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Democracy and Values in Global Times with Nigeria as a Case Study

Edited by
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Introduction

George F. McLean and *Robert Magliola*

In these days an old term has taken on renewed meaning. After a century of attempts to promote human life on the basis of the political ideologies of totalitarianism and liberalism, the economic ideologies of dialectical materialism and capitalism, it has become apparent that more is needed. The difficulties—indeed the horrors—of the XXth century have shown that it is necessary now to build anew on the deeper foundation of communities of free persons. See the companion volume: *Democracy: In the Throes of Liberation and Totalitarianism*.

But to say freedom is to say self-determination with others, and hence to raise the question of the basis upon which these determinations are made. What are the goals of human life; what qualities and characteristics are needed by a community in which these goals can be realized; what must be the values according to which one commits one's life and makes daily decisions? With the emergence of freedom and a new beginning in the efforts to develop democratic life these issues of values have replaced those of scientific ideologies as the basic coordinates of public and private life.

In turn this suggests the need for a new investigation of the sources and foundations of values. As the creative and cumulative expression of human freedom a peoples future reflects the decisions and commitments undertaken by a people, their rejection of what is vicious and ugly, and their deepest sensitivity to what is decent, appropriate, worthy and even beautiful.

In order to project a democratic life for the next century we need, first, to look back into our culture, not to repeat the past, but to draw upon these deepest aspirations of human freedom in creating a new future. Secondly, we need to review the basis for the values these cultures contain in order that they be grounded more securely than in our tragic century. Like our rights, human values in order to be truly inalienable must not be based merely upon the decisions of those who have won a struggle for power, but must have a basis that transcends history and through time inspires human strivings. Finally we need to look toward the next century constructing structures for a democratic life which will build upon the values of the various cultures in ways that will enable them to be lived in new ways adapted to new times.

Part I, "Re-Thinking Values," explores what values support democracy, how values can be manipulated unscrupulously, and how truly democratic values can be cultivated, especially in post-Communist countries.

Chapter I, by George F. McLean, "Cultures and Democracy," is concerned with lining cultural traditions as the exercise of freedom by a people to the process of democracy. The goal is to enable value to suffuse public life and the political process to aid the people in living the good life.

Chapter II, by Ghia Nodia, "Rethinking Nationalism in the Light of Post-Communist Experience," examines in detail the complex relation between democracy and nationalism, arguing that Francis Fukuyama's thesis on 'liberal democracy as the end of history', while often correct, is too simplistic. In this regard, Nodia brings into play some relevant paradigms from E. J. Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France*.

Chapter III, by Penka Marinova Vartcheva, "The Mythomania of Contemporary Absolutism," deploys Karl Marx's classic "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" and Ernst Cassirer's studies of mass psychosis, to show how 'bureaucratic absolutism', be it socialist or capitalist, can

hold values captive and then generate mass delusion. Marinova Vartcheva stresses the importance of 'intellectual democracy', so mythomania can be de-mystified.

Chapter IV, by Richard A. Graham, "Why Democracy Can't Be Taught," with an eye towards current efforts to build democracy in Eastern Europe, researches the history of democratic values in the West. Graham, using empirical data and socio-psychology, critiques the successes and failures of formal programs of education in civic responsibility.

Part II, "Building Democratic Structures," exposes two potent threats internal to democracy, oligarchy on the one hand and despotism of the majority on the other.

Chapter V, by Dragos Popa, "Freedom and Choice: Between Heidegger's '*das Nichts'* and Jaspers's '*das Umgreifende'*," develops the notion of antinomy, of 'being' and 'having', to show how the 'autarchy of the economic element' has appropriated both these modes, in Eastern Europe for the past half-century under Soviet Marxism and in the West under triumphalistic Capitalism. Popa argues that both Communism and Capitalism have produced oligarchies which reduce human values to 'exchange-value'.

Chapter VI, by Hristo Smolenov, "New Dimensions of Democracy," uses the classic Marxist dialectic of 'recurrence and innovation' to argue that only the 'intellectualization of democracy' can protect democracy from itself, i.e., from the despotism of the majority. In this regard, Smolenov recounts how, in the Eastern Bloc, Communist egalitarianism slipped relentlessly into enslavement.

Part III, "Accommodating Pluralism," studies historical precedents, the metaphysical grounds, and the structural exigencies of democratic pluralism.

Chapter VII, by Roberto J. González-Casanovas, "Biblical Ethics in Alfonso X's *General Estoria*: A Historicist Critique of Cultural Authority," researches the twenty prologues to parts I and II of the *General Estoria*, commissioned and directed by King Alfonso the Wise of Castile (1252-84). Using the historicist mode, González-Casanovas shows how these texts interpret the Bible so as to shape and justify a new 'humanistic' realm peacefully accommodating Christian, Islamic, and Jewish cultures.

Chapter VIII, by William E. May, "Human Dignity, 'Natural Law', and Human Rights," grounds human rights in the philosophy of 'natural law' exposited so brilliantly by Thomas Aquinas and developed in our day by Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Joseph Boyle.

Chapter IX, by Habib C. Malik, "Democracy, Minorities, and the Plurality of World Views," supplies a 'phenomenology of beleaguered minorities', followed by a historical study of the Christian Arab minorities in Muslim countries. Malik argues for international protections of minorities from the 'despotism of the majority'.

Part IV, "Case Study: Nigeria and Democracy," recounts the oppression of the Colonial period and analyzes the post-colonial efforts at democratization in Nigeria.

Chapter X, by Izu Marcel Onyeocha, "Nigeria and Western Democracy: The Possibility of an African Alternative," demonstrates how the model of Western multi-party democracy does not suit Nigerian culture. Onyeocha summarizes Western theories of democracy, critiques their claims, and then examines in detail Julius Nyerere's 'African alternative'. Onyeocha affirms Nyerere's *Ujamaa* (Swahili: "Working Together"), especially in its applications to the civic education of the electorate.

Chapter XI, by Abubakar S. Mohammed, "The Role of the Civil Society in the Establishment and Maintainance of a Democratic Society in Nigeria," explores what was the dehumanizing trauma of Colonialism, and the failure of Western structures imposed immediately upon the abrupt departure of the British. Discrediting Western principles such as 'parliamentary opposition', 'separation of powers', and the privileging of individual over community rights, Mohammed proposes what he calls 'corporate democracy' as a format more attuned to African values.

Chapter XII, by Joseph Abah, "Institutional Patterns in Social Transformation," argues that the real struggle in Nigeria and elsewhere is between bureaucracy and democracy, not capitalism and socialism *per se*. Abah goes on to demonstrate that higher education in Nigeria, heretofore dependent on a British academic template, must adapt to the real needs of the Nigerian people. Like Onyeocha, he takes Nyerere's *Ujamaa* as his overarching inspiration.

Chapter I
Cultures and Democracy

George F. McLean

The companion volume showed how modern rationalism so reduced the vision of freedom that by the 20th century the sense of democracy atrophied into the ideologies of the right and left, i.e., the cold war. As the 21st century breaks out of that iron clutch there is a new possibility to rebuild democracy upon the freedom of peoples as they diversely shape their cultural traditions. In our present rediscovery of the significance of culture and of the plurality of cultures democracy becomes ever more a dialogue in, and between, cultural traditions.

Moral Authority of Cultural Traditions

In *Truth and Method*, H.G. Gadamer undertook to reconstruct the notion of a cultural heritage or tradition as: (a) based in community, (b) consisting of knowledge developed from experience lived through time and (c) possessed of authority. Because tradition sometimes is interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a Democracy, attention will be given here to the way a cultural heritage reflects the life of free and responsible members of a concerned community.

Community

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence which undergird or undermine the capacities for subsequent social relations. There one learns care and concern for others independently of what they do for us, and acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.1

Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. The phenomenologist sees this life in community as the new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is life in the family and in the progressively wider social circles into which one enters.

Experience: Horizontal and Vertical

If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition as that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. In fact the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive

generations. In this laboratory of history the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique. While this can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms and might seem to concern merely how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances, and constructing and defending one's nation. Moreover, this wisdom is a not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted. It points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history and directs our attention vertically to its ground and hence to the bases of the values which humankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize.2 The historical and prophetical books of the Bible are an extended, concrete account of one such process of a people's discovery of wisdom in interaction with the divine.

The impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such epics as the *Mahabharata* or in dance. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition then, is, not simply everything that ever happened, but what appears significant. It is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true. It contains the values to which our forebears freely gave their passionate commitment in specific historical circumstances and progressively over time. The content of a tradition is expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture whose worth progressively emerges as something upon which character and community can be built. Tradition then constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community.3

Authority

Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one's heritage and the enlightenment spirit relates to authority. Is it possible to recognize authority on the part of a tradition which perdures while still retaining freedom through time? Could it be that a cultural tradition rather than being the negation of freedom and hence antithetic to democracy, is its cumulative expression, reflection of our corporate access to the bases of all many, and even the positive condition for the discovery and realization of needed new developments?

One of the most important characteristics of human persons is their capability for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love, and life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary

character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural--quite the contrary. Within as well as beyond our social group we depend upon other persons according to how they possess abilities we, as individuals and communities, need for our growth, self-realization and fulfillment.

This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to the will of others, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension—whether this be the doctor's professional skill in healing or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others. All of these—the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience regarding the horizontal and vertical axes of life and meaning, and the grounding of dependence in competency—combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages. 4

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation on any terms with no sense of the value either of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision the result would be devoid of existential content.

The fact that humans no matter how different in culture do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute—even bitterly—the direction of change appropriate for their community reflects that every humanism is committed to the realization of some common—if general—sense of perfection. Without this, even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions, and hence no debate or conflict.

Through history, however, one finds vision of actual life which both transcends time and directs our life in all times, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orient the life of a person.5 Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. It is also normative because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged. What begins to emerge is Heidegger's insight regarding Being and its characteristics of unity, truth and justice, goodness and love not simply as empty ideals but as the ground of things, hidden or veiled, as it were, and erupting into time through conscious and free human beings in history. Seen in this light democracy becomes more than a method for managing human affairs; more substantively it is the mode of the emergence of being in our time.

One's heritage or tradition constitutes a necessary specification of this sense of being or perfection but not as if it were chronologically distant in the past and therefore in need of being drawn forward by culture or tradition as some artificial contrivances. Rather, being and its values live and act in the lives of all whom this inspires and judges. In the form of tradition through time it is the timeless dimension of history; rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it—just as it belongs to us. The traditions are in effect the ultimate communities of human striving, for human understanding is implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity—described by Gadamer as flickerings in the closed circuits or personal consciousness—6 but by our situatedness

in a tradition. By fusing both past and present this enables us to determine the specific direction of our lives and to mobilize the consensus and commitment of which true community is built.7

Conversely, it is this sense of the good or of value, emerging through the concrete lived experience of a people through its history and constituting its cultural heritage, which enables us in turn to assess and avoid what is socially destructive. In the absence of tradition, present events would be simply facts to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence which could be restrained only by some Utopian abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of modern rationalism. Eliminating all expressions of democratic freedoms, this is the archetypal modern nightmare, *1984*.

It stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative expression of meaning evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius, Gandhi, Bolivar, or Lincoln, a Martin Luther King or a Mother Theresa. Superseding mere historical facts, as concrete universals they express that harmony of measure and fullness which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating.

The truly important battle at the present time is, then, not between, on the one hand, a chaotic liberalism in which the abstract laws of the marketplace dictate and tear at the lives of persons, peoples and nations and, on the other hand, a depersonalizing sense of community in which the dignity of the person is suppressed for an equally abstract utopia—a victory by either would spell disaster. The central battle is rather to enable peoples to draw on their heritage constituted of personal assessments and free decisions, and elaborated through the ages by the various communities as the working out their response to present circumstances. That these circumstances are often shifting and difficult in the extreme is important, it is of definite importance that this people's response be truly theirs. That is, that it be part of their history, of their free and democratic response to the good, and not simply the imposed effect of another's history, or—worst of all—of abstract, impersonal and depersonalizing structures, slogans or utopias.

Democracy as Dialogue in and between Cultural Traditions

Thus far we have treated the character and importance of tradition as bearing the long experience of persons interacting with their world, with other persons and with God. It is made up not only of chronological facts, but of insights regarding human perfection and its foundations which have been forged by human efforts in concrete circumstances, e.g., the Greek notion of democracy and the enlightenment notions of equality and freedom. By their internal value these stand as normative of the aspirations of a people.

Secondly, we have seen the implications of historicity for novelty within the context of tradition, that the continually unfolding circumstances of historical development not merely extend or repeat what went before, but constitute an emerging manifestation of the dynamic character of being that is articulated by the art, religion, literature and political structures of a cultural tradition.

It remains for us now to treat the third element in this study of tradition, namely, the hermeneutic method. How can earlier sources which express the great achievements of human awareness be understood or unfolded in a way that is relevant, indicative and directive of our life in present circumstances? In a word, how can we interpret or draw out the significance of tradition for present action?

Interpretation of a Cultural Tradition

First of all it is necessary to note that only a unity of meaning, that is, an identity, is intelligible.8 Just as it is not possible to understand a number three if we include only two units rather than three, no act of understanding is possible unless it is directed to an identity or whole of meaning. This brings us to the classic issue in the field, described above as the hermeneutic circle in which knowledge of the whole depends upon knowledge of the parts, and vice versa. How can this work for, rather than against the development of social life?

The experience of reading a text might be suggestive. As we read we construe the meaning of a sentence before grasping all its individual parts. What we construe is dependent upon our expectation of the meaning of the sentence, which we derived from its first words, the prior context, or more likely from a combination of the two. In turn, our expectation or construal of the meaning of the text is adjusted according to the requirements of its various parts as we proceed to read through the parts of the sentence, the paragraph, etc., continually reassessing the whole in terms of the parts and the parts in terms of the whole. This basically circular movement continues until all appears to fit and to be clear.

Similarly, in regard to our cultural tradition and values we develop a prior conception of its content. This anticipation of meaning is not simply of the tradition as an objective past or fixed content to which we come; it is rather what we produce as we participate in the evolution of the tradition, and thereby further determine ourselves. This is a creative stance reflecting the content, not only of the past, but of the time in which I stand and of the life project in which I am engaged. It is a creative unveiling of the content of the tradition as this comes progressively and historically into the present and through the present, passes into the future.

In this light time is not a barrier, separation or abyss, but rather a bridge and opportunity for the process of understanding, a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The importance of the historical distance it provides is not that it enables the subjective reality of persons to disappear so that the objectivity of the situation can emerge. On the contrary, it makes possible a more complete meaning of the tradition, less by removing falsifying factors, than by opening new sources of self-understanding which reveal in the tradition unsuspected implications and even new dimensions of meaning.9

Tradition, Discovery and Progress: Democracy as Openness to Being Questioned

Of course, not all our acts of understandings about the meaning of a text from another culture, a dimension of a shared tradition, a set of goals or a plan for future action are sufficient. Hence, it becomes particularly important that they not be adhered to fixedly, but be put at risk in dialogue with others.

In this the basic elements remain the substances or persons which Aristotle described in terms of autonomy and, by implication, of identity. Hermeneutics would expand this to reflect as well the historical and hermeneutic situation of each person in the dialogue, that is, their horizon or particular possibility for understanding. As an horizon is all that can be seen from one's vantage point(s), in dialogue with others it is necessary to be aware of our horizon as well as that of others. For it is precisely when our initial projection of their meaning will not bear up under the progressive dialogue that we are required to make needed adjustments in our projection of their meaning.

This enables one to adjust one's prior understanding not only of the horizon of the other with whom one is in dialogue, but especially of one's own horizon. Hence, one need not fear being trapped; horizons are vantage points of a mind which in principle is open and mobile, capable of being aware of its own limits and of transcending them through acknowledging the horizons of others. The flow of history implies that we are not bound by our horizons, but move in and out of them and it is in making us aware of our horizons that hermeneutic consciousness accomplishes our liberation.10

For this we must maintain a questioning attitude. Rather than simply following through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, we must remain sensitive to new meanings in true openness. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of the tradition, nor an extinction of passionate concerns regarding action towards the future. Rather, being aware of our own biases or prejudices and adjusting them in dialogue with others implies rejecting what impedes our understanding of others or of traditions. Our attitude in approaching dialogue must be one of willingness continually to revise our initial projection or expectation of meaning.

The way out of the hermeneutic cycle is then not by ignoring or denying our horizons and initial judgments or prejudices; but by recognizing them as inevitable and making them work for us in drawing out not the meaning of the text for its author, but its application for the present. Through this process of application we serve as midwife for culture as historical or 'tradition', enabling it to give birth to the future.11

The logical structure of this process is the exchange of question and answer. A question is required in order to determine just what issue we are engaging—whether it is this issue or that—so that we might give direction to our attention. Without this no meaningful answer can be given or received. As a question, however, it requires that the answer not be settled or determined. In sum, progress or discovery requires an openness which is not simply indeterminacy, but a question which gives specific direction to our attention and enables us to consider significant evidence.

If discovery depends upon the question, then the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, in working in conjunction with others, the heart of the democratic process is not to suppress, but to reinforce and unfold the questions of others. To the degree these probabilities are built up and intensified they can serve as a searchlight. This is the opposite of both opinion which tends to suppress questions, and of arguing which searches out the weakness in other's positions. Instead, in democracy understood as conversation and dialogue one enters upon a mutual search to maximize the possibilities of the question, even by speaking at cross purposes, for it is by mutually eliminating errors and working out a common meaning that we discover truth.12

Further, it should not be presupposed that a law or constitution will hold the answer to but one question or can have but one horizon which must be identified by the reader. On the contrary, the full horizon of the authors is never available to the reader, nor can it be expected that there is but one question to which a document or tradition holds an answer. The sense of the texts reaches beyond what the authors intended because the dynamic character of being as it emerges in time means that the horizon is never fixed but is continually opening. This constitutes the effective historical element in understanding a text or a tradition. At each step new dimensions of its potentialities open to understanding, so that the meaning of a text or tradition lives with the consciousness and hence the horizons—not of its author—but of people in dialogue with others through time and history. This is the essence of democracy as a process. It is the process of broadening horizons, through fusion with the horizons of others in dialogue, that makes it possible to receive from one's cultural tradition and its values answers which are ever new.13

In this one's personal attitudes and interests remain important. If our interest in developing new horizons is simply the promotion of our own understanding then we could be interested solely in achieving knowledge, and thereby domination over others. This would lock one into an absoluteness of one's prejudices; being fixed or closed in the past they would disallow new life in the present. In this manner powerful new insights can become with time deadening pre-judgments which suppress freedom.

In contrast, an attitude of authentic democratic openness appreciates the nature of one's own finiteness. On this basis it both respects the past and is open to discerning the future. Such openness is a matter, not merely of new information, but of recognizing the historical nature of man and his basis in an absolute that transcends and grounds time. This enables us to escape what had deceived us and held us captive, and to learn deeply from new experiences.

This suggests that democratic openness does not consist in surveying others objectively, obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner or simply juxtaposing their ideas and traditions to our own. Rather, it is directed primarily to ourselves for our ability to listen to others is correlatively our ability to assimilate the implications of their answers for delving more deeply into the meaning of our own traditions and drawing out new and even more rich insights. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us. The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness is then not methodological sureness, readiness for new compromises or new techniques of social organization for these are subject to social critique and manipulation on the horizontal level. Instead, it is readiness to draw out in democratic dialogue new meaning from a common tradition.14 Seen in these terms our heritage of culture and values is not closed or dead, but through a democratic life remains ever new by becoming more inclusive and richer.

Notes

1. John Caputo, "A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Emotion," George F. McLean, Frederick Ellrod et al., eds., *Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, 1986), pp. 199-222.

2. H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, (New York: Crossroads, 1965), pp. 258-267.

3. *Ibid*. Gadamer emphasizes knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-253.

5. *Ibid*., pp. 253-258.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 245.

7. *Ibid*., pp. 267-274.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 261-262.

9. *Ibid*., pp. 263-264.

10. *Ibid*., pp. 267-274.

11. *Ibid*., p. 242.

12. *Ibid., pp. 325-341*.

13. *Ibid*., pp. 258-274.
14. *Ibid*., pp. 319-325.

Chapter II

Rethinking Nationalism and Democracy in the Light of Post-Communist Experience

Ghia Nodia

What has happened in, or to, the past communist countries, and what is happening there now, is not something restricted to a particular region of the world, but is part of the common experience of humanity. I do not have in mind the specific impact the collapse of communism has had upon the global strategy or regional relations, the creation of new political and economic alliances and the dissolution of older ones. The unity of the world is mediated not only—and, I think, not so much—by mutually targeted warheads and economic cooperation/competition, but by participation in the common realm of ideas and values. Thus, the impact of the counter-communist revolution (or capitalist counter-revolution) on the rest of the world involves first of all the need to rearrange the principal reference points, to rethink basic ideas and values on which the Western civilization is grounded.

A major attempt of this rethinking was proposed in 1989 by Francis Fukuyama in his much noted philosophic work, entitled *The End of History*?1 The main idea of the article, later developed into a book, *The End of History and the Last Man*,2 consisted in an assumption that *Perestroika*and the later complete collapse of the Communist system meant that the liberal democracy no longer had any viable alternatives, and that this, in turn, indicated the advent of the post-historic stage of human development, boring as that may be. If "liberal democracy" is the embodiment of the highest political values, then, according to Fukuyama, the collapse of communism urges us to rethink the world in new terms that are optimistic at least, optimistic from the liberal point of view now that there is no threat to the reign of liberal democracy.

From the very beginning, I will admit to sharing this general attitude so that Fukuyama's outlook will provide a kind of starting point. What I do not share, however, and what I hope gives some sense to this paper, is a different assessment of the role of nationalism in the advent, spread and victory of liberal democracy.

The controversy may be outlined in a simple way. Fukuyama shares in general the idea, predominant in Western political thinking, that "democracy" is one thing, or one idea, while "nationalism" is another thing, or another idea, and the latter usually presents itself as a kind of alternative to the former. If "democracy" wins, it does so at the expense of nationalism, and vice versa. The two ideas usually bear opposite value labels: the word "democracy" is usually linked to words "good", "civilized", "progressive", "rational", etc., while "nationalism" is associated with "backwardness", "immaturity", "barbarity", "irrationality", "mythological way of thinking", etc. The discussion is in this case between optimists and pessimists: while Fukuyama optimistically presumes that "irrationalist" nationalism does not present any viable alternative to democracy, so history has come to a safe end,3 others argue that nationalism, not liberal democracy, is the real successor to communism, which means that history continues.4

My point consists in an opposite assumption: nationalism and democracy are not two separate things, but two sides of the same idea—or, more precisely, nationalism is a component of the more complex idea called "liberal democracy". The idea of nationalism is impossible, and incomprehensible, without the idea of democracy, and there never exists democracy without nationalism. The intertwining of the two forms a sort of complicated marriage: the spouses cannot

live without each other, but find themselves in an almost permanent state of conflict. An attempt to divorce seems a very attractive solution for a Western liberal mind scared by the 20th century experience of European nationalism, but proves to be a piece of wishful thinking once real political forces come into motion.

The manner in which the break-up of communism, and of the Soviet Union, has occurred demonstrates the validity of this approach. The failure of mainstream Western political science to catch up with developments in the former Soviet Union is at least partly due to a one-sided understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism and its relation to democracy.

This one-sidedness derives at least to some degree from two features predominant in modern Western social science when handling issues of democracy and nationalism (whether separately or in their relationship to each other). The first is economic determinism; the second is value-laden judgments. It is presumed that in order to explain social developments in a really "scientific" way, they should be deduced from, or at least tied to, some economic realities. This is the presumption of the "modernist instrumentalist" doctrine of nations and nationalism, according to which nations and nationalisms emerge as a result of (a) industrialization and (b) mass manipulation undertaken by certain social elites pursuing their own ultimately economic interests. The same "scientist" attitude, however, does not prevent many from using the terms "democracy" and "nationalism" as evaluative, rather than descriptive terms. The presumption is that democracy is the "good guy," and it is a disgrace for it to have anything in common with the "bad guy," nationalism.

Of course, any social scientist cannot completely avoid his or her value preferences. I, for instance, following Winston Churchill, think that democracy is quite a poor political system, but has the one very good justification that all others have proven to be even worse. However, having assumed a theoretical attitude, I have to forget what is "good" and what is "bad". An evaluative attitude is incompatible with a theoretical one, and political theory is no exception to that. I am not interested in whether nationalism is "good" or "bad"; what is important, is that it is. On the other hand—and in this I once more agree with Fukuyama—one feature of social reality is that not everything there depends solely on objective data; subjective human attitudes cannot always be reduced to the latter and this is what we ought to have in mind for a proper understanding of both democracy and nationalism.

Preliminary Distinctions

I shall begin to attempt to understand the relationship between the two by making certain distinctions. Without them any reasoning on the proposed subject tends to be abstract and vague.

First of all, it is usually taken for granted that "democracy" is the same as liberal democracy. But the latter combines two ideas, liberalism and democracy, the fusion of which is not as trivial as it may seem today for an average Western citizen. There is some difference and even tension between the two, and, crucial for our topic, they have different attitudes to nationalism.

Second, in viewing different countries from the perspective of modern democratic societies, the important difference between emerging democracies (which often have to form themselves in newly emerging states) and established, balanced, stabilized ones—those that exist in states with a long uninterrupted traditions of statehood—is usually overlooked. Some social forces, namely nationalism, work in a different way in those two cases. These two outlooks could be linked: one could say that the test of mature democracy consists in this fusion or some proper compromise between liberal and democratic principles, while the birth-pangs of emerging democracy represent an effort to find this formula of blend or compromise.

The third distinction here is between "original" and "trans-" or "imported" liberal democracies. The model of modern democracy first emerged in a specific part of the world, namely, in the North-Western Europe and North America. There exist a number of theories about the preconditions which made this possible and\or necessary. Later, the democratic model was disseminated throughout the world and now, after victory in the Cold War, seems to have won almost universal recognition. But are the preconditions and mechanisms of emergence of the democratic model in the first place the same as preconditions and mechanisms of its dissemination? Is the relation between liberal and democratic principles the same in "home-bred" and "imported" democracies? And is the role of nationalism the same in both cases? I think it is not, and having this too in mind will also be helpful.

Finally, we are now witnessing something that has never before occurred in history: the transition to liberal democracy after communism. All previous transitions were from traditional societies. Does this make any essential difference for the role of nationalism in democratic transition? I think it does.

Democracy and Nationalism

By "democracy" I understand a principle according to which government is legitimized only by the will of people governed by it. Historically, as well as logically, democracy as a principle of legitimation of power "from below" is opposed to the system of power made legitimate "from above", which means—to one having divine legitimacy. In the latter case (I have in mind mostly absolute monarchy) the power governs on behalf of God (real mechanisms of power struggle notwithstanding); democracy, unlike that, governs on behalf of the People.5

This general principle has to be distinguished from the procedures of democracy which are there to embody the general democratic principle, or to discern what the People really wills. The main procedure, largely identified with democracy in general, is, of course, elections. There are other sets of procedures, preventing democracy from degenerating into the dictatorship on behalf of the People—those which restrain elected rulers by such measures as separation of power and term limits which make it difficult for representatives of the last majority to overturn everything done on behalf of previous majorities, and so forth.

Democracy is supposed to be a highly rational enterprise. It is not by chance that it was based on the rationalist philosophical tradition, and the most vivid expression of this idea consists in the notion of social contract. People themselves have to decide, based on rational considerations, after calculating the interdependence of individual and group interests, the best possible ways of reconciling or harmonizing these interests. Democracy is a system of rules, made legitimate only by the will of the people, and supposed to serve in the best possible way the interests of the people.

That is why everything non-rational, or not sufficiently rational, be it irrationalist philosophy or the irrational sentiments of the people, is traditionally understood as contrary to the idea of democracy, or at least unable to be related to it in a positive way. Nationalism is only one example of irrational theory and irrational human sentiment; therefore it has to contradict democracy, or at least finds itself outside that realm.

Thus, arguing in favor of the existence of necessary positive links between nationalism and democracy, I argue in favor of the existence of a necessary non-rational component in the foundation of the democratic enterprise.

To inspect this non-rational component it would be helpful to compare the democratic enterprise to a game. Democracy, like a game, is just a set of rules, the validity of which depends

solely on the willingness of a certain community (political community, or community of players) to observe these rules. This analogy corresponds well to both the aspects of democracy we mentioned: the general principle of popular sovereignty, and the fact that this sovereignty expresses itself and is meaningful only as far as some system of specific rules (Constitution and laws) are created in its name. Popular sovereignty consists in the claim that "We the People" are going to play only by rules set up and validated by ourselves and nobody else is going to impose any other rules on us. Yes, these rules (unlike rules of the game) usually are supposed to have some moral justification, which in its turn may be based on certain religious beliefs (In God We Trust). But the concrete manner of interpreting those universal values (or the will of God) depends on individual believers and, respectively, on "Us the People".6 This is the difference from traditional political systems, where it was rulers (Monarchs, or whoever) who interpreted the Divine Will (in case of Communism—the Laws of History) and made Us play by Their rules.

It is this game-aspect of democracy which is (or is supposed to be) completely rational. But if we try to draw this analogy further, we run into non-rational aspects of the democratic enterprise. Besides a set of rules, play necessarily requires two components: a community of players and a playing field. In the case of actual play, these are exactly as conventionally and arbitrarily set: a player decides himself, with whom, against whom, and where, to play. The composition of the playing teams, or the borders of the playground, for whom and within which rules of the game are valid, depends solely on the will of the community of players.

Not so in the democratic enterprise. Whereas the set of democratic laws are conventional and depend on rational decision of the polity, the composition of the polity, and the concrete territory ("playground") on which these laws will have validity, cannot be defined that way. Democracy has standard forms for shaping these components of itself: citizenship and state borders. But the criteria for solving the issues themselves are beyond the logic of the democratic enterprise. Yes, We the People must obey only laws set up by ourselves; but who is included (and excluded) in this "We"? And how far in space may the power of these laws be extended?

These are issues whose solution is indispensable for democracy, but the rational logic of democratic action has no inner resources for solving them. This rational logic has to find them pre-solved. Here we may draw another, this time more "serious" analogy and compare the democratic enterprise to building a house ("building democracy" is a quite common expression). In order to build a house, not only is the project needed, but also a team of workers and a building site. These are problems which the most skillful architect or engineer may be incapable of solving; but without settling them the construction enterprise will never begin.

By this, I do not mean that democracy is not involved in solving the issue. It provides some formal principles and procedures according to which they may be solved: these are the principle of self-determination and the procedure of plebiscite. It does not matter how well these principles and procedure work in reality: the fact is that they formally correspond to the democratic ideal. The political community defines its own composition through the universal democratic procedure of vote. What, however, the rationalist logic of democracy does not provide are specific criteria for which way to vote, whom to include into the team of "democracy-builders" (or players), and whom to exclude from it. Why should or should not a given unit of people secede from any larger body, or unite its effort with some other unit(s)?

Since the idea of democracy is universal, it would be only natural if the principle of popular sovereignty were embodied in some world-wide polity. But this presupposes, that (1) the democratic transition should be worldwide in the first place, and that (2) the "People" Itself wants it that way. But neither premise has turned out to be feasible. Historically, democracy has emerged

in separate communities; and the force which claimed to provide some kind of criteria and settle the problem of defining those political units for democracy has been nationalism. "Nation" became another name for "We the People".7

Traditional, or I would say utopian, European nationalism tried to provide some objective criteria of nationhood, compliance with which could enable any given unit of people to justify in a rational way its demand for "self-determination". This could be language, common origin, an historical tradition of statehood, or whatever. If this kind of criteria were relevant and operational, the edifice of democracy could find a completely rational foundation. There would exist some universally valid objective criteria of "fair" distribution of land between the peoples to whom it "really belongs"; in case some group or individual had any doubts about membership in a given nation, just and impartial judgment would always resolve them. But the practical history of nationalisms, and the later theoretical critique of nationalist utopianism undertaken by H. Kohn, E. Gellner, and others, has shown that these objective and universal criteria were unattainable. It has become clear, that evolution of pre-modern ethnic communities to modern nations was mediated by historical contingency and by conscious political effort. Thus, the contention of nationalist utopianism, that there preexisted national entities with their national territories, molded by nature or God, and that borders between democratic states could and should be drawn in compliance with these naturally or divinely defined national borders, has turned out to be futile.

However, this discovery has undermined only the claim of utopian nationalism to provide universally valid rational criteria. It has not changed the function of nationalism, that is, the function of moulding democratic (which means: self-determining) political communities. Yes, nations are not preexistent non historical entities, with which any democratic enter prize should comply. Yes, nations as politically-minded communities striving for "self-determination" are essentially a modern phenomenon, and national cohesion is to a greater degree the result, rather than the precondition, of this movement to self-determination, i.e. nationalism. But still, democracy works only in political communities, which "determine themselves," that is, make decisions about their compositions; and when they determine themselves, they call themselves "nations." The criteria they base their decisions on may not pass the rationalist test of universal validity,8 but they do work in every concrete case, and only through them is achieved the cohesion of polity necessary for political action.

Of course, the insufficiency of the nationalist principle makes the national foundation of democracy not just shaky and nonrational, but sometimes quite bloody. The absence of universally valid criteria of nationhood gives birth to conflicts, which cannot always find rationally justifiable "fair" solutions. It is hard to find even an island nation that has not some record of border conflicts with its neighbors over some piece of land which both sides regard as "historically ours." The most usual and logical means of resolving those kinds of conflicts is war.

Many nations have to convince some marginal ethnic groups that "you are our kind," while the latter claim that "we are different and should be independent," or "we belong to others." Almost every emerging nation has to deal with ethnic minorities, which are viewed with suspicion as potential traitors and which in their turn consider the majority as would-be oppressors. There are different means of resolving these majority-minority conflicts: radical "final" solutions like genocide or expulsion; gradualist solutions, like assimilation; compromise solutions, like different degrees of autonomy within a given state.9 On rare occasions, solutions are found without pain, violence and blood. This makes it quite clear why one could wish to avoid the nationalist principle in moulding modern democratic polities. But the difference between wish and reality is valid even in the social science.

Failure to acknowledge this reality stems from reluctance to admit that the democratic enterprise, supposed to be the embodiment of rational political behavior (and "rational" is usually regarded as synonymous to "good"), is based on a nonrational foundation, and that it cannot be otherwise: at least in the initial stages of democracy-building, a non-rational act of defining political "We" of "the People" is a necessary precondition of rational political behavior. This failure precluded the majority of Western intellectuals from understanding what was really happening in the Soviet Union (or, rather, to the Soviet Union) during "*perestroika.*" Dogmatic statements appeared like "nationalism is a main obstacle to democratic reforms," while in fact all real democratic movements were at the same time nationalist. Irrelevant questions were addressed at political leaders from the independence-minded republics like "what specifically (or economically) are you going to gain if you become independent?"—while the would-be nations themselves viewed independence not as means, but as an end in itself.

The interdependence of democracy and nationalism expresses itself in one more way. Much is written about the artificial character of nation, but the modern democratic polity is artificial in exactly the same sense. Pre-modern democracy is exclusively that of the polis, of the city. This democracy was essentially commensurate with human personality: the site of democratic enterprise was observable for a member of the polity, and he could meet any other member on the city Agora. Modern democracy, which had to overcome the city-boundaries, required a new kind of site and polity, which was no longer observable by human senses. This meant, both site and polity ("We the People" and "Our Land") had to exist in the human mind or imagination. This is what Benedict Anderson speaks about in his book *Imagined Communities*.10 Under "Imagined Communities" he means nations; the title of this book is usually mentioned when one wants to stress an illusory, arbitrary, mythological, etc. nature of national cohesion. But in reality, his reasoning may, and should, be applied to the mechanism of building any democratic polity whose scope exceeds city boundaries.

The same may be said of another famous and provocative title *Peasants into Frenchmen*.11 The point here is obvious: by the time of the French revolution, from which the French nation in the modern sense stems, not many rural dwellers of the country (who clearly formed the big majority of a would-be nation) had a distinct self-consciousness of being "French", and many of them did not actually speak French. Thus, national cohesion had to be enforced through a deliberate and centralized political effort, which means that the French nation is more "artificial" than "natural". But the title of the book could as well be "Peasants into Citizens". This would sound even more paradoxical because the word "citizen" in all languages means "city-dweller", and it is something extremely artificial to turn a peasant into a city dweller without taking him to the city. But, artificial or not, this is what the possibility of the modern democracy is based upon. Democracy, which is a city-phenomenon in the first place, had to be spread throughout the "country" (which included also "country" in the sense of "countryside"), and this could be accomplished only through a conscious political effort (undertaken by government bureaucracy, cultural elites or whoever). In fact, making peasants into Frenchmen and into citizens is a single process which could just be viewed from two perspectives: "peasants" could be made into "Frenchmen" only through becoming citizens, and visa versa. These two aspects can be divided only in our minds.12

Thus, it may be said, that democracy is based on nationalism, and, at the same time, it is the necessity of moulding democratic polities that provides incentives for moulding nations out of preexistent ethnic material. If "nationalism engenders nations,"13 then, in exactly the same sense, nations are engendered by democratic transitions (not just industrialism or a capitalist economy).

That is why in emergent democracies, the movement towards democracy and movement towards independence (another name for "nationalism") are hard to separate. Both are covered by the word "self-determination": We the People (i.e. the Nation) are to determine our fate, we are going to observe only those rules which we set up ourselves and we will not allow anybody (absolute monarch, dictator, foreign enemy) to impose his order on "Us."

Whatever is said in the last paragraph, however, refers mostly to emerging democracies. Nationalism is usually needed for starting a democratic enter prize, but its role in sustaining it is different. Perhaps once democracies feel stable and secure in their own borders, these borders themselves will gradually lose any meaning and "die away" together with the nationalism which produced them. Maybe yes, maybe no— but that is another issue.

Liberalism and Nationalism

What one usually has in mind when denouncing nationalism in the name of democracy can be classified more precisely as a controversy between liberalism and nationalism. Under liberalism is usually meant (and I shall mean here) a doctrine of individual human liberty as the foremost political value. Nationalism, in contrast, is understood as a doctrine giving preference to collective rights based on race, culture or whatever. Liberalism is the champion of a person's right to choose, while nationalism gives preference to something that does not depend on personal choice.

But the controversy is supposed to be focused not only on value preferences. The main point of the liberal critique of nationalism is that the nation is something "unreal" ("imagined", "created", "concocted", etc.), while the human person is "real". Thus, an appeal to inalienable individual rights is "rational", while nationalism is by definition "irrational". Fukuyama presents the differentiation this way:14 "The distinction between human and non-human is fully rational: only human beings are free, that is, able to struggle for recognition in a battle for pure prestige. This distinction is based on nature, or, rather, on the radical disjunction between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom. The distinction between one human group and another, on the other hand, is an accidental and arbitrary by-product of human history".

I think this passage shows how shaky is liberalism's claim to be rationally grounded. The distinction between human and non-human is really "rational" in the sense that it is evident and may be described in "natural" terms. But the tricky thing is, the claim for universal recognition for man as a man (which for Fukuyama and myself is the core of liberalism) is based not on mere acknowledgement of the disjunction between the realms of human and non-human. What personal "dignity" demands be recognized is not just the fact that man is different, but that there is something in this difference which is of absolute value, and this value is no longer empirically "evident" or "natural". Fukuyama himself admits, following Hegel, that this claim for universal personal recognition is based upon Christianity, which he calls a "slave ideology" (unlike "master ideology", which would imply recognition for masters only).15 It was Christianity that ascribed exclusively to the individual human soul a sort of intransigent value. If Christianity is just an "ideology", which means that it is by definition false, then its claim for universal human recognition is based on a false, illusory premise, and certainly cannot be called "natural" or "rational". Of course, it is not necessary to be a Christian believer to be a dignified human personality, but neither is it indispensable to claim that my demand that the value of my personal freedom be recognized is based on some "rational" considerations, which may be scientifically proved.

The fact is that, though real victories of liberal democracy may have become possible thanks to progress of scientific rationality, neither democratic nor liberal principles are based on a rational foundation. Both may be described as "non-rational", or "pre-rational" (but not necessarily "irrational", for the latter term is usually associated with hostility to the rationality). Value preferences in this case (as, I think, all other cases) may be ultimately based only on faith (Christian faith is one of the instances) rather than on rational knowledge.

On the other hand, the "instrumentalist" doctrine of nation, which insists that the latter "is an accidental and arbitrary by-product of human history", has really done a very good job in exposing the nationalist myth of nation as a non-historical entity directly stemming from natural and/or divine order. But that does not make the nation "unreal" for an individual man born into a specific society, culture, state, and obliged to make concrete choices not only on existential, but also on social and political levels. There is no necessity that a nation to be "rational" in order to be "real".

Anyway, these arguments do not affect in any way the conventional wisdom that liberalism and nationalism are mutually exclusive principles, and do not diminish the need to make a choice between them. There is some positive link between liberalism and nationalism, as well as between the ideas of human personality and nation. The empirical fact that both principles are tied to the same historical epoch (which could be called "modernity") is not a random coincidence.

I have in mind a set of ideas, which in different theories could also be called a "paradigm", "*epistheme*", "*Vorverstehen*", "transcendental system of categories", etc., which has created the socio-cultural realm known as "modernity". The central place in this "paradigm" is occupied by the idea of the autonomous human personality, which in itself bears an intransigent value (in Kant's language this means that it is always the end and should never become a means) and is willing to follow only rules endorsed by its own personal verdict (the idea of self-determination). This in no way means suggest that this idea is necessarily atheistic. Historically it is based on the Christian tradition and may theoretically accept an Absolute Divine Order, but the monopoly of legitimate interpretation of that order and deduction from it of specific incentives for human actions belongs to individual rationality and moral conscience rather than to any community or institution.16

The modern idea of nation belongs to this "set". It is this intrinsic link to the idea of personality what really distinguishes it from the "primordial", non-historical notion of ethnicity.17 The ethnic phenomenon consists of extending the idea of family to the macro-social level. Community is "imagined" as a big family, stemming from the same ancestor. If, however, the nation "imagines itself", it imagines itself as a personality. And if the nation is what it imagines itself, then it is a personality.

The self-understanding of a nation is cut out according to the blueprint of individual human personality from two points of view. First, the nation is a community of people organized around the idea of self-determination. The nation is a personality, because, like a modern individual, it is willing to observe only those laws which it itself endorses, denouncing any rules imposed by an external force. This is just another interpretation of the thesis mentioned above that nation is created by nationalism (i.e. through an effort of self-determination), and not vice versa.

Another aspect of the nation-personality consists in the idea of activity. The nation is active, as a whole it is an agent of activity. Thus the nation requires an arena, which is the history of mankind. As a subject of history, it also requires partners for interaction and mutual recognition, and these are other nations. A nation can only imagine, understand, or recognize itself in the perspective of humanity—an idea completely unthinkable for even the most advanced ethnic consciousness. The idea of nationhood is the idea of membership in humanity—which may find

formal expression in joining, for instance, the United Nations. Humanity as a "family of nations" is the ideal of liberal nationalism.

Insofar as the idea of nation follows the idea of personality, it does so also in one very important aspect. Nation demands self-determination (independence) not as an exclusive privilege, but as a particular case of the general principle, the principle of nation-state (if you are a nation, you deserve a state of your own). I do not understand why Fukuyama thinks that nationalism is by definition megalothymic (which means: demanding unequal recognition), while liberal individualism is by definition isothymic (demanding equal recognition). Nationalism in its proper sense does not "extend recognition only to members of given national or ethnic group".18 This attitude is better covered by such terms as "racism" or "ethnicism". What nationalism does demand is recognition for the "nation" as a whole, which means acquiring a general standard of nationhood: legal status consisting of independent statehood (comparable, in the case of individual, to the legal status of citizen), being accepted in the "family of nations" as an equal member. Rejecting this attitude as based on the "unequal recognition" is exactly the same as mixing us "individualism" and "egoism" as criticized by Karl Popper:19

proclaiming the value of individual personality does not imply, that I demand some privileges for myself (although I may use individualist ideology to justify my selfish conduct). The initial idea of nationalism is at least as much isothymic as that of individualist personalism. On the other hand, nations also share with individuals the megalothymic danger.

Sharing dangers, liberalism and nationalism also share accusations. Both are charged with being divisive. Liberal atomistic individualism divides the community; nationalism divides humanity. The accusations are quite accurate in both cases. But this is not where the similarity ends: practically, both liberalism and nationalism have proven to be most effective unifying forces. Yes, liberal individualism is emotionally divisive, but only those societies which accepted liberal ideology have achieved a stable civil state, while "warm" communal ideologies often end up in bloodshed. Attempts of universalist ideologies like Christianity (I mean Christianity as a political force) and Communism to unite the world have led only to international hostilities.

Although plenty of blood has been shed in the name of National Interests, still the first organization that embraces almost the whole World is called "United Nations", and in fact it is based on the ideology of isothymic nationalism ("respect for national sovereignty",20 accepting the principle of "inviolability of borders"—the direct analogy to "personal immunity"). The general principles of nationalism seem still more universally accepted than "pure" liberalism or any other ideology.21 The part of the world which invented nationalism—Western Europe—has also outrun the rest of it in finding a new pattern of international unity. The latter was reached not through neglecting nationalism, as it is broadly believed, but through respecting its isothymic aspect. Independent states voluntarily gave up larger and larger parts of their sovereignty—because it was respected. The borders between them are gradually losing practical significance because their inviolability was proclaimed a sacred principle of international relations. The movement from megalothymia to isothymia is possible not only on the individual, but also on the national level.

