as we admit such a memory, it must necessarily refer, as already pointed out; to the corresponding Consciousness of having known nothing during the state of dreamless sleep.

Though the post-sleep statement of the form: "I did not know anything" during dreamless sleep does establish the existence of Consciousness during the said period, the acceptance of this knowledge, that is, the knowledge of not knowing anything expressed by the statement as a case of memory raises some technical difficulties.

The direct awareness of not knowing anything during the period of dreamless sleep cannot obviously be accredited to the ego or empirical Consciousness absent during the period. The awareness in question must therefore, belong to the witness or the pure Consciousness which may be said to function, that is, to reveal its objects without the apparatus required for the empirical knowledge, the knowledge of the ego. This being so, the question arises as to how the ego can remember the experience accredited to the witness.

This objection, though formidable on the face of it, loses its entire force when we take into consideration the fact that it is impossible for one individual to remember the experience of another, for the ego and the witness do not stand for two separate subjects which are entirely independent of each other. For, the ego, the witness itself is associated with the apparatus of empirical knowledge, namely, the internal organ. If so, there is no inconsistency in the ego appropriating the experience of the witness during the period of sleep and expressing it in a form as though it were its own experience. What really matters is not the ego but the continuation of one indivisible Consciousness—the subject or witness—which alone makes both the original experience and the memory of it possible. Thus the above analysis of the state of dreamless sleep establishes beyond all doubt that pure Consciousness, or the real subject, continues even in such states. If sleep appears to the unreflective mind as a state characterized by a mere emptiness or lapse of Consciousness, it is, as we have already emphasized, because of the absence of object of cognition during the period, and not because of the cessation of Consciousness itself. If so, while the object derives all its meaning in and through its relation to the subject, and cannot consequently be shown to possess any being apart from its relation to the latter, the analysis of dreamless sleep (by proving the existence of Consciousness during this period) establishes that Consciousness can and does exist even when it is unrelated to the object and uniformly presents in all levels of experience.

The Problem of Humanization of Social Life Arises only in Waking Experience

Waking experience is the state where all human beings commonly experience the duality of the world with distinctive desires. This is the state of individualism and separation. This is the state of dynamism of Ego which maintains difference. This is the state where everyone experiences pain and pleasure uniformly. The state of dream is completely private unlike waking experience. The dreamless sleep experience is the state of complete unity and peace. It is the state common to all beings where everyone experiences bliss uniformly. Among the three states of experience the waking and dreamless sleep are commonly experienced and the dream experience is unique and privately experienced without concerning others. The dream is false is a universal experience of all and therefore, is not important for the present discussion. The commonality is the factor applicable for both waking and dreamless sleep. These two states of experience are opposite to each other. For in dreamless sleep every one experiences bliss. The experience of bliss is possible in dreamless sleep due to the absence of the experience of manifold objects of the world. It is common for all beings to experience bliss in their dreamless sleep. The experience of bliss is always liked by all beings uniformly. This is the state where there is neither pain nor pleasure. Since there is no experience of difference in the state of dreamless sleep and everyone likes the experience of bliss, the experience of dreamless sleep cannot be a problematic for our present context. Thus the waking experience alone becomes the locus of our problem, namely, humanization of social life. The state of waking consists of difference, individuality and experience of pain and pleasure which is called duhkha. It is mentioned in the above analysis of three levels

of experience that Ego projects the Humanness – the Pure Consciousness in different ways mainly in the forms of likes and dislikes; good and bad. Thus the Ego can be said to be the defective principle which ought to be corrected towards the unity from all diversity and individualism. In a way of discovering the unity in the diversity, different civil societies are formed in order to maintain the freedom of all individuals. As long as the freedom of the individual in the society leads to the unity that becomes a healthy freedom or else it would be the freedom tainted by the influence of the defective principle – Ego. The free expression of humanness by the corrected Ego which leads to unconditional unity and universal brotherhood can be taken as the standard of real freedom, dignity and social justice. Any knowledge, society, law, religion or any other institution if leading to the unconditional unity of all human beings then such institutions are acceptable or else one should denounce the same.

Self or Consciousness as Value and as Humanness

As it is proved by the arguments of Advaitins the subjectivity of the Ego is temporary and limited only to waking and dream experiences. The actual person or man in essence is only Consciousness which is the ever flowing light of knowledge. The defective principle tries to modify the real expression of Consciousness. The Consciousness is unchangeable and therefore, value. Since Consciousness alone is found as the one and only unchangeable factor in human being it can be said that Consciousness is humanness and therefore, value to be realized. That means though humanness is everlastingly flowing out of man there is a defective principle which projects it in a different way. One should know how that defective principle arises and functions. To know about this defective principle one has to study the process of nature. Once man understands the process of nature and its destiny it will be easy for him to humanize his life in society along with others. Now let us examine the process.

The Process of Nature

According to Advaita Vedanta, in the beginning, before formation of the world, there was one and non-dual reality, which is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. This reality is unchangeable, unmodifiable and indivisible. The present problem is how this immutable reality gives rise to the world of diversity and man? Let us study this problem through the following diagrams.

When Man Studies Reality from Object

Figures

Fig- A. Inconceivable One and Non-dual Reality — Existence-Consciousness-Bliss

Fig- B. The maximum possible conceivability of the empirical reality when inquired into the reality of any object

Fig- C. Beginning of viewing empirical reality at maximum deepest micro level

Fig- D. Beginning of viewing empirical reality as the slightest possible fundamental unit or ego

Fig- E. Formation of the combinations of empirical reality with two fundamental units or 2egos together

Fig- F. Formation of the combinations of empirical reality with three fundamental units or 3egos together

Level A:
Inconceivable, non-empirical and non-dual Consciousness = Consciousness

Level B:
The maximum possible conceivability of the empirical reality when inquired into the reality of any object. The state of instability and ambiguity of identity between the Consciousness and empirical reality. = Instability

Level C:
Beginning of viewing empirical reality at maximum deepest micro level. The foundational appearance of the empirical reality as the instable fundamental unit or ego which could either merge itself into the Consciousness or try to hold its individuality. = First Appearance

Level D:
Beginning of viewing empirical reality as the slightest possible fundamental unit or ego. The formation of the first fundamental unit or ego. = Fundamental ego

Level E:
Formation of the combinations of empirical reality with two fundamental units or 2egos together = Combination of 2 Egos

Level F:
Formation of the combinations of empirical reality with three fundamental units or 3egos together = Combination of 3 Egos

Formation of Matter – Sample of Combinations:

A = Consciousness
B = Infinite number of unstable and dynamic fundamental units
C = {Infinite – (Infinite – 1)}
D = (I)0 = Basically neutral but can assume any charge + or –
E = [(I)0/+/– + (I)0/+/–] = Same as D
E0 = [(I)0 + (I)0]
E+ = [(I)+ + (I)0] or [(I)0 + (I)+] or [(I)+ + (I)+]
E– = [(I)– + (I)0] or [(I)0 + (I)–] or [(I)+ + (I)–] or [(I)– + (I)+] or [(I)– + (I)–]
F0 = [D0 + E0]0 or {(I)0 + [(I)0 + (I)0]0}0 or [E0 + D0]0 or [D0 + D0 + D0]0 = One can apply permutations and combinations of different formations of the most micro level fundamental units or egos

Every Whole Is a Part and Every Part Is a Whole

The reality at level A is inconceivable or unknowable through the means of empirical knowledge. The Consciousness at level A is static. Such reality while viewed by the means of empirical knowledge, at large one can conceive uncountable and interchangeable, unstable and rapidly transformable dynamic basic units. One cannot go beyond this level by any empirical means because there is only non-dual reality as background for everything. This non-dual reality

does not have any scope of space, time, name, form and any kind of difference. When this reality is viewed through the means of empirical knowledge, there arises the space, time, name, form and difference due to the limitation of the means of the knowledge. The means of empirical knowledge by their intrinsic limitations reveal the reality as if reality consists of space, time, name, form and difference. That means space, time, name, form and difference are created by the means of empirical knowledge due to their limitations.

Beginning to view the reality with this sort of limitations, one can see the reality (empirical) by all his maximum utility of means of empirical knowledge as shown figuratively at the level of D in the above scheme of diagrams. While the reality is viewed at the maximum level for instance level-D, one can see the ultimate units of empirical reality.6 In the level-D we have (I) which implies either number one, or the 'I' (Ego) or both or neither. One has to understand the reality in essence is neither number one nor the 'I' (Ego) nor both. But as it is said above due to the limitations of the means of empirical knowledge the reality appears to be either number one or the 'I' or both. The state of the conception of reality at the level of D cannot be constant because the level of D is not the actual revelation of the reality in essence. One can see the struggle of the free expression of the reality in essence and the quest for perfect knowledge of man. Both aspects create a journey towards the free expression of reality. That means (1) the ultimate unit of empirical reality never stops its productions till reality is freely expressed and (2) the pursuit of knowledge by man never stops till it reaches the revelation of the reality in essence. In both the cases we can find the same functional destiny of journey that is, going toward the unified reality or the free expression of reality. This free expression of reality one may say freedom. Freedom is the essence of the empirical reality. Imperfection of the means of empirical knowledge is the obstacle of the expression of the freedom.

Let us see how reality at the level of D functions. Since reality which does not have space, time, name, form and difference is viewed as it consists of all these, the ultimate unit of empirical reality sharply functions individually as an independent unit. There begins the expression of the 'I' or Ego. This unit though represents reality in essence, since it is not fully revealed in this unit, it tries to unite with other individual ultimate units keeping its 'Ego' as it is. When two individual ultimate units of empirical reality function together they express higher reality than that of their own individual reality. This higher expression of reality can be found from the level-E, F and so on. At level-E two individual units together form another unit which is unique and contains its own Ego. While it maintains the combined Ego at level-E the two individual units keep their own Egos as they are. That is to say that when two individual units together form a new type of Ego, their individual Egos are not destroyed. The new Ego is formed just due to the unified function of the two individual ultimate units of empirical reality. Similarly at the level-F three individual ultimate units of empirical reality form another unique Ego by keeping the individual Egos intact. Likewise many combinations and permutations are formed and consequently any number of unique Egos arose. The key point here is the expression of freedom in empirical reality exists in unity of individuals by forming a total Ego. This quest of empirical reality lasts so long as the grand total Ego is freely expressed.

Human being in the Process of Nature

Man is the product of such combinations of individual units at different levels and contains a total Ego. But his Ego is insufficient to express his freedom or his own reality. Therefore man is struggling to have revelation of reality. The revelation of reality, that is, freedom is possible only

when all individual Egos form a total Ego. The formation of total Ego consists in the total expression of humanity and it is possible by the perfection of human Ego. The perfection of human Ego can be said to consist in perfection of his means of empirical knowledge or perfection in knowledge which consists in viewing reality in unity and faultlessness of Ego to form a greater and total Ego to express his freedom. This freedom of expression of one's own reality should be guided by one's own knowledge of unity in reality in essence. Though one trains individual Ego by the restrictions such as law, society, politics, economy and natural conditions to form a total Ego, it should rise to the level of self conditioning or voluntary surrender of Ego, which comes out of overwhelming love and out of the knowledge of the unity of reality to form the total Ego of all human beings. The present day situation can be said as it is in the process of forming this total Ego. It is not an alternative but a natural process of the empirical reality in its free expression of the reality in essence. Different political, social, economical policies, etc., and their negations to form a better policies are nothing but the expressions of the formation of the total Ego. This process culminates in the formation of a universal policy for all human beings on earth. Thus the total Ego can be formed. Let all of us strive to form this total Ego by correcting our own Egos.

Now let us see the process of human vision of empirical reality. The level-B or level-C or level-D, etc., are not revealed to man. Man is trying to explore this reality which culminates in level-B. Depending upon the knowledge of revealed state of reality man behaves differently. Man's quest for knowledge stops when he realizes the absolute unity of all individuals. This knowledge of unity leads to a kind of behavior with love, compassion, etc., which form the total Ego to express one's own freedom. Till then the journey towards this expression of reality in total Ego continues.

What has been said so far is true at any state of reality. In this process of totality the main points can be said as follows: (1) Any state of reality as seen an individual unit maintains its Ego at that level. (2) At any state of revealed reality contains two different levels of Ego namely, (i) individual Ego and (ii) total Ego. (3) The process always goes toward the unity. (4) Every unity involves in two major aspects, namely, (i) construction, that is, formation of total Ego by getting together some individual units and (ii) destruction that is, splitting of total units into individual Egos. (5) Every construction requires some destruction. The destruction is of two kinds, namely, (i) destruction of total Ego and (ii) destruction of form. Again the destruction can be said to be of two kinds, namely, (i) partial destruction and (ii) total destruction. (6) All stages of destruction are possible for human Ego. (7) When nothing is constructed out of any destruction it is against the process of totality. (8) When man's Ego functions against the process of totality that Ego has to be corrected by means of love, knowledge and law depending on the situation.

Let us now examine all these points by taking man as an example. We can view man at two levels, namely, (i) functional and (ii) real. Firstly man functionally consists of limbs, head, trunk, etc., and has a total Ego of all these. But within this total Ego one has many states of different levels of total egos. For instance hand functions along with the total Ego by keeping its individual Ego alive. When the hand is paralyzed it won't join with total Ego in function. Similarly within the hand as total unit of Ego there are lots of total Egos like different muscles, bones, vessels, blood etc. Each of them can act independently.7 When they function generally under the total Ego of man we have a healthy man with total Ego of all different individual units of subordinate total Egos within man. If any individual unit at any level starts behaving on its own without giving room for a total Ego of man then one can imagine how man in function will be. Similarly so long as all human beings do not come together to form a higher and grand total Ego all individual men behave on their own. Consequently everyone has to live in fear and insecurity. When everybody behaves

on their own without forming the total Ego, the situation will be like when all the parts of the human body function independently on their own in the body without mutual cooperation. While it happens to body we call it abnormality or disorder of the body. But fortunately it is not the case either with the body or with man in society. Sometimes as one gets disorders in the body, we do have certain individual Egos of men in the society who create disorder in the natural process of unity. They have to be treated as we treat the disorder of the body.

Secondly man in reality can be seen totally as a social, political, economical being striving for unity. Man at the lower level of reality is a material body with life. The same man at further lower level of reality is a totality of different individual units such as muscles, fats, bones, blood, etc., within the cover of the skin. Man at the still further lower level of reality is nothing but the molecules made of proteins, carbohydrates, fats, enzymes etc. Man at even further lower level of reality is a set of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, sodium, magnesium, calcium and so on. The same man in even lower level reality is nothing but atomic and sub-atomic particles such as protons, neutrons, electrons, neutrinos, positrons, etc. Similarly every individual unit of reality can be traced back to some other subordinate individual units. Because every whole is a part and every part is a whole. Man taking this process into consideration can realize the unity and equality of everything at least from the standpoint of atomic and sub-atomic particles. One has to observe that nature has developed its process from identity to more of difference, for instance from micro sub-atomic level to macro level of man. This is because the identity cannot be realized unless there is absolute unity and the realization of the identity is not possible for such simple and lower individual units of reality at that micro level. Thus nature is traveling towards the destination of the absolute unity by forming a total Ego to realize its identity with the reality in essence. Therefore, it is our task that everybody should travel along with the nature to form a grand total Ego to realize the total unity and to express the freedom on the name of reality. Let us examine how nature at different dimensions takes man to its destination. The different dimensions of the nature in relation with man can be said as: (1) individual, (2) social, (3) political, (4) economical, (5) geographical, (6) atmospherically, etc. All these dimensions mainly can be classified into two namely, (1) Micro level and (2) Macro level. Let us now consider one after another.

Micro Level

Ontology of the Ultimate Units of Empirical Reality

Origination: The origination of the ultimate units of the empirical reality cannot be traced because of the following reasons.

(1) They last not more than a moment.

(2) They are not absolute existents in the real sense of the term; rather, they have dependent origination.

(3) They are thought of or imagined existents.

(4) At the time of their genesis they were only different individual Egos.

(5) They have only choice between merging themselves into the reality in essence by losing their existence completely and by joining with other individual ultimate units of empirical reality or with some other total Egos to keep up their existence.

(6) The ultimate goal of this process is either (i) to dissociate everything into individual ultimate units of empirical reality and merge into the reality in essence or (ii) to join all individual

Egos together to express the absolute reality in freedom. However, the first is not seen in the process because the individual ultimate units of empirical reality struggle to keep their existence. It is struggle between individual expression of free existence and natural and potential instability of the existence of the individual ultimate units of empirical reality. Though the possibility of the process of the dissolution of all empirical reality is not natural it can be made possible by the higher individual Egos of man who go against the process of the nature by their ignorance of the natural process. Therefore, one must be careful in society while one deals with the destruction of the individual units.

Ego

(1) At the lower level the Ego can be understood as expression of free existence.

(2) Any individual Ego cannot last for mare than a moment after its genesis.

(3) Therefore, any individual Ego strives to express itself before it loses its existence.

(4) The free expression of the existence of any individual unit is possible only when it is joined with another individual unit.

(5) While two individual Egos joined together they form a total Ego of the both of them. A total Ego is a common Ego which represents all the participants in the unit.

(6) While some individual units form a total Ego the participating individual Egos keep their existence as they are. Similarly while many total Egos form a grand total Ego the subordinate or constituent total Egos which participate in the formation of the grand total Ego sustain the existence of the individual total Egos undamaged.

(7) The existence of the matter depends upon the formation of the total Ego. When the total Ego is formed the original state of individual units within the total Ego can be called as matter and the total Ego represents a common Ego for such matter. Thus the individual Egos or individual total Egos within a higher total Ego form the content of matter. The higher total Ego is the factor of expression of the matter.

(8) Any Ego beginning from the individual ultimate unit of empirical reality to any level of total Ego cannot last more than a moment after its genesis. Therefore, there is always a struggle for joining one Ego with the other in order to survive themselves and to express their existence freely.

(9) This struggle leads to different relations such as (i) relation of agreement to join together, (ii) relation of force to join together, (iii) relation of attraction to each other to join together and so on.

Relation

While the ultimate individual units of empirical reality form a total Ego they must have had only the relation of agreement to join together because they are neutral in nature and therefore there was no choice of relation for them. They are neutral in nature because they do not have polarity. Once they form total Ego and matter there begins the new way of expression by the total Ego. The new way of expression may develop any kind of polarity or it may even remain neutral in nature.

It is to be understood that though the individual ultimate units of empirical reality are neutral in nature, they have potentiality to create polarity in any total Ego. That means fundamentally the

polarity of any total Ego is formed out of neutrality. The polarity can also be formed in any total Ego by any other total Ego. When polarity begins to function there arises different relations.

Relation of Agreement: In this relation the participating individual Egos or individual total Egos remain unchanged in their original structure. It is just getting together out of understanding and cooperation for mutual survival.

Relation of Force: In this relation, between any two participating Egos, one must force the other to adjust to it and form a total Ego. While a total Ego is formed out of the relation of the force either or both of the participating individual Egos lose their original structure.

Relation of Attraction: In this relation the participating Egos develop polarity for each other before forming a total Ego. This polarity is formed in each unit out of changing the original structure either by losing an individual unit or by adding another unit to the original structure. The polarity may also be formed with out any change in the basic structure in the participating units. After forming the polarity one Ego joins with another which has attraction for it. The relation of attraction is also possible in the following way. When two neutral Egos get together they can develop mutual attraction either by losing or by gaining or by donating their constituent unit/s. Or they may even develop attraction without any change. And consequently they form a total Ego by the relation of attraction.

Origin of Space

While two individual ultimate units of empirical reality join together, they have an agreement with cooperation for mutual survival. But they will not become one by merging. They keep their identity and individuality even after forming a total Ego. That means while they join they are mutually isolated. Any two units could never become one. This isolation is possible because their individuality. Even though they are mutually isolated they join together and form a total Ego. This kind of state, that is, keeping the individual identity in a total unit, is possible by space. Space or gap is assumed between any two individual ultimate units of empirical reality in the total Ego. When such space is assumed then there comes forth the origin of matter. Matter and space are interdependent. If there is no space then there is no matter and *vice versa*. Both matter and space comes into existence simultaneously. At the level of the combination of the two individual ultimate units of empirical reality there is no such thing as matter in space. This is because these two are interdependent. So long as matter exists space also exists.

But a specific difference between the matter and space in their ontological condition is that the constituents of matter, that is, the individual ultimate units of empirical reality or fundamental individual Egos, exist earlier than matter and space. Therefore, the content of the matter exists earlier than the space. Since, the content of the matter is not called a matter unless it assumes space within, one can see the interdependence of the matter and space.

Relative Space: The space is relative when it is assumed outside the matter. It is relative to the nature of different kinds of matter. It is mainly quantitative difference among different matter. While two huge sets of matter are seen then the insignificant matter, that is, quantitatively minute matter, is ignored. The ignorance of such minute matter brings forth the relative space, that is, the space between two huge sets of matter in the example. In fact space does not exist out side matter.

The space assumed out side matter is only the indication of the ignorance of minute quantities of matter and therefore, it is false. But it appears that the space assumed to form matter can said to be having a degree of existence. That means space can be said to exist only within the structure of any total Ego. However, since every whole is a part and every part is a whole, the space within the matter ultimately becomes false because space cannot be empty and any space either within the matter or out side it is nothing but ignorance of some kind of micro matter.

Origin of Time

Time is originated along with matter and space. But its existence depends upon matter. Unlike space, time does not have any ontological participation in the formation of matter. Time is assumed externally. It is just like the relative space in its ontological status. But there is a minute difference between relative space and time. That is relative space is assumed by ignoring certain minute existents of matter between any relatively huge quantities of matter and time is assumed only in relation to matter. Therefore, time has a higher degree of existence than the relative space. But both of them are assumed external to the matter. Origination of time begins with the formation of the matter by the combination of the two individual ultimate units of empirical reality.

Origin of Fear

When the individual ultimate units of empirical reality come into existence: (i) They first try to secure their existence; (ii) Because they cannot last for more than a moment after their genesis, they struggle to hold on to other individual ultimate units of empirical reality for their survival; (iii) Since they could extend their existence while joined with other individual units of empirical reality, they somehow try to hold on to other individual units forming many relations; (iv) While they form relations with others they try to keep up their individuality as it is. This factor is the cause of fear or it can be said that this factor is itself fear.

This struggle can be known as ‘first fear’. This fear is the cause of many relations. This fear creates many forms of individualities. Fear sometimes may demand force, sometimes self-surrender, sometimes self-destruction and sometimes destruction of others. Whatever it is fear continues to exist so long as the individual unit realizes the unity of reality.

Origin of Movement

When fear causes relations and combinations of the individual ultimate units of the empirical reality there arises a necessity for assuming the movement of the individual ultimate units to reach its co-existent to make relations. This movement in fact is relative and imaginative. Once one touches the ground reality then there will not be any movement what so ever. But so long as empirical reality is viewed in its course the movement appears to be real. The wonder in the conception of the movement is that though it is apparent and relative one can find distinctive relativity of movement within the original relative movement. This can be found after biological life is formed.

Origin of Life

Here one should distinguish ground life from the biological life. Biological life is a superior out come of the process of the nature in its course of reaching the capacity to express the ultimate unity of the reality. But the very capacity of movement can be considered as ground life because it is this movement which causes the biological life in the course of the process of nature. Therefore, the very origin of the individual ultimate unit of the empirical reality itself can be considered as ground life. Thus we can say that the very nature of the Ego is life. The life is originated when the individual ultimate units of empirical reality comes in to existence. The essence of the individual ultimate units of the empirical reality or the fundamental Ego is the ground life. This is the key in the process of nature to reach the highest realization and to express the ultimate unity of reality. Let us now see how this ground life leads to the different formations of the life in the course of the process of the nature.

Macro Level

The macro level begins with the formation of the total Ego by two individual ultimate units of the empirical reality. The formation of the total Ego can be explained as follows. Consider that in the set { (I) (I) (I) (I) (I) (I) ...} each (I) is an individual ultimate unit of the empirical reality. Each (I) tries to survive its existence but by very nature the existence of (I) lasts only for a moment when (I) stands isolated. Therefore, each (I) tries to hold on to another (I) to extend the existence. But this will not be a hope for a permanent existence and therefore the process of joining with others continues perpetually. This process is called the process of nature. In the process of the nature the first combination in the set can be figured out as { (I) (I) (I) **[(I) (I)]** (I) (I) ...}. Within this set the sub set [(I) (I)] starts acting as a single set represented by a total Ego that is, [I]. This [I] can be said to be the first form of matter constituted by two (I)s and there begins the process of formation of higher total Egos. For example, total Ego may be formed by the combination either of [(I) (I)] or [(I) (I) (I)] or [(I) (I) (I) ...] or { [(I) (I)] (I) } or { [(I) (I)] [(I) (I)] } or { [(I) (I) (I)] (I) [(I) (I)] } or any other such possible combinations. While total Ego is formed the constituent Egos in the total Ego become subordinate Egos/total Egos to the higher total Ego. The key for continuation of such process can be said: (1) any total Ego will not survive more than a moment, and (2) the Ego at any stage keeps up its individuality, for instance, if it is an individual ultimate unit of the empirical reality then it tries to keep up its individuality as such and if it is a total Ego then it tries to keep up its individuality of that particular total unit.

In the process of the nature while the Egos and different levels of total Egos keep forming greater total Egos the matter will be resulted. Such matter at fundamentally macro level can be called as the matter of sub-atomic level for the easy understanding. This sub-atomic matter is ever flowing and rising into the higher levels of matter. This is the process of an ascending style from micro level to the macro level. Briefly saying, the sub-atomic matter formulates the atomic matter. While it forms atomic matter each total ego of all subordinate levels will maintain their individuality. This atomic matter is so diverse and of many forms. The scientists are trying to count the sub-atomic as well as atomic matter treating them as some completely independent particles. This is a futile attempt because any level of matter/total Ego is never be constant. Though it appears and functions like a constant matter in reality nothing is constant in the process of the nature. Every level of the total Ego survives for a moment and tries to hold on to some other Egos. It may be asked that if everything is changing then how we can get the repeated results of scientific inquiry of a particular case. It is said by way of answer that the change in matter is not grasped by the scientists and the minute change in matter will not lead to any kind of change in the gross results

of the scientific experiments conducted on the macro level. While there is change in matter occurring in micro aspects of matter, there cannot be seen any change in the results of the scientific experiment; and there cannot be seen a great change in the macro matter. Actually saying whatever the scientists notice in their laboratories is nothing but the change of matter occurring in the other macro matter. But nobody knows about the change of matter caused by the micro matter. The stress here is not on how the addition or deletion of one individual ultimate unit of empirical reality can create change in any level of matter (micro or macro). Since one ignores such a minute change in matter one may argue for the constancy of certain matter depending upon some repetitions of the same results of the experiments. However, it is not our concern here to see how scientists work but our concern is to stress the *continuous change* in the matter.

In this process first there originated the gases. The reason for this is gases have the structure nearest to that of the sub-atomic matter, especially Hydrogen, because it consists of only a proton and an electron which are the basic and highest known forms of the sub-atomic matter. The combination of these two fundamental forms of atomic matter, by adding another minute sub-atomic matter called a neutrino, becomes a neutron. The formation of the neutron brings forth the possibility of different forms of atomic matter. But how can this combination happen? This question refers to the relations in forming the total Egos. Scientists call the process of the formation of a neutron the result of fusion of two hydrogen atoms. Likewise there occur many relations in the formation of the higher forms of matter. While we refer to fusion of two hydrogen atoms we see such relation of matter formation in the sun and stars. Therefore, it can be said that immediately after formation of hydrogen gas there originated the stars. Stars bring forth different forms of matter, namely, elements of different atomic structure. Certain reactions regarding the formation of helium from the sun out of the fusion of hydrogen atoms hold evidence of such process. This process has been extensively studied in the works of astrophysics.

This continuous change in matter leads to the formation of the different planets. Our concern is to deal with the planet earth where man exists. Planet earth is called as the planet of water. Three forth of the surface of the earth is covered by water. It can be assumed that the formation of water was made earlier than the solid matter of the earth. This is assumed so not only because of abundance of water but also because water is formed by the combination of two gases namely, hydrogen and oxygen which are pre-existents of solid matter. After formation of the planet earth there has been a higher development in the process of the change in matter which leads to the formation of life- matter. Life-matter can be said to have originated in water. Modern scientific theories hold that life originated from inorganic matter, especially from clay. Whatever the theory is, life was formed in the process of nature. The distinction between the life form and other matter is that life-matter has visible independent function within itself whereas the other matter does not have this visible independent function. But this does not mean that the other matter is inanimate. In fact life in the life form has emerged from the potentiality of the ground life hidden in the individual ultimate units of the empirical reality. Thus it can be said that there is no inanimate matter at all. However, one can make a distinction between the biological life forms of matter and other forms of matter because the life force is highly explicit in the biological form of matter. The other distinction between both kinds of matter is that the non-biological matter does not undergo death because it does not have any visible independent function, and death is the loss of such function. Through change in matter which is common to biological as well as non- biological matter, biological matter is said to undergo death in the course of change in the particular biological form of matter, it loses the nature of biological life at that particular total level. It can be said otherwise as at the total Ego level when a particular biological life loses its total Ego by any reason

it can be called death of that of particular form of biological life. That means 'death' is nothing but the destruction of the total Ego and total Ego is destroyed only when it becomes isolated from the process of nature. This gives the possibility of avoiding such death by managing the total Ego to keep it perfectly in the way of process of nature. This possibility is also raised from the fact that there is no death essentially in matter or there is no dead matter. This is because any matter is essentially a life form. It can be said that death can be avoided by developing the capacity to express perfectly the humanness or Consciousness which is the one and only non-dual reality. This is possible only for human being because he has a particular biological structure where the Consciousness emerges at its highest level. As it is said earlier, the emergence of the Consciousness is obstructed by a defective principle which is a primary product of process of the nature. In fact the function of this defective principle is to unite and form greater total Egos to make the expression of humanness possible in its great length. But due to its innate function, that is, to preserve its individuality, it gets confused with that function and tries to ignore the major function of expressing humanness by working predominantly on the function of preservation of the individuality. Therefore, what is required is to make total Ego aware of its major function of free expression of humanness—the very purpose of the formation of the total Ego. Thus one can correct the total Ego to form the grand total Ego to express Consciousness as it emerges in man.

Characteristics of Life-Matter

Life forms can be classified mainly into two, namely, primitive and developed. The primitive life forms can again be kept in an order of hierarchy beginning with potential biological life form, which is almost like non-biological matter but possesses the quality of life form. This form does not undergo death as biological matter does. It is the junction between the biologically inanimate matter and the biological life form of matter. As it stands in between non-biological and biological matter and is almost like non-biological matter, it does not experience biological death. Similarly the next higher form of biological life will be having more of the nature of biological matter. This can be said as the fundamental biological life form developed from the primitive biological life form (which is almost like non-biological matter).

Biological Life Form of Matter

The biological life form is the point in the process of nature where one can find an explicit attempt of the expression of freedom. But externally the essential quality of the biological life form is survival. This is a new development in the process of nature, namely, the need for food for survival. In the process of survival we can divide biological life forms into two, namely, the life forms which are capable of manufacturing their own food out of natural sources and those incapable of manufacturing their own food for survival (dependent for their food on other parts of nature). The first type can generally be said to be plants and the second the animals. The major characteristic of the first type is obeying the natural principles and accepting whatever that comes along on their way of life. This situation shows the incapacity to express freedom in the fullest sense. Whereas in animals one can see a sort of independence, that is, independence of choice and selection. But this independence of animals is comparatively less than that of man.

Process of Nature as Process of Resistance

From the beginning in the process of nature every step of the formation of any total Ego is essentially qualified as an individual resistant. That means any individual total Ego has a capacity to resist itself from other individual total Egos. This resistance is the key for the formation of the Grand total Ego. The whole process of nature can be divided into four levels, namely, (1) primitive level, (2) micro material level, (3) macro material level, (4) biological level. Again the biological level can be classified into two levels, namely, (a) micro biological level, and (b) macro biological level. The micro biological level begins with the formation of the primitive biological life form, then fundamental biological life form. The macro biological life form in chronology broadly includes plants, animals and human beings. Even on the primitive level in the process of nature containing the appearance of the ultimate individual units of the empirical reality, the resistance is quite obvious. It is the essential nature of any ultimate individual unit of the empirical reality to keep its own individual Ego by resisting other form of Egos. Similarly total Egos in the primitive level also can be considered as having more resistance than the ultimate individual units of the empirical reality. Likewise the process of resistance continues to develop along with quantity of each individual total Ego up to the macro material level. The trend of the development of resistance seemingly changes from the formation of the primitive biological form, that is, the trend of the development of resistance along the quantity of the individual total Ego changes while the primitive biological forms emerge. Because the primitive biological life forms are smaller in quantity in comparison with the forms of the macro material level, they have high resistance and they are highly penetrable. Thus the development of resistance takes a new direction and gradually develops more and more resistance in the later higher forms of biological life such as fundamental biological life forms, plants, animals and man. Thus man stands atop in the hierarchy of resistance. However, none of the different forms of Ego is successful in having a complete resistance, that is, none of the forms of Ego can survive in the process of nature when it tries to keep itself away by resisting other forms of Ego. Thus in the process of nature one can see: (1) nature's quest for the formation of the Grand total Ego, (2) the innate quest of complete resistance of the individual Egos and (3) the force of the one and non-dual reality in the process of nature spring forth to express itself freely. Within the process of nature it seems contradictory to maintain both individuality and the formation of the Grand total Ego. Against this contradiction in the process of the nature the force of the one and non-dual reality stands alone in having free expression. Thus we have two different sources for the formation of unity with mutual contradictions, namely, (1) the nature's innate quest for the formation of the Grand total Ego having intrinsic contradiction of maintaining the individuality and resistance which mainly runs by innate fear; and (2) the force of nature in man to express Consciousness freely. These two sources stand against one another even though their ultimate goal is the same.

Conflict between Two Sources of Unity

Functionally, the major characteristic of man's total Ego is intrinsic fear, so as to seek self-preservation; whereas Consciousness as one and only non-dual existence tries to break down the function of self-preservation in the total Ego of man. This conflict arises because the function of self-preservation of the total Ego of man cannot exist on the dawn of realization of Consciousness and Consciousness cannot be fully expressed while man's total Ego tries to act in self-preservation. Thus man becomes a 'house' for this conflict and keeps acting according to the prevailing conditions. Nature is devoid of the Consciousness characteristic of man. But it seems there is only choice for nature in its process,—it has to either break down all different total Egos to merge into

Consciousness, making a futile attempt of forming the Grand total Ego; or somehow to form the Grand total Ego by breaking the function of self-preservation in man in order to reach its ultimate goal, that is, to enable Consciousness to express freely.

So long as man keeps his total Ego and its basic function of self-preservation without concerning the goal of the process of nature, one day nature shall destroy the total Ego of such a man. We call this self-destruction by the name of 'death'. In order to continue its process towards its goal, nature has developed procreation. Though one total Ego (man) dies, procreation tries to bring out another life of totality to continue its process. This process of life and death continues so long as man does not realize and express Consciousness fully.

Bondage and Liberation

It has been already explained that in reality there is no such thing as death. But we often use the thought/word 'death' when we look at a corpse, mistaking the biological death which means destruction of total Ego for the total destruction of man. Every death of man leads to another birth of man. This process continues so long as man continues to be in ignorance, that is, as long as man acts in favor of self-preservation and believes death is real. The process of the destruction and construction in nature can be seen in ascending and descending process. While man (man's total Ego) is said to be dead what happens really is the process of destruction: when man's total Ego is destroyed the constituent individual total Egos within the total Ego of man will become free and run towards further construction. If there is a smart and highly intelligent scientist he can make use of all the individual parts of dead human being to support the patients who lost their parts, by way of transplantation or some other technique. Similarly construction process is an ascending process, that is, adding or deleting one or more individual total Egos leads to construction. This can be said as an ascending process. The ascending and descending process is natural in the process of the nature. But very often we mistake descending destructive process to be the total destruction. Meanwhile man also gets confused by the influence of the total Ego. Also man often ignores reality and does not recognize the underlying reality. All this is ignorance which leads to bondage. Bondage manifests in different levels such as bondage to his body, his mind, his senses, his material possessions etc. Unless and until man gets rid of such bondage he has to undergo the process of death. Therefore, it is very essential to break out of this bondage and this leads to liberation. The liberation is freedom of expression of the self and getting out of the process of the death. When the context of man arises in the process of nature the process seems to lose its turn by giving the independence to man. Independence and freedom of choice are special characteristics of man. Therefore, the burden of fulfilling the goal of the process of nature is laid on the shoulders of man. If man does not raise himself up to form the Grand total Ego, then self destruction, that is, death, becomes the consequence. But if man tries to come out of his ignorance and opens himself to form Grand total Ego by formulating an intercontinental society and inter galactic identity then the process of the nature will be completed and ultimately man shall lead a blissful life in a perfect intercontinental society. Thus in the process of nature especially in the context of man, the formation of the society becomes a key to express freedom by the formation of the Grand total Ego.

Humanization of Social Life

Man and Human Creation

Man has capacity to exercise independence. This is made possible for him by his imagination. His imagination is a surplus in him in comparison with other known creatures in the world. He has a capacity to identify himself with others. This identification with others can be called love. While love is his essential quality, the hatred occupies him by the influence of the essential function of his total Ego, that is, self-preservation. Man usually in all his life gets confused with the function of Ego and the spring of consciousness. He has one and only instrument to realize his own self the Consciousness, that is, his Ego. By very nature Ego functions for self-preservation. When man purifies his Ego and directs it towards self-realization the same Ego helps to realize the self and to express Consciousness completely in the manner of humanness. However, Ego usually does not go by itself towards self-realization. But the innate process of nature in man always tries to influence him to form Grand total Ego. Whatever the influence is man can create his own world within nature. This is possible for him because of love and imagining different relations. Such creation of man can be seen in the formation of the society.

Context of the Social Life

The social life falls under the realm of human creation. It is the society where man expresses humanness. But unfortunately very often man is directed many times in the history towards inhumanity. However, history proves that man cannot stop others' freedom of expression of humanness. From the analysis of ego, mentioned earlier, society can be analyzed generally in to eight units of total Egos, namely, (1) individual (man), (2) family, (3) community (relatives, religious groups and political parties etc.), (4) street, (5) village or local area, (6) district, (7) state and (8) nation. In the process of the social life the said eight units in the society function as individual total Egos. For instance, when man deals himself with others he acts like an individual total Ego as in the case of a chess game or tennis 'singles' (Since man is already a product of many subordinate individual total Egos as explained above which relates him to the process of nature). Similarly while the same man is playing basketball or football, his identity will be mainly with the team. Thus team of players become an individual total Ego (While the team acts as an individual Ego it contains many subordinate individual Egos, namely, players). Likewise while man is an individual within a family he acts as an individual total Ego and when the context comes in between two families, the family as a whole acts as an individual total Ego. The proof for that behavior is the expressions such as 'myself' and 'my family'. Similarly in the case of the expressions such as 'my religion', 'my political party', 'my company', 'my team', and 'my community', etc., every unit functions as an individual total Ego. Even while one says my street, my village, my area, my district, my state, and my nation, every unit represents an individual total Ego. The main point here is that it is the context that limits the unit and it is the identity with the unit that makes the unit as an individual total Ego. Man has reached to the level of identifying with nation. I am enthusiastic and optimistic to say that man has reached to the level of identifying even with the continent from my own experience in America while I was filling up an application form I had to write that I am an Asian(since I am a citizen of India). However, apart from all such optimistic trends of unity in the social life, man is struggling for freedom and survival within every unit of individual total Ego mentioned above. But it is quite confident to say that man is going to reach the level of identity as one single society for the people all over the world. However, man needs to learn to avoid the obstacles for such unity within every individual unit. When man succeeds in managing to form such a unity of people all over the world, nature definitely gets

satisfied because it is its goal to form Grand total Ego. Since the single society for all people represents such Grand total Ego, where love for all is exhibited, perhaps every body will be quite peaceful and happy in such a society.

How to Formulate Universal Society

Though nature somehow is trying to take all of us towards its goal of unity, we ought to know how it functions in contrast with the function of our own individual total Ego. Economic and political imbalance in nowadays societies is creating a situation for man to struggle for survival by losing all his abilities of humanity. This happens perhaps due to the natural and apparent appearance of inequality among human beings. This apparent inequality leads to exploitation by the influence of Ego. Whether there is equality or inequality in psycho-physical dimension of man, man essentially free and he always tries to be free within the given limitations. These limitations are determined by the knowledge and ability of the person to choose the level of freedom. Knowledge is possible mostly by education and by understanding the real situation.

Since the social life of man is always dominated by the total Ego in its function of self-preservation man ought to maintain the strategy of the social life in a way in which the Ego is satisfied by its minimum requirements and to enable to express humanness as it really is. To achieve this goal of the process of the nature one can broadly analyze the total scheme of the social life. The foremost important thing in the scheme of the social life is the purpose of life. The purpose of life is directly connected with the purpose of the journey of the process of the nature that is, the expression of the reality or humanness. Therefore, the purpose and the goal of the human life is to express reality as it is in the way of expressing the identity oneself with the other living beings and the relation between oneself and the other living being. Thus, the whole of human life should be directed always towards the goal of identity of oneself with the universal reality. This kind of realization generally does not arise accidentally or by any short-cut methods. It requires life and a constant practice in changing nature. Therefore, it is suggested that the whole life of man should always be directed towards this realization. However, man's life journey towards the realization requires some basic requirements which essentially belong to the total Ego such as basic needs of life preservation etc. The needs of the total Ego can broadly be analyzed in to two, namely, economic and social relations, without which man cannot successfully go ahead in his life to reach his highest goal. The logic behind this analysis of basic needs is that man to maintain peaceful life he needs to have enough wealth without which the total Ego runs far away from its natural goal. This wealth cannot be achieved while man is alone. Therefore, man needs to have a good society where he successfully can achieve all his goals of life. Again, if in the society man creates an unwanted situation like enmity, hatred, etc., he will fall again into the disturbance of life and total Ego will be ready to wander away from its natural goal. Therefore, man needs to always maintain desirable relations with others in society in order to get rid of the obstacles in his way of realization of the self. However, though one tries to keep good relations, others might try to create disturbance. In order to balance man's life process in all circumstances he has to exercise some principle which enables him to be constant on his way of realization. That principle can be said to be righteousness and virtue. This principle should be digested by man right from his early childhood. It is possible by intensively inculcating this principle in the culture for its continuance throughout the generations; intense stress on method in courses of teaching in the school might also be insisted.

Function of Ego in Social Life

Functionally Ego can be classified from the standpoint of social life into three levels, namely, (1) the total Ego, (2) the internal functional Ego and (3) the external functional Ego. The total Ego is basically existential and physical. The internal functional Ego has two phases, namely, static functional state and dynamic functional state. The static functional state of the Ego can be referred to the Ego in the form of ignorance which is evident in the dreamless sleep and the dynamic functional Ego can be referred to the Ego in the form of the "I" which is responsible for both waking and dream experiences. The external functional Ego can be said to be the Ego in the form of expression. Originally the external functional Ego is nothing but altered internal dynamic functional Ego.

The total Ego belongs to the natural process. It has no any prejudice or any sort of discrimination etc. The process of nature loses its hold in its own process with the total Ego of man because from this total Ego the functional Ego emerges and rules the total Ego of man. Thus nature drops its independence so long as the functional Ego keeps working. The static functional Ego is the point where empiricality originates. It is the seed of the conception of empirical reality. It can be said that the very nature of the static functional Ego is ignorance. Ignorance is nothing but conceiving something on some other thing as in the cases of the perception of snake on a rope and perception of silver on the conch shell. Ignorance is the cause of illusion. The same static functional Ego though not directly involving in the social life, it gives rise to the dynamic functional Ego which is prime factor in the social life. The dynamic functional Ego by very nature functions at two different levels, namely, Waking and dream level. Dream stands in between waking and dreamless sleep as a middle point. Dream like the static functional Ego does not have any direct participation in the social life. Therefore, it can be said that the social life consists while the dynamic functional Ego functions in waking experience. In the waking state where man participates in the social life, the dynamic functional Ego again functions in four levels, namely, (1) receptor, (2) computer, (3) censurer and (4) eliminator. As the receptor the functional Ego always knows things out side it and within itself. The table, chair, pen, etc., are things out side the dynamic functional Ego whereas happiness, misery, etc., are the things within itself. The thing within itself is nothing but its own states. While it receives the objects from outside itself, the dynamic functional Ego makes use of the sense organs. Thus the knowledge of the received object depends upon the nature and ability of the sense organ. The dynamic functional Ego, like a computer, keeps all that it knows in memory and understands all that comes across its path. The way in which it understands the received knowledge depends upon several factors, such as the store of its knowledge, maturity, angle of thought at the given time, etc. The memory can be classified basically in to two, namely, (1) vague memory and (2) strong memory. The characteristic of the vague memory is to fade quickly, whereas strong memory is the memory which is readily available for an immediate action. When the part of the strong memory is not used frequently automatically that part of strong memory gradually goes to the vague memory. Whenever some part of vague memory is called for function it will be brought to the strong memory. Thus both vague and strong memories are interchangeable. As a censurer, the dynamic functional Ego selects what is desirable and needed either to transport the desired knowledge from the vague memory to strong memory or to eliminate it out either for further computation or for external expression. The dynamic functional Ego as an eliminator, takes what is given by the censurer and tries to express it. While it expresses the selected memory it requires external media. The external media mainly consists of speech and action. This external media are the constituents of the external functional Ego. Therefore, the dynamic functional Ego as eliminator stands as a bridge between the proper

dynamic functional Ego (i.e., which basically characterized to work internally) and the external functional Ego. The external functional ego while uses the medium of speech or action, it goes along with the functions of the internal functional Ego and finally expresses the selected form of memory.

This sort of process creates a situation for man in his social life that there will be no guarantee of justification of the likeness of what man thinks, speaks and acts. When there is no likeness among the three major functions of man which constitute social life, namely, thinking, speaking and acting, the man can be said to be a bad man. Because badness consists in not withstanding to what is said. That means distrust which is major hazard of the social life is possible only when man manipulates and maintains distinctive difference among the three major functions, namely, thinking, speaking and acting. Thus it can be said that righteousness consists in maintaining the harmony and identity among thinking, speaking and acting in the social life. Therefore, man ought to learn to maintain the identity among the said three major functions of the social life. It is also essential to learn to direct always the three major functions in the social life towards the unity in order to go along with the nature's goal to form the Grand total Ego. This harmony of the said three major functions in the society towards the ultimate unity enables man to express humanness fully without any censorship and it automatically brings forth the agreement among different people in the society. The harmony among people is possible only when the humanity is expressed in the society fully as it is without any censorship.

But it is not so easy to maintain identity among the three functions because it involves many factors like satisfaction of the total Ego etc., which demands and diverts man towards desire for economy, polity etc. Therefore, man must learn to ride his vehicle (physical body or total Ego) on the road with stones of economics, politics, sociology, education, science and technology etc., by holding the steering of righteousness (that is, maintenance of identity among thinking, speaking and acting) towards the goal of the nature, that is, the total unity especially the unity, harmony and solidarity among all human beings by forming the Grand total Ego of all Empirical reality.

Obstructions to Righteousness

In the ascending process of nature down from the ultimate individual units of the empirical reality to man, the quest for unity or formation of the Grand total Ego consists in the formation of several total Egos by making the constituent individual Egos as subordinate Egos. This process of making other individual Egos as subordinates is true even to human society. The natural process lands at this subordination and formation of total Ego. But in the context of human society this process of subordination represents the process of domination and oppression, because man having highly potential internal Ego and due to the natural differences among the psycho-physical organisms (total Ego of man). That is to say that differences among psycho-physical organisms enable man to maintain differences in abilities and skills and because the basic function of the internal Ego is self-preservation, internal Ego always try to utilize the said differences and consequently it lands at the process of domination by conscious or unconscious suppression of other individual Egos. This process can also said to be the process of exploitation. Exploitation can be of many kinds, such as physical (in the case of strong and weak bodies), Psychical (in the case of intellectuals *vis a vis* ignorant people), Social (in the case of maintaining superiority among others in the name of caste, race, religion, culture, civilization, nationality, etc.), political (in the case of individual holding power among others), and economical (in the case of the rich and the poor), and so on.

Also this process of exploitation is supplemented by certain characteristics of the individual Ego, namely, (1) Lust or Concupiscence (*kama*), (2) Burning anger or Wrath (*krodha*), (3) Covetousness (*lobha*), (4) State of being enamored or Captivated by bondage like sexual appetite, etc. (*moha*), (5) Lasciviousness or Insanity or Arrogance (*mada*), (6) Envy or Jealousy or Malice or Hatred (*matsarya*) and (7) Fear (*bhaya*), etc.

Righteousness as Mode of Sacrifice

What man needs to learn is that he ought to understand the status of being self-centered in the society with all the said natural qualities is living inhumanly which does not have the potentiality to express Consciousness freely and fully. This is the real ignorance that is, not realizing the abilities and capacities of man. To be man is to be free and freedom is really one's own self as identified with others. Freedom is the real status of human being. To be free is to negate the self-centeredness. However, this negation of self-centeredness is not a total negation of the very nature of the Ego. It is the idea of sacrifice substituting self-centeredness. Sacrifice implies that "man should earn and accumulate as much as possible and in a good way in order to serve others. The idea is to share love while distributing the accumulation. One must earn to benefit others while fulfilling one's own requirements. Thus no stagnation of accumulation is encouraged. As a mother takes care of her child, the strong should take care of the weak, the intelligent should take care of the dull minded, and the powerful should take care of the powerless with the same spirit as a mother's care to her child. While a mother takes care of her child she never expects anything as return for her service from the child. It is a service absolutely without expectation. This, in other words, can be called sacrifice of life or utilizing one's energies for the benefit of others. Everyone begins life with struggle, growth and development. But one usually tends only to one's personal rather than to universal benefits.

