The Humanization of Social Life
Volume 1

Theory and Challenges

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This paper will consider the dilemmas of change involved in the process of the humanization of social life in the Philippines. For third world countries, the problem of humanization and social life is a pressing one since the answer to this question determines the social, economic and political structures and relationships that should be put in place in order to achieve a humanized society. As Jose Abueva, current president of the University of the Philippines, has noted, "like many other nations in the Third World, the Filipino nation, which is less than a hundred years old, is still very much in search of a combined political, economic, and social system that is most conducive to the fulfillment of its national ideals and aspirations."1

Challenges to Humanization

Problem of Humanization at the Practical Level

Just as in Romania2 the problem of humanization is made difficult by the ambiguity of culture, so it is in the Philippines. As Ledvina Carino notes about the plurality of Philippine culture:

The predominant culture, transcending regional and ethnic differences, is that of the lowland Christian Filipino. About 85 per cent of Filipinos are Roman Catholic; another 7 per cent belong to various Protestant denominations, including the Philippine Independent Church (Aglipayan). . . . Muslims account for another 5 per cent, those belonging to the indigenous Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of Christ), 1 per cent, and those belonging to various paganistic and animistic groups, numbering 42, around 2 per cent.3

Another problem that makes humanization difficult is the geographic separateness and linguistic diversity of the people. In a country of fifty four million there are over 7,000 islands and 88 languages. If language determines the way we think, conceptualize the world, and relate to people, how is the humanization of diverse and pluralistic social lives possible?

While the Christian Filipino culture is predominant, it would violate the freedom of other ethnic cultures if its ideology were made the basis for humanization and social life, for as was correctly noted in one of the papers read at the Seminar,4 the tendency to reduce all cultures to a unity should be avoided. There must be a plurality which allows freedom for local knowledge and cultures to grow.

Problem of Humanization at the Theoretical Level

Even if the Philippines had a homogeneous culture, it does not follow it can serve as the ideal basis for the humanization of Philippine social life. There could be some aspects of it that are dehumanizing. Therefore it must be open to criticism and to contributions from other cultures. To determine, however, which parts of native culture to retain and which to abandon and what to

borrow from other cultures, we need an ideal and theoretical concept of humanization of the whole man and of society.

But what it means to be human is a difficult theoretical question. Some papers read in the Seminar suggested community as an essential aspect, others suggested the unity of individual egos in a Transcendental Consciousness. But there are those who would consider this ideal of humanization really a dehumanization. Would that all human beings agreed on a common concept of what it is to be a human being! Plato in his Republic attempted to give us a view as to how social life can be constructed by basing it on a concept of a humanized individual as one who is just. By justice he meant the interdependent and harmonious relationships of the three parts of the human soul, namely, the rational part, the spirited part and the appetitive part. Society is the individual writ large, hence, society must have three classes of individuals, the rulers, the auxiliaries and the producers. But this utopian view of humanization and social life has never been realized; in fact, it has been severely criticized as elitist. Aristotle followed Plato and provided his own view of the humanized man as the pursuit of happiness by the fulfillment of all his potentialities, but especially of his rational faculties. The ideal man for him was the contemplative man. In the middle ages, we had Christian humanism, a representative example being that of Thomas Aquinas in which man can only be fully humanized by aspiring toward the supernatural. As a result, the social arrangement was a collaboration of church and state for the promotion of spiritual life. We do not need to go further in our review of some significant theories of humanism. In recent times we have Marxist humanism and democratic capitalism. The question is, what is a humanized individual or community upon which Philippine society should pattern itself?

Sociological question - how is society to be methodologically understood? Is the primary category the community or is the individual? Do we start with atomic individuals each pursuing their self-interest who then decide to form a society through a social contract? This view would then determine the function of government as an arbitrator of the various conflicting self-interests. Or do we start with the community in which individuals fulfill themselves by pursuing a common good?

Psychological question - Is humanization self-sufficiency and autonomy or participation and belongingness? Can one be humanized if he participates in society only for the sake of his self-interest? Or is an individual humanized only if he identifies with and pursues the common interest? Can one be humanized if the whole is not humanized?

Ethical question -- how is freedom to be conceived? In the individualistic view of freedom, a distinction is made between the individual and society such that freedom pertains to the individual while society is seen as a threat or as a circumscriber of that freedom.5 Hence, freedom, in the individualistic view, can be secured by demarcating a private sphere for the individual which is free from the encroachment of society.6 In contrast, in the holistic view, "only in community (with others has each) individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible."7

Ecological question -- If we have obligations as individuals, nations and species to the rest of the evolving universe, to the environment, to future generations, how can we be humanized if we violate these obligations by raping the environment, depleting natural resources and forgetting to provide for future generations of Filipinos?

Political question -- can Filipinos be humanized purely as citizens of a nation or must they become citizens of the world? Teilhard de Chardin among others believes that the age of nations is past, that because of scarce natural resources and the threat of nuclear holocaust we need a different organizing principle.8 If it is true as was argued by one of the papers in the

Seminar9 that virtue determines belief, that action and praxis determine political culture, then it is important that we know what virtues to inculcate. We cannot have a national life that is closed to world society, to ecological problems, to the Transcendent. Such a life would not be virtuous, hence, humanized.

My own view of true humanism is based on unity, harmony and integration. To be humanized is to be in harmony with nature, with fellowmen and with God. To be in harmony means to be in an I-Thou relation with nature, with fellowmen and with God so as to constitute a "we" relation as opposed to an "us-and-them" relation. The sense of community as a "we" consciousness which was developed by two papers in the seminar10 should be extended to the whole universe. Hence, to be humanized is to develop a cosmic sense, a sense of belonging with the cosmic community. Social life includes for me social life with nature and with the Transcendent and not only with one's fellowmen. One cannot have a truly humanized social life if it is confined merely to one's own family and country while millions in the world are poor and starving, and when this social life is obtained at the expense of the exploitation of others and the pollution of the earth. This personal view of humanization is in the realm of the "soft" cultural field, as opposed to the hard system of socioeconomic and political structures.11 The problem is what sort of cultural concept of humanization are we to use in determining how to humanize social structures?

Humanization as the Attainment of Human Rights

Given the practical problem of diversity of social life in the Philippines, and the theoretical problems of determining what it is to be human, it is impossible to arrive at a concept of humanization in the fullest sense of the term which would respect the values of the various cultures and subcultures in the Philippines.

What we need is to derive common elements of humanization from various cultural fields which will serve as criteria for determining the shape and form of social structures and judging the degree of humanization in various societies. The common denominator we will propose is human rights. Thus a society is humanized when human rights are attained by all members of society. The ontological foundation of human rights, as George McLean has suggested in his paper, is subsistent individuality.12 Of course, this minimalist definition of humanization is subject to criticism precisely for being minimalist. But this is also its strength in allowing freedom for each individual to pursue what he believes to be the ideal man. It allows freedom for both secular humanists and religious humanists to pursue their own brand of humanism.

The 1948 United Nations *Declaration of Human Rights* furnishes us with a working list of these rights which any individual regardless of race, religion, etc. must have. These human rights may be divided into three, 1) civil rights, 2) political rights, and 3) economic and social rights. Civil rights are mainly claims against the state. They include freedom of speech, association, religion, movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest, right to private property, etc. Political right means the right to a voice in the government of the country, hence, a claim to a control of the state. And economic and social rights, which are of recent origin, mean claims to benefits from the state. These include an income consistent with a life of human dignity, the right to work, the right to equal pay for equal work, the right to social security against illness, old age, unemployment and death of the breadwinner, etc. What is missing in the UN declaration is the right of subjected ethnic groups and native or aboriginal peoples to self-determination and to their traditional way of life.13

Having narrowed the concept of humanization to the pursuit of human rights, we can now interpret the recent historical changes in the eastern European countries and in the Third World countries as a process of humanization.

For the Philippines, particularly, the main and urgent problem of humanization is the pursuit of economic and social rights. This level of humanization must first be laid before the other levels can be attained. In the Philippines, there are only two classes, the rich and the poor. In 1985, about 60 per cent of all families were at or below the poverty line.14 The solution to the economic problem of poverty and the social problem of the distribution of wealth is felt to be modernization. This question leads us to a discussion of the political and economic structures in which economic and social rights could best be achieved. Unlike Eastern European countries that feel the need to democratize the political system and adopt a free-market system, the Philippines has already a democratic and a free-market system in place. While there are problems of dehumanization at the political level, I will skip these problems and concentrate instead on the problems of dehumanization involved in modernization within a capitalist system.

Modernization

Capitalism and Modernization

By modernization we mean the industrialization of a nation by means of advanced technology. Modernization can be achieved within any economic system be it communist or capitalist and within any political system be it totalitarian or democratic. But the recent historical changes in the eastern countries of Europe under the Soviet bloc and for the majority of third-world nations, it would seem that modernization can best be achieved within a democratic and capitalist society. Hence, Third World and Eastern European countries look to the west as model.

We cannot argue against the financial and material success of a free market system. As the American philosopher, John Hospers notes, consider East Germany in comparison to West Germany. Both have the same culture and same level of technical skill, yet, in the former, "tyranny, regulation, misery and an irresistible impulse to leave" while on the other side, "capitalism, freedom, and affluence."15 He might have said the same for Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. in comparison to western European states. And in the Far East, Hospers compares Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan, on the one hand, to India, China, Vietnam and Cambodia, on the other. The former societies with a free market economy are affluent, and thriving, but in the latter with central planning and bureaucracy are poor and starving.16 The Philippines too is a capitalist oriented society, trying to catch up with its more affluent and prosperous far eastern neighbors.

Although most Third World countries and Eastern European countries are bent on instituting a free-market economy, there are dilemmas and trade-offs with respect to humanism and social life.

Capitalism and Communal Values

In importing the method and technique of capitalism, there is a danger that also its ideology of individualism is imported. According to C.B. Macpherson, the ideology of capitalism is based on the "early liberal notion of the individual as a being prior to and rightfully independent of

society or community."17 In contrast to this ideology, Macpherson believes that "we shall need to recognize that the individual can be fully human only as a member of a community."18

Macpherson believes that the Third World has always recognized that humanization can only be fully achieved in community. The paradox, as Macpherson puts it, is that for the sake of modernization, the Third World countries are now going to sacrifice communal values. Permit me to quote him at length:

Paradoxically, that recognition now seems more likely to be generated within the Western countries than in the Third World. Paradoxically, because one would expect that the priority of community would be a more natural assumption in the Third World countries, which are closer to the pre-capitalist idea that one's humanity was more a matter of one's membership in the community than of one's freedom from the community, that the greatest human right was the right of belonging to the community, and the severest deprivation was to be cast out. But what has happened is that the Third World countries, in so far as they are struggling against their previous subservience to the West, have had to use Western ideological weapons. They have had to base their claims in the world forum, on their need to promote the modernization which would permit the enhancement of the individual. Aboriginal people threatened with submergence within First World countries do still invoke community values, but the Third World has largely given in to the Western values. Their search for rapid economic development has put them under strong pressure to abandon community values.19

The dilemma is one of trading off communal values for individualistic ones in order to achieve economic freedom. What sort of individual does capitalism need and require for economic growth?

Capitalism becomes a means of maximizing market and consumer man. With the right of private property as inalienable, the individual can develop his full potentialities. The individual needs a private space or sphere within which he feels free against the encroachment and interference of society which is seen as a threat to this freedom.

For the success of capitalism, a certain kind of individual is needed. As Andrew Mclaughlin observes,

Capitalism requires a competitive individual, one who gets his satisfaction from outdoing others. Capitalism does not run on love and cooperation. The second value required of capitalism is materialism, or the idea that one becomes happy by possessing more and more material things. Both of these values make a person who is willing to sacrifice most of his waking time to either working to earn money to buy things or using the things he buys.20

Thus, for capitalism to thrive, it is necessary that there be increasing demand for goods and never-ending consumption.21 This requirement of economic freedom leads to another dilemma.

Capitalism and Third-World Ecology

Should Third World countries sacrifice the environment for the sake of economic freedom through capitalism? Is this not humanization at one level which is achieved by dehumanization at another level? In Third World countries, the danger of pollution or the depletion and waste of natural resources, though more severe than in First World countries, is not considered the most urgent nor the primary problem. Whole forests are cut down and logs sold to get dollar exchange

for capital investment. Foreign companies from First World countries contribute to the ecological problems in the Third World by relocating their polluting industries in the Third World.

Capitalism and Civil Rights

Another dilemma caused by the necessity to attract foreign investors is the violations of distributive justice and civil rights. Native workers are paid very cheaply and thus exploited. To keep production high and uninterrupted, the right to strike for higher wages is made illegal. Hence, the government uses the language of trade-off to legitimize bans on strikes. But the language of trade-off is mere rhetoric to hide the fact that it is really an exchange of the civil rights of the majority for the economic rights of the native elite and foreign investors.

It would seem that the imperatives of capitalism which is the unlimited accumulation of private property (capital) is at odds with the requirement of economic and social rights. To implement the latter would reduce the accumulation of capital. Thus, we have another dilemma of humanization here. The right to unlimited accumulation of property is a civil right which is at odds with economic and social rights.

Modernization and Philippine Humanism

The Philippines is a capitalist-oriented country. But capitalism has not produced affluence for the many. Economic freedom is only for the few. The economic situation is one of mass poverty. This situation is made worse by economic and political dependency on First World countries. Imported models of economic development have not worked. Foreign aid has not helped because of political corruption in Third World governments and because of lending policies which is in the interest of the lenders. As one Philippine intellectual has observed:

The sad fact, however, is that the countries of the Third World have little to share among themselves except a great deal of sympathy and much poverty. The largest sources of aid, both technical and financial, are still the advanced industrial countries—the United States, western Europe, Canada, and Japan—and next to them, the Soviet Union and the socialist states of eastern Europe. The World Bank and the various regional banks catering to the needs of the developing countries receive the bulk of their funds from the contribution of the more affluent states which consequently dictate their lending policies. The same is true with respect to the transfer of technology: the actual practice is almost invariably to transfer only marginally important or obsolescent technology.22

The Marcos dictatorship which was propped up by the United States for the sake of U.S. companies with investments in the Philippines suspended civil rights. The 'New Society' Marcos put up was justified as "a trade-off: political authoritarianism for development and equity."23 Union strikes were illegal. For the sake of industrialization, aboriginal peoples in the north and in the south of the Philippines have been driven off their ancestral lands and relocated into shanties in barren lands. Marcos' cronies controlled the sale of copra and sugar through their companies. While there was an expansion of wealth in terms of greater volume of production of goods and services, larger foreign exchange reserves, more capital for investment, etc., the gains went mostly to Marcos' cronies and foreign investors. Just as wealth for a few accumulated in Swiss banks, the national debt to foreign banks increased to billions of dollars. Thus, the right to unlimited

accumulation of property was achieved through the sacrifice of the economic and social rights of many.

How can there be social life if there is animosity and resentment between the rich and the poor? Can we say that the few rich are humanized by dehumanizing the many poor?

After Marcos was ousted from power, the challenge to the Aquino government is economic recovery. But the goal has not been achieved. For many the economic situation has worsened. There is unrest in the land. The frequent military coups are symbolic of the impatience of the people for needed reforms. Corazon Aquino has been slow in instituting land reform. As a result of these injustices, a growing number of intellectuals, among them the clergy and religious, feel that democratic socialism is the way to attain economic democracy.

According to the National Economic Development Administration, the problem for the Aquino administration are the a) alleviation of poverty, b) generation of more productive employment, c) promotion of equity and social justice, and d) attainment of sustainable economic growth.24 Thus for the Philippines, humanization means the achievement of economic and social rights. How to achieve them is the question.

Conclusion

How to solve the dilemma of modernization and humanization is a difficult one. Can capitalism be modified so as to preserve community values? Or is not a socialist economy better able to preserve community values? But what is the point of preserving community values if people are starving and poor? These are difficult questions for which I have no answer. We fall back on fundamental philosophic questions: What is true humanization? Is an affluent country more humanized than a poor starving country? Is an industrialized economy more humanized than an agricultural economy where people are able to feed themselves though quite poor in modern amenities?

There is a very real danger that as the First World begins to realize that a no-growth economy may be a way of preserving the environment and of recovering more humanistic values, Third World countries are still emphasizing materialism, self-interest, and competition which may result in economic growth and modernization, perhaps, but at the cost of humanistic and cultural values.

Clearly, a democratic form of government allows for the greatest freedom of all members of society to be humanized the way they want to. But if humanization at the economic level means an economic system that would maximize production but at the same time distribute goods and services more equitably, I do not know what economic system is best. As evidenced by the countries of eastern Europe, a free market allows for greater freedom than a centrally directed economy. But I have reservations about present-day capitalism as practiced in the Philippines. While it has not eroded strong family ties and communal values at the micro level, at the macro level it has caused a split in society between the few rich and the many poor.

Notes

1. See his article, "Philippine Ideologies and National Development," in *Government and Politics of the Philippines*, ed. Raul de Guzman and Mila a Reforma (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 22.

2. See the paper of Ion Bansoiu, "The Ambiguity of a Culture and its Freedom of Choice," in Volume II of this collection.

3. See her article, "The Land and the People," in *Government and Politics in the Philippines*, p. 10.

4. See the paper of Jon Anderson, "Social Science and the Humanization of Social Life,." in this volume.

5. This is the view of John Stuart Mill in his essay, *On Liberty*. Cited from Richard Norman, *Free and Equal* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 12.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

7. See K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology, Part One*, ed. C. J. Arthur (London, 1970), p. 83. Cited from Richard Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

8. See his *Human Energy*, p. 37.

9. See Michael W. Foley, "'Coming to Value' is More Important Than 'Having Value': Building Democracy in the Contemporary Mexican Peasant Movement," in Volume II of this collection.

10. See the papers of James A. Loiacono, "The Community of Persons as Foundations of Human Society," and Albertine Tshibilondi Ngoyi, "The Understanding of the Human Person and Society in Traditional and Modern African Culture," in this volume.

11. See the paper of Gytis Vaitkunas, "Social Structure and Cultural Field: Humanization of Social Life," in Volume II of this collection.

12. George McLean, "Person, Creativity and Social Change," in this volume.

13. See C. B. Macpherson, *The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 22-23.

14. Carino, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

15. John Hospers, "Free Enterprise as the Embodiment of Justice," in *Ethics, Free Enterprise, and Public Policy*, ed. Richard T. De George and Joseph Pichler (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), p. 72.

16. *Loc. cit.*

17. *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. See his article, "Freedom versus Capitalism," in *The Main Debate*, ed. Tibor R. Machan (N.Y.: Random House, Inc., 1987), p. 229.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

22. Salvador Lopez, "The Foreign Policy of the Republic of the Philippines," in *Government and Politics of the Philippines*, p. 251.

23. Abueva, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

24. NEDA, 1986:11. Cited from *Government and Politics in the Philippines*, p. 70.

Introduction

Ambivalent change — political, social, and technological — has been the outstanding feature of the twentieth century affecting vast numbers of peoples throughout the globe. Whereas the first half of the century witnessed elaborate campaigns of political and economic unification and assimilation culminating in totalitarian systems of suppression, the latter half has been emerging, not without its own contradictions, as a movement toward human freedom buttressed by a newly found sense of the dignity of the human person. This movement, today symbolized by the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, manifests itself politically and economically as generally favoring participatory forms of political organization and free market arrangements. In this respect it has been a period marked by a gradual freedom, first, from Fascism, Nazism, then from colonialism, and, more recently, in Eastern Europe and Asia, from Soviet Communism, as evidenced by a myriad of new independent nations which have arisen after World War II. In the United States this greater sensitivity to human freedom and the dignity of the person has found expression in civil rights movements, in a reversal of the "melting pot" mentality toward a greater respect for racial and ethnic differences as well as a new found appreciation for cultural identity and diversity.

Additionally, technological changes have profoundly altered life in the twentieth century, giving rise to a steady procession of "Ages" such as the Nuclear Age, the Space Age, the Information/Communications Age, and, currently, the Age of Genetic Engineering. The latter will provide the resources for determining, to some extent, the physico-cultural constitution of the human subject, and hence of human communities.

Within this context the present volume raises the question of how the humanization of social life is to be understood?

Many developing nations look to Western "First World" countries as models of political organization and economic development. Humanization, here, is often understood as synonymous with democratic institutions that, while protecting individual liberties, aggressively promote free markets. However, while a progressive process of rationalization, generative of technological breakthroughs, has made possible an unrivaled period of production of goods and services for the satisfaction of individual and communal needs, it has also led to a process of reification, to use Weber's term, wherein efficient means for achieving predefined goals have subject the human person to greater calculability, control, systematic planning, bureaucracy, economic and administrative efficiency. In "First World" countries this has led to a progressive process of depersonalization and desacralization of the natural and the social world. Indeed, the technical rationalization of social life has paradoxically led to a new mode of slavery or unfreedom in the form of consumerism and hedonism, where the possession of goods and the exaltation of the pleasant has tended to replace people with objects and human relationships with the pursuit of pleasure.

Western democracy and technology are not the magic wands for a more humane world. Indeed, social problems such as poverty, homelessness, indigence, disintegration of the family, the high divorce rate, teenage pregnancy, teenage suicide, AIDS, pornography, sexual promiscuity, abortion, drug addiction, crime, and a growing sense of apathy and disillusionment, as well as ecological abuses, are mainstream problems of the "First World." George F. McLean aptly describes this problematic: "All three worlds appear to be experiencing the same problem: scientific and technical instrumentation — whether in the form of a so-called scientific philosophy

of history, a promised industrialization or a new age of information and communication — have come variously to enslave, exploit and/or depersonalize the nations which have taken them up."

This, of course, is not to say that participatory forms of government and free markets do not have much that recommends them, but, that their promises —freedom and material affluence — should be at the service of — rather than at the mercy of — the human person and human community. There is, in short, a need to develop a deeper sense of human personhood, of human dignity, of personal transcendence and ultimate meaning in terms of what it means to be human. A treatment of these issues will clarify, in turn, the question of change in our times and the direction that such change should take. The present volume, *Theory and Challenges of The Humanization of Social Life*, endeavors to illuminate these various concerns.

The Prologue, by Eulalio Baltazar, "Humanization and Social Life: Issues of Theory and Practice," raises the philosophical issues that need to be addressed in considering this collection's theme, the humanization of social life. Though Baltazar is primarily concerned with the dilemmas of change involved in the process of the humanization of social life in the Philippines, he begins his reflections by considering philosophical questions such as: On what model should a humanized individual or community pattern itself? How is society to be methodologically understood? Is community or the individual the primary category? Is humanization autonomy or participation? How is human freedom to be conceived? Is an affluent country more humanized than an underdeveloped one? After deriving common elements for an understanding of humanization in terms human rights as understood in the 1948 United Nations *Declaration of Human Rights*, Baltazar articulates the problems of dehumanization involved in modernization within a capitalist system.

Part I, "Theoretical Context," is dedicated to the theoretical issues involved in the humanization of social life.

Chapter I by George F. McLean, "Person, Creativity and Social Change," concentrates on the issue of what is the human person and what this means for facing the dilemmas of change today. McLean's concern is with the nature of the person as the subject versus object of social life, a consideration which he develops in terms of three questions: Is the person a subject existing in his own right or a set of roles constituted in function of a structure or system? Is the person truly free? Does human freedom consist in merely implementing a pattern of behavior encoded in one's nature or is the human subject a creative center shaping change within and without?

Chapter II by Rose B. Calabretta, "Methodology in Crisis: The Fact-Value Dichotomy as a Metaphysical Issue," holds that the socio-empirical methodology currently in vogue in the West is rooted in a metaphysical axiom that, as a function of an epistemological model that informs it, denies knowledge of the essence of the human person. In providing a historical account of "critical positivism" and the metaphysical origin of Weltanschauungen, the author lays bare the theoretical assumptions of so-called "value-free sociology," that framed within a defective ontology harbors an inherent dichotomy between cognition and volition. Calabretta ends her analysis by introducing — in the light of its relevance for the humanization of social life — Rielo's new metaphysical axiom which discloses reality in all its multifarious dimensions, including the metaphysical, ontological, anthropological, etc.

Chapter III by James A. Loiacono, "The Community of Persons as the Foundation of Human Society," focuses attention on the relationship between the emancipatory process — whether understood poltically, socially, legally, economically — and the epistemological question of truth. The author contends that a genuine liberation may only proceed as a function of the truth of the

human person. This involves articulating the philosophical-theological anthropology of Karol Wojtyla that provides a definition of the human person and of the community of persons, as well as explains the relationship between a hermeneutics of suspicion and solidarity as critique and resolution. The latter is presented with a view to indicating the manner in which the community of persons serves as a locus for the realization of an emancipatory, self-formative process understood as a freedom "for" others rather than as a freedom "from" others.

Chapter IV by Eduardo Rodriguez and Robert P. Badillo, "The Personhood of the Zygote," considers the conceptual question concerning what constitutes the personhood of the unborn. The authors endeavor to argue in favor of the personhood of the zygote from a biological perspective and from the novel optic of Fernando Rielo's genetic metaphysics with its notion of constitutive presence as the ground of human personhood. The biological-metaphysical foundation of personhood provides the basis for upholding the moral rights of the zygote, the implication being that the humanization of social life demands respect for the inviolability of each human life, beginning with that of the unborn.

Chapter V by Jon W. Anderson, "Social Science and the Humanization of Social Life," assesses social science from the viewpoint of earlier modernist presuppositions concerning conceptions, approaches and data in order to evaluate the implications and entailments of the more contemporary postmodern orientations. Anderson argues for humanizing social life by recognizing diversity rather than suppressing it through the reductive and methodological uniformities characteristic of modernist social science.

Chapter VI by Christopher J. Wheatley, "Rhetoric and Social Change," considers the issue of change from a novel perspective, viz., not in terms of how change will be brought about as social intervention, but, rather, how people are brought to accept change, the means for its achievement and the end toward which it points. Beginning with a consideration of the misconceptions about rhetoric and a description of the rhetorical arena, he proceeds to examine two faulty rhetorical pleas, as well as the dilemma that postmodernist theory presents for social change. He ends with an assessment of Burke's rhetoric and the limits of rhetoric itself.

Chapter VII by Kwabena Archampong, "Freedom of the Person and the Riddle of the Building Blocks of Community," proposes the notion of freedom as the defining characteristic of man as the context for analyzing the conflict between the principle of freedom (universalizability) and the asymmetry of practice. For the author the idea of freedom involves the symmetry principle and the internalization of the idea of freedom causative of freedom when understood as a disposition leading to action: "freedom or liberty is its own condition."

Part II of the volume presents the challenge involved in the humanization of social life. Chapter VIII by Vadim S. Semenov, "Social Life: Contradictions, Changes, Perspectives," articulates the need for a new stage in the development of social life, as well as directions for its realization in terms of social justice and social equality. Semenov's analysis proceeds by first considering the contradictions in the process of the development of social life, i.e., in the dialectic of the humanization of social life. He then addresses the problems of social life in socialist countries, especially in Soviet society, with a view toward indicating its contradictory development. He ends by offering perspectives for the development of social life in the New Century.

Chapter IX by Fang Nengyu, "Scientism, Free Choice and Harmony: A Chinese Contribution to the Contemporary Challenge," argues for the significance of the Chinese notion of harmony that by safeguarding an eminently human perspective, may be understood as a correction to scientism

and its mechanistic conception of human life. The author elaborates on the relationship between medicine and science with a view toward contrasting how these are understood in Chinese and Western culture.

Chapter X by Enrique S. Pumar, "Revolutionary Elite in the Periphery: A Comparative Study of Cuba and Nicaragua," provides an insightful comparative and contrastive analysis of the contemporary revolutionary elite in the Western Hemisphere, *viz*., that of Cuba and Nicaragua. The author's explicit aim is to foster, generally, a reexamination of the traditional approaches to revolutionaries in Latin America, and, specifically, to current revolutionary movements and regimes in Central America. For Pumar the failure of those engaged in the process of social and political change to take account of the differences between the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions has led to a misunderstanding of their nature, direction, and results.

Chapter XI by David J. Blanchard, "Pastoral Practice as Rebellion: The Humanization of Social Life," focuses on the difference between rebellion and revolution, as well as the manner in which change transpires within a context of violent repression. Reflecting on his own experience as part of the pastoral team at Santa Lucia, in El Salvador, the author seeks to underscore a subsidiary thesis: that one should not overly identify dehumanization with communism or freedom with "free-market capitalism," since any reduction of humankind to "available labor" is dehumanizing. Blanchard develops his position by reference to Camus's *The Rebel*.

Chapter XII by Marek Masiak, "Personality, Social Groups Structure, Functioning and Transfer in Terms of Transactional Analysis," concentrates on the psychological and social dimensions of the bio-psycho-social approach for medicine in terms of personality and social group structure and functioning. Masiak's contribution consists in disclosing the relations at work in transactional dynamics so as to better understand aberrant social behavior.

Chapter XIII by Linda P. Perez, "The Filipino Woman's Role in the Humanization of Social Life," presents the multifaceted contribution of the Filipino woman as mother and housewife, as working mother, and as single "alternate" mother and/or breadwinner to the humanization of social life.

Chapter I
Person, Creativity, and Social Change

George F. McLean

In a way it is surprising that there should now be a new call for the humanization of social life. In little more than a century electric power has turned darkness into light; petroleum has given heat, energy and transportation; communications have bound us together as one world; chemistry has transformed medicine and even psychiatric care; physics has burst with untold brilliance above Nagasaki.

But perhaps that is the rub. The modern power of scientific rationality of which we have reaped so many benefits had become so pervasive and powerful as to destroy a city and threaten a planet. The warm light of the lamp by which the child reads had become the blinding energy before which the world trembled — not least because, like an adolescent, mankind fears that it does not possess sufficient cohesion and self-control to be able to direct its own powers.

These developments in the physical order are, of course, but a sign of a parallel evolution in the personal and social order. The passion for clear and distinct ideas and the resulting focus upon method ignored the free creativity of the subject in favor of market forces, class conflict and/or manifest destiny. By the end of the 19th century this had set the world upon a collision course of ideologies, competing in exploitation both within and between nations.

Our purpose here, however, is to identify not how bad things have been — a story of horrors, indeed — but the corresponding explosive reaction of the sense of freedom and liberation which is now afoot. In the last fifty years step by step and generally through great suffering new and myriad modes of liberation have come to be asserted: from fascism in the 40's, from colonialism, in the 50's and 60's, from racism and other prejudices in the 60's and 70's, and from communism in the 80's. It has been a series of triumphs, each with its richly deserved moment of delirious celebration.

More soberly however, even this series of progressive liberations seems best described by the parable of the sower whose good seed has not found ground that was good enough to enable real and sustained growth. Hence, the independence movements of the 50's produced new nations which now look for adequate leaders; the Second Vatican Council in the early 60's produced real changes in structures and symbols which now contend with emphases upon tradition and control; the student protest in the late 60's turned to narcissism in the 70's; the minority rights movement of the 70's lacked leadership after the assassination of Martin Luther King; the women's movement of the 80's searches for the values needed to guide its acquired freedoms. The benefits of developing affluence have come to be shadowed by hunger and homelessness, drugs and violence.

All this but suggests the challenges entailed by the changes in Eastern Europe which call for everything at once: food and housing, new leaders and a whole new style of leadership, more democratic structures and a new sense of social participation and responsibility.

Perhaps then our greatest hope is also our greatest challenge: the call for personal dignity which has emerged in our lifetime now challenges us to discover anew the person, not merely as producer, consumer or citizen, but (1) as a unique being or substance existing in his or her own right, (2) as a free and responsible subject of his or her own actions and (3) as participating creatively in social change.

We must determine then just what is the person and what this means for facing the dilemmas of change in our time. To do so this paper will search for answers to three questions which concern the nature of the person as the subject, rather than object, of social life.

(a) Is the person only a set of roles constituted entirely in function of a structure or system in which one plays a particular part? If so, one could not refuse to do whatever the system demanded or tolerated. Or is the person a subject existing in his or her own right, with a proper dignity, heritage, goals and standards?

(b) Is the person truly free? If so what is the basis of this freedom and how does it characterize the full identity of the person?

(c) Finally, does a person's freedom consist merely in implementing a pattern of behavior encoded in one's nature? If so, there would be little place for the anguish of decision, the pains of moral growth or creativity in social life. Or is this free subject a creative center whose basic dynamism consists in shaping change both within and without in the progressive and correlative realization of a unique inner harmony of values and virtues and an even more intensive public community of peace?

To undertake a response to these questions it is necessary to note that the notion of the person has not always had an identical or unchanging meaning. By natural growth, more than by mere accretion, the notion has managed to incorporate the great achievements of human self-discovery for which it has been both the stimulus and the goal. This continuing process has been central to philosophy from its earliest days. Like all life processes, the search for the person has consisted in a sequence of important steps, each of which has resulted in a certain equilibrium or level of culture. In time each has been enriched and molded by subsequent discoveries. It may not be incorrect to say that this search is also at the heart of our personal and social life.

Subject as Independent Substance

To look into this experience it will be advantageous to study the nature of the person through reflection on a series of paired and progressively deeper dimensions: first, both as a role and as the one who lives out this role; second, both as free self-consciousness and as the subject of that freedom; and third, as creative participant in social life. The first member of each pair is integral to an understanding of the human person and of moral growth, but it requires also its corresponding dimension and evokes the pair on the level that follows.

One means for finding the earliest meaning of a particular notion is to study the term by which it is designated. As earliest, this meaning tends to be more manifest and hence to remain current. The major study1 on the origins of the term 'person' concludes that, of the multiple origins which have been proposed, the most probable refers to the mask used by actors in Greece and subsequently adopted in Rome. Some explain that this was called a 'persona' because by 'sounding through' (*personando*)2 its single hole the voice of the wearer was strengthened, concentrated and made to resound clearly. Others see the term as a transformation of the Greek word for the mask which symbolized the actor's role.3 Hence, an original and relatively surface notion of person is the assumption of a character or the carrying out of a role. As such it has little to do with one's self; it is defined rather in terms of the set of relations which constitutes the plot or story-line of a play.

This etymology is tentative; some would document an early and more rich sense of person in Homeric literature.4 There can be no doubt, however, that the term has been used broadly in the above ethical sense of a role played in human life. Ancient biblical literature described God as not being a respecter of persons, that is, of the roles played by various individuals.5 The Stoics thought of this in cosmic terms, seeing the wise person either as writing their role or as interpreting a role determined by the Master. In either case, to be a wise person was to be consistent, to play out one's role in harmony with oneself and with reason as the universal law of nature. From this ethical sense of person as role it was but a short step to a similar legal sense. This generally is a distinct and characteristic relation, although, as Cicero noted, it could be multiple: "Three roles do I sustain . . . my own, that of my opponent, that of the judge."6

Far from being archaic,7 the understanding of person as the playing of a role seems typical of much modern thought. John Dewey in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy* characterized the essence of the modern mentality in just these terms: in the case of ancient or classic usage "we are dealing with something constant in existence, physical or metaphysical; in the other [modern] case, with something constant in function and operation."8 The social and psychological sciences focus upon these roles or functions and in these terms attempt to construct, through operational definitions, their entire conceptual field.

This undergirds much of the progress in the social and behavioral sciences. As the same individual can play multiple roles even in the same circumstances, studying the person in terms of roles makes it possible to identify specific dimensions of one's life for more precise investigation and to analyze serially the multiple relations which obtain in an interpersonal situation. William James, for example, distinguishes in this manner the self shown to family from that which one shows to professional colleagues or to God. Further, determining to pursue this exclusively on the basis of data which are subject to empirical verification9 has made possible an immense collaborative effort to achieve a scientific understanding of human life.

Though much has been accomplished through understanding the person in terms of roles, there may have been a distant early warning regarding the limitations of this approach in Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) *Cours de philosophie positive*. By rejecting psychology as a scientific discipline and reducing all data concerning the person to either biology or sociology, he ignored introspection and the corresponding dimensions of the individual's conscious life. The person was not only one who could play a role, but one whose total reality consisted in playing that role.

More recently Gabriel Marcel has pointed up numerous unfortunate consequences which derive from considering the person only in terms of roles or functional relations, for in that case no account can be taken of one's proper self-identity. If only "surface" characteristics are considered, while excluding all attention to "depth,"10 the person is empty; if the person can be analyzed fully in terms of external causes and relations one becomes increasingly devoid of intrinsic value. What is more, lack of personal identity makes it impossible to establish personal relations with others. Even that consistency between, or within, one's roles — which the Stoics as early proponents of this understanding of person considered to be the essence of personal life -- is left without foundation. Life could be reduced, in the words of Shakespeare, "to a tale told by an idiot."11

These difficulties suggest that attention must be directed to another level of meaning if the person is to find the resources required to play his or her role. Rather than attempting to think of a role without an actor, it is important to look to the individual who assumes the role and expresses him or herself therein.

In order better to appreciate the members of a community it is helpful to consider them on three progressively more specific dimensions, first as instances of a particular type, that is, as substances; secondly as existing in their own right, that is, as subsisting individuals; and thirdly as self-conscious, that is, as persons. The order in which these three will be considered is not accidental for, while it is necessary to be of a certain definite type, it is more important to exist as an individual in one's own right; for the person, finally, it is important above all that one be self-conscious and free. Hence, our exposition begins with substance and the subsisting individual in order to identify some general and basic — though not specific or exclusive -- characteristics of the person, whose distinctive self-awareness and freedom will be treated in the following sections.

Substance: An Individual of a Particular Nature

It was Aristotle who identified substance as the basic component of the physical order; his related insights remain fundamental to understanding the individual as a creative member of society. The clue for his first discovery about substance appears in language. Comparing the usage of such terms as "running" and "runner," we find that the first is applied to the second, which in turn, however, is not said of anything else.12 Thus, one may say of Mary that she is running, but one may not say that she is another person, e.g., John. This suggests the need to distinguish things that can be realized only in another (as running is had only in a runner) whence they derive their identity, from those which have their identity in their own right (e.g., Mary, the runner). Thus, a first and basic characteristic of the person as subject, and indeed of any substance, is that it have its identity in its own right rather than through another; only thus could a human being be responsible for his/her action. Without substances with their distinct identities one could envisage at best only a structure of ideals and values inhabited, as it were, by agents.

Secondly, as the basic building blocks in the constitution of a world, these individuals are not merely undetermined masses. As the basic points of reference in discourse and the bases for the intelligibility of the real world, individuals must possess some essential determinateness: they must be of one or another kind or form. The individual, then, is not simply one thing rather than any other; he or she is a being of a definite -- in this case a human -- kind13 relating to other beings each with their own nature or kind. Only thus can one's life in the universe have sense and be able to be valued.

Thirdly, being of a definite kind the individual has its own proper characteristics and is able to realize a specific or typical set of activities. These activities derive from, or are "born of" (from the Latin, *natus*) the person according to its kind — which therefore is called "nature." The determination of what activity is moral will need to include not only the good to be derived from the action, but respect for the agent according to his or her nature.

The notion of an individual of a particular type does not yet engage us in the field of actual beings. One might know what kind of musician is needed in order to complete an orchestra, but this does not mean that one is available to be engaged for a concert. In sum, in order to consider the field of social life it is important to take account not only of the nature or kind of agent involved, but also of his or her actual existence and actions.

Subject: Existing in One's Own Right

Something of the greatest importance was bound to take place, therefore, when at the beginning of the Christian era the mind expanded its range of awareness beyond the nature of

individual things to what Shakespeare was to call the question, namely, "to be or not to be." In Greek times, because matter was simple supposed, attention was directed to being an individual of a particular nature or type; the issue of existence or non-existence was not directly confronted. When, however, matter too was seen to depend upon God the mind was enabled to take explicit account not only of the kind, but of the existence of the individual in its own right, by which it is constituted in the order of actual, and hence of acting, beings. C. Fabro suggests that this awareness of existence may have been catalyzed also by the new sense of human freedom and responsibility implied by the Christian *kerygma*. No longer encompassed by tasks of furbishing one's world or choosing a career, human freedom had become also response to the invitation to redemption and new life. To be was to live in the image of God, enlivening and transforming one's world.

From this there followed a series of basic implications for the reality of the person. It would no longer be considered as simply the relatively placid distinct or autonomous instance of some specific type. Rather, it would be understood in its dynamic act of existing. This means being in its own right, subsisting or, as it were, standing on one's own two feet. Even more it means bursting in among the realities of this world as a new and active center (ex-isting). This understanding incorporates all the above-mentioned characteristics of the individual substance, and adds three more which are proper to existence, namely, being complete, independent, and dynamically open to action and to new actualization.

First, a person must be whole or complete. As regards its nature it must have all that is required to be of its distinctive kind — just as, by definition, a three digit number cannot be made up of only two digits. Hence, if humans are recognized to be by nature both body and mind or body and soul, then the human mind or soul without the body would be neither a subsisting individual nor, by implication, a person for it would lack a complete human nature. This is of special importance in view of the tendency of some to reduce the human person to only the mind, soul, or consciousness or to consider the person to be adequately protected if these alone are cared for. In fact, the essential inclusion of body in the human person is central to education and to human rights. The same, of course, is no less true of the mind or spirit in view of the tendency of others, described by William James,[14] to reduce the person to "nothing but" the inert by-products of physiology, or to functions of the structure of production and distribution of goods.

Further, the existing individual requires not merely a complete nature, but his or her proper existence. As existing, the individual is not merely an instance of a specific nature or kind, but a concrete reality asserting him/herself and dynamically struggling to achieve his/her fulfillment. In the person this goes beyond merely walking a course whose every step is already charted; it includes all the unique, fully individual choices by which a life is lived. It is subject then to combinations of the precarious and the stable, of tragedy and triumph in its self-realization. These are described by the American pragmatists and Continental existentialists as the very stuff of life.

Secondly, as subsistent the person is independent. Being complete in its nature it is numerically individual and distinct from all else. In accord with one's individual nature, one's existence is, in turn, unique; it establishes the subject as a being in its own right, independent of all else. This, of course, does not imply then that the human subject does not need nourishment, or that it was not generated by others: people do need people and much else besides: there is no question here of being self-sufficient or absolute. What is meant by independence is that the needs it has and the actions it performs are truly its own.

In turn, this means that in interacting with other subsistent individuals one's own contribution is distinctive and unique. This is commonly recognized at those special times when the presence of a mother, father, or special friend is required, and no one else will do. At other times as well,

even when as a bus driver or a dentist I perform a standard service, my actions remain properly my own. This understanding is a prerequisite for responsibility in public as in private life. It is a condition too for overcoming depersonalization in a society in which we must fulfill ever more specialized and standardized roles.

Another dimension of this independence is that the human person as subsisting cannot simply be absorbed or assimilated by another. As complete in oneself one cannot be part of another, for being independent in existence one is distinct from all else. Hence, one cannot be assumed or taken up by any other person or group in such wise as to lose one's identity. It is the growing awareness of this characteristic in recent years that has generated a strong reaction against the tendencies of mass society totally to absorb the person and to reduce all to mere functions in a larger whole — whether state, industrial complex, or consumer society.

As noted above, it is perhaps the special challenge of the present day, however, to keep this awareness of one's distinctive independence from degenerating into selfishness — to keep individuality from becoming individualism. Caution must be exercised here lest the search for the subject or the self appear to reinforce the excesses of self-centeredness and individualism. This could be a special danger in the context of cultures whose positive stress on self-reliance and independence has been rooted historically in an atomistic understanding of individuals as single, unrelated entities. This danger is reflected, for example, in the common-law understanding of judicial rulings not as defining the nature of interpersonal relations, but simply as resolving conflicts between individuals whose lives happen to have intersected. In contrast, when Aristotle laid the foundations for the Western understanding of the person he did so in the context of the Greek understanding of the physical universe as a unified, dynamic, quasi-life process in which all was included and all were related. Indeed, the term 'physical' was derived from the term for growth and each component of this process was seen always with, and in relation to, the others. Similarly, modern physical theory identifies a uniform and all-inclusive pattern of relations such that any physical displacement, no matter how small, affects all other bodies.

Within this unified pattern of relations the identification of multiple individuals, far from being destructive of unity, provides the texture required for personal life. Distinctiveness thus becomes not an impediment to, but a principle of, community.15 The individual existent, seen as sculpted out of the flow and process of the physical universe, cannot be rightly thought of as isolated. Such an existent is always with others, depending on them for birth, sustenance and expression. In this context, to be distinct or individual is not to be isolated or cut off, but to be able to relate more precisely and intensively to others.

My relation to the chair upon which I sit and the desk upon which I write is not diminished, but is made possible by the distinction and independence of the three of us. Their retention of their distinctness and distinctive shapes enables me to integrate them into my task of writing. Because I depend still more intimately upon food, I must correlate more carefully its distinctive characteristics with my precise needs and capacities. On the genetic level it is the careful choice of distinctive strains that enables the development of a new individual with the desired characteristics. On the social level the more personable the members of the group the greater and more intense is its unity. Surveying thus from instruments such as desks, to alimentation, to lineage, to society suggests that as one moves upward through the levels of beings distinctness, far from being antithetic to community, is in fact its basis. This gives hope that at its higher reaches, namely, in social life, the distinctiveness of autonomy and freedom may not need to be compromised, but may indeed be the basis for a community of persons bound together in mutual love and respect.

The third characteristic of the subsistent individual to be considered is openness to new actualization in interrelation with others. The existence by which one erupted into this world of related subjects is not simply self-contained; it is expressed in a complex symphony of actions which are properly one's own. It is not merely, as was noted above, that running can be said only of an existing individual, such as Mary, who runs. What is more, actions determine their subject: it is only by running that Mary herself is constituted precisely as a runner. This is important for our relations to, and with, others for the actions into which our existence flows, while no less our own, reach beyond ourselves. The same action which makes us agents shapes the world around us and, for good or ill, communicates to others. All the plots of all the stories ever told are about this, but their number pales in comparison with all the lives ever lived, each of which is a history of personal interactions.16 The actions of an individual existent reflect one's individuality with its multiple possibilities, and express this to and with others. It is in this situation of dynamic openness,17 of communication and of community that the moral growth of persons takes place. As subsistent therefore the person is characteristically a being, not only in him/herself, but with other beings. About this more must be said below.

To summarize: thus far we have seen the early derivation of the notion of person from mask. For this to evolve into the contemporary notion of person a strong awareness first of the nature and then of the existence of independent individuals needed to be developed. The first was achieved by the Greeks who within the one physical process identified basically different types of things. Substances are the individual instances of these specific types or natures. This provides the basis for consciousness of one's own nature and hence of relating in properly human terms to others within the overall pattern of nature.

There were limitations to such a project, for in its terms alone one ultimately would be but an instance of one's nature; and in the final analysis the goal of a physical being would be but to continue one's species through time. This was true for the Greeks and may still be a sufficient basis for the issues considered in sociobiology, but it did not allow for adequate attention to the person's unique and independent reality. This required the subsequent development of an awareness of existence, as distinct from nature or essence, as that by which one enters into the world and is constituted as a being in one's own right. On this basis the subsisting individual can be seen to be whole and independent, and hence the dynamic center of action in this world.

Still more is required, however, for the above characteristics, while foundational for a person, are had as well by animals and trees; they too, each in their own way, are wholes that are independent and active in this world. In addition to the above realities of substance and of subsisting individual, therefore, it is necessary to identify that which is distinctive of the human subject and constitutes it finally as personal, namely, self-consciousness and freedom.

Self-consciousness and will had been central to philosophies of the person in classical times; indeed, at one point Augustine claimed that men were nothing else than will. Descartes' reformulation of metaphysics in terms of the thinking self and the focus upon self-consciousness by John Locke and upon the will by Kant brought the awareness of these distinctive characteristics of the person to a new level of intensity and exclusivity. This constituted a qualitatively new and distinctively modern understanding of the person. It is necessary to look in the two remaining sections of this study first for the ancient roots of this sense of freedom and then for the modern sense of its creative exercise: its characteristics and how these stand in relation to the subsisting individual analyzed above.

Person as Self-Conscious and Free Subject

While it has been said that ancient thinkers had no concept of the person, a very important study by Catherine De Vogel18 has shown that there was indeed a significant sense of person and of personality among the ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as a search for its conditions and possibilities. It will be helpful to look at this in order to identify some of the cultural resources for understanding the way in which self-consciousness and freedom are rooted in the subject and constitute the person. Above, we saw a certain progression from the Greek philosophical notion of the individual as an instance of a general type to a more ample existential sense of the subject as an independent whole, which nonetheless shares with others in the same specific nature. It is time now to see how this relates to self-consciousness and freedom, how this one human person can stand firmly upon feet planted in the earth and yet be autonomous and self-directed, creative and caring.

The Greeks had a certain sense for, and even fascination with, individuals in the process of grappling with the challenge to live their freedom. T.B.L. Webster notes that "Homer was particularly interested in them (his heroes) when they took difficult decisions or exhibited characteristics which were not contained in the traditional picture of the fighting man."19 In the final analysis, however, the destiny of his heroes was determined by fate from which even Zeus could not free them. Hence, an immense project of liberation was needed in order to appreciate adequately the full freedom of the moral agent.

This required establishing: (a) that the universe is ruled by law, (b) that a person could have access to this law through reason, and (c) that the person has command of his relations to this law. These elements were developed by Heraclitus around 500 B.C. He saw that the diverse physical forces could not achieve the equilibrium required in order to constitute a universe without something which is one. This cosmic, divine law or Logos is the ruling principle of the coherence of all things, not only in the physical, but in the moral and social orders. A person can assume the direction of his life by correcting his understanding and determining his civil laws and actions according to the Logos, which is at once divine law and nature. In this lies wisdom.20

This project has two characteristics, namely, self-reflection and self-determination. First, as the law or Logos is not remote, but within man -- "The soul has a Logos within it"21 -- the search for the Logos is also a search for oneself — "I began to search for myself."22 Self-reflection is then central to wisdom. Second, the attainment of wisdom requires on the part of man a deliberate choice to follow the universal law. This implies a process of interior development by which the Logos which is within "increases itself."23

A similar pattern of thought is found in the Stoic philosophers for whom there is a principle of rationality or "germ of logos" of which the soul is part, and which develops by natural growth.24 A personal act is required to choose voluntarily the law of nature, which is also the divine will.

These insights of Heraclitus and the Stoics, though among the earliest of the philosophers, were pregnant with a number of themes which correspond to Kant's three postulates for the ethical life: the immortality of the soul, freedom and God. The first of these would be mined by subsequent thinkers in their effort to understand the constitution of the person as a physical subject that is characteristically self-conscious and free. The implications of Heraclitus' insight that the multiple and diverse can constitute a unity only on the basis of something that is 'one' gradually became evident, binding the personal characteristics of self-consciousness and freedom to the subject with its characteristics of wholeness, independence and interrelatedness.

Aristotle concluded that the unity of the disparate components of a living being could be explained only by something one, which he termed the soul or psyche, whence the term 'psychology'. The body is organized by this form which he described as "the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it."25 For Aristotle, however, the unifying principle of a physical subject could not be also the principle of man's higher mental life, his life of reason. Hence, there remained the problem of how to understand the person as integrating self-consciousness and freedom in a subject which is nonetheless physical.

Over one-thousand years later when Thomas Aquinas reviewed the texts of Aristotle in the light of the evolution of the Christian sense of existence he was able to draw out the implications of Heraclitus' insight for the unity of the person in full range of physical and mental life. He showed that there could be but one principle or soul for the entire person, both mind and body, for one subject could have but one existence, nature and form.

By this single formal principle the consciousness identified by Locke and the autonomous will elaborated by Kant exist as a properly human subject. This is physical fully, but not exclusively, for it also self-conscious and free. Similarly, it exists in its own right, yet does so in such wise that it exists essentially with others as a person in society.

There are pervasive implications for society in such an integration of the physical with the self-conscious and free dimensions of the person through a single principle. One does not become a person when one is accepted by society; on the contrary, through the form by which one is a person one is an autonomous end-in-oneself and has an inalienable and imperative claim to be responded to as such by other persons, the community and the state. Though the person has a unique need for acceptance, respect and love, the withholding of such acceptance by others -- whether individuals, families or states -- does not deprive them of their personhood: one does not have to be accepted in order to have a claim to acceptance. (Even in circumstances of correction and punishment, when one's actions are being explicitly repudiated, one must not be treated as a mere thing.)

Similarly, it is not necessary that the person manifest in overt behavior signs of self-awareness and responsibility. From genetic origin and physical form it is known that the infant and young child is an individual human developing according to a single unifying and integrating principle of both its physical and its rational life.26 The rights and the protection of a human person belong to a person prior to any ability consciously to conceive or to articulate them. Finally, attempts to modify the behavior of a person must proceed according to distinctively human norms if they are not to be destructive.

There is a second insight of great potential importance in the thought of Heraclitus. When he refers to the Logos27 as being very deep he suggests multiple dimensions of the soul. Indeed, it must be so if human life is complex and its diverse dimensions have their principle in the one soul. Plato thought of these as parts of the soul; in these terms the development of oneself as a person would consist in bringing these parts into proper subordination one to another. This state is called justice, the "virtue of the soul."28 Both the *Republic* and the *Laws* reflect amply his concern for education, character formation and personal development understood as the process of attaining that state of justice. The way to this is progressive liberation from captivity by the objects of sense knowledge and sense desires through spiritual training described in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. All this prepares the way for the emergence of a sense of the transcendent Good or of goodness itself in relation to which no particular good can be compelling but every good can be desirable but we are able to take account of the full meaning and value of each thing, and freely to relate oneself to others in coordinating virtue of *philanthropia*, the love of all mankind.29 It is of

foundational importance for a truly free life to have not merely access to some goods, but an ability to evaluate them in terms of the Good, establishes that inner harmony of soul through which the person is able to act with freedom and responsibility, both in principle and in fact. Because this vision, this sense cannot be communicated by teaching but remains "an extremely personal interior vision,"30 the uncalculating and unmeasured love shared in family, Church and other communities has special importance for the constitution of truly social life.

Correlatively, recent thought has made crucial strides toward reintegrating the person in one's world. The process of identifying the components of the world process initiated by the Greeks was inherently risky, for as analytic rather than synthetic it would turn attention away from the understanding of personal identity and thereby distract from grounding the person in the One. Cumulatively, the intensive modern concentration upon freedom in terms of self-consciousness would generate an isolating and alienating concentration upon self.31

Some developments in recent thought have made important contributions to correcting this individualist -- even potentially solipsist -- bias. One is the attention recently paid to language and to the linguistic character of the person. Our consciousness is not only evoked, but shaped by the pattern of the language in which we are nurtured. In our highly literate culture -- many would say in all cultures -- the work of the imagination which accompanies and facilitates that of the intellect is primarily verbal. Hence, rather than ideas being developed and then merely expressed, our thought is born in language. As this language is not one's private creation, but that of one's community over a long period, conscious acts, even about ourselves, involve participation in that community. To say that our nature is linguistic is to say that it is essentially "with others."

A similar point, but on another level of insight, was developed by Martin Heidegger and laid the basis for the stress among many existential thinkers on the importance of considering the person as being in community. As conscious and intentional, essentially one is not closed within oneself, but open to the world; one's self-realization depends upon and indeed consists in one's being in the world. Therefore it is not possible to think of persons in themselves and then to add some commerce with their surroundings; instead persons exist and can be conceived only as beings-in-the-world. Here the term 'in' expresses more than a merely spatial relation; it adds an element of being acquainted or familiar with, of being concerned for, and of sharing. At root this is the properly personal relation.32

From what was said of being-in-the-world it follows that the person is also being-with-others, for one is not alone in sharing in this world. Just as I enter into and share in the world, so also do other persons. Hence, as essentially sharing-in-the-world, our being is also essentially a sharing with-others or social. A more extended study would enter more fully into the workings of freedom;33 it would look to the ways of personal and social growth, of the correlative development of values and virtues, both by the person and the culture as has been done in other studies. Here, in order to focus upon the possibilities for social change it seems important to attempt to search out those dimensions of the human consciousness which enable the person not only to think along fixed tracks to pre-fixed conclusions, but to be truly creative will his or her freedom in the creation of new social inventions. For this the structure of Kant's three Critiques can serve as a guide to a new and thus far little used dimension of our personal capabilities and suggest not only that freedom is to be protected by reason but that freedom itself can and must be exercised creatively to provide the context for social life.

Person as Creative and Social Change

It is unfortunate that the range of Kant's work has been so little appreciated. Until recently the rationalist impact of Descartes directed attention almost exclusively to the first of Kant's critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which concerned the conditions of possibility of the physical sciences. Its rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted by reductionist positivisms and materialisms as justifying their a priori rejection of anything other than the inherently spatial and temporal.

Kant himself, however, quite insisted upon going further. If the terms of the sciences were inherently phenomenal, then his justification of the sciences was precisely to identify and to justify, through metaphysical and transcendental deductions respectively, the sets of categories which enable the phenomenal world to have intelligibility and scientific meaning. Such a priori categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind. Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a world encountered as a given to which one can but react. Rather, he shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation of even the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, man is to have such a central role in the constitution of his world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

First there must be an imagination which can bring together the flow of disparate sensations. This plays a reproductive role which consists in the empirical and psychological activity by which it reproduces within the mind the amorphous data received from without according to forms of space and time. This merely reproductive role is by no means sufficient, however, for since the received data is amorphous any mere reproduction would lack coherence and generate a chaotic world: "a blind play of representations less even than a dream".34 Hence, the imagination must have also a productive dimension which enables the multiple empirical intuitions to achieve some unity. This is ruled by "the principle of the unity of apperception" (understanding or intellection), namely, "that all appearances without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception."35 This is done according to such abstract categories and concepts of the intellect as cause, substance and the like which rule the work of the imagination at this level in accord with the principle of the unity of apperception.

Second, this process of association must have some foundation in order that the multiple sensations be related or even relatable one to another, and hence enter into the same unity of apperception. There must be some objective affinity of the multiple found in past experience — an "affinity of appearances" — in order for the reproductive or associative work of the imagination to be possible. However, as such this unity does not exist in past experiences. Rather, the unitive rule or principle of the reproductive activity of the imagination is its very productive or transcendental work as "a spontaneous faculty not dependent upon empirical laws but rather constitutive of them and hence constitutive of empirical objects."36 That is, though the unity is not in the disparate phenomena, nevertheless they can be brought together by the imagination to form a unity only in certain manners if they are to be informed by the categories of the intellect.

Kant illustrates this by the examples of perceiving a house and a boat receding down stream.37 The parts of the house can be intuited successively in any order (door-roof-stairs or stairs-door-roof), but my judgment must be of the house as having all of its parts simultaneously. The boat is intuited successively as moving down stream and, though I must judge its actual motion

in that order, I could imagine the contrary. Hence the imagination in bringing together the many intuitions goes beyond the simple order of appearances and unifies phenomenal objects in an order to which concepts can be applied. "Objectivity is a product of cognition, not of apprehension,"38 for though we can observe appearances in any sequence, they can be unified and hence thought only in certain orders as ruled by the categories of the mind.

In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in some unity or order capable of being informed by a concept or category of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the subject the imagination is active here, but as integral to the sciences which are characterized by necessity and universality, its work is necessitated by the categories or concepts. There is no freedom here.

The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason

As noted above, reductionist materialisms whether positivistic or dialectical are anxious to suppress any thought beyond this level of Kant's first critique. The necessity of the sciences gives control over one's life, while their universality extends this to control over others. Their hope is that once concrete Humean facts have been informed with the clarity of the categories of Kant's first critique Descartes' goal of 'walking with confidence in the world' will have been attained.

For Kant, however, this simply will not do. Clarity which comes at the price of necessity may be acceptable and even desirable in digging ditches, building bridges and the back-breaking slavery of establishing heavy industry, but it is an appalling way to envisage human life. Hence, in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* and his second *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant proceeds to identify that which is distinctive of the moral order. His analysis pushes forcefully beyond utilitarian goals, inner instincts and rational scientific relationships — precisely beyond the necessitated order which can be constructed in terms of his first Critique. None of these recognizes that which is distinctive of the human person, namely, one's freedom. To be moral an act must be based upon the will of the person as autonomous, not heteronomous.

This becomes the basic touchstone of his philosophy; everything thence forward will be adapted thereto, and what had been written before will be recontextualized in this new light. The remainder of his Foundations will be composed in terms of freedom; his entire *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* will be written to provide a context which will enable the previous two critiques to be read in a way that protects this freedom.

First, in the Foundations he rearticulates the whole notion of law or moral rule in terms of freedom. If all must be ruled or under law, and yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous, then my maxim must be something which I as a moral agent give to myself. This, in turn, has surprising implications, for if the moral order must be universal, then my own maxim must be fit to be a universal law for all persons.39 On this basis freedom emerges in its true light. It is not whimsy; it is not despotic; it is not the clever self-serving eye of Plato's rogue.40 Rather, as the highest reality in all creation, freedom is power that is wise and caring, open to all, and bent upon the realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves." It is, in sum, free men living together in righteous harmony.41

*The Critique of Judgment*42

Despite its central importance, I will not remain on this point, because the creative role of freedon is not played here. It is rather in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment that the freedom

uncovered in the Foundations becomes the basis for a new elaboration of creative imagination. Or perhaps it should be said the other way round, namely, the elaboration of the creative imagination in the third Critique enables the freedom previously discovered to unfold its truly pervasive social and cosmic significance.

Kant is so intent not merely upon uncovering the fact of freedom, but upon reconceiving all in its light that he must now further contextualize all the work he has done thus far. For he faces squarely modern man's most urgent question, namely, what will be the reality of the freedom uncovered by his second Critique when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in his first *Critique of Pure Reason*? Will the scientific interpretation of nature trap freedom within the inner realm of each person's heart, and reduce it at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others? When we attempt to act in this world or reach out to others must all our categories be universal, and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal; must they be necessary, and hence leave no room for freedom? If so then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated and anonymous. Finally, must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated unfolding of the scientific dialectic? If so then how can one escape the irrelevancy of a traffic director either in the jungle of unfettered competition or in an already foregone system of the mind. Freedom would indeed have been killed and would pulse no more as the heart of mankind.