The Liberal Attitude to Nation and Nationalism

Thus, if democracy was founded on nationalism, in the case of liberalism it is nationalism which finds itself dependent: the idea of nation follows the blueprint of human personality.

Nationalism substitutes the nation for the individual person, but understands (and creates) the former in terms of the latter. But what about the reverse relation? What does liberalism think about its offspring?

After World War II the liberals denounced nationalism as "barbarity", actually declared it the enemy no. l (preferring nationalism to communism was supposed to be "right-wing", hence anti-liberal). But the attitude of classical liberalism was more complicated. Theoretically, it did not need the principle of nation at all. The autonomous human personality, on which idea liberalism is based, had borrowed all its basic attributes directly from the Christian God. Thus, it was supposed to be as indifferent to divisions between human beings as the Christian God had been. God makes only one division: between those who love Him, and those who do not. For liberals, the only difference that mattered was between freedom lovers and freedom-haters.

Liberals (as well as Christians) had to meet nationalists not on the level of general ideas, but when trying to implement the idea in social reality. What social order corresponds to the liberal ideal?

It is most natural and appropriate for a liberal to endorse anarchy or the "state of nature". Any state organization is based on repression, something that the true liberal should dislike. The state is acceptable only because its absence would be even worse for the individual, because in practice that would lead to the unchecked dominance of sheer force, or to the complete enslavement of a person by a collective (community).22 Thus the liberal, whether he likes it or not, has to make a deal with the state—the only force, capable of guaranteeing individual rights.

Thus, the real question is: what kind of state? Now, it seems self-evident that the liberal must prefer a democratic state to any other kind. But liberals did not come to that inclusion right away. Why should it not be a decent enlightened monarchy? After all, the social base of liberalism has always been elitist-aristocratic: if not aristocracy of blood, than at least one of soul. Liberals have always had a fear of His Majesty the People, because there was never a guarantee that the new sovereign would care much about personal freedom.23 The tyranny of the majority—and of mediocrity—is an inescapable threat for democracy. But, if liberals accept democracy as the lesser evil when compared to the tyranny of blood over soul and the arbitrariness of dynastic rulers, they have to respect, and even to some extent follow, the General Will. However, as I think we have seen, this General Will is—and cannot help being—more or less nationalistic.

A more vivid and consistent expression of this liberal dilemma may be found in the classical liberalism of l9th century, namely, in works of John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton. John Stuart Mill, as I have earlier mentioned, was not an emotional nationalist; but, being clearly and consistently for democratic liberalism, through practical reasoning he came to the conclusion that "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities",24 and therefore "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities".25 Having endorsed democracy, he had to proceed to endorsing nationalism.

Lord Acton, on the other hand, was an outspoken opponent of the nationality principle, which he rendered incompatible with personal liberty. Contrary to Mill, he thinks that "the combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men and women in society".26 This logically led him to accepting the principles of imperialism27 and racism.28 He did not openly reject democracy; but he came close to it, denouncing the Rousseauesque principle of equality as an example of a false doctrine side by side with those of communism and nationality.29 The elitist attitude, however, had to lead to the rejection of democracy, or to approving the latter on a rather limited scale. Practically, it had to

lead to its complete rejection, because the "Peoples" themselves, when it is up to them, usually begin building democracy by creating an independent nation state. This rejection does not contradict liberal aspirations: a quite benign ancient regime may be much friendlier to personal freedom than unrestricted and unbalanced democracy.

It is no longer appropriate for a 20th century liberal to approve imperialism and racism. The "People", having turned into the "middle class", no longer seems as dangerous as it used to be. Still, liberals reject nationalism more strongly than ever. Why?

There are, of course, different factors. The unhappy experience of the period between two world wars, when nationalism emerged in the brutal form of fascism and ethnic hatred, has had its emotional impact. The stabilized system of nation-states with "inviolable borders" established in Western Europe completely removed the problem of "self-determination" from the political agenda. It remained urgent only in the third world countries, which reinforced the association between nationalism and "backwardness". In the advanced countries, the national agenda was reduced to the "Soviet threat" and "traditional values"—pressing that was considered "right-wing". The liberal cause in nationality issues, on the other hand, is predominantly identified with a real problem of protecting "ethnic minorities", which are, or may be, in trouble vis-a-vis the nationalism of majorities.

Still, I think, there is more to it. Fear of "the People", is still there, even if in a latent form. Since the option of enlightened absolutism seems to be dead, a liberal can no longer afford the luxury of being openly anti-democratic, so fear of the people takes the form of an aversion to nationalism. However, when the choice between a benign ancient regime and forces of emerging democracy reemerged in the world of collapsing communism, liberal preferences expressed themselves once more. They were displayed in the way the Western World for a long time preferred Michael Gorbachev—an enlightened liberal communist monarch, never endorsed in power by his own people—to Boris Yeltsin, a popularly elected democratic leader as unpredictable as the people that brought him into power.

Anti-Liberal Nationalism

However, all that has been said about the attitude of nationalism toward both democracy and liberalism definitely calls for reconciliation with empirical historical reality. Even if dependent on liberalism and providing a basis for democracy in theory, real nationalism has often been illiberal and sometimes anti-democratic.

Nationalism is a kind of two-faced phenomenon. One of the faces is political, the other is ethnic. There have been attempts to present those two faces as two kinds of nationalism, thus making a division between its "good" and "bad" versions.30 But these are only ideal types; in reality, nationalism is always both political and ethnic, although either component may predominate. The relationship may be expressed as one between body and soul: the political-nationalist soul embodied in ethnic flesh. Or, it would be more precise to speak about a form-matter relation in the Aristotelian manner: a formal principle of nationhood creates the reality of nation out of ethnic matter. The liberal effort to overcome ethnicity is of the same nature as the effort of a Christian ascetic to subdue flesh: both are frantic and vain, if they understand their task literally.

The illiberal flesh of ethnicity cannot be subdued, but it can be tamed, if dealt with reasonably. A common pride in ancestors, glorious history, great traditions, language, culture, etc. (which form the essence of ethnicity) may be sublimated into pride in the order of things (institutions, economic

prosperity, way of life) created by a democratic, not just an ethnic "we". The American nation presents a pattern of this sublimation: national pride consists in having built free institutions, the "American way of life", and being "leaders of the free world". Glorification of all this may still be annoying to many individualistic liberals, but this at least contains no threat to ethnic minorities. On the contrary, being tolerant to minorities can also become an element of national pride (and has actually become it in the case of many Americans or representatives of other democratic nations).

It is the failure to tame the ethnic flesh of nationalism that leads to fascism, racism, "bad" (ethnic) nationalism and other social disasters because of which nationalism is usually so much feared. By underlining the word "failure" I want to stress that the nasty side of nationalism comes not as a result of excessive ethnicity, but because of the lack of a political element, or political muscle, in nationalism. When nothing is created by me to take pride in, then I have to take pride in something that has created myself (the race, the language, "blood and soil", etc.).

Here I am approaching the point mentioned in the beginning: the different role of nationalism in "original" and "transported" democracies. I have earlier tried to demonstrate that the democratic enterprise needed for its implementation some principle of moulding the body politic, and that this principle was provided by nationalism. But in "original", North-Western European and North American cases a certain set of political institutions which we now call "democracy" came as a result of centuries-long gradual developments in culture, society, human consciousness, and economic life. The liberal ideas or their social-economic (private property) and cultural (the Protestant Reformation) preconditions preceded the advent of political democracy; the latter was viewed more as a means of restricting power, then as an end in itself ("Power to the People"!).31The ethnic-national factor in moulding the new body politic played its role in a latent rather than explicit way: mainly it provided a unity of basic values, on which the new democratic order had to be based (the "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant" background of American democracy could be mentioned). In the case of France, the existent population subject to monarchic rule was proclaimed the "people", which is the "nation", and nationalism had only later to play its role as the force "turning peasants into Frenchmen".

But did, and could, other nations follow the similar paths to their own democracies? Does there exist some common scheme of democratic transition, followed independently by different countries? In his book, Fukuyama provides this kind of scheme: industrial progress, based on scientific rationality and capitalist economy, "gets us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy, but it does not quite deliver us to the other side". What makes human kind take that final step is "desire of recognition" or, in other words, a sense of human dignity.32 Economic prosperity may be achieved without showing respect to personal freedom, but the person cannot tolerate disrespect, and makes use of the preconditions beneficial for establishing the liberal order. Thus, first some social-economic preconditions make a country "ripe" for democracy (and "a strong sense of national unity" is supposed to be one of those preconditions33); then a desire for individual, personal recognition takes it to the end.

In general, this scheme is quite convincing. Industrial society with a free enterprise system is a necessary basis for firm, stable, balanced democracy. But are all countries so "consistent"? Do they wait until they are quite "ripe" for democracy to take the final step? I am not sure. The right-wing dictatorships in East Asia or Chile, which first prepared everything necessary for democracy, i.e., an advanced economy based on free market and private property, and then just threw away their dictatorial regimes as no longer necessary scaffoldings, are not very typical examples. Rather, democracy spread in a much less rational way—like an infection, or the latest fashion from Paris.

Having sprung up first in some concrete portion of the world, it gradually became attractive to other peoples (why this is so is a different issue). The democratic nation-state was accepted as a blueprint for political systems that others (first in neighboring regions, than throughout the world) felt compelled to follow.

In this enterprise of "importing" democracy nationalism played an extra and crucial role, which has been as two-fold as nationalism itself is. It is most certainly what Fukuyama calls "thymotic pride", and in particular its isothymic aspect, that provides the final incentive for making a democratic transition. But it is a matter not only—and maybe, not so much—of individual dignity, but rather of national dignity. After the liberal democratic blueprint gains recognition, success or failure in following it becomes a measure of a nation's "political maturity". The failure to implement it becomes a national disgrace. Only as an independent state with a stable liberal-democratic order can a nation be admitted to the international "high society", a club of "advanced", "progressive", "normal", "modern" nations. Otherwise, a country may (at best) be feared (like the former Soviet Union), but not treated with genuine respect. In this case, nationalism happens to provide society with incentives for creating not only a democratic, but also a liberal order.

However, this kind of sensitivity to "national disgrace" is not expressed in the same way by all strata of society. Usually, it is characteristic for elites participating in the world movement of ideas and having the idea of the "normal", "civilized" order. These are mostly intellectuals; but this kind of sentiment may be felt by anybody who has been in touch with "the blueprint". This explains, why not only intellectuals, but also liberal communists of high rank supported substantial changes in the former Soviet Union, even if by doing so they were undermining their own positions34. With the development of an international media, even broader masses become sensitive to being "politically backward". It was a sense of national, not only individual, dignity, that sent many Russians to the barricades against the die-hard communist putschists who symbolized "barbaric forces" in August of 1991.

However, in the case of "imported" democracies the lack of the social, economic, spiritual or cultural preconditions of democracy could create an especially deep gap between the liberal elite bearer of the "politically correct", "progressive" ideology, and the "people", still living in obscurity. The opposition "Intelligentsia and the People" emerged. It found its classical and especially dramatic form in Russia, but became quite universal for many "backward" countries trying to "succeed". The liberal elite itself was too thin and weak to lead the transition movement; there was no strong middle class to make a deal with. And since, according to the blueprint itself, the transition to modernity had finally to be done on behalf of the People, first of all the People had to be enticed into political activity. But classical liberal values, the foundation of the first Western democracies, could not possibly bring wide masses into movements. As to the gradual preparation of society for their acceptance, this was something "backward" societies could not afford: they were in a hurry to "catch up". The accelerated politization of "the People" needed more focused ideologies, which could be understood in terms of his everyday life.

This role had been played by two offsprings of Western liberalism: socialism and nationalism and "Progressive" Western ideology had a chance to inspire popular movements either in the form of socialism, or in the form of nationalism. The outward hostility of those two resembled that of competing retailers, trying to sell the same merchandise ("Progressive Western ideas"), though packaged in a different way, to the same customers. Both were religions of the People, but the same Deity in one case was addressed as "class", while in the other case it was "nation".

However, having become the locomotives, rather than the carriages, of the modernization movements, and appearing in a different milieu, these ideas changed their behavior. The concrete

difference depended, and depends, on specific social, economic, cultural, psychological conditions of a given society. On the level of general tendencies, however, one can say that in "backward" countries the populist and anti-individualist messages of socialism and ethnic nationalism were no longer balanced by traditions of civil society, enlightenment, economic freedom, political liberties, understanding and respect for law, sometimes different religious attitudes—in short, something usually covered by the somewhat vague term "political culture". This lack of "political culture" transformed the initial socialist ethos of fairness into sheer envy; while the failure to master the means of political behavior transformed nationalism into the doctrine of "blood and soil".

When blended with the above-mentioned intrinsic difficulties of the nationalist doctrine, this lack of "political culture" and sense of political failure carries the national idea away from its democratic and isothymic origin to the most outrageous expressions of racism and fascism. However, denouncing any kind of nationalism as would-be fascism is not much wiser than rejecting any religious movement as ultimately leading to fanaticism and Inquisition. The point is that problems of nationalism are nothing but the indispensable components of democratic transitions. As nationalism and socialism have usually been tools of accelerated modernization, so fascist and communist totalitarianism were expressions of over strain and political impotence.

Nationalism after Communism

What is there (if anything) in the Post-Communist situation that makes Nationalism-Liberalism-Democracy relations significantly different?

Usually, the transitions to democracy, coinciding in general with the modernization effort, implied a transition from traditional societies. Some elements of the latter were preserved and in a sense provided a basis for modernity.35 So that the sense of historical continuity was thus maintained, and the whole development was regarded as a forward movement to what now turned out to be the "end of history". Communism, however, is far from being a traditional society; being in fact a blind by-path of history, it proclaimed itself to be the end of history.36 That is why destroying communism implies not a forward-to-the-end-of-history, but a back-to-history movement.37 Returning from the journey beyond history, people carry with themselves only a belief that communism has created nothing worthy of being retained in a "civilized" life. The predominant attitude is that of building something from nothing.

The reason for this does not lie just in rejecting the eschatological vision of communism. Being totalitarian in its essence, the ideological regime penetrated and mediated all structures of social life: all elements of civil society (any which existed in pre-communist past) were destroyed. Thus, rejection of communism means in its turn not just rejection of the political and economic system, but demolishing the whole way of life. This makes it like returning to the "state of nature" and building state and society anew.

That is why Fukuyama's above-mentioned scheme, according to which in order to make a democratic transition, a country should first be taken to the gate of the Promised Land through economic development, becomes quite irrelevant for post-communist reality. Of course, the notion that nothing created under communism could be carried to the liberal democratic world should not be taken literally. Communism did accomplish some tasks of modernization: society was urbanized and educated, railways and highways were built, etc. All this should and could not be reversed or destroyed.38 Moreover, the fact that the strata of urbanized and educated people is larger in today's Russia and other post communist countries than at the beginning of the century, gives the attempts at democratic transition much greater chances of success.

But when one speaks of the social-economic preconditions of a free society, the crucial thing is not just education and urbanization, but private property.39 It is an economic system based on private property that establishes in personality a balance between freedom and responsibility, or freedom and order, on which the democratic enterprise is also based, and which can never be learned through theoretical education. Urbanized and educated elites clearly are supposed to be the driving force of the democratic transition, but what may it be based upon?

When there is nothing real to lean upon, the movement tries to be based on ideology. Having returned from a journey beyond space and time, the nations try to resume their history from the point at which it was interrupted by the communism. The rejection of communism throughout Eastern Europe is at the same time a series of restorations.40 Communism strips both peoples and nations of their identities, and the only means to regain that identity seems to be through self-recollection. On the other hand, the post-communist nations also return from a journey beyond space: having destroyed the Berlin Wall, they have to join the world. But the world has gone forward quite a distance after the unlucky nations fell victim to communism. Thus a movement to regain one's own self and the movement to join the world come into contradiction: the "true self" exists in the past, while "the World" to be joined exists now. This produces severe identity crises and aberrations of time in the post-communist nations, and lack of understanding on the part of "the World". The former make a tremendous effort to rejoin history only to discover that history has already ended.

This continuous identity crisis makes over sensitivity to national issues unavoidable. But since the structures of civil society were destroyed by the totalitarian regime, the latter left behind itself a rubble of atomized individuals who look frantically for a common principle on which to base the building of their new lives on. In this situation, nationalism emerges as the major—if not the only—principle capable of holding society together. But since the political tradition is interrupted, its ethnic element becomes especially strong. This does not mean, that no other social forces and ideologies exist; there is religion, there is pro-Western liberal elite. But everything is somewhat blended with nationalism, or defines itself in relation thereto. What is called the "cultural revival" is definitely more national than cultural in the proper sense. Religious revival is more of a national religious revival: it has to "unify the nation" and help it to overcome the legacy of atheistic and cosmopolitic communism, rather than bring salvation to an individual human soul. Appeal to liberal-democratic values takes the form of appealing to "our political traditions", to "our" identity as "Western", "European" and/or "Christian" culture. Without these connotations, liberal ideas have next to no chances of exerting influence on political discourse. I have already spoken of another aspect of this, namely, being able to assume the liberal-democratic model and joining the free world as a matter of national dignity.

Nationalism thus becomes a major destructive force (destructive for communism) as well as a constructive one (providing unity in the world of disarray); a major menace (for building the liberal democracy), and a major hope (for achieving the same goal). It is far from being uniform; but almost all political discourse finds itself inside the paradigm of nationalism. Saying of a person living in that world that he or she is a "nationalist" means saying next to nothing, because while being a "nationalist" one may be liberal or fascist. A pronounced rejection of nationalism also does not always mean the same thing as it could in the West; it might imply the rejection of one sided ethnic nationalism, but not, for example, the necessity of political independence for his/her country. A British activist of the liberal international once complained to me that the organization had some problems with Eastern European liberal parties which seemed to them too much "right-wing" and nationalist. Still, I do not think that Eastern European liberals are necessarily less liberal

than the Westerners. What is really different, is the place of nationalism in the political discourse. An ardent rejection of nationalism is possible, but what the post communist intellectual cannot afford is indifference to national issues.

There is one more significant aspect which I think it important to mention here: the difference between Russians and other former members of the "Socialist camp". Russia was the first to install the communist system; the spread of communism in other republics of the former Soviet Union, and later in Eastern and Southern Europe, came as a result of the Russian-Soviet conquest. Communism was regarded as not only a politically, but also (if not in a predominant way) a nationally hostile force, as a part of foreign occupation. Accordingly, overcoming it meant overcoming the occupation. Of course, to some extent this was an illusion: even forcefully exported communism has penetrated all levels of society and made getting rid of its legacy a matter of generations, rather than one of a political revolution, whether "velvet" or bloody. Still, this helped nationalism become a driving force of the anti-communist movement. From one point of view, this was good because it helped to destroy communism; but it also had its negative side, because the source of evil is seen as an external force, thereby obscuring the deeper problems of the communist legacy in one's own society. Depicting communism as something "foreign" encourages an effort to project the responsibility for the totalitarian sin onto a definite strata of society, which expresses itself in a witch hunt, a tendency to understand the political realm in conspiratorial terms, etc.

As to Russia, the national aspect of post-Communism is even more complicated. The tradition of Russian statehood has been the tradition of an empire; in the Soviet period, this tradition merged with the role of the leader of the communist world. The spread of communism and the expansion of the Russian Empire were almost synonymous (only later did some communist states begin to defect from Russian domination), and it was thanks to communism that the Empire reached the historical peak of its might and influence. So the imperial-nationalist tradition found itself not in opposition, but rather in convergence with the communist principle, which in its turn lead to a controversy between liberal democracy and nationalisms of any kind.41 That made an identity crisis even more painful.

Russian ethnic-cultural nationalism formed itself as openly anti-Western (i.e. anti-liberal) and, although it initially considered communism as a Jewish virus aimed at contaminating and extinguishing the Russian people, it ended up in a logical coalition with hard-line communists. As to the Westernizing democrats, up to this time they have failed to produce any viable and consistent concept of Russian statehood. There is much frantic and irregular movement between self-denigrating images of a country of slaves which is organically unable to succeed, and renewed national pride, which too rapidly took on openly imperialistic and authoritarian overtones leading to defections from the "democratic camp" to "patriotic forces", and to demanding resurrection of the Russian-Soviet Empire. A small group advocates the idea that even the Russian federation continues to be an empire and should not preclude its smaller autonomies from seceding. The government tends more and more towards a pragmatic vision of a "united and inseparable" Russia within the borders of the existing Russian Federation, but from time to time cannot help making territorial claims on the Ukraine. A non-imperial concept of Russian statehood has yet to be created.

The preoccupation with national issues in the absence of deep democratic and liberal traditions raises legitimate fears of nationalist authoritarianism in post-communist countries. The danger is real; but, as I earlier mentioned concerning the illiberal tendencies of nationalism in general, the source is not nationalism as some isolated force, a crazy devil which must be tamed in itself, but

the general weakness of democracy. The transition from nothing to something creates a real, objective necessity for strong executive power. Almost all post-communist countries display that course. This naturally creates a fear of authoritarianism and few post-communist leaders avoid accusations of dictatorial style. On the other hand, lack of a strong power leads to anarchy and disarray, the backlash of which may be even more bloody and repressive. Since the most operative ideology is, as I have said, nationalism, it is only natural that authoritarian tendencies lead to a nationalist, and in particular an ethnic nationalist, kind of authoritarianism. Almost all post-communist countries with sizable ethnic minorities face painful problems between unstable and insecure majorities and even less secure minorities. Almost all governments in such countries face accusations of following a not quite liberal minority policy, which in most cases are true at least by Western standards. I do not see any hope of satisfactory solutions for the numerous ethnic issues in these countries for some time to come.

All this raises quite legitimate fears that the post-communist world is going to plunge into a series of wars and repeat the history of Europe between the two world wars (according to the psychological mechanism of self-recollection, that is where all the post-communist countries now exist). The only counterbalance to that is the presence of the Western world, which is of another historical era. I have underlined the world "presence", because I have not much hope of direct international involvement, or in attempts at mediation, economic sanctions etc. These measures have proven to have very limited effect (although in some particular cases even that limited effect can wholly justify them). The real counterbalance of nationalism based on "recollecting" the historical past is an alternative version of the nationalist sentiment: an effort of "joining the civilized world as an equal and dignified member". Sense of international isolation is much more painful, than any international sanctions. This world provides the blueprint not only of the flourishing market economy, but of a real and working balance between forces of democracy, liberalism and nationalism. The possibility of just observing this is the greatest help for young emergent post-communist democracies in their effort to succeed.

Notes

1. "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer, 1989), 3-18.
2. New York, *The Free Press*, 1992.
3. Fukuyama (1992), pp. xix, 201-202. In reality, Fukuyama's attitude to nationalism does not seem to be quite consistent and well thought through. In general, he treats nationalism as opposed to liberal democracy as an irrational form to a rational one. Elsewhere, discussing developments in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, he says that "there is no inherent contradiction between democracy and at least some of the newly emerged nationalisms" (*ibid*., p. 37), or that "Nationalism in these cases is a necessary concomitant to spreading democratization" (p. 272). In another place, he goes even further: "For democracy to work, citizens need to develop an irrational pride in their own democratic institutions, and must also develop what Tocqueville called 'the wart of associating', which rests on prideful attachment to small communities", which "are frequently based on religion, ethnicity, or other forms of recognition that fall short of the universal recognition on which the liberal state is based" (p. xix; see also p. 215). This comes close to endorsing nationalism as a positive force which democracy actually needs: why "small communities" and not political nations, on behalf of which democratic institutions are created? Thus, in fact we have three statements: "nationalism contradicts liberal democracy", "nationalism does not contradict democracy" and "democracy needs nationalism". These are difficult to reconcile.

4. Shlomo Avineri, "The Return to History. The Breakup of the Soviet Union," *The Brookings Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 30.

5. Liberals are often disinclined to admit this simple idea, labeling it to be too "vague" and "metaphysical"; "real", or "instrumental", practical democracy consists in procedures of restraining the power, which claims to govern "on behalf of people" (See K. Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 1 [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957], p. 120_121). Perhaps, there is also a semi-conscious reluctance to admit real dangers in democracy proper, real controversy between the principle of democracy and the principle of freedom.

6. Of course, this is the major point of intersection of Protestantism and democracy.

7. Presumably, the word "nation" has two different meanings which do not have much in common: the legal-political (the totality of citizens of a given state) and ethnic (people of the same origin, language, culture, etc.). But this division, even if useful in a lexicographic sense, would be unacceptably simplistic if recognized as an absolute one on the theoretical level. The point of democratic nationalism consists in overcoming that division: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." E. Gellner (1983), p. 1.

8. It is another issue that the non-rational, arbitrary character of these decisions are often exaggerated by „modernist instrumentalist" doctrine. There is always some space for rationality and common sense in handling any particular issue. An analogy could be drawn with human communication: it can never be fully rational, but admitting that does not necessarily lead to a statement that it should be fully irrational.

9. Secession may be regarded as a solution for a given minority, but usually not for the minority problem in general inasmuch as the former minority becomes a majority for others.

10. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

11. E.J. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976).

12. E. Hobsbawm, who by no means tries to underline positive relationships between democracy and nationalism, also finds "the very act of democratizing politics, i.e. of turning subjects into citizens, . . . hard to distinguish from a national, even a chauvinist, patriotism". See Hobsbawm (1990), p. 88.

13. E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 55.

14. Fukuyama (1992), p. 201.

15. *Ibid*., pp. l96-198.

16. Some aspects of this attitude are presented in my "Humanism and Freedom", in Paul Peachey, John Kromkowski, George F. McLean, eds., *The Place of the Person in Social Life* (Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991), pp. 33-43.

17. "Non-historical" not in the sense of immunity to historical change and\or ideological manipulation, but in the sense that ethnicity does not owe its existence to history; it had existed in the prehistorical era and can survive history if the latter is ended.

18. Fukuyama (1992), p. 266.

19. Popper (1957), vol.1, pp. 95-99.

20. Modern international relations based on liberal-democratic ideology do not regard the principle of "national sovereignty" as absolute: human rights abuse is considered a good excuse for intervention. But this by definition only involves the attitude of liberal states to non-liberal ones, which makes it inapplicable to post-war Western European relationships. Even in the case

of repressive regimes, these interventions do not exceed the level of moral pressure or economic sanctions. Only an apparent exception, the defense of the Kurds from the Iraki regime, was not intended to change the regime or state borders. The attitude of the international community to state-citizen relations in sovereign countries is similar to the attitude of society to family relations in liberal states: society may intervene only if something really outrageous is happening, and the intervention is made only on a minimal scale.

21. "Nationalism not only holds together the histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, showing them to be part of a continuing crisis. It has also brought the histories of Asia, Africa and the Pacific into relation with European history, making them part of a universal history". See E. Kamenka, "Political Nationalism—the Evolution of the Idea", in E. Kamenka, J. Plomenatz, eds., *Nationalism. The Nature and Evolution of the Idea* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 3.

22. On this see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974) .

23. For example, "the Founding Fathers [of American Democracy] thought that the liberty with which they were most concerned was menaced by democracy". See Richard Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition* (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), p. 10 .

24. *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 230.

25. *Ibid*., pp. 232-233.

26. *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Boston, Mass.: The Beacon Press, 1948), p. 186.

27. "We must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them," *ibid*., p. 193.

28. "Inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior," *ibid*., p. 186.

29. *Ibid*., p. 168.

30. Lord Acton distinguished between bad (French) and good (British) doctrines of nationality; in the first case, state corresponds to nationality, in the second, nationality is derived from the state (1948, pp. 183-184, 187). Anthony D. Smith makes a distinction between "territorial and ethnic nations", which corresponds to difference between political and ethnic nationalism. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 134-138.

31. It is not surprising, that the United Kingdom, the core of European liberalism, has not even formally completed its democratic transition: the ancient regime was never overturned there, but deprived of power in a gradual way, and the country still lacks such basic attributes associated with democracy as a Constitution and citizenship. These shortcomings are usually overlooked, as plainly symbolic; but perhaps it was this gradualism and compromise between old and new political systems that enabled Britain to avoid some extremes characteristic of more consistent—hence more nationalistic—democracies of continental Europe?

32. Fukuyama (1992), p. l34.

33. *Ibid*., p. 216.

34. The same mechanism of "feeling disgrace" may explain the attitude of liberal elites in the Republic of Georgia, who supported the military ousting of the democratically elected president, which put the republic in the position of an international outcast.

35. "Liberal democracies, . . . are not self-sufficient: the community life on which they depend must ultimately come from a source different from liberalism itself": see Fukuyama (1992), p. 326.

"Stable democracy requires a sometimes irrational democratic culture, and a spontaneous civil society growing out of pre-liberal traditions," *ibid*., pp. 334-335.

36. Perhaps only communist China promises to fulfil that scheme in the end.

37. "Far from seeing an end of history, Eastern Europe now goes through a massive return of history and to history": Sh. Avineri (1992), p. 30.

38. However, the largest part of the economy has to be destroyed, even in a literal sense: even the best enterprises, which seemed to do well under the socialist system, are no longer competitive once they join the world market, while an attempt at "technical modernization" or "conversion" in practice means preservation of old factory buildings at best.

39. At least, this was what Hegel, the main source of Fukuyama's vision, thought.

40. This point is very well elaborated in Avineri (1992).

41. This controversy, however, exists on the ideological level. I would argue that to a significant degree the psychological, emotional source of rejecting communism for Russians consisted in a sense of a deprived national dignity, in weariness of having the image of embodiment of the world evil, of the big but clumsy one that everyone fears but despises.

Chapter III
The Mythomania of Contemporary Absolutism

Penka Marinova Vartcheva

Mythomania is a marked propensity for falsehood and exaggeration.1 Although it is a term of psychiatry rather than of political sciences, I wish to argue that it applies also to some socio-psychological phenomena. It is typical, in particular, of the state of affairs under so-called bureaucratic absolutism.

The latter manifests itself in various garments, but with similar contents. The mantle which covers sheer autocracy is never long enough to hide the balance of forces and interests that make it possible for tyranny to prolong the reign of absolutism beyond the limits of the past and into the present agony of entire countries and their peoples.

I should like to begin with "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" where K. Marx has shown "how the class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part."2 The glorification of such mediocrities is also quite grotesque, but it remains, nevertheless, a nationwide practice in the countries where absolutistic traditions are strong. Of course, by far not all the people share the official belief that their topmost leader is a man of titanic capacities and nearly divine merits, though it is not at all easy to maintain the opposite under an authoritarian regime. As far as the prestige of the state is concerned, no compromise whatsoever is made, but, strange as it is, this prestige is always being associated with the one who is in power. Hence, their prestige becomes a matter of state policy, and their images undergo mythopoeic changes and even canonization. No criticism is tolerated while, on the contrary, excuses are readily accepted and paid for, despite skepticism on the part of genuine intellectuals and working men who do not take panegyrics seriously.

For all that, panegyrics are common and criticism rare, indeed, even persecuted. This turns out to be one of the weak points of the respective society in terms not only of ethics, but also of cybernetics, for the lack of negative feedback hinders progressive moves and frustrates the system's development towards real social self-steering.

Contemporary absolutism, which is closely related to the so-called bureaucratic authoritarian system, imposes itself on two different modes of production: the capitalist and the socialist — the latter making it even more difficult for the people to overcome bureaucracy based on state ownership of the means of production. Bureaucratic absolutism is, therefore, much stronger and less vulnerable in countries where the personal freedom to produce is restricted or simply does not exist and where no private initiative is tolerated. This, however, does not imply that only private undertakings or economic enterprise alone are capable of destroying bureaucratic absolutism.

Economic developments are a necessary, but not at all a sufficient condition for overcoming bureaucratic absolutism: what happened in China in the summer of 1989 proves this. It is not possible radically to change the relations of production without trying to do away with the old relations of power. The latter are quite important for the very system of bureaucratic absolutism, to a great extent, resembles the old dynastic absolutism of the so-called Asiatic mode of production, which is the perfect ground for despotic dynastic absolutism. The corresponding form of society seems an eclectic unity of primitive communities, slave ownership and semifeudal structures incorporated in the framework of huge states, where the ruling class is characterized by the relations of power, rather than by the relations of production. It consists in the control of the

all-powerful state machinery by means of which the productive forces are sanctioned and the power forces are intensified to the extent of dominating society as a whole. One can hardly speak of society under these circumstances. Instead, the state performs all the functions of governance, i.e., planning, steering and administration which might also be combined with a sort of a primitive self-steering on the part of separate communities.

But the main point about the Asiatic mode of production lies with the very mode of domination: a prototype of a totalitarian, administrative, bureaucratic system. The latter is a sophisticated structure of power forces and relations of power which tends to reproduce itself and is, therefore, the main obstacle to the development of the relations of production themselves. All productive forces are used mainly for the sake of reproducing an old type of subordination so that the topmost leader (be it emperor, king, president or secretary general) should remain in power.

Unlike constitutional monarchs, this topmost leader has real power, being on top of the administrative authoritarian pyramid. It is only natural, then, that he should consider the state to be an extension of his own self and compel the others to respect him as "Le Roi Soleil." Pharonic-style ceremonies are organized, and myths are created as to the personal contributions of the topmost leader. He is represented as the one and only person who can secure the national welfare and open up new prospects for the country and the people.

But, this is no longer the collective, wishful thinking embodied in his person. Neither is it any longer the sincere worship of gods and the unconscious acknowledgement of people's weakness in the face of hostile elements that account for mythopoeic achievements nowadays. Of course, Ernst Cassirer is quite right in claiming that collective beliefs and the related, wishful thinking come into effect whenever the making of political myths has to be accounted for in terms of social sciences and philosophy. In his essays on the myth of the state, Cassirer describes the myth as follows:

[It] is not an expression of thoughts or ideas; it is a collective set expressing some fundamental collective feelings and desires. A French scholar, E. Doutte, has given a short and striking definition of myth by saying that the demonic or divine powers we meet in primitive mythologies are not so much personifications of natural forces as personifications of social forces: they are 'le désir collectif personifié." This fundamental character is preserved in all our modern political myths. What we find here is not a system of 'thoughts' but a turmoil of the most violent emotions. The whole gamut of social passions, from the lowest to the highest notes, appeared and burst forth in the creation of the 'myth of the twentieth century'. And finally all these emotions were, as it were, focused in one point. They were personified and deified in the 'Leader'. The Leader became the fulfillment of all collective desires.3

Further, in his paper on "The Technique of Our Modern Political Myths" 4 Cassirer elaborates his views on myth-making as a means to mastermind and manipulate mass consciousness by way of rites and rituals. But the characteristic feature of contemporary mythology, according to him, is the political aspiration that leads to a sort of a Leader's cult: the Führer in Nazi Germany was really a personified collective desire, a personification of aggressive mass conscious (as well as subconscious) aspirations and drives stirred up to the utmost. This was, by no means, a spontaneous outcome of emotions; on the contrary, it was an intentional misuse of the energy of what Albert Schweitzer has called the `collective spirit'. In his essay on "Philosophy and Politics" Cassirer refers to Schweitzer's book, *The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization*, quoting, among other passages, the following lines:

The modern man is lost in the mass in a way which is without precedent in history, and this is perhaps the most characteristic trait in him. His diminished concern about his own nature makes him as it is susceptible to an extent that is almost pathological, to the views which society and its organs of expression have put, ready made, into circulation.5

It is the overwhelming influence of the "collective spirit" that renders individual human beings incapable of preserving their identity and ready to dissolve into a mass, dropping their personal responsibility as well as reason, and leaving it up to the Leader or Führer to perform all the functions of steering (including the judgment of good and evil). Therefore, they can be easily manipulated and misled to commit unprecedented crimes against other people and against humanity, such as wars, genocide, etc.

Cassirer himself has explicitly pointed out a significant turn in the evolution of myths and of the attitude towards myths:

The Romantic thinkers were very far from our modern political myths. They saw in myth an 'unconscious' activity; they looked at it as a wild and exuberant stream springing forth from an unknown depth. In modern politics this stream was embanked and canalized. Myth was no longer a free and spontaneous play of imagination. It was regulated and organized; it was adjusted to political needs and used for concrete political ends.6

Cassirer is quite right to observe that the very practice of myth-making and people's attitude towards the official myths of the state has been subjected to a severe discipline, called ideology. According to him, the Nazi leaders "knew very well that their ideology was the strongest and, at the same time, the most vulnerable point in their whole political system. To deny or even to doubt this ideology was to them a mortal sin".7 The same holds true for Stalinism and its tremendous, administrative, authoritarian system, despite the fact that it was based on state ownership, i.e., on the denial of private property, whereas in Germany the entire industry was in the hands of huge oligopolies. The latter's interests and activities were quite compatible with the politics of National Socialism; what is more, they played an active role in its coming to power. This is yet another proof that contemporary bureaucratic absolutism is a mode of administration which can base itself on two different and even quite opposite modes of production: capitalist and socialist. Both are capable of creating a superstructure where despotic regimes thrive by exploiting the collective desire of people who are misled and reduced to cogs in a myth-making machine.

Demystifying myths about the state is quite essential for the wholesome social critique that can undermine the ideology of contemporary absolutism, no matter what its disguise. The technology of demystifying is a subject which I prefer not to dwell upon here. I wish only to point out that the evolution of modern political myths has not yet come to an end, and not all developments serve to support and reinforce the ideology (i.e., the mythology) of contemporary absolutism. There are powerful trends and forces operating against absolutistic traditions in mass consciousness and in favor of intellectual democracy. In view of these new liberating tendencies, one might be tempted to become an optimist, if only optimism were not associated with wishful thinking. The main source of optimism lies with the intellectual democratic developments, in the light of which the present is not at all doomed to repeat the tragedies of the past. Of course, there is a certain repetition or recurrence of past and outdated forms in all new forms of social organization. Yet, these recurrences can either be intensified in strength or, on the contrary,

weakened by accumulated social experience. It is here that we ought to realize the importance of philosophical analyses of the ways and means of civilization, on which Cassirer himself laid so great emphasis.8

Nowadays, bureaucratic absolutism is a much weaker version of its totalitarian prototype that came into being in the 1920s and 1930s of the twentieth century. Along these lines even its myth-making capacities are less dangerous and even less grotesque. Absolutistic mythology has become a mythomania, which is all the more ridiculous given the inferiority complex of modern dictators. It is true, however, that their ambitions are not to be underestimated: the State machine is a powerful means, not only of myth making, but of repression.

Nevertheless, bureaucratic absolutism at the end of the 20th century seems incapable of stirring up mass consciousness to the extent of creating genuine myths that can inspire a great number of people. Nevertheless, some of the top-most leaders still cherish hopes of becoming the successors of Hitler, Stalin or Mao. It is neither a matter of proportion nor the size of countries that matters because the suffering of people (e.g., in Cambodia) is not at all different from the genocide in Nazi Germany.

It would be an oversimplification to maintain that such developments are due only to the respective leaders being maniacs. The point is that being on top of the bureaucratic-administrative pyramid, they became affected with mythomania. The latter is, therefore, a system's characteristic and not just the leader's personal characteristic. It is a deviation from the normal behavior not only of persons, but also of society. It is quite useful for the explanation of a phenomenon called "personality cult," a myth, a rite, a mode of domination which is the hard core of absolutism, in general.

These considerations of mine are meant to provide a glimpse of the functions of political myths in the structure and dynamics of society. My approach to the issue involves an analysis of contemporary myths from the view point of collective beliefs, as personified in personality cults. I will not dwell either on the precise technique of myth making nor on the variety of presently existing social myths. I am interested mainly in the sociop-sychological aspect of the problem in connection with the most important functions of contemporary political myths and their representation in mass consciousness.

The individual personality is simply lost in the manipulated, collective experience under bureaucratic absolutism. Not only is the personal will dissolved in the collective drive to fulfill the instruction of top authorities, but the group itself is reduced to a transmission of the leader's will. So, it loses its initiative, its creative impulses and the ability to pursue a goal of its own. It becomes absolutely dependent on the leader's ideas and judgments; it is degraded into a mass of people who are only followers. They have no personal opinion, no moral imagination, no desire for self-steering, whatsoever. Thus, they become a silent majority which can easily be made to support any official move but at the same time are quite alienated from the process of decision making. As the results of some sociological studies in our country show, some 65 percent of the population are indifferent to the restructuring proclaimed by our authorities: these people constitute the silent majority. But, on the other hand, this is a kind of self-preservation instinct on the part of people who often have been misled by the propaganda, who have had enough of slogans and have learned to discern between real and staged *perestroika*. For example, 85 percent of the young people in our country are quite enthused about the Soviet *perestroika* but not so enthusiastic about our homemade efforts to depict a democratization. In the minds of a number of young people, there is a peculiar unity of hunches about a forthcoming convergence of the two social systems; on the other hand, they espouse elements of beliefs pertaining to primitive communism.

This eclectic unity is not the only unity of opposites to be found in the realm of socio-psychology. Generally speaking, this is the result of a complex of reasons. It is worthwhile to note, among others, the following point about the situation in question. For years and decades on end, the official propaganda itself has been trying to introduce different (at times, contradicting) notions or values in the minds of people. This has already created a certain resistance to such manipulations for fear of being masterminded; on the other hand, this resistance prevents people from being open to new ideas and projects for changing their conditions by way of social action. Our society lacks spontaneity as far as public activity is concerned. But the appearance of spiritual stagnation is certainly misleading: it covers a thirst for real renovation, and the activity of independent, pressure groups or movements in the East European countries shows how important any intellectual-democratic moves can be under the circumstances and in general.

The overcoming of false mass consciousness (including manipulative ideology) is a task of real philosophy, as young Marx observed. According to him, the demand to get rid of illusions in order to think about one's conditions means, in fact, to get rid of the very conditions which demand illusions for people to bear them. This sort of social change involves creative efforts to construct a new reality. This new reality, in turn, needs a lot of personal, as well as collective (in general, social), imagination in order to be delineated and reaffirmed in the minds of those who undertake the transformation. It takes courage to have moral imagination, and it takes more courage to strive for its implementation, being well aware of the circumstances and of reality. But reality is not only the status quo: it is also the will to go beyond the chains of illusion, even beyond imagination.

Notes

1. *The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language*, p. 632.
2. K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx, Frederik Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 11 (New York: International Publishers).
3. Ernst Cassirer, *Symbol, Myth and Culture. Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer*, 1935/1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) p. 238.
4. Ernst Cassirer, "The Technique of Our Modern Political Myths" in *Symbol, Myth and Culture*.
5. Ernst Cassirer, "Philosophy and Politics" in *Symbol, Myth and Culture*.
6. *Ibid*., p. 235.
7. *Ibid*., p. 240.
8. *Ibid*., p. 232.

Chapter IV
Why Democracy Cannot Be Taught

Richard Graham

The building of democracy is now a matter of critical importance in Eastern Europe yet, if American experience is any indication, democracy can't be taught—not in school anyway.

Democracy, it seems, can't be taught for much the same reason that Socrates figured virtue can't be taught. Both require well-developed reason based upon the sorting out of a stock of ideas and experiences that most school-age people don't possess. More importantly, the building of democracy, like virtue, requires the will to act upon the reason that is founded upon true knowledge. What Socrates called right opinion—a kind of hand-me-down knowledge—may occasion a superficial commitment to democracy just as sympathy may substitute for Socrates's concept of virtue as justice. But right opinion can be ephemeral and sympathy can't be counted upon in public affairs. Indeed, in several of the nations that have recently adopted it, the commitment to democracy may be too superficial to last.

In late 1989 Sylvia Pajoli, an Eastern European correspondent for National Public Radio, reported that the people who had joined in toppling their Eastern European governments were then splitting up into civic-minded factions and ethnic-minded factions. Although democracy was the cry for both, there was division between the people who wanted ethnic-based separatism and those who wanted a democracy in which diverse interests would be represented. Generally this involved popular election of representatives to a legislative branch of government and in which the rights of minorities would be protected by the government and from the government by means of an elected chief executive and an independent judiciary.

The causes of the revolutions were variously interpreted. Mikhael Gorbachev cited a pervasive "new thinking" while Vaclav Havel spoke of a new sensibility. But it was soon evident that there had also been a reawakening of old ethnic-based distrusts and animosities. In several countries, it seemed questionable whether there was a sufficient mandate for democratic governance that would take precedence over ethnic self- identifications and self-interests.

In various ways the question that was asked by John Stuart Mill 150 years ago was being asked again: Under what social conditions is representative government inapplicable? Mill concluded that representative government can only be suitable when three fundamental conditions are met:

1) The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it, or, at least, not so unwilling as to pose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment;

2) They must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing;

3) And they must he willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfill its purposes.

He concluded that representative government is the most perfect polity for any portion of mankind only in proportion to their 'degree of general advancement" and, while this is an awkward term, it is probably useful enough until it can he enlarged upon later in this article.

The history of efforts over the past fifty years to found and maintain democratic governments in African, Asian and Latin American countries would seem to bear out the necessity of readiness

for democracy though it still isn't clear to many what a sufficient measure of "general advancement" should be and how it might vary throughout a society.