This is the point where man should divert his natural process influenced by the internal Ego from self-centeredness to universal benefits. Man should realize that sacrifice is to be free and happy. This is the education does man need to ascend him from primitive nature to that of human nature. Sacrifice is the mode of exercising freedom and humanness in the society. Therefore, man ought to learn by all means to sacrifice his total Ego for the sake of other total Egos after sustaining one's own total Ego. Thus nature fulfills its course of process of unification by sacrificing itself for the sake of the expression of the unity of reality. This principle namely, sacrifice should be understood as a mode of righteousness in social life.

Thus it can be said that man by taking the principle of righteousness as virtue and as the basic steering of his life, should pass through the economic and social relations towards the goal of self realization. This scheme enables man to express humanness at its highest level without any interruptions in the social life.

"Let everybody be happy and let everybody be peaceful"—Om! Peace! Peace! Peace!

Notes

1. This defective principle is an inevitable factor through which the subject expresses itself. The very nature of this principle is to retain and maintain individuality. While in the course of this exercise of self-expression, this factor overwhelmingly and over-enthusiastically censors the original self expression and projects something else. That is why I prefer to call this principle the 'defective principle', though it is the most important factor in self-expression.

2. We will explain about the natural process in the following sections.

3. Panini, *Sutras* 5.2.91.

4. Ramanuja, *Sri-bhasya*., 1.1.1 *Mahasiddhanta*.

5. Bellamkonda Ramaraya Kavi, *Sri Sankarasankara Bhasya Vimarsah*, (Kavitha Grantha Mandali, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, India), p. 115.

6. These ultimate empirically real units are only imagined. This is the maximum limit of scientific exploration of micro level reality.

7. The proof is the possibility of transplantation of limbs and the transfusion of blood, etc.

Chapter VI

The Eternal Church in a Changing World: The Relationship of the Church and World in the Thought of John Paul II

Maciej Zieba

Historical Background

The monumental role that the Catholic Church has played in the current democratic changes in Poland and her contribution to changes in Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, the Ukraine and in Latvia (together with the protestant churches, also extremely significant among the Hungarian minorities in Romania and East Germany) raises the question with great force about the Church's participation in social changes. Keeping in mind experiences of the Church in Latin and South America or in the Philippines, or the debates following the pastoral letters of the Episcopate in the U.S., it is obvious that this question is not reserved exclusively for Eastern Europe. And it transcends not only geographical boundaries but historical ones as well.

At the very onset of Christianity, it had to define its position with respect to the Roman Empire: should a Christian pay taxes, serve in the army, participate in games and attend the theater, or sacrifice to the emperor? Aside from answering these specific, clearly formulated questions, the Church *ipso facto* took positions defining her attitude towards different social institutions of the ancient world: social stratification, family and the educational system. It is only from the historical perspective that we can appreciate the ancient Church's role in bringing about the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of women; her role in increasing the appreciation of physical labor, creating educational and welfare systems (hospitals, orphanages, homes for the elderly). The conversion of Constantine and then the preserving of both the Christian and ancient cultures during the barbarian invasions of the falling Empire strengthened and broadened the influence of the Church. Inadvertently it increased her political role as well. From the late Middle Ages on, we can also describe the Church as the supporter of arts and sciences (from the founding of universities to the spreading of agricultural innovations), a factor in limiting the cruelties of war (e.g. "Truce of God," religious orders buying freedom for slaves) and limiting nationalism (*universitas christiana*) and abuse of human rights (debates, during the Council of Constance concerning formulation of the human rights doctrine at the University of Salamanca). We can also talk about the Church abusing her religious privileges to strengthen her lay political power; her being involved in enterprises as dubious as the crusades and as clearly reprehensible as the Inquisition or the forced conversion of non-believers in the world from Lithuania to Mexico. The complexity of the Church's situation which to a degree stemmed from the Christianization of whole societies (church membership included peasants, bourgeoisie, armies and rulers at war with one another, religious orders of knights and hospitallers, hermits and bishops) increased even more during the centuries of religious warfare. In essence, a religious facade was used in these wars for a purely political purpose. The supremacy of politics over religion was well illustrated by the *cuius reglo eius religio* principle commonly in use. If to this political struggle the rivalry between the reformationists and counterr-reformationists is added, one can perceive the Jesuits as either the defenders of human rights (Francisco Molina and his school, the reductions in Paraguay), heroic missionaries open to local cultures in Japan and China, and promotors of education (counting among their number the best university minds and running 10000 free colleges educating the youth

throughout Europe) or one can perceive them as a lay superpower trying to rule the world through international conspiracy. It was the political interests of ultra-Catholic European rulers that motivated them to pressure the popes to abolish the Jesuit order and the political interests of the Russian Orthodox Tsars that prompted them to protect the Jesuits from the papal verdict.

The British Enlightenment with its anti-clerical bent and the French Enlightenment with its anti-Christian one, and the success of the American Revolution (realizing the principle of the division of church and state), and the French Revolution (striving to destroy religion independent of the state) gradually but steadily limited the position of the church. The 19th century is the epoch of a constant shrinking of its sphere of influence. The second part of the 19th century is also a time of limiting the church's cultural role. Mechanicism, ruling supreme in the physical sciences; Darwinism in biology and its derivatives in economics and in social and political sciences and the progress of archeology; all these put into question the basic tenets of Catholic faith (creation of the universe and man, original sin, free will, inspired nature of the Bible, etc.). The popes enter the 20th century as "prisoners of the Vatican." A siege mentality prevails throughout the Church, and not unjustifiably so. Aggressive anti-church policies of the majority of European countries made it impossible for the church to freely fulfill her mission and they subjected believers to persecution sometimes leading to martyrdom. Also, scientism, the almost fanatical faith in scientific progress, whose followers often use dishonest methods, sets as its goal the total elimination of religion from human culture. On the other hand, many church members attempt to weaken the democratic order (mainly in France and Italy) and Sapiniera (*Sodalitium Pianum*) formed to protect the doctrinal unity barely resembles a committee of theologians. Rather, it is a kind of "thought police." I review these facts briefly in order to point out the ambiguity and complexity of the history of the relationship between the church and the world, a history even today obscured by ideological interpretations, stereotypes, emotional reactions. To this day our understanding of the church depends mostly on the tradition in which we were raised: We either admire the spirit of the Middle Ages or despise its obscurity; reject the shallowness of the Enlightenment period or accept its formulated beliefs in irreconcilable conflict between faith and science, the church and the world. For most people in Western Civilization numerous stereotypes still get in the way of appreciating the complexity of the relationship between the church and the world, accepting historical findings and engaging in a balanced rethinking of difficult issues.

One should not forget about this in the context of the controversial opening of the church to the world which can be seen so clearly in the pontificate of John XXIII. Most people, Catholics and non-Catholics alike, welcomed it. For many others living within the church, this opening signalled the decline of the church. For others still, from the outside, it meant the church's invasion of strictly lay territories/areas. This controversy grew during the last decade. Part of the inside-the-church opposition (followers of archbishop Lefebre), accusing the Vatican of liberalism, decided even to break away from the church. From other quarters, voices critical of John Paul II accuse him of Polish conservatism, reinstating papal autocracy, reviving the 19th century, if not an outright medieval vision of the church. Each of these criticisms is based on different interpretations of history, different views of the church, different cultural contexts. In other words, some of this polemic is based on misunderstandings. For this reason alone it seems worthwhile to try to see and understand the characteristics of the papal thought about the church's role in the contemporary world.

There is no question that the Polish origins of John Paul II determine his thought to some degree.1 So let's consider a few crucial characteristics of the Polish Church experience that for eight years shaped Karol Wojtyla.

Paradoxically, the abnormal conditions under which Polish society happened to evolve during the past 200 years can be considered to have benefited the Church. These conditions allowed the Church to avoid many a historical trap and many a temptation to which the Church elsewhere in the world was exposed. The Church's past in Poland is not encumbered by a colonization complex, a Church-Crown alliance, or economic ties with the rich. Neither does the Church suffer from the complex of being a community of the uneducated, of those living at the margin of society, of not being rooted in the national culture. This lack of past ballast has great significance for the present. The Church need not keep proving that she has undergone a profound change, nor need she keep proving that she is changing appropriately rather than opportunistically. The Church need not, in her present activity, feel embarrassed by the past (e.g. her conciliatory policy toward the government cannot be said to be the renewal of an old alliance) and her message can more easily reach widely different groups (workers, intellectuals, peasants, artists, etc.).

Polonia Semper Fidelis

The constant threat to the faith, in the beginning from the anti-Catholic policies of Prussia and Russia, later from Nazi Germany2 and then from the communist government imposed on Poland by the USSR3 had the effect of making fidelity to the Church the most valued quality to Polish Catholics. In the face of a direct threat to the Faith and an official policy aiming at promoting discord among the faithful, doctrinal controversies or political disputes could have had real and dangerous consequences. Thus building up and maintaining the unity of the Church became the essential task for all Catholics.

This fidelity was not necessarily totally uncritical. The conciliatory policy of the papacy towards the tsarist regime was often criticized in Poland.4 In turn, when Cardinal Wyszynski was triumphantly greeted in Rome after his release from a Stalinist prison, Pius XII ostentatiously punished him for his political independence (in seeking a *modus vivendi* with the communist regime!) by having him wait for days for a Vatican audience. Some newer events might serve as examples of the same independence of thought. In August 1980, Cardinal Wyszynski made an appeal to abandon strikes. The workers listened to his words with obvious respect for the speaker, but then quietly ignored them. Again, in 1989, some well-known candidates, supported by the present Primate, Cardinal Glemp, were soundly defeated at the polls.

Polish Political Theology

In reality, Polish political theology does not exist. It would be a vain task to look for even one book of political theology written in Poland. Certainly, the removal of the chairs of theology from the universities, strict government censorship, and sharply limited contacts with foreign centers of theology, all had their effect. In my opinion, however, the true causes of this lack lie deeper. For one, with the authorities taking an aggressive stance and constantly accusing the Church of enmity toward the state, any reflections on the subject would seem to be the working out of a specifically Christian "war doctrine." More importantly, among Polish Catholics there is a centuries-old unwritten consensus that made possible a proper understanding of Church activities and allowed them to be a part of the political dimension.

In my opinion, the essence of this political practice of the Church was to play what J.B. Metz calls a meta-critical role, but at the same time, to go beyond it, accept responsibility, and participate in many dimensions of social life. This requires a more extensive explanation.

Metacritical Role of the Church

Obviously the basic challenge to believers was the system of "scientific" materialism--Marxism. Even toward the end of the 70s this official doctrine still had some influence on the intellectual posture of the society, especially the youth. Behind this doctrine stood the power of the state, which was the almost absolute employer and dispenser of goods, and the censor and owner of all the cinemas, theaters, movie studios, radio and TV, and of schools of all levels.5 The Church, with only minimal options at her disposal, in every manifestation of her existence6 declared her "eschatological reservations" (J.B. Metz) and demonstrated the alternative ways of thinking in the face of the Marxist/Leninist explanation of the world. She declared those reservations also regarding the omnipotence of the state, at times in a dramatic way. In the 50s, for instance, the Primate's opposition to the state's filling ecclesiastical offices cost him three years in jail. In the 60s, when a part of the Communist party apparatus unleashed a nationalistic campaign that employed anti-semitic slogans, the episcopate's protest caused a hue and cry against the Church in all the mass-media and brought.

In the 70s, repressive measures were weaker even though the Church consistently protested in essential matters: opposing (to no avail) an amendment to the constitution that strengthened the role of the communist party or defending (with good results) the workers of Ursus and Radom7 massacred in June 1976. She also acted in some matters which, while seemingly less important, had a real influence on the shape of the life of the society. As examples one could recollect the successful fight against the decision to build a super highway that would have cut off the Jasna Gora shrine8 from the town of Czestochowa, or the lost campaign for school vacations at Christmas.9

The third level of metacriticism, after ideology and the state, was opposition to the politicization of religion. In spite of many requests and encouragements on the part of the government and of a variety of Catholic groups, both lay and clerical, the bishops never supported univocally any association, program or party. On the contrary, the episcopate rejected participation in all the groups attempting to devalue their Catholicism for strictly political purposes (e.g. "patriotic priests," Pax Association). The lack of any support for a variety of attempts to create "Christian Democracy," both immediately after the war, when the political scene was not yet completely dominated by the communists, and today, after the overthrow of the communist monopoly, and also the rejection of proposals to replace the abolished "Solidarity" with a Catholic trade union (with which the authorities tempted the Church in the 80s) testifies to the fact that the opposition to the politicization of religion is not exclusively anticommunist in character.10

Participation in the Life of Society

In the circumstances where the absolute majority of the citizens does not identify with the communist state, remaining satisfied with the role of a metacritic would be as easy as it would be insufficient. The Church undertook activities far exceeding her strictly pastoral duties. The Polish Bishops have for years been considered the principal voice of independent public opinion, and the opinions they expressed significantly influenced the policies of democratic countries towards Poland (their opinion counted also in USSR). The bishops even created Polish politics through their strictly religious statements. A beautiful example of this was the solemn message to the German bishops with its famous formulation: "We forgive, and we ask for forgiveness," to which

the authorities reacted by an unusually vicious campaign against the Church.11 A less fortunate example is the recent homily of the present Primate of Poland on the subject of the Carmelite convent in Oswiecim. To the same sphere of activities belongs also the strong support for the political opposition in Poland: from efforts to obtain humanitarian treatment of prisoners and struggles for consecutive amnesties, to material help: making available accommodations, cooperation of experts, etc.

Simply by the employment of many architects and artists the Church became the only patron of the arts independent of the state. In a situation where the government put a premium on obedience for creative artists and harassed the unrepentant, in Church-owned buildings art galleries came into being, author evenings, song recitals, movie projects and dramatic performances took place. Numerically modest Catholic publications12 were the asylum for many independent writers and journalists. The Church's answer to the breakdown of the system of upbringing and education was to organize children's and young people's vacations and to create youth organizations. Even though not officially recognized, and in fact persecuted, these activities in the 70s embraced hundreds of thousands of youths. Many Church centers also began independent educational activities. "Weeks of Christian Culture" and "Weeks of Social Action," especially, gathered throughout Poland masses of participants studying not only philosophy and theology but also history and political and social sciences.

In this presence of the Church within the many dimensions of social life, far exceeding pastoral and charitable activities, one might notice some probably seldom articulated but clearly present principles: option for the poor--the place of the Church was always on the side of those who cannot defend themselves. Whether it was peasants or students, workers or political dissenters, the Church insofar as she could, shielded them from acts of repression and gave them aid; uniting people--representatives of all the social classes, of all generations and of a variety of political orientation,13 believers and unbelievers,14 worked together in Church owned buildings. There, for many years, human solidarity was built.

Crossing over divisions--in all her interventions, the Church respected the dignity even of those opponents who fought her dishonestly. On principle she attempted to lessen the tensions between the opposing camps. She was always ready for compromise and mediation. That is why Cardinal Wyszynski concluded the first Eastern Bloc agreement between the state and the Church (so ill taken by Pius XII), and this was the reason why the episcopate tried to reconcile Poles and Germans, and for many years was the mediator between "Solidarity" and the government.

Division of competence--strictly political activity belongs to the vocation of the laity. Activity by the clergy, if unavoidable, has the character of intervention. The proper sphere of activity of the hierarchical Church is pre-politics: the area of moral choices that have political implications. The cardinal role of the clergy is in administration of the sacraments and in propagating of the Gospel.15

Notes

1. This statement is not an accusation. Every human experience has to be particular. Universalism differs from provincialism in that it does not consider its experience to be absolute but can place it in a context of other experiences. You can be equally provincial in Ulan Bator or Lusana, Paris or Glasgow. Warsaw or New York.

2. Out of a total of 10,000 Polish priests almost 3,000 were murdered; a relatively small number of them died in Soviet prisons.

3. The postwar government confiscated almost all real property: kindergartens, schools, hospitals, hospices, etc. Almost 1000 priests found themselves in Stalinist prisons, often accused of collaboration with the Hitlerites or the CIA but sometimes also of such things as purchasing dollars.

4. This found its reflection in the arts. In the foremost Polish romantic drama, the hero, in the course of his argument with God says: "I will say that you are not God but... a Tsar." A line in another well-known drama from the same period, declares: "Poland, your doom is in Rome." During his last pilgrimage to Poland John Paul II jokingly quoted these words and quipped: "I hope Slowacki [the author] was mistaken."

5. Even the sole private university in the eastern bloc, the Catholic University of Lublin [KUL], had its autonomy greatly restricted -- for instance, the government authorities would not permit a professorship to be awarded to Karol Wojtyla until October 1978.

6. Hence the essential significance of wearing the clerical garb in the street: umerous police harassments.

7. Heavy-industry centers.

8. The home of the famous icon of the Black Virgin.

9. The authorities abolished the long holiday break, common to all schools, and introduced staggered semester breaks. In this way they weakened the religious character of Christmas and, at the same time, made more difficult common vacations, especially for multi-child families. It was a fragment of the general government strategy aimed at weakening family life, since the family was perceived as the center of handing down the faith and as a factor weakening the efficacy of state propaganda

10. It is significant that, even in the interwar years, when the Church had many opportunities for political action, the Episcopate did not give its backing to the Christian-Democrat party, and that this party was numerically quite small. The then Primate, Cardinal Hlond, strongly warned against giving the Church a political character. For instance, in the pastoral letter of April 23, 1932, the Cardinal wrote: "One must beware of identification of a certain party direction and interests with the Church, of the abuse of her authority for electoral or party aims, and of drawing her into arguments on behalf of this or that political faction. Such activity [orig. it] would be a very harmful warping of her mission. The Church is not at the service of political parties. She does not enter into a political alliance with anybody and leaves to Catholics the freedom of belonging to parties that are not contrary to Catholic ethics. A desire to draw political advantages from the Faith by whatever the party would repel from the Church people of different political views...."

11. The government’s only social credential in a country that lost 6 million of its citizens during the war was the fear of Germany. Thus the authorities were trying to keep up the state of enmity between the Poles and the Germans.

12. The authorities controlling the allocation of paper allowed only ca. 1% of the total available to be purchased for Catholic books and periodicals: orientation, believers and unbelievers,1 worked together in Church owned buildings. There, for many years, human solidarity was built.

13. Including individuals belonging to the so-called "left-wing laity" and those members of the communist party that disagreed with the communist totalitarianism.

14. The fact was underscored by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his lecture on the occasion of his being awarded a doctorate *honoris causa* by the University of Louvain on Feb. 2, 1990: "Something very important was achieved in Poland: a meeting of Christians with people of a different, and until recently ill-disposed towards Christianity, tradition--secular, agnostic and

positivist. The essential discord, caused on one side by looking at Christianity and the Church as the world of yesteryear and on the other by seeing in that other tradition the world of foreign, distant and merely hostile values, was defeated. Treating believers as people with an intellectual and social blemish, and treating the representative of that other tradition as people with a moral blemish was to a great degree overcome."

15. Only in the posthumously published homilies of Fr. Jerzy Popieluszko, considered the most "political" priest in Poland, whom the government-sponsored press called "the sower of hate," can one see how distant he was from politics, and how his social improvement program was based mainly on the oft-repeated Pauline "conquer evil with good."

Chapter VII

Transcendence and Social Change: Individualism as a Religious and Theological Issue

Joseph G. Donders

1. It is interesting to note that in recent research on the political and spiritual tendencies around Jesus of Nazareth the issue of individualism is raised in a form recognizable to us. The recent interest in the Judeo-Christian dialogue has provided us with an ever-growing insight in that fascinating religious Jewish development.1 There are good reasons to believe that Jesus was under the influence of the Pharisaic movement. Some even hold that Jesus was a Pharisee.2

"He was a Pharisee who engaged in intense interaction with other Pharisees."3 To understand that interaction, we should have a greater acquaintance with the dynamism of Judaism in the time of Jesus. The Pharisees were afraid that the Jewish temple service undermined what the Jewish people should have learned from the Exodus event, where Yahweh himself had taken up the work of justice and mercy.

The Pharisees wanted to express that aspect in their daily life of worship and service. The temple service should not disappear but it should be done in such a way that it would reinforce social responsibility rather than serve as the dominant or single component in religious expression. Something prophets like Amos had said so forcefully:

I take no pleasure in your sacred ceremonies. When you bring me you whole offerings and your grain offerings I shall not accept them, nor pay heed to your shared-offerings of stall-fed beasts. Spare me the sound of your songs; I shall not listen to the strumming of your lutes. Instead let justice flow on like a river and righteousness like a never-failing torrent.4

Yet the temple cult had continued to remain the principal religious expression. After the exile in Babylon the temple had been rebuilt, and the priests had resumed the leadership of the people. It had not helped the people, and it was not helping them in Jesus' time. They were again under foreign, this time Roman, occupation.

The Pharisees knew that an armed revolution would not save the nation. A fundamental change in the structures of the whole Jewish people was needed. They wanted to liberate the people from the grip the priests and the priestly party of the Sadducees had over the people. They tried to do that in four different ways.5

(1) They considered that the Sinaitic Law was given by Moses to the whole people, to every individual and not only to the priestly leaders to interpret it for the rest of the people. The traditional 613 commandments of the Hebrew Bible had to be carefully restudied from the point of view of the human need for a just and peaceful society in everyday concrete life.

(2) They gradually produced a new religious kind of lay leadership in the new religious figure called rabbi. The rabbi was not a priest. His task was to interpret the Law and to apply it to to the concrete situations of every day. They were not only academic scholars reading books while sitting in their studies. They had to combine their teaching with concrete acts of mercy and healing the people. The ultimate test of their views and their intelligence was, did they show mercy, did they heal those who were sick?

(3) The Pharisees are the ones who developed the institution called synagogue. The synagogue focused around a local community. Though some synagogues had a place connected to them where some ritual slaughter could take place, and though prayer played an important role in the synagogue service, the synagogue was not a replica of the temple. It was not so much the "House of God," but the "House of the People of God." The synagogue became the communal focus. It was here that courts of law were held, strangers were welcomed, alms were given, and questions discussed.

(4) In their efforts to reach the whole of the people in their daily lives, the Pharisees applied the command of the Law: "You will be to me a Kingdom of priests, my holy nation"6 to everyone. They reasoned that the Temple altar in Jerusalem could be replicated at every table in the household of Israel.

The commandment, "You shall be a Kingdom of priests and a holy people," was taken literally: everyone is a priest, everyone stands in the same relationship to God, and everyone must keep the priestly laws. At this time, only the Pharisees held such a viewpoint, and eating unconsecrated food as if one were a Temple priest at the Lord's table thus was one of the two significations that a Jew was a Pharisee. . . .7

The real difference Pharisaism made was changing the way in which the relation between God and humanity was seen. The Pharisees believed that God related to each individual person. They generalized an attitude already expressed by Hebrew prophets like Isaiah and Ezechiel, in their response to God: "Here am I! Send me!" (Is. 6,8). The prophets are the first witnesses of an individualization created by the responsibility they felt for the other.

God was not only the Father of the Patriarchs or of the people of Israel as such. Each and every person had the inborn dignity, possibility and right to address God directly as Father. God had become the Father of each and every person. God cared about you, was concerned about you, and loved you. This personal love was also the reason that Pharisees believed in the resurrection of each one after death. God loved you so much that God wished your unique self to live forever and ever, like a real lover wishes of the loved one.

Hearing all this we might wonder why Jesus did not relate better to them, and they not relate better to Jesus. Different reasons for their sometimes stormy difference of opinion are given. We know that the Pharisees were divided into many schools of thought of which the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel were the more important ones.

In contrast to Hillel's conviction, Shammai denied the salvation of the gentiles. Jesus — of course — upheld the view of Hillel with all the conflicts that this caused, especially as in his time Shammai's School controled Jewish life. The main difficulty all the Pharisees had with Jesus was his interpretation of the point the Pharisees made on the relationship of the individual God and individual Law. Jesus went further than the Pharisees did. He did so in different ways. The Pharisees acknowledged God as their communal and personal Father. Jesus called that Father "Abba," indicating a different degree of intimacy than the Pharisees would have been willing to accept. This new intimacy with God corresponded, of course, also to a fresh understanding and experience of one's own personal dignity. That dignity prevails over anything else. It is at this point that the Pharisees would hesitate.

The Pharisees gradually began to look upon Jesus' independent stress on the worth of the individual as a potential threat to Jewish communal survival They were concerned with the absorption of Judaism by Hellenism and thus insisted on erecting what they termed "a fence around the Sabbath" as a safeguard against the destruction of the people of Israel.8

In a miracle like the liberating of a bent woman on the Sabbath day,9 the healing itself is not the issue. Rather Jesus' deliberate assertion of the primacy of each woman and man as person is the issue. As Pawlikowski remarks: "Thus, while the Pharisees pushed the concept of each individual's worth a tremendous distance, Jesus stretched it to its final limits." The issue is how far can you go to stress that primacy without undoing the community. How do individual and society relate to each other?

Another consequence of Jesus' radical belief in the dignity of the human being not all Pharisees liked to draw, seems to have been his attitude towards the *am ha aretz*, the people of the land, the poor. To be able to live the Pharisaic life in the way they did, you needed a certain affluency. The Pharisees were in general a rather well-off and self-aware lot. They inclined to look down upon others. Something foreign to the approach of Jesus.

He was also blamed for having changed the meaning of an old rabbinic saying that you cannot serve two masters. While the Pharisaic rabbis insisted that the second master opposed to divine discipleship was "evil inclination," with a probably sexual overtone, Jesus changed this to "mammon," wealth. It is wealth — and the running after it — that so often makes people disregard the basic dignity of women and men.

It is the same respect for that basic human dignity in everyone that makes Jesus say — in contrast to Pharisaic teaching — that we should not only not hate our enemies, but that we should love them.

And then there was a last point where the Pharisees attacked him openly. It is the point of forgiveness. Jesus was so conscious of his special and personal relationship with "Abba," that he claims this power — according to the Pharisees exclusively God's — his own, transferring it even to his followers. According to Jesus our intimacy with God is so great that we share the power to reconcile. He loves with God's love, and we should love in that way, too.

Pharisees in those days were clearly unwilling to go this far. Jesus had become in their eyes a real danger for their society. They could not see how you could teach and practice the human individualized personality of Jesus — and its spirit — without endangering the needed communality in society.

All this illustrates at the same time the spirit of the person of Jesus himself. If there was ever someone who affirmatively possessed a self, it was he. Who of us would be willing to say in all sincerity to others as he did: "Peace is my parting gift to you, my peace I give."10

He was self-possessed in a way no one of us is, although many of us seem to have come far. So far that the problems the Pharisees foresaw, in case Jesus' type of personality would be popularized, definitely are with us. In fact those problems are much more serious than they could foresee. It is not only a question of how this new independent self-possessed individual relates to society as regards even very elementary issues as procreation, but also as regards justice, peace, and the integrity of our life and environment.

The individualizing development is not considered to be a blessing without any further ado. That is the theme of much in our western literature, and in the kind of books we read like Robert Bellah's *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (1985), Christopher Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism* (1978) and *The Minimal Self* (1978), but also some older but widely read works like David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* (1950). Our growing individuality, increased self awareness, expanded self possession, and grown subjectivity make the rest of reality so often into a mere object to us. We have difficulties in relating to others, and to our whole environment.

Increasingly freed from the preoccupation and the limiting worries about physical and — in many cases — psychological survival, we are within grasp of subduing the earth and controlling life. It is as if many of us remain locked up in their personal castle, considering total independence as their ideal. It seems such a joy to be able to be yourself and not to be bound any more. The thing to do seems to be to defend yourself against any possible infringement of this freedom. That means at the same time that you have to try to control all and everything around you.

Legalistic systems and insurances flourish where physical and psychological force do not help. Nature itself has to be mastered and conquered, a situation in which it becomes difficult to be a Fragment of/in the Whole. Last year I participated in this Seminar. During the discussion one of the Russian participants was amazed about his American contacts. When he wanted to sum up all he had to say about his experience with the West, he said: "You are so aware of yourself, you made yourself into God."

Of course we are not Jesus, and we are not God, yet all through our Christian tradition we were supposed to be like He is. Maybe the time has come that we can do that better than ever before. He possessed himself as none of us, but we are all moving in that direction as modern medicine, education, and psychological insights allow us an increasing sense of wholeness. As long as one is embedded in a social structure, bound by an ethnic group, subject to social control, afraid of sanctions, caught in misery, diminished by poverty, wrapped in exploitative myths, the issue of that freedom does not easily arise. It is only at the moment that one has access to self that one can "dispose" of self.

It is only when one is "available" to self, that one can be "available" for others. What happens when it does? What happens when you are in affirmative possession of self? What does a society look like when the majority is in that position? How do you organize its structures and support systems? How do the parts then relate to the whole? How does wholeness relate to partiality in that situation?

Dr. Jack Dominian put it like this in his usual no-nonsense way: The whole gospel was directed at the poor and our Lord himself enjoyed no riches. Indeed, the church is extremely well orientated when it comes to serving the poor. But what about those whose material needs are being met? Have we reached a stage when thirty to forty percent of the world has to be spiritually disenfranchised? There is little evidence that the church has a plan for the affluent west except that it should use its riches to serve the poor. This is a policy of despair.11

It is not only despair, it is consternation. It is something that hits leadership again and again. As long as Moses was helping his people to emancipate, he did not have the type of difficulty he got when that same people really had come into their own. It took him and them forty years in the desert before they could go on in an organized way. Moses — and all those who went with him through the Red Sea — died in the process, except a few.

The Pharisees were frightened to see this liberated man Jesus walking through their streets, propagating his ideals. So were the adherents of the priestly party the Sadducees. They go to him with a question on his belief in the resurrection, a typical Pharisaic belief as we noted above. They hope to ridicule that conviction but also him. They reason — like so many nowadays still would do — that even the thought of a resurrection, or of life after death, is plain silly.

The logistics of such a human survival are impossible. They give an amusing example of this impossibility. They are really out to ridicule him. They tell him the story of a widow who married seven times seven brothers in succession during her life. One brother after another dies without leaving her any children. Finally she dies. What is she going to do in the hereafter, with those seven husbands lining up to see her?

The crowd must have loved this type of exchanges between Jesus and his opponents. Jesus simply silences them. He refers to something they all know of. He refers to the logic of love. Real lovers never see an end to their love. Lovers love each other *ad infinitum*. If God loves you, how could there be an end to that love? How could there be an end to you? God is faithful — even through death. Is love not something infinite between lovers? As far as the logistics of afterlife are concerned, things there will not be organized as things here. People are no longer married over there. Love will have come to fulfillment. Union will be realized. Life will be lived without any further restraints.They had hoped to ridicule him, he made them feel foolish.

Where the Sadducees do not succeed the Pharisees hope they will. He really is too dangerous. They too come to try to silence him, to get him down from their shoulders and out of their streets. They come with the real difficulty they have with him. When you stress the dignity of the individual person as much as Jesus does, and when you base that dignity on a personal relationship to God, how are you going to organize society? How do God, self and community relate to each other? How do you prioritize? What is the most important law?

Hearing that he had silenced the Sadducees, the Pharisees came together in a body, and one of them tried to test him with this question: "Rabbi, which is the greatest commandment in the law?" He answered, "`Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind.' That is the greatest, the first commandment. The second is like it: `Love your neighbor as yourself.'" Every thing in the law and the prophets hangs on these two commandments.12

Jesus answers their question as much to the point as they ask it. He could not have been more direct. His answer covers all their worries. How can you be the emancipated personality Jesus propagated in his life-style and word, and yet relate to community and transcendency? What would a spirituality look like when developed for those affluent and independent enough to be able to afford the luxury of individualism?

Not only a problem for the Pharisees in Jesus" time, but also for the actual world"s mainly Christian 30-40 percent affluent in the West.13 Jesus" answer is short and simple. It is the old answer, too. Three factors have to be taken into consideration: self, the other and God.

2. Emmanuel Levinas (born 1906) is the Jewish philosopher who spent all his time and all his attention on the relation "I and the Other." He does that in the Judaic context. He does not skip their relation to transcendency. In fact he blames the Western "logos"-fed philosophy in general (there are exceptions like Plato's Idea of the Good and Descartes' Idea of the Infinite) for having ignored Transcendency. Western philosophy became the prisoner of "thinking" and "being." In its relation to the other and the world there is in that way no "absolute Other," and consequently no transcendent "other."14 It is in relation to this "Absolute Other" that we are a real "different " one, and that others are really different from us. Not recognizing this "Otherness" leads to the possibility of colonization, exploitation and extermination of the "other."

We meet the Other in the "face" of everyone. The "presence" and the "nearness" of the Other is demanding my response. "Respondeo, ergo sum." The Other is a mystery, even in our contact. For Levinas the ecstasy of eroticism is not "becoming as one." "It is the experience, aroused to an intensely delightful degree, of the absolute 'otherness' of the other, sought for in every caress and never reached."

Individualism is a Western conquest of the "totality" thinking of "myth." It has its roots in the biblical prophetic tradition. Individualism contains an egocentric and hedonistic element, that should not be — even not ethically — overlooked. In our social thinking the "absolute transcendency" of the Other should be founded on a re-consideration of Transcendency. In other

words individualism should be radicalized. Not because of a "suspect" contemporary turn to narcissism, but because of the presence of the Other in my life.

In the context of Bellah"s book *Habits of the Heart* this task is formulated in another way: "Perhaps the most important ministry the Church can have in the renewal of public life is a `ministry of paradox': not to resist the inward turn of American spirituality on behalf of effective public action, but to deepen and direct and discipline that inwardness in the light of faith until God leads us back to a vision of the Public and to faithful action on the Public's behalf."15

3. Individualism and solidarity can be "thought" next to each other. One of the attempts to do this can be found in Fritjof Capra's *The Turning Point* (1982), a New Age amalgamation of physics and mysticism, in which the "dancer and the dance" are the same. This analogue is — as noted — "mystically" inspired. It is in this context that Christians might find new significance in their Trinitarian belief. According to that belief three persons remaining individualized persons are at the same time One. Greek Fathers trying to grasp something of this mystery used the term *perichoresi*s. A word that, next to technical meanings like *circumincessio* and *circuminsessio*, in more everyday usage means "dance." Leornardo Boff suggests that when looking for a model to humanize the ever growing personal, social, ethical, political and even economic individualism we should consider that paradigm.16 The simple advice "first God, and the other as yourself" might prove to be significant in fields of human behavior and learning hardly ever guessed before.

Notes

1. John T. Pawlikowski, O.S.M., *Christ in the Light of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue*, Paulist Press, New York, 1982, pp. 76-108.

2. Harvey Falk, *Jesus the Pharisee, A New Look at the Jewishness of Jesus*, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.

3. William E. Phipps, "Jesus the Prophetic Pharisee", in *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 14, No. 1, (Winter 1977), pp. 17-31.

4. Amos 5: 21b-25.

5. Stuart Rosenberg, "Contemporary Renewal and the Jewish Experience," paper delivered to the 1968 International Conference of Christians and Jews, York University, Toronto, Canada, Sept. 1968, p. 4, quoted in Pawlikowski, l.c. p. 85.

6. Ex 19: 6.

7. Jacob Neusner, *From Politics to Piety, The Emergence of Pharisaic Judaism*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1973, p. 83, quoted in Pawlikowski, o.c. p. 86.

8. Pawlikowski, o.c. pp.l03-104.

9. Lk 13: 10-17.

10. John 14: 27.

11. Dr. Jack Dominian, *Spirituality in the West*, see footnote 2, p. 12-13.

12. Mat 21: 34-41.

13. Dominian, *ibid*. p. 2.

14. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et Infini*, 1961; *Humanisme de l'autre homme*, 1972; *Autrement qu'être ou au-dela de l'essence,* 1978; *Ethique et Infini*, 1982.

15. 1961, 233; 1978, 1, 14, 16. Robert N. Bellah, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment* (Berkeley: UCAT, Berkeley, 1985), quoting from Parker J. Palm, *Company of Strangers: Christians and the Renewal of America's Public Life*, (New York: Crossroad, 1981), p. 155. (My italics).

16. Leonardo Boff, *Trinity and Society*, Orbis, (New York, 1988).

Chapter VIII

The Hermeneutics of Mediation in Ramon Llull: *Blanquerna* as a Thirteenth-Century Parable

Roberto J. Gonzalez-Casanovas

Introduction: Llull and *Blanquerna*

For the preachers and religious writers who are active in the movement of church renewal and of the reform of Christendom in the thirteenth century — in the years following the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 and the founding of the Franciscan and Dominican orders — ,1 every life of a Christian in society represents an interpretation of the letter and spirit of the Gospel. This phenomenon can be termed an apostolic hermeneutics, in which the *kerygma* of the New Testament is recontextualized as a contemporary mission of conversion (spiritual, confessional, and ecclesial): it constitutes the dynamic axis in a process of revealing and exemplifying in the modern world the doctrine, teaching, and mission of the Church. The religious novel *Blanquerna*,2 written in 1283-85 by Blessed Ramon Llull (the medieval Doctor of the Missions and Apostle to Islam who lived in the years 1232-1316),3 constitutes an attempt to reinterpret the Gospel for the sake of increasing devotion among Christians, perfecting the life of the Church, and preparing missionaries to convert the whole world to Christ.

Blanquerna consists of a fictional hagiography that evolves into a religious and social utopia. The young Blanquerna, scion of a middle-class urban family, goes in quest of a hermitage: on his journey, he first finds allegorical figures of the Ten Commandments, Faith, Truth, Devotion, and Valor, who lament that the faith and charity practiced in the times of the Apostles have been allowed to decline;4 then he encounters a series of religious institutions that are all in need of reform in order to restore them to the model of the church of the Apostles. Divine providence leads him to become in turn abbot, bishop, and pope in order to renew the church and world.5 At each stage of his evangelical education and apostolic service, he is able to transform, through his grace, authority, and example, the whole medieval world:6 Rural and urban communities, the many estates of society and levels of the church, every Christian nation and infidel land, all are affected, and most are reformed, by the popular preaching, organized works of charity, and pious fraternities that he inspires and helps to regulate. Finally, having completed his mission to preach the Gospel and form other missionaries, he resigns from the papacy7 and finds the hermitage he has always sought, where he devotes himself to active contemplation.8 He becomes a mystic who is still engaged with the contemporary world: he mediates an ascetic rule for all the hermits of Rome9 and writes devotional works; these include the *Book of the Friend and the Beloved* (that combines Sufi techniques with Franciscan piety), the *Art of Contemplation* (that provides a scholastic manual for meditation on the divine and human virtues),10 and the very novel that the reader/listener is in the process of interpreting.11

Novel and Parable as Pious Narrative

In *Blanquerna*, Llull attempts to witness to his own experience of the Gospel message and to communicate to his contemporary popular audience (the same one addressed in the vernacular by the preaching of the friars)12 the imitation of Christ; at the same time he offers, by means of the

general parable and particular examples of the novel, a context for interpreting the Gospel according to the contemporary conditions of the Church. By narrating the fictitious life of a "modern" saint (based on autobiographical facts and Franciscan typology), Llull is able to model his own religious formation, articulate his vision of the Kingdom of Christ, and translate his mystical searches and encounters with God. Through this parabolic device, which combines in exemplary narratives both personal devotion and criticism of society, Llull attempts to signify and mediate the very process of conversion (*metanoia*, poeni*tentia*, and *professio*) at the heart of the Gospel message and the Apostolic preaching.

For Llull, this parabolic hermeneutics of conversion is centered on the *imitatio Christi*, the Christocentric humanization of faith and morals that evolves into the *devotio moderna* and *via apostolica* of clerical, religious and secular communities of the late Middle Ages.13 This dynamic of imitation involves translating the divine image into the likeness of Christ: it calls for a transformation of the creature, graced by the Creator yet fallen through sin, into the fully human person (as described by Irenae)14 of the Christian saint as mediator of salvation and collaborator with the Spirit; it promotes the education of the heart, divided (in Augustinian terms)15 by attractions to God and the world, so as to follow the call of the divine-human Friend or Beloved and seek out a holy company in this inner pilgrimage; and it urges the radical restoration of the church (as understood by Francis of Assisi and his companions)16 as the true community of the faithful, passionate, and compassionate people of God established by the Apostles, instructed by the Fathers, and inspired by the example of the saints throughout history.17

In order to exemplify the way of communicating devotion, Llull recognizes the importance of relating Blanquerna's preaching to the Gospel by way of parables. These serve as intertexts (parallel models) and contexts (interpretative frames of reference) to the novel *Blanquerna*. In key passages in the book, parables function as signifiers of spiritual meaning, reflect the power of providence, recall the primary intention of created life, manifest a communicated grace, and evoke an interiorized response to the Other. By this parabolic means the author/preacher converts the didactic tale into a humanized narrative grounded in real conditions and problematic situations that serve to form/deform/reform the divine image in each Christian as he struggles to be like Christ.

Throughout the novel it is important to note that, according to the conventions of scholastic exegesis as well as evangelical piety, all persons and events can serve as both divine message and human sign: "Blanquerna," the abbot said, "this event that has befallen you is an example and sign that God wants you to be His servant in our company."18 What is curious is that often, as happens in the Gospels, the explanation of the parable leads to another emblem or symbol: "The abbot and all the others begged Blanquerna to explain the words he was speaking through similitudes. Blanquerna explained the example of the wounded man by another example. . . ."19 This represents a process of hermeneutic linking in which, instead of being concerned with the "correct" translation of the example, emphasizes the educative value of the very search for meaning as connection and application; for what is being attempted is to rouse the listener's mind, appeal to his emotions, and provoke a formative reaction to the mediating of the message.

Beneath the examples and their expositition can be appreciated the importance that is assigned to the *virtus* (value and power) that words, especially those communicated through dialogue or figurative speech, have to obstruct or make manifest the divine will. In terms of Augustinian voluntarism, words reflect good or bad appetites or desires — for Llull, *amor* or *desamor* — that operate, according to the movements of the psyche and individual habits, underneath the meanings comprehended by the mind: "Blanquerna felt within himself temptation multiplying through the words which the young woman was saying, and turned once more to remembering God and the

virtues, as he was accustomed to do."20 For the preachers in Blanquerna, who understand moral psychology, the authentic meaning to be grasped in a dialogue (vital content of*enonciation)* can contradict the message that is being expressed in the discourse (conventional form of the *enonce*) and instead evoke a response different from what was expected. In this novel-sermon, the process of signifying religious truths depends, then, not so much on the doctrinal text as such (theology) — which might not be understood at all or might not have an immediate reference for the listener — as on the communicative context (*kerygma*) that relates and interprets the message within a vital situation:

So devoutly and so humbly was the abbot [Blanquerna] praying and saying *Dominus tecum,* that God placed such great virtue in the words the abbot was saying and in the devotion he had, that the farmer became aware of the harm he had done to the abbey, and through the awareness he had contrition, charity, and justice.21 Here the farmer was converted and reconciled by means of the saint's dialogue: the latter transforms the Latin phrase from the Ave Maria, "Dominus tecum" into a concrete and contemporary example of the life of Christ on earth. That is why at the center of Blanquerna one finds the transformation of words (the signifying l*angue*) into parables (the situational *parole*).

When speaking of evangelical parables in this novel-sermon, one encounters the phenomenon of the special grace with which they are being inspired, communicated, and received. The inspiration can be manifested in terms of the popular poetry or entertainment of a minstrel of God: "The Canon [of the Beatitude of the Persecuted], in the likeness of a fool, went through the city as he was accustomed often to do, saying some foolish words, so that by them he could lead men to good works."22 Grace can also appear as a case of a providential or mystical illumination, which, according to Augustinian trinitarian psychology, rouses the memory, informs the understanding, and conforms the will.

A divine light warmed the heart of the prince with celestial love, and he said these words: "It is not proper that such a bishop [as Blanquerna] or his companions [the Canons of the Beatitudes] be disobeyed in anything...." The prince asked for forgiveness and made reparation, and commended himself to the grace and blessing of the bishop and the whole cathedral chapter.23 In this case the inspiration of the preacher — Blanquerna who is modeling the apostolic work to his canons according to the eight Beatitudes of the Gospel, that serve as their rule and guide — is communicated to the person receiving his counsel, who in turn recognizes the presence and effects of divine grace: thus is completed the cycle of communication, not of some doctrine that is being explained through words, but of the very divine grace that is being incarnated in a human speech act of address, interrelatedness, and reception.

Mediation through Words and Deeds

It is significant that in Blanquerna Llull is representing the hagiography of a preacher whose sanctity is manifested in words that function as acts of witness, as well as in works that proclaim his message with the language of living examples. The apostolate the protagonist, as well as the author, consists of translating, executing, and fulfilling what is preached in the Gospel: they translate confessional states, execute processes of proclamation, and fulfill the objectives of the counsels of perfection. This apostolic homiletic is recapitulated in passages that refer to lay piety, personalized mediation, a communitarian medium, moral fruits, and the agency of grace. In Blanquerna Llull employs sanctity as a model for preaching, which reveals the human

interpretation of a Gospel that is not a static text, but rather a context that is being transformed into the Kingdom of Christ on earth and in the present.

When the thirteenth-century Christian returns to the model of the life of faith and community found in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles, as Blanquerna himself does in his reform of Christendom, the role of the institutional Church comes to be examined as a problematic issue, as the evangelical and missionary *ecclesia* (assembly of the believers) is subjected to redefinition. With respect to the exemplary figures of the preachers in *Blanquerna*, it is important to note that the kerygmatic role of the laity is widened. Among the lay characters, the saint's parents stand out for their piety and works of charity; they preach the Gospel through their living out of its precepts: The whole city was in a better condition through the good life and good estate and example of Evast and Aloma, for those who were in matrimony and in religion received good example and edification from them; and they were loved and honored by all the people of the city. In such grace were Evast and Aloma in that city that the men and women found in them counsel and favor, and consolation in their needs.24 The example of virtue, wisdom, and love offered by this middle-class couple transcends the lay and religious states: "Since through a good life we have been until now a light and doctrine to those who are in the order of matrimony, so then through the sanctity of good life let us give example from now on to those who are in order of religion."25 It is significant that Evast and Aloma decide to preach in the only way possible to them, which turns out to be the best one of all: "Instead of preaching [as with a clerical office], you will be able to preach by good life and by good example to all those who are in the order of matrimony, and you will be able to strengthen religious people in their order. . . ."26 Spiritual and moral authority here appear to take precedence, in terms of the evangelical model of life, work, and community, over the hierarchichal order and clerical institution of the Church (especially as it was perceived after the papal reforms of Gregory Vll and Innocent).27

Once the reform of Christendom has been launched by the protagonist and his canons and cardinals, the apostolic initiative passes to the numerous and various types of secular "preachers." These are both inspired and organized by the saint and his growing number of companions and officials. In this part of the novel (Blanquerna's episcopate and papacy), there is a significant shift in interest: in going from Books I-II to III-IV, the action moves towards the modeling of a complete utopia through the institution of new *oficis* and *regles* (offices and rules) that, in ever-widening circles, will engage all the faithful in urban preaching and social reform; although the focus turns away from the formation of exemplary preacher saints (like Evast, Aloma, Natana, and Blanquerna), it will return to it with the ascetic and mystical works included at the end of the novel. This narrative transformation reflects a change in the hermeneutics of mediation: from the interiorized process of conversion (*metanoia*) in the saint and his company (clerical, religious, and lay), one passes to the external effects of public penance and social reform centered on the Church as an social and historical institution; after having examined the problematic issues of intra/interpersonal relations, the author then idealizes the collective norms, structures, and rituals of good counseling and arbitration.

The new lay preachers emerge from the common people, especially in the cities; the majority are sinners or pious persons who have experienced an interior conversion and then join the movement of church renewal and social reform. Among them can be found: knights, squires, rogues, minstrels, emperors, kings, princes, lay brothers, farmers, shepherds, teachers of philosophy, schoolmasters, students, pilgrims, and hermits.28 Another development is the founding of new lay confraternities that devote themselves to popular preaching: these include those who dispute on moral questions, proclaim the divine attributes, exemplify the human virtues,

advocate norms of justice and mercy, compare models of holy living, and consider the rewards and pains of heaven and hell;29 the latter, in imitation of the Sufi brotherhoods in the contemporary Muslim world,30 appeal to the emotions of the populace to consider the agonies and glories that await them in the other world, in order to reform their lives and societies in the present one.

