Democracy, Culture, and Values
Volume I

Democracy:
In the Throes of Liberalism and Totalitarianism

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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Introduction

George F. McLean and *Robert Magliola*

What distinguishes – and bedevils – human life is freedom. It would not be a problem – though it would be meaningless – if humans lived apart and alone. Problems begin when this freedom must be exercised with others. This is the story of democracy.

This is rooted in the task of freedom to order human goods setting them in a hierarchy of values. Over time this becomes a culture and a tradition, which as incorporated in constitutions rule public comity.

Modern times have put this exercise of freedom by persons and peoples to severe tests. In an effort to gain greater control over life, Descartes as the Father for modern philosophy sought clarity and distinctness of concepts, while Kant sought universality and necessity. To achieve this the rich cultural traditions were reduced to ideologies right and left, of the single individual or of the community, liberalism or communism, colonial domination or world hegemony.

The present volume explores this trajectory of democracy during the 20th century and by pointing out its limitations provides some guidance for the 21th century explored more in detail in the companion volume *Democracy and Values in Global Times*.

The present volume proceeds in three parts.

Part One, "Roots and Forms of Democracy," deals with the history of democracy in relation to diverse cultural traditions and social structures, and thus lays the foundation for the more specialized parts which follow.

Chapter I, by George F. McLean, "Values, Cultures and Traditions," probes how the western tradition developed the concatenated notions of (1) freedom or self-determination, (2) in participation with others, (3) for the individual and general good. Examining what values have fostered or thwarted this humanistic project, McLean applies Gadamer and others to demonstrate how authentic democracy is a creative dialogue with tradition. Democracy necessarily entails an *openness to questions and questioning.*

Chapter II, by Joseph Donders, "Some Hermeneutic Issues on Democracy from the Point of View of Different World Visions," describes five different world visions, four of them empirical ('genetic', 'personalistic', 'social', and 'naturalistic') and one 'metaphysical' (holistic). Donders matches these to corresponding interpretations of democracy.

Chapter III, by Charles R. Dechert, "Democracy, Pluralism and Inculturation," interprets the chequered history of modern democracy as a tension between two emphases, "the freedom to pursue wealth" and "the egalitarian appeal" promised by "elective representation." Arguing that contemporary global corporatism is crushing unique and valuable cultural traditions, he militates for "diversity" and "multiplicity," a truly "pluralistic world order."

Chapter IV, by William Fox, "Culture, Democracy and Constitution-Making: Some Tentative Observations," compares successful and unsuccessful written 'national constitutions', examining the American Constitution, the first Polish Constitution (1791), and the French Constitution of 1791. He then compares analogous Indian, Soviet (1977), and Pakistani constitutional provisions pertaining to sensitive areas such as religion, etc., aiming to show what kinds of constitution-drafting are effective in the long run, and which are not.

Part II, "Classical Liberalism vs. Transcendental Value," presents one paper which defends the classical liberalism fostered by the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and two papers which critique such liberalism as anarchic selfishness, and advance, instead, the Continental tradition which regards a 'transcendental core' as essential for happiness and social cohesion.

Chapter V, by Ronald Calinger, "Reform Absolutism of Joseph II in the Austrian Monarchy in 1781," exposits the emancipatory reforms (religious, politico-economic, and ethnic) of Joseph II; and analyzes the opposition of the privileged nobility and the entrenched Counter-Reformation Church.

Chapter VI, by Algirdas Degutis, "Individual Freedom and Political Power," attributes to law the negative function identified with the 'classical liberal' position (lineage from Adam Smith), namely, 'not achieving positive good, but preventing the evil of unfreedom'. Degutis goes on to defend *laissez-faire* capitalism, maintaining that 'the value of things depends on their utility for individual goals' and that 'relatively scarce goods become [thereby] more valuable'.

Chapter VII, by Richard K. Khuri, "A Few Remarks on the Interconnections Between Science, Reason, Freedom, Democracy and Tradition," argues that a transcendental center is required for individual and social meaningfulness: to limit freedom to 'making one's own choices' sets all of society adrift. Khuri critiques Karl Popper's 'critical rationalism' because contemporary science proceeds contrary-wise, and leaves room for the transcendent.

Chapter VIII, by Jozef Pauer, "In Search of the Human Sense of Dwelling," invokes the Heideggerian notion of "Dwelling," and its cultivation of a transcendental center, to assess architectural structure and space. He shows in detail the deleterious effects of (1) post-Enlightenment rationalism, (2) capitalist consumerism, and (3) free-floating postmodernism upon human Dwelling.

Part III, "Marxism, Post-Marxism, and the Struggle for Democracy in Eastern Europe," probes how the Soviet Communist parties suppressed real democracy, how the Czechoslovaks overthrew Communism, and how the post-Communist period has been fraught with difficulty.