Generally there is little difference between the most advanced citizens in one society and in another and little difference between those least advanced in one society and in another. But, where there is a considerable difference between societies in the level of advancement of their average citizens there seems to be a significant difference in the applicability of democracy. Similarly, there appears to be a significant difference in the applicability of democracy when there is a significant difference in the level of advancement of the roughly ten to twenty per cent of the members of a society who do most to shape opinion, to foster the development of judgment and to stimulate vitality.

There is not widespread agreement on what ought to take priority in efforts to foster general advancement or on whether programs to teach democracy can hasten the process. Efforts to teach democracy itself don't seem to have much effect, not if recent efforts in the United States are any indication. Still, there is encouraging evidence that through good education a substantial part of the stock of ideas that underlie democracy can be taken in for sorting out in light of experience later on. In the words of the final conclusion of "Education for Democracy," a joint project of The American Federation of Teachers, Freedom House, and The Educational Excellence Network, it requires:

A broader, deeper learning in the humanities, particularly in literature, ideas, and biography, so that students may encounter and comprehend the values upon which democracy depends. Through such study, moral education — not religious education and not neutral values clarification — can be restored to high standing in our schools. Our children must learn, and we must teach them, the knowledge, values, and habits that will best protect and extend this precious inheritance.

It takes more, however, than teaching values or encountering and comprehending them. The research with which I am most familiar makes it clear that to hold to the principles of justice upon which democracy depends requires processes of thought and of judgment that are not yet developed by teenagers nor by most adults even in generally advanced countries. The evidence from hundreds of studies in over 50 societies throughout the world makes this abundantly clear. Good accounts of the level of abstract reasoning that is required for a true knowledge of democracy are provided in Jean Piaget's *The Growth of Logic in the Child*, and in several other works.

The level of 'general advancement" that assures a "true knowledge of democracy" does not however, seem necessary for its maintenance. To the degree that a nation's laws represent "right thinking' about the principles of justice expressed in a nation's constitution, and to the extent that there is general adherence to these laws, a representative democracy can be maintained.

It might seem, therefore, that it would be enough to teach patriotism but, as seems all too evident from recent history, patriotism cannot be taught when the general level of advancement in a society is not sufficient for civic concepts but only for ethnic affiliation, that is, for a sense of "we-ness" that gives greater weight to one's ethnic traditions than to the laws of one's country.

While the commonly held perceptions of the "general advancement" of a society are mostly subjective and largely based upon economic and industrial development, these assessments often depart from the criteria for measuring a society's advancement according to its standards for justice and the degree to which these standards apply to women and minorities. Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse and others have suggested criteria of this latter kind by which the intellectual and moral development of a society could be assessed but only recently has it become possible to assess a society's general advancement in these terms and, more particularly, in terms of the advancement of its citizens' reasoning about justice. It is now possible to establish an individual's capacity for

reasoning in the domain of justice and, by extension, his or her ability to knowingly enter into the implied social contract upon which democracies function or to hold to the principles upon which democracies are founded.

The most common measures of an individual's capacity for logical reasoning are derived from the research of Jean Piaget, while the measures of an individual's capacity for reasoning about justice are largely based upon the work of Harvard psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates. Greatly simplified, Kohlberg's longitudinal studies indicate that there is a universal human tendency to progress in an invariant sequence through a series of well-defined stages of reasoning about what is right and just. It begins in childhood with a first stage where "right makes right," then progresses to a second stage where justice is equal exchange, good for good, bad for bad, and then to a third where what is right is what the traditions and conventions of the group one belongs to hold to be right. Cross-sectional studies in over 50 societies throughout the world establish this as the thinking of most adults in most countries, but most well educated people having complex responsibilities in a modern society will progress to a fourth stage that can be thought of as civic reasoning that is based upon an implied social contract to uphold the laws of one's country. It is, in effect, the right thinking upon which the maintenance of a democracy depends. A small part of a society — generally not more than 20 percent of the citizenry in an advanced society, and much fewer in a primitive society — will respect laws that foster a stable, productive society but will give primary allegiance to the principles of justice upon which most advanced societies are ostensibly based.

It cannot he emphasized enough that in this stage-by-stage development of reason one's stock of thoughts and experiences is not supplanted as one stage is succeeded by another. The processes of reason are reorganized but the content of reason remains much the same. One's cultural traditions are not replaced. One's sense of identity still depends primarily upon one's roots even though a broader sense of identity is formed and a more universal concept of justice is developed. It is upon this more highly developed concept of justice that the principles of a democracy are established.

For example, the Constitution of the United States represents an accommodation between the more universal reasoning of James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and a few others on the one hand and, on the other, the social contract reasoning of Alexander Hamilton and men like him who had a practical understanding of the self-seeking side of the "human nature" of most men and women. Together, they brought forth a constitution compromised in principle yet still principled and practical enough to guide the United States for over 200 years of representative democracy. It was a constitution which, using Gorbachev's term, drew largely upon the new thinking of the enlightenment but, using Havel's term, it was sustained by a newly forged sensibility or a sense of common identity in the new nation. Although the workings of government were expected to count upon the offsetting of one ethnic or class or geographical faction against another, there was, as John Jay observed in the second Federalist Paper, an initial basis for a sense of common identity:

Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people — a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and, who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their liberty and independence.

"New thinking" or "general advancement" or higher stage reasoning about justice is, for a society as for an individual, not enough to determine behavior. In addition to general advancement,

there must be resolution or will or character or a sense of identity that gives power to reason, that provides force for democratic government as for ethical behavior.

The stage by stage development of an individual's reasoning is in some ways paralleled by the historical advancement of a society's prevailing judgment as evidenced by its institutions of justice. Similarly, the crises that mark the changing identity of a nation parallel the crises that mark the reformulations of an individual's identity as his or her age-linked biological changes and society's expectations assign new roles and responsibilities.

Using the terms employed by Erik Erikson in his analysis of the development of an ego or self, one finds an individual's school-age crisis of Industry vs. Inferiority is paralleled by that of the transition from a pre-literate to a literate society, just as the Identity vs Identity Diffusion crisis of an individual's adolescence is similar to the crisis of identity in a nation in its transition from a traditional ethnic-authority society to a democratic civic society. There is a comparable similarity between an adult's crisis of Generative vs. Self-Absorption and a great power's resurgence or decline. In some ways the present crises in Eastern Europe are Identity vs. Identity Diffusion crises and the crisis in the United States is one of Generativity vs. Self-Absorption. According to Erikson, a student of Freud, the crisis of adolescent identity is brought on by puberty and by the associated changes in roles one's society assigns as one becomes an adult. For many individuals, the adolescent crisis is intensified by an unsettling change of reason. The expanding social roles, whether in school or at the work place, often involve a broadening sense of kinship that cuts across ethnic ties and cultural traditions. This often stimulates not only a redefinition of what "I am" but also a reconstruction of reason. What is right and fair can no longer be defined by reasoning based upon what is good for those belonging to my ethnic or cultural group. But between the time that an individual makes that judgment until the time that he or she arrives at a stage of reasoning according to which each person, regardless of race, color, sex, creed or ethnic origin has equal rights that can best be protected by a representative government, he or she is, in a sense, caught between systems for organizing ideas. Ethnicity as the foundation of justice has been questioned, if not rejected, but nothing has taken its place.

A similar crisis occurs in a society in which traditional values have lost their force but an insufficient part of the populace has reached reason that accords an equal claim to opportunity and justice for all its citizens. Without this measure of advancement, representative democracy is, as Mills would say, inapplicable.

A somewhat similar crisis of reason occurs when a leading segment of a society begins to find inadequate the reasoning that justice is best defined and secured by its nation's representative democracy, but has not yet reached the stage of reasoning at which everyone in all societies has an equal claim to opportunity and justice. A national government is then perceived to be inadequate partly because of its inherent vulnerability to chauvinism and, less extremely, because though it may be committed to accord equal rights and opportunities to each of its own citizens, it is not committed to doing so for others.

If, then, there are these similarities between individuals and societies in the development of reason and identity, does this provide insights for what education should be for the development of an individual's reason and character and, as well, for fostering democratic governance and a national will in keeping with it? It would seem so.

There are several reasons for the resurgence of interest in teaching democracy in the United States and in teaching the knowledge and values upon which democracy depends. Only about half of American citizens eligible to vote do so. There is a perceived increase of venality in public office. There has been an appalling decline of knowledge of history, geography, language and

science on the part of American students as compared with their counterparts in other modern societies. The United States is suffering a decline in economic prominence in the world. And the U.S. is experiencing a frightening increase in crime and general lawlessness which is seen by some observers as a loss of traditional values and, by others, a breach of the social contract upon which a democracy is based.

Not surprisingly, efforts to teach democracy in the United States have intensified in recent years. Two quite different approaches are being tried with little or no crossover between them. One is exemplified by the Education for Democracy Project mentioned above. The other is to practice democracy in school. It involves the creation of within-school democracies or, as some of them are called, 'just communities." Whatever they are called, they are more a form of teenage kinship than a representative democracy. They are, first, a means to create solidarity in a teenage group that typically includes ethnic cliques which have been stand-offish or adversarial, then a means to establish values of fairness and kindness as criteria of membership. Knowledge of some of the features of a representative democracy are conveyed in the process of drafting their own constitution, their laws and by-laws, and by the creation of separate committees to charge members with violations of their laws. The offenders are then tried according to the judicial procedures that have been established by their laws and constitution, and penalties are imposed according to a roughly defined code of justice. Each student and each faculty member has an equal vote in legislation and in judicial proceedings. In inner-city schools the trials typically involve charges of repeated violation of self-imposed rules against theft, vandalism, or use of drugs. Typically, the most contested and severe punishment is expulsion from the group.

I don't think that these programs teach democracy. They teach the language and the forms of democracy. They teach Robert's *Rules of Order* and something about the reasons for the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Some basic notions get through to students and are there in their heads to later build upon. But mostly these programs provide opportunities for adolescents to try out new roles and responsibilities and, through them, to progress in their ability to take the perspectives of others, to put themselves in the shoes of others. Mostly these programs teach the uses of community and of solidarity. In the best of them, adolescents learn something about caring for one another and, as they increase their ability to take the perspectives of others, they become more able to see fairness from these other perspectives. It is this that enables them to develop the more comprehensive and widely applicable notions of justice on which support for democracy must depend.

These in-school efforts at representative self-governance tend to be short- lived for much the same reasons set forth by Mill. School authorities seldom want them enough, largely because the success of a program cannot be measured by the criteria of test scores upon which the success and advancement of a school administrator is often based. Moreover, school authorities are seldom willing to do what is necessary for the preservation of these programs. Since they generally take more time than a regular course in civics or social studies, teachers must volunteer the extra time or receive supplemental pay from special funds provided either by the school budget or by a foundation grant. But specially funded programs are usually the first to go in a school system's budget crunch and special grants are usually made for only a short time.

The evaluations of these programs indicate that they succeed in helping students to take the perspectives of others, to develop a broader sense of kinship, and to practice some of the procedures of a democracy. But, as suggested by the Education for Democracy program, more than this is needed and much of it is needed when children are younger.

Here is what I believe the research suggests for education that prepares for democracy. I present it with the realization that many children will continue to grow up in illiterate societies or in families that provide limited opportunity for the early development of reason and the self-assurance to act upon the highest stage of reasoning they are capable of exercising.

But even in illiterate societies, most children, through folktales, songs and parables taught by their families, can learn the legends, traditions and religious beliefs of their culture. In literate societies good education begins with these and soon moves on to the early teaching of biography, history and great literature. It starts with the first reading of fairy tales, legends, parables and adventure stories that, for the most part, deal with themes of triumph over evil or adversity. Heroes prevail by virtue of religious faith, courage. steadfastness, loyalty, truth and kindness — especially kindness to animals and people in need.

In the elementary school years, biography, history and literature are drawn upon to continue the development of one's sense of identity and kinship through a shared culture and tradition, usually with emphasis upon the virtues of justice and benevolence that give at least partial justification for wars and revolutions. In the early secondary school years, biography, history, literature and science are used to develop patriotism and pride in a nation's heritage and to foster national kinship and identity. And in the later secondary and college years these subjects along with a foreign language, and opportunity to take a variety of new roles and responsibilities are looked to for the development of still broader kinship and identity.

Education of this kind doesn't teach democracy but it helps to preserve the traditions and to foster development of the reasoning, the values and the strength of character on which democracy most relies. It is education in which the development of reason and character is the aim. It is education in which cultural values are cherished as means, not ends. Cultural values are seen as means to justice and kindness, reason and sympathy, fairness and supererogation and to the development of the self and its connection to nature or God.

Under the best of conditions it takes at least two decades for an individual to reach the "democracy stage" of reasoning and almost as much time to resolve the identity crisis of late adolescence. And, of the two inherent human drives — to understand the reasons for things and events in the world and beyond and to construct and preserve a self for this world and thereafter — the latter drive seems the stronger. For everyone, everywhere, the assurance of integrity of the self is of greater importance than wealth or power or approval though these usually do much to bolster a sense of self- identity.

For many, if not most, of the citizens of Eastern Europe the integrity of the self is most founded upon ethnic identity and kinship. Although their societies have reached or have nearly reached the advancement on the part of leaders and followers that is necessary to make democracy appropriate by Mill's criteria, several of these societies are still undergoing the crises of identity which make it uncertain whether there is sufficient will to maintain a democracy. The promise of a democracy was strong enough to hold to their authoritarian governments but its promise may not be sufficient to energize economic progress. It may not offer enough hope for the pride in economic and social progress that would strengthen a national identity.

These societies face a choice. One seems to be that of belonging to a weak, poor and isolated nation surrounded by ethnic-based states that are unsympathetic in the best of times and adversarial at others. Another prospect is that of becoming a member state in a European community that could become one of the three or four most prosperous and socially advanced in the world, one that would share common concerns, a common currency, and a common second language along with traditions that arc over present borders. There may be other alternatives hut, of these two, the

second seems to offer greater hope and with it the will and the energies now needed for economic progress and for representative government. For, as Samuel Johnson observed, "our energies are in proportion to our hopes."

Several of you in this colloquium have said that economic progress is not the first business of government. John Stuart Mill agreed. To him, the first merit of ideal representative government is its contribution to the citizen's advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency. The second is that it ideally organizes the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs.

Perhaps democracy cannot be counted upon to do this well but it can be counted upon to do it more surely than any other form of government. It seems worth educating for.

Chapter V

Freedom and Choice: Between Heidegger's *Das Nichts* and Jasper's *Das Umgreifende*

Dragos Popa

General Considerations

Democracy - a Western Creation

This paper deals with democracy—a creation of the Western world where it holds the main place. A Greek creation, democracy seems to have been a characteristic element in the evolution of the European culture, even when at times it temporarily disappeared as a form of political organization. This implies that political and social organization plays a less decisive role than the more complex and *prima facie* less obvious issue of man's stance in relation to his own self, society and, in the first place, transcendence. This relates also to the deep differences separating the Greek and more broadly the Western spirit from the Eastern tradition regarding the problem of the metaphysics of being, the relation between the individual and the cosmos, and the place and meaning of transcendence. From another point of view this may be related to the distinction of Erich Fromm between the two ways of being, which he describes as "*Haben*" (to have) and "*Sein*" (to be). But as such an enterprise exceeds our present purposes, we shall try only to sketch out some problems in order to bring to the surface some questions which seem more important.

As democracy seems linked to the deep contents of culture and to its values in a way that can be traced back to its origins and evolution, the problems of freedom and choice appear to require particularly attentive analysis.

Historical Recuperation and Freedom of Choice

Obviously our Epic raises a problem strictly related to contemporaneity, and even to a certain extent to the actual historical moment. At the same time, the complexity of our subject requires a refinement of analysis difficult to obtain without a careful historical investigation.

A digression is necessary here: we can conceive history as a string of events and data to which we can refer, and in a similar manner we can deal with ideas, values and cultural contents. This treats them as well- formed and clearly classified historical factors to which one can freely refer. According to another definition of culture and history, these elements are ineffable and alive; they do not allow for classification without being emptied of content.

In any classification of this kind what we actually find is information about the individual, the school or the culture that has attempted the classification. In other words, what we can do in this case is to bring a certain historical content closer and to appropriate it. This recovers history at the level of our historical knowledge; in the first place it recovers our own cultural setting. There is a danger here of falling into a vicious circle in historical argumentation about any idea. The risk is quite unavoidable if we begin by assuming an historical demonstration. However, this risk can be overcome if we have in mind merely to make the problem more explicit by an analysis which tries to recover certain historical themes with the help of our own cultural or structural contents. This attempt does not ignore Pascal's arguments: "You would not seek for me, if you had not already

found me," or Aquinas' form of the logical proof, according to which the initial topic is found again in the end now with deeper understanding and broader context (*utrum, videtur quod non, sed contra, respondeo dicendum*).

On the contrary, we would like to draw attention to the dangers that can appear in any analytical demonstration in the context of our present topic, since it will set out from premises considered as correct and will end up with supposedly definitive conclusions. Since in any demonstration the conclusion depends upon the premises, by changing the premises we can demonstrate nearly anything. For that reason it is not the demonstration of certain assertions, but the deepening of their content that is of primary importance. We have attempted this digression not only for its theoretical and methodological implications, but mainly to suggest the profound difficulty raised by the problems of choice and contemporary freedom.

Analyses such as those of Ortega y Gasset on the subject of logical argumentation point undoubtedly to the risk of the logical chaos that originates in the arbitrariness or the conjunctural aspects of the premises. This can be avoided by an archaic type of culture in which the premises are imposed by an explicit archetypal structure through the validity that belongs directly to the reiteration of the mythical origins. However, as soon as the sorcerer apprentice is born, as soon as the Faustian myth can become real, logical and technological chaos become inherent life partners. Thus transcendence should be considered to be a factor of stability in the sense of coherence and harmony.

In this perspective desacralization can be defined as a break with origins and foundations, running the risk of a loss of the deeper significance of values and of harmony dissolving into chaos. Still desacralization seems always and necessarily to be accompanied by a contrary process of re-sacralization (which is hidden at first). Hence, logical chaos bears the hidden germ of a new order. This regards a more general problem concerning the relation of opposites. In this respect it is interesting to remember from Indian tradition how Vishnu, killed by Indra, passes into the latter. Under these circumstances our limits are no longer explicit, but are transformed and concealed. In another sense here is involved also the problem of cyclicity. This can be discussed in terms of the Indian tradition, of the relation of sacred to profane or of cosmicity to chaos. But we can at the same time regard this problem in terms of Aquina's logical structure mentioned above. On this basis the Romanian philosopher, Constantin Noica, has developed an extremely interesting logical pattern, which belongs equally to discourse, to the real and to being in its metaphysical sense.

Our interest in this subject comes from considering our relation with transcendence to be the main factor that determines our values, upon which depend essentially freedom and the possibility of choice. On the other hand, in the Christian world transcendence is related directly to the antinomic character of the Trinity, and to the love which characterizes this. Due to the essential role these elements play here, we shall attempt to refine their meaning by a recuperating historical excursus, which may perhaps be less expected, but which can be highly relevant.

The Essential Antinomy and Relation of Love and Knowledge

Both the problem of freedom and that of choice and values seem intimately connected with that of the relation between the individual and his self, the exterior world and finally the transcendent. Any attentive analysis will point, in the end, to an essential antinomy which may attempt either to assimilate by a technique of self-transformation as in the Indian tradition, or the Chinese formal constructions of Ying Yang, or simply to deny. By denying , however, one of the two terms is lost. We shall now look closer to the Christian tradition. According to the Romanian

philosopher, L. Blaga, and the explanations offered by the Romanian theologian, Dr. D. Staniloaie, the essential theoretical spirit of Christianity consists precisely in the explicit assumption of the antinomy. God is one as a being, and multiple as a person. Christ is the Father's son, but he is also man by birth. Christ's dual qualities, in turn, implicitly affirm man's opening to God where the essential determination of God - which is love - becomes a potential quality of man. So love can be regarded as a crucial problem. It implies men's opening to transcendence. But what can be the proper approach of love?

Another Romanian philosopher, Nae Ionescu, discusses this in terms of knowledge and action. If the meaning of action derives in the first place from the meaning of love as creation, love's meaning for knowledge can be understood as identification with the object. Thus, the act of knowledge is understood not as a photograph of the object to be known, but as identification with it. This correlates with the common observation that one understands more easily someone one loves.

At the same time, the Christian meaning of identification by love and by knowledge does not and cannot mean the loss of the self or of individuality. On the contrary, it must mean that this is the way to real fulfillment. The Trinity shows that love not only does not regard one person, but in its fulfillment supposes three persons. The love between two persons can represent an isolation, a closing, a limitation, a form of egocentricity. Only the participation of a third person in their joy assures the fulfillment of the other two.

In this perspective love can never be separated from either creation or action, from knowledge or from identification with the other. If in the perspective of the originary act of love one can argue for the predominance of action or creation, as regards the human act the point is more delicate. The predominance of action could belong precisely to the way man takes hold of a demiurgical function. Once action or creation has become desire, vanity or satisfaction, it already has decayed from its quality of an act of love; from a demiurgical act it can become a demonic act. On the other hand, it is interesting to note the way in which, for example, according to the Romanian folk tradition God is assisted by the Devil in making the world. Since the technological character of creation, so to speak, cannot be achieved by God alone, it will have to be undertaken by Satan or by one of his representatives.

The predominantly active character of creation of the human act of love seems possible only after man has achieved sufficient distance from the divine so that love or the act of creation can pass into the Faustian demonic. As in Faustus's case this act of creation will consist finally of values which are possibly contiguous with what we have called metaphorically "the technological," that is with that action whose goal is actually and essentially a result or product, and not knowledge as identification or as a real and deep participation. Knowledge has become lately—both as living experience and as a theory—an act of creation, at the cost of its previously described meaning.

We have stressed this problem as there are essential differences between the two ways of being, at the level both of values and of freedom and choice. The Faustian element implies that freedom of choice is based upon the valuation of what is new and the dynamic of transformation, where participation no longer affects the contents but the mere renewal. In contrast knowledge deals with transformation only indirectly in the sense of identification with the object to be known. Freedom of choice is now intimately correlated with the general necessity of harmony which derives from the metaphysical sense of being.

This may provide another perspective from which one can attempt to reach the two ways through which, starting from Fromm's distinction, man can project himself. One is to have—when

his instructions are given by the object as a possession or acquired element. The other is to be—when he centers on the very way of being, that is, when the value derives not from an object as the hypostasis of a symbol, but from its own identification with an alterity to be known by a deep and intimate act of love.

Antinomy and Knowledge

Starting from the irreducible antinomic character of the Trinity, and the specific form of knowledge it implies, Lucian Blaga developed in the 1930's a whole system in order to explain the specific content of knowledge which results from the assumption of an irreducible antinomy as a starting point. His analysis extends to its characteristics as they appear in the contemporary scientific thought. Somewhat complementary analyses can be found in the neo-Kantian philosopher, Mircea Florian, and the French philosopher of Romanian origin, Stephan Lupasco. The identification of a cognitive structure that is common to the original Christian thought and to contemporary fundamental science can interest us for various reasons. The first is that it reduces the gap between the so-called exact science and the theosophic, metaphysical or mythical thinking which are considered by many false types of knowledge. The second is that it re-opens the problem of transcendence and of knowledge as identification or love, which it restates in the field of contemporary science. Especially, it shows us with the force of demonstrative argument that the estrangement of the more recent Christian doctrines from the Christian meanings exposed by the Church Fathers, the contemporary Faustian spirit and the retreat of Christian love before aggressive pragmatism do not represent an evolution which is to be extrapolated, but merely a stage on a recuperating path.

The Passage from Love to Reason

A brief digression here in order to reconsider a few significant elements in the evolution of European culture might prove helpful. One important element is the appearance of modern science. This does not distract us from our subject, but brings us to our point because science is one of the major cultural pressures of the contemporary world. Values, freedom and the possibility of choice have been tributary to the scientific paradigmatic system. The link between the deep content of science and European culture appears extremely intimate and hence important for our subject. On the other hand, as this content consists of a series of elements which receive less attention and are less discussed it seems important to consider it here.

Contrary to the common Enlightenment conception of the appearance of science *ex nihil*, the emergence of modern science seems to have been prepared precisely within the Catholic Church. This affirmation is supported by the ideas and the works of Jean Bouridan, Albert de Saxa, Nicolas Oresme and others who anticipated the basic ideas of the modern scientific revolution. However, these concrete facts are less important than the more intangible issue.

The long intellectual effort of several centuries of logical analysis of the theological foundations raised the principal problem of the logical discussion concerning God in his profound antinomical sense of Trinity. It results a logical accommodation of the antinomy, in Blaga's words, a transfigured antinomy. This means that we pass from God as one and many, to God as one as being and many as person. The antinomy is not resolved insofar as we do not loose the initial sense of the Trinity, but arrive at a logically acceptable form which makes the ontological argument possible. In this argument two points are of major interest to us. One is the dignity of logical

thought which can serve to demonstrate the existence of an antinomy: the Trinity. The other concerns the fact that in this period concepts produced by men's mind without any connection to the sensorial world receive a very concrete statute, becoming more important and even more concrete than the others. (For example we can remember the debate about the angels).

On the other hand, in this period mathematics becomes highly valued as men's rationality in general. At the same time theoretical thinking comes very close to the experimental enterprise. We have in mind first the important astronomical work done within the Church, and then the concrete activity related to the construction of the cathedrals. Together, they put experimental activities in direct relation with the theoretical, the mathematical, and at the same time with faith to God.

In this historical context Newton raised his mathematical and physical system beginning implicitly from the finite-infinite antinomy. His mathematical and thus his physical thinking starts (as does Leibnitz) from the concept of vicinity, of neighborhood. A number or a point is at the same time regarded as an interval. The two form classes of irreducible elements. But Newton creates an abstract concept defined as an interval which by becoming indefinitely small defines the point. Thus this abstract element has an indefinite dimension. Strictly speaking it has an undetermined dimension, but defines a dimensionless element, the point. In other words it is characterized by the finite-infinite antinomy discussed by Stephane Lupasco. Starting from this antinomical abstract term the whole of modern physics and mathematics has been developed. The point, which has this new content, will now receive an attached abstract parameter, the inertial mass, thereby defining the material point which will become the most important and concrete element of science and world. As the resulting theories cannot completely explain reality, there must be introduced a lot of assertions or, from the experimental point of view, so called preparation rules, which may oblige the experimental object to behave according to the respective theory. However, identifying substance with systems of material points taken as concrete elements, materialists tried to construct and impose a mechanistic universe. This was done by leaving inexplicit many assertions and imposing this new view of the universe through the pressure of the dignity of rationality and science. In this oppressive form this pressure would seem to originate, in Descartes work, which starting from the *dubito* ends up with the implicit interdiction of any doubt about whatever concerns rationality.

In saying he had read God's laws in the book of nature, Newton consecrated the force of reason. Later, beginning from a methodical doubt, Descartes reached a first certitude: *dubito, ergo cogito, ego sum.* Yet, this is only the first necessary step in the demonstrative approach aimed at reasoning to the existence of God. That St. Augustine based his system on love whereas Descartes needed the "*cogito*" marks the extent of the development by the Scholastics. Only when God's existence had been demonstrated is the demonstration of one's own existence also achieved, but the existence is governed no longer by love, but by reason.

Reason, however, bases knowledge no longer upon an identification of the subject with the object, but upon the creation of an explanatory structure reiterating—or in more modest terms—by reading anew, or rediscovering the act of creation. This is the beginning of the modern demiurge of the Faustian spirit. Freedom belongs no longer to love or participation, but to reason; it depends upon constructs. Knowledge ceases to be identification with the object to be known and ends up being a mere classification or system of rules.

Revaluations of the Antinomy

Having the cultural background of the antinomy of the Trinity, modern science starts from the finite-infinite antinomy, but now the antinomy is to be forgotten. The antinomical abstract term became a concrete term for scientific thought which has to obey mathematical rules. Its antinomical character is no longer observed and the antinomical no longer has a place in accepted patterns. Mechanicism becomes more and more aggressive and autarchical; in many instances the linearity of the logical approach comes to dominate in the human science and positivism becomes a school.

This passage has generated a spectacular evolution, with corresponding vanity. But it also has generated loneliness for the individual. Obviously it has stimulated action and man has become a transforming force, but this has increased his loneliness.

In this context, psychoanalysis seems to have appeared precisely under the pressure of the modifications caused by this loneliness. Various schools such as Freud's or Adler's, for example, appear less as distinct interpretations and more as the expression of parallel modifications. Accidentally, these give birth to psychic diseases and seem to point to deep changes in the values and cultural content of our civilization and we in turn are largely conditioned by these changes. Knowledge understood as identification of the subject with the object to be known has also survived, though nowadays it may seem improper to call it love.

What to us seems extremely important is the brutal way the irreducible antinomy emerges, shocking not only non-specialists but above all the scientific community. We refer here to quantum mechanics in which both light and matter impose an irreducible duality—wave and corpuscle—as well by experiment as by the physical-mathematical theory itself. A closer analysis may show that this is actually the opening of the old finite-infinite antinomy through which modern science has appeared. Besides the finite-infinite antinomy, it actualizes also the antinomy of the identical and diverse.

To the mechanicist spirit the new quantum universe appears unintelligible. By the same token, it is said that things are not to be understood, but simply accepted as such. This points, on one hand, to the difficulty in assuming the antinomy and, on the other hand, to a disposition to assume this new universe by a new form of identification therewith, which appears to be probably a resensibilisation of rationality.

A new opening to transcendence also becomes evident and explicit in the new mode of knowledge as men of science tend to seek transcendence in the sphere of their scientific universe.

Another deeper correlation is also obvious. Lucian Blaga showed that from the point of view of the deep content of the irreducible antinomy that implies transcendence, the complete resolution of the antinomy requires a leap into the transcendent. Or, from the quantic viewpoint, when working within the space-time universe we are forced to accept explicitly the irreducible antinomy. Passing to a different mathematical space in which the coordinates describe the states proper to a quantic system, the antinomy is no longer to be seen. These mathematical universes are sometimes approached in the attempt to be re-spiritualized as possible gates to transcendence.

The antinomy banned from scientific thought reappears in scientific thinking as the very subject of this kind of knowledge while, at the same time, transcendence demands the key to the city.

In this way the contemporary universe of values is determined by the struggle between two opposing scientific pressures: one mechanicist-positivist, the other one that supports the irreducible antinomy, the non-separability and the unity of the world. Our axiological universe will be governed by the clash of these two contrary influences.

Our hidden beliefs probably will mark essential mutations which will have to be discovered in order to come closer to the deeper aspects of our freedom of choice. If cultural anthropology generally aimed at the possibility of understanding other cultures, today its purpose must be to help us in our necessary attempt at self-knowledge and in discovering our own cultural determinations.

Two European Worlds

If the progress of fundamental science points to the recuperating evolution of the antinomy and its beginnings, the technical approach and a considerable part of scientific thinking continues along the path of positivism. At the same time, the parallel evolution in Eastern and Western Europe is also noteworthy.

Parallel to the evolution of science, the period between the 17th and 19th centuries also marked an intense process of secularization. Naturally, this gradually led to a loss of the deep content of things. The predominance of the senses and the rational prestige of matter took over. The passage in Marx of the Hegelian dialectic from the sphere of the spirit to that of matter appears significant. In his rather prolix works—though unitary in the perspective of his dialectical and materialistic thinking—one can identify two main analytic directions: the one economic and the other philosophical.

What the economic direction finally achieved was the determination within the framework of society itself of an abstract universe. This, nevertheless, is made sufficiently concrete by constructs which allow the economic to obtain the consistence necessary in order to be considered reality itself. This would seem to be the heritage which Marx bequeathed to the Western world.

At the same time he succeeded in constructing the concept of consciousness as a form of the existence of matter which by valorizing the objective reality of the social consciousness placed before man his own objective image. Communist egalitarianism and totalitarianism appear as obvious consequences and finally generate a society reduced to a mechanicist use of objects. This means that one conceives a concrete abstract term, puts it in relation to some existing entity and then treats it not according to its own demands, but according to the characteristics of one's own concrete abstract term. Moreover, one reserves the right to change this according to one's own will. This attacking force from the East was meant to annihilate individual self-consciousness.

The Western world, too, experienced an autarchy of the economic element, that is, a certain pressure to reduce value in general to exchange value. This comes finally to a gradual loss of any specific content in favor of preserving its utilitarian meaning. This economic approach is furthered by its relation to systems theory in which a given element is reduced practically to a relation between input and output data, and finally to information theory. According to this, information ceases to be in-forming, to identify subject and object, and to be a sensible gate to transcendence; instead it becomes a mere symbol capable of inducing a specific and reversible modification in a given double-state cell of the information system. From this perspective in which society is an economic system, man an object of exchange, and information is reduced to the linear succession of zero and one, it is no wonder that the so-called post-historical period can be theorized for it is characterized by the exchange value as a unique effectively accepted value. In such a pattern, freedom and choice practically lose their significance. In other words, in a certain cultural perspective it becomes impossible for axiology to discuss freedom and choice and this to the same degree—even if from different reasons—as in a society in which consciousness is reduced to a form of matter, and existence is subdued to the "social autarchical consciousness".

The two patterns for the East and the West are obviously stated here rather simplistically and without refinement. If the dictatorship of the proletariat as a state structure gave birth to few nuances Western democracy which permits a freedom at the level of life itself makes the discussion more complex. However, here we are less interested in analyzing the complexity of the two socio-cultural modalities than in underlining the two main salient tendencies, which have played an important role in our century and which have marked essentially the evolution of the two socio-cultural areas. Two main complementary effects must be distinguished in this evolution—direct and compensatory modifications. The pressure of the economic correlated with systems theory and the theory of information seems to us to have led to a huge cultural mutation which includes changes both in values and regarding the freedom of choice. Only recently and rather timidly has it led to a compensatory reaction. At the same time these mutations seem to concern both the East and West, with major differences.

Freedom and Choice

We are now in the position to inquire regarding the foundations of our values which determine our freedom and our possibility of choice. The quality of man as a rational being may appear to us to represent the main value. It is this quality that supports man's justification of his being. The practice of reason imposes itself by becoming permanent and its result acquires the significance of creation and of cosmic participation. Man thereby acquires the liturgic value of transforming nature and making new worlds. God withdraws while man tries to fill His place. In this case our freedom would be, in the first place, that of reason and our choice would be a rational one. But how false this conclusion seems. If we could effectively confine ourselves to the states of rational beings the above answer would be correct. But if, with St. Augustine, we consider that we exist in the first place by love then our relationship with transcendence is irreducible: reduction to a mere rational being would leave behind a whole spiritual universe. If the sleep of reason gives birth to monsters, abandoning the soul to reason alone does not represent fulfillment. On the contrary, it can lead, on one hand, to the maladies studied by psychoanalysis and, on the other, to Ortega y Gasset's hidden beliefs. These two aspects take hold sometimes as really autarchical forces which dictate our choices and give content to our freedom—but what content? Nevertheless, they try to substitute themselves for our axiological system. Descartes affirmation, "*cogito ego sum*," actually represents the way out of a universe of methodological doubt. By assuming a conclusion as a definite truth it forbids doubt in the sense of any interrogation regarding this very conclusion, which is posited as final truth. This introduces the fundamental modern taboo, in the sense that society pressures one not to reject the idea that "nothing exists outside reason." The fact that contemporary science points to the existence of one irreducible antinomy at its very core has the significance of breaking with this taboo, not from outside, but from the very interior of its dogma.

It is interesting to note how—when comparing Jasper's thinking to Heidegger's nothingness (*das Nichts*) and the comprehensive (*das Umgreifende*)—reality appears in a double relation to transcendence. In an analogous manner at the level of the scientific universe, the given material datum has a double way out of its finitude—in infinity and in the antinomical.

By this we do not support irrationalism against reason. On the contrary, we state that what we mean by reason is "us": while reason may be reduced to us, we certainly cannot be reduced to reason. Only when we succeed in doing away with the rational taboo of interrogating whatever surpasses the field of reason itself have we conquered the freedom of our reason, and perhaps even more than that. In order to achieve this we must notice, as we have already tried to suggest above,

that knowledge does not necessarily mean to take a photograph or to analyze by dividing the object; rather knowledge can be understood, in the first place, as identification with otherness; to be known means love.

From this perspective, interrogation and doubt do not imply the question as a means of dissection which imposes knowledge as a dismemberment of the Otherness according to the method well-known to mechanicism and analytical positivism. Doubt and interrogation can now signify a new horizon, a new experience of love.

We are suggesting that recuperation of the irreducible antinomy, as an originary foundation of modern culture at the very core of contemporary science, can bring to our mind the recuperating memory of the freedom of love. "Love and do what you will!", not as a going back into time, but as a new opening towards the future. For love in its acceptance of knowledge does not annul reason, but liberates it from its own taboo. Thus the significance of choice and freedom no longer remains within the Faustian sphere of chaos generated by the sorcerer's apprentice. Rather, it comes to inhabit that double determination or limitation which does not limit—to use one of Constantin Noica's philosophical concepts—what we think the couple *das Nichts* and *das Umgreifende* suggests as a double openness in the transcendence.

The often misunderstood "love and do what you will!" is far from instituting a chaos of the common choices. On the contrary, it imposes a certain order of freedom in which values and order spring from the very act of love, always open to transcend in its effort to identify itself with otherness. This is the force of our profound responsibility regarding others and ourselves as being. Only in the domain of love does reason acquire its true fulfillment and knowledge, and freedom of choice imply real order. Originating in God's Word, love rediscovers Him insofar as in the first place He is love and identification with Otherness. This is recovery, not return.

Romanian Particularities

We shall now direct our attention to some particular aspects regarding the Romanian state of confusion which during the last year has marked the endeavor to pass from one type of society to another. It is only normal that under these circumstances the problems of freedom and choice should be posited with exceptional force.

General Considerations, Freedom and Jasper's Guilt ("Die Schuldfrage")

The past forty-five years of dictatorship have confronted the individual consciousness with problems similar to those raised in Hitler's Germany. As in that period, a careful analysis of consciousness is absolutely necessary.

In his "Consciousness of Guilt" (1946), Carl Jaspers makes a fourfold distinction of guilt (*die Schuldfrage*): criminal, political, moral and metaphysical. The first concerns juridical aspects; the second political aspects, with the essential amendment that each is co-responsible for the way in which he is governed. Moral guilt refers to all the deeds committed by an individual, the only judge in this case being his own conscience. Metaphysical guilt derives from the people's solidarity—hence the co-responsibility—of each man towards each injustice in the world. From the point of view of metaphysical guilt, as long as one does not do all that lies within one's power to prevent a crime, one shares the guilt and is guilty in turn. If from the moral viewpoint one cannot be forced to risk one's life when one's gesture is useless, from a metaphysical perspective the very fact that one still continues to live is liable to be considered guilt.

Metaphysical guilt is not an absurd self-accusation, but a self-surpassing. Thus, according to Jaspers, those who, revolted and desperate, could not prevent an atrocity from being committed, by living the metaphysical guilt still were able to take a step forward in transforming their consciousness. Metaphysical guilt is directly linked to the problem of love as identification with Otherness which appears in Jaspers' concept of "*der liebende Kampf*" which concerns communication and knowledge.

We have dealt here with a particularly delicate aspect of the problem of freedom and choice. In the absence of moral and above all, of metaphysical consciousness my freedom seems almost unlimited: I can choose without any limitations. But choice ranges in the field of facts and of action; freedom that does not concern the metaphysical limitation is rigidly determined by the moral as law, by the political and by the juridical.

If these laws are assumed as one's own norms the personal feeling will be that of complete freedom. The problem arises, however, whether this freedom can be understood as such, that is, as freedom. In this respect ignorance can generally appear to us as a form of freedom. Yet, we think that freedom concerns not the acceptance or the assumption of political or juridical norms as one's own, as in Marxist theory, but something more.

The above form of conditioning is, in a way, that of a robot. The freedom of man consists in the assumption of norms not in the sense of acknowledging them or identifying with their purpose, but with regard to their basis or deeper significance. One must assume the norms from "beyond" and not from "here."

Thus the assumed metaphysical guilt can be regarded no longer as a failure, but as a way to fulfillment for this implies a more profound identification with the otherhood, a deeper questioning about values, about freedom and choice from the most profound exercise of love.

Even when norms are assumed as completely personal, they force us from within by setting us within firm limits. Only metaphysical consciousness creates the obligation which permanently opens us, the limit which does not limit. In a deeper sense, it is only from here that we can begin to talk about freedom.

Choice then no longer appears to us as an occasional or arbitrary question which an answer can satisfy. Choice becomes an organic step to freedom, for it represents that continuous opening of the limit which does not limit.

The Romanian Revolution

The installation of the communist dictatorship in Romania, as far as the social and military aspects are concerned, "had nothing to do with a revolution," but represented a human disaster. It tried to destroy the intelligentsia and the country's social and cultural life; it destroyed millions of lives, introduced terror in the soul, displaced villages and tried to annihilate tradition. This disaster did not succeed, however, in subjugating the soul. Terrorized and humiliated people who have experienced famine have preserved their freedom of thought and the delicacy of their soul with a cup of tea and a book saved from destruction.

One of the greatest Romanian philosophers, Constantin Noica, said of the period of his detention and deportation that it represented the period of his philosophical fulfillment. Indeed the most valuable part of his work was written after the years he spent in detention, during Ceaucescu's terrifying regime. Then Noica lived as a hermit, struggling with all his powers to awaken the philosophical consciousness of his fellow citizens, to give them the necessary courage, and to prevent them from abandoning the field of culture.

Arrested, under house arrest, enduring serious material shortages, and isolated from the world, was he free? Common sense says clearly no; nevertheless, he considered himself to be free. Unfortunately, he died before the revolution and did not have the opportunity to see it and to bring his support to the awakening young people. Were those young people aged fifteen or twenty, who for days (between December 16th-21st) turned their eyes from the outside towards the inside of their soul and their consciousness, free? Staring upwards at that heaven which allowed Timisoara's martyrdom, were they free? Their sight was transfigured and the metaphysical consciousness made their soul its dwelling. Were they free, these young people who were facing the bullets with flowers in hand? No, that was not unconsciousness; it was an assumption. What followed proved more difficult when events seemed to demonstrate that all had been built on a lie, and that the significance of their sacrifice had been profaned.

It took time to realize that in all things concerning their souls there was not place for the lies of others, but that the fight they began by their innermost and profound love has just started. What was hard to understand was that you can be beaten not only by your enemies, but as well by your fellows, and this even in good faith. Nothing is changed overnight, but what is important is that love is winning.

University Square in the days of June 15-16 demonstrated that nothing can defeat this. In a certain way the Romanian post-revolutionary disaster started with Ceausescu's trial and sentencing to death. This began a political mechanism which was to inhibit the process of awakening consciousness needed by everyone in order to assume the metaphysical guilt. This was needed in order that the judgment of moral guilt might be lifted, thereby enabling people to begin a new social life with a free soul and a free conscience. This is the reason why, instead of freedom, we are, on the contrary, witnesses to a process of subjection of the soul by the ghost of moral guilt which has covered the citadel-like smog. That freedom of conscience appears to us more important than the problem of the civil rights itself. This is not to reduce the importance of human rights, on the contrary. However, we think that only this freedom of conscience can permit us to define the human rights we are now fighting to achieve.

Chapter VI
New Dimensions of Democracy

Hristo Smolenov

Introduction

It would be wishful thinking to assume that intellectual democracy has already become a matter of real policy, i.e., a political reality. It is still but a ghost in the corridors of power. The very notion of intellectual democracy belongs to the sphere of social heuristics, but not yet to the state-of-the-art apparatus of political science. In its capacity of innovation, it should not be reduced to the previously existing forms of democracy. Nor is it democracy for intellectuals only.

It is, rather, a trend towards a new mode of social regulation which shall no longer be a mode of domination. This tendency towards increased public self-steering stems from the democratic traditions of humanity and implies socialization of intellectual labor. To be sure, it involves ever-growing participation in intellectual production, as well as increasing access to decision-making and information on the part of more and more people. Yet it has nothing to do with the despotism of the majority which has been too often mistaken for real democracy. Intellectual democracy renounces any despotism whatsoever; it defies the abuse of power and challenges all forms of oligarchy.

Needless to say, it takes certain changes in the mode of production to achieve such a radical transformation of the mode of power. The transition from an industrial to an information society is already under way, at least in the most developed countries. But it would be misleading to expect that intellectual democracy comes into effect simply as a result of the ongoing scientific and technological revolutions.

The latter are among the necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the intellectualization of democracy. This process relates, but is not reduced, to the gradual democratization of intellectual life. As far as the scientific technological revolution is concerned, it can only create some favorable conditions for the approximation of real intellectual democracy. But its achievements may as well be alienated and exploited (often misused) by those in power, who are also in full control of the means of intellectual production.

It is here that a new fundamental contradiction arises between two opposing tendencies. On the one hand, there is a powerful trend towards increasing socialization of intellectual labor; on the other hand, the appropriation of its products remains nonsocialized, as far as the functions of power, social regulations and government are concerned. Most of these functions, however, depend on decision-making, communications and information which involve socialized intellectual production, socialized labor in general.

This contradiction calls for a revolutionary change in the very mode of power. The latter, in my opinion, is a system of two main components: power forces and relations of power. It is precisely the relations of power that have to undergo radical changes along the lines of a new type of democracy. But this transformation can hardly be carried out without the adequate power forces which come to being in the process of transition from the industrial to the information type of society.