It is interesting to observe the manner in which Blanquerna's papal court promotes popular forms of the art of preaching that respond to the needs of the urban mission as well as of the missions to the lands of infidels and pagans. Upon receiving news from the messengers or nuncios of the great masses of peoples yet to be evangelized, it was decreed by the pope and the cardinals that they should send to those peoples saintly and devout persons who knew their languages, and that these should preach to them with examples and stories [*exemplis* and *custumes*], and by metaphors and likenesses [*metafores* and *semblances*], until the sensual faculties [*sensualitats*] should elevate the likenesses to the powers of the soul, through which they would be illuminated, in their intellectual faculties [*entellectuitat*], by the holy Catholic faith.31 In this manner the affective life of Christian devotion (of the believer and preacher who is reconverted to the love of Christ) is related to the efficacious means of attracting and reorienting the human emotions of the masses (of unbelievers yet to be converted). As the preachers give experiential and popular examples (*exemplis, custumes, metafores*, and *semblances*) of their own faith and virtue and charity, they in effect develop an apostolic psychology and sociology (based on Augustinian, Franciscan, and Sufi traditions, as well as on missionary practice); according to these apostolic methodologies, the whole people can be converted by contemplating, first on the affective level of the *sensualitats* and then on the rational one of the *entellectuitat,* their true human condition. Popular preaching (urban and missionary) is thus founded on the common and communal experience of becoming disaffected with the evils (ills or sufferings) of sin and affected by the goodness (healing and consolation) of God.

What is important in this widening of the popular base of the *kerygma* — precisely what should be remembered about Blanquerna, his family, and companions — consists of the authentic community of the faithful that is being refashioned within the supposedly Christian cities: by means of this collaboration in giving witness, support, and counsel to each other, the Gospel is interpreted in the concrete and symbolic terms of the City of God.32 Every exemplary word and work, as well as every confessional preacher and listener, are in effect interrelated. This is what happens in the apostolate of penance that Evast and Aloma undertake: "Great were the example and good life that Evast and Aloma led, and by their merits God bestowed many graces to many people, and heard [the prayers of] many sinners in that city, and God cured many sick people in the hospital through the prayers of Evast and Aloma. Many who were accustomed to sin did penance as a result of Evast's good example, and many entered religious orders; and everything Evast and Aloma did served as rule, example, sermon, and reproof to conscience [*regla, exempli, preycacio,* and *remordiment de consciencia*] to those who saw Evast and Aloma; and through their actions, they mortified in sinners the seven deadly sins. . . ."33

Just as the "preaching," not official but exemplary, of these lay saints represents the most authentic imitation of the Christ of the Gospels — save that of the martyr (as the Friend understands in the mystical *Book of the Friend and the Beloved*) — ,34 the "rule" that they introduce into their city constitutes the social order most faithful to the spirit of the Apostles. In order to ascertain that this ideal transcends the limits of clerical, religious, and lay states within the Church, the exemplary effects of their apostolic "rule" should be compared to the monastic rule instituted by the abbess Natana in the reform of her convent: "The abbess lived for a long time in that monastery, following all the ordinances...; and there were many good women in that

monastery as a result of the holy life and teaching of the abbess Natana. Many women in the city derived good example from her, and many other monasteries based their rule and practice on those instituted by the abbess Natana."35

In both cases, the cloister and the city, the whole community is reformed as a result of an interior conversion that is then translated into external transformations. Since everything that a saint thinks, feels, says, does, and loves is combined in the total preaching of the Chrisian life, it is difficult to distinguish between the good effects of his words, "rules of conduct," examples, and works. On the one hand, one finds that the hagiographic model of good deeds is often being praised: "A lay brother...asked the friar [who had preached]: 'Sir, from which sermon does the greater fruit come: from the sermon of words, or from the sermon of good deeds and good example?' The friar answered: 'Inasmuch as there is greater virtue in doing good deeds, and to do them requires more effort than to tell someone to do good, the fruit of good example is greater than that of saying words; and it is but a short time since Evast and Aloma through good example converted to chastity a woman, whom I could not convert through preaching and through words.'"36 On the other hand, the saint's life is integrated into the homiletic pattern of preaching according to evangelical and apostolic contexts: Great was the virtue that God showed in Blanquerna, and Blanquerna served as a light and good example to all the monks and all the peoples of that land so that they might lead a holy life. And by Blanquerna's holy speech [*santa conversacio*] God blessed all the peoples and all the lands of that region in health, peace, and abundance of spiritual and earthly fruits. All blessed and praised God, who had bestowed on one man so much virtue that through him by the grace of God many people had so many virtues.37

Here one finds summarized the example of the good preacher, whose words and parables, deeds and witness, offer in equal measure blessings for the whole community. The agency of divine grace at work through his mediation derives at the same time from the primordial Gospel story, text, or life, which is traditionally communicated by dialogue, and from the community inspired by the Spirit, whose multiple circumstances, contexts, or experiences are now offered as living testimony of faith and transformed into new apostolates.

Conclusion: Hermeneutics of Exemplarity

The process of conversion in Blanquerna is communicated through the exemplary life of a fictional saint, who recapitulates the various types of apostolate and spiritual ideals of his age: active and contemplative, scholastic and monastic, lay and clerical. These religious states, which he represents and interrelates into a harmonious model for the whole Church, correspond to several traditional forms of religious literature: the prayers and works of the devout Christian are integrated into a complete hagiography that serves as mirror for society, in which are reflected the virtues and vices of humanity; the theological arts and the liturgical worship of the professed Catholic are incorporated into didactic and pious techniques for exercising the mind and heart in dialogue about and with God; and the social relations and institutional roles of the members of the City of God and Body of Christ are harmonized into utopian and mystical visions of the Church, which transcend the tensions of a certain period of history and the divisions of a given condition of society that are in transition. Hagiographical emblem, social mirror, didactic *exempla*, pious example, scholastic dialectic, liturgical dialogue, utopian commonwealth, and mystical communion are all combined by Llull in *Blanquerna* into the creation of a unique novel-sermon.

This work represents an exemplary narrative and parable, in which particular *exempla* are situated in contemporary contexts, and personal examples of preachers are related to communal

concerns. Throughout the story both the author and the protagonist refer to the *virtus* or power of the divine words of the Gospel; these are interpreted by holy lives and mediated by the community of sinners on the way to becoming saints. Upon studying this process of translating and communicating the Christian faith as it is modeled in Blanquerna, one discovers that the author's evangelical homiletics constitutes in effect a genuine hermeneutics of the apostolic life of the Church in a "modern" human society.

Llull's ecclesial hermeneutics in this novel comprehends two fundamental modalities of religious discourse: his mediation of the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles is here realized through parable and hagiography.

(1) The parables, that can be characterized as evangelical since they either derive from a reading of the Gospel or refer back to a rereading of it, represent a series of symbolic sayings, gestures, and acts, which are to be interpreted according to the scholastic allegory and reforming morality of the historical period in question. In Llull's work they lend themselves to various functions on the multiple levels of the novel as sermon; these functions include: a signifying frame (the *vita*), a narrative process (the *fabula*), a situational message (the *exemplum*), and a spiritualized lesson (the *glossa*). Ultimately, one can regard the parabolic process in *Blanquerna* as a way of inducing theology to return to its existential point of departure in the Gospel account of the life of Christ and in the living faith of the Church. (2) The hagiography represents an apostolic context, since it both returns to the example of the Apostles as the first, direct, and privileged readers and interpreters of the Gospel, and also since it offers new examples of living with Christ in the Church, as it is presently constituted and as it is evolving under the guidance of the Spirit. The saints in *Blanquerna* demonstrate the manner in which individual quests for salvation unfold within the social conditions of the times so as to foster the growth of the City of God on earth. Their exemplarity serves as a living sign of the mystery of divine grace that is incarnated and communicated in human figures; for Llull, they do not constitute so much an emblem to be venerated as a process of formation that reflects in a dynamic way the evolving image of God in moral consciousness (as an arbiter of virtue and justice) and the unfolding likeness to the divine Exemplar of love (as Interpreter of what is true and good in humanity). Thus, in *Blanquerna*, the saints are situated here and now, in the midst of a society and Church undergoing crises, conversions, and restorations, as the agents of the Kingdom of Christ that is continuously being formed.

In *Blanquerna* Llull narrates the psychological formation and social education of a modern saint, so as to preach on the reform of the Church; at the same time, he represents a utopian allegory that functions as a parable on the inner life of faith, as the soul struggles to achieve spiritual conversion and moral perfection, that serves as a symbol for transforming humanity. Together, sermon and parable, novel and allegory, constitute for Llull a hermeneutics for reading, translating, and mediating the Gospel in the life of the individual and the community; through them are to be interpreted the growth in compassion and the interrelationship through charity of the "modern"/medieval Christian and Church, as they progressively become more like Christ.

Notes

1. On this period of renaissance, crisis, and reform in the Church, see: Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979); Mircea Eliade, *A History of Religious Ideas*, III: *From Muhammad to the Age of Reforms*, trs. A. Hiltebeitel and D. Apostolos-Cappadona (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985); Alexander Murray, *Reason and*

Society in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Steven Ozment, *The Age of Reform, 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (*New Haven: Yale Univ.press, 1980); Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christian Tradition III: The Growth of Medieval Theology 600-1300* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978); Ray C. Petry (ed.), *A History of Christianity: Readings in the History of the Church*, I: *The Early and Medieval Church*(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981); R.W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* [The Pelican History of the Church, III (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1970); and Paul Szarmach (ed.), *An Introduction to the Medieval Mystics of Europe*. (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1984).

2. On *Blanquerna*, see E. A. Peers, R. L.: *A Biography* (London: Soc. for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1929): 159-191; Frank Pierce**,** "*Blanquerna and The Pilgrim's Progress Compared*," in *Estudis Romanics*, III (1951-52): 88-98; and Wolfgang Scleicher, *Ramon Llulls Libre de Evast e Blanquerna: Eine Untersuchung uber den Einfluss der Franziskanisch-Dominikanischen Predigt auf die Prosawerke des Katalanischen Dichters* (Geneve: Librairie E. Droz, 1958). See also my Ph.D. dissertation (Harvard 1990*): Predicacion y narrativa en Ramon Llull: De imagen a Blanquerna semejanza en Blanquerna.* Peers' modern English translation (1925) has recently been reprinted:, tr. E. A. Peers (London: Dedalus/Hippocrene, 1987).

3. Ramon Llull's autobiography, the *Vita coetania* (1311), has been translated into English: *The Life of Ramon Llull*, tr. E. A. Peers (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1927). For Llull's biography, in its historical, intellectual, religious, and literary contexts, see: J. N. Hillgarth, *Ramon Llul*: *Llullism in Fourteenth Century France* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) and *The Spanish Kingdoms,1250-1516* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976),1: 215-30; Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1975): 504-12 and 636-40; E. A. Peers, *Ramon Llull: A Biography* (London: Soc. for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1929) and *Fool of Love: The Life of Ramon Llull* (London: Soc. of Christian Missions, 1946); Annemarie Schimmel "Ramon Llull," in *Encyclopedia of Religion* [ed. M. Eliade, 1987], IX: 52-53; Arthur Terry, *Catalan Literature [A Literary History of Spain,* VIII (London: Ernest Benn, 1972); and David J. Viera, *Medieval Literature*: *Prose and Drama* (New York: Twayne, 1988):4-24. For Ramon Llull, teacher of missionaries, see Jeremy Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Semitism* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1982): 199-226; E. Randolph Daniel, *The Franciscan Concept of Mission in the High Middle Ages* (Lexington, KY: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1975): 66-75; Benjamin Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches toward the Muslims* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1982): 145-46 and 189-200; Mark D. Johnston, "The Rhetorica nova of Ramon Llull: An *Ars praedicandi* as Devotional Literature," in *De Ore Domini: Preacher and Word in the Middle Ages*, eds. T. BK. Amos, E. A. Green, and B. M. Kienzle (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan Univ./Medieval Institute Publicat., 1989): 119-45; Stephen Neill, *A History of Christian Missions* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1984; 2nd ed.): 114-17; and J. R. S. Phillips, *The Medieval Expansion of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988): 146-47 and 149-50.

On Llull's theological and pedagogical system, the *Ars magna*, see Frederick Coplestone, *A History of Philosophy* (Garden City, NY: Image, 1985), Il: 456-59; Etienne Gilson, *La Philosophieau Moyen Age* (Paris: Payot, 1944; 2e ed): 461-65; Mark D. Johnston, *The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); R. D. F. Pring-Mill, "The Trinitarian World Picture of Ramon Llull," in *Romanistisches Jahrbuch,* VII (1955-56): 229-56, and "The Analogical Structure of Llullian Art," in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*: *Essays Presented to Richard Walzer* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1973): 315-26; Dominique Urvoy, *Penser l'lslam: Les presupposes islamiques de l'Art de* Llull (Paris: J. Vrin,

1980); and Frances A. Yates, "Llullism as an Art of Memory," in *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966): 173-98.

On utopia in Llull, see J. N. Hillgarth "Ramon Llull et l'utopie," in *Estudios Llulianos*, XXV (1981-83): 175-85; and Frank E. and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press/ Belknap, 1979): 207-8.

4. Bk IIB: cc 42-45 and 48.

5. Bk IIB: cc 60-66 (reforms in the monastery and surroundings); Bk III: cc 67-77 (reforms in the cathedral chapter and city); and Bk IV: cc 7895 (reforms in the papal court, Rome, Christianity, and the world).

6. See Bk IV: cc 80, 84, 87, 88, and 95, on pope Blanquerna's missions (religious and diplomatic) to every land: Babylon, Bohemia, Dacia, Egypt (Alexandria), Georgia, Ghana, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy (Lombardy, Tuscany, and Venice), North Africa (Barbary), Spain (Santiago), and Turkey. In cc 80, 84, and 95, he organizes and directs twelve messengers (or nuncios), who travel to every corner of the world and report on the peoples they meet. In c 95, he even institutes a council, under Rome's supervision, to arbitrate among princes and communes; this represents in effect a medieval prototype for the United Nations.

7. It is interesting to note that pope Blanquerna's resignation (in a novel written in 1283-85) served as a fictional precedent for historical events: in 1294, after six months in the apostolic see, Celestine V (Pietro Murrone, a hermit and founder of the Celestines, who was close to the "spiritual" Franciscans) became the only pope to resign from office; in spite of his being canonized in 1313 (by the first Avignon pope Clement V), this earned him the reprobation of Dante ("il gran rifiuto"). See Sebastian Garcias Palou, "El Papa Blanquerna de R. Ll. y Celestino V," en EL, XX (1976): 71-86.

8. Bk V: cc 98-99 (Blanquerna's hermitage).

9. Bk V: c 99.

10. Bk V: c 100=*Book of the Friend and the Beloved*; cc 101-14=*Art of Contemplation*. These are autonomous, detachable works that were written in an earlier period of Llull's life, when he was engaged in the ascetic life at Miramar, a monastery school for missionaries which he founded *Biography,* (with the support of James II of Mallorca) on his native island in 1276. See Peers, *Ramon Llull: A* 175-91.

11. Bk V: c 115.

12. On preaching in the thirteenth century, see, for example: Thomas L. Amos, Eugene A. Green, and Beverly Mayne Kienzle (eds.), *De Ore Domini: Preacher and Word in the Middle Ages* (*Kalamazoo: Western Michigan Univ./ Medieval Institute Publicat., 1989); D. L. D'Avray, The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons Diffused from Paris before 1300 (*Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); *Jean Longere, La Predication medievale (Paris: Etudes Agustiniens, 1983); Anscar Zawart, The History of Franciscan Preaching and of Franciscan Preachers (1209-1927): A Bio-Bibliographic Study* (New York: J. F. Wagner, 1928); and Michel Zink, *La Predication en langue romane avant 1300* (Paris: Honore Champion, 1976).

13. See the studies in Jill Raitt (ed., in collab. Bernard McGinn and John Meyendorff), *Christian Spirituality, II*: *High Middle Ages and Reformation* (New York: Crossroad, 1987), especially the following: Ewert Cousins, "The Humanity and Passion of Christ" (375-91); William J. Courtenay, "Spirituality and Late Scholasticism" (109-20); Otto Grundler, "Devotio Moderna" (176-93); Alois Maria Haas, "Schools of Late Medieval Mysticism" (140-75); Richard Kieckhefer, "Major Currents in Late Medieval Devotion" (75-108); and McGinn 1985: 323-28 ("Image of God"); cf. Hundersmarck, in Amos, Green, and Kienzle (eds.), *De Ore Domini, 147-*

67 ("Preaching the Passion: Late Medieval `Lives of Christ' as Sermon Vehicles"); and Margaret R. Miles, *Practicing Christianity: Critical Perspectives for an Embodied Spirituality* (New York: Crossroad, 1988): 21-42 ("An Image of the Image: The Imitation of Christ"). See also two companion studies on "The Human Person as Image of God", in Bernard McGinn and John Meyendorff (eds., in collab. Jean Leclercq), *Christian Spirituality, I: Origins to the Twelfth Century* (New York: Crossroad, 1985): Bernard McGinn, 291-311 (on its role in Western Christianity), and Lars Thunberg, 312-30 (in Eastern Christianity).

14. On Irenaeus's theology of likeness, see Henry Chadwick, *The Early Church* [The Pelican History of the Church, I] (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1967), 80-81, where he states: "[Irenaeus] believed that in the Fall only the moral likeness to God was lost, not the basic image. . . . Error came in because mankind is growing to maturity. . . . God allowed man to fall to quench his pride and to teach him by discipline and experience. So the history of salvation is a progressive education, in which God has gradually brought man forward step by step in a long process culminating in the incarnation of the divine Word with a universal gospel diffused throughout the world by the church."

15. For Augustine's psychology and ethics of love, see: Vernon J. Bourke, *Wisdom from St. Augustine* (Houston: Univ. of St. Thomas/Center for Thomistic Studies, 1984): 93-156 (section III on "morality and values"); Coplestone, Il: 81-86; and McGinn, 316-21 (on the "intellectual subject").

16. On Franciscan renewal and reform, see Eliade,188-91; J. A. Wayne Hellmann, "The Spirituality of the Franciscans," in Raitt, 31-49; and Ozment. 98-115.

17. On the relation of the exemplarity of saints to medieval spirituality, see these studies: Peter Brown, *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981) and *Society and the Holy in Late A*ntiquity (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1982); Caroline Walker Bynum, *Docere verbo et exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century* Spirituality (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979), and Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1982); and Michael Goodich,*Vita Perfecta: The Ideal of Sainthood in the Thirteenth Century* (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1982); Andre Vauchez, *La Sainteté en Occident aux derniers siecles du Moyen Age, d'apres les proces de canonisation et les documents hagiographiques* (Rome: Ecôle Française de Rome, 1981); and Donald Weinstein and Rudolph M. Bell, *Saints and Society: The Two Worlds of Western Christendom, 1000-1700* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982).

18. Bk IIB: c 54, in ENC l: 283. All quotes are taken from Llull's *Libre de Evast e Blanquerna,* eds. S. Galmes, A. Caimari, and R. Guileumas (Barcelona: Barcino/ENC [*Els Nostres Classics*], 1935, 1947 and 1954; 4 vols.), henceforth referred to as ENC; the translations are mine.

19. Bk IIB: c 56, in ENC l: 290.

20. Bk IIB: c 51, in ENC ll: 260.

21. Bk IIB: c 63, in ENC ll: 44-5.

22. Bk lll: c 76, in ENC ll: 121-22.

23. Bk lll: c 70, in ENC ll: 89.

24. Bk l: c 1, in ENC l: 24-25.

25. Bk l: c 4, in ENC l: 41.

26. Bk l: c 4, in ENC l: 49.

27. See Barraclough, 77-93 (Gregory VII) and 112-17 Innocent III); Bynum, 9-21 (on „the religious revival of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the clericalization of the Church"); and Southern, 100-33 (on the „age of growth of the papacy" from 1050 to 1300).

28. In Blanquerna, the lay persons who after their experience of conversion become "preachers," appear in these sections: the knights, in Bk II: cc 47 and 64, and in Bk IV: cc 80 and 82-83; the squires in Bk IIB: cc 51-52 and 85 and 87; the rogue Narpan in Bk IIB: c 52; the minstrels in Bk IIB: c 48, Bk III: c 76, Bk IV: cc 79 and 83, and Bk V: c 115; the emperor in Bk IIB: c 48 and Bk V: c 115; the kings and princes in Bk IV: cc 81 and 87; the lay brothers in Bk: c 62; the farmer in Bk II: c 63; the shepherd in Bk IIB: c49; the teachers of philosophy in Bk IV: cc 82 and 85; the schoolmasters and students in Bk IV: c 86; the pilgrims in Bk III: c 76, Bk IV: c 84, and Bk V: c 98; and the hermits in Bk V: cc 97 and 99.

29. The lay confraternities of preachers appear in these chapters of Bk IV: those who dispute in c 82; the proclaimers (*crides*) in cc 83 and 85; the exemplifiers (*recontadors*) in c 88; the advocates (*procuradors*) in c 91; the comparers in c 92; and those who "consider" (*consideradors*) in c 93.

30. The imitation of the Sufis is described in Bk IV: c 93, in ENC II: 241; cf Bk IV: c 88 and Bk V: c 99. It should be noted that pope Blanquerna and the cardinals admire not their doctrine (of which they seem to know nothing), but their affective mode of devotion and the popular forms of their preaching.

31. Bk IV: c 88, in ENC II: 216.

32. With respect to the Augustinian hermeneutics of the image of the City of God (based on biblical, Platonic, and Stoic traditions), see Bourke, 159-69 and 188-205 (on "Augustine's Political Philosophy" and "The City of God and History"); Jose Ferrater Mora, *Diccionario de filosofia* (Madrid: Alianza, 1979; 4 vols.), I: 508-10; and Edward R. Hardy, "The City of God," in R. W. Battenhouse (ed.), *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979): 257-286.

Ferrater Mora underscores the multiple symbols of the Two Cities according to the various ways in which the image functions: mystical (heaven vs. earth), militant (saints vs. those in league with demons), political (Church vs. Empire), utopian (the Christian Republic vs. corrupt society), and eschatological (the elect vs. the condemned).

33. Bk I: c 10, in ENC l: 97.

34. Bk V: c 100. See the references to the Friend/Christian's martyrdom (psychological *passio* and allegorical c*om-passio*) through and for love of the Beloved/Christ: vv 52, 167, 255, 262, 323, 359, and 361 (in ENC lll: 22, 48, 68-69, 70, 85, and 94).

35. Bk IIA: c 41, in ENC I: 205.

36. Bk I: c 18, in ENC I: 116.

37. Bk IIB: c 59, in ENC II: 21.

Chapter IX

Democratic Revolutions: A Partial Historical Retrospective

Ronald S. Calinger

Events beginning in l989 in China, central and eastern Europe, and South Africa have been sufficiently sudden, dramatic, and generally irreversible to legitimate the phrase "Revolution of l989," introduced by American diplomat Paul Nitze. Modern telecommunications have familiarized international mass audiences with scenes from Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the election of Solidarity candidates in Poland, the fall of the Berlin Wall, mass marches for self liberation in Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, Sophia, and the Baltic Republics, the freeing of Nelson Mandela, and the ending of the Cold War. The present era is without historical precedent for the tempo, magnitude, and scale of social change.

This paper seeks to provide a partial historical retrospective to the current movement in central and eastern Europe for multiparty democracies and free market economies by examining what American historian Robert Palmer called the first "age of the democratic revolution" — the period in Europe and America from l760 to l800.1 Its first section attempts to identify formative influences for change in that time; its second salient characteristics and improvements in the human condition from the American and French Revolutions as well as from reform from above in the multi-ethnic Austrian Habsburg Empire.

To be sure, the "velvet revolution" of 1989-90, as President Vaclav Havel termed it for Czechoslovakia, differs from the late-eighteenth-century uprisings in being the first mostly peaceful and orderly revolution in modern European history.2 But in their territorial sweep and fundamental change with at least the look of permanence, the two are often alike and instructive in their differences. This paper, of course, does not propose a continuing linear process for the spread of democracy. Nor does it suggest simple causal determinism for eighteenth-century change, but a contingent interplay between varying forces and circumstances with each other and with political choices.

Dynamic Setting: Agents of Change

What agents of change moved late eighteenth-century Europe toward modernity? For perspective, remember that eighteenth-century European society was predominantly agrarian. Peasants lacking education worked the estates of aristocrats, wealthy bourgeoisie, or clerical landlords. Peasants paid feudal dues and various taxes. In most regions they and urban laborers constantly battled poverty. Crop failures and job dislocations produced large numbers of rootless and sometimes threatening beggars and vagrants. In the Old Regime the aristocracy had tradition, hierarchy, and privilege, while individual rights were unknown for peasants. In this setting change came slowly. From the mid-eighteenth century, however, demographics variously combined with ecology and economics to transform material life and enlarge the middle class. Population growth was to nudge economic progress. While population statistics for the eighteenth century must be viewed with caution,3 solid estimates hold that after Europe's population rose slowly from l20 million to almost l40 million between l700 and l750, it surged to l80 or l90 million by l800. All states participated in the growth.4 Population growth had previously waxed and waned; now it

continued to increase strongly. Europe's dynastic states were not well prepared to feed larger populations, which dangerously heightened tensions where subsistence was marginal.

What factors underlay eighteenth-century population growth? The effective disappearance of bubonic plague from Europe outside Russia, conquered by an acquired immunity emergent after four centuries of exposure, eliminated one hindrance to growth. Still such diseases as cholera, dysentery, smallpox, and typhus perennially ravaged the population. A turn to standing armies paid by the state lessened looting, and generals protective of their trained men substituted flexible troop formations and tactics for the massive slaughter of pitched battle. That l720 to l734 and l763 to l778 were periods of peace was also due in part to replacement of dynastic statecraft with Machiavelli's "reason of state," which seemingly added prudence to expansionist egos of eighteenth-century princes.

Climate and agriculture probably did the most for population growth. The decades after l7l0, a year of famine, brought comparatively good weather that fattened crops of wheat and rye, Europe's principal grains. Improvements in agricultural technology helped ward off major famine until l787. Since medieval times, peasants had used the two and three field systems of tillage, letting one field lie fallow, so as not to exhaust the soil. By trial and error, Dutch and Flemish farmers discovered a more effective crop rotation that became the core of high farming. Rotating crops like clover, peas, and turnips with grain crops renewed the nitrogen content of the soil.

From mid-century, high farming spread selectively. Frederick II in Prussia, Catherine II in Russia, and Joseph II in Austria-Bohemia encouraged its adoption. Arguments of French economic reformers known as Physiocrats seem to have influenced them. Physiocrats believed that all economic production depended upon expansion of sound agriculture. High farming proved especially effective with single crops. This prompted landlords in the late century to enclose their property and plant single crops. Where basic existence depended upon traditional agriculture and survival was more tenuous, these changes were fought, most notably in peasant uprisings in central and eastern Europe. In contrast, failure to generally adopt high farming in France meant short food supplies for an expanding population and endemic misery in the countryside.

By the l770s the potato, the humble immigrant from the New World two centuries earlier, was first widely produced and accepted across Europe. From Ireland to Russia, where Catherine the Great had potatoes or "ground apples" introduced,5 but had to call in troops to quell peasant disturbances against this perceived work of the devil, the potato with its minerals, vitamins, and high content of carbohydrates became a principal source of nourishment. It offered more nutrition per acre than traditional grains and it can grow in poor soil under varied climatic conditions and at a low cost. It also requires little labor to grow.

Late eighteenth-century population increases and a spreading improved agronomy contributed to the growth of regional economies in Europe. The century had begun with confining state policies based on the economic theory of mercantilism. Mercantilist states accumulated and hoarded gold bullion by exporting more than they imported, and monarchies controlled trade and production through granting monopolies. Still, pressures for investment built from the l720s, when speculators spawned the inflated financial fiascos known as the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles.

Members of a growing and self-conscious middle class became aware that mercantilist theory with monopolistic guilds and state regulations was hostile to their interests. New schools of thought soon challenged economic orthodoxy. First came Physiocracy, which means "rule of nature," advanced by Francois Quesnay (d. l774), the "Confucius of Europe," and his small French band. Introducing the slogan laissez-faire, they urged the central state to support the circulation of wealth

by repealing uncoordinated taxes, domestic and trading monopolies, and tariffs. These were burdens from the past, they said, that were crippling initiatives and new enterprise.

Influenced by Physiocrats and David Hume, Hume's fellow Scot Adam Smith (d. l790) advised a general governmental "hands off" policy toward business and free trade in his seminal work on political economy, *Wealth of Nations* (l776). He believed that mercantile protectionist regulations and guild policies prevented economic expansion, while individual economic actions motivated by self interest in a marketplace of competing traders unregulated by the state would generate more goods and services. In place of mercantilism's assumption of scarce goods and resources, Smith projected a boundless economic realm.

Smith's early labor theory of value and theological-like metaphor of an "invisible hand" directing the economy remain popular. Industrialists embraced his founding views on the "classical" school of economics. Smith urged a limited role for government in the economy to meet military, transportation, and educational needs and to prevent damaging merchant and industrialist conspiracies against labor.

In England high farming proved a crucial precondition to industrialization. Increasing food production provided for a relatively well-fed populace, while the enclosure movement swelled a growing labor pool in towns. High farming made for a prosperous gentry that chose to invest in industry. In addition, Britain had a substantial stratum of educated and skilled workers in textile techniques and metal handling as well as a tradition of technical tinkerers. The confluence of all of these with a strong Bank of England with bonds at a relatively low 5 percent interest rate, a reliable system of nearly 300 provincial banks by 1790 connected with those in London that increased financial liquidity, an extensive canal system for transport, and abundant coal and iron provided the foundation for the Industrial Revolution in England.6 The cumbrous domestic system, in which farm families and urban dwellers produced goods in their homes, gave way to the factory or mill system with industrial discipline.

The first phase of the Industrial Revolution from roughly l780 in Britain also depended upon a felicitous economic conjuncture of the cotton industry with rapidly expanding colonial and western hemispheric markets. Lightweight cotton and cotton mixtures were more durable, more versatile, and cheaper than woolen or linen cloth, and they could be sold in the tropics as well as temperate zones. British cotton exports increased tenfold in the two decades after l750, in part as India produced less at home.

Sharper late-eighteenth-century expansion encouraged British entrepreneurs to support a series of new production technologies, including Richard Atwright's water frame with water or horse-driven rollers that made stronger cotton threads and Samuel Compton's water mule that produced a cotton yarn finer than that made in India and increased production. The first power looms were small and quite inefficient. But as they grew bigger and more efficient, entrepreneurs built factories to house them. This marks the founding of the modern factory system.

In order to run the textile machinery and to transport more raw materials and fuels to factories and more finished products to consumers, the steam engine was developed. The invention of the condenser and more precise engine valves by the Scot, James Watt, from 1769 improved iron fabrication that allowed operation at higher temperatures and pressures: these were exceptionally crucial early developments. With these Watt and the Birmingham ironmaker Matthew Boulton constructed an engine with a quadrupled efficiency over earlier ones. After 1790 Richard Trevithick reduced the size and weight of these engines and built the steam-driven iron horse that George Stephenson successfully married to rails in England. This predecessor of the modern railroad removed what was potentially a major stumbling block to greater economic growth by

moving goods and passengers quickly and reliably. More than any other invention, the steam engine facilitated industrial growth.

The first phase of the Industrial Revolution contributed to the eighteenth century's dramatic growth of global trade but had an evil underside. Between l7l6 and l789 Europe's global trade increased fourfold from the equivalent of l22 million French livres, Europe's dominant currency, to 500 million. Bringing prosperity and growth to Atlantic port cities, the soaring demand for Lancashire's cotton expanded slave labor on the plantations of the West Indies and what became the southern United States to supply raw cotton.7 In the century after 1750, the British demand for raw cotton went from 5 million pounds to 588 million.8 American Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin (1794) responded to the demand for raw cotton. Despite the lucrative cotton trade, slaving was heatedly debated on moral grounds in Britain. In 1807 Britain outlawed the Atlantic slave trade and its warships were ordered to stop slave ships.

Concomitantly with the alteration of material life, a mosaic of sociocultural forces — criticisms of absolutism, which was widely evolving into a so-called enlightened stage; disruptions and expenses from warfare; antagonisms between and within the nobility and middle class; and an expanding dimension of critical rational discourse for reform led by the *philosophes* and influenced by a growing reading public — also undermined the Old Regime from mid-century.

The eighteenth century was the age of an evolving absolutism in government.9 The modern centralized state continued to be formed, and kings grew in power. Following the model of France's Louis XIV, these kings had claimed to rule by divine right, giving them spiritual as well as unchallengeable secular power. Even in divine right theory, French bishops Jacques Bossuet and Francois Fenelon, who had praised monarchical absolutism as a guard against anarchy, had distinguished between absolutism and arbitrariness. The king, they said, was limited by law, custom, and reason. Within literate circles, divine right theory lost sway and was not taken seriously as the century progressed, as Denis Diderot's refutation of it in the *Encyclopedie* article "Societe" suggests. By mid-century continental absolutism had widely evolved to a reform stage with such rulers as Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine II of Russia, and Joseph II of the Austrian Monarchy, all of whom were influenced by the 'reform thought' of Enlightenment savants, especially in the areas of law and agrarian policy, as well as by reason of state.

While the eighteenth was the French century, with France enjoying military hegemony on land and eminence in culture and currency, three new powers now rose. Two were on the flanks of Europe, England and Russia, and one in the center, Brandenburg-Prussia. Prussian historian Leopold von Ranke (d. l886) and his students have argued that rivalries among states have had more to do with historical development than class struggles, cultural or ethnic differences, fundamental aspirations, technological advances, or transforming values. His student Wilhelm Dilthey referred to this approach as the "primacy of foreign policy."10 Mid-eighteenth-century military and diplomatic actions in central Europe support Ranke's thesis, as they were critical in leading to the democratic revolution.

In l740 Frederick II ascended the Prussian throne at the age of twenty eight and Maria Theresa the Austrian Habsburg throne in Vienna at the age of twenty three. Bent on achieving great power status for Prussia, Frederick invaded and, at great financial cost, conquered Silesia, an Imperial Austrian land, during the first two Silesian Wars, which are known as the War of the Austrian Succession (l740-1748).

Through the adroit diplomacy of Maria Theresa's adviser Wenzel Anton Kaunitz and Frederick's unscrupulous negotiations, a reversal in longstanding alliances, known as the Diplomatic Revolution, occurred in l756. Through Kaunitz's efforts, Austria joined its old enemy

France as Prussia allied with Britain. So far the new alliance followed confessional lines. The next year, however, Russia and Sweden joined Austria and France in an alliance to destroy Frederick, "the robber of Silesia," and Prussia.

Either as a preemptive strike or an attempt at further conquest, Frederick in 1756 attacked Saxony, the gateway to Austrian Bohemia, beginning the Seven Years War. This conflict rapidly expanded into a general European war and extended to India and to the North American colonies, becoming known there as the French and Indian War. Tens of thousands of soldiers died. The war devastated the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian economies and left the treasuries of France and Britain with burdensome war debts. As will be seen, the British search for new revenues had a significant consequence in the thirteen North American colonies.

In Continental Europe a hybrid of societal divisions from the past and present also spawned a stratified society and tensions. These divisions were based mainly on birth or blood lines and occupation. In eighteenth-century hierarchical society, the aristocracy was immediately under the king in a social pyramid. Its members enjoyed special privileges, such as the right to bear arms, to separate judicial treatment, and to tax exemptions, based not on industry or moral character but on defined legal rights because of their status at birth. Supposedly God put this hierarchical order into nature. By the late eighteenth century the aristocracy comprised about 3 percent of Europe's population, ranging from great princes and landowners, like the Potockis in Poland and Esterhazys in Hungary, to impoverished, "sandalled" Hungarian nobility, who could not afford shoes. Thus, the nobles were not all equal. All but poor nobles received tax exemptions. Among the nobility the wealthy landowners controlled higher positions in the government, military, and the Church, and they set the tone for elite cultural life in Europe.

In mid-century France partisans of the "royal thesis" mounted an attack on the "noble thesis." Voltaire's sharp rejoinder to Montesquieu's defense of aristocratic privilege in *The Spirit of the Laws* (l748) epitomizes this debate.11 In *The Spirit of the Laws,* an influential pioneering work in political sociology, Montesquieu had grounded aristocratic privilege in medieval French history and French law. A strong aristocracy and its courts alone, he asserted, could resist royal tyranny, preserve longstanding freedoms, and hope to achieve reform in France. In essence, he argued that "privilege is the ancestor of liberty." While Voltaire praised *The Spirit of the Laws* for its decency, insight, and humanity, he rejected Montesquieu's speculations in defense of the "noble thesis" and interpretation of medieval French history. Voltaire championed the strengthening of royal prerogatives, including those over legislation, as the best road to greater freedom in France.12 The medieval nobility, he believed, had perpetuated a feudal oppression. Royal absolutism was a curb on feudal anarchy and a guarantee of peace and harmony.13

Among the commercial bourgeoisie and literary groups, criticism of both special aristocratic privilege and royal despotism spread in western Europe. While some intermarriages occurred, the bourgeoisie, who worked with their heads rather than their hands, had long chafed under aristocratic prerogatives and pretensions. To the present the term 'bourgeoisie' remains inexact yet unavoidable. It was expanding in size and importance, especially in many growing towns as the urbanization of Europe was underway. The lifeblood of these towns was trade. The middle class was diverse ranging from the wealthy commercial families to the *petit bourgeois* of shopkeepers and craftsmen to the growing professions of law, medicine, education, and bureaucrats. It was largest, up to 15 percent of the population, in areas in the west of Europe.

The '1970s historians', especially Marxists, described an intensifying conflict between a rising middle class and resurgent aristocracy dating from the l770s.14 The assumptions that history operates on three levels — economic, social, and cultural — and that a new industrial

middle class controlled modes of production and was at the center stage of history undergirded that thesis. The section on the French Revolution below describes its demise. Late century authors did call for civic equality, equal justice, equal opportunity, and social mobility — explosive concepts not yet part of the social order.

The Enlightenment

A time of intense intellectual ferment, the eighteenth century in Europe is best known as the 'Age of Enlightenment' — a name the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant (d. l804) introduced. Also called the 'Age of Reason', it was a time of sober and not so sober hope. A "family circle" of *philosophes*, a name suggesting the power of critical thinking, promoted "a revolution in men's minds to free them from prejudice," as Denis Diderot wrote in l762.15

Although they differed in temperament and hopes, the *philosophes* shared a deep commitment to human liberty, including freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize one's talent, freedom of moral man to make his way in the world.16 They set out to crush *l'infame*, religious fanaticism and the repressive power of the Church, as an obstacle to human progress. Fanaticism and repression arising from superstition proved vulnerable to their critical assault. First generation *philosophes* admired England as a model of freedom, decency, and proper institutions. Above all, *philosophes* were tireless social propagandists who came mainly from the middle class.

While most *philosophes* were French, their "family circle" was international. It included Benjamin Franklin from America, David Hume from Scotland, Edward Gibbon from England, Jean-Jacques Rousseau from Geneva, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Immanuel Kant from German lands, and Cesare Beccaria from Milan. American historian Peter Gay has divided the French *philosophes* into three overlapping generations with Montesquieu and Voltaire dominating the first; Georges-Louis Leclerc Buffon, Jean d'Alembert, and Denis Diderot prominent in the second; and Nicolas Condorcet in the third. Many, like leading philosophers from the time of Descartes to their own, were bachelors.

Philosophes championed a new kind of reason linked with direct experience (or '*au fait'*, 'to the facts', in Voltaire's phrase) and that pursues utility. Methods of formal logic yielded to critical rational methods from the exact sciences. Voltaire went so far as to assert that "true philosophy [and modern rationalism] began to shine on men only at the end of the sixteenth century" from the work of Galileo.17 Crucial to scientific reasoning were Gottfried Leibniz's search for sufficient reasons and John Locke's and Isaac Newton's critical empiricism. This shift from reason as the expression of perfect intelligence as given in formal logic and epitomized in Euclidean axiomatics to reason as objectively reflecting the laws of nature and describing operations of nature more exactly with calculus was crucial to the Enlightenment.

Surviving inefficient censorship and imprisonments, the "party of humanity" spread its thought through the printing press, issuing pamphlets, plays, poems, popularizations, novels, histories, encyclopedias, newspapers, and journals. With their satire, irony, and invective, the *philosophes* succeeded in reaching a markedly wider literate audience than had ever been before. Reading was becoming a widespread habit in Britain, Holland, and France. More of the middle class, urban artisans, and women swelled the reading public.18 Books were expensive, but there were circulating libraries. By the end of the eighteenth century, printing was to help create a tribunal of public opinion that in part broke older judicial secrecy and gave rise to new literary and artistic criticism. In Paris *philosophes* attended influential salons, such as those of Mme. Marie

Therese Geoffrin and Mlle. Julie de l'Espinasse, known for their stylish, witty, and original conversation. Among the philosophes, d'Alembert was a dominant figure in the salons.

Their audiences were essentially asked to heed the exhortation Kant made famous in his article "What is Enlightenment?" (l784): "Sapere aude! (Dare to know!) Have courage to use your intelligence."19 This phrase taken from Horace's *Ars poetica* as revived by Wolffian philosophers became the motto and battle cry of the Enlightenment. Completion of the publication of Diderot's *Encyclopedie* and the near apotheosis of Voltaire in Paris in the l770s suggest the *philosophes* had won many, if not most, educated Parisians over to their views.

The aristocrat Montesquieu began the first generation of *philosophes*. In a time when censorship barred serious criticism, he assumed a casual style and employed wit, humor and a cross-cultural dialogue lightly to make criticisms in *Persian Letters* (l72l), which set the general tone for the Enlightenment. This book denounced what Montesquieu saw of slavery, cruelty, and superstition. In *The Spirit of the Laws* (l748), he argued that a balance of power between as many as ten groups was necessary to maintain liberty in a mixed, representative government.

Voltaire contributed to the dominant Enlightenment disciplines of natural science and a new, critical history as well as to legal reform. The exact sciences decisively influenced a European outlook on the physical universe. Newton's dynamics with the law of gravitational attraction from the *Principia Mathematica* (l687) together with his corpuscular optics, calculus, and critical empiricism came to dominate eighteenth-century research and methods in the exact sciences. Voltaire championed Newtonian science beginning with *Letters on the English* (l734) and continuing with his popularization *Elements of the Philosophy of Newton* (l738). During the l740s Newtonian science supplanted the Cartesian system in France, partly through such popularizations. More important were research by Pierre Maupertuis and Alexis Clairaut at the Paris Academy, its biennial prize competitions, and its geodetic expeditions to Lapland and South America between 1736 and 1744. Together these expeditions and Clairaut's study of hydrodynamics confirmed the orange shape of the planet with a slight flattening at the poles, which Newtonian theory projected. The elongated lemon shape projected by Cartesian physics was discarded.

Research in rational mechanics and astronomy was confirming the greater accuracy of Newtonian science and therein supported a mechanistic view of nature and desacralization of the European *Weltanschauung*. Against critics who derided attraction as an occult quality, measurements of the tides and three major astronomical tests definitively affirmed the law of gravitational attraction. After initial mistakes, d'Alembert, Clairaut, and Euler found in their approximate solutions for the motion of three-mutually attracting bodies, in this case the earth, moon, and sun, that the moon's apogee fits the predicted Newtonian value. The apogee is the moon's farthest point in its orbit from the earth. After Clairaut used Newtonian theory in 1758 to predict within a margin of error of thirty days, the return of Halley's comet in the next year, Pierre-Simon Laplace resolved a vexing problem late in the century by proving the long-term stability of our solar system based only on gravitational attraction.20 Increasingly precise astronomical observations based on technical improvements of telescopes confirmed both the precision and the predictive power of Newtonian science. With regard to the latter, William Herschel's discovery of the planet Uranus in 1781 fit Newtonian projections. Rapid development of differential calculus and its systematic application to rational and celestial mechanics also made it possible to solve many previously intractable problems in physics.

Movement toward the complete description of the physical universe governed by Newtonian mechanical laws without appeal to God, together with attempts to apply the new natural science model to the moral sciences and the growth of Deism and materialism as rivals to traditional

religion brought some Europeans to what historian Paul Hazard has called a "crisis of conscience." This crisis emanated from tension between religion and the Enlightenment. Deism held that the universe operated like an orderly watch created by a distant God. This does not imply a warfare between science and religion. To the contrary, Swiss-born mathematician and physicist Leonhard Euler had a deep, abiding religious faith that inspired him, and he attacked materialism.21 At mid-century Euler dominated all branches of higher mathematics and the exact sciences in Europe.

Voltaire's contributions to history reflected the search for science and reform. He, William Robertson, David Hume, and Edward Gibbon secularized historical causation, deftly searching for physical and human, not divine, causes of change in original documents and voraciously read older histories. Voltaire then used historical method as a critical instrument to unmask ineptitude and pretensions. In *Age of Louis XIV* (l75l) he enlarged the canvas of history by emphasizing intellectual history — an approach Pierre Bayle and Bernard Fontenelle had taken. This allowed Voltaire to examine carefully such new historical topics as the economy, art, modern culture, and population shifts. His historical survey *Essai sur les moeurs* (1756) broke with tradition by not concentrating on Christianity. Looking beyond the four or five ancient peoples from the Mediterranean whom historians had previously identified, the *Essai* was a global history that included Asia.

Throughout his career Voltaire waged a relentless campaign with the message: *ecrasez l'infame*. In this time of growing sentiment for liberty and tolerance, the monster *l'infame'*s last refuge was the Church intolerant, which had not disclaimed forceful repression to religious dissent and heresy. Voltaire invited victims of religious intolerance to live in his village of Ferney, and in l762 took up the Jean Calas case.

The elderly Huguenot shopkeeper Calas had been accused of strangling his son Marc Antoine, because the son had recently become a convert to Catholicism. In a wave of anti-Protestant hysteria in eighteenth-century Toulouse, Calas was convicted of murder and executed by torture and mutilation. Using satire, ridicule, invective, and a detective story, Voltaire had the case reopened, proved Calas innocent, and rehabilitated the family reputation.22 Through his efforts, this case became famous in Europe and turned many literate Europeans against such intolerance and perhaps torture.

The energetic Voltaire did more. Writing during the Seven Years War, he ridiculed naive optimism, militarism, and religious hypocrisy in *Candide* (l759). Its credulous hero, the German Candide, experienced a mix of ridicule and horror in what Voltaire called "Job brought up to date." Its concluding maxim — ". . . we must cultivate our garden"23 — meant that individuals must work rationally within their locality to combat evil and improve what is within our power to improve for the individual and community. Voltaire's efforts to crush *l'infame* continued in his*Philosophical Dictionary* (l764) with sober criticisms of Benedictines, Jesuits, and their scholarship, along with critical commentaries on the Bible. His *Dictionary* gave common sense answers to a wide range of issues from theology to linguistics to science and was constructed as a short supplement to Diderot's *Encyclopedie*.

The intellectual landmark of the Enlightenment was Denis Diderot's *Encyclopedie, ou dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts, et des metiers* (28 volumes, l75l-77). Written by over l00 authors, it categorized information from the tree of knowledge and sought, as the preface states, "to change the general way of thinking." It supported social and material progress, religious toleration, and government by consent. An article on the ancient Roman god of speech "Aius Locutius" contains a plea for freedom of thought; on "Certitude" prefers Locke's reasoning to religious revelation; on "Philosophes" considers them apostles of civilization, on "Political

Authority" denies the right of any men to exercise sovereignty over others; and on "Salt" cites the injustice of capricious excise taxes on the poor. Diderot's sketch of manufacturing processes reflects his conviction that technology and science were the way of progress.

Support and opposition greeted the *Encyclopedie*. By l757 it had more than 4000 subscribers added to thousands of readers in public libraries.24 From its inception clerics attacked its articles as false and dangerous, and Jesuits issued a competing publication.25 Publication of volume seven with d'Alembert's provocative article "Geneva" and even more the attempted assassination of Louis XV, both in l757, heightened calls for censorship. For readers of that time, d'Alembert's assertions that some Genevan pastors doubted the divinity of Jesus and were nearly pure deists were outrageous. So was his claim that these pastors criticized Calvin for having burned the physician Michael Servetus at the stake. The *Encyclopedie'*s right of publication was revoked two years later for its "irreparable damage to morality and religion." Undaunted and acting alone after d'Alembert prudently resigned as science editor, Diderot edited its volumes underground. By l765 the French government gave tacit permission to complete its publication.

Except for Voltaire, the quarrelsome Genevan Jean-Jacques Rousseau probably most moved his generation and its thinking, shifting the discussion from empirical or logical knowledge to morality. Where most *philosophes* accorded reason primacy, Rousseau perceived a balance between reason and feelings or conscience, each to preside within its sphere of competence. Resolution of moral issues and knowledge of God, Rousseau argued, rely upon conscience or inner sentiment,26 which everyone possesses, scholar and uneducated peasant, wealthy and poor. It follows that in reaching moral decisions, individual choice is superior to institutional authority. Moral judgements from conscience established commitments to right action.

In a burst of creative work Rousseau published the moral, didactic novel *La Nouvelle Heloise* in 1761 and *Emile, or On Education and The Social Contract* in 1762. The first of these became immensely popular, going through seventy editions by l789. Rousseau argued that a moral sense made human beings human. For its deistic views *Emile* was burned in Paris, Geneva, and Rome. *The Social Contract*, although not widely read until after the French Revolution,27 has become a seminal book in political theory and has been interpreted in conflicting ways. After the jolt of its introductory assertion — "Men are born free and everywhere they are in chains" — Rousseau protested against the divine right theories of social contract that justified a Leviathan state. He contended for a kind of contract in which each individual enters freely, surrenders that freedom to a consensual system, and receives back a freedom that consists in participating in an impersonal general will. For his ethical imperatives that citizens were morally obliged to obey laws of a state following the principles and practices he presented, and that these moral democracies must "force the citizen to be free," he has been charged with projecting not liberal, participatory democracy but totalitarianism.