Chapter IX, by Bohumila Kozelouhova, "Philosophy of Violence and Its Aftermath," demonstrates how in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere the Communist Party functioned as the new Ruling Class. Appropriating Karl Popper much more approvingly than does Khuri, Kozelouhova uses 'critical rationalism' to critique Soviet Marxist ideology. The Communist Party's "Real Socialism" is judged to be a non-philosophy because it fails the criterion of 'falsifiability'.

Chapter X, by Jana Gasparikova, "The Path of the Czechoslovak People to Democracy," traces the fascinating history of the Czechoslovakian revolt against the Soviet system. Gasparikova sheds much light on the unique version of humanism common to the Central European cultures, and argues that it, rather than Western consumerism, should become the mainstay of Czech and Slovak democracy.

Chapter XI, by Ivo Reznicek, "Threats to Democracy from Within: A Psychosocial Perspective," studies the aftermath to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc countries. Applying various psychosocial measurements to this process, Reznicek finds that much of the post-Collapse adjustment has been maladjustment, an "emancipation in decay." Special attention is given to how the former Communist Parties have been able to transform themselves, sometimes both thwarting and coopting real reform.

Chapter XII, by Shu-li Ji, "The Antinomy of Science and Democracy in Modern China," narrates the vagaries of the two 'imported' concepts of the May 4th Movement, western Science and western Democracy. Shu-li Ji traces the diverse attempts to amalgamate these 'new' concepts

with traditional Chinese morality and pragmatism. He then goes on to analyze in detail Mao Zedong's appropriation of 'Scientific Thought', and the later degeneration of Science into Scientism and 'Scientarianism' at the hands of Party cadres.

Chapter I
Values, Cultures and Traditions

George F. McLean

Though democracy may have as many modes as there are peoples and as many ramifications as there are dimensions of social life, it would appear to be centered in self-determination in participation with other persons and peoples in the disposition of social affairs.1 This places us at the vortex of a number of mankind's deepest issues: it is self-determination, yet essentially with others; it must create the future, yet not dissolve the identity a people has developed in the past; it must manage the multiple crises of ongoing life, yet through them unpack the deep and perduring meaning of life.

Hence, by way of approaching the nature of democracy and preparing to look at the concrete issues relating to its realization in our day it may prove helpful first to examine the grounds upon which we develop our identity as a people and the process by which, in concert with others, we advance into the future. To do so we shall first inspect some contextual notions. In this light we can then take up three specific issues: First, what is the relation of freedom to values and cultures? Second, what is our role in creatively shaping and developing this tradition in response to contemporary issues? Third, what does the character of this work suggest as essential to democratic attitudes and progress in our times?

Values and Cultural Traditions

Values

For the drama of self-determination and the development of persons and peoples one must look to their relation to the good. The good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. Basically it is what completes life; it is the "per-fect" understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through and once achieved it is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing: the most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else, but we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree given the right conditions grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life--fiercely if necessary--and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to an animal's realization or perfection, is in this regard an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting fulfillment upon its attainment. Goods then are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.

The moral good is a narrower field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to our own perfection and to that of others—and indeed to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of the persons or things, are objectively disordered or mis-ordered. This constitutes the objective basis for values and disvalues.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete. However broad or limited the options, as responsible and moral as act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the persons, actions, and things involved. In addition one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who in the context of his/her society and culture appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term 'value' here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term 'axiology' whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." It requires an objective content--the good must really "weigh in" and make a real difference—but the term 'value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.2 Thus, different groups of persons or individuals, and at different periods, have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to and prizes a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing it delineates among the limitless order of objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors their corporate free choices.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes as well the prime pattern and gradation of goods which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through a lens formed, as it were, by their family and culture, and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history and often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses it does not create the object; but it does focus attention upon certain goods involved rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for one's affective and emotional life. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values. Through this process we constitute our universe of moral concern in terms of which we struggle to advance or at least perdure, mourn our failures, and celebrate our successes. This is our world of hopes and fears, in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, our lives have moral meaning.

Martin Heidegger describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and is concerned. In this process one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. In relation to these goals certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one's world of meaning. Freedom then becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and

more even than self-determination in the sense of causing oneself to act as described above. It shapes--the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes--one's world as the ambit of human decisions and dynamic action. This is the making of a person or people in a community of persons or nations.

This process of deliberate choice and decision transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. Whereas the somatic dimension is extensively reactive, the psychic dynamisms of affection or appetite are fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values which evoke an active response from the emotions in the context of responsible freedom. But it is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral dimension of life. For in order to live, oneself and with others, one must be able to know and choose what is truly conducive to one's good and that of others. Thus, the person must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth both in itself and in relation to others. This is moral truth: the judgment regarding whether the act makes the person good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfillment, or the contrary.

In this I retain that deliberation and voluntary choice whereby I exercise my proper self-awareness, self-possession, and self-governance. By determining to follow this judgment I am able to overcome determination by stimuli and even by culturally ingrained values, and to turn these instead into openings for free action in concert with others to shape oneself, as well as one's physical surroundings and community. This can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of one's actions. By definition only morally good actions contribute to the fulfillment of the person, that is, to one's development and perfection as a person with others in community. As it is the function of conscience as man's moral judgment to identify this character of moral good in action,3 moral freedom consists in the ability to follow one's conscience.