The so-called scientific-technological revolution gives rise to innovations that bring about new tools, new means of power, communication and regulation. But the misuse of these new means

for anachronistic ends, e.g., for the purpose of securing domination, can hardly be called social progress. So the new information society needs a new type of democracy and a new revolution to accomplish it: the intellectual-democratic one.

Intellectual democracy seems to be the point of departure in all social revolutions; they all begin as intellectual-democratic movements. But, soon they go astray and drop their lofty ideals, being diverted by those who have come to power as a result of the revolution, who take advantage of it and try by all means to remain on top.

The evolution of revolutions has proved that deviations from the original intellectual-democratic orientation in any largescale social transformation inevitably lead to authoritarian (or even totalitarian) regimes which involve state-organized terror and, thus, jeopardize the survival of the population.

As Marx has observed in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (long passages from which I am going to quote here for the purpose of clarifying the main points of my sociogenetic view), "An entire people which had imagined that by means of a revolution it had imparted to itself an accelerated power of motion, suddenly finds itself set back into a defunct epoch."1 This is a paradox which has to be reconsidered in the light of what usually comes after great revolutions. I shall refer to it as the sociogenetic paradox.

It holds true not only of France under Louis Bonaparte, but also of most post-revolutionary developments which tend to go astray from what the moral imagination of genuine revolutionists has delineated. This is characteristic, for instance, of some stages in the evolution of the so-called socialist countries. Society there appears to have "repeated" (though on a higher level and with the requisite historic acceleration) the succession of preceding socioeconomic formations, i.e., economic-social constellations.

The respective historical development seems to be parallel to the step-by-step process of transition from wartime, primitive communism to a sort of state slave-ownership, then to a neo-feudalism *sui generis*, followed by attempts to introduce elements of quasi-capitalist order both in the mode of production and the mode of administration. The latter is a category which seems to contribute to a better understanding of the structure and dynamics of these societies.

I shall refer to it variously as: mode of administration, mode of domination, mode of regulation, mode of power. They are not strictly synonymous, but all of them relate to the use, or misuse, of power in the framework of social relationships. The mode of power is conceived of as a dialectical unity of the following two components: power forces and relations of power — just as the mode of production with Marx is a system of two main components: production forces and relations of production.

I wish to synthesize the two categories, namely, the mode of power, or domination, and the mode of production, in a new one, referred to as mode of alienation. It accounts for the process of exploiting people’s creative activity in general.

The heuristic analogy here is obvious. It is not the only analogy that I am going to use for the sake of clarifying the above-mentioned paradoxical situation. In the process of its development, society was, as a matter of fact, set back and forced to repeat, on a new level of economic and political organization, the evolutionary process that had already brought it to the initial revolutionary point of departure.

First came military Communism during the revolution and a few years after it. (This stage seems to corresponds to prehistoric developments in what is considered to be primitive society, where the wartime leaders were admired for their personal merits and capacities, where there was

a sort of primitive equality and the community itself was less differentiated, where spontaneous collectivism was predominant and the related enthusiasm was overwhelming.)

Then a despotic administrative-authoritarian system was built. The power structures of bureaucratic absolutism under Stalin or Mao resembled a sort of neo-slave ownership, whereby millions of people were imprisoned in order to make them toil almost like slaves. This was a "repetition on a new level" of the so-called Asiatic mode of production; and the modes of administrative domination were very much alike.

Later this system evolved into a kind of neo-feudalism. The very mode of power, which I wish to call bureaucratic absolutism, underwent certain mutations which brought about a state of absolute bureaucracy. During all these mutations, the status quo seemed but a recollection of past experience, as if already witnessed. As in the notorious "*déjà vu*," it looked as though people already had lived through the circumstances they were presently facing.

What was the reason; and what could be the explanation? In what follows, I am going to present some arguments and heuristics, relating to the sociogenetic paradox. Needless to say, this is but a personal outlook on the evolution of social order from a sociogenetic point of view. My heuristic approach is based on a nontrivial notion of dialectical logic. This is conceived of as a general theory of the structure of change and the change of structures. But the social structures, unlike mathematical ones, are unthinkable all by themselves. It is the personal commitment of people, the activity of living human beings that gives impetus to social dynamics in the struggle for freedom against alienation.

The Sociogenetic View: Heuristic Negations, Recurrences and Innovations

I shall try to argue that revolutions are interwoven in this mainstream evolutionary process, so that historic developments are both discrete and continuous. This heuristic approach is, no doubt, dialectical; yet it should not be reduced to the Hegelian one. Of course, we ought to do justice to Hegel who maintained that all processes were discrete and continuous. (There is a joke to the effect that he maintained discrete and continuous silence when asked to clarify this idea of his.) In fact, he has written a lot to make it clear how a process can be both discrete and continuous.

But the social implications of Hegel's views on the dialectics of history reinforced tendencies which were by no means democratic. On the contrary, his political doctrine served as an apology of absolutism. I share Joseph Liu's opinion that Hegel's pan-logistic approach, from the viewpoint of totality, allowed for conclusions which paved the way to totalitarian forms of social organization. But neither Hegel nor Marx can be held responsible for the misuse of their philosophical considerations. Refusal to blame them, however, does not imply an apology: it only points to a certain alienation of the product of their intellectual labor. This particular kind of alienation is but an aspect of a more general process, a phenomenon which is worth studying in order to understand the exploitation of ideals, of revolutionary enthusiasm and of the good will to change society for the better.

It seems worthwhile to analyze the dramatic ontogeny of the new society from a sociogenetic point of view. I take for granted that the intuitive meaning of the very sociogenetic view can be conveyed by a kind of heuristic analogy with the well-known biogenetic law and, in general, with the theory of recapitulation. The latter, in terms of biological science, means "the repetition of ancestral evolutionary stages in the embryonic development of an organism" (see *The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language*).

The analogy in question is obviously interesting all by itself. Yet it is not by mere analogy that I wish to introduce the notion of social recapitulation and the related concepts of social ontogeny and of social phylogeny, respectively. It does make sense to maintain that the relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny (in terms of biology) can be extended to the realm of social changes, and even to the evolution of revolutions.

In the mainstream process of evolution (in which the social revolutions are interwoven), some characteristic features of the preceding development are revealed and "repeated on a higher level" (or so it seems). In the formation period of new societies, i.e., in their embryonic state, evolutionary stages and forms pertaining to their ancestors can be traced. The recurrences in question manifest themselves both in the mode of production and in the mode of domination. This is an aspect of the continuity of social development which cannot be arbitrarily interrupted and altered, no matter what be the moral imagination of revolutionists.

But in the process of development, things, tendencies and relationships undergo gradual changes up to a certain moment, a limiting point beyond which the changes become radical. Such is, so to speak, the structure of change itself. Evolution, which in a sense is associated with continuity, leads to (and incorporates) revolutions, i.e., discontinuity, followed by new gradual changes and new limiting points or moments.

Continuous changes are intersected by phases of discontinuity which bring about new turns in the process of further development. Alongside the above-mentioned recurrences, there are also innovations which manifest themselves in biological as well as social evolution.

Innovations are always an essential change: the occurrence of something new and therefore different, often the transition into an opposite. The very nature of dialectical opposites implies at least two characteristic features. Dialectical opposites, unlike the trivial ones, are capable of changing themselves and their opposite.

Due to the fact that they are inextricably bound up, they influence each other, and their individual changes are synthesized in a sort of a joint development. As a result of this, a new system comes into being: a dialectical synthesis, a unity of opposites, which can no longer be separated or isolated, nor reduced to the old entities.

Up to a certain point or moment or a period of time, the relation between them remains invariant. But beyond this limit of invariance, a conversion takes place; and the very relation between dialectical opposites itself undergoes a transition into its opposite. For example, a shift occurs from incompatibility to compatibility, or vice versa. What has formerly been necessary becomes contingent and even impossible, or, on the contrary, previously impossible things become a matter of fact and reality. As time goes by, things, properties, tendencies and relationships change into their opposite.

Flourishing things fade away; "eternal" empires are ruined. The march of glory first evokes enthusiasm, but then just the opposite occurs: a subtle comment to the effect that *Sic transit gloria mundi*. A play on words conveys the meaning of the so-called irony of history: *Passer gloire gloire passée*. Attempts to revamp past glory are often grotesque, and so is the recurrence of outdated social structures or relationships. For all that, it hampers economic and political innovations.

The dialectics of recurrence and innovation is of particular interest to those who do not regard history as an aggregate of miscellaneous happenings. To be sure, history is neither a whirlwind of contingent events nor a hard line of iron necessity. Some would say, it is a drama rather than a process. "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce."2 In this keen observation, however, Marx also forgot to add that this farce, after tragedies, might have

far-reaching and quite tragic consequences. Hence, the main point of the heuristic message of the sociogenetic view is a sort of a warning: Beware of past tragedies; they can be repeated.

Dialectical synthesis brings out the intrinsic dynamics of the two poles which were formerly given in a relation of contrariety. Meanwhile, it highlights their capacity for joint development and creates not only a new system, but also a new entity. So the synthesis is a heuristic negation of the initial opposites; since they originally negate each other (as a thesis and its antithesis, in terms of dialectics), it is the negation of their negations, too.

Thus, to my mind, the heuristic negation is a two-stage process of transformation, leading to an innovation. In fact, dialectical synthesis is a multistage process of change, its components being themselves two-stage transitions into an opposite. The first step is an elementary, dialectical negation, whereby some aspects of the initial entity are changed, while others are still preserved. The next step is also an elementary negation, but the emphasis laid on invariance is now reversed and so is the accent on transformation. What has remained invariant at the first stage of heuristic negation now undergoes changes; whereas the results of former transformations are, generally speaking, preserved at the second stage. It is against the background of these changes and the related innovations that the recurrences of past social experience manifest themselves:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past.3

Following Marx, there are two different attitudes towards the recurrence of past experience. One of them is the "miserable farce" of their simple repetition. (But this farce after the tragedy may also have far reaching tragic consequences.) The other one, on the contrary, is a focus of retrospective socioheuristics which makes us aware of what might well happen in the future. Needless to say, it serves "the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given task in imagination, not of fleeing from its solution in reality; of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk about again."4

The evolution of revolutions is paradoxical: society has once again "come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh," because freedom fighters have succeeded "to throw down their adversary only in order that he may draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, and recoil again and again from the indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until a situation has been created which makes all turning back impossible."5

Marx was convinced that the abolition of private ownership over the means of production would suffice to take this adversary off the ground and finally crush him down. But neither the moral imagination of utopian socialists nor the scientific insight of Marx could foresee what a monster was going to come out when all the means of production became state property; whereas all the means of power (including the state itself) were, as a matter of fact, the possession of bureaucracy.

Private property, then, can by no means be considered abolished. There is only a shift from one domain of ownership to another. Instead of financial oligarchy, there is bureaucratic oligarchy; instead of direct, man-from-man exploitation based on private property of the means of production, there is an indirect, but no less severe exploitation based on bureaucratic-corporate ownership over the means of power. (I shall further call this new form of alienation, "super-exploitation"; it is,

indeed, by far more than just a relation of production.) And instead of bourgeois democracy, which in terms of dialectics is the negation of feudal despotism, there is a new, bureaucratic despotism.

The latter is the negation of bourgeois democracy, so it is the negation of the negation of feudal despotism. It is only natural then (at least as far as dialectical logic is concerned) that some recurrent forms pertaining to the despotic (or even absolutistic) mode of domination should manifest themselves in contemporary bureaucratic absolutism, too. The ancient dynastic absolutism is, so to speak, the ancestor of the contemporary bureaucratic one. To put it another way, the latter is the negation of the former's negation.

The double dialectical negation, i.e., the negation of the negation conveys the meaning of a helix, of a spiral development which is not simply a circumvolution. It is rather an evolutionary process which unfolds along a spiral line and combines a roundabout course with a certain shift, so that the winding results in a sort of recurrence or repetition on a new level. It is usually taken for granted that this new level is a higher one, given the assumption that evolution itself is always associated with progress. But the ways of progress are rather paradoxical; this also holds true for the evolution of revolutions.

This is the reason why "Society now seems to have fallen back behind its point of departure; it has in turn first to create for itself the revolutionary point of departure, the situation, the relations, the conditions under which alone modern revolution becomes serious."6

Modes of Alienation

Society is now in a sort of neurotic state, the outcome of ever-growing alienation: the social organism as a whole has become a slave to a part of it. While mankind still runs the risk of being involved in an all-devastating war, while millions of children are starving to death and ecological degradation jeopardizes the survival of the population, oligopolies find it worthwhile to invest billions of dollars in the production of weapons. The profits are so great that they stimulate them to continue the business so that more money is being invested and more and more arms are produced for the sake of getting still greater profits, and so on. This vicious circle keeps reinforcing oligarchies and the related mode of domination. In order to break it, a social innovation is needed, involving the heuristics of intellectual democracy. As Erich Fromm has observed in his book, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion:*

Modern man, in industrial society, has changed the form and intensity of idolatry. He has become the object of blind economic forces which rule his life. . . . Precisely because alienation has reached a point where it borders on insanity in the whole industrialized world, undermining and destroying its religious, spiritual and political traditions and threatening general destruction through nuclear war, many are better able to see that Marx had recognized the central issue of modern man's sickness. . . . that contemporary idolatry is rooted in the contemporary mode of production and can be changed only by the complete change of the economic-social constellation together with the spiritual liberation of man.7

Elsewhere I have argued that such a liberation can be accomplished only by a forthcoming, intellectual-democratic revolution leading to a radical change in the very mode of domination, viz., to the socialization of power.8 The socialization of production is a necessary but not at all a sufficient condition for a real democratization of society. On the contrary, it increases the power of oligopolies and the respective oligarchy, be it financial or bureaucratic. That is why a

socialization of power is also necessary, overthrowing the very mode of domination, not simply the old mode of production. For alienation takes place not only in the sphere of production, but also in the framework of the relations of power.

It was an illusion to think that changing the form of property ownership over the means of production alone could bring about social justice and real democracy. The question of property and control over the means of power remained unsolved, and the absolutistic bureaucracy took advantage of this in order to establish a new, quite sophisticated mode of domination, i.e., bureaucratic absolutism.

It was disguised as a new social order characterized by definition by social ownership of the means of production and the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. But, as a matter of fact, it was sheer dictatorship of the secretariat of the ruling party, based on state ownership. The latter covered bureaucratic ownership and control of both the means of production and the means of power. Some would speak of a "partocratic" form of governance, but it is worth pointing out that the very party, in its capacity of political organization, is but a means of power. And this tool of alienation can, as well, be misused: e.g., by tyrants and oligarchies trying to mastermind masses of people whose revolutionary enthusiasm and moral imagination are alienated. How are illusions about social progress exploited, just as creative efforts in the process of material and intellectual production?

How is it possible that alienation should distort the wholesome process of social transformation, so that grotesque mediocrities should play a hero's part and millions of people should believe it? Of course, it is a matter of collective wishful thinking, which alone can create contemporary myths and the related illusions. But this mythopoeic ability and the real power to mastermind mass imagination can themselves be accounted for by a more fundamental category, that of alienation.

Studying alienation makes it possible to understand not only the so-called commodity-fetishism, "the domination of living men by dead matter," but also the leadership idolatry and the related aspects of domination of real persons and social processes by an imaginary "hero" in power. This power, however, is quite real — as real as capital in the process of capitalist production. Capital is considered a self-increasing value, and it has, indeed, the capacity to grow (as if all by itself, but in reality by exploiting the labor force). And so is power, not all by itself but in the context of a certain mode of alienation, associated with the administrative system of bureaucratic absolutism. The latter is strongly authoritarian (at times even totalitarian), and those on top of it are in command of immense power forces by way of which specific relations of power are established and reproduced. These are as real as the relations of production, never mind the imaginary character of the merits and capabilities of the leaders in question. Concentration of power takes place just as does the concentration of production, and it leads to a form of oligarchy.

The bureaucratic oligarchy is no better than the financial one: it is even more repressive and less responsible as regards the organization of social production. Both may use similar modes of domination, despite differences in the modes of production. Both tend to disguise their reign by means of social illusions, but the bureaucratic one is in greater need of illusions because it gives fewer commodities to the population. Both types of oligarchy involve alienation of peoples' creative capacities and labor, in order to remain in power, to produce new goods and to reproduce old social relationships.

It takes a new kind of social change to overthrow this mode of domination. The process of overcoming alienation, in general, must have among its premises awareness of reality which is too grave to let us cherish illusions. As Marx has put it, the demand to give up illusions about one's condition means to give up conditions which demand illusions.

Illusions, however, are deeply rooted in individual and social consciousness. They are grounded in the political and economic life of society. The key to their adequate understanding lies with the notion of alienation. There are various facets of alienation, many aspects of alienated activity. Here I am going to point out the two main ones: the alienation of labor and of power. Both are essential for the understanding of processes that reduce human beings to cogs in a tremendous profit-making machine, meanwhile compelling them to take part in an immense myth-making ceremony. The two forms of alienation are so closely interwoven that we just cannot do away with the one without overthrowing the other. This is the main thrust of my approach to the problem of overcoming alienation, and this paper is but an outline of it. In what follows I am going to delineate the unfolding of human emancipation, pointing out only the main stages of this gradual, yet dramatic process.

Slaves, to begin with, were totally alienated, being regarded as things, rather than as human beings. They enjoyed no personal freedom and were denied any rights whatsoever. Instead, they were forced to work under a most drastic physical compulsion.

The transition to feudalism meant a radical social change: first and above all, it was a change in the means and the very character of the compulsion to work. The peasant was now forced to work primarily by the feudal laws. This was a kind of administrative compulsion which, like the physical one, was due to the fact that the workers themselves were not free persons.

But the degree to which feudal peasants were independent was by far greater than that of slaves. The latter were not at all free, whereas the former enjoyed, so to speak, half-freedom. So feudalism marked the beginning of a step-by-step process of increasing freedom and gradually liberating the laborers. Needless to say, this was only the first step; but the overall process of liberation was already under way. That is why some historians regard the transition from slavery to feudalism as the true turning point of history. In his book on the cybernetic laws of social progress, A. Aulin has argued that "the true turning-point occurred after the collapse of slave empires, the general trend ever since has been toward a gradual expansion of human emancipation, and especially so in the most developed countries."9 But, feudalism, as a dialectical negation of slavery, abolished only one aspect of the noneconomic compulsion to work, i.e., the purely physical one. (This was not a clear-cut result, but rather a tendency.) Yet another aspect of the noneconomic mode of alienation, the administrative compulsion to work, was preserved and even intensified under feudalism. In addition, slavery and feudal relationships were combined in an eclectic unity in enormous despotic empires based on the Asiatic mode of production: the related dynastic absolutism as a mode of domination.

The combination of these yields a specific mode of alienation, characterized by the personal dependence of workers and by the noneconomic compulsion to work. The heuristic negation of this particular type of compulsion does not lead to the abolition of alienation in general, but rather to a new kind of alienation, i.e., the economic one. So under capitalism, the noneconomic compulsion to work is considered to have been done away with (although this is certainly not the case, as far as colonial policy is concerned). The ontogeny of capitalism does reveal the recurrence of ancestral evolutionary forms and stages, thus confirming the sociogenetic view.

As a matter of fact, millions of people kept toiling as slaves during the period known as the initial accumulation of capital and for a long time after the consolidation of capitalist relations of production. Obviously, some characteristic features of the ancestral evolutionary developments continued to reappear in the formation period of the new society. The law of double dialectical negation contributes to the understanding of these recurrences.

In terms of dialectical logic, capitalism is the negation of the negation of slavery: so some of the latter's characteristics were, so to speak, "repeated on a higher level." Yet this was by no means the main point about capitalism. In general, workers in the metropolises acquired personal freedom and the rights of citizens. The labor force was unchained and set free: feudal restrictions were no longer valid, and so workers became more mobile. They now formally belonged to themselves: everybody could sell his own labor which formerly had not been possible for the majority of the population.

Labor power is the only kind of commodity which most of the people have for sale in a world dominated by commodity-monetary relations. In this type of society, everything (including human beings) is a commodity and can, therefore, be sold and bought. Having no means of production whatsoever, workers have to sell their own labor-power to those who are in possession of such means. Thus, the process of production is begun, and alienation of labor takes place: exploitation of labor comes into effect so that capital should increase its value. Here two main aspects of the economic compulsion to work are simultaneously manifested: first, private property of the means of production and, correspondingly, the lack of such means for the majority of the people; secondly, commodity-monetary relations which are the result of evolution in the division of labor. These relationships are almighty under capitalism, alongside private property, which is characteristic of all preceding societies, as well.

But, under capitalism, man in general is his own private property, as far as his labor-power is concerned; this makes a tremendous difference, as contrasted to previous forms of social organization based on noneconomic compulsion to work.

In fact, this is the radical change from an agrarian to an industrial society, which helps reveal the mechanisms of founding power, "the social origins of dictatorship and democracy,"10 according to Barrington Moore. Alongside the transition from feudalism to capitalism, a new mode of alienation was established. It was based mainly on the economic compulsion to work in the framework of great technological innovations.

The industrial revolution and the related socioeconomic developments brought about a change in the very character of labor: a process of socialization came into effect and a contradiction arose, as Marx has keenly observed, between socialized labor in industrial production and the private appropriation of its products. To put it another way, workers were alienated from the creation of their hands: their labor remained alienated, despite the fact that it became more and more socialized as regards the forms of its organization and performance.

This is the most fundamental contradiction under capitalism which cannot simply be overcome as a result of increasing socialization of production, for that leads only to oligopolies and the related oligarchies, or to a state monopolism in the so-called socialist countries which is the perfect ground for a monopoly of power. The latter is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people, or even of one single person, whose reign is unchallenged, since no opposition whatever is tolerated. Thus, authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes tend to emerge out of the unilateral process of the socialization of production. This kind of socialization is not at all sufficient to secure genuine democracy. A new radical change must take place in the very mode of power, but it cannot come into effect automatically, just because the labor has become socialized in the sphere of material production. A brand new type of social transformation is needed, namely, an intellectual-democratic revolution which alone is capable of undermining the established mode of alienation.

The term referred to as a "mode of alienation" accounts for the exploitation of individuals, as well as peoples. Yet, it is not reduced to the mode of production; it also implies the mode of domination, bringing out the mechanisms of super-exploitation, too.

The mode of alienation, then, is conceived of as a system, a unity of two main components: the mode of production and the mode of domination. In their capacity of dialectical opposites, they both undergo individual developments which result in a variety of historical forms. Due to the link between them, however, their individual changes influence and reinforce each other, so that a joint development takes place and the whole system is gradually transformed. The relation between the mode of production and the mode of domination (or regulation) remains invariant up to a certain point. Beyond this limit of invariance, a transition occurs and the above relation is changed into the opposite one. If, for instance, the mode of production was initially compatible with a given mode of domination, the development of the former may well become incompatible with the latter, especially when those in power try to preserve the old mode of domination.

For the purpose of doing this, they are ready to sacrifice not only people's welfare, but even the lives of millions of human beings. Old power structures need outdated political and economic relationships in order to reproduce themselves. But here is yet another paradox of social development which, unlike the sociogenetic one, seems rather optimistic.

As a matter of fact, in a world of continuous economic competition, no government whatsoever can afford to prolong a stagnation period beyond certain limits, lest its political and military power should be undermined. For fear that the old power structure may be overthrown, those at the top are compelled to encourage the growth of productive forces, the development of the very mode of production in general. The latter might as well remain compatible with the old mode of domination for a certain period of time, thus giving rise to illusions on the part of the ruling oligarchy.

But the gradual change of economic structures brings about (although not automatically) a transformation of people's attitudes and behavior, alongside changes in their personal and social awareness. The very persons are changed in the process of new social production and in the new mode of communication which needs more information and more education, i.e., spiritual liberation in general.

On the other hand, the relations of production and the productive forces form a pair of dialectical opposites *sui generis*. As Marx has shown in the preface of his work, *Towards the Critique of Political Economy*, at a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production become incompatible with the old relations of production which previously stimulated their very development. The two of them have been compatible for a long time, up to a certain moment or period of time, a limit beyond which the above-mentioned conversion takes place. The relations of production have to be changed in keeping with the predominant development of the productive forces of society. The material and the spiritual aspects of the need for more freedom are brought together, and they reinforce each other, highlighting the necessity to overthrow the old mode of alienation.

Thus, a limit is reached, beyond which the new developments become incompatible with the old power structures and the related mode of domination. New horizons are opened up, new frontiers are ahead and a higher degree of personal freedom is necessary for society to survive and develop along the lines of progress and civilization. But this sort of optimism goes hand in hand with the warning that new modes of alienation are also to be expected along these lines.

Prospects for the Future

Overcoming alienation involves changes both in the relations of production and the relations of power. Otherwise, even the process of economic democratization is blocked by social groups interested in preserving their privileged position in the structure of power. They themselves may have come to power as a result of previous revolutions, but now their attitude has changed into an apologetic or even a counter-revolutionary one. This metamorphosis can be accounted for not only in terms of moral judgment and ethics, but also of cybernetics. A. Aulin presents an interesting argument which he calls: The Law of Compensative Hierarchy. If social hierarchy that is requisite for the survival of the population is by some overmeasured social reform or revolution cancelled, a surviving community must build up compensative hierarchy in some other area of social power.

What kinds of area of social power are there in a human society? There is the economic power based on the ownership and income. There is political, administrative and judicial power. There is also power based on the control of education or information in a society. So these sectors of power at least are available when compensative hierarchy must be set up. If, say, economic power in the form of ownership or income is abolished, compensatory power may appear in, for instance, the fields of political and administrative power called 'bureaucracy'. This precisely is what happened, by way of compensatory hierarchy, in both of the most notable full-scale social revolutions in Europe, viz. the French and the Russian revolutions. We shall return to details later on.

In view of the above, a full-scale social revolution has four characteristic stages:

1. a revolutionary situation, with retained traditional hierarchy, while productive forces are growing;
2. a revolution, where the old hierarchy is abolished;
3. a period of terror, during which slaughter jeopardizes the survival of the population;
4. the establishment of compensatory hierarchy.11

I shall try to argue that revolutions proper include only the first two stages, although stages 3 and 4 are typical of later developments, too. But these developments can hardly be called revolutionary. They indicate rather that a counter-revolution, from above, is already under way.

Basing itself on the monopoly of power gained in the process of social transformations, a new oligarchy tends to emerge in the course of the socialization of production, unless power itself is also socialized. State monopolism creates favorable conditions for the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of leaders: control over the means of power and the ownership of the means of production are closely related and interwoven.

This is by no means a trivial link, nor a one-way dependence of the former on the latter. Hence, the socialization of production does not automatically bring about the socialization of power; it creates the necessary conditions, but not the sufficient ones. This is the reason why monopolism, oligarchy and super-exploitation come into effect, leading to totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. They have nothing to do with the revolutions that precede them although the slogans and pledges often remain the same for reasons of demagoguery. But the social content of the process is drastically altered: a shift of power occurs giving rise to a new sort of absolutism, namely, the bureaucratic.

Only now is society in a position to overcome bureaucratic absolutism. In my opinion, Soviet *perestroika* marks the beginning of a genuine intellectual-democratic revolution. It undermines the administrative-authoritarian system which resembles very much, indeed, the administrative system of dynastic absolutism during the Middle Ages. Along these lines, the

ongoing process of *Glasnost* seems to reproduce on a higher level some characteristic features of the Enlightenment.

The wholesome development towards social restructuring might well be envisaged as a neo-Renaissance period which comes after the new middle ages of bureaucratic "feudalism." It is only natural, then, for people to feel the liberating impact of new ideas, the importance of personal and national identity, the ever-growing significance of intelligentsia for the sake of the democratic awareness of the people.

Let us hope that the democratization shall be both radical and irreversible; that it is to continue despite the tremendous difficulties encountered on the way to intellectual democracy. But to forget what happened in Tiananmen Square in the late spring of 1989 would be an historical shortsightedness. The tragedy there has once again shown that changes are a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for a radical democratization of society. The very mode of domination has to be overthrown in order to guarantee genuine democratic developments. Only thus can the old mode of alienation be overcome, too.

Otherwise, intellectual democracy is much too vulnerable, as was the case in China. Nevertheless it must put up a fight, for a situation has been created in the "socialist" countries which makes all turning back impossible. But it is not only these countries that are in desperate need of intellectual democracy. It is not only up to them to solve the problem of control over the use or abuse of power. The demand for a real socialization of power is a need of contemporary civilization, in general.

This strategy alone is capable of bringing together the world which so far has been split into opposing systems of economic and sociopolitical organization. Intellectual democracy seems to be a political formula, aiming at a forthcoming synthesis of the two opposite social orders. In both capitalism and socialism an essential tension is to be found. A fundamental contradiction occurs between the increasing socialization of intellectual labor and the private (as a matter of fact, oligarchic) appropriation of its products, especially those which relate to the various functions of power. As Bertrand Russell has rightly noted in his book, *Power: A New Social Analysis:*

Like energy, power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be regarded as subordinate to any other, and there is no one from which the others are derivative. The attempts to treat one form of power, say wealth, in isolation can only be partially successful, just as the study of one form of energy will be defective at certain points, unless other forms are taken into account. Wealth may result from military power or from influence over opinion, just as either of these may result from wealth. The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power, not in terms of this or that form of power.12

Russell also argues that "There are many ways in which different societies differ in relation to power. They differ, to begin with, in the degree of power possessed by individuals or organizations; it is obvious, for example, that, owing to increase of organization, the State has more power now than in former times."13 Precisely this is the reason why contemporary bureaucratic absolutism is a lot stronger than the old dynastic one. As Marx keenly observes in his profound critique of neo-Bonapartism:

under the absolute monarchy during the first revolution, under Napoleon, bureaucracy was only the means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Under the restoration, under Louis Philippe, under the Parliamentary republic it was an instrument of the ruling class, however much it strove for power of its own. Only under the second Bonaparte does the state seem to have made itself completely independent. As against civil society, the state machine has consolidated its

position so thoroughly that the chief of the Society of December 10 suffices for its head, a casual adventurer.14

But bureaucracy, according to Marx, is "only the low and brutal form of a centralization that is still afflicted with its opposite, with feudalism." This is why bureaucratic absolutism appears to be such a dreadful combination of highly centralized power and quasi-feudal relationships. In its capacity of negation of the negation of feudal (dynastic) absolutism, it is no less despotic but even more repressive. This is also the reason why societies dominated by this mode of power are so static and hard to change.

There the sociogenetic paradox is strongly felt, alongside the recurrence of outdated social orders. The society in question is forced to repeat the evolution of social orders, i.e., the evolution of revolutions of large-scale social changes that have already taken place: from slavery to feudalism, and from feudalism to capitalism, until the revolutionary process reaches again its genuine point of departure.

But the revolution is thorough. It is still journeying through purgatory. It does its work methodically. . . . First it perfected the parliamentary power, in order to be able to overthrow it. Now that it has attained this, it perfects the executive power, reduces it to its purest expression. isolates it, sets it up against itself as the sole target in order to concentrate all its forces of destruction against it.15

This is how Marx has put it with respect to continuing revolutionary developments. But this continuous revolution is by no means monotonous. It is not merely the repetition of uniform efforts, like the succession of waves running against a rock and then retreating, but gradually undermining it until it is, at last, crushed down.

The revolutionary process is rather an aspect of the evolution of social orders in which dramatic changes occur alongside more productive and gradual developments. The social revolutions themselves are combinations of economic and political changes. The transformations take place not only in the mode of production, but also in the mode of domination, until the very mode of alienation is finally overthrown. The person is set free, and labor no longer needs any kind of external compulsion to drive the social production. But this is impossible, unless power itself becomes socialized.

Nowadays, under the scientific-technological revolution, considerable progress has already been made in securing the technical devices, organizational mechanisms and economic means for the socialization of power. Labor in the sphere of intellectual production is bound to undergo further changes towards a new level of socialization. This tendency is incompatible with the existence of the old power structures, with the private appropriation of products created by socialized intellectual labor. It is common knowledge that some of these products, created by large groups of specialists, relate to decision making which is no longer the privilege of one single person in power. The very access to decision making enables experts to take part in government on intellectual rather than on bureaucratic grounds. The scientific-technological revolution itself undermines bureaucratic absolutism; the democratization of education contributes to this process, too, alongside increasing possibilities for public self-steering and efficient self-government. John Naisbitt discussed this matter in his book *Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives.*16

Along these lines, a new possibility of overcoming alienation is opened up. It has never existed before; but, to be sure, it is not one that automatically comes into effect. No doubt, the scientific-technological revolution operates in favor of intellectual democracy. Yet it is hard to imagine that

the technological revolution alone can change social structures in any decisive way. On the contrary, it is likely that the achievements of such technological or scientific innovations might as well be alienated from those who create them in the process of intellectual production.

In order to block the recurrence of outdated social relationships on a new, technologically higher level and to overcome the alienation of intellectual labor which may have far reaching tragic consequences, a new strategy of social transformation is needed. I wish to maintain that the notion of intellectual democracy paves the way towards such a strategy of peaceful co-existence and socioeconomic cooperation. What is more, intellectual democracy provides a pattern of joint development along the lines of genuine humanism and civilization. It also conveys the meaning of a forthcoming (and hopefully plausible) synthesis of the two formerly contrary world systems, conventionally called "capitalism" and "socialism."

Being dialectical opposites, each of the two has a certain impact on the development of the other. Despite their individual developments, the relation between them has remained unchanged for a long period of time. Yet a limit is reached in the process of their joint development when this very relation undergoes changes and is converted into the opposite kind of relationship. A transition takes place from incompatibility to compatibility. This is the message of the conversion heuristics.17 The idea of intellectual democracy is itself a heuristic outcome of such a dialectical synthesis. Its meaning relates to a synthesis – a synthesis that is not merely the convergence of contemporary social orders, viz., of capitalism and socialism with all their shortcomings and weak points. It is rather the dialectical negation of both capitalism and socialism, which yields a new prospect of social development: the perspective of intellectual democracy.

Notes

1. K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx, Frederik Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 11 (New York: International Publishers), p. 105.
2. *Ibid*., p. 103.
3. *Ibid*., p. 104.
4. *Ibid*., p. 105.
5. *Ibid*., p. 107.
6. *Ibid*., p. 106.
7. E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* (McComb, Ms: Abacus, 1980), pp. 55-56.
8. See: (1) H. Smolenov, "Revolution von Oben? Zur Entwicklung des politischen Systems der sozialistischen Laender," in *Sozialismus,* vol. 4 (Hamburg, 1988), pp. 52-54. (2) H. Smolenov, "Das Rad der Geschichte kommt auf touren. Widerschpruche der Transformations-gesellschaft," in *Sozialismus,* vol. 11 (Hamburg, 1988), pp. 48-50. (3) H. Smolenov, "Neue Barrikaden," in *Marxistische Blaetter*, vol. 6 (1987), pp. 63-65.
9. A. Aulin, *The Cybernetic Laws of Social Progress* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 155.
10. B. Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (New York: Penguin Books, 1966).
11. A. Aulin, *op. cit*., p. 139.
12. B. Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1938), pp. 12-13.
13. *Ibid*., p. 14.
14. K. Marx, *op. cit*., p. 186.
15. *Ibid*., p. 185.

16. J. Naisbitt, *Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives* (New York: Warner Books, 1984).

17. H. Smolenov, *Paradoxes and Heuristics* (Sofia, Bulgaria: Science and Art Publishing House, 1985), summary in English.

Chapter VII

Biblical Ethics in Alfonso X's "General Estoria": A Historicist Critique of Cultural Authority

Roberto J. González-Casanovas

Introduction: Biblical Culture and Royal Reform

King Alfonso X the Wise of Castile (reign 1252-84) attempted to use the various cultural projects (legal, historiographic, scientific, didactic, and devotional) sponsored at his court for the purposes of modeling a royal discourse of authority. By employing methods of cultural historicism,1 one can determine to what extent the king's authority is to be founded upon an ethics derived from biblical, classical, scholastic, and courtly traditions. Through Alfonso X's patronage in his scriptoria of cultural works of both an official and popular nature, he contributes to the development of a secular, civic humanism in Castile during his important reign. In particular, it is useful to determine what are the images, rhetorical codes, and didactic functions of culture in the *Prologues* to Alfonso X's second historical encyclopedia, the *General Estoria* (circa 1273-83).2

Through a close reading of the *Prologues* found in the six part *General Estoria* (here limited to the twenty *prologues* that appear in parts I and II),3 it is possible to establish a model for Alfonso's "enlightened" ethics that addresses the central issue of a royal or national secular authority in relation to the vernacular contextualization of the Biblical text. Such a study should include three aspects:

(1) the Bible as sacred and profane text, which develops issues of interpretation in terms of models of authority;
(2) the Bible as traditional *matière,* which consists of the narrative as the history of a certain culture and the human story of formation; and
(3) the Bible as exemplary *sens,* which combines particular didactic subtexts with general ethical contexts. These three aspects of discourse will contribute to a critical understanding of the relationship of Biblical to historical and ethical hermeneutics in the cultural, intellectual, and political contexts of Alfonso X's multireligious, pluri-ethnic kingdom of Castile.

An unfinished history of the world that only reaches the eve of the Christian era, the *General Estoria* represents a vernacular and secularized reconstruction of the Old Testament as well as of pagan antiquity. The Bible, in all its multiple versions (*Biblia hebraica* and *Biblia vulgata*), vernacular translations (*Bibles romancées*), cultural expositions (*Bibles moralisées*), constitutes the most important literary document and narrative monument of the Middle Ages: it is the foundation text for all historiographic, hermeneutic, and ethical manifestations of authority in the homogeneous culture of Western Christendom during the Age of Faith. What Alfonso X's appropriation of the Bible represents is the broadening of cultural horizons beyond the complex hegemony of Christendom and Christianity, as well as the return to the pre-Christian past in order to determine a sense of mission for a modern state-in-the-making. In this attempt to define his royal authority and mandate, Alfonso not only projects an image of the wise ruler based on Platonic and Solomonic archetypes, but also exercises a shrewd form of *Real politik* for he sees the

necessity to include the great masses of Muslim and Jewish peoples recently incorporated into the Crown of Castile during the forty years, 1212-52, in which the Iberian crusade known as the Reconquest reaches its height and doubles the population and territory governed by the Christian kings of Aragon, Castile-Leon, and Portugal. Of the three monarchs in question, Alfonso X shows the greatest interest in creating a new multicultural consensus based on the Castilian language, Roman law, Greco-Arabic science, and the ethics held in common by classical philosophy, Oriental sapience, and monotheistic revelation.

When Alfonso X of Castile began his illustrious and eventful reign (1252-84), he had already earned a reputation as a wise prince through his patronage of learning at the courts of Toledo and Sevilia.4 His accession to power upon the death of his father, the sainted reconqueror of Andalucia Fernando III, represented. in terms of the rhetoric and ideology of cultural history, three important ways in which to interpret wisdom in royal contexts: (1) It provided an opportunity to apply the biblical ideals of sagacity and prudence to the government of a bicultural, plurilingual, and multidenominational kingdom. (2) It permitted the extension of a courtly code of discretion and service to a mixed society of crusaders and conquered. And (3) it gave rise to a grand humanist project of erudition and technocracy designed to restore to Hispania what were perceived as the ages of enlightenment of Rome and *al-Andalus*. The Alfonsine Court, along with that of Jaume I of Aragon (1213-76), constituted, at least on the level of official policy and royal propaganda, the most significant attempt to establish the universal rule of reason and law to be undertaken in the history of medieval Spain until the reign of the Catholic Monarchs Fernando and Isabel (1476-1516).5

As the monarch of the expanded Crown of Castile, Alfonso X prides himself in being the "King of the three laws": king of all Jews, Christians, and Muslims. At the same time, as pretender to the Holy Roman Empire for over seventeen years,6 Alfonso wishes to set an example of secularized enlightened rule for all of Europe. In both respects, the King establishes himself as educator and defender of all his peoples in the name of their one true God, common scriptural tradition, and shared cultural values. In this model of authority, the king rules for the people in the name of God: monarchy thus combines the rhetoric of theocracy and democracy. The ethical rhetoric serves to justify a power struggle that will lead to the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance: in an effort to check the regional, feudal privileges of the aristocracy, the King of Castile (like his French counterpart St. Louis, who reigns from 1225 to 1270) develops instead the nationalist, legalistic authority of the Crown and relates it both to an international framework of government and to a historicist model of ethics. Hence, the Bible with its historical and ethical exemplarity serves as the central text for the legitimization of secular royal authority in the late medieval nation-states that now emerge in Spain, as well as in France and England.

Ethical Contexts: From the Bible to Medieval Humanism

Seen as a model of cultural and ethical authority, Alfonso X's General Estoria poses certain critical questions of interpretation: What is the intention of the author/editor in rewriting a sacred text as secular history? How are the religious types of antiquity represented for a medieval lay audience accustomed to the profane literature of epic songs, romances of chivalry, and *exempla*? What is the relation of pagan mythology to biblical history in constituting the authority for the narrative? How is the rhetorical apparatus of the medieval historiographer, based on classical and clerical traditions, used to mediate for a contemporary audience the exemplary meanings of the

Bible as human history and story? What type of reception (linguistic, cultural, social, political, and ethical) is sought for such an encyclopedic work in the vernacular? Finally, why does Alfonso X's court in thirteenth century Castile attempt to assume the Church's role as interpreter of biblical and world history to the laity?

The method to be followed in this study, a narratological as well as historicist reading of the levels of mediation by which sacred texts are given secular contexts, offers certain perspectives that only recently have begun to be applied, by critics such as Francisco Rico,7 to Alfonsine historiography in terms of cultural discourse. Studies on the function of the Bible in the *General Estoria* traditionally have dealt with the use of sources, the complex phenomenon of translation and redaction, and the development of Castilian prose. However, there are several critics who have provided useful groundwork for discussing the issue of biblical authority.8 Samuel Berger (in his 1899 article on Romance versions of the Bible) contrasted the universalist objectives of the *General Estoria* With the more limited aims of the literal interpretation of sacred history to be found in various medieval *Bibles historiales* such as Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica*. Antonio Solalinde (in the introduction to his 1930 edition of the *General Estoria* noted the manner in which Alfonso X's moralist concerns went beyond medieval historiographic traditions to include at times pre-Renaissance historicist critiques of past and present; Maria Rosa Lida de Malkiel (writing in 1959 on Josephus' influence on the world history) stressed the Wise King's didactic obsession as it was reinforced by classical models of secularized and rationalist historians. Sister Francis Gormly (in her 1963 dissertation on the Bible in thirteenth century Castilian literature) concluded that the Alfonsine historians combined the analytical exegesis of Latin commentators of the Bible with the synthetic narrative of Hellenistic historiographers. Diego Catalân (in a 1965 review article of Gormly) emphasized the full narrative and didactic development of this vernacular history that is based directly on the Latin Vulgate Bible, rather than on any contemporary translation (such as the *Biblis romanceada* of the Escorial MS I.j.8).9 Margherita Morreale (in her 1969 entry on medieval Spain in the *Cambridge History of Bible*) addresses the question of interpretation for the Alfonsine historians in terms of traditional clerical morality vs. a rationalist humanistic critique that extends historiography beyond Judeo-Christian biblical commentaries to classical mythology and Islamic traditions. Francisco Rico (in his 1972 monograph on the *General Estoria* revised in 1984) analyzes Alfonsine historiography as such, according to its didactic ideology, synchronic structure, and coordinated narrative, and rejects its definition as a *Biblia historial*, so as to underscore instead the critical balance between the framework of a universal history and the axis of the biblical story. Finally Francisco Lopez Estrada (in the 1979 edition of his manual for medieval Hispanists), in evaluating previous studies on this world history, sees the need to underscore the cultural politics of Alfonso X as an *imperator litteratus*, as well as both *auctor* and *auctorista* (compositor and commentator), for whom the interpretation of the Bible as historical and historicist knowledge represents a useful end in itself, one that offers multiple benefits to King, Court, nation, and mankind in terms of humanistic ethics as well as spiritual salvation. What remains to be investigated in depth, following the lead of Rico and Lopez Estrada, is the very question of how the Alfonsine historians read, interpreted, and rewrote both sacred scriptures and profane classics as the archetypal texts, narratives, and exemplars of a world history that is to be understood by contemporary readers as a story of human formation and reform.

The Bible as Sacred and Profane Text

Alfonso X's inclusion of the Old Testament in the *General Estoria* represents a recognition of its importance as a source of both information and formation for medieval Christendom. At the same time, the choice by a secular ruler of the Bible as a framework for a history of the world reflects a certain conception of historiography that does not coincide with modern notions of the social sciences, but rather points to a traditional view of history as an official and exemplary story. It is as a corpus of historical literature, which deserves to be grouped with pagan mythology, and as a subject of historical tradition, which incorporates the interpretations of its many authors, editors, translators, and commentators, that the Alfonsine scholars approach the Bible. For these Castilian historiographers, the bible constitutes the foremost in a series of great documents (or scriptures to be revered for its truth) and monuments (or classics to be imitated for its form). As the general prologue states,

I, Alfonso, by the grace of God king..., after I had many writings and many histories of ancient deeds collected, chose from among them the truest and best of which I knew; and thus I had this book put together, and I ordered that in it be placed all the outstanding deeds of the Bible histories as well as of the other great events that happened in the world, from the time it was begun until our time. (GE I: 3)10

What constitutes the equally historical and literary textuality of the Bible makes it as useful for the *General Estoria* as for the *Estoria de Espanna*. The prologue to the history of Spain offers striking parallels to that of the world history: "We, Alfonso, by the grace of God king..., ordered as many books as we could obtain of histories that told of the deeds of Spain to be collected..., and we put together this book with all the deeds that could be found about her, from the time of Noah until our own" (EE 1: 4).