Though subsequent ideologies of liberal capitalism and totalitarian collectivism were willing to accept as total such laws of the market place or of the dialectic, Kant's answer would have been a resounding 'no!'. On the contrary, taking as his basis the reality of freedom — so passionately if tragically affirmed in our lifetime by Gandhi, Martin Luther King and from the Berlin Wall to Tienanmen Square — Kant proceeded to develop his *Critique of Judgment*. He did so precisely in order to provide a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed in which necessity could be the support and instrument of freedom.

In the face off between freedom and necessity, whether in the physical or the social world, Kant's refusal to compromise freedom led him to affirm, and provided the justification for, the teleological character of nature as the broader context of scientific necessity. For if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws — if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom — then nature too must be directed toward a goal; it must possess intentionality within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms nature no longer is alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. Though Kant's system will not enable him to affirm that this teleological character of reality is a metaphysical reality, nevertheless he sees that we must proceed "as if" it is so precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in this ordered universe. This is the second part of his *Critique of Judgment*, the "Critique of Teleological Judgment."43

In the structure of Kant's work the above-mentioned teleological character of reality was identified last, for it is the ultimately required supposition for the entire field of reality. But if teleology in principle provides the needed space, how can freedom be exercised, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science which the first Critique sought to ground? This is the task of Part One of the *Critique of Judgment*, its "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment,"44 and it is here that the creative imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in the development and changes of human life. From the point of view of the human person, its task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity: how can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating?

Above we saw how the Critique of Pure Reason described the work of the imagination in assembling phenomena not simply as registering, but as producing the objective order. However, that productive work took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a house or receding boat must form a unity — which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. The objective order of sciences valid for all things and all people was a human product, but it was a universal and necessary one.

Here in the "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment" the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In working toward an integrating unity the productive imagination now ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions ordering and reordering them in order to see where and how relatedness and purposiveness emerge. Hence, it might stand before a work of nature or of art; it might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations. Indeed any combination of these, such as a natural environment or a society, might be considered either in its concrete reality or as expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this the ordering and reordering by the productive imagination brings about numberless unities, for just as the range of materials is unlimited so is the range of the unities which can be elaborated by the productive imagination. Unrestricted by any a priori categories, it integrates the necessary patterns of the dialectic within its own free production, and uses the scientific universals within its own unique and concrete harmonies. This is the properly creative work of the human person in this world.

It is essential to note that the success of the productive imagination in bringing these elements into an authentic harmony cannot be identified through reference to abstract categories of the understanding precisely because then freedom would be reduced within the necessity which characterized the universal scientific laws of the first critique. Hence, its success must be recognizable by something free, namely, by the response of pleasure or displeasure it generates. The aesthetic judgment is concerned directly and formally neither with the thing in itself nor with a concept,45 but with the pleasure or displeasure — the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting — which flows from our contemplation of our imaginative productions. It is this elation or disgust which manifests whether a proper and authentic harmony has been achieved or destroyed.

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and the related judgment of taste46 by looking at it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter, as something which takes place at a level of consciousness unrelated to anything other than an esoteric, indeed stratospheric, band of reality. That would ignore the structure of Kant's work, which he laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third critique.47 He conceived his critiques of the aesthetic and teleological judgments not as merely juxtaposed to the first two critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole. In the aesthetic imagination one works with and includes both the necessary relations of nature and the free interrelations of persons.

This may be exemplified through one's reaction to the exploitive housing of migrant workers. To respond in disgust is to go far beyond the cool technical judgments of "unsafe" or "unsanitary" made by the engineer or health specialist at the level of the first critique. But it would be obscene to speak of the squalor of the migrant housing as having been dictated by market forces or of the events of Tiananmen Square as confirming one's theory of history. It reaches beyond positive methods or positivist thoughts or anything that could be stated in terms of Lenin's definition of

matter as "that which, acting on our organs, produces sensation," beyond Marx's periodisation of history, and beyond all that can be stated in the terms of the sciences understood according to the first critique.

Indeed, it goes beyond even the objective judgments made by economic analysts, legal advisors or social critics at the level of the second critique. Though abundantly true, it would be too tidy and grossly insensitive to say only that the civil rights of the migrants or the requirements of justice were being violated.

In the third critique the work of the productive imagination variously "turns over," models and inspects all these factors from the scientific and moral levels on which the migrant labor camp has just been considered. But it goes further to situate them as multiple modes of destructive personal violence with regard to the full dignity of the concrete persons involved, including not only their physical well-being but their human dignity, not only elements which are common to all but those which are unique to particular persons in the family, as well as social commitments which constitute their search for meaning and fulfillment.

Finally, the productive imagination working at the aesthetic level does not merely tally all of these once and for all as might an accountant, but considers endless points of view and patterns of relationships which do or could obtain between these factors. Engels was correct in saying that "Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of those laws and in the possibility thus afforded of making them work systematically toward definite ends."48 It reflects, in other words, upon the level of harmony or disharmony, of beauty or ugliness of the whole. On the part of the object then, the aesthetic judgment is all-inclusive.

On the part of the subject, this judgment is profoundly personal, for it is based upon one's deepest, richest and most passionate response as an integrated person — body and spirit. This, in turn, does not make one's judgment solitary or arbitrary, however, for it corresponds to real harmony or disharmony. Hence, developing new degrees of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and to image responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future.

This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt. Their power to mobilize a people lay especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons, and thereby to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to his or her capabilities. As personable, free and creative such work of the aesthetic judgment is not less, but more inclusive in its content, applications and the responses it evokes from others.

Such experiences of aesthetic taste, passed on as part of a tradition, become components of a culture. Some thinkers such as William James and Jurgen Habermas,49 fearing that attending to these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs of the people, have urged a turn to the social sciences and their employment in pragmatic responses or in social analysis and critique. Kant's third critique points in another direction. Though it integrates, it does not focus upon universal and necessary scientific social relations or even directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we have freely created, and this in terms of the response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion they generate deep within our person.

In this way one's freedom at the height of its sensibility serves as a lens presenting the dense block of reality in varied and heightened ways: it is both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of being. Even more, freely, purposively and creatively, our imagination weaves through reality focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and

interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only its forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free response of love and admiration or of hate and disgust. In this manner we become the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the disposition of all that we imaginatively can propose.

What emerges finally is an awareness that all is purposive, that all has been created out of love and for our personal evaluation and response. As free, our task is to assess and choose among the many possibilities, and through our imagination creatively to project them toward the flow of actual being. In this manner we enter into that teleology called Providence by which all are drawn to Resurrection and new Life.

Notes

1. Adolf Trendelenburg, "A Contribution to the History of the Word Person," *The Monist*, 20 (1910), 336-359 published posthumously. See also "Persona" in *Collected Works of F. Max Muller* (London, 1912), vol. X, pp. 32 and 47; and Arthur C. Danto, "Persons" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), VI, 110-114.

2. This was pointed out by Gabius Bassus. See Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, V, 7.

3. *Prosepeion*. This explanation was given by Forcellini (1688-1769), cf. Tendelenburg, p. 340.

4. C. J. De Vogel, "The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought," *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), II, 20-60.

5. "That accepteth not the persons of princes." Job 34: 19. See also Deut 10:17; Acts 10:34-35; Rom 2:10-11.

6. Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 28 and 31; *De Orator*, II, 102; and Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, ch. 17.

7. A. Danto. See n. 2 above.

8. (Boston: Beacon, 1957), p. 61.

9. Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath, "The Scientific World View: The Vienna Manifesto," trans. A. E. Blumberg, in *Perspectives in Reality*, eds. J. Mann and G. Kreyche (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 483.

10. *Ibid*.

11. Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existence*, trans Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, l956), p. 14.

12. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, 4 73 a 3-b 25.

13. Réné Claix «La statut ontologique du concept de sujet selon le metaphysique d'Aristot. L'aporie de Metaphy. VII (Z) 3,» *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 59 (61), 29.

14. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), ch. I.

15. See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper, 1959); Wilfrid Desan, *The Planetary Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1961).

16. See also Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 181ff.

17. Gabriel Pastrama, "Personhood and the Burgeoning of Human Life," *Thomist*, 41 (1977), 287-290.

18. C. J. De Vogel, pp. 20-60.

19. T.B.L. Webster, *Greek Art and Literature*, 700-530 B.C. (Westport, Ct., Greenwood, 1986), pp. 24-45 (cited by C. De Vogel, p. 27, fn. 17a).

20. Heraclitus, fns. 2, 8, 51, 112 and 114 (trans. by C. De Vogel).

21. Heraclitus, fn. 115 (trans. by C. De Vogel, p. 31). See also fn. 45.

22. Heraclitus, fn. 101 (trans. by C. De Vogel, p. 31).

23. Heraclitus, fn. 115 (trans. by C. De Vogel, p. 31).

24. *Diog. L. VII 136; Marcus Aurelius IV 14, VI 24.*

25. Aristotle, *De Anima II*, 2 4l2 a 28-29.

26. For a detailed consideration of the first weeks after conception and of the point at which an individual life is present see André E. Helligers, "The Beginnings of Personhood Medical Consideration," *The Perkins School of Theology Journal*, 27 (1973), 11-15; and C. R. Austin, "The Egg and Fertilization," in *Science Journal*, 6 [special issue] (1970).

27. Heraclitus, fn. 45.

28. Plato, *Republic* I 353 c-d; IV 43 d-e, 435 b-c, and 441 e-442d.

29. De Vogel, pp. 38-45.

30. *Republic*, VI 609 c. See De Vogel, pp. 33-35.

31. Different cultures, of course, are variously located along the spectrum from individualism to collectivism.

32. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 52-57 and 118; see Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Martin Heidegger* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 24-25 and 56-57.

33. George F. McLean, "Philosophy and Technology," in *Philosophy in a Technological Culture*, ed. G. McLean (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1964); *Plenitude and Participation* (Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1978).

34. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A 112; cf. A 121.

35. *Ibid.*, A 121.

36. Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.

37. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 192-93.

38. Crawford, pp. 83-84.

39. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. R.W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), Part II, pp. 38-58 [421-441].

40. Plato, *Republic*, 519.

41. *Foundations*, III, p. 82 [463].

42. Cf. Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1982), Part I, pp. 1-2; pp. 39-73; and W. Crawford, espec. Ch. 4.

43. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1968), pp. 205-339.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-200.

45. See Kant's development and solution to the autonomy of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where Kant treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.

46. See the paper of Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" below for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant's aesthetic theory.

47. Immanuel Kant, *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

48. F. Engels, *Anti-Düring*, I, 11.

49. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Washington Square, 1963), Ch. I, pp. 3-40. For notes on the critical hermeneutics of J. Habermas see G. McLean, "Cultural Heritage, Social Critique and Future Construction" in *Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America*, R. Molina, T. Readdy and G. McLean, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, 1988), Ch. I. Critical distance as an essential element requires analysis by the social sciences of the historical social structures as a basis for liberation from internal determination by, and from dependence upon, unjust interests. The concrete psycho- and socio-pathology deriving from such dependencies and the corresponding steps toward liberation therefrom are the subject of the chapters by J. Loiacono and H. Ferrand de Piazza in *The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas,* G. McLean and O. Pegoraro, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, 1988), Chs. III and IV.

Chapter II
Methodology in Crisis:
The Fact-Value Dichotomy as a Metaphysical Question

Rose B. Calabretta

As has been proven, the socio-empirical methodology currently in use in the West is based on a metaphysical axiom that is circumscribed by an epistemological model which, by its very nature, impedes the rational understanding of the meaning of life. How can we then presume to "humanize social life" if we are denied knowledge of the essence of the human person?

Since the 1950's both natural and social scientific circles have considered the fact-value dichotomy as "problematic," not only to the scientific enterprize they profess to master, but also to the grand project of the "humanization of social life" which has characterized the intention of the social scientific community from its very birth. To understand the reasons for this contradictory development, it is necessary to go back to the roots of the dilemma and see how it had once been considered the "only acceptable way to do science."

Brief Historical Account

The "science" to which I refer is "logical positivism" which developed into "empirical criticism" or "critical positivism." All three currents, however, ultimately derived from the simply coined term "positivism."

In the second half of the 19th century August Comte applied the "scientific method" to the philosophical field, with the following characteristic theses: (1) that science is the only valid knowledge, and sense-data comprise the only possible objects of knowledge; (2) that philosophy does not have a method which is different from the scientific method; (3) that the aim of all philosophy is the discovery of general principles common to all sciences, and their use for the control of human behavior and as the basis of social organization.

Comte's positivism denied the existence, or the intelligibility, of transcendence in data and in the laws affirmed by science. It was opposed to any kind of metaphysics and, in general, any research method which could not be reduced to the scientific method. But his scientific theory was nonetheless characterized by the formula: "science wherefrom prediction; prediction wherefrom action." Comte's notion of "action" was to proceed according to his Law of Progress in human history which proposed the commitment of the "sociologist" (as scientific elite) to the construction and direction of the sociocracy, the "new absolutist social regime based on science and the religion of humanity." It is clear that Comte considered scientific knowledge as preliminary to responsible action in society; its ethics, however, was definitionally bound to positivistic science, and its "canons of objectivity."

Comte's contemporary, Charles Darwin, published his thesis "The Origin of the Species" in the western scientific community, focusing his evolutionary positivism on nature, rather than on society or history.

At the same time, critical positivism grew with the increasing popularity of the works of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius and the founding of the Vienna Circle. Their canons of objectivity—some of which still exist in some scientific circles in our age—may be stated briefly as follows: (1) Against German metaphysical constructions, it stated that natural science had proven to be the

certain means for the stable and progressive accumulation of the truth, by using intellectual sobriety and the demanding techniques of empiricism and logic. There was no other sure model which could advance knowledge in general. (2) By scientific means, one became acquainted with the field: beginning with facts of observation, one used only those tried means of inference, proceeding with caution toward levels of generalization. (3) Why shouldn't there be a means of verification, at least analogous to this, for all other statements about the truth of the world? (4) If the statement be not verifiable, it may be abandoned as nonsense, or at least discarded as mere artistic expression since inadequate for the real knowledge of things. (5) The underlying premise: artistic expression is not related to real knowledge; metaphysics offers no cognition at all.

This pattern of reasoning was technically "foundationalist." It began with a non-problematic foundation: the observational statements in themselves needed no other verification; they were what they were. Later on, through equally non-problematic inference rules, they produced hypothetical laws or theses.

The Vienna Circle supposed that logical propositions corresponded to sensorial observations as to their contents. These correspondence rules assured the meaning and the truth of the basic propositions, each of which offered a unique report of an observation. Science, then, consisted of the simple incrementation of our storage of such propositions, and by joining them together, the formulation of more complex propositions. Verification was thus reduced to either the truth-functional proof or the proposition of inductive rule-based probabilities.

Logical positivism was the most ambitious foundationalism in the history of human thought. At the turn of the 19th century, the positivistic mode was united to naturalism, giving rise to "social Darwinism" which dominated the European continent. What had been the intellectual trend of utilitarianism, related to Comtian utopianism, by which social problems were considered resolvable by rational means, was now locked into this evolutionary analysis as the theoretical frame for the study of human history, stripping research of its rational perspective: instead of conscious free will and logic, there was an underlying determinism based on social factors, such as "heredity" and "environment," as the principal causes of human action.

Young thinkers of that era reacted against this categorical tendency to speak of human behavior in terms of analogies taken from natural science. They attempted to vindicate the rights of rational investigation and to save human thought from the threat of this iron-fisted determinism. They insisted upon the qualitative difference between man and the rest of nature. With firm conviction, they examined historical events in order to establish the difference between the nature of subjective existence and the schematic order imposed on the external world by the natural sciences (Bergson); the separation between the areas of the human mind that sought after interior comprehension and the field of external and purely conventional symbols constructed by natural science (Dilthey); and/or a method by which to penetrate beneath the surface of human experience (Croce).

The term "ideology" came to mean a "grandiose abstract scheme used to explain the totality of things by affirming general laws that were presumed to underlie the apparent reality of historical development, both past and future.

Alongside the positivistic development of knowledge, the Cartesian "mind"/"matter" dichotomy dominated the intellectual scene; Kant had displaced the axis from "subject"/"object" to "noumenon"/"phenomenon". And Hegel had shaped a metaphysics to embrace the totality of Being with the historical development of its self-realization. German idealism had by this time become the dominant tendency of Western philosophical thought.

On the one hand, there was positivism; on the other, idealism. Both tendencies may be—and in fact have been—cross-cut by "ideology." In idealism, ideology was understood as metaphysics; in positivism, it was really Marxism that—as an aberrant form of positivism—dominated the cultural horizon as the most ambitious of the abstract ideologies which enchanted European intellectuals since the mid-19th century.

Searching for a valid method for historical analysis, the Idealists (neo-Kantians) abandoned the observation of external events in favor of penetrating the subjective meaning of human action. Their method was called *Verstehen* which was an intuitive penetration to delve beneath the appearances of social action, and achieve comprehension through empathy of the social experience under consideration. The object of their analysis was no longer "that which really exists," (or "real knowledge"), but rather "that which men think exists" (or "subjective knowledge"). Since the impossibility of certain knowledge about human behavior apparently had been proven, with this subjectivist position the mind was freed from the bonds of the positivistic method; it could now speculate, imagine and create.

But this definitional change as to the object to be studied, reduced historical knowledge to a completely subjective, partial and hypothetical realm because the prescribed methodology (intuition + empathy) could only attain a description which precariously balanced on the borderline of relativism in observing objects without establishing relations among them.

The term *Weltanschauung* (world-vision) was coined and, though still used in many scientific circles, especially in academia, it constituted the manifest foundation of the segregation between the objective and subjective realms. The door was opened to the conjecture that men projected their own vision upon the real totality of things which may or may not be correct, and so a general skepticism was arose regarding beliefs and their ontological foundations.

The Metaphysical Origin of *Weltanschauungen*

Max Weber established his sociology as empirical science with the specification of *Verstehen* (comprehension of the motives of social action) + Ideal Types (explanation verifiable through hypothetical propositions). He defined "meaningful social action" as the exclusive object of his socio-empirical science.

The dilemma of sociological knowledge is explained in its three fundamental moments: (1) the ontological dichotomy of intellect and will which contrives the impossibility of "naming" a metaphysical model, (2) Rickert's extension of the Kantian epistemological mechanism, and (3) Weber's determination of an empirical methodology for social analysis, based on the definition of man as "cultural being," that is, "endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance."[1]

"Value-free" sociology is not the only kind of sociology. Rather, it is the only sociology which can be established on the basis of Kantian metaphysical propaedeutics. The Weberian definition of man as "cultural being" derives from a particular anthropological model, which, in turn, derives from an ontological model. This presumes a cosmological model which harbors a metaphysical axiom, identified as the Platonic "Summum Bonum," and characteristically named the "Noumenal Cause."

The Kantian agnostic premise has marked western epistemology with resignation to an insuperable ignorance of the essence of any being, including Man himself.[2] As is well-known, Kant circumscribed the human intellectual capacity to sensation, synthesized in "original apperception." This process of double synthesis, though condemned to the material stimuli offered

to the human mind, was intentionally limited to permitting only the possibility of affirming the reality of "freedom" in Man (the Third Antinomy which leads to the development of the Second Critique). By negating natural knowledge of the Absolute in the speculative sphere of human reason, Kant affirmed freedom and its moral law, inscribed in the human will, as a second, more immediate means by which the "Summum Bonum" may be known by Man, and may manifest itself in history. In his Third Critique, Kant attempted to unite the two faculties of the human soul which he had segregated into two fields: speculative and practical. He hypothesized as a necessary postulate of Pure Reason, a hypersensible or noumenal substrate to nature which enlivens it to bring itself to self-consciousness in Man (as final cause of nature). Then, if the categorical imperative be faithfully lived with a sense of duty, the hypersensible substrate would realize itself in all its fullness, manifesting itself in history as ontological perfection in a moral world. Kant's premise is a pantheistic cosmological model, within which he constructs an agnostic epistemological model.

As previously described, the turn of the 19th century was characterized by intense investigation in search of the philosophical foundations which would allow for the development of an empirical methodology to justify historical analysis as "scientific" according to positivistic canons of objectivity. Kant's exclusion of history, the human collectivity and man in general, from the domain of his epistemological model—since "man remains a mystery unto himself"—did not dissuade the young neo-Kantians of the day. They recognized the singular importance of his provision for the development of the natural sciences by means of "universal" hypothetical concepts (called "generalizing concepts" by Rickert) which the faculty of Judgment, in its reflective sphere, creates in order to broaden knowledge and to grasp the infinite variety of things. Rickert extended the function of reflective Judgment in order to develop Man's speculative knowledge about Man, by positing *a priori* the existence of universal cultural values in the human consciousness, thus allowing for the identification of their presence in historical situations. Rickert thus proposed "individualizing concepts," created and offered by reflective Judgment to the faculty of Understanding as hypothetical concepts which likewise must be accepted "as if they were" universal, in such a way as to establish "value relevance" as criterion of objectivity in historical analysis.

Max Weber adopted the Rickertian development of the Kantian model as foundation for his empirical scientific methodology, with the sole exception of the *a priori* affirmation of universal values in human consciousness. Adhering completely to the Kantian denial of metaphysical certainty, Weber substituted the metaphysical function by the personally chosen "god or daemon" created by each individual as cultural being, and according to which he required no longer a "categorical" imperative, but rather a "personal" imperative of ethical action. Hence, the concept of *Weltanschauung*3 which now pervades contemporary culture.

According to Weber, "culture" was defined as the capacity and the will to create the ultimate meaning of life. And the sociologist of integrity was characterized by the following qualities which were neatly segregated into "public/private" and "objective/subjective" spheres of life:

clarity + sense of responsibility
(understanding and explanation) (world-vision)
knowledge + ethical action
(objective) (according to his personal imperative)
science + politics
(facts) (values)

Weber's empirical scientific knowledge was always4 partial as opposed to total relative as opposed to universal, and concrete as opposed to transcendental.

"Value-free" sociology is not at all "free" of values. Rather it was admittedly grounded on subjective5 "evaluative ideas" as hypotheses of motivating values in acting subjects.6 This methodology left its "object" in a completely vulnerable position within a probabilistic scheme of mass data processing which, abstracted from the observed human beings, could be manipulated as a technified means for achieving dehumanizing, though perfectly justifiable and scientifically approved, ends. Weber feared this fact which he, indeed, predicted as the coming of the technifying age of specialization that, while blinding the investigator, would incapacitate his ability to appreciate the origins of his methodology.7

A Closer Look at "Value-Freedom"

Weber's exterior fact-value dichotomy was due to his faithful adherence to the Kantian ontological model which harbored an inherent dichotomy by virtue of Kant's limitation of theoretical cognition (which is the only certain knowledge that he established "dogmatically"). Since Weber developed his epistemological premises (via Rickert) exclusively upon Kant's source of theoretical cognition, his empirical science could only be constructed on the basis of the one faculty (Understanding as affected by speculative reason in conjunction with reflective judgment), which was denied certain knowledge of "meta-empirical" reality. To supplement the limitation of the understanding, however, Weber maintained (as a "transcendental presupposition") that man was to be defined as a cultural being, i.e., having practical reason and the will to provide a meta-empirical ultimate meaning to reality. The whole of metaphysics and ontology had been "packaged" into the term "culture" for Weber. This was rendered possible for Weber because Rickert had extended theoretical knowledge by means of reflective judgment in relation to reason and its transcendental Ideas to include cultural science as well as the natural science already established by Kant.

The ontological foundation of Weber's epistemological premises in instituting empirical social science can be attained through the following points:

(1) What Weber adopted from Rickert and why it was so important to him for establishing value-free sociology as empirical science, including:
　(a) Weber's definition of the scope and method of social science as objective science;
　(b) his designation of ultimate meaning as that which is created by man as a cultural being;
　(c) his establishment of ideal types by which to analyze empirical reality;
　(d) and his employment of ideal types as checks on *Verstehen*.

(2) What Weber adopted from Kant's ontology and where the origin of the "fact/value" dichotomy is found, including:
　(a) Weber's necessary rejection of metaphysical certainty and his adherence only to theoretical cognition;
　(b) his prohibition of practical value judgments from empirical social science;
　(c) his acceptance of Kant's ontological model and the noumenal realm within man;
　(d) and his consequent transformation of the universal moral imperative into a personal imperative.

Let us look at each of these.

Max Weber and Heinrich Rickert

Rickert provided a necessary bridge between Kant's critical system and Weber's value-free social science.

Weber's Definition of the Scope and Method of Social Science as Objective Science. Rickert worked specifically within the Kantian theoretical epistemological framework, referring to the function of sensibility and understanding in an effort to extend theoretical knowledge to include historical analysis by constructing individualizing categories. Kant had treated the extension of theoretical knowledge of nature alone, and in this, exclusively with proposed universal categories, by which reflective judgment hypothesized general laws for nature according to the understanding's *a priori* principle of conformity to law.

Beginning with his doctrine of knowledge which was based on the Kantian "formal" epistemological foundations, what Rickert first asserted was a justification of historical analysis as equally objective and scientific as the natural sciences. All knowledge for Rickert was of appearances, as structured by the judgment in its application of the universal categories of the understanding to empirical intuitions. Reality as it is-in-itself was beyond the cognitive capacity of Man and, therefore, the "laws" of natural science did not reveal the essences of things as they really are in themselves. The "categories" which men formulated to extend their knowledge provided new "forms" for the "contents" presented to the understanding by the infinite variety of empirical reality. From this presupposition of what made for the extension of "knowledge," and what was its actual content, Rickert formulated two related, original theses: the "principle of fact-selection" and "value-relevance" for the cultural sciences.

All knowledge was extended by a volitional act to assert something about reality, thus attributing "real" existence or "truth-value" to concrete phenomena.

Facing the infinite variety of empirical reality as possible "contents" for knowledge, Rickert asserted that science should investigate *all* facts and not only those adopted by the natural sciences, and that since the human Understanding was limited, men had to select the facts which were essential to their purposes. Now, since *facts* were constituted by the *application of forms or concepts to contents*, Rickert distinguished between two different types of concepts which were equally objective and valid (i.e., they each, in their own right, attributed "real" existence or truth-value to their objects): generalizing concepts which were meant for the discovery of general laws of nature (these had already been established in Kant's third Critique), and individualizing concepts which were intended for understanding the unique, unrepeatable characteristics of particular cultural-historical events (this was Rickert's innovation of the Kantian formal system). For objective science, then, what was required was unanimity within scientific communities in agreeing upon their particular method of abstraction from concrete reality which was determined by their scientific interest or designation of what was essential to them.

Since generalizing fact-selection was determined by the structure of the understanding itself, to establish a non-arbitrary criterion for individualizing fact-selection Rickert asserted that cultural values must always be the reference point to which concrete social phenomena relate which was determined by the structure of Reason itself. The goal of cultural science was to locate and describe those particular social actions or personages which exhibited in varying degrees that which was universal in culture (defined as the emergence of "objective spirit" in the course of history). The

empirically general cultural values most directly strove for realization of the ultimate universal cultural values. Rickert quite clearly stated that the meaning he attributed to "culture" was, in Kantian terms, the "noumenal will" realizing itself in men's actions, in so far as man is a moral subject and, therefore, the final purpose of nature. Nevertheless, Rickert stated that for establishing "empirical objectivity," the criterion of empirically general cultural values for fact-selection in the cultural sciences was sufficient, since the establishment of "philosophical objectivity" lay beyond the limits of empirical sciences (as also beyond the limits of the theoretical faculty). To compensate for this cognitive limitation, he stated that in any case his position was philosophically justified in that, given empirically general cultural values, the assumption of universal cultural values was a logical necessity, and the former had to be treated as if they were universal. Here he uses Kant's *a priori* principle of the reflective Judgment as related to reason and its *a priori* principle of "final purpose" as distinct from the *a priori* principle of the reflective judgment as related to the understanding and its *a priori* principle "conformity to law" in the case of "generalizing" concepts applied to nature.

Furthermore, Rickert made a sharp distinction between "theoretical value-relevance" and "practical valuation," stating that the former in objective cultural science was totally different from the practical positing of values which pertained to practical Reason and which had no place in the theoretical extension of empirical knowledge.8

Now, we may see that Weber adopted from Rickert his principle of theoretical value-relevance in cultural science for justifying its empirical objectivity, i.e., with empirically general cultural values established as non-arbitrary criteria. For Weber, all scientific analysis had to be value-relevant in the process of fact-selection or separation of the "important" from the "unimportant" elements, taking the observed social reality in terms of its interest to the researcher.

Weber's social science was operationalized by means of forming concepts of an Ideal-type with which empirical reality was analytically ordered, i.e., the particular characteristics of social reality were unveiled to the investigator for his further analysis.

As Weber stipulated that value-relevance was a purely logical aspect of the objectivity of empirical social science, he made the same distinction as did Rickert between the logical or theoretical characteristic and practical value judgments (or stating "what ought to be"). Their sharp and insistent distinction on this point was clearly based upon Kant's ontological dichotomy between the Understanding as empirical cognitive faculty, and Reason in its practical sphere as related to the will and the moral law. The latter was the source of practical valuation in each man, and could not be derived from empirical sources.

Weber's Designation of Ultimate Meaning as That Which is Created by Man as Cultural Being. Value-relevance, as the principle of fact-selection (using individualizing concepts) and therefore the basis of "objectivity" in cultural science, became a presupposition of Weber's social science. A presupposition of epistemological premises indicates either a larger model upon which it is based, or an arbitrary starting-point conveniently used in order to begin research at any cost. The latter alternative seems too superficial a reason to be attributed to a thinker of the caliber of Weber who argued with such passionate fervor (and not ingenuously) for the establishment of a methodology which would be both interpretative and explanatory. He set the limits of his empirical science by such insistence upon clarity and precision: its only understandable object was "the meaningfully oriented action of individuals and groups of people."9 "Evaluative ideas" themselves could be discovered and analyzed as "elements of meaningful human conduct."

It seems evident that behind this presupposed starting-point of social scientific investigation, lies intact the whole of the cultural-nonsensorial or noumenal realm. This was the ontological model within which Rickert extended Kantian theoretical knowledge to history by formulating individualizing concepts to detect those "spiritual values" which were to emerge in the development of human history. For Weber, however, the "meta-empirical" realm was unknown, and this led him to affirm the "transcendental presupposition" that Man as cultural being lends significance to reality. Therefore, the ultimate meaning or ultimate position on life—discoverable and analyzable in both observed human conduct and evaluative ideas as an individual and personal creation—was possible by virtue of the meta-empirical capacity and will of each person.10

Weber's Establishment of Ideal Types by Which to Analyze Empirical Social Action. Taking "concept-formation" as a necessary extension of Kant's theoretical knowledge by means of the function of the *a priori* principle of reflective judgment to construct these "contingent forms" of new knowledge, Rickert developed his system of individualizing concepts. Since he saw history as an individualizing science, the categories thus constructed had to be used for analytical, not for synthetic, knowledge, i.e., for description of what remained hidden in empirical reality, and not for discovery of universal laws.

It is not surprising, then, that Weber developed his ideal types as methodological tools — not as ends in themselves or generic concepts, but as a theoretical means by which empirical and meaningful social action could be explained. That is, along with the particulars of the concrete empirical reality, the cultural meaning could also be reconstructed. The ideal types were designed specifically for the analytical ordering of social reality.

Weber's Employment of Ideal Types as Checks on Verstehen. Weber insisted that sociological analysis was "explanatory-understanding."11 As already noted, the object of this science was "meaningful subjective action" of individuals by which they relate to one another; it is possible, indeed necessary, to specify this "subjectivity" because Weber identified "culture" with the meta-empirical reality.

Because of Weber's agnostic position toward the meta-empirical universal cultural values, which Rickert assumed *by logical necessity* in order to establish the philosophical objectivity of his value-relevance, he had to designate "subjective meaning" as that meta-empirical ultimate meaning which disseminated into concrete viewpoints about aspects of reality. In this way, similar to Rickert, Weber also fulfilled the requisites for establishing the philosophical objectivity of his "empirical science."

By beginning with Ideal types as methodological tools, Weber affirmed that one could induce from empirical social action those ultimate "cultural" values (no longer held to be universal) which the individual or group created. Weber described his "evaluative ideas" as: "discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct," but the resultant empirical analysis was incapable of proving it more valid than any other ultimate position on life. This "value-interpretation" was made "with reference to its ultimate meaning" which was either "rejected or accepted according to our ultimate position toward life."

To summarize then, we can see that Rickert provided Weber with:

(1) the justification of historical social analysis as equally objective and scientific as the natural sciences;

(2) the "principle of fact-selection" and theory of "concept-formation" as necessary for the delimitation of scientific fields;

(3) "value-relevance" as a notion providing the basis of empirical "objectivity" in cultural science;

(4) "culture" as meta-empirical source of ultimate meaning; and

(5) "social activity" as the proper object of historical analysis.

Divorcing his doctrine from Rickert's *a priori* universal cultural values, Weber necessarily:

(1) defined the limits of empirical social science by accepting social activity as a subjectively valued object of knowledge;

(2) developed "value-relevance" as personal cognitive interest within the delimited intersubjectively valued area of scientific concern, and according to the norms of logic and method adopted by the scientific community;

(3) designated as a transcendental presupposition of sociological science that man is a cultural being, capable of creating ultimate values as meta-empirical reality;

(4) relegated "evaluative ideas" to the individual's cultural creation of ultimate meaning;

(5) limited empirical science to that which proceeds from meta-empirical reality, but as incapable of proving its validity; and

(6) developed the ideal types as methodological tools by which the analytical ordering of empirical social reality was made possible, and the cultural context of meaning could be rationally understood.

Max Weber and Immanuel Kant

Having completed the analysis of the intellectual origins of Weber's definition of the scope and method of empirical social science, the philosophical origins of the fact-value dichotomy12 may be easily understood as deriving from Kant's critical system.

Max Weber was a Kantian to the very core, and it was because of Kant's critical system and his peculiar delineation of theoretical knowledge that Weber was obliged—for reasons of "intellectual integrity"—to define empirical social science with an inherent theoretical-fact/practical-value dichotomy.

Weber's Necessary Rejection of Metaphysical Certainty and His Adherence Exclusively to Theoretical Cognition. Weber adhered exclusively to the theoretical use of reason, and considered the gap to be unbridgeable, which Kant openly granted as justified.13 For him the sensible realm was determined by the "value-spheres" of science (supplied by Rickert's extension of Kant's reflective Judgment).

Weber was obliged to restricted to Kant's theoretical cognition because this was the way Kant defined his epistemological model. Kant's overt intention was to limit knowledge in order to make room for faith. And Weber fully accepted this position as he confirmed in his *Science as a Vocation*: "faith is 'a possession' which required an ultimate 'intellectual sacrifice' in this disenchanted world." But why was the world disenchanted for Weber, and why was it that science could not tell us the meaning of life?

The reason lies in the fact that the Kantian critical system terminated in rational agnosticism: the noumenal realm was completely beyond the limits of the human empirical cognitive faculty.

Even moreso, in his polemic against theological dogmatists, Kant discredited the validity of the traditional "sacred" arguments for the existence of God and for consequent "revelation" (according to his "transcendental method"14). Weber specified further that opting for the religious interpretation meant returning to "the old churches," after having decided to make an "intellectual sacrifice." Weber believed the Kantian transcendental philosophy to be the only certain, rational demonstration of the sources of human knowledge and their respective domains. Weber's own position of integrity was to see how much he could support in accepting a pluralist perspective on the meaning of life.

Weber's Prohibition of Practical Value Judgments from Empirical Social Science. Weber faithfully accepted Kant's epistemological model as providing the only mode of certain knowledge available to Man. He wanted to establish social analysis as empirical science according to positivistic canons. The consequences were as follows:

(1) his position of "ethical neutrality," i.e., the prohibition of reason's value imperative in scientific findings and exposition; and

(2) the requirement of "ideal types" as analytical tools. These "categories" could change, in fact, they should change according to the needs of the times, but they were to be always grounded as "objective" in "value-relevance," as dictated by the cognitive interest of the scientist within his scientific community. In other words, their origin was, beyond all doubt, really "subjective."

Weber's Acceptance of Kant's Ontological Model and the Noumenal Realm within Man. Weber accepted as true Kant's ontological designation of Reason as the noumenal faculty in Man. From Reason derived in the speculative realm the ideas which guided the theoretical use of the Understanding, and in the practical realm the moral imperative.

Facing the denial of metaphysical certainty and, therefore, of all universals, Weber emphatically stipulated that the "evaluative ideas" were in the final analysis "subjective" and they influenced and guided the focus of the empirical analysis. Accepting Kant's practical reason as the source of another mode of knowledge that supplied reason with its highest end, Weber converted it into man's cultural being which was an "indisputable transcendental presupposition" for all cultural science as it held within it the entire noumenal realm. However, for Weber, there was no longer any universal meaning of reality, but rather necessarily a plurality of meanings of life (*Weltanschauungen*) by virtue of this "meta"-empirical character of Man's being. The particular meaning posited by Kant in his second *Critique* was simply a religious interpretation and only one among numerous other possibilities.

Weber's Consequent Transformation of the Universal Moral Imperative into a Personal Imperative. Why did Weber stipulate "responsible ethical action" as the sign of the integrity of his exercise of socio-empirical science? The answer is found in Kant's development of practical reason on the basis of the concept of freedom, which established man's will as autonomous of natural determinism.

Allowing for man's freedom according to Kant's meaning, Weber insisted that once a person achieved "self-clarification," i.e. once he had created or chosen a personal ultimate position on life by virtue of his cultural being, then he had to "make a decisive choice" and act out of a sense of responsibility according to his personal meta-empirical reality "whatever its contents may be."

What had Weber done to Kant's categorical imperative, that moral law inscribed in the very essence of the will? Kant meant it to be a statement of an ontological principle within man, arriving ultimately at a transcendental theology with the postulate of "the ideal of supreme ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity." Weber transformed it, by virtue of theoretical cognition's necessary ignorance of transcendent reality, into "moral forces" or necessary personal imperatives, each according to the "god or daemon he finds and obeys." To Kant's categorical imperative Weber further responded by stating that the ethic of the "Sermon on the Mount" was an expression of "undignified conduct" when viewed from the "mundane perspective." "Figuratively speaking, you serve this god and you offend the other god when you adhere to this (or that ultimate *Weltanschauliche*) position."15

Weber was a firm "believer" in freedom which—he asserted—found its source in Reason itself. Due to the effect that it could produce in empirical reality, Kant had established "freedom" as an "objective" reality, which related the moral law to the faculty of the will, leading man to live his ultimate vocation, that is, ontological perfection or union with the holy will of the Absolute Being, which was within the noumenal realm. Because he maintained "ethical neutrality," Weber could not impose his "personal belief" in freedom on anyone else, rather we was obliged to establish "science as a vocation," as he truly believed it to be the most free of practical value positions.

Final Analysis

Weber's epistemological premises are based on a specific ontological model of man which is incapable of reflecting the reality which man really lives. In spite of Kant's intention to unite the sensible and supersensible faculties and their respective domains, in fact he denied theoretical knowledge of the concept of the ground of their unity, and thus intellectually "legitimized" the "scientific" developments leading to the "rationalization, intellectualization, and the disenchantment of the world"—alongside the "option" of faith as choice of an "intellectual sacrifice."

In other words, Weber's "value-free" empirical social science was defined according to Kantian rational agnosticism which derived from his particular ontology of the human person. One could say of Kant, that his discovery of the ontological principle which leads man to fulfill his "ultimate vocation" was inopportunely placed outside of man's cognitive grasp; or of Weber, that his designation of "science as a vocation" was thoroughly unkantian, and that he did well to require ethical responsibility in the personal sphere of the scientist's life in order to remain faithful to man's essential action, the presently forgotten underlying source of modern epistemology.

However, at the turn of this 20th century, we are in the advantageous position of being able to perceive the ultimate roots of our methodology. Perhaps it is so because we are witnesses to the disastrous effects of a whole century's systematic application of such "positivistic" knowledge to man and his societies . . . in the massive failure of Marxist affirmations in what was called the "Second World," and in the social indifference and ethical void of pluralist, consumer liberalism in what still—though weakly—calls itself the "Free World."

Try as we may in our contemporary scientific epoch to solve the problem of "value-free" sociology, we will always have to return to a limping ontological model of Man which by its very structure determines the dichotomy of theoretical fact and ethics-based-on-ultimate-values. To say that all knowledge is "value-laden" only reiterates Weber's presupposition of empirical social science. To demand ethical responsibility from social scientists is to re-affirm Weber's official

dictates of integrity for the scientist. To state that beyond empirical sociology there is a "meta-sociology" which vindicates sociological scope and methods, is to point exclusively to the Kantian ontological model.

But, the real risk in examining the origins of our "scientific" methodology lies in the overall cultural incapacity for understanding its meaning. Our epoch's most serious handicap lies in the strictly specialized and highly technical formation of scientific "experts." Their serious *lacunae* in philosophical and classical training permit ignorant apathy as to the challenges which science is actually facing at the start of this third millennium. Normally, those specialists of good will who want "to do something" ask: But what can possibly be done to make a difference; this is the way our science is; what alternative do we have?

An interesting turn of events is now taking place in European scientific communities. Specialists are re-proposing that scientific circles reconsider the ontological model of the human person; that we begin with an ontology that is not defective with an inherent dichotomy between cognition and volition. This would be one in which the principle of being and the principle of knowledge are one and the same in man: an open anthropology whose theoretical expression coincides with our real everyday experience.

Notes

1. Cfr. Annex 1: the philosophical diagrams of the kantian critical system (n.3-5), the rickertian theoretical extension (n.6), and the weberian epistemological premise for socio-empirical methodology (n.7).

2. "Even as to himself, a man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by internal sensation.…" (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, I. Kant, trans. Thomas K. Abbott, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954, p. 70).

3. "In terms of its meaning, such and such a practical stand can be derived with inner consistency, and hence integrity, from this or that ultimate *Weltanschauliche* position. Perhaps it can only be derived from one such fundamental position, or maybe from several, but it cannot be derived from these or those other positions. Figuratively speaking, you serve this god and you offend the other god when you adhere to this position. And if you remain faithful to yourself, you will necessarily come to certain final conclusions that subjectively make sense" (*Science as a Vocation*, M.Weber, in *The Relevance of Sociology*, ed. Jack J. Douglas, New York: Meredith Corp., 1970, p.59.).

4. This is admittedly an absolute statement, based on the kantian theoretical agnosticism.

5. "Undoubtedly all evaluative ideas are subjective." M. Weber, *'Objectivity' in Social Science*, in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. Shils and Finch, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949, p.83.

"The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are *subjective* in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the *value* of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us." *Ibid.*, p. 110.

6. Cfr. Annex 2.

7. "All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once it is oriented towards a given subject matter through particular settings of problems and has established methodological principles, will consider the analysis of the data as an end in itself. It will discontinue assessing

the value of the individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general." *Ibid*., p. 112.

8. Cfr. Annex 1, n.5 and 6.

9. Rickert asserts that the object of his cultural science is "social activity" without any other qualifying adjective; "meaningful" as a qualification of this object is a superfluous element only when one assumes the "universality of meaning".

10. Cfr. Annex 2.

11. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich [New York: Bedminister Press, 1958] vol. 1, pp. 4, 8.

12. It should be clear that the fact-value dichotomy was understood by Weber as a "value-relevant fact"-"practical value judgment" dichotomy, i.e., an intellect-volition dichotomy, or an empirical knowledge/meta-empirical knowledge dichotomy. For Weber, "value-relevant" knowledge made for "objective" knowledge, which was not to be confused with a mirror-image of external reality. All facts were value-laden, i.e., "subjective" in that they were derived from "evaluative ideas." On the other hand, practical value judgments projecting ultimate meaning upon empirical conditions was subjective knowledge for Weber, since it was created by cultural man as meta-empirical knowledge, or that which was beyond our theoretical cognitive capacity.

13. Compare the following statements: "The tension between the value-spheres of "science' and the sphere of "the holy' is *unbridgeable*" (M. Weber, *Science as a Vocation*, p. 62.)

"Now even if *an immeasurable gulf* is fixed between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom, so that no transition is possible from the first to the second (by means of the theoretical use of reason) just as if they were two different worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the second, yet the second is *meant to* have an influence upon the first." (I. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by J.H. Bernard, New York: Hafner Press, 1951, p. 12.)

14. Cfr. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 644.

15. M. Weber, *Science as a Vocation*, p. 56.

Chapter III
The Community of Persons as the Foundation of Human Society

James A. Loiacano, O.M.I.

Since the time of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, there has been the articulation and attempted actualization of an emancipatory process, realized politically, socially, legally and economically. It can be seen as part of the warp and woof of the fabric of the continuing historical thrust for liberation by the community of persons which has sought to free the self and the human community from the bondage of natural necessity, reductionistic dogmatistic assertions which legitimize an oppressive status quo. This is imposed by brute authoritarian force and those problematic internal dynamics which seem to originate in the person's spirit, and impede the liberative process for both individual and the community.

This longing for and call of emancipation from whatever is understood as oppression is not the phenomenon of modernity but can be seem in antiquity with the establishment of Torah in Judaism whereby monarch and subject, rich and poor, citizen and foreigner, powerful and weak are subject to the very same law and justice. The God of Judaism is a God of justice who refuses complicity in the legitimization of any and all systems of discrimination and oppression since every human being, every man and woman without exception is created to his divine image and likeness. Because of him and before him, each and every human person is equal. Before his prophets, all political and economic systems are ruthlessly critiqued and fiercely challenged. The God of Israel declares himself to be the One who defends and frees the poor and oppressed, freeing them of whatever reduces or denies their true status and dignity as his image and likeness.

Jesus continues this thrust in his declaration that the truth will be known and will realize freedom. It is also a freedom from any and all that reduce the true status and dignity of the human person, including and foremost within the realm of the spirit, for it is within the dynamism of the spirit that the divine image and likeness as subject-person has its origin. Nonetheless, the human being (*ha adam*) is indeed a creature of the earth (*ha adamah*), s/he is subject-person bodily and realizes the full dimensions of his/her humanness in, through and with the body. In order to effect freedom in truth, Jesus, therefore, offers a means of critique which amounts to a meta-critique(to use the terminology of the Hungarian Marxist theoretician, György Lukács). That is to say, Jesus offers a means of critiquing the critique which is the legitimation of the situation of oppression in the self and community. This freedom is the continuation of the action of the God of Israel who frees the oppressed from all untruth which can be understood as internal and external dogmatisms (legitimating, reductionist critiques) which reduce the individual and the community, subjugating them to a reductionistic and oppressive authoritarianism (the force of an oppressive status quo or power structure). The relationship of this liberation to truth must not be minimized. There is no real liberation or freedom outside the truth. This is articulated by Thomas Aquinas who states that the root of all liberation is constituted in reason. Specifically, liberation can only be legitimate in reference to the whole truth of being human. No liberation is legitimately so called if it reduces the whole truth of being human in any way whatever. This is the only basis for a truly human society.

Thus, the emancipatory process, if it is to be authentic cannot be separated from the perennial epistemological question of truth. In this century, the great forces of liberation loosed by the

Mahatma, Mohandas K. Gandhi, and his American protegé, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., profess the "power of truth," (*satyagraha*), which eliminates the antinomous relationship of theory and praxis. The truth (dogma) is asserted as a critique of reductionistic assertions (dogmatisms) which legitimate a tyrannical status quo while authority (the force, *graha* of dogma or truth, *satya*), is used as a non-violent means against oppressive authoritarianism (the force of dogmatism). What is being asserted here is that authority is the liberating force of dogma (the liberating critique in truth) while authoritarianism is the oppressive force of dogmatism (the legitimating critique in untruth or reductionism). In contemporary times one sees in the movements of Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. the continuing historical process of emancipation which is to live a more truly human life. Their movements also demonstrate the possible unity of theory and praxis based upon spiritual principles.

The effective unity of theory and praxis, sundered by René Descartes, was found to be difficult to restore. While Immanuel Kant labored brilliantly to end the antinomous relationship between the two, the mediation of knowledge through epistemological categories made it impossible to grasp clearly the reality of the very agent of praxis, i.e., the human person, and the personal reality to which freedom and inalienable rights could be predicated. He therefore failed to bring theory and praxis together, so Georg Frederich Hegel would evolve an idealist system of a self-formative process which realized itself in the emancipation through immediate apprehension of truth. While the antinomous relationship between theory and praxis was resolved, nonetheless, praxis was critically compromised by his legitimation of the Prussian political power structure as well as the totally idealist perspective of his philosophical system.

Karl Marx transformed the Hegelian system in a materialist mode. While Hegel conceived of Mind or Spirit as the all encompassing reality upon which all else is contingent, including matter, Marx posited matter as the dynamic principle of existence upon which mind, the human mind, is contingent. Emancipation is realized historically through the labor process as it is developed in increased cognitive progress realized in instrumental action for the more efficient exploitation of natural resources. Philosophy, in Marx's perspective, finally becomes the means for revolutionary action whereby theory and praxis are unified in a socio-political, economic system in which the laborer is no longer alienated from the means of production and the good of production are equitably distributed to all within the social unity. Like Aquinas, Marx's epistemological perspective is both objective and realist. The truth is apprehended immediately in the mind which mirrors exactly the external reality in which it is in sensual contact. This is the basis for scientific knowledge which is emancipatory. Thus, one can say that, for Marx, the root of all liberation is constituted in reason.

For all the philosophical optimism with respect to the emancipatory process, the words of John Paul II's 1987 encyclical on contemporary social concerns, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,* in particular rings true. He cites the various crises which threaten the human community in various ways. He notes that the ecological problems can surely be seen not only as a problem of human ignorance of more refined scientific use of nature's good, but also as a moral-practical problem of ruthless exploitation of these goods, revealed in the concomitant oppression and destruction of native people and their cultures which accompany this process. While there appears to be less likelihood of nuclear war at the present moment, one must remember that civilian populations were subjected to nuclear bombs as well as fire-bombing. No apologies or self-critiques have been forthcoming. He recalls recent history when six million Jews were murdered in an attempt at total genocide while, at the same time, other populations were relegated to the status of sub-human slave labor. Communal violence brings oppression and slaughter to various parts of the globe. While the

Jews have finally achieved a desperately needed and long desired homeland, the Palestinians face agonizing displacement and suppression. In Central America, nominally Christian governments run by persons who attend Sunday Mass consider the Bible subversive literature and murder anyone who critiques the social contradictions while the United States supports these governments with billions of dollars which its citizens can ill afford either morally or financially. On the other side are the "freedom-fighters" who wreak pitiless havoc on the oppressed populations in "so-called" struggles for liberation. Human persons are relegated to the category of the unwanted where their fate is abortion or euthanasia. In the West, we are inundated with increased destruction of relationship within the family, teen suicide, drugs, violence, fear and pessimism about the future.

In considering the belief that freedom is inevitable, questions of definition are crucial. Truly, 1989 has been a remarkable year in the most extraordinary way. The freedom movements which have brought about the downfall of dictatorships have given much reason for hope, even the seemingly failed attempt in the People's Republic of China. But liberation has not always been an unequivocal gift, attested to by millions of Cubans, many of whom are communists now living in exile. Eastern Europe opens its doors to the Western gifts of unbridled consumerism and pornography. Freedom in the United States has brought more banal pleasure than happiness, and something of the soul seems to have died in Western Europe because of World War II, as noted by the Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Elie Wiesel. Perhaps this is the result of an inadequate anthropology which must be the terms in which any liberation is realized or the results miss the mark with terrible inevitability. It is necessary to attempt to grasp the truth of the subject who is also the agent of liberation, i.e., the human person, for "the root of all liberation is constituted in the truth." In this case, it is the truth of the human person. What will be examined here is (1) the definition of the person, (2) the community of persons, (3) hermeneutics of suspicion and solidarity as critique and resolution based upon the first two. Within this frame of reference, we will also examine the problem of reductionism and inalienable rights, solidarity vs. individualism and totalism, censorship as a reductionistic critique, and hermeneutics of suspicion and solidarity as critique and resolution. In the latter we will examine how the community of persons might unify theory and practice to realize an emancipatory, self-formative process as a freedom from oppression and a freedom "for" others rather than a freedom "from" others.

The Person as Relational and Communicative

In the chapter written by George McLean for this volume, the philosophical basis of the human person has been adequately established. Within the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyla, there is more to be said about the person as relational and communicative. Using both a metaphysical analysis and a phenomenological reduction, he establishes the human being as both subject and person. One can state that this species of being, each individual comprising it, is human by nature; i.e., essentially human by the dynamism of the spirit which expresses and realizes itself bodily. It is this essential dynamism which defines the human being as subject and person. As subject, there is an interiority by which man and woman reflect reflexively upon their own individual reality as it unfolds to them in all it richness. S/he reflects upon their actions (cognition - reflection) and comprehends the self-formative process their action realizes (recognition - self-reflection). S/he encounters his/her own uniqueness and self-determination. There is the fact of non-transferability as no other can stand in the place of his/her conscience.

This, however, could define the person as radically individual and virtually non-relational. As subject, there is the need and ability to communicate and share the richness of this interiority with

others. The very fact of meaning symbolized in language reveals the relational and communicative nature of the human person. The individual communicates his/her own subjectivity externally in the dynamism of being person; the role manifests his/her unique intersubjectivity which can only be communicated to and shared by another person who is also subject. One can only be person with another person who is conscious, self-reflective and free. The intersubjectivity and its meaning indicated a nature meant to be communicated and shared interpersonally. Thus, while the individual human is the primary or principle reality of being human, being human is realized within a community of persons who communicate and share from the depth of the spirit that which defines them as relational and communicative. It is within the very nature of this conscious, self-reflective, self-determined human being that inalienable rights are constituted and defined. One is truly oppressed when these inalienable rights are frustrated, for they constitute the basis for every man and woman to realize what it means to be human. Precisely because men and women are relational and communicative by nature, these rights cannot be construed as a forensic freedom "from" others but a loving freedom "for" others. As such, individualism damages the process of self-realization. On the other hand, to suppress the inalienable rights of the individual to the group, as in totalism, unjustly deprives the person of the conditions necessary for self-realization and frustrates what is the person's by nature. In both cases the relational, communicative nature of being human is compromised and community is deformed.

Ostensibly, Karol Wojtyla's desires to establish the understanding of being human from a purely philosophical perspective, but the richness of his theological anthropology adds even more. In the analysis of Judeo-Christian Scripture, the human person is understood to be created to the image and likeness of god. Both man and woman, i.e., all human beings, are created to this divine 'image and likeness' which affords equal and profound dignity to them. As God is subject, the human person is subject; as God is Person (three distinct Persons), the human being is person. In fact, God is a Community of Persons (*Communio Personarum*), and, as the divine image and likeness, the human being is by nature meant for community of persons. After the creation of the human being (*ha adam*), God realizes that it is not good for the human to be alone for two reasons. The first is that only God is one and alone self-sufficient. The human, if alone, goes into annihilation as finite creature. Of all the creatures, only the human is both subject and person; to be alone would annihilate the meaning of being human as the divine image and likeness demands a relational and communicative existence with other subject-persons since God is a Community of Persons. No other earthly creature is subject-person; the human is indeed alone, and this is not good for it frustrates the meaning of human existence as relational and communicative. Thus, the human being is placed in deep sleep and awakens man (*ish*) and woman (*isha*), for to be human is realized only in community.

As God reveals himself as love, i.e., self-donative love, men and women are created in love and for love, fully realizing their being human in self-donative love. The solidarity of freely offered love revealed in the Trinity as a Community of Persons is manifested in the human community of persons who are also bound together in a solidarity of freely offered love. It finds its source in the spirit which defines being human as subjects bound in interpersonal relationships. Reflecting on the words of the American Bill of Rights written by Thomas Jefferson, one reads, "We hold these truths to be self-evident that all persons are created equal and they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among these being life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Were the person understood in radically individualistic terms, these rights would be the source of and reason for a forensic sense of relationship whereby liberty becomes a freedom "from." Seen in the light of Judeo-Christian Scriptures, while the individual human person is the first and primary

reality of being human, it must be in the context of community. Liberty in this case is seen as loving solidarity whereby the "nontransferability" of the individual is submitted or given over to the law of *ekstasis*. Thus, liberty is a freedom "for" others as exemplified by the Person of Jesus who reveals not only God but the full meaning of being human. This relational fact of human existence is poignantly underscored in the Cross which, in the most radical way, proclaims freedom "for" in solidarity and total self-donative love.

There is no room for individualism in either Judaism or Christianity, as the person is always seen in intimate interpersonal relationship to God and other persons - within the community (*qahal* in Hebrew and *ekklesia* or *koinonia* in Greek). At the same time, to subject the human persons within the group to an epiphenomenal status is to wreak terrible havoc upon their dignity and nature. The group is not more important than the individual persons who constitute it. Moreover, all persons, regardless of rank or position are protected by and subjected to the same laws and justice. In fact, the social structure in its entirety is critiqued and confronted in terms of laws and justice based upon the dignity of every human being as the divine image and likeness but as subject and as community of persons.

The structures of society are to be developed to incorporate and realize fully the meaning of being human. Society is not to be based upon an ideological Procrustean bed to which the human person must fit, but the system must develop in a more humane way. When Jesus insists that man is not for the sabbath, but the sabbath for man, he is saying just this. The sabbath is not a mere moment of time filled with empty ritual which restricts rather than fulfills being human. Such a sabbath is not the free interaction within interpersonal relationships as in a community of persons but a protective legalism which can either afford a freedom "from" real interpersonal commitment or legitimate the subjection of others to an inhuman situation, stultifying true human realization and solidarity. Rather, the sabbath, being holy is THE moment of interpersonal relationship of love and solidarity between God and human persons as well as between human persons. The sabbath is community of persons which asserts freedom "for" rather than a freedom "from." To build a truly human society and to be most fully human, I must always be with reference to the whole truth of the human person. Anything less than this is injustice and oppression. Justice and liberation can be defined in terms of the truth of being human, reflecting the words of St. Thomas Aquinas: "The root of liberation is constituted of reason." Reason's purpose is to apprehend the truth, and, as Jesus, says, the truth brings freedom. Such is the philosophical/theological anthropology of Pope John Paul II.

Turning to Jürgen Habermas, one also finds the assertion of the relational and communicative nature of being human. While Habermas draws from a number of sources, his philosophical foundation is in Karl Marx, specifically the "young" Marx. Habermas asserts that to be human is to be a creature of historicity whereby the species in a transcendental mode of inquiry is acquiring and communicating knowledge in a self-reflective, self-determined, self-formative process of emancipation. The human family writes its own history in an evolving process of emancipation. The human family writes its own history in an evolving process of emancipation, not merely in a biological mode but in a truly transcendental and free way which is communicated. If other creatures are bound by laws of physics and biology, evolving according to the laws of nature, the human species is appropriating ever increasing control over its fate in a self-reflective, self-determined, self-formative, emanicaptory process. As communicative creatures, this is effected through the process of historicity, not biological necessity. As a Marxist, Habermas has a sociological perspective, placing the human reality always within the social context. Being human cannot be understood as *solus ipse* but more properly along the lines of Marx's *Gattungswesen*. If

the human species can be defined in Habermas' perspective, it is in terms of communication and self-determination, both of which are rooted in self-reflection. This parallels a significant portion of John Paul II's anthropology. The difference between the two thinkers is the importance John Paul II places upon the individual, based upon his reflections as well as his personal experiences of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes.

Habermas endeavors to analyze the historical movement of emancipation of the human species from natural as well as socio-economic and political exigencies which dehumanize existence. While, through the acquisition of knowledge, humanity progresses at all levels and communicates this knowledge accordingly, each point of development is characterized by its own truth statements and their specific validity claims. While Marx understood the human species as determined and defined by the various factors which constitute the labor process, Habermas locates this definition in the communication of truth statements which legitimate the social structures. These truth statements, always articulated in a specific historical context, are the means by which humanity defines nature and itself. This definition is articulated in the values and traditions of a society and are to be understood as the validity claims which constitute the legitimation of socio-economic and political structures. Thus, the status quo is justified in truth statements based upon knowledge historically acquired and transmitted, forming the intersticial network of social structures through which members and various social agencies relate to one another. All relationships are mediated through the truth statements articulated as values and tradition.

The truth statements which constitute the legitimating values and tradition of a society are communicated and thereby constitute its self-understanding and definition. Being human is therefore constituted contextually according to the truth statements of a given moment in history. In the philosophical anthropology of Jürgen Habermas, the definition of being human cannot be fixed by the idea of a nature or a metaphysics. Rather, it is historically contextual, determined by the knowledge acquired at a given moment in time and communicated within the values and traditions of the group. While to be human is to be communicative and relational, there is no nature to which these attributes can be affixed. Liberation is the process whereby the acquisition of new knowledge is brought to bear dialectically upon existing truth statement in a critique. At the practical or social level, the critique should, through a process of self-reflection and self-determination, expose the hidden power claims in the validity claims of the truth statements.

In this instance, knowledge has practical results in a self-formative process of emancipation; theory and praxis are unified in a liberative critique as the truth statements of the status quo are exposed as dogmatistic and as having been maintained by an oppressive authoritarianism. The old definition of being human is now dissolved as the historical context is altered and a new definition emerges. As will be noted in the next section, all knowledge is mediated through interest, and the interest of reason is emancipation. One is therefore confronted with the relationship between freedom and reason. Reason's continuing appropriation of truth is a movement toward ever greater freedom. It is realized in a process which is self-reflective, self-determined and self-formative. As humanity knows itself within the given historical context, so will it understand and define itself. This constitutes the basis of self-formation to its desired emancipation.

Perhaps one of the major difficulties of Habermas' anthropology is a weak base in defining either person or community. It is impossible to assert the meaning of liberation for a subject, either individual or group, which is essentially a *je ne sais quoi*. He does not examine the interiority of the subject who is self-reflective and self-determined, and it is not certain if this is in terms of the person or the group. While there is indeed an articulated belief in the movement toward reason and its interest, which is emancipation, there is no development of the subjects of this movement nor

their interrelatedness. Self-determination, self-reflection, self-formation, reason and its interest are means to an end, which is emancipation, all of which seem quite disembodied. How is one to move in the direction of liberation if the subject of this liberative movement is not defined? One might further ask as to how one can consider a situation as oppressive, unjust or immoral since Marx himself understood the validity of these terms only within their social contexts. Is a given situation immoral and unjust or merely dysfunctional? Without an anthropology based upon a human nature, there can be no basis in asserting that a given situation is oppressive.