Not to be overlooked in the history of ideas during the two decades before the French Revolution was the growth of *libelle* literature in Paris.28 This phenomenon was a reaction to the unwillingness and inability of the republic of letters to support the growing number of young authors. It confined itself to an elite of *grands*, including *philosophes* who frequented salons. With the support of patrons, the *grands* held *le monde* of publication for themselves through monopolies and a labyrinth of institutions. Many of them nonentities, they lacked the fire of earlier*philosophes*. Condemned to poverty and isolation, the rugged pamphleteers who wrote the *libelles* became the cutting edge for social change. Theirs were no polite Voltairean calls for reform but outrage against degenerate despots and corrupt elites, couched often in simplistic and inaccurate politico-

pornography. *Libellistes* wanted to overturn society, not reform it. Their writings deepened and spread disaffection with the Old Regime.

Three Results: The American Revolution, Austrian Hapsburg Reform, and the French Revolution

Agronomic, demographic, economic, and military factors combined with the *philosophes'* organized pursuit of freedom that created a broad climate of opinion for reform produced slow change in the Old Regime. That change seemingly posed no serious threat to the Old Regime, however, until joined by fiscal, mainly tax related, tensions linked to monarchs and, on the Continent, social inequities. Three results, roughly in chronological order, were the American Revolution from the middling ranks of society, Austrian Habsburg reforms from rulers, and the seismic upheaval of the French Revolution from above, the middle, and below.

The American Revolution

The American Revolution may be traced more immediately in part to quarrels over taxes in the l760s. When the Seven Years War ended in l763, the British Parliament decided to station a large army in the North American colonies. The colonists, like the British, disdained having such a standing army. To defray its military costs and help address the doubled British national debt that reached L 130 million with costs from the Seven Years War, George Grenville of the Exchequer and Parliament decided to impose a series of new taxes on goods imported into the colonies, including glass, coffee, tea, and most notably sugar. This occurred at a time of intensive economic growth based on trade for these colonies. Accustomed to personal freedom and self-government, colonial officials took the so-called Sugar Act and the Stamp Act on printed papers, such as newspapers, deeds, and court documents — both of l764 — as threats to existing liberties. Colonial legislatures had not passed them, and colonists had no representation in the British Parliament. They wanted no taxation without representation. Colonial officials urged repeal of these acts and warned of dangerous consequences. Colonists reacted ferociously with riots and set upon and burned the houses of tax collectors. Moreover, colonial officials opposed the British attack on the lucrative black market trade with a new rule that transferred judicial authority over smuggling to the British Admiralty in England.

Parliament's repeal of the Stamp Act defused this crisis, but frictions grew during the following decade as Parliament passed revenue and supervisory measures. In 1766 the British Parliament's passed the Declaratory Act, which held that Parliament had complete jurisdiction over the colonies. What had been a protest against the tyranny of King George III now also turned against Parliament. Importing techniques of London radicals who opposed Parliamentary policy, colonial papers aroused public support against the king; boycotts put more people in the public arena; and public demonstrations were designed to intimidate. The Boston Massacre, with five citizens killed, occurred in l770 and the Boston Tea Party against the East India Company's monopoly of the tea trade in l773. With the colonists' protest, the British repealed their revenue measures.

Continuing immigration, better diets, and lower mortality rates had produced a rapidly growing population in the thirteen colonies that fueled the economic expansion and independent spirit. Most American colonists were of British descent including Scots-Irish; a small number were Germans. Although there was no privileged aristocracy or peasant serfs, there were one-half

million slaves from Africa who did not participate in political decision-making. The colonists, who otherwise cherished freedom and private property as expressed in John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* (l690), believed they were preserving the tradition of Anglo-Saxon freedom, reaffirmed by Britain's Glorious Revolution of l688 and the tracts of John Locke. Most colonists were Protestant, Calvinists constituting the largest group. Most colonists were landowners, and most of these men could vote. Appearances told them that they were politically equal.

During the decade of crisis with Britain, committees of correspondence were elected throughout the colonies to make citizens critical of Britain aware of common problems and plan united action. In the past colonists had been highly litigious and unlikely to help neighboring colonies in times of separate dangers. In September of l774 the committees of correspondence assembled as the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia. It sought conciliation with Britain, aiming only to restore colonial self-government and have Britain abandon direct supervision. After King George III declared the colonies in rebellion in l775, Thomas Paine's popular pamphlet *Common Sense* galvanized public opinion behind independence from Britain.

The Second Continental Congress now organized a colonial army and navy and in April of 1776 agreed to open American ports to trade with all lands. On July 4 the *Declaration of Independence*, written by Thomas Jefferson, was adopted by the Congress. Jefferson appealed to a spectrum of Enlightenment thought on natural rights and government and to English rights when he wrote: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."29

Many colonists remained Loyalists, especially the wealthy and the politically moderate. Farmers, artisans, and a few wealthy, like George Washington, formed the broad, successful coalition. Benjamin Franklin obtained French support for the revolutionaries, thus widening the war in to a European conflict. In 1779 Spain and Holland joined against England for other reasons. Volunteers, including Lafayette of France and Kosciuszko of ill-fated Poland, came to fight alongside the colonists. In l78l the forces of George Washington, aided by direct intervention of French troops and ships, decisively defeated Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown. The Treaty of Paris two years later recognized American independence.

The concern here is not with military campaigns or economic motivations for the Revolution, but what American historian Edmund Morgan calls the "Americans' search for principles."30 These principles had appeared in state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation of l78l, which provided only a feeble government. Dissatisfaction with this arrangement prompted the consolidation of these principles in the American Constitution of l787 and the appended Bill of Rights of l789. In their discussions and debates, delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia took factual, commonsensical experience as their chief guide, neither submitting themselves to the passion and theoretical reason that would characterize the French Constituent Assembly of l789.

The American Constitution offered a strong federal government operating within limits. Following Locke's model, the federal government was tripartite with an executive branch headed by a president, a legislative branch with the House of Representatives and Senate of the Congress with the power "to make all laws," and a judicial branch with justices appointed by the president with Senate confirmation. The three branches were to balance each other in a way that suggests Montesquieu's idea of good government. States' rights, specifically protected later in the tenth amendment, also served as a check on the federal government.

The American Constitution had to be ratified by the states. When opponents of the proposed Constitution charged that the extent of power of the federal government and personal liberties of citizens were still unresolved, Constitutional framers promised to spell out those freedoms as soon as the Constitution was accepted. Just after the first Congress met in March 1789 in New York City, the first ten amendments to the Constitution were passed.

The first ten amendments to the American Constitution, the Bill of Rights, safeguard the individual citizen. Most of these rights — to peaceable assembly, trial by jury, due process of law, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures — are indebted to English law and the English Bill of Rights of l689. Other freedoms — of religion, speech, and the press — have roots in natural law theory and the American experience.

With the new American republic undergoing rapid and formative change, younger founding fathers known as Democratic Republicans and led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison found it necessary to develop a responsible opposition party. Today it is taken for granted that an organized and free opposition party is essential to a successful representative democracy. Although late-eighteenth-century Britain had a two-party system, there was strong anti-party cant in America. Englishman Henry Bolingbroke's definition of parties as a "political evil" was influential, while many considered them invidious factions.31 Craving unity, George Washington opposed the formation of parties, but Jefferson and Madison saw them as unavoidable and necessary evils to act as a check on the party in power.

The American Revolution and Constitution fascinated European authors and statesmen. The North American colonies had served as an experimental laboratory for nascent political ideals and institutions. They had successfully risen against perceived tyrannical oppression and established a new social contract — a permanent, written Constitution — mandating deliberative representative government based on popular consent and popular sovereignty and guaranteeing individual liberties. Educated Europeans sensed that a different political age was being born.

The young American Republic was a fledgling, not yet a full, liberal democracy. It lacked, for instance, the principle of one person-one vote. A first, legitimate opposition party, essential to its pluralism, was emerging, followed by another largely through the work of Martin van Buren. Slavery had to be addressed through amendments to the Constitution. Across the Atlantic, the nature and limits of individual liberty within a responsible society were examined and refined, especially by Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and, at the end of nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche and Georges Sorel. The last two warned of dangers of mass democracy based purely on majority decisions.

The Hapsburg Reform

The Austrian Hapsburg Empire, a loose confederation of territories formed around the Austrian Alpine hereditary lands, Bohemia, Hungary, and Croatia, underwent another experience. This essentially landlocked power in central Europe differed markedly from the young American Republic in its social context, its stimuli for reform from monarchs, partly when faced with military attacks and peasant upheavals, and its backward economy. Its authoritarian society had an emperor, privileged aristocracy, peasant serfs, and an entrenched Catholic Church. In preserving autonomy for component lands, the aristocracy controlled the power of the purse for the empire, voting on direct taxation in provincial Diets and collecting it. Serfs were exploited, having to give labor services up to six days a week on the lands of the local aristocracy and urban-based gentry.

Ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity threatened the imperial union. That union had narrowly escaped the derogation of empires in the seventeenth-century.

From the 1740s Austrian monarchy officials pursued a series of reforms under Maria Theresa (r. l740-80), the "Great Empress," and her son Joseph II (r. l780-90). This reform program focused on state-building (including taxation), agriculture, and the Church. Governmental reorganization under Maria Theresa transformed into a centralized, absolute state her traditionally amorphous empire consisting of a monarchical union of provincial states (*Standestaaten*).32 Joseph II then established a unitary state (Einheitstaat), in which the ruler held a virtual monopoly on public authority. The practice had essentially been for the monarch to command the law and police powers, while nobles in autonomous provincial estates controlled legislation and taxation. The crown now reduced the authority of the provincial aristocracy.

Neighboring Prussian monarchs, able earlier to secure better the power of the purse and coordinate it with military tactics, now threatened during the War of the Austrian Succession not only Austrian primacy in central Europe, but the very existence of the Austrian Habsburg monarchy. War costs and the loss of the prosperous duchy of Silesia made the small palliative changes in government available to earlier Habsburg monarchs insufficient. Motivated chiefly by *raison d'etat* and a passionate survival instinct, Maria Theresa worked closely with the capable noble ministers whom she named, such as Friedrich Haugwitz, Rudolf Chotek, and Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, to achieve fundamental governmental and agrarian reform.

During the initial wave of administrative and tax reforms, the first period of *Retablissement*, Haugwitz from 1748 to about 1753 reorganized the civil bureaucracy into a more centralized Directorium in Publicis et Cameralibus (1749). The Directorium united the chancelleries of Austria and Bohemia and combined administration and finance. The central government also had agencies for the treasury, war and justice. A supreme court (*Oberste Justizstelle*) established for Austria-Bohemia was made independent of the Directorium. *Kreishauptleute*, governmental officials appointed by the Directorium for Circle divisions of the empire, directly represented the monarch to the people without intervening nobility. Working initially on military and tax matters and later also on education, roads, and agriculture, the civil service *Kreishauptleute* began to supplant functions of provincial nobility.

Tax reform was crucial to the first *Retablissement*. In order to increase taxation for the central government, begin to circumvent provincial noble control of taxation and replace it with royal control, and reapportion tax burdens among social groups by moving toward equalization, Haugwitz obtained a ten-year tax approval from provincial Diets that taxed nobles and clerics for the first time in the empire. Nobles and clerics were to pay 1 percent , while the peasants contributed 2 percent . After verbal opposition, diets in Austria, Bohemia, and Moravia accepted this proposal, but Hungarian, northern Italian, and Belgian magnates refused to pay taxes. Tax monies went mainly to enlarge the standing army.

Maria Theresa also championed educational reform, mainly because an efficient, better-trained bureaucracy was considered a precondition for rejuvenating her empire. Her government founded the famous Theresianum in Vienna to educate sons of nobles for higher administrative posts in government. Schooling for her army's officer corps was improved. The officer corps was a unifying and reforming force in her polyglot empire. Maria Theresa's physician and court librarian Gerard van Swieten reformed the University of Vienna curriculum over faculty objections by adding and stressing practical, modern subjects in public administration, geography and natural science.33 New faculty like Paul Riegger and Karl Martini in law and Josef Sonnenfels in politics soon began to call themselves the *Aufklarungspartei*.

When the Seven Years War made for fiscal needs that administrative and tax reforms of the first *Retablissement* could not meet, Kaunitz led a second *Retablissement* from about l758 to l765. He replaced the Directorium with a central Council of State (*Staatsrat*) in 1761 — a "curia" of senior ministers under him as State Chancellor. To finance the Seven Years War, Kaunitz proposed a "God-pleasing equality" in taxation. His equalization extended taxes to recalcitrant Hungarian and other nobles outside Austria-Bohemia and brought more higher clergy into tax rolls. No other Catholic Church in Europe possessed a greater portion of national wealth than in Austrian Habsburg lands. Bequests continued to flow into churches, monasteries, and convents at state expense. Kaunitz countered this by taxing for the first time new land inherited by the Church. In addition, local taxes that serfs owed noble seigneurs were reduced. Besides *raison d'etat*, the attack on seigneural and clerical privilege reflects Enlightenment sentiment to a degree. It gained respectability by the emerging feeling, but not yet conviction, for social equality. In her personal dialogue between innovation and traditional royal conservatism, Maria Theresa exhibited a mixture of responses. As "ruling mother," her distrust of rationalism and embrace of tradition have denied her the appellation of enlightened despot. Slow, selective Theresian reform programs during the coregency with her son Joseph II from l765 to l780, beginning with agrarian and ecclesiastical policy demonstrate this well. Responding to peasant unrest and fiscal advice of progressive ministers, Maria Theresa acted to protect serfs from abuses but not to make them free peasants, except on Crown lands. She restricted arbitrary penal powers of the landlords' manorial courts, and her commissions from 1773 to 1778 limited compulsory labor service (*Robot*) that serfs owed lords, usually to three days a week.34 The "Raab system" instituted in 1773 even allowed money or crop payments in lieu of services. Landlords resented these royal actions and clung tenaciously to customary rights.

Urged by the anticlerical Prince Kaunitz and van Swieten, the empress imposed ecclesiastical controls. Tradition clashed with Febronian-minded ministers, who wished to limit the Catholic Church to the spiritual sphere. The pious empress recoiled from the idea of religious toleration. She loathed Jews: a "bigoted reactionary," historian Saul Padover has called her. Where strengthening the state by means of ecclesiastical reforms was involved, however, she broke with the past. Beginning part of what is now called Josephinism, she reduced the numbers of pilgrimages and holidays, prohibited men from taking monastic vows before the age of 24, and reluctantly agreed to expel the Jesuits in 1773. After issuing several amortisation laws, her government in l767 forbade clergy and congregations to acquire property. Its order that year to monasteries to supply specifics on number of members, resources, and income proved a prelude to dissolution. Legal reform and reduction of censorship also proceeded cautiously. While legal reformers at the time wanted more humane laws and less torture, Maria Theresa's codification of criminal laws (l769) kept barbarities, including torture to obtain confessions, over contrary pleas of her senior advisers and son. Continuing opposition, especially from Joseph Sonnenfels, led her to rethink her position and formally abolish torture in l776. The empress's nurturing of a group called "the Great Ones" of the *Aufklarungspartei* led by van Swieten affected censorship. In a protracted struggle, they replaced all clerics on the censorship commission. They persuaded the empress to release Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*, but Voltaire and religious criticism were banned. Maria Theresa even refused to found a science academy in Vienna, because it might spread dangerous thought.

Kant's judgment of Prussia under Frederick II seems applicable to the Austrian Habsburg Empire under Maria Theresa and perhaps Joseph II: "It was not an enlightened age but it was an age of enlightenment." Historians disagree over the exact roles of continuity and change in Joseph

II. Still, he is justifiably called a "revolutionary emperor" and the foremost representative of enlightened or, better yet, reform absolutism in his quest for a unitary, humane state.35 Unlike his mother, he directly assaulted two pillars of her empire, the aristocracy and Church. Utilitarian doctrines, the public good, and a cold rationalism from *philosophes* and Austrian *Aufklarer* guided this uncompromising, austere ruler on programs ranging from the nature of monarchy to religious toleration.

Joseph II rejected old theories of monarchy and imparted a new coherence to governing. Where Maria Theresa had believed majesty and God's grace resided in the ruler, Joseph II considered himself simply a civil servant — a modification of Frederick II's concept of "first servant of the state." Joseph II further forbade servile practices, such as kissing the emperor's hand, as beneath the dignity of man. The notion of an impersonal state separate from the ruler, which after the French Revolution would be ascendant, was already taking root in the Old Regime.

In l78l Joseph II issued his "Patent of Religious Toleration," which extended toleration beyond the Lutherans and Calvinists recognized in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to smaller Protestant groups, such as Hussites and Mennonites in Bohemia, and to the Greek Orthodox. Rejecting anti-semitism, he issued two separate edicts granting toleration to Jews. Alone among enlightened absolutists, he took this last step. With his patent and these edicts, non-Catholics could buy land, join guilds, take university degrees, or enter the civil service. Jews no longer had to wear the yellow star of David but still had to pay a tolerance tax to live in Vienna. Joseph II, who despised religious fanaticism, also hoped to draw to his empire able Protestant craftsmen, merchants, and peasants by these actions.

His second great reform — the abolition of serfdom, which he called *Leibeigenschaft* or bondage — came in a series of decrees from l78l to l789. Joseph II's government supplied financial support to peasants to attain hereditary status on the land, seeking to end their servile status and transform them into free landowners, and ordered the compilation of land registers (*Kataster*) with uniform tax rates for all, including nobles and clergy, based on levels of soil quality in their lands. Many officials passively resisted and nobles rebelled against these changes, chiefly when Joseph attempted to extend the abolition of serfdom beyond Austria and Bohemia to Hungary in 1783. After experimenting with an annual rent for Robot on Crown lands, the emperor also commuted it to a cash tax in 1789. Even peasants did not at first trust Joseph II, chiefly because they viewed his liturgical innovations in religion as heretical.

In addition to these revolutionary edicts, Joseph II accelerated and extended a spectrum of Theresian domestic reforms. Influenced by Cesare Beccaria, his ecclesiastical policy extended her amortisation laws by dissolving all contemplative monasteries and convents beginning in 1781. Their older monks and nuns were paid pensions. Joseph II employed their vacant buildings and funds from sales for a state system of primary schools, orphanages, maternity hospitals, prisons, and asylums.36 Not even an unwelcome visit by Pope Pius VI in 1782 could alter the Erastian Josephist policy of putting the state above the Church. Joseph II did not seek to be destructive to religion. He had the six-year curriculum for educating parish priests revised to prepare them to be more effective public servants, improved their salaries, and created many new parishes.

Perhaps emulating Sweden and partial efforts in France, Spain, and Denmark, Joseph II granted freedom of the press, except for pornography, atheism, and superstition. He recognized that he needed allies in his battle with the Church over taxes and toleration. This freedom unleashed a torrent of pamphlets and books critical of clerics and in time of public life. The emperor accepted even scurrilous attacks upon himself but lashed out against critics who wanted to limit his absolute powers. After continuing criticisms from the Church hierarchy and the power of the press helped

block his reform program for the Austrian Netherlands in 1786-87, he reimposed censorship for criticisms of his policies and religion.37 He also established a small secret police under Count Johann Anton Pergen to gather information on and counter opponents of his reforms.

While mainly a progressive in domestic policy, Joseph II pursued a disastrous militarism in foreign policy. His radical domestic reforms needed time and resources to be established and suffered in the consequences of foreign aggression. Having learned little from the "Potato War" against Bavaria in 1778 and 1779 that depleted his treasury, Joseph continued into l790 a futile and catastrophic war allied with Catherine II against the Ottoman Turks. Eagerly fulfilling treaty obligations, he had entered that war in 1787. From a small surplus in his treasury in 1786, the national debt soared by 1790 to 400 million gulden.38 As food prices rose and war taxes were imposed, bread riots erupted in Vienna after the poor harvests of 1788/89 and the emperor's popularity plummeted. While leading his army in the Balkans, Joseph II also caught a fatal fever during an epidemic that devastated his troops. He returned to Vienna, where he died at the age of forty nine in l790.

The French Revolution

Joseph II's reform program had lost momentum before the French Revolution began in 1789. The French abolition of the remnants of feudalism and their "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen" in August of l789, he believed, had plagiarized his policies.39 With his military losses, Hungary and Croatia near revolt, and his partial deathbed revocation of his reform program in the face of continuing opposition from the nobility and Church, Joseph II thought himself a failure at the end. The 1831 judgment of Prussian Count Hellmuth von Moltke is more accurate: The Austrian emperor, to whom history still owes rehabilitation, attempted to achieve by means of his authority and power vested in him, what the French Revolution only obtained after many years of blood and terror.40

Building upon continuity and dramatic change, the French Revolution ended what we call the Old Regime and started modern history with its creations. Transpiring during the decade after 1789, its major achievements were in politics. The French Revolution overthrew an absolutist monarchy and the old social order with a privileged aristocratic elite. It experimented with democracy drawing millions into the political process, established the modern secular state as ascendant, saw nationalism emerge as a potent force, and spread mass politics and Enlightenment ideas across the globe. Violence, political instability, economic hardship, and a period of systematic terror punctuated its course. Not surprisingly, this revolution and its socio-political, legal, and economic consequences, which endure to the present, have been the subject of many conflicting interpretations. Charles Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities* (l859) presented the Great Revolution, as contemporaries knew it, principally as a popular upheaval. Twentieth-century Marxist historians describe a bourgeois seizure of power, while conservatives disagree. This commentary sketches the immediate origins of the revolution, its course to the Thermidorian Reaction (1794), and major recent historiographical debates.

The late-eighteenth-century French monarchy had experienced a fiscal crisis. From France's defeat in the costly Seven Years War, its finances were unsound, and it was losing in trade competition to Britain. Support for the American Revolution greatly increased the royal debt. During the l780s interest and payment on France's past war debts consumed almost one-half of the annual budget. Even so, the national debt was less than Britain's and not necessarily an

excessive burden. Paradoxically, France, with fragile prosperity on the whole, had pockets of extreme poverty and a government that was becoming impoverished.

The fiscal crisis stemmed from inequities in France's tax structure based on traditional social status, anachronistic agriculture, and a weak monarch. Custom and law divided the Old Regime into three orders or estates. Near the top of the social pyramid was the First Estate, the clergy; followed by the Second, the nobility, who previously had a protective military function. The pyramid base was the splintered Third Estate of commoners or everyone else in the land, who included the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The first two estates comprised less than 3 percent of a near 26 million population, but they dominated French political life.41 This obsolescent division no longer reflected social realities and property. Because nobility with vast holdings were exempt from the *taille* (land tax) and wealthy bourgeoisie could obtain exemption with some effort, government income suffered.

The nobility rebuffed new taxes, chiefly through the Paris *parlement* (appellate court), which refused to register tax edicts. In 1787, when the government wanted the *taille* replaced with a general tax on all landowners proportional to land value, the king bypassed the *parlement* by summoning an Assembly of Notables of leading nobles, churchmen, and magistrates. When they reasserted their privilege of exemption from such taxation and demanded a greater share in governing, Louis XVI was forced to convoke the Estates-General, a medieval body. This patrician defeat of royal absolutism began a move toward constitutional monarchy and the revolution.

Since no Estates-General had met since l6l4, Louis XVI called for proposals on its voting procedure. Among the Third Estate this was a time of hope for a respite from price rises and poor harvests with talk of tax reform, but the Paris *parlement* ruled that votes in the Estates-General must be by estate rather than by head. This favored the nobility, who controlled the first two estates, and their programs. The Third Estate took the vote by estate or order with a total of three votes as an insult, even after the king permitted it to elect as many members (600) as the other two orders combined. Many turned against the Paris *parlement*, earlier perceived as a champion against royal absolutism. In his pamphlet "What is the Third Estate?" Abbe Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes (d. 1836), who attended Parisian salons, expressed well the mood of the commercial and professional middle classes when he asserted: "What is the Third Estate? Everything! What has it been in the political order up to the present? Nothing! What does it ask? To become something!"42 When the Estates-General met in May of l789 at Versailles, the country was drifting toward dissolution. Disastrous harvests in l788 had brought famine. Desperate peasants refused to pay manorial dues, and beggars and vagrants filled the countryside. Bread prices doubled and tripled in cities in l789, a year of depression. Most people agreed that the main cause of the fiscal and food crisis was not vagaries of nature but the royal court. Nor were voting procedures settled, as representatives brought to Versailles *cahiers de doleances*, list of grievances, calling for preserving privilege or concerns for liberty, equality, and the rule of law. These *cahiers*amounted to the first national opinion poll. With moral support from the nation and leadership from Sieyes and the nobleman Honore de Mirabeau, Third Estate representatives refused to meet separately and invited clergy and nobles to meet together with them in June. When some sympathetic clergy joined them, they boldly changed their name to the National Assembly. When Louis XVI posted guards with bayonets to lock their regular meeting room, they met at a tennis court and proposed writing a constitution for the nation. Political disintegration was swift. The king refused to cooperate with the National, or Constituent, Assembly and mustered troops near Versailles. The people of Paris, fearful of a royal offensive, stormed the Bastille on July 14 in search of weapons. Its fall became the symbol of the overthrow of the Old Regime tyranny. The king was now forced to accept the National Assembly. With

rumors of royal troops massing and an aristocratic resurgence, a collective hysteria known as "the Great Fear" swept the countryside. Town and country stood against the old order. Peasants refused to pay feudal dues and joined together to break into chateaus to destroy documents stating that they owed services or dues and to take food supplies. News of the widespread rural violence shocked Versailles and the National Assembly. In an effort to stabilize the situation, on the night of August 4-5, liberal nobles, churchmen, and townsmen emotionally renounced their remaining feudal rights and the principle of privilege.

Influenced by natural law, the *philosophes*, John Locke, and the American experience, the National Assembly representing the French people issued on August 27 the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen." It proclaimed civic equality and announced that "sovereignty resides essentially in the nation."43 This document made "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression" inalienable rights. (It may be seen as part of a tradition extending to the human rights' work of Eleanor Roosevelt with the United Nations and the Helsinki Accords of 1975.) Notably no mention of women as the subject of these newly defined rights appeared in this declaration or coming French constitutions. The Marquise de Condorcet soon criticized the revolutionaries for this shortcoming. Angered by shortages of the staple of bread, the opulence of Versailles, and what they saw to be treachery on the part of the king, perhaps 6000 women marched to Versailles on October 5 demanding bread. After they killed several guards the next morning, Lafayette persuaded the shocked king and his family to return to Paris with the mob. A few days later the National Assembly followed. The government was now in the midst of a city steaming with revolutionary passion.

After the collapse of the old order, the National Assembly reconstructed France. It created a new political culture and social realities, partly from public opinion in cafes, salons, and learned societies. In judicial reform the National Assembly abolished special privileges of the old orders. At the same time it moved in a democratic direction in the Constitution of 1791, which created a constitutional monarchy accountable to a unicameral legislature, the Legislative Assembly. Although all men had gained civic equality in 1789, only males of some wealth elected this legislature. The National Assembly also decentralized administrative institutions and promoted economic freedom, a topic important to the middle class.

Possible compromise with the Old Regime, which was weakened by the abolition of noble titles and extension of civil liberties to Protestants and Jews, ended when the anticlerical National Assembly confiscated Catholic Church lands. This was done to deal with pressing financial problems. Assignats, treasury bonds, based on the value of these lands, were issued to raise money. Unchecked printing of *assignats*, however, brought 100 percent inflation in France. The result was misery and rioting in the cities. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy (l790) also imposed oaths making priests and bishops state employees.44 "Non-juring" priests rejected this measure. The Vendee in western France rose in arms against the revolution. Aristocratic emigres and churchmen entailed conscience as well as safety. A popular base for counterrevolution now existed. During the brutal civil war in the Vendee about 250,000 people died.

Late in l79l there was more violence and a new Legislative Assembly. Following the English statesman Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), condemnation of the Revolution grew abroad. In the Declaration of Pillnitz (1791) the Austrian and Prussian monarchs threatened intervention on behalf of the French monarch, but other monarchs refused to join them. Bellicose Girondins led by Jacques-Pierre Brissot and Georges-Jacques Danton dominated the Legislative Assembly, which convened in October. Girondins were a belligerent faction of the

Jacobin Club headed by Maximilien Robespierre, a party that at the time was generally as peaceful in matters of foreign policy as it was ferocious at home.

War with Austria and Prussia from April l792 helped further radicalize France. A second revolution based on the call for equality erupted. Parisian *sans-culottes* (craftsmen wearing not the elites' knee breeches but a version of modern trousers) overtook in influence the domestically more moderate Girondins and demanded a popular democracy. The people were now a potent force. When Louis XVI attempted to flee the country, the constitutional monarchy was doomed. Riots spread against the king in August, and he was beheaded in January 1793. The Paris Commune had Girondins in the National Convention arrested in June. With France susceptible to foreign invaders in September, l200 prisoners — many of them aristocrats and priests — were murdered in Parisian jails. A universal draft, the *levee en masse*, was decreed, and 650,000 young men inspired by nationalism marched to service singing a new anthem, the Marseillaise. The modern army was being born. The French repulsed the Prussians at Valmy.

In the face of invasion jitters, soaring bread prices, despair, and possible anarchy, the brilliant tactician Robespierre became the head of the twelve-man Committee of Public Safety and dictatorially directed the Reign of Terror from l793 to mid-1794. Revolutionary tribunals channeled popular resentments, searching out enemies of the Republic and republican virtues and, after summary trials, meting out swift justice. During a paroxysm of fury, 35,000 to 40,000 people were executed. When the guillotine proved too slow, many were shot. Civil war opponents in the Vendee were massacred. The order was to give no quarter. Robespierre now founded the Cult of the Supreme Being to develop revolutionary moral values, establish a republic of virtue, and undermine persistent Catholicism. His attacks on opponents both on the radical left and right brought him many enemies. Fearing another purge, a coalition of those enemies in the National Convention had Robespierre branded a traitor and beheaded. The Terror prefigured modern totalitarianism.

With the end of the Reign of Terror, the grand revolution entered a new, tempered phase. With the Terror viewed as Robespierre's attempt to save social democracy, democracy and popular movements momentarily lost legitimacy. The revolution was now consolidated, albeit with continuing violence and corruption in the Thermidorian Reaction from July 1794. The governing legislature, the Convention, added a first executive five-person Directory in 1795 and chose a second two years later. The Convention strongly favored landowners and rich bourgeoisie. Although Thermidorians were Jacobin to an extent, the Convention closed Paris's Jacobin Club and there was a white terror against Jacobins and other citizens, including prison massacres. By 1795 the *sans-culottes* were suppressed as a major political force. Continuing wars to extend Revolutionary France's frontiers grew unpopular. Military defeats, farmer discontent with a weak economy and low agricultural prices, and corruption in the Directory sparked resistance in 1798 and a coup brought Napoleon Bonaparte to power in the next year.

Among interpretations of the French Revolution that have clashed two centuries later, Marxism provided for a time a leading contender. In *The Coming of the French Revolution* (l947), Georges Lefebvre argued that a class struggle between a rising capitalistic bourgeoisie and a reform-blocking landed aristocracy ultimately caused the revolution. Supported by Ernst Labrousse, Albert Soboul, and most other historians, this orthodoxy stood until the l960s, when Alfred Cobban and Norman Hampson elucidated ambiguities in the term "bourgeoisie," and Colin Lucas and George Taylor argued that the late Old Regime middle class had not been economically antithetical to the nobility. The iconoclastic Francois Furet scathingly attacked as incoherent commemorative history the Marxist class-conflict "catechism," including the claim that a straight

line runs from Jacobins to Bolsheviks.45 Revolutionary historiography, Furet asserted, is divided not between right and left but between commemorative and conceptual interpretations. His systematic analysis employs conceptual history in the tradition of Alexis de Tocqueville. The French Revolution now appears not so much a class struggle as a shift in rulership from men of birth to men of property.

Following Cobban's revisionism, conservative historians have called into question the significance of the revolution. After all, in 1789 the Bastille was nearly empty and feudalism a hollow relic. And did not the Reign of Terror consume the Rights of Man? These conservatives have called the revolution a myth. In an engaging rejoinder,46 Robert Darnton observes that no adequate terminology existed for political revolutions before l789. National Assembly seating in relation to the podium, for example, first gave the modern political terms left, right, and middle. The revolutionary search to reorder society rationally included its agronomic republican calendar of twelve months with three ten-day weeks plus five patriotic days. Adopted in 1793, it was short-lived. It introduced beautiful new names for months based on the seasons and vegetation, such as *prairial* from meadow. The revolutionaries also had the Paris Academy develop the metric system of weights, measures, and lengths that gradually became the global standard. Darnton points out that in exalting liberty, popular sovereignty, and the pursuit of equality, the French Revolution transformed the French mental frame. It rejected rigid privilege of nobility and rank and united the disparate groups that peopled the Old Regime into the modern French nation.

Conclusion

The first age of the democratic revolution emerged in a dynamic setting. Sustained demographic growth, increased agricultural productivity in areas employing crop rotation, better nutrition with expanding use of the potato, demise of protectionist mercantilism before market economies, and the early Industrial Revolution were slowly and variously transforming material life in areas across Europe. By the l770s the *philosophes'* rational program for freedom and against fanaticism together with the emerging tribunal of public opinion among the growing reading public created a broader discourse for reform. At the same time, mounting fiscal problems, largely from past war debts, focused and accelerated radical change against privileged elements of the Old Regime. In addition, misery in the countryside increased in France after a poor harvest in 1788.

The first age of the democratic revolution may be viewed as an extraordinary moment in the progress toward responsible liberty, equality, moral politics, and peace. A deliberative tripartite federal government and the Bill of Rights that follow the American Revolution are a prototype of a new liberal democracy. Josephist reforms in the Austrian Monarchy for tax equalization, religious toleration, and the abolition of serfdom were fragile, but serve as a model of reform absolutism. The shift to modernity is clearest in the French Revolution. Although steeped in violence, including the Terror, it restructured French society, fostering liberty, anticipating political democracy, and following human rights with civic equality intended to go beyond legal equality. The French Revolution's fraternity among citizens, or modern nationalism, was unleashed in a variety of forms across western and central Europe during the Napoleonic Wars.

Notes

1. See R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), vol. I; and C. B. A. Behrens, *Society, Government, and the Enlightenment* (New

York: Harper & Row, 1985). To place the origins and purposes of this period of upheaval in a more complete perspective, historians today generally refer to it as the age of revolutions or a revolutionary era.

2. The impact of the region of the economic superiority of the European Community (EC) and the information revolution spawned by modern telecommunications is also without an earlier, exact historical counterpart. They hastened the demise of Marxist-Leninism there.

3. See Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 2-20; and Michael W. Flinn, *The European Demographic System* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

4. Isser Woloch, *Eighteenth-Century Europe: Tradition and Progress 1715-1789* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp. 103-119.

5. John T. Alexander, *Catherine the Great: Life and Legend* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 100.

6. E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848* (New York: New American Library, 1962), pp. 44-51.

7. The expanding slave trade from Africa to the Americas added to two triangular trades that had flourished — (1) rum from New England for slaves in Africa for molasses in the Caribbean and (2) pots and cloth from Bristol, England, for slaves in Africa for tobacco in Virginia to be processed in England for sale in central Europe. For estimates on the size of slave imports, see James A. Rawley, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).

8. Mark Kishlansky, et al., *The Unfinished Legacy* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993), p. 631.

9. Britain, Poland, and Sweden were non-absolutist states. Economist Wilhelm Roscher introduced the term "enlightened absolutism" for the last phase of absolutism after 1740 on the European continent.

0. This thesis appears in Ranke's brief article, entitled "The Great Powers," in volume II of *Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift* for 1833. See Roger Wines, ed., *Leopold von Ranke: The Secret of World History* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1981), pp. 120-156.

11. For an excellent study of Montesquieu and his work, see Judith Sklar, *Montesquieu* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

12. Peter Gay, *The Party of Humanity* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 90 ff.

13. See Voltaire, *The Age of Louis XIV* (1751) (New York: Dutton, 1966), chapter II; and Theodore Bestermann, *Voltaire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

14. R. R. Palmer, *Age of the Democratic Revolution* I: 439-469.

15. See P. N. Furbank, *Diderot: A Critical Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1993) for a sympathetic study of this unsystematic scholar.

16. Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation* (New York: Knopf, 1967), I:3.

17. Voltaire, *Essai sur les moeurs* (1756) II: 172.

18. See Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991) trans. by Lydia G. Cochrane, pp. 38-92.

19. Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" in Lewis White Beck, ed., *Kant: On History* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 3.

20. Thomas L. Hankins, *Science and Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 37-45.

21. See Ronald Calinger, "Euler's Letters to a Princess of Germany as an Expression of His Mature Scientific Outlook," *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* 15, 3 (1976): 211-233.

22. A. Owen Aldridge, *Voltaire and the Century of Light* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 297-301.

23. Voltaire, *Candide* (1759) (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), p. 120.

24. Stephen J. Grendzier, ed., Denis Diderot's *The Encyclopedia: Selections* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. xxvi.

25. The Jesuit Dictionary of Trevoux, which opposed the *Encyclopedie* on political and theological grounds, feared its commercial competition as well.

26. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile or On Education*, trans. by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979), pp. 268 ff.

27. J. McDonald, *Rousseau and the French Revolution 1762-1791* (London, 1965), p. 50 and Carol Blum, *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

28. Robert Darnton, "The High Enlightenment and the Low Life of Literature in Pre-revolutionary France," *Past and Present*, No. 51: 81-115.

29. Edmund S. Morgan, *The Birth of the Republic 1763-89* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 159.

30. *Ibid*., p. 3.

31. Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 1-86.

32. See Helen Liebel-Weckowicz, "Auf der Suche nach Neuer Autoritat: Raison d'Etat in den Verwaltungs-und Rechtsreformen Maria Theresias under Josephs II"; and Jean Berenger, "Die Habsburgermonarchie als Standestaat: Zasur and Kontinuitat zur Zeit Maria Theresias mit besonderer Berucksichtigung Ungarns, in *Osterreich im Europa der Aufklarung* (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenchaften, 1985), pp. 339-364 and 437-447.

33. See Frank T. Brechka, *Gerard van Swieten and His World, 1700-1772* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).

34. C. A. Macartney, *Maria Theresa and the House of Austria* (Mystic, Conn.: Lawrence Verry Inc., 1969), p. 121.

35. Eberhard Weis, "Enlightenment and Absolutism in the Holy Roman Empire: Thoughts on Enlightened Absolutism in Germany," in *The Journal of Modern History* 58 (1986): S181-S198.

36. T. C. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, 33-34 and 80 ff.

37. See Janet L. Polasky, *Revolution in Brussels, 1787-1793* (Brussels: Academie Royale de Belgique, 1987).

38. T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, p. 86.

39. Eberhard Weis, "Enlightenment and Absolutism . . .," p. S187.

40. T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Absolutism*, p. 86.

41. Albert Soboul, *The French Revolution l787-1799: From the Storming of the Bastille to Napoleon* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 29-31.

42. As quoted in Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1964), p. 102.

43. As quoted in Kevin Reilly, ed., *Readings in World Civilizations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) II:109.

44. See David C. Miller, "A.-G. Camus and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy," in *The Catholic Historical Review* LXXVI, 3 (1990): 481-505.

45. William Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) Part I; Francois Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

46. Robert Darnton, "What was Revolutionary about the French Revolution?" in *The New York Review,* January 19, 1989, pp. 3-6 and 10.

Chapter X

‘Coming to Value’ vs ‘Having Values": Building Democracy in the Contemporary Mexican Peasant Movement

Michael W. Foley

While mainstream political analysis of the Latin American situation today stands squarely within the tradition of political economy, a prominent undercurrent stresses the importance of a distinctive "Ibero-American" heritage in explaining the political forms and travails of contemporary Latin America. Championed in particular by Howard Wiarda, this approach points to corporatist, authoritarian, patrimonial, and personalist "values" said to be embedded in Latin American culture and to the difficulties, accordingly, of importing "Western-style" democracy into the region.1 In its current guise, the culturalist explanation recalls earlier attempts to explain the apparent backwardness of Latin American economies by recourse to their cultural heritage. The psychologist David McClelland in particular became identified with the notion, quite widespread in the early 1960s among "development" experts, that the missing ingredient in Latin American societies, as in Third World societies generally, was a lack of "achievement orientation." Latin American cultures, for various historical reasons, simply did not foster the entrepreneurial spirit in the way the cultures of Northern Europe had at the dawn of the modern age.2

History has proven cruel to McClelland’s thesis. Even as he wrote, the most dynamic of the Latin American economies were growing at rates of five and six percent a year, rates far in excess, it should be noted, of the historical growth rate of Britain and the United States even in their most vigorous phases. Any trip through Latin America, moreover, would have revealed marvels of entrepreneurship. On any busy street corner, boys and girls of eight and ten years old jostle with older vendors to sell whatever wares or services they could imagine of interest to passing motorists. Public transportation systems are crammed with commuters and migrants willing to travel great distances to find work. And the more successful enterprises have branched out to become multinational corporations, while their owners enjoy international vacations and the protections and opportunities afforded by the international banking system. Wiarda’s argument, in fact, might be seen as a response to the failure of the older culturalist explanations of Latin America’s problems: if personal values did not account for the fits and starts in Latin American’s encounter with "modernization," then perhaps the region’s political values, its "political culture," would.

History is proving equally cruel to Howard Wiarda. For Wiarda the forms and practices associated with liberal democracy were a foreign implant on Latin American soil, its concern with individual rights barely comprehensible in the Ibero-American legal tradition, Latin American commitment to its tenets no more than rhetoric. This last claim may have been true of certain societies in the 1970s, notably Argentina,3 but it was clearly not true even then of Chile (whose military dictatorship was a rude break with the country’s deepest traditions) or Costa Rica. His argument is itself barely comprehensible in the light of the events of the last ten years, which have been not just the toppling of military regimes throughout the Southern Cone but the revivification of civil society and the construction of democratic movements within civil society throughout the region.

These observations might be taken as grounds for rejecting out of hand the culturalist project: whatever culture means, we might be inclined to argue, it does not mean that societies are simple products of static "values" held collectively and embodied in key institutions nor that their

historical trajectories might be deduced from an examination of those values. This is a fair enough assessment, but it does not tell us either what culture is nor how seemingly powerful attitudes and beliefs might be overcome in promoting democracy. I am not going to try to tackle the larger question of political culture here.4 Nor do I intend to deal directly with the notion of a distinctively Ibero-American, or Latin American, or Mexican, political culture. Rather, I want to focus more narrowly on the process by which democratic practices might be encouraged under unpromising circumstances. To do so I propose to look at three aspects or levels of the independent peasant movement that has arisen in Mexico over the last twenty years: first, I will draw on my own case study of organizing at the grasp roots level to uncover some aspects of what we might call "democratizing practice" and of the moral rhetoric that sustains it in the process of popular mobilization. Second, I present a case study of the democratic construction of a large-scale and multifaceted economic union of a number of peasant communities in the Mexican state of Sonora; this study will suggest some of the elements necessary for the constitution of a vital civil society. Finally, I discuss briefly the current struggle in Mexico to structure at the national level a peasant movement that is at once politically independent and politically effective; this discussion, too, will touch on questions both of democratic practice and of the role and character of organizations within civil society in bringing about and sustaining a democratic policy. The conclusion will return us to more general questions about "values," "political culture," and the development of democratic practice.

Organizing el Lago

El Lago, as I shall call it, is a strikingly poor community of some 20,000 inhabitants in south-central Mexico, the heart of Mexico's traditional peasant territory.5 Though large in size (in official statistical practice, the town would be counted as an "urban concentration"), El Lago is for all practical purposes a village. The majority of the population is engaged in agriculture; there is no major industry in the town — indeed, only a scattering of workshops — there are only two substantial commercial outlets, and these are small; and social services are extremely limited. Town life, such as it is, centers on the daily market, which is one of the most vigorous in the area, and on the church, which houses only one or two services a week, since the priest lives in another town. Town government has very limited scope in that El Lago is merely a satellite of the neighboring *cabecera municipal* (roughly equivalent to the "county seat"). Most village lands are part of the *ejido*6 of El Lago, which is governed by a *comisariado ejidal* elected periodically by the town's five hundred or so *ejidatarios*, or officially designated usufructuaries. With a population of 20,000, the town suffers severe problems of landlessness and unemployment as a result of both the ejidal system and the shortage of land in general.

In 1976, a young couple, recent graduates of the National Autonomous University of Mexico and enthusiasts of the educational philosophy of Paolo Freire, asked the Diocese of Cuernavaca to suggest a village where they might work. The Diocese, under the direction of then bishop Don Sergio Mendes Arceo, had long been a center for experimentation in social change and church renewal. Ivan Illich had his center there, and the Diocese's base Christian community (BCC) program WAS the largest in Mexico and had already gone a long way toward awakening a new form of popular piety and popular participation in local communities.7 Cristina and Eduardo were offered a choice of two villages; they took El Lago.

Originally working as school teachers in the town, the two spent their spare hours meeting people and creating groups. Cristi worked at first through the local Legion of Mary, a traditional

women's group. Her goal was to rejuvenate a moribund base Christian community, and, indeed, today the Legion of Mary, an odd collection of pious older women and rather fiery young mothers, remains at the center of the organizing efforts in El Lago. Edurado devoted himself to the men, meeting campesinos in their homes and fields, offering to give classes in literacy and agricultural production, convincing and cajoling men to join him for weekly meetings. These efforts issued in the irrigation cooperative that still plays an important role in the movement.

Freirean theory enjoins on the educator the duty of listening as the fundamental starting point for adult education and community organizing. Both Eduardo and Cristi listened a good bit, concluding that the twin problems that obsessed Laguenos were water and credit, the one for lack of the fundamental resources to increase production, the other because the constant quest for financing tied people to the money lenders and thus deprived them of all opportunity to enjoy the fruits of added labor. Answering these two wants would release Laguenos decisively from the cycle of poverty, a cycle that was already a downward spiral in the generalized decline of the peasant economy in Mexico. And the attempt to answer these wants would also give Laguenos the two tools they needed above all else to meet future difficulties: consciousness and organization.8

Freirean theory insists that insight and solutions must come from the people themselves; the Freirean educator's role is that of facilitator. This is a hard row to hoe, however, especially when one has at one's disposal the authority of the teacher and the catechist. (We will return to the paradoxical role of the educator-organizer shortly.) Eduardo and Cristi, at any rate, did not hesitate to suggest. On the men's side, the project would be an irrigation scheme, collectively organized and maintained; on the women's side, it was a saving's bank or *caja popular*. On the men's side, Eduardo acquired the assistance of a foundation set up by a group of priests and religious to do Freirean-style community development; they helped organize some 24 smallholders with contiguous or nearly contiguous land to create the irrigation coop. The foundation also contacted a Dutch charity to help finance the drilling, the purchase of the pump, and the cement canal that joins the plots. The men themselves had to negotiate with one of the land-rich peasants through whose land the canal had to pass and to deal with the rumors he spread that they were "Communists."

On the women's side, Cristi drew out a few leaders, put them in contact with representatives of the *Caja popular* movement in Cuernavaca, and began getting them to classes on accounting and organization. These contacts provided long-term links with the *Frente Auténtico del Trabajo*(Authentic Labor Front, FAT), a leftist but nonpartisan organizing effort based in Cuernavaca with a strong interest in the Cuernavaca *Caja*. Later Cristi would bring in friends to teach groups of women how to make cement blocks in a short-lived manufacturing project, and, on another occasion, nurses to teach hygiene and medicine and to promote the revival of herbal lore. Out of the latter effort came a group of "barefoot doctors," who continue to meet regularly for classes, to prepare herbal medicines or to help one another deal with unfamiliar cases. Eventually, the men's and the women's movements came together, in part through educational sessions sponsored by the Diocese (the bishop himself visited the village for the fiesta celebrating the drilling of the well), in part through the joint effort that built the community center where the *Caja* is housed, literacy classes are held, and the irrigation association meets.

When Eduardo and Cristi separated and left El Lago in 1980, they left behind a handful of leaders with strong ties to the diocesan movement, to the FAT, and to numerous smaller cooperative ventures in central Mexico. The development foundation which Eduardo had introduced to the community continued to offer support, and another Cuernavaca-based team of consultants offered their services as well. Though the movement in El Lago has been racked by

personality conflicts and the failure of some of these projects, it continues to organize Laguenos both through the BCCs and in cooperative ventures. It has also debated vigorously the question of whether and how to enter local politics, which one and all view as nearly hopelessly fractionalized and generally corrupt. The movement promotes a radical critique of capitalism, which it blames for the persistent poverty of the countryside, and of the Mexican political systems which it sees as both authoritarian and thoroughly corrupt. To the one it counterposes cooperative organization of peasant producers and consumers; against the other it maintains a vigorous independence, refusing to be entangled either in government-sponsored programs or in partisan conflict.

The most potent effect of the organizing effort that Eduardo and Cristi undertook, however, was the creation of a core of leaders and activists with the self-confidence, and to a lesser extent the skills, to confront what they see as the major problems facing the community. Their achievement, that is, was to create not a dependent clientele under the direction of outside leaders or experts but a self-reproducing peasant leadership and an activated following capable of assessing their own situation and taking steps to deal with it. This is the core of "democratizing practice," and it is important for our purposes here to unravel what goes into making it work.