To the advantages the Bible offers as the ready-made history and exemplary story of great men, the Alfonsine historians add the problems of interpretation associated with an ancient text that has undergone countless revisions through the ages. As a reflection of the medieval appreciation for traditional authority, one finds throughout the *General Estoria* constant references to the various authors, in the historical sense of successive writers and rewriters who engage a given *matière*:

[Those who] spoke about the first of these books [on the creation of creatures, were] Moses and Josephus and Jerome and Theodosius and the seventy translators, and those who commented upon them: Augustine, Origen, Bede, Master Peter [Comestorl and many others. . . . (GE I: 591)

All these "authors" have collaborated over time on the redaction of the "Bible" as a literary tradition of texts end glosses that surpasses the original sacred books. Moreover, what constitutes the letter and the sense of the biblical story has continued evolving beyond the original Hebrew writings so as to create a dynamic process of reception that involves a dialogue with all subsequent readers.

The Alfonsine historians, conscious of both the Christian appropriation of the Hebrew bible and the patristic/scholastic "deconstruction" of ancient texts give as much "authority" to Jerome as to Moses. On the one hand, the Bible requires a historicist reading from the vantage point of "modern" theology and rhetoric:

[Jerome's] prologue [to the Book of Numbers] . . . tells . . . that all these things happened to the Jews as a figure, since the Law was nothing but a shadow of things to come, and they saw the shadow and not the substance from which the shadow came, [for] the prologue says that the history [or story] must be read in such a way as not to lose the meanings that in it should be understood. (GE I: 592)

On the other hand, given the complex layering of readings through time, the "letter" of the Bible has acquired a richness of textuality that corresponds to its multiple authority as sacred history, narrative story, and repository or interpretations:

Since we have told you this about [Jerome's] prologue and about the commentaries of the Holy Fathers, let us now turn to telling you what the letter of the Bible says, and Josephus and Jerome and Theodosius and the other translators and also the Holy Fathers who commented upon what these said. (GE I: 593)

It is true that Alfonso here makes a distinction between figure and letter that derives from the difference between the *Bible moralisé* (as the decoded allegory or typology of things divine found in Jerome and Augustine) and the *Bible historiale* (as the explicated histories and stories of another people and time offered by Josephus and Peter Comestor). But beyond this distinction lies a convergence of what may be termed biblical writings with the Bible texts as such. The Bible history assimilated by the Alfonsine historians represents as much a broad literary tradition as a specific historical source.

The Alfonsine historians in effect create a series of interpretative frames through which to "read" the Bible story: Alfonso the editor interprets Peter Comestor the commentator, who is interpreting Jerome the translator, who is interpreting Moses or Joshua the author of a story, who is interpreting Moses or Joshua the actor in history:

Know that all the matters [or sayings, *razone*] that are in this book [of Joshua] were written (*conpuso*] by Joshua according to the deeds that he happened to do, as commanded by God, as you shall hear in this book that he wrote about them in Hebrew, which Jerome later translated into Latin and we from Latin into this language of Castile. (GE IIA: 4)

The identification made by Alfonso with respect to biblical personages, such as Moses, Joshua, the Judges, end Prophets, as both actors and authors of history is fundamental to the issue of royal historiography in the *General Estoria* and *Estoria de Espanna* since Alfonso X through his historians wishes to project an image of the Wise King for whom the knowledge of past history translates into cultural and political power for ruling a kingdom in the present age.

The Bible as Matière: History vs Culture

Alfonso X places great importance, in both of the general prologues to his histories, on the function of history as story. For him historiography consists of the recording of past events as "read" by contemporaries and of the collection of traditional writings as interpreted by succeeding generations:

The wise men strove to put into writing the deeds that were passed so as to have remembrance of them, as if they existed then and there, and so that those who were to come after them might know them. And they put together many books, which are called histories and deeds [*estorias* and *gestas*] in which they told of the deeds [*fechos*] of God and the prophets and the saints, and also of the kings and high ranking men and knights and nations. (GE I: 3)

This passage from the *General Estoria* has its parallel in the *Estoria de Espanna*:

And they wrote the deeds of the fools as well as of the wise, and also of those who were faithful to God's law and of those who were not, and of the laws of the sanctuaries and of the peoples, and of the laws of clergy end laity. . . . (EE I:3)

Among the great repertories of history as story, the Bible stands alongside the national epics and ancient mythologies, as a textual tradition that offers accounts of past deeds that are intertwined with present collective memories and with patterns for future guidance.

One of the striking characteristics of the *General Estoria* is the equal weight assigned to biblical and pagan histories, which are interrelated according to a synchronous model based on the chronological tables of Eusebius and Jerome:

We shall here tell you about (the Book of Exodus] and, along with the history [or story] of the Bible, also about the stories [*razanes*] of the Pharaoh kings that are not in the bible, and about the reigns of the other Gentile kings, and of the deeds [*fechos*] of the other peoples that took place in other lands during the time of the history of this book, and about each thing in its place. (GE I: 267)

In reading through the copious material in the *General Estoria* on classical antiquity, one finds an indiscriminate blending of fact, legend, and myth. This reflects not only an uncritical acceptance of the established view of historical "authorities," but also an appreciation for the traditional*matières* of historical narrative. One notable example is the story of Troy, which merits special consideration by the Alfonsine historians:

Although we order this General History according to the years in which things happened – and each one should be told in its [proper] time –, nevertheless on account of the memory of this history [or story] of Troy, and so that its narrative [*lecta*] might all be brought together, and that in this way the whole story and the events through which the destruction of this city was brought about might be better understood, we took these stories and all their matter [or sayings, *razanes*] for [this section], as they come one after the other in [proper] order. (GE IIA:46)

This heterogeneous and literary conception of history points to Alfonso X's desire in both his chronicles to include all the great deeds, stories, and examples from the past. It should be noted that the Alfonsine contribution to world history consists of going far beyond the patristic chronologies and scholastic expositions so as to create a truly encyclopedic, and not just universal, narrative of the past. Further, the *General Estoria* represents a vernacular *summa* of world history that is predicated upon a didactic model of literature. This explains why Alfonso has the entire Pentateuch translated, although much of it covers little historical action as such: "Unto this point we have told in the first part of this *General Estoria* about the stories [*estorias*] and the laws of the

Old Testament. which are contained in the five books of Moses..." (GE 114: 3). For the Alfonsine historians, the sections on the Mosaic law are as valuable as the chronicles of Exodus:

The Law, which is the name of the first of these [three] divisions [of the Old Testament], means the same as customs that are good, profitable, given by God, holy, and placed by wise and holy men into writings, so that they might be observed. And on account of this, the Law and the books about it give us teachings on how to maintain a good life for God's sake and our own, and how to live with God in this world and in the other world to come. (GE 114:4)

The whole Old Testament, throughout all of the three parts of the Law, Prophets, and Hagiography (or Holy Writings) commented by Jerome and Alfonso (GE 114: 4), thus offers a mirror for conscience and society as they unfold in history. Beyond the traditional and narrative models of authority, it is this moral exemplarity that emerges as the principal influence of Bible history on Alfonsine historiography.

The Bible as 'Sens': History as Example

The central message of Alfonso X's history of the world and history of Spain consists of the moral authority of all forms of earthly rule. What is essential to Alfonsine historiography is the combination of traditional narrative and of historicist exposition with an ethical critique:

[The wise men] told the truth about all things and did not cover up anything concerning those who were good as well as those were evil. And they did this in order that men might take example from the deeds of good men so as to do good, and receive warning from the deeds of evil men so as to know how to keep from doing them. (GE I: 3)

Once again, this passage from the general prologue of the *General Estoria* echoes one from the prologue of the *Estoria de Espanna*:

They also wrote the deeds of the leading men, of those who did evil as well as of those who did good, so that those who came afterwards might strive to do good through the deeds of the good men, and through those of the evil men they might take warning not to do evil, and thus was the course of the world set right with each thing in its [proper] order. . . . (EE I: 3)

Historiography serves to show that power must be legitimized by a tradition of good deeds (as exemplary histories) and ratified by the reception of good counsels (as didactic stories). In this respect, biblical and pagan history offer equally moral lessons drawn from a common reservoir of traditional sapiential lore. When the Alfonsine historians refer to "King Darcon of Egypt and his deeds," they give the narrative a didactic frame:

It speaks of how this king followed his customs, as you shall hear in it, and of how his judge [*alguazi*] Tenedrez counseled him [*Jo castigava]* with such counsels that he accomplished in him what he desired, and finally he came to a good end, which serves as an example that the one, whether king, or other ruler, or other good man, who has a good and loyal counselor was born in a good time. (GE I: 753)

A similar process of didactic framing serves to interpret the biblical narration of Judges. From the Alfonsine discussion of the role of judges, which is based on the scholastic commentaries, it becomes clear that these books are not to be read primarily as chronicles but as exemplaries:

Master Peter [Comestor] . . . says that these other judges, who came after [Moses and Joshua] in Israel, had no power or right over the people, nor did they do anything for any other reason than because they were older, and they accomplished more and experienced more things so that they were wiser, and hence other peoples took counsel with them, and in their disputes and actions they made use of the counsel and wisdom of those judges more than of their own [wisdom]. (GE 114:127-26)

This passage offers a key for understanding the ways in which Alfonsine historiography serves as an interpretation of biblical history as story: the writings of the ancient sages (*los sabios antiguos*, GE I:3 and EE 1:3), whether pagan, Jewish, or Christian, represent the distillation of centuries of human experiences of good and evil that have periodically been articulated, modeled, mediated, and transmitted to other generations of readers, translators, and commentators. What is striking about Alfonso X's role as historian is the manner in which he would unite into one and the same person the principal actor, ultimate authority, and official interpreter of history for the whole nation. In addition to being the Wise King of an enlightened court, he wishes also to be on Emperor of History who, as *imperator litterarum* and *imperator gestorum*, would combine the power of the Word with a dominance in the world.

Conclusion: Biblical Ethics and Enlightened Rule

For King Alfonso X the Wise and his collaborators, who find themselves at the crossroads of Christendom and Islam in the midst of the greatest expansion of the Reconquest (military, religious, and intellectual), the appropriation, interpretation), the transmission of the monuments of Eastern end Western culture represents an important political activity for the court at Toledo, Seville, and Murcia. Of special concern for the king and his pluricultural, multilingual scholars (Christians, Jews, and Muslims), is the question of the ethics of culture as an instrument of royal policy and administration. As "enlightened rulers, they recognize that culture, understood as both the realm of wisdom and the tradition of a people, represents a crucial area of royal authority. In medieval Iberia at the height of the Reconquest, the ethical ways of thinking and acting in relation to culture reflects the prestige, power, and propaganda of the king's court.

As Wise King, Alfonso X sees himself as a new Solomon who is answerable to God for the welfare of the whole of his diverse realm. He is in effect the guardian of all the revelations of divine reason to be found expressed in earthly tongues. Alfonso's official image of royal and imperial enlightenment can be seen ultimately to rest on a humanist rhetoric based on the Greco-Romano-Arabic cultural tradition, as understood in the Judeo-Christian-Muslim hermeneutics of the written Word of God as providential revelation and transaction. The Alfonsine scholars thus emerge as mediators, interpreters, and executors of the legacy of humane knowledge held in common by all the "peoples of the book" in the culturally heterogeneous territories ruled by the thirteenth century kingdom of Castile.

By examining the twenty prologues contained in the first two parts of the *General Estoria,* the Alfonsine recontextualization of the biblical *auctoritas* as historiographic poetics and literary narratology becomes manifest. For the Wise King's historians, translators, end editors, the Bible

(in effect the Old Testament) now emerges as the central text in their culture in its multiple functions as history, scripture, discourse, code, and model. Among its levels of textual authority for Alfonso X, it is important to note the following: (1) the foundation text in efforts to "restore" the national culture (based on Roman-Christian Hispania) by means of a series of encyclopedic works written in Castilian; (2) the only common text to all three "peoples of the Book" (Jews, Christians, and Muslims) in the renewed kingdom of Castile during the expansion of the Reconquest; (3) the fundamental intertext for all exemplary histories of nations in Christendom (including Alfonso's own *Estoria de Espanna*); (4) the critical context for a didactic corpus that serves as mirror for princes on models of earthly rule; and (5) a hermeneutic metatext on the Word's role in shaping history and story according to human codes of order, power, virtue, and truth.

Notes

I. Cultural historicism, a development in poststructuralist critical theory, consists of the analysis of any system of textuality (whether didactic, poetic, political, religious. etc.), as a discourse of authority and power, which is examined in terms of the dynamic interaction of intertextual rhetoric, literary genre, extratextual ideology, cultural semiotics, and metatextual critique. Unfortunately, new cultural historians have not as yet contributed many critical studies on medieval Iberian texts.

Recent publications in comparative history and literature related to this field offer general (and sometimes direct) applications useful to Iberomedievalists. Among these studies, one finds: Kevin Brownlee and Stephen G. Nichols (eds.), *Images of Power: Medieval History/Discourse/ Literature*, *Yale French Studies* 70 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930); Kevin Brownlee and Walter Stephens (eds.). *Discourses of Authority in Medieval and Renaissance Literature* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College/University Press of New England, 1969); Patrick J. Gallagher and Helen Damico (eds.), *Hermeneutics and Medieval Culture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Aron Gurevich, *Medieval Popular Culture: Problems of Belief and Perception* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Alexander Murray,*Reason and Society in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); and Paul Zumthor, *Speaking of the Middle Ages* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1986).

2. On Alfonsine historiography, see: Diego Catalán, "El taller histórico alfonsi métodos y problemas en el trabajo compilatorio," *Romania* 84 (1963): 354-75; Inés Fernández-Ordóñez, "La Estoria de Espanna, la General Estoria los diferentes criterios compilatorios," *Revista de literature* 50, 99 (1988): 15-35; Gonzalo Menéndez Pidal, "Cómo trabajaron las escuelas alfonsies," *Revista de Filologia Hispanica* 5 (1951): 363—80; and Ramón Menéndez Pidal, "Estudio sobre le Primera Cronica General de Espanna" and 'Notas prelimineres,' *Primera cronica general de Espana que mando componer Alfonso X el Sabio*, ed. R. Menédez Pidal (Madrid: Gredos, 1955: rev. ed. in 2 vols., reprinted 1978), I: XV-IVI and IVII-IXXII.

3. On the importance of the Alfonsine prologues, see Anthony J. Cárdenas, "Alfonso's Scriptorium and Chancery: The Role of the Prologue in Binding the *Translatio Studii* to the *Translatio Potestatis*," ed. R.I. Burns (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 90-108, and "The Literary Prologue of Alfonso X: A Nexus between Chancery and Scriptorium," *Thought* 60, 239 (1985), 456-67. Cf. Wilhelmina Jonxis-Henkemans, "En torno a los prólogos de la General Estoria de Alfonso el Sabio," *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 66 (1989), 343-50.

4. On the interpretation of Alfonsine cultural authority, see: Robert I. Burns, "*Stupor Mundi*: Alfonso X of Castile, the Learned", *Emperor of Culture*, 1-13; Francisco Lopez Estrada, "Los maestros de la prosa medieval," *Introduccion a la literatura medieval Espanola*, 412-20; José Antonio Maravall, "La concepción del saber en una sociedad tradicional," and "Los 'hombres de saber' y la formacion de su conciencia estamental," *Estudios de historia del pensamiento espanol*, vol. I: Edad Media (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1983; 3rd ed.),201-4 and 331-2; Francisco Márquez Villanueva, "The Alfonsine Cultural Concept", *Alfonso X of Castile the Learned King* (Harvard University Symposium, 17 Nov., 1964), eds. F. Márquez Villanueva and C. Vega (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Studies in Romance Languages, 1990), 76-109; and Evelyn S. Procter, *Alfonso X of Castile, Patron of Literature and Learning* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951).

5. For the Iberian and European contexts of Alfonso X's reign, see Burns (ed.), *The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror*, Jerry R. Craddock, "Dynasty in Dispute Alfonso X el Sabio and the Succession to the Throne of Castile and Leon in History and Legend." in*Viator* 17 (1986): 197-219; Jocelyn N. Hillgarth, "Ramon Lull arid Alfonso X of Castile," *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516*, Vol. I: 1250-1410 *Precarious Balance* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976): 215-21; Eugenio Montes, "Federico II de Sicilia y Alfonso X de Castilla," *Anejo de Revista de Estudios Politicos* 10 (Julio-agosto 1943): 1-31; Roberto Sabatino Lopez, "Entre el Medioevo y el Renacimiento: Alfonso X y Federico II," *Revista de Occidente* 43 [extraordinario 11] (diciembre 1984): 7-14; Cayetano J. Socarrás, *Alfonso X of Castile: A Study on Imperialistic Frustration* (Barcelona: Hispam. 1976); Julio Valdeon. "Alfonso el Sabio: Semblenza de su reinado," *Revista de Occidente* 43 [extraordinario 11] (diciembre I 984): 15-28; and Wilhelm Freiherr von Schoen, *Alfonso X von Kastilien Ein ungekronter deutscher Konig* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1957).

6. On the political, cultural, and literary importance of the Empire (whether Hispano-Roman or Holy Roman) for Alfonso X and his Court, see Burns, "Castle of Intellect" and "*Stupor Mundi*," Diego Catalán, "España en su historiografia: De objeto a sujeto de la historia," introduction to Ramon Menéndez Pidal, *Los españoles en la historia* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1982): 9-67; Carlos Estepa, "Alfonso X y el 'fecho del Imperio'," *Revista de Occidente* 43 [Extraordinario 11] (diciembre 1904): 43-54, Charles F. Fraker. "Alfonso X, the Empire, and the Primera cronica" *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 55 (1978): 95-102, and 'The Fet des Romains and Primera Cronica General," *Hispanic Review* 46 (1978): 192-220; and Cayetano J. Socarrás, "Imperialistic Frustration: Alfonso X of Castile and the Idea of Empire" (PhD diss. New York University, 1969). Cf. the title and theme of Angus Mackay's historical survey, *Spain in the Middle Ages*: *From Frontier to Empire* (London: Macmillan. 1977).

7. Francisco Rico, *Alfonso el Sabio y la "General estoria"* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1984; 2nd ed.).

8. The studies I shall cite in the following section include: Samuel Berger, "Los Bibles castillanes, *Romania* 28 (1899): 360-408 and 508-67; Antonio G. Solalinde "Introduccion" to his ed. of *General Estoria, Part I* (Madrid: Junta para Ampliacion de Estudios e Investigaciones Cientificas/Centro de Estudios Historicos, 1930): vii-lxxxi; Maria Rosa Lida de Malkiel, "La General Estoria: Notas literarias y filologicas," (I) and (II), *Romance Philosophy* 12 (1958): 111-42, and 13 (1959): 1-30, and "Josefo en la General Estoria," *Hispanic Studies in Honour of I Gonzalez Ljubera* (Oxford: Dolphin Book, 1959): 163-81; Sister Francis Gormly, The Use of the Bible in Representative Works of Medieval Spanish Literature, 1250-1300 [diss. 1962] (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1962); Diego Catalan, "La Biblia en la Literatura medieval española' [review of F. Gormly's dissertation], *Hispanic Review* 33 (1965): 310-18; Margherita Morreale, "Apuntes bibliograficos pare la iniciacion al estudio de las traducciones biblicas medievales en castellano," *Sefarad* 20 (1960): 66-109, and "Vernacular Scriptures in

Spain," *The Cambridge History of the Bi*ble, ed. G.W.H. Lampe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), II: 465-91, with bibliography 533-35; and Francisco Lopez Estrada, "La religiosidad medieval y su relacion con la literatura romance," *Introduccion a la literatura medieval Españia* (Madrid: Credos, 1979; 42 ed): 208-232.

See also: Margherita Morreale, "El Canon de la misa en lengua vernácula y la Biblia romanceada del siglo XIII," *Hispania Sacra* 15 (1962): 1-17, and "La fraseologia biblica en la General Estoria: observaciones para su estudio," *Linguistic and Literary Studies in Honor of Helmut Hatzfeld* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1964): 269-76.

9. See Mark G. Littlefield, "Introduction," *Biblia Romanceada I.I.B: The 13th Century Spanish Bible Contained in Escorial MS. I.I.B*. Ed. M.G. Littlefield (Madison: University Wisconsin/Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1983).

10. Quotations with page numbers are taken from GE,—Alfonso X, *General Estoria* Part I, ed. A.G. Solalinde (Madrid: Junta para Ampliacion de Estudios e Investigaciones Cientificas/ Centro de Estudios Historicos, 1930), and Part II, eds. A.G. Solalinde, L.A. Kasten, V. Oelschlëger (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas/Instituto Miguel de Cervantes. 1957-61 2 vols.), and from EE,—Alfonso X, *Estoria d'Espanna* or *Primera cronica general*, ed. R. Menêndez Pidal (Madrid: Gredos, 1955; rev. ed., 2.

Chapter VIII
Human Dignity, "Natural Law," and Human Rights

William E. May

Introduction: Human Dignity, Free Choice, and Moral Norms

According to the Catholic tradition, there is a twofold dignity proper to human beings: one is intrinsic and an endowment or gift; the other is also intrinsic, but is an achievement or acquisition1.

The first dignity proper to human beings is the dignity that is theirs as members of the human species. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, this is the dignity that human beings possess by virtue of the fact that they are persons created in "the image and likeness of God" (Gn 1.27). From the perspective of philosophy, this is the dignity that human beings possess because they are radically different in kind from other animals, capable of coming to a knowledge of the truth and of determining themselves by their own free choices.2

This intrinsic, inalienable dignity proper to human beings is, ultimately, a gift from God, a gift in virtue of which every human being, of whatever age or sex or condition, is a being of moral worth, an irreplaceable and nonsubstitutable person.

When we come into existence we are, by reason of this inherent dignity, persons, not things. And as persons we are endowed with the capacity to discover the truth and to determine our own lives by freely choosing to conform our lives and actions to the truth. A baby (born or preborn) does not, of course, have the developed capacity for deliberating and choosing freely, but it has the natural capacity to do so because it is human and personal in nature.3 Yet when we come into existence we are not yet fully the beings we are meant to be. And this leads me to consider the second sort of dignity proper to human beings, a dignity that is intrinsic, but an achievement, not an endowment.

This is the sort of dignity to which we are called as intelligent and free persons capable of determining our lives by our own free choices. This is the dignity that we are to give ourselves (and, according to the Catholic tradition, with the help of God's unfailing grace) by freely choosing to shape our lives and actions in accordance with the truth. In other words, we give this dignity to ourselves and inwardly participate in it by making good moral choices, and such choices are in turn dependent upon true moral judgments.

The actions in which human persons engage are not, like the falling of the leaves and aging of wine, merely material events that come and go. There is, obviously, an external performance in human actions that comes and goes, but more importantly, at the core of s human action is a free, self-determining choice that abides within the person, disposing him or her to make similar choices in the future, a choice that remains until a contradictory kind of choice is made.4 Human actions, those proceeding from human persons insofar as they can deliberate and make free choices, can be described as intelligible proposals adopted by choice and executed externally. Their moral significance lies primarily in the fact that they are freely chosen and that, through free choices, human persons make themselves to be the kind of persons they are.

Let me illustrate this. Assume that my wife gives me a letter to mail in the morning, and I promise her that I will do so. I put the letter on the dashboard of my car. When I arrive at Catholic University I park the car not far from a mailbox, but I am preoccupied and fail to mail the letter. In the evening I get into the car, again preoccupied, and drive home without thinking about the

letter. As I enter the driveway, I see the letter on the dashboard and realize that my wife will immediately ask me, "Honey, did you mail the letter I gave you?" I now have a choice to make. I can lie and tell my wife that I mailed the letter, or I can tell her the truth. If I choose to lie to her I make myself to be a liar, and I remain a liar, and disposed to lie in similar situations in the future, unless, by another choice, I repent of my lie. My point is simply that at the heart of a human action is a free, self-determining choice. And choices last, abiding in the agent and making him or her to be the kind of person he or she is. Indeed, we can say that a person's moral character is his or her integral existential identity as shaped by his or her free, self-determining choices.5

We are free to choose what we are to do and to be, but we are not free to make what we choose to do to be right or wrong, good or bad. Their rightness or wrongness is determined by objective criteria that we can come to know. We ought to choose in accord with our own best judgments. But these, unfortunately, can be mistaken (and corrected). If the mistake in them is not attributable to our own negligence in seeking the truth, we do not make ourselves to be wicked persons in choosing to act in accord with them, even if what we choose to do is not, in truth, what we ought to do. Our judgments, however, will be "correct," i.e., true, if they are made in accord with true norms of human choice.

To sum up: we have the gift of free choice, of self-determination. Choice is possible only when there are alternatives from which to choose, i.e., intelligible proposals that we can adopt by choice and execute through our deeds. But it is possible to choose wrongly as well as rightly, and choice proceeds from deliberating about what-is-to-be-done. It must be possible for us to determine, prior to choice, which alternatives are morally good and which are not. This determination is the work of human intelligence as ordered to action—of practical reason. It is the work of our capacity to discover the truth about what-is-to-be-done. This "truth" is moral truth, and consists of a criterion or set of criteria (moral truths) intended to guide human choice and action.

But what are these moral truths, these criteria or norms for distinguishing between morally good and morally bad alternatives of choice? And how are these truths related to the subject of human rights?

To answer these questions, I propose for your consideration the understanding of "natural law" that is rooted in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas as this has been developed by three contemporary writers, Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Joseph Boyle6

An Overview of This Understanding of Natural Law

In 1980 John Finnis published his *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Early in the study he summarized, in "bald assertions," the sense that "natural law" had in his book7. Here I will make "bald assertions" of this kind, revising what Finnis had to say in 1980 in the light both of St. Thomas's understanding of natural law and of clarifications of this understanding made by Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle in intervening years: The "natural law" is an ordered set of true propositions of practical reason. The first set (I) consists of "common and first principles" of human practical reason, principles "*per se nota*." Two sorts of principles are included in this first set of "common and first principles." The first sort (I.A) embraces (I.A.i) the principles that "good is to be done and pursued and its opposite, evil, is to be avoided," and (I.A.ii) those principles of practical reason specifying the good that is to be done and pursued. These principles of practical reasoning are used in one way or another by everyone who considers what to do, however unsound his conclusions.

The second sort of "common and first principles" (I.B) consists of (I.B.i) the first principles of morality, a principle expressing the integral directiveness of all the principles of practical reasoning (I.A.i and I.A.ii), and (I.A.ii) the "specifications" of this principle, or "modes of responsibility," i.e., principles excluding ways of choosing and acting incompatible with the first moral principle.

The second set (II) consists of more specific moral norms prescribing or proscribing specific sorts of human actions. Of these some (II.A) are absolute or exceptionless [and relevant to the issue of human rights], whereas others (II.B) are not.

I will now attempt to explain more fully the above "bald assertions" and support their reasonableness.

The First Principles of Practical Reasoning (I.A.I and I.A.II) and the Relationship between the "Good" and Human Choice and Action

Human choices and actions, whether morally good or morally bad, are intelligible and purposeful. Wrongful choices, while unreasonable, are not irrational, meaningless, unintelligible. All human choice and action is ordered to an end, a purpose, and the ends or purposes to which human choices and actions are considered as "goods" to be pursued. The "good" has the meaning of what is perfective of a being, constitutive of its flourishing or well-being. Consequently, the proposition that "good is to be done and pursued and its opposite, evil, is to be avoided" is a proposition to which every human being, as intelligent, will assent.8 It is a "principle" or "starting point" for intelligent, purposeful human activity. If human persons are to do anything, there must be a point in doing it, and the point is that the deed chosen is related by the one choosing it to some "good." The principle, "good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided" is, then, known to be true once one knows the meaning of "good" and "evil." It is not derived from any prior kind of knowledge. It is a principle or starting point for thinking about what-is-to-be-done (practical deliberation), just as "the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way" (the principle of noncontradiction) is a principle or starting point of thinking about what-is (speculative inquiry)9 Nonetheless, the principle that good is to be done and pursued is not a moral norm or moral truth enabling us to distinguish between morally good and morally bad alternatives of choice. All human agents, the morally upright and the morally wicked, ultimately appeal to this principle to render their actions intelligible and to justify (to "rationalize") their choices and actions.

Moreover, there definitely are real goods of human persons,10 aspects of their flourishing or full-being, and these goods are grasped by human practical reason as purposeful ends of human choices and actions. St. Thomas Aquinas suggested that there is a triple-tiered set of such human goods, which, when grasped by practical reason, serve as the "first principles" or starting points for intelligent, purposeful human activity. The first set includes being itself, a good that human beings share with other entities, and since the being (*esse*) of living things is life itself (*vivere*), the basic human good at this level is life itself, including health and bodily integrity. The second set includes the union of male and female in order to transmit the good of human life to progeny who need education and care if they are to flourish, and this is a set of goods that human persons share with other animals, but, of course, in their own unique and distinctive way. The third set includes those goods that are unique to human persons, for instance, the good of knowledge, especially but not exclusively the knowledge of God, the good of living in society with others (friendship and justice), and the good of being reasonable in making choices, a good that we can call the good of

practical reasonableness, or the good of putting harmony among our choices, judgments, and actions.11

St. Thomas's list of basic goods perfective of human persons is not intended by him to be taxative or exhaustive, but illustrative, as indicated by the fact that he uses such expressions as "and the like" (*et similia*) and "of this kind" (*huiusmodi*) in referring to them. His point is that these goods, when grasped by human practical reason, serve as the starting points or "principles" for deliberating about what we are to do. These principles of practical reasoning are not, of themselves, moral principles or norms but are rather, as is the principle that good is to be done and pursued and its opposite avoided, practical principles making purposeful or intelligent human choices and actions possible. They are used by everyone, even the morally wicked, and cannot be obliterated from the human mind.12 Whatever we do, whether morally good or morally bad, is ultimately done so that we can participate in one or another of these basic human goods. The goods in question are, in short, goods of human persons, not goods for human persons; they are goods that we prize and do not price.

Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle develop St. Thomas's thought here by attempting to articulate a taxative and not merely illustrative list of basic human goods. They argue that these goods can be discerned by noticing the assumptions implicit in the practical reasoning of ordinary people and by considering the "ends" or "purposes" for whose sake human persons ultimately engage in various activities. The basic human goods, while diverse, are alike in that each is a good of persons, not a good for persons. The basic human goods perfect or "fulfill" diverse aspects or dimensions of human persons in their individual and communal flourishing. According to these authors there are seven categories of such goods. Four of these have harmony as their common theme, and the relevant goods are the following: (1) self-integration or "inner peace," which consists in harmony among one's judgments, feelings, and choices; (2) "peace of conscience and consistency between one's self and its expression," a good in which one participates by establishing harmony among one's judgments, choices, and performances; (3) "peace with others, neighborliness, friendship," or harmony between and among individuals and groups of persons; and (4) "peace with God . . . or some more-than-human source of meaning and value," a good that can be called the good of religion13.

Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle call these basic human goods "reflexive" or "existential" because they fulfill human persons precisely insofar as they are able to make choices and are thus capable of moral good and evil. Choice is included in the very meaning of these goods, because the choice by which one acts for them is included in their realization or "instantiation." For example, one cannot participate in the good of friendship without making a choice whose object include harmony between that choice itself and the will of another person, whose friend one wills to be.

It would, however, be a mistake to import moral value into these "existential" or "reflexive" goods.14 It would be a mistake to do so because one can choose to realize these diverse goods whose common theme is harmony in immoral ways. For instance, one can seek to realize the good of harmony between judgments and choices by rationalizing immoral choices; one can choose to realize the good of friendship with others by compromising moral principles or by cooperating with others in immoral enterprises. Thus, not all choices to participate in these reflexive goods are morally good choices, although true and lasting fulfillment in them must be.

In addition to these existential or reflexive goods of human persons, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle identify three basic goods that they call "substantive." These are goods of human persons in whose definitions choice is not included insofar as they fulfill aspects of dimensions of human persons other than the existential or reflexive. There are three categories of such basic substantive human

goods: (1) human life itself, including health and bodily integrity and the handing on and educating of human life, a good that fulfills human persons as bodily beings; (2) knowledge of the truth and appreciation of beauty, goods that fulfill human persons as intelligent beings; and (3) playful activities and skillful performances, goods that fulfill human persons as simultaneously bodily and intelligent beings and as makers and sharers in culture.15

This account of both reflexive and substantive human goods should make it evident that these authors, in identifying the basic human goods that are to be "done, pursued, protected, and promoted" and whose opposites are to be avoided, are in essence taking the lead of St. Thomas. Their endeavor is to specify more completely the kinds of goods to which he referred when he distinguished between goods pertaining to human beings as substantive entities, as bodily beings, and as intelligent and choosing persons.

Like Aquinas, they speak at times of basic or "natural" inclinations dynamically orienting us to these goods, and they appeal to the work of cultural anthropologists and others to support their views.16 But, with Aquinas, they insist that the "natural law" does not consist of natural inclinations. Rather, it consists of true propositions about what-is-to-be-done. And the first set of true propositions about what-is-to-be-done is made up of the proposition that good is to be done and pursued and its opposite avoided and of propositions identifying the goods that are-to-be-done-and-pursued.

This set of natural law propositions consists of principles of "practical reasoning," principles that make our choices and actions to be intelligent and purposeful. These principles, however, are not moral principles, for they do not enable us to distinguish between alternatives that are morally good and alternatives that are morally bad.

The First Principle of Morality (I.B.I) and Its Specifications, or the Modes of Responsibility (1.B.II)

Among the "first and common principles" of natural law St. Thomas included both the sorts of principles already discussed and principles enabling us to distinguish between morally good and morally bad alternatives of action. He did not explicitly draw attention to the difference between these two sorts of first and common principles, but he clearly held that both sorts were among the first and common principles of natural law. In addition to the principle that good is to be done and pursued and the principles specifying the goods that are in truth to be done and pursued, he spoke of such principles as the Golden Rule (do unto others as you would have them do unto you, do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you), the principle that we are to do injury to no one, and the principle that we are to love God and neighbor, and be included these among the "first common principles" or "precepts" of natural law.17 ln fact, St. Thomas, in an article devoted to showing that all the moral precepts of the Old Law could be reduced to the ten precepts of the Decalogue, taught that the twofold law of love of God and love of neighbor, while not included among the precepts of the Decalogue, nonetheless pertained to it as "the first and common precepts of the natural law." Consequently, he held, all the precepts of the Decalogue must be referred to these two precepts, love of God and love of neighbor, as to their "common principles.18

St. Thomas, in other words, held the first moral principle is that we ought to choose in such a way that we exhibit, in and through our choices, a true love of God and neighbor. This seems sound. If we love God, we ought to accept from him his good gifts, the goods perfective of human persons, And if we love our neighbors, we ought to will that the goods of human existence--goods such as life itself, knowledge of the truth, friendship and justice and peace, etc.--flourish in them.

Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle think that St. Thomas's formulation of the first principle of morality is sound when viewed from the perspective of religion. Nonetheless, they believe that it can be more adequately formulated in philosophical terms in the following way: "In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, we ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those alternatives whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment"19.

The matter can be put this way. We ought, in our choices, to respect and revere the real goods of human persons, the goods to which we are directed by the first principles of practical reasoning itself. Our hearts ought to be open to these goods, and they ought to be open to them precisely because they are goods perfective of human persons. One about to choose in s morally upright way respects all the goods of human existence and listens to all the appeals they make through the principles of practical reasoning. One about to choose in a morally wrong way does not respect all of the real goods perfective of human persons. The alternative one is about to choose involves detriment to some human good, which, we must recognize, exists in real human persons. One is tempted to accept this detriment for the sake of realizing some other good. Such an alternative is responsive to at least one principle of practical reasoning, and it might be merely irrelevant to and thus consistent with some others, but it is both relevant to and inconsistent with the principle that directs one to promote and respect the good which the proposed alternative will impede or destroy or set aside20. In other words, some alternatives of choice, although promising fulfillment in only one or some basic human goods, are compatible with a respect for all the principles of practical reasoning, the integral directedness of all the principles of practical reasoning; such alternatives are morally good. Other alternatives of choice, promising fulfillment in only one or some basic human goods, are compatible with a respect for some principles of practical reasoning but are incompatible with others. Such alternatives are not morally good insofar as they do not respond to the requirements of unfettered practical reasoning, to the whole range of human good to which we are directed by the first principles of practical reasoning.

In sum, the first principle of morality is that we ought to choose in such a way that we are open to the real goods of human persons and unwilling to choose in ways that neglect, slight, ignore, damage, destroy, or impede them either in ourselves or in others. Morality comes from the heart, and our hearts ought to be open to what is really good and to the human persons in whom what is really good is meant to flourish.

It is important to recognize that the "integral human fulfillment" to which we are directed by the first principle of morality is not itself a basic human good alongside of or in addition to the basic human goods already identified, While it is by no means individualistic self-fulfillment, it is not "some sort of supergood transcending all other categories of goodness"21 or some "gigantic synthesis of goods in a vast state of affairs, such as might be projected as the goal of a world-wide billion-year plan."22 Unlike the basic goods, it is not a reason for acting; it is, rather, an ideal whose attractiveness depends on all the goods which can appeal to persons and serve as reasons for acting23. This ideal guides human persons in making choices by directing them "to avoid unnecessary limitation and so maintain openness to further goods"24.

By doing so, the ideal of integral human fulfillment constitutes the "object" of a good will and as such "rectifies" the will, i.e., it is the "object" of unfettered practical reason. The will of a person committed to choosing and acting in accord with the requirements of integral human fulfillment is the will of a person inwardly disposed to choose well. It is, in short, the ideal community of all human persons richly fulfilled in all human goods, for whose realization s virtuous person wishes;

this ideal guides such a person’s choices in pursuing particular benefits for particular persons and communities25.

It is important to note here, I believe, how the thought of Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle complements and harmonizes with the thought of St. Thomas. For Aquinas the moral virtues inwardly dispose persons rightly toward the "ends" of human existence, i.e., toward the basic human goods perfective of them as individuals and as members of a community26. For Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, the ideal of integral human fulfillment, proposed by the first moral principle, is the "object" of unfettered or rectified human reason, It thus provides the criterion in terms of which moral virtues are intelligible, for moral virtues are precisely dimensions or aspects of the character of a person more or less integrated with moral truth, i.e., of a person committed to choose in the light of the requirements of integral human fulfillment.

Just as the first principle of practical reasoning, "good is to be done and pursued and its opposite, evil, is to be avoided," is specified by identifying the real goods to be pursued and done, so too the first principle of morality is specified by identifying ways of choosing that do, in fact, fail to honor and respect "integral human fulfillment," i.e., the whole range of real goods perfective of human persons. St. Thomas identified some of these specifications of the first principle of morality (which he formulated, as will be recalled, as the twofold command to love) when he referred to the principle of the Golden Rule and to the principle that pe are to do injury to no one (principles he included among the "first and common principles" of natural law).

In their effort to develop more systematically and clearly what St. Thomas was doing when he articulated these basic moral principles, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle seek to identify more precisely the specifications of the first principle of morality. They call these specifications of this first moral principle "modes of responsibility," or requirements of unfettered practical reason27. The function of these principles is to specify or "pin down" the first moral principle by excluding specific ways of choosing that necessarily involve willing that is incompatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment28.

In their earlier writings Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle articulated these "modes of responsibility" in both affirmative and negative ways. In their more recent writings they formulate all of them negatively rather than formulating some affirmatively and others negatively. They do so because formulating them negatively shows that it is impossible for them to come into conflict, because one can simultaneously forbear choosing and acting in an infinite number of ways29. The precise way in which they formulate these principles negatively is provided in the accompanying note30. Put simply, these principles exclude ways of choosing in which one would intentionally slight, ignore, neglect, damage, destroy, or impede real goods or act in ways based purely on nonrational feelings or in ways that unfairly or arbitrarily limit participation by human persons in the goods of human existence.

It is, in my opinion, important to note that they include among these "modes of responsibility" or moral principles specifying or pinning down the first principle of morality, the principles referred to by St. Thomas, namely, the Golden Rule and the principle that we are to do injury to no one. They formulate the principle of the Golden Rule by saying that "one should not, in response to different feelings toward different persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone unless the preference is required by intelligible goods themselves." They formulate the principle that we are to do injury to no one by saying that one should not choose freely to damage, destroy or impede any human good, either out of hostility to it or (as more commonly occurs) because one chooses to do so because the continued flourishing of some real good inhibits one’s participation

in some other good that one arbitrarily erects as "greater." In other words, one ought not to choose to do evil for the sake of good to come.

The specifications of the first principle of morality taken together guide human choices and actions positively toward the ideal of integral human fulfillment. Together with the first principle of morality that they specify, they enable human persons to have a vision of moral truth--a worldview that opens them to transcendent sources of meaning and value. Although, as Grisez observes, "alternative worldviews tempt people to turn from the vision of moral truth," anyone "who deals uprightly with this temptation makes a more or less explicit commitment to integral human fulfillment. Such a commitment is basic in the sense that it shapes the whole life of the one who makes it. For Christians, their act of faith constitutes such an upright commitment; for those who have not heard the gospel, their basic commitment [to shape their lives in accord with moral truth] serves as an implicit act of faith.31

Specific Moral Norms (Set II or the Principles of Natural Law) and Moral Absolutes

St. Thomas, who considered the precept of love of God above all things and of one's neighbor as oneself as the first moral principle of the natural law, thought that it was possible to infer "immediately, with little consideration," some very specific moral norms on the basis of this fundamental moral principle; for he held that the precepts of the Decalogue follow as immediate and proximate conclusions from the precept to love God and neighbor, and he held that the precepts of the Decalogue were absolute.32

Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle think that here it is necessary to clarify and develop Thomas's thought by making explicit matters that he treated more or less implicitly. They point out that he included, among the first and common principles of natural law, not only the love command but also such normative principles as the Golden Rule and the principle that we are to do injury to no one (principles included in their "modes of responsibility"). Their point is that principles of this kind--the principle of the Golden Rule, the principle that we ought not intentionally damage, destroy, or impede any basic human good, etc.--enable us to show the truth of more specific moral norms, such as those requiring us to keep our promises, not to kill the innocent, not to punish someone for a crime he or she has not committed, etc. That is, they enable us to show why such specific moral norms as these indeed follow as conclusions from the first principle of morality.33 The modes of responsibility, in other words, are normative principles more specific than the first principle of morality but more general than specific moral norms identifying kinds of human choices as morally good or morally bad. Such specific norms are discovered by considering the ways a proposed human action relates a person's will to basic human goods and by considering such a proposed human action in light of the first principle of morality and its specifications.

For example, one specific moral norm is that we ought to keep our promises. The truth of this specific moral norm can be seen if we consider the action at stake, keeping a promise, in the light of the first moral principle and of the Golden Rule or mode of responsibility requiring us to be fair and treat others as we would have them treat us. Similarly, we can grasp the truth of the specific moral norm requiring us to forbear intentionally killing innocent human persons if we consider this type of action--one that intentionally destroys the basic human good of innocent life--in the light of the first principle of morality and of the mode of responsibility requiring us to forbear intentionally destroying, damaging, or impeding a basic human good, whether out of hostility

toward that good or because we consider its continued flourishing in ourselves or others an inhibition to our participation in some other good that we arbitrarily prefer.

Many specific moral norms, while true, are not absolute or exceptionless. These norms are nonabsolute because they are open to further specification in light of the same moral principles from which they were derived to begin with. Promise-keeping is an example. We are obliged to keep our promises in light of the good of interpersonal harmony, the basic moral principle, and the Golden Rule, or principle of fairness that excludes arbitrary preferences. However, promises and the cooperation among persons that they foster very often concern goods other then interpersonal harmony. When keeping a promise would harm these goods, and if these goods could be protected by breaking the promise without being unfair or violating the Golden Rule, then the obligation to keep the promise ceases. Thus, for example, if I promise a friend to play tennis on a specific morning and, on awakening, discover that I have a temperature and am sick with the flu, I would not be obliged to keep the promise--and my friend would understand why, for my friend would not regard it unfair of me to break the promise in order to protect the good of health and life.34 In other words, the principle of fairness or the Golden Rule generated the norm that promises are to be kept; the same principle or mode of responsibility generates exceptions to this norm.

But some specific moral norms, in the understanding of natural law rooted in the thought of St. Thomas and developed by Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, are absolute or exceptionless. For example, the specific moral norm proscribing the intentional or deliberate killing of innocent human life, which violates the modes of responsibility requiring us to forbear from choosing intentionally to destroy, damage, or impede any basic human good, is absolute. This norm and others like it are absolute because nothing which can further specify the kind of action which the norm concerns would prevent it from violating the relevant mode of responsibilitY and the first Principle of morality itself. In short, any specific moral norm which so specifies an object of human choice so that no further condition or circumstance could so modify it that it no longer violated a relevant mode of responsibility and, therefore, the first principle of morality, is absolute. In choosing such an object--willing such a proposal--we are not acting in accord with the ideal of integral human fulfillment, the object "rectifying" the will. We are not to "do" evil, i.e., to make ourselves will that evil be, no matter what the further circumstances may be or no matter what good we may seek to realize by our willingness to do what we know to be evil35.