For Habermas, it is cold truth which distinguishes oppression from emancipation, and it is cold truth which motivates the self-formative emancipatory process. This truth lacks the warmth which generated concern for others in love and solidarity. It hardly would motivate one to lay down his/her live for another. It too easily turns to a freedom "from" and the legalism which protects from interpersonal relationship. Rather, it reduces human interaction to an indifference toward the plight of other while guarding zealously one's own rights and privileges. It can well lead to a destruction of honest communication and relatedness, as there is no basis in a freedom "for" others.

The Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Solidarity

Critique and Resolution

In Paul Ricoeur's distinction between the hermeneutics of suspicion and the hermeneutics of faith, Freud's psychoanalytic theory and Marx's philosophy are classified philosophically as belonging under the category of the hermeneutics of suspicion, as they seek to expose what is hidden behind and protected by legitimating symbols. For Freud it is repressed desires which are socially unacceptable and carry serious sanctions if seen for what they are. These desires are thus cloaked in symbols which protect from punishment and are realized in ways that are bizarre and bind the person in neurosis. Marx understands the socio-cultural superstructure as providing the legitimating symbols behind which the power structure stands in order to justify an oppressive status quo. For both Freud and Marx, the purpose of their theories, psychoanalytic and philosophical respectively, is to expose what lay hidden in order to bring about a transformation which liberates respectively from neurosis, in the case of Freud's theory, and oppressive socio-political and economic structures, in the case of Marx's philosophy. It is precisely a hermeneutics of suspicion which is operative because it suspects a lack of truthfulness, a guile, which allows the maintenance of an oppressive mode of existence.

The Frankfurt Critical School, founded by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, sought to utilize both Freudian theory as well as that of the "young" Marx in the analysis of the historical movement toward freedom or emancipation. Repressive Stalinism in Eastern Europe compelled them to theorize a problem with the "mature" Marx's "historical materialism," later developed by Engels into "dialectical materialism." They turned to the Hungarian Marxist theorist, György Lukács, associate of Imre Nagy during the 1956 Hungarian government. Lukács conceived of philosophy as a legitimating critique of the political, socio-economic structure. He understood the "young" Marx as moving towards a philosophy that would be critique of the legitimating critique. This would evolve philosophy into a revolutionary tool whereby theory and praxis would be unified in an emancipatory self-formative process. As Lukács felt that the "mature" Marx had lost sight of this possibility, it was his endeavor to recapture and develop it. Thus Lukács sought to develop a critique of bourgeois philosophy which legitimates the power structure or status quo by

explaining reality through the lenses of the given labor structures. If bourgeois philosophy is a legitimating critique of the power structure, then his philosophical theory is a meta-critique or critique of a critique which is also placed squarely within the hermeneutic of suspicion.

It has been the thrust of the Frankfurt Critical School to appropriate and develop Lukács' meta-critique along a Freudian-Marxist line, as can be seen in the works of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Eric Fromm and Jürgen Habermas. Certainly if their philosophical theories are based upon Freud, Marx and Lukács, then they are also within Ricoeur's category of hermeneutics of suspicion. While Horkheimer's and Adorno's book, *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, and Adorno's book, *Negative Dialectic*, are crucial to grasp the movement of thought and analysis, it would involve more time and space than allowed here. It has been Habermas' attempt to analyze and resolve the serious dilemmas articulated in these two works - i.e., to examine the reasons why there has been serious regression with respect to the movement towards a more rational and emancipated society when it is precisely through reason that the emancipatory, self-formative process occurs.

While Habermas has ranged far and wide within a multitude of areas in philosophy as well as the social and behavioral sciences, what might be germane to this topic is his early work, *Knowledge and Human Interest*. In this book he follows the historical development of the emancipatory, self-formative process through the notion of critique beginning with Kant, moving to Hegel and Marx, Mach and Peirce, Dilthey and Freud. The attempt is to analyze the various attempts and failures at critique in order to develop a critical theory of knowledge. Its purpose would be to analyze the various truth statements within different areas of inquiry in order to uncover possible power structures which prohibit the questioning of the dogmatic truth statements. This is in order that the validity claims remain unexamined and the power claims remain thus securely beyond the grasp of critique. There is an attempt to maintain all inquiry at the level or within the dimension of the dogmatism, trapping the critique within a strange loop or "cognitive" loop whereby the question always returns to the same point no matter what direction it takes. The ultimate purpose of Habermas' critique is to examine the truth statements through a meta-critique which jumps the level of the censor in order to eliminate the dogmatism, i.e., the validity claims which hide power claims with a view toward neutralizing their force (referred to here as authoritarianism).

Habermas found the possibility of a meta-critique in Freud and Marx with respect to political and socio-economic theory. It is his intention to develop an analogous meta-critique of socio-economic and political structures as a critical science as Freud and the "young" Marx had attempted. Thus, it is a critique of legitimating structures much in the order of Lukács theory. While Habermas refutes any notion of using a hermeneutical approach, he is engaged in an examination of the communication of knowledge in truth statements and their validity claims. This leads to the development of a methodological framework that may serve as a critical instrument within a logic of theoretical and practical discourse with the immediate result of an emancipatory, self-formative process for socio-economic and political critique. Habermas has been working in the area of language theory, specifically in the development of a universal pragmatics, in order to establish an analysis of communication with the aim of continuing what is perceived to be the continuing historical, self-formative process of emancipation through reason.

While Habermas remains within a materialist perspective, he understands humanity, as already noted, to be self-determined and self-reflective, writing and determining history. He vehemently rejects a mere bio-genetic, evolutionary explanation of human progress as reductionistic, though he does not deny an obvious relatedness of humanity to its biology. But, this

is rather in a mode of continual transcendence as a creature of historicity rather than mere biological evolution and adaptation. In a self-determined historical process, emancipation is achieved at various levels through critical reason. In fact, emancipation or freedom is the interest of reason; i.e., freedom from whatever is problematic with respect to the exploitation and distribution of nature's resources as well as with respect to socio-economic and political structures. It is within the terms of the latter that Habermas wishes to develop his clarifying meta-critique in order to continue the process of rationalization of society; i.e., as society that frees itself from truth claims which hide power claims behind validity claims (dogmatism), exerting a force (authoritarianism) which maintains oppressive superstructures.

It should be noted that the progress of reason, i.e., process of rationalization, has not been seen as an unequivocal blessing by everyone. Max Weber, who conceived the term *Zweckrationalität*, saw the replacement of all myth by reasons (the process called rationalization), reducing all humanity to a completely mechanized world controlled by a technocracy, devoid of human imagination or spirit. This technological "iron cage" would eliminate the *joie de vivre* or *élan vital* of human life which is articulated in myth and religion. This was not the specific problem which gave anxiety to the Frankfurt Critical School. Rather, it was the fact that technology now carries validity claims within its own truth statements, and within these validity claims are hidden power claims which legitimate socio-economic and political structures. Horkheimer and Adorno saw both the Enlightenment and reason as betraying its own purpose.

Habermas, while agreeing with the dangers, is more optimistic and believes this process to be necessary. But, precisely because of the dangers noted by Nietzsche, Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas has been working in the area of a clarifying critique at the meta-level in a quasi-transcendental process of inquiry to examine truth claims. An example of the problem and its possible solution might clarify what Habermas is attempting to do. He notes that Marx's error was to reduce the science of man to the science of nature while concomitantly emphasizing the labor process. In both instances he reduces or eliminates the process of reflection to instrumental action. Thus, in attempting to critique the problems that marked the Stalinist system, the inquiry is trapped in a frame of reference that refuses reflection. It is erroneously objectivistic and scientistic precisely because it places all inquiry within the frame of the positive sciences, thereby confounding two different modes of inquiry, i.e., technological and practical. In fact, it reduces the practical by collapsing it into the technological. In attempting to critique truth statements, one is caught in a "cognitive strange loop." That is, every time a critique is attempted and questions are asked, they are fixed within a cognitive frame of reference by which they continually return to the same point. Instead of a liberating critique, it is more like a fugue where a given melody is repeated over and over again, though in different ways and scales, but always returning to the same melody. It is what Dr. Christo Smolenov of the University of Sophia calls a socio-genetic helix, for what was intended to liberate becomes another oppressive structure. The negation of the negation is really oppression at another level. Thus, Marx's ironic observation in his essay, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," is realized; i.e., "History tends to repeat itself, first as tragedy then as farce."

This is observed in many instances. In the invasion of Panama, President Bush noted that he began with four objectives, and they were achieved. Ergo, his adventurism was justified, along with the loss of civilian and military lives. One T.V. network took a poll to inquire whether or not Americans supported an invasion of the Vatican Embassy to Panama. When it was suggested to the network that their real question was whether or not Americans are international outlaws and hooligans as such an action is always illegal, the network denounced the suggestion as absurd.

They were, after all, only trying to find out whether or not the American population supported a takeover of the embassy. In all three questions, the frame of reference has been reduced and a real censorship is imposed. Every time a critique is attempted, it is suppressed and the question is forced back to the same point of departure as set by the status quo or power structure. One is forbidden to ask about or examine the motives behind the official truth statements or their validity claims. The power claims remain hidden and protected so that the *apparatchiki* can maintain their privileged position within the social institutions.

For this reason, a hermeneutics of suspicion is crucial. It exposes the censorship which is really a reductionist critique. This reductionist critique rejects the whole truth of the human person in favor of a status quo of a privileged group. Such is seen in South Africa, El Salvador and Guatemala as a professed way of life, articulated overtly within the institutions of the countries. Yet, this also exists in a de facto manner in other parts of the globe, such as the United States as well as the Soviet Union. It exists in attitudes of racism, anti-semitism, sexism, ethnic and religious bigotry or wherever truth statements are really dogmatisms supported by the brute force of authoritarianism. It is the hermeneutics of suspicion that is needed to uncover the power claims within the validity claims by jumping a level to free itself from the "cognitive" strange loop that would trap it in futility. As a meta-critique, it moves to the meta-level, transcending the limitation of the legitimating critique in order to examine the contradiction by exposing the power claims hidden in the validity claims. It exposes the legitimating critique for what is; i.e., a reductionistic critique which conceals what is in fact censorship.

Thus, Nobel Peace Prize laureates Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Lech Walesa assert the dogmas about the dignity, freedom and inalienable rights of every human person, and it is precisely the force of authority (the force of truth or dogma) that overturns the oppressive structures. But the very thrust of Archbishop Tutu and Lech Walesa, as well as of Mahatma Gandhi, is that of solidarity. Thus, as Ricoeur rightly asserts, both hermeneutics of suspicion and solidarity must be united in the clarifying critique. Thus, while Habermas works specifically expose the elements of oppression, John Paul II offers one other variable, which is the truth of the human person. In his anthropology, he presents the focus and the starting point from which oppression and liberation are understood in terms of the truth of the human person. Moreover, in a real sense, the Judeo-Christian Scriptures offer their own hermeneutics of suspicion and clarifying critique through the power of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth which liberates. But it also offers a needed thesis from which to move towards negation, and this is the nature of the human person created to the divine image and likeness, created as love and freedom "for." Thus, solidarity and community concerns always accompany the hermeneutics of suspicion through the process of negation in order that the thrust move towards a positive resolution rather than another form of oppression; i.e., to avoid moving from tragedy to farce.

John Paul II clarifies for Habermas the means and direction in which to move; he also clarifies exactly the agent-person who is also the subject of the emancipatory process. Both insist upon incessant and patient dialogue in attempting to clarify the truth; it is a truthful dialogue in which the critique is realized. Moreover, both vehemently reject violence as a means of achieving the goal of emancipation. Nonetheless, to rely solely upon a hermeneutics of suspicion which begins at the point of negation risks violence, since the perspective is not one of love and solidarity. It is not truly an attitude which is relational and communicative, but solely one of opposition. Thus, it can really go nowhere, as authentic sublation is denied. The hermeneutics of solidarity allow one to begin at the point of thesis in order to incorporate the truth that is distilled through the process of sublation as the dialectic moves through the point of dissolution which is the negation. The truth

of the human person is not merely preserved but self-understanding is enhanced in this self-reflective, self-determined, self-formative process. The reductionist critique is exposed and its censorship dissolved. Thus, the negation of the negation is the work of solidarity and love within the community of persons who critique themselves and the situation in which they are a part in order that all may live in the whole truth of their human dignity, inalienable rights and freedom "for." It is not a movement of history but in history, nor is it the progress of the human *je ne sais quoi* but of communicative and relational subject-persons who are human by their very nature as the divine image and likeness. This is a transcendent action of spirit. Even while engaged in a hermeneutics of suspicion, they operate within a hermeneutics of solidarity so that victim might not become victimizer and that love and mutual concern might prevail over legalism and self-concern. The image for this realization and ongoing emancipation of the community of persons is the Cross. To paraphrase the words of Jesus: Greater love has no one than to give his/her life for others. This is the constitution of the community of persons as the foundation for a truly humane society.

Chapter IV
Rights of the Zygote: From a Biological and Metaphysical Perspective1

Robert P. Badillo and *Eduardo Rodriguez*

The ethical question at the center of the abortion controversy concerns the conceptual issue of what constitutes *personhood* with a view toward determining the existential status of the unborn, i.e., whether or not the unborn is a *human person*.2 In the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision, the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly denied the personhood of the unborn by depriving them of their constitutional right to life, a protection guaranteed to every citizen.3 The majority view ruled that the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment includes a woman's right to have an abortion until viability, the point at which the fetus can survive outside the mother's womb.4 Although a typical anti-abortion response to this position would argue in favor of the humanity of the unborn from a biological perspective, the response developed here will endeavor to supplement the biological defense by considering a novel optic for considering the notion of personhood as put forth in the *genetic metaphysics* of Fernando Rielo.5 This study will begin by considering the relation between eugenics and abortion that underscores the urgency in resolving the question concerning the ontological status of the unborn. This will be followed by an examination of what constitutes a *human being* from a biological perspective. Then, prefaced with a section on the philosophical and theological problem in defining the human person, this study will consider what constitutes a *human person* from a metaphysical viewpoint. In each case what renders the unborn a human being and person is present at the moment of fertilization, thereby providing the basis for recognizing, in a concluding section, the human rights of the zygote as a human being and person, and, if of the zygote, of the various stages of prenatal development, including that of the blastocyst, of the embryo, of the fetus.

Eugenics, Prenatal Diagnosis and Abortion

The remarkable advances in molecular genetic technology during the last decade have led to a dramatic improvement in the possibility of diagnosis and in the understanding of the origin of a considerable number of human diseases. The international effort of the human genome project is expected to provide information on the many defective genes responsible for thousands of inherited diseases. This will lead to the development of genetic tests aimed at detecting disease-causing mutations, which, in turn, will enable people to minimize the effects of such disorders by altering unhealthy lifestyles, choosing health enhancing diets and/or environments and, if necessary, taking appropriate medications. But such information will also pose considerable ethical problems.

One such problem is the possibility of eugenics. This term here is employed in its more classical sense as the study of the factors that has as its object the improvement of the genetic qualities of future generations. Supposedly, eugenics serves the interests of society by providing humankind with control over its genetic destiny, i.e., with the possibility of promoting certain human traits deemed desirable while eliminating others considered undesirable. Indeed, given the pace in which such research is being conducted and the enormous results which it is yielding, some

scientists fear that an uncontrolled use of clinical genetic tests may lead to a revival of social policies based on eugenics.6

To complicate matters the development of genetic tests often precede by many years the discovery of treatments such that one of the choices for avoiding genetic diseases in future offspring is abortion. Researchers can now identify genetic defects before birth, and fetuses that are tested as genetically abnormal can be aborted. In today's society there is virtually an automatic reaction in favor of an abortion in cases where a prenatal diagnosis yields a diseased fetus with a negative prognosis. For many, to abort, say, an embryo with a genetic disease is regarded as a humanitarian action in order to ease the suffering of the family and the burden that it places on its members, as well as to society. However, medicine exists for the purpose of healing diseases and, when this is not possible, for relieving suffering, but never for the object of actively terminating a life. Although, in some cases, it is now possible to intervene phenotypically, by, for example, providing a missing nutrient during a pregnancy, and while in the future it may be possible to operate directly on the genotype, the potentially disastrous effects of eugenics on the unborn provides an occasion for raising the issue concerning their rights, which itself depends on how one answers the question of their ontological status.

The Zygote as a *Human Being* from a Biological Perspective

At the moment of fertilization in which the spermatozoon or male germ cell penetrates the ovum or the female germ cell forming the single-cell zygote, the emergent biological entity is a *human being*. The term 'human being' is understood here as signifying, first, that the zygote is conceived of human parents such that it belongs to the same human species as that of its progenitors7 ; and, second, that the zygote, as a biological entity, contains a specifically human genetic constitution that programs its physiological and psychological structures.8 The resulting human being is not just a mass of organic material but a being whose development and functioning derives from the precise programmed and successive operations of thousands of genes which are present from the moment of conception. Biologically independence is never achieved, and development is a continuous process as indicated by the varied capabilities that a human being exhibits during a lifetime.

For those who would want to argue that the unborn, particularly during the first trimester of a pregnancy, are not yet human because they do not exhibit the characteristic properties of a human person such as consciousness, intuition, thinking, memory, imagination, and hence do not deserve the same rights and protections accorded to such persons, it may be countered that, although such characteristics are not yet developed in the zygote, it has the genes for the development of the brain wherein these capacities are located. From a biological viewpoint the *generating principle* refers to the genes such that a zygote's psychological and physiological program is already determined by its genetic constitution at the moment of fertilization. Indeed, after fertilization there is no scientific experiment that may be performed with a view toward determining when the unborn becomes fully human; any point used as a dividing line for signaling the commencement of "integral humanity"—whether this is taken to commence when the cells of the embryo are no longer totipotent or at cerebral activation or at quickening or at viability—represents an arbitrary point open to question.9

Reasons, however, against treating the pre-embryo (before implantation) as fully human demand attention, and include: (1) the high level of "wastage" before implantation given that cell division does not always result in an embryo due to a failure of implantation; (2) the insufficiency

of the embryo's constitution to govern development apart from maternal influence such that the pre-embryo needs external information in order to develop (if this is lacking, it becomes a nonpersonal biological entity such as a tumor or a hydatidiform mole); (3) the "totipotentiality" of the cells of the pre-embryo so that, if separated, each cell has the same developmental potential as the zygote with the possibility of twinning; indeed early cells possess full developmental potential due to their lack of differentiation and are capable of developing into either fetal cells or extra-embryonic tissues. 10 A response to each of these objections follow.

First, with respect to implantation, the embryo cannot develop without the formation of a placenta given that it establishes functional connections that are critical for embryo survival. The influence between the uterus and the embryo is reciprocal. The process requires synchrony of activities in the development of the uterus and the blastocyst (stage of the embryo at implantation). Before implantation the uterus undergoes developmental changes controlled by ovarian hormones to facilitate implantation and the blastocyst expresses adhesion molecules to attach and proteinases for invasion into the uterine wall for the formation of the placenta.11 Thereafter the placenta itself redirects maternal endocrine, immune and metabolic functions that directs changes in the uterus necessary for pregnancy to continue and establishes a hybrid vasculature in which trophoblasts (specialized cells of the placenta) are in direct contact with maternal blood to transport nutrients and gases.12 However, what this scientific evidence reflects is the reality of the relational character of life in which an entity can never be completely isolated in itself. The close physiological relationship that takes place during embryological and fetal development with the mother is paralleled with the relationship that takes place through nurturing and communication in childhood. The nature of the dependency varies throughout development, but there is no life without interaction with other beings.

Since one-third of normal human pregnancies present failures of implantation,13 this indicates that implantation constitutes a dramatic biological event, second in nature to the process of fertilization, in which a new being emerges. If implantation takes place there is a much greater probability of successful development. Therefore, it can be said that implantation signals a crucial moment for the completion of normal development.

Secondly, Bedate and Cefalo have suggested that the pre-embryo is in a state of genetic dependency because it needs extra genetic material apart from the chromosomal information, such as maternal mitochondrial DNA and maternal or paternal genetic messages in the form of messenger RNA or proteins.14 However, the biological evidence is that maternal mitochondrial DNA is already present in the mitochondria of the zygote and genetic messages in the form of messenger RNA or proteins are also present in the zygote. It is true that the zygote's chromosomal DNA is not sufficient to determine the development of a human being, but the zygote is more than its chromosomal DNA and as a whole contains sufficient information to direct development in interaction with the maternal environment. It is known that the cytoplasm of the zygote contains specific morphogenetic substances paternal and maternal in origin that selectively allow the expression of certain genes that are necessary for differentiation of specific cell types and that these substances are distributed spatially through the process of cell division so that depending on location some cells will become extraembryonic tissue and others into different embryonic tissues. The genetic information that thus programs all developmental steps, including implantation and the formation of extraembryonic tissues, is present at the end of the fertilization process, when the nucleus of the sperm and of the egg fuse and the cytoplasm contains all the necessary informational molecules. Information for differentiation is present in the genome of all cells, but is not utilized without the stimulation received from the morphogenetic molecules present in the cytoplasm. The

zygote not only contains genetic information but also morphogenetic molecules; both are necessary for development and both are part of the programming of a human being. The first differentiation process takes place after cleavage with the formation of the blastocyst, which includes the inner cell mass, destined to be the embryo, and the trophectoderm (formed by trophoblast cells) which attaches to the uterine wall. The allocation of cells that become trophoblasts is dictated by the position in which they are found in the morula (ball of cells resulting from cleavage or first cellular divisions).15 These findings reflect the reality of the interdependence of life. After all, the genes of the zygote come from both the mother and the father.

Bedate and Cefalo have also suggested that sometimes a normal zygote fails to develop into a fetus because of its lack of complementary genetic information and forms hydatidiform moles or tumors.16 However, the biological evidence is that moles and tumors are formed because of failures in the process of fertilization or meiosis. Hydatidiform moles have been shown to result from failures in the fertilization process, such as dispermic fertilization of empty eggs or parthenogenetic reduplication of empty eggs fertilized by one sperm.17 Tumors have been shown to result from malignant transformation of germ cells, or from failures in the meiotic process of germ cells, or from gestational trophoblastic disease, and never from a normal zygote.18 In normal development the formation of trophoblasts that form the placenta is controlled by imprinted genes that are expressed mostly from paternally derived alleles and whose proliferation is maintained by contact with the inner cell mass, whereas development of embryonic tissues depend mostly on maternally derived alleles.19 By the phenomenon of imprinting, paternal and maternal alleles are marked differently and fulfill different roles during embryogenesis. The imprinting process seems to have an epigenetic component (the "imprint," part of it consisting in DNA methylation) that marks one parental chromosome, and a genetic component (the DNA sequence or "imprinting box" in parental DNA) that is modified by the imprint during development.20 Imprinting has been suggested to underlie the control of intrauterine embryonic growth. This reality precludes the development of isoparental embryos. Both, the maternal and paternal genome must be present for an embryo to develop, something that occurs with the formation of a normal zygote.

Thirdly, Norman Ford and others have argued that each of the cells contained in the pre-embryo are totipotent and each capable of forming identical human individuals.21 Suffice it to say that a distinct human individual is present after implantation takes place when the primitive streak is formed. However, the possibility of twinning does not disprove the individuality of the nascent human life. The individual cells of the pre-embryo cannot be considered actually totipotent as long as they are integrated in the pre-embryo; they are not an independent life. For twinning to take place a cell must be separated from the rest, therefore a new entity is formed. This can be regarded as a rare form of asexual reproduction or as genetically determined. In the case of asexual reproduction, a new individual is being formed. If genetically determined, two individuals were programmed from the beginning. The close relationship that they enjoy at the beginning of life constitutes a special physiological relationality that will change through development. What this evidence shows is that during cleavage the information to direct whole development is present in each cell as well as in the whole pre-embryo. Biologically, totipotentiality is lost because of a process of methylation that silence certain genes in each cell that becomes differentiated. This process of methylation is controlled by genes already present in the zygote.22 Furthermore, twinning has been shown to occur even up to two or three months after fertilization, so that some cells of the embryo are still totipotent at this stage.23

In short, there is no reason for regarding the fertilized egg as a different entity from the embryo. The fact remains that human life with a unique genetic constitution is present from fertilization. Indeed there is no record of an embryo which has not first been a fertilized egg. The fertilized egg is a unique human individual with 46 chromosomes mixed differently from those found in the father and the mother and with enough supply of morphogenetic molecules to control the beginning of development. No other biological event in development can be said to be the starting point of a new being. The singularity of fertilization resides in the fact that it requires the union of two entities, the gametes, which belong to two different beings, the father and the mother, and which by themselves do not have any power to direct growth and differentiation. Implantation only signals sufficient stability for the new being that has already emerged.

From a biological viewpoint, then, the entitative integrity of the unborn as a human being resides, not in the brain but, in the genes. This position is in contrast to that which argues that a woman may decide to abort a fetus if she feels that it represents an unwanted violation of her right to her body. The fetus, however, is not a part of the mother's body in the same sense in which her heart and liver are parts of her body. The fetus is an organism with its own genetic wholeness, although for a while it is attached to the mother and requires nutrition from her. The genetic constitution of the unborn bears genes from *both* their mothers and fathers, and not only that of their mothers. Indeed, the fetus is not one more organ of the mother, but a distinct biological entity wholly unique and distinct.

Philosophical-Theological Problem in Defining Human Person

Philosophically, the tendency to define the human person in terms of a single characteristic, faculty or property has been an ambiguous enterprise. Many have been the definitions put forth as definitive, such as the human person is: a rational, social, linguistic, ecological, artistic,… being. Yet, once the essential characteristic is identified, there then emerges the predicament of deciding just when the alleged property is present. For instance, if one defines the human person as a rational being, when does this faculty become present in the human being. Is it present from conception though not in a visible manner? Is it present at 14 days when the rudiments of the nervous system have been formed, or at two months when the first cerebral electrical activity may be registered by means of an electrocephalagram? Is it present at 5 months when the cerebrum possesses the necessary substrate to realize functions such as sensation, memory, or learning, or is it present at a certain time after birth when children acquire consciousness of their own existence? Is it, rather, present when children attain the use of reason? Herein lies the ambiguity of appealing to characteristics proper to a human being with the aim to determining personhood.

The result of defining a human person in this way is not entirely innocuous. Eugenesic abortion, for one, is procured for genetic reasons with—it may be said—the moral justification provided by philosophy. In this respect some authors claim that the fetus has the right to life only if it possesses the potentiality of developing into a self-conscious being, capable of self-determination and free action. These are demands that cannot be met by those affected with numerous genetic illnesses.24 Harris has gone so far as to declare that it is an injustice to allow children with malformations to reach full term; it is the duty of their parents to have them aborted. Harris reasons that to deprive existence to what he calls pre-persons—which includes embryos, fetuses, and the recently born—is not an injustice since such humans are incapable of valuing their own existence. Such reductive reasoning is quite arbitrary, and may be grounds for justifying a

sort of moral permissiveness with the end result that countless abuses are committed against the unborn.

The same arbitrariness that afflicts philosophical positions affects theological ones. Although a number of theological schools, for their part, generally agree that personhood, for instance, is achieved when the embryo is animated, there is no agreement regarding when such animation takes place. Hence any attempt against the vital integrity of an animated embryo is considered a crime. Yet with respect to the time period prior to such animation—though there is a moral obligation to respect life—if this life is nonetheless ended, the fault is considered less grave.25 The imputation of less grave may lead many to justify their choice of abortion since there is nothing definitive regarding when embryonic animation takes place. The Catholic Church is without peer in respecting the embryo as a human person from the moment of the conception, although this has been a relatively recent event.26 In the other religions there is a diversity of opinion.27 For some Muslims 40 days elapse before the embryo is spirited; for others it is 120 days, leading some to justify abortion within the first 40 days. Jews, for their part, accept the practice of prenatal diagnosis and permit abortions to take place before the fortieth day. Protestant Christians typically hold that each case needs to be considered on its own merits and that it is the couple who should ultimately decide whether to have an abortion or not. Since what is essential to Buddhism is to avoid suffering, the Dalai Lama thinks it permissible to abort the unborn if the life of the mother is in jeopardy, or if she is to give birth to a child with a grave impediment.

The arbitrariness affecting philosophical and theological attempts in determining what constitutes the human person seems to indicate that the *sine qua non* for human personhood should not be conceived in terms of a faculty or property but a reality constitutive of the human being and hence present from the very initiation of human life.

The Zygote as a *Human Person* from a Metaphysical Perspective

Rielo provides such a constitutive definition of the human perosn. As a way to approach Rielo's thought, it would be useful to consider the Biblical notion of what it means to be a person. Genesis provides a transcendent definition of the human being as one created in the *imago dei*, i.e., in the "image and likeness" of God. Since, according to this account, the human person is made in the *imago dei* the greater the comprehension of God the greater the understanding, *mutatis mutandis*, of the human person. Revelation discloses the very constitution of God as Trinity, as a*relational absolute* constituted by three divine persons that mutually inhabit each other. Christ confirms this absolute inhabitation or pericoresis: "Do you not believe that *I am in the Father* and *the Father is in me?* The words that I speak to you I do not speak on my own. The *Father who dwells in me* is doing his works" (Jn 14:10; emphasis mine). In this passage Christ reveals an indwelling of the divine persons in each other: the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father, a mutual possession of one person in the other such that to be a divine person is to be constitutively a person in relationship to another divine person.

The theological import of saying that the divine persons are constituted by this mutual indwelling has profound implications for comprehending the human being as *imago dei*. Rielo contends that there is an act of God in the human being that constitutes each human a person. Rielo terms this divine act the *divine constitutive presence*, referring to an immediate or unconditioned act by which the Divine Persons make an *act of presence* in the created nature of the human being so as to constitute the human being a person in their own image and likeness. For the human being to be made in the image and likeness of God then requires that the indwelling presence that exists

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among the divine persons also exist in the human being such that the human person possesses a deitatic character. Christ confirms this when, corroborating Hebrew Scriptures, he states, "*you are gods*" (Jn 10:34). He also openly declares the indwelling of the divinity in the human being: "On that day you will realize that I am in my Father and *you are in me* and *I in you*" (Jn 14:20; emphasis mine). It is thus the indwelling of the divinity in the human being that defines a human being as a *person*. Although Scholasticism spoke of modes of divine presence, these modes of presence did not define the human being prior to baptism,28 such that there was no distinction with respect to the modes of presence between an unbaptized person and a rock or a tree. Further, for Rielo the divine constitutive presence defines or forms constitutively the human being from the moment of fertilization, i.e., before one pertains to any religion. This presence must take place at fertilization because it is then that the genetic integrity of the human life is present.

The question, however, which may be raised at this point is whether the notion of personhood as divine indwelling or divine inhabitation—whether said of the Divine Persons or of the human person made in the *imago dei*—has metaphysical or rational articulation. We now turn to the master lines of Fernando Rielo's *genetic metaphysics* in which this theological capital finds metaphysical endorsement. First, introductory remarks will be made of Rielo's genetic conception of the Absolute, and then from this perspective what defines the human being as a person will be considered.

For Rielo the definition of the human person has been hampered historically in the light of the long-standing metaphysical principle, the so-called principle of identity, by which reality is understood in terms of itself, "A is A." Rielo rejects the tautological character of this principle which render metaphysical and ontological relation impossible, and, instead, proposes a novel principle from which reality is to be understood, viz., the genetic conception of the principle of relation or, more simply, the genetic principle.29 For Rielo the reasonableness of the genetic principle becomes evident once the absurdity of identity as a metaphysical principle is made manifest.30 Since metaphysical language refers ultimately to the Absolute, as ground of all other possible reality, metaphysical language must always be understood in *absolute* terms. Thus to conceive of the metaphysical principle or the absolute in terms of the so-called principle of identity is to elevate a single term, say "being," "existence," "consciousness," to absolute that, precisely as singular, is absolutely sealed or closed within itself. In this way the so-called principle of identity yields in absolute terms the tautology "A is A," meaning that whatever is meant by "A" is utterly identified with itself and this in absolute terms. For Rielo such an absolute is meaningless syntactically, logically and metaphysically. Syntactically, "A is A" is a meaningless predication given that the predicate is the same as the subject, yielding no metaphysical knowledge. Logically, the tautology "A is A" has the same validity as "non-A is non-A," such that "A" is understood by negation of "non-A," and "non-A" is understood by negation of "A." Metaphysically the expression "A is A" incurs in the paradox of the reduplication of the subject and predicate such that the application of identity to the subject and predicate terms yields the reduplicative "[A is A] is [A is A]" and so forth and so on *ad infinitum*, such that identity fails to attain to whatever is signified by the term "A": "being," "existence," "consciousness,"… Moreover to elevate a single term to absolute "A" is to define "A" in terms of "A" such that "A" turns out to be self-certifying or in flagrant violation of the fallacy of the *petitio principii*, meaning that when inquiry regarding what grounds "A," the answer is "A," whatever it is taken to be, grounds itself. For Rielo the metaphysical Absolute cannot consist in a single term in self-identity; for Rielo there is no reality that is self-defining or self-certifying. Suffice it to say that this same procedure has been used historically to define the human being as a person. Thus, to assert, for instance, that the "human

being is a rational animal," is to say "A is A," where the predicate-term "rational animal" is understood as commensurate with the subject-term "human being." Rielo rejects this manner of proceeding in favor of genetic definitions, which will be better understood once Rielo's conception of the Absolute has been introduced.

For Rielo, the metaphysical Absolute then is not constituted by the identity of a single term, but by two terms, viz., by *Being (+)*, i.e., *Being more*. In this respect, Rielo rejects the formulation of the Absolute as "Absolute Being," which is an elevation of a single term, *being*, to absolute, in favor of "Absolute Subject," which is constituted on the intellectual level by at the very least two terms or beings.31 This principle, the genetic principle, may be articulated in a well-formed formula: [B1 in immanent intrinsic complementarity to B2].32 By this means Rielo substitutes the tautological formula "A is A" with the genetic formula constituted not by a single term "A" but by the immanent intrinsic complementarity or genetic relation of two really distinct terms or beings [B1 complementarity to B2].33 Not less than two beings for one would have reverted to identity, and not more than two given that a third term surfaces as a metaphysical surplus of the absolute simplicity inherent in the elevation to absolute of the notion of relation.34 Further, the two beings, also termed the *Binity* by Rielo, must be personal beings, [P1 in immanent intrinsic complementarity to P2],35 because the person, for Rielo, is the maximum expression of being.

In arguing for the rupture of the so-called principle of identity as a *metaphysical* principle,36 while conserving its more conventional sense,37 Rielo effects the substitution of the absolute identity of "person is person" with the absolute *congenesis* of at the very least two personal beings in a state of immanent intrinsic complementarity. This means that the two personal beings constituting sole Absolute Subject and sole absolute act are related in such a manner that it is not possible for one to be without the other; therefore, they define each other mutually and never by any other notion, inferior or superior, to these two personal beings. Thus in the case of the Absolute Subject neither of the two persons constituting the genetic principle defines itself. Accordingly the genetic principle does not incur in the fallacy of the *petitio principii* given that the two personal beings are related in such a manner that it is not possible for one to be without the other. Indeed, the genetic principle is not self-certifying since each of the two persons constituting the principle serves as the ground for the other.

If the Absolute Subject, moreover, was not so constituted by these two personal beings, there would be, metaphysically, no possibility for relation and hence for communication, such that creation would be rendered unattainable. This dictates the reasonableness of the rupture of a unipersonalist absolute that is pseudomonotheistic since, in this case, the possibility of any other being would have been made impossible. If there is no *ad intra* openness (*aperturidad*), as in the case of absolute identity, neither can there be any *ad extra* openness for the Absolute cannot give what it supposedly does not have. The Absolute, as metaphysically devoid of any possible relation or communication, would be unable to effect the creation of natural being. Monotheism, then, at the rational sphere, is not of a unipersonalist absolute but of an Absolute constituted by at the very least two divine persons, whereby one person is the active agent with regards to the other person, who is, in turn, the receptive agent. Said another way, one person represents the origin, agent action and the *definiens*—with respect to another person, who represents the receptive action and the *definiendum*—of the first person. One person is defined by another; in no case is the person defined by the same person or by something inferior to the person.

Rielo provides a *theological* transcription of the two personal beings constituting the Absolute: "…the first one is named Father; the second one is named Son. In other words the generation of the Son [P2] by the Father [P1] consists of the transmission of the hereditary

character or geneticity of the [P1] *per viam generationis* to [P2]."38 [P1] is Father by reason of being origin, and [P2] is Son as end or replica of [P1]. While transcending all specifically masculine connotations, since the Absolute Subject—referring equally, within the context of this paper, to God, divine being, or the divinity—is without gender, the Father-Son—or the *Binity*—emerges as the positive actuality of the genetic principle.

Now, in defining the *human person*, it is not possible to resort to the person being defined or to something inferior to the person. In the first case one would have incurred in the absurdity of a tautological definition, "human person is human person," lacking any information. If one accepts the second, one would have reduced persons to one of their properties or faculties. Whereas these originate in something deeper which essentially constitutes the person, the human being is *more* than itself. There is something in persons that cannot be reduced to the particulars of physical and chemical laws: this "something" is what makes the human person "more than matter," for human persons are incomparably more than their 35,000 genes estimated by the human genome project. What is, in short, this "being more than" matter, psychology, morality, himself?

For Rielo, the human person is formed by the *divine constitutive presence* of the Absolute Subject, which confers on the human being its ontological vital form.39 It is this presence in the human being that destroys the ontological pseudonotion of a being insofar as it is a being, i.e., a being intrinsically and immanently *for* itself, *of* itself and *by* itself.40 The divine constitutive presence is that which renders the human person open to the divine persons and to other persons defined by the same presence. The human person, then, signifies, supposing the act of creation, a being constituted by two elements: one created, human nature; and another uncreated, the divine constitutive presence in the created nature, which makes the human being a "person," i.e., an "incarnated spirit." This is to say that if the human person cannot be defined by a tautological pseudorelation, nor by something inferior to its ontological constitution, it should be defined by something transcendent that satisfies it transbiological, ethical, social and ontological openness. This openness cannot be satisfied if not in relation with an *Alter transcendens* that, creating and forming it, inhabits the human being.

The divine constitutive presence—whatever the biological state in which the "flesh" finds itself—makes the human being a "person" from the fertilization of the ovum by the spermatozoon to whatever other later stage of development in which it may find itself, be it that of the embryo, the fetus, the child, the youth, the adult, or the senior adult. If one removes this definition of person, necessary from conception, one would have to resort to purely conventional definitions that would change according to the dispositions of the interested party. This "legal" conventionalism opens the door to dehumanization and depersonalization: abortion, euthanasia... The changing character of legal convention makes it possible for questions such as the genesis of the human person to be determined at any moment as a function of a certain utility or interest: Why not place the personalization of human children at 9 years and their depersonalization at 80? Given that the divine constitutive presence of the Absolute Subject in the created element of the human person invalidates any identitatical conception of personhood, there is no ontological reason for holding that the divine constitutive presence occurs at any moment after fertilization, i.e., after the point at which the zygote is begotten as a genetically unique entity. In this, science and ontology agree. Indeed, elevated to the highest regions of ontology, the human being from fertilization is structured to relate transcendentally—whether implicitly or explicitly—with God. This ontologico-filial constitution makes the human person open and ontologically colloquial with God,41 who establishes himself, moreover, as sole anthropological, epistemological and ethical model of the human being.42

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Concluding Moral Implications

Whereas from a biological perspective there is a basis for arguing in favor of the zygote as a human being, Rielo's notion of the divine constitutive presence provides a metaphysical optic from which to consider the zygote as a human person. It is the presence of the Absolute Subject in the human zygote—rather than cognitive-volitional-linguistic,... properties—that ontologically constitutes it as a human person.43 From this perspective, all arguments presented in favor of abortion—whether resulting from violations suffered by the mother due to rape or incest; or from a desire to prevent the birth of a genetically deformed or handicapped child; or from personal considerations due to the physical, emotional or financial burden involved in carrying a pregnancy to full term—are without moral justification. Since the only way to disengage the fetus from the mother's womb before viability is by killing it, the right of the unborn fetus to its own life must be taken as outweighing the mother's right to her body.44 Indeed, the unborn should have—regardless of their stage of fetal development—the same rights as the newborn or adults, and they should be accorded even greater protection given their greater weakness and vulnerability. The magnitude of the damage brought about by the abortion of unborn fetuses is greater than any damage that could possibly be inflicted on an adult given that the unborn are deprived of their future, which includes all prospective experiences, projects, activities.45 In the same way that there are laws to protect the newborn, there should be laws to protect the unborn, who are, moreover, completely defenseless.46

Following Rielo, the metaphysico-ontological ground for ethical justification resides in the divine constitutive presence of the Absolute Subject in the human person, in contrast to the deontological and (utilitarian) teleological approaches to ethics with their moral standard expressed respectively in terms of action/means and consequences. The nature of the ethical exigencies which may be derived from a genetic model of ethics places actions and consequences as a function of a genetic relation of complementarity, i.e., of love, between persons. Christ, presiding over this ethical model as its exemplar,47 formulates its moral standard as follows: "*Love one another as I have loved you*" (John 13:34); a *relation* of love of God and of neighbor is thus the *sine qua non* of any genuine moral deliberation. The ethical model for human behavior is founded on the relation of mutual love among the persons constituting the Absolute Subject. In this respect, genetic metaphysics does not only reject the so-called principle of identity as it pertains to metaphysics, but also as it pertains to the science of human conduct. Identity, as diametrically opposed to any notion of complementarity, is founded on an egocentric notion of being, wherein human conduct is comprehended in terms of self interest rather than as a function of a certain manner of relation. Love is the moral imperative of human conduct and therefore of human relations.48 Egotism—practical identity—is agenetic.

The ontological definition of the human person, then, as *a being inhabited by God*, renders morally prohibitive any action that would in any way compromise the proper realization of this relation. Since abortion consists in compromising the personhood of the unborn, it is morally impermissible. In this respect, it is surprising that abortion is typically presented as a woman's issue; this is misleading given that, besides God as the Absolute Subject of the origin and destiny of the human being, there are at least three *related* parties involved: the father, the mother, and the unborn. In view of their biological and metaphysical constitution at fertilization, zygotes, as a being fashioned by the divine constitutive presence of the Absolute, are a *sacred* form of life which should be respected in accordance to the dignity of their ontological status. It is love for the unborn that is lacking in today's society.

Notes

1. The original form of this paper (1990) was modified somewhat in the light of a later, more developed version of the same in Spanish, prepared for publication: "El Cigoto, inicio de la vida humana desde una perspectiva biológica y metafísica". *Ars Medica. Revista de Estudios Médicos Humanísticos*. Vol. 4, No. 6 (Faculty of Medicine, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (2002): 31-46. The current version (2004) for this publication takes from both earlier papers.

2. For an excellent précis of the ethical and legal issues pertinent to the abortion controversy, see T. L. Beauchamp and L. Walters (eds.), *Contemporary Issues in Bioethics* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989).

3. United States Supreme Court, *Roe v. Wade: Majority Opinion and Dissent*, in 410 *United States Reports* 113, decided January 22, 1973.

4. For the Court's reasoning on abortion cases, see L. Glantz, "Abortion: a Decade of Legal Decisions," in G. J. Annas and A. Milinsky (eds.), *Genetics and the Law III* (Plenum Press, 1985), pp. 295-307.

5. Fernando Rielo is a Spanish philosopher whose *genetic metaphysics* is acquiring increasing recognition in this country. On October 29, 1989, a symposium-tribute was held in Rielo's honor at Georgetown University, where prominent specialists presented papers covering the three areas of his work, metaphysics, poetry and literary criticism, which were later published in a Spanish-English commemorative volume titled *Fernando Rielo: poeta y filósofo/Poet and Philosopher* (Madrid: E. F. R., 1991); henceforth *Poet and Philosopher.*

6. D. J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (New York: Knopf, 1985).

7. J. T. Noonan, Jr., "An Almost Absolute Value in History," in *The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 51-59.

8. For Paul Ramsey the defining characteristic of a human person is a certain gene structure; see his "The Morality of Abortion," in *Moral Problems*, ed. James Rachels (New York, 1971).

9. See R. M. Fox and J. P. DeMarco, *Moral Reasoning: A Philosophical Approach to Applied Ethics* (Fort Worth, TX: Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1990), pp. 323-326.

10. See A. Sutton, "Ten Years After the Warnock Report: Is the Human Neo-conceptus a Person?," *Linacre Quarterly*, 62 (1995): 63-74: 64-66; and L. S. Cahill, "Notes on Moral Theology-1992: The Embryo and the Fetus: New Moral Contexts," *Theological Studies*, 54 (1993): 129-134.

11. See J. C. Cross, Z. Werb, and S. J. Fisher, "Implantation and the Placenta: Key Pieces of the Development Puzzle," *Science*, 266 (1994): 1510-1513; henceforth "Implantation."

12. See *ibid.*, pp. 1514-1516.

13. See A. J. Wilcox, "Incidence of Early Loss of Pregnancy," *New England Journal of Medicine*, 319 (1988): 189-194.

14. C. A. Bedate, and R. C. Cefalo, "The Zygote: To Be or not Be a Person," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 14 (1989): 642: henceforth "The Zygote."

15. See Cross, et al., "Implantation," p. 1509.

16. Bedate and Cefalo, "The Zygote," p. 644.

17. See N. Wake, T. Seki, H. Fujita, H. Okubo, K. Sakai, K. Okuyama, H. Hayashi, Y. Shiina, H. Sato, M. Kuroda, and K. Ichinoe, "Malignant Potential of Homozygous and Heterozygous Complete Moles," *Cancer Research*, 44 (1984): 1226-1230; S. D. Lawler, and R. A. Fisher, "Genetic Studies in Hydatidiform Mole with Clinical Correlations," *Placenta*, 8 (1987): 77-88;

and R. A. Fisher, S. Povey, A. J. Jeffreys, C. A. Martin, I. Patel, and S. D. Lawler, "Frequency of Heterozygous Complete Hydatidiform Moles, Estimated by Locus-specific Minisatellite and Y Chromosome-specific Probes," *Human Genetics*, 82 (1989): 259-263.

18. See R. S. K. Chaganti, P. R. K. Koduru, R. Chakraborty, and W. B. Jones, "Genetic Origin of a Choriocarcinoma," *Cancer Research*, 50 (1991): 6330-6333; T. Ihara, K. Ohama, M. Satoh, T. Fuji, K. Nomura, and A. Fujiwara, "Histologic Grade and Karyotype of Immature Teratoma of the Ovary," *Cancer*, 54 (1984): 2944-2988; and K. Ohama, K. Nomura, E. Okamoto, Y. Fukuda, T. Ihara, and A. Fujiwara, "Origin of Immature Teratoma of the Ovary," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 152 (1985): 869-890.

19. See D. P. Barlow, "Gametic Imprinting in Mammals," *Science*, 270 (1995): 1610-1613.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 1611.

21. N. M. Ford, *When Did I Begin?: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 139-145.

22. See A. E. H. Emery, *Elements of Medical Genetics* (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), p. 103.

23. See K. Dawson, *Embryo Experimentation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 58; and K. L. Moore, *The Developing Human* (Philadelphia: W. B. Sunders Co., 1982), p. 133.

24. See H. Lilie, "Aborto Eugenésico," in Biotecnología y Derecho. Perspectivas en Derecho Comparado, ed. C.M. Romeo Casabona (Bilbao: Cátedra de Derecho y Genoma Humáno, Universidad de Deusto; and Granada: Editorial Comares, 1988), p. 188.

25. See R. Frydman, *Dieu, la Médicine et l'embryon* (Paris, 1997).

26. The Magisterium teaches that human life is sacred in view of the fact that from the beginning the creative act of God intervenes. See Puis XII, *Humani Generis*: AAS 42 (1959) 575; John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra*: III: AAS 53 (1961), 447; Paul VI, *Professio Fidei*: AAS 60 (1968) 436.

27. See S. Boukhari, *God, Genetics and the Embryo* (2000).

28. St. Thomas in his *Summa Teologica* and in *Sent. Id.* 37 q.1a.2 distinguishes three grades of presence of God in creatures: (a) of immensity, common to all creatures (by essence, by presence, by potency); (b) by reason of God's inhabitation in the soul by grace); (c) of union or personal (hypostatic union).

29. Fernando Rielo, "*Concepción genética del principio de relación,"* III Congreso Mundial de Filosofía Cristiana (Quito, July 9-14, 1989).

30. Fernando Rielo, "Hacia una nueva concepción metafísica del ser" in *¿Existe una filosofía española?* (Seville: E.F.R., 1988), pp. 119-120; henceforth "Hacia…"

31. For Rielo the conception of the Absolute Subject is at the rational level of two beings or divine persons, the *Binity*; and at the revealed level of three divine persons, the *Trinity.* See Rielo, "Hacia . . .," p. 125ff.

32. For an introduction to Rielo's genetic metaphysics, see Part III—Thought in *Fernando Rielo: Dialogue in Three Voices*, trans. by David G. Murray (Madrid: F.F.R, 2000), pp. 127-128; henceforth *Dialogue*.

33. This term has nothing to do with Neils Bohr's use of the term 'complementarity' to mean jointly necessary but mutually exclusive conditions.

34. See note below.

35. To assert that the two personal beings are in a state of *immanent intrinsic complementarity* signifies, with respect to the term *complementarity*, that the two personal beings,

[P1] and [P2], while being really distinct, nonetheless are necessary one to the other in order to constitute the absolute unity of a sole Absolute Subject and sole absolute act.35 Moreover, the Absolute Subject, constituted by two personal beings, must be understood in complementary terms, for if one were to understand the relation in terms of opposition or contradiction, one would proffer a notion of the Absolute as constituted by two terms wholly inimical to each other and hence at absolute odds with each other and therefore without any possibility for mutual relation or communication. The term *immanent*, given the complementarity stated, indicates that the two personal beings define one another to such a degree that there is nothing that transcends them, nor is it possible for one person [P1] to transcend the other [P2] or vice versa (for [P2] to transcend [P1]), for in that case subordinationism would be introduced into the Absolute Subject. The term *intrinsic* underscores the fact that there is nothing extrinsic between [P1] and [P2] such that the two personal beings are *entirely open* one to the other to such a degree that [P1] *is entirely in* [P2] and [P2] *is entirely in* [P1].35 This principle thus eradicates any conception of identity as a metaphysical principle, for there is no such a thing as a "being in a being," i.e., a being *per se*, a *solus ipse*, but rather, on an intellectual level, the immanent intrinsic complementarity of two personal beings who indwell one other. Further, whereas the genetic principle may be expressed in terms of the following formula: [P1 complementary to P2], a [P3], although a metaphysical *surplus*, has nonetheless metaphysical *validity*, as a result of the functions that it fulfills (Rielo, "Hacia …," p. 123). With [P3], the *Binity* [P1 complementary to P2] is elevated to *Trinity* [P1 complementary to P2 complementary to P3] (*ibid.*). Moreover, by [P3] satisfying the functions of [P1 complementary to P2], a [P4] would result unnecessary because it would be devoid of any possible function.

36. For a critique of the so-called principle of contradiction and non-contradiction, see Fernando Rielo, "Concepción genética de lo que no es el sujeto absoluto," in *Raices y valores históricos del pensamiento español* (Madrid: E.F.R., 1990), pp. 100-110; henceforth "Concepción genética." Cf. José M. López Sevillano, "Pure Metaphysics in Fernando Rielo," *Poet and Philosopher*, p. 203, n. 7; henceforth "Pure Metaphysics."

37. López Sevillano, "Pure Metaphysics," p. 205, n. 9.

38. Rielo, *Dialogue*, p. 133.

39. Fernando Rielo distinguishes metaphysics from ontology: Metaphysics refers to the *ad-intra* constitution of the Absolute Subject; Ontology refers to the *ad-extra* presence of the Absolute Subject in the created element of the human person.

40. See Rielo, "Hacía...," p. 124.

41. Rielo distinguishes between a natural or *deificans* level, and a supernatural or *transverberans* level; the latter expresses the ontological constitution of the baptized in relationship to God as Trinity by virtue grace. See Fernando Rielo, "Mystical Definition of Man and the Meaning of Human Suffering," *Conference on Spirituality I: Toward a Health Service Apostolate*, Part II (Rome, November 9, 1996).

42. See Rielo, "Hacia...," p. 132; for the epistemological question see *ibid*., pp. 132-36; for the ethical question see "Concepción genética," pp. 130-134.

43. This is against those, such as M. A. Warren, who argue that the absence of such criteria provides a justification for abortion, and M. Tooley, who, in addition, considers infanticide justifiable. See M. A. Warren, "The Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," *The Monist* 57 (1973): 1; and M. Tooley, "In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide," in J. Feinberg (ed.), *The Problem of Abortion* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1984).

44. See B. Brody who provides a detailed response to J. J. Thomas's defense of a pregnant woman's right to her body such that it cancels out any possible rights that the fetus might have. B. Brody, "The Morality of Abortion," in *Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1975). J. J. Thomas, "A Defense of Abortion," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (1971): 47-66.

45. See D. Marquis, "Why Abortion is Immoral," *The Journal of Philosophy* 86 (1989): 4.

46. See K. Martyn, "Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law," *UCLA Law Review* 29 (1982): 1194-1215.

47. Although for Rielo, the question of who may be [P2] cannot be resolved on an intellectual level alone, he maintains that what is *sensu stricto* original to Christ's revelation may be articulated in two truths that exceed reason unaided by theological faith, viz.: (1) that he, Jesus Christ, is himself a divine person, i.e., [P2] of the genetic principle, in immanent intrinsic complementarity with [P1]; and (2) that there exists a third divine person [P3], whom he names Holy Spirit. With respect to the first truth, which is of interest here, Christ declares quite explicitly that the Father and he constitute the *unum geneticum*: "*Ego et Pater unum sumus*" (Jn 10:30). In fact, he indicates to his contemporaries that though they do not believe in him, they should believe in the light of his deeds: "*Si mihi non vultis credere, operibus credite, ut congnoscatis et sciatis quia in me est Pater et ego in Patre*" (Jn 10:38).

48. See Rielo, "Concepción genética," pp. 130-134.

Chapter V
Social Science and the Humanization of Social Life

Jon Anderson

Change in our time makes the understandings which comprise the social sciences intensely problematic. As the characteristic self-knowledge of modern society, they are part of the world they would understand and share properties of the domains they would limit. The century which has seen over-determined society has also seen over-determined conceptions of what it is to be human that both reflect and reflect upon its vehicles. Whether one looks at professional psychology, with its emphasis on cognition as learning and personality as disposition, at professional sociology with its emphasis on frameworks of consensus, or at anthropology's horizon-defining conceptions of culture, a sort of double determination is at work.

Here, I want to look at that double determination as it has been manifest in the social sciences. I range widely and touch lightly on conceptions, particularly long-term conceptual orientations, that have marked twentieth century social sciences, especially as those have sought and provided the distinctive self-knowledge of this time. These conceptions, and their underlying orientation, are marked by what I would call high modernism in both the social sciences and their objects. I want to draw some parallels between some of what is happening in the social world, broadly conceived, and what is happening in our conceptions of this world across several of these disciplines, and especially in my own, anthropology, which I know best. For there is a sea change underway in the contemporary social sciences that is significant for them, for the understandings they provide and, to the extent that those are part of the world, significant for it. Whether these changes are leading or lagging indicators is moot: they are both, from an anthropologist's perspective, and here I want to examine some of their continuities and discontinuities with older, more established but increasingly questioned paradigms.

For this examination, I begin with some of the markers of high modernism that link social life so characterized to the social sciences of them as a setting for assessing implications and entailments of post-modernist conceptions, approaches, and data. The way to approach the linkage between social life and understanding of it for me, as a social scientist, is through methodology. I look first at this linkage and consider briefly its de-linkage in the objects and more extensively its de-linkage in the subjects of social science.

Modernism as Method

Arguably, methodology, even methodology triumphant, marks what we understand as modernism in social life and in the sciences of it. The triumph of means, of procedure, is a characteristic of our times and of modernity; so these means are an appropriate site to understand the implications of modernity and what it entails. In such terms, nothing so marks our century, thus far, as much as totalitarianism. Whether of the right or left in politics, whether chauvinistic or universalistic in ideology, utopias bestride the twentieth century with methodologies of one rule for all, suppression of alternates, homogenization, and tyrannies not just of overweening power but of ambitions to order, and to reduce to order, especially to a single order. Not only in the West, with Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinist communism, but also in the Third World as well, the pattern includes "villagization" in Tanzania no less than the cultural revolution in late Maoist China,

uniform civil codes imposed on divers populations, restrictive nationalisms, endless one-party states and more. Some are modernizations in reaction to earlier ones of western imperialism and excesses of early industrialization, but for that no less totalitarian, reductive, and bent on ordering or reordering to rule. Whether a matter of straightening the lines, as in the social democracies and welfare states, or of drawing them positively in others, the shared characteristic is reductionism in pursuit of uniformities and "management" through them. We have learned to call it banal, although less for becoming ordinary than for having been from the start too simple.

Part of and response to all this has been an impulse or moment in the social sciences that is equally totalitarian. Behaviorism in psychology, unified theory in sociology, modernization theory in politics and the lure of systems theories everywhere were not alone in projecting their own reductive, one-rule-for-all visions of encompassing order. These exemplars of the moment of high science share a conceptual space with variations on "spirit" in historical studies, each like Toynbee's vulgarization of Hegel, usually stripped of the dialectic but not of optimism. I mention these modern specifications of Hegel's project because their failures are among the more spectacular and telling: they no longer attract extensive research. Conceived in optimism, their impulse has been both to order and to reduce to order by finding, in order to manipulate, some underlying principle. One cannot say whether high scientism in the social sciences is the chicken or the egg of modernism for this reason—they are part of this world and not just about it. Their disappointments have largely come as recognitions of this ambiguous relation to their own ontology.

While these have never completely dominated the topical disciplines of social science, they have set the tone and frame in which the alternatives have come to share the same characteristics. Two of these characteristics are important. One is monocausality, the search for simple rules, for one cause for each effect, for underlying principles and an encompassing perspective on them. So, along with the unified functionalist theory of mid-century sociology there existed alternatives, each with all of its characteristics save one, each preserving its overall structure while advancing some subordinated corner from dependent or intermediating status to that of an independent variable. Such alternatives, whether advanced by symbolic interactionism against the Parsonian synthesis in sociology or by Schumacherist arguments for "appropriate technology" against the Rostow synthesis in development theory, share—actually, adopt—the conceptual frame and space of what they oppose. In so doing, they also expose what they oppose to share their own most disappointing methodological lack of closure. They are all open-ended and fail thereby to grasp enough to be predictive outside the metaphysics on which they depend analytically for closure. Synthetic approaches accordingly fail to do more than ultimately reproduce the diversity of the empirical social world as sectoral or short-term perspectives whose relations to each other are indeterminate in so far as all "other things" are never equal. So the most characteristic features of twentieth-century high modernist social sciences have been searches for unified theories on the one hand and encounters with real indeterminacy on the other as aspects of the same thing.

They are also aspects of the kinds of social utopianism that have marked social life in this century as something to manage. The sciences of social life, and for its management, have been above all practical, which is to say for that morally loaded and so a good place to examine that loading. They share, and advance, visions of comprehension as comprehensiveness. And while it is the latter which breaks down in the changes of our time, it is in the breakup of their comprehension which is reflected in the social sciences as reflections upon that. In proclaiming the "End of History," Francis Fukayama has pointed beyond what was earlier proclaimed (by Kristol) as the "End of Ideology" to an end of the sorts of monolithic, unified theoretical synthesis

that has been a key vehicle of modernist optimism that the world, and individuals, can become somehow all more alike.

Experience confounds theory, but caution is in order. We see the breakdown now, with symbolic appropriateness that is potentially misleadingly taken as an omen, in one of its type-sites in the sudden revolutions of Eastern Europe and dramatic loosening of the Soviet Union. But it would be mistaken, in my view, to adopt the sentimentalism of envisioning reversion to some status quo ante, as if the whole modernist moment had been a mistake. That, of course, is the first impression in the rise of nationalisms, but only because those are pre-existing terms of understanding, pre-understandings ready to be applied because they have been around at least as long. As such, these understandings belong to modernism's earlier transitions, and so appear appropriately anachronistic.

The first, and perhaps easiest, way to understand the end of modernism in the social sciences is in terms of the equally anachronistic model of C.P. Snow's "Two Cultures." Reversionist sentimentalism here is manifest in the sort of appreciationist humanism of an earlier day. Its protective abode is the gap of cultural differences Snow discerned between high science and disciplines predicated on connoisseurship as profound as any between different societies not in communication with each other; its manifestation is the heel-dragging response to the excesses, and successes, of a modernism already superceded in far more powerful, if often less accessible, post-modernist turns in the humanities. These turns are marked by their own paradoxical "ends" of history through eclecticism and opening up the interpretive process to what I would call an at least potentially post-dialectical form of understanding. They dissolve time and sequence, not into the abstract timeless but into the particular and instantiated, and with that the sorts of one-sided understanding of humanism as absorption of a structured canon into unstructured recipients, dialectical only in the sense of conveying the structure of the former into the latter, whose sole role is a further elaboration of received structure.

In the humanities in particular, it is this structured sender to unstructured receiver model which has broken up, much as its scientistic counterpart has broken up,—a dissolution of the misplaced concreteness in the notion of there being some thing integral to receive. This notion, inchoate in the humanities conceived in perfectionist terms as 'Greats' and in metaphors of 'Treasury', is basic as well to high modernism's central analytical method of structuralism. As conceived from de Saussure to Levi-Strauss and developed in structuralist poetics by Jakobson and others out of nineteenth century projects to decompose communication into its mechanisms, structuralism bestrides and enables modernism's most profound conceit. In linguistics and poetics, for instance, de Saussure's twin distinctions of sender/receiver and signifier/signified enabled a methodology of replacement, or of representation, of one thing (signified) by another (signifier) through the medium of a structure which had the ultimate reality. The implication was that counters don't count, but are merely counted with, and a theory of language as an abstract structure variously instantiated, in more extensive models or metaphorizations of language as a system of (any kind of) signs rather like the recursive instructions model of DNA. The vogue of these two perspectives was, in fact, coeval; and their convergence in some of the more ambitious semeiotic theories (e.g., Sebeok and to some extent Levi-Strauss) should not obscure the methodological impulse in language theory. In the hands of the Prague School, it is to reduce the tropes, or conveyances, of communication to a single type: as Jakobson remarked about poetics, metaphor ultimately has something of the metonymic, or similarities ultimately rest on conjunction. The reduction is complete in Levi-Strauss' attempt to universalize the finding and make all likenesses ultimately

the same by universalizing the field of discourse, or in Santayana's tropology of matter struggling to realize form.