Eduardo and Cristi presented themselves, first of all, not as leaders (a suspect term in El Lago, at any rate) but as facilitators and organizers. Their express goal was to create self-sustaining peasant organizations with their own leaders, and this was reflected in their practice. As one young man put it: "I always watched the way [Eduardo] helped us. He created the irrigation coop disinterestedly, and out of that came all the rest." Moral integrity, in other words, was important to the image Eduardo projected — and a moral integrity of a particular sort.9 Eduardo's efforts were "disinterested," they were "for the good of the community, not for his own personal good." These words echo a prevailing evaluation of local political figures, one reinforced by Eduardo and Cristi and the leadership they developed. Local politics was suspect precisely because all figures appeared to be in it primarily for their own sake and that of their clique. Here is what Tomasa, probably the leading figure in the movement at the time of my interviews, had to say about the matter: "Local leaders are grabbing the money which the government provides for development projects, stealing it, and for that reason do not finish them or finish them badly, and the money is lost. The government is bothered by these things, and they are right. . . . Often it is we ourselves, people from here, who do not want the village to advance but to go backward . . . who want to go on beating it down to their own advantage."

A landless peasant puts it even more colorfully: "The *comisariados* (ejidal officials) here were, so we'd say, good and hungry. They wanted money and used their positions for themselves, to sell off El Lago's land. . . . Here the tinkle of coins does the trick (*aqui cayando los centavos son felices*)."

The critique of politics thus provides a rule for the conduct of leaders, and that rule demands strict moral accountability. "For the good of the community," however, is not in itself a prescription for a democratic politics; authoritarian regimes have almost always sought to ground their legitimacy in their supposedly superior ability to advance the good of the whole. Where the practice of Eduardo and Cristi and of the leaders they have developed differs is in their commitment to fashioning an environment in which people can learn to speak up and develop their own leadership talents. One woman put her experience this way: Her cousin Tomasa, she says, talked her into asking her husband's permission to come to meetings; he reluctantly agreed. "Before, I was a dummy (*tonta*)," she says. "I was shut up in the house all day, I did not do anything but chores. I did not think about anything. Now that I am waking up (*Desportando*) I feel better because I look forward to the meetings, I do my chores thinking this is what I have to do to go to

the meeting." As in many such conversions, Felipa's awakening involves as much a change of view as a change of mind. But the new activities also bring a new sense of self: "Now I feel different. I am doing more. I am waking up bit by bit to life as it is today. I feel different, more capable of doing more and doing different things." Felipa has been drawn into a community and a movement, then, which promotes her own self-awareness and her own desire for self-development. It makes her a subject, in other words. At the same time, it directs her attention outward, towards the needs of the larger community.

As in regard to both the moral criteria by which leaders are judged and the effort to create social and political "subjects" among a hitherto passive peasantry, this effort to reach out, to direct the activities of these newly empowered subject to the needs of the larger community, has both ideological and practical dimensions. Ideologically, the movement is committed to a notion of solidarity among the poor of El Lago, who are often identified with the community itself (and, indeed, the vast majority of Laguenos fit this category). As the educational material of the FAT puts it: "The cooperative movement from its birth forms part of the movement of the workers; one of its principal objectives has always been to show that people can live in harmony, without misery, sharing without exploiting one another, mutually protecting one another, sharing with justice the riches produced by human lands. The cooperative movement as an instrument of the workers is born to construct a new society."10

Translated into ordinary usage, people in the movement in El Lago speak habitually of the need for "unity" within the town and the necessity to "work together" in order to advance. The first echoes the sentiments of most Laguenos, who consider politics inherently "divisive." Both the FAT and the BCC movement urge the second on a population grown skeptical of efforts to overcome divisions.

The BCC movement adds its own flavor to the ideological mix in arguing that the root both of factionalism and of people's reluctance to work together to better conditions in El Lago is the "sin" of individualism, specifically "egoism." Thus Tomasa, in reflecting on her father's failure to send her to school, employs a judgment drawn from the ideology of the BCC movement: "`No," he says, "I thought to myself you were going to marry one day, and the money you would get was going to be for your husband. . . ." "Perhaps it is egoism," she reflects, "because egoism is not giving what you have to give. It had to be either for me or for himself." Her own justification for her participation in the movement likewise hinges on a rejection of egoism, but in this instance of the broadly familial type. To her husband's objections that she was abandoning home and duty for her organizing work, Tomasa responded (so she reported):

On the one hand, maybe I am hurting you, but on the other hand, what does it matter if one person is hurt and everyone else benefits? He said, "Why should other people interest you? They are not going to thank you. People are bad, they are perverse. Besides, you have your home, your kids." I said to him, "But it interests me a lot — I want to help people."1 0

In practice, the identification of the root "sin" in El Lago as egoism both confirms prevailing judgment of the character of social life and challenges those judgments. It gives organizers an important tool against the reluctant: "if it is egoism you condemn in local leaders," they can say to their interlocutors, "you can hardly excuse yourself on personal grounds when we ask for your participation." The notion of solidarity and the condemnation of egoism give organizers a hortatory edge; they can demand that Laguenos live up to their own rhetorics recast, however, not just as a critique of prevailing practice but as a call to unitary action. We have identified three elements of the rhetoric of organizing in El Lago: an image of moral integrity, and in particular of disinterested service, by which leaders are to be identified and judge; a call of "awakening" which is meant to

create genuine subjects among a peasantry largely reduced to passivity under the prevailing political system; and a moral call to solidarity and service. Together with the conduct of the meeting in which members of the movement engage, the rhetoric of the movement constitutes the "democratizing practice" of the organizing effort in the town. Although the actual practice of democracy in the movement's structure is an essential ingredient, the call to solidarity is also crucial to recruiting villagers and enlisting members of the BCC groups and cooperatives as participants and leaders. The ideal of disinterested service and the exhortations to solidarity and service make up the bulk of the moral discourse of the movements and together they reinforce a sense of collective responsibility essential to democratic practice.

It is important to note, before we move on, the ways in which democratic practice in El Lago differs from widely accepted understandings of liberal democracy and the extent to which organizers are responsible for impressing a democratic or non-democratic character on a movement of this sort. Democracy as practiced in the movement in El Lago is more or less direct democracy. It is premised on the equal participation of all in the decision-making of each group. Indeed, leaders and the general membership alike often understand the failure of the movement as failures to observe the principles of participatory democracy. One landless laborer, speaking of problems in the irrigation society, argued that "the one who speaks best (*tenía más palabra*) was the one who destroyed the unity of the society. He did not want to do anything but order people around. The one who was more intelligent, he got more out of the society, and that just made the other angry. This critique suggests one of the problems of this kind of democracy: even where all have a say, the words of some count more than those of others. Similar problems attend the political ideal articulated by the movement: unitary action — without hint of faction — for the good of the community. The democratic practice promoted in El Lago, in fact, is founded on unfulfillable expectation: an equal say for all, unlimited cooperation, politics without factions. The move to practical democracy, and to participation in local politics, will be fraught with disappointment. That does not make the achievement of El Lagos' organizers unworthy; it only suggests its precariousness.

The distinctive character of democratic practice in the movement also suggests the degree to which organizers are responsible for the democratization of a social movement. No doubt the very experience of mobilization for some cause is enough to make "subjects" of hitherto passive individuals. But whether these individuals are then subjected to another sort of passivity, to manipulation at the hands of a movement oligarchy or new political elite, depends at least to some extent on the sort of education they receive in the process of mobilization. Even mobilization on behalf of democracy may be devoid of democratic practice, at least at the main level, if they are simply convoked by distant leaders or anonymous groups.11 Much of the recent experience in the countries of Eastern Europe seems to have had this character, only as the wave of street demonstration proceeded did efforts begin to organize participants and give them voice in the process, and those efforts are apparently only slowly bearing fruit in the formation of new political parties and the reconstitution of old ones. Much depends, then, on the efforts of organizers and on the understanding they bring with them of the character and purpose of organizing. Eduardo and Cristi brought with them a radically democratic charter, drawn partly from the theoretical work of Paulo Freire, partly from the experience of the Christian Base Community movement. They implanted an ideology of democratization, but one which took hold, it should be added, because it drew upon and confirmed people's sense of the evil of politics as practiced.

The movement in El Lago maintains itself only with some difficulty today, and it has been reluctant either to take on the local political machine or to construct links with the larger peasant

movement in Mexico. It remains largely a hope, at the moment, in the revivification of civil society in contemporary Mexican politics. Other peasant groups, however, have overcome the considerable obstacles to independent organization and thrust themselves as genuinely autonomous forces against the political machine that has dominated Mexican politics since the Revolution of 1910-1920. In the next two sections, we will consider the development of one such group and the efforts of national level groups to maintain their autonomy while effectively challenging the hold of the official party and the state on social and political organization.

Gaining Autonomy: The Union of Collective Ejidos of the Mayo and Yaqui Valleys

Throughout Latin America, anti-authoritarian movements have originated in a revivified civil society, itself the product of attempts on the part of a variety of groups within society to gain some space for autonomous action vis-a-vis the authoritarian state.12 The emergence of autonomous social groups has been particularly noteworthy in Mexico, where a highly developed corporatist state had seemed for decades in thorough control of civil society through a vast array of organizations affiliated with the official Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI.13 Where it was once possible to see corporatist occupation of most of the political "space" in the system, analysts must now explain the decay of the monopoly implied in that explanation and the emergence of effective challengers. This decay has been visible the longest, arguably, in the countryside. While urban centers displayed their discontent in increasing attachment to opposition parties, autonomous peasant organizations were the first to prevent direct challenges to the party-state's control over social organization. Since the era of President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940), when the great land reforms took place, Mexico's peasantry have been organized under of the National Confederation of Campesinos, or CNC. Petitioners for land as will as recipients of ejidal grants and members of communities whose communal holdings were recognized or enlarged under the land reform were all automatically enrolled in the CNC, the peasant wing of the official party. The CNC held out the promise of land or benefited directly from peasants' perceptions that it was the vehicle for gaining the attention of the Government; and peasants responded with acquiescence in PRI control of local politics and in PRI victories, often manipulated, in state and national elections. CNC control began to weaken in the 1950s, however, as the Mexican state poured resources into large-scale commercial agriculture, largely abandoning, except in rhetoric, both land reform and the support of peasant agriculture.14 This was particularly true in the northwestern States of Sonora and Sinaloa, where large landholders (*latifundistas*) acquired hundreds of thousands of newly irrigated lands. Here an independent peasant movement arose in the 1950s to press for the distribution of illegally held lands.

Despite repression and often successful efforts on the part of the government to coopt the leadership of the new movement, agitation for land reform increased in the area, especially in the early 1970s when President Luis Echeverria Alvarez attempted to recoup the PRI's lost legitimacy by a wave of populist gestures, including the encouragement of peasant hopes for further land reform. The challenge to the traditional system and the *latifundistas* came to a head in 1975 and 1976 when in the face of repeated land seizures, Echeverria ordered the expropriation of some 600,000 hectares of land nationwide, including 99,000 hectares in the fertile Yaqui and Mayo Valleys of Sonora.15 The Coalition of Collective Ejidos of the Yaqui and Mayo Valleys (CEGVYM) was created as a result of this action.16 The CECVYM plays today an important part in national level peasant politics. It is also the organizational umbrella for some of the most prosperous *ejidos* in Mexico who owe their prosperity, by and large, to the institutions established

by the Coalition in its early days. CECVYM was not created in the Echeverrria reforms, however; rather, it was the product of a prolonged struggle with the state bureaucracy assigned to aid and supervise ejidal affairs. A closer look at this struggle will give us some insight into the dynamics of constructing a vital and democratic civil society.

In November of 1976, in the most spectacular single redistribution in Mexican history, President Echeverris distributed some 42,000 hectares of prime irrigated land in the Yaqui and Mayo Valley of southern Sonora. The land was distributed among more than 8,000 *ejidatarios* to form 79 collective *ejidos*. The Echeverria government felt that only collective exploitation could maintain the previous level of productivity of the land in question and provide peasant families with a decent livelihood. Primary responsibility for the economic success of the new *ejidos*, however, was assumed by the rural development bank, *Banrural*, which provided agricultural credit, extension, and marketing opportunities, and by the state agricultural insurance agency, *Anagsa*. It was in conflict with these preponderant institutions that the Coalition of Collective Ejidos of the Yaui and Mayo Valleys constituted itself.

Conflict appeared immediately, in the attempt by the bank to retain some eleven million pesos in earnings from the first harvest as reimbursement to the expropriated owners for their planting expense. *Ejidatarios* from 18 *ejidos* invaded local offices of *Banrural* and demanded the return of their earnings. They found themselves opposed not only by the state itself by also by the official peasant organizations to which they were affiliated and under whose umbrella they had gained access to the land in the first place. Members of all the *ejidos* of the region commenced talks aimed at creating an independent organization capable of protecting the holdings they already possessed (former landholders were seeking redress in the court), confronting the bank on a number of issues, and rectifying some of the inadequacies of the original repartition.

The *ejidos* faced crippling disadvantage at their inception. Besides their dependence on the bank and on *Anagsa*, three characteristics of the distribution proved potentially disintegrative: First, members of diverse peasant groups were mixed in the assignment of *ejidatarios* to *ejidos*, planting seeds of discord within the *ejidos* themselves. Second, the amount of land per family was quite small (4.5 hectares average as opposed to the legally prescribed 10 hectares), rendering precarious the economic viability of the *ejido*. At the same time, the high degree of mechanization of farming in the region meant that *ejidatarios* would be underemployed on their own land and tempted to seek full time employment elsewhere and to rent out their interest in the *ejido* to others, making possible a process of social differentiation within the *ejido* that again might very easily lead to it dismemberment. Finally, the land granted for ejidal exploitation was typically far from the homes of *ejidatarios*, and the grant included no provision for the construction of population centers.

Banrural and *Anagsa* were organized so as to ensure efficient return on the credit administered by the state, but they did so by exercising effective control over the profit created by their clients; and the *ejidos* were so constituted that despite these guarantees of economic viability they were constantly liable to disintegration as functioning social and economic unity. The Coalition, therefore, set itself the twofold task of wresting control of ejidal profits from the state agencies and of building the internal unity of the *ejidos*. The first was achieved with the creation, first, of a Common Fund designed to replace the crop insurance function of *Anagasa* and at the time provide working capital for Coalition projects, including especially the hiring of a cadre of trained personnel to provide technical assistance to the *ejidos*; later, 42 *ejidos* within the Coalition formed a Credit Union which effectively freed them from the last hint of dependence on *Banrural*. The second effort was necessarily more difficult, but it commenced with a campaign to persuade

the government to add population centers to the lands already distributed for agricultural purposes. When this campaign was successful, the Coalition set about building homes for the new communities, opting for self-construction (including the creation of factories to provide basic building materials) out of a conviction that by doing so they would be enhancing community responsibility and blocking possibilities for disintegration within the *ejidos*.

As the last example illustrates, at each step of the process of building an autonomous and viable organization, the Coalition opted for practice which would maximize participation and unity.

Thus, in the determination of work rules for the everyday functioning of the *ejidos*, the membership voted for a system which allocated rewards according to members' contributions and disallowed the "renting out" of ejidal privileges. In establishing a system of planning that would maximize efficiency in response to market conditions, the Coalition chose a decentralized system that would give considerable autonomy to individual ejidal assemblies and avoid the accumulation of power in the hands of technical personnel that planning often entails. At the same time, the decision to break with *Banrural* and *Anagsa* provided the pattern for subsequent efforts to have autonomy: self-construction of the new housing complexes rather than contract of services from outsiders; self-supply through Coalition-run factories for fertilizers and pesticides rather than dependence on the state agencies supervised by *Banrural*; and self-finance for all of these projects to the greatest extent possible. In each of these matters, while the leadership and technical staff pointed the way, full consultation with the membership and the vote of the ejidal assemblies were the basis for the final decision. As Gordillo emphasizes, both the circumstances surrounding the genesis of the Coalition and the general pattern of its decisions suggest more general conclusions about the construction of autonomous and democratic associations within civil society. First, these peasants managed to overcome the disintegrative tendencies built into the circumstances of the reform by identifying a common enemy in the concrete form of *Banrural*. The peasants who created the coalition were not uniting against an abstract "State" or "capitalist system" but against an institution with practical powers over their affairs. The concrete and economistic character of their rebellion gave it wide appeal: the practical necessity to wrest control of ejidal profits from the bank and *Anagsa* gave the rebellion its radical character.

Second, two circumstances contributed to the Coalition's search for democratic forms of operation. In the first place, the peasants who made up the new *ejidos* had been separated by the character of the distribution of land from the official organizations which had pressed for the reform but which also acted as organs of restraint. At an early stage, moreover, these peasants discovered a secret covenant between their organizations and the state, granting large indemnifications to land owners and imposing a ban on further land invasion. Feeling thus betrayed, the peasants who built the Coalition were "cut loose" from organizations that had previously had the ability to manipulate them and make deals with the state. They were free and motivated, in other words, to seek autonomous forms of organization under an "accountable" leadership. Coalition leaders thus recognized from the start that in order to overcome the centrifugal tendencies in Mexican political organizations usually associated with personalistic factions, they would have to create a system of full accountability. The need for unity in the face of the institutions of the state, in other words, and reflection on the failures of peasant organizations in the past, contributed to a commitment to genuinely "polyarchical" institutions for collective decision making.17 This commitment became particularly important in the Coalition-wide elections of 1982, called in the wake of the fissure of some 26 *ejidos* dissatisfied with the character of the leadership. Amidst tensions born of the long tenure of the chief leaders and the presence of

diverse political tendencies among the technical staff, the elections resulted in a thorough turnover in the top offices of the Coalition. The dangers of personalism were averted at the polls and without the further fissuring of the organization.

Finally, both the embattled character of much of its history and the polyarchical safeguards built into its management probably would have gone for naught, as Gordillo argues, if the organization had not at the same time embedded a large measure of autogestion in its everyday practices. Autogestion, the management of their affairs by the workers or participants themselves, is not the same as polyarchy. In the United States — the model, for Dahl and Lindblom, of the polyarchical system — most of the groups that participate in the political process and benefit from the democratic safeguards of the system are themselves internally governed as oligarchies or dictatorships. Firms, trade associations, churches, unions, consumer advocacy groups, professional associations — the vast majority of these are governed "from the top down." This need not be so, of course, though there are potent reasons why it is so in a great many cases. In the cases of the Coalition, however, necessity dictated internal democracy as the most efficient mechanism to overcome the powerful disintegrative forces built into the ejidos themselves; and internal democracy in this case meant giving considerable control over their economic lives to the ejidal assemblies themselves. The relative success of the Coalition in insuring a decent standard of living to its members certainly reinforced these measures, as did the polyarchical controls that assured the legitimacy of the leadership. But in the end, autogestion gave the organization the internal coherence necessary to carry out its projects and maintain its integrity as an independent actor in civil society.

The effort to achieve internal democracy in the part of group within civil society certainly contributes to the democratization of polity, especially where, as in Mexico, the state itself has exercised considerable control over organizational life. By themselves, however, such efforts cannot transform the political institutions of a country. Autonomous groups in civil society contribute to democratization in demanding accountability of the state and in providing models of democratic practice. But without reform in the political institutions themselves, democracy will not take hold. In the next section, we will look at efforts to build a new type of organization within the peasant movement and at the movement's struggles with the issue of partisanship in contemporary Mexican politics in an effort to understand better the difficulties involved in constructing civil movements capable of challenging and transforming a hegemonic state.

Pluralism and Political Power: The New Peasant Movement in Mexico

Independent peasant mobilization, as we saw earlier, dates back to the 1950s, but it attained its greatest strength in the wake if the mass movements and subsequent reforms of the mid-1970s. Recent administrations have attempted to eliminate the issue of land reform from the national agenda and to repress or coopt the new peasant organizations that coalesced in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, but to no avail. Indeed, their effort have arguably fueled the fire.18 Two elements of this mobilization interest us here: the internal organization of the movement, and the question of partisan affiliation. Both touch on the character and role of interest groups in the creation of an autonomous civil society.

The first national level coalition of independent peasant groups came together in 1979 at a convocation in the historic village of Milpa Alta. The National Network "Plan de Ayala," or CNPA (name for the land reform platform of peasant revolutionary Emiliano Zapata), is not a unitary organization but an umbrella for a wide array of local and regional groups, most of them dedicated

to resolving disputes with large landholders and state over land. CNPA has considerably organizational coherence and has been able to convoke not only huge demonstrations in Mexico City but also carry on monthly negotiations with a number of government agencies over issues affecting its member organizations. Nevertheless, the national body does not take significant action without the consensus of the member organizations. Its approach has been to avoid studiously the sort of "transmission belt" structure assumed by peasant organizations of the past, most of which ended by being coopted by the government to the detriment of peasant interest. Hence, the organizations which make up the network, even those connected with opposition political parties, have insisted on a strict regimen of consultation with the base in making organizational decisions.19

Similarly, the CECVYM discussed in Part II began in the early 1980s calling together other regional organizations, primarily ejidal union, to discuss the possibilities of forming a 'national level' organization. In 1984 the National Union of Regional, Autonomous Peasant Organizations, or UNORCA, was founded, and a few years later members of UNORCA from the Northwest (including the CECVYM) joined force with other independent peasant groups and, significantly, groups affiliated with the official CNC to form the Alliance of Campesinos of the Northwest. Both these organizations have focused their energies on "productivist" issues — support prices for their products, access to credit on reasonable terms, the availability of key agricultural inputs and so on. And both organizations have employed a dual strategy, starting with collective negotiation with government agencies and state and federal officials but turning to direct action (road blockade, sit-ins, etc) when negotiations fail. Like CNPA, these organizations have self-consciously opted for a "network" type structure, leaving the maximum autonomy to individual groups.20

Perhaps the most interesting of the major national level organizations is CIOAC, the Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Campesinos. Formed in the late 1950s by peasants affiliated with the Mexican Communist Party, CIOAC has undergone an evolution that reflects that of both the PCM and the peasant movement of which it is a part. Initially closely tied to the party, it is now widely regarded as independent, despite the active participation of militants of the Mexican Socialist Party into which the PCM merged in the course of the last decade. At first CIOAC focused its energies on land reform. In the mid-1970s, in the midst of fierce ideological struggles the organization turned its attention to creating a union for agricultural workers, who had been left out of the comprehensive organization of peasant and worker undertaken by the regime since Cardenas. As the land issue heated up again at the end of the decade, CIOAC again turned to peasant concerns and has become a strong presence in some of the most conflicted areas of the country, particularly the southern state of Chiapas; but it has also organized peasant farmers for productivist goals, including coffee farmers in the state of Veracruz. Besides diversifying its organizational base in this way, however, CIOAC has also been the most committed of all the national level organizations to fomenting joint action with groups of all kinds. It has joined demonstrations organized by CNPA. It participates with UNORCA in the Alliance of Campesinos of the Northwest. And it even takes part with the CNC and other "captive" organizations on the Government-sponsored National Agrarian Conference created in January 1989. Like the PCM from which it sprang, CIOAC has seen its role as one of promoting unity among the scattered forces of the opposition; but, more than the PCM (today, the PSM), CIOAC is willing to work with the government to achieve concrete goals for its constituents.

Despite these efforts, the peasant movement in Mexico remains divided. The last effort to forge unity, the Second National Encounter in August 1989 was boycotted by one of its planners when partisans of 1988 opposition leader and presidential candidate Cuahtémoc Cardenas

appeared to be dominating the process; and both CNPA and CIOAC leaders objected to the prominence of Cardenistas in the meetings, at which Cardenas himself gave the closing speech. As Ramon Danzós Palomino, founder of CIOAC, put it, "If we have combated the corporativism of the government, we are not going to turn around and promote a corporativism of the left."21 The fear of the "corporativization" of peasant organizations is long-standing and has led to considerable conflict within the movement. It stems from the experience of the CNC, which plays the dual role of representative of peasants within the official party and representative of the PRI to the peasants. As a wing of the PRI the CNC has special access to the government; but it also owes it its loyalty. Adherence to the government line has meant neglect of peasant interests, especially as the government moved to strengthen private agriculture after 1940. Some peasants have also had unpleasant experiences with parties of the left, which have often been perceived as moving in to claim a victory after independent peasant groups had done all the work.

As electoral reforms made party competition more viable after 1977, opposition parties began competing for peasant votes, in some cases creating new organizations around their own followings in the countryside, in others developing close ties with existing peasant organizations. Conflict over partisan ties developed within the heart of CNPA in 1984, and several organizations broke with CNPA in protest of the undo influence of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party. Later that year groups affiliated with the Trotskyites likewise left CNPA. The issue of partisanship became particularly acute in 1988, as it began to look possible that a united left could beat the candidate of the PRI in the presidential elections. Independent organizations argued over the advisability of endorsing a candidate, with some coming out in favor of the opposition's Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, others in favor the PRI's Salinas de Gortari, others advocating abstention, and still others maintaining strict neutrality. The issue continues to generate attempts at creating unity among the independent peasant organizations, as we have seen.

The different organizational paths taken by CNPA, UNORCA, and CIOAC, and the disputes concerning partisan affiliation, just sketched, illustrate important questions about the character of interest groups in a democratic movement. In part, the organizational structure assumed by CNPA and UNORCA is simply a reaction to the structure prevalent under the authoritarian corporatist regime of the last fifty years. Nevertheless, it reflects the importance of democratic practice to participants in the opposition. The struggle of most of these groups, it must be remembered, is not itself a struggle for democracy but for rather more limited economic goals. While some of the militants of these organizations, under the influence of ideologies of the left, see these battles as part of a larger struggle for the transformation of society, it is by no means necessary that their vision be democratic. Where, then does the insistence on democratic practice come from? From two sources, I would argue: first, from the necessity of gaining and maintaining the confidence of a membership long accustomed to manipulations, despite the rhetoric of democracy; second, from that rhetoric itself, from a long education in the principles of democracy without real experience of its practice. It is time, people seem to be saying, that we practiced what the regime has preached all these years.

CIOAC's practice, on the other hand, suggests the sort of willingness to accommodate, within the context of a struggle for the organization's interests, that is necessary to make democracy work. CIOAC, in other words, and to perhaps a lesser extent the other independent peasant organizations, is helping to forge a civil society and undermining the prevailing authoritarian structure at the same time simply by pursuing concrete goals in a spirit that combines militancy, accommodation, and a certain carefulness in regard to autonomy. CIOAC's role is not to promote political reform per se, nor to bring about a change in administration, but to represent independent demands within the

society and to press for them in such a way that CIOAC can continue to be a channel for such demands. The insistence on autonomy or independence that is so pervasive in the new civic organizations in Mexican life is itself a reform of the political system, though on the level of informal practice and not that of formal organization. A willingness to bargain, finally, is part and parcel of this stance, since it is only the other side of the coin of the insistence that independent organizations within society must have some ‘standing’ in the political system. Normal political reform and the active pursuit of a change of administration, however, are also necessary to the dismantling of an authoritarian regime. The disputes over partisanship in the Mexican peasant movement suggest the tensions that might develop between the role of such organizations as members of civil society and their role as participants in a movement for the democratization of the political system. In fact, the concern to avoid a "corporativism of the left" suggests a certain tension in the movement for democratization itself as elements of civil society — interest groups such as the peasant organizations we have been considering — are charged primarily with formulating and then posing demands upon the state and negotiating resolution of those demands. Whether their internal structure is democratic or not, such groups "democratize" the political system simply by counter-posing their own power to that of the state and of other organized interests. They contribute, in other words, to the vaunted "pluralism" of liberal democracy. The presence of such groups, of course, is not enough to ensure the triumph of democracy. On the contrary, like capitalist firms within the context of economic liberalism, they may be happy to grab for monopoly power within their sphere or to cooperate with an authoritarian state in order to protect the interests they represent. Nevertheless, it appears that the liberal democratic state presupposes such groups as competing powers. Likewise, the emergence of such groups may effectively challenge the monopoly power of the state and its coopted organizations and thus move an authoritarian regime toward Pluralism.

Autonomous social groups, however, have also been important participants in agitation for democratic reform, not only in Mexico and the Southern Cone of Latin America, but to some extent in the recent events in Eastern Europe. Certainly that is the role which Solidarity played in Poland. The relationship between such groups in civil society and in the political parties is, however, problematic.22 Civil associations which are simply branches of one or another political party, while they may play an important role in the process of democratization, nevertheless run the risk of surrendering the autonomy of civil society to the interests of party leaders and, in the extreme case, to those of the state when it is in the hands of "their" party. Civic associations that confine themselves to the pursuit of their own interest, on the other hand, may either fail the democratic movement altogether or allow it to be "bought off," piece by piece, by a government that still retains the power to satisfy isolated interests.23 In this respect, the debates within the Mexican peasant movement may have outlived their usefulness. That, at least, is the assessment of one group of sympathetic observers. For the peasant organization, the problem consists in how to guarantee that the processes created in the last 20 years, which have permitted them to convert themselves into a real option, will be able to transcend the local limits in which they have developed up to this moment, and thereby make them present in the national struggle for power. Insofar as the national independent peasant organizations have had many problems opening up their own ‘spaces" and, above all, maintaining them, links with the political parties (principally those of the Left) could permit them to transcend the arenas within which they have been confined up to the present time.24

How they might do this without compromising their autonomy or alienating their constituencies remains unclear, however. Such tensions, nevertheless, appear to be inherent in the problematic of democratization.

Conclusion: 'Learning to Value' Is More Important Than 'Having Values'

Our survey of recent mobilization in Mexico, though superficial, has touched on the difficulties of democratization on several levels: in the process of organizing at the grass roots, in the organizational structures of both local and national level organs of independent peasant action, and in the strategies of groups within civil society in confronting an authoritarian state. We have already drawn out some of the implications of these experiences. In conclusion, I intend to focus principally on the importance of democratic practice, and the important but subsidiary role of democratic ideology, in democratizing social life.

At the beginning of this essay, we noted some of the empirical difficulties encountered by "culturalist" explanations of recent Latin American history. At this point we are in a position to amplify those observations and add some theoretical grounds for setting aside the culturalists' case.

In El Lago, we found a population which had become accustomed, despite the democratic rhetoric of the state, to thinking of itself as powerless and "without words" and of politics as the 'realm of the fast talker', suddenly encouraged to adopt words to express its grievances and to join with its neighbors in trying to do something about those grievances. The villages of Mexico are unpromising arenas for civic action because attitudes molded by experience have assumed the character of folk wisdom. People will not protest because protest would "prejudice" their position with respect to their neighbors and local politicians. People will not enter politics because they "do not know how to speak" and because to do so would implicate them in the "factionalism" that appears to them the fundamental evil of political life. Leadership appears permanently wedded to corruption and personal life inescapably caught up in the alcoholism and violence of the peasant culture.25

Though the experiences on which such attitudes and practices of evasion and survival are based cannot be erased, these effects are not immutable. Organizers, at times from the outside, at times arising within the community itself, employing persuasion and personal example, have been able to create groups of civic-minded peasant men and women increasingly confident of their ability to speak their minds and increasingly concerned to find a way to address community problems. Both the practice and the discourse of these groups are broadly democratic, and peasants draw on a common fund of ideas about equity and community service in defending that practice and condemning both authoritarianism and corruption in village and national life. Elements of prevailing wisdom thus come into service in a practice that just a few years ago appeared impossible. Organizers have made this transformation possible through practice and through the careful reinforcement of key elements of the democratic critique of existing conditions, a critique which peasants already possessed.

This is less the triumph of a "counter-hegemonic" ideology than the appropriation by peasants of the democratic rhetoric of the Mexican state for their own ends in practical endeavors to realize democracy against the state and the political system. The "culture of silence" in which they were immersed simply gave way, though certainly not completely or all at once, before the opportunity to participate meaningfully and the encouragement to do so.

This should surprise us only if we cling to the notion, explicit in structuralist analyses of culture and still implicit in "post-structuralist" approaches, that "culture" is a closed system of

signs, reproducing itself by the self-referential character of language itself. Language in use, however, or discourse, and culture as practice (including the practice of discourse), is fundamentally open because fundamentally referential and "polysemic."26 It attempts to make sense of the world outside itself, even as it "constructs" that world, and it does so using terms and gestures whose meaning is constantly open to interpretation and re-negotiation. In particular terms, reinterpretation and renegotiation are often discouraged, whether the setting is that of the family, the neighborhood or workplace, the community, or the national political arena. Pluralist theorists, from Montesquieu to Robert Dahl, see the multiplication and institutionalization of interests as essential to guaranteeing that interpretation and negotiation play their proper role in keeping the polity at once open and responsive. In this respect, the democratic theory of the liberal tradition is rather far from that which is implicit in the rhetoric and practice of the peasants of El Lago, who value a consensual and participatory democracy, in which factionalism is discouraged and each participant has an equal voice. Here, too, however, the renegotiation of traditional attitudes and practices is encouraged, and not just in the challenge organizers and participants opposed to the tradition. It is embodied in the ideology and practice of the movement, which inculcate the value of speaking one's mind and seeking "the truth," even if it be politically and personally disruptive.

We need to attend to both sides of the paradox, however. Democratic practice — in this context, the practice of deciding for oneself and standing up for what one believes — must be taught; it requires a certain indoctrination. On the other hand, that indoctrination only proves itself in the practice of democracy. Without such practice — and without some satisfaction in that practice — people may continue to "believe in" democracy; we might even say that they have "democratic value." But they will not come to *value democracy*, and democracy will not flourish. Indoctrination, nevertheless, appears essential, even if it means no more than giving people the means and the encouragement to practice what they already believe. The argument can be made in terms of an older moral philosophy. Classical and medieval moral theory bridled at the notion that moral action was a product of something one "possessed" in the sense in which many today speak of "having values." Certainly, knowledge and belief were part of moral action, and it was particularly important to have knowledge or right and wrong, of what may and may not be commonly acceptable. But insofar as moral action could be assured, it may only be through a certain disposition, "virtue," which may be realized, as it may be learned, primarily through practice. In the terms of the present argument, "coming to value" is more important than "having value."

For some the triumph of democracy is a spontaneous product of popular mobilization. Sara Evans and Harry Boyte, in a study of grassroots movements in the United States, maintain that the very experience of organizing to defend their rights or advance their common interests makes democrats of ordinary people.27 This appears doubtful to me, however close the connection between the experience of empowerment — of becoming subjects — and the practice of democracy. Who organizes whom under what banner has always made a telling difference in the character of popular movements. While democracy at the grassroots is a common feature of such movements, this does not always translate into democracy within the organization as a whole nor in its ultimate commitments. Democracy is learned in practice backed by doctrine — and it may be learned in the face of a prevailing culture which scarcely encouraged it. Moreover, it must be institutionalized to flourish. For that to happen, people must come to value it at the institutional level as well as at the level of local experience; but this takes us to our next consideration.

Even the most prominent figures in the Mexican opposition movements of the 1950s, such as the famous labor leader Vincente Lombardo Toledano or the founder of one of the first

independent peasant organizations, Jacinto Lopez, regarded the state as the "mediator" between the interests of the exploited and those of the bourgeoisie; and they were confident that the strengthening of the Mexican state, with its origins in the Revolution, would ultimately mean the strengthening of the popular movements with which they were affiliated.28 This attitude, which contributed to the "statism" and "corporatism" of the Mexican system, had to be broken before a democratic movement could gain force in Mexico. For the peasants who eventually made up the membership of the Coalition of Collective Ejidos of the Mayo and Yaqui Valey, the break with corporatist and statist models may be accomplished by the breakdown of another set of attitudes commonly said to characterize Mexico's political culture: personalism and clientelism. Most of these peasants were longtime members of one or another peasant organization upon which they depended for leadership and for access to the state. They were attached, as well, to the leadership of these groups, who had recruited them and in many cases personally nurtured them as militant within the organization's rank. The break came at the vary moment when traditional loyalties both to the state and to the peasant organizations should have been reinforced: with the distribution of the land. At this point, however, peasant militants from a variety of organizations were interspersed in the new *ejidos,* weakening the old ties. Finding themselves cheated by the rural development bank, moreover, they also discovered that they had been betrayed by their organizations. In rejecting the exploitative patrimonialism of the state, they also found themselves rejecting the leadership of the past; and they were forced to forge new institutions along lines which would not repeat the mistakes of the past. They were forced, in other words, to become democrats in practice as well as in rhetoric. This experience has been repeated throughout Mexico as the state increased its reach into peasant life without increasing the benefits peasants could enjoy by accepting state tutelage and as the traditional organizations proved themselves increasingly incapable of challenging the state or wresting meaningful concessions from it. Again and again, peasant militants learned in practice the value of democratic forms of organization in the course of a struggle both over concrete issues of rural life and for democracy against the party state.

The hope that the struggle is being resolved in favor of democracy rests largely on the persistent demand for autonomy on the part of emerging popular interest groups. The statist and corporatist tendencies of the Mexican system, however, are built into its law and the conduct of public administration. Independent peasant organizations, labor unions, and neighborhood associations either have to be able to show the fruits of their stance — and thus stave off pressures to affiliate once again to the party-state in a clientelist bid for attention — or join in the political struggle for power over the state. The latter strategy, however, requires that such groups recognize the mediatory and convocatory role of parties, a recognition that has been blocked in many instances by fear of a loss of autonomy, this time to the parties of the opposition. This nonetheless seems to be a necessary tension. Democratic practice at this level requires not just the autonomy of individuals but of "civil society," that is, of the groups which represent the concrete interest and concerns of those individuals; it also requires democratic political parties capable of mediating those interests and pressing them upon the state. The Mexican peasant movement is forging democracy in facing the tensions between the two.

Mexico has a long and proud tradition of democratic thought. Democracy is built into her institutions in periodic elections, the recognition of parties, the strict separation of church and state, and a variety of constitutional and institutional provisions for the pursuit of economic justice. In practice, nevertheless, Mexico has long been recognized as an authoritarian system and one in which, moreover, corporatism, clientelism, the patrimonial organization of administration, and widespread corruption twist the democratic institutions and capture incipient oppositions in the

service of a permanent party-state machine. Culturalist theories attribute such distortions to a long-standing tradition embodied in both the ideology and attitudes with which Mexicans and other Latin Americans approach political issues. However long-standing such traditions, we have seen that they do not go unchallenged, either in popular attitudes or in the practices of groups and organizations which act under the burdens of the authoritarian system. Their challenges are rooted both in the democratic ideals which the system itself professes and in their own practice, learned in the process of organizing or in confrontation with the institutions corrupted by corporatist practice.

The studies sketched here, finally, make clear that "culture" is scarcely immutable. To return to our earlier discussion, these studies suggest that culture is less a closed system of symbols capable of practices, with ideological trappings, constantly subject to reinterpretation and thus to multiple challenges by alternative practices and claims. Forging democracy in unpromising terrain, in this view, is a matter of *practice*. Nothing more, but nothing less.

Notes

1. Wiarda has written a great deal on these themes. See in particular, *Politics and Social Change: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974; 2nd ed., 1982); *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); and "Can Democracy Be exported? The Quest for Democracy in U.S.-Latin American Policy," in *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis*, ed. by Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press). See also Guillermo O'Donnell's response to the last articles "The United States, Latin America, Democracy: Variations on a Very Old Theme," in the same volume.

2. David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961). For a more recent, popularized version of this argument, see Michael Novak, "Why Latin America Is Poor," *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 1982).

3. See the observations of Guillermo O'Donnell in "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. by David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

4. For a thoroughgoing critique of prevailing notions of political culture, from a point of view markedly different from my own, see Steven Chilton, *Defining Political Development* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987).

5. Much of the narrative that follows is drawn from my article, "Organizing, Ideology, and Moral Suasion: Political Discourse and Action in a Mexican Town," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32:3 (July 1990).

6. The so-called "base Christian community" movement (from the Spanish *comunidades cristianas de base*) grew out of attempts to create social action "cells" in the barrios and villages of Latin America in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Originally under the auspices of the Catholic Church and vehemently anti-Communist in orientation, the movement's technique and focus on organizing the poor for community action soon spread to Protestant denominations as well; and in Chile, Colombia, Central America, and elsewhere, BCC leaders drew closer and closer to parties of the Left and occasionally to revolutionary movements. Today the movement is widely known as a Leftist-Populist challenge both to national authorities throughout Latin America and in many cases to local church hierarchies as well. For an informal introduction to the movement, see Penny Lernoux, *Cry of the People* (New York: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 389-408. David E. Mutchler, *The*

Church as a Political Factor in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1971), provides an "inside look" at the origins of the movement in Chile and Colombia. And Brian H. Smiths *The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982) is an important study of the shifting strategies of the Catholic Church in Latin America.

7. See Paolo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1983) and *Call to Moral Action for Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

8.When Eduardo left Cristi and settled in Cuernavaca with another woman, the Laguenos were scandalized, but that did not erase for them the force of his example in the organizing effort. On the importance of the organizers's moral integrity to the calculations of the "rational peasant," see Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

9. FAT (Cuemavaca: January 31, 1984).

10. An example that is particularly relevant is developed in a recent comparison of the political implications of the base Christian community movement in Brazil (where it has been closely associated with the movement for democratization) and Colombia (where communities have been tightly controlled by a conservative Catholic hierarchy). See Levine and Mainwarin, "Religion and Popular Protest in Latin America." On the general problem, see Jonathan Fox and Luis Hernández, "Offsetting the Iron Law of Oligarchy: The Ebb and Flow of Leadership Accountability in a Regional Peasant Organization," *Grassroots Development* 13:2 (1989).

11. On the anti-authoritarian movements of the last ten years and the question of the role of civil society in the collapse of authoritarian regimes, see particular, Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Manuel Antonio Garreton, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military Regime and Problems of the Transition to Democracy" in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America*, ed. by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Manuel Antonio Garreton, "Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile 1973-1980," in Mil*itary rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions*, ed. by J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Eckstein, *Power and Popular Protest*.

12. For a good survey of the Mexican political system, see Judith Adler Hellman, *Mexico in Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983). On the recent emergence of autonomous groups within the system, see especially the account by one of Mexico's leading journalists, Carlos Monsiváis, *Entrada Libre: Crónica de la sociedad que se organiza* (Mexico City: Edictiones Era, 1987); also Joseph Foweraker, "Popular Movements and the Transformation of the Mexican Political System." Paper prepared for delivery at a workshop on Mexico's Alternative Political Futures (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1988).

13. Clarisa Hardy, *El estado y los campesinos: La Confederación Nacional Campesina* (CNC) (Mexico City: Nueva Imagen, 1984).

14. On this period, see Steven E. Sanderson, *Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State: The Struggle for Land in Sonora* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). On the structural cause for the development of peasant protest in Mexico since 1970, see especially Blanca Rubio, *Resistencia campesina y explotación rural en México* (Mexico City: ERA, 1987).

15. Gustav Gordillo, *Campesino al asalto del cielo: De expropiación estatal a la apropiación campesina* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1988).

16. The term was first used by Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom to describe those aspects of "democratic" systems that involve political pluralism and the accountability of authorities through fair and equal access to the vote among citizens. See especially Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 133.

17. For a fuller account and a development of the argument that the state's abandonment of the rhetoric of land reform has contributed to the formation of an independent peasant movement, see Michael W. Foley. "Agenda for Mobilization: The Agrarian Question and Popular Mobilization in Contemporary Mexico," *Latin American Research Review* (forthcoming).

18. See Graciela Flores Lúa, Luisa Paré, and Sergio Sarmiento, *Las Voces del campo: Movimiento Campesino y politica 1976-1983* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1988), pp. 66-89.

19. On the beginnings of UNORCA, see Gordillo, *Campesinos al asalto del cielo*, pp. 270-275.

20. *La Jornada*, August 8, 1989.

21. See the special edition of *Pueblo* no. 135 (May 1988).

22. On this issue, see Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 1.

23. On the difficulties of achieving genuine reforms via the mobilization of interest groups and social movements, see Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "Interclass Alliances in the Opposition to the Military in Brazil: Consequences for the Transition Period," and Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of the Invisible transition," both in *Power and Popular Protest*.

24. Fores Lúa, Paré, and Sarmiento, *Las voces del campo*, p. 235.

25. For a more elaborate portrait and analysis of the everyday conflicts and their ideological rationalizations in Mexican villages, see James B. Greenberg, *Blood Ties: Life and Violence in Rural Mexico* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989).

26. The distinction and the terms are those of Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976).

27. Sara M. Evans and Harry C. Boyle, *Free Spaces: Democratic Change of America* (New York: Harper & Rowe, 1986).

28. Gordillo, *Campesinos al asalto del cielo*, pp. 17-18.

Chapter XI

The Polish-American Experience in Multi-Ethnic America: Exercises in Measuring and Searching for Meaning

John A Kromkowski

Introduction

Philosophical reflections on the social, psychological and ecological dimensions of "humanization" and the multi-disciplinary analysis of economic and political conditions which foster "humanization" have emerged steadily. But periods of crisis seem to accelerate the search and the application of energy and insight into this agenda of re-theorization and recommendations for action. Generally these studies and recommendations are more than exhortations to be human; they employ scholarly discipline and most approaches marshal evidence and arguments. However insightful such findings and courses of action may be, forecasting and plotting scenarios as well as implementing even the most simple personal remedies and social therapies are uncertain, difficult and oftentimes inhuman.

The desire to forecast and to shape the future is amongst the foremost experiences of the modern age. The modern age, more than most epochs of significant changes, has been fascinated by socially effective and intellectually supported models of human fulfillment — the autonomous individual and the enthusiastic collectivity. These paradigms and their advocates both view the life support patterns of traditional communities with disdain and irrelevance to the modern task of improving human well-being. Thus mainstream recommendations for the future of traditional communities — especially ethnic enclaves and ethnicity as a social form of existence — are rare and the topic is generally ignored and neglected. In fact for both paradigms a humanity without ethnicity would be a certain sign of the improvement of social life and the "humanization" of social relations. Scant evidence can be found for a view that would argue ethnic communities are social entities at risk. The utter marginality of ethnicity to the thrust of the American political and economic dynamic is overwhelming. Yet contrary to conventional wisdom traditional communities and ethnicity should be explored and may be importantly related to the problematic of "humanization."

Though many sources of this intellectual and pragmatic condition may be suggested, perhaps some degree of causality for this eclipse of meaning and practice lies in the philosophy of social reality and the failure critically to clarify the difference and distinctions between the social-existential relationships among human beings — communities and the expression of a shared experience of unity and universality commonly carried by the word "humanity" and the intention of the modern process called "humanization." A similar case can be made for the notion of individuation as a goal of personal development that denies the need for other elements of maturation. A facile conception of freedom and responsibility must ignore the evidence of social and personal pathology associated with loneliness and anomie. Nonetheless a case can be made for the achievements of modern development for persons and groups.

For example, the following analyses of American ethnic population uses the Census of the United States as a set of indicators that point to the achievement and distribution of valued objects generated by the economic processes and the policies of the American government. These processes and relationships are commonly called democracy — a popular symbol of human

freedom. Ever increasing numbers of people seem to be seeking human fulfillment through and in this type of human activity. Thus the comparative assessment of valued objects and their distribution are expressible in measures of existential conditions and the relative benchmarks for achievement are potential indicators of human development. The following exercises in seeking and arraying measures of the American reality and attendant reflection on measures of social realities [indicative of explorations in the emergence of ethnicity in periods of crisis] are proposed as illustrative of the problematic of "humanizing" social life. These findings expose the theoretical and practical limits of dominant paradigms and their approaches to improving social life.

One of the many macro-measures of "humanization" proposed and implemented by modern developments involves the critique of rurality and the complex of social symbolization called ethnicity. The scenario of "humanization" driven by this critique prescribes the transcendence of "primitive" forces of social life i.e., rural and ethnicity, and the development into a realm of "advanced" forms of social life, i.e., urbanity and universalism. This passage in the American reality from rural to urban and from ethnic to universal may be examined in the measures of transition from peasant to citizen and from immigrant to "becoming American" manifested in a contemporary mode of intermediate social form called urban ethnicity. Urban ethnicity is a sort of phase-shift mode of existence — in between more static conditions. Perhaps the following analogy suggests my point: H20 as rain, vapor and ice are static expression of the reality called water; H2O as sleet, snow, mist and stifling humidity are experiences of the same reality — as inbetweenesses of a phase-shift mode of existence. The following case analysis of social form and indicators as well as other phenomena in point of the discussion of "humanization" was derived from reflecting on and re-visiting my interpretation of Polish-Americans and other ancestry populations that emerged from the data collected by the US Census. In some way the findings of the US Census provide us with some answers, but in more curious and interesting ways they intimate a new register and horizon for songs and visions which are related not distantly to the ongoing process of being yet becoming human. These emerge during periods of significant change that provoke and reflect a crisis; this in turn leads to new ways of viewing and measuring the elements and articulation which constitute social realities.

Census Policy on Ethnic Populations

The 1980 Decennial Census of the United States of America established new benchmarks for the measurement of the American population when it introduced an ancestry question that generated comparative data on ethnic populations in the United States. The collection of such information signaled the acknowledgement of the ethnic factor in American public policy. The ancestry question enabled the disaggregation of data for populations which seem to be betwixt the categories "foreign-born," "native stock," and "native born of foreign parentage." The 1980 Census fostered the feasibility of examining the American reality from the vantage point of comparative ancestry measurement of the multi-ethnic character of American society. The 1980 Census certified many previously uncertain and unknown dimensions of American ethnic populations, especially the economic, social and general demographic indicators. Most of the following documentation of the various populations that constitute the American reality was derived from Item 14 of the 1980 Census which posed the question and included the following guide to respondents:

14. What is this person's ancestry? If uncertain about how to report ancestry, see instruction guide. (For example: Afro-American, English, French, German, Honduran, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Jamaican, Korean, Lebanese, Mexican, Nigerian, Polish, Ukrainian, Venezuelan, etc.)