Moral Absolutes and Human Rights

Among the true propositions of what-is-to-be-done that go to make up the "natural law," there are, as we have seen, some specific moral norms that are absolute in character, i.e., norms admitting of no exceptions, Many people today deny that there are moral absolutes of this kind, e.g., the specific moral norm requiring us to forbear completely from intentionally killing innocent human beings. Yet, paradoxically, in our day many claim "absolute" or "inviolable" rights of human persons. As we shall see here, absolute moral norms and inviolable human rights go hand-in-hand.

To see this it is necessary, first of all, to clarify "rights language," which is so widely, diversely, and, at times, wrongly used today. Many speak of a "right to life," others claim that women have a "right to an abortion," still others speak of s "right to smoke," while others assert the "right of a couple to have a child of their own." Usually rights are expressed in "two-term," "thing oriented" language, e.g., women have a "right to abortion," human beings have a "right to life," mature adults have a "right to read pornographic literature," etc. There is frequently a failure to distinguish properly between "rights" in the strict sense and "liberties."

If "rights language" is properly analyzed, in "three term" language specifying the rights holder, the action to which a right is claimed, and those obliged to respect the right, the difference between "rights" in the strict sense and "liberties" can be easily seen. A (a person or group of persons; all human persons) has a right in the strict sense that B (another person or group of persons; all other persons) should x (an act-description signifying some act), if and only if B has a duty to A to x. The x in question can be either an act of forbearance (the refusal to do something) or some positive kind of activity. Thus, the right of innocent human persons to life can be expressed as follows. All innocent human persons (A) have the right in the strict sense that all human persons (B) should forbear intentionally killing them (x), if and only if all human persons (B) have a duty to all innocent human persons (A) to forbear intentionally killing them (x). Note that in the case of strict rights the action at issue is one required of those who have the duty or obligation to respect the right(s) of the right(s)-holder. Thus, innocent human persons have an inviolable right to life if and only if all others have an absolute duty to forbear intentionally killing them. Inviolable rights and absolute duties, expressed in absolute norms, go together.

In the case of a liberty, on the other hand, the action claimed is an action on the part of the one claiming the liberty. Thus, in general, B (a person, a group of persons, all persons) has a liberty relative to A (another person, a group of persons, all other persons) to x (some specific sort of act), if and only if A has no right that B should not x. Thus, for example, women (B) have the liberty relative to unborn children (A) to abort them (x), if and only if unborn children (A) have no right that women (B) should not abort them (x). Or, again, smokers (B) have the liberty relative to nonsmokers (A) to smoke (x), if and only if nonsmokers (A) have no right that smokers (B) not smoke (x).36

As can be seen, once various "rights" claims are analyzed in this way, it is possible to distinguish between rights in the strict sense and liberties; it is also possible to see that some alleged rights and liberties are quite spurious. It is also evident that human persons have inviolable or absolute rights if and only if there are moral absolutes, i.e., if there are some absolute duties incumbent upon human persons. Insofar as it is always unreasonable, i.e., contrary to the normative principles of the natural law, to choose directly against any basic human good, i.e., to adopt by choice proposals intentionally and of set purpose to destroy, damage, or impede basic human goods, there are, as we have seen, some moral absolutes. Correlative to the exceptionless or absolute duties entailed by this requirement of unfettered practical reason are, therefore, exceptionless or absolute or inviolable human rights--most obviously, the right not to have one’s life taken directly as a means to any further end. Other rights of this kind include the right not to be condemned and punished for crimes one has not committed, the right not to be lied to in any situation in which truthful communication is reasonably expected (e.g., in a court of law, in a classroom).

Conclusion

The natural law is not some sort of funny internal feeling. Nor is it some mystic sort of intuition into human nature. It is rather, an ordered set of true propositions of human practical reason about what-is-to-be-done. It includes both principles of practical reasoning, used by everyone in acting purposefully and intelligently, and principles of moral choice. The principles of moral choice, when brought to bear on specific kinds of human actions, generate specific moral norms, and of these some are absolute or exceptionless in character, and corresponding to such moral absolutes are the inviolable rights of human persons, beings of moral worth, possessed of

an inherent and inalienable dignity as persons and called to give to themselves the dignity of persons willing to shape their lives and in light of moral truth.

Notes

1. See, for example, Vatican Council II, *Gaudium et spes*, nn. 12 and 14 on the intrinsic and inalienable dignity of human persons as beings made in the image and likeness of God; see *ibid*., nn. 16 and 17 on the dignity which human persons are called to give to themselves by choosing in accord with the truth. See also Vatican Council II, *Dignitatis humanae,* nn. 2 and 3.

2. On this see, for example, Mortimer Adler, *The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes* (Cleveland: Meridian, 1968).

3. Here the comments of Alen Donagan on the identity between being human and being a person are relevant. He writes: "Duties owed to any being arise out of the respect that is owed it. Let it, then, be provisionally conceded that, in the first instance, respect is recognized as owed to beings by virtue of a state they are in: say, that of rational agency. If there are beings who reach that state by a process of development natural to normal members of that species, given normal nurture, must not respect logically be accorded to them, whether they have yet reached that state or not? The principle underlying this reasoning is: if respect is owed to beings because they are in a certain state, it is owed to whatever, by its very nature, develops into that state. To reject this principle would be arbitrary, if indeed it would be intelligible. What could be made of somebody who professed to rate the state of rational agency as of supreme value, but who regarded as expendable any rational creature whose powers were as yet undeveloped?" *The Theory of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 170. On this also see Adler, *The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes,* and my own, "What Makes a Human Being to Be a Being of Moral Worth?" *Thomist* 40 1976) 416-441.

4. As St. Thomas says, "agere autem est actio permanens in ipso "agente." *Summa Theologiae*, 1-2, 57, 4.

5. For an excellent presentation of the self-determining character of free choices see Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus,* Vol. 1, *Christian Moral Principles* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), pp. 41-72, especially pp. 50-53, 55-59.

6. Germain Grisez has been developing this understanding of natural law in many works since 1964; Finnis has been collaborating with him for many years; and Joseph Boyle must also be included in light of the substantive contributions he has made to the development of this understanding of natural law. For a bibliography of the major writings of these authors on natural law see their "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 32 (1987) 99-151, at 147-151,

7. John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 23.

8. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* 1-2, 94, 2.

9. On all this see Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends." See also St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae,* 1-2, 94, 2. It is important to note here that the understanding of natural law rooted in the thought of St. Thomas and developed by Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle in no way requires, as such critics of natural law as D. J. O'Connor maintain, "the belief that propositions about man's duties and obligations can be inferred from propositions about his nature" (O'Connor, *Aquinas and Natural Law* [London, 1967], p. 68). For Aquinas and his modern commentators the first principles of natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil

and which can be grasped by anyone of the age of reason and not only by metaphysicians and Mensa members, are underived, indemonstrable, self-evidently true.

10. Aquinas, Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle would agree that were man's nature different, so would be the goods perfective of him, The basic forms of human good grasped by practical reason are what is good for human beings with the nature that they have. But, and this is most important to grasp, these goods are not known deductively, by inferring them from some speculative knowledge of human nature. As Finnis says, "Aquinas considers that practical reasoning begins not by understanding this nature from the outside, as it were, by way of psychological, anthropological, or metaphysical observations and judgments defining human nature, but by experiencing one's nature, so to speak, from the inside, in the form of one's inclinations. But...there is no process of inference" (*Natural Law and Natural Rights*, p. 34),

11. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1-2, 94, 2.

12. *Ibid*., 94, 6.

13. Grisez, Finnis, Boyle, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," 108; see Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles*, p. 123.

14. See "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," 139-140.

15. *Ibid*., 107; *Christian Moral Principles* , p. 124.

16. E.g., Grisez, *Contraception and the Natural Law* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964), p. 54, and p. 74, notes 19 and 20, refers to the work of psychologist Ernest R. Hilgard and the anthropologists Robert H. Lowie and Alexander MacBeath regarding tendencies or inclinations universally found in human beings. Likewise Finnis, in *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, pp. 83, 97-98, refers to the work of a number of psychologists and anthropologists on the same subject.

17. For "injury is to be done to no one" as a first or common principle, see *Summa Theologiae*, 1-2, 95, 2; for the Golden Rule as a first or common principle see *ibid.*, 94, 4, ad 1; for the twofold command to love see *ibid.* 100, 3, 1 and ad 1.

18. *Ibid*., 100, 3, and ad 1; cf. 100, 11,

19. Grisez, Finnis, Boyle, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," 128; Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles*, p. 184; Grisez, Finnis, Boyle, *Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Reality* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 283.

20. For a clear presentatin of this, see Grisez and Boyle, *Life and Death* (Notre Dame Press, 1978), pp. 365-366.

21. "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," 132.

22. Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Reality, p. 283.

23. "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," 132.

24. *Christian Moral Principles*, p. 186.

25. "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," 127-132.

26. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, 11-2, 58, 5; cf. 58, 3, ad 2.

27. In *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, pp. 100-127, Finnis called these the "requirements of practical reasonableness." "Modes of responsibility," the expression usually employed by Grisez, is now the way in which all these authors refer to these specifications of the first principle of morality. On this see *Christian Moral Principles*, pp. 205-228.

28. *Christian Moral Principles*, p. 189.

29. On this see *ibid*., p. 191.

30. *Ibid*., p. 225: "These are the eight modes of responsibility: 1. One should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible goods, 2. One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act individualistically for intelligible goods. 3. One should not choose to satisfy an

emotional desire except as part of one's pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself, 4. One should not choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one's avoidance of some intelligible evil other than the inner tension experienced in enduring that aversion. 5. One should not, in response to different feelings toward different persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone unless the preference is required by intelligible goods themselves (this is Grisez's way of formulating the principle of fairness or the Golden Rule); 6. One should not choose on the basis of emotions which bear upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) in a way which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the bad. 7. One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or choose the destruction, damaging, or impeding of any intelligible human good. 8. One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage or impede some other instance of an intelligible good (this is Grisez's way of formulating the principle that we are not to do evil for the sake of good to come)."

31. *Ibid*., p. 226.

32. On this matter see the excellent study of Patrick Lee, "The Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His Modern Commentators," *Theological Studies* 42 (1981) 425-446, along with the Thomistic texts referred to and analyzed therein.

33. See *Christian Moral Principles*, pp. 251-274,

34. *Ibid*., pp. 256-257.

35. *Ibid*., pp. 257-258.

36. On this see Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, pp. 199-205.

Chapter IX
Democracy, Minorities, and the Plurality of World Views

Habib C. Malik

For the purposes of the present discussion let us define democracy as consisting of the following three elements: majority rule; minority rights; and the peaceful resolution of all disputes and differences through well-established constitutional and electoral mechanisms. In a fundamental sense all democratic systems of government in those countries with long democratic traditions understand majority rule to embody the automatic guaranteeing of the rights of minorities. The concept of the majority exercising power and running the affairs of state implies by definition that minorities excluded from government, or proportionally represented, are nevertheless immune from all forms of persecution, particularly those based solely on their numerical disadvantage. Minority views simply do not represent enough people to warrant handing over to their holders the reigns of power. Respect for these views and their holders, however, and the equality afforded them before the law, are sacred tenets in any system of government worthy of the label "democratic."

The issue of minority rights and the problem of minorities as a whole reveal a far greater complexity upon closer scrutiny. Not only do minorities come in diverse forms, but the nature of their relationships to the majority differs markedly from one socio-cultural milieu to the next. Ultimately, and on a level beyond politics though having definite political implications, the question of majority-minorities interaction raises the more basic question of the nature of truth. Is the truth of anything and everything to be determined through the majority principle, through counting heads? Is not making truth conditional on the majority principle the Achilles Heel of democracy? Is truth the slave of numerical determinism? Can such a thing be called "truth"? Do majorities, merely because of overwhelming size, have a monopoly on "the right way," on what is "true and good" for all? Or is perhaps the whole issue of truth irrelevant to the discussion of majority-minorities interaction in a strictly political context? To answer my last question, I do not think this issue is entirely irrelevant; however, it does of necessity broaden the discussion to include ethical, philosophical, ideological, and metaphysical ingredients and their impacts on political life and political systems.

My intention in peeking into this Pandora’s box (or can of worms) is to focus on the highly relevant question of pluralism and relativism. Whenever the subject is minorities, the democratic political *telos* being sought after is a healthy, well-balanced, and participatory pluralism. The manner in which the Western democracies have dealt with a diversity of perspectives (relativism) coexisting peacefully within a pluralist setting has been a combination of what can be termed least-common-denominatorism subsumed under the umbrella of an overarching amorphous secularism that is the result of two hundred years of historical development. This pervading secularism, with its liberal underpinnings, acts as the closest thing to a single unifying "world view" and lays the ideological ground rules for tranquil, functional, and pragmatic pluralism in the Western world. For the most part Western polities do not easily sink into internal factional discord because of the binding effects of this secular post-Enlightenment world view. The ethico-political glue that has come to hold this world view together is a well-developed concept of universal human rights that stems in the final analysis from the heart of the Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian, Western cumulative tradition and its modern secular-liberal appendix. The claim of the universality of

human rights has itself run up against the challenge of cultural relativism, but as Jack Donnelly persuasively maintains in his book *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, to comprehend human rights as universal moral rights is not at all incompatible with a recognition of their historical contingency and particularity.

A Typology of Minorities

A plethora of minorities and minority groups exists around the world. These can be gathered under three broad headings:

Integral Minorities: These are groups belonging to well-rooted communities and sharing a number of traits and outlooks that, taken collectively, form a coherent world view. In other words, they are just like the dominant majority when it comes to the presence of internal structure, an inner cohesion, and claims of legitimacy, with the difference that they are at a clear numerical disadvantage. Being a distinct minority, their shared world view would differ—often significantly—from that of the majority. Nevertheless, in a genuine pluralistic political environment, such integral minorities would be treated with respect and the dignity of their members, both individually and collectively, would be preserved. This is in fulfillment of the principle that if an authentic part of the pluralistic whole—an integral minority—is unhappy, then the common good would not be served. Ethnic, racial, cultural, linguistic, and national distinguishing characteristics can often define integral minorities and set them apart, but what makes them truly integral and organically autonomous is an underlying common world view and concomitant value system unique to them. Examples of such integral minorities would include the Sikhs in India; the indigenous Christian communities of the predominantly Muslim Near and Middle East; the various Jewish communities in non-Jewish Third World settings; the Muslim communities of the Soviet Union when seen in relation to the dominant majority of Christian Greater Russians; the Muslim Algerians of southern France; the Druze of Lebanon, Syria, and Israel; the Kurds of Iraq; the Baha'is of Iran; the Asian minorities of East and South Africa; the Aborigines of Australia; the native American Indians of the United States and Canada; and many others.

Groups like the South African whites would also qualify as integral minorities not so much on account of racial apartness as because of differing civilizational presuppositions from the black Bantu and Xhosa majorities. The Catholics of Northern Ireland are also an integral minority; however, when compared to minorities listed above the divergences in beliefs and practices that exist between these Catholics and the local Protestant majority are weak and more than compensated for by the unity of a Christian world view in a secularized liberal Western nation-state. Similarly the various Cantons of Switzerland contain integral minority communities, but due to a single unifying world view that binds them together and connects them to the rest of Europe the Swiss model cannot be transposed and applied to situations in the Third World where two or more competing world views must coexist. Many of the minority communities in the Soviet Union and India would also qualify for consideration under the heading "integral" as long as ingredients of an independently charted world view are present. Thus a treatment of democracy in terms of relations between integral minorities and dominant integral majorities must necessarily concentrate on the problem of the plurality of world views, and not merely on pluralism within the confines of a single world view.

Pseudo-Minorities: These would comprise single-issue groups, special interest political collectives, cults, and other esoteric ephemera. They do not qualify as integral minorities because they lack a cohesive self-formulated and time-tested world view, or they view the world reductively through the prism of their special single obsession. They usually belong to the far fringes within pluralistic societies, and although they often vocally clamor for their "political rights," they cannot be entitled to the same degree of political self-expression and participation as authentic integral minorities. As long as they do not break the laws of the land or offend the established sensibilities of the dominant majority and the other integral minorities or behave in a parasitical fashion, they can be tolerated and allowed their freedom of operation. What they should be deprived of is the right to impose their guidelines and set the tone of the political debate. Homosexuals, political action committees promoting insular marginal agendas, and members of the Flat Earth Society out in the Nevada desert would be examples of pseudo-minorities. Politically speaking, the mentally ill form an obvious pseudo-minority; in their case they are incapable of viewing the world at all. Such groups as these are not eligible to be the subject of a discussion of democracy and the problem of minorities, especially in the context of opposing world views. They are a limiting case and therefore stretch freedom to its absolute limits.

Cliques: These are usually self-perpetuating minorities with a distinct anti-democratic bent: ruling military juntas, minority political parties that seize power, illiberal groupings of any sort that exercise an inordinate control, and other oppressive minorities. These too fall outside the scope of consideration.

Towards a Phenomenology of Beleaguered Integral Minorities

One of the toughest obstacles to overcome as the democratic idea makes its way around the world to sow its seeds in distant unfamiliar quarters is the inevitable clash of opposing world views and what that does to native integral minorities. There is no easy answer to this knotty problem. Long before democratic infusions have arrived from afar, the field has already been littered with casualties. The weaker, less demographically assertive integral minorities always suffer at the hands of hostile majorities, particularly ones whose world view includes a definite belligerent posture vis à vis specific minorities. The history of oppression is cluttered with examples; virtually all the integral minorities listed above have been the recipients of violent abuse at one time or another, and repeatedly or constantly in some cases.

A subtle and, in the long run, a very damaging form of abuse to which integral minorities are subjected when surrounded by a sullen unsympathetic majority is the process of deauthentication. Deauthentication is the alteration of identity over time. This could occur within single world view pluralisms as well as in situations where there is a plurality of world views. In the former the process is usually more voluntary and less violent. It is often undertaken for the sake of increased homogeneity and blending in, as with the vigorous pursuit of the American ideal of the melting pot prior to the explosion in the 1970’s and 1980’s of the "back to ethnic roots" movement (itself a quest by certain groups for re-authentication). However, the deauthentication of an integral minority as it faces the threat of an aggressive majority with an opposing world view is far more traumatic. As pressures to assimilate mount, so do fears of the consequences of resisting assimilation. Minorities are often rent apart as a result. Some try to resist the corrosive effects of the gradual loss of identity by becoming hardened minorities. They cling tenaciously to their separateness and emphasize defiantly the distinctions between them and the majority. This merely

aggravates the already existing tension leading to violent confrontations often with tragic consequences for the weaker minority.

On the other hand, those who prefer to assimilate and sacrifice identity in return for security do so by adopting cultural, political, and personal postures that would appear least offensive to the watchful majority. With time these self-inflicted compromises erode features of distinctive identity and deauthentication occurs. The resulting hybrid is by then quite removed in terms of its value systems and its attitudes from the pristine original. Its ontological integrity has been breached. What the terrified integral minority has gained in terms of temporary tolerance and sheer physical survival it has more than paid for in loss of dignity and identity. The process becomes an unending downward spiral as more and more special features are deliberately watered down or jettisoned altogether in pursuit of that elusive *modus vivendi* that would satisfy the demands of the overbearing majority. Meanwhile the hardened and embattled minority contingent which chose to fight it out drifts historically ever farther away from its assimilating deferential sister minority. With time the initial organic links between the two become hardly recognizable. Fatally compromised in all this is the possibility that genuine pluralism could emerge. Without such pluralism chances become dim for the democratic idea to succeed in gaining hold and tempering the clash of world views.

The Case of Islam and Christian Arabs

The preceding discussion is best anchored with an example taken from the historical experience of Christian Arabs living under Islam.

Ever since the rise of Islam in the 7th century AD. and the subsequent Islamic conquests of the Near and Middle East, the relationship between the new religion and indigenous Christianity has been unstable and plagued by tensions. In their historical interaction with the Muslim majority Christian Arabs have experienced successive periods of stormy upheaval punctuated by brief respites of calm. Consequently, they have undergone an uneven development involving rapid progress at times followed by periods of prolonged stagnation. Thus the Christian Arabs have had a checkered and lopsided history, and they will most likely have a checkered and lopsided future.

Accurate demographic statistics are hard to come by in the Near and Middle East; however, scholars currently place the number of native Christians in the Arab World (specifically in Egypt, the Sudan and the Fertile Crescent) at somewhere between 10 and 15 million, with the Muslim majority throughout the entire region between Morocco and the Persian Gulf nearing 200 million.

Muslim attitudes towards the non-Muslim minorities in their midst and the responses and reactions of these minorities present a classic case of the clash of incompatible world views which constitutes a formidable challenge to the implementation of the democratic principle. Islam is a centuries-tested total outlook on God, man, and life as a whole. There is a greater organic unity in Islam between the temporal and spiritual dimensions than is found in either Judaism or Christianity. Politicaly, the Christian Arabs—an integral minority—have spanned the spectrum in their reactions to the various historical phases and political formulations of the Muslim majority. In the process they have not escaped the ravages of deauthentication. In the days of the Ottoman empire they usually had little choice but to stick to their *millet*, or pocket of autonomy sanctioned by the imperial authorities. Yet they did step forward at the turn of the century and later to take part in—and at times to champion—the budding movement of Arab nationalism and independence from Turkish rule. Members of the educated urban Christian class of the Levant (usually Greek Orthodox) were ideally suited to mediate the concept of nationalism, essentially a nineteenth

century Western phenomenon, between Europe and the Arab east. They felt that nationalism as a shared political goal with the majority would serve as the perfect defense mechanism against persecution, assimilation, or stagnation. Some of these Christian intellectuals became more royalist than the king and continued in that vein even after Arab nationalism had taken on a decidedly authoritarian and anti-Western character. Other Christians, principally Lebanon's Maronites, who were initially unmoved by the idea of Arab nationalism, became outspokenly hostile to things Arab when Arab nationalism entered its radical phase of rejecting the West as imperialist. The first of these groups, by now well on the way to being deauthenticated, has remained dubious at best in the eyes of the Muslim majority. Many of its members have assimilated so thoroughly with their Muslim surroundings that they have adopted aspects of the majority's mind-set—they have been Islamized culturally to a great extent. An example of this is a pervading fatalism that one senses colors the outlook on life of these native Christians. The second of these groups—the hardened faction of the minority—became the object of the majority's outright hatred.

How the Christian Arabs will adjust to the post-national phase the Arab World appears to be entering remains to be seen. With growing portions of the Arab World shedding nationalism as a failed unifying ideological framework in favor of a return to a religious definition of identity, the situation of non-Muslim minorities in the region is bound to become more critical. Clearly those Christian Arabs who placed their hopes in an all-encompassing nationalism (not to speak of an elusive secularism) as a way to overcome the majority-minorities split along religious lines have been bitterly disillusioned. Nor is specific country-by-country nationalism any long-term match for a resurgence of Islamic fervor. The fact, for example, that the Coptic Christians and the Sunni Muslims of Egypt share strong feelings of Egyptianism is ultimately no guarantee for the Copts against intolerance or persecution.

If then the Arab World is indeed moving from Ottoman/Western imperial domination through the phase of nation-states and on to some revived version of Islamic *umma*, where does that leave the Christian Arabs? Here again the Christian Arabs do not constitute a uniform block. For the vast majority of them has long ago been reduced by Islam to second-class, or *dhimmi*, status in their own ancestral lands. This is in keeping with the traditional Islamic view of Christians and Jews as "People of the Book," to be tolerated but never treated as equals. Those who have resisted such a fate, namely the one million or so beleaguered Christians of Lebanon comprising (until the Syrian takeover in October 1990) the last remaining free Christian community in the entire Middle East, have lived to see their flawed and fragile—but nonetheless unique—experiment in coexistence collapse in bloody shambles around them.

The example of the turmoil besetting the historical interaction between Christian Arabs and the Muslim majority raises the thorny problem of the anomalous relationship that Islam has with democracy. In the West's excitement to package and export democracy to the Third World, sight is often lost of the extent of readiness by the indigenous cultures to comprehend—much less to accept—the fundamental democratic assumptions, particularly the safeguarding of minority rights, taken for granted say in countries such as Britain and the United States. That is why the democratic ideal has rarely encountered fertile terrain in a place like the Arab World, populated as it has always been with an assortment of despots and dynasts. Great promise of peace and prosperity looms in the immediate future of Europe following the collapse of Communism. Unfortunately, however, the same cannot so far be said of the Middle East with its closed societies, its authoritarian (and often repressive) regimes and its undercurrent of religious fundamentalism. Suffice it to say that in Islam—unlike Christianity—there is no separation of Church and State; and the Middle East—unlike the West—has not undergone two hundred years of secularization.

What is particularly disturbing is the apparent unshakable resistence exhibited by Islam to all attempts to impress it with the need to reconsider its position on non-Muslim minorities. As Donnelly points out (*op. cit.*, pp. 50-52), Muslim scholars pay lip service to human rights by claiming that these have solid Koranic roots. In fact they are not speaking about universal human rights as understood in the West, but about human dignity which is a different concept. Nor do they regard human rights as open to all people just by the mere fact that they are people. Quoting Majid Khadduri, Donnelly writes: "Human rights in Islam...are the privilege only of persons of full legal status; (i.e. someone who) is a living human being of mature age, free, and of Moslem faith" (p. 51). One might add that the person also has to be a male.

Islam's conception of freedom also lacks universality and is essentially exclusivist. Being a mature Muslim male means you are at your freest. As for political freedom, it is granted only to those parties whose platforms reflect the precepts of the prevailing world view, namely Islam. Even countries like Turkey and Pakistan, which are often referred to as democracies, only display the outward trappings of modern liberal democratic states. When you gaze beyond the window dressing you will quickly discover that political freedom, freedom of expression, and especially freedom for non-Muslim minorities are seriously deficient. In the case of Pakistan the *Shari'a,* or Islamic law, is regarded as the final legal arbiter.

One intriguing example of the special way in which freedom of political action is viewed by some authoritative Muslims comes from an article in Arabic entitled "A Brief Islamic Reading of the Twin Concepts of Freedom and Democracy from the Intellectual and Cultural Points of View," written by the Shiite cleric Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual advisor of the radical Iran-inspired Hezbollah group in Lebanon which is believed to be holding the remaining Western hostages, and published in the group's monthly magazine *Al-Muntalak* (April 1990). Fadlallah states at one point that non-Muslim political parties and organizations basically have no place in an Islamic society. He adds, however, with no attempt to conceal his utilitarian opportunism, that in periods when "Islamic reality," as he calls it, is under pressure and threatened from without, it is better to allow such non-Muslim groupings the freedom to operate in the open because that way they could be watched and would constitute "a lesser danger." Freedom therefore, according to this view, has the single purpose of smoking out the dangerous opposition presumably as a first step towards eliminating it when the pressure is off. This is a predatory concept of freedom.

It ought to be clear by now that whenever some influential voices in the West—in government, the universities, the media, and the churches—have emphasized democracy as solely a numerical question of one man-one vote and majority rule, minorities in the Islamic world have suffered. Such glib treatments of the minorities-majority question, particularly in the context of the plurality of opposing world views, spells disaster for countless communities around the globe.

The Consociational Panacea?

A solution, it will be protested, does exist for bringing together in reconciliation minorities and majorities with differing or opposing world views. It is alive and well not only in the minds and books of political scientists, it will be confidently added, but in actual practice around the world. Its name is consociationalism, or consociational democracy.

Arend Lijphart, in his seminal work *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, defines consociational democracy as that system in which "the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population. Elite cooperation is (its) primary distinguishing

feature." (p. 1). He adds that consociational democracy is "defined in terms of both the segmental cleavages typical of a plural society and the political cooperation of the segmental elites" (pp. 4-5). Lijphart sees consociational democracy as consisting of four components: government by grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; the mutual veto or "concurrent majority" rule, which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests; proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; and a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs (p. 25). According to Lijphart, consociational democracy has worked well and maintained stability in a number of smaller European pluralistic states: Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The results of consociational experiments in the Third World, however, have been mixed. In Lebanon and Malaysia initial success was followed by disintegration. In Cyprus and Nigeria the story was generally one of failure.

Although Lijphart's discussion is illuminating in its comparative breadth, it is also conspicuously glaring in its omission of any in-depth treatment of the obstacles to consociational success posed by a plurality of antagonistic world views. Surely this, more than any of the technical factors cited by the author, was responsible for debacles and failures in the consociational experiences of the Third World countries he investigates. In the four examples mentioned by Lijphart, Christian-Muslim tensions played an important—sometimes decisive—role in precipitating civil war and eventual collapse. In Lebanon and Cyprus the religious conflicts are well-known; in Nigeria it was the secession of the Christians of Biafra; and in Malaysia the East Malaysian state of Sabah continues to witness sporadic harassment of its Christian communities.

As a theoretical model consociational democracy remains probably the best one to be applied to Third World situations where opposing total outlooks intersect. On this point Lijphart is correct. As a matter of fact, such delicate situations where integral minorities are involved necessarily suggest that the approach should be to search for arrangements ensuring local autonomy and a decentralized federal or confederal type of system. But all these neat formalistic prescriptions, including consociational democracy, run the risk of turning into empty shells if religious, ideological, and other world-view cleavages are not more seriously addressed. Can consociationalism hope to safeguard the rights of integral minorities in the Third World by applying, for example, what Lijphart calls overrepresentation of minorities (using the principle of parity instead of proportionality as a device to protect minorities in the way the Belgian cabinet, according to a constitutional provision from 1970, must consist of equal numbers of Dutch-speaking and French-speaking ministers so as to protect the francophonic minority)? (pp. 40-41). What good would it do for the leaders of opposing communities to come together in coalitions in order to wheel and deal as they are used to doing if the fundamental distrust, the deep-seated suspicion, and a denigrating view of the other remain embedded in their respective communities and collective psyches?

What then is the answer? It has to involve some internal as well as external mechanism of guarantees. The quest for guarantees for beleaguered integral minorities on the basis of universal human rights, if nothing else, has been at best an elusive pipe dream and at worst a dismal failure. Donnelly discusses three arguments against using human rights as an instrument of foreign policy. These are the realist argument, which says foreign policy is a matter of national interest defined in terms of power; the legalist argument, which abhors the interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; and the relativist argument, which regards an international human rights policy as a form of moral imperialism (*op. cit.* p. 229). Donnelly, however, makes a convincing case in support of an important role for human rights in foreign policy. Basically, he says that certain

abuses and violations simply cannot be allowed to go unchecked. The experience with Nazism is only the starkest example.

If guarantees are to be realistic, they have to be desired by the collective will of the international community and enforced by the powers that be through a combination of the available agencies, international organizations like the United Nations (now experiencing something of a renaissance), economic and diplomatic leverage, and humanitarian scrutiny and accountability under international law. All the current talk about the dawn of a New World Order stands or falls on the willingness of the international community to be serious, thorough, consistent, and insistent.

But it will be said this is fine and good for large provocations and infringements—Hitler's invasion of Poland; Saddam's invasion of Kuwait—yet what about creeping incremental persecution and deauthentication of out-of-the-way integral minorities? Why should they matter? Even in such cases it pays in the long run for the international community to be vigilant. Local abuses have a way of snowballing out of hand with time. Quarantining messy situations does not always work; witness the terrorist havens and drug empires that have flourished in war-torn Lebanon over the past 16 years and the international headaches they continue to cause. At this moment in history those societies and states which value the sanctity of human life and dignity and which adhere to universal norms of civilized human conduct enjoy unprecedented power and global influence. The judgment of history will be harsh if they make little or no attempts to redress wrongs, no matter how seemingly inconsequential, especially if this can be done at a relatively small cost. This is not "moral imperialism" and policing the world. How can an arbitrary line be drawn between the big provocations and the little ones? What kind of New World Order would this be if the vulnerable and fragile are automatically classified as humanly insignificant?

It is amazing how neglected the question of distant embattled integral minorities really is. Equally amazing is how media-fed popular notions of democracy are skewed away from minority rights and in the direction of majority rule. The tyranny of numbers is at once the most brutish and the most avoidable of tyrannies. If a certain amount of deauthentication is inevitable both on the personal and collective levels, the sheer weight of opposing numbers must not be allowed to create a drag that would end by crushing anything in its path. Integral minorities are not like endangered species, to be preserved only as curiosity items or out of deference to nature or to assuage our sense of guilt. They are living breathing human beings with vibrant traditions and long rich histories. And hardened minorities need to be accommodated to be softened, not molded by force as despots are wont to do.

Democracy does not decide truth. But it can protect it and safeguard the freedom of all to seek it. Democracy is worth exporting only if it pays close attention to the intricate problems arising from clashes of world views, that is only if it is able to guarantee minority rights anywhere and everywhere.

Chapter X

Nigeria and Western Democracy: The Possibility of an African Alternative

Izu Marcel Onyeocha

Personally I'm always ready to learn, although I do not always like being taught. -- Winston Churchill

If all mankind, minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing humanity. -- John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*

In the following analysis, I wish to state that Nigeria, and other developing countries, cherish the ideal of democracy and have learnt a great deal from, and about, Western forms of democracy and theories that support them. My worry is that the concept of democracy has been so narrowed down as to give the impression that the concept of democracy is exhausted by only that system of government or perception of government obtainable in Western countries — the so-called multi-party democracy whose history in any case has not dated so long even in those countries. Sometimes some elements of the Western media have talked of democracy as though it were equivalent to capitalism, as when one TV reporter talks of "the states of Eastern Europe overcoming communism and embracing the capitalist system of democracy."

The ensuing analysis will be in three stages. The first stage will consist in a 'wading through' of some of the theories that might have contributed to the shaping of Western systems; in the second stage the claims of Western democracy will be subjected to some scrutiny to show that it could still do more to vindicate the ideals of democracy more fully; and the third stage will explore the question of the possibility of non-Western democratic alternatives and the options open to Nigeria for discovering them.

From Western political theory Nigeria has learnt the ideals of modern democracy even if she may not be adapted to all its forms, particularly the multi-party type as practiced in Western countries. Among the important lessons of modern democracy is the preference for tolerance and discussion rather than imposition and confrontation.

It is fact beyond question that Nigeria has a leaning towards Western methods — politically, culturally and ideologically. When a group of Nigerian legislators were asked to indicate their opinions of various countries on the scale of 1 to 10, their preference for the West as exemplified in the United States and Britain showed clearly in contrast to the Soviet Union. The United States scored 8.3, Britain scored 6.9, and the Soviet Union scored only 4.6.1 But that does not mean that Nigeria must necessarily and in all circumstances adopt whatever the West prefers.

The dominant concept in contemporary Western political thinking seems to be that of democracy. It has not always been so, for both Plato and Aristotle rejected it on quite different grounds. Plato saw it as the rule of the mob because he remembered the unjust condemnation by Athenian democracy of Socrates his mentor and friend. He wanted the philosopher-king instead of a group of half-baked bureaucrats. Aristotle dismissed democracy as the rule of the poor against the rich. In the history of Western thought, a variety of theories of democracy has emerged thanks to the work of philosophers and political theorists. These theories have covered trends and

tendencies from the aristocratic outlook of Plato through the qualified democracy of Aristotle, the authoritarianism of Hobbes, and the totalitarianism of Rousseau. These tendencies find echoes in modified forms in Kant's duty for duty's sake, Hegel's notion of the absolute spirit, and Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat.

Some Problems

There are some problems, however, with the applications and general attitudes with regard to the Western political theories. Among the most obvious of the problems are included the tendency to universalize Western perspectives to encompass the whole world; a selective application of the principles and parameters for political legitimacy; and the inherent ambivalence within each political system as demonstrated by Aristotle.

The hostile attitude towards socialism or Marxism in general, though not altogether unjustified, can be said to be exaggerated. By the same token, the strenuous and vociferous objection in the Western media to Zimbabwe's proposed transition to a one-party state is indicative of this intolerance of any idea that is unusual or different. At the present moment pressure is being mounted on governments in the developing countries to adopt both the so-called "free market economy" and the so-called "multi-party democracy." As a result of this pressure, social unrest is threatening to engulf such countries: Kenya, Uganda, Cameroon, Zaïre. (Nigeria has already committed itself to a timetable of transfer to an elected government and is therefore spared the scourge agitators in that direction). Some of these countries could in past years claim some degree of stability in spite of economic poverty. Now their stability has begun to totter.

In the 1960s which constituted the decade of independence for most African states, these states had inherited, along with national 'sovereignty', Western models of government under the multi-party system. Soon most of these "newly-independent" states found themselves having to abandon the multi-party for some reason or other. It can be said that the political turmoil that characterized the decades of the 60s, 70s and 80s is a result of trying to cast off what can be called figuratively an unwieldy Davidic shield amidst the continued insistence of their Western mentors that the armour suits Africans. The biblical story of David and Goliath2 shows that in the final analysis, victory came David's way not by his following the rules of war imposed by the conventional wisdom of mentors but by his native nimbleness of foot, his skill with the sling, and a mighty touch of good fortune. The point of the analogy is that though multi-party democracy works in the West, it has simply not worked in Nigeria and other so-called new states, and probably may not work in the immediate future. The fault is neither in the system itself nor the people of the newly-independent states themselves. It is rather a matter of different circumstances requiring different approaches.

In trying to decide what is suitable to Nigeria's own requirements it is almost irresistible to say: let Nigeria go ahead and adopt or adapt any of the extant theories -- the best of them -- and make it hers. This temptation must be resisted, or at least viewed with great caution, and for good reasons. In the first place, there is the possibility that the newly adopted one may turn out to be unworkable. That a given political theory has worked quite well in, say, the U.S. or the U.K., does not guarantee absolutely that it will work everywhere and in all circumstances.

Historically, politically, socio-economically, between the Western nations and Nigeria the circumstances are so different. It will be presumptuous to think that the Western theories when swallowed bait, hook and sinker will be the 'Open Sesame!' to all socio-political problems. There is no universally guaranteed political theory, for even the most perfect has its Achille's heel, and

the success or failure of any given system depends most on its effectiveness in addressing the problems of the community.

When Aristotle upholds the leadership of the middle-class,4 he inadvertently contributes to the use of stereotypes that has been the scourge of most political systems. Nothing stops one comparing what Aristotle advocates with either oligarchy or the type of democracy that he had earlier discredited. With oligarchy it shares the feature of favouring a few, and with democracy it shares the feature of being at some other group's expense. The middle class whom Aristotle here commends were written off by Marx as the petty bourgeoisie. Furthermore, to give rulership to the middle class as of right could not be any different in justification from what the dynastic state used to justify the Divine Right of Kings, as Jean Bodin gives it:

Because there is nothing greater on earth, after God, than the sovereign princes, [the middle class?], and that they are established by him as his lieutenants, to rule over other men, it is necessary to have due regard for their status so as to respect and obey their majesty in all obedience, and to speak of them in honourable terms: for whoever shows contempt for his sovereign prince shows contempt for God, of whom he is the image on earth.5

Hobbes advocates the rule of one physical person, and believes that organized society is opposed to the state of nature. To achieve social harmony therefore it will take the rule of an artificial man, Leviathan, wielding unlimited and irrevocable power.6 The frightening scenario is one of Leviathan big-footing into all human affairs, universalizing itself and reducing everyone else to trembling silence. Citizenship after Hobbes' theory would be marked by terror and anxiety under the watchful eye of the Orwellian ubiquitous 'Big Brother'.7

There is another element in Hobbes' theory that could be a source of worry. It is his understanding of the human person in terms of either an actor/mask or an author. Hobbes leaves the question of personal responsibility ambivalent, since if people claimed the authorship of the actions of the Sovereign to whom they irrevocably transferred their right of nature, they would in effect be responsible for the consequences of the actions he would perform on their behalf.8 The ambiguity lies in the fact that while exercising unlimited executive powers, he or she would in reality be doing so as an actor rather than an author. Hobbes provides that he would be immune from any negative consequences that might arise from the actions he or she might have taken.

In Rousseau, humankind is collectivized, and individual persons abnegate their autonomy. Thus the price of citizenship in Rousseau's theory is the "total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community."9 It is frightening to think of a citizenry of zombies. This is further aggravated by the paradoxical idea of 'forced freedom',10 which is impossible to reconcile with the normal understanding of freedom as implied in the normal meaning of democracy. There is also the idea of the 'General Will', which Rousseau denies as amounting to consensus.11 The latter is the mainstay of decision-making in traditional as well as contemporary Nigerian society.

The legacy of citizenship according to Rousseau's theory will be tantamount to the people being present as mere cogs in the political wheel without any corresponding will, choice or decision to show for it. Before them all is the leader, having the attributes of a god, who decides what the will of the people is or should be. Him the people would be obliged to obey. Nigeria has already lived through several 'leaders' of this description and would now rather do without any further ones.

At the opposite pole of the issue is the concept of popular sovereignty as expressed in the theories of Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclopedists, and Marx. One should not be overawed by

a grandiose sovereignty that exists in slogans alone. Not one known political system has been able to put into practice the complete ideal of popular sovereignty -- Power to the People -- which is the kernel of democracy.

Furthermore, there is also the idea of the Common Good as the end of government. Each theory claims the ability to realize it in its application; yet there is no agreement among them as to what the common good consists in. Each system defines it on the basis of its own presuppositions and according to the protagonist's own ideological leaning. A conservative's idea of property or freedom or defence, etc., for the common good is often diametrically opposed to what the liberal or socialist would propose. It seems that all political leanings, right, left and centre, appeal to nothing else in their references as much as they appeal to the ideals of democracy, freedom, and common good. Each claims to be democratic, yet democracy seems to elude all.

Political theories are reflections on the social and political environment in the society to which they belong. They are generally their authors' attempts at providing an answer.12 They are not meant to be dose-administered to any society different from their place of origin. If they must, it has to be after a period of vigorous scrutiny and adaptation. The citizens of the recipient community should have the final decision as to what suits or does not suit their country's unique needs.13

It is said that democracy rules the world. To rule the world it must operate a system of justice and base its authority on the express will of the people. The style of democracy that rules the Western world does not appear to be suitable for Africa because the features it manifests do not appear to the average African to be either just or democratic. One need only consider the international bodies like the United Nations with only fifteen out of over three hundred constituting the Security Council and out of which the five most powerful countries take on the status of 'Permanent' membership'. It is enough for one of them to disagree with a resolution for that resolution to die. But once all five are agreed on any resolution they see to it that it is binding on the whole world. Even at its face value, that does not look very democratic. It is like one arm of a country's government — say the executive — overruling entire parliamentary decisions to go its own way.

On the national level one needs also to look at the structure of the multi-party states where the views of the opposition count for nothing and the winner takes all at all times. That makes it difficult to separate party interests from national interests. Democracy under such conditions can be likened to an 'elected' dictatorship of the ruling party. The Roussean Sovereign thus resurfaces under another name. Though the electoral process remains free, it seems that votes are won or lost more by the candidate's ability to sway opinions through eloquent political speechmaking than through the actual disposition to deliver what they promise. This is not the style of democracy Nigeria wants because the people are used to decision-making via consensus, and to appoint public servants on the basis of personal merit.

Practically-speaking, a multi-party government is perhaps not the best idea for Nigeria, at least at her present stage of political development14 . This assertion might be surprising to some people, but there are a variety of reasons for this conclusion:

First of all, there is too much hassle and the electorate, made up of a vast majority of uneducated and ill-educated citizens, is left in confusion. It cannot cope with a plethora of parties with really no substantial difference in ideology.

Secondly, it seems that the multi-party system will polarize rather than unite the country. Nigeria's great problem is with existing polarization along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. A polarized political set-up will be the *coup de grâce* against the fragile links that at present seem to bind the country together. In most of the countries where the multi-party system is at work, it seems that at some stage in their history there had to be a charismatic leader that would gather the scattered bits and weld them together. Washington did it for the United States, Franco for Spain, Bismarck for Germany, De Gaulle for France, and Mussolini for Italy15 . Nigeria must be able to come together first under one banner, under a strong but good and patriotic leader. Only then would it be possible to diversify methods without the danger of rapid disintegration. As Rousseau, in Chapter V of his *Social Contract*, quoting Grotius, said:

(Only) a people . . . can give itself to a king. . . . A people is a people before it gives itself. The gift is itself a civil act, and implies public deliberation. It would be better, before examining the act by which a people gives itself to a king, to examine that by which it has become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society.16

Thirdly, all party politics brings about the element of partisanship in dealing with issues and objectivity goes to the wind as party loyalty most frequently overrides personal sense of judgment, and the desire to 'keep one's job' becomes the overriding concern.17

Fourthly, technically speaking, the element of consent which is so crucial in any democratic process is distorted in a multi-party arrangement by the reliance on a majority rather than a consensus. In a majority-oriented set-up the majority, which is nevertheless a part, is treated as though it were the whole, and the minority is expected to conform to every determination of the majority and get lost in the majority. The fact that the majority has, not infrequently, been proven wrong by events, makes an institutionalized majority-is-all assume the face of tyranny.18

Fifthly and finally, the multi-party system just does not seem to work in Africa and some other geographic zones. It is not quite correct to suggest that the failure is due to the people's incompetence alone. It is probably reasonable to suggest that its failure is because it seems to be unsuited to the people's way of thinking and operating at their present level of development. It seems to be a grave mistake to think that the multi-party system, often referred to as 'Western-style Democracy' is the only, or even the best type of democracy. Other people must be allowed to apply their talent in working out a pattern of 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people' according to their own understanding and as their own peculiar circumstances demand. Those who do not want, or are unsuited to the 'Western-Style Democracy' must be given a fair chance to demonstrate an alternative.19 Perhaps what they come up with might be of benefit to politics even in the West. Provided that a system protects the life, liberty and property of citizens, and provided it is what the people want, the question of multi-party or dual-party or non-party is a matter of modality and should not occupy the centre stage.