Steps to a New Tropology

In all this, the forgotten trope has been irony, which particularizes discourse and consciousness by calling attention to the particularity of frames. And irony is in consequence the axis of post-modernist departures from modernism's diagnostic emphasis on exposing and celebrating not just structure but structure's independence from its vehicles. Irony is everywhere in post-modernism and post-structuralism, from their techniques of extensive quotation to their eclecticism and celebrations of diversity and insistent calling attention to technique as instantiation. This is because, as Jean Francois Lyotard has said, post-modernism is not so much an historical phase as a frame of mind: it defines itself, initially, as opposition to modernism and, in its knowledge of it, is a moment of its continuation as a sort of demystification.

In its simplest, in the social sciences, post-modernism continues the debunking project of the social sciences and extends it by treating them as ideologies whose conventional structures can be exposed as such. In this sense, there have always been a post-modernist moments of analysis, save perhaps the most positive and programmatic (from Comte to Parsons, Skinner and Rostow?); there have been analysts willing, as it were, to look beyond the frame or over the edge and contemplate the prospect of their temporality. Max Weber was one, Georg Simmel another; R.D. Laing, perhaps Gregory Bateson, and in our own time Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida—"deconstructionists" all of them, who go beyond particularity to contemplate how it is masked. The step is more than one to particularity; it is in a sense beyond relativism and the problematization of context as "factors," such as in Schumacherian departures from the unilinear development theories of Stages of Economic Growth as another phase of imperialist impulses to systematize the world. Its message is that there is no place to stand that assures itself.

This is a sensibility for diversity as not a problem to be reduced to uniformities but to be grasped as a primary datum that theoretical understanding must preserve. It is most appropriately encountered not in recognizing diversity but in recognizing how it is organized and encountered. This may be in recognizing rather than reducing ranges of argument in a society or a tradition, which I consider an essential first step for grasping the social and cultural significance of diversity. Beyond that, it may also be recognized in grasping the fact of ambiguity and ambivalence in experience as primary data about experience rather than as something to be straightened out, sorted and thereby defused. The plain fact about social life as experienced is that it is ambiguous less because it is not clear than because its clarities are multiple. Conventionally, this, like diversity itself, is treated as "conflict" within paradigms which privilege consensus or some other uniformitarian principle in which it is the opposite or negative case.

A moment's reflection, however, is enough to consider that conflict implies also cooperation and consensus at a lower level or in more restricted terms. So modern conflict-minded theories, pressed as alternatives to the consensus focus of voluntaristic action theory in sociology or modernization theory in politics and to conditioning theories in psychology tended to shift rather than to replace their emphases. Still broadly function-minded, or reading underlying structure from superficial outcomes, approaches to understanding social life through conflicts affirmed at one level what they denied at another, and were argued in such terms as finding the more "basic" level of analysis. But in typological characteristics, these levels were the same; so the argument turned empirical, to find units with sufficient integrity to stand for something they could come into

conflict over or on which they could be contradicted. In anthropology, for instance, solidarity was removed from society as a whole, or as an object, now taken instead as an arena, to some component parts in contests for domination or at least generalization of their sectoral properties into secular or long-term features of the context itself. Similarly, in sociological terms, classes became little or alternate societies, with attention redirected from typological relations between kinds of societies in the more straightforwardly Hegelian conceptions of earlier comparative sociologies of Comte, Spencer, Marx and Durkheim toward relations of interdependency between classes within society.

The move, "downward" as it were, is a characteristic of high science and of modernism in the social sciences. It is a move toward empiricism, and one that applies the theory by specifying its application. But the move is itself indeterminate, for there may be additional dimensions of conflict within classes or cutting across classes as, for instance, feminism has show itself to be. The problem, simply stated, is that there are multiple dimensions of identification and social values, which may or may not bear some homologous relations to each other but which surely do not otherwise coincide. They do not coincide, barring attempts—one should say—to make them coincide through advocacy movements or through policies of some otherwise dominating institution to generalize its principles and totalize itself synechdochically as a new synthesis: blood and iron, the dictatorship of the proletariate, New Deals and free markets, upward mobility, mental health, African Socialism, Sukharnoism, permanent Cultural Revolution, Welfare Capitalism are just a few examples of Heaven-on-Earth utopianism of modernism that, in search of basics, finds too many candidates and their synthesis far from unproblematic.

What the move downward, or empiricism, also reveals is that properties of one level are also found at another and, in fact, that there are no "levels," only sides. Put differently, it reveals that stratifications of data do not add up, in Comtean fashion, to a master stratification of their types; for an empiricism that reproduces the variety of the empirical world in divers constructions of it points not to even the possibility of monolithic understandings but to the contextualization of all understandings as part of the data about them. That is, diversity is something to be explained and accounted as a fact rather than a problem to be overcome by averaging effects, taking the long view, or some other methodological control that is reproduced on the level of theory as ontological priority.

This different view of diversity as irreducible points to two kinds of data previously subordinated or "controlled" by averaging and selection. The first of these neglected data are those of the frames of diversity as data of the same sort as the ranges they articulate. These have been called "doxa" by Pierre Bourdieu, or taken-for-granted "practical" frames which include a range of heterodox understandings along with official or discursive orthodoxies. Bourdieu points to these as silent on the level of discourse, where orthodoxies are privileged to have voice, and manifest instead in broader terms as practice. He goes further, however, in suggesting that practices are less usefully approached as extensions of discourse, or on the model of discourse as its inexplicit versions. Instead, he argues that practice is the larger set of which discourse is only a limited specification. On the one hand, this move is not radical. It draws on a long tradition in the social sciences, and particularly in anthropology and sociology, of widening the data base to include, even to privilege, the proletarian and peripheral. On the other hand, it is radical in carrying that project to a point where none is privileged absolutely, and so their privileges can be examined.

The point has been made also in studies of language that shift from languages as systems and speech as their employment to speech itself, with its broader or additional properties, of which language-systematics are only part. In anthropology, this shift has been one from grammar- and

dictionary-minded comparativism to ethnographies of communication and thence to speech, lately to poetics. The shift was conceptualized by Silverstein as one from models built on the most restricted properties of language, its semantic-referential core, taken as models for all the properties of communication, to the properties by which speech is set as social action. This widening of the database first reveals language to be too restricted a model for communication generally and for performative communication that accomplishes rather than points to action and, second, shifts the balance to the extra-linguistic surround. The core case becomes indirect speech, which can never be equivalent, even linguistically, to direct speech, since it depends on an extra-linguistic property of priority for meaning. A report of speech, or of action, is not their duplicate when a myth, for instance, cannot be recited without performing what it is 'for' or 'a part of' (Hymes). The same is the case, logically, for language itself, which may mark grammatical features such as the past tense, that take their significance, as opposed to their signification, only from the extra-linguistic feature of sequence. From the ethnography of speech, which ironizes language by calling attention to its frames, it is a short step to ethnopoetics, which examine speech by performative turns on it. The point is that such properties are preserved, while comparison, whether between languages or of language with "other" modes of communication, can only illuminate its own procedures, not those of its objects which it cannot exhaust.

The other kind of data, so far less well integrated with these, is of ambiguity. What diversity also means as a fact of social life is that views of social life contain fewer dimensions that it has; if more than one can be applied, a thing can be more than one thing in the instant. Experience is ambiguous because it can be understood in more than one way, and these ways contain no way in themselves of choosing for it is choice which points to their multiplicity and to the ambivalent character of every experience. This has been something to explain away, or to control, by focusing on systemic properties of understandings, rather as if they were languages. But the same objection applies here: the data of "application" are not a different type, or an extension of the type. Thus, the familiar ambiguity of social experience, and the ambivalence of its vehicles which not only do multiple duty but thereby convey multiple significances, is a primary fact and property of them. The temptation in modern social science has always been to reduce these ambiguities, as Raymond Aron put it: "to render social or historical content more intelligible than it was in the experience of those who lived it" (1967: 202). But such adjudication is not only preemptive redaction; it also wastes data and thereby as well constrains as analysis what in another setting is constrained as belief and experience.

In fact, people confront ambiguity articulately as well as inarticulately. The great examples in anthropology have always been in myth and ritual, which to the modernist sensibility were proto- or failed sciences. From a perspective closer to Bourdieu's than to Durkheim's, however, these modes are rather the general case. They both include explorations of the experience of social life that they are about, and they include explorations of their own terms of construction. Ironizing society, they ironize themselves, or at least provide no barrier to that, by their very multiplicity and situatedness; in the hands of adepts, this is one of their less appreciated characteristics, else we would have studies of "primitive" theologians and vernacular philosophers in far larger numbers than the outstanding few examples of Paul Radin's of Indian mythologies, Gregory Bateson's of Naven ritual, or Louis Dumont's of Hindu hierarchy, or even Levi-Strauss's, which tends to emphasise the philosophical more than the vernacular, or the passage to grasping the latter in terms of the former.

Learning the Tropes

To the extent that the social sciences do not adjudicate but record such matters, turns to their articulation frame the social sciences' own ambivalences toward the modernisms which framed them. Central to these turns have been expansions of the database, such as Bourdieu's to practice or the ethnographers of communication to speech, to the vernacular and renewed attempts to grasp their properties as something beyond problems of translation into flatter or unidimensionalizing analytical languages to which Aron pointed approvingly. Translation implies equivalence and replacement of one way of saying with another in terms of common referents, which become increasingly problematic the more one attends to the vernacular.

The problem that any vernacular poses is learning the tropes. Figures of speech, as conventions of reference, point to what they cannot say and draw on one set of dimensions to speak of another. Consequently, they are phenomena of middling duration, neither wholly of the moment nor completely stable: they inscribe a tropology of transference, of confounding categories. They work, when they work, because multiple dimensions (or categories) intersect in some instance, which belonging to more than one is subject to a range of interpretation. Taking this seriously, the characteristic transitional move of post-modernist social science is toward the vernacular, frequently to "popular culture" as its site, and toward the argumentative qualities of context marking. Its characteristic feature, in turn, is a range of interpretation that is constantly renewed and interpretations constantly at risk. Its proper method is critical, or de-constructive, rather than analytical, in order to preserve, rather than to factor away, contexts or settings which are defined, and problematized, in terms of what (else) they can mean.

The unit of analysis shifts from the model of the proposition ("belief") to frameworks of debate, discussion and bundles of interpretation, and away from the settled to the problematic. Multiplicity of meanings or significances is a feature above all of situations, events, and personal experience in which they have to be juggled. The high modernist mode of social science has directed attention away from such features by directing its own attention to one feature at a time in a search for central tendency. To turn away from the central tendency to the range is to turn to these features of situations, events and personal experience. These features include duration—literally, waiting—that phenomenological turns in the social sciences have long pointed to as a crucial frame of experience. They also include confusion, which in turn includes contending voices, perspectives, felt and expressed demands.

If anything, this is more social than the sender-receiver model of social action as enactment, whether of enduring disposition or situated response. It involves a shift beyond the essentially non-interactive enactive model of speaking a language, and of speech or action so modeled, to a range of interpretations, positions and applications of interpretive resources that Bourdieu pointed out make social life rather more like a discussion than like a speech. I do not mean just that it is interactive, but that interaction implies diversity or a range of discourse and action that is recognizable. The signal failure of modernism in the social sciences has been their inability to comprehend this in any other terms than as conflict. The signal departure of post-modernism in the social sciences is, in effect, to embrace diversity and to look for the range rather than for a central tendency. Against their flattening to variously false (because partial) consciousness or to otherwise determined interests that marks high modernism, a denser notion of "interests" than that modeled on purpose alone is implied in this recognition of reflexivity and critical activity in social actors.

There is in all this one more danger in addition to the dangers of reopening the doors that modernism in the social sciences closed to anachronism and connoisseurship. It is a further danger

of recording and encoding a very American sensibility as something more than that. I mean pluralism as a value, or at least as an apologetic for the otherwise manifest failures of high modernism and its various totalitarianisms. Certainly, pluralism is their alternative; but the whole question of what we mean by pluralism is reopened by sensibility for the vernacular, for the multiplicity of voices, and above all for the ambiguous character of social experience and reflection upon it. When the bonds of one-rule-for-all loosen, it is not the Human Spirit nor Yearning for Freedom that are liberated any more than the status quo ante: those belong to older arguments. Just as certainly, the pluralism to which these point is not that conventionally of egoistic individualism, which is if anything as mono-dimensional as over-socialized conceptions of what it is to be human. One of the strongest senses from which post-modernisms depart is that of connection; another is a sensibility for the partiality of connections.

I think instead that what we see in post-modernist turns in the social sciences to real-time accounts, to almost autobiographical encounters, and to the sense that what one truly knows is how the multidimensionality of social experience plays upon one's own consciousness of self are lineaments of a social science more appropriate to complex societies, and then to a recognition that all societies are complex in these ways. Recently, in my own field of anthropology, much has been made, and continues to be made though increasingly less interestingly, of the analytic constitution of our subjects in one-dimensional and monocausal terms. The classic example is "Primitive Man," and before that "Savages," formerly encased in "The Cake of Custom" and more recently in "institutions," whose recipes it was anthropology's task to fathom. These figures still populate textbooks as tropes of our understanding, although we know them to be (stick) figures of speech for our own reactions to them and really function to mask that move. This discussion is increasingly less interesting because the rush to embrace is a rush past difference, not just between ourselves and others but also past differences among others and frequently between them that flattens the contours of other lives in the process of straightening the lines of our own. This has been a familiar oscillation between over-determining and under-appreciating the otherness of other ways of life and thought that shares the conceptual space of conquest and totalitarianism.

The exit from this oscillation has been described in my own field by Clifford Geertz as a "refiguration of social thought" in "blurred genres" more appropriate to complex societies than the mind-your-own-business, bureaucratic model of modernism. This model, privileging the division of labor, and the control of labor, has serious inadequacies when generalized to other domains than industrial organization. Arguably, post-modernist society is becoming, or becoming recognized, to have rather more in common with another class of complex societies that have been exceedingly ambiguous for anthropology. These are the intermediate societies between the small-scale "primitive" and the large-scale industrial that for lack of a better term have been called "traditional"; they submit neither to the models and methods of study for "primitive" societies nor to those for industrial ones, and thereby challenge a century of such distinctions. The challenge is most directly to the framing of such distinctions in terms of searches for dominant institutions, such as economy in one and kinship in another, to which additional institutions are gathered or subordinated, and from which a typology can be generated in terms of institutional dominance can be generated. Such schemes basically do not work except as explorations of their own terms, which generate variously Edenic or utopian myths.

Where they most especially don't work is in "traditional" complex societies such as in the Middle East, where the artificiality and non-congruence of boundaries is clear, if not clearly understood. The Middle East has never submitted well to high modernism's scientific moment. Institutions there are indeterminate in its terms, and ethnography of the area contributed much to

discrediting integrative structural models because of their partiality. One finds there instead arenas of discourse and practice with conventional, and contested, ranges of positions, perspectives and tropes. But none is privileged over others, not even Islam; routine claims to encompass are variously and particularly specified from positions with long and familiar histories and variable social success. What becomes predictable, at least in a general sense, is argument and discussion. It is in this sense that, as Geertz put it, all knowledge is local. And that could be the motto of post-modernism both in society and in the sciences of its examination that mark their contemporary humanization.

Chapter VI
Rhetoric and Social Change

Christopher J. Wheatley

Conscience is but a word that cowards use, Devis'd at first to keep the strong in awe: Our strong arms be our conscience, swords our law! — *Richard III,* 5 3.309-311

O sir, we quarrel in print, by the book—as you have books for good manners. I will name you the degrees. The first, the Retort Courteous; the second, the Quip Modest; the third, the Reply Churlish; the fourth, the Reproof Valiant; the fifth, the Countercheck Quarrelsome; the sixth, the Lie with Circumstance; the seventh, the Lie Direct; and you may avoid that too, with an If. I knew when seven justices could not take up a quarrel, but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought of an if, as, "If you said so, then I said so"; and they shook hands and swore brothers. Your if is the only peacemaker; much virtue in If. — *As You Like It,* 5.4.90-104

At some point, having determined why change ought to occur and in what direction change should be directed, one needs to consider not merely how change shall be accomplished in the sense of social interventions (such as changes in political and economic structures) but how people are to be brought to accept and work with the means and toward the end desired. This brings us to rhetoric in the broadest sense of the term: the method by which people are brought to identify some particular program with their own interests. I will begin with a discussion of misconceptions about rhetoric and a description of the rhetorical arena. This will be followed by an examination of two faulty rhetorical pleas, and of the dilemma that post-modernist theory, itself largely responsible for the renewed interest in rhetoric, poses for social change. I will then describe contributions to rhetorical theory, and, finally, consider the strengths of Burke's rhetoric and the limits of rhetoric itself

Rhetoric and Its Area

A brief description of what rhetoric is not may be necessary for some readers who persist in regarding rhetoric as opposed to "the scientific," "the real," and "the true" (every time I use words such as "true," "real," or "fact," they should be read as having quotation marks around them, since, as will become apparent, I regard the use of all such terms as extremely problematic), and who possess the intellectually impoverished notion that rhetoric is merely the use of tropes and figures. These are not mistakes that theoretical scientists tend to make. Thus Steven Hawk (the inventor of black holes) says blithely, "I shall take the simple-minded view that a theory is just a model of the universe, or a restricted part of it, and a set of rules that relate quantities in the model to observations that we make. It exists only in our minds and does not have any other reality (whatever that might mean)."1 This is not a new idea; Locke points out in the fourth book of *The Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that we cannot prove that nominal essence corresponds to real essence, and Kant argues that we cannot know the thing in itself. Nor does such a position generate relativism since we still have the criteria of explanatory force and predictive capacity to distinguish good theories from bad ones. Thus Freud's theories are simply bad *prima facie* because they cannot generate useful predictions, and Marx's theories, while well-formed, are either bad

theory or mis-applied theory because they, as a matter of historical fact, generated predictions that did not obtain. What Hawk's remark does mean is that the assumptions that underlie a theory are something we are persuaded of for various reasons, not something we can demonstrate, if only because an argument cannot justify its own premises.

Some aspects of physical theory are not testable—super string theory for instance. When that is the case, criteria such as "simplicity" and "elegance' lead the scientist to prefer one explanation to another. And Occam's razor is rhetorical to the core. The simplest explanation may well not be the right one, but as a human characteristic, we prefer simplicity to complexity. Thus if two models have equal predictive force or are equally indemonstrable and can equally account for the observed data, our reason for preferring the simpler is emotional—it is easier to retain a simple model than a complex one—or aesthetic and not a function of reality or truth at all. For instance, the argument that the universe cannot be static begins with the observation that the universe looks the same in whatever direction we look and the assumption "that this would also be true if we were observing the universe from anywhere else"(*Time*, 42). Hawking says bluntly, "We have no scientific evidence for, or against, this assumption. We believe it only on grounds of modesty: it would be most remarkable if the universe looked the same in every direction around us, but not around other points in the universe"(*Time*, 42). The use of the word "modesty" indicates the rhetorical dimension. If we did think of man as the center of the universe, and hence were "immodest, this assumption might never occur to us. In other words, the argument begins not with an appeal to fact, or a self-evident claim, but to the audience's sense of fitness, and that puts us in the realm of rhetoric because fitness is a social construct. Of course this does not vitiate the force of the theory, since it retains explanatory force and predictive capacity. I am not claiming that science does not correspond to something real that exists someplace out there, because physics does "work" remarkably well. But the reason we think the model corresponds to something out there is because that is the simplest explanation for why the model works, and hence is something we are persuaded of, not something that can be demonstrated. Pragmatism is a rhetorical philosophy because determining the merit of a theory in terms of its utility is a judgment about expediency rather than a judgment about truth. Moreover, appeals to science as something opposed to rhetoric have to cope with the fact that a huge body of evidence has been accumulated in social sciences such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology which indicates that "rather than being a guiding rule of individual, organization, or scientific life, rationality turns out to be a rhetorical achievement—a symbolic product that is constructed through speech and actions which in themselves are nonrational."2 These social sciences are dependent on their assumptions, but so is philosophy, and neither set of assumptions is demonstrable.

Language itself mirrors the gap between models of reality and reality. Words are not the thing itself, but a symbol for the thing. Many words have no direct referent. Thus, we can point to many examples of courageous behavior but cannot point to courage itself. The noun in such cases is a concept that represents some class of things out there by indicating a set; words cannot adequately describe the set, while there nonetheless remains no substitute for the word. To illustrate this point, look up a word like courage in the dictionary, look up the words used to define courage, and observe how fast the definition becomes circular; i. e., one word defines the other and *vice versa*. Moreover, words come not with just their denotative meaning, but with a baggage of connotative meanings as well; the problem is apparent if one meditates for a moment on Keats' epigram "Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty." Whose truth, and what is beauty? The words cannot be separated from their historical and material instantiations. In the two and a half millennia since the Platonic dialogues, we remain no closer to a definition that all educated people can agree on because we

are looking for the wrong answer; we have been seeking for referents to terms that do not have referents. Thus rhetoric has recently been described as the "art of describing reality through language".3 It follows then that "Scientists, historians, philosophers, and others are engaged in rhetorical activity to whatever extent they assert or imply that reality is as they say it is" (64). Everything we know may not be mediated through language, but everything we can talk about certainly is.

Or, to put it another way, twentieth-century linguistic philosophy has rewritten the Platonic dialogues, although the insight was implicit in rhetorical theory from Aristotle. When the character Socrates asks what the good life is and the rhetors are only able to respond with examples of the good life, Plato presents them as crushed because they have not answered the question. In fact what the rhetors probably responded was that Socrates was asking a bad question based on the faulty assumption that all linguistic constructions have referents out there (because the question, "What are examples of the good life?" can be answered concretely, Socrates is assuming that the question "What is the good life?" also corresponds to some real thing). But there are only culturally, historically, materially instantiated examples of the good life, for the good life separate from those examples is merely a linguistic "address" indicating where in memory those examples are to be found. Or to use another analogy, the good life is just an intellectual holding company, producing nothing itself, but conveniently incorporating multiple stocks into one blue-chipper. If you try to define a term like the good life without the examples, seeking some essentialist definition, you have only the resources of language to fall back on, so the definition rapidly and inevitably becomes circular. The rhetors actually had the firmer grip on reality and a sounder understanding of how language works, but the Platonic dialogues have retained their appeal through their creation of the mystical, ultimate terms, the "forms" of good and beauty, etc.; in short, the appeal of the Platonic dialogues relies on the rhetorical trump card of ultimate terms, not on their arguments.

But even if we waive all of this and claim that there are things that are real and words that refer to them, whatever that might mean, reality is not opposed to rhetoric, for facts are merely one of the materials that the rhetor uses, as well as appeals to emotions and beliefs. For language itself is inherently rhetorical in that there are very few positive terms, and some kinds of adjectives are not among them. The computer I am writing on is real, a solid object. When I say it is a good computer I am now entering the realm of rhetoric, at least if I expect someone to agree with the claim, for any evaluative adjective takes its meaning from a complex network of associations that are different for different rhetors and audiences. What qualifies a computer as being good is a function of what the rhetor and his audiences regard as good, and what my purpose is in saying it is good. The goodness of the computer is not intrinsic to the computer itself, but extrinsic and a function of the set of beliefs that make up goodness. If you have much word-processing to do or many numbers to crunch, the computer is good, whereas "a good computer" is an oxymoron to a Neo-Luddite who regards machines as contributing to the dehumanization of society. In the realm of rhetoric, a thing can be both one thing and another. That is, my claim that the computer is good is a claim about the computer in relation to other computers; the Neo-Luddite response translates the claim into the moral realm and asserts that computers can never be good.

Shortly after Plato and his rhetorical stalking-horse Socrates (and Socrates in the history of thought exists only as his character has been appropriated by P1ato and others, and it bears recollection that Aristophanes' dramatization was found more compelling by Socrates contemporaries, who exiled the poor rhetor from the academy). The more practical Aristotle immediately reinstated him. Aristotle distinguishes between rhetoric and dialectic in that the

dialectic, starting also from opinion, dispassionately seeks the true names of things, while rhetoric is an attempt to persuade people of positions using whatever names are likely to be effective.4 Aristotle apparently believed that in some fields (such as ethics) the dialectic provides an adequate method for seeking truth. Since his ethic produces the contemplative man (i.e., Aristotle) as the highest ethical life, we may question whether he was right. And logic too can be involved in rhetoric as an argument may be perfectly valid whether or not we know the premises to be true. We should remember that up until the seventeenth-century when philosophers like Hobbes argued for the fiction that there is some Edenic language that genuinely corresponds to things as they are, logic and rhetoric were not regarded as opposed but as different means of communication that were used with different audiences for different subjects; logic was used to convince the learned in areas of science of some position, while rhetoric was used to convince those who did not know logic and in political and judicial questions. Both, were persuasive and hence, in the sense I am using the term, rhetorical.5 Logic, at least for some (such as Bacon) was not a method of discovering truth, but merely the means by which truths previously established were communicated to a particular kind of audience. This underlies Descartes' rejection of logic at the same time he was rejecting rhetoric: "Mais, en les [philosophy, logic,- and mathematics] examinant, je pris garde que, pour La logique, ses syllogismes et la plupart de ses autres instructions servent plutot a expliquer a l'autrui les choses qu'on sait ou meme, comme l'art de Lulle, a parler, sans jugement, de celles qu'on ignore . . . ."6 The self-evident truths at the top of Descartes' hierarchy are prior to logic rather than a consequence of logical demonstration.

On a much simpler level, science, philosophy, religion, and art all participate in the rhetorical even if we allow them to have autonomous components. Thus the theory of evolution may be true science and correspond to reality. But this fact is not self-evident, and simply claiming that evolution is a scientific fact will not convince a fundamentalist; the fundamentalist must be persuaded of this, and that is a rhetorical activity. The salvation that Christ offers may be a reality, but the unbeliever must be convinced of that, and that is why Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas were both concerned with rhetorical questions (Augustine in *Doctrina Christiana* and Aquinas in his commentaries on Aristotle)—although too frequently the rhetorical method may take the form of Saint Olaf's conversion of Iceland and Norway. In other words facts, in whatever form they may appear *never* speak for themselves; people have to be convinced first that they are facts, and second that they mean what the speaker says they mean. You can, for instance, use statistics as a part of an argument, but they are not themselves an argument. Nor are good arguments irresistibly compelling. Suppose Plato's argument banishing the rhetors really is irrefutable. Why did it not convince Aristotle?

Moreover, whenever science, religion, or art appears in another context than its own autonomous realm, it becomes rhetorical. Evolution may be true as a biological fact, but when it is used as an argument about how society should function, it becomes a rhetorical device because it is an analogy rather than something that can be show to be demonstrably relevant. A hierarchy of creation may be a divine fact, but when it is used to justify a particular hierarchical social structure, it becomes a rhetorical device. And the sculptor may create a statue that simply is itself, but when a banker buys it and puts it in front of her building, it becomes a rhetorical statement that says, "We are the Preservers of culture, and we can preserve your money." The point is that rhetoric is an inescapable part of human relationships. Yes, it can manipulate people through lies and emotional appeals that are irrational. It can also be the means by which the truth is spoken most effectively (whatever that might mean). Rhetoric is not good or bad in itself, but good or bad as it is used by the rhetor towards a purpose. Rhetoric is a method of criticism and action, not a

metaphysics (but many contemporary philosophers would argue that metaphysics are no longer possible and that all that's left is the study of rhetoric). It does not supply its own premises, although premises are invariably shaped by rhetorical context, and it does not provide the end toward which it is used, although any end will be limited by what the rhetor judges, consciously or not, will be possible. In other words, rhetoric is not just the figures and tropes of appeal: it is the methods (the kinds of arguments, the selection of tropes and examples, the consideration of semantics), by which people are persuaded to adopt some action or to continue in some state of belief. The chief contributor to faulty rhetorical practice is the failure to recognize rhetoric's ubiquity.

Finally, the rhetorical view for which I am arguing—and it is an extreme view—could be summed up as saying that knowledge is something we construct rather than something we discover, and truth is not something that can be demonstrated, but something negotiated between the speakers. Such a view helps to humanize social change because it makes humanity not contingent on some greater reality, but makes reality something we determine. The recognition that truth is something we are persuaded of leads to an appropriate humility so that the rhetor "will accept it that the pieties of others are no less real or deep through being different from his, and he will seek to recommend his position by considering such orders of recalcitrance and revising his statements accordingly."7 Rhetoric emphasizes the centrality of values, because values are the most important of the rhetor's materials.

Physical coercion is, arguably, a rhetorical device, a method of persuasion. The old canard, that though the pen may be mightier than the sword, the sword speaks more loudly and forcefully at any given moment, hides the central weakness of change that is imposed rather than internalized. The events of the recent past in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union show that however effective violent persuasion may be on a local level and for a limited period of time, the people must consent to political and economic systems, or, rather, must accept, whether consciously or not, such systems as a legitimate rubric within which the narrative of their lives can have meaning. New meaning cannot be imposed; it can only be built out of the strands of meaning that already exist, since new terms and linguistic constructions must take their definitions from the language that we already know or they will be incomprehensible. As any marketing student knows, you can buy in any language you like, but you have to sell in the language of the buyer (the centrality of marketing to capitalism and marketing's close relationship to rhetoric may well be an important factor in capitalism's durability). Anyone who would convince others to change, must know the language, both semantics and deep structure, of those that he would change.

Burke and the Marxists, Blanchard and the Capitalists

Kenneth Burke's interest in rhetoric made him almost unique in American intellectual circles in the 1930s. His first major practical application of that interest made his name an anathema in leftist circles, and was so traumatic for Burke that fifty-five years later, the address has still not appeared in any collection of Burke's writings. At the American Writer's Congress in April of 1935, Burke delivered a paper entitled "Revolutionary Symbolism in America." Gramsci, it should be remembered, was dying in Mussolini's prison, and American Marxists still had a comforting belief in a teleological view of history whereby ultimate socialist victory was inevitable (in their defense, the United States was still in the throes of the Great Depression, so the inevitable breakdown of late capitalism appeared to be going on all around them). Moreover, prior to the *Prison Notebooks* and Althusser's essays, the prevailing view was that "symbolism" was an

element of the superstructure, and hence a purely derivative function of the economic base, a view now associated by smug academics with "vulgar" Marxism. In a passage in *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950) that may refer to the incident, Burke sums up the difficulties of addressing a Marxist on the subject of rhetoric:

Whatever may be the claims of Marxism as a "science," its terminology is not a neutral "preparation for action" but "inducement to action." In this sense, it is unsleepingly rhetorical, though much of its persuasiveness has derived from insistence that it is purely a science, with "rhetoric" confined to the deliberate or unconscious deceptions of non-Marxist apologetics. Thus, we once saw a Marxist (he has since left the Communist Party) get soundly rebuked by his comrades for the suggestion that leftist critics collaborate in a study of "Red Rhetoric." Despite their constant efforts to find the slogans, catchwords, and formulas that will most effectively influence action in given situations, and their friendliness to "propaganda" or "social significance" in art, they would not allow talk of a "Red Rhetoric." For them, "Rhetoric" applied solely to the persuasiveness of capitalist, fascist, and other non-Marxist terminologies (or "ideologies").8

Marxism is thus a "privileged" language, possessing a truth value denied to other kinds of language which are deceptive in that they mask the determining economic base of society with "fictions" of liberty, laws, and opportunities. Such a belief, when combined with a teleological view of history, guaranteed that Burke's address was going to be regarded as "ideologically deviant."

What Burke told the American Marxist writers was that the rhetorical appeal to workers as a heroic, revolutionary class was not working and was not going to work: "There are few people who really want to work, let us say, as a human cog in an automobile factory, or as a gatherer of vegetables on a big truck farm. Such rigorous ways of life enlist our *sympathies*, but not our ambitions."9 Representations of heroic workers do not appeal to Americans because their culture has created in them a desire to escape such a status: "Some people, living overly sedentary lives, may like to read of harsh physical activity (as they once enjoyed Wild West Fiction)—but Hollywood knows only too well that the people engaged in such kinds of effort are vitalized mainly by some vague hope that they may some day escape it (*Symbolism*, 28). The Marxist rhetoric of the thirties was failing, according to Burke, in two ways. First, American workers weren't listening; after a hard day's work their tendency was to want to listen to a radio program or see a movie that presented Fred and Ginger dancing something different from what they lived, cheek to cheek presented a goal, that., however unrealizable, represented an alternative to a life that they knew better than the Marxist intellectuals. The workers were repulsed by images of themselves as heroes because American culture had convinced them that hard physical work was something to escape (and Burke must have really annoyed his audience by implying that was not only a product of social conditioning but an innate characteristic of "humanity"). Second, the machine of American cultural hegemony welcomed representations of deprived workers because that fed into the needs of the system for a populace that measured happiness in material terms: "Adult education in capitalist America, today is centered in the efforts of our economic mercenaries (our advertising men and sales organizations) to create a maximum desire for commodities consumed under expensive conditions—and Hollywood appeals to the workers mainly by picturing the qualities of life in which this commercially stimulated desire is gratified"(*Symbolism*, 29). Burke was standing vulgar Marxism on its head. The glossy fictions of the movies created a desire for more of what capitalism was good at—producing goods. Moreover, it reinforced a belief that one could

transcend one's initial status to achieve that Hollywood lifestyle. In the language of America, as soon as one had material goods one ceased to be a "worker" and that was a consummation devoutly to be wished. Frank Lentricchia sums up Burke's argument: From the American point of view, the rhetorico-syrnbolic weight of the "worker," is burdened with an irrelevant historicity that is put into play every time the word is uttered, for it tends to carry with it an attendant rhetoric, decidedly foreign to our ways—proletariat, *bourgeoisie, ruling-class*: the stuff of European experience, but surely not ours.10

American Marxists, according to Burke, were preaching to the converted and using a language that guaranteed that those who did not want to listen did not have to. Burke's suggestion that Marxism, to succeed in this country, must learn to use the central terms and symbols of *this*country (liberty, self-reliance, responsibility) fell not merely on deaf but hostile ears. The reasons for his failure are implicit within the rhetorical theory that informs his own argument. His audience was convinced that class structures are universal and that culture is purely a product of the economic base. Burke was arguing for an attention to local language under an assumption that the relationship between base and superstructure is dynamic; prior to American Marxists had no framework in Gramsci and Althusser, which to understand such a claim.

Before turning to an explanation of how rhetoric might function in the framework of social change, I would like to use an earlier paper from the seminar to show how a failure to consider the rhetorical context vitiates an otherwise powerful argument. Father Blanchard's paper on El Salvador ends with a plea to Eastern Europeans: These men and women have captured the attention of the West because of their courage and sacrifice. They have "triumphed" over communism. But have they triumphed over oppression or simply replaced an inefficient economic and social system with another yet to be tried? Have they taken a stand for liberty, or will they merely vindicate capitalism, whose equally powerful potential for oppression is yet to be seen in Eastern Europe, but is all-to-evident in Central America. (25)

The disjunctive rhetorical questions propose a dilemma: the reader is invited to regard capitalism and communism as equally unattractive alternatives. Insofar as the reader does so, this is a rhetorically effective device. Communism is left largely undefined (probably rightly, since few audiences remain that find it an attractive possibility) in the paper, but the term capitalism has appeared earlier.

Capitalism appears in the context of a discussion of the opposition between the right wing death squads of ARENA and the Church: "According to ARENA's logic, the Church has chosen to favor the non-producers, the users of national resources over the producers. ARENA regards the capitalist producers as the foundation of Salvadoran society. . ."(16). The explanation of the distinction between producers and users appears still earlier in the essay: "The oligarchy regarded themselves as the "producers" and the Indians as "Non-producers," i.e., as "users" of national resources. The oligarchy maintained that it was their capital and not the labor of the Indians that allowed the plantations to produce crops for export (l4). I think most would grant that as the terms are defined in the essay, capitalism is at least as unattractive as communism.

But is this in fact the way most audiences define capitalism? That is, will an audience accept this appropriation of the term as it is used for polemical effect? The response of one member of the seminar from Poland is instructive; he pointed out that what the author is describing is a sort of dark parody of feudalism rather than what most people would regard as capitalism. If this reflection proves characteristic of Eastern European responses, then one of the primary audiences for the paper has been lost. The dilemma of choosing between capitalism and communism dissolves and the author's position is discredited because of his 'inaccuracy." Many in an American

audience will not be inclined to accept this definition of capitalism either. For instance, President Bush in the January of 1990 State of the Union address, described education as a way of improving "human capital"; i.e., education will increase the value that workers hold in themselves as labor. This, too, is not a particularly attractive formulation, but it illustrates the gap between what the author of the paper regards as capitalism and what highly paid American speech-writers, master rhetors all, regard as capitalism.

But this represents a problem on the level of semantics, which, while not trivial, is less damaging than a rhetorical misperception in the deep structure of the paper where it concerns involvement in El Salvador: Sartre's position that Stalinism was a necessary historical moment invites another, equally frightening interpretation of history and of the contemporary: the excesses of National Socialism were necessary to bring about the triumph of communism. This thesis, transported to Central America by the U.S. State Department is equally chilling: "the saturation bombing of the countryside, disruption of the population, support for the Salvadoran military and, indirectly, for the notorious death squads, is necessary to stop the spread of communism." "This is an obscene suggestion."

One must agree with the author's moral indignation. But if I may use a characteristically Burkean maneuver of punning on the etymology of words, it is not an "obscene" suggestion at all. The State Department's action is not "from or behind' the scene; it's right in the middle of it, and denying that is to deny the language (in its broadest sense) of the audience one wishes to convince. The author, like the Marxists Burke was chastising, is preaching to the converted. If this passage is designed to reaffirm attitudes of a friendly audience, a traditional rhetorical task, then this is excellent technique, but if the desire is to change an attitude, then the passage is a rhetorical disaster. A popular American columnist has within the last few months written a column arguing precisely what the author wishes to dismiss as obscene; that it is preferable to prop up the current government by any means necessary because the FMLN would be worse. If one audience for the paper is American policy makers, or, at least, their constituents who can bring pressure upon such policy makers, then the author must accept their linguistic arena if only to transcend it. The rhetor cannot convince if he refuses to enter the discussion.

The Post-Modernist Dilemma

In *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (1941, rev. 1967), Burke describes the rhetor's arena: "Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion hail already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of your ally's assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress."11

We are, in short, as a matter of necessity, rhetors as a fact of existence. We cannot know all the causes of the historical moment, and consequently are arguing from opinion rather than demonstrating propositions; hence any discussion, other than science (and Burke does allow a little room for positive terms in science, many fewer than scientists perhaps would like and more than the rigid post-structuralist will allow) is a matter of enthymemes rather than logical proof.

But despite the fact that we must die without knowing how the discussion turned out, or whether what we championed was accepted as a useful step in the discussion, that the discussion is by its nature rhetorical is a positive element for Burke. That almost all use of symbols is necessarily implicated in rhetoric is the guarantee that on some level we are free. In his discussion of Aristotle's rhetoric, Burke says, "Persuasion involves choice, will; it is directed to a man only insofar as he is free. This is good to remember in these days of dictatorship and near-dictatorship. Only insofar as men are potentially free, must the spellbinder seek to persuade them. Insofar as they must do something, rhetoric is unnecessary, its work being done by the nature of things, though often these necessities are not of a natural origin, but come from necessities imposed by man-made conditions. I do not think Burke has realized here the full implications of his earlier parable. The passage on Aristotle continues, "as with the kind of *peithananke* (or "compulsion under the guise of persuasion") that sometimes flows from the nature of the 'free market'." Even claims about the "invisible hand" of the market imply a need to convince people that the conditions of a free market economy really are responsible for the "necessities" that economic choice forces on one. Or, the claim implies a recognition that the audience could simply reject the claim, whether rightly or wrongly, as being not inevitable but a mask for a particular interest.

Much of *A Rhetoric of Motives* that was original in 1950 is now commonplace, particularly Burke's explanation of how "autonomous" realms like science, religion, and art participate in the rhetorical; that is, they function at least partially as attempts to justify a particular social or political order. Explaining exactly how these realms participate in the rhetorical has been the playfield of post-structuralism since its seminal figure Nietzsche began the game in *A Genealogy of Morals* and *The Gay Science*. I do not mean to discount the contribution of Nietzsche and his merry band; Burke agrees with Aristotle that the rhetor must be a critic of rhetoric, recognizing how it is used by others, explaining how its presence is disguised. Or, as Burke remarks about the New Critics, who insisted on the poem as an artifact independent of author and audience, "so much progressive and radical criticism in recent years has been concerned with the social implications of art, that affirmation of art's autonomy can often become, by antithesis, a roundabout way of identifying oneself with the interests of political conservatism. In accordance with the rhetorical principle of identification, whenever you find a doctrine of 'nonpolitical' esthetics affirmed with fervor, look for its politics"(RM, 28). What is refreshing about Burke, in contrast to others, is that Burke then attempts to construct a positive system of how the rhetor both should construct a rhetoric and toward what ends.

Burke's statement of the post-structuralist dilemma comes in a strong reading of Mannheim as a kind of deconstructionist. Burke's view of the Platonic dialogue is laid out with unusual clarity (for Burke):

1. Mutual exposure of imperfect ideas (ideas bound to the sensory image).
2. Socratic transcending of this partiality.
3. Socratic summarizing vision of the pure idea.
4. Translation of the pure idea into terms of the mythic image.
5. Whereupon enters Mannheim, who proposes to develop a "sociology of knowledge" by treating the first and last steps as if the were of the same nature.

Hence, he would perfect a method for discounting the limitations of both ("unmasking" their bias). (RM, 201-202). The final myth becomes not a transcendent moment but another expression of interest, and, if the machine works properly, there are no transcendent moments, merely

expressions of interest. This leaves no reason to act whatsoever: "However, a motivational problem arises, if you treat the mythic motive as on a par with ideological motives. For you find that, if your method for eliminating all such bias were successful, it would deprive society of its primary motive power. For though bias is false promise, it is promise. Hence if you eliminate bias (illusion) from men's social motives, where do you find an equally urgent social motive?"(RM, 200). The key word is social. Motivation still exists but it remains entirely personal. Thus, if mystification were entirely eliminated, all claims of altruistic motives would be reduced to claims of interest. Most deconstructionists have not understood this point. Yes, the claim that "justice" requires that admissions at a university be based wholly on merit can be a mask for maintaining a dominant social or racial group, and thus an expression of interest. But taken to its logical conclusion, so would the claim that requires retributive elements in order that oppressed "justice groups be given a chance to overcome the uneven playing field caused by oppression. The response by the dominant group can be simply that is an expression of interest too, and there is no available mechanism to determine which particular interest *ought* to be chosen, because there are no untainted positions from which to choose. There is no longer any reason to want to change anything except that some changes might help a particular individual or group, and that means that those that already have the advantage in trying to get more. Thus post-structuralism does not empower the disenfranchised as its proponents have claimed; it finally removes the last shreds of conscience from those who have power.

In a discussion of Bentham, Burke made clear the relevance of rhetoric to the humanization of social change. As rhetorical critics, the last two centuries have done a wonderful job of recognizing the presence of masks: "The debunking vocabulary can disclose material interests with great precision. Too great precision, in fact. For though the doctrine of *Zweck im Recht* is a veritable Occam's razor for the simplification of human motives, teaching us the role that *special material interests* play in the "impartial" manipulations of the law, showing us that law can be privately owned like any property, it can be too thorough; in lowering human dignity so greatly, it lowers us all."12

But rhetoric is more than just the methods of criticism, for it seeks to provide a method for action as well. Burke's answer will be that we have to postulate some kind of ultimate terms, whether we believe in them or not, for the rhetor to escape (my example, not Burke's) the final freedom of Nietzsche's *die Uberman* who decides what is right by an arbitrary act of will, and the framework of the ultimate term is a comic vision of the universe.

Burke's Rhetorical Theory

Burke's rhetoric begins with the paradox Of substance developed in *A Grammar of Motives:*

First we should note that there is, etymologically, a pun behind the Latin roots. The word is often used to designate what some thing or agent intrinsically is, as *per* these meanings in Webster's: "the most important element in any existence; the characteristic and essential components of anything; the main part; essential import; purport." Yet etymologically, "substance" is a scenic word. Literally, a person's or a thing's substance would be something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing.13

Burke's point is that the term used to describe what a thing is describes the thing by what it is not. The human, as substance, exists inevitably within a context, and, indeed, cannot be known

independently from a context. This does not eliminate substance; it merely forces it into the dialectical (Burke's term is "Dramatistic") ratios of the Pentad: Act, Agent, Scene, Agency, Purpose. From this Burke will generate the rhetorical arena of *A Rhetoric Motives*:

A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is *identified* with B. Or he may *identify himself* with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so.

Here are ambiguities of substance. In being identified with B, A is "substantially one" with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. (RM, 2021)

Burke's key rhetorical term is not persuasion but identity. Broadening his rhetorical field to consider the rhetoric of science, politics, and religion as they participate in identity claims in non-verbal systems requires this move on his part, since a missile factory in one's city is not precisely an act of persuasion, but an unspoken reminder of community interests.

In the context of his defense of the term substance, Burke makes clear that the field of rhetoric involves the establishment of consubstantiality: They [modem philosophers] abolished the *term*, but it is doubtful whether they can ever abolish the *function* of that term, or even whether they should *want* to. A doctrine of *consubstantiality*, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an *act*; and a way of life is an *acting-together*, men have 'common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, that make them consubstantial'. (RM, 21)

Rhetoric is concerned with consubstantiality in its "partisan" aspects, "the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another"(RM, 22). Though identity claims are the central mechanism of rhetoric, identity implies "division": "For one need 'identification' very sharply to turn, its ironic counterpart: not scrutinize the concept of see, implied in it at every division. Rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall"(RM, 23).

The problem basically is that identity claims have typically simplest way to achieve unity been based on difference. The between factions is to point out another — action that represents an even greater threat, whether real or not. This can operate consciously, as when the dying Henry IV advises Prince Hall to turn his subjects' minds toward France: Therefore, my Harry, Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels, that action, hence borne out, May waste the memory of the former days.14 This is good, sound advice as Henry escapes, for the most part, the civil wars that darken his father's reign. And, as an Englishman, French deaths probably seemed a small price to pay for English unity to Shakespeare dramatizing the matter nearly one hundred and eighty years later.

But we can see this tendency even in works whose avowed purpose is peace. Thus in *Lysistrata*,15 the Greeks are reminded of their identity through a reminder of their danger: "though you use a lustral urn in common at the altars, like blood-relatives, when at Olympia, Delphi, or Thermopylae-how many others might I name if I took time! — yet, with barbarian hordes of enemies at hand, it is Greek men, Greek cities, you destroy" (35).

Not merely are the barbarians the true threat, they are a more appropriate object for aggression. The characters in the play are tamed through sexual deprivation, but the audience is approached by reference to the "other." *The Late Revolution: or The Happy Change* "written by a person of

quality" and produced in England in 1688 is a work that seeks to dramatize the reconciliation of old enemies:

Cavalier: Friend Testimony! Parliament Neighbor Hot-Head—Who thought to've seen you at this end o'th' World? What, for the Prince's Army!

Cavalier: That's impossible! This certain—No—I've done now of fighting with my friends; when I do it next, it shall be with my Enemies—Were not you and I a pair of wise ones, as well as thousands more, to knock out one another little Brains, to make Knaves laugh at us, and wise-men pitty us.

Parliament: I joy to hear thy voice—Now then agreed for ever.

Cavalier: A Curse on him who e're attempts to part us.16

But roundhead and cavalier are united by their common fear and loathing for two groups so despicable that the author assumes any rational reader will see the danger they represent: the Jesuits and the Irish. Father Peters, when the rising starts, says about the English, 'Kill all—the quickest method to convert 'em', and is dissuaded only because "'this not practicable." And the citizens of London are agreed that James fl's greatest crime has been the hiring of Irishmen for his anny, "to set a villain o're his Naster/To make a Slave thus Lord it o're his Lord"(l1). The Irish are a "Brutal race," quite literally born slaves, and, "Like Toads and Serpents made to be destroy'd"(ll). The irony that the vilified Father Peters and the sturdy honest Englishmen are equally bloodthirsty is almost surely unconscious. The author seeks to show consubstantiality between the English; only the reader of three hundred years later can make the next step up the hierarchy to regard both sides as identical in their lack of humanity.

Of course this claim of identity through difference still exists in Northern Ireland, and shows how difficult it is to disentangle the two. The IRA has frequently shown its willingness to attack soldiers and policemen at great risk to themselves. Nor are they squeamish about bloodshed, killing even their own if they suspect them of helping the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Yet Ian Paisley, on record as believing that the Catholic Church is "The Whore of Babylon,' that John Paul II is the anti-Christ, and that the Irish Catholics are a dangerous sub-human species who must be kept down lest they slaughter all the Protestants in implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an *act*; and a way of life is an *acting-together*; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, that make them consubstantial. (RM, 21)

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But we can see this tendency even in works whose avowed purpose is peace. Thus in *Lysistrata*, the Greeks are reminded of their identity through a reminder of their danger: for though you use a lustral urn in common at the altars, like blood-relatives, when at Olympia, Delphi, or Thermopylae — how many others might I name if I took time! — yet, with barbarian hordes of enemies at hand, it is Greek children, Greek cities, you destroy. Not merely are the barbarians the true threat, they are a more appropriate abject for aggression. The characters in the play are tamed through sexual deprivation, but Aristophanes's audience is approached by reference to the "other."

Of course the claim of identity through difference still exists in Northern Ireland, and shows how difficult it is to disentangle the two. The IRA has frequently shown its willingness to attack soldiers and policemen at great risk to themselves. Nor are they squeamish about bloodshed, killing even their own if they suspect them of helping the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Yet Ian Paisley, on record as believing that the Catholic Church is "The Whore of Babylon," that John Paul II is the anti-Christ, and that the Irish Catholics are a dangerous sub-human species who must be kept down lest they slaughter all the Protestants in their beds, campaigns door-to-door with minimum security. Paisley's life is safe because every time he opens his mouth, he justifies the actions of the IRA, particularly with Irish Americans far from the conflict who provide funds and weapons for the IRA. And Paisley equally needs the IRA to justify his claims. They establish the identity of interest within their constituencies through the presence of the dangerous division. It is impossible to say whether Paisley, the IRA, Aritophanes, or "the Person of Quality" are aware of their strategy; the rhetor as critic points out that the strategy exists nonetheless.

An identity claim is an attempt to transcend interests by showing a common higher interest; hence, rhetoric relies on hierarchies. One might wish to argue, as some feminists have, that the problem is the concept of hierarchy itself. That is, the notion that something is "higher" than other things is a consequence of the linear thinking produced by phallocentrism. Unfortunately, Burke is almost certainly right when he argues that hierarchy is an inescapable fact of "systematic thought": "It is embodied in the mere process of growth, which is synonymous with the class divisions of youth and age, stronger and weaker, male and female, or the stages of learning, from apprentice to journeyman to master." (RM, 14l)

The last example shows the abuse to which hierarchy is heir. Though an innocent statement of degrees of skill initially, it "rhetorically reenforces the protection of privilege"(RM, 141). That is, this hierarchy is taken out of its own realm and used to justify something in a different realm; greater skill is used to justify perquisites not dependent on skill. As an example, up until the seventeenth-century In England, sumptuary laws ordained what one could wear based on rank and independently of what one could afford.

But since Burke is writing a rhetoric, he reminds us that "To say that hierarchy is inevitable is not to say that any particular hierarchy is inevitable"(RM, 141). Moreover, "Though *hierarchy* is exclusive, the principle of hierarchy is not; all ranks can "share in it alike"(RM, 141). That is, the hierarchy suggests that highest and lowest can be reversed, as in the Christian promise that the low shall be high, when the circumstances change. This reversal is at the core of Marxism as well. But the greatest threat of hierarchy is that it involves us in the principle of division that we examined earlier, which Burke will explain by invoking the tragic scapegoat: "The scapegoat is dialectically

appealing, since it combines in one figure contrary principles of identification and alienation. And by splitting the hierarchic principle into factions, it becomes ritually gratifying; for each faction can then use the other as *katharma*, the unclean vessel upon which can be loaded the dyslogistic burdens of vocabulary (a procedure made all the more zealous by the secret that, if not thus morally "protected," each faction might "court" the other)." (RM, 141)

This can perhaps be better understood by reflecting again upon the example of Northern Ireland. Division is inherent in human language as much as identification, and the scapegoat allows us to ease ourselves from this divisive tension by laying the blame upon the other. And if we did not invoke the scapegoat, we would be in danger of being "courted" by the other, or of becoming united with them and of needing to seek division elsewhere. Thus, Paisley and the IRA serve a cathartic function for each other, being the means by which guilt is justified through the rhetorical purgation.

Burke's next step is to argue that the principle of hierarchy, inevitable in thought, is also necessary to a successful rhetoric as a purposive principle. Unlike many modem theorists, Burke accepts the proposition that there are some positive terms: "A positive term is most unambiguously itself when it names a visible and tangible thing which can be located in time and place"(RM, 183). We need not involves ourselves in the argument that this definition, too, is rhetorical; we need merely except that such a term is at least more positive than "the 'fictitious' entities of the law. ('Tree' is a positive term, but 'rights' and 'obligations' are legal fictions)"(RM, 183). "Fictitious entities" exist in the next order of terms which Burke calls the dialectical: "Even insofar as the positive terminology acquires theoretical champions who proclaim the 'principles of positivism,' we are in the realm of the purely dialectical," because positivism is a "titular" term (RM, 184): Titles like "Elizabethanism" or "capitalism" can have no positive referent, for instance. And though they sum up a vast complexity of conditions which might conceivably be reduced to a near-infinity of positive details, if you succeeded in such a description you would find that your recipe contained many ingredients not peculiar to "Elizabethanism" or "capitalism" at all. (RM, 184)

This is pragmatism. The key words are "sum up," for they argue that our ethical, epistemological, and ontological terms are the positional terms for the sum of experience. Thus they rmphasize the way in which we construct our reality and the notion that truth is additive rather than something we discover out there. We cannot do without these terms, but they do not in themselves refer to anything in particular. They are a cluster of actions and attitudes rather than positive terms. This, it could be argued, is far enough for the rhetor to go. Once one agrees that many (possibly all) of our value terms are dependent on material and cultural instantiations, the rhetor realizes that what is necessary is conversation and persuasion for social harmony in the absence of certainty because there is too essential component to any value. We can accept some limited number of widely acknowledged, if not universally accepted, rules for behavior (it is wrong to injure others because they might injure me, it is better to tell the truth most of the time because otherwise people will figure Out I am lying and not believe me when I want them to) and agree that values must be a negotiable proposition. In other words, social harmony becomes the end not because it has some essential value but because pragmatically most an agree that harmony is better than disharmony; the method for achieving some approximation of harmony is the dialectic of conversation: "Dialectic in itself may remain on the level of parliamentary conflict, leading to compromise. It being the realm of ideas and principles, if you organize a conflict among spokesmen for competing ideas and principles, you may produce a situation wherein there is no one clear choice"(RM, 186-187). This is, of course, the preferred method of government in western

civilization. Its chief advantage is that no one participant, confident of his truth, is allowed to impose it on others violently.

Burke then goes on to a dyslogistic description of the "Parliamentary wrangle" which indicates his dissatisfaction with this as a legitimate end for the rhetor: "Each of the spokesmen, whose ideas are an extension of special interests, must remain somewhat unconvinced by any solution which does not mean the complete triumph of his partisan interests. Yet he may have to compromise, putting through some portion of his program by making concessions to allies whom, if he could get his wishes absolutely, he would repudiate." (RM, 187)

This can be readily regarded as, according to Burke, "demoralization." A major gap here is that Burke does not explain why he regards this as an unsatisfactory terminus. The parliamentary dialogue has the obvious advantage that it is physically non-violent, a result preferable to the actions of many who have insisted on imposing their essential truths upon the world. Yet Burke wants to suggest that some ultimate term is necessary to transcend the dialectical wrangle: The "dialectical" order would leave the competing voices in a jangling relation with one another (a conflict solved *faute de mieux* by "horse-trading"); but the "ultimate" order would place these competing voices themselves in a *hierarchy*, or *sequence*, or *evaluative series*, so that, in some way, we went by a fixed and reasoned progress from one to another, the members of the entire group being arranged *developmentally* with relation to one another. (RM, 188) And Burke's immediate example of the effective hierarchy leading to an ultimate term is the Socratic dialogue where Socrates means by dialectic not merely the step from sensory terms to ideas, but also a hierarchic ordering of steps (RM, 181). This is unsatisfactory on a philosophical level; as we saw earlier, Socrates has a naive assumption about language, that because we can find examples of the beautiful, there must also be an essential referent for beauty. All we need to make sense of utterances about beauty is a view of beauty as a sort of pointer to examples of beautiful things, largely identified by culture, and a rudimentary algorithm that allows us to determine whether new elements should be included. Burke's interest, however, is not in the ultimate term as the end of the series, but in the ultimate term as providing a possibility for a hierarchy of means, "whereby a somewhat formless parliamentary wrangle can, by vocabulary, be creatively endowed with an 'ultimate design"(RM, 188). Burke's argument rests then on the assumption that the inevitably of hierarchy carries with it a desire for design and hence an ultimate term: the principle of hierarchy "includes also the entelechial tendency, the treatment of the 'top' or 'culminating' stage as the 'image' that best represents the entire 'idea"'(l41).

That humanity as a fact of language may require ultimate terms may be Burke's greatest insight. As a practical example of this from the history of science, consider Thomas Kuhn's analysis of why Darwin's *Origin of the Species* was so bothersome in 1859. According to Kuhn, "evidence pointing to evolution, including the evolution of man, had been accumulating for decades, and the idea of evolution had been suggested and widely disseminated before.1 7 But though many in the scientific community had already accepted some version of evolution they "had taken evolution to be a goal-directed process"(*Science*, l71). Darwin's theory was revolutionary because it suggested "a process that moved steadily from primitive beginnings but *toward* no goal"(*Science*, 172). The doubters simply could make no sense of a. theory that had no ultimate term at the end of the progress of evolution. The still barely hidden assumption of many conservative economists, that the poor are poor because they deserve to be due to personal insufficiencies, is evidence that many still have not understood Darwin and appropriated his theory for rhetorical reasons.

But even if we agree with Burke that humanity *needs* ultimate terms, this presents a difficulty for Burke since I think he, too, does not believe in any ultimate terms. Thus, one of his examples for an effective rhetoric based on an ultimate term, a hierarchical development of competing interests, is Lenin's treatment of the worker as gaining a conscious sense not just of himself as worker but as member of an emergent, revolutionary class: "The worker whose understanding becomes infused with this doctrine then sees himself not merely as an individual joining position with other individuals to improve his bargaining his employer: he sees himself as *member of a class*, the proletariat, which is destined to play a *crucial role* in the unfolding of history as a whole" (RM, 196). Burke now makes it hard on us, remarking "Call it fallacious if you want, but pointing to a notable formal advantage, got by the union of drama and reason, a wholesome rhetorical procedure in itself" (RM, 197).

Not only does Burke not believe in ultimate terms such as 'God', but he clearly thinks that belief in God is a function of the hierarchical tendency in man as the "symbol using animal." *The Rhetoric of Religion* ends with an "epilogue" entitled *Prologue in Heaven* where "The Lord" explains to Satan how the idea of God develops out of the logical nature of man. Satan as interlocutor takes that conclusion:

S. But when these Word-People are gone, won't the life of words be gone?
TL. Unfortunately, yes.
S. Then, what of us, the two voices in this dialogue? When words go, won't we, too, be gone?
TL. Unfortunately, yes.
S. Then of this there will be nothing? nothing . . .but it's more complicated that that.
TL. Yes.

The ending is deliberately ambiguous, as throughout the dialogue Satan has attempted premature summations, and the Lord has responded with "It's more complicated than that," forcing the dialogue to a higher level of summation. But at best, Burke is saying that 'logology' is incapable of finding God in language: "Above all, logology fails to offer grounds for the perfection of promises and threats that theology allows for"(RR, 300). That, of course, is a two-edged sword since theology is composed of words. If we grant the view that an effective rhetoric must incorporate an ultimate term, what are the constraints? All ultimate terms are not created equal on a moral level. Hitler was a brilliant rhetorician in that "One Reich, One Folk, One Furhrer' were ultimate terms to which the Germans responded very deeply. Hitler's rhetoric was also responsible for the deaths of perhaps twenty million Russians, twelve million Germans, and perhaps another six million French and English, as well as six million Jews of assorted nationalities. I think one must go earlier in Burke's career to find the dramatic source of the appropriate world-view for the rhetor .In a passage in *Attitudes Toward History* Burke says about the "comic view" that the progress of humane enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as *vicious*, but as *mistaken*. When you add that people are *necessarily mistaken*, that *all* people are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that insight contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that underlies great tragedy. (ATH, 41)

Frank Lentricchia regards this as Burke's descent into quietism, an excuse for detachment from the arena of rhetorical dispute.1 9 This, however, overlooks the reason for discussing the world in dramatistic terms at all. Even in *Attitudes Toward History*, Burke is aware of the dangers of the "debunking" tendency inherent in Marxism, Capitalism, Sociology and Psychology. These

alternate ways of making sense out of life center around mechanistic explanations for human behavior; that is, what are the causes of why we behave as we do. These explanations emphasize the contingency of human behavior. The dramatistic view, on the other hand, emphasizes our roles as actors. While not denying the place of scene and agency in limiting our actions, it asserts a role for agent and purpose. Thus Fredric Jameson's critique of the Pentad as allowing too attenuated a role for purpose misses the point of dramatistm, 2 0 a system that centers around life as a dramatic action can incorporate the mechanistic explanations without eliminating purpose and agent entirely. Since neither system is demonstrably more accurate, the rhetor chooses the more useful.