The instruction guide text provided the following explanation and examples:

Print the ancestry group with which the person identifies. Ancestry (or origin or descent) may be viewed as the nationality group, the lineage, or the country in which the person or the person's parents or ancestors were born before their arrival in the United States. Persons who are of more than one origin and who cannot identify with a single group should print their multiple ancestry (for example, German-Irish).

Be specific: for example, if ancestry is "Indian" specify whether American Indian, Asian Indian, or West Indian. Distinguish Cape Verdean from Portuguese, and French Canadian from Canadian.

A religious group should not be reported as a person's ancestry.1

The purpose and intent of the question based on respondent self-identification which allowed multiple responses replaced earlier Census questions and methodologies.

The inclusion of the ancestry question addresses the need for basic research on comparative ethnic data which may throw new light on a broad range of questions related to ethnicity, social science, and public policy. The need for comparative data grew out of interest in assessing the impact of public policy on the processes of social development related to ethnicity in American society. Yet the existence of such data only underscores the imperative to search for bridges between the humanistic and sociological traditions. These sciences as well as policy studies which have attempted to interpret, explain, and analyze American ethnicity seem to fall short. Questions related to ethnicity involve various methodologies because an ethnic population has an ancestral tradition that includes a historical and ethnic legacy and cultural-literary-artistic-religious canon, but an ethnic population if it is to remain vital and attuned to its foundational sources and constitutive substance must also examine itself within and among its specific historicality, i.e., the social economic and general demographic realities that constitute its being within a particular place and time. From this theoretical perspective, the vitality and contemporaneity of an ethnic tradition and culture include the capacity to rethink its tradition and renegotiated relationships that renew and rearticulate social answers to questions of personal identity and shared participation in ethnic foundations. Such intellectual and persuasive work requires creative forms of thought, experience and action that invoke a population to become a people constituted in specific existence in a social reality.

If Polish-American ethnicity is to remain vital, Polish-American persons must examine their origin, rethink their traditions, and renegotiate relationships within the place and time of the social relations that constitute their personal and social existence. American ethnicity may be a source of social answers to questions of personal identity as well as a factor in the political processes that influence social formation and contribute to the thought and praxis which constitutes the American reality.

The findings are clear: The Polish-American population has entered a singularly crucial era of measurable demographic change. This most certainly signals a pivotal period in its history; one of the central features of the decades to come for the Polish-American community will derive from

the recognition that the immigrant grounding of its existence is nearly exhausted and that its foundation in a modern, pluralistic society is a fragile historical and social phenomenon. To deepen this impending debate about strategies for survival requires an examination of this population and its communities from various angles of vision. Only now has the relatively short history of the ethnic experience of immigrant communities in America begun seriously to be charted; yet most contemporaneous information about these populations still remains focused upon limited reportage and anecdotal material. Unlike the analysis of other social phenomena, where nearly comprehensive data exist, current social indicators for ethnic communities are rudimentary. At best, social forecasts about very carefully observed and measured phenomena include extensive disclaimers and wide margins of error; even so, such scenarios and prescriptions often produce only disagreement and skepticism. The reader, therefore, should be forewarned that this forecast is grounded in hopefulness and realism — a grounding determined by the evidence, most of which has not been previously accessible or available.

In themselves, these data suggest plausible, realistic possibilities. The hopefulness of the forecast, moreover, emerges also from the methodological expectation that the recent data hold. For this new data once factored into the discussions of the Polish-American reality should reveal the intersection of the dynamics of community change and the dynamics of self-conscious image and institutional action. Only at such a convergence, can strategies for survival for a pluralistic ethnic population in a pluralistic society become compelling and convincing. This search for basic measurement of the Polish-American population, moreover, also calibrates the social and economic accomplishments of other ancestry groups. Such indicators and the patterns they produce relate how ancestry populations negotiated with and participated in the American reality. In a certain fashion, the following compendium of indicators establish and define the social, economic reality of a group and/or category. These measures of communities and/or categories, therefore, must also be delineated before plausible scenarios and realistic strategies can be proposed.

Census Data on Polish-Americans

Early expectation and nativist scenarios for the future assumed that ethnic communities in America would disintegrate. Such goals were often cheered; currently they are often ignored as tolerance of diversity and ethnic pluralism has become embedded in American life. The legitimation of ethnicity was fostered, in part, by the 1980 U.S. Census which included a new question, "What is this person’s ancestry?" This question used self-identification as the means for identifying a person’s ethnicity. This question replaced the question on parental nation of origin and the category, "native of foreign parentage," the demographic terminology for populations midway between other demographic/cultural categories, i.e., "foreign-born," and "native stock." In the 1980 Census, moreover, respondents of the Long-Form were provided space to write in their ancestry. Multiple ancestry responses also were accepted, for example, Polish-Italian, German-Scot-Irish, etc. Regrettably, funding for the complete cross-tabulation and publication of data on ancestry was deleted from both the Executive Budget and Congressional appropriation for the U.S. Census. Ancestry populations in America, particularly Eastern and Southern European immigrants and ethnic populations, have not been systematically profiled. This lapse is particularly evident for Polish-Americans, one of the largest ancestry communities and categories. Some data, however, has been tabulated and the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA) has developed and assembled a basic data profile and a rudimentary set of comparable measurements for selected ancestry groups. Within these data-sets a timely visage of the Polish ancestry populations can be

discerned. Such indicators, moreover, provide a fresh set of measurements which has implications for Polish-American institutions and the Polish-American reality. In addition, these data as well as other ethnic specific information reveal dimensions of American social history, contemporary characteristics of the social economy and the ethnic factors within this reality.

When the 1980 U.S. Census introduced the self-identification principle for the measurement of ancestry, it not only expanded the definition of ancestry beyond parental nation of origin; it also increased the number of ethnic Americans. This new principle of enumeration quantified the frequently noted and estimated difference between an "immigrant population" measured in 1970 and the foreign-born, "immigrant, ethnic and multi-ethnic" population of the 1980 Census. For example, Table 1 reveals a four-fold increase in the counted population of Polish-Americans from 1970-80. For some this confirmed the revered maximum, "if you're not counted you don't count." But the 1980 Census also fashioned a fuller ethnic matrix of the American population within which Polish-Americans exist. In this regard, it exposed the limits of earlier classifications especially white and black designation. This matrix suggests a set of interesting comparisons. Data constraints and funding, however, limit this analysis of segments of the matrix to Poles, Italians, English, German, Irish, Black, White, Hispanic and Asian populations and Eastern and Southern European foreign-born populations. Prior to exploring such group and category differentiations, however, the basic composition of the Polish-American population derived from the ancestry questions must be arrayed so that its elementary features can be discerned.

Tables 2 and 3 provide a closer look at the demographics of immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe. The 8 million Polish-American persons include only 418,128 foreign-born Polish-Americans, or only 4.9 percent foreign-born of the total Polish-American population. Moreover, the percentage of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe has steadily diminished. Only the USSR and Czechoslovakia have smaller percentages of foreign-born populations within the United States. The era of large-scale Polish immigrant populations graphically has run its course. Also, Tables 4 and 5 provide State, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), and period of arrival counts for the immigrant segment of the Polish-American population.2 These tables illustrate the real numbers and percentages of decline of the Eastern and Southern European immigrants in the United States. Table 5 pointedly reveals that 234,200 of these foreign-born persons are pre-1950 immigrants; less than 50 percent of the total foreign-born Polish population has arrived in the last forty years. Nevertheless, these Polish immigrants comprised 33 percent of the immigration from Eastern Europe in both 1960 and 1980, in 1960 Polish immigrants accounted for only 5.7 percent of the total U.S. immigration, and by 1980 their percentage had diminished further and only 2.9 percent of the immigrants gave Poland as their nation of origin. Quantitatively, the Polish immigrant and the Polish immigrant experience is diminishing in the United States.

Ironically, since the Immigration Reform of 1965 which many Polish-Americans perceived as a redress of the immigration exclusions of the 1920s, only 72,213 foreign-born Poles settled in the United States. Moreover, between 1960 and 1964, 34,227 entered, eight thousand more than during any five-year span of the post-immigration reform period. Such data illustrate the gap between an image of Polish-Americans as an old-world community and the reality of this population's American origin and orientation. Published analysis of the Polish-American community frequently focused on such immigration issues as its social, psychological, and occupational transition and assimilation. To be sure, the immigrant influence on institutions, culture and tradition were foundational and historically essential, and no doubt this is qualitatively still relevant to the population in many aspects. However, the magnitude of the American born

Polish-American population and the lack of assessment of its achievement and its social/economic profile imposes important questions for the contemporary and future definition of the Polish-American reality.

Table 6 sharpens the details of differences among three discernable segments of the Polish ancestry population. A clearer micro-view of each state and four regions also takes shape from the composite of indicators arrayed in Table 6: The population of each state, its percentage of foreign-born, the number of Polish-Americans, their percentage of the state population, the number and percentage of single ancestry, multiple ancestry Polish-Americans and foreign-born Polish-Americans. Though these data suggest many truths and hypotheses on the important elemental level, they also document high percentages of native-born Polish-Americans and multiple ancestry Polish-American persons for each region of the nation. The largest population of those that indicated Polish and at least one other ethnic origin, for example Polish-Irish, Polish-Italian, Polish-English, are found in the Northeast and North-Central states. Single ancestry persons are less concentrated in the South and West. If one assumes that the foreign-born population is generally single ancestry, then, 54 percent of the 8 million Polish-American population is composed of persons of multiple ethnic ancestry; 4.9 percent is foreign-born, and 46 percent is single ancestry. Fifteen states have large Polish-American populations though the percentage of the total population varies a great deal. Disaggregation of the population by state and region is perhaps politically relevant; and that 6.2 percent of the American population is of Polish ancestry has significant Presidential Electoral meaning.

Table 7 provides an angle of vision focused on the magnitude of Polish-American residents in the macro-urban economic centers of America that cross state boundaries to function as the hubs of financial and corporate power. Table 7 also contextualizes the three segments of the PolishAmerican population: foreign-born, single ancestry, multiple ancestry, to areas that include large foreign-born populations within large urban/suburban markets. Table 7's Consolidated Statistical Areas (CSA) and a few other significantly large SMAS's (Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Baltimore) contain 57 percent of the Polish-American population. Furthermore, these massive urban networks contain about one-third of the US population. Certainly, as Table 7 illustrates, Polish-Americans are a metropolitan population.

Table 7 provides an urban lens through which a pluralistic Polish-American population can be observed. These data relate the magnitude of Polish-American residents to the strongest cultural and economic conurbations of America. Such metropolitan regions function as the hubs of finance, services, information and communication. They are foci of the educational, corporate and cultural capacity of the United States. Table 7 arrays the Polish-American population into three segments — foreign-born, single ancestry and multiple ancestry. Interestingly with the exception of Baltimore and Indianapolis, the Polish-Americans are settled among large foreign-born populations within the largest urban/suburban communication markets and concentrations of economic capacity.

Another view of settlement avoids the problem of large-scale analysis of economic and political forces which can be misleading. The disaggregation of information into smaller components of metropolitan areas is exceedingly helpful. Table 8 overcomes the fallacies attendant upon large-scale analysis and points out neighborhood variations and illustrates important variations that are measurable with small-scale clusters of data. Such fine grain analysis of neighborhood data for metropolitan populations are significant as complements to urban indicators at the macro-data level. Additional urban housing information were not available because the U.S. Census did not publish a full tabulation of the 1980 ancestry data micro-measurements of Polish-

Americans. The data set used for Table 8 was derived from an NCUEA monograph, "Who's Left in the Neighborhood,"3 which used a sample of 86 urban neighborhoods of the Northeast and Midwest in 17 older industrial cities that included Polish neighborhoods in Buffalo, Toledo, Milwaukee, Baltimore, Wilmington and Detroit. 1960 and 1970 data were compared to the 1980 Census data.

But because the U.S. Census did not publish a full tabulation of its ancestry data, micro-measurements of the metropolises, especially urban settlements, of Polish-Americans at the neighborhood level are not readily accessible. Nonetheless, Paul Kochanowski, NCUEA research associate, found in his work on updating "Who's Left in The Neighborhood" that, in the sample of 86 neighborhoods in 17 older industrial cities, the predominantly Polish neighborhoods still were predominantly Polish in 1980. Admittedly, the NCUEA sample included only working-class neighborhoods, frequently those in the path of transition that required and often developed successful approaches and strategies for urban revitalization. Nonetheless, because no other comprehensive list of Polish settlements exists, this analysis of Polish neighborhoods will set the standard of validity. The completeness, though, of this neighborhood analysis must be left open. However, if one brackets whether such neighborhoods are at the margin or in the mainstream of urban neighborhood life, this sample, nonetheless, reflects an essential feature of contemporary ethnic urban enclaves. Such Polish enclaves are neighborhoods that are stable but remain vulnerable. Like most urban areas they have not escaped economic distress, housing deterioration and social poverty.

Building on the Baroni-Green study, Kochanowski selected a set of indicators that enabled him to establish rates of poverty for the 86 neighborhoods in the sample. Table 8 arrays the neighborhoods by ethnicity and the change in poverty rate between 1970 and 1980. The poverty rate is comprised of the following predictive indicators: percent of workers in service, blue-collar, managerial, sales, government, retail, wholesale and finance occupations, mean income, percentage with college and elementary education, unemployment rates, age, divorce rates, household and family type.4

The various weight of influence such factors have in the SMSA, the entire city and the neighborhood were measured and the well-being of households and urban economies was assessed. The evidence in Table 8 speaks for itself: 8 of 10 Polish neighborhoods had lower rates of poverty in 1980 than in 1970. Polish urban neighborhoods also appear to have survived the urban crisis, though the onslaught of the early 1980's recession and the full impact of de-industrialization are not reflected in these indicators.

Kochanowski found that statistical links to poverty associated with female-headed households are not confined to Black and Hispanic neighborhoods. His comparisons of poverty rates indicate that Italian neighborhoods in this sample have poverty rates 9.8 percentage points higher than Polish neighborhoods. The rates of female-headed households varied from 39.3 percent for Italian neighborhoods to 27.7 percent for Polish neighborhoods. Testing for the weight of this factor, he found that 52 percent of the differential between poverty rates in Polish and Italian neighborhoods could be explained by the head of household.5 Further inquiry into the effects of social cohesions, education, age, and economy in Black, Hispanic, Polish and Italian urban neighborhoods and the extent and depth of a wholesome Polish-American presence in urban America would contribute much to our understanding of the American social economy.

Curiously a cultural ideal or positive prototype of Polish-Americans appears to be the converse of Kochanowski's predictive indicators of high poverty rates. For example, being married, having older full-time workers in the household that are not employed in service jobs,

that have high educational achievement, as well as high rates of home ownership are nearly always related to being above the poverty level. These indicators reflect the social, economic aspirations that closely parallel Polish-American cultural goals that were adopted and preached as the mobility strategies of Polish immigrants. A closer look at the 1980 U.S. Census data will test the efficacy of those ideals and the correspondence of traditional words with contemporary deeds manifest in social indicators for Polish-Americans.

A preliminary composite profile of the Polish-American population in Tables 9, 10, 11 was developed from U.S. Census micro file.6 This data-base and sample is comprised of 47,105 men and 33,600 women in the US workforce. The sample included 201 Polish Foreign-Born, 2,056 Polish and 1,046 Polish Multiple Ancestries census respondents from which a set of social, economic measures were drawn and disaggregated. Tables 9, 10 and 11 provide an initial profile and establish comparative measures for various segments of the Polish ancestry population. This compendium reveals contrasts and comparisons within the population and to the micro-file sample at large. To correct for age induced and influenced indicators the data in Tables 9 and 10 include separate tabulations for persons who are 25 years of age or older. These findings are provided and then added in parentheses to each category. Table 11 is an age specific and type specific data-base for single and multiple ancestry groups. Though many interpretations could be developed and much analysis remains to be completed, only the barest findings can be included in this elemental analysis. A profile of the contemporary population has the following contours:

- The Polish ancestry population is older than the sample; the multiple ancestry population is younger.
- A vast majority of foreign-born respondents speak a language other than English at home, women more so than men; only 10.6 percent of the sample, and among the multi-ancestry Polish population only 4.3 percent , speak a language other than English.
- Except for foreign-born women, all Polish ancestry categories surpass the average number of years of schooling, and except for foreign-born respondents all surpass the percentage of college degree holders in the sample.
- Migration since 1975 for single ancestry Polish-Americans is markedly lower than the sample average, as well as lower than the foreign-born and multiple ancestry persons.
- The percentage of employed for all Polish ancestry persons was higher than the sample. Income from interest, dividends or rentals was exceptionally higher for foreign-born persons.
- Income from wages and salaries for Polish ancestry populations was higher than the sample.
- The percentage of persons in poverty in all Polish ancestry categories is lower than the sample.

Though this compendium yields much general information, larger and more detailed data sets would yield more detailed comparisons and a more accurate visage of the Polish-American reality. For example, a more pluralistic matrix could provide comparative indicators for various native-born and foreign-born populations with origins in Eastern and Southern Europe that migrated to America during the twentieth century. On the question of Polish-American participation in various sectors and occupations of the economy, profiles of and comparisons to other ancestry groups can be derived from the General Characteristics Report of the U.S. Census. National data for multiple ancestry respondents was not published by the U.S. Census. Consequently, information on multiple ancestry respondents at the national level is not easily available, though some state specific tabulations for single and multiple groups have been developed.7 Nonetheless, the

General Characteristics Report projects a fuller and more robust contour of single ancestry populations than the micro file data found in Tables 9, 10 and 11. Moreover, the data found in Table 12 and subsequent tables offer a wider range of inter-group comparisons including all foreign-born populations and Eastern and Southern European immigrant populations.

Specifically, Table 14 arrays Polish ancestry participation in ten (10) sectors of the economy and includes a matrix of comparable data for the entire population and the following racial/ancestral categories: White, Black, Spanish Origin (Hispanic) Asian, Italian, Polish, English, German, Irish. These data suggest that:

- Polish ancestry persons are employed primarily in manufacturing, wholesale and professional and related services;
- A secondary employment tier is evident in construction, transportation, services, finance and public administration;
- Mining and agriculture are the least likely economic sectors for Polish ancestry persons.

In broadest contour, this sectored distribution mirrors the sectorial distribution of the national economy. In this respect Polish ancestry participation in the economy appears to be integrated. Nonetheless, differences can be noted. Polish ancestry persons are below the average percentage in the following sectors: agriculture, mining, construction, transportation, wholesale and retail trade, professional and related services and public administration. They appear to be overly clustered in finance, insurance, real estate and manufacturing. Given the unionization of manufacturing and vigor of the financial sector as well as other indicators, especially age, it is not surprising that the Polish-American median household income in Table 12 is more than $2,000 above the national average and higher than all ethnic/racial groups except Asians and Italians.

Table 12 also indicates comparative measures of family poverty and unemployment, which document another dimension of well-being. Though only 4.5 percent of Polish ancestry families are below poverty level, the lowest percentage for the analyzed groups, the 15.0 average weeks of unemployment for Polish ancestry persons are above the national average.

The distribution and comparative analysis of occupational position is recorded in Table 14. Six general categories of occupation are charted by the U.S. Census. A variety of indices and percentages are arranged and method of comparison — relative dissimilarity — was calculated. These indices measure differences and also reflect the complexity and the hazards of relative standards and explanations for occupational clusters and patterns. For example, if one uses Polish (single ancestry population) and compares it to total foreign-born Polish-Americans, and then to foreign-born populations before and after the Immigration Reform of 1965, the pre-1964 index is 2.53. Hence it has a dissimilar distribution among various occupations for Polish ancestry persons. Such findings are not found for Italians and foreign-born Italians. The use of various Census categories, for example, Irish, English and White, produces various relative measures of dissimilarity. Additionally, if 1 percent of the Irish/Polish population would shift occupational position these two groups would have an equal occupational distribution. Polish-Americans, it seems, have achieved an occupational distribution that makes them virtually indistinguishable from Irish, English and White populations. However, foreign-born Polish-Americans have occupational patterns that are quite different from the occupational patterns of the Irish, English and White. In fact, immigrant Polish arriving after 1965 have an occupational profile much like the newest immigrants from Southern Europe and yet they are much different from post-1965 immigrants from the USSR. Though such data are often marshaled as evidence for non-

egalitarianism and the practice of discrimination, careful attention to age, education and mobility strategies of groups is required to infuse these data with significance and meaning beyond the existence of different networks of opportunity, accessibility and perception of advantage.8However, an ethnic pattern exists and is evident; the persistence of change in the work force and in the ethnic factor cannot be denied and suggests the need for continued measurement of the labor market.

Tables 15, 16 and 17 record NCUEA's 1972 and 1984 findings on Poles, Italians, Hispanics, and Blacks, in the executive suites of Chicago's largest corporations.

Russell Barta's findings about these populations and their inclusion in decision-making levels of corporations reveal that:

1. In 1983, Poles, Italians, Hispanics and Blacks continued to be virtually absent from the upper echelons of Chicago's largest corporations.
2. Considering the high proportion of Hispanics, Poles, Italians, and Blacks in the population of the Chicago metropolitan area, each group was grossly under-represented in these major executive suites, and change remained excessively slow.
3. The number of corporations without any director or officer who was Black, Hispanic, Italian or Polish decreased between 1972 and 1983. While there was a slight increase in the number of Blacks as directors and in the number of Poles as officers, Blacks and Poles continued to be under-represented in these respective areas.
4. The proportion of Italians in Chicago's executive suites in 1983 remained almost unchanged from that in 1972.
5. In 1983, Hispanic representation in high-level, decision-making positions remained almost nonexistent.
6. Italians and Poles with executive positions continued to be concentrated in financial institutions. Blacks were more likely to be present in corporations directly serving the public, such as utilities, banks, and food companies.

The need to ascertain information on occupation and mobility is clearly required in a nation that claims not to be concerned with accident of birth and that has outlawed discrimination based on national origin. This commitment to equal protection suggests the following research and action protocol:

Evidently, ethnic patterns exist. Their persistence and change in the work force and in the ethnic populations need not be denied or ignored. Continued measurement and analysis of such dynamics in a multi-ethnic society provides the knowledge required for an informed and wise pursuit of economic justice. Yet, the U.S. Census' failure to tabulate multiple-ancestry Polish-American data violates this protocol. Its failure diminishes members of ancestry groups and reduces the researchers' ability to track social phenomena. In a society driven by formulae and information this amounts to the imposition of invisibility. For example, the multiple ancestry population experience and its mobility and occupational distribution are not available. Consequently implications for the study of comparative achievement cannot be developed.

For example, the comparative age cohorts in Table 19 documents the fact of significantly high percentage of Polish-American elderly. This table arrays the size of the population as well as differences among Black, Hispanic, Polish and Italian populations and the White populations. Table 20 reveals other differences: Polish-Americans' high educational achievement and strong preferences for church-related schools which sets them apart from White and Black Americans.

Both Polish-Americans' and Italian-Americans' patterns of church-related school attendance are considerably different from Hispanic, Black and White populations.

Data in Table 21 reveal even more how patterns of family, household and female householders indicate divergent interests and concerns among and within ancestry groups. The extraordinarily divergent rates of family and household are Black families with no workers; Hispanic married couples with no workers; and Black and Hispanic householders with no workers. Table 22 provides another set of divergent indicators among ancestry populations for fertility, household type, marital history and labor force.

The percentage of Polish-American women employed is higher than the rate for the Italian and Hispanic populations, but lower than the rate of the White and Italian families are households headed by women. Hispanic rates are nearly twice as large and Black rates are more than three times as large.

- The birth rate among Polish-American women is substantially lower than white, Hispanic and Black Populations for nearly all cohorts.
- The household size of Polish-Americans is smaller than Italian, Hispanic, Black and White populations.
- The rates of marriage, divorce and widowed are nearly identical for Polish and Italian American populations. These rates of marriage are higher, but the divorce rates lower, than Black and White populations.
- The age distribution of the Polish-Americans and Italian population comprise a clear pattern of aging. Polish-Americans in the oldest age cohorts and the youngest cohorts are respectively higher and lower than other populations.
- In all but two age cohorts, 3-4 and 25-34 years of age, Polish-Americans have the highest rates of school enrollment.
- Polish-Americans have higher rates of high school and college graduates than White, Hispanic, Italian and Black populations for persons 18-24 years of age. Of persons 25 years and older only the White population has higher rates of high school and college graduation.
- The rate of workforce participation for Polish-Americans is lower than Italian, Hispanic and White populations, yet the percentage of married Polish-American women that are employed is higher than Italian and Hispanic rates, but lower than Black and White rates.
- The percentage of households headed by women among Polish-Americans, Italians, and White populations is appreciably smaller than rates for Black and Hispanic populations.

Tables 23 indicate yet another set of comparative measurements for Polish-Americans and ancestry group participation in America.

- Polish-Americans have the highest percentage of population designated as military veterans.
- Polish-Americans have higher rates of private vehicle usage and lower rates of public transportation usage than Black, Hispanic and Italian populations.

That the U.S. Census did not tabulate multiple ancestry Polish-American data leaves us without the sort of analytical ground required to track the multiple ancestry experience and its occupational implications. Such a lapse creates other problems. Because the multiple ancestry factor is not included in the General Characteristics Report, the 1980 census data compiled by the Department of Commerce claims that 11.01 percent of the Polish-American population is foreign-

born. Yet if one includes the numerically significant multiple ancestry populations this percentage drops to 4.9. Such variations reveal the disparities and differences induced by inconsistent aggregation of ancestry information. Nonetheless, a fuller and comparative view of Polish, Italian, Hispanic, Black and White populations illustrates the diversity and pluralism of the American social economy. Inasmuch as such data help to refine analysis of the immigrant and ethnic experience our view of this reality is made clearer.

New Outlooks on Social Policy and Cultural Practice

Beginning in the late 1960s, new approaches to social policy and cultural practice, as well as overall economic prosperity and attendant mobility induced profound change which fostered pluralistic and more tolerant and open-ended processes of social and cultural formation. Polish-Americans may benefit from the legitimation of ancestral-ethnic variety. However, these changes in American cultural policy could be misread as a simple warrant for the maintenance of an entertaining ethnic-folklorique. Other dimensions of ethnicity ought to be explained beyond ethnic-folklorique celebration of tradition, i.e. food, festivals, famous people. The continued articulation of Polish-American ethnicity and ancestry, which is a unique way of being American,9 ought to be enhanced by an open, self-conscious and self-confident exploration of the consequences of change and participation in the American reality during the twentieth century. Bolstered by accurate information about themselves as well as others, all may come to a fuller understanding of their drama of migration and settlement.

Census data, moreover, say nearly nothing about the extent to which personal identity is shared with others — that is, what is ethnicity and how it is articulated.

The survival of an ethnic group depends ultimately not on governmental support, but on the quality and capacity to sustain the relatedness derived from a common experience. To understand who we are and to discern differences between the demographic world of categories, indicators and correlations and the lived world of "relatedness" is to address the mediating purposes and functions of institutions which create a culture and transmit a tradition and a heritage. The foregoing data suggest remarkable accomplishments which have heretofore not been reported; but the next decades impose other imperatives. A fruitful future will require use of such information and the development of creative leadership. The creative articulation of new images grounded in the reality of the Polish-American and multi-ethnic experience and the experience of our relatedness raises issues about our institutional life and the transmission of our legacy. Though a core cultural pattern exists, the vitality of the Polish-American ethnic pattern is uncertain and the prospects of its complicity in the withering or thinning of a substantively rich tradition should be anticipated. The impact of dispersal caused by events in Poland and displacement occasioned by social and economic change and wholesale community decline and plant closings and de-industrialization in America will continue to influence the Polish-American reality. A new age for Poland has dawned, but a creation of singular importance is needed to announce the new substance of this cultural tradition. To provoke the birth of culture and to supplement a tradition in our place and time is a rare event and a courageous venture. That such a reconstruction could be imagined is not remarkable. These contemporary and comparative indicators of the Polish-American reality were compiled so that forecasts of the future and suggested scenarios of action for Polish-Americans would be grounded in accurate information about their participation and achievements as well as in the specific conditions and the multi-ethnic context within which, and from which, they may chart their course.

At bottom, these measurements are reflective of choices (personal, corporate, public) that shape and channel issues of work, war, family, education and health. Knowing the reality of the Polish-American participation in these choices ought to frame more clearly the salience of such issues for the populations as well as for their potential for inter-group cooperation.

These data surely suggest a variety of directions, and may close some avenues. They reveal the stunning achievements of Polish-Americans. But they suggest also needs: for language preservation, for documentation and data about multiple ancestry Polish-Americans, and for inter-ethnic networking and communication about convergent issues. More pointedly, the data reveal the importance of attentive care for the elderly, in health services and in family life, and the deep tradition of alternate, non-public schooling so clearly evident for Polish-Americans. The data also reveal gaps in our knowledge about neighborhoods and housing in Polish-American communities. The paucity of current information on small businesses, ethnic churches and other aspects of community life underscore the need for continued inquiry. At bottom, however, such comparative data should not limit nor exaggerate our participation in the American reality. These data are measurements of our common reality. But data clusters are not the entire social reality; they are merely its elemental features.

The 1980 Census legitimated ancestry and ethnicity. Since the founding of America, the American reality has included the use of governance strategies which reshaped person and groups through the tactical use of social physical, economic, legal and educational pressure and attraction. Like most large-scale political orders of world history, the American experience was replete with episodes of inter-ethnic conflict, cultural bigotry, ignorance, fear and uncertainty. Throughout its history various public and private mechanisms and mentalities sustained ethnic and racial division and conquest. At times group antipathy, moreover, was fueled by "scientific" support for racism and ethnocentrism. These nativistic social, genetic sciences of the early 20th Century undermined commonsense experiences of persons and communities and challenged the finest universalistic values fostered by the Classical and Enlightenment intellectual traditions that comprised the aspirations of the American founding.

Moreover, in their best moments, the religious traditions of the founding colonials and immigrants overcame sectarianism and also nurtured forms of governance imbued with habits of justice, clarity and tolerance. Such ethical and religious influence percolated at all levels of the American reality — secular and civil society. Thus foundational sources in the broadest sense informed social peace and well-being. Religions and philosophic pragmatism offered moral critiques which tempered the hateful racist and ethnocentric practices that are endemic to multi-ethnic societies, competitive systems of allocating resources, and inequalities that become institutionalized.

Nonetheless, the effective influence of all sources of support for American pluralism from the 1870's into the 1950's were muted by strong modernizing forces and attendant mentalities — economic development, progressive managerialism, destructive liberal industrialization, defensive religiosity and elitist cultural conservative, scientific social and economic determinism and a positivistic intellectual tradition which relied on selective social measures and indicators dutifully supplied by the U.S. Census. By the mid-1960's generations of simplistic and muddled interpretations of race and ethnicity and the massive transformation of productive processes and forms of residential settlement contributed to the creation of an enormous crisis that induced ferment and violence as well as the search for a political order and language frequently intersected the passions associated with, and endemic to, ethnic affiliation, loyalty, and affinity. The

politicization of all things during a period of intense change included the misuse of the ethnic factor.

Even today ethnicity occupies a murky terrain that exists between universalistic values and narrow ethno-racial claims of special merit and need. The intellectual bankruptcy of the past and its persistence in ambivalence toward ethnic diversity have become part of American cultural practice and analytical and interpretative tradition. The recent American experience which celebrates ethnic diversity and ongoing analytical struggle with the topic in various disciplines are hopeful signs of acknowledgement that precedes the fresh insight and clearer understanding that are needed in order to restore integrity to the sciences of society and to solve issues that exacerbate inter-ethnic relations in America.

On one level, the 1980 Census signaled official governmental tolerance and a rudimentary policy which fostered the significance of ethnic pluralism. In other respects, however, the 1980 Census also raised new questions concerning the character and meaning of the ethnicity it measured and more specifically the meaning of such ancestry data and the implications of comparisons based on ancestry. On one level, the ancestry data speak for themselves. It is abundantly clear that many ethnic populations (including Polish-American), are engaged in a social, economic, and cultural metamorphosis. Yet, the details of this transformation are not sufficiently known, nor adequately documented, nor explained and integrated into earlier studies. Put simply, basic research in this field has been ignored and the implications of this knowledge gap must be understood because they suggest a significant set of features about the American Reality that studies of the ethnic factor ought not ignore nor neglect. Consequently, even rudimentary assessments of the relationship of ethnicity/ancestry to other social indicators require basic data development. A compendium of data was needed and specific indicators for ancestry populations had to be compiled.

Compiling these data was no simple task. The first step was to gather and to array data in ways which facilitated elementary assessments. The American social sciences, the product and service marketing establishment and governmental agencies have been notably passive in their interest in ethnic data. Interest and uses of educational, residential and income preferences far outweigh interest in methodologies that include the intersection of social, economic, cultural and religious research. The dominant research paradigms and their purposes influence data collection. The perception of most ethnic information in many academic disciplines is that it is marginal or meaningless. Such presumptions also diminish the importance of gathering ancestry data. Thus the intellectual climate strongly imposes on basic research such as data development regarding ethnicity.

In addition to the bias of academic and ‘market research’ data-bases, the collection and tabulation of basic data were impeded because of the change of political-government climate. Federal funding for the publication of ancestry data supported by the Ford and Carter administrations was not included in the Reagan Administration’s Executive Budget nor in its supplemental request for Congressional appropriation for the Department of Commerce which includes the U.S. Bureau of Census. Thus, systematic profiles of ancestry populations in America, particularly Eastern and Southern European immigrant and ethnic populations, were not generally disseminated or included into formulae for measuring the need for various populations and the equity of resource distribution. The consequence of this ‘public censorship’ was more than the eclipsing of ancestry information. The practice of neglecting and denying the relevance of ancestry data is a *prima facie* violation of rights to equal protection and due process for millions of persons.

Original legislative interest in all matters related to ethnicity is certain and clear, though administrative practice and legislative oversight have assiduously avoided such provisions.

The 1980 Census marks the passage from "immigrant" to "ethnic" and perhaps toward going beyond ethnicity for many populations that began their American experience with the large-scale European migration from 1880 to 1924. These data about America invite new accounts of the immigrant era and its ethnic legacy. The data also provoke questions about ethnicity in America: What are its contemporary sources and cultural foundations? What are its institutional purposes and how valid is the substantive warrant for claims that more than nominal continuity across the generations exist for ethnic populations?

Even at first blush elemental features of the population measured in l980 regarding the various geographic, economic and social dimensions and characteristics of Polish-American communities invite fresh visions of the future of Polish-Americans. Such measurement may induce a reanalysis of the relatively short history of the Polish-ethnic experience in immigrant communities of America. To be sure, a new history or a new view of the present shaped by the past may indicate new course of action for Polish-American institutions and may reveal convergent issues at the intersections of social, economic and community forces of change. The imperative of this approach is that the aspirations expressed in traditional consciousness and the energy and power of institutional action ought to engage the contemporary reality. Only at such critical intersections can Polish-Americans begin to understand the past and to deliberate on which current strategies are required for ethnic survival. For Polish-American ethnicity to become meaningful, convincing and finally a compelling source of personal identity and social action various institutions related to ancestry populations must have and use accurate measures and indicators about their various levels and degrees of participation in American society, i.e., a complex, multi-tiered, political-social, economic, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious social reality and historical expression of the human condition.

Thus, the elemental demography of Polish-Americans is worth knowing and pondering. Though such data are not meaningful in themselves and demand analysis and interpretation, a particularly relevant and important feature of such information is derived from asking: how the government uses data, to what other tasks and purposes these data can be applied, and in what ways are institutions and leaders that shaped the public policy and programs influenced by the variety of sources which define the Polish-American reality.

To be sure, attention to Census information and its policy function is not a warrant for neglecting humanistic and other expressions and explorations of Polish-American culture and traditions that are essentially qualitative or not easily quantifiable. Measurable data are not replacements for the creative and imaginative faculties that are used to seek and to articulate the depths and heights found within and about an ethnic culture and tradition. Nor do data outline a program of cultural formation and prudent institutional direction. However, there is sound evidence for the views that vital moral action and authentic humanistic and cultural expressions of ethnicity should be anchored in the social reality of a population.

At bottom this claim arises because ethnicity is a social form and an ongoing articulation of a ‘peoplehood’. The claim that ethnicity is a peoplehood implies that it is not a project of transmitting a cultural tradition in an antiquarian, idealistic, romantic fashion. The willful continuation of a literary canon and the maintenance of urban enclaves of immigrants are precious and perhaps necessary elements of peoplehood but not a sufficient and complete agenda. In addition to cultural preservation and the maintenance of community-settlements, other parallel efforts grounded in the contemporary social reality of the Polish-American population ought to be explored for their

suggestions of new modes and models of ethnicity. The claim that ethnicity is a peoplehood implies a challenge to reshape in contemporary words, art and action the manifestations of the spirit of a people that emerges from the existence of a people — the ethos, the memory, the tradition and the contemporary social and economic praxis, i.e., the total experience of existence in a multi-ethnic social reality. In sum, culture must convey meaning to experience and experience must convey existence to culture.

A corollary of this thesis is that forecasts for the future of the Polish-American population ought to be based on careful analysis of various dimensions of the current conditions. The implicit argument of this compendium is that important parameters of Polish-Americans in the past, present and the decades to come are reflected in measurable aspects of ethnic social existence and participation. This compendium provides a quantified view of Polish-American settlements, age, income, education, occupations, family, nativity, language, and other demographic aspects. Expanding this data-base and updating it with local measures, as well as maintaining it when future Census data become available, will establish indices of vital factors of the Polish-American reality and legacy. Accurate indices about Polish-Americans and other ancestry populations have various implications in a society that increasingly relies on standardized information for decisions about a host of questions that influence the structure of life in a modern, bureaucratic society.

This compendium of indicators of the social, economic reality of ancestry groups reveals as much about the American context as it does about the ancestry populations. In fact, understanding the American context of ethnicity is an essential dimension of understanding the present as well as the future of Polish-Americans in their multi-ethnic milieu. Within these data-sets several visages of the Polish ancestry population can be discerned. These measurements of the Polish-American reality and other ethnic-specific tabulations reveal contemporary dimensions of American social history. Such extensive information on characteristics of the social economy and its ethnic factors had not been measured prior to the l980 Census. Consequently, an entirely fresh approach to interpreting the immigrant and ethnic experience is implied in this compendium. Its scope widens the perspective from which the participation of ethnic populations can be viewed. Such a wide angle vision regarding cultural variety in the United States may also suggest the consequences of early eras and decisions regarding the social, cultural and economic formation of ethnic population.

These data as well as new information collected in the 1990 Census should become publicly available, accessible and be factored into the consideration of public policies and resource allocation. A public, private, community and scholarly effort in this regard ought to be on the agenda of all who are concerned about Polish-American culture/ethnic pluralism, the structure of rewards and benefits, and the social well-being of America.

Ethnic Consciousness and the Humanization of Social Life

The persistence and recurrence of serendipity and mysterious contingency in research, scientific discovery and political history should prepare us to expect uncertainty. Yet in personal as well as social phenomena the search for recognized patterns and proven paths which can guide our choices and inform our desire to know provides the balance needed to face the unknown with hopes for ongoing well-being. Various aspects of social being can be measured and patterns of social phenomena often provide direction and guidance for personal and social choices.

In search for firmer answers to the problematic posed by Dr. Danuta Mostwin at a Polish-American Institute of Arts and Sciences Panel which attempted to make reasonable forecasts and

likely scenarios for the future of Polish-Americans, a data collection project — sponsored by the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs on comparative social indicators and ethnicity and targeted on Polish-Americans — was expanded. Portions of this data-base were collected to form a compendium of comparative indicators on ancestry populations in the United States. Completing this venture was unexpectedly delayed for technical reasons and the project was postponed because of the opportunity and urgency of other research.

Beginning in 1986 in a series of international scholarly seminars sponsored by the Council for Research on Values and Philosophy, there was a thrust towards a deepened reflection on the problematics related to the American ancestry data and its interpretation. Seminars in the series included the issues of person and society, urbanization and values, and the convergency, equivalence and nature of relationships between cultures across time and continents. The findings of these projects which have led to a series of publications address on a global level the same questions which had been under study with regard to the future of Polish-Americans. These global researches involving scores of persons from various disciplines and regimes led to organizing a colloquium between The Catholic University of America (CUA) and The Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) on State and Civil Society in America and Poland. The CUA-KUL colloquium convened in Lublin, Poland on the very day, June 4, 1989, that the electoral voice of Poland resounded with a "No" to the Communist Party's list of candidates.

Just prior to that colloquium a new batch of data made it possible to finish the Polish-American data project — A Compendium of Social, Economic and Demographic Indicators — which was then shared with Polish scholars interested in emigration history. This led to an essay which

- analyzes the indicators and measures of Polish-American and selected comparative ancestry populations in the United States;
- explains the shift in data collection initiated by the U.S. Census in 1980 which enables the disaggregation of ancestry information;
- indicates the extent and distribution of multiple ancestry respondents among Polish-Americans;
- documents the integration and achievement of Polish-Americans and their participation in American society; and
- reveals some occupational disparities and skewing of U.S. Census tabulation and the paucity of publications regarding comparative ancestry data.

The argument of the data collection project, in capsule form, is that comparative information is an important device for measuring the social and economic mobility and achievement within the American reality and that the American reality was the principal focus for Polish-Americans.

When I wrote about the Polish-American reality no one expected the events in Poland or the extraordinary visit to America of Lech Walesa and his speech to Congress on November 15, 1989 in which he makes common cause with the American experiment. Lech Walesa's speech began with the following invocation and dramatic proclamation:

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of the Cabinet, distinguished members of the House and Senate; Ladies and Gentlemen,

"We the people. . . ."

With these words I wish to begin my address. I do not need to remind anyone here where these words come from. And I do not need to explain that I, an electrician from Gdansk, am also entitled to invoke them.

"We the people. . . ."

I stand before you as the third foreign non-head of state invited to address the joint Houses of Congress of the United States. The Congress, which for many people in the world, oppressed and stripped of their rights, is a beacon of freedom and a bulwark of human rights. And here I stand before you, to speak to America in the name of my nation. To speak to citizens of the country and the continent whose threshold is guarded by the famous Statue of Liberty. It is for me an honor so great, a moment so solemn, that I can find nothing to compare it with.

The people in Poland link the name of the United States with freedom and democracy, with generosity and high-mindedness, with human friendship and friendly humanity. I realize that not everywhere is America so perceived. I speak of her image in Poland. This image was strengthened by numerous favorable historical experiences, and it is a well-known thing that Poles repay warm-heartedness in kind.

The world remembers the wonderful principle of the American democracy: "government of the people, by the people, for the people."

I too remember these words; I, shipyard worker from Gdansk, who has devoted his entire life - alongside other members of the Solidarity movement - to the service of this idea: "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Against privilege and monopoly, against violations of the law, against the trampling of human dignity, against contempt and injustice.

Such in fact are the principles and values - reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln and the Founding Fathers of the American republic, and also of the principles and ideas of the American Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution - that are pursued by the great movement of Polish Solidarity; a movement that is effective. I wish to stress this point with particular strength. I know that Americans are idealistic but at the same time practical people endowed with common sense and capable of logical action. They combine these features with a belief in the ultimate victory of right over wrong. But they prefer effective work to making speeches. And I understand them very well. I too am not fond of speeches. I prefer facts and work. I treasure effectiveness.10

Lech Walesa's words and the deeds in Poland initiated *Solidarnosc*. But in November of 1989 his presence echoed throughout the Halls of Congress, the Gallery, the American nation and the world via telecast. The intensely moving, deep passions and immediately shared historic events of the past half-year, however, only sharpen the point and purpose of my reflection on the future of Polish-Americans and the relevance of the American context and its multi-ethnic character.

Because of the tempting opening for Polish-Americans and Polish-American institutions to believe in *Solidarnosc* and to expect that focusing their attention to things Polish creates the answer to the questions regarding the future of Polish-Americans, special care must be given to exploring the Polish-American experience, its consequences and their implications for the years to come. This is the argument of the essay and the invitation to study collected indicators and measures of American domestic policy and the achievements of various populations. But what of the experience of *Solidarnosc* and the Polish-American reality? Does attention to social indicators neglect consciousness and freedom?

At first blush, to do what Solidarnosc has accomplished for Poland was in no small measure assisted by speech and deeds . . . by organizing persons and the invocation of 'American' symbols of political liberty and liberty generated from economic production and market freedom. However, to ponder more fully the words and deeds of Solidarnosc for the Polish-American reality suggests the need for a fresh approach to social rearticulation which includes a fuller understanding of the multi-ethnic essence of the American reality and thoughtful attention to the task of organizing persons around the fact and the vision of cultural diversity and various other forms of pluralism attached to liberty and freedom in America.

The ethnic factor, willy nilly, makes the American reality measurably more complex than organized action and invocation of symbols of political choice through democracy and economic policies in support of services and product choices driven by the free market. The consequences of cultural pluralism in America can not be avoided; policies and resource strategies which selectively ignore and neglect ethnicity seem to exacerbate social tensions; but policies of denial and ignorance of cultural legacies, traditions and bonds of community seem to depersonalize and deprive person and society of the integrity and cohesion needed for overall social and cultural development.

The articulation and reconstitution of a multi-ethnic peoplehood in the American reality proposed in this essay rests on the additional need for a check on both governmental and corporate action and power that has eroded the associational bonds of personal and social well-being. Thus, ethnicity is proposed as a community force and a new pathway toward justice, which is especially challenging, but especially needed in a multi-ethnic country such as America. Ironically the American and Polish reality may yield new commonalities; as Solidarnosc begins to reconstitute Poland in the context of multiple European ethnicities and as these ethnicities move toward a United European order for the 1990's and beyond, their agenda and the agenda of Polish-Americans as well as of all American ethnicities may converge. Thus, both the European and American realities must search for the proper balance between compactness and differentiation of their social order and the appropriate social, political and economic order consonant with human aspirations for freedom in such relationships. Adjusting and adjudicating practices and policies that enable such 'balancement' not only requires mechanisms and mentalities that are attuned to ethnic pluralism, for these will be efficacious if they are grounded in: Accurate information about disparities, inequalities and differences; thoughtful attention to the ethnic factor; and artful approaches to building coalitions within and among various segments of the pluralistic and changing texture of personal and group order. The 1980 Census in a small way enhanced the feasibility of this enormously ambitious project as well as this hopeful theoritization about the best human order.

Thus convergence in the search for mechanisms and mentalities which assure peaceful human development in large territorial areas populated by many ethnic groups may draw Poles and Polish-Americans and many others into a common struggle with tensions constituted by the richness and variety of the human condition as well as claims of cultural freedom, social mobility and economic and political justice.

For the past two decades Americans have been involved in a lively chapter of social change which has included various appeals to ethnicity and to a search for remedies for the persistence of inequities related to the structure of opportunities, the institutionalization of ethnic stratification and other exclusionary practices which are not consonant with the avowed purposes of the American regime. A recent conference11 commemorating twenty years of socio-cultural

explorations and programs designed to find remedies for ethnic conflict produced the outline of this problematic and some suggestions for the future of multi-ethnic harmony in America.

This conference produced ten topics and twenty recommendations which distill the experience and the judgment derived from practitioners and theoreticians engaged in the emergence of ethnic consciousness and the socio-cultural turbulence and the economic-spatial settlement transformation of the American reality which occurred during the post World War II era.

The following conference documents indicate the provocative platform from which ethnicity as a foundational aspect of human reality may be examined. An ethnic approach is especially interesting in an era which apparently has lost track of correct consciousness of social and economic class dynamics and discovered that the sciences of person, society and history are not driven by transcendent or immanent dialectics. The preceding exercise in search of standards for "humanizing" social life in America and the following rationales and recommendations regarding the legitimization and significance of ethnic politics, ethnic groups and coalition-building skills suggest a set of theses regarding the reality of specific areas of social life and practices, ethnic groups and cultural-ethnic relations in America. These deserve consideration as approaches or pathways toward fuller understanding of the meaning and measures of the "humanization" of social life. The search for human fulfillment is focused upon the existential social forms and processes, i.e., within and among the confluence of the manifold expression of ethnicities, the movement of peoples and the intensive interaction among peoples that comprise the current period of change. The attendant search for new insights and approaches to improve social life and our understanding of these processes define the problematic from a perspective grounded in the following rationales for ethnic politics, the influence of ethnicity on behavior, and the importance of good-faith coalitions among ethnic populations present the case for an approach to humanization of social life through the affirmation of ethnic diversity, pluralism and politics.

Ethnic Group Politics

American politics have always been deeply influenced by ethnic influences and ethnic voting patterns, but it is only recently that this phenomenon has received some legitimacy. Those who think that ethnic power distorts the idealized democracy of individual Americans setting the national agenda no longer prevail, even though the legitimization of ethnic lobbying is still perceived by many as at a few notches lower than that of the interests of business and labor.

As we deepen our understanding of American ethnic pluralism, we are becoming more open to considering ethnic interests, on a more even par with other interests, and in many cases conceding that what we once considered to be merely ethnic interests are often essential for the society as a whole.