Pluralism and Political Systems

Pluralism which is acknowledged in other departments of life should also find a place in political systems. From the political and ideological points of view, pluralism is a factor that no one may casually ignore, for there is no system that is completely immune from its challenges. Moreover, there is no system that is without its own flaws. Though Western Europe and North America have the tendency to claim to operate the true democracy, theirs is only a version of

democracy — the parliamentary version. Every country on earth claims to operate a democracy but the results are as diverse as the countries' circumstances themselves.

Not too long ago, the vast majority of French Catholics had stuck to the theory of the divine right of kings and were resolutely opposed to democratic republicanism which, ironically today, the same vast majority consider as their touchstone of democracy. The Marxists, on the other hand, believed that supreme happiness for humankind would only result from a classless society under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and under the guidance of the communist party. Recent developments in Eastern Europe have shown that that is not to be any more. The Americans were as convinced of the 'divine right of democracy', so to speak, and would pride themselves — often to the irritation of some — as the world's greatest democracy. They would often proceed, almost with holy zeal to seek to propagate, and if necessary impose, their own ideas of democracy around the world.

On the left of the political spectrum, the Soviets have had until quite recently an all-too-similar attitude with regard to socialism which is their own brand of 'people's' democracy. Now the Soviet empire is rapidly dissolving into separate, sovereign republics, each invoking the name of democracy. The confusion generated in the mirage chase for 'democracy' around the world leaves the image of democracy not a little tainted by scepticism in the consciousness of many as to whether it could ever be found in a pure form.

As Ignace Lepp rightly points out,20 there is no political regime that has divine sanction guaranteed in advance; no regime that is alone legitimate or at the best for all peoples at each stage of their evolution. Political morality like the morality of property must take into consideration that humanity is certainly one, but that this is a unity in an infinite diversity. It is futile to moralize or speculate, or appeal to stereotypes in regard to imaginary excellences that make 'democracy' work in some places, and the absence of which prevents the monolithic `democracy' from working in other places. If such stereotypes are anything to go by, then the Hitlers, Mussolinis, and Francos of the not-too-distant past should have sprung from some stock other than the Nordic stock.

And as Ignace Lepp concludes, it would be a mistake to wish to apply the same system, in the name of a static and abstract political morality, to nations that have not attained the same degree of maturity.21

Even though one might morally object to the human rights abuse under communist regimes, the system did accomplish in the Soviet Union what would have been impossible under some pseudo-democratic system.22 In Africa the 'People's Democracies' have failed in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin; just as the 'liberal' democracies have, in practically all of Africa including Nigeria, failed to answer the precise needs of the people. It will be simplistic to say that the fault is totally that of the people. It is more realistic to consider the situation as analogous to that of a square peg which does not fit snugly into a round hole.

In Search of an Alternative

With the multi-party government not considered as the best option for a country like Nigeria, the question arises as to what alternative system one might propose in its place. The alternative that is most likely to be conjured up in the minds of many is the one-party government. For psychological reasons of the 'great scare' which conventional wisdom has come to associate with it, it is probably not the best idea to advocate a one-party system either. To begin with, such a proposal is not likely to find favour from many people even though it is in itself not necessarily

always bad. The idea of a one-party state sends chills down the spines of many who have learnt — not without justification — to associate it only with despotism.

The greatest setback for a one-party rule, technically speaking, is the reductionist presupposition that the whole nation is suddenly equivalent to a party of bureaucrats who inflict their will on the generality of the people; and who presume to speak for the people without the people ever having the chance to speak for themselves. A non-party or zero-party form of government seems to offer the best prospects for unity and stability.

For a distinctively Nigerian approach, it is necessary, among others to a) be primarily based on distinctively Nigerian or related sources; b) consider the Athenian model of democracy which is so similar to the traditional and contemporary Nigerian socio-political experience; c) consider the contributions of such luminaries as Julius Nyerere in his interpretation of democratic principles according to Tanzania's contemporary experience and ideals, since there are a great many parallels between Tanzania and Nigeria; d) analyze and seek to understand and apply the principles of democracy to Nigeria's present needs and circumstances; e) understand democracy and put it to work.

The primary resource material for exploring new systemic alternatives for Nigeria is without doubt the country's constitutions and allied documents. With those forming the background, the history of political thought as well as a study of the major political theories and systems of contemporary times will provide an in-depth understanding required for operating and living a political system well-suited to the country. The relevance of any political theory to the country can be measured from understanding the historical circumstance behind its formulation, the issues it sets out to address and how successfully it manages to address the issues. The next question is how, if at all, and given Nigeria's unique historical and social circumstances, any or several theories can be applicable in its case.23

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria defines, as no other document does, what the national goals are; its expectations for citizens, the place and role of the individual in the community, the way to relate, the economy, the freedoms, the laws, etc. The Constitution set out for the Nigerians at least two major ideals of:

1. Living "in unity and harmony as one, indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God."
2. "Promoting the good government and welfare of all persons in Nigeria on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, and for the purpose of consolidating the unity of our people."

Specifically articulated in the Constitution is the national ethic as comprising "Discipline, Self-reliance, and Patriotism.24 " From the Constitution also the phrase "one nation under God" is worthy of note. It implies that theism or religion does have an important place, and precludes atheism as a principle in the national life. Thus Nigeria as a nation is theistically oriented.

Nigeria also upholds the principle of freedom, equality and justice. Thus in practice, those whose convictions do not lead them to theism are still protected under the principle of justice and freedom. In brief the Constitution demands of the good citizen the disposition to live in unity and harmony, and promote good government on the principles of freedom, equality and justice.

There are also other ideals for citizenship education. These include the inculcation and nurturing of a patriotic spirit, learning and practicing the spirit of democracy, vindicating the universal franchise which democracy guarantees to citizens, and making the government work according to the will of the people rather than impose its will on them.

Talking of democracy and education, some questions come to mind. Does democracy mean that everyone should have a say as to the content, method, setting and style involved in the educational system? In other words should the educational policy be based on a plebiscite, on the decision of the government, on the wishes of parents, on the preferences of students, or should it be left to experts in the field? These represent the various tendencies that come into play in determining the educational policy and each has arguments in its favour. The democratic aspect is certainly not breached if the experts in the field of education, in full cognizance of the concerns and wishes and overall goal of education for the given community, work out the programme and its content.

To guide them in this task they need the guiding light of certain principles which are plausible in themselves and suitable for the task they are meant to accomplish. In this regard, Amy Gutmann, in her book *Democratic Education*, argues that our allegiance to democracy commits us to accepting at least three fundamental educational principles of preparation for democracy, non-discrimination, and non-repression:

1. For Democracy: That education must provide the ability to participate actively in the democratic process.25

2. For Non-Discrimination: That no educable child may be excluded from an education adequate to participating in the political processes that structure choice among good lives.26

3. For Non-Repression: That neither the state nor any group in it may use education to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and good society.27

Also worthy of note is the concept of "one nation." This concept has the capacity to evoke in the citizen the nationalist as well as the patriotic spirit. The spirit of nationalism is often viewed with suspicion particularly for its association with fanaticism, militarism and disruptive revolution. However, no nation could do without at least some measure of nationalism.28

There is actually only a thin line between nationalism and patriotism. The distinction between them lies in the distinction between the concept of nation — place of one's birth — and country — a political entity to which one belongs as of right and where one is entitled to exercise franchise. Clearly then, while the concept of patriotism has cosmopolitan implications, the concept of nationalism is more parochial. Since the French Revolution there has been a close synonymy between country and nation and, consequently between patriotism and nationalism.

As Ignace Lepp points out,29 nationalism was from the beginning a return to closed society. Patriotism is by far superior to nationalism for in it one's country is cherished for what it actually is, while in nationalism it is prized for what it is imagined to be. Nationalist patriotism is directly opposed to other nationalisms. While pursuing its goal of preaching the love of country, it indirectly preaches at the same time hatred of other countries. The elevation by Dr Joseph Goebbels of Nazi fame, of lies and calumny to the rank of patriotic distinction is a case in point.

Traditionally nationalist patriotism has been associated with the conservative right political wing, while the left wing is associated with internationalism; indeed radical cosmopolitanism, and would sometimes regard themselves as citizens of the world. The former would stress elements of national pride, territorialism,30 strong defence, national identity or sovereignty, while the latter would stress the world community, disarmament, international dialogue, and international cooperation.

Fired by a patriotic spirit, Nigeria must decide what form of government it must have: a centralized, unitary government; a federal model with a strong central government; a loose federal model (confederation) with a weak central government; a completely new arrangement unique to Nigeria.

The first option, a unitary government, leaves the central government with all the powers while the states have no powers at all. A unitary government would be unworkable in Nigeria now, since it will be construed as a renunciation of autonomy, so to speak, by people of the component section, who have known nothing else since Nigeria was established. Furthermore, Nigeria is so large geographically that it will be too unwieldy for one central government to run effectively, since the cultural, ethnic political and religious peculiarities of the various sections would call for special consideration each on its own merit.

In the second option, the central government is strong and the states are fairly strong also. That has been in operation in Nigeria all along. The strength of the central government is in its monopoly of the armed forces, the police force, and the foreign affairs. In that way it is able to place the states under control. This option gives ample room for self expression of the various component sections, and at the same time leaves ample room for unitary action on the national level. The states are sufficiently strong but not so strong as to overwhelm the central government. Thus it seems the Federal system remains Nigeria's most viable option.

The third model, a confederation, would deprive the central government of complete control and the possibilities are limitless as to what each state would decide to do with its autonomy. Theoretically a confederal system will grant each of the various peoples ample opportunity to be themselves and give their peculiarities full expression. The drawback of this possibility is that a national identity diminishes in inverse proportion to the increase in sectional or ethnic identity. Mobilization for national causes would be difficult to achieve, since there could hardly be any cause where every state would agree without any of them foot-dragging or trying to back out.

Another important point has been the implication for Nigeria's unity of either aligning with the capitalist West or Socialist East,31 or whether it were best to be politically non-aligned. It seems that Nigeria's position of greatest strength will be to remain politically non-aligned32 . That will enable it to enjoy the best that each political bloc has to offer without placing itself under the perpetual spell of any. It can enjoy full autonomy and always talk from a position of strength in world affairs. It can relate with a member of either bloc on a strictly business level as an equal partner, or it can feel free to go completely on its own without requiring any other country's endorsement.

It seems more realistic in the light of what has been said, to go instead for a non-party government.33 The advantage is that a non-party arrangement is spared all the defects of a multi-party system which have been pointed out in the last chapter, including: pressure on individuals to tow party lines rather than follow one's own conviction; party loyalty overriding national interests; reductionism arising from considering the country as a party and the majority as though it were the whole. The non-party arrangement will enable Nigerians to pick across the board the very best talents that could fill the positions of leadership, put them to work together according to a well-defined *modus operandi* based on the constitution, and dispense, at least for a while, with the expensive, rancorous, time-consuming, often confrontational partisan rhetoric. The blueprint for this kind of proposal is the family, which is the foundation of all society. In the family the members often have to discuss frankly in order to reach the best decision in the interest of the entire family.

The military government in Nigeria, apart from the fact that no mechanism has been provided for monitoring its leadership, seems to be operating according to what might be considered a zero-

party blueprint that is politically centrist. It can provide an interesting model with features that could be gainfully adopted in a civilian context:

a: It is essentially task-oriented.
b: There is no opposition on the basis of losers.
c: Appointment to public office is not the triumph of winners over losers but a recognition of personal competence.
d: Every office holder therefore stands or falls not on party loyalty or patronage, but by the effectiveness or otherwise with which he or she handles the responsibilities entrusted to him or her in the service of the country.

If this kind of model can be constitutionally established and refined and put into operation in a civilian context, it would be possible to hold political debates on national issues on the basis of what one frankly views as best for the country without having the party's interested policies in one's way. Everyone will be entitled to raise an objection, or contribute an idea to any point that needs either clarification or modification. Thus each point brought up for consideration has the chance of a tough but thorough and dispassionate discussion rather than a wholesale, uncritical endorsement by fellow party members, and guaranteed rejection by the members of the opposing party members. Finally, inordinate ambition for political position will be minimized such that those who want political appointments must compete for them on the basis of proven personal competence.

Nigeria must discover for herself the true meaning of democracy in its original sense. This will mean a substantial modification of the current understanding of the term on both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum. When Rome was faced with a similar situation Aristides encouraged Romans to hold on to their own system of democracy -- the Republic -- because it was better than the Greek versions and had the advantage of being "a blend of all political systems, without the faults associated with each."34 Basically a republican system is very much alive in traditional Nigerian society and can be updated to meet contemporary needs.

Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, has already taken the bold step of attempting to give the definition of democracy an African flavour. The definition he gives and the order of priority he outlines are different from what obtains in both the Western and the Eastern world. He once declared:

Our nation has neither the long tradition of nationhood, nor the strong physical means of national security which older countries take for granted. . . . Development must be considered first, and other matters examined in relation to it. Our question with regard to every matter -- even the issue of freedom -- must be, "How does this affect the progress of our National Development Plan?"35

To reach an application of democracy that is more meaningful and relevant, at least two models are available to Nigeria -- the Athenian model of Greek democracy and the pioneering effort of Julius Nyerere.

From the Athenian model the following features already familiar to the Nigerian mentality are evident:

1. Decision was by consensus in the *Ekklesia* or assembly.
2. The leaders were directly accountable to the community.

3. Accountability demanded that all holders of public office should not go abroad, or make donations, or administer property; and that their own personal property be held in security until they rendered the final accounts to the community.36

4. High ethical standards were expected of public officers.

5. There was political control of the armed forces and public officers to forestall such behaviours as indecent sexual behaviour and the abuse of public funds.

The Athenian democracy was indeed popular sovereignty at work. It protected the rule of law such that no individual would be able to claim immunity or place himself or herself above the law. In studying the Athenian democracy one sees that it is specifically forbidden for anyone to seize political power by force. Military regimes are denounced for the penchant for ruling by decrees rather than by the law. As Andokides points out in his *On the Mysteries*, this is unhealthy for democracy and an abuse of the constitution:

In no circumstances whatsoever may the authorities apply an unwritten law. . . . No decree, whether of the Council or of the people, may override the law. . . . No law applying to an individual may be passed, if it does not apply equally to all. . . .37

In *Against Timocrates*, Demosthenes pursues the point that no established law may be repealed, save in a legislative committee; and that anyone proposing that a law be repealed should have the onus of providing a better alternative or face the possibility of an indictment under the law that deals with the proposing of detrimental laws.38 This is a sure safeguard against erratic whimsical laws issued by people with no proper knowledge of the law, and who have placed themselves above the existing laws.

From Nyerere's model, the *Ujamaa* — the Swahili word for "working together" — features similar to those that obtained under the Athenian model are evident:

1. Decision was by consensus and not arbitrary.
2. There was the in-built system for monitoring the activities of public officers.
3. The leader used persuasion rather than coercion. He therefore led rather than ruled.
4. Political education included in the secondary school programme.
5. There was political control of the military establishment.
6. The leader led by personal witness of life and example.

Nyerere captured the African mind in his propositions. He based his system on the principle that power belongs to the people. His system was socialist, but provides a direct say to the people. Seeing no need for a distinction between a ruling party and the people, Nyerere preferred a single political party to which all belonged. The prime purpose of the party was to instill a sense of national purpose and identity into the populace, a purpose which was quite well realized. C. George Kahama, a long-time government official who worked under Nyerere said of him:

We call him Moses because he gave us the tablets of *Ujamaa*. With hindsight, I think those ideals have served us well. There are no riots in the streets of Tanzania. We have stability. We have basic national principles.39

In-built within the *ujamaa* system were avenues for individuals to appeal or protest against governmental decisions. The laws were simple and justice was speedy. There was also a permanent Commission of Enquiry which looked into the conduct of any person in public office to prevent abuse. Finally, the regime leaders were to apply persuasive rather than coercive means of social control, since viable socialist communities, argued Nyerere, could only be established with willing members.40 Nyerere's goal was to build a society in which all members had equal rights and equal opportunities; and in which all lived at peace without anyone suffering or inflicting injustice, exploiting or being exploited.41

He incorporated political education into the Tanzanian secondary school programme and the party had a youth wing in each school. To reach the grassroots, a system was created whereby every unit of ten houses in their towns and villages was designated a "cell." The cell leader was duly elected from among them and had the responsibility of explaining party policies, mobilizing groups for work and other projects, and channeling their complaints for consideration.42

Nyerere was able to steer beyond the pulls of tribalism43 and achieve a political control of the armed forces. He sought to restore to the people a sense of pride by reversing the negative, stereotypical definitions of the African by detractors.44 "The average Tanzanian," he declared, "is a rather hard-headed, but essentially malleable, citizen fully capable of effecting behavioral balance which will serve both self-interest and national needs. . . ."

In addition, Nyerere was able to effect policies that were unquestionably in the interest of both the people and democracy, and would rather have a country that is honourable and poor than one that mortgages its independence to foreign powers for the purpose of obtaining foreign aid. In his *Arusha Declaration* he asked:

How can we depend upon foreign governments and companies for the major part of our development without giving to those governments and countries a great part of our freedom to act as we please? The truth is that we cannot. . . .45

Nyerere's belief was that neither political independence nor material development is truly meaningful unless the direction and operation of independent development springs from the aspirations and labour of the citizenry. Chiefly because of his belief in indigenous African values, Tanzania is the only country in Africa with a native African national and official language — *Swahili*.46

Besides putting together a political system, Nyerere earned for himself credibility beyond question. He attempted to live the principles of the ideology he proclaimed by pursuing a frugal style of living, shunning pomp and ceremony, and by being disposed to sacrifice some degree of economic utility in order to maintain a consistency of approach. He thereby achieved at the same time a robust, philosophically coherent alternative to the extant political systems. In addition he left an impressive legacy of personal probity and integrity that speaks volumes in the field of social and political enterprise.

Democracy is not an abstract label for what politicians do in parliament, nor does it stop with casting votes in the ballot box. It pervades the socio-economic life of the community. It is the people having full control of their own destiny. The first step towards democracy is by preparing the mind through education. Education, particularly formal, structured education will take full account of the central issues involved in democracy and subject them to informed and vigorous critical analysis.

Questions about what democracy consists in, the moral basis of political legitimacy, how the respect for personal rights can be observed in a democracy, how good leadership is to be distinguished from bad, and what can be done to prevent or eradicate bad leadership must engage the attention of anyone who is genuinely interested in the democratic process.

John Dewey's description of democracy puts into sharper relief the contrast between leadership which enables human free spirit to thrive rather than being tethered to some inordinate form of external control:

Democracy is belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in ordered richness. Every other form of moral and social faith rests upon the idea that experience must be subjected at some point or other to some form of external control; to some 'authority' alleged to exist outside the process of experience. Democracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing process.47

Besides providing the principles for distinguishing between good and bad leadership, between good and bad government, the democratic principle is also interested in such other questions as, what it means to say that power belongs to the people; what the basis of popular sovereignty is, and what power and legitimate authority consist in. More globally, there could arise the question as to whether the sovereignty of one nation could legitimately override that of another. If the theory is well understood, the application is easier to put into effect.

Familiarity with the central issues prepares the mind effectively than the actual experience (in the role of a spectator) of politicians at work. The people are equipped to distinguish good politics from bad, a genuine political point from mere rhetoric, and true patriotism from pretence.

The questions proposed above are clearly complex ones requiring a considerable amount of intellectual competence in the field of history of ideas. This competence does not come overnight but must be built up over time by the students being exposed to simpler issues in their junior school years. Students can address such questions as: What makes a good leader? How do you distinguish between a good leader and a bad one? What does it mean to be law-abiding? Why be law abiding? In what consists political legitimacy? Such questions lend themselves to an analytic approach, which is by no means the only approach. A historical approach is also possible and useful. In a historical approach, students might begin on the global scale to study the lives of people whose greatness was as a result of rendering political or other service to their country — George Washington, Mahatma Gandhi, Charles de Gaulle, Winston Churchill, Mao Tse Tung, Vladimir Lenin, Otto von Bismarck, Kwame Nkrumah. The specific things that earned them a place in history — fighting for their country or judicious, selfless leadership in serving or uniting their country — would be able to inform, inspire and motivate the students. Then the contributions of specific national figures to specific national issues can provide yet more inspiration for the young.

Education supplies the enlightenment required for effective application of the universal suffrage which Nigerians already enjoy. As Mortimer J. Adler points out, without education universal suffrage produces an ignorant electorate and amounts to a travesty of democratic institutions and processes. The one without the other is a perilous delusion. In the past as Nigeria tried to grapple with Western-style democracy, it was sufficient for someone to stand up and tell his people: "I want you to vote for so-and-so; see his picture; his electoral symbol is so-and-so; just press your inked thumb on the little square besides his picture." The result was always

complete chaos, and most of the time the ballots were manipulated. The words of Mortimer J. Adler hold true when he said: "Suffrage without schooling produces mobocracy not democracy -- not the rule of law, not constitutional government by the people as well as for them."48 The mobocracy that seems to have been Nigeria's lot has shown itself in seven military coups and only two constitutional governments in twenty-nine years.

Nigeria's road to democracy has been checkered by the constant involvement of the military in government. In 1985 the then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major General Tunde Idiagbon, gloated over the idea that his group was 'not running a democracy!', and warned vocal malcontents of the possibility of severe reprisals for 'unpatriotic activities'. It is doubtful if Nigeria can understand democracy while operating a dictatorship.

Some people have proposed Diarchy as a way to pacify the military while operating a full democracy.49 Diarchy is not a viable option for the following reasons: The military establishment is all about issuing and obeying orders. Their rule is by decree and they get to implement them through the barrel of the gun. Their entry into government is through seizing power by force. On accession to power their first act is usually to suspend the country's constitution and issue such decrees as suit them. By such acts the military fail to be bound by the constitution, fail in respect for the democratic process and impose their presence, on an intimidated citizenry.50 They institutionalize force as a way of getting into power.

Notes

1. John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 1967-1970 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 8.

2. 1 Sam 17; 21:9; 22:10.

3. Aristotle believed that it is possible to have one, a few, or many, rule for common interest in each of the three forms of government. But he did rank democracy among the bad forms of government, next only to tyranny and oligarchy. See his *Politics*, Chapter 3:7-8.

4. *Ibid*., 1266a3-17b10.

5. Louis J. Halle, *The Ideological Imagination* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1985), p.17.

6. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part I, Chapter 14 (Middlesex, England: Penguin Classics, 1985), pp. 189ff.

7. George Orwell, *1984* (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1984), p. 5.

8. Thomas Hobbes, *op. cit.,* p. 218.

9. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Of the Social Contract*, Book I, Chapter VI (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 180.

10. The idea of freedom is contradictory to the idea of force. Hobbes' defines freedom or liberty as "the absence of external impediments: which impediments, may take away part of a man's power to what he would." (*Leviathan*, p. 189).

11. *Ibid*, Book II, Chapter III.

12. The concept of "General Will" as used by Rousseau goes against the concept of self-determination which democracy builds on. The *coup de grace* is delivered by the denaturalization of humans in the process of achieving the general will. If anything, this theory can could hardly make it in the most basic Nigerian society where the people are republican in their decision-making process.

13. Marx's theory for example, is based on a criticism of capitalism where a few propertied people hold the masses in their employ and make profits on them. Such a scenario has no

equivalent in traditional Nigerian society, for everyone was heir to his parent's lands and property and could only sell them in times of grave need. Landed property is rarely sold in perpetuity. Rather the "buyer" would hold it in trust for a token sum over an agreed period of years after which the owner would reclaim it. Where it is sold in perpetuity, eg. to someone who wants to build a home, the latter would either exchange an equivalent piece of land elsewhere or provide the amount needed to purchase an equivalent in case the former would someday decide to build. The point being made here is that neither the communist theory nor the capitalist practice that provoked it, can be exactly applicable in Nigeria. The population is largely agrarian and each person is self-employed. One cannot talk of a class structure in a society that is egalitarian. By a similar process of elimination most other Euro-based theories can be shown to be unsuited to Nigeria.

14. At the present moment Nigeria is experimenting with a two-party system. That removes the fear many people have of a one-party government with the risk of degenerating into a dictatorship. At the same time it avoids the polarization that has often characterized previous attempts at multi-party arrangements.

15. The fact that some of the people cited as example were dictatorial in their ways is not to be taken that I advocate authoritarianism. The focus is the cohesion they did achieve for their various countries.

16. J.-J.Rousseau, "The Social Contract" in *Social Contract: Locke, Hume, Rousseau*, edited with an introduction by Sir Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 179.

17. The desire to keep one's job is very important indeed in any type of political or professional arrangement. There is a difference though between keeping one's job within the party and earning one's place in a non-party arrangement. The former involves conformity with party policies whether one agrees with it or not; the latter involves a full, judicious use of one's faculties and abilities untrammeled by any partisan bottlenecks.

18. For a detailed discussion of the plight of the minority in a majority-based government, see J.S. Mill's *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government*, edited by H.B. Acton (London, Melbourne and Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1977), pp. 256-275.

19. What comes immediately to mind is the sad drama of mowing down demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Peking. The Chinese government claims that the demonstrations have been at the instigation of the US Central Intelligence Agency. From the twenty-four hour radio/TV live coverage of the events here in the United States, with the opening of telephone hot-lines with call-collect services, one tends to agree that the American government was involved. Governments are not known for letting other countries dictate to them how to run their own affairs. Hence the stiff resistance to the promptings of the media and the decisive crackdown. Furthermore, no government, unless overwhelmed by the forces of opposition, will throw in the towel simply because students angrily demonstrate.

20. Ignace Lepp, *The Authentic Morality*, Translated by Bernard Murchland (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 151.

21. *Ibid*. p. 155.

22. Quoting a recent article "The World in the 1990s" published in the London-based *The Economist*, Joe Slovo gives an impressive statistic of the progress made in the Soviet Union since the Bolshevik Revolution: "There are more graduate engineers than in the U.S., more graduate research scientists than in Japan and more medical doctors per head than in Western Europe. It has also produced more steel, fuel and energy than any other country. . . . How many capitalist countries can match the achievements of most of the socialist world in the provision of social security, child care, the ending of cultural backwardness, and so on? There is certainly no country

in the world which can beat Cuba's record in the sphere of health care." See Joe Slovo, *Has Socialism Failed?*, A South African Communist Party Pamphlet, Published by Inkululeko Publications, P.O. Box 902 London N19 3YY, 1990, p. 1.

23. The Biafran crisis has continually raised the question in Nigeria as to which system serves best in protecting the interest of all groups. Nigeria is a federation but claims are that Igbos were singled out for decimation in the pogroms of 1966, and no longer feeling safe under the umbrella of Nigeria, want self-determination. The secession did not work out and there are suggestions in some quarters that a looser form of federation might be able to pacify all the groups so that none would feel cheated or swallowed up.

24. *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* (1979), Chapter II, 22.

25. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 136.

26. *Ibid*.

27. *Ibid.*

28. In spite of its weaknesses nationalism can be described as a political virtue; it is a "virtue of the moment", so to speak; just as courage could be described as a virtue of the moment, since it comes into play whenever the situation warrants it manifestation. And when the situation is resolved it yields place to the more perfect and more sober form of patriotism. The term "political virtue" must needs be clarified a bit. A "political virtue" is not necessarily a moral virtue. As a matter of fact it can sometimes constitute an obstacle in the way of moral virtue, especially when the reasoning behind it is merely one about securing a political advantage rather than consideration for morals. The consideration here is when it is morally neutral, that is, when it is amoral.

29. Ignace Lepp, *The Authentic Morality*, translated by Bernard Murchland (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1985), pp. 131-135.

30. By territorialism here I mean a fascination for laying claims to some territory as a way of asserting one's own sovereignty. It is territorialism that is the motivating force for all the other characteristics subsequently identified.

31. Recent political developments in the Eastern Bloc countries are rapidly rendering this distinction out of date.

32. The substance of Nigeria's non-alignment was a major topic of discussion in 1969. Because of the Civil War experience, Nigeria was able to expand ties with the Soviet Union without feeling constrained by the Western powers. This expansion of ties had the further effect of deterring greater interference by Western powers (on the side of Biafra) and ensuring support from the radical members of the OAU. Cf. John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970*, p. 378.

33. The zero-party system has been tried in Nepal, but recent unrests in that country give the impression that it has failed. What did actually undermine it was the king's undisguised despotism which he disguised under the name of a zero party while he retained limitless political and legislative powers for himself alone. Therefore the zero-party was not given the opportunity to thrive and therefore Nepal's case could hardly be cited absolutely without qualification.

34. Aristides, *To Rome*, p. 9.

35. Nyerere, Julius, "President Nyerere Opens Dar es Salaam University College Campus," 21 August, 1964 (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1987), p. 17.

36. Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 9-12, See Rodenwald, p. 12.

37. Andokides, *On the Mysteries* 82-87, See Rodenwald, p. 20.

38. Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates* 33, See Rodenwald, p. 21.

39. Neil Henry, "Nyerere Bows Out With Tanzania in Deep Decline," *The Washington Post*, Wednesday, September 26, 1990, p. A21.

40. Julius Nyerere, *Interim Constitution of Tanganyika 1965* (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967), p. 32.

41. See John R. Nellio, *A Theory of Ideology: the Tanzanian Example* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 102.

42. One's instincts would send an immediate caution signal here; what starts off in pursuance of an ideal of reaching out to the grassroots can later degenerate into a system of governmental control - the secret police who are government informants against fellow citizens. Nyerere's experiment never came to that but no one should be so naive as to rule out the possibility of such a development.

43. In a tribute to Nyerere as he bowed out finally from the political scene, an unnamed American official resident in Tanzania said of his impact on the national life of his country: "Even though there are 120 tribes here, I also think Tanzania has a larger sense of national identity than most countries in Africa." Cf. Henry, Neil, "Nyerere Bows Out With Tanzania in Deep Decline", *The Washington Post*, Wednesday, September 26, 1990, p. A21.

44. In December 1962, American Democratic Senator Ellender of the State of Louisiana at a news conference in Southern Rhodesia, in apparent defense of white oligarchy in that country said: "The average African is incapable of leadership except through the assistance of Europeans,"*Time Magazine*, December 7, 1962, p. 22.

45. Julius Nyerere, *The Arusha Declaration, TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1987), pp. 10-11.

46. Neil Henry, *Washington Post*, *loc. cit.*

47. John Dewey, "Creative Democracy — the Task Before Us," *The Philosophy of the Common Man: Essays in Honour of John Dewey to Celebrate His Eightieth Birthday*, ed. by Sidney Ratner (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), pp. 220f.; See also Eugene Freeman, ed., *The Abdication of Philosophy: Philosophy and the Public Good* (Illinois: Open Court La Salle, 1976), p. 102.

48. Adler, *op. cit*., p. 3.

49. Diarchy is a Greek concept first proposed as an ideological option for Nigeria by Nigeria's former President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. It is a system whereby there would be two wings of government -- the civilian and the military. Under this arrangement there will be no necessity for the military to try to overthrow constitutional government, since they would already be part of it. This over optimistic view is not borne out by facts since of the six military coups carried out in Nigeria since independence, only two have been against an elected government. The rest have been military against military.

50. The General Provisions Part I no. 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states as follows: "This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria." Yet in the tumultuous year of 1966 alone, five (Suspension and Modification) Decrees 1, 17 n. 3, 50 n. 7, 55 n. 8, 69 n. 10, were promulgated by the military. Later in 1967 the Repeal and Restoration Decree and the Constitution (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree followed. What is more, the Military Government issued in 1970 The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree. By this decree, they decisively placed the Constitutions underfoot and made themselves above every law. (Source: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (With the Amendments), 1979, pp. 143-144.

Chapter XI

The Role of the Civil Society in the Establishment and Maintenance of a Democratic Society in Nigeria

Abubakar S. Mohammed

Background

Nigeria was a creation of British colonialism in the later parts of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Before the arrival of the British the area covered by the present day Nigeria was composed of some kingdoms and republican communities. There was a lot of interaction among the various groups especially through trade and diplomacy.

The forceful imposition of British colonialism on the hitherto independent politics in the area brought about the economic and political subjugation of the communities. Colonial rule was of course meant for the benefit of the colonizing power. So it created a series of structures in order to assist it in achieving its objectives. Some of these structures were a police and army, bureaucracy, labour force, infrastructure, etc. The colonial system was a brutal and dictatorial system. Hence, the exploitation and oppression that it imposed on the communities attracted a rebellious response which culminated in the struggle for independence by the colonized subjects. Independence was subsequently achieved after a lot of struggles and negotiations short of an armed rebellion in 1960. The few lessons that were taught to the Nigerian people in democracy were at the tail end of colonial rule. They were never allowed to exercise self-rule throughout the colonial period. So, on the eve of independence, structures of British parliamentary democracy were hurriedly erected but with a lot of flaws, e.g., political parties were set up on a regional and ethnic basis, the parliamentary system of Britain was imposed on Nigeria with the assumption that since it had succeeded in Britain it would succeed in the former colony, fears of minority groups were swept under the carpet, etc.

On October 1, 1960, Nigeria became an independent sovereign nation within the British commonwealth. There was a democratically elected government in power which was set up by one of the three regionally-based parties in coalition with a second one. The third party formed the opposition in parliament.

In less than six years the political system had generated so much political tension and crisis that it had to be overthrown by the military in 1966. The after-effects of the political crisis, mainly, (1) struggle over the control of the Federal Government which held the major economic resources and took the most crucial political decisions; and (2) fears of domination of one part of the country by another, led to a series of coups and eventually a Civil War which lasted for 30 months from 1967 to 1970. The four regions were divided up into 12 states in order to give the minority groups some measure of self-rule.

At the end of the Civil War the military set up a program of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. This included a political program to return the country to a democratically elected government in 1976. When the time approached the military government in power reneged on this promise. This was also the period of the oil boom for the country. In 1975 another military regime took over the reins of power, lodging accusations of misrule, corruption and the failure to keep to their promise of returning the country to democracy, against the previous regime.

The new military regime of 1975 drew up a timetable to return the country to democracy in 1979. This program was faithfully executed. The 12-state structure was reformed into 19 states to further allay the fears of minority groups and to give them more autonomy for self-determination.

Out of the scores of political parties that sprung up to contest for power in the return to civil rule, only five were officially recognized and registered to contest for the 1979 elections. This time around a new constitution was drafted which adopted the American Presidential System of democracy before the return to civil rule One of the five registered political parties won the election amidst accusations of election rigging and partiality on the part of the military towards the party that won. Three of the five parties also had some regional basis, reminiscent of the first republic (1960-66).

The economy was buoyant and the politicians had a field day. The structures of the Presidential system were too numerous and too expensive for the country to bear. The elected politicians, in spite of the training that they got in the new presidential system, operated as if it were the British parliamentary system. There was a lot of confusion and muddle which angered the electorate. There was also a lack of political and financial accountability. There were a lot of frivolities and tomfoolery in the running of the democratic experiment of the second republic.

After completing the first term of office in 1983, it was time for elections. There was a lot of political violence and intimidation. The ruling party of course made use of its incumbency to ensure its return to power. Meanwhile an economic recession had set in as one of the turning cycles of the international oil market. Thus the second term of the ruling party in the second republic lasted for only three months.

The military took over the reins of power on December 31, 1983. The regime was very repressive though some observers believed it had the best of intentions in tackling the problems of the nation. The worsening economic situation, the bad human rights records of the government, and the debt burden of the nation, weighed so heavily on the regime that it had to be overthrown by another military government in August, 1985.

The military government which came to power in August, 1985 is the present ruling regime. It had set up a transition program to democracy by 1992. The constitution has been revised and the military have organized two political parties which shall contest for power in three stages from local governments, to states, to national elections, between 1990 and 1992, when the government will be handed over to a civilian- elected political party. The government has created two more states and now there are 21. There are criticisms of the manipulation and stage- managing of the transition program but the military are committed to carrying out their orders. Hence the citizens are anxiously looking forward to the third republic with a lot of trepidations.

The Failure of the Western Structures of Democracy

As we have noted in the background, the experience of Nigeria with Western democratic structures has not been a story of success. A number of reasons could be adduced to explain why this was so.

The Colonial Experience

The colonial experience could not have prepared any country for democracy. Colonialism's only tool of politics was force. It denied the nation the right to self-determination until colonialism was overthrown. The hasty and feeble preparations for democratic rule on the eve of independence

did not benefit the nation very much. It could not be stable, as it was only a "crash program." The military and the bureaucracy were the most powerful tools of subjugating and ruling the people under colonialism. It was not a surprise that these were the same undemocratic forces that have continued to be dominant in the society.

The Conflict of Values

The conflict of values between the Western notion of politics and the African notion of politics has not provided a fertile ground for Western democratic structures to be easily copied in Africa and Nigeria. I shall illustrate this with three points:

1. The Notion of a Parliamentary Opposition. This notion has no counterpart in African politics. It is completely alien. In the kingdoms that preceded colonialism, once a new king was appointed, everybody including those who contested for the throne with him declared allegiance and loyalty to him. Similarly, in the republican communities where village-level democracy was practiced akin to that of the Greek city-states, decisions were always arrived at by *consensus*. Hence the notion of a parliamentary opposition as a necessary feature of Western democracy tried to create enemies where none existed in Africa. On the other hand, where an opposition tried to exist, it was either bought over to the ruling party ("cross-carpeting") or it was bullied, intimidated and destroyed.

2. The Notion of Separation of Powers. The notion of separation of powers as a necessary feature of Western democracy does not seem to have any corresponding notion in African politics. For instance the kings and community elders were in full control of the political system. They had to take full responsibility for running the affairs of the society. This does not mean that there were no checks and balances against arbitrary rules. Nor does it mean that there was no accountability of the rulers to the citizens. There was a division of labour in running the affairs of state and there were very strong sanctions against misrule which were often invoked when necessary. Hence, the efforts by the West to impose the notion of the separation of powers has not succeeded in Africa and Nigeria. Hence, in the modern democratic setting an African president would like to feel that he is fully in control of the affairs of state. Where he encounters any challenges to his authority he would not hesitate to remove the source of such obstruction by using a "carrot and stick" policy.

3. Corporate vs. Individual Interests. The emphasis of Western democracy on the sanctity of individual rights is contrary to the notion of the collective interests of the community as a corporate body in Africa and Nigeria. The individual's status and rights are meaningless outside the group to which he/she belongs. The welfare of the individual is judged from the welfare of the community and vice-versa. The contradiction of individualism within democracy is a difficult notion for Africans to assimilate.

Specific Problems

The Absence of Political and Financial Accountability

Elected politicians in Africa tended to perceive their election as a license not to be accountable to the electorate both politically and financially. Hence, the links between the politicians and the citizens come alive only during the elections when all kinds of promises are made to secure the votes of the electorate. Hence, the politicians take a lot of political decisions which are

indefensible, e.g., when a governor decides to establish a university or industry funded by the government in his home village. Similarly, the senators and representatives may decide to allocate certain resources to themselves far out of proportion to what they are entitled. The politicians also do not feel obliged to explain or justify their decisions and actions to the citizens.

The whole anathema of democracy without accountability in the Western fashion becomes so nauseating to the citizens that they would yearn for change from any quarters including the military.

Exploitation of National Divisions

Most African countries were colonial creations. Hence, the issue of national unity is on top of the national agenda in these countries. This problem has led to a lot of internal strife and secessionist tendencies.

In the absence of a solid ideological political base that could cut across the nation, the politicians exploit the various national divisions in order to be relevant in the multi-party system which is a necessary feature of Western democracy. Hence, the politicians fall back on regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious basis for support in the electoral race for office. This process breeds a lot of antagonism and prejudice between different sections of the nation. It heightens the fears of minorities and weakens the collective strength of the nation. These developments under democracy have divorced it from peace. The turbulence and violence that go along with politicking make the citizenry feel intimidated and become more concerned about peace than democratic rights.

Subversion of the Democratic Process

One of the major causes of the failure of Western democracy in Africa is the subversion of the democratic process by the politicians. Election-rigging is one of the principal justifications for the military to overthrow a democratic government in Africa. In order to ensure their continued perpetuation in power, African politicians would be ready to do whatever they could notwithstanding its implications for the democratic process. For instance, constitutions can always be amended to extend the stay of a government in power. A one-party state can be legislated to pocket all political opponents. Political opponents could be detained without trial. Media houses could be closed down or banned. Impartial judges could be sacked, especially in political cases. In the end the culmination of the subversion of the democratic process produces an oligarchy that could rule for 20 to 30 years. These failures of the Western structures of democracy usually prepare the grounds and provide the justification for military intervention in politics.

Military Rule as an Aberration

If there is any political issue on which there is a consensus in Nigeria, it is the notion that "military rule is an aberration." Not even the military has convinced itself that it can be a substitute for a democratic form of government in Nigeria. Notwithstanding the justification for any military seizure of power, the soldiers are always very eager to assure the citizenry that they would return power to an elected civilian government at a given date. Similarly on the part of the population once a military regime is considered to have overstayed in power, demands would be made for its return to the barracks. Often, recent military regimes in Nigeria have developed the fear of being ousted from power by a civil uprising.

In spite of the collective unacceptability of military rule as the norm in Nigeria, there are a few features of this form of government which the citizens appreciate. For instance the military are perceived to engender a greater sense of national unity because they run their administration more or less on a unitary basis though the nation is officially a federation. In terms of political decision-making the military are viewed to be less partisan than the civilian politicians. For instance most of the decisions to create more states in the country were taken during military regimes. The military is a task-oriented institution and it brings this to bear on its style of administration. For instance the military believes in leaving behind as legacy of its achievements in terms of physical construction. Hence, a lot of physical development is recorded during military administrations, e.g., the present military government has set up a Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI).

The critics of military administration have pointed out that the military are most politically accountable to the population when they are in power. The military have also been lucky to rule the country when its economic fortunes were at the brightest. Hence, they were able to achieve a lot of physical development but they also became corrupted in the process.

The internal rivalry within the military for political appointments and the largesse that goes with it has become a matter of concern to the military establishment. The long involvement of the military in political administration (e.g., Nigeria has been independent for 30 years; elected governments ruled the country for a total of about 10 years only; the rest of the period was under the control of military dictatorships) has affected the professionalism of the organization. The most professional of the military are seriously concerned about this and its implications for the future of the establishment. This is why some of the military are absolutely committed to the political transition program of the present regime in the interest of their military profession.

The human rights record of the military is an unacceptable aspect of their administration to all democracy-loving citizens. Hence, periods of military rule in Nigeria witness a lot of conflict between the establishment on the one hand and what are considered to be the democratic forces on the other hand, namely, the mass media, intellectuals, labour unions, student associations, professional bodies and human rights organizations. Military regimes have been associated with the banning of such associations and the detention of their members without trial.

The other obnoxious dimension of military rule is its method of legislation. It rules by decrees. The decrees could be made to take retroactive effect. The decrees cannot be challenged in courts of law. In some cases the human rights chapter of the Constitution has to be suspended for the decrees to be effective because they violate the fundamental rights of the citizens. Sometimes the decrees are personalized in order to deal with particular individuals or issues. One can perceive that at this rate military rule drifts into arbitrariness and even brigandage.

Thus, the unacceptability of military rule as a norm to the critical and democratically-minded Nigerian citizenry and the fact that the military as an institution has not convinced itself that it should continue ruling the country perpetually leads to the evolution of a political transition program by almost every military administration to return the country to democratic rule.

The Civil Society: Composition and Role in Democracy

The civil society is usually defined as the independent portion of the society which is not part of the ruling class nor does it form part of the structures of government nor its apparatus. Hence, the civil society should be in a position to exercise some independent political action.

In the Nigerian context the civil society could be said to compose of the labour movement, student movement, women's associations, professional associations (e.g., Nigerian Bar Association, Nigerian Union of Journalists, Nigerian Medical Association, etc.), human rights organizations, and religious associations. The peasantry is the weakest link in the chain of the civil society in view of the lack of a national organization of peasants, its low level of education and articulation. Of course, this does not write off the peasantry as a potential force in the struggle for democracy. Some of the most remarkable struggles against injustice have been waged by peasants in Nigeria.

The characteristics of the civil society will shed some light on its potentials in the struggle for democracy in Nigeria.

Democratic Organizations. The various components of the civil society that have been identified are democratic organizations. Their operations are guided by rules and regulations. They elect their leadership democratically. They also pursue some noble objectives vis à vis the national interests as distinct from the rulers' interests.

Fundamental Rights. The organizations identified uphold the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens. This makes them take a partisan position in favor of democracy if faced with a choice. Hence, such organizations do not only struggle for the narrow interests of their members but invariably for the larger benefits of the citizenry in general, e.g., The Nigerian Labour Congress's "Workers Charter of Demands," 1980 and The Nigerian Students's "Charter of Demands," 1982.