The dramatic alternatives, waiving farce, satire, the grotesque and melodrama, are comic and tragic views of life. The tragic view assumes that things go wrong in the nature of things. Preceded by the "heroic" where the heroes recognized forces beyond their control, the resignation of tragedy is based upon this same sense of personal limits: but the cultural materials with which the tragic playwright works are much more urban, complex, sophisticated than those that prevailed at the rise of thy primitive epic. Though the same magical patterns of fatality, magnification, and humility are present, they are submerged beneath a more "enlightened" scheme of causal relationships. (PATH , 37)

Thus tragedy is the dramatic mode in which humanity becomes the victim of forces beyond its control, the "causal" factors that lead to destruction. In a sense then, if we choose the tragic mode of viewing life, we fall prey to the same tendency inherent in mechanistic explanations for human behavior.

While the preference for the comic mode is partially moral, it is also justifiable both on practical and theoretical grounds. First, as a matter of praxis, there are two possibilities with both the comic and tragic views: you can be right or you can be wrong. If you are right about the comic view, then you can make a difference if you can get people to recognize their mistakes through rhetorical practice. If you are wrong about the comic view and things genuinely do go wrong because they were always going to, then the result is irrelevant because your mistake has no consequences. If you are right about the tragic view, the result is exactly the same as being wrong about the comic view; nothing you do could have made any difference anyway. Being right in the tragic view has only the positive result of providing a sort of gloomy satisfaction in knowing that disaster is not your fault. But if you are wrong about the tragic view, then things that you could have changed, the world that you could have made better, remains the same through inaction. To sum up, practically one ought to choose the comic view because it cannot cost and is the only formulation in which you could win. The tragic view is antithetical to any rhetoric. As we mentioned earlier, rhetoric assumes the subject has the capacity to choose. If the tragic view of the world is right, then none of those choices make any difference. Hence rhetoric becomes a subject without an object, a technique directed to no end.2 1

Rhetorics for Social Change, and the Limits of Rhetoric

What, then, is the appropriate rhetoric toward change? President Havel demonstrates a writer's grasp of the issue. First, Havel accepts the role that rhetoric has to play: "Consciousness precedes being, and not the other way around," as the Marxists claim. Second, Democracy provides the ultimate term: "As long as people are people, democracy, in the full sense of the word, will always be no more than an ideal. One may approach it as one would the horizon in ways that may be better or worse, but it can never be fully attained." Democracy is an unreachable but plausible goal to aim at. Any division is transcended by an appeal to whichever choice seems to move better toward

that ultimate term. Notice, moreover, the very undefinability of the term contributes to its efficacy. By that I mean that it would be hard to find an American, for instance, who is opposed to democracy; nonetheless, if you asked the next hundred Americans you passed on the street to define democracy, you would probably receive a hundred different definitions. Yet most of these people can be expected at least to restrain their conflicts, if not work together, in the interests of achieving democracy.

And President Hovel also supplies a hierarchy of means in pursuing the ultimate term. Morality must take precedence: "In other words, we still don't know how to put morality before politics, science, and economics. We are still incapable of understanding that the only genuine backbone of all our actions, if they are to be moral, is responsibility." The proper language of rhetorical appeal will subsume science in ethics. Hence rhetorical plans that emphasize division, that would choose violent or coercive modes of persuasion must be rejected. Again, if constantly reiterated, if constantly appealed to by the rhetor, at least the chances go up of conciliation and cooperation than if no hierarchy of means is provided. This does not eliminate division—that is impossible—but it tames it, and reminds the rhetor that he, too, will be implicated in mistakes.

But rhetoric is not a silver bullet.2 2 The comic attitude requires a sense of humility in that our rhetorical choices will necessarily be sometimes wrong. Moreover, it is simply true that rhetoric will be sometimes inapplicable. As the song goes, it is difficult "to talk to a man with a shotgun in his hand," and hopeless "to talk to a man when he don't want to understand." Which brings me, at long last, to an explanation of the epigrams with which I began this article. Confronted with the endlessly sliding signifies f ethical discourse, the temptation is to just cut the knot, as Shakespeare anticipated and as Nietzsche lid, and claim that the opposite of the moral is not the immoral but the autonomous, and the further from conventional notions of morality the better. The alternative is the code duello. The duel itself is a movement toward containing human aggression, and, compared with the warfare of earlier times, "a more limited trespass on law and order." Moreover, since the duel recognized the rights of the lesser nobility to challenge the greater, it also functioned as a strategy of identification, "the sign and seal of a dynastic equality between higher and lower, a fraternal bond uniting the whole multifarious class.2 3 But a number of changes in seventeenth-century personal combat (more attention to skill, a movement away from wearing armor) made the duel an increasingly deadly sort of affair. Thus the code duel lo was not a way to facilitate duels, but a way to tame them, to ensure a kind of orderly sequence of events: in short, in rhetoric. And the fool Touchstone proposes a way that even the final stage may be avoided by an 'if," in ultimate term that transcends even the code duello.

The rhetor must also fear the enormously appealing assumption that in the interest of right, rhetoric is irrelevant. In Robert Bolt's *Man for All Seasons*,24 the devout young Roper wishes to cut through the law to the truth and is opposed by Sir Thomas More:

More: What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get to the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: (roused and excited) Oh? (advances on Roper.) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? (Leaves him.) This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast — Man's laws, not God's — and if you cut them down—and you're just the man to do it — d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly.) Yes I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.
Roper: I have long suspected this; this is the golden calf; the law's your God.

More: (wearily): Oh, Roper, you're a fool, God's my God.

(Rather bitter.) But I find him rather too (Very bitter) subtle . . . 1 don't know where he is or what he wants.

The law is, in its way, the most sustained achievement of rhetoric. The law is a system for adjudicating disputes, for determining what to do when certainty is impossible. More , with humility, recognizes that if God's justice is the actual foundation for the law, then the manner in which this is so is unclear.

And More's response to Roper's objection that More must not swear the oath affirming the Act of Supremacy because the oath serves immoral ends, is perhaps the best response any rhetor can make when he must defend the methods of the "political barnyard." about the wording, and Roper says that More's first question is they both know what the act means. More replies that the act it means. When Roper objects that that means what the words say is immoral, More defends rhetorical quibbling: God made the angels to show him splendor—as he made animals for innocence and plants for simplicity. But Man he made to serve him wittily, in the tangle of his mind! If he suffers us to fall in such a case that there is no escaping, then we may stand to our tackle as best we can, and yes, Will, then we may clam our like champions.. if we have the spittle for it. And no doubt it delights God to see splendor where he only looked for complexity. But it's God's part, not our own, to bring ourselves to that extremity! Our natural business lies in escaping — so let's get home and study this Bill. (74) Roper's position, against arrogant, a confident belief that we know what is right and need which More argues, is profoundly the niceties of discourse. Burke's *Permanence and Change* places this not concern ourselves with resonant final paragraph in arrogance in perspective:

We in cities rightly grow shrewd at appraising man-made institutions—but beyond these tiny concentration points of rhetoric and traffic, there lies the eternally unsolvable Enigma, the preposterous fact that both existence and nothingness are equally unthinkable. Our speculations may run the gamut, from play, through reverence, even to an occasional shiver of cold metaphysical dread — for always the Eternal Enigma is there, right on the edges of our metropolitan bickerings, stretching outward to interstellar infinity and inward to the depths of the mind. And in this staggering disproportion between man and no-man, there is no place for purely human boasts of grandeur, or for forgetting that men build their cultures by huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of an abyss. (PC, 272).

Notes

1. *A Brief History of Time: from the Big Bang to Black Holes* (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 9. Subsequently referred to as *Time*.

2. *Society as Text* (Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1987), p. 77. For an explanation of how rhetoric functions positively as a source of useful assumptions in the social sciences see Donald N. McCloskey's *The Rhetoric of Economics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

3. *Rhetorical Epistemology*, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina P, 1986).

4. "Aristotle, certainly no epistemological relativist, nevertheless articulated something like a contextual principle by insisting that rhetoric can be properly conceived as an art (as opposed to a set of gimmicks) parallel to the art of dialectic: the basis of such a claim is that there are levels of

certitude and exactitude relevant to different spheres of operation"; *A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987), p. 77. For a comparison of Burkean and Aristotelian rhetorical theory, see L. Virgin Holland's *Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke's and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

5. The reasons for the dismissal of rhetoric as anything other than tropes and "lies" are complex and have to do with Ramist "reforms" and the rise of the new science with its occasionally naive assumption that the empirically observed constituted reality and hence could be discussed with certainty independently of rhetoric. Wilbur S. Howe describes the Ciceronian view of rhetoric commonly accepted up until the eighteenth century: "Grammar sought to establish an accurate and orderly language in which discourse could be phrased for comprehension by all who possessed that language in common. Logic sought to make discourses consistent both in themselves and in their relation to the basic assumptions of their time. Rhetoric sought to make discourses effective with people who must act wisely in concert if civilization is to endure, and who are given to emotionalism, prejudice, ignorance, and stupidity unless they are constantly reminded that these impulses must not be allowed to nullify reason and good sense."; *Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton U P, 1971), p. 77. Even if rhetoric were no more than Tropez, many social scientists use Tropez as an important mechanism for understanding social interaction; see Professor Jon Anderson's paper in this volume.

6. *Discours de Ia méthode* (Paris: Libairie Larousse, 1969), p. 46. Even after rhetoric was discredited, it continued to be taught, although usually with invidious comparisons to the instructive. Thus Adam Smith in his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* contrasts the didactic with rhetoric: "The former proposes to put before us the arguments on both sides of the question in their true light, giving each its proper degree of influence, and has it in view to persuade no further than the arguments themselves appear convincing. The rhetorical, again, endeavors by all means to persuade us, and for this purpose it magnifies all the arguments on the one side, and diminishes or conceals those that might be brought on the side contrary to that which it is designed we should favor. (John M. Lothian, 1963), p. 58. (London: Thomas M. Nelson and Sons Ltd), p. 58. Smith's point seems to be that there are degrees of persuasion, less truthful, not that rhetoric can be avoided.

7. *Purpose* (Berkeley: University of California), subsequently referred to in text as PC.

8. *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California P, 1969), p. 101; subsequently referred to in text as RM.

9. As reprinted in Frank Lentricchia's *Criticism and Social Change*.(Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1983). This incident is derived from Lentricchia's analysis of change.

10. *Criticism and Social Change*, p. 31.

11. *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action* (Berkeley: University of California P, 1973), pp. 110-111.

12. *Attitudes Toward History* (Berkeley: University of California P, 3rd ed., 1984), p. 166. Subsequently referred to in text as ATH.

13. *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California P, 1969), p. 22.

14. *2 Henry* IV 4.5.211-215. All quotations from Shakespeare are from *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blake. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin).

15. *Lysistrata*, trans. Donald Suthland, in *Comedy*, ed. Robert W. Corrigan (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1971), p. 38.

16. *The Late Revolution* (London: 1690), p. 55. Au subsequent references are to this edition.

17. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago P, end ed. 1970), p. 171. Subsequently referred to in text as *Science*.

18. *The Rhetoric of Religion* (Berkeley: University of California P, 1970), p. 315. Subsequently referred to in text as RR.

19. *Criticism and Social Change*, pp. 62-63.

20. Fredric Jameson, "The Symbolic Influence; or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis," in *Representing Kenneth Burke* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 68-91.

21. I am indebted to Stephen H. Brane for this observation.

22. See *Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques* (Seattle: University of Washington P, 1957).

23. V. G. Kim Jan, *The Duel in European History: Honour and the Reign of the Aristocracy (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 6 and 52.

24. Robert Bolt, *A Man for All Seasons* (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 39.

Chapter VII
Freedom of the Person and the Riddle of the Building Blocks of Community

Kwabena Archampong

For many of her peoples, post-colonial Africa has not fulfilled the promise of building a shrine where free men can worship. Yet one cannot dismiss the idea that freedom is the subject of the story of the African peoples. Nkrumah's cry of "Freedom First" was not intended merely as a first item in the programmatic ordering of the modernization agenda, the transition from a poor and technologically backward society to an industrial and affluent one. Nkrumah's call is a reference to, perhaps, the most fundamental of values and therefore the surest guide to the direction of social change. As he put it in Rousseauesque language, "all people wish to be free, and the desire for freedom is rooted in the soul of every one of us." But the skeptic may ask, how can we not dismiss the idea of freedom from the central place it claims for itself in history and especially in the history of black Africans, seeing that African history, so far, has been a record of oppression, arbitrary rule and human indignity? In this essay I wish, like Nkrumah, to speak of freedom, but first to the theme of humanization.

The usual point of departure for a philosophic traveler through the conceptual landscape is to ask for one's bearings. This lead to the question is: What do we mean by humanization? What is the home of the concept? By the home of a concept I understand the constellation of ideas in terms of which a concept may be explained or analyzed. For example, when Frege asks: What is number? He has in mind a set of logically antecedent concepts like function, quantifier, equivalence, class in terms of which he proceeds to explain the idea of number. Having identified all these ideas as forming the logical parentage of the concept of number, ideas which he claims are all logical in character or classification, he is now in a position to establish his thesis that arithmetic is reducible to logic.

Similarly, when Einstein asks: what is space? What is time? He also has in mind the operation of measurement with rigid stationary rods in inertial systems and of measurements by clocks of local times of the inertial system. It is with reference to these operations, together with the law of the constancy of the speed of light for all observers, that he explains the phenomenon of relativity. Thus in science the search for meaning derives its justification from the practical needs of explanation, proof and prediction.

It would be idle to suppose that when we raise the question of humanization and its relation to the freedom of the person we are being called upon to undertake the clinical task of conceptual analysis, nor does the question call merely for historical or ethnographic generalization. It is a truism that man is an historical and cultural animal living in different and complex historical and cultural environments. Therefore, to fish out the essential man from the river of historical time seems to require a net of too fine a gauge and yet so large in size as to be impossible to cast. The difference in circumstances and place and the need to change his habit with changes in the habitat impose a fundamental limitation on empirical generalizations about man. So much so, that even if one were a much-traveled Odysseus who has seen many cities of men and many customs and cultures, the best picture of man one might be able to come up with would be no better than the confusing tapestry depicting one-eyed Cyclops, savage cannibalistic Lystrogonians, witches who can turn men into beasts and monstrous land, sea and air creatures, half human, half beasts. Such

has been the story of man as narrated by social scientists—historians and ethnographers. Myth and science are one and indistinguishable.

What I intend to do therefore is to proceed ahead of the story, any story, and hazard a generalization—to propose an idea, the idea of freedom, as the defining characteristic of man and then retrace our steps to basic intuitions, accessible to us all, which give content to this most basic of all human values. By following this method of relying on common intuitive experience I hope we can escape self-refuting relativism.

I start with Kwame Nkrumah's account of the African liberation movement. He says in "Africa Must Unite":

The ideas of freedom and democracy, which the Western world was busily propagating to engage support for their cause, were being eagerly absorbed by those to whom freedom has been most strenuously denied. A boomerang to those who broadcast them and 'dangerous' to those to whom they were not intended to apply, they were feeding the milk of freedom in the overseas areas of the world where their meaning was most deeply felt and accepted.

We have in this little piece a history, a theory of freedom, and a theory which links history with the idea of freedom. The history is, first, free democracies exist with unfree peoples under their influence or direct rule. Secondly, these unfree people owe their loss of freedom and self-determination to Western colonialism. Thirdly, the idea of freedom, though propagated as a universal doctrine or value by the West, was nevertheless not intended for the subject peoples in the colonies. Lastly, the propagation and acceptance by colonial peoples of the ideas of freedom and democracy led to the anti-colonialist freedom movement which undermines the imperial aspirations of Western democracy. The theory of freedom is as follows: the principle of freedom is also a principle of universalizability. The universalizability principle underlying the idea of freedom is that whoever claims any rights based on the principle of freedom must also concede those same rights to *everybody*. Lastly a theory that links freedom and historical life: people may be said to accept the principle of symmetry in the idea of freedom but when practicing it claim special privileges which contradict the symmetry principle. Hence, there is always a conflict between the symmetry of the principle and the asymmetry of the practice, but the acceptance of the idea causes those who are victims of the infringement to redress the infringement by fighting for their freedom. What this theory lacks is the idea of completeness or finality in the career of freedom, the idea in Hegel that freedom may somehow come to find a resting place, that there is something like the end of history. As the environmentalists tell us, history could come to an end not in a consummation of freedom, but in a global hot house. I shall settle for (i) the position that the idea of freedom involves the symmetry principle and (ii) the more controversial, but I believe basically correct, position that the internalization of the idea of freedom causes freedom, that liberty is its own condition.

Possessiveness vs. Freedom

The idea of freedom, as I see it, settles around one of the foggiest enigmas of human life—the idea of property, the idea of having something. Persons may be said to have their bodies, their minds, faculties, dispositions, beliefs, thoughts, sentiments. A person may also be said to have family, relations, friends, house, a piece of land, his labor, capital, culture, country, religion, values, a way of life or even life itself. All these things which a person may be said to have may be abstract or concrete and may be construed as goods or rights which he enjoys. It is now easy to see the connection between property and power. A person without property is also a person without

rights, he becomes a locus of pure obligation. If property is a right, if a right is not a right unless it is exercised, and if nothing is exercised except power, then it follows that property is power, that power is (a species of) causality, and hence that all property is causality. A person is therefore free if he has a disposition or will to power—a disposition which fulfills its role directly or indirectly in the modification of the behavior of oneself and of others A person without property is therefore not free and not being free, he must be considered as falling short of the standards of humanity—a metaphysical nightmare which may be said to belong rather to the order of nature than of society. Societies which have practiced slavery often try to reconcile this peculiar institution with the idea of a free person by the convenient fiction that slaves are not quite persons, or human in the fullest sense. The Asante (a people of Ghana) word for slave is *odonko*. Captain Rattray in his study *Ashanti Law and Constitution* says "the derivation of *odonko*was given to me as *do*, to love, and *ko* to run off, i.e., someone whom you love but who may run away." Rattray admits though that the etymology seems at least doubtful. However, he conjectures that "slavery may very possibly have been the outcome of a desire to extend to the domain of human beings the wish to possess some object over which they might enjoy an individual and undisputed control, instead of merely sharing it with others as copartners." The desire to extend one's powers by acquiring absolute power over and rights in another object finds justification in considering one's property both subjectively as an extension of one's self and objectively as something lying against one's self and which, as it were, constitutes the frontier or boundary of the self. There is therefore a fundamental tension in the idea of property both as part of the person and as totally alien to and alienable by the person. In fact the idea of property is a formal way of determining kinship in the sense that the flow or direction of the family relationship in time is a vector with the same direction as that of inheritance and succession. There is, however, a fact which Rattray observes about the Asante, but which I contend is universally true, namely, that the slave was always a possible successor to the head of the family. This remarkable possibility makes the dilemma not just a moral or social one; it is a fundamental metaphysical dilemma. Sir Henry Maine in his *Ancient Law* has remarked about the depth of the perplexity to man in the institution of slavery:

There seems to be something in the institution of slavery which has at all times either shocked or perplexed mankind, however little habituated to reflection and however slightly advanced in the cultivation of its moral instincts. The compunction which ancient communities almost unconsciously experienced appears to have always resulted in the adoption of some imaginary principle upon which a defense or at least a rationale of slavery could be plausibly founded.

What could be the nature of this imaginary principle and why imaginary? Rattray in introducing the subject of the institution of slavery in Asante feels the need to enter this caveat on behalf of Asante: "The first essential to the proper understanding of this highly important and interesting subject, is to banish from our thought the familiar pictures conjured up in our minds by the popular conception of slavery as it existed in Europe and America prior to its abolition." If we should ask what was the conception of slavery in Europe and America the answer lies not so much in the degree of brutality—which becomes understandable once the justification is accepted—as in the nature of the justification. When the racial dimension is added to the already existing human desire the practitioners need (in Sir Henry Maine's words) "little habituation to reflection" to find a justification. The natural conservatism of the human mind also resists any attempts to find its employment beyond ordinary appearances. The dilemma which the phenomenon of slavery posed at the time when both black Africans and white Europeans and Americans who practiced it might be said to have been "only slightly advanced in the cultivation of their moral instincts" was resolved in the European mind by the simple criterion of color. Color or appearance becomes the

basis on which a social system is constructed and the person of color becomes only potentially a person. The justification simply lies in a principle of reductionism. Reductionism generalizes: its methodological demerit lies in its "thinking things away," and thereby shrinking the extension of a category. Reductionism properly understood means a process of thinking by division in such a way that either whole categories become empty or some members of the category are reassigned to another category.

In either case a whole class of entities come to lose their essence. The German word *Entwesung* expresses this process of categorial elimination. *Entwesung* is the process of robbing living organisms of their being, the process of decontamination when applied to lice or fleas, or the process of disinfection when applied to germs. Goebbels is quoted as having said, in the context of identifying Jews with vermin: "of course you can say that the flea is a living creature but what kind of creature?" Reductionism then is based on the dispensability of a category - and in the process a category of objects becomes eliminated. Hence a germ, a louse, a madman, a Negro, a Jew might be subject to the process of *entwesung*. The etymology of the Asante word for slave, *odonko,* can now be decoded: *odo* = love, *nko* = let it go, depart. The *odonko*, slave, marks the boundary of love, the limits of the familiar or social group. The biblical saying that where your treasure lies there your heart lies also is ambiguous in this sense; a man's treasure is by definition his loved object. But when the loved object becomes also a treasure in the sense of a possession, to be kept under lock and key, an object to be hidden under tight security and incapable of being shared, then—whatever the nature of the treasure, whether a material object like gold or a person like a wife, husband, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter or even the self—love goes out of the relationship. Possession as possessiveness kills love. A slave *qua* slave, that is, as property, cannot therefore be a person who is loved for his own sake, for the love or services of the slave, being unfree and commanded are mediated by necessity and a sense of isolation rather than solidarity. The figure of a person, of a free person in the sense of the human being invested with property, with rights and endowed with power has as its contrapositive the picture of the unfree in the form of a naked and disinvested figure, a lapsed person, a madman, a savage and all those persons who live by necessity.

Having and Sharing: The Politicians as Philosophers

One might raise this objection: If there is a significant link between the image of the naked body and the idea of destitution which, as I argue, expresses human bondage, how is it that the artistic image of the Greek god is the nude statue? If the form of immortality, power and glory is the nude figure how could the idea of a body stripped of vestment depict the negative ideas of deprivation and captivity? The answer lies simply in the distinction between nakedness and nudity. Before I elaborate on this distinction we may recall one detail from Michelangelo's Sistine ceiling paintings called the Drunkenness of Noah. In this picture Noah is depicted in a naked, weary, reclining posture, the head sunk forward as if in anticipation of death. To the left of him is the figure of a man in labor tilling the bare soil. Noah's youthful sons point one to the man undergoing penal servitude, another accusingly to Noah, but all of them suggest the identity of the drunken life-weary Noah, sick unto death—with the man condemned to a life of hard labor and possible or eventual death by inclination to vice and sin. The figure of the laboring man and the sorry state of Noah are all elaborations on the theme of fallen humanity and paradise lost. The picture succeeds in capturing both the pagan Greek and the Christian ideas about the connection between lapsed personality and servile condition. The Protestant or Puritan ethic is not very explicit on this idea

of work, whether labor expresses the true calling of man or lapsarian state of humanity. However it is unambiguous that the idea of work is part of what we understand by the concept of duty. Hence the ethic of work and the conception of an ethic as a system of obligations or duties are intrinsically inseparable. Nietzsche's radical dismissal of morality as founded in a slave mentality is a sophistical attempt to discredit the connection of ideas in Christian culture between the fall of man and his servile ethics while keeping the pagan Greek idea that the servile condition is the natural state of the intellectually inferior, the ignoble. The Weberian equation of rational ideality with enterprise is therefore contradicted by the aesthetic vision of true humanity (you might also call this image of man: the Hollywood image) as *homo ludens*. In Schiller's famous passage, "man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays."

I must admit there is some ambiguity and even tension in the idea of play as defining the truly humanized person. Some critics of African culture attribute the continent's technological and economic backwardness to a culture devoted to the celebration of music and dance. In fact, it is a widespread notion encouraged even by some blacks that music and dance is in the blood of the race. This racial or cultural trait is contrasted with European culture which, it is argued, depends upon a massive renunciation of instinctual gratification and pleasure. Anybody familiar with blacks or with Africa knows the poverty of this hypothesis. A little familiarity with exploitation and hard material environment would indicate how play could not be an intrinsic part of that existence, but comes in as physical and spiritual solace. Marxist historiography and sociology would even generalize that the Greek ideal of the playful harmonious person is a bourgeois fantasy realized by a few in a sorry state of society where a considerable proportion of the members are condemned to helotry. It would follow that things being what they are only the gods could be free not to work. On the Marxist analysis the capitalist assumes the role of the deity by compelling everybody to work, a kind of compulsion which is a "compulsion to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert their own." Marx's hatred of capitalism and his promethean hatred of all gods are inseparable. It is only natural that the Marxist would dismiss the aesthetic vision of man in capitalist society as utopian and idealist fantasy. We need not mention the irony that Marx's own conception of the whole unalienated person is through and through aesthetic, a concept which he shares with the wretched of the earth everywhere. As compared to the American worker, Marx's own vision of freedom as fundamentally freedom from servitude to desires for possession and consumption is rather the idealistic fantasy. The aesthetic conception remains, however, a powerful vision and expression of freedom. It is little wonder that the black and African aspiration liberation is encapsulated in the slogan "Black is beautiful" as a rejection of the dominance of the European aesthetic.

This idealist conception of freedom as perfect harmony reduces to a certain interpretation of the concept of 'having' or 'having a property'. This interpretation is found in the connection between Greek metaphysics and Greek sculpture. The nude statue of the Greeks may be seen as a concrete interpretation of abstract Greek metaphysics—the metaphysics of ideal forms. The question which Greek metaphysics tried to resolve was this: what do we mean when we say that Socrates is wise, or, Seven is a prime number, or, Courage is a virtue? This question is answered in Greek metaphysics schematically as follows: in all these sentences we are saying that a certain subject has a certain predicate, that an object we have referred to by the use of a singular term has a certain property we refer to by the use of a predicative expression, that a substance has a certain attribute, or that an individual participates in, shares, a certain universal. This explanation further leads to the question: given that properties, attributes, universals or forms exist, as indeed they

must exist if predication is possible, do they exist in the sensible particulars or do they exist neat and pure in a separate ideal world? It is to Greek sculpture, more specifically, to the Greek nude statue that we turn for a concrete interpretation of the theory of ideal forms. According to Lord Clark the Greek nude "takes the most purely rational concept of which mankind is capable, mathematical form, and makes it a delight to the senses." To the Greek philosophers the notion of form as expressing rationality establishes the connection between mathematics, logic, ethics and aesthetics. Form is always a logical, mathematical, ethical or aesthetic form. However, by making the idea of form central to the human body, the Greeks also intend to make visible the property of rationality which the thing housed in the human body, the soul, must have if it is to qualify as a person. Rationality as applied to a person embraces not only theoretical and practical wisdom and the virtues of character, like temperance, justice, courage—qualities which are said to fit a man for happiness; rationality also is a form of sensibility bringing it to beauty and fullness of spirit. The nude was not meant to symbolize anything poor in spirit; it was a representation of the ideal man or the God incarnated. The Greek nude therefore has to be distinguished from the naked body of the person bound to necessity. Like truth, the nude has nothing to hide, for it is the projection of a balanced harmonious and prosperous body, whereas the naked projects into the mind the image of an embarrassed, huddled and defenseless body. The fact that the nude and the naked are phenomenologically indistinguishable and only intentionally distinct expresses the fundamental ambiguity in the notion of property. On the one hand, property is something to be possessed and monopolized; on the other, it is something to be shared, something around which a community is formed. Universals may be looked at as that on which Leibnitzian identity is based or regarded as the basis of family resemblances, shared properties. The Greek nude by itself does not resolve this fundamental ambiguity of having and sharing, just as on the theory of forms any attempt like nominalism to resolve the ambiguity of universals leads to a drastic deprivation both in speech, thought and ontology. So, something seen as naked is seen as an object of personal desire, as something exciting the sexual and proprietorial instincts, whereas something seen as nude is seen as open to inspection and available to all, a means of binding others through common desire and alliance or solidarity with others.

Any attempt at a sharp distinction leads to a paradox and also reveals an inclination to break the symmetry, to establish claims which subvert the commutativity of having and sharing. The forcing of paradox and the partiality of advocacy belong to the sophist and the politician. It is perhaps not a contingent fact about philosophy that in the dialogues of Plato we find the need to stress the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher, a distinction which like the nude and the naked might be lost to appearance through phenomenal indistinguishability. Philosophy, we might say, is the battle against the politician in us. And this politician, this representative of interest and faction inside us appears under the guise of the sophist. The disarming plausibility of his cynical rhetoric and the sureness of his *ad hominem* make the sophist a formidable opponent whenever the mind turns its attention from the physical world (where rhetoric collapses on the solid rocks of experimentation and verification) to the human world, to itself. Philosophy is always besieged with the temptation to turn into advocacy, doubting that somehow the evidence might not be able to speak for itself.

Philosophy has never recovered from the destabilization of the mind by the paradox of the liar. This is because our commitment to the concept of truth is not dictated by any vested interest or by our special relationship to the system of property, power, status, cultural, or psychological condition. Where there is no relative position, logic seems to totter against paradox. In that sense there is a justification for relativism as a means to escape from contradictions. When questions

about social life arise, questions in the sphere of morals and politics, the philosopher becomes a partisan and must play the role of the moralist and politician. One would have thought that when we come to consider the paradox of the liar the means of escape that naturally recommends itself is a kind of training and development strategy that encourages truth-telling. But this possibility will not work, because the paradox is not generated through our embracing or being partisans of any specific social goals and ideals. It does not arise through our having adopted or conducted specific experiments in living. It arises through the use of ordinary language. However, when the question of freedom and community arises it is a question of a way of life, a question of values. On such issues the philosopher cannot take an aloof position; he must become a politician and moralist. What would be even better is that the politician in him should convert into a philosopher: Marx saw the philosopher as a politician; Plato saw the politician as a philosopher.

Symmetry and Freedom as its Own Condition

Moralists of different persuasions are agreed on this fundamental principle: that freedom to choose what to do is a necessary condition for morality. To say that I ought to do X implies I can do X if I choose. To claim that I ought to have done Y implies I could have done Y if I had so chosen. It follows then that we could not recommend or prescribe any system of morality if we denied that moral agents are free agents. Here I include among actions not only physical or bodily movements, but also speech acts. If we are to avoid crude materialism, it is important to stress this mental connection in our conception of the freedom of the person in terms of property and rights. For many people what is distinctive about Western democracy is the importance it attaches to the freedom of the individual which expresses itself as freedom of opinion or freedom of speech. Freedom of opinion or speech does not derive its compelling attraction or, if you like, justification from the canons of sophistical rhetoric, as some people believe. For as a canon of sophistical reasoning it does not appear to be based on any social or moral imperative. At best freedom of opinion as a rhetorical requisition is justified only in an epistemology, on the distinction between knowledge and belief or opinion. Seneca the Stoic philosopher and tragedian saw this as the foundation of Sophistical rhetoric. He reports that Protagoras declares that one can take either side of any question and debate it with equal success—even the very question whether every subject can be debated from either point of view. (Seneca, *Epistulae Morales* LXXXVIII). Rather, freedom of opinion or speech has its intrinsic value as that which defines what it is to be a free society. Given this idea that a free society is to a large extent one in which freedom of opinion is guaranteed, one may ask: when do we say that a society is committed to or guarantees freedom of opinion?

At this juncture I shall like to address this question of freedom of speech by considering a concrete case, a report in the *Washington Post*, February 24, 1990:

White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu said today that Congress is "too fair" because it gives witnesses who hold unorthodox views equal time in testifying on legislation pending before Congress.

Sununu told a conference of House Republicans that the American public is apt to receive a distorted view of expert opinion on controversial issues because minority viewpoints are often expressed at length in congressional hearings. "It gives anybody with an idea a platform," Sununu said. "You are much too fair." He said that even if 99 percent of expert opinion on pending legislation endorsed one point of view, Congress would give equal time to the dissenting 1 percent. "You give the impression to the public that it is a 50-50 issue."

As an example of attention to dissident voices, Sununu mentioned frequent congressional testimony by environmentalist Jeremy Rifkin. "There is a difference between a panel from the National Academy of Sciences and Jeremy Rifkin," Sununu said.

As I have argued that the principal ingredient of the idea of freedom is the principle of symmetry, freedom of opinion means that whatever goes for one opinion goes for any opinion that runs counter to it. It follows that no matter the number of dimensions (so long as the number exceeds two) in which opinion is divided on an issue, the issue must be seen as a 50-50 issue. The symmetry principle is not justified, as we have already argued, by epistemological considerations or by appeal to some canon of rhetoric. It is not tied up with the majoritarian decision procedure of democracy—indeed, the majoritarian decision procedure if construed on a par with the principle of symmetry of opinion formally contradicts it. Mr. Sununu, in criticizing Congress as "too fair" to dissenters is confusing the symmetry principle with the majoritarian principle or some unstated version in his mind. For in identifying the view of the panel from the National Academy of Sciences as the expert opinion which by implication should have more weight in terms of right to Congressional hearing, Mr Sununu is here repudiating the principle of symmetry of opinion. To see the division of opinion in terms of the orthodox and the dissenting is already to have undermined the symmetry principle. The paradox in the idea of freedom of opinion therefore stems from the conception that the idea of freedom of opinion derives from a non-conformist tradition and its special moral plea that dissent *qua* dissent needs special hearing. But this special plea for a privileged hearing of dissent is not a peculiarity of the Puritan mind, but it seems to be the general plea for dispensation by all freedom fighters and dissenters and their claim to a monopoly of the moral credit. But once we have identified an opinion as the official, establishment opinion we have thereby repudiated in practice the principle of symmetry. It would therefore be a mistake in choosing or canvassing our opinions to consider which opinion is the orthodox and which unorthodox, for once an opinion is identified as the orthodox establishment opinion it thereby carries with it an aura of authority and thereby comes to enjoy paradigmatic status which goes with a natural reasonableness. Then any view which runs counter to the orthodox view cannot be a correct or right one and dissident views are then ruled out as mistaken by definition and as subscribed to out of a spirit of contrariness and rebellion or induced by a form of madness or both. This is how we should understand the phenomenon of Fascism, of one-party rule in Africa, of life-presidentships in Africa, indeed of all the illiberal regimes of the left and right. If the symmetry principle is justified, this is justified by refusing to accept these practical consequences of its repudiation.

My idea of community of culture is a group linked by a family resemblance. Corresponding to this relation of family resemblance is the structured distinction between us and them, a distinction around which our emotions of love and hate, our memories, prejudices, fears, and hopes eventually come to settle. This us-them distinction seems so pervasive as to be the origin of community as well as the stumbling block to universality. For in recommending something as good it is at the same time seen as something of ours rather than theirs or vice versa. The very basis of the recommendation undermines the good reasons for their acceptance, namely, that—something is-good-for-us/them. Captain Rattray, in his study *Ashanti Law and Constitution* has this to recommend about the Asante family: "It is a lesson which the African can well teach the European who finds it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out the dispositions which alone render family amenities harmonious into his service and dealings with the state . . . .

This family was a corporation: action, even thoughts, certainly speech on all special occasions, were corporate affairs. It is not easy for us [Europeans] to realize what must have been the untold

generations of thinking and acting and speaking, not in terms of one's own self, but in relation to a group. One result has been that to an Ashanti the idea of what we should term "moral responsibility" is perhaps more developed than among ourselves where individualism is and has been for so long the order of the day."

Captain Rattray's opinion of the alleged difference between Asante corporatism and European individualism is wrong for two reasons. Apart from the generality of the antithesis which means nothing except self-justifying structuralism, the idea of a family he speaks about is so entrenched in all human societies as to constitute a stumbling block to anybody anywhere who attempts to think "in terms of one's self." But it is precisely this kind of universal temptation, which Rattray misses which also blinds him to the moral corrective—the idea that corporate thought is intrinsically inconsistent with freedom of opinion. It is because we both share this tendency of thinking of ourselves in terms of the group and at the same time tend to partition opinion into orthodox and dissenting opinions that we need to embrace the spirit of the principle of freedom of opinion. The value of the principle can be seen in two stages of moral development. First, it encourages us to think of ourselves as agents who can and must work out for ourselves how we choose to live. Secondly, it enables us to redress the misconception about democracy presented to Africans that it is just a technique—the best technique of running the economy and of arriving at decisions about it. But if a democracy were just a matter of arriving at the correct decision (whatever the correct decision might be) or a technique of running the economy then we might just as well leave it to the experts. In such circumstances, the idea of freedom of opinion in a democracy loses its ultimate prescriptive appeal. Democracy embraces the idea that every citizen is free to his opinion about what form of society he considers acceptable and a society which rejects this idea cannot claim to be a free society.

It might be objected that the concept of symmetry underlying the idea of freedom means that the idea of freedom is unrealizable in a situation where people think in terms of "us" and "them" or in a society where some are rich and some poor. This might be answered by going back to the one controversial thesis about freedom and its relation to history, namely, that the idea of freedom causes freedom if having the idea of freedom is interpreted as a disposition which is consummated in action. So, freedom or liberty is its own condition. In any conception of social change, if there is a principle of humanity we can hold constant, it is the idea of the freedom of the individual person.

Chapter VIII
Contradictions, Changes, and Perspectives

Vadim S. Semenov

A philosophical analysis of the socio-political dimension of social life and humanization was initiated elsewhere, in the first section of this project. This must now be continued in relation to the real development of society at its different historical stages and in concrete situations. The

problem of subject and object, and of their interrelations, is the leading philosophical methodology for the socio-political analysis of the humanization of social life.

Both the person and the society can be treated either as subject or object. The essence of personal life depends upon whether the individual is an object of manipulation by group, dictator, state or society, or the real subject of personal and societal life. Society also is not only object in relation to the concrete individuals living in it; through its institutions and organizations such as the State, parties, etc., society is an active subject in all human and social life and in all historical development. Hence, when people are real subjects of societal life and society is "their own" fully democratic and free civic society, the type of relations between men and society have decisive significance for the humanization of people themselves and of social life as a whole.

An analysis of social life should begin with its definition. Social life can be understood in a more narrow or in a wider sense. In the latter sense it is the entire life of society, including its main spheres: economic, social, political, spiritual or cultural, as well as the development and life of concrete communities, families, etc. For this we prefer to use the term "societal" (from "society"), which expresses the whole complex life of society. The narrow and more proper meaning of social life is the life and development of social groups, classes, strata, social movements and organizations, the actions of men as citizens of society. This is what constitutes the notion of Civic Society; in a word, it is the many-sided life of men as social beings.

Our analysis will concentrate upon social life as connected with humanistic problems of social justice and social equality as the center of people's aspirations, hopes, desires and dreams. We shall touch upon three groups of questions:

(a) the origin and development of social life, contradictions in this process, its qualitative levels, the concrete stages and present situation in the historical development of social life, research in religion and science, social theories and movements for an improvement and humanization of the social life of the masses, and the dialectic of the humanization of social life in the last decades of the XX century;

(b) the situation and problems of social life and its humanization in socialist countries, especially in Soviet society; its contradictory development during the last seventy years, the transmutation of people from subjects to objects of social life, the interruption of the process of creating civic society in the USSR, the totalitarian domination by the State over the people's social life; *perestroika* (restructuring) as a movement away from an undemocratic, inhuman and unjust situation; difficulties in *perestroika* itself, the critical situation in Soviet society; and subjective and objective measures for securing an improvement in the situation of the social life of the masses along the lines of a consistent humanization;

(c) perspectives for the development of social life for the New Century, the need for a new stage in the development of social life and for ways for its further humanization; unity and diversity: the variety of ways to move toward the one aim and task of uniting all peoples in real social justice, equality, liberty, democracy and happiness; the inclusive human value of civilization and the place of socialism therein; the need for much work and change in order to secure real progress in the realization of the potentialities of social life and humanism for all people around the world.

Social Life in a Process of Historical Change

The development of social life appears to be a natural-historical process in the sense that it follows definite objective trends and laws and a logic of change. As a societal phenomenon, social life needs to pass through concrete stages of development before it appears as a fully mature result. Social life includes people (subjects) and societal conditions (objects), both of which should be so developed that they will correspond to the meaning and essence of social life itself.

Historically, social life is present ever since the origin of man and manifests the real connections and relations among people in everyday life. The needs of existence demand joint actions and unity among men gathered in community. Such mutual, communal life is not only a necessity but also constitutes the essence of their nature fundamental, and much needed value. That is why K. Marx wrote that man is the totality of societal relations, meaning by this the combined economic, social, political and spiritual relations.

In evaluating social life one must measure three main dimensions: its level, quality, and characteristic. "Level" indicates the point of development on the scale of social life: low (undeveloped), middle (developed), or high (highly developed). "Quality" defines the concrete historical stage of development of social life: whether it is an extremely primitive or patriarchal social life (and in this sense also at a low, middle or high level); and whether it is a traditional or modern social life (again, whether at a low, middle or high level). "Characteristic" indicates whether social life is free or unfree, conscious or unconscious, moral or amoral and immoral, just or unjust, mass or elite, collective or individualistic, spiritual, value-oriented or egoistic and selfish, progressive or regressive, democratic or totalitarian, open or closed, and so on.

The combination of these measures gives the best possibility for a complex, integral and concrete estimation of social life through the course of its historical development.

Let us approach the development of social life from the logical and historical point of view, beginning with a logical analysis of this process.

Dialectics of the Development of Social Life

The development of social life includes three main processes: its appearance in society and in history; its development, including the evolutionary and revolutionary development of its functions, and great changes: qualitative leaps, reorientations and upheavals; or, on the contrary, its slowdown, interruption and arrested development, crises and even retrogression and reversal. All these depend upon existing concrete subjective and objective factors and their interrelation which define the real development of social life in society and history. Hence, the first step in any analysis of social life must be an assessment of its actual dialectical appearance, its concrete historical manifestation.

Second, the stages in the development of social life are determined by very concrete foundations and conditions, some of which constitute the basis of social life itself, while others are necessary objective or subjective conditions of its appearance and development. The basis of social life is inevitably economic. Normal social life is entirely impossible without growth of economic life and achievement of a level which provides men with the possibility, not only of striving for primitive existence, but also of exercising active social, political and spiritual life. The other three necessary conditions or premises for expressing and exercising social life are: culture, especially political and social culture, consciousness, especially civic consciousness, and morals. Of course, social life begins in history before the required level of culture, consciousness and morals are reached. But the real state of social life appears where and when social actions and the initiatives of men include the necessary level and achievements of human culture and morals with rather

developed group, class, national, public, and universal human consciousness. The interrelated and balanced growth of the economic, cultural and moral spheres of life and of the deep conscious orientations and aspirations of men create the solid ground for successful development and the progress of social life.

Third, social life in its development is based upon and expresses the dialectics of subject and object. Above we were talking primarily about the objective conditions for active social behavior and relations — its economic and cultural foundations. But the one who really acts and plays a role in social life (as indicated in this collection in McLean's paper, "Person, Creativity and Social Change") is man, the individual person. It is not the objective conditions in his stead, but man himself and only when he begins to act socially in society and hence in history.

From the beginning social actions appear in two forms: conscious and unconscious or spontaneous, according to the degree of understanding of one's interests. Historically, conscious social behavior and public activity are characteristic of rather small groups of socially and culturally developed people, while the masses of people express their social needs, demands and protests mostly spontaneously. That is why K. Marx was using such notions as "class in itself" and "class for itself." The first expresses the situation, in which the members of such a large group as a class do not yet understand or realize their real, objective interests and hence in social life act mostly in an emotional or spontaneous manner. As the subjective factor does not yet appear in their social actions, their social movements (protests, rebellions, etc.) are mostly blind. That is why a class which is only "in itself" is able to express itself mostly potentially. On the contrary, when members of a class become conscious of their objective interests, when a public civic consciousness arises regarding their behavior and actions, a class is transformed into a "class for itself," that consciously expresses and realizes its interests and aims in struggle and actions. At such stages of history large groups or masses of people (and not only, as before, the rich and powerful, the so-called "elite") essentially change their role from that of objects to that of subjects of social relations and public life. This constitutes a new stage in the development of social life itself.

Fourth, the development of social life expresses the dialectics of the unity of generality, particularity (specificity, peculiarity) and singularity. Indeed nothing in society can be everywhere uniform; variety is always present in social events. Accordingly, social life throughout the world does have some very important general features and characteristics; there are common directions to the development of social life in the world. At the same time, it differs qualitatively according to particular groups such as regional (for instance, now the division between North and South), national (for instance, highly developed, developing, backward), and class (definite social classes and groups have in the main a number of common characteristics). Concrete social life has singular features and peculiarities in each country, state and nation according to its distinctive geographical, economic, cultural, and political situations, its historical development, etc. The dialectical attitude uniting general, particular and singular approaches and dimensions of social life enables one to reflect all these complexities.

Fifth, the interaction of all these dialectical foundations, tendencies and peculiarities in the development of social life constitutes a definite object-subject direction for the development of the historical process. Through all fluctuations, zigzags, steps back, and stoppages, whither is social life moving in its historical development and progress? What should social life, through its progress and humanization, help to create in favor of the various aspects of human life? The answer should be one only — a truly civilized life for people, a self-developed civilization.

Indeed, the achievements in the development of social life, expressed through the creation of a civil society which subordinates the state to man, provide the real foundation for the constitution of democratic and liberal civilization; only free citizens can constitute free civilization. Hence, the progress of social life and of civic activity by the masses lead directly to fruitful forms of civilized human life.

The following schema represents the historical development of the process leading man to full civilization — while continuing to be part of nature biologically and surrounded by nature (note how this underscores the importance for humanity of the problems of ecology and the environment):

Origin of Man
Nature Civilized Man Society
Culture
Civilization

This is not a circular, but a spiral mode of development. The first step is nature, which exists as a life process. The second step, revolutionary indeed, the origin of man resulting from labor (work), consciousness (thinking) and psyche. Thence, man appeared as a human being orientated toward civilized development. The totality of men, being together as a community of continuing interrelations of labor and everyday life, created the coherent integration called society. Being a societal person, man intensively cultivated nature, mastered himself and society, and as a result created culture (material and spiritual) as an expression and product of his multi-faceted creative activity. The complexity of man, society and culture in its interrelated development led to the formation of civilization as the highest achievement of human beings. The conclusive step, appearing in the schema at the center of the human world, is Civilized Man as the real essence of the world's life, closely connected in his life with other men, with society, culture and cultures, civilization and nature.

Thus the subjective and objective dialectics of the development of social life leads us to an understanding of the universe and of the place of man therein, to an understanding of civilized man and of civilization as the self-direction and self-determination of personal and social development.

Development of Social Life in Historical Reality

Taking into account the dialectical trends and lines of development of social life, let us analyze the expression and realization of dialectical laws in concrete historical events with all their contradictions, consistencies and inconsistencies. It should be stated without any doubt that all development in actual social life has been extremely contradictory, with great and extraordinary gaps, and even breakdowns. This is because the starting point for the development of men, society and civilization was inevitably at such a low level of development in the technical, economic and then cultural and spiritual spheres of life that it was objectively impossible to achieve great success and progress. Civilization and the corresponding social life developed, not only contradictions, but even the ugly, inhuman, and unjust, through oppression, exploitation and direct destruction of the masses of people.

What were and continue to be the main contradictions in the historical development of social life? We shall study six such key contradictions.

First, contradictions in the development of aspects of societal life which caused difficulties and weaknesses in the development of social life. Primitive society was at the very beginning of its formation concerned above all with securing material economic foundations for man's existence. The problem of the economic and biological existence of man relegated the problems of the quality of life to a secondary position. This is still the case in many regions of the world, especially in Africa, where people this year die in the thousands from hunger without actively being able to exercise other aspects of societal life such as the social, political, cultural and spiritual.

In order to turn from a one-sided (mostly economic) into a multi-faceted (economic, social, political, spiritual) developing organism, society needed to pass through many centuries of historical development. This is true in the best of circumstances; in the worst circumstances many concrete societies, countries and nations remain till now almost fully undeveloped and altogether destitute in economic, social, political (democratic) and spiritual terms.

In the best situation, historically realized in Greece, the accumulation of economic growth was achieved although the overwhelming majority of people were not free and lived as mendicants without any real social or public life. This was the contradictory historical price paid for the appearance of groups of free men, democracy, active social and public life, worthy spiritual and cultural activity and creativity.

Can we say that at this stage of history civic society already appeared? Certainly not, if we are speaking of civic society for all and not only for a definite group of free people. For the social and political (democratic) liberation of the majority of people economic liberation is needed first of all. This means that the masses of people cease being physically unfree, either fully (slaves) or partly (serfs), and that the accumulation of economic growth be according to purely economic norms rather than through physical obedience.

Hence, the possibility of active and free social life for most people and of civic society requires as a foundation, first of all, definite economic and, then, socio-political and cultural conditions. These are two: an industrial revolution, providing the economic foundation for valid social life, and a political revolution (bourgeois, socialist or other democratic liberation), providing freedom and democracy for people. These two — a techno-economic and a politico-democratic revolution — create the conditions for overcoming the contradiction in the development of different aspects of societal life and open the possibility for a more complex and multi-faceted development of societal organisms and of men themselves.

The industrial revolution in Europe, first of all in Great Britain, then in France, Germany, and the United States, was based as a precondition upon the industrial development of the late 17th and early 18th centuries, which came to full strength from the middle of the 18th to the end of the 19th centuries.[1] These and other European countries, as also Russia-USSR, Japan, Canada and Australia, entered into modern industrial life during the last decades of the 19th century, being in this sense, in W.W. Rostow's words, "early-comers" to industrialization. India, China and other countries in Asia and America, which entered industrialization only in the 4th, 5th and 6th decades of the 20th century, are called "late-comers" to industrialization,[2] entering modern industrialization a full half century later. This was their misfortune, due to their colonization by the great metropolitan powers, especially Great Britain.

In Europe the industrial revolution was accompanied by a number of bourgeois political revolutions, especially the French Revolution of 1789, which provided economic and common rights to the people. This furnished rather mature economic and political conditions for the development of progressive forms of social life and civic society for all citizens. Thus,

approximately 200 years ago developed economic, political, cultural conditions were created in Europe and the USA securing a new level or improved function of social life and civic society.

The other or second revolution of techno-economic conditions for all spheres of social life began in the mid 20th century. Its basis was established by developments in the natural and technical sciences and the shift from industrial to scientific and technological modes of development. This opened more mature possibilities for the progress of all forms of social and civic society. The human challenge was to utilize fully these new potentialities for scientific and technical progress for the well-rounded development of the human personality and social life. This progress was successfully utilized in Western Europe, USA, Japan and many other countries, but was lacking or only partially utilized in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries because of conservatism and inefficiency on the part of the party and government rulers at that time.

This shows that new objective possibilities for overcoming contradictions in the development of different aspects of social and civic society have been thus far utilized quite differently: in a more or less successful or in an entirely unsuccessful manner. This creates additional difficulties and even crises situations in the development of social and civic life.

Second, contradictions between the different segments of people who participate in social activity and social life. Like the first contradiction, this too is between different parts of the whole. But whereas in the first case the contradiction is between different spheres of society, in this second case it is between different sectors of people, of the entire population in a society.

Indeed, from the beginning of history till now not all segments of the population in each country, society and region have participated equally in social life and development. This is not due to their free choice but to real and objective circumstances, viz., the situation of societal relations. Two main factors are responsible: (1) the economic and cultural level of the development of the majority of the population in society and (2) inequality and injustice in the distribution of possibilities for real active social expression and social life.

This is why for many centuries, civilization and social life have been developing in a one-sided manner: progress, achievement, well-being, and pleasures were enjoyed by the smallest part of the population, while backwardness, poverty, suffering and oppression were the condition of the majority. This continued in more developed countries till the development of modern industry and culture in 18-19th centuries (as stated in our analysis of the first contradiction). Another group of countries did not develop in this way till the beginning of 20th century; for a third group of countries it was not until the 1950s to 1970s; but in the fourth for a very large group of countries, especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America, industrialization has yet to take place. Nowhere — in none of these four groups of countries in the modern world — have the contradictions between the different sectors of the population been overcome fully nor a satisfactory level of justice and equality been achieved.

The material and spiritual means needed for the development of civilization and social life are created by the working population, the goods and culture they create, as well as of the nation's wealth, power and pleasures is usually unjustly and unequally distributed. The largest and best part of it is concentrated mostly in the hands of the monied and power elites, and sometimes also (as in the USA and other highly developed Western countries) the middle social groups, the so-called "middle class." The majority of the working class receives (per capita) an incomparably lesser portion of the welfare and culture created.

This is why, in the first stages of history, social life appears as "elite social life," but not as a shared phenomenon that is part of everybody's life. Taken in its philosophical and social sense, the problem of the alienation of the masses from property, labor, creativity, culture, and political

and social expression, from real societal and social life, is one of the more important historical realities. Throughout the centuries enormous masses of the population presented themselves not as subjects, but unfortunately, as objects — very often as pawns of the historical process. In this sense the philosophical problem of being the subject or object of historical actions was always presented and continues to be presented in historical reality as an acute, sometimes antagonistic, contradiction between different parts of the population.

These contradictions: (1) between social groups are called social contradictions; and (2) between nationalities and races, national and racial contradictions. Both, especially when they take sharp and conflictual forms make social life tense, uncomfortable and even dangerous. Overcoming such contradictions of social life are necessary steps for social progress and humanization.

Contradictions in social life express a disunity of groups of people in society, grounded in the main sphere of their activity — the productive activity, which secures the material basis of life. These relations of production inevitably involve relations to the means of production (property relations) and relations to the concrete type of productive activity (relations of production). Indeed, in any kind of work man is involved with property (it is his property or that of another) and with the modes of production (industrial, agrarian, mental, manual and so on).

Divisions of property and of labor between groups of people constitute the basis for their disunity and division into social groups according to their concrete social positions and interests, which not only differ but very often are quite opposite and antagonistic. We distinguish the following social groups which are connected with divisions of property or of labor. The first division according to property is into classes of owners, workers and peasants. The second division, based upon divisions of labor, constitute the other social stratification system in society, e.g., employees, intellectuals, etc. The third division based on labor, which continue, till the present, are: (1) the division between industrial and agrarian labor, of the city and village respectively; (2) the division between those in mental occupations who constitute the social layer of the intelligentsia and those involved mostly in manual labor (workers, peasants); (3) the division between, on the one hand, the social group occupied with management duties as a special division of mental labor (managers), and, on the other hand, all other classes and social groups, who do the work in the industrial, agricultural, and mental spheres.

In terms of civilization and social life the most active and creative part of the population has always been concentrated in cities which expressed the energy and activity of the whole nation. Correspondingly the leadership and control has ranged from more forward looking in the cities to relatively backward in the villages of the countryside. The rural population usually has been less active in social life though it often represents the majority of the population, especially in the countries of the Third World. The difference and even antagonism between city and country in world development is expressed in our days as the contradiction between North and South, where North is characterized by developed industrial and cultured urban life, while the South is characteristically the agricultural and usually only traditionally cultured village.

The class and social divisions express not only social differentiations but also the social injustice and inequality, which often lead to oppression and exploitation of one class or groups by another class or groups. This is reflected in the social hierarchy constituted by upper, middle and lower social classes and groups.

The relations between classes and groups in social life differ according to their concrete social positions: they vary from class to relations of mutual assistance, common development, united social actions and activities. Class and social group relations are changing through the

development of social life, especially of civil society. Social interaction leads to greater human understanding of the interests of all classes and social groups, who in mature societies express themselves as groups "for themselves." Through such social interaction and cooperation, they identify common interests which unite them as social groups "for society as a whole." In less mature and backward societies, through these contradictions and their resolutions social life is rising to more developed stages of self-expression.

So far as national and racial contradictions are concerned, it should be stressed that they appear only on definite social levels. This means that by themselves national and racial differences do signify inequality or social inbalance. They are as natural as are differences in hair color. Only unjust discriminatory policies created national and racial tensions and conflicts.

Racial, national and ethnic contradictions are still the more abrasive dimension of societal life in the United States, and, since 1979 and 1990, in the Soviet Union. Inevitably, ethnic, national and race conflicts break out where there exists social injustice, inequality, outrage, neglect and chauvinism. Fascism, genocide and apartheid are polar expressions of such national and racial inequality.

The experience of the last years in the Soviet Union (1988-1990) shows that the main reasons for ethnic and national clashes and conflicts consisted in objective and subjective factors. Objectively, many economic, social, political, cultural and spiritual needs of nations and nationalities have not been satisfied during the five years of *perestroika*. Such acute problems as unemployment of young people in the Middle Asia Republics, work conditions for women, the underestimation of the concerns of the small nations in the Caucasian and other Republics left unattended for years. Subjectively the low level of common and especially of political culture, feelings of nationalism and national exclusiveness, and religious fanaticism promoted extreme national conflicts, for instance, between Moslem Azerbaijanis and Christian Armenians in the Caucasus.

Only united, reasonable and just actions, taken simultaneously from above (government, power) and from below (the masses of the concrete nations or nationalities), can overcome and humanize national and racial contradictions. Real actions and goodwill can considerably improve the actual state of social relations and social life.

Third, contradictions within persons as the bearers of social life (as subjects or objects) and the different aspects of their activity and existence or life. Once existing, a person, through his economic and over-all societal development, begins to stand out from the mass of men. He begins to perceive himself not only as a member of the mass of people and societal life, but also as a separate "I," as a personality with individuality. He understands the meaning and the essence of his being in the world as the realization of his personal "I," his "Ego" (this problem is analyzed in this collection, in the paperr by Prabhakara Rao, "The Story of Man").

Standing out of society, however, man bears in himself the same complexity as society, viz., that of being a whole, an integral unit. An organism society is many-sided and complex, consisting of economic, social, political and spiritual dimensions. Society is not the mere sum of these and other dimensions of societal life. At the same time society is the interrelations between all these spheres of life, with their interactions and contradictions, their unity and their inbalance.

The same is true of man. What is a person? Is he economic, social, political, spiritual, or cultural; or something else? Like society, the person (taken as a phenomenon) is both many-sided and at the same time one integral whole. It cannot be otherwise. By their activity and interactions men create society, which in turn, as an integral organism, influences the formation of the societal essence of man as a totality of societal relations. Thus, for the person there are two main problems

which express his essence: both to be many-sided, and through this and because of it to be a whole person, a unity, i.e., to be a personality or individual, man with a capital "I".

That is why the whole life of the person is a process toward the expression of his many-sidedness and the realization of his highest aspiration to reveal to the maximum his wholeness and universality. The main attractiveness of life consists in the fact that it is an endless process in which personality cannot reach once and for all the needed universality, but is always but drawing closer to it. In this is all the beauty of life.

Concretely, however, how can each person, in the objective conditions of societal life, express his many-faceted wholeness? Does this depend on himself or on other objective conditions? The answer is on both. In fact, one person's wish or desire to be many-sided and universal is not enough. Men create their circumstances as much as these objective circumstances create man. That is why the reality of social life through out history and till the present manifests great contradictions in a person's life. This results from a mostly one-sided development, usually only in the economic sphere as a worker, and his underdevelopment in other spheres of societal life such as the social, political and especially the cultural and the spiritual.

In many countries and societies the life of many has become and remains one-sided or ugly. They exist, but do not really live. This is the tragedy of millions, even billions of men in the past and in modern society, including highly developed countries in the West, as well as in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The true situation of one-dimensional man and one-dimensional society in the modern world was described incisively by Herbert Marcuse in his *One-Dimensional Man*.3

Concerning social life we would stress that its development requires that the social dimension of a person's life be experienced and practiced by large masses of the population. The humanization of social life cannot be fulfilled if social activity is underdeveloped or even absent in man's actual existence. The efforts of both the person and society are needed in order to overcome this contradiction. Real humanization of social life may be reached not by the efforts of certain groups of people acting for the rest of the population, but only by the united social actions of the whole mass of people. To achieve this stage it is necessary to secure conditions in modern society which enable, the entire mass of the population to develop in a many-sided and multi-dimensional manner. This will mean that they possess real personal possibilities for active participation in modern social life and for improving it in the direction of humanization.

Fourth, contradictions in the essence of man, mainly between his personality and sociality but also between person, community and people. Although man is distinguished from society as a person and then as a personality or individual, as was considered in the previous section, he continues to be and to live in society with other men. Being a subject and the "owner" of his life, man cannot but be in contact and in relation to other such subjects. Hence, in his essence man includes both personal and social components.

Moreover, in contrast to nature, man differs from animals first of all as a social being. Emerging from nature, man is biological-social. By this duality, on the one hand, man is a biological organism with all the laws and rules of natural development; on the other hand, he is a product not only of nature, but also of society as a quite new phenomenon based upon the economic, social, political, spiritual, cultural, national, communal, family and other dimensions of life.

By his essence, however, a man is social. The whole manner of his life is social: he works, lives and rests together with other men, with whom he communicates and is united in his personality and individuality. His "I" or "Ego" expresses, of course, his original and unique personhood and life, but for and with whom? Who will see, value and receive this particular

personal expression? Who will be glad and delighted that such a concrete personality is living on the earth? To whom will he bring joy, gladness and happiness through his personal expression and life? Who will and can support him help him, when he is personally disappointed or in a situation of crisis, decline, depression or disillusionment with life? To these cases there is but one answer, namely, only another social beings. Real personality and individuality exist in the social sphere and is expressed only socially. That is why the essence of man is social.

But there arises a contradiction between the person and other social beings, a contradiction between personality and sociality. How is this sociality to be understood? It is the surrounding social beings who usually are united in some sort of community, whether in one's living place, work, enterprise, group, recreation, etc. The largest social surroundings for a person are one's people or nation.

Thus, the contradiction between personality and sociality is expressed in the following line of contradictions: person-community nation.