The Influence of Ethnicity on Behavior. Students of human behavior have come to recognize the significance of ethno-cultural factors. Ethnic differences in child-rearing practices, subtle ordering of values, judgment of acceptable and unacceptable behavior, and expressive tendencies are now a ripe field of inquiry and controversy.

While few deny the importance of such variables as class, generation, region, intermarriage and differential rate of acculturation, there is a growing tendency to assert that one’s basic group identity is shaped by conscious forces deriving from ethnic origins. This insight has made clear the need for ethnic sensitivity on the part of therapists and human service providers. It has also made it more important for the media to portray ethnic authenticity rather than stereotypes so as

to help shape healthy group identity and not encourage disdain against, and self-hate among, members of groups that are inauthentically portrayed.

Despite the greater awareness of the significance of ethno-cultural factors in promoting positive personal and group identity, we lack a unifying theory that integrates the psychological aspects of identity and ethnicity.

Similarly, the translation of what has been learned about ethnicity into professional practice (treatment methods, delivery of services and training) has been sporadic. It has yet to become an integral part of the helping professions.

The State of Intergroup Relations. Signs of an increase in racist, anti-semitic, anti-immigrant and anti-minority group acts appear to be confirmed in recent studies.

Even so, large population studies continuously confirm that in the areas of ethnic, racial and religious differences Americans are more tolerant than ever.

These seeming contradictions are confusing yet they might be answered by a deeper analysis of the category of youth and bigotry. Teenagers commit eighty percent of all bias-related acts.

Civil rights enforcement is widely perceived by minority groups to have lost much of its rigor especially as the Supreme Court rules variously on affirmative action suits.

The field of intergroup relations both as a profession and as a movement seeks to moderate the excesses of ethnic chauvinism while at the same time help ethnic groups legitimately assert their agendas. A consensus is growing on the need for greater efforts at conflict-reduction and coalition-building.

The Art and Science of Coalition Building. America's ethnic map has been transformed by the emergence of new ethnic leaders who are involved in America's civic mainstream, and by millions of newcomers from Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Europe.

This new social and political climate in America has made ethnic advocacy a more complex and noisier game in America's cities and in our nation's capital.

The public's reluctance to support programs for single groups is forcing ethnic advocates to adopt coalitional approaches to problem solving. As a result, coalition building has been transformed from a crusade by utopian reformers, who once regarded ethnic advocacy as questionable, to a movement of rooted leaders and service providers who work together to meet the needs of diverse groups.

All of this has spawned the new art and science of coalition building. Its practitioners accept the attitudes and behaviors that flow from ethnic, racial and religious identities.

The list of group causes that have been transformed into coalitional issues grows as ethnic advocates learn about making trade-offs and making alliance-building a priority.

The implications and elaboration of the agenda of ethnic diversity, pluralism and politics appear most clearly in concerns of special worth: The arts, education, media, immigration, women, enterprise and neighbor development. These issues are argued in the following fashion:

The Cultural and Performing Arts. Ethnic art forms, as expressed in their traditional ways and in the ways they are fused with contemporary expression, are enduring. They are powerful representations of both folk and sophisticated urban arts. They evoke memory and satisfy a hunger for authenticity and roots.

Except as they are occasionally commercially adapted, they operate too often in the byways of an overly homogenized society. Our mainstream culture is revitalized through a greater encouragement of our ethnic artists and support for many ethnic performing groups.

The education of our young people in their own group's cultural contributions and an appreciation by them of the arts of other American ethnic traditions is an important feature of preparation for life in a pluralistic society.

Cross-cultural aesthetic stimulation creates a lasting impression on children, and for both children and adult viewers and participants, it is often an antidote to ethnic chauvinism.

Multi-ethnic Education. The large number of ethnic and racial minorities in the United States, augmented by the newer immigrants from all over the world requires American schools to create a total school climate that supports pluralism.

Even though there are signs across the country of conscientious efforts in this direction, multi-ethnic education — whose goals are the enhancement of healthy group identity and improved intergroup relations — is not yet the norm in many schools.

Fear of controversy, lack of adequately trained staff and administrators, and a low priority on the educational agenda hamper efforts to universalize effective multi-ethnic education. Programs that involve parents in fostering group identity enhancement are still in their infancy.

To achieve a higher level of multi-cultural learning and activity in the schools, we need also to improve and support English proficiency training, bilingualism and universal learning by all of a second language.

Media. The depiction of ethnic characters in the media has been the subject of hot debate for decades. The feeling still exists among leaders of many ethnic groups that very little has changed in the negative and stereotyped way they are portrayed. On the other hand, media managers believe that they have become more culturally sensitive and often view the demand of ethnic groups as out of touch with the realities of the industry. The truth lies somewhere in the middle.

Unquestionably, more minority and ethnic characters and scenes can be seen than in the days of Father Knows Best and Ozzie and Harriet. But TV programs and films are still marred by the low visibility of certain groups and the stereotyping of others.

While the news media played an important role in the l960s by vividly documenting in pictures the struggle for civil rights, today too many radio and TV stations deliberately try to "hype" ratings by showcasing extremists and bigots. Their appearance often works to increase tensions between ethnic groups. Today's media are rarely as crude in depicting ethnic groups as are the current crop of greeting cards and "truly tasteless" joke books. The negative stereotypes on TV and in print journalism today come in a more sophisticated form. Nevertheless, they do reinforce bigotry and negative stereotypes.

Ethnic Women. The past two decades have seen a major acceleration in the leadership roles played by women in our society. Among those women were many who were nurtured in minority and white ethnic communities and whose rise to leadership began by advocacy for their own ethnic group, with simultaneous positive identification with the broader women's movement.

Many of these women, while supportive of the women's movement and its general goals, have also been critical of early stages of the movement. They believed it did not adequately speak to the needs of women whose ethnic and religious diversity made it difficult for them to identify with some of the issues and the style of the women's movement.

In asserting ethnic agendas, they have tried to sensitize the nation to the special plight of Black and minority women, neighborhood women, older women and women who did not have middle class options. Ethno-cultural and religious factors affecting the family life of Jewish, Catholic and Fundamentalist Protestant women also were highlighted.

The prescribed ethnic sub-cultural roles for men and women were identified by these leaders as worthy of greater attention in shaping an overall women's agenda.

The New Immigration and Acculturation

Though the statistics are not yet certifiable, it is quite possible that the past two decades have witnessed the largest influx of immigrants and refugees in the history of the United States. Certainly, the current inflow is the most diverse in our history, with non-whites predominating overwhelmingly.

The "new immigration" has added greatly to American economic growth and the redevelopment of neighborhoods. At the same time, social problems that often accompany large waves of immigration also challenge us.

Immigration restrictionists are pressing for less generous immigration policies and to seek to reduce the centrality of the family reunification principle. Amnesty and sanctions policies are still in their infancy, and their efficacy is yet to be tested.

U.S. foreign policy concerns and political judgments still play a role in our immigration and refugee policies and sometimes create unfairness.

The need to acculturate millions of newcomers challenges our employment, education and human service systems as never before. We must pay more attention to how cultural differences affect the relative standing of new immigrants, and devise ways to deal with intergroup conflict, indigenous leadership training and citizenship education.

Ethnic Enterprise and Neighborhood Development

One of the most interesting features of neighborhood renewal is the economic and social benefits derived from the activities of small and medium-sized businesses that are initiated by ethnic enterprise.

Even though the statistics that make up the gross national product usually underestimate the vitality and size of this economic sector, these businesses continue a tradition of immigrant-ethnic exploitation of small intimate affinity-markets providing services and jobs that the general economy neglects.

A bustling street life grows with this form of ethnic enterprise — creating variety, excitement and feeling of greater safety. Capital is generated and circulated, a new middle class grows, and children of these ethnic enterprises are more likely to enter rapidly into the mainstream economy.

On the basis of these foundational concepts and the rationales for an agenda and approach to multi-culturalism, the following recommendations for improving social life were made by the conference as steps towards the implementation of their theses on ethnic diversity, pluralism, and politics.

Recommendations

1. Lobbying for the special needs of ethnic groups should be considered as legitimate as lobbying for the interests of labor, business, etc.

2. Leaders of ethnic groups should take as seriously their role as coalition builders as they do their roles as group advocates.

3. Ethnic communities should formally train their leaders in the art and science of coalition-building.

4. Ethnic groups should meet regularly with other groups and engage in friendly "what's your agenda" meetings.

5. There should be strong state and federal legislation and school and voluntary agency programs that maximize the ability of communities to deal effectively with bias-related crimes.

6. There should be a substantial increase in university undergraduate and graduate studies that result in the training of professional 'intergroup relations' practitioners.

7. Human service policies, programs and training must recognize the multi-ethnic nature of American society and incorporate a sensitivity and responsiveness to white and non-white ethnic groups.

8. All large-scale studies of human behavior should be disaggregated by ethnicity avoiding such large and distorting categories as Asians, Hispanics and whites.

9. Ethnic artists should be prepared to offer their unique understanding of traditional cultures to human service professionals who need insights into clients' feelings and experiences.

10. Producers of ethnic arts programs should offer performers the same kind of supports, from electronic equipment to program notes, that are made available to other professional artists.

11. The development and adherence to media guidelines on ethnic-sensitive programming and news coverage.

12. Ethnic organizations must provide more resources to support their own writers, artists and filmmakers.

13. An increase school activities and curricula that strengthen ethnic identity and enhance multi-ethnic relations to raise students' self esteem and improve educational performance.

14. Language programs in the schools should aim at both teaching foreign-born students English and maintaining their native tongue, as well as teaching foreign languages to American-born students.

15. The Women's movement should develop its programs with a greater sensitivity to the diverse ethnicity of American women and should utilize the energies and backgrounds of ethnic women more fully and creatively.

16. Ethnic communities and the general society should create a climate that encourages women to assume new roles while preserving their ethnic traditions.

17. Ethnic enterprise should be recognized as one of the most dynamic sectors of the American economy: banks, government agencies and other lending institutions should recognize their economic viability and aid in their development.

18. Neighborhood redevelopment should have a proper mix of low and middle class housing, with costs of housing and rentals of store space compatible with the average incomes of residents.

Thoughtful assessment of this model and its applicability to the American reality and to other regimes and mixes of diversity may yield fresh insight into the process of "humanization." The level and magnitude of the relevance of ethnicity for the process of improving social life has not been discerned and in fact has been neglected and avoided. To advance ethnicity as a significant feature and factor in the process of humanization is contrary to the essential characteristics of

"humanization" as a univocal and universal object, state and condition of personal and social well-being. This paper suggests an alternative.

Humanization may be pluri-form and ethnicities are manifestations of the various ways of being and becoming. Perceived in this way, to humanize social life becomes the task of developing multi-ethnic competency and devising strategies for peacefully resolving personal and socio-economic-political conflict that arises from the following errors of deficiencies and excess: A lack of attention to one's ethnic identity and too much attention to one's ethnicity in interaction among ethnicities. From this position the following imperatives for humanizing social life emerge:

- To know one's tradition and the traditions of others with whom existential relationships in civil society must be mediated.
- To acknowledge the persistence of ethnicity as an ontological dimension of personal and social realities that constitute a source of and a ground for human energy-power that can be freely used and misused.
- To foster personal and social knowledge of ethnic realities and resources for the enhancement of social life.

These imperatives establish the ethnic dimension, but it would be foolish to suggest that such a therapy would yield a complete recipe for human development. Nonetheless, within this framework other questions of personal and social concern such as equity, distribution, participation, inequality, disparities as well as the plagues of want, boredom, and manifold vices will still define the human condition. But the fallacious neglect and/or invocation of ethnicity will diminish and some fuller measure of systematic knowledge about the ethnic factor and its relationship to other questions can be gained through critical clarification and disaggregation of elements, relationships, conditions, and other influences. To pursue answers to the prospect of humanizing social life and to include the range of options for improving conditions that are currently used to measure the amount and distribution of valued objects are surely important research and action topics. To transcend the models of the autonomous individual and the economic collectivity by devoting attention to ethnicity requires the recovery of politics as the science and art of peacefully resolving conflict.

The primordiality and/or the induced ultimacy of ethnicity indicates its power as a social force. Ethnicity is frequently invoked and injected into cases and controversies related to resources and valued objects within and among contenders for these resources and to the capacity and access to deliberate and decide upon the distribution of all shareable objects — including esteem and honor. The centrality of ethnicity to such issues argues that it is past time to decide that ethnicity is not an epiphenomenon within and among social realities that shape and direct our personal being. To humanize social life means to address the realities of ethnicity and diversity as a core feature of our common humanity.

These formulations and the preceding recommendations stake-out an approach which announces that the marginalities of prior theory and praxis are the very mainstream of the mysterious process heretofore claimed to be historical but now discovered to be a contingent form of consciousness and practice. The pluraformity of these modes of personal and social being may be resolved through balancing the interests of various existential communities. Such pluraformity is the reality that scandalizes all modern plans and schemes for the homogenization of life.

Yet this pluriformity is the reality within which the action with regard to the humanization of social life must take place. This research, clarification of problematics, the public conversations,

deliberations and decisions regarding the relationship of ethnicity to the range of action designed to improve social relations ought to address the implications of group participation, cultural preservation and the modes of change that are consonant with various ways of being and becoming human.

To avoid the process of conversation, deliberation and decision through the use of approaches to personal and social control that rely on power and rest on intellectually indefensible pretense and the socially effective capacity to manipulate cravings — methods which large scale state and corporate enterprises have mastered and have employed to satiate and truncate consciousness — is a denial of the political as a central aspect of the human condition and its pluri-form manifestation in ethnicities. The events of the past decade and perhaps every period of change indicate that when larger scale institutions do not govern well they collapse and in this situation the emergence and ongoing presence of ethnic consciousness becomes a factor in the human effort to reconstitute order. Any order which does not acknowledge and fairly deal with ethnic variety is an order without justice. Approaches to improving human life in these circumstances would do well to recognize that universal standards of measuring well-being may be imagined, but that the real processes of achieving well-being involve ethnic politics — a science and art that needs to be studied and practiced.

Notes

1. See "Ancestry of the Population by State," *1980 Census of Population*, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census PC8051-10.

2. See Thaddeus C. Radzialowski and Carolyn Olson, "An Analysis of Polish Immigration to the United States 1950-1980 as reported in *US Census 1980*" (Washington, DC, NCUEA, 1983).

3. Gerson Green and Msgr. Geno C. Baroni, "Who's Left in the Neighborhood?" (Washington, DC, NCUEA, 1976). This analysis of social, economic indicators for poor/working neighborhoods in Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Hartford, Indianapolis, Lowell, Milwaukee, Newark, Philadelphia, Providence, St. Louis, Springfield, Toledo, and Wilmington is currently being updated by Paul Kochanowski, NCUEA Research Associate.

4. Kochanowski, "Who's Left in the Neighborhood?" Unpublished manuscript (Washington, DC: NCUEA-Resource Center, 1986).

5. *Ibid*.

6. NCUEA Data File, "Eastern and Southern European Ancestry Group Analysis" (Washington, DC, NCUEA, 1984-).

7. See, "Census of Population, Characteristics of Population by State" (1980). These volumes contain data for the four largest multiple ancestry populations in each state.

8. See, Russell Barta, *Minority Report 2*, "Poles, Italians, Hispanics and Blacks in the Executive Suite," (Chicago and Washington, NCUEA/ Urban Life Institute, 1984). This study reports that 28.3 percent of the corporations had none of these groups as either directors or as officers in 1983 as compared to 51 percent in 1972.

9. See Thaddeus Radzialowski, "Presidential Address," Polish American Historical Association (PAHA) 1985, which called attention to the need for inquiry into the second-generation experience of Polish-Americans. The distinction between ethnic and immigrant is an important dimension of Dr. Radzialowski's analysis. In this vein, the proposals for a Polish-American Encyclopedia to fill in the gaps of knowledge and to weave European and American dynamics of change into a coherent saga awaits its editor and source of support.

10. Lech Walesa, "Address to a Joint Meeting of the Congress of the United States of America," November 15, 1989.

11. *2nd National Consultation on Ethnic America* (New York: Institute for American Pluralism, 1988).

Chapter XII
Modernization and the Left

Tamas Toth

As is well-known, the theories of modernization emerged in the USA in the 1950s and rapidly gained international renown and significance. The history of their subsequent influence shows, however, a remarkable paradox. In Hungary, after initial interest in the sixties and an ideologically-founded rejection in the seventies, the eighties gave birth to numerous studies on modernization which entailed a pressing need to adapt the main results of the Western research. In the meantime, however, international publications on the subject began to express a wide and deep skepticism as to the heuristic values of modernization-theories.

The marked criticism of modernization theories can be formulated as *"premodern*", "*antimodern*" and "*postmodern*" standpoints. It may exhibit "traditionalist" and "populist", "fundamentalist" and "Stalinist" or even "Marxist-Leninist" forms. The challenge can come from the standpoint of the "Left" and the "Right", from the "New Left" and the "New Right", from "progressive". "retrogressive" and "alternative" positions. It may express diverse national, regional and continental interests, as well as aspects of the world-systems approach.

The criticism can be directed against certain methodological, ideological and historico-philosophical presuppositions of early American theories of modernization and the subsequent international research on the subject. It may involve a fundamental critique of basic characteristics of modern times and modern culture, or even a total rejection of the whole system of modernity. This skepticism and criticism can be observed not only among researchers of the "periphery" and "semiperiphery", but also among the scientists of the "core" countries. Their challenge attacks not only the theory of modernization, but its very *practice*; all this certainly concerns both "*Western*" and "*Eastern*" models of modernization.

The question now is to see whether and to what extent this skepticism, which increasingly superseded the former state of euphoria, is well-founded. What heuristic value should we attach to this critique of modernization which so relentlessly questions the scientific reliability of the modernization-apologies? To answer these questions we should probably assess each author, tendency and issue separately. Within the limits of the present sketch, however, I will confine myself to some general remarks concerning major forms of the "Left-oriented" criticism of modernization.

My second point is that though theories of modernization are mostly theories of "social change" and "historical development," they are not always free of such weaknesses as overemphasizing historical gaps, a dichotomous approach to history or a kind of "ahistorical evolutionism", which explains why the capacities of modernization theoreticians to explain development are often questioned. In what follows, I will concentrate on these questions. First of all, I should like to introduce a working definition.

For simplicity's sake I shall assume the definition of modernization from the *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan* (1983). If we leave out its specifically Japanese concerns, this definition is based on the article"modernization" in the *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (1988). In its general statements it is essentially a skillful radical abbreviation of Daniel Lerner's paper.

The *Kodansha Encyclopedia* defines modernization as "the process of economic, political and social change by which a non-developed society acquires characteristics shared by more developed

societies. The theory of modernization, which resulted from the effort by Western social scientists to elaborate a universal view of the process of transformation that would comprehend the varied experiences of postwar developing nations, is an attempt to conceptualize the modernization process, identifying the components of that process and building a general model of modernization.

One of the first steps taken by scholars in developing a unified theory of modernization has been to describe the result of the modernization process, namely, the condition of modernity. Through this effort at description, social scientists have reached general agreement on the criteria of modernity—the shared characteristics of modern societies. These characteristics include a measure of self-sustaining economic growth, a degree of mass political participation, an increase of social mobility, a diffusion of secular-rational values, and a transformation in personality enabling individuals to function effectively in a society that operates according to the above conditions.

The second step has been to analyze the process of modernization itself. Some consensus has been achieved on the identification of the components of modernization, which are seen to include such subprocesses as industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization and secularization. Scholars have come to recognize, however, that there is no single model of modernization but rather a variety of models, principally because the subprocesses of modernization begin at different times, move at different rates, and follow different sequences.

To find in the recent literature a combination of the problems of modernization—of which the above-mentioned working definition could furnish only an oversimplified concept—with questions of historical understanding and explanation then we must turn to the German-speaking part of Europe. West-German historical research at the end of the sixties experienced an "acute theory-deficiency" which, strangely enough, was a consequence of the joint impact of historicism and antihistoricism. A new definition of the tasks and functions of the historical studies "as a historical and historico-critical social science" was formulated in the first half of the seventies by such historians as Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen Kocka and Heinrich-August Winkler.

"If we take seriously the requirement that history, today, should be understood as a historical social science", wrote Hans-Ulrich Wehler in 1974, "we must bear in mind the declared ambition of modernization theories to supply historians with a specific theory of social change". In view of the challenge of the theories of modernization one has urgently "to examine the problems of the international research on modernization" regarding whether or not the framework of theories of modernization made the interpretation and explanation of certain historical phenomena easier, whether these theories offer a better categorial apparatus than that formerly established, whether it can be argued plausibly that their use is beneficial and that they are advantageous over other possible theories.

Wehler stresses further that in the course of the verification of modernization-theories, one should examine first of all their scientific utility, for the fact that the circumstances under which they emerged were not free of ideological burdens is far from settling the problem. It is clear from the above stated convictions of Wehler that he proceeds in his analyses in a very distinctive manner. On the one hand, he is quite explicit about the "essential weaknesses of numerous theories of modernization". On the other hand, he puts forward serious arguments "against the radical revisionism which recommends the general rejection of all the modernization-theories". So in the last analysis he gives a positive answer to the often debated question whether "a modernization of the theories of modernization" is worth pursuing.

Wehler obviously has in mind those vivid discussions which unfolded since the mid sixties in the international literature on modernization. These profoundly elucidated the problem of "what

advantages theories of modernization possess and of what kind of corrections would be possible to overcome their weaknesses". As a result of this work, to summarize his position, a better variant of modernization-theories with greater *explanatory power* could emerge. In this connection he refers first of all to the clear "trend of historization of modernization-theories" as well as to the emergence in the seventies of historical-comparative research on modernization. He emphasizes that "the analysis of the processes of modernization obviously returns in those regions in which these emerged." Thus, Europe and North America began to figure again as subjects of research; the "Third World" is no longer, as it was in the first years of modernization-research, the unconditionally first or *only* object of investigation.

In the last analysis, history as a historical social science—which is of wide scope, combines organically the theoretical and empirical moments and is interested in "modernization"—can be most easily realized through joining the historical-comparative direction of contemporary research on modernization. As Wehler in 1974 programmatically stated, this means, on the one hand, the theoretical initiative of Reinhard Bendix, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Stein Rokkan and others and, on the other hand, also the considerations of the "Committee on Comparative Politics" (CCP). However, these moments do not hinder Wehler at all from giving a clear formulation of the fundamental question of the possibility of theoretical alternatives.

In this respect he concludes that "in the contemporary state of affairs alternatives for a theory of modernization which would be in the historical and theoretical sense properly differentiated are not easy to formulate". Traditional Marxist theory claimed to represent such an alternative. This was the only theory which in challenging the theories of modernization had a comparable span and even more far-fetched claims. It would, however, be an illusion to believe that traditional Marxism could immediately offer a satisfying alternative to an improved version of modernization-theory.

However, even if traditional Marxism cannot challenge the modernized theories of modernization, it might be proposed that this probably could be done by a modern or modernized version of Marxism. And indeed, after the appearance of Wehler's book two interesting endeavors came about to surpass critically the Western theories and capitalistic processes of modernization.

One of the most remarkable Left-oriented criticisms of conceptions of modernization is associated with the names of André Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and Eric R. Wolf. These are the so-called theories of dependency and world systems analysis which emerged in the sixties and seventies in the USA and later spread widely over the world. Wallerstein in an ironic article of 1976 characterized the theory of modernization as "childish", "manipulative" and in the last analysis leading to a theoretical impasse inasmuch as the social sciences of the world somehow have been dragged into this track. Recognizing that we live not in a modernizing but in a capitalist world, the social sciences must break free as soon as possible.

Another interesting and characteristically "Left-oriented" criticism of modernization is represented by a specific "Marxist-Leninist" interpretation of the Marxian theory of social formations [*Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Formationen*] which was elaborated in detail by the social scientists of the German Democratic Republic. On the basis of this conception Günther Rose critically opposed and sharply challenged almost all forms of the modernization-theories of North America and Western Europe. (His impressively rich book was published in 1981.) Undoubtedly, both Rose and Wallerstein put forward many weighty arguments and effective critiques.

Nevertheless, it is my conviction that neither the world-systems theory created under the impact of the international and inner-American political situation of the sixties, nor the GDR-type of theory of social formations inspired by East German socialism and the older German traditions of social research, proved able to realize all the theoretical possibilities offered by the Left-oriented

thinking for the unbiased historical evaluation of the theoretical and practical achievements of modernization. One can draw a more complete overview of these possibilities only by taking into account not only the sometimes schematic East German, but also the far more nuanced West German publications, not only the unavoidable Anglo-Saxon, but also the increasingly rich Hungarian literature on the subject. By the same token one must consider seriously not only the critical arguments of the challengers of the modernization-research, but also the self-critical theses of the most qualified protagonists of the modernization-theories.

From the mid sixties in the international literature on modernization a new significant, genuinely self-critical and, in case of some of its protagonists, even "Left-oriented" trend emerged. This direction of research, putting forward comparative historical and historico-sociological problems, is both theoretically and empirically well-established and is characterized mainly by the names of Reinhard Bendix, Barrington Moore and Samuel N. Eisenstadt. Obviously, several other scholars also should be mentioned, such as G. Omvedt, I. R. Sinai or W. F.Wertheim. The latter three theoreticians are "Left-oriented", but the texts of the other three contain far less of this type of argumentation and practically none in Huntington's book. This trend of research might be termed "self-critical" for the following reasons. The protagonists of this trend, although in a more or less radically renewed way, maintained the paradigm of modernization. On the other hand, they severely criticized one of its versions, namely that elaborated in the USA in the fifties and called by Eisenstadt the "initial model of modernization". But they have not confined themselves to this challenge, and have criticized no less some of their own former convictions as well.

Claus Offe writes in retrospect, although these researches are empirically differentiated and methodologically nunanced, it is not unfair concerning these authors to constate that their perspective is fixed upon a *single* question. This question is namely: what are the preconditions of the possibility that we [North Americans and West Europeans—T.T.] have become such as we are today, and that also others follow us on this successfully established ways.

This research on modernization, continues Offe, endeavors to formulate generally descriptive and explanatory statements concerning the preconditions and propelling forces of modernization, as well as to describe the ways in which premodern, traditional societies historically have surpassed (or can in contemporary times surpass) the signs of their rigidity and stagnation, and approaches (or can approach) the system of the democratic-capitalist industrial societies of the Western world (a system which has an at least implicit preference in all variants of modernization-theory).

Consequently, Offe points out, "in the sixties, when this type of modernization-research reached its climax, the concepts of `modernization' and `Westernization' were handled in a perfectly interchangeable way."

On this question Wolfgang Zapf and Vernon Aspaturian have a similar opinion. "The developing countries are urged to take over the achievements of the Western world. Modernization is interpreted as progress," writes Zapf. Aspaturian adds, in this manner "modernization becomes associated with another basic Western value concept, `progress'. . . . Thus the circle is completed—progress is defined in terms of modernization, modernization is defined in terms of Westernization, and Westernization thus becomes the concrete empirico-historical reference point of progress."

From the middle of the seventies such respected protagonists of the West German social sciences as historian Hans Ulrich Wehler, sociologist Claus Offe and philosopher Jürgen Habermas, in tackling diverse questions related to modernization, considered it necessary to take a kind of mediating position between the extremes of the "Rightist apology of modernization" and the "Leftist critique" thereof. They themselves especially at the outset, took the direction of

modernization-research which, having surpassed the IMM-paradigm, was refinely self-critical and moderately Left-oriented. But the political, ideological and social scientific situation soon became uncomparably more intricate.

In the course of the seventies and eighties the problems of modernization, modernity and modernism was not the only point of attention of leading Western social scientists. The massive spread of the diverse forms of the criticism of modernization—first of all in certain strata, subcultures and movements of the West German urban population—also was easy to perceive. But this skepticism and criticism, taking on first of all an "antimodernist" and "postmodernist" character used elements of both "Left" and "Right" world-views. This is even more remarkable when, say, the critical aspects of the "neo-conservative Right" and those of the "post-industrial Left" still generally can be clearly distinguished.

It should be noted furthermore that in Offe's 1986 opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany the only considerable political force to preserve unbrokenly its traditionally (and sometimes uncritically) positive relationship to the goals, values and means of modernization was the main trend of the "traditional" social-democratic Left. On the other hand, there were also German authors who have preserved unbrokenly their traditionally *negative* attitude (sometimes lacking in self criticism) towards modernization. I would include in the former type, besides Günther Rose, some protagonists of the "Leipzig-school" who retained the standard East German type Marxist-Leninist theory of social formations.

In their case the situation, however, is more complicated for the following reason. In principle the above mentioned East German authors criticize and reject possibly in the sharpest and most determined way all versions of the theories of modernization. But as far as their *de facto* pursuit is concerned they themselves seem (be it unconsciously) to admit some of the historico-philosophical presuppositions and biases of certain modernization-theories. This is proved among others by the fact that in their reasonings about the theory and history of social formations (due allowance being made) certain elements of the unilinear, deterministic-voluntaristic-teleological and ethnocentric view of history appear time and again. These are elements of historicism in the Popperian sense of the term and of the structuralist-functionalist concept of society, today, without exception, these are highly problematic and were criticized by Bendix, Eisenstadt, Moore and others within the overall criticism of the "initial model of modernization".

This does not change in the least the fact that for the GDR-type version of Marxist-Leninism the theory of social formations, on the one hand, and the modernization theories, on the other, appeared as incompatible and mutually exclusive. The thought of R. Bendix, S. Avineri, G. Brandt and V. Aspaturjan, however, give the impression that between these two groups of social theories there are not only contradictions and differences, but within certain limits also moments of compatibility, complementarity and even deep affinity rooted in the traditions of the West European culture. Thus, in the 19th century, for instance, Marx was an outstanding theoretician of the problems both of modernization and of social formations.

It should be stated, however, unambiguously that the criticism by the GDR-version of the theory of social formations against the Western theories and capitalistic processes of modernization is in many respects not really convincing. The version of socialist modernization elaborated in the GDR proved to be a failure, leading to the disastrous major "breakdown of modernization", as Eisenstadt would put it. It proved to be the ideology of an unprecedented social implosion, perhaps the most astonishing ever in a socialist country. One definitely has the impression that the capitalist period of modernization cannot be skipped and that its Western theories are not to be neglected. This certainly does not invalidate all the theoretical and practical

aspects of the international criticism of modernization. Aspaturjan states, however, with good reason that in their concrete historical analyses both Marx and Engels "frowned on the idea of skipping or collapsing stages, although [they] recognized the possibility of accelerating development within stages."

In such circumstances to surpass the one-sided extremes of scepticism and euphoria in the evaluation of modernization is not at all a simple venture. Is a widely acceptable historico-philosophical synthesis concerning these problems at all imaginable? This seems possible only if the social sciences no longer confine their efforts to the "modernization of the *theories* of modernization" (which is undoubtedly always necessary). They should direct their attention also to the *real processes* of modernization (which obviously are of universal significance) in order to elaborate their critical and self-critical reevaluation and to mitigate their most negative consequences which have now accumulated a huge explosive potential. They should "modernize" thoroughly the entire system of modernity. Such endeavors appear mainly in the West German and Anglo-Saxon literature. For instance, Claus Offe writes:

The context of the concept of *modernity* within the sphere of the social sciences became very different from the mid-seventies on. The perspective is no longer determined by the deliberate analysis within the Western social studies of the "others" who used to be characterized as the "latecomers" . . . Such discourses are treated sceptically from that time on and analyze rather modern societies *themselves*, i.e., the debates lead to the reflexive questioning of the structures and normative premises, the defeasibility and the future chances of the ‘modern’ societies themselves.

This change of perspective in the social sciences is determined by a cluster of factors which belong either to their historical setting or to their immanent concerns. We can indicate here only some of these factors, Offe continues.

We mean among others the political and economic crisis-phenomena of the seventies, the abrupt practical disproof of some important Marxian tenets, the emphatic reevaluation of the "dialectics of the Enlightenment" as well as Weber’s theories of the "Western rationalism"; and further, the aesthetic, socio-philosophical and sociological symptoms and prognoses concerning the onset of the `postmodern’ period of Western cultural and social development.

What Claus Offe perceives as ironic in these changes of contexts and perspectives obviously is

not so much the fact that the attention turned away from the ‘others’ to one’s own cultural and structural conditions, but the very insight that the ‘modern’ societies are no less limited in their possibilities, no less burdened with myths, rigidities and inner boundaries, than the ‘premodern’ societies were according to the diagnosis of modernization-theories. ‘Modernity’ is no longer only the future desired goal of ‘the others’, but is no less an awkward beginning stage for the subsequent developments of the ‘Western’ societies.

Generally speaking, the question whether the crisis of the mid seventies unveils only the end of the postwar modernization wave or also the end of the whole three hundred year long process of German modernization continued to be debated among the social scientists of the Federal Republic. The problem, in other words, is whether the most developed countries of the West witness the end of a historical epoch, whether the modern era is definitely transcended and a new "postmodern" era begun.

The most realistic minded authors, such as J. Berger, W.L. Bühl, H. Dubiel and C. Offe, recognize that what is termed by Habermas as the "modern project" remains till now unaccomplished. Even in the most developed Western countries, no one can speak about the complete realization of the emancipatory values of the Enlightenment. A great number of critical reservations can be put forward as to the achievements and social costs of modernization, modernity and modernism, but according to the authors just referred to, neither a naive apology for modernity, nor its radical rejection and the announcement of a new "postmodern project" can offer a genuine way out of the crisis. A new critical and self-critical investigation of the processes, results and perspectives of modernization seems indispensable.

From this context one can understand also the fundamental question formulated as follows by Johannes Berger: "Is there a postmodern period of the developments of societies?" "If one identifies modern times with the bourgeois capitalistic epoch", he writes, "then a postmodern society is not only a theoretical possibility, but already has real existence." Unfortunately, he seems hardly interested in the intricate problem of whether the unbourgeois and uncapitalistic societies of the Second and Third World have not at least as many "premodern" as "postmodern" features, whether they should not themselves be considered as "modernizing", or, in the sense of Rüschemeier's thesis, as "partially modernized" societies. Of course, "modernization" means here less "Westernization" than "Easternization", provided you permit me this arbitrary neologism. We can, however, certainly agree with another aspect of Berger's answer. "If the main emphasis of the modernization-processes is concentrated", he writes, on the one hand, "upon emancipation from the traditional frameworks of life" and, on the other hand, on the structural differentiation of diverse social subsystems then "a postmodern phase in the sense of reversion of the development in question is by a fundamental presupposition of the theory impossible'. (Berger means here obviously the "disembeddedness-" and the differentiation-thesis of the modernization-theory).

If, however, one subscribes to Habermas' diagnosis that the crisis of the Welfare state and the exhaustion of the utopian energies of the Left are the most characteristic features of the seventies and especially of the eighties, then the question to be raised: is how to fulfill nevertheless the emancipatory hopes of the enlightened reason, how to accomplish the "modern project", how to "modernize" modernity?

Chapter XIII

The Renewal of Social Life Through Dwelling Environments: Implications for an Ethical Architectural Practice

Stephen H. Kendall

The notes I have to contribute may at first glance seem distant from the theme of 'The Humanization of Social Life: Change in our Times'. But I'd like to suggest that questions of the humanization of social life in conditions of change have to do also with questions of the 'inhumanization' of the processes out of which physical settings emerge and evolve.

Questions of "process," as well as "states of being," come up in my field of architecture and building. Just as social life is not only a "state," but also a process of becoming, so I'd suggest that it is useful to picture the 'built' environment as having to do with a process of cultivation, as well as a static outcome at any particular time. The built environment is under constant transformation as a result of people's action. I'd not want to suggest any particular causal links between social forces and built form, but to simply suggest that in the relation of evolving social forms and the cultivation of environmental form, there is fertile territory for thought and work.

I'd like to focus the thoughts here on practices of designing and making our built environments. I mean by this the processes by which built environments find congruence with living social forms over the course of time by way of gradual transformation. Such congruence has an important connection to my field of environmental design by way of what I'd call ethical technique in practice. The ethical technique I refer to has a dimension of its own: its own repertoire, methods, and technical things, which I won't go into here.

If I may, I'd like to concentrate these few thoughts on the enterprise of cultivation of that part of the environment where people live, that is residential environments. This seems a good place to focus, since our living habitats constitute the greatest areas and investments among all sorts of environments in which we find ourselves, and because social life is very much linked in our minds to where we dwell.

A basic question in the cultivation of residential environments was posed in a fresh way 30 years ago by John Habraken, working in Holland; and by John Turner, working in Peru. Habraken's picture of our task is worth paraphrasing briefly. He asked:

How is it that all the necessary work can be organized, so that no dwelling will come into existence without the direct action of the household? That is, can we work, as professionals, in such a way that both the common domain and the individual domains are fully and directly respected in the act of dwelling, not by way of statistics and abstract classifications, but by direct action of dwellers?

Now, this question poses very interesting dilemmas to many experts who find themselves involved in "housing." Suffice it to say that the question is radical. It was radical in Holland, and in Peru, and still is wherever the question is raised in professional circles. There are, the questions suggest, limits to professional control if we really wish the social and individual realms in dwelling environments to find equilibrium over time. Professionals can have only 1/2 of the world!

The reason I bring this up is that underlying this idea of dwelling as an act is the notion that when we work out of this conception, "housing" will not become strictly a commodity for passive consumers. Nor will "housing" become a plaything for experts' self-expression and paternalism.

Dwelling, we'd assert, is a verb. Without the action of the dweller, a dwelling in its deepest sense cannot come about and live in the social sphere. Likewise, without the action of the social sphere, a dwelling cannot exist as a setting for the expression of household values. So there is always a balance to be found in each situation. Too often I think we'll find this relation tilted out of balance. On the one hand are the stark public housing estates we can find in many societies, extensions of a dominant social/ professional ethic operating without respect for the individual sphere. On the other hand, we'll find the homeless and marginal settlements in many societies in which the social sphere and expert capabilities have withdrawn. Where do professionals align themselves in this picture? What can they do? What should they stop doing?

Very significant qualities of a nurturing social life are, I 'd suggest, implicitly coupled with the actual, living process of making a dwelling in a social context. There are agreements to be made on shared conditions of a dwelling environment. Each individual territory is there to be cultivated, bringing a wide range of social exchanges to life, involving many actors in useful work, sharing of conventions and assertions of human values and individuality.

There are really three reasons to bring up this question of dwelling as an act, rather than as a commodity, in relation to the theme of the discussions here.

First, observations of healthy, vital dwelling environments suggest that where the household level is in direct control of its own territory, there is a correspondence in general terms with a healthy and human social condition. Control is, of course, different from ownership. Control means the exclusive ability to act and change the physical environment.

Second, we will find that environments in which we can observe the patient cultivation of dwellings and shared places are congruent with a sort of organic visual variety, expressive of living, fine-grained decisions with its own orderliness. This is most often the case in situations in which professionals do not continuously dominate all processes and forms of transformation. We see these sorts of environments in situations in which strong "bottom-up" forces complement "top-down" forces.

Third, such environments cultivated by the acts of households in a shared situation are more "efficient," more "economical" in the large sense than the optimized, rationalized, and "correct" environments conceived and managed by a professional elite too often out of touch with reality.

These three observations on the equity and balance of forces are interesting because they make us think about professional practice, and the ethics out of which we work. Renewed methods and values of practice to enable, or at least not inhibit, the cultivation of such "healthy physical/social situations" in dwelling environments constitutes a pressing need today.

In the area of practice from this standpoint, I'd like to suggest that reflection on moral technique will indicate that -- as professional designers and builders -- we would be wise to consider the dictum enunciated by Rudolf Steiner in the early part of the 20th century, and reiterated in Bernard Lievegoed's work in Holland later on.

That is, while transforming the present into a future state, there comes the skill to do this in such a way that the object with which one is working is not violated -- so that the object is transformed according to its own laws. In social terms, this means that whenever one wishes to act in the social realm, one must always start from the premise that one's own actions should not prejudice the freedom of others.

The direct relation of this dictum to environmental design is that as we enter into a role in support of the cultivation of dwelling environments, it is our task to work out of an understanding of the laws of environmental transformation. Since dwelling environments are nothing if they are not people and forms interacting in time, then the task of professionals is to conceive of our work

in a way that will not prejudice the freedom of others to do their own after our job is done, particularly those who will daily make their lives in the environments we help to cultivate.

As I mentioned, this raises quite interesting methodological issues, centering on the coordination of the many agents who together must agree to build, and whose participation is apparently needed to support this cultivation process in all its social and technical dimensions.

It is a very open question as to what exactly the ordinary built environment has to do with the humanization of social life. I have a feeling that we share the observation that there is a relation, but that it is very hard to pin down. But pin it down we must, if we wish to act in support of a knowledge we have accepted as tacit. I'm suggesting that we would do well to understand the built environment as a transforming phenomenon, instead of a static artifact. That way, we will be in a better position to devise ways of working as design and building professionals that correspond in detail to social life as it transforms.

In my field, these issues are important because they touch on methods of practice, on things we can really do. The issues are also worth examining because as educators, the epistemology of teaching and practice out of which we work is important to our students in many direct and indirect ways. Finally, the ethical stance we take, as we participate in the transformation of the built environment, and the methods found workable, have a measure of importance in the maintenance of the profession of architecture in the humanist tradition.

Epilogue
War: Inevitable or Now Obsolete?

Paul Peachey

Is war, like chattel slavery, an institution destined for obsolescence? Or is it rather inherent in the human condition, and hence ineradicable? Do events in eastern Europe, in South Africa, and elsewhere since the late 1980s shed any light on these questions, or are these events rather mere ‘happenstance’? Historically, war has been an engine of social change. Most modern states have been created and/or maintained by military sanctions. But war, as everyone knows, "is hell" (William T. Sherman). Though a human activity, it is quintessentially inhumane. Any serious discussion of the humanization of social change must confront the problem of war.

During the second half of the twentieth century it has often been observed that ours has been a "century of total war." The suffering and devastation caused by wars in this century are quite beyond human comprehension in both scope and intensity. Yet for several decades we have been forced to live on the brink of dangers that dwarf anything this century has thus far brought.

Paradoxically, war has been waged as the means to peace. A fourth century Roman officer named Vegetius left to the world its military axiom: "Si vis pacem, para bellum." If you desire peace, prepare for war. According to "realist" political theory, disregard of this axiom led to WorId War II. "Pacifist" sentiments and policies prevailing in the Western democracies produced the vacuum that Hitler filled. Seeking peace without preparing for war, governments brought on the very evil they thought, by "pacifist" means, to avoid.

In effect, then, this "century of total war" has nurtured two fundamentally opposed impulses, indeed ideologies, both seeking to avoid war. One drives toward the dismantling of military machines, the other toward the extension of the Vegetius maxim. Meanwhile "deterrence," the Vegetius maxim, is said by many to have worked. After World War I the Allies disarmed and war came; after the second, the West armed and "peace" prevailed. Or did it? History, however, has yet to render the verdict.

Meanwhile, late in this century, we confront a new situation. Major changes, changes that in the past precipitated violence, have been enacted nonviolently, without military sanctions--in eastern Europe, in South Africa, and elsewhere. And though each instance was home-grown and unique, all were informed as well by antecedents, notably Gandhi in India, and King in the United States.

What do all these developments, taken together, signify? Clearly a larger perspective or framework is needed if they are to be properly assessed. After all, armed conflict is as old as "civilization." History may be said to be weighted in its favor. Moreover, though universally feared, war also fascinates. Military exploits are glorified, and thereby the horror, the suffering, and the loss of war are somehow made bearable.

More fundamental, nonetheless, than the glorification of war is the yearning for peace. That yearning--and the promise of peace, was expressed classically by the ancient Hebrew prophets. These foresaw the time when nations "shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks . . . neither shall they learn war anymore; but they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree, and none shall make them afraid" (Micah 4:3-4). Is this to occur "within history," as later thinkers were to observe, or "beyond history?" Somehow the concept remained ambiguous. Nonetheless the vision of peace was taken up resoundingly in the early Christian

tradition, only to be traduced when the faith became the ideology of empire. Though thereafter submerged, the vision was never extinguished, surviving instead in a variety of monastic and "sectarian" forms. The dream was to reappear, increasingly in secular guise, in the modern peace movements, beginning in Great Britain and the United States in the year of the Congress of Vienna of 1815. Some forty merchants and clergymen formed the New York Peace Society in December, 1815, followed a month later, quite independently, by the founding of the London Peace Society. Simultaneously, but likewise independently, a Massachusetts Peace Society was formed in Boston. As other local groups sprang up, by 1828 an American Peace Society was formed to consolidate these efforts. That Society remained active throughout the nineteenth century.

Since that time, peace movements have risen and declined in the Western world, sometimes in great profusion, depending on the fortunes of peace and war. They have been part of the ferment that led to the formation of international institutions such as the International Court (The Hague), the League of Nations, and today's United Nations. These movements have been linked even more directly to the nurture of "nonviolent direct action" as an alternative to violence as a tool, either to "enforce" or to "challenge" authority (Understanding Violence, by Graeme Newman, New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1979).

Our century has been indeed a "century of total war." But almost surprisingly, it may end as the century of change without war. "Realism," as defined above — "si vis Pacem, para bellum" -- has been the prevailing paradigm in political theory and policy in recent decades. Indeed, as noted, World War II, as conventionally interpreted in the US, reinforced that maxim. But in the absence of a regulating corrective, this "realism" gave us the global projection of U.S. power, Viet Nam, the Cold War, and the arms race. Much of early twentieth century pacifism, against which this realism is arrayed, may have been utopian. In part it rested on conceptions of human progress and perfectibility that cannot be sustained. Yet in the end, the "realism" proposed as remedy, may be even more misguided than the pacifist naivete it was intended to remedy. "There is no way to peace," the veteran pacifist, A. J. Muste, used to say, as if replying to Vegetius, "peace is the way!"

Groups cohere by both "carrot" and "stick," by "both-and" rather than "either-or" means. Reality is too complex to be reduced to simple binary moral terms. Yet repeatedly we confront moments of truth. We must take this way or that. Historically is this such a moment? Do the end of the Cold War and the sudden triumph of "ballot over bullet" in a dozen conflicts around the world suggest that at long last war itself is becoming obsolete? Is it really within our power to choose Muste rather than Vegetius, peace rather than war? Can we realistically reverse the ancient maxim to read, "If you do not want war, prepare for peace?" Armed international conflict will not disappear overnight. But as long as we consider it inevitable, and arm accordingly, it doubtless will be. This may well be a moment of truth for the international community, and hence for each of us. What can we do?

Appendix

Reports of Seminars on the Humanization of Social Life: The Dilemmas of Change

First Report*:* Initial Reflections on the Problematic and Some Related Research Themes

Theoretical Context

The theme: "Humanization of Social Life" immediately directs attention to the notion of person and extends the last seminar on "The Place of the Person in Society." The present seminar is directed toward two special implications of that theme especially appropriate to our time. One is that the progressively generalized recognition—during the last 50 years and culminating in 1989—of the lack of adequate attention of the distinctive dignity of the person in social life and its structures implies the need for social development and change. The second is that this need confronts us with some of the most profound dilemmas of life in ever more complex times.

Together these present a number of tasks. The first is to the grasp true dimensions of the challenge. The watershed events in Eastern Europe and China in 1989 drew the world's attention to the issue of human dignity. But these must not totally distract our attention from other types of challenges to the dignity of mankind more characteristic of other regions. Some are so violent and shockingly ruthless as to make them difficult to accept; others are so subtle and enticing that they may be easily accepted and thereby undermine even new found freedoms. Hence, it becomes necessary to look for root characteristics of our times which enable us to grasp with new insight the dignity of the person, to recoil from oppressions long accepted and to search for ways as yet unexplored in which to respond to the dilemmas of our times and in which even to advance and enrich the sense of what it is to be human.

Four theoretical steps seem suggested. The first is to look into the Western tradition for what it has come to discover about the person, in particular: (a) for its constitution in itself or, as it were, on its own two feet, (b) for its character as free and responsible, and (c) for its creative capacities to envisage new possibilities. The second is to look to the Eastern sense of unity for ways of healing the divisive conflicts of egoism. This could make it possible to look more directly at the corrosive forces destructive of social life and both to understand the dynamism of oppression and to gain our bearings for attempts to respond thereto. Thirdly, it was suggested that the Trinity may constitute a model for combining the two, namely, the full integrity of the person that is yet lived in full communion with others. To this could be adjoined, fourthly, a broad Christian anthropology which would project a theoretical framework for the humanization of social life.

Without such sense of what the person is by nature and should strive to be in fact, efforts to understand the situation could provide only a basis for despair, adjustment to the situation might be in fact only compromise, and compromise in turn might be capitulation to the vortex forces of human destruction. Hence, an effort to bring into focus some of the historical progress in learning more about the dignity of the person and the goals for a corresponding humanization of the relations between persons is a first and continuing task.

Socio-Political Dimension

The dignity of the person can be experienced not only positively, but negatively or by contrast. Hence, many mentioned ways in which the person is treated not as subject and hence as a free and responsible determinant of their actions, but as an object to be manipulated by others and utilized for goals or goods that are less than human.

In the social, political and the economic orders this can be experienced in many ways. It can be the concentration of power in the hands of the few leaving the vast number of people powerless over their fate. It can be the reality of empire as overriding entity which treats entire peoples as objects in order to assert its own goals and interests. In our more intellectual times it can be ideology which is willing to sacrifice the free expression of peoples in favor of its own constrictive sense of order, progress, production or unbridled competition.