Possession of Social Power. The various components of civil society seem weak on the surface level but they possess an enormous amount of social power which could be used in advancing the cause of democracy. For instance, labour power is such an important force that it cannot be ignored in any society. Hence, the collective social power of the civil society in addition to its numerical strength could be put at the service of democracy.

High Level of Consciousness. The knowledge and skills that are possessed by the civil society enable it to achieve a high level of consciousness. Certainly for democracy to thrive it demands a high level of consciousness and articulateness on the part of the citizenry. At the moment the political process in Nigeria excludes this vast reservoir of the nations' talent from participating effectively.

There are various roles that the civil society can play to ensure the establishment and maintenance of a democratic society in Nigeria as follows:

1. Participation. The civil society must participate actively and effectively in the political process for democracy to be realized in Nigeria. The present situation whereby the most articulate sections of the society are banned from participation in the political process or the conditions for participation makes it impossible for them to participate must be seen as an impediment to democracy. The participation of the civil society in politics will raise the quality of politics and move the trend towards the politics of issues rather than the politics of personalities.

2. 'Watchdog' function. The civil society can act as an effective watchdog in the political process. In view of its high level of consciousness and commitment to the rule of law it can monitor and oversee compliance with democratic rules and regulations.

3. Sanctions. If the ruling class fails to heed the admonitions of the civil society to abide by the tenets of democracy, the civil society should not hesitate to mobilize its social power, as a

sanction against misrule. In politics the failure of moral persuasion can only be supported by some form of power, not necessarily military power. For instance, suggestions have been made that if a democratically elected government is overthrown by the military, all workers, students and professionals should stay at home until the military returns to its proper place. Another extreme view is to engage the military forcefully in the contest for power.

4. Counterforce to the Military. As a form of check and balance, it is only the civil society that can act as a viable counterforce to the military in the country. The civil society is the only force that can prevent the military from taking over power or force it to hand over power to a democratically elected government. This has happened twice in the history of the Sudan and the Nigerian military and they are aware and afraid of this specter!

Conclusion

Nigeria is faced with a multitude of problems such that sometimes people do not accord the necessary priority to the quest for democracy. Much as democracy will provide a conducive atmosphere for the resolution of these problems they cannot be ignored. Some of these problems include:

1. The survival and unity of the nation;
2. The need to drastically improve on the quality of life of the citizenry on the basis of the agricultural and mineral resources of the country;
3. The resolution of the national question in such a way as to allay the fears of minority groups;
4. The need to actualize the industrial power of the country which would form the basis for solving many of the problems of underdevelopment in Nigeria; and
5. Hence, if the above issues are properly addressed then democracy will be more meaningful to the lives of the ordinary citizens and they would be ready to make the necessary sacrifices for the establishment and maintenance of democracy.

As for the form of democracy that could be viable, I would suggest a corporate democracy whereby various national organizations should elect their representatives to a national congress. The states should elect representatives to the senate. The congress and the senate should elect a government to rule the country periodically. The same process should be adopted for the states and local governments. On the other hand, a multi-party system could be allowed to exist until some major dominant parties evolve out of a long process of natural weeding. This is given the assumption that all sections of the society will have an equal access to participation in the political process.

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Chapter XII
Institutional Patterns in Social Transformation

Joseph Abah

Introduction

Living in the 20th century has become a very precarious exercise. These days very few things are good for your health. The air you breathe, the food you eat, the water you need, are all bad for you. Even exercising can lead to untimely death.

One other area that has the potential of being inimical to good living is the field of theorizing. Theories are much more than words that attempt to describe the realities of human life. They also have the power to create and shape realities. The process of theorizing can be said to consist of three dimensions: "the intellectuals who define reality, the power wielders who shape the world to conform to the definitions, and the others who are called upon to suffer in consequence of those enterprises."1

In developing societies the problems that present themselves often require urgent solutions. Policy makers in these regions are usually faced with situations that require urgent action. It is this part of the world, however, that can least afford the luxury of being distanciated from reality. For them the consequences of theories are often too real.

It is also among such peoples, in social settings characterized by rapid change, that the mythical qualities of theories assume their most potent form. For it is through myths "that men are lifted above their captivity in the ordinary, attain powerful visions of the future, and become capable of collective actions to realize such visions."2 For those living on the precarious margins of existence, the idea of progress, of modernization, of change for the better, can elicit something on the level of messianic hopes and expectations. In this sense, ideas and slogans often acquire levels of magnitude that frequently exceed their original intentions.

Western institutions have always been cited as standards and examples to be followed. Yet, Western industrial capitalism as we know it today was established at great human cost. And attempts to repeat this "successful transformation" in various societies have frequently been accompanied by great levels of brutality and violation of the sanctity and dignity of human life.

It on this score that it becomes important to re-examine such concepts as standards, and norms, either with regard to institutional structures or processes.

Democracy has been defined as a government of the people, for the people, by the people. In essence, we assume the existence of appropriate institutions within which individuals are able to exercise certain rights that pertain to them as human persons and as citizens.

Does the concept of democracy entail a moral dimension? Is it enough that one express interest only in the democratic practice within one's own country?

So far we have idealized certain 20th century democracies as worthy of emulation, especially on the part of developing nations. We have in fact gone from idealizing to insistence, and propaganda. In the latter half of this century, this has taken place under the back-drop of the threat of communism. A good number of developing nations have had to learn a hard and unforgettable lesson, by presuming they are capable of defining what form democratic institutions ought to take in the light of their societal experience. Those who at the start of their independence had declared a socialist stance have had to pay an enormous price in human costs, from Angola to Nicaragua to

Cambodia. A lesson that has been consistently driven home with utmost clarity is that the "real" democracy must be defended, and protected, both at home and abroad. That this might entail the destabilization of a popular, even if "illegitimate," government has so far not appeared to be an important consideration.

The inescapable conclusion is that people are free to choose only when the choice is by means of popular elections and institutions that meet some normative standards. There are occasions, however, when the choice is not between candidates, but between two conditions that are equally reprehensible. People sometimes must choose between tolerating a non-democratic regime, or a situation of indefinite and protracted internecine warfare. There are nations today whose development has been scaled back several decades because choices were made for them, and for what was considered "their own good," by democratic countries. Where the consequences of choice involve human lives, it appears there is a moral requirement that the majority of people have a say in choices that determine whether they live or die. Whether the outcome of their involvement leads to a true democracy or not then becomes a secondary issue.

The point at issue is people's ability and freedom to evolve their own institutions, corresponding to their structure of values. The problem, as Robert Michels and Max Weber observed a long time ago, is neither capitalism nor socialism, but rather the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy.3 In other words it is less a question of institutional type but rather one of the pattern of organization. In this sense, they predicated that bureaucracy and oligarchy will tend to be equally evident in both socialist and capitalist governments.

Others have, on this premise, proceeded to outline "required" stages for the institutionalization of democracy and economic growth for societies in transition.4 Thus the first phase is urbanization, followed by education and the growth of the media, and finally industrialization. Criteria based on these assumptions have frequently been used to organize and evaluate institutions or programs for developing nations. Alvin Toffler is one among several recent writers, who had drawn attention to the severe limitations of the Western models. These institutions are not only proving inadequate and inefficient for the West; they are even less appropriate for African countries in search of modernization.

Weber has shown that the great institutions of the West arose as expressions of a people's system of values. These institutions were in turn highly instrumental in the subsequent industrial development of the Western world.

What gives rise to institutions, therefore, is the freedom people have to affirm or redefine their values through appropriate institutions. African nations, like most developing countries, have been indelibly imprinted with alien cultures, through contacts and especially through adopting Western institutions.

The question then is no longer how to return to some form of "cultural purity" or how to keep culture and values intact and free of "contamination," but rather the availability of means for individuals to participate in the ongoing process of redefinition of their values. Such means would consist mostly of democratic institutions, characterized by voluntarism and autonomy.

The Process of Institutionalization

Social values arise from a crystallization of group experience. They reflect the degree of significance or emphasis attached to objects, behaviors and relationships in so far as they satisfy individual or group needs.

Their meaning and significance can be understood only in the realm of human activity: production of food; organizing institutions to fulfill social needs; the use of symbols; intellectual activities; ideological movements. Human existence, however, says Berger and Luckmann, necessarily takes place in a context of order, direction and stability.5 Hence in the course of time these values acquire objective reality for the group in question, and thus come to be required of every member of the group.6 Once formed these values serve as frames of reference for individual members of the group, determining to a large degree their choices and preferences. Social values are thus interiorized in individuals as attitudes, motivations, and aspirations.7

It is the habitualization of human activity, the need to reproduce with an economy of effort, frequently occurring human actions that create a recognizable pattern, or sense of order. These patterned activities are typified, or assigned "standard weights," so that they can be anticipated in given situations, and it is these that give rise to institutions.8 Human activities then are given a more potent and visible form in social institutions. As a result an institution consists of values that indicate a people's lived experience. One can thus predict that the number of institutions in a society would be in direct proportion to the number of values the society holds in high regard (legal, political, economic, family, military, educational, aesthetic, religious, philanthropic, ecological). The institution then is an organized tendency among a social group, and it involves a corresponding system of values.9

With time an institution comes to assume a certain quality whereby it is experienced as existing apart from the individuals in whom it may be presently embodied. That is to say, the institution acquires an objectivity, a reality of its own, "a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact."10 It is only in this way that the institution can effectively transmit social values or tradition. Both as objective facticities (undeniable facts) as well as through their mechanisms of control, institutions come to exert coercive power over the individual.11 Therefore not only can institutions be guarantors of values, they also do initiate values. Ultimately institutions themselves acquire the quality of values, and become valued in and of themselves. Nonetheless, on account of its historical dimension, the institution is still a construct or product of human activity, what Bergher and Luckmann have called "objectivated human activity." In other words even though the institution is accorded legitimation by which it is able to justify its existence, it does not thereby acquire an ontological dimension, distinct from its human origin.12

It does not appear necessary, therefore, that the source of legitimation be a legally constituted body such as the state. Some, however, hold the opinion that it is only when such relationships are accorded status by the state that they become institutions. However as Hertzler pointed out, one can think of several institutions, notable religions, that not only exist independently of the state, but in principle seek to distance themselves from the political structure.

The point, however, is that there does not have to be some clearly identifiable body such as the state, for an institution to be accorded the status of legitimacy. There are usually other constraining social forces that can equally give sanction and approval to institutions. This is especially the case in traditional, non-literate societies. Frequently this takes the form of public opinion. When disapproval comes from "significant others" or a group, the membership of which one considers important, it leads to a lowering of esteem, a situation that produces a powerful incentive to conform.

Social and political groups readily accord institutions the sanctions they need in order to perform. They are willing to do so on account of their experience of the practical usefulness of the institution. And this precisely is what is really at issue. It is this more than anything else that ought to determine the utility or appropriateness of an institutional form. To properly evaluate the

appropriateness or usefulness of an institution in a new situation, it is essential that one identify the social values that gave form to and inhere in the institution. This is particularly important because as an institution lives and grows, it produces a system of values that has reference to the growth development of a particular social group.

The values we place on foods, on dress, on furniture, on what constitutes technology, on a system of education, on a political system, on occupations such as law, science, medicine, teaching, these are all outcomes of a particular institutional development. In other words, each institution representing these values has origins which are tied to the experience of a particular group of people. Thus the present educational system can be said to be a product of a particular confluence of economic, historical, political, intellectual and historical developments.13

Since in every society, the individual engages in activities that are continually directed by institutions, his ideas and priorities are, ultimately, outcomes of the structure of institutions he has been exposed to.

Educational Goals

An issue developing societies must face is the question of adaptation to Western technology. Adapting to Western technology carries a number of price tags. It entails a re-conceptualization of an entire value system. The consequences often observed include unemployment, mass migration to cities, rural decay, and social unrest. If their value system is to be protected, peoples of developing nations need to carry out a thorough analysis of their technological needs, and the social costs. Since science and technology are products of an educational system, for education to lead the efforts toward a social transformation, it must be shaped by or at least reflect the value structure of its social environment. Again the problem is not so much what type of institution or technology is most appropriate, but rather how the choice is arrived at. It is an organizational problem.

It is interesting to note that when people ask for education, they may not always have a clear grasp of nor be able to clearly formulate what exactly it is they wish for. The educational statements of developing nations often encompass very wide goals. However, it is usually clear that they want more than mere training, mere diversion or knowledge of facts. By education, people appear to be seeking for "ideas that would make the world, and their own lives intelligible to them."14 They seek an education that encourages innovativeness, inventiveness, initiatives, and resources that appear to be fundamental for any form of social transformation. Education may thus be considered the most vital of all the resources required in the process of modernization.

It calls for a system of production, or organization where the masses have full participation. Mass education would then no longer be education for the masses, but education by the masses. It is a system where decision-making and policy implementation are guided by the resources and the needs of the majority of the people. The principles of democracy cannot be restricted only to political institutions.

Development and the Human Person

To understand an institution adequately, it is necessary to have some degree of knowledge about the historical process that gave it form. In the same way, to adequately understand how an institution will function in a new environment, it is necessary to have an adequate grasp of the pre-existing value patterns of the new social setting. The assumption here is that the ways in which

human groups have sought to relate to reality, to assign pattern to their experience, and to give meaning to their lives has varied across space and time. "There is neither a philosophical nor a scientific method by which this variety can be arranged in a hierarchy from lower to higher," says Bergher, and consequently "every human world must be deemed, in principle, as being equal to every other human world in its access to reality."15 In this sense, the one can say the peasant knows his world a whole lot more than any outsider ever can. It does not mean that there can be no outside information that has a beneficial bearing on a local condition. It does, however, call for a certain degree of what Bergher has called "cognitive respect," that is, giving utmost consideration to the way in which societies define their own reality.

Nigeria is an amalgam of nation states and tribal groups under the umbrella of a nation. Each group on the most part possesses a distinct culture, language and character trait. Any organization that would function effectively within such a setting must take cognizance of these differences. The educational system has been singled out by the government as the pivotal institution in the achievement of its goal of national development. However we look at it, the ultimate goal of all institutional and organizational concerns is the human person. Therefore even when the professed ends are the provisions for the full development of individuals and groups, we must begin with the basic needs of the person. Victor Uchendu's research among the Igbo tribe of Nigeria is illustrative in this context.16

Among his findings was the conclusion that even though an Igbo individual may have achieved great commercial success, his status in the society is not determined by material wealth. His social values rest on a rejection of self-sufficiency based on individualism. He derives spiritual and emotional health from "belonging." Social status of itself is meaningless except as it diffuses to others of one's kin.

In other words, material wealth is significant only in so far as it is a reaffirmation of one's traditional roots. One's success and the condition for the conferring of the much-coveted traditional title—the ultimate achievement—is determined by the extent to which a person has gone in "bringing up" his community.17 The community recognizes and holds in high esteem that son or daughter through whom certain symbols of development have chanced upon the village. An important characteristic of the Igbo that emerges from the foregoing discussion is a concern for achievement and self development in the context of community progress. It was a step from investing in community developments to investing directly in the human person. It becomes, for instance, prestigious for the entire village community that they have one among them who has been to "the white man's world" for his education. That the individual concerned had graduated in classical Greek or Latin is of far lesser importance to the proud community than the fact that he had to go so far to get it. This, predictably, sets off a chain of rivalry between village communities as each seeks not to be outdone. The individual who has been a recipient of such benefits is usually conscious of obligations to his town or community.18 In any case he is not allowed to forget it. He is expected to make appropriate contributions to the welfare of the community. The fact that a degree in classical Greek may not exactly be what is required for rural development is besides the point.

A side benefit is that the Igbo have enhanced their educational opportunities all round. The principal point, however, is the end that competition serves in this context. Here, the only use for competition is for the provision of amenities that benefit all. The idea of competing for self-serving ends would have been regarded as alien to this people. As a criterion of economic success, this differs markedly from the usual indicators of economic and social development. Needless, to say,

the Igbo have since acquired a good deal of Western "civilization," and have largely discarded this apparently "outmoded" form of competition.

A recent news spotlight on the former president of Tanzania concluded that his twenty-year rule of his country was largely a failure. The fact that Julius Nyerere was unable to bring about an economic and industrial transformation of his country was enough grounds to consider his contribution to the development of Tanzania to be, at best, minimal.

The evaluation of Nyerere was based on such criteria as the GNP, the degree of industrialization, urbanization and level of higher education. These, according to Lerner (1958), constitute the elements of modernization, and they are interdependent.19 Thus to the degree that any is absent, the society is less developed. An evaluation such as this is meaningful only when made in reference to some norm or standard. The norm often used is that of Europe, according to which affluence was a result of frugality, hard-work, the Protestant Ethic, and a rational approach to the planning of social and economic transformation.

However, even Max Weber admits the possibility that a historically unique serendipitous occurrence of events was instrumental to the form assumed by capitalism and democracy in the European part of the world.20 Even more startling is the recent trend economic development has taken in the Middle East. The discovery of large quantities of oil reserves coupled with a propitious rise in the price of oil has created a situation where wealth preceded rather than followed social and economic transformation.21

To a large extent the industrial world, as Schumacher pointed out, has been shaped by its metaphysics, which shaped its education, and this education in turn produced its science and technology.22 Without doubt, many non-industrial societies will heartily agree with the Socratic injunction "know thyself." Man indeed is the cornerstone of all metaphysical valuations. Thus, even for purposes of economic development, the primary resource is not nature but the human person. Says Schumacher, "The key factor of all economic development comes out of the mind of man." 23

There is a strong belief in the Western world that education is the key to almost everything. This belief that has been whole-heartedly adopted by people of the less industrialized world. With the monumental advances in science and technology, there is more and more reliance placed on education as the means that would enable ordinary folks cope with the problems of a "scientified" and "technologized" world.24

If education is indeed to help man in making sense of his world, then its foremost objective must be in the transmission of ideas of values; it must concern itself with what we are to do with our lives.25 The quest for education goes beyond the ability to do things; what to do is an even more important concern of the educational enterprise. In this sense the role education is likely to play in the process of modernization, and its organization, becomes highly important. Any definition of modernization or development must thus begin by clearly defining what constitutes progress. A process of education that proceeds as if man were the servant of technology must be clearly different from one where the assumption is that technology is at the service of the human person.

How a society defines a human person, and the place accorded human dignity in the scheme of values, are fundamental in the understanding of a society’s path to modernization. It is interesting in this regard to observe Julius Nyerere of Tanzania’s notion of development. As he sees it, even though the path to modernization would lead to many changes in the society, this must come about through a growth process. This growth will be determined by, and rooted in the needs of Tanzanians. "We shall draw sustenance," says Nyerere, "from universal human ideas and from

the practical experiences of other people; but we start from a full acceptance of our African-ness and a belief that in out own past there is very much which is useful for our future."26

In the Arusha declaration, Julius Nyerere laid down his philosophy which was a commitment to a certain quality of life that is fundamentally man-centered. It was a commitment based on an assumption of human equality, and a view of the human person as an object of dignity. It was a commitment erected on the principle that material wealth for its own sake shall not be the object of national development. It was a commitment to the belief "that there are more important things in life than the amassing of riches, and that if the pursuit of wealth clashes with things like human dignity and social equality, then the latter will be given priority."27

According to this view, then, national development cannot be separate from human development. The criteria for modernization must take into consideration activities and ends that are essentially human. Some human activities, it must be pointed out, are engaged in for their own sakes irrespective of any economic considerations. There are activities, on the other hand, that are carried on for a purpose, as a means to an end. Activities that are ends in themselves do not easily lend themselves to economic or utilitarian calculations.28

However, an important characteristic of institutions, as indicated earlier, is their tendency to control human conduct. This they do by setting up predefined patterns of conduct or expectations that serve to channel behavior in specific directions. This controlling characteristic, Bergher and Luckmann have pointed out, is inherent in the very process of institutionalization, and is clearly distinct from any mechanisms of sanctions specifically set up to support or give legitimacy to the institution.29 Therefore, any design to use institutions as instruments of social transformation in new or different social settings must take these characteristics into account.

Strategies in the Planning of Education

What all the foregoing leads to is that there must be a thorough overhaul of our prevailing notions about the use of institutions to achieve social goals. The prevailing approach to education in developing societies has been through clearly defined national plans. The general emphasis on detail in educational planning for manpower rests on the assumption that the production of manpower is the most important function of the educational enterprise. There is a further assumption that the demand for skills is highly inelastic (relatively fixed over time), and that it is important to be able to estimate future needs rather than to guess at them, even if the data is minimally useful."30 It further assumed that the principal clients of the educational system (parents, and students) are not capable of choosing wisely with regard to the purpose of education. As a result, planning must be centralized, and decisions are taken concerning programs and institutional capacity with little attention paid to students' demands.

This whole approach is what Anderson and Bowman have called "technological determinism." It gives rise to "a structural model characterized by technologically determined rigidities and inflexibilities in both the formation and the use of human skills, yet at the same time one marked by dynamic and uneven technological change."31

Planning for human resources is especially difficult in transitional societies on account of the rapid rate of change and the fluid nature of manpower requirements. There is an emerging paradox here: "the pace of change in manpower requirements must indeed be both rapid and irregular if economic growth is to be significant, and ... decisions with respect to the higher levels of education do entail investments that are large relative to total resources (and to existing facilities) and in a major degree indivisible."32

As a result we have a situation where success in actually reaching the goals of manpower projection renders those particular set of skills inapplicable in the job market, since the needs have, in the interim, changed; this in turn creates the tendency to emigrate to foreign job markets that offer favorable opportunities. It is a classic case of the vicious cycle.

Educational planning in this context will involve decisions relating, not only to processes directed to the attainment of select goals, but also to the relationships between the dimensions of the environment versus goal and organizational structure.

Thus the capacity of an organization to undergo change is, as Toffler emphasizes, a necessary and unavoidable response to the acceleration of change in society. As long as a society is relatively stable and events are thus largely predictable, problems that arise would tend to be routine and predictable. In such environments organizations tend to be permanent and rigid.

However, when change is accelerated, as is often the case in newly emerging nations, problems encountered would tend to be novel and ‘first time’. Traditional forms of organizations would prove to be inadequate in confronting them. The quality of permanence which, under different circumstances, provides for predictability and dependability, now becomes an obstacle when faced with novel situations. What is needed then are either "self-destroying" organizations, or organizations with "self-destroying qualities."33 The emphasis here is toward temporary, autonomous, and modular organization units, created to solve specific problems, and allowed to die when the need for them has disappeared. "The more rapidly the organization changes, the shorter the life span of organizational forms."34

There is an emerging trend in the process of organization. According to Alvin Toffler, to be effective in modern society organizations must be able to make the change from bureaucracy to what he calls "Ad-hocracy": "The acceleration of change has overpowered the decisional capacity of our institutions, making today’s political structures obsolete, regardless of party ideology or leadership. These institutions are inadequate not only in terms of scale and structure but in terms of speed as well."35

It is in this sense that we must understand Max Weber’s contention that the problem of modern society has little to do with political ideology. It is rather an organizational problem. The problem is to find the appropriate balance between, on the one hand, complete bureaucracy where individual freedom is almost non-existent, and on the other hand, complete democracy, where individualism can become a recipe for anarchy. Whether in a capitalist regime or a socialist one, the governing of a metropolis the size of New York City, for instance, would continue to prove intractable. The events of 1988 through 1990 in Europe have once again made clear that what are at issue are fundamental human problems. So far neither the socialist nor the capitalist viewpoint has provided any viable solutions.

The Role of Higher Education

In an environment that is stable and predictable, standardization becomes necessary and desirable. Standards in curricula and testing often serve the purpose of sorting people into "levels" of intelligence and occupation.

This sorting also frequently occurs at the level of institutions. In education, especially, it is often considered important to have the appropriate approval and recognition, usually through accreditation and affiliations. Developing nations tend to be singularly conscious of this. Even when experience clearly indicates the necessity for deviation from precedence, they tend to be quite reluctant to make the necessary adjustment.

On the occasion of the founding of the University of Lagos, in Nigeria, the national government had taken pains to elicit inputs from sources other than the British. Valuable suggestions came from bodies as important as UNESCO. Based on conclusions drawn from German and American universities, they drew up a constitution that allowed a greater degree of governmental input into the decision-structures of the emerging universities. But one of the British consultants later claimed that such a design would have been "disastrous." "To attempt to run a university on these lines," claimed Eric Ashby, "would have been like asking a mechanic to construct a car from a mixture of components, some from Ford and some from Volkswagen."36

Ultimately, the "experts" won and the initial "hybrid" constitution was rejected and replaced by one more typical of the British university model. Concerning Ashby's analogy with the auto industry, though, it is interesting to note that he did not appear to have looked far enough ahead. While it may be true that cars have not yet been assembled with Ford and Volkswagen parts, today Ford does produce models with Mitsubishi engines. Further, with regard to their concern for institutional "purity," it did not seem to have mattered that the seemingly "unblemished" English model was itself an evolution from the medieval universities, and its current form was a consequence of adaptation to the English social context.

What apparently drew the concern of Ashby and other experts, was that such a development would have been out of step with what existed in the English system, and consequently incompatible with the "proper" notion of what constitutes a university. Yet as he later made clear, "what had been flagrantly transgressed by the Chairman of the Council was not a law, but a convention. British Universities simply could not work their constitutions if this convention were disregarded."37

These non-typical "hybrid" models worked in the U.S., and most recently in Japan. The Japanese system is especially interesting in that it combines the German emphasis on research with the American concern for the flexibility demanded by the need for equal opportunity. True enough deviations from "standards" and "acceptable norms" may have worked in other places, but for Eric Ashby and the other consultants responsible for the genesis of the Nigerian University, it did not seem that such could be the case in the Nigerian context. Effective use has been made of the threat of deviation from standards to make sure that emerging universities in the former British colonies maintained the basic structures of the English University. The threat was essentially economic. Federal and state governments constituted the largest sources of employment. Their definition of standards and qualifications would tend to have a powerful influence on the perception of the economic worth of qualifications by prospective employees as well as by institutions. In this case the only acceptable standards appeared to have been those that were associated with the English model. Thus the perception was strengthened by the structure of incentive and inducement structure, and by economically based sanctions. What this practice eventually led to is a situation that has been appropriately termed "unintentional neo-colonialism."38

However, the sense of legitimacy accorded these conventions is based, not on law, but on shared values and on commitments to shared purposes. Shared values and shared purposes must necessarily vary in relation to different societies and cultures. Thus as Ashby rightly pointed out, "There is one set of conventions for the State universities of Germany and Belgium, another for the centralized university system of France, another for the American land grant university, and another for the British civic university."39

There is the danger then that when structures of the university institution are exported to different social settings, the tendency is often to tack on these conventions by the exporting culture. It is the responsibility of the importing culture to select from or discard altogether these

conventions based on their own commitments, values, and capacity, even if it leads to being charged with lowering standards.

The U.S. and Japan are good examples of countries into which the university institution was imported, and that have successfully used it to attain both broad and specific development goals. Japan in particular was deliberately selective in its borrowing from the West. Japan appeared to have followed a pattern consisting of three distinct stages. The first stage was the adoption of foreign ideas and institutions. This consisted of a program of educational exchange in which Japanese students were sent to the West to gain acquire knowledge of Western technology, and Western experts and professionals were invited to Japan an instructors.40

Though "bursting with intellectual curiosity about the West,"41 Japan was determined to borrow only the best of what the West had to offer. Her cultural unity and unique historical experience led Japan to a process of adaptation of foreign ideas and institutions to Japanese culture, sometimes to the point of complete distortion of the original ideas or institutions.

The third stage , substitution, reflected Japan's intention that the social, economic and industrial elevation of Japan shall be essentially Japanese. The intent is that foreign ideas may only be used to enhance, but never to substitute for Japanese values. Thus it was necessary not only to discard elements that are incompatible with the culture, but where possible to substitute in their place "Japanized" versions of these foreign ideas and institutions.

In establishing their universities, the Japanese borrowed extensively from the U.S. and Germany and ultimately achieved "a successful marriage of indigenous and Western ideas and institutions."42

Isomorphic Trends in Institutional Structure

A question arising from the preceding discussion is whether institutional or organizational structures are indeed critical to the attainment of social objectives. Meyer and Rowan (1983) contend that the formal structures of modern organizations are to a great extent a reflection of the myths of their institutional environments more than they are of the demands of their work activities.43 Thus institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies and programs have the function of myths. They are defined by the prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work in society. Organizations that incorporate these practices acquire and are accorded legitimacy, independent of the efficacy of these practices in relation to the environment. The relation of activities to appropriate occupations becomes a function of social expectations, and often acquires legal force that has little to do with any calculations of efficiency.

Thus certain functions are classified as appropriate to the domains of certain organizational forms. Instruction and research in certain subject fields may be determined to be appropriate or inappropriate to the university system. The criteria used, however, may have more to do with how the organization is portrayed than any calculations of effectiveness.

What it comes to then is that these rules or standards are merely classifications built into society as reciprocated typifications or interpretations.44 Fundamental to the argument of Meyer and Rowan is the view that such rules or prevailing norms often have effects on organizational structure and implementation processes that are quite different from what was intended.

Some of the effects, as P. J. Foster pointed out is that in spite of the great emphasis placed on vocational education in educational documents of developing countries, educational institutions continued to produce literary type outcomes. This was the outcome that was most evaluated and remunerated initially by the British colonists. Thus when Nigeria sought a higher educational

system, the primary concern of the founders was "to establish an institution which met the highest British standards."45 When Nigeria's first university was established in 1952, the need for recognition by the highest authority led to the rejection of the proposal to award its own degrees; until the London University examiners intervened on the students' behalf, the University of Ibadan was holding its own candidates to a higher standard than London.46

The decision-making process in these institutions is strongly influenced by the value that the public attaches to the operations resulting from decisions. Decisions must be perceived to have been sanctioned by referent groups, or significantly important "others" within the institutional milieu. Here again we have the concept of perceived legitimacy. Government agencies determine the prestige and status (validity) of jobs by certification requirements. Programs that deviate from prevailing certification requirements are likely to attract the stigma of "low quality," and consequently carry less attraction for prospective students.

The end result is that such a stigma reduces opportunities in the job market, the programs suffer, and the institutions which have the greatest relevance to people's needs, in so far as they depend for their resources on their perceived "quality," will suffer loss of reputation, resources and patronage.

The solution is certainly not to reject academic standards. But it does call for re-conceptualization of the place of "standards" when the issue is human development. Organizational structures adopted from a different society, to be ultimately productive in a new environment, must tread the path of renewal. "The only society that can renew itself over a long period of time is a free society."47 This raises the question of the definition of freedom. Freedom is frequently associated with democracy. If so we must define the ideal democracy as a condition where persons are most free to exercise choices that reflect their value priorities. Such choices will inevitably be as varied as the individuals that constitute the social group. An essential character for the structure of institutions in such a democracy ought to be the provision for conflict resolution. In reality this includes the rule of the majority, a situation that frequently gives rise to permanent institutions that tend to acquire a conservative character. In other words, a situation is produced that ends up constraining the very freedom that gave form to these institutions.

This conserving tendency of institutions, for purposes of survival and efficiency, has gave rise to the concept and practice of bureaucracy.

Growth through Creativity

Once an organization comes into existence, there begins a tendency toward routinization and self-perpetuation. Consequently, organizations begin to lose vitality and flexibility, especially as problems become more routine. The reduction in creativity this engenders leads in turn to a reduced capacity to meet unexpected challenges or crisis.48

For an institution to be effective in transitional societies, the pattern of organization must increasingly go beyond the ability to provide solutions to immediate and specific problems. It must acquire the capacity to continually reform and reconfigure itself to respond to the unforeseen.

In a changing world, the only way to conserve is by innovating.49 "The only stability possible is stability in motion."50 The ultimate goal of an educational system is to shift to the individual the burden of his own education. The most useful aid is that which removes obstacles to the individual's ability to attain fulfillment. The most useful educational system is that which provides the individual with knowledge and skills for overcoming obstacles to self-improvement.

Growth and improvement is a product of the kind of learning that often comes from experience. Learning involves risks, exploration and experimentation. To keep on learning, we must keep taking risks. This goes against the conserving tendency of organizations. The desire for dependability, predictability and legitimacy in organizations frequently discourages creativity and growth.

Creativity is also a function of an organization's or society's pool of resources. This is because there is a degree of recklessness or gambling associated with creative endeavors that necessarily must be held in check in a society close to the margin of survival.51 For people under severe deprivation attempts at experimentation and trying new ways of doing things carry an expensive risk. The costs of failure are prohibitive, and often fatal. As Gardner points out, certain kinds of creativity require a reasonable margin of abundance. Where human survival is at stake, the motivation to be creative is correspondingly diminished. Where people's lives are on the line, the institutions concerned have a moral responsibility to take into account, in their decision-making, the viewpoints of those on whose lives the decisions arrived at would have the greatest impact. This too must be included in any definition of democracy. An institution in which constituencies have an effective input necessarily assumes a form and emphasis that most represents people's values. The utility of institutions for developing countries ought to be assessed then, not by how closely they conform to some existing standards, but rather by the degree to which, in attempting to satisfy human needs, they succeed in deviating from the "norm." Since institutions, by nature, also transmit values, institutional norms and standards, when applied rigidly to changing societies, merely succeed in sustaining or imposing alien values.

The Japanese adopted the automobile technology from the U.S., but they insisted on borrowing only the technology, not the values that gave form to the technology. Thus while Americans placed great value on bigness, which encouraged the production of big cars, Japan's value emphasis for smallness and utility encouraged the production of compact cars. Today, Japan has permanently altered the perception of value and utility of the automobile industry with their compact vehicles.

What Africa and other developing regions of the world need the most from industrialized nations is not so much methods of organization, or particular forms of organization, (these are undeniably important), but the willingness to make resources available for creative explorations and experimentation. Innovative organizations often require protection. This is not exactly a new idea. It was successfully employed, through the Marshall Plan, in the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War. It was also at the root of Japan's industrial success.

A system of education in a changing society must therefore aim at providing an environment conducive to the release of potential. Education for renewal is to a large extent education for versatility.52

Effective Strategies

Taking the Environment into Account

The possibility exists that certain social institutions, such as education, may, as a result of their specific structures, turn out to impede the development process or radically alter the original purpose for which they were set up. This is why it is important that a prerequisite to development programs must be the mobilization of people's full participation in the process. This calls for democratizing structures of development, so as to facilitate their inputs. Education ought to be a

tool for collective action. The pivotal element is collective action, and therefore the emerging structure of the educational system should be an outcome of such an action. Currently, development is characterized by "mimetism" - imitating the prevailing practices. When institutions in developing societies assume forms compatible with those of industrialized societies, they create favorable environments for the industrialized nations, often at the expense of the less industrialized nations. The people are forced to produce what favors an already wealthy society rather than what helps themselves.53

The key to progress thus lies in redefinitions of strategies and practices. This will entail:

1. A process that transforms a societal structure to involve effective participation by a majority of its human resources, and in which all are held to accountability.
2. The allocation of resources to basic needs.
3. Productive work to be integrated into the educational system at all levels as part of the learning process.54

Educational institutions, particularly at the higher levels, can and ought to be endogenous. Whatever the ultimate objective, the process of education should more and more involve ordinary people in a process that links education with production at all levels. The end product is a system of knowledge empowerment.55 Merely making knowledge of better and productive processes available is not enough. There is also the need to identify inducements that encourage the application of available knowledge to conditions.56

A critical factor is the linkage or coordination of institutional outcomes. In this sense an educational system can serve the role of an enabling system between such goals as transportation and agriculture, or health and fiber optics. What is important is that the education institution constructs its standards and curriculum around fields that have urgent relevance to the needs of people. It discourages the imposition of external standards which denies people the capability to establish and manage their own organizations. In their efforts to maintain accountability and encourage standards, funding agencies frequently prevent this growth process from occurring.

In this regard it is interesting to note that the American Land-Grant College in fact failed its founders. Its products did not all become farmers as envisaged. Rather it was the quality of research and information about agriculture they made available that fundamentally changed the character of agriculture. This it was able to attain by knitting various fields of knowledge such as engineering, economics and agriculture into a composite wholes to produce completely new areas of learning. What eventually developed was a unique form of institution that, by prevailing standards, was supposed to be below quality, yet was eminently effective in solving a fundamental human problem.

There cannot be a national development without a change in attitudes and behavior. The ability to influence behavior to any degree will depend upon the coordination of one or more of the institutions that shape and sustain those attitudes. Implicit in this approach is the recognition that an educational system by itself cannot really achieve its stated objectives. It must take into account other factors which directly or indirectly impact upon its programs. Such an environmental scanning approach helps to determine the timing, pace, volume and kind of programs that ought to be offered. In some situation, success may depend, not by directly implementing a program, but through an indirect or supportive role an on-going process.

The effectiveness of an educational institution may then be measured by a number of factors, including the quality of its environmental scanning; the extent to which important contextual

variables are reflected in institutional policies; and the degree to which administrative practices (especially in the allocation of resources) are driven by such policies. For instance a brief look at the principles underlying successful primary health care institutions frequently reveal the following: Equitable distribution; community involvement; preventive and "promotive" approaches; appropriate technologies; and inter-sectoral action.57 These same guiding principles are equally applicable in productive education.

If a system of education succeeds in establishing such a process it will be an achievement with enormous implications for the society. It has been pointed out that where needs are relatively simple, it is the simple approach that works best. "The fundamental strength and wisdom of sub-Saharan Africa lies ... in the villages and rural areas, invested with the small farmer and the nomad and all the others who long ago fine-tuned their survival to the vagaries of the land."58 In nearly 100 years of educational attempts through schooling, very little use has been made of endogenous knowledge systems.

To be effective then, it does not seem necessary that a proposed institution meet the specifications of a plan. Effectiveness, rather, should be a function of the capacity to be flexible and to attain a form that is most compatible with the needs of constituencies. Flexibility in organizations is what provides the necessary coordination of diverse means and efforts that ultimately results in outcomes that both satisfies a society's needs and is also in tune with its value priorities. A coordinated system means that when planning institutions one must consider their interaction with other needs.

Education Planning for Development

Education, whatever system it is, must always aim at equity. Equal priority should be given to both school and out-of-school education. Conventional economic and human resource planning is often based on processes taking place in the formal sector only. This causes two immediate problems. The first is that when we attempt to transfer a system from one ecological space to another, it is rarely possible that the new system takes root without either losing something of its original state or else carrying along cultural elements that could "contaminate" the new environment. The second problem is that those who need the system are denied access to the cumulative process of learning. Either way results in the loss of objectives and failure in the ability to fully access and utilize the new system. In education for instance, curriculum ought to be structured in such a way that knowledge is gained iteratively in a manner directly applicable to real life. The objective here is the inculcation of "new perceptions and a new awareness of the relationship between man and machine and man and nature, as well as new manual skills."59

The implications are clear. Formal education, by itself, cannot be made a prerequisite for such awareness or the development and acquisition of skills. Obviously education can lead to the quest for new knowledge. But experience fails to support the assumption that mere literacy necessarily leads to the acquisition of productive knowledge. On this note schooling, as exemplified by the university system, may need to re-examine its erstwhile practice of attempting to "take knowledge to the people." The goal is to make people aware of the great potentials of their unique wealth of experience. It is in this sense that education can really mean " to lead out." In practice it is a process that encourages the acquisition of applicable knowledge. It is important then that learning activities and objectives become available in a medium with which people are most familiar. However, in a situation such as we have in Nigeria, with over 200 different languages, the problem of attempting to educate the masses assumes enormous proportions. But this is as it should be. If the masses

cannot adapt to the institution, the institution should adapt and respond to the masses. Universities, especially, should find this an invigorating challenge.

The object of education as a development tool is not an ability to reduplicate conditions and processes external to the local context, but rather how to coordinate locally available elements and resources to achieve progress that may be equivalent, but not necessarily the same as what obtains elsewhere. Institutions in different environments can achieve similar goals without necessarily having the same structures and processes. If needs can be different and situation-specific, then institutions should equip themselves to reflect those differences. Institutions in new environments frequently go to great lengths to adhere to or conform to "standard forms." This provides them with an aura of legitimacy, which is sometimes essential for institutional survival. But the cost is a deficiency in organizational "learning," something that appears to be essential for adaptiveness and for the satisfaction of fundamental needs.

To achieve the ideals of education for social development, institutions, particularly at the university level, must first respond to real needs, even if these do at first appear to "go against the grain" or contradict the "approved," prevailing goals. It may require the application of unorthodox methods. If education is to be productive then we must have a system that is capable of integrating educational activities with productive work. Adult education must, for instance, go beyond the teaching of literacy to "the introduction of science and technology . . . for farmers and workers."60 On the other hand, a curriculum taken directly out of the textbook may be too expensive to implement, and probably inappropriate to the situation. The aim is to channel productivity toward development of individuals and communities.

Added incentive is provided where outcomes or intended benefits can be immediately experienced. Where necessary goals ought to be broken into progressive steps each of which is directly attainable by the individual. The import of these is that activities which lead to knowledge stimulate enthusiasm for further activities that can lead to directly observable "success." This forms the threshold for creativity and originality. This in turn becomes a powerful incentive to the attainment of overall short-term or long-term goals. The point here is not a rejection of long-term educational goals in favor of short-term needs. The point, rather, is that for long-range planning to be even approximated, they must be broken down into sequentially attainable objectives. This in turn requires a recognition and utilization of native resources as a starting point.

The net result is a kind of iterative process; a series of short, sometimes, jerky steps that always gains and adds to the existing pool of knowledge and skills. This has the added benefit of continually re-defining goals and re-adapting processes in the light of previous results and new experiences and circumstances. It is an advancement in knowledge that is geared toward specific needs that raises the quality of life. We must admit that it may not be possible to organize the process in such sequence. The quality of individual and group participation is unpredictable. There are physical as well as language obstacles that may be presently unsurmountable. However, the power of the educational institution lies in the ability to organize iterative acquisition of knowledge and skills within local constraints. Empowerment thus consists of the provision of opportunities that enable individuals to make full use of their natural resources; individuals are thus enabled to construct their own "success story."

Conclusion

Two to three centuries ago, at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, not much was known about the African continent by Europe: there were untapped deposits of mineral resources; one

could get cheap labor in the form of slaves, and on account of the prevalence of malaria, the environment was deadly to Europeans. However, none of these early writers ever appeared to have held the opinion that starvation existed in Africa. Even though Africa may have been a "dark continent" in the past, none of these early writers said anything about it being a hungry one. In contrast, however, most writings on Africa today are, increasingly, full of instances of poverty, hunger, and disease. Many of these are certainly true. Whatever the case may be, what seems to be indisputable is that these factors have arisen in concomitance with the exposure of Africa to Western civilization and institutions. It is an irony that to the degree that Africa is becoming "more civilized," the incidence of these social malaises appears to be increasing.

People in the villages have always depended on the produce of the land for sustenance. The countries of Africa still depend largely on food that is produced by tilling the soil, the traditional method of farming in the villages. In the villages, however, we find only old men and women still tilling the soil. The young and able-bodied men and women are all in the cities seeking an easier and more "civilized" way of living. There is only so much that old men and women can produce, and they can only survive for so long.

Meanwhile, a number of "experts" on Africa have attributed the causes of hunger, poverty and disease to such factors as overpopulation and corruption in the government. The many solutions that have been attempted so far are based on this assumption. To give an illustration, in attempting to solve the problem of overpopulation, the emphasis so far has not been on providing inducements that will lure people back to the villages from the burgeoning cities. Rather, the frequently advocated and implemented solution is to make available contraceptives and other methods of family planning. Overpopulation has never been a problem in the villages by any account. How the reduction in city population will encourage productivity, and lead to the eradication of the general effects of poverty in the villages has not yet been clearly explained. But the implementations still go on. The ineffectiveness of many governments of developing nations today may continue to be attributed to corruption and political instability. But as is evident from the failure of World Bank projects and other attempts at solutions in Africa, the problem of ineffective institutions involves much more than the quality of individuals that constitute the society. The means of attaining set goals, that is the institutions themselves, must be evaluated with regard to their appropriateness for stated intentions.

If in the course of building their own institutions these societies fail, they have at least the advantage of being able to learn from their mistakes. They can begin again, since they already know how. A number of countries have consecutively attempted different forms of government. It is an expensive process in terms of human costs and lost opportunities. But it also is the beginning of a fully indigenous institution. If, on the other hand, an institution imposed by external forces fails, not only are people unable to profit from the mistakes made, they may even be unaware of such ineffectiveness. If the goal then is to help people develop, the emphasis must be on "helping," not directing.

Societies in Africa and other parts of the less industrialized world have a unique experience that has informed their conception of life and of reality. Thus they maintain a view of man and of technology that is necessarily distinct from that of the industrialized world. The forms that modern technology has assumed and the uses to which it has been put represent just one possible application of the wide range of human intelligence. So far that application has not proved to be the best possible. The world is today in a greater danger from the effects of Western Civilization than from the supposed "ignorance" of the non-industrialized societies. The wealth of experience of these peoples has not yet been translated into institutions. The primary reason appears to be a

pre-occupation with standards, and keeping up the appearance of legitimacy. It is, therefore, essential, in the interest of the general Human Civilization, to acknowledge the strengths of these potential institutions, and to make provision for their growth and evolution. This also must constitute a part of the democratic principle.

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