George F. McLean, in his paper, "Person, Creativity and Social Change," writes that the individual existent "is always with others, depending on them for birth, sustenance and expression." James A. Loiacono, in this same collection in his paper, "The Community of Persons as the Foundation of Human Society," stresses that it is the community that is "the foundation of human society." He emphasizes that "being human is realized within a community of persons who communicate and share from the depth of the spirit that defines them as relational and communicative." He adds, "The human family writes its own history in an evolving process of emancipation, not merely in a biological mode, but in a truly transcendental and free way which is communicated." Concerning the peasant movement in Mexico, Michael E. Foley in his paper writes that people in the region of El Lago feel "the need for unity" within the town and the necessity to "work together" in order to advance. This "reinforces the sense of collective responsibility that lies behind the democratic sentiments fostered by the movement in El Lago" (in Volume II of this collection, see Foley's paper, " 'Coming to Value' is More Important than 'Having Values': Building Democracy in the Contemporary Mexican Peasant Movement").

The same situation obtains in the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly in Romania. Ion Bansoiu writes in his paper (also in Volume II), "The Ambiguity of a Culture and Its Freedom to Choose," that in old Romania "the form of communal participation was the village, founded upon basic family relationships." Moreover, "The communal village was led by a council which was elected by consensus. The main decisions were taken by the whole community; customary law was applied by the council. Relationships between the communal villages were peaceful; the governing principle of both inter- and intra-communal life were tolerance and understanding." He writes that for the three worlds the "goal is a society centered upon real persons, representing a universe of values, individual needs and aspirations, and cooperative social initiatives and actions."

Erich Fromm in his work *The Revolution of Hope* wrote that, according to the conviction of the radical humanists, "there is a hierarchy of values" which are "compelling principles for the practice of life — individual and social." According to Fromm, "This new attitude toward life can be expressed more specifically in the following principles: Man's development requires his capacity to transcend the narrow prison of his ego, his greed, his selfishness, his separation from his fellow man, and, hence, his basic loneliness. This transcendence is the condition for being open and related to the world, vulnerable, and yet with an experience of identity and integrity; of man's capacity to enjoy all that is alive, to pour out his faculties into the world around him, to be 'interested': in brief, to be rather than to have and to use are consequences of the step to overcome greed and egomania."4

These citations help to reveal the contents of the contradictions between personality and sociality (or the individual and the social, as Erich Fromm writes), between person and community, person and people, nation, and the extremes which follow from the separate development of either side of the contradictions: personality or sociality, person or community, which deeply influence the character of life in society and especially its process of humanization. What are the concrete types of persons in definite society: communal or individualistic, sociable or selfish, associative or separate, collective or egoistic, kind or greedy, friendly or hostile, human or inhuman and the like. Accordingly, what are the character types of social life and social relations in concrete groups or in a given society: communal or individualistic, collective or egoistic, sociable or selfish, friendly or hostile and so on?

Of course there is always a great range of such expressions, but usually one type prevails, as is confirmed by Fromm's analysis in his book *The Revolution of Hope*. One trend is expressed in the transformation of individuality into individualism, which leads to an exaggeration of personal features and to a lack of communal, collective, or sociable orientation (McLean writes in his paper, "Person, Creativity and Social Change" that it is necessary "to keep individuality from becoming individualism"). The opposite trend consists in diminishing personal development, disregarding the need to fulfill all the possibilities of each one's personality, individuality. This often was done "for the sake" of the development of whole masses of people, characteristically in the USSR and other socialist countries, and in some developing countries. George F. McLean calls this the ideology of "totalitarian collectivism."

In Western societies the more characteristic trend is individualism, the concentration of a person's life upon the narrow interests of family and a close group of friends and colleagues. Loiacono writes in his chapter that "freedom in the United States has brought more banal pleasure than happiness, and something of the soul seems to have died in Western Europe because of World War II, as noted by the Nobel Peace Prize recipient Elie Wiesel." Indeed, "individualism damages the process of self-realization." Bansoiu also writes about "more individualistic European values."

In connection with the individualistic orientation in the social life of Western countries the philosophical problems of whether the essence of man's life is "to have" or "to be" has been raised by its philosophers, and thinkers.5

The reason for raising this problem consisted in the fact that during the last two decades, in Western countries, and especially in the USA, many people, particularly youth, felt the gap or contradiction between the high level of economic development and the low level of spiritual, personal and social values of many people. Due to the scientific-technical revolution begun in the mid-50s, the economies of USA, Western Europe and Japan rose to a new level oriented to mass consumption. W.W. Rostow speaks about "the most remarkable two decades of economic growth in modern history, running from the early 1950s to the price revolution that began in 1972."6 The material level of life of masses of people rose outstandingly, while the quality of their aspirations and values remained concentrated mostly upon material needs and desires.

"To have" — wealth, cars, houses, money, savings and many other things — became the main interest of life, the main orientation of man's life. Money came to be considered by many and even by the majority of men as the very sense and meaning of personal and social life, as the final highest aim of all human activity. The everlasting challenge for man is "to be" — to be a personal, individual and social being. This means, on the one hand, to realize one's full personal potential and abilities, and, on the other hand, to be as much as possible for other social beings, for community, for nation. In the life of many individuals this problem remained in the background, and very often was entirely forgotten.

That is why, instead of "to be," as the valid and profound personal and social realization, many people only fulfilled their material intention "to have" money and wealth and "to use" them "effectively" for the creation of new money and wealth. This is not real human life, but the mere imitation of life; it is, in fact, the rejection of life in its broadest and deepest personal and social sense. Such a situation generated dissatisfaction in many intellectuals and philosophers in the West, who sharply raised this problem ("to be" or "to have" and "to use") as that of the essence of the human being, that is, of humanity and humanism. Different youth movements including that of the "hippies," protested that such rich material prosperity was spiritually and socially empty, dull and lifeless.

We cannot say that such breakdowns and gaps in Western and other countries between "to be" and "to have" in man's life, between individualism and communalism, collectivism and egoism, sociality and separateness, have been overcome during recent years. Such contradictions remain as long as persons are living in society. This always raises the problem of the coexistence and interrelation of personality and sociality, of person and community, of person and people (nation), of community and the whole people or nation. The question is only that of the degree and acuteness of these contradictions, which very often are exercised in extreme antagonistic opposition.

To humanize social life means to find ways for the coexistence and harmonization of personality and sociality, for securing the mutual development of person and community, person and people, nation, community and people. Real humanity and personality can only be social humanity and social personality.

This means, we are convinced, that the principal way of overcoming the contradiction between personality and sociality is not in choosing between "to be" or "to have," but of uniting "to be" and "to have." Real personality and social phenomenon cannot fully and freely "be" without "having," which requires a quite developed material and cultural basis, and a high level and standard of personal life. In no way can poverty be considered a desirable condition of man's life as being. The best condition for a person "to be" in all aspects of his life is via a high level of material and cultural prosperity and security for every person. The combination or unity of the two sides of this contradiction is one of the most effective dialectical ways of overcoming it. But we want to stress that this must be a combination and unity of two sides ("to be" and "to have"), where "to be" plays the predominate or leading role.

Thus, the more promising direction for the humanization of personal and social life in modern society consists, we are convinced, not in the elimination of one side of the contradiction, but in an integration of both sides with a predominance of man's main task, namely, "to be" in one's personal and all social life. This is the central dialectical dilemma for the humanization of social life given present conditions.

Fifth, contradictions in the development of social life in history, namely, earlier, between great powers and colonies, and, now, between countries of the "first" and "third" worlds. Before we analyze contradictions between parts of society, the contradictions between parts of the world are those inside whole civilizations.

Although the first development of civilization, this historical development of civilization was not so much a matter of moral fault. The problem comes rather in understanding the objective and subjective reasons for such development, *viz.*, the conditions used for the oppression and exploitation of large number of peoples in the colonies. On the one hand, there are the objective economic and cultural conditions for a very unequal development of civilization, and on the other hand, an unjust subjective policy of oppression and exploitation conducted by the great powers with regard to the people of their colonies.

The last five centuries — from the 15th to the 19th and even to the middle of 20th century — have been a period of extremely uneven and inadequate development of civilization. Countries such as Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, the Low Countries (Belgium, Netherlands), built their great colonial empires.

In these countries development and progress of social life was secured by rising economic and cultural growth (in many respects through the exploitation of their colonies), and strengthening independence, democracy and freedom; in the colonies, on the contrary, peoples lived in conditions of economic and cultural backwardness, and political oppression and suppression. In fact, then there was really only one world — that of the great powers and other independent countries such as the USA, Japan, Russia and so on. They comprised not only the First World but the "only" real world of economically, socially, politically, spiritually and culturally developed civilization. The colonies with their great populations provided mostly natural resources for the development of the rich nations, cheap labor and a great market for the goods produced by the major powers or by their enterprises in the colonies.

By comparison with the First World, the other independent world, formed from previous colonies which were now free to develop their own economic, social, political, and spiritual and cultural life, began to appear only from the beginning of the 20th century (formal independence of Morocco and Ethiopia came in 1900). But most peoples in the former colonies gained independence only after World War II in the 50s (Egypt and India in 1947 and more than 40 other new national states), and even in the 70s (Angola and Mozambique from Portugal in 1975). By 1977 almost all former colonies had achieved independence. These liberated colonies comprised the so-called Third World, after the First World of capitalism or private enterprise (with its 2-3 centuries of history) and the Second World of socialism beginning with the Russian Revolution of October 1917.

This means that the former colonies have participated as independent states in the development of modern civilization only since the 50s or even the 70s, while the countries of the First World have already undergone from the 16th to the 19th centuries the stages of the industrial revolution and related cultural development. By the middle of 20th century they had become mature societies in every sense of the word. While their former colonies were only beginning their independent development, the Western countries had entered upon the highest stage of scientific-technical development, cultural progress and mass-consumption.

While the USA and countries of Western Europe and Japan were celebrating and, so to speak, summing up the results of their 200 and 300-year development (as in 1976 the USA bicentennial), countries in the Third World have only recently begun their movement from economic, social, political and cultural backwardness to modernity since the 50s and 70s.

In view of the real and severe contradictions between those two parts of the modern world - the First World and the Third World - we cannot speak of any adequate, equal and just historical possibilities for their social and civil development. That is why, after winning or receiving independence, many countries of the Third World remain distrustful and suspicious towards the countries of the First World; many of which had severely exploited and oppressed their former colonies.

To this it is necessary to add the neocolonial policy of the great Western powers toward many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America after their liberation. Till now USA, countries of Western Europe and Japan retain their unequal and unjust economic ties and their culture and values in many developing countries.

In another volume in this series, in his paper "Pastoral Practice as Rebellion: The Humanization of Social Life in El Salvador," Dave Ross, who lives in El Salvador half of each year, writes that "with the American aid and military advisors, countries like El Salvador have seen murder, rape and 'disappearances' systematized in a way that rivals the repression of Stalin and Hitler." The real situation in the social life in El Salvador is not only contradictory and antagonistic, but totally upside down. Dave Ross writes that since the 30s in this country there has been increased oppression and virtual enslavement of the vast majority of the Salvadoran people by the oligarchy, who regard themselves as the "producers" and the Indians as "non-producers," i.e., as "users" of national resources. The oligarchy maintained that it was their capital and not the labor of the Indians that allowed the plantations to produce crops for export. The government of El Salvador reflected this understanding in all national programs. The racism and classism inherent in the worldview was accepted by and given symbolic expression by the Catholic Church.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s ARENA, the National Republican Alliance, an ultra-right political and paramilitary organization, was founded upon the division of Salvadoran society into the simple categories of producers and users.

One can see that in El Salvador the real producers and creators of the economic basis of the country are considered to be of the lowest sort, as good-for-nothing. Such a real situation certainly cannot help to humanize the social life in El Salvador, or even simply to organize and secure the real, free and democratic social life of the country.

All this supports the conclusion that only by actually overcoming the contradictions between the countries of the First World and the Third World (mostly former colonies) can one hope to promote the countries of the Third World, in their democratic, social, as well as economic, political, cultural development. This must be for all men, the masses of people, and above all for working people, and it must be directed toward humanization and progress.

If today's world is truly one, then the efforts of all its parts must be united for mutual and joint progress in all spheres of societal life. In the case of "to be" and "to have" a way has to be found to resolve the contradiction. This will involve the efforts of the First and the Third Worlds, as well as that of the Second World. This will bring about the best results in the process of humanizing social life.

The sixth contradiction lies in the development of social life in different parts of the world. This concerns the formation of socialism (the Second world) at the beginning of the 20th century (1917 in Russia) and the development taking place in the Third World in the middle of this century. Contradictions between development as it takes place variously in the Three Worlds influence the evolution of social life.

As the clash of attitudes between the First and the Third Worlds was considered previously, here we shall concentrate our attention on the ways in which relations between the countries of the First (capitalist) and the Second (socialist) Worlds influence social life. These relations and contradictions express also the dialectical mode of development of civilization. Thus, the more interesting questions are: What is the essence or quality of the differences and contradictions between capitalism and socialism in the development of social life? How have these contradictions been expressed in the different stages of the development of socialist countries and, first of all, of the USSR?

To answer these questions, we shall distinguish three periods in the development of Soviet society: (1) from November 1917 till 1929; (2) the following 55-60 years of development under Stalin's dictatorship and its consequences; and (3) the present period since 1985.

From its beginning, theoretically and practically, what has the socialist's way of development of civilization meant in comparison to the capitalist way? First of all, it is necessary to stress that for V.I. Lenin, who was the head of the first Soviet government, all socialist development of Russia was considered within the framework of the development of the entire human civilization, not in separation therefrom. According to Marxism (and hence Lenin in contrast to Stalin and many others), socialism contradicts not human civilization (for it lies within a civilization and its task is to express that way of life in a better way), but the capitalistic way of civilization. Real Marxism, then and now, has had a very high estimation of capitalism as an objective historical need and a high stage in the development of civilization and social life. But no actual society is thoroughly ideal. The same is true of capitalism. Then and now, both scientists and the common people see a number of contradictions and shortcomings in the development of capitalist countries. These concern, for instance, contradictions between personality and sociality, individualism and community, "to be" and "to have" in human life, the rich and the poor, and between racial, national and ethnic groups, etc.

The socialist idea, which arose in Western European countries and cultures of France, Germany, England, etc., was directed toward bettering and humanizing civilization from within in contrast to capitalist practice which already was known for its positive and negative aspects.

Lenin himself was a very civilized person. He knew well the achievements and problems of civilization at the end of the 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries. For many years he lived as an emigrant in Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Finland, France and Poland, and he also visited Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Czechoslovakia. He knew Western Europe as the cradle and citadel of the world's culture and civilization. He spoke fluent English, French and German; studied Latin, Greek, Italian and Polish, and could understand Czech and Swedish. As a real intellectual he highly valued culture and civilization.

Being a realist, Lenin understood that at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia as a whole was in the mid-range of capitalist development. W.W. Rostow considers Russia to have passed the "take-off stage" at the end of 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century to have entered the stage of the "drive to technological maturity."7 In Europe Russia was the fourth-ranking industrial producer in 1870-1913, after the United Kingdom, France and Germany (in 1913 it was on the same level as France) and ahead of Belgium, Scandinavia and Italy.8 In many parts (South, North, East and Far East) of its territory, however, Russia was backward, especially because it bridged the more developed Europe and the more backward Asia.

Recognizing that in Russia there lacked the economic and cultural conditions for mature socialist development, Lenin stressed that the main task of the country was to pursue the more civilized countries and peoples in the economic and cultural spheres in order to catch up and then to secure in Russia a higher level of the development of economic and cultural life. The policy was to be with, and at the level of, the whole of civilization, not to depart from or to oppose it.

As a Marxist, Lenin saw the socialist way for Russia for the development of civilization to consist in six real conditions: (1) the people (and first of all laborers) are the real subjects of civil society rather than — as before — only the ruling elite and wealthy classes and social groups; (2) power is in the hands of the people themselves though direct "Soviet" democracy; (3) property, rather than private, would become mostly social or public (although other forms of ownership, including private, continued to exist during Lenin's time) so that people would begin to work for themselves; (4) the social life of the people based on the principle of social justice, community and social equality; (5) socialism as the promise of social improvement from a human, social and moral

points of view; (6) the possibility of catching up with the economically and culturally more advanced peoples and countries.

In brief, in socialism the person is in possession of his life. All persons are united in various communities and collectives, whose social relations are just. Each person has the possibility of well-rounded development. Of course, such socialist formation is a distinctive part of civilization; it cannot be reached at once, but requires a number of decades, just as it has taken capitalism 2-3 centuries to reach its highest stages. We will see in the second part of the chapter that during first five-ten years of development after the October Revolution of 1917 large changes in all spheres of life of soviet society took place and many goals were practically attained.

Let us turn now to the essence and quality of the contradictions between the First (capitalist) and the Second (socialist) Worlds in the first years of the latter's development. As the two were mutually related (as Lenin stressed) forms and types of the same human civilization, this contradiction had the form of peaceful competition. This was between the capitalist world, which was much more developed in the economic and cultural spheres, and socialism, which sought to use its social, political, human and moral advantages to overcome its economic and cultural disadvantages.

Because of this understanding in Soviet society, during the first years the main practical line in the development of the USSR from 1917 to 1922 was to take from the West all that was good, all its achievements, especially in the technological, economic and cultural spheres. Many times Lenin stressed that Russia should incorporate from the experience of the U.S. and Germany their advances in science, technology, education and culture; that is, American technology, organization of trusts and public education and German railroads.

In Lenin's words, socialism is capitalist monopoly (as the highest development of economy at that time), "only" turned to the use and profit of all the people. So it can be said that if the changes in capitalism (the First World) resulting from the social activity of people and the development of democracy are such that the people are in control and the economic, educational, cultural and other resources of society are directed increasingly to the good of the whole population, then capitalist society is changing radically in the direction of humanization. This would mean that in the course of its progress civilization unites different ways of development (such as the capitalist and socialist) in one general and universal progress.

The theoretical sense of close interaction between socialism and capitalism in the development of civilization was applied practically by Lenin as prime-minister in many concrete measures during the first years of the development of soviet society. For instance, he supported and spread the new achievements in science and technology from the USA, especially the "Taylor System" of scientific management in industry and business. The work of F.W. Taylor (1856-1915), *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911), was translated into Russian and published in Soviet Russia as were the works of other American scientists and engineers. In the 20's through Lenin's initiative, 12 institutes for the scientific organization of labor headed by the Central Institute of Labor (1920) were organized. Their task was to reorganize all spheres of work, especially in industry, on the basis of Western scientific and technical expertise. Many industrial enterprises were modernized and more than half a million qualified workers were trained for the basic industries. These measures helped to restore ruined industries on the basis of modern advances and to raise productivity in the country during the 20's.

In the 30s, after Stalin came to power, all these institutes for the scientific organization of labor were dissolved and for more than 30 years (to the middle of the 60's) the very notion of the "scientific organization of labor" disappeared from the scientific and industrial vocabulary. This

implied an isolation of Soviet society from world civilization in the scientific, cultural and technical senses, and a rupture of the development of socialist society from that of other parts of civilization. Was this better for socialism? In no way. Did it hurt all civilization? I consider it one of Stalin's most serious historical mistakes.

The second period in the development of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism, which began during Stalin's period in the 30s, was characterized by a growing isolation and gap in the development of Soviet socialism from that of the greater human civilization. This was not only a gap in the development of human civilization, but a breakdown of Lenin's understanding of the development of socialism as an integral part of the development of civilization as a whole.

Instead there arose competition through the mutual development of dichotomous attitudes regarding the two Worlds (the First and the Second) as hostile according to the principles of "class struggle" and exclusiveness: either one world or the other, but not both in one civilization. The notion of "civilization" was almost not mentioned. Instead it was proposed that socialist formation would inevitably change the capitalist structures according to "a rule" of history. This line of thought was continued in fact by Stalin's successors till the 80's. As Jim Hoagland wrote recently in *The Washington Post:*

World War I and the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution split apart the imperial international economy that flourished at the end of the 19th century. World War II completed the division of the world into antagonistic economic blocs. Communist nations set up their own non-money and retreated into defiant self-sufficiency and isolation. Through Comecon, the economic arm of the Warsaw Pact, they vowed to undermine free-market economics and bury it.9

This effort to be isolated rather than together with civilization caused the USSR and other socialist countries increasingly to lag behind the First World in scientific-technical progress and in techno-economic development. For this reason the USSR and other socialist countries did not overcome the contradictions between the Two Worlds in Lenin's sense of pursuing Western civilization, reaching it and then surpassing it. On the contrary, taking these contradictions only in terms of opposition or resistance to capitalism, socialist countries began one after another to fall into economic and socio-political crises. From the dialectical point of view this meant that in the contradiction of the Two Worlds the socialist countries began to represent at this time the weak rather than the strong side of the contradiction, being more passive than active. For this reason the period of the 70's and the first half of the 80's was called in the USSR the period of "*zastoi*" or stagnation without forward movement ahead. Objective conditions in the country for scientific, technical, cultural and overall societal progress were not subjectively employed in an effective manner because of the weakness of party and state leaders.

The third period in the development of the contradictions between the First and the Second Worlds, which began in the USSR in 1985, can be called the period of the "return" of the USSR and other socialist countries to human civilization. This "return" means continuation under new conditions of the first years of USSR development and the rejection of the following years of isolation. No part of the world can be isolated from the other parts, for they represent a system of interrelations within our human civilizations. While having such concrete diversities and peculiarities as reflected in the terms First, Second and Third Worlds, their common aim is to be on the highest level of civilization in terms of the development of society (economic, social, political and spiritual life), the development of culture in its broadest sense (all its material and spiritual aspects, social and human relations, labor and life and so on), the development of each personality and individuality.

The present period of return by the USSR to human civilization raises three cardinal questions: (1) return with which "face," with which "luggage"?; (2) return where: to civilization or to capitalism?; (3) return with which aim or central task?

Indeed, first, the "return" may be expressed as that of an economically and culturally strong and productive country or as that of one that is economically weakened and ruined; as a great power or only as a memory of one that was.

From 1917 Soviet society was represented to world civilization as an economically and culturally, socially and politically growing country. Even in the years of "*zastoi*" (the 70's and the first half of the 80's) the Soviet Union was one of two world Super Powers; but now? Five years (1985-1990) of the present leadership unfortunately has not provided a positive answer to this first question.

Second, there is a great difference between returning to civilization or to capitalism. In the first case it is returning to the one civilization, but with the plurality and diversity so valued in the West, and with socialist methods for realizing its possibilities and prospects. The alternative would just be to capitulate before the capitalist part of civilization — the First, which does not necessarily mean the best, World. Keeping in mind that the First World had been developing for 2-3 centuries and the Second World for only 73 years since 1917, we can understand that returning to capitalism (especially in the most economically weakened situation) would mean beginning all societal development from the beginning. It would lead to full dependence upon modern capitalism and its superpower — the USA — twining the Second World simply into "the tail" of the capitalist world.

Third, what must be the aim of a return to civilization? As in the first years of Soviet development, it is to learn from capitalism, from the First World, all its positive and fundamental achievements, successes and progress in science, technology and social, political and cultural life; to see this World not as an enemy, but as a colleague and friend, though nevertheless as something distinctive, so as to retain a socialist social, political, ideological, cultural, moral "face"; to envision not struggle, but emulation and even competition with Western colleagues, as they compete among themselves. In this way one should hope to be as well as the First World, while eluding its negative features.

The main goal is then to be a definite part of civilization with one's own socialist "face" in order to contribute to the whole of civilization the distinctive features of the Second or socialist World. These include a civil society of people by the people, direct democracy and freedom, a social life built on the principles of social justice and social equality, equality and freedom for all nations, races and ethnic groups, and the freedom, dignity and the possibility for the all-around development of each personality. In brief, to be in a social, human and moral sense a better society and better world of people than the First World.

Is competition between Two Worlds in one civilization positive? Would it not be better for civilization if there were two or three different parts and worlds like different persons in one family?

In such a world situation there would be different opinions, different views, different positions on the same problems and events. It would be a genuinely free and competitive civilization, rather than the monopoly or imposition of but one part of civilization.

On the basis of such an understanding of one human civilization, which exercises justice and freedom because it is inherently diverse and pluralistic, I fully agree with the following statement by R. Blanchard:

Men and women in Eastern and Central Europe have captured the attention of the West because of their courage and sacrifice. They have "triumphed" over communism. But have they

triumphed over oppression or simply replaced an inefficient economic and social system with another, yet to be tried? Have they taken a stand for liberty, or will they merely vindicate capitalism, whose equally powerful potential for oppression is yet to be seen in Eastern Europe, but is all-too-evident in Central America? What words will the new age of leadership in Eastern Europe have to offer on behalf of the oppressed and suffering in other parts of the world?

Who will speak for the seventy thousand dead and the millions of *campesinos* kept in a state of enslavement — chattel for the "producers?" Will Mr. Walesa and Mr. Havel speak out for the other oppressed peoples of the world or will they remain silent so as not to endanger the flow of capital to their respective countries? And if so, how do they differ from Sartre and the other intellectuals who knew of the Gulags and yet remained silent in front of Stalin. (In this volume, see Blanchard's paper, "Pastoral Practice as Rebellion: The Humanization of Social Life in El Salvador").

Our conclusion about the state of the contradictions between the Three Worlds in today's civilization is that this state is much more favorable for the progressive development of civilization and for the humanization of social life in all regions of the world. But let us not forget that besides the resolution of one set of problems through favorable development in the USSR and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, other problems may arise, connected with the strengthening one power in the world and the growing reaction and oppression from that power. This would threaten the present favorable international situation from a new direction which itself could become monopolistic.

Concluding the analysis of six main contradictions in the development of social life in actual history and society, one can ask reasonably which of these contradictions is most important to overcome for the progressive development of social life? We suggest the answer in four parts. First, all of them are important, because overcoming or not overcoming each of them really stimulates or impedes the humanization of social life. Second, contradiction which is the more important one in a given time and place is the one demanding resolution first. Third, those contradictions have special importance which affect the generality and universality of social life due to the complexity in the development of the person, community, people, society and world civilization. Fourth, in order to overcome successfully the stated contradictions it is necessary to pay the greatest attention to the deepest and most basic roots of them all, namely, the contradictions in man and in society. These two components define, in the main, the state and development of social life: what are man and society, at which level of development are they, what type and quality of relations exist between them — all these constitute the real conditions for concrete social life.

Historical and societal reality lead to different combinations and levels of these contradictions in the development of social life. If in one region of the world, in South Africa, there is still a struggle for racial equality, for including in social life all parts of the population; in another part of the world, in the United States, there is a problem of further humanizing the social life of all groups of the population. These are problems of the same very interdependent and interconnected world. The resolution of these problems and of the main contradictions in social life can be the result only of mutual and united efforts on the part of all mankind and all regions of the world.

The Inhuman Situation of Social Reality and the Search for a Way Out

People have always thought about their social reality because it has never satisfied them. Considering real economic, social, political, spiritual and cultural practice, people easily have seen there injustice rather than justice, inequality instead of equality, oppression in the place of freedom,

exploitation rather than mutual and collective relations, unhappiness and misfortune instead of happiness and joy. Masses of people have come to understand themselves not as subjects in society, but as objects oppressed by the power of an economic elite. Being unfree they have felt their alienation from the main societal spheres of life, including alienation from themselves as free personalities and individuals.

To overcome this unjust and inhuman social reality what must be done, what changed? How can one reconstruct a social reality which will be just, equal and humane? These remain the main questions and problems. Understandably these vital problems are connected with three phenomena: man, people and society. Which is man in this social life; what are his thoughts, ideas, orientations, beliefs and intentions? What are the social relations in which people live with others in community whether they want to or not? Many men constitute a people as a large mass of population living in society and united by labor, recreation, public duties, social and family activity and so on. This is the decisive and driving force in society and history. The issue is whether persons are real citizens in a society that is "their own" — a civil, democratic people's society? Is society split into opposite social groups and classes, or is it socially unified, representing a collaborative unity of groups and persons? This complex of problems has long attracted the attention of intellectuals.

In the process of answering these questions three main factors long have been included (and continue to be included), aimed at improving and humanizing social life and raising its quality — religion, science and social movements, including social revolutions.

The most interesting thing is that all three intellectual and social forces in humanity and society are based in masses of people, rather than in individuals. They understand, that the influence should be mass, that improvement and humanization of social relations need to be mass, because the issue is the social relations of masses of people. Changes in the real quality of social life can be executed only by masses of people, revolutionary social and political upheavals in the social relations of the whole society can be executed only by the revolutionary actions of masses of people. That is why their appeal, their attention, their call and their hope are to the masses of people. The issue is whether by these measures the masses are to be kept silent, passive and obedient or are called and lead to social and revolutionary actions for major improvements and the reconstruction of social life and society.

Religion seems concentrated mostly on the person, on his spiritual and emotional life, on his beliefs and moral orientations, on personal contacts and relations between concrete persons. Opened to two lives, the one on earth and the other with God, religion unites people through this belief, influences them toward improving and altering their relations according to common human and religious moral norms. Because of their religious beliefs, people strive to harmonize their personal and social relations, and feel one with others as brothers and members of the same human community. Stressing the importance of a people's love for each other and of peaceful relations between them, religion does not orientate them toward social movement and the struggle of social and political revolutions, as do science and social movements.

Science, through its rational approach to social reality, combines empirical and theoretical analysis. Especially social sciences, including sociology, political science and some others, are oriented toward the explanation of social and other processes in society. Describing and analyzing reality these sciences draw conclusions about the outlook for social development in the regions, countries and the world as a whole. They pay special attention to the behavior of the masses of people, their social inspirations and movements, conflict situations in social life, revolutionary movements and so on.

The great social theories combine the results of the development of philosophy, political economy and concrete social sciences. Some reflect a definite period of time: theories of "industrial society," "post-industrial society," "welfare state," "technetronic era," "modernization," "de-ideologization," "convergence" and others. Others have a long history in the theory and societal practice. We shall consider briefly the theories of socialism and communism (their practice will be considered below in the second part of this paper).

The theories of socialism and communism appeared in the world's culture and civilization as a response to the need to improve and perfect the social life of the masses of people. The origin of the word "socialism" is in the words "social," "sociable," "sociality," "society." This means that socialist theory is oriented toward changing and improving societal conditions (economic, social, political, spiritual) for the sake of all persons and for perfecting society itself in which all persons and people live. The word "communism" is close to commune, which means people living together, communicating between themselves and helping each other. This leads to the idea of having a society in which people are in just and equal positions and relations, constituting a base for real freedom, democracy and happiness. To have such a common, public, social, communal society means to build a communistic society or communism.

Socialism and communism can be seen as creations of peoples culture and civilization which come from ancient times. This approach was used in two very old books on socialism. One was published in 1890 by Father Cathrein in Germany and then translated into eight other languages and published in 1904 in USA. Victor Cathrein wrote that from the most ancient of times we meet with certain partially communistic systems and institutions. On the island of Crete we find a certain kind of communism introduced as early as 1300 B.C., which in later times Lycurgus took as his model for the constitution of Sparta. This constitution seems to have been Plato's ideal when he composed his work entitled *The Republic*. . . . The roots of modern socialism are to be found first of all in the great development of industry and the consequent modification of social conditions dating from the latter part of the eighteenth century.10 The other author, T. Kirkup, in his work, *A History of Socialism*, first published in 1892, wrote that the word 'socialism' appears to have been first used in *The Poor Man's Guardian* in 1833. In 1835, a society, which received the grandiloquent name of the Association of all Classes of all Nations, was founded under the auspices of Robert Owen; and the words 'socialist' and 'socialism' became current during the discussions which arose in connection with it. As Owen and his school had no esteem for the political reform of the time, and laid all emphasis on the necessity of social improvement and reconstruction, it is obvious how the name came to be recognized as suitable and distinctive.11

Socialism and communism are then products of Western European culture and civilization. A utopian version of socialism appeared in the 16th century in England, where Thomas More (1478-1535) wrote his *Utopia* in 1515-1517. In the 18th and 19th centuries socialist doctrines were intensively developed in France (Comte Henri de Saint-Simon, 1760-1825; Francois Marie Charles Fourier, 1772-1837; Louis Blanc, 1811-1882; Pierre Joseph Proudhon, 1809-1865), in England (Robert Owen, 1771-1858), and in Germany (Ferdinand Lassalle, 1825-1864, Karl Johann Rodbertus, 1805-1875). Three European countries — France, England, Germany — led in the development of socialist theory. K. Marx and Marxism drew upon socialist ideas and conceptions, developed first of all in France, and renewed them in new historical conditions.

What is the essence of notions of socialism and communism from the point of view of Western authors and which we share in the main? According to Victor Cathrein:

Socialism advocates the transformation of all capital, or means of production, into the common property of society, or of the state, and the administration of the produce and the distribution of the proceeds by the state. Since modern socialists, and chiefly the followers of Karl Marx, intend to realize this scheme entirely upon a democratic basis, they call themselves social democrats, and their system social democracy. . . . Edward Bernstein defines socialism as "the movement toward, or the actual existence of, the co-operative organization of society."

Communism has a wider signification than socialism. By communism in its wider sense we understand that system of economics which advocates the abolition of private property and the introduction of community of goods, at least as far as capital, or means of production, is concerned.[12]

In his book, T. Kirkup mentioned that "Laveleye explains it thus: 'In the first place, every socialistic doctrine aims at introducing greater equality in social conditions; and in the second place, at realizing those reforms by the law or the state.'"[13] Recently Fromm wrote: "In many ways, Marx's socialism in the nineteenth century was the most important popular religious movement — though it was formulated in secular forms."[14] Rostow called communism "a great fact of history":

Before 1914, as the pressures to balance out and soften the harshness of an industrial society mounted, the societies of Western Europe moved more sharply towards the welfare state than the United States. This was probably because they were less agrarian in their political balance; but there were other elements as well, notably the greater weight of Socialist doctrines and ideals within the industrial working force and among intellectual leaders. The government was called upon to provide a higher proportion of total consumption than in the United States.[15]

Marx himself stressed that the abolition of private property was not the main aim of socialism but only the economic and social condition for man's assuming his human essence. By this man returns to himself as a social being, which means, to being human. In such an understanding communism is equal to humanism, where humanism is social humanism and the main idea of socialism and communism is to secure the social conditions for the full human realization of the personality of each person.

Socialism and communism are directed toward reaching and securing the freedom and happiness of each person in society. Thinking about freedom and happiness, three questions arise: (a) where, (b) from what (against what), and (c) of what (in what sense)? Indeed, freedom and happiness may be had only in society, not outside of society. That is why the first condition of personal freedom and happiness is a free, human, just, equal and mature society. This is the starting point of socialism and communism. Next, freedom should be understood as freedom from such incompatible social features as oppression, exploitation, totalitarianism, inequality, injustice, racism, nationalism, fascism, repressions, terrorism and so on. Lastly, freedom and happiness will include: freedom or the right to speak, to vote, to work, to take any political and social position, self-expression and creativity in the full sense as a multi-faceted and culturally rich personality.

Marx and Engels both write in "The Manifesto of the Communist Party" ("Communist Manifesto") that future society would be "an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."[16] This means that Marxism starts from the person or personality, thinking first of all of the freedom, happiness and well-rounded development of

each individuality. Then Marxism takes into account the real social surroundings of each person — other persons, communities, society as a whole: all should be happy and free. Happiness and freedom of personality and society are inevitably and deeply interconnected; they cannot be separated. Subject (personality) and object (society) together and jointly secure the real movement to social humanism and personal freedom, as well as to human personality and full, civil society, to socialized personality and humanistic freedom — in all their dialectical connections, combinations and shadings. This constitutes the real direction of the complex humanization of social life.

So far as social movements and social revolutions are concerned, they also were paving the way for an escape from inhuman social reality and its reconstruction, for creating and building a more humane, just and democratic society. In this connection we shall attend to four main social and political revolutions in recent history. In Volume II of this collection, in his paper, "Democratic Revolutions: A Partial Historical Retrospective," Ronald Calinger treats three revolutions: the American (1776), the Habsburg (the series of reforms after 1765), and the French (1789). From these we comment on the American and the French, as well as the Commune of Paris (the Paris Commune) of 1871 and the October Socialist Revolution of 1917 in Russia.

Our interest here is to compare the ideas animating these four revolutions, the tasks and aims they proclaimed, their recommendations for the improvement of life as a whole, their practical changes and reconstructions, and whether each of them brought the masses of people a really "new," "better" and optimal social life? As stated in all historical research literature, the American and French revolutions are bourgeois revolutions while the Paris Commune and Russian revolutions are socialist ones. This is the principal and essential difference between the two kinds of revolutions. Within these two types there are also some differences of a social nature, which reflect differences in the development of social life in these countries.

The matter and essence of the American and French revolutions were expressed in different proclamations, slogans and constitutional decisions. The American revolution was proclaimed on July 4, 1776 in the "Declaration of Independence" written by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the Second Continental Congress: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" (See Ronald Calinger, "Democratic Revolutions: A Partial Historical Retrospective").

The three main rights — life, liberty, happiness — are mostly rights of the person — of personal, not social, life. As regards social demands it is stated that "all men are created equal," — note "created equal," but not necessarily equal in social life. The main differences between the American and French revolution, as well as the differences between both of these and the two socialist revolutions, lie in the role of sociality in the proclaimed demands, in the different stress upon individuality in the American revolutions and upon sociality in the French revolution.

The American rights are mostly those of individuality, of person and personality (i.e., "all men"). While necessary and good, are they enough for the humanization of social rather than of individual life? I think not, and the French revolution affirmed this by stressing mostly social rather than personal demands.

The main slogan and essence of the French revolution is: "liberté, egalité, fraternité" (liberty, equality, fraternity). Thus, both revolutions, the American and the French, include liberty as the main right of man and the principle of all life, including the social. The difference lies in the stress upon the social demands, upon equality and fraternity, in the French revolution's slogans. Equality concerns social positions and relations, not only in being created. Fraternity is just a kind of social

relation between men — being together in community (we think about the Paris Commune), interconnected for mutual help and support insofar as they are free and equal.

Thus, the American revolution placed its main stress upon the person as an individual by reflecting the old roots of individualism in the Anglo-American culture, while the French revolution emphasized sociality and communality (the original idea for the Paris Commune). This constitutes the difference in approach to social life in the USA and in the countries of Western Europe (see note 15 on W.W. Rostow). There are old social, cultural and human differences in the traditions of the countries on opposite sides of the Atlantic.

The American and French revolutions gave much, but not all that was necessary, for people moved on to new social revolutions, especially in France. The Paris Commune of 1871 was the first socialist revolution in history. The leaders and participants of this revolution represented a range of various ideas and programs: followers of Karl Marx and Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Blanquist socialists, radical republicans in the Jacobin tradition, moderate republicans and some others. On March 28, 1871 the Central Committee of the National Guard, composed mainly of Parisian workers, proclaimed an independent government. The aim was to create a real people's society and state through the organization of a series of communes in the country. The first and central of these was the Paris Commune, which appealed to other French cities to organize their own, with the end in view that the federation of all the communes would form a national government. Such communes were then created in Marseille, Lyon and other cities (which shows the eagerness of people radically to reconstruct society and social life). Though they were quickly suppressed, the Paris Commune approved many radical and revolutionary measures to benefit urban workingmen and other groups of the population, and with a view to organizing civil society on the principles of a direct people's democracy, with justice and equality. The Paris Commune revolution was overthrown by the Versailles troops during the bloody week of May 21-28, 1871. That it cost the lives of more than 20,000 Communards shows the breadth of this revolutionary movement.

The victorious October Revolution in Russia in 1917 continued the traditions of the two French revolutions (1789 and 1871) and the two previous Russian revolutions (1905 and February, 1917). Its main task was to destroy the system of capitalist and feudal exploitation and oppression in the country. The ideas, program and practical lines of the October revolution were understandable to common people: power to the "Soviets" made up of deputies of the peasants, workers and soldiers (people's power); land to the peasants (people's land); factories to the workers (people's, social enterprises); peace to all peoples; freedom to all nations and national groups. The first soviet government, headed by Lenin, in 1917-1918 recognized or declared the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The essence of the October Revolution was further to socialize the life of all men and all people on the principles of liberty (people's democracy), equality and justice, fraternity and collectivism, peace and dignity for each person and each nation and nationality. It was a people's revolution, made by the people and for the sake and benefit of the people. That is why in the first decades after the revolution many workers, engineers and managers by their own will and desire came from Germany, Sweden, Finland, USA, Hungary, Poland and other countries to live and work in Soviet Russia as the first workers country in order to help the successful development of that country.

The October Revolution in its first five years focused on practical radical measures and the realization of the goals that had been set. This secured support from the people and facilitated economic, social, political success and cultural development. At the same time there were many

difficulties and even crisis situations (especially in March 1921) which were quickly overcome for the sake of the people. Power, land and factories were in the hands of the actual laborers who thus became subjects in society, beginning the formation of civil society in the country. Their alienation from power, work and life itself was successfully overcome. The sense of freedom and liberty was expressed practically in everyday life. These were years of revolution and enthusiasm, of humanization of social relations and social life. Present day publications by historians support this interpretation of these events.

The analysis of experience and history of these four revolutions in mankind's history shows that although different they helped people to move along the lines of progress and humanity, culture and civilization. They raised to new levels the problems of people's individual and social rights, and created possibilities for moving ahead in the direction of freedom, democracy, justice, equality and the humanization of social life. They changed and reconstructed society — each through its own goals and practical measures. If they did not create the "best" society on earth, still they did much to improve and better the social life of the people.

Thus, these social movements, reforms and revolutions had a place in history. In some aspects they fulfilled and in others did not fulfill their objective and subjective aims and intentions. They were needed instruments for the radical improvement and reconstruction of social life, and they remain such instruments for the future life of humanity. There is still too much inhumanity, injustice, discrimination and poverty, violence, oppression and inadmissible cruelty in the world which can and must be remedied through active mass social movements. One should not exclude from them social and political revolutions, especially when they are real mass revolutions of the people and express the social, political and human needs and aspirations of those who actually realize human life — the peoples.

Social Life and the Humanization in Socialist Conditions

We have seen that in the real historical process the development of social life is not simple but takes place in an uneasy, contradictory fashion. The same dialectical manifestations are characteristic of the development of social life in socialist societies in the countries of the Second World. Our attention will be concentrated on the situation and problems of social life and its humanization in soviet society in the USSR.

The Initial Rise of Social Activity and Life After the October Revolution, 1917

The October Revolution of 1917, as any revolution, started from below and awoke the masses of people for political and social action. It was truly a social movement of the people, first of all in cities and then in villages and the countryside, through meetings, demonstrations, protests, demands, expropriations, revolt, and civil and class struggle. From the previous revolutions of 1905 and February, 1917, the masses of people already had some experience of extraordinary social action, but not the experience of organized and humane social life. These had been practically absent in the pre-revolutionary conditions of the Tzarist regime. The masses of people were not yet acquainted with democratic forms of social life, with social and political self-expression. Without liberty, they were objects of the social policy of Tzarist rule.

Participating in the Revolution, masses of soldiers, workers, peasants and other citizens created from below the political and social forms of their action and power — the so-called

"Soviets." These were organs of the masses composed of deputies freely and democratically elected by the people through direct discussion and voting.

"Power to the Soviets" was one of the main slogans and lines of development of the October Revolution. The "Soviets" constituted the organizational form for the people's mass social and political activity, for self-government from below in all the affairs in each region of the country and in society as a whole. In the "Soviets" the people sought the guarantee for freedom of social and political life. This brought out the initiative and energetic social life of the largest masses of common workers, peasants, intellectuals, soldiers and students. That is why through the people's "Soviets" the masses began to change from being objects to subjects of their social life and historical process.

In socialist conditions for the first time in the history of Russia there began the formation of civil society. This awakening of the masses of people to free social life helped to overcome such extraordinary internal and external obstacles to social development as civil war, the intervention of foreign troops and hunger. For 4 to 5 years (1918-1922) this promoted industry and agriculture, restored the export of grain (wheat, rye) and introduced already in 1922 convertible currency ("*chervonetz*" — a ten-ruble note, also as a ten-ruble gold coin). The country grew economically and culturally, took the first visible steps in the direction of becoming a civilized society with greater integration into the development process of human civilization.

W.W. Rostow, Concerning the Development of the Economy in the USSR during the First Years after Revolution, States

The Communists inherited, then, an economy that had taken off; and one which had developed a substantial export surplus in agriculture.

It took about a decade for Lenin and his successors to reorganize this system to their taste, and to get it back to its previous peak output; and then came the series of Five Year Plans. They are to be understood not as a take-off but as a drive to maturity: the process of industrial differentiation, the advance to modernization on a wide front.17

After the first stages of Soviet society (1917-1922 and till 1929) some very important features which characterized the development of social life began to disappear and mostly disappeared during the second period (that of Stalin's dictatorship from the end of the 20's till Stalin's death in 1953 and even during the post-Stalin period). Till now, in this third period (*perestroika*), these have not yet been restored fully in the life of Soviet society and its people. We shall mention these five features, which characterized the development of social life in Soviet society in the first period.

First, real social life may be created only by the people themselves, for it is a product of the life and actions of living people. This was the policy of the first government, headed by Lenin, and of the Communist party at that time. The new socialist society was not forced upon the people or simply decreed, as had been done later in Stalinist times. People formed social life according to their own understanding, including the socialist ideas which they shared. Because of this the development of social life was natural, rather than artificial, as it later was to become in Stalin's and subsequent times. People were the real creators of the relations of their social life.

Second, social life was formed freely by the people in conditions of real democracy. There was full correspondence between freedom of thought, speech and actions in those years in defending and asserting their rights and positions. Social and political life was pervaded mostly by high socialist ideals and intentions rather than being directed to primitive, narrow and pragmatic

tasks. This was a revolutionary time of great ideas, enthusiasm, spiritual uplift and progress. Unanimity of ideas led to unity of the social action of masses of people and as a result led to great and progressive changes in people's social relations and to the humanization of their social life.

Third, because of this free expression of ideas and action, social life developed by means of a pluralism of ideological expression and social action, contradictions, and even revolts. The main one was in March of 1921 (the Kronshtadt revolt of sailors as mostly former peasants), which was called by Lenin the most serious economic and political crisis of Soviet power. In contrast to the number of crises not decided in our country during 1985-1990, the crisis of 1921 was resolved quickly (in 6 days), radically (the "new economic policy" was introduced by Lenin) and for the sake of people, first of all of the peasants. They were very satisfied by this radical reform, which quickly gave positive results in the sense of a large rise in agrarian productivity and the renewal from 1922 of grain exports abroad in the millions of tons. This, in turn, provided the foreign currency, so greatly needed by the socialist state for the development of the economy and of culture.

Fourth, social life was developing in accord with the principles of social justice and equality: all who were working were on the same level and had the same responsibilities in socialist enterprises. The new society was created consisting in the community of laboring people. Social differences could result only from differences in labor, not in wealth or power.

Being divided into classes and groups (workers, peasants, intellectuals and others), society was not divided unjustly into classes composed of those with privilege and common persons, the elite and the people, "they" and "we," the wealthy and the powerful vs. groups of common laborers, as happened from Stalin's period until now. Society was not a social pyramid with an "upper" or "top" and the "lower" levels, as it is now, where the "top" is constituted by privileged power and wealth (including private business, the "black market" and speculators), while the "lower" is represented by millions of honest socialist laboring people, working masses.

In the first years, that is, in "Lenin's period" of soviet history, all saw and felt personally that life was based on socialist principles of justice and equality.

Fifth, social relations between people were human relations. Men were creating a society of people, not of money (wealth) or power. What was most important for them was "to be" persons, that is, real social beings with their own free social and personal life. Expecting the same attitude on the part of other persons, people considered social life to be not only human, but also collective and communal. They did not want to be separated one from the other, individualistic or closed, as from Stalin's time, but open. Hence, they formed social relations and a civil society which was open to all other people, including some who came freely to the Soviet Union from many capitalist countries, including the USA.

These were very important features and characteristics of the new social life, formed and developed in soviet society in the first years after the October Revolution in 1917. Historical data shows that people mostly supported radical changes in social relations. They considered themselves to be real powers in social life and were happy with the new social developments as improving and making more open and free their entire material, economic, cultural, social, political and spiritual life. Though still backward in many respects (especially economically and culturally), they considered the new social life to be truly their own, rather than that of elites.

In sum, people considered themselves to be better off in all respects, with more justice and humanity. This was the main character of the objective and subjective social situation in the first post-revolutionary years of societal development. This social situation began to change negatively after Lenin's death and the emergence of Stalin's dictorial rule.

Difficulties in Development of Social Life and the Deformation of Society and of People's Lives Through Stalin's Dictatorship

The optimistic beginning in the free, democratic development of social life, which began in the time of Lenin was interrupted in the 30s with Stalin's institution of a personal dictatorship. Society in the USSR began to lose many essential features of socialism: its popular character, leadership by the workers, democracy, freedom, justice, self-development of people and nations, and the expression of one's personality. The social deformation principally affected power and property. Instead of the power of masses of people through the "Soviets," Stalin established his own tyrannical power supported by a huge party and state apparatus to which the public property of the workers, engineers and peasants was transferred.

All this transformed the people again from subjects to objects of social life, now in socialist conditions, thus interrupting the process of creating civic society in the USSR. Totalitarian domination by the state over the people's social life caused fear and dread in the exercise of free social activity. In reality there was a decline, even a crisis in the development of social life.

Negative changes in social life in the USSR during the time of Stalin and subsequent rulers (N.S. Krushchev from 1955, L.I. Brezhnev from 1964) had a negative effect upon the development of social life in other socialist countries, especially those Eastern European socialist countries close to the USSR. "Sovietcentrism" did not encourage creative, humane and democratic socialist forces in those countries during the 40's-60's.

All this points to the difficult areas of socialist development, in which some of its main advantages may become obstacles for the real development of socialism and social life, namely, the social and political actions of people, their ideals, ideas and inspirations, especially the actions of party and state leaders or rulers not controlled by the masses of people from below. This is the situation, when uncontrolled actions and the policy of the party and state leaders — usually one and the same leader — become voluntaristic and subjectivistic, without correspondence to the objective laws of the historical development of socialism, which they proclaim only in words.

This situation began from the Stalinist period. Lenin in the last years of his life (1922-1923) had already noticed these features of Stalin's character and mode of action and suggested removing Stalin from the post of Secretary General of the Communist Party, to which he had been appointed eight months before. Lenin suggested some concrete measures such as electing from the masses from 50 to 100 workers and peasants as members of the Central Committee of the Party, and some of these to the Politbureau. This would enable the masses to control the actions of party functionaries, including members of the Politbureau and the Secretary General himself. But most of these measures were not realized by Stalin or after him, not even in the years of *perestroika* when the political direction was proclaimed as a "return" to Lenin's theory and practice of socialism. To place political power in the hands of the top political leadership uncontrolled from the masses of the population below has then been the consistent focus and goal of the rulers.

The situation in the Soviet Union and the recent "Revolution of 1989" in Eastern European socialist countries show that in all these countries the masses of people long understood and had been indignant regarding the uncontrolled voluntaristic political rule of the small power elite, headed by one, often middle-aged or older, person. Thus, all those so-called "leaders" disappeared at once, many being severely condemned as good lessons for those that remained.

'Perestroika': Tasks of the Renovation of Soviet Society, Difficulties and Contradictions in the Present Social Situation

Perestroika (restructuring) appeared as an objectively needed and subjectively long awaited radical, revolutionary and rapid improvement of the existent complicated situation in social life. Its goal was to secure a mode of life for all masses of the Soviet people which would be economically effective, politically democratic and free, socially just and equal, and spiritually more humane, cultured, moral and value-laden. For this it was necessary to abolish a number of deformations in societal life which arose during the 60 year period from the end of the 20's to the middle of the 80's.

Two main lines of changes, positive and negative, were hoped for by the people and proclaimed by leaders.

For securing positive progress in society, it was necessary first of all to return the power to the people themselves, both power from below in all localities, and power from above. Democracy had to be introduced and guaranteed throughout the whole society. Secondly, property had to be returned from the state and state apparatus to the laborers themselves. This would really interest them concretely in raising productivity and efficiency (Lenin had noted that only labor "for oneself" could be really effective and productive).

Neither of these two main positive lines were achieved during the five years beginning in 1985. Undoubtedly, a democratic process was begun in the country, but mostly at the upper levels of the social structure. *Glasnost* (openness) added many new democratic avenues to social life: the gap between thinking and the ability to speak and to act was mainly overcome. But we should not forget that glasnost was the normal reality in the country for the five, even ten, years after 1917, and that even nowadays the truth is not yet fully spoken without limitations and restrictions.

Negatively, two undemocratic, unjust, anti-populist phenomena in society have yet to be abolished. One, created from Stalinist times, is the powerful "Command-administrative system" from the top, which secured for the members of this system enormous privileges. The other, created mostly in Brezhnev's time is the "grey" or "black" economy, parasitically plundering people's labor and undermining the Socialist economy by speculation and bribery (graft). Often both factors are connected and support each other, for power needs money, while wealth must be supported by power. Thus, corruption develops at both the top and at the other levels of a deformed social structure.

That neither of these anti-democratic, unjust and anti-people's "systems" were abolished during the five years of *perestroika* is astonishing and incomprehensible. Why have the leaders not done so? Even after the radical and revolutionary events of the end of 1989 and the beginning (January-March) of 1990 in Eastern European countries, during which the old antidemocratic institutions were abolished, nothing concrete of this sort was done by the top authority in the Soviet Union. Time will tell whether they reject such anti-people systems or are connected with them.

One thing is clear for the majority of the population in the Soviet Union: the real economic, material, cultural and social life of the people has worsened greatly compared to pre-*perestroika* times. Was it necessary to begin *perestroika* only in order to seize political power?

Whereas in the first years of Soviet development people were satisfied with the social changes and improvements in their life, now they are not. If then they saw positive reconstruction and achievements in social life, now they feel quite the opposite. In terms of humanization they are not satisfied with their own or their country's social, political and moral position. What exists now is mostly the ruins of the previous country. The people look to the leaders who have brought the

country to this unusual and unthinkable situation, and have the right to ask: What kind of leadership has turned the country into a place without a past, present and future?

Now *perestroika* as well as the country and its people are at a turning point in their development; in which direction will social life and society turn? There are various alternatives, but ultimately the decision must be made by the people themselves, and first of all by those who labor in the material, cultural and spiritual spheres and constitute the real basis and scope of society. They created the country, defended and saved it in World War II, and now are eager to secure a more progressive development. The way must be one of real, radical, revolutionary innovation, renovation and improvement; it must strengthen the country, not weaken it; raise, not lower, its world prestige; make the country more humane, democratic, just and people-oriented.

Towards a New Stage of the Development of Social Life in the World Community

Keeping in mind the dialectical logic of the development of social life, its change during the process of history (Part 1), and the changes in social life in present Socialist conditions (Part 2), it is necessary to think carefully about further prospects for the development of social life in the world.

Progressive changes everywhere — in First, Second and Third Worlds, in society and personality, in culture and civilization — demonstrate the objective and subjective directions for a mutually interrelated and humane development for all mankind. We summarize here them as follows:

- Stress upon the popular or mass character of social life. This is not the life of particular people or of the selected or self-selected; ideally it should be the life of all persons in society.

- A personal "starting point" for social life. As only an individually enriched, well-rounded and developed personality can constitute the basis for an active and rich social life, this must be humane.

- A dialectical connection of personal and social life, of person with community and society, of personality and sociality. Humanism must always be social. There must be individuality but not individualism, collectivity but not dependence.

- Justice and equality as the principles of a humanized social life. Without these social life cannot be really human or human beings fully social.

- Freedom and liberty for all personal and social relations: a close connection of freedom with sociality and social life, as was stated in the French Revolutionary motto "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."

- A high spiritual, cultural and moral level in social life and relations as the real "soul" of social life. Active social life cannot be soulless, for spirit, ideas, ideals and culture create strong beliefs (religious, scientific, or both) for social and other initiatives.

- Creativity (see the title of McLean's paper, "Person, Creativity and Social Change"): the construction and reconstruction of social life by the people as an expression of their search for justice, equality and freedom. Ideally social life should always be the result of the free creativity of the masses of people; it cannot be forced upon people, nor given to them as a present from above; social life is the people's own life and fortune.

- Change in social life — its evolution and revolution — as the method for improving and bettering the life of the largest masses of people. Activity, not passivity, as the main attitude of people to social life.

- Social life, as any other sphere of life, is one of the more important values of humanity and sociality; it is the great creation and achievement of civilization and of mankind. Its care, development, improvement and perfection is the indispensable goal and task of the entire people.

- Dialectical inter-connectedness of social life with the full complexity of the universe: nature, man, society, culture and civilization. Social life must contribute to all of them and they must return its gift.

- For this reason the humanization of social life is the essential component of the humanization of the entire universe. This combines efforts at the humanization of nature, man himself, society, culture and civilization.

These are the main dimensions and directions for the humanization of social life in modern and future society.

A new stage, not only of thinking, but especially of action and interaction is needed and inevitable. The dialectics of unity and diversity should increasingly unite all parts of the world, all peoples and nations, in the search for a more humane and just social life. At the same time, different peoples and nations, personalities and communities should be able to follow the paths of social, political, economic and spiritual progress they have freely chosen.

It is necessary to reject tendencies, on the one hand, to consider one's own manner of developing social life to be the best or the sole possible, and, on the other hand, to reject all other manners of development of social life as unperceptive, inhuman, harmful or even evil. It is time to stop frightening people by the terms "socialism," "communism" and "Marxism" for they are real theories, movements and societies; they are real parts of the human culture, history and civilization, created and chosen by the people.

Kim Keyes wrote in *The Washington Post* on February 24, 1990, the following:

In your editorial "Hailing South Africa's Communists" [Feb. 13], you denounced the African National Congress's 1955 Freedom Charter as a "lumpily Marxist formulation." Obviously you never read it thoroughly.

The Freedom Charter's "Marxist" provisions include: the eradication of adult illiteracy (Barbara Bush's cause); the right to a fair trial and an end of unauthorized searches and seizures (see the U.S. Bill of Rights); the right to unrestricted travel (a right U.S. citizens enjoy); an end to discrimination on the basis of race or sex (a goal of U.S. civil rights activists and feminists); and the imposition of a 40-hour work week, minimum wage and paid leave time (policies similar to those of an average U.S. corporation). In addition, the Freedom Charter never mentions — either in name or spirit — Lenin, Marx, Stalin, Mao or any other Communist.

Under your standards, the U.S. Constitution would be "Marxist." Or do you believe that Americans enjoy too many civil liberties?

Let us respect all others' ideas, ideals, social positions, movements and structures which may exist, principally, because people themselves have chosen and prefer them. Social pluralism is better than social monopoly, social choice than social determinism, social competition than social guidance and leadership, and social democracy than social dictatorship.

A new stage in the humanization of social life inevitably means respect for free choices and alternatives in the social development of all nations, peoples and countries. Shared progress is to be found along the road of multiple expressions for the expectations, hopes and dreams of peoples and persons for a better and happy life. Our future can best be seen as a world community of all

social units, expressions and positions, rather than as the domination and supremacy of one social power over all others. We need great mutual efforts to secure major progress in realizing the potentialities of social life and humanism for all people around the world.

Notes

1. See W.W. Rostow, *The World Economy: History and Prospect* (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1978), pp. 48, 51, 661.

2. *Ibid*., pp. 12, 26.

3. See Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man; Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

4. Erich Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope; Toward a Humanized Technology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 135-136.

5. See Erich Fromm*, To Have or To Be?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).

6. W.W. Rostow, *op. cit*., p. 247.

7. *Ibid*., p. 51.

8. *Ibid*., p. 52.

9. Jim Hoagland, "Finally, a Global Economy," *The Washington Post,* February 27, 1990, A23.

10. Victor Cathrein, S.J., *Socialism: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1904), pp. 21-23.

11. Thomas Kirkup, *A History of Socialism* (London: Black, 1913), pp. 3-4.

12. Victor Cathrein, *op. cit*., pp. 17, 19, 13.

13. Thomas Kirkup, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

14. Erich Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope*, p. 134.

15. W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1965), pp. 162, 82.

16. Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 491.

17. W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto,* p. 66.

Scientism, Free Choice and Harmony:
A Chinese Contribution to the Contemporary Challenge

Fang Nengyu

In keeping with the interdisciplinary and cross-cultural character of this study I would like to relate medicine and science for the purpose of comparing these in Chinese culture, and in Western culture.

Medicine and Human Values

Medical practice is undoubtedly human behavior, but it can also be most inhumane. For example, as early as 15,000 years ago operations in Europe drilled into the skull; amputation and other such operations were common in ancient Greek medicine. One picture of an operation at that time shows a patient bound to a table with strong men pressing upon him while the operation was being performed. Most patients were not cured, but killed. From the very beginning of humanity medical efforts have not been humane but cruel.1 Hence, Hippocrates decided that he would never surgically operate, except for a cyst lithotomy, and swore to do no harm to the patient.2 This oath has since become a main principle in medical ethics. But medical cruelty such as bleeding and Paré's cauterization continued in medieval times. Even Hitler's slaughter of the handicapped and the mentally ill was carried out under the name of medical kindness, euthanasia.

To guide their behavior, doctors chose the will of a deity. Later the paramount value became an abstract principle and they considered their behavior to be right if in accord with scientific theory. "Scientism" consists in taking a scientific theory as a dogma, an "iron-cage" or an absolute principle and applying it forcibly at the expense of other values, especially that of humanity. Western doctors are susceptible to just such inhumanity since in the Western scientific tradition the patient is taken as an object or machine to be treated according to scientific principles. This leads to medical cruelty.

In contrast, in traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) doctors do not conceive man as a machine. Instead, they understand the patient in terms of their own experience and empathize with him or her. This hermeneutic tends to generate more consideration of the patient's feelings and pain. Under the Chinese value of harmony drastic measures are usually not adopted to treat a patient. Hence, such medical cruelty as is mentioned above seldom occurred in Chinese medical history: different values produced different effects, even without being specifically conscious of these issues.