This suggests work on a number of levels. First, a critical hermeneutics could make it possible to identify at various levels the patterns of interests and the social and psychological dynamisms which constrict free expression. Second, it may now be possible to achieve new understanding of what triggers and enables change, and, perhaps even more, what can guide change along paths which lead to a result that is truly democratic? After many decades when change was undoubtedly desired but was seemed impossible, great changes are suddenly afoot: what are the conditions and catalysts of such change? For this, studies of the rhetoric of change whether in classical sources or contemporary situations might prove to be of special help in gaining insight into the way new vision is shaped, deep and broad human commitment constituted, and social consensus constructed.

Socio-Cultural Dimension

A first question in this area is how change can take place without descending into anarchy and chaos under the pressure of economic need, ethnic rivalries or simple lack of leadership? This directs attention toward the past in order to garner the considerable resources of restraint, civility, sacrifice and dedication in the tradition of the peoples. If we are to rise to this task our own stature will not do, we must stand on the shoulders of our forebears. If we are to have the needed adaptability the fixed patterns of scientific constructs will not suffice; hence it is important to survey the values of our culture in order that the profoundly humane achievements and commitments of our people might be engaged and promoted. And we must ask whether values influence policy; and if so whether these cases are remembered and institutionalized in the policy making process possible rather than being relegated to a secondary place in favor of national interest, security and the like.

Second, the resources of the various cultural traditions may hold special promise. Where some cultures have structured their modern institutions on a model of single competing individuals linked externally through a social contract, others, e.g., the Philippines, may have retained a greater emphasis upon deep bonds of community and harmony. This may be an important resource for any effort to conceive a humanization of social life. The economic and industrial prowess of the so-called five small dragons along the Pacific rim suggest that modernity is not an univocous notion, that humankind possesses rich and varied resources for its humanization, and indeed that humanization of any one part of mankind may now depend upon a wise assimilation of ideas and examples from many sources.

Third, work toward the future requires models of society which can guide our efforts? We need to search for models of wholeness and open social cooperation in a pattern of subsidiarity in order, instead of mutual exclusion and extensive marginalization, to maximize participation and

responsible self-determination at each level. This would suggest a pervasive program of humanization and entitlement at all levels of social life.

Fourth, in this light the nature of science must itself be deeply reassessed. In the Kantian system the sciences work with universal and necessary terms. But humans work in science and make it an exercise of freedom in which human genius, creativity and commitment are important. This is true in physics and even more true in economics and medicine. In the field of communications a global network exists already. It will be a major task to safeguard in this appropriate individual, commercial, national and cultural interests. The recent effort of the United Nations to work out a global policy simply for information illustrates how difficult this can be. The humanization of modern social life cannot proceed without investigations of the human role in scientific work and the humanizing potentialities of scientific progress.

Religious and Ecclesial Dimensions

Finally one should look to the theological groundings of reality and cultures. The notion of a unitary source and goal gives a sense of personal dignity which takes the person beyond the position of being an object of social manipulation. At the same time it grounds in love that relatedness and brotherhood which go beyond measured legal requirements. This can suggest alternate horizontal models of social relation, even with vertical strictures as, e.g., in the medieval utopian vision of R. Lull and the contemporary indications of Vatican II. Further, the notion of redemption bespeaks forgiveness and reconciliation.

It seems not at all accidental that from Poland, where this religious vision comes to life in a strong sense of church or *ecclesia*, there came the first and it seems irrepressible impetus for humanizing change—or that conservative efforts in El Salvador finally focused murderously upon the Catholic University and its Jesuits professors.

But what is the proper role of the church in a pluralistic society? How can it bring the message of an absolute grounding for human dignity to save it from subjection to a system or a state made by men, while at the same time it promotes the human freedom this entails? Are the two contradictory or identical?

Second Report

The session considered the reports of G. McLean "Person, Creativity and Social Change" and D. Blanchard "Pastoral Practice as Rebellion: The Humanization of Social Life in El Salvador." Together they directed attention to the Western foundations of the dignity of the person and to the radical attack upon this dignity in an area of the Western Hemisphere. The following session will look again at these foundations, but with the resources of Eastern philosophy and of the critical hermeneutics of social practice.

Person

A Subject in One's Own Right

A major mode of dehumanization which effects contemporary efforts at modernization in all parts of the world is its tendency as scientific rationalization to reduce all to clear and distinct structures in which persons are considered only functionally or as roles. The more properly

personal dimensions of the human being, at first ignored, are crushed progressively whenever they disturb the machine-like system.

In responding to this modern threat it seems helpful to draw up the resources developed in Greek philosophy. In Greek the term person appears to have reflected an actor playing a role by speaking through a theatre mask. If Athens was to promote human life—rather than killing off its Socrates—there was need for an understanding not only of roles, but of the persons who played those roles. This was progressively sculptured in the Academy and Lyceum.

First, there was need to distinguish between what came to be called accidents, namely the reality which existed in and by something else, and the subject of these accidents, in which they exist. This is the substance, the reality which exists in its own right or, as it were, stands on its own two feet. Progressively through ancient times, and especially through Christian philosophy's development of the sense of existence as the direct effect of the creative power of God, the subject came to be recognized as having three characteristics: completeness, independence and being the subject or source of actions.

When these are considered in substances which are persons, completeness would exclude reduction of the person to any of its dimensions after the manner of an idealism or a materialism. It would urge attention not merely to either mind or body, to either spirit or matter, but to both together as a whole. Today we would think also of the developmental character of the person and in any assessment of a situation give great weight to what would stunt or promote human realization in either or both of these dimensions.

Independence for the person does not mean unconnectedness, for being material the person is sculpted out of the flow of material life and hence integrated and even integral to the development of the physical universe. At the same time, emerging precisely out of that universe and being constituted in its own right, the person cannot be merely absorbed into, or reduced to, any other unity whether physical or social. Instead, as subject of actions which affects not only others but oneself, the human subject is intimately and responsibly related to the whole which it must preserve and promote.

A Self-Conscious and Free Subject

Thus far we have been speaking about how the Greek tradition though ancient and medieval (i.e., classical) times evolved the characteristics of subsistent individuality which undergirds the sense of human rights. It showed that rights pertained, not to a society which at its discretion extended them to persons, but to persons themselves whose protection and promotion are an imperative for society.

The Greeks faced another task as well. That was to identify the level of the dignity and responsibility proper to the human person as such. This task becomes clearer when one notes that in the Greek mythic horizon, not only were humans subject to the will of the gods, but the gods, in turn, were subject to impersonal fate. It was liberation from this, rather than from mere physical necessity, which constituted the greatest development of the person through classical times. We face similar challenges in this century proportionate to the development of our technical prowess and its power for invasive and pervasive controls of spirit as well as body.

The project of Heraclitus for liberation from an impersonal fate required three components: (a) a universe that was under law and had a sense, (b) the ability of the person to obtain some understanding of that law, and (c) with these laws to be able to exercise command over their life. For Plato and Aristotle the powers of knowledge and command characterized the person and non-

physical beings above mankind. In the Christian Middle Ages, by evolving the way in which the person incarnates these principles and capabilities, philosophy provided essential understanding of personal unity and vision, goodness and love.

First, that the person has but one existence and one form or soul means both that one's physical reality has human dignity and must not be coerced, and that one's spiritual dignity must be exercised and realized in temporal and historical modes. Second, the mode in which the laws of the universe are present to the person is not merely one of consciousness as with animals, but of self-conscious. This implies not a self-centeredness, but an ability to grasp the reality and structure of things in a controlled scientific mode, to express this in a language and to shape it creatively as art. Finally, as not limited to matter, but spiritual, the person can transcend self and universe and be open to Being, Truth and Goodness Itself. In this relationship every good, as participating and imaging Goodness Itself, can be attractive; but because none of them fully matches Goodness Itself each engagement is free.

Freedom and Creativity. The phenomenologies developed in this century have made it possible to come to a still more direct appreciation of the subjectivity which characterizes the person and the way in which the free exercise of this is itself the manifestation par excellence of Being and hence the essence of creative change.

This can be approached through Marcel's critique of the subject-object relationship as the basic frame for epistemology: if in order to be known the subject must be made an object it thereby loses its very subjectivity. Hence a new approach centered in the subject is required. The three *Critiques* of Kant constitute a more intricate approach to this subject. In the first he shows how the subject is at work in the very constitution of the objective necessary and universal laws of the sciences. His second *Critique* leads us to freedom as the source of the moral and hence social laws. The third *Critique* shows that if human freedom is not to be suffocated by the necessary laws of the universe then all must be considered as teleological or goal oriented.

But just how is the exercise of human freedom to be mediated to this teleology? If exercised ultimately according to scientific laws it will not be free; if exercised according to universal moral laws, even those given to ourselves, it will not be a creative centers for change. Hence, our imagination must range through reality considering all, both the actual and the possible. It must evaluate all according to our sense of what would befit and contribute to the constitution of a life of harmony, beauty and peace. In these terms we must react with the full force of our personality involving our total being to its very roots.

At this point our creative human freedom becomes not only the source, but the model, mirror and norm of change that humanizes social life. This is not to say that our freedom is absolute; it is the divine Goodness Itself that is the *alpha* and *omega* and whose love creates and dynamizes us at each moment. But we experience that love through the ways in which it is imaged or disfigured in the life of every person and community. Our response reverberates at our very core where the divine gives us ever new and transforming life.

Discussion

The suggestion of the paper was that in approaching the issue of change toward a humanization of social life both the classical Western tradition regarding substance and subject and the modern attention to subjectivity have important contributions to make. If this be so then, first, both elements will need to overcome their real and perceived limitations, and secondly, they

will need to be related effectively one to the other. The hope for some success in this is that the two may prove to be complementary parts of the same project of the humanization of social life in our time.

Substance and Person

First, there are difficulties in drawing upon the classical tradition. One is the way it is perceived and presented and by whom. Those who appeal to it most forcibly appear in fact to be of a conservative mind-set, not only in the broad and obvious cultural sense of being concerned to preserve earlier achievements, but in the socio-economic sense if clinging to a laissez-faire individualism. Themes such as the autonomy of the individual, 'private property', and the rights to self-determination by the individual states in contrast to the broader nation, seem to vibrate in unison as parts of an overarching restrictive ideology. There is a twin danger here. On the one hand, those concerned with the significance of any one of these points might be enlisted as foot soldiers in the campaigns of a broader and reductionist ideology; and/or those who share more social concerns might reject or be willing to compromise values central to the personal subject in order to achieve legitimate social goals.

The example of Camus examined in the paper of D. Blanchard is important on this latter count, namely, his critique of Sartre for being willing to accept human repression in order to achieve the goals for the working class. Finally, given their voice in 1989 the peoples of Eastern Europe immediately, unanimously and passionately reechoed that critique. Their dignity and freedom was not to be restricted for any reason. This is not merely a matter of choice which a people might or might not make, however, for it was noted that any society which attempts to leap forward at the expense of the personhood of its members is in internal and destructive contradiction: social life is personal and the destruction of personal life is social suicide.

But is a turn to the notions of substance and subject, which apply also to rocks and plants, really helpful for understanding the human person? If the terms were to be taken univocously so that predicating existence or life of a person expressed no more than when they were predicated respectively of a rock or a plant, they would not be helpful and might indeed be counterproductive. This has been the central reductivist side effect of the attempt in the sciences to conceive all dimensions of life only in clear and distinct univocous terms.

But when one speaks of the actual reality or existence of a plant one states more than when one spoke of these in regard to rocks, for to speak of the existence of a plant is to speak of life. Existence, then, and its cognates such as substance and subject are not univocous but analogous terms. Each is said precisely according to the nature of the being involved.

Hence, to say that persons are substances is to say two things, first that each exists in his or her own right, that they can no more be annihilated or treated as non-existent than can the Rock of Gibraltar, that they are independent and cannot lose their identity by being assumed into something else. In our days of mass society this is a message from the past which we need desperately not to forget.

But there is a second meaning to being a substance which broadens and enriches what has just been said. The analogous character of the notion means not only that a substance exists in its own right, but that this existence is according to the proper nature of the being. As subject then the human being has not only the stalwart irreducibility of the rock and the dynamic reactive character of the plant, but combines these and much more in the tenacious, adaptive and creative human nature characterized by insight and will. Thus, to say that the human person as substance is

complete expresses one's human integrity as irreducible, as beyond compromise and inviolable by any and all others. This was the basic text of the events of 1989 in both their tragic and their triumphant modes.

The same is true of the characteristics of substance: independence and even incommunicability, for both are said classically according to the properly human nature of the person. They bespeak not isolation from, or lack of concern for, others, but an ability not merely for pre-determined reactions to external stimuli as cattle in a storm, but for assessing the situation, freely determining the direction of one's response, and coordinating accordingly all involved—which probably will include not only physical realities but free persons, each of which must be treated in turn according to its nature.

In this light the emphasis of Kant upon the human person as an end in oneself is important, not least because of his insistence that one must treat not only him or herself accordingly, but all persons as well. This means that we are challenged to move beyond the notion of the person to that of community and society; this will be carried further in the subsequent chapters. This first step regarding the person, however, must remain firm if the resulting notion of society is not to be a new impersonal and depersonalizing mass. The humanization of social life must never forget this resource of the classical Western tradition.

Subject, Society and Freedom

There may, however, be other starting points. It is suggested by many in this century, such as G. Marcel above, that we need to begin at a new place: not in the distinction of subject and object, but in the more unitive sense of community.

It may be noted that Aristotle's intent in distinguishing subject and object was not to isolate or oppose: indeed, for him the very essence of knowledge was the subject's becoming the object. This is important to note, for if the diagnosis of the sources of dehumanization is faulty, we may undertake unnecessary and radically destructive surgery. Radical objectification would appear to stem rather from the Cartesian search for clarity and distinctness. This began with a focus upon the subject which contains in germ the hopes and possibilities for progress in our time, but only if it be followed with care. Hence, it is important to look to the problems entailed.

First, can one speak at the same time of freedom, especially full freedom, and values, commitment and responsibility? Does not the latter bespeak limitations and restriction? Or would this not be too limited a notion of freedom, characterized by negation of direction and specification, by arbitrariness and emptiness? To appreciate freedom as that which is prized one needs to set it within the context of the good or desirable and then look at the character of the desiring. If it be but blind instinct or passion it would not be at the human level. If it be but capricious option it would not relate to a life that is serious, constructive and creative. Hence one needs to appreciate it rather as that point at which we determine our actions , i.e., the point of self-determination. Its quality will consist then in the degree of self-awareness and commitment and in the extent of the sense of the good which our decisions reflect.

Or is this unrealistic not only in the practical, but especially in the technical sense of the term? Is not the notion of full freedom something that applies only to the interior and "subjective" life of the person, but becomes impossible as soon as one considers other persons and other things. Indeed, the realism of a social materialism insists not upon the person alone, but upon social laws and in turn their grounding in the conditions of production. To be a philosophical realist in these terms goes beyond the realism of the classical philosophical tradition to separate drastically interior

freedom which might be called "personal" freedom from life in society with its basically objective laws able to be known and plotted according to a scientific theory of history.

But is this enough? If this theory is total, if what is real is material and what is material is what, according to Engels, impinges upon the senses then all reality is equally open and present to all who have the ability to sense. Nothing is private; there is no reality to the distinction between the interior and personal, on the one hand, and what is exteriorly available and social, on the other. The limitations upon personal persecution become only those of public pursuit, which in our age of communication and indoctrination are skrinking indeed. Conversely, if the public social arena is a forum not for personal freedom, but only for laws and rules, then there can be no meaning to the term 'democracy'. Yet this has been the vocabulary of the call for social change in `89.

In this light an overview of this pattern of social theory in this century would appear to reveal precisely a progressive personalization and thus humanization of social theories and structures. Philosophically this can be read in terms of the sharp cleavages which have characterized modern philosophy and the Cartesian efforts at the rationalization of all in terms that are clear enough precisely to distinguish one thing from all else. The division which would appear to have characterize life earlier in this century has positioned on the one hand, a theoretical individualism with its resultant laissez faire capitalism within and its colonialism without. Related changes have been the political decolonization and the development of the many "new" notions in the 50's and 60's, and the work of labor unions and minority movements to change attitudes and develop related social legislation.

On the other hand, one found the concrete hypothesis of the social in the German National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi) and in the Communist party. The bloody travails of the Second World War was a passionate rejection not only of Hitler as one mad megalomaniac, but of nazism and fascism as a whole outlook on social life. Spain was not allowed to enter the European community till after the death of Franco.

How should one interpret the events of '89 in Eastern Europe and China; what have been the direction and goal of the subsequent changes? Some see it simply as a process of overcoming the megalomania of Stalin and his successors which excluded democracy, within as well as without the Party. Or did the pervasive disbanding or renaming of the communist parties in Eastern Europe reflect a much deeper and broader change, in which case we would be at a more radically new and democratic beginning in the search to achieve the ideals of Socialism, Marxist-Leninism and Communism. Indeed, it may be precisely that the theoretical absolutism of ideologies signified by the letters 'ism' is being supplanted by democracy as a more open and pluralistic system, precisely as this extends personal freedom to the social sphere.

But then will we not encounter new difficulties, for if we are not to depend simply upon the application of scientific theories of history or of social change, if we are to allow human choice and freedom to play a central role, are we not opening ourselves to the prejudices of individuals and groups and to the limitations of the vision of societies and even cultures. Is it not safer to appeal simply to the sciences at the level of the first critique. This is the effort of critical hermeneutics to enlist the sciences in the project of the humanization of social life. It is an important effort and can give us new capabilities for the transition to the next century. It is important, however, that the employment of the sciences not eviscerate the humane core of our social structures or reduce all to structures alone. Similarly, efforts at the level of the second *Critique* add an important sense of 'lawed' rights and duties which can inspire and protect the person. Nevertheless, it is important not to allow human life to be bleached out by what can be articulated in law and made universal for all. If the more abstract and universal is the higher, then

the ability to recognize, promote and draw upon the concrete experience of persons living in communities and culture is depreciated or even suppressed, and the bonds for love, caring and reconciliation are lost.

It is in this sense that the third *Critique* becomes important, not as a substitute, but as an integrator on the previous two levels. It is here that the dignity, creativity and freedom of persons and peoples enters to shape according to a sense of harmony and peace physical and social relations which can be understood only partially according to the principles of the physical and social sciences. Human life now can realize its potentialities and be expressed—even proclaimed—with brilliance (to echo the three characteristics of beauty: species, order and clarity). Because some will try to do this with unfounded and inconsistent economics, the project will require the best of economics and the other sciences at the level of the first *Critique*. As others will attempt to do this at the cost of peoples' lives the project will require social ethics, national constitutions and international conventions at the level of Kant's second *Critique*. But the system which thinks of progress without taking care to educate its coming generations to a deep respect for its own and others' values and cultural traditions at the level of the third *Critique* will find change destructively dehumanizing both for itself and all whom it touches.

The challenge for the related theory is to be able to unite the classical vision and its sense of the unity of the person and of persons with the modern value of the enlightenment with its sense of human subjectivity and freedom in a way that will enable each to enrich the other. Both are needed to develop creative responses to the concrete challenges of contemporary social life. There are important theoretical resources in our distant and more recent past; we now confront a desperately urgent need for vision and orientation; ahead there looms great potentialities for mankind in a truly liberated century.

Practical Order

In the practical order people seem quite limited in their ability to recognize social aberrations, increasingly so as the evils are more atrocious, closer to home or matters in which one's people and hence oneself shares real complicity.

This was the case, e.g., for people in North America vis-a-vis the atrocities in Central America. There a system of oligarchies initiated by the colonizers, reestablished in the new post-colonial nations and ruthlessly imposed in recent decades divides the populace between the very few (e.g., 14 families in one nation), on the one hand, who hold the land and make use of its products and, on the other hand, the practical totality of the rural populace—largely Indian in some countries—who have been dispossessed of their communal lands which they now must work for exploitive wages.

This system is imposed even through genocide which in some cases eradicates whole populations— it is estimated that as many as 250,000 Indians have been killed in one region of Guatemala. Those who protest simply "disappear" or are brutally tortured and butchered in a real aesthetic of terror. Those who would help in any way—health workers, literacy teachers, priests who would bring people together for self help and improvement—are seen as liberating, marked as communist, and scheduled for elimination. The execution of six Jesuit professors at the Catholic University of Central America in El Salvador is but one known example of a very common occurrence.

Before this situation the example of Camus is important. He insisted that human oppression must be rejected and condemned by all, without excuse or qualification. No matter of policy,

commerce or even liberation can excuse one from condemning human oppression wherever it is found. What and whence is the force of such protests? They do not automatically necessitate a result the way throwing a light switch automatically turns on the light, as on the level of Kant's first *Critique*. The appeal to rights and to justice of the second *Critique* would be closer as its appeals to people's moral conscience according to the norms of justice and order. Yet, any meaningful change may well have to be in the social order itself and a way must be found to go beyond a society's formal and structured response to law and order. The velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries were first met with legal bannings and "forces of order," as had Martin Luther King in Birmingham and Montgomery, Alabama. As in the Philippines, these soon became irrelevant and almost quaint before the massive force of the expression of peoples' freedom. Beyond the decrees and structures of law and order they called for freedom and, as in the battle of Jericho, the structures collapsed. Beyond brute force and the science of history the people had given voice to what they most deeply were and would be. This is the real power in human affairs. A Mother Theresa or Mahatma Gandhi, a Martin Luther King or Vaclav Havel symbolize what reality enlivens people's freedom and in the end it is this which both mobilizes and directs human striving and hence human events.

In this light those who share the concerns of the oppressed in Central America dream that the charismatic leadership which could topple oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe might find the universality of heart to extend some of their considerable moral wreght to the oppressed of Central America.

Is it feasible to expect such universality of concern when attention and practical efforts must be focused in order to achieve results, or is it functional reasoning that permits manipulation? In fact, the phenomenon of hundreds of thousands of "disappeared," even after the Second World War, is a concrete shared experience of Eastern Europeans. Further, the moral stature of persons, while intensely historically and culturally specific, does appear to be communicable to other peoples. Indeed, this suggests that it is not the abstract universals which carry moral weight, but freedom as concretely lived. This is what proclaims human dignity and commands human respect..

This may have important implications for efforts to humanize social life. At the end of World War II a number of efforts to form universal human values abstracted from the concrete traditions and experiences of the individual peoples. More recently some think to overcome cultural conflict by generalized human values. When these ignore or depreciate the traditions of a people by which, in freedom and sacrifice, they have constituted their identity, such insensitive ministrations can inflame tensions for they constitute cultural genocide. Instead we have to face freedom, value what people have freely become and help them to open new roads along which they wish to construct their future. Today "of the people, for the people, by the people" means "of their freedom, for their freedom and by their freedom."

For this we need to reach far, for our efforts must span from the work of providing a liberal education which will truly free the next generation to the construction of a world social order in which persons and peoples can live that freedom.

Third Report

The theme "humanization of social life" requires an effort at clarification to which the Hindu approach may both make its own distinctive contribution and at the same time constitute an alternate perspective, enabling others to reassess and approach anew their own positions.

Beyond situationally specific behavior, ‘humanness’ is a deeper principle or value which one ought to realize in full freedom for oneself and others. The need for `humanization’ bespeaks the reality of the inhumane; it suggests that the humane is the natural state of life and that the impediments to this must be removed.

One impediment might be the attempt to realize life: (a) only in terms of the subject, or (b) only in terms of the object, or (c) only in terms of the relation of subject and object. A unity of (a) and (b) would point to personal moral development and self-respect, that of (a) and (c) would point to social equality, freedom and dignity in society. Throughout unity emerges as central.

Another impediment is the identification of humanness with ego, according to which the individual person is seen in contrast to others. An analysis of the various states of human consciousness, especially that of deep and dreamless sleep, suggests rather that humanness is self or consciousness (*prajna*), which becomes myself (*visva*) by acquiring the I or ‘ego’ in the state of wakefulness. Hence, humanness in essence and ultimately is active consciousness. It is the distinguishing Ego which in our daily experience conceals this consciousness and/or projects it in a different manner. Hence, the task of humanization is correction of the Ego. For this one must know why and how it functions as it does, which, in turn, requires knowledge of the full story of the Ego.

The ego or individuality can turn in two directions. If it turns to opposition toward others and isolation it cannot but lose its existence, annihilate itself and disturb the process of nature. Hence, it must turn toward others in an attitude of cooperation and peace. In this the ego must not lose its individuality within the total Ego, lest the whole process be futile. Instead the process must promote the reality of individuals in a way which leads to unity. The key to this is ultimately to enable the reality of ultimate consciousness to emerge within each individual.

It should not be thought that this is merely a matter of human beings in contrast to the whole of nature. On the contrary, this same dynamism is basic to nature at each level from the formation of atoms to that of mega social structures.

At the second level the problem is that the lack of coherence in social life renders problematic the straightforward expression of humanness. In order to find a solution one needs to know how the essentially good natural process is manipulated in accordance with the private Egos of different individuals. ‘Relation’ exemplifies this: though by nature relation promotes the process of nature, one tries always to manipulate relation in order to use it for one’s own benefit. One cannot maintain the same concern he shows for himself with his family, and it is even worse with the others, for the private functional ego works over enthusiastically for self preservation. Similarly, such good things as colonies, communities, society, religion, law and state policies which promote human unity by arresting the function of the private Ego, ultimately become manipulated for class division power, domination, and exploitation.

Our task is to balance the private Ego with the public Ego after making corrections in social life. The ultimate quest is to conceive the world community on a single platform for if one does not join with the process of nature one not only destroys oneself but also disturbs the whole process and becomes a hinderance for the development of humanity. Thus, one ought to be responsible for one’s own sake and for that of others as well.

The major suggestion of this paper regarding the "humanization of the social life" is that the course of the evolution of revolutions in the history of social change will not end in itself. Therefore, while one thinks about the articulation of social structures one ought to keep in mind that the goal should be the perfection of the person. This means that everything involved in the articulation of social structures, such as, the social, political, economic, educational, and

psychological aspects should be directed towards the goal of human perfection, for without individual perfection the real freedom of the individual cannot be exercised. One may argue that every theory has its own end, i.e., a person's benefit, but this can be questioned. Where do all such political goals end? In fact, they never end, or they may end in total destruction. For instance, one could have argued that the perfect articulation of social structure was to attain socialism, but could socialism or any such social goal constitute an end in itself? Next this also will undergo the dialectial process of evolution of revolutions, which continues till all men are perfected. True freedom cannot be exercised by man merely in terms of law, politics, etc. Therefore, it is very important to keep personal perfection as a goal for all aspects of social life.

"Let everybody come together and form a universal society for all human beings, where everyone exercises full freedom, where there will not be any sort of prejudices whatsoever, where there will not be any differences and where love and knowledge always flourish." Om! Peace! Peace! Peace!

Discussion

A holistic view can make important contributions in integrating the levels of nature, persons and God. Modern developments in attenuating the integrity of this vision suggest dangers for its redevelopment in our day.

First, there is danger that it might result in an idealization which would lose sight of the concrete situation which is so important to the materialist. Not attending to the actual structure of the problem, one's technical efforts to respond would be misguided. From the human intuitive and even aesthetic point of view there is much to be said also for beginning with the concrete and making immediate, direct concrete adjustments of the situation, which cumulatively can transform the world. This may echo something of Voltaire's conclusion to *Candide* regarding tending one's garden.

On the other hand, understanding the present situation might require more than an analysis of the present. If there are defects in human attitudes they will show up in all dimensions of life: education, religion, culture, structures, etc. Responding piecemeal without a sense of the deeper common origin of the problem may itself be subject to misdirection and/or to the specific concrete corrections which, once achieved, may be overwhelmed by habits of mind and heart under the pervasive formative effect of other disoriented dimensions of life. If the issue is humanization for the human person as essentially free it will not suffice to consider only structures without healing more deeply in the heart, the basis of personal egoism and selfishness.

Finally, the holistic approach may involve a danger of totalitarianism. Whenever an attempt is made to force all into too narrow a Procrustean bed it can only shrink and destroy human life. This has been the character of many utopias. However, the difficulty may not be in utopias as such, for they have often been related to concrete places and specific social circumstances. The real difficulty might lie instead in the fundamental misconception of human life, namely, in forgetting that in our condition life is inevitably a mixture of good and evil, that imperfection is a constant of human life. To forget this can lead, on the one hand, to a pessimism about life and a desire simply to escape therefrom, or, on the other hand, to rendering one inattentive to protecting society against the danger of an imposition of an idealized totalitarian system.

Second, for this reason others see the dangers as coming from an opposite direction, namely, from a fascination with the objective and the material. To reduce consciousness to the bodily in man is to reduce it to the necessitated character of physical laws, to the tug of war between

competing desires within, and to a conflict of egoisms without. To focus upon the evolution of revolutions is to condemn man to an endless cycle of human turmoil which simply substitutes one set of oppressors and one pattern of oppression by another. This would suggest that one focus more upon the consciousness for the person and not allow this to be confused by the characteristics of matter.

We need to break out of the dichotomies of the rationalist mind which make of the subject ultimately an object of inspection, and set it over against the physical universe as either an alien environment or the reality to which man must be reduced. Phenomenologists in their attempt to overcome this opposition of subject and object and Kant in attempting to overcome the dichotomy of necessitarian science (first *Critique*) and self sufficient freedom (second *Critique*) both point to a need to restructure thought in a basically new direction in order to overcome the dilemmas inherent in the rationalist character of modern thought. Its fundamental horizons need to be changed from a dichotomy of spirit and matter to one of the origination and goal of human life and indeed of all realities in terms of the deeper Hindu sense of reality as existence, consciousness and bliss or of the Christian sense of reality as expressing the Trinitarian life of unity, truth (logos) and goodness (spirit).

This would be the radical capacitation for a healing of the basic dichotomies which have sundered human life in our century between idealistic and materialistic totalitarianisms, and opposed both to a view of radical and random conflict whether on the physical or economic level. It would make it possible to refocus our efforts from things and benefits over which men compete but can never satisfy, to free the person from consuming selfishness, and to enable us to gain a new self-understanding of ourselves as integrating centers of nature and of peoples ever more expressive of a differentiated unity.

The effort of this paper is to broaden the horizon from person to society. This is not a new and opportunistic evolution but reaches back to the origins of the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is founded in the sense of the unity of God in Judaism reflected in Christianity and Islam, for there can be nothing beside or limiting Him who is the infinite source and goal of all. To be in God's image there is to follow his law whether ruler or subject, but that means that each person is constituted as free and equal. Injustice, untruth or oppression deny one's basic reality as image of God. It is to set up other Gods and constitutes an abomination before the Lord.

A Christian anthropology is centered upon the way in which the person has oneself the capacity to be aware of this transcendent origin, goal and dignity. As self-reflective man is essentially free, but this freedom must be exercised with others. This is reflected in the creation narrative. If it is essential that God be one and unique, man as not God differs in precisely this regard. It is not good for him to be alone and it is precisely in interaction that mankind reflect the unity of the divine. But this will be realized only if the exercise of freedom is not seen as 'from' others, but for others. Hence, the root to being fully human is to reflect the self-giving of God manifested in the Trinity, in creation and in the cross.

In this light the importance of social critique becomes apparent. Human claims to truth must be reviewed not merely horizontally in terms of correspondence to objects but vertically or in terms of the quality and authenticity of the personal life of those involved. As noted by Habermas and others truth claims often like validity claims, which in turn hide power claims. That is to say that those who possess and exercise economic, political or other powers may by their will or in an authoritarian manner impose claims over others which impose upon their full freedom and/or dignity as persons. It is necessary with sociological and psychological tools to make this manifest and thereby to overcome the older reductionist dogmatisms in the name of more simple truth.

At the root of this process, however, are horizons of competing power claims. The proposal of an ideal of perfect equality of communication will not do if it is left within a hermeneutics of suspicion. We need instead to be able to find the bases for identifying the reality of human dignity, rights and material justice and the bonds of mutual concern and love. The former can tell us something of what should be, only the latter will move us to acknowledge it and to strive toward its realization. It is here that the religious truth about man becomes essential and has been the moving force of the development of society.

Discussion

One line of suggestions followed the effort to locate the person in the social context and pointed out a number of dimensions of this task which it would be most helpful to explore:

(1) the relation of theory to practice
(2) the dialectic between the group and the individual, in which, although the person has a recognized priority, the group plays a most important role in human development
(3) the locations of the creativity of the human person in history
(4) the interpretation of the role of the dialectic in the development of Marx's philosophy.

The main direction of the reflections concerned the bases for critique. In essence the suggestion of a meta-critique seems problematic for it supposes that a culture is not sufficiently aware of the truth about itself and that it must come to the required awareness on the basis of some other truth. This will work well if there is some universal scientific theory of history which once known can be the authentic lens and yardstick for the interpretation of all. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the very notion of such universality bespeaks an insensitivity to the actual exercise of personal freedom. Hence, it is necessary to find some other bases or some other model.

One approach would proceed by way of language, but if this is to be more than a question of internal consistency it would require some sensitivity to the people's values and traditions which are borne by their language. This in turn would suggest work in hermeneutics to reflect on ways in which the exercise of freedom by persons and a people can generate a sense of meaning and value which can be normative for the future. If this can be understood and justified then a people can have access to common values upon which evaluations of the present and projections for the future can be discussed and some consensus can be hoped.

Another approach would proceed by way of action and all that this would imply, but while this might serve to correct theory, there remains a need to assess the results of the action. That something is useful for action is a value only if the action is well directed. But what will be the norm for evaluating this direction? For Kant it would be principles whose truth is proportionate to their universality and which come to us as imperative natural rights or duties. These might guide, but they are not the stuff of the creative humanization of social life.

For that something more seems needed. First we need to be able directly to see and judge reality (intus-legere) for if all must be judged according to something further we are caught in a process of infinite regress, while if all is to be judged according to a universal law we cannot take account of the concrete and the unique, or *a fortiori* its mode of freedom. Thus we need to recognize the distinctive capacity of the uman intellection for knowing and evaluating a situation, envisaging directions and ways in which it can be transformed, and carrying out that transformation.

Above all this capacity is open to the transcendent truth and goodness made concrete through the Incarnation, constituted as radical critique through the Cross, and assuring liberation in the Resurrection. The ability to understand, to assess and to envisage anew is in fact a sharing in the Trinitarian life which Christ expresses in time and which humankind lives in history. The cumulative experience of this history is what constitutes tradition as mentioned above and gives hope for progressively humanizing changes for the future.

Fourth Report: Social Life: Contradictions, Changes, Perspectives

The Historical Development of Social Life in Socialist Countries

The development of the historical process of social life should be considered in terms of: (a) its dialectical laws, (b) its economic, cultural and political conditions, (c) whether persons are treated as subjects of the process or only as its objects, (d) the differences of specific groups, regions and nations, and (e) the common direction of the process toward the development of civilization.

The actual development of social life reflects (a) the condition of social life, (b) the development of industrialization which provided a firmer material basis and enabled broader and more active participation, and (c) the length of the experience of modern democratic life, which in some areas is now celebrating its 200th anniversary. In the USSR this had three stages.

Stage I was the decade following the Russian Revolution, which includes the five years during which Lenin was Prime Minister. This can be seen as marked by the development of participation from below through the Soviets as self-governing bodies which made possible the expression of new ideas, through individual enterprise and through economic reforms which resulted in large exports and a convertible currency. The spirit was not that of doctrinaire assurance, but of an exciting search to discover and explore dimensions of social life as yet untried.

Stage II was the following 60 years. Under Stalin power was concentrated in the hands of one person and exercised through a large state and party apparatus. People were thus shifted from being subjects and reduced to objects without the power of speech or action. While the tyrannically oppressive forms of this largely ceased in its last decade the objective concentration of decision making power did not. Further, despite calls for change in the 60s and 80s this has had a pervasive negative influence upon other Eastern European countries.

Perestroika was essentially a reform movement directed toward changing the social interaction from democracy for the people to a democracy of the people, but decision making remained tightly concentrated at the top and a real flow of expression and power from below is only now being established. The problems were twin: at the top a grasp for the power provided by a command administrative system and at the bottom a parasitical grey or black market which sapped the production of the country. As power needs money and money needs power there is a tendency for the two to reinforce each other or at least to permit the other to continue. The delays of the last five years did great damage, and made decision ever more urgent.

Stage III should be a response to the need to create new modes of human participation in social life. This will require not only new thinking to overcome apathy and indifference, but new action in order to engage the powers of the people. It would seem important to abandon the idea that there is some one scientifically known ideal way and to open the discussion to many and diverse outlooks both from within and from other countries. It can be hoped that a series of steps extending

well into the 21st century will lead to the development of a new more human and democratic world.

A number of lines of questioning arise regarding the thesis that the socialist project itself is a sufficiently humanizing vision of social life, as proven by Stage I, but that this had been derailed by the personal lust for power on the part of Stalin. These questions appeal to broader historical and theoretical horizons.

History

Approached from an extended historical and cultural horizon the brief pre-Stalinian period appears as a fleeting blip after a millennium of absolutist Czarist rule, which lacked protection against despotic aberrations. This continued under Stalin and long after his death, e.g., in Romania until the very end of 1989. Indeed, these tendencies may already have been afoot in the first ten years, both in the centralization of power by Stalin against which Lenin warned, and in Lenin's own steps to centralize all in a single all-powerful party.

This raises the question of whence and how new sensitivities to human value and an expansion of the sense of human freedom can be had in our days. If a people's cultural history is characterized by subjection of personal freedom to absolute and at times despotic rule, what resources can generate new expectations and new commitments both in the people as a whole and in those who come into the responsibilities of leadership? How can a society come concretely to envisage the freedom to hold, to express and to work toward new visions of social life as a whole or in any of its particular areas, e.g., education, economy or politics.

Solzhenitzen saw these resources in the deep literary, religious and spiritual traditions of Eastern Europe itself, but for this to make its humanizing contribution effectively requires more freedom than writers and churches often have been allowed. Others would see new possibilities in this age of instant and constant communication to observe the struggles of other peoples and to learn from their experience, but this too requires some freedom of access to, and dissemination of, information. Still others would see the productive needs of a modern country as requiring a greater openness, communication and empowerment of individual and group initiative than is conciliable with prior autocratic modes of control. All three may be interacting and reinforcing each other in a gradual process of inevitable liberalization at the conclusion of this century.

Theory

If the issue is approached in terms of theory then socialism appears as an ideology integral to the intensifying mathematization of knowledge since Descartes. This has been marked by the consistently and increasingly losing struggle in Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel and National Socialism to provide for freedom.

This sequence suggests that there may be a flaw in the very project of reason to establish a unified and all inclusive science whether this be played out as an idealism or as a materialism. If so the problems which were experienced in the past with socialism were not the aberrations of one leader, but would reoccur in any attempt to construct a dialectical or historical materialism—indeed any "ism"—in the future. This is suggested in a number of ways.

(a) There appears to be some tension in the notion of a "structured diversity" redolent of the discussions of analogy in the 1930s. It then became clear that analogy could not be a mode of

univocity or even a combination of univocity and equivocity and still retain room for personal freedom. The same seems true if diversity is understood in function of structure; but it is precisely the dialectical structure which dialectical materialism has made the key to understanding all human process.

(b) The danger appears again in the notion of "collective subject" where the very subjectivity of the person is in danger of being annulled by the primacy given by historical materialism precisely as a science to the collectivity, particularly when the unity of the collective is founded upon the objective material or economic conditions being the same for all.

(c) Civil society seems bound to generate countervailing plurality of outlooks, assessments and choices. But should a miners' strike, a Solidarity or other forms of expression from below be embraced as authentic voices of the people? If not it would seem that the authenticity of a mass or class phenomenon is determined on the basis of more universal, but less personal forces, which can be read scientifically by the few leaders acting in the name of the proletariat. Even the party member was not expected to use his or her free creativity to search out new ways, but to propagandize and implement objectively the true insight of the leader(s).

(d) The difficulty of escaping this horizon was manifested in the effect it has upon language. "Democratic" was in the official title of East Germany, which later denied that it had been truly democratic in the past; "humanization" had been the appeal of Castro, who later rejected Gorbachev's calls for a human face for socialism; and party "solidarity" long has been appealed to as a reason for abandoning one's personal freedom.

This suggests that a science of history can be appropriated by an autocratic ruling system as a powerfully reductionist rational tool for objectifying, organizing and manipulating a people which lack a sufficient economic base to assert its freedom or sufficient theoretical sophistication to mount an effective modern social critique and reconstruction.

If this be the case then science would appear open to manipulation according to a set of scio-cultural values and traditions. If so the means for change may need to be rethought, for to turn to science as the basis for a contemporary critique may loop one back into rationalist, necessitarian and universal modes. This could oppress one's freedom or bury it under material possessions and/or concerns.

Or should one turn to the tradition in order to renew the humane sense of terms and provide resources for their progressive adaptation and growth for new times? If so to avoid entering into a welter of conflicting traditions which promise ethnic conflict these traditions must be mined deeply enough to render principles for transcending egoism—both material and spiritual, personal and social—toward social peace and progress. Does the human spirit have the capacity to integrate science and tradition for a decisive step forward in our times? If so what epistemological developments are required and indeed may already be in process?

The Fragmentation of Truth and the Humanization of Social Life

From Unity to Plurality

Durkheim distinguished three modes of self understanding: totemic for primitive societies, religion for intermediate societies, and science for modern societies. As the characteristic mode of modern self understanding, science is also, and by that very fact, the key structuring force for social life in our times. It is characterized by a search for unity, for the constant and universal

factors which reduce all to order and enable thereby the organization and management of our world and even the manipulation of mankind. This tendency to reduce all to a unity has been characteristic not only of the emphasis upon method and structure in the first and second world, but of the social restructuring which has marked the post-colonial history of the third world as well. All together this has come to be referred to as modernism in the social sciences.

As we approach the end of this century these monistic tendencies appear to be breaking up. The commitment to a single goal, model or methodology appears to be passing and making room for a greater pluralism. How is this to be understood? Some would see it as releasing a plurality which was there from times prior to the modern social sciences and theories and their political instantations. This is not arbitrary for the divisions along which ethnic conflicts are reemerging are well-known and centuries old. One has simply to know the history of the way in which a population has been composed of different peoples in order to know how it will divide, if indeed it is to do so, in the future.

But it is not simply a matter of rediscovering or of recapitulating the past; it is also a question of opening up the real range of human capabilities in the present and hence of the possibilities of humankind for the future. In particular it is a focus upon the capacity to take account of diversity. Working with universal or constant similarities, with the patterns and structures which pervade the multiple, in the Platonic manner these had come to be treated as the real while diversity was devalued, discounted, ignored and where convenient oppressed and suppressed.

The development in recent decades of a new emphasis upon person, freedom and creativity has been perhaps above all a reaction to the oppressive nature of such "systems." It has become necessary to look again at the reality of diversity as such in order that what man might freely decide might be reaffirmed and promoted. Some would suggest that this is a turn toward the empirical, but such countings of that which is available to the senses, devoid of both meaning and value, are hardly calculated to regain lost dimensions of what it is to be human and free or what this could creatively realize in the future.

Instead, in order to take account of the distinctive content of the limitless aspects of the unique personality of the human participants and their varying commitments and concerns the terminology of the search becomes predominantly that of literary analysis. ‘Irony’ as valuing the difference of horizons, "ambiguity" as unpacking the multiple facts of the same reality, "vernacular" and the "local" as attending to cultural specificities, "figures of speech" as suggesting what cannot be directly stated in terms of universal meaning: all these point to a new sensibility to differences. These are taken not as simply there to be encountered empirically or sensibly by man or beast, but as available to properly human encounter in which the human spirit endlessly unpacks the potentialities of reality and envisages new avenues along which reality, especially human society, might progress. This is the proper realm of human freedom as rising above systemic determinations of the given to creatively envisage what might be, and to join together in free concourse toward its realization.

Epistemology and Diversity

In the development of this new departure in the social sciences a number of points are in need of attention. First, one needs to assure that the insights achieved have a solid foundation. For Kant the degree of truth of a principle corresponded to the degree of universality of its applicability; the new attention to that which is different and even unique must search out a new norm of validity. It cannot be merely wilful subjective assertion by a person: each assertion must be subject to a

critique and no standpoint can be assumed or treated as unquestionable. This, however, is not to say that the intellect alone is the only active factor, or that the abstractive character of the human intellect should be the norm and limit for our recognition of reality. If so then man would not be free, but would be subject to man and his limitations: this is the fundamental "slavery" from which man must be freed.

Second, attention to diversity must not become so local—and that, in turn, so individual—that all are enclosed in themselves and entrapped in solipsism. Third, the history of thought must not be simply a succession of points of attention, one canceling the other in pendulum-like succession, for that would merely replace one insight by another, generating confusion and leading nowhere. *A fortiori*, a reductionist approach to but one of these facets would destroy any attempt to open the horizons of the mind and enrich human sensibilities.

The purpose of employing a sense of irony would be precisely to break through the level of such partial, if serial, points of attention and to get below appearances. This step into reality is important for academics. In the university environment they are rightly free to evolve, explore and test multiple models; they need to be able to work playfully with various juxtapositions in order creatively to image new possibilities and avenues for social life. But the deadly seriousness of such models when played with real lives must never be forgotten. The Hobbesian "man-wolf," the Cartesian "thinking-thing," the fascist "super-man," the "citizen," the "consumer," the "worker" are but some of the defective humanoids which thinkers have released upon the world. States have attempted to shrink their people to such abstractions in disastrous social experiment often culminating in murderous programs and World Wars.

The free association of ideas is essential, but so deadly serious a game must be realistic in its orientation. On this basis one is able to proceed to carrying out the injunction first given to Parmenides: "Thou shalt inquire into everything: both the motionless heart of well-rounded Truth, and also the opinions of mortals. . . . One should go through all the things that seem, without exception and test them." (Frag. 1) The creative imagination must work over all things and all aspects of things, unpack their potentialities, envisage and test new paths in social life. This should be seen not as attending to ideal forms from which possibilities are deduced and then imposed somewhat violently upon the real, but as insights into living reality which we are able to join in unfolding in new ways: our service is that of midwives to being.

In this sense a post modern position need not be a new affirmation of the skeptical foundations of liberalism, for it need not abandon responsibility for the content of positions in favor of a formal promotion of dialogue and compromise, which in turn is to be approved as long as it promotes more dialogue and compromise, etc. Rather, the basic need is positively to promote the real importance of the diverse insights as such.

An Open Unity

Beyond this, a social vision must be concerned to promote the unity and cohesion of reality. Rather than an atomistic nominalism of isolated egos clashing over scarce commodities, the new awareness sees the person as essentially transcending itself and as social in its orientation. Hence, the fulfillment of self is not against, but with others and its freedom is not from, but for others. As integrating all, social wisdom differs from the tunnel vision of utilitarianism and from the solipsistic egoism and abstractive specializations of monocausal science. Instead, wisdom must attend to diversity as enriching the whole within which alone its multiple potentialities can be realized.

This, indeed, is the heart of democracy which promotes a pluralism of views by uniting them to constitute a more rich vision of social life and a more sensitive response to its needs. A society which celebrates the breadth of sensitivities of its entire people and applies creatively their full ingenuity is able to promote social change that continues the work of personal and social growth.

What then should be said of such an approach to knowledge in social life? It seems correct to say that the postmodern sensibilities are truly new and that the future cannot be built or promoted by going back to simply repeat premodern sensibilities. If the excessive and reductionist unities and univocities of science have been the mode of modern self understanding, their abandonment in favor of a premodern or antimodern mode would not promote social life in an ever more populated and interrelated world.

Yet the critique of modernism is based upon real and bitter experiences of modern life which in various ways it both promoted and degraded, of family life that is more affluent but also more weakly bound together. If the postmoderm search is for a major development in sensibility to the importance of the person and to the properly personal character of human life in a society which characterizes this last half of the 20th century, it must not be simply another swing of the modernist pendulum between idealism to empiricism. Both are forms of the same basic outmoded rationalism; neither can cure itself or its mirror image.

If then one cannot go backward or sideward, the only direction is forward to integrate the newly appreciated diversity inherent in freedom and creativity. This must be done in a way that builds new unity, promotes freedom, contributes a more humane social solidarity, and enlivens creativity. This in turn will give new life in our times to the values discovered in our history and build upon our tradition.

If this is no longer a pattern of simply universal and necessary truths, should it be called science? To do so may confuse the nature and weaken the critical controls jealously and rightly guarded by the sciences. Hence, it may be advisable to recognize multiple dimensions of human insight as required in order to take account of human freedom and creativity with their emphasis upon the unique and hence differentiated contributions of all social life. This would mean abandoning the hegemony of science over the human mind. Like all bureaucracies the scientific community may be reluctant to do so.

Nevertheless, this seems inevitable in the face of new sensibilities and in order to achieve the truly momentous step they evoke in the long process of human liberation and self development. Kant suggested just such a recognition of multiple dimensions of the human spirit in his three *Critiques*. In contrast the terrible power of the totalitarianisms of this century may be one result of Hegel's attempt to weld all three back into a single all powerful and all inclusive dialectic.

Kant termed his third *Critique*, beyond science and morals, a *Critique of Judgment*: aesthetic and teleological. This sense of the beauty and purposiveness of social life must be developed afresh, not as a return to Platonic idealism, but as a free and creative joint struggle of many to overcome the gross and the ugly, to realize dignity and purpose, harmony and beauty in social life.