Alienation

Similarly, many rulers have taken certain doctrines as value-guides to policy, thinking they were carrying out the most scientific social system. Their original intent may have been to do good for their countries and to be kind to their people, but in the end they practiced a cruel politic, did evil to their countries and became cruel tyrants. The Chinese government exemplifies this. Mao Tze-tung and Zhou En-lai did not intend to ruin the country; their private life was not luxurious, and they dedicated themselves to the Chinese "communist" revolution. Nevertheless, they became

tyrants and accomplices. Mao said, "I do not think Emperor Qin-I3 was the cruelest tyrant in Chinese history. In his evil action of burning books and burying intellectuals, only 3,000 intellectuals were buried, whereas we have oppressed (the Chinese term means killed, but includes imprisoned) more than 300,000." This figure, from the "Campaign of Liquidation of Counter-Revolutionaries" (March 1956), is not a mistake, but the result of a premeditated policy carried out according to the theory of proletarian dictatorship. They choose pseudo-communism as the paramount value at the cost of humanism. I call it "pseudo-communism" for as humanism real communism intended to prevent the alienation of man.

The mechanism by which the original intention to construct communism arrived at its opposite, is multi-factorial. Epistemologically, they misunderstood science, seeing it as an abstract truth, an iron rule or dogma; thus they opposed science and free-will such that in order to strive for freedom they felt they had to follow a scientific route and subordinate to the scientific method all other such human values as individual free-will, *amor personae*, etc. This was a misunderstanding of Engels' statement that "Freedom is obedience to necessity." Engels had meant the status of freedom, not the philosophical meaning of free-will. Further, he continued that man must control and make use of necessity: the natural law of necessity should serve man. One of the former leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Ju Qiou-bai, said that a scientific outlook upon the world is needed in striving for liberation and that the Marxist worldview with its sense of history, viz., its law of social development (scientific communism), is the highest science: a law we have to obey. This plants the seed of believing blindly, obeying absolutely, combating dissenters, and totalitarianism. Under this dogmatic understanding the leaders unconsciously became so alienated as to oppose individual liberty and scientific reserve, and to move on to slavery.

Institutional Basis of Alienation

Before these ideologically alienated Party leaders had seized the government, their alienation was manifested only in their cruel internal struggles and their liquidation of dissent. This occurred many times in the history of the Chinese Communist Party and the international communist movement, but the harm it did was limited. However, after taking over the state under the extremist theory of proletarian dictatorship, they established a system which structured their totalitarianism into institutions and organs. Through the great power of these organs of dictatorship they arbitrarily and forcefully proceeded in their extremist direction without respect for the will of the people. They persecuted dissidents and even the mass population of intellectuals out of fear of their knowledge.

Their blind belief in a cult of personality and totalitarianism was magnified greatly by an institutional fixation. Structuralists point out that institutions make things move automatically (Levi-Strauss) and maintain the social system (Radcliffe-Brown). Thus, the establishment of an institution is vitally important as it determines the further development of a society. French type revolutions established the first constitutional countries and made possible development of the capitalist system. The Constitution of the U.S. guaranteed the further development of that country. In contrast Lenin's establishment of a dictatorship and the institutions of a monopoly government provided the conditions for the origin of Stalinism.

The key role of an institution is to provide a fixed power structure. According to a widely accepted definition, power is the ability of one person to influence other persons. Rulers who are scientistic are always power-philiacs; for from their deterministic point of view, they think that the

more they forcibly carry out their "supremely scientific social theory," the greater the success to be obtained. They exercise their dogmatic will at the cost of the will of the people, and hence of humanity. In this sense oligarchy contradicts humanism: any social system is inhuman if it is oligarchical; any political reformation is false if there is no change from oligarchy. By this measuring rod Deng Shao-ping never carried out real reform in China. In 1979-1980 he made some suggestions for reforming the government personnel system, abolishing the system of life-long officers and diminishing centralization, but neither carried them out nor mentioned them later. His "openness to the world" policy was not real openness, which first of all must be interior (i.e., carrying out democracy, ending oligarchy, guaranteeing the basic human rights of people), and then an attitude of openness to the world. Gorbachev proposed the term *perestroika* (restructuring), and took real steps to carry it out. People throughout the world watched these developments in Soviet Russia, though it remains oligarchic.

These issues are reflected in the advance of biomedical technology whereby medical science has come to exercise ever greater influence upon human life. Psychotropic drugs directly modify human behavior and genetic engineering; artificial insemination, and other genetic technologies act upon the heredity of humanity so that the evolution of mankind is determined no longer by natural selection, but by cultural selection. It would be an unimaginable horror if the evolution of mankind is not guaranteed in terms which include the many faces of mankind, human dignity, people's choice, etc., rather than only the choice of a few oligarchs or scientists as would be the case if a few persons could decide to explode a nuclear bomb. Therefore, today there is an ever more urgent to broaden one's personal moral sense to the full dimensions of humanity and to strive to develop institutional and constitutional guarantees for sharing power with the people.

It is hopeful in the field of medicine to see the principle of informed consent with full respect for the patient's free choice firmly established and fixed by regulations. This minimizes paternalism on the part of the doctor, and medical inhumanity. We can look forward to a parallel as regards human values in social life.

Objective and Affective Needs of Society

The gathering of people into family-clan-tribe-community-society is in response to the need not only for objective struggle against nature but also for interpersonal or social sensibility and concern. Solecki found the first evidence of the bonds joining primitive Neanderthals into society in the gathering of pollen around Neanderthal skeletons. This memorial indicated the emergence of self-awareness regarding death, and of the ties that bound the Neanderthals into a society. Therefore, we can say that the social life of mankind emerges concomitantly with the emergence of self-consciousness and love among people. A society must be organized by morality and legislation, but morality comes first. However, since morality is an integration of affection and rational judgment (justice), society cannot be formed without affection.

Ruling is a derivative and alienated phenomenon. Many historians have held that the division between the rulers and the ruled was due to the requirements of production in primitive society, i.e., that production in primitive society required a slavery system by which people could be organized and forced to carry out massive building projects such as irrigation systems, pyramids, castles, the Great Wall, etc. This explanation is doubtful for Japanese scientists have found recently that the Great Pyramid was the achievement of mass and especially religious enthusiasm, while the smaller pyramid, which is in risk of collapsing, was constructed by the forced labor of slaves. In ancient China the legendary flood control and irrigation system construction under Xia-yu and

the famous Dujiang (Du River) Dam were constructed through voluntary participation by the mass of the population, rather than by slavery. Even the Great Wall was not constructed by forced labor, for Emperor Qin-I only connected fragmentary walls which had been constructed voluntarily during the times of the original countries. In history the outstanding cultures of both ancient Greece or ancient China were developed under kind rulers or in a more free period: tyrants were much fewer and always short-lived. Thus, humanity plays a leading role in the progression of society which can be promoted only in humane ways, not forcibly through a so-called scientific doctrine.

Science: Necessity or Freedom

Let us return to the question: Does science discover 'truths', i.e., a necessity which has to be obeyed? On the one hand, science is a knowledge system which has been man-made in order to reflect objective reality; it must be proven by facts and follow the rules of logic. It has a certain degree of objectivity and to a certain degree it reflects truth; in this sense it must be respected. On the other hand, science belongs to the World-3 of Popper: It is a man-made hypothesis or instrument to explain and predict the world; it is a part of culture which man has developed in order to adjust better to nature in striving for more freedom. In this sense it is a creation of free choice. Science should enable us to choose better, to explain more facts, to apply them more effectively, to predict more correctly, to be simpler, to be in accord with various principles, to live in greater harmony and with more beauty, and therefore to be more humane. Science is never absolute truth which has to be obeyed absolutely; scientific theories are conjectures which have to be tested through refutation (Popper). Hence, the essential spirit of science is skepticism which makes possible continued choice. For Popper the reason why man can understand nature is that he is a part of it; that is, the foundation for understanding nature is the very nature of man or humanity.

As the reason why science continues to develop is the free choice of man, society will improve through people's free choice. Allowing them to choose is in accord with the natural law of selection which has been the natural process of evolution all along. The opening poem in a famous Chinese classical novel, *The Three Kingdoms*, says, "the river flows eastward. How many heroes have been submerged in its rolling waves!" Dictators can avoid the choice of the people for a time, but cannot escape trial by history!

If free choice is most important, this does not mean that scientific theory is not needed, for choice must be guided by thought; without thinking there would be no choice, for theory helps people think. However, this is not to say scientific theories are laws which must be obeyed absolutely. In a challenging world we have ever greater need for theories, but these must be humane and must be treated as suggestive rather than as imperative.

The Chinese Sense of Harmony in a Changing World

For more than 2,000 years ancient Chinese society had a very brilliant civilization and a very stable society. Needless to say there are important elements in the Chinese vision which made ancient China so stable and which could be helpful in facing present challenges. The core idea is harmony which is a trinity of:

harmony between nature and man,
harmony between persons, and
harmony of human nature.

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Harmony Between Nature and Man

Harmony begins with nature and man, who is marked by benevolence, justice, feeling, honesty, etc. The harmony constituted by these virtues is rooted in the harmony of Heaven. Mencius said, "He who has exhausted all his mental constitution knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows heaven." That is to say that his 'man'- nature (harmony) is the same as the nature (harmony) of Heaven. This means also that man is a part of Nature. Nature has its regularity. In one's volitional activity, it is better to observe the regularity of nature. As the Chinese Medical Canon stated, "Winter is a season of hibernation, so one should stay in his room," and the like.

In fact, Heaven is not important in Chinese ideology, since the Chinese never seek to explore it except to note that it provides a foundation for the humanity of man and the ethics of human society. This does not mean that Heaven is a supreme power or superior to man who, in the Chinese vision, is the center of the Universe (geocentric). The Deity-centered view waned early in Chinese history. In the *Book of Odes* (*Shi Jin*) there are such sentences as "Heaven is not to be believed," "Destiny is not imperative," and "Fortune depends on yourself." In Zhou Dynasty (B.C. 1122-249) the idea of human domination was established. In Zhuo Zhan (*Historical Record*) there are such sentences as "Fortune and disaster are determined by man," "The people is the Lord of Deity," and "The Tao of man is near, the Tao of Heaven is far and cannot be reached." About the same time in ancient Greece there arose the idea that "Man is the measure of all things" (Protagoras), but this did not dominate their overall view. Harmony between heaven and man with human desires in accord with the Tao of Heaven, is man's highest spiritual and moral achievement. When this unity between man and Heaven is reached, one will see things not as objects but as a part of the unity, i.e., "Everything is in my mind." This is the highest level of life, viz., unity of spirit and body and congruence of subject and object.

In Western thought there is a relation between heaven and man but this is different from the sense of harmony in China. In ancient Babylon astronomy developed to predict human affairs and health. Plato suggested the concept of macrocosmos and microcosmos. Paracelsus drew very detailed parallels between nature and man, comparing veins to rivers, and every part of the human body to particular stars in the sky, etc. Western thought is more formal and statistical, where the Chinese sense of harmony is more functional and dynamic.

The Harmonious Person

This means that man is by nature good. Confucius first pointed out the self-consciousness of man, saying "Man is noble for his self-understanding." Hsün Tzu first pointed out the rational nature of man, observing that "water and fire have *Qi* (energy) but no life; plants have life but no learning, animals can learn but have no justice; Man has *Qi*, life, learning and justice." Mencius said,

If you let people follow their feelings (original nature), they will be able to do good. . . . The feeling of commiseration is found in all men; the feeling of shame and dislike is found in all men; the feeling of respect and reverence is found in all men; the feeling of right and wrong is found in all men. . . . They are not drilled into us from outside. We originally have them within us.

This refers not only to virtues, but also to man's natural desires. Therefore, "Desire for food and sex is the greatest ethics of humanity" (Confucius). All these are in accord with universal ethics or rite. "Rite of no rite, music of no sound" denotes this natural harmony. Therefore, the rationale is in man himself and the desire to overcome evil by virtue is within man. Hence, when faced with moral dilemmas one can ask one's heart. Confucius used to teach people to reflect in their hearts as a way of solving life's puzzles. In the Indian and Western religions the harmony of man is sought in another world. In Christian culture reason and virtue tend to be abstracted to God; as man is fallen he must receive revelation and salvation from God. Kant's *a priori* morality is akin to innate virtue, but it is transcendental. Freud made the unification in man himself, but postulated that the instinctual drive of the id tended to evil. In interaction with the environment the ego is differentiated from the id, and the superego develops. The ego and superego develop through an elaboration of reason (in part through Skinner's conditioning), which is internalized into the subconscious and unconscious. These Western ideas differ from Chinese thought in stressing conflicts, and envisaging unification through suppression. In Western culture since the Renaissance it is sought in materialistic hedonism. The Chinese idea of the harmonized person integrates realism and idealism; it seeks self-cultivation and social responsibility. Confucius said, "Begin with poetry, rise up with norms and reach to music," i.e., cultivate in the context of culture. "The sage is increasingly energetic" (Mencius) in taking on social responsibility in spite of the heavy burdens and great distances" (*Tsang San*) in order to reach the harmonious realm.

Harmonious Society

A harmonious society (Great Community) is the idealized society in Chinese thought. It will be achieved first by the "cultivation of one's self, then by the harmonization of one's family and finally by expanding to all the world." Proverbs such as "harmony is the noblest," "With a harmonious family everything will succeed," and "Everything will be prosperous in a harmonious world," reflect the importance of harmony in social life. The foundation of a harmonious society is *Ren*4 (humanism); hence, Confucius said, "The world arrives at *Ren*".

Since the Chinese established the idea that "man is noblest" about 3,000 years ago, religion never fully formed in China; the country cannot be organized by the force of religion (God). The Chinese also lack a spirit of law. A Code of Hammurabi or Roman Law has never been established in China, and the force of law in social life is weak. Thus this very large country has functioned on a more autonomous basis, depending upon the ethical order of family. According to an organic concept the Chinese believe that everything proceeds in its own place according to the Tao. An experienced government official, Lu Kin-wu of the Ming Dynasty, said, "The principle of administration is to make stable without disturbing, giving without taking, doing good by not-harming, making prosperous by no-action."5 The motto of Lao Tzu: "by acting without action all things will be in order" has deeply influenced Chinese ideology. Another saying of Lao Tzu, "To know harmony means to be in accord with the eternal" can serve as its motto. In the West there is also a motto. "The government is best which governs least." This is similar to Chinese thought.

Hence, the key notion is harmony. The proverbs "Extremes meet" in the West and "Everything in its extreme goes to the opposite" in China supplement this idea. "In order to contract, it is necessary to expand. . . . In order to receive it is necessary first to give"6 (Lao Tzu).

Therefore, in order to organize people it is necessary to practice democracy; in order to administer it is necessary to allow them to act autonomously; in order to avoid trouble from people it is necessary to promote the humanization and social life of the people.

There is no successful example of an ideology which can forcefully organize and implement life; but liberty, harmony, humanity, etc., can keep a country stable. More than 2,000 years of ancient Chinese history exemplifies this.

The most important contribution of Chinese thought is then that of harmony, which is the core of "Chinese" humanism. In comparison with Western thought, the Chinese vision pays more attention to conciliation than struggle, to function than substance, and to autonomy than control; it is short on ideas of rights, freedom, democracy, organization and legislation. But as a supplement to Western ideas its sense of harmony may contribute to the realization of peace and stability in this changing world.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to discuss a rationale for the application of Chinese thought in social life. What has been said above leads to the conclusion that scientism is directly against the spirit of science and is very harmful for social life. In this dilemma the notion of harmony would appear to be helpful in retaining a human perspective. Is such an ambiguous concept reasonable in this highly scientific age?

First, we can say humanity is harmonic, scientific laws are harmonic, music is harmony, nature is harmony, and anything aesthetic is harmonious. Democratic politics is harmonic and aesthetic. Friedrich Schiller in his "Letters on the Aesthetic Education" concluded: "Man will never solve the problem of politics except through the problem of the aesthetic, for it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom." Hence, as a belief and value harmony is reasonable although it cannot be positively proven.

Secondly, harmony is an idea; unlike positive science pursuing the power to control or manipulate, it serves as a value guide. Harmony cannot be used as a scientific law to produce something of value, but it is a value which can be applicable to social life. Since we believe the world to be a harmony, we must keep our social life harmonious with the world rather than seek power over it. Harmony then is reasonable.

Thirdly, unlike science which takes reality as an object to be controlled, the idea of harmony not only sees objective reality as harmonic, but also has an intuitive inner feeling of harmony with things. In this sense it is transcendent and exists between subject and object. It cannot be proven precisely or logically; it is fuzzy, synthetic and natively reasonable.

Fourthly, socialization is not only a requirement for objective production, but a subjective feeling from human nature. A society cannot be maintained merely by law, power or some ideology; ethical feeling, communication and socialization between persons are required. Harmony and affection are essential demands coming from human nature; to minimize this is to alienate man.

Fifthly, harmony implies conciliation (minimization of conflicts), adaptation (openness and assimilation adjusted to trends in society and the will of the majority), relaxation (less control), mildness (rather than severity), etc. Primitive man was superior to the dinosaur, not in muscular strength but as more adaptable. No matter what the reasons for Mao Tze-tung's thought, the leadership of the Party, the socialist road, etc., it was not good because the practice of any social system, like all human behavior, is a matter of learning by trial and error and hence must include free choice. The pseudo-communism in China and other countries was not intentionally evil; millions of people supported it in the past and it is never too late to change in order to come into harmony with the democratic trend of the world. Hence, harmony can be not only a paramount

value, but also a strategy for living in a challenging world. Finally, I strongly resonate with the word "peace" mentioned in other papers in this collection. In relation to peace, I see the notion of "harmony" as adding philosophical and dynamic content.

Notes

1. As the first evidence of human morality Solecki (1973) interpreted two Neanderthal's femoral bones broken two years before the person's death, as an indication that Neanderthals were compassionate and cared for one another.

2. Many medical historians have puzzled over this oath and given different explanations, but it is not difficult to understand in terms of his human sensibilities.

3. Emperor Qin-I (259-210 B.C.), the cruelest tyrant in Chinese history, killed 460 persons including 30 senior intellectual officers—the figure 3,000 is greatly exaggerated.

4. It is well known that in Chinese thought *Ren* means "to love man" and mutual understanding between persons, as "Put oneself in the situation and empathize with the other person."

5. S.M. Liang, *The Essence of Chinese Culture*, p. 162.

6. Lao Tzu in his *Philosophy of System* predicted that, with the development of information-technology, computers would become popular and that people would work in their homes. This means that society will work in an autonomous manner, in which regard the Chinese sense of life can be suggestive.

Revolutionary Elite in the Periphery:
A Comparative Study of Cuba and Nicaragua

Enrique S. Pumar

Ever since the drastic radicalization of the Cuban revolution, the fallacy of "another Cuba" has been the subject of paramount concern all through the hemisphere. Public and private officials, and some theoreticians in the Social Sciences, repeatedly warn of the dangers of another Castroite type of upheaval. Throughout, various parallels have been outlined between the Cuban model and other instances where social movements seem to menace the status quo, thus popularizing a general theory of revolutions for Latin American politics.

Recent political developments in Nicaragua have not escaped such a problematique. The insurrection against the repressive and illegitimate Somoza regime was perceived in many political circles not so much as an authentic national revolutionary effort, but as a successful attempt by Cuba to export its state of affairs. Paradoxically, this perception was formulated, one may add, despite the "low-profile" played by the Cubans during the course of the struggle in that Central American nation. Several allies of the United States, including Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama among others, in one way or other greatly contoured the fate of Somoza's rule. Concomitantly, there was no need for "an all-out" Cuban involvement. Premier Fidel Castro, aware of the implications of possible Cuban assistance to the Sandinistas, declared early in 1979: "At the moment, the best assistance we can provide to the FSLN is none at all."[1]

The purpose of this study is to compare the two most significant contemporary revolutionary elites in the Western Hemisphere: those of Cuba and Nicaragua. Besides enhancing our understanding of these leaders, one hopes that such a comparison could induce a reexamination of traditional approaches to revolutionaries in Latin America, in general, and, especially to the revolutionary movements and regimes in Central America today.

Underlying this inquiry is the assertion that, despite the many similarities between Cuba and Nicaragua, they constitute quite distinct revolutionary upheavals. On the one hand, Cuba experienced a political revolution, the primary purpose of which was to restructure the state along bourgeois-democratic lines. The social commitments of the revolutionary elite were second to the political one and remained vaguely defined even in 1959. The 26th of July Movement issued several political manifestos but lacked a sound social reconstruction program for its government. In fact, this is one of the criticisms most often made about Castro's organization.[2]

The guiding ideology behind the Cuban revolution was similar in many respects to the one advanced by the democratic sector of the national bourgeoisie and, therefore it might be categorized as reformist and nationalist. Even at their most radical formulation, Castro's proposals and those of his movement resembled the program of the Ortodoxo Party of the late 1940's and early 1950's and the intellectual proposals of the Catholic generation around the same period. The character of the Cuban revolution was moderate rather than radical as is generally professed.

The revolution in Nicaragua, on the other hand, was social. Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and/or transformative processes in that social and political structural changes are sought through class upheavals.[3] An historical analysis of events in Nicaragua illustrates this point. The popular sector massively supported the propositions and actively participated in actions of the radical opposition — the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional.

This phenomenon was without precedent in the traditional political framework of contemporary Nicaraguan politics. The same cannot be said about Cuba where the majority of the populace were not mobilized by the rebels.4 The struggle against Somoza was clearly marked by class conflict, the opposition against Batista was not. Peasants, workers, and some sectors of the middle class battled against the dictator Somoza and his cronies; the democratic sector of the national bourgeiosie maintained its own opposition movement until 1978. Thereafter, three factors debilitated their efforts and forced them to align with the radical opposition: the assassination of their most charismatic leader, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the failure of their negotiations with the Somoza regime and the United States, and finally the departure, from the Frente Amplio de Oposicion coalition, of the Grupo de los Doce and the Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (PSN).

From the beginning the Sandinistas proposed to transform the socio-political structure and the mode of production in the country. For this task, the revolutionary elite predicated a socialist solution, albeit adjusted to the existing conditions in Nicaragua. Consequently, the goal of the revolution and its ideology were bold and radical. Hence, it is safe to hypothesize that the distinct class alliance, organizational structure, and ideology of the revolutionary elite in Cuba and Nicaragua dictated the course and character of the respective upheavals. For reasons that will be explored below, the Cuban revolutionary elite organized a "political protest movement" against the Batista dictatorship. In Nicaragua, however, a "radical social movement" constituted the vanguard of the revolution.

For the purpose of this discussion, a "political protest movement" is one which neither develops a comprehensive political action program of its own or an elaborate ideology. Moreover, the aim is to restructure the state apparatus. On the other hand, a "radical social movement" is integrated by a class-conscious membership whose intention is to transform the polity. To this end, all major social movements elaborate a consistent ideology and "action program" which serve to legitimize their claims.5 Both movements nevertheless share the desire to do away with the *ancien regime.*

This study proposes to demonstrate this assertion by pinpointing the different societal, structural, and international characteristics around which the two revolutions developed and the position of the revolutionary elite with respect to particular situations. Before proceeding, several caveats are in order. Hereto, the emphasis is on substantive, not methodological issues. A valuable discussion of the methodological approach to the paradigm of social movements has already been pursued by Snyder.6 Moreover, a theoretical review of the literature on social movements has also been examined elsewhere.7 Rather, this inquiry will stress only the distinct features of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutionaries, despite similar historical development patterns. With that in mind, this study will be divided as follows: first, the similarities between the two countries are outlined, our hypothesis on the political and social movements will then be illustrated and, finally, some concluding remarks are offered.

Parallels between Cuba and Nicaragua

At first glance, one can draw several parallels between Cuba and Nicaragua. Domestically, both nations suffered from weak democratic institutions, economic dependency, and low levels of social mobilization. Internationally, relations vis-a-vis the core state were asymmetrical.

Cuba's political system was shaped by authoritarianism, public graft, corruption, and increased violence. Her political parties were more a reflection of *personalismo* than representatives of a particular program or ideology. One indication of this is the popular Ortodoxo

Party. After the death of its leader Eduardo Chibas, the party broke into factions, each of which maintained its own strategy and program; thus, by 1954, the "electoristas" supported a political compromise and Action Radical Ortodoxa — the youth party wing — violently opposed one. Then, too, the short democratic experience of the 1940's did not alter the basic components of the Cuban political system. The Autentico Party's platform for the elections of 1944 and 1948 proposed a state program which combined welfare capitalism and democracy by consensus.

Of course, Nicaragua had its share of *personalismo*, corruption, violence, and authoritarianism, too. In 1934, out of a milieu of family rivalries emerged the "Somoza Dynasty," to use Richard Millet's phrase. After the death of Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1956, Luis Somoza succeeded his father. Nicaragua under the second Somoza benefited from the relative economic prosperity of the postwar era and later from various programs under the Alliance for Progress. Luis Somoza also tried to modernize the Liberal Party and encouraged the emergence of alternative leadership, albeit within the margins of family tolerance, in that organization. He also amended the constitution in 1959, so as to prevent any member of his family from occupying the presidency of the nation. Despite legal limitations Luis' younger brother, Anastasio, managed to run away with the 1967 election. The task of satisfying his presidential ambitions was a relative easy one, for he controlled the National Guard.

Civilian institutions in Nicaragua facilitated the political stalemate in several ways. They created a bureaucratic network tied to the Somozas which balanced any possible influence from organized interest groups. Also these institutions lent an illusion of constitutional democracy; elections were held irregularly during moments of political crisis and puppet candidates became president without opposition.

Economically, both Cuba and Nicaragua primarily produced and exported agricultural commodities. Whatever indigenous industrialization developed prior to each revolution was largely concentrated in the production of light consumer goods and was not very technologically sophisticated. Both nations were, therefore, dependent on the core industrial states, particularly the United States, for manufactured goods, industrial technology and international credit, and were highly vulnerable to the effects of malfunctions in the international division of labor.

Overall, the Cuban economy showed some dynamism during the late 1940's and early 1950's. During this period, direct foreign investment shifted from agriculture to the exploitation of other national resources and the monopoly of utilities. Parallel to this, other sectors in the economy were "Cubanized," and the national aristocracy gradually took control of the production of the sugar crop. The bourgeoisie played an active role in managing the modernized infrastructure. Hence, when the Central Bank of Cuba was organized in 1950, native professionals were assigned to its operation.

During the past two decades, the Nicaraguan economy experienced some growth, although with periodic fluctuations. This prevailed until the early 1970's when the economy deteriorated sharply. Two primary factors contributed to the success of the 1950's and 1960's. First, agricultural innovations and modernization of the infrastructure had already been initiated, and on the basis of such developments the intensive cultivation of cotton — a cash crop geared towards the world market — could begin to transform traditional agriculture and the social structure associated with it. Cotton production went from 3,300 tons in 1950 to 125,100 tons some fifteen years later.[8] Additionally, under the auspices of the Central American Common Market, Nicaragua developed a light industrial base which could export to the rest of the region. The level of industrial activity fluctuated from 13 percent in 1960 to 19 percent in 1970.[9]

The economic structure of Cuba and Nicaragua might be categorized by what CEPAL has conceptualized as "capitalismo periferico latinoamericano"; that is, economic growth without wealth "trickling down."10

Economic disequilibrium and dependency brought about contradictions in the social organizations of both Cuba and Nicaragua. For instance, the traditional peasantry was transformed into a rural proletariat. This transformation was necessary to "modernize" the agrarian economy. In Cuba this process happened early in the twentieth century with the expansion of the sugar crop which required large concentrations of land and cheap seasonal labor. Nicaragua experienced similar developments much later when, during the 1950's, cotton became the key to the national export-economy. In both cases, thereby, the peasantry were subjected to massive land expropriation.

Studies of the social structure in Cuba still entail much debate. This discussion centers around the question of whether or not there was actually a middle class per se. First, Lowry Nelson remarked in 1949: "This observer is not at all certain that a middle class exists in Cuba. . . . One has the general feeling that Cuban society has not set or jelled.''11 Some twenty years later, Ramon Ruiz seconded Nelson's assumption. Those who contradict these assertions have argued, more convincingly, that the characteristics outlined by Nelson and more primarily by Ruiz are common to most middle classes, even in industrialized nations. Moreover, others have distinguished a middle class in Cuba and Nicaragua, principally formed by local merchants, small property owners, professionals, and skilled labor. Hugh Thomas and Theodore Draper have even asserted that the 26th of July Movement was a middle-class organization.12

In Nicaragua, cleavages in the social structure are more easily defined. 13 Before the postwar period, the class structure was dominated by an upper class composed of traditional rural land-holders and high public officials in the urban centers, a small middle class of professionals and shopkeepers, and a large marginal class engaged in agriculture, to which one can add the unemployed and under-employed. With the relative economic dynamism of the 1950's came the rise of a middle class formed by teachers, small entrepreneurs, and industrial employees in the urban centers. Yet, low levels of social mobilization were concomitant to scarce political and socio-economic opportunities in both nations.

Finally, internationally, both Cuba and Nicaragua are within the sphere of influence of the United States. Nevertheless, their relations vis-a-vis the core were shaped by other variables besides geographic determinism. Ever since colonial ties, American policy makers conceived the Caribbean and Middle America as zones vital to the national security and economic expansion of American capitalism. Historically, Cuba and Nicaragua formed the cornerstones of American foreign policy in these regions. The military forces of both nations, especially of Nicaragua, were an integral part of the hemisphere's defense assistance programs. These motives moved officials in Washington to secure these regions from outside penetration. The pattern-created by these "special relationships" between the core and periphery developed from dominance to hegemony.14

Within the birth of American imperialism, the foreign policy objectives of the core tightly overruled the periphery. Cuba and Nicaragua repeatedly experienced authentic manifestations of this paternalistic inter-connection, as interventionist policies were carried out by the U.S. Marines, while private interest, enjoying a comparative advantage, invested heavily in the two countries.

The formulation of the Good Neighbor Policy rested on the principle of hegemony toward the periphery. Particularly in the Caribbean Basin, this position was best characterized by what Gramsci denominated as the "hegemony consensus."15 In the midst of the Cold War, the United States revitalized old interventionist policies toward its periphery. The means to "contain

Communism" were compatible with the idea of hegemony and can best be analyzed by the "demonstration effect" hypothesis. In short, the various similarities already outlined in this context suggest the categorization of Cuba and, particularly, Nicaragua as Sultanistic-Authoritarian regimes.16

Contrasts between Cuba and Nicaragua

The list of similarities between the two particular cases under inquiry here could easily be extended, but this could be misleading since underlying such resemblances are key differences which shaped the political and social character of the two revolutionary elites.

The forces behind the 26th of July Movement were bourgeois, and the character of the movement was reformist rather than radical. Only after it was in firm control of the polity did the elite become radical. Moreover, there was no popular insurrection on the island; instead, there was a popular opposition. The main difference here is that while many sectors of the society opposed the Batista government, only a few supported the Castro movement and its program. In fact, it has been said that until 1957, the 26th of July Movement's struggle was more for its own survival than against Batista.17 Although this is perhaps exaggerated, the point remains that Castro's forces represented a minority, albeit an important one, within the opposing coalition. So, even if they had a radical program, the cost of defending it publicly during the revolutionary struggle was too high for the movement to undertake such a risk. The 26th of July Movement had a moderate, nationalistic orientation. However, Castro won where others had failed: he moved the perennial battleground away from the urban centers into the interior, and this provided him with indubitable advantages.

This argument contradicts the official interpretations that come out of the island these days. However, a careful observer of Cuban affairs may note that the official position in Cuba concerning the class structure of the revolution has periodically changed according to the particular doctrinal configuration emphasized at various intervals after the victory of 1959. Easily, one can distinguish three such interpretations: from 1959-1961 the official position was that the revolution had been carried out by "the most advanced elements of the bourgeoisie"; from 1961-1968, it was an agrarian revolution; and from 1968 to the present, it has been categorized as a radical revolution with the support of the progressive sectors of the working class, i.e., those represented by the PSP (Partido Socilista Popular, the name of the Communist party during the 1950's).

Needless to say, most observers subscribe to this interpretation but the concepts for the the other two periods are questionable, originating out of the political necessities of the particular period, rather than being based upon objective historical analysis. The reasons for this are obvious. Internationally, they reinforced Cuba's foreign policy vis-a-vis the super powers. Up to 1968, Cuba played "the Latin American Card." Its objective to export revolution — i.e., "to build many Vietnams" — in Latin America was an attempt to divert the attention of Washington and present the Chinese and Russians with hopes so the most could be gotten out of both of them.18 After the failure of this policy, Cuba had to re-align its position with the Soviets, so there was a need to stress the role of the PSP.

Domestically, these interpretations were the result of the struggle between the different factions within the state apparatus, i.e., *Fideistas*, Old Communists, and members of the university student groups. The agrarian interpretation was an ideological tool against the Old Communists to justify the close identification with the Chinese and to obscure the failure of the industrialization attempt of 1961-1963. The "Sovietization" of the Cuban revolution, which preceded the

institutionalization of the 1970's, demanded a reconciliation with the Old-Communists, so the official line shifted from an agrarian to a proletarian interpretation.

Finally, this hypothesis contradicts the so-called "revolution betrayed" assertion originally exposed by Draper but later widely publicized by some sectors of the Cuban exiles. They claim that Castro was a hidden Communist all the way and that he was only sincere after he had total control of the island. According to this assumption, Castro intentionally forced the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations, and the Cuban people either support the regime because of their own blindness or out of fear of totalitarian reprisals.19

This last view is even less sophisticated than the official one outlined above. An objective analysis would demonstrate that the first bourgeoisie government, in 1959, was the result of an authentic effort by Castro to fulfill the reformist transformation plan. However, four factors contributed to the steady evaporation of the winning coalition and, then, the radicalization of the Cuban revolution. First, and most important, given that the 26th of July Movement was not a social movement, it needed the support of the Communist party to provide an ideology and elaborate action program that would mobilize the large rural and urban proletariat which might serve as a base for a transformation. Second, there was the charismatic leadership of Fidel Castro which, together with his unconventional political style and the lack of political vision of other bourgeoisie leaders, contributed to the support by the poorer classes of the new course of the revolution. Third, the experiences of the Sierra Maestra — by far the most neglected area in the island — radicalized the hierarchy of the 26th of July Movement enough to devote all their energy to fostering the well-being of the populace, rather than promoting elections. And, lastly, U.S. reaction to the power struggle during the consolidation period accelerated the leftist evolution of the upheaval.

In Nicaragua, events followed a very different path. The Sandinista coalition — MPU — truly was representative of the lower sector of the society. From the beginning, the movement made no reservation as to whom they were fighting. In one of their manifestos, they claimed: "the MPU was organized primarily to represent workers, peasants, and urban poor while the FAO is directed by progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie, trying to appeal to both labor and business."20 One can assert that the situation was the reverse of the situation in Cuba. The bourgeoisie did not form an opposing coalition until later in the insurrection. From the beginning, the only permanent opposition to the Somoza regime was the FSLN. Unlike the 26th of July Movement, the Sandinista movement constituted a majority within the opposition. After 1978, when the semi-legal opposition became active, the FSLN was more organized and already had established an underground mass-base. The organization did not have a mass-base, but did have an urban underground whose purpose was to facilitate operations in the interior by disseminating news reports and collecting supplies. The Cuban urban underground was a support group whose lack of maturity and organization contributed to the failure of the spring 1957 general strike.

Two factors further indicated the strength of the Sandinistas during the last phase of the revolutionary struggle. First, unlike the 26th of July Movement, the group has not dissolved. In fact, the movement has grown to unprecedented proportions, resulting in even stronger links between the Sandinista elites and the masses. This, of course, contributed to the defeat of the well-trained and equipped National Guard.

In Cuba, the insurrection was much less violent and the fighting less intense, but the transition to power after Batista fled the island was marked by constant power struggles from within the coalition formed by Castro. Hence, before Castro arrived in Havana his forces had to fight first against a self-proclaimed provisional government headed by the military, and later against the students' federation which refused to move out of the Presidential Palace.

The strength and openly radical position of the Sandinistas were determining factors for Washington officials, causing them to adopt a policy not at all conciliatory to the group. The Carter administration did not recognize the need for an alternative to Somoza until days before the FSLN entered Managua. "Meanwhile," as Richard Fagen has said, "in an attempt to placate conservative opinion at home and to justify diplomatic and perhaps conservative military intervention, the White House and intelligence agencies conducted a desperate search for a Cuban-Sandinista connection."21

So far, this study has attempted to stress some of the consequences of the class-structure on the respective revolutionary movements in Cuba and Nicaragua. It has deliberately avoided analyzing the reasons that led to the two social compositions here outlined. In Cuba, perhaps no other event precipitated the breakdown of the system more than the coup of 1952. As Dominguez has asserted, the coup undermined the flexibility and adaptability of the Cuban political system. Morevoer, political cleavages were difficult to bridge and the pattern of coalition formation and defection was forever destroyed.22

Consolidating the new regime required consummate political skills. Batista captitalized on his ties with the armed forces and also expanded his coalition, integrating different groups in the conservative sector. The most threatening political figure against his move was Autentico labor leader Eusebio Mujal, who called for a general strike. But Prio had already fled, and labor would not strike against the populist policies of the new regime. In a short time, Batista and Mujal struck an agreement of mutual support. Batista already had a nucleus of support in the party he had organized after his return to Cuba in 1948, which he later integrated into his Progressive Action Coalition in preparation for the 1954 elections. This coalition was supported by the conservatives who had supported his regime in 1934 and in 1940. Batista also enjoyed the support of the business sector, foreign interests, and the quasi-backing of the Communists.

The Batista regime continued with the economic interventionism and pro-labor policies of the previous administrations, cultivating labor support for his rule. And despite economic fluctuations, real wages went up during the 1950's. Between 1946 and 1955, wages and salaries in the private sector increased by 46 percent. By the mid 1950's, the number and variety of available consumer goods and the increase in spending on non-essential items indicated that purchasing power had also increased. Moreover, the various public works programs to modernize the infrastructure partially offset the seasonal decline in income during the dead season in the sugar industry. The percentage of age increase for agricultural workers went up by 1.2 percent during this time.23

Labor was organized strongly during 1950's. By 1959, an estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million workers of a total labor force of two million belonged to labor organizations,24 and all unions were centralized with strong bargaining powers. Many benefits obtained under the Constitution of 1940 were still effective in 1959.

By no means is this an indication that everything had gone well. However, these facts help explain labor's passivity during Castro's 1953 insurrection and the failure of the 26th of July Movement to penetrate the labor movement despite several appeals to the workers to join in the struggle for a better Cuba. So by the time the revolution was launched in 1956, Castro had to establish connections with other opposition groups. More important was the flow of funds and political support he negotiated with the bourgeoisie at home and in exile. Yet, the real challenge for his group was to extend its base of support among the peasantry. This would offer the possibility of outnumbering other opposition groups that were strong in the cities — the students — , facilitate operations, and raise the morale among the rebels. The group had paid a heavy price both in terms of lives and material during their near-fatal landing in Oriente where they

encountered the armed forces. Moreover, at their refuge in the Sierra they were practically alienated from the rest of the country.

In response to this situation, the leadership tried to recruit the campesinos. This task was not an easy one for the campesinos in that part of the island had little contact with the more urban population, and the rebels came predominantly from the lower middle class — students, professionals, and discontented white collar workers with little personal contact among the campesinos.25

The participation of the campesinos in the revolution has always been a point of controversy. The literature on this question varies according to the ideological perspective of a particular author. On the one hand, Boris Goldenberg denies any association between the peasantry and the rebels.26 On the other hand, Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy concede an active involvement.27 The peasantry28 did participate in the revolution, but not in the conventional manner that was later professed by some theoreticians of the guerrilla war paradigm. During the early stage of the revolution, the campesinos distrusted the revolutionary forces. In part, this attitude was fomented by the lack of communication between the inhabitants of the region and the rest of the population. Also, the army and middlemen with whom they traded were usually abusive toward them. Hence, the campesinos were apprehensive of all outsiders.

Through their association with the peasantry, the rebels succeeded in projecting a different image, treating the campesinos courteously and with respect. However, the 26th of July Movement was not a peasant army. For one thing, the population of the area where the rebels operated was small. The mountains of Oriente are some of the least populated areas on the island, and the rebels did not have an underground mass-base to politicize the campesinos until late in 1958, when Raul Castro opened the Second Front in the Sierra Cristal.

The revolution was not marked by class-struggle, and the rebel army was not representative of a particular class. "The revolution," as was often predicated, "[was] the struggle of the Cuban nation to reach its historic goal and accomplish its complete integration."29 The rebels associated their struggle with those previous generations, thus hoping to legitimize their purpose.30 Karl Mannheim's conceptualization of generations is particularly useful here.3l The rebel army was composed of men ranging from 20 to 30 years of age, and their common historical experiences furnished a common frame of reference for them.

The ideology of the revolution subscribed to the doctrines of José Martí and other middle class national patriots, and one can find also references in the rebel manifestos to several other western ideologists who have helped to develop the roots of Western democratic thought. This inclination was necessary to appeal to the wide political spectrum in the island. The influence of Marxist-Leninist interpretations was minimal during the insurrection.

Castro was very effective in capitalizing on Batista's lack of legitimacy. Without much success, Batista tried to justify his rule, promising — after an anti-Communist campaign — a quick return to democracy, but after the first couple of years neither had been achieved. The Communists did not constitute a threat to the system and most political parties were reluctant to participate in the fixed elections organized by the dictator. By 1956, the regime had already lost the support of the progressive sector of the military and Batista's coalition was eroding rapidly, as increasing violence by students and other groups oould not be controlled. In his effort to contain the opposition, Batista became increasingly ruthless. Also, efforts to achieve a political compromise with the opposition were met with reluctance by the incumbent.

Meanwhile, the 26th of July Movement was becoming an integral part of the opposition. Since its foundation in 1953, the movement had remained under the umbrella of the Ortodoxos. Castro

first came to the public eye after the unsuccessful attack on the Moncada Barracks, and afterwards in prison and in exile, he established links with other groups in the opposition through his political writings and personal contacts. In 1956, he departed from the Ortodoxos and a year later assumed full control of the 26th of July Movement after the death of Frank Paiz.

Contrary to the later revolution in Nicaragua, the bourgeois nature of the revolutionary elite in Cuba facilitated the army's reluctance to defend the precarious Batista dictatorship. In 1956, there was an attempted coup against Batista by members of the officer corps under the direction of Colonel Ramón Barquín. A year later, there was another uprising at the naval base at Cienfuegos. Fortunately for the dictator, order was restored in a matter of days on both occasions.

Finally, the United States32 reversed its policy toward the regime, after it became clear that the last-minute elections organized by Batista were fraudulent and the economy had drastically deteriorated and civil violence increased. In addition, the United States realized that the opposition was not radical, (the Communist Party did not reach a compromise with Castro until 1958), and the Eisenhower administration refused to continue shipments of arms and other military supplies to the Batista regime. This action, however, did not alter the course and/or outcome of the battle, for Batista was well supplied with arms purchased in western Europe, particularly Great Britain.

The American attitude was most significant among the citizenry who interpreted it as a gesture against Batista. This was particularly significant for the upper and middle classes in control of the infrastructure, who were sensitive to the direction of American foreign policy in relation to questions of the inevitable elite rotation that would occur in Cuba. The traditional aristocracy either took refuge in the United States or tried to disassociate themselves from the regime. Business declined sharply during the insurgents' final offensive and workers began to express public dissatisfaction. By the autumn of 1958, it was clear that Batista would fall. Cubans only questioned how long he could hold on.

Contrary to Batista, Anastasio Somoza Debayle had to face a serious opposition group when he assumed control of the polity in 1967. The Sandinista Front was born out of the social unrest that followed the events of the 1950's, originating among young university students influenced by the success of the revolutionaries in Cuba. However, the leadership and the majority of the opposition members came from lower and upper-lower class backgrounds and were born in the rural interior.33 With little success, the Sandinistas followed a guerrilla strategy until 1968. At Pancasan, the movement clashed against the superior forces of the National Guard and almost evaporated. After the event, radical changes took place within the Front: first, guerrilla tactics were almost eliminated; second, the Sandinistas were divided into three "tendencias" of which only one continued the guerrilla fighting in the countryside; third, the objective became to foment community-based organizations first and, then, to fight, and not the other way around as occurred in Cuba; and finally, they agreed to form an alliance with the bourgeoisie. The latter, however, only came towards the end of the struggle when they were visibly strong.

Despite setbacks, the Sandinistas were able to maintain close association with the popular sector. Two factors contributed to this phenomenon: first, the Sandinistas had a sophisticated political program; and secondly, this effort was carried out initially in the interior until other sectors could manage to establish their own programs and areas of operation.34 The political advantages of this link with the lower strata were many. In several cases, it preceded the founding of another chapter of the Sandinistas. Through the politicizing program, the Sandinistas fomented a class-consciousness among the masses which, in turn, shaped a class struggle. Workers, peasants, students, and the marginal lower class were taught that the enemy was the puppet oligarchy that controlled the state at the disposition of foreign capitalism. Furthermore, the FSLN was introduced

as the true representative of their class interest; the national bourgeoisie was pictured as the closest allies of the "oppressive forces." The ideology of this program was a mixture of Marxism and nationalism, and the figure of Agusto Cesar Sandino was the link between the two.35

Another factor was the character of the Nicaraguan state. The polity had been run as a family affair. Ever since its independence, Nicaragua had been ruled by a handful of families of which the Somozas were only the last. The political system was one of "institutional illegitimacy," where one member of the family succeeded the other. The real power rested with the commander of the National Guard, a post always under the Somozas' control. Elections were only organized under domestic and/or international pressure and the winner was hand-picked, with the Conservative Party playing the role of legal opposition. In 1967, after four years of puppet civilian presidents, Anastasio Somoza Dayle had himself elected president, and departing from the tradition, centralized the state apparatus. The military again played an important role within the state and was given a free hand to eliminate the radical opposition.

The Somoza family also enriched itself tremendously from public office. When the "dynasty" was started in 1936, the family owned no more than a single coffee estate. By the time of his assassination in 1956, the senior Somoza's wealth was an estimated $60 million. His assets are said to have included 10 percent of the nation's arable land, 51 cattle ranches, 46 coffee plantations, extensive real estate in Managua, and interests in various business ventures. The Somoza fortune grew as other family members succeeded each other in power. In 1978, their wealth was calculated at some $400 to 500 millions.36 The personalism of the regime led one observer to comment: "... all welfare spring from the Somozas, who have benefited enormously from their position, amassing a fantastic personal wealth. Most of the property has not filtered down to the lower classes. The Somozas are more than a regime, they are a way of life."37

By the 1970's the stability of the Somoza dictatorship was being questioned, and three extremely important events augmented the political contradictions of the regime and the societal cleavages in Nicaragua in favor of the Sandinista claims.38 First, as a result of the devastating earthquake that struck Managua in 1972, several thousand lives were lost and property damages were calculated in the millions. The political aftershocks of the event fatally weakened the structure of the regime. Somoza and his cronies maneuvered the international relief aid intended for the victims toward their personal advantage. With Somoza in charge of the reconstruction, Managua was rebuilt on his land, by his construction companies, and with the financing of his banks. The extent of corruption, together with the expansion of Somoza's economic empire into areas of economic activities previously reserved for other members of the national bourgeoisie, alienated large sectors of both the middle and upper classes. Among the popular sector, economic adversity fostered the claim of the radical opposition which preached a restructuring of the state and society. An increasing wave of strikes, demonstrations, and land seizures swept the country after 1973.

Another important test came in 1974, when the "terceristas" in the FSLN initiated a violent campaign against the government. The Sandinistas were able to capitalize on the popular outrage from Somoza's own personal policies and the deterioration of the national economy. The National Guard became more repressive but was able to stop the mounting opposition among the workers, peasants, and some sectors of the national bourgeoisie. In 1978, the O.A.S. reported the severe violations of human rights by the Somoza regime, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded that those affected the most were the members of the lower class.39

Finally, in January 1978, the national bourgeoisie's endeavor against Somoza was severely curtailed with the death of Pedro J. Chamorro. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry led the

nation in a general strike calculated to have been 80 or 90 percent effective.40 The determination of the popular sector to oust the regime was also fueled by the steady deterioration of the economy and the politicization of the lower classes by the programs developed by the FSLN and reinforced by the incumbent's obsessive attacks against dissent. High unemployment, coupled with a 20 percent inflation rate, brought the people to the streets of Managua in 1978 and after.41

Although the bourgeoisie had stimulated the strikes and mass demonstrations, it could not capitalize on the protests. Leaders of FAO, the political coalition formed by the bourgeoisie, feared that the conflict would radicalize public demands and invoke more than political reforms, thus threatening their own interests as a class. Meanwhile, the Sandinistas launched their own military offensive with the support of the popular sector which they had cultivated throughout. The pre-revolutionary Cuban state did not fit this Nicaraguan mold. Batista arbitrarily managed to filter down some of the wealth experienced during the 1950's. Moreover, he did not enrich himself to the extent the Somozas did. In Cuba, the polity was dominated by a coalition not a family dynasty. The democratic experience of the 1940's gave political parties and organized interests something to fight for. Interest-group politics were strong. Yet, the 26th of July Movement did not have such an elaborate program among the popular sectors. In fact, Richard Fagen has effectively demonstrated that after the revolution, the main challenge of the elite was to form a revolutionary consciousness among the cadres of the revolution and the populace. Their answer was the formation of the School of Revolutionary Instruction and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.42

Concluding Remarks

A comparative analysis of the revolutionary situations in Cuba and Nicaragua underlines the assertion that both upheavals were quite distinct. Politically conscious sectors of the middle class pursued a revolutionary strategy in Cuba to restore the politics of consensus they saw violated after the coup of March 10, 1952. Concomitantly, disenchanted students, professionals, politicos, and whitecollar employees supported particular efforts to depose Batista. Castro's organization was part of this pool.

Like the forces within the opposing coalition, the political protest movement mainly recruited members of the middle class, but the polarization of the opposition induced a wide appeal to every social group in the island. Moreover, the failure of Castro to mobilize the urban proletariat and campesinos stimulated an alliance with the bourgeoisie and traditional politicos, despite an initial commitment to do otherwise. A corollary of this assertion is that the revolutionary elite in Cuba were moderate with no radical ideology. What is more, belligerence was legitimized through doctrines from bourgeoisie political culture. Hence, the means and ends did not differ much from those of others within the opposition except in that a distinct military strategy was engineered which opened the path for political power to the guerrilla vanguard.43

Class alignment during the upheaval in Nicaragua was sharply defined. From the beginning, the Sandinistas operated-among and enlisted members of the lower classes in the campaign to transform the polity, social stalemate, and the mode of production. Moreover, the struggle was led by a matured social organization, which by the 1970's had learned to spread its own ideology of class struggle. Consequently, the FSLN inspired a social revolution from below and was able to adapt to and establish linkages with the popular sectors. Through these linkages, the Sandinistas managed to project a successful image as the authentic representatives of the popular interest and capitalized upon the class isolation of the bourgeoisie.

The structural configuration of the polity further delineated the upheavals in Cuba and Nicaragua. The Batista regime was authoritarian but not autocratic. In order to minimize the cleavages and maintain a certain equilibrium in the political system after the coup, Batista arbitrarily cultivated an alliance with some organized interests while antagonizing others with previous ties to the state and alienating those not yet organized. A revolutionary fervor was, then, uniformly disseminated among those who did and did not favor the coup. Political decay during Batista's tenure precipitated his own demise, for he failed to resolve the basic contradictions in the political system.

The accession to power of Somoza, on the other hand, exacerbated the political and economic dilemmas in Nicaragua. The traditional opposition vigorously questioned the legitimacy of the regime after a personalization of the nation. More important, however, was the public sector's infringement of non-traditional markets to extract wealth and resources rather than to distribute them. This narrowed the social base of the regime and legitimized the radical claims of the FSLN. A mobilized bourgeoisie, furthermore, tried to reform the system in order to maintain power as a class, but the damage instigated by Somoza's maneuvers were so unpopular that only a social transformation was capable of restoring order.

Spill-overs from the international economic crises of the 1970's accentuated the reverse turn of the national economy in Nicaragua. High inflation, currency devaluation, and the failure of external markets to absorb Nicaragua's exports slowed down the rate of development and increased unemployment while enriching Somoza and the few around him. In addition, the fragile alliance between the regime and the United States and the unsuccessful efforts by the latter to neutralize the social revolution had contradictory effects.[44] On the one hand, it polarized cleavages in the society in the direction of a radical transformation. On the other, it allowed the accommodation of the national bourgeoisie and the Sandinistas, as the former saw no other alternative to influence the ongoing crisis. Intentionally or not, such accommodation was also advantageous for the left which was perceived as pragmatic, sagacious, and pluralistic. This presents a sharp contrast to events in Cuba where the United States reacted to the social revolution after the revolutionary elite had captured the polity, pursued a social transformation, and the bourgeoisie had to choose either to be accommodated with it, albeit to terms already dictated, or exile from the revolution. Consequently, the Cuban elite was perceived as intransigents thereafter. Today, with the kind of policies endorsed by Washington with respect to the Sandinista regime, the revolution is becoming militarized and the compromise between the left and moderates to appease the United States and the private sector is eroding.

In sum, the key difference between the Cuban and the Nicaraguan cases was the class composition of the revolutionary elite and the structural configuration of the state apparatus. The international division of labor served to catalyze and shape the cases under inquiry here. Failure by those preoccupied with the process of social and political change in Latin America to understand the dynamic relations among these variables has led to misperceptions about the nature, course, and outcome of the revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and elsewhere throughout the hemisphere.

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Pastoral Practice as Rebellion:
The Humanization of Social Life in El Salvador

David Blanchard

Introduction

The young people from the canton of Santa Lucia spend a great deal of time in front of the convent of the Dominican Sisters. Sometimes they just sit and talk with one another. I have often seen young Salvadorans doing their homework there, books perched on their knees, seated on the tree stumps and split logs that lie scattered in front of the convent. Whenever the young people of Santa Lucia become discouraged — and discouragement is a perennial condition for the vast majority of El Salvador's young — Juanita Martinez or another member of the pastoral team makes them see the hidden possibilities of life. When people are killed, either in the war, or by accident — or worse, when they are "disappeared" — these pastoral workers manage to keep hope alive. Juanita and her co-workers believe in the resurrection, but they are participating in El Salvador's historical project to build a society of justice and equality.

I should note that the pastoral team at Santa Lucia does not devote all of its attention to the young. They give their time and resources to the many poor who visit the church. I do not think people visit the church primarily for financial support or for consoling words. They visit because of the atmosphere created by the pastoral team. It is affirming and challenging. Juanita Martinez's genius is the way she silently offers this affirmation. She has become adept at training her co-workers to do the same. She challenges people to give more of themselves. She leads the destitute to hidden springs of strength they did not know they had.

On November 11, 1989, the Salvadoran resistance, the FMLN, launched a major offensive in the Department of San Salvador. When the FMLN pulled out of the capital they retreated through Santa Lucia. This retreat lasted over a week. During this time the Salvadoran Armed Forces made a huge sweep through the canton, invading homes and arresting many. The pastoral team at Santa Lucia could have sought refuge in the city at this time, but they remained with the people. They believe that "accompaniment" of the poor is not an intellectual exercise; the "preferential option" for the poor is not just jargon. It is a commitment that demands saying "no" to injustice.

Juanita called me on January 5, 1990, with news and an urgent request for help. A member of her team, Carlota Sucre, had been captured by the Armed Forces on the night of December 20. Carlota had been accidentally released by the security forces who were now searching for her in order to send her back to prison as a "subversive."

Carlota is not a subversive. But she lives in a country where suspicion is grounds for being arrested, executed or "disappeared." The army has returned to Carlota's house twice. A "death squad" — three heavily armed men with nylon masks over their faces — searched her home at three in the morning the day after she was released. She is in hiding and needs to flee El Salvador. That was why Juanita called me.

In the eyes of El Salvador's military establishment and oligarchy, Juanita is a rebel. For this reason, I had half-expected to get this call from Carlota with the news that Juanita had been captured. She is a rebel in the long tradition of Salvadoran rebels, living and dead: Sister Silvia Arriola, Father Rutilio Grande and Archbishop Oscar Romero. These Salvadorans — and tens of

thousands more like them, living and dead — are part of the Christian tradition of prophetic rebellion. This essay demonstrates how, in certain social circumstances, the casual association of youth in front of a church could be considered rebellious, and why, in this historical context, a government would regard nuns, priests, catechists, health workers and literacy teachers as subversives.

The pastoral work that is taking place throughout El Salvador and in other parts of Central and South America would have been a great challenge to Albert Camus.1 I suggest that if Camus were alive today, and had the opportunity to meet Juanita Martinez and her co-workers, he would have revised some of the conclusions that he reached in his work *The Rebel*. This essay is an attempt to introduce Camus to Juanita and other members of her pastoral team and to the rebellion to which they have devoted their lives. It is about rebellion and how rebellion differs from revolution. It is about how change occurs in the context where violent repression has been cloaked in the mantle of innocence and legitimacy.

One additional note of introduction: the challenge that the pastoral team at Santa Lucia presents to us today is all the more critical given recent events in Eastern Europe. While applauding the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the toppling of Stalinist dictatorships and the dawn of democracy in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic republics, it is important not to over-identify dehumanization with communism; or freedom with its ideological opposite, "free-market capitalism." The revolt against dialectical materialism should not imply an affirmation of capitalist materialism. Any system that reduces humankind to "available labor" is de-humanizing and should be resisted.

Camus took this stand in *The Rebel* and was ostracized for it by many European intellectuals, including his longtime friend, Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre and others were willing to turn to Stalinism because of their abhorrence of fascism. Camus refused to turn away. His integrity makes his philosophy all the more vital today.

Albert Camus' Anthropology

If Camus demands anything from his readers it is integrity. And so one must be honest with Camus. Albert Camus was not a Christian. He was a humanist and an atheist.2 To treat Albert Camus as a "religious thinker" is to do the man and his writings a disservice. In her critical review of Walter Kaufmann's *Religion from Tolstoy to Camus*, Susan Sontag calls the sanctification of Camus' writing irrelevant, frivolous and tainted by academicism. Kaufmann claimed that Camus (and various other writers, including William James, Sigmund Freud and Oscar Wilde) was "religious in general." Sontag correctly countered that "one cannot be religious in general any more than one can speak language in general."3 Religion may be an option in life, but it is always a specific option. In his notebooks Camus wrote that his "secret" universe was "imagining God without human immortality.4 But this universe only existed in Camus' imagination. Camus could not conceive of a god outside of eternity. What Christianity regarded as hope, for Camus was an act of philosophical suicide. Camus *described the full extent of the betrayal of Christian hope in his work, The Plague.*5 In *The* Plague the priest, Paneloux, delivers a sermon to a vast congregation suffering from the Black Death. "You deserve to suffer," Paneloux says. "You must do penance and yes, even thank God for the plague, because this suffering is your path to salvation." The "Plague" was Camus' metaphor for the Nazi invasion. He could not accept that his countrymen deserved the Nazis any more that the Middle Ages deserved the Black Death. He rejected Christian resignation as a betrayal of humanity.

Paneloux eventually undergoes a conversion. Like Camus, he fights against creation, even while believing it to be the perfect work of God.

Camus was equally hard on Marxism. In his *Notebooks* he wrote how "German thought" had substituted history for God. Christianity and Marxism were "two religions," Camus wrote. "For Christians, Revelation stands at the beginning of history. For Marxism it stands at the end."6 Camus called the choices presented by Christianity and Marxism those of "the victim or the executioner."

Although Camus was not a religious man, his anthropology suggests a spirituality — an attempt to understand the essential nature of being human that lies above and beyond one's social status at any particular historical moment. Camus developed his anthropology in response to the question: "What is the purpose of human life in a world without God?" Camus explored this question in *The Myth of Sisyphus*7 and in *The Rebel*.8

In *The Myth of Sisyphus* Camus presented his readers with a metaphor for modern life. Sisyphus was the ancient hero-highwayman from Greek mythology condemned to slowly push his rock up a hill only to watch it roll down and so to be pushed up again. In *The Rebel*, Camus further characterized modern consciousness as having been freed from the shackles of religion only to become enslaved to history. Modernity's response to the absurd was suicide; its response to history, murder. Yet Camus argued that neither suicide nor murder were adequate solutions to the problem of being human without God.

For Camus, the meaning of human existence was to be found in human nature itself. Camus' passion to understand human nature reflects his early fascination with classical Greek philosophy. Aristotle's dictum "all men by nature desire to know" is found in Camus' assertion that "the mind's deepest desire, even in its most elaborate operations, parallels man's unconscious feeling in the face of his universe: it is an insistence upon familiarity, an appetite for clarity."9

The Greek word for nature, *physis*, is derived from the word "to bring forth," "to come into being." A seed's nature is found in the tree that lies locked within it. For Camus, human nature was to be discovered in its fullest potentiality. While Camus believed that the meaning of human nature existed in community and solidarity, it could be discovered only in solitude. The stark Algerian landscape presented Camus with adequate images of solitude. "There are no more deserts," Camus wrote. "Yet there is a need for them. In order to understand the world, one has to turn away from it on occasion; in order to serve men better, one has to hold them at a distance for a time."10

For Camus, it was not enough to contemplate and understand. Integrity demanded speaking out clearly, passionately and forcefully on the insights gained from such contemplation. Once, when asked what responsibility an artist had to the world, Camus replied, none.

But considered as men, yes. The miner who is exploited or shot down, the slaves in the camps, those in the colonies, the legions of persecuted throughout the world — they need all those who can speak to communicate their silence and to keep in touch with them.11

Camus claimed that Christianity often relinquished this responsibility for political expediency. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Church's silence in the face of the Nazis. Once while discussing Rolf Hochhuth's *The Deputy* with some Dominican friends, Camus asked why the Catholic Church had not spoken out against the holocaust. Like many Europeans, Camus said, he had waited "for a strong voice to be lifted up in Rome" even though he was not a Christian. Camus said that he had known "that spirit would be lost if Rome did not raise the cry of condemnation in the presence of force."12 When told that such a protest had been made, Camus retorted that he and "millions" like him had never heard it. This was because "the condemnation had been uttered

in the language of encyclicals, which is not clear. The condemnation had been pronounced but it had not been understood."13

Camus' spirituality demanded contemplation. It demanded speaking out forcefully and clearly. It also demanded action. Camus' upbringing in poverty helped shape his commitment to action. Camus wrote that he never regarded his childhood poverty as a misfortune, but rather as a kind of "radiance." He claimed that his suffering as a child moved him to rebellion on behalf of others. "To correct a natural indifference, I was placed halfway between poverty and the sun. Poverty kept me from thinking all was well under the sun and in history; the sun taught me that history was not everything.14

Camus held, with Aristotle, that man fulfills his nature in solidarity with others. Camus regarded solidarity, friendship and love as the necessary consequences of being fully human. To be human for Camus was to be for others, especially for the poor. Camus wrote that he could not keep "from being drawn toward everyday life, toward those, whoever they may be, who are humiliated and debased." This was not the fascination of a voyeur. Camus wrote that these poor "need to hope and if all keep silent. . . they will forever be deprived of hope, and we with them."15 Camus articulated his ideas about solidarity in Aristotelian categories. Like Aristotle, Camus held that solidarity implied equality. As Aristotle wrote in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, "when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases." Friendship, as a stage in human solidarity, did not admit of domination for reasons of sex, power, race or any other "accident" of human nature.

Ironically, it was in his commitment to love that Camus made his definitive split from Christianity. For Camus, the capacity to love was integral to human completion. He wrote that it was "merely bad luck in not being loved" but great misfortune in not loving. He added, cryptically, "all of us today are dying of this misfortune."16 While admitting that he did not understand the concept of "sin," Camus identified sin as not trying to love and giving up on this life in the hope of a better one here-after.

Although Camus regarded the sacrifice of one's life for a friend to be the greatest expression of love, he rejected the esteem Christians placed on Jesus' sacrifice. He characterized Christianity as a doctrine of injustice because it had been founded on "the sacrifice of an innocent and the acceptance of this sacrifice." While he admired Jesus as a man and as a teacher, and even the nobility of his death, Camus found it repugnant that the Christian community accepted the horrible and unjust death of Jesus without protestation. To him, a religion that legitimized death was no better than a philosophy that regarded killing as an inevitable stage of historical development.

If Neither Victims nor Executioners, What?

Life without God was absurd. Camus rejected suicide (the role of a victim) and the callous disregard for the lives of others (the role of the executioner) as responses to the absurd. What options were left to modern man? Camus advocated the role of the rebel.

According to Camus, the Jacobin myth of terrorism implied a nihilistic world-view. Ideological nihilism achieved fuller expression in Hegel's dictum that historical laws fulfill their own reality. Camus condemned the murder of millions by Stalin. His worst antagonists, however, were the philosophers from the left who justified this murder in the language of historical necessity. Strictly speaking, *The Rebel* is not about murder: it is about "the arguments by which murder is justified."17 The culpability that Camus wanted his readers to understand was not the act of killing, but its hermeneutic. Murder for greed, murder for glory, murder for vengeance — Camus

held that such terror was easy to understand. The challenge he met in *The Rebel* was to examine "slave camps under the flag of freedom, massacres justified by philanthropy or by a taste for the superhuman." This killing "crippled judgement," Camus wrote.18 Camus maintained that Marxism had met its logical consequence in Stalin. In Stalin's Soviet Union, human life had no meaning or worth outside of the "task of history." The contradiction inherent in Marxism was that the revolution justifies the use of oppressive force to overcome oppression, thus justifying revolt against itself.

As a young journalist Camus advocated the rights of the downtrodden Berbers in his native Algeria. In "Resistance, Rebellion and Death" he wrote "in forming friendships, I have never made any distinctions among the men who live here (Algeria), whatever their race."19 Camus himself refused to take sides in the Algerian revolution which was largely supported by the French intelligentsia. He wrote that "although I have known and shared every form of poverty in which this lands abounds, it is for me the land of happiness, of energy and creation. And I cannot bear to see it become a land of suffering and hatred."20 Sartre and his disciple, Francois Jeanson, attacked *The Rebel* and Camus' inactivity on behalf of the Algerian resistance as "anti-historical." Jeanson led the attack in *Les Temps Modernes* claiming that by characterizing modern revolutions as nihilistic, Camus had placed himself outside of history.21 Like Hegel's "beautiful Soul," Camus wanted to remain pure, Jeanson claimed, and to be pure was to be irrelevant. Jeanson went further. Not only was Camus irrelevant, he was also a reactionary. By criticizing Stalin, Camus played into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Finally, Jeanson claimed that Camus had made some fine enquiries, but the task was to act, not to simply ask questions. In Jeanson's interpretation, only the Communist Party had the ability to lead the oppressed masses against their capitalistic oppressors.

Sartre contributed nothing of intellectual value to *Les Temps Modernes*'s critique of Camus, choosing instead to repeat Jeanson's argument. Camus responded that Sartre's justification of Stalinism as a "necessary historical moment" contradicted Sartre's own thought and the intellectual position of *Les Temps Modernes*. Sartre seemed to imply that history had a final meaning and necessary outcome and that, despite excessive moments like Stalinism, "progress toward that moment of final reconciliation which will be the jump into ultimate freedom, is inevitable."22

Sartre's position that Stalinism was a necessary historical moment invites other, equally frightening interpretations of history and of contemporary social life: the excesses of National Socialism were necessary to bring about the triumph of communism. This thesis, transported to Central America by the U.S. State Department, is equally chilling: "the saturation bombing of the countryside, disruption of the population, support for the Salvadoran military and, indirectly, for the notorious death squads, is necessary to stop the spread of communism."

This is obscene.

If we are to be neither passive victims (sacrificial Christian lambs), nor vicious executioners (like Stalin), what options are left to us? Camus is not very clear about the world that he would like to see. In describing this world he used imagery and symbols from his North African youth. This earned Camus the distrust and suspicion of "activists" and revolutionaries. The simple beauty of his native Algeria and towns like Oran dominate Camus' utopian vision. While Oran provided Camus with his imagery, his convictions came from his experience as a young man in the resistance and as part of the French intellectual community after the war. "After the experiences of the last two years," he wrote, "I could no longer hold to any truth which might oblige me, directly or indirectly, to demand a man's life."23 Camus acknowledged the arguments taken against his position by Sartre and countered that his critics were incapable of really imagining another

person's death, that killing, for them, had become an idea, not a fact of life. Camus wrote that he did not want a world where murder did not exist, but one in which murder was illegitimate.24

"Murder lives on murder," Camus wrote. "Revolutionaries on the left and reactionaries on the right (with the exception of a few swindlers) recognize this fact and wish to overcome it. "And yet the combination of all these good intentions has produced the present infernal world, where people are killed, threatened and deported, where war is prepared, where one cannot speak freely without being insulted or betrayed."25 Camus knew that his critics charged him with emotionalism and over dramatizing. In his essay "Neither Victims nor Executioners," Camus offered this rebuttal: the present "bloody mess" of history was not created by emotion, but by "the logic of history." He acknowledged that emotional arguments alone could not cut through the stranglehold of historical materialism. "Reason alone can meet logic" Camus wrote, aided by love and imagination. But love and imagination alone were insufficient to clean up the bloody mess of history. "It is essential that [people] not be carried away (by love and emotion) but rather that they be made to understand clearly what they are doing."26

For Camus, the rebel was a man who says "no", but who, at the same time, says "yes" from the moment he makes his first gesture of rebellion. "A slave who has taken orders all his life suddenly decides that he cannot obey some new command. This is rebellion." Camus' rebel is in reality a typification of his anthropology. "The rebel simultaneously experiences a feeling of revulsion at the infringement of his rights and a complete and spontaneous loyalty to certain aspects of himself."27 Those aspects are his potentialities that have been denied him by his oppressors.

The rebel refuses to be a victim. The rebel refuses to offer up life or life's potential to the oppressor. In insisting on the right to life and life's potential, the rebel may use force and violence, but refuses to legitimize force and violence within a religious or scientific system that requires some future validation. In this, the rebel's "no" is also an affirmation.

The Pastoral of Liberation

Return now to the pastoral strategy of Juanita Martinez and her co-workers at Santa Lucia. I want to create a dialogue between this group of young Salvadorans and Camus. Such a conversation would have interested Camus much more than a dialogue with the theoretical and magisterial statements that stand behind the work of the pastoral team. For all of his intellectual acumen, Camus would not have been overly impressed by the writings of Jon Sobrino, Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff and the "theologians of liberation." For all of the historical importance of the documents of the Second Vatican Council, the Councils at Medellin and Puebla, the encyclicals of Archbishops Oscar Romero and Arturo Rivera y Damas, Camus would have been more interested in how these teachings were carried out in fact.

Abstractions are deadly, especially to Christians, Camus wrote. In the discussion with the Dominicans over Hochhuth's play, Camus noted that Christians needed to "get out of their abstractions and stand face to face with the bloody mess that is our history today. The gathering that we need today is the gathering together of men who are resolved to speak out clearly and pay with their own person."28 Camus would have read the theologians' books and the bishops' pastoral letters patiently, and then sought out the pastoral team at Santa Lucia to see how these ideas were carried out.

A pastoral plan — like any plan of action — is in dialogue with a particular history. Camus understood that, while "we cannot 'escape history'...we may propose to fight within history to

preserve from history that part of man which is not part of its proper province." An essential component of the pastoral of liberation is that God is a God of history. The gospel must address the real conditions of social life and challenge these conditions in light of gospel values.

To be fully understood as an act of rebellion, the pastoral work at Santa Lucia needs to be situated within the specific historical context of El Salvador's history. After the conquest of El Salvador by the Spanish, the surviving Indians organized themselves into communal villages with common lands — *confradias*. The Spanish elite settled on larger farms in the valley of San Salvador, employing Indians as laborers. These haciendas remained few in number. Under the *confradia* system the natives had a sufficient food supply, but little was grown for export. Without export crops there was no foreign capital; without foreign capital, no importation of foreign goods. In the 1880s El Salvador's oligarchy — the so-called "fourteen families" — passed legislation that dispossessed the Indians of their land in order to create more haciendas. They planted "cash crops" — coffee, cotton and sugar. The oligarchy formed a national police force to control the Indian population and guarantee sufficient labor for their haciendas. When the Indians resisted efforts to seize their lands, they were killed. When they resisted efforts to force them to work on the haciendas, they were slaughtered by the security police.

Fifty years after the seizure of Indian lands, in 1931, there was a world-wide decline in coffee prices. The oligarchy responded by halving the wages of their Indian laborers and cutting back production. They also denied the Indians the right to use fallow land for food production. By 1932 there was widespread famine throughout the country, particularly in the western highlands.

That year the rural Indians planned a coordinated rebellion with the newly formed communist party in the capital of San Salvador. When the military learned of the uprising, they responded by massacring 30,000 Indians. For weeks, the air over El Salvador reeked with the stench of rotting flesh. So great was the carnage that decaying bodies polluted the drinking water and caused epidemics of cholera, dysentery and typhus. This event, called *la matanza*, was followed by increased oppression and virtual enslavement of the vast majority of the Salvadoran people by the oligarchy. According to many scholars, the whole contemporary political and social labyrinth of El Salvador can only be interpreted with reference to the trauma of the uprising and the *matanza.*

After this great massacre, the relationship of laborers to the oligarchy was clearly defined in El Salvador. The oligarchy regarded themselves as the "producers" and the Indians as "non-producers," i.e., as "users" of national resources. The oligarchy maintained that it was their capital and not the labor of the Indians that allowed the plantations to produce crops for export. The government of El Salvador reflected this understanding in all national programs. The racism and classism inherent in this world-view was accepted and blessed by the Catholic Church.

Unrest continued after *la matanza* and galvanized in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. The current wave of resistance has its roots in the Second Vatican Council's "opening to the world." In Latin America such openness implies listening to the poor. The Latin American Bishops' Conferences at Medellin and Puebla affirmed the "preferential option for the poor" and the importance of the Church's commitment to social justice.

In El Salvador the preferential option for the poor became an integral part of the Church's pastoral mission. Archbishop Oscar Romero criticized the government and oligarchy, claiming, "It is not enough to undertake works of charity to alleviate the suffering of the poor, we must work to transform the structures that create this suffering." The Church continued to nurture the poor but also began to challenge the dominant society and to lend support to popular organizations committed to change.29 The Church also helped form Christian unions. Political parties also responded to this atmosphere of hope, change and reform.

In 1979 five groups advocating an armed response to state terror formed the Faribundo Marti Liberation National Front (FMLN). The FMLN made significant military and political gains in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It controlled distinct parts of the countryside and spread its clandestine structure throughout the cities. The FMLN's progress alarmed the United States which then committed military material and advisors to the Salvadoran Armed Forces. Archbishop Romero wrote to then-President Jimmy Carter asking for a cut-off of aid. Five weeks later Romero was dead — the victim of an assassin linked to the National Guard.

During this time — the late 1970s and early 1980s — Roberto D'Aubuisson founded ARENA, the National Republican Alliance, an ultra-right political and paramilitary organization.30 D'Aubuisson and ARENA accept the division of Salvadoran society into the simple categories of producers and users. Law must favor the producers, D'Aubuisson has said, because they strengthen the "Fatherland." ARENA is a nationalistic party and it regards all "internationalists" as enemies of El Salvador. D'Aubuisson has publicly praised the Nazis for their treatment of the Jews. "The Jews were communists, after all," D'Aubuisson reasoned, "what else could the Germans do but kill them." D'Aubuisson alternates the expression "dirty little Jew" with "dirty little Indian," and regards both as synonymous with "communist." Jews, Indians and communists are against the Fatherland and so are evil. D'Aubuisson has advocated "separating these cancers out," "removing them from national life," "exterminating them, when necessary."

ARENA has characterized the Church's preferential option for the poor as "communistic" and as inimical to Salvadoran nationalism.31 Once again, it is important to understand ARENA's antagonism to the Salvadoran Church in the context of its world-view. According to ARENA's logic, the Church has chosen to favor the non-producers, the users of national resources, over the producers. ARENA regards the capitalist producers as the foundation of Salvadoran society. Any organization perceived by ARENA to be in opposition to the forces of production is regarded as treasonous.

In the late 1970s the Right unleashed its "Army of National Salvation," the notorious death squads, in a reign of terror against the poor and their supporters.32 In the past ten years seventy-thousand men, women and children have been killed — most by death squads with ties to the military, the oligarchy or ARENA. During the 1989 presidential elections, ARENA waged a successful media campaign in the United States. It gained control over all three parts of the Salvadoran government (assembly, judiciary and presidency) in March 1989. D'Aubuisson was kept in the background during the election, although no one doubted his presence behind the scenes. During an unscheduled appearance in downtown San Salvador, D'Aubuisson whipped ARENA supporters into a frenzy with inflammatory rhetoric. During this speech he promised "to get these Jesuits... who are polluting the minds of our children." ARENA "won" the elections and American military aid to El Salvador increased.

The campaign against the rural population and the suppression of the popular organizations has created massive unrest in El Salvador. Victims have fled into San Salvador where they seek refuge in relocation communities or displaced-persons camps operated by the Catholic Church. There are three of these relocation communities and one large refugee camp within the boundaries of Santa Lucia.

The life-stories of Santa Lucia's pastoral team reflect the strife of the past two decades in El Salvador. The stories of two pastoral workers illustrate the dangers to those who resist oppression in this war-torn country.

Laura Santiago grew up in the canton of San Pedro, near the volcano of Guazapa, about ten kilometers north of Santa Lucia. Her campesino parents leased a small plot of land for growing

beans and vegetables. They paid for this land with their labor. From November until January, Laura, her seven brothers, two sisters, mother and father harvested coffee for the patron. After they had picked enough coffee beans to pay for the land, they earned an additional four hundred dollars. This they used to buy clothing, medicine, perhaps a few chickens and some small amenities for their one-room house.

In 1980, when Laura was seventeen years old, her family fled Guazapa and sought refuge in the capital of San Salvador. The incident that forced this exodus left an indelible scar on Laura's soul. Her parents were members of the Union of Salvadoran Campesinos. In October, 1980, the union asked the patron for a raise in pay. The union leaders explained that, because of rising prices, workers could no longer afford basic necessities for their families. The patron listened and then explained that wages depended on international prices. At least for that year, he said, there could be no raise. The union leaders responded that, if the campesinos did not receive a wage increase, the union would strike.

That night the Salvadoran National Guard visited San Pedro. They led Laura's father and nine other men to a ditch next to the patron's house. They killed these men, severed their genitals and stuffed these into the mouths of their victims. The people found the corpses the next morning. Terrified, they buried their dead, packed their few belongings and began the long trek to the capital of San Salvador.

Laura met Juan Gonzalez while on this exodus. They became friends and eventually lovers. They found refuge in the camp established by the Catholic Church in the basement of the archdiocesan seminary. Their child, Oscar Gonzalez y Santiago, was born a year later. Oscar spent his first two years in that seminary basement. He first saw the light of day on June 13, 1983 when Laura and Juan left the refugee camp to settle in a "relocation" village in Santa Lucia.

The families who re-settled in Santa Lucia dug latrine trenches. They laid out the roads, and, with the assistance of the Church, secured a loan to purchase bricks, cement, wood and sheets of metal for roofing. Men, women and children all worked together. When all thirty-one homes were completed, they held a Mass of thanksgiving. During this Mass each family was assigned a home by lottery.

Once, when Oscar had fallen ill with dysentery in the refugee camp, Laura had gone to the camp infirmary for medicine. There, she learned about a course for community health workers. Laura enrolled in this course. Over the next year she completed two steps in the four-part program for community health workers. When Laura went to Santa Lucia, she joined the pastoral team as a health worker. She formed a committee and taught the people about the microbes that infect water and cause dysentery; how to prepare water for drinking and how to re-hydrate babies suffering from dysentery and diarrhea. Laura assumed responsibility for the clinic's small pharmacy and began a level-one course for her own committee. Once a month she took the bus into the capital to continue her own schooling.

As Laura's reputation as a medic spread to the other villages near Santa Lucia the small clinic became inundated with more sick people than there were medicines available to treat them. Laura asked a few of the women who came from these villages to volunteer some time in the clinic. She began a training program and soon had teams of health workers visiting the outlying villages to teach preventative health.

El Salvador is a mountainous country. From May until August it rains every night. It does not rain at all during the rest of the year. In the countryside drinking water comes from wells. The health workers explained to the people that their wells must be deepened and, in some cases, moved a safe distance uphill from latrines. They explained that animals must be kept penned because

animal feces pollutes the drinking water and animals that eat human feces become sick and infect humans. Many villages refused to listen. It takes a great deal of effort to dig a new well and people did not want to do this. The health workers responded by explaining that clean water was the only solution to the horrible dysentery that killed so many children. The people in some of the villages listened and agreed. When the effects of these efforts became evident, the people in other villages also moved their wells.

Laura's husband, Juan, found work as a laborer in the capital. He became a brick carrier earning three dollars a day. After deducting the cost of bus fare to and from work, Juan earned barely enough to buy food and clothes for his family. On May 1, 1985 Juan joined thousands of Salvadoran workers in a demonstration in San Salvador. While returning home, Juan and two companions were captured by the National Police. When Laura learned of her husband's capture she attempted to secure his release. But Laura was told that she had been mis-informed. There was no Juan Gonzalez in custody and no record of his arrest. Laura returned home in despair. Juan had been disappeared.

Carlota Sucre is another member of Santa Lucia's pastoral team. She is a literacy teacher. Carlota's background is quite different from Laura's. Carlota was raised in the capital of San Salvador. Her father, Pepe Sucre, had worked as an electrician in Guatemala and upon returning to El Salvador was hired by a firm that installs electrical wiring on government construction projects. Carlota's mother is a teacher in the government school system. With both parents working, Carlota grew up in comfortable circumstances. She shared her father's interest in electrical engineering and was intent on applying to the engineering school at the National University when she graduated from Saint Dominic High School in 1986.

The nuns who teach at Saint Dominic are members of Juanita Martinez' community, the Dominican Order. After they made a "preferential option for the poor," these Dominicans continued to staff middle-class high schools like Saint Dominic's, but also assumed responsibility for the parish of Santa Lucia north of the city. They integrated both ministries by involving their middle-class high school students in various projects in the parish.

It was on such a project that Carlota Sucre first encountered the reality of El Salvador's poor. She volunteered to work one day a week with a community health worker trained by Laura Santiago at the clinic in Santa Lucia. Her co-worker, Adela Casteneda, was intelligent but could not read. This made Adela apprehensive about distributing medicines whose labels were indecipherable to her. At first, Carlota helped Adela by simply reading labels. In the afternoon, when there were fewer patients, Carlota taught Adela to read. She did this by creating word games that associated printed words with rhymes. Soon, everything in the clinic had a small card attached with its name carefully printed in block letters.

One day when Juanita visited the clinic she watched attentively as the two women played their word game. That afternoon Juanita asked Carlota where she had learned to teach. Carlota explained that her mother was a teacher and that these games were variations on learning rhymes her mother had taught her. Juanita thanked Carlota for giving this "gift" to Adela. She added that "If you could teach more women to read in this easy manner, Salvador would achieve peace without war."

Previously, Carlota had not regarded reading a "gift" nor associated the ability to read with peace. When she graduated from Saint Dominic High School, she still went to the National University, but she declared education as her major. Carlota's father was pleased. "Women should not be engineers," he said. "They are better made to be teachers."

Carlota's professor of education insisted that his students learn by immersion. He required that each student volunteer in a literacy program for which they would be evaluated and given

credit. Carlota returned to Santa Lucia and asked Juanita for permission to start a literacy program. She developed a proposal with Adela and in a month both women had instituted a literacy program in Santa Lucia. At first Carlota travelled to Santa Lucia every Friday afternoon. After a few months she moved into the community and is now part of the pastoral team.

What would Camus' response be to the social situation in El Salvador under the ARENA party? I suggest that it would be like that of Laura Santiago, Carlota Sucre and Juanita Martinez. Like these women, Camus believed that one's nature was to be found in the fullness of their potential. Any system that prevented a man or a woman from achieving this potential, whether because of race (National Socialism), historical necessity (Communism) or one's relationship to the forces of production (capitalism), was de-humanizing and must be withstood. This is the position of the Catholic Church in El Salvador and the cornerstone of the pastoral strategy at Santa Lucia. The pastoral team refuses to accept the social servitude of the poor, much less bless it. They provide education to the poor and encourage them to pursue vocations formerly denied them. Carlota Sucre accepts and celebrates a young man's decision to be a farm-laborer — if that is in fact his decision. But she refuses to accept that he must be a laborer.

When young people ask Carlota, "But who am I?" she responds, "You are who you may become." Laborers may become doctors and even employers of other laborers. Carlota is not a socialist, nor a capitalist. But her encouragement of the young has gotten her into some difficult situations in the past. In El Salvador, when a teacher advocates education and study among people whom the oligarchy intends to be laborers — in the context of El Salvador, she is advocating rebellion.

Like the Salvadoran Church of the post-Vatican era, Camus rejected the acceptance of suffering as inevitable and deserved. He also rejected Marxist acceptance of suffering under the banner of historical necessity. Any forced violation of human freedom must be resisted, Camus wrote, even if it means one's own suffering and death. Archbishop Romero and his auxiliary Bishop, Arturo Rivera y Damas articulated this same approach to social sin in their Encyclical on the Feast of Transfiguration, August 6, 1979.33 At Santa Lucia, this conviction is expressed in a resistance that assumes as many forms as the violence that rules the country.

El Salvador's violence is pervasive. One of its most notorious forms is the rampant sickness and the repression by the government when people organize for better health. Community health workers like Laura Santiago engage in an act of resistance when they get medicines and health care to communities that are being victimized by El Salvador's economic system. Preventative health requires community action. If a village moves a well to high ground but one family continues to dispose of waste uphill from the well, the effort is wasted. Community health workers in El Salvador spend as much time developing decision-making strategies in the villages as talking about health. As Laura has learned, community-building is a subversive activity in a country that requires terror to keep workers docile for the labor pool.

Juanita identifies her pastoral style as "accompaniment." The language she uses to describe accompaniment echoes that of Camus' 'rebel'. "The Church refuses to accept the oppression of the poor," Juanita says. "And even though we have few resources to give to the poor, we can offer ourselves. And so we must be with the poor, in their communities and sharing their dangers with them." As I mentioned earlier, when the Salvadoran Armed Forces invaded Santa Lucia, Juanita and her colleagues stayed in the parish. Like Camus, Juanita's service to her fellow men and women is built on "patience, strength, and secret cunning." Because she has the support of the Church authorities in El Salvador, when she stands in the doorway of some small shanty to defy the National Guard that has come to arrest a young person from the parish, her eyes are those of

the archbishop; her defiance, that of the whole Church. Through her witness, the Church "stands in the midst of all, in the same rank neither higher nor lower, with all those who are working and struggling."34

The vocation of the pastoral team at Santa Lucia is, in Oscar Romero's words, "to be a voice for the voiceless." Here again, the pastoral of accompaniment is analogous to Camus' human vocation: in the face of oppression, human responsibility demands that we open the prisons and give voice to the sorrows and joys of all. Camus spoke of prisons in a literal and figurative sense. He regarded revolution as a type of prison, relegating as it does, human beings to mere objects of historical force. Rebellion differs from revolution. It stresses unity over conformity. In a revolution, conformity is sometimes disguised as consensus but its effects are the same in either case: setting limits (prisons) around the individual that deny one's full development.

Carlota, Laura and Juanita have not taken up arms in El Salvador's war. They are part of a rebellion and not part of a revolution. Each of these women fear for the consequences of a revolutionary movement which not only uses force to oppose oppression, but has justified it with reference to "El Salvador's historical project." Given a choice between the FMLN and ARENA all three would probably choose the FMLN, although with grave reservations.

Rebellion recognizes an individual's limits as well as the limits of history. But the rebel tries to establish the limits of history and in so doing define values common to all. "Common to all": this is a key phrase in the analysis of Camus' ethics as well as an important point of departure between Camus and Christianity. Camus held that human nature is social. Every person is a being in community, sharing a common history with others. So when others are diminished, I am diminished and I must rebel — even unto death. Up to this point, it would be hard to detect a distinction between Camus's thought and classic, Christian anthropology. But Camus rejected Christianity because the Christian accepted death (and so killing) as meaningful. For Camus, it was not a great leap between this position and that of accepting suffering. And if truth be told, the Church has urged its followers to accept suffering more often than it has encouraged rebellion at the risk of death.

Here again, the Church has changed in its self-understanding, moving in a direction that addresses Camus' critique. After the Second Vatican Council and the Latin American Bishops' Conferences at Medellin and Puebla, the Church developed a new understanding of its place in the world. Pastoral workers in El Salvador today speak of the Church and the gospel "incarnated" in history. To be incarnated in history means to share responsibility for human progress, as Christ did. In this worldview, "human rights" mean the right to achieve the fullness of one's potential within community. To be incarnated in history means saying "no" to whatever relegates human beings to prison. To the poor of El Salvador, the Church offers great liberating potential. It is rebellion.

Conclusion

From my reading of Camus, I do not have the impression that he was a self-righteous man. Still, I cannot help but think that he would feel vindicated by the recent turn of events in Eastern Europe. As I prepare to return to El Salvador tomorrow, I also find myself thinking that Camus would have been at home at Santa Lucia, either enjoying the company of the youth in front of the convent, or working alongside the pastoral team. But I wonder how he would have reconciled the West's celebration of the freedom of the East with its financing of oppression in the Southern Hemisphere. With American military aid and advisors, countries like El Salvador have seen

murder, rape and "disappearances" systematized in a way that rivals the repression of Stalin and Hitler.

I suspect that Camus would have had a great deal to say to many of the leaders of the "freedom movement" in Eastern Europe. These men and women have captured the attention of the West because of their courage and sacrifice. They have "triumphed" over communism. But have they also triumphed over oppression or simply replaced an inefficient economic and social system with another, yet to be tried? Have they taken a stand for liberty, or will they merely vindicate capitalism, whose equally powerful potential for oppression is yet to be seen in Eastern Europe, but is all-too-evident in Central America? What words will the new age of leadership in Eastern Europe have to offer on behalf of the oppressed and suffering in other parts of the world?

The countries of Eastern Europe will require huge infusions of aid over the next few years to re-build industries, re-structure agriculture and maintain the balance of payments on their foreign debt. These needs have already disrupted the United States' relationship to countries which have been traditional recipients of the bulk of foreign aid. Even so, the Congress and the Administration recognize an obligation to support the continued demise of Communism in Europe. But who will speak for Carlota Sucre, now that the death squads are looking for her? And who will speak for Laura Santiago's husband? Who will speak for the seventy thousand dead and the millions of campesinos kept in a state of enslavement — chattel for the "producers"? Will the intellectuals of Eastern Europe speak out for the other oppressed peoples of the world or will they remain silent so as not to endanger the flow of capital to their respective countries? And if so, how do they differ from Sartre and the other intellectuals who knew of the Gulags and yet remained silent in front of Stalin?

I believe that Albert Camus and Juanita Martinez would say that these intellectuals have no choice. When we refuse to oppose the executioners, we collaborate in their bloody task and share responsibility for their murders. Perhaps today, with the moral ascendancy that has been achieved by Eastern Europe's intellectual, labor and artistic community, it is fair to paraphrase Camus' conversation with the Dominicans: "I waited for a strong voice to be lifted up in the East even though I am not an Eastern European. I knew that spirit would be lost if the Poles, Czechs, Germans, Bulgarian and Hungarians did not raise the cry of condemnation in the presence of force. But when no voice was heard. . . ."

Notes

1. For work done in the past twenty years on the relationship of theology and pastoral practice to social change in Latin America see:

Aman, Kenneth, (Editor). *Border Regions of Faith: An Anthology of Religion and Social Change*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 1987.

Berryman, Philip. *The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 1984.

Fierro, Alfredo. *The Militant Gospel: A Critical Introduction to Political Theologies*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 1977.

Gottwald, Norman, (Editor). *The Bible and Liberation: Political and Social Hermeneutics.* Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 1983.

2. The following studies discuss Camus' relationship to religion and Christianity in particular:

Bruckberger, Raymond. "The Spiritual Agony of Europe," in *Renascence,* Vol. 7, 1954.

Durfee, Harold. "Albert Camus and the Ethics of Rebellion," in *The Journal of Religion*. Vol. 38, 1958.

Hanna, Thomas. "Albert Camus and the Christian Faith," in *The Journal of Religion.* Vol. 36, 1956.

Lauer, Quentin. "Albert Camus: The Revolt Against Absurdity", in *Thought*, Vol. 35, 1960.

3. Susan Sontag, "Piety Without Content," in *Against Interpretation and Other Essays*. New York: Delta Books. 1964. pp. 253.

4. Albert Camus, *Carnets*. Vol. II, Jan. 1942 - Mars. 1951 (Paris: Gallimard. 1964), p. 86.

5. Albert Camus, *The Plague*. (New York: Knopf, 1948).

6. Albert Camus, *Carnets. op. cit.*, p. 188.

7. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays* (New York: Random House, 1955).

8. Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York: Knopf, 1956).

9. Albert Camus, "An Absurd Reasoning", in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

10. Albert Camus, "The Minotaur", in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

11. Albert Camus, "The Artist and His Time," in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

12. Albert Camus, *Actuelles: Chroniques 1944-1948* (Paris: Gallimard. 1950), p. 46.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Albert Camus, *Lyrical and Critical Essays*. Edited by Philip Thody (New York: Knopf 1968), p. 6.

15. Albert Camus, "The Artist and His Time," in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

16. Albert Camus, "Return to Tipasa," in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

17. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

19. Albert Camus, "Resistance, Rebellion and Death," *op. cit.,* p. 140.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Francois Jeanson, Review of *The Rebel* by Albert Camus, in *Les Temps Modernes*, May. 1952.

22. For a review of the controversy between Camus and Sartre see: Bree, Germaine. *Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment.* New York: Dell. 1972. Chiaromonte, Nicola. "Paris Letter: Sartre vs. Camus," in *The Partisan Review*. Vol. 19, 1952. pp. 680-686. Domenach, D-M. "Camus-Sartre Debate: Rebellion vs. Revolution" in *The Nation.* Vol. 176. 1953. pp. 202-203.

23. Albert Camus, "Neither Victims Nor Executioners," in *The Pacifist Conscience*. Edited by Peter Meyer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 425.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 426.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, p. 437.

27. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, *op. cit.*, p 17.

28. Albert Camus, *Actuelles Chroniques 1944-1948*. *op. cit.*, p. 46.

29. A popular organization is an association concerned with change around some particular problem. There are popular organizations of marginal people — those poor who are forced to live

in tin and cardboard huts along railroad tracks and in garbage dumps. Other popular organizations include committees of mothers of the disappeared, displaced people, and farm laborers.

30. For two well-researched and documented treatments of the rise of the Salvadoran right's paramilitary forces see:

Pyes, Craig. "Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots," a series of reports in *The Albuquerque Journal* from December 18-22, 1983.

Nairn, Allan. "Behind the Death Squads," in *The Progressive*. Vol. 22, 1984.

31. Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio Rosa-Chavez reported to the Archdiocesan office for human rights that the official Armed Forces radio station and vehicles broadcasting over loudspeakers threatened to kill the "Jesuit communists." In a more official capacity, Mauricio Colorado, the Attorney General of El Salvador, wrote to Pope John Paul II on November 18, 1989, suggesting that certain bishops be removed from El Salvador. He argued that these bishops promoted a "church of the poor," and that such a position was contrary to Salvadoran national interests.

32. D'Aubuisson had help in forming ARENA's death squads. The sources of this help bear investigation as they have left their stamp on the party. They include Guatemala's Mario Sandoval of the National Liberation Movement (MNL). The MNL was formed with CIA backing during the 1950s to overthrow the reform government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. In 1980 the MNL advertised itself as "the party of organized violence." D'Aubuisson also contacted veterans of the French colonial wars in Algeria for help in developing a terror campaign against El Salvador's "communists." ARENA imported the White Hand Death Squad from Guatemala and began a systematic campaign to eliminate union officials, students, activists and Church workers.

33. Oscar Romero and Arturo Rivera y Damas, "The Church's Mission amid the National Crisis," in *Voice of the Voiceless: The Four Pastoral Letters and Other Statements* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985).

34. Albert Camus, "The Artist in His Time," in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*. *op. cit.*, p. 151.

Personality and Social Group-Structure, Function and Transfer, in Terms of Transactional Analysis

Marek Masiak

The bio-psycho-social approach in medicine takes into account all determinants of health and of illness. In this article, however, I will pay attention mostly to the psychological and social dimensions in terms of personality and social group structure and functioning.

My attitude towards this area is determined first of all by clinical experience and by the psychiatric traditions and schools of thought which contain the following elements: the community psychiatry concept (Tuke, Connolly and others) which is developing in various types of therapeutic communities; the evolutionary approach (Hulings, Jackson, Jan Mazurkiewicz and others) that assume both: a stage-by-stage evolution of human psychic life (which could be stated also in terms of social life) as a psychological norm, and psychopathology as a reverse process, called dissolution as a process of devolving to an earlier stage of evolution; and, last but not least, transactional analysis (TA). TA, originated by Eric Berne, nowadays is rapidly developing into a world school of psychotherapy and thought impacting education, management and even religion. Because the group analysis in this article will be stated in terms of TA that are some what technical, I shall include here a sort of a dictionary of basic TA terms in order to avoid being misunderstood.

One of most basic assumptions of TA is as follows (after C.M. Steiner, 1974): Human beings are, by nature, inclined to and capable of living in harmony with themselves, each other, and nature. If people are unhealthy, uninterested in learning, uncooperative, selfish, or disrespectful of life, it is the result of external oppressive influences, which overpower the more basic positive life tendency that is built-into them. Even when overpowered, this tendency remains dormant, so that it is always ready to express itself when oppression lifts. Even if it is not given a chance to be expressed in a person's lifetime this human life tendency is passed on to each succeeding generation of newborns.

Terms

Personality. According to Berne, there are three main ego-states (elements of personality): Parent, Adult, and Child. These terms include levels of experienced feelings as well as specific behavior and types of communication. At any time one element (or ego-state) dominates and can communicate with other elements of the person or of another person's elements in different types of transactions. A well functioning person easily shifts ego-states and types of communication.

Child. "Everyone was a child once" (E. Berne). We are born with this element that is organized during the first five years of our life, reflecting the feelings and experiences of that time and becoming the most powerful element of one's personality. Child is manifest in three states: free Child, adapted Child and little professor.

Free Child: this comprises spontaneity, enjoyment of life, sex, self-indulgence (free Child has no moral rules), emotionality, etc.

Adapted Child: reflects parental attitudes and comprises conforming and self-limiting feelings and behavior. On the other hand, it could be rebellious and can gradually accumulate negative

feelings of hate and revenge (racket feelings) which, after "collecting coupons," can explode in aggressive activity without feelings of guilt (rabat-discount).

Little professor: the basic problem for Child is how to get strokes (a unit of positive or negative reinforcement received from other persons such as parental figures; this is necessary for living). This element of Child that helps to get strokes is called little professor. This is creative, inspiring, intuitive, precocious, magical-thinking, and can play an important role also in mature psychological life.

Parent. This ego-state comprises two elements: control (critical Parent) and nurturance (nurturing Parent) and reflects memories of parental figures from the first five years of life, with some later changes. In our psychological life Parent is present in the form of internal dialogue in which he warns, punishes or supports and rewards us; parent is not persuaded by reality and in this sense is nonperceptive, noncognitive and arbitrary.

Critical Parent could be: aggressive, ambitious, bossy, demanding, dissatisfied, egotistical, selfish, stubborn, suspicious, prejudiced, value giving, etc.

Nurturing Parent could be: helpful, loyal, conventional, praising, stable, etc.

Adult. This is sort of an individual person's own, original thought concept of life that is built during the course of one's individual experience of life and is connected with constant exchange of information. Sometimes it is compared to a brain computer that can take up all information from life (as well as from other elements of personality), store, figure them out and predict the results. Adult can build up its own value system that sometimes can be distant from parental dogmas. Adult can be: realistic, organized, methodical, thorough, industrious, wise, predicting, competent, reliable, open-minded, rational, decision-making, etc. In certain circumstances Adult could be dominated by either Parent or Child (contamination), that can affect substantially his activity.

Now to conclude—the language as a form of communication of Parent, Adult and Child has its specificity.

Parent's statements are usually arbitrary, generalizing, sometimes vague and not referring to reality straightaway. Often the following words are used: must, should, ought, right, wrong, always, never, moral, immoral, order, teach, protect, help, reward, punish, etc.

Adult language is precise and real. Expressions like these are often used: I think, it seems to me, as far as I am informed, according to; facts, data, information, result, decide, anticipate, estimate, etc.

Child's form of communication is often non-verbal. Words used have emotional hue. Could be curses or words of joy and of positive excitement: Oh, gee, OK, fine, magnificent, great; also: want, hate, dare, won't, mad, scare, funny, sex, lick, etc.

Egogram. After C.M. Steiner, the egogram is a simple diagram showing the relative strength of the elements of personality, that is, which element dominates. It can also be used to show changes in personality as well as the way in which two persons in relationship compare.

Transactions

These can occur at two levels: the social, visible level and the psychological, covert level which may accompany it. They can be of different types and can form games. Formally, transaction

is a form of interpersonal behavior in which different ego-states take part, and that consists of a stimulus and a response.

Life Positions. These reflect the stroke situation and the life decisions that, concerning themselves and other persons, children make when about six years of age. Usually the stroke deficiency makes us feel not OK while others (mature people) seem to be OK. The first attitude could be gradually changed to "I'm OK — you're OK" which is optimal for any form of social behavior. However, if the upbringing is not positive, people can stay not OK all their life. Other, rather rare, attitudes are: I'm OK — you are not OK," and "I'm not OK — you are not OK."

Games. A game may be defined as a recurring series of transactions, often repetitive, superficially rational, with a concealed motivation and outcome that could be dramatic or at least make impossible any real development or real positive changes in the situation. In this pattern of transactions, many forms of manipulating the other person or persons are used in order to get strokes, mostly negative. The basic game, often played in childhood is "Mine is better than yours." This reflects the state of stroke deficiency and "I'm not OK — you are OK" attitude. This game also could be used concerning mature people for different forms of manipulation. The roles that people play in games usually form "The Drama Triangle" (after S.B. Karpman) and comprise: Victim (I'm not OK you are OK, help me"), Rescuer ("I'm OK — you are not OK, but, after all I'll try to help you") and Persecutor (I'm OK — you are not OK and it is your fault").

Script of Life. The best illustration is Berne's aphorism: "People are born princes and princesses, until their parents turn them into frogs." "Parents" could be understood in a broad sense as all parental figures and all bosses of our life that can profit from our script. The script or scenario is written in our early childhood and we perform it all our life, unless we decide one day to change it, to change our life, and to be a prince again. Registered in the script are injunctions and counter-injunctions of our parents, survival conclusions of our little professor, and other elements that strictly determine our life performance.

Social Group Structure and Functioning

Three basic ego states or three elements of personality could play various roles in different peoples' psychological and social life. Generally speaking some people who are not well functioning are dominated permanently by one of these elements and show a consistent tendency to make transactions that are specific to it. Such transactions can form and influence different types of social groups. They could be called broadly speaking: a Parent Level Group (PLG), and a Child Level Group (CLG). We can speak also about an Adult Level Group (ALG), however, not in terms of domination of any elements of personality.

Adult Level Group

Here the elements of personality function in harmony so that people can use them all easily and freely and can realize themselves and fully develop their personalities. The consistent, free and independent Adult plays the basic role in this situation; in the egograms Adult has the dominant position.

All types of transactions take place, there is no favorite transaction; nevertheless, Adult transactions are overwhelming and, in a sense, verify all others. These people create groups characterized by intensive and unlimited exchange of information and by the basic attitude: "I'm OK — you're OK," that is, an attitude of partnership and mutual responsibility.

The role of Adapted Child is minimal and most unemployed; there is no need to play games. People easily receive positive reinforcement, for a lot of feedback is still going on and racket feelings are minimal. Different forms of communication are used, but the basic type is the language of Adult. This group could be called a democratic one.

People are not divided according to different levels, but specialize in different roles that make the group function. Due to unlimited exchange of information and being free from games, peoples' energy can be used for the development of their personality and the whole group. This process could be called (after Jackson) a social evolution.

Child Level Group

These groups do not have a well-stablished and reliable structure. This is due to the character of Child which does not plan, look ahead or even think too much, but first of all reacts, feels, and seeks to gain strokes by every possible way that the little professor can invent. Child — level groups could easily be destroyed and rebuilt, just for fun or to do damage together. There are at least two types of Child level groups. When the free Child is dominant and the attitude of group members is "I'm OK and you're OK," the main goal is to gain positive strokes. It is something like "let us play together" and for some time such a group could be self-sufficient because the group members are at the same time donors and recipients of positive strokes. In the egograms the free Child is dominant and favorite transactions are mostly Child (free) — Child (free) and second Child (free) — Nurturing Parent.

It is a different situation in a state of stroke deficiency. The adapted, rebellious Child is dominant and the attitude changes from "I'm not OK — you're not OK" to "I'm OK — you're not OK." In that case people act like "rejected children" and there are a lot of racket feelings and a lot of games, first of all — "mine is better." The basic group goal is to gain as many negative strokes as possible if positive ones are not available. But in that case the donors of negative strokes should be first of all people from the outside world. It is quite common, for instance, that after doing terrorist acts their authors try to focus public attention on them in every possible way. But in most cases the game has started earlier. For a long time they feel rejected and their Adapted Child collects "coupons for rabat-discount" in the form of increasing amounts of racket feelings of hate and revenge. They feel mostly "not OK" and for the time being play the role of a victim in a drama triangle. But when the time comes that the amount of "coupons" is great enough for the Adapted Child to begin revenge, one changes roles and begins persecutory activity. In the egograms the adapted rebellious child is dominant along with transactions: "adapted Child — adapted Child" and secondly "adapted Child — critical Parent." At first it could be single acts of vandalism, then accidental fights with police, then acts of terrorism, then if many other factors coincide, even a revolution can start.

Quite often the collected "coupons" are enough only for a limited amount of aggressive action and then people can change their attitude and eventually their group. However, the groups mentioned above disappear easily; one should bear in mind that perhaps in each society there are people or groups that "collect coupons" and in certain circumstances can explode or be manipulated in different ways.

The interesting thing is the transformation or incorporation of these groups into a hierarchical structure. The second favorite transaction of those people, directed to a Parent, is a sort of a crying for strokes. Usually it evolves in this manner. By joining the hierarchical structure, Child-level people gain a stable source of positive strokes from the leader and an ideological cover, that helps them to neutralize their own Parent. This could be put in the following terms: "Although I am killing people, I am doing it not because I do not feel OK and it makes me feel better, but for the future happiness of mankind; besides it is not me but my leader who takes responsibility for all." Thus Child-level people quite often became a part of the hierarchical structure when, after revolutionary activity or the pseudo-democratic arrangement that sometimes follows, a new hierarchy is established.

A Parent-Level Group

The favorite transaction in this group is: "critical Parent -adapted Child," and secondly "Parent — Parent." What is most significant in the group is the dominating position of the expansive, power hungry and critical Parent who tries to put others in the position of a subordinate, adapted Child. Consequent to that, the most significant trait of the group is the inequality of its members and their division into different levels. For, if such groups are to function, the transactional situation of the top of the group should be multiplied at each level, with the exception of course of the last or bottom level. In other words, each group member, at each level should have the great boss, that is, Parent-boss for all and forever, and his own "private" boss from the next upper level, and his "private" subordinate Child on the level below.

It should be stressed that the most extreme and the most "consequent" Parent-level group in history was realized in our age in the form of concentration camps. The most substantial difference in the situation of the people was of course between the great boss who had all power and all responsibility and the lowest level people who had no power and no responsibility. Their role in the structure was just to obey orders and function on the Adapted, subordinate Child level. Their attitude should be: "I'm not OK — you're OK." Depending on the historical situation and the manner of development of the group (whether it is a sort of a prison situation or long time lasting hierarchical structure), these people can function in different ways. Some act as subordinate children, some try to create even Adult-level groups in the form of so-called internal emigration, some start "collecting coupons," some according to their little professor's invention try to improve their situation by collaboration with the group establishment which allows them to climb a bit in the group hierarchy, etc. The basic problem for all of them, however, is not how to grow up or how to develop, but how to survive; and sooner or later in many cases it is not Adult but little professor that influences people's decisions and level of activity, because the basic rule of the Parent-level group is deprivation of Adult, this latter is a basic danger to the hierarchical system. Thus at the very beginning of the imposition by force of such a system upon a big social group, those were exterminated who represent a societal Adult, that is intellectuals, independent thinkers, etc.

Besides, these continue very intensive indoctrination which usually causes, at least in the case of some people, Parent-Adult contamination. The methodology is simply but to some extent effective. Firstly, it is to block the exchange of information in a very possible way: the death penalty for keeping radio-sets at home, jamming programs of foreign radio stations, imprisonment for oral or written exchange of information that differs from that which is official, imprisonment even for political jokes, elimination of free travel abroad, very strict censorship, no foreign press,

destruction of "dangerous" books or their restriction to special libraries, available only under special permission.

In fact, for normal Adult activity what is most important is the exchange of information in small groups; it is families, close friends, etc. Sometimes, however, even those transactions can be paralyzed, and as a result the Adult-computer is in a very difficult position. On the other hand, the official sources constantly and in numerous ways spread either false or half-truths. That makes the situation of Adult more and more difficult. The story of Jim Jones' sect could be mentioned in this context. Jones first took his folk into the deep brush in order to isolate them from exchange of information with the outside world and then began further indoctrination. Those mechanisms could be intensified much more in a prison situation where the isolation of the Adult could be complete. The indoctrination of children and young people is a separate problem. For them the family is to be replaced by specific group structures or institutions, and the educational system is used as means of indoctrination from kindergarten to university, where so-called ideological education plays an important role. Children's and young people's organizations, usually of a uniformed and paramilitary type, play similar roles. All these efforts can create a very specific script of life.

The next problem is the activation of the subordinate Child. Subordinate Child-like behavior can be achieved in many ways. First by specific PLG rituals. Normally in an Adult-level group, rituals play a positive role in interpersonal communication, but in this case they direct group and at times also individual behavior, to express obedience and subordination to the great boss or his representatives. It could be the Nazi "Heil Hitler" or specific festive rituals with "parade marches," etc., but also letters with obedient greetings that all Polish school children were forced to write and send to Stalin on his birthday, numerous poems, songs and speeches on many occasions to proclaim his greatness and power, daily rituals that begin with all people lining up in military order, singing a revolutionary song and expressing admiration for all that the great boss was, is or will be doing, now or in the future. Another method of activating Child is to keep people feeling constantly insecure. A simple method for achieving this is to cut down the food supply, sometimes to the level of artificial famine, or the persistent real threat (as no civil rights in fact exist) of psychological or physical punishment in case, or even upon suspicion, of insubordination. Another method are games arranged according to a certain scheme in a drama triangle: (a) The victims are ordinary people, mostly of the lowest level; (b) The persecutors are enemies, either from within: class enemies, different minorities, the Church, smugglers, representatives of some professions, such as doctors or even the state bureaucracy, or from without: imperialists, backsliders—for the Jones sect people it was probably the US government, etc., (c) The rescuer is always a great boss, his party or his establishment, presented as the only donor of peace and security, the only support in the face of those threats. The games are usually of two types: "mine is better" (they try to smash us, we must be prepared), and "if not you" (they try to keep us from achieving our goals, otherwise we could have done a lot). However, in order to engage people in games it is much more important to give them above all an internal enemy. Therefore, for example, Polish farmers who traditionally were living in well-functioning village communities that helped them, among other things, to survive both world wars, were a priori divided, after the Second World War, into four different classes. The authorities did a lot of work to cause class war ('mine is better' game) among them and to change neighbors into enemies.

Once started, games usually tend to be played a long time, sometimes through generations, even if the situation that originated them no longer exists. Only the roles change in the drama triangle.

As a result of games, the position of great boss and his supporters as providential rescuers is constantly strengthened. Also a lot of aggression is produced which can be directed in different ways. Usually the adapted Child aggression of lower level people is a real energy that drives PLG expansion outside, as was the case of different empires in history. Sometimes, when other factors coincide, the aggression can be directed toward upper level people and lead to some exchange there.

The attitude of the great boss, it should be stressed, is "I'm OK, you're not OK," or "only I'm OK, I must control you, teach you, reward or punish you according to your conduct." In his egogram, the grandiose, expansive and power desiring critical Parent is dominant. The great boss personifies the whole group and in a sense gives a bit of his power to all bosses at all levels. His function and future depends on many factors, one of more importance being communication. Quite often this is disturbed so that information from the lower level is filtered and deformed by higher levels, so that the great boss gradually can lose contact with reality. His decisions, taken always at the parental level, could be therefore more and more unrealistic and make the group situation more and more difficult; this can increase also the aggression of people at lower levels to a level that may destabilize the group.

Finally, upper level people usually play the stabilizing role in PLG functioning. They are trained to transfer orders from upper level boss to their subordinate and to keep things as they are. They stop all processes that may induce anything new or any changes in group functioning or structure. Sometimes however, in the face of total destabilization, they can inspire and manipulate people's aggression to cause limited changes at the top of the hierarchy and again keep things as they are. In their egograms, both critical Parent and adapted Child play important role. Their attitude consequently changes from "I'm not OK — you're OK" in transactions with the boss, to "I'm OK — you're not OK" with subordinates. They seem to be the most typical product of PLG.

The last of the PLG characteristics is an ideology. There are different types of ideological cover that attempt to justify the inequality of men stratified in this group structure. Usually issued in more or less typical parental language (vague, generalizing, slogan-like), it appeals to so-called "objective rules of history" to which there is no alternative, or even directly to God (*Gott mit uns*). Interestingly, often it works in connection with your birth situation: you are born in a nation of masters or slaves, as a member of the right class or to be class enemy, etc.

In conclusion, it should be stated, that PLG can cause not only control by the boss of people's behavior in a very profound way (Jones' people committed group suicide probably just on his order), but also can influence substantially people's egograms, making it easy to restore the PLG structure time and time again.

However, it is not always so. In the war and the postwar history of Poland, the totalitarian order imposed from outside was never completely successful and did not do so much damage concerning people's egograms. This is because there were zones of Polish social and psychological life which were never penetrated by totalitarian ideology: first of all the Roman Catholic Church (particularly the "Light and Life" movement within the Church), most Polish families, and the so-called internal emigration field. Two types of transactions and of language existed in the life of that time. Those used for contacts with public authorities, and those used in private. The upbringing of generations of Poles in a spirit of independence and freedom, made possible the birth, growth and success of the solidarity movement.

The Transformation of Group Structure

By entering into conflict among themselves in the First World War some totalitarian structures (states) became weak. This was followed by revolutions and after an anarchic period the establishment for a rather short time of pseudo-democratic structures. Then again totalitarian structures were restored. This three-stage cycle of group transformation is to some extent typical. It reflects hierarchic egograms and the life scripts of group members, Parental contamination of Adults, the rebellious adapted Child full of hate and aggression, games that still go on regardless of changes occurring in the world around us, etc.

What could be stated in this context is that people should be more and more informed that they can change their scripts of life if they really want to and that therefore they can change their life. Their life can be free from games, hate and aggression. They can realize their natural desire to communicate freely with others and to grow up. Our great opportunity in the present world is for real progress in the process of exchange of information among peoples and nations. That will make very difficult the isolation and deprivation of people's Adult, to stop him from growing up. Due to this, the changes that occurred recently in Poland have been spreading out in the Middle and Eastern Europe in a chain reaction. The real building of ALG is a long process, because changing scripts of life and the experience of a new manner of functioning as an independent, responsible adult person takes time. This process can be facilitated or stopped, but never completely blocked.

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Chapter XIII
The Filipino Woman's Role in the Humanization of Social Life

Linda P. Perez

This marvelous creation was described as a submissive wife whose reason for being was to love, honor, obey, and occasionally amuse her husband, to bring up his children and manage his household. — Anne Firor Scott

This in a capsule is every woman held captive by her traditional role as "Queen of the Home."1 Yet changes brought about by the movements of "the late 1840s and early 1850s"2 and "the '60s and '70s,"3 that swept women around the world, catapulted them into new career roles, as secretary, teacher, lawyer, manager, president of a company or of a country. . . . To the "women's rights organizations . . . in Europe and America,"4 the liberators of the race, our debt of gratitude: at least, now women cannot be "denied . . . the facilities for obtaining a thorough education . . . "5 and "their conditions . . . that of a legally inferior caste"6 will be history.

The aim of this paper is to present the multifaceted role the Filipino woman plays in the humanization of social life as mother and housewife, as working mother, and as alternate mother and/or alternate breadwinner. Simple, sometimes shy, usually dedicated, hard-working and faithful, the Filipino woman is a real partner in the humanization of social life.

Before considering the Filipino woman's role in the aspect of humanization, it is proper to define some terms.

Filipino. This term refers to the inhabitants of the Philippine archipelago (called the Philippines, a country of more than 7,000 islands and islets that lies off the southeast coast of Asia7) regardless of racial strain or economic status.8

Humanization. It is the art or process of giving a human character or aspect; regarding or treating as human;9 to be human (having the attributes of man - understanding, evaluating, choosing, accepting responsibility).10

Social Life. 'Social' is concerned with the welfare of human beings as members of society.11 'Life' is the state of a material complex characterized by the capacity to perform certain functional activities . . . growth, reproduction and some form of responsiveness and adaptability.12

Filipino Woman's Role

The Filipino woman plays a multifaceted role in the humanization of social life. First and foremost, if she is married and with children, she is a mother and/or "pure housewife"13; second, she is an "alternative breadwinner," working mother, or "career woman;"14 and third, the single "alternate mother" and "alternate breadwinner."

Mother and/or Pure Housewife

The most important role of a Filipino woman is being a mother and/or pure housewife. She stays at home most of the time. As mother, her primary responsibility is the care of the children

— from feeding them nutritious food, bathing them, preparing them for school to supervising them with their homework. Her secondary duty is cleaning the house, putting things in order, doing the dishes, laundry, gardening, grocery (this is sometimes done by men because most Filipino women do not drive) and budgeting the family income to balance with expenditures, while setting aside some amount for future needs. This is a full-time job, but of course, first and foremost, she is a wife, and as such she also has to attend to her husband's needs - preparing his meals, setting the table for him (while the man reads newspapers), packing his lunch, etc. (It may be a consolation to know that some men do work that are usually reserved for women.) All the above and more make up the job description of the woman whose designation or appointment (that does not come with a monetary consideration) became official during the marriage ceremony when the priest said, " . . . Be a good housewife."

An important aide for the mother and/or pure housewife is the availability of house-help. A well-off husband can hire a helper or maid. The presence of extended family members is also a relief for the overworked woman.

The woman falling under this category armed with whatever education she has earned before her marriage goes about her duties without complaining. She is the model, perhaps unlike Griselda in patience but patience for her husband she does have, like a Penelope, for Odysseus,15 upon his return, "did find his wife waiting for him. . . ."16

One disadvantage of this type of role is that though the woman is preoccupied with bringing up one or more upright individuals, a humanized family ready for entrance into society, in the process she herself is dehumanized. She is cut off, so to speak, from society. Today some of this has changed. The mother or the pure housewife goes to parties, plays tennis when children are in school, becomes a member of a club or two, attends meetings, goes to aerobic classes, etc.

An advantage which outweighs the disadvantages is ". . . the positive psychological impact the mother's constant presence is believed to have for children during the latter's growing and formative years."17 This must be the reason for women, including the career-oriented ones, to choose to stay at home and return to work when the children are in school or grown up and are able to take care of themselves.

"Alternate Breadwinner," Working Mother, or "Career Woman"18

The second category, the working mother, career woman or "alternate breadwinner" is well-protected by The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Article XIII Social Justice and Human Rights, Section 14 on Women states:

The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.19

In spite of this provision however, women still encounter a lot of problems. More often companies are reluctant to hire married women who are of child-bearing age because of probable disruption in the office when she applies for maternity leave. Besides, when children get sick usually it is the woman who excuses herself from work, although the man may take care of the child when circumstances warrant it.

In the Philippines, a woman who was working before she was married may arrange with the husband to work even after she has children. She may be allowed to work if the husband cannot

afford to provide for the family with his salary alone; however, if he can manage, then they may decide for the woman to stay at home. In cases of women who hold prominent or high positions or may be engaged in scientific pursuits such as medicine, nursing, pharmacy, chemistry (particularly those undertaking research), etc., they are allowed to continue working. Others, such as those in teaching, are also allowed to continue, because the work entails a shorter absence from the home. In addition, when the children attend the school where the mother is teaching, they enjoy free tuition grants. The children studying from grade school to the university are recipients of this privilege and this helps a lot considering that education is expensive, especially in the university. This arrangement also enhances the prestige or position of the family in the community. The teacher is always accorded respect and so are the members of the family.

A disadvantage for this category may be echoed in Jeanne Frances I. Illo's study "Woman and Development: Alternative Roles and Strategies":20

A rare breed among married women, the career woman is often caricatured in popular literature as a mother faced with delinquent children, a topsy-turvy household, and a marriage on the rocks. Some believe that a woman must choose a career or a marriage, since they are mutually incompatible.

An advantage of this category, however, is that the burden of supporting the family financially does not fall solely on the man's shoulders. Furthermore, the family can enjoy greater material comfort which contributes to their social standing in the community. Further, when the man of the family is not able to provide for the family, there is a ready substitute or alternate to carry on the burden such that the family members do not have to go begging.

The third category concerns the eldest girl in the family. More often than not this member of the family stays single throughout her life because the burden of caring for the younger members of the family falls on her shoulders. In the case of richer families, the eldest girl is sent to good schools, gets an education, works and earns some money. She can do as she pleases with her money and may get married if she wants to. Her counterpart in a poor or middle class has really little or no choice at all.

This eldest child sends her younger brothers and sisters to school, provides all the financial and psychological support, paving the way for their humanization. When the younger ones have finished their studies and find work, they may go their own way. If however, they are not able to find work and provide for their living, the eldest child still has to provide for their needs, unless the parents are able to help. It is a difficult job but in a way rewarding because in the end she will see the fruits of her labor.

Perhaps, the hardest part of this is after everything has been done, the parents are now old and they can no longer take care of themselves. The burden of taking care of them goes to the eldest girl. Her task does not end there. Sometimes, it goes beyond the first generation of family members. This extends to the second or third generation. The process is taxing but this is a practice that has been going on for generations.

Conclusion

The Filipino woman, then, does indeed contribute to the humanization of social life - as a mother and/or pure housewife, "alternate breadwinner," working mother or career woman, or as the single "alternate mother" and "alternate breadwinner."

Many may not have realized the depth of the sacrifices women have been making in humanizing the home, the community and the world. These women like Shakespeare's Viola and Rosalind play the role of the "restorer of a natural wholeness and meaning to life."21 The position of women in society is of such importance that according to "the laws of Manu (In Hinduism, the rules of social relationships, based on the Vedas and, according to Tradition, given by Manu, the progenitor and first legislator of mankind), "where women are honored, . . . the gods rejoice: but when they are neglected, all rites and ceremonies are fruitless. Where women do not grieve, it [society] even prospers."22 However, it is surprising to note that women to be recognized and accorded the love, respect and esteem they so deserve have to resort to the "parliament of the streets" to air their grievances and be heard. In short, they have to fight for their rights. Hence the organization "Association of the New Filipina, known as KaBaPa in the Philippines [is] . . . one of the militant women's organizations . . . [and] consistently struggles for equality, development, independence and peace."23 This organization was able to bring "women from all walks of life together for the delegation to the World Congress of Women in Moscow, June 1987, such as rural women workers, professional and intellectuals, women in government and in the media."24

With all the women movements around the world, including the Philippines, the role of the Filipino woman as mother or housewife has distinctively changed in the course of time, whether it is good or bad, only time will tell. Perhaps, Winston Churchill25 was right when he said, "It will be the same, I trust, as it has been since the days of Adam and Eve."

Notes

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