This work of conscience is then not a merely theoretical judgment, but the exercise of self-possession in one's actions. Here reference to moral truth constitutes one's sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which I ought to do. When this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual only in the sense of being repeated. These patterns are modes of activity with which we are familiar; in their exercise-along with the coordinate natural dynamisms they require--we are practiced; and with practice comes facility and spontaneity. Such patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of our life. For this reason they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to or, as is often said, "amount to." Since Socrates the technical term used for these specially developed capabilities is `virtues'.

But if the ability to follow one's conscience and hence to develop one's set of virtues must be established through the interior dynamisms of the person, it must be protected and promoted by the related physical and social realities. This is a basic right of the person--perhaps *the* basic human and social right--because only thus can one transcend one's conditions and strive for fulfillment. Its protection and promotion will be a basic concern of any order which would be democratic.

That yet the very desire to allow for the multiple value patterns of the many participants in a modern democracy has led to a reduction or alienation of value in the public process of education is one of the dilemmas of our times which must be addressed by a society anxious to build its future.

Culture

On the one hand, the term "culture" can be derived from the Latin term for tilling or cultivating the land. Cicero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (*cultura animi*), for just as even good land when left without cultivation will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained.4 This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (*paideia*) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (*Bildung*).5

Here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a person or people and the ability to work as artist, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political. The result is a whole life characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and encouragement to share deeply in the meaning and value of life. The capacity to do so cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation.6 This will lead us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

On the other hand, "culture" can be traced to the terms *civis,* or citizen, and civilization.7 These reflect the need for a person to belong to a social group or community in order for the human spirit to produce its proper results. The community brings to the person the resources of the tradition, the *tradita* or past wisdom and productions of the human spirit, thereby facilitating comprehension. By enriching the mind with examples of values which have been identified in the past, it teaches and inspires one to produce something analogous. For G. F. Klemm this more objective sense of culture is composite in character.8 Tyler defined this classically for the social sciences as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits required by man as a member of society."9

Each particular complex or culture is specific to a particular people; a person who shares in this is a *civis* or citizen and belongs to a civilization. For the more restricted Greek world in which this term was developed, others (aliens) were those who did not speak the Greek tongue; they were "barbaroi" for their speech sounded like mere babble. Though at first this meant simply non-Greek, its negative manner of expression easily lent itself to, perhaps reflected, and certainly favored, a negative axiological connotation, which indeed soon became the primary meaning of the word 'barbarian'. By reverse implication it attached to the term 'civilization' an exclusivist connotation, such that the cultural identity of peoples began to imply cultural alienation between peoples. Today, as communication increases and more widely differentiated peoples enter into ever greater interaction and mutual dependence, we reap an ever more bitter harvest of this connotation. The development of a less exclusivist sense of culture must be a priority task for an expanding democratic order.

Tradition

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time and hence depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. The culture which is handed on or *tradita* comes to be called a cultural tradition; as such it reflects the possibilities and achievements of mankind to discover and mirror the deepest meanings of life.

However, the recognition of the value of tradition constitutes a special problem for us as heirs of the enlightenment. It idealized clarity and distinctness of ideas both in themselves and in their interconnection and as such divorced them—often intentionally—from existential or temporal

significance. Such an ideal of human knowledge, it is proposed, would be achieved either through an intellect working by itself from an Archimedean principle or through the senses drawing their ideas exclusively from experience and combining them in myriad tautological transformations.10 In either case the result is a-temporal and consequently non-historical knowledge.

Two attempts to break out of this have proven ultimately to be unsuccessful. The one, by attempting to recognize the historical sequence while retaining the ideal of clarity and distinctness attempted to attain such knowledge about each period, thereby relativizing everything to its point in time and placing historicity ultimately at the service of the rationalist ideal. The other, the Romantics, ultimately adhered to the same revolutionary enlightenment ideal even in appearing to oppose it, for in turning to the past and to myths they too sought clear and distinct knowledge of a static human nature. Tradition thus became traditionalism for all was included in the original state of nature and our only way of obtaining a firm grounding for human life was simply to return thereto.

In the rationalist view any meaning not clearly and distinctly perceived was an idol to be smashed (Bacon), an idea to be bracketed by doubt (Descartes), or something to be wiped clean from the slate of the mind as irrational and coercive (Locke and Hume). Any type of judgment— even if provisional—made before all had been examined and its clarity and distinctness established would be a dangerous imposition by the will.

This raises a number of problems. First, absolute knowledge of oneself or of others, simply and without condition, is not possible, for the knower is always conditioned according to his or her position in time and space and in relation to others. But neither is such knowledge of ultimate interest, for human knowledge, like being, develops in time and with others.11 This does not exclude the more limited projects of scientific knowledge, but it does identify these precisely as limited and specialized views: they make specific and important—but not all-controlling— contributions.

Secondly, as, according to Descartes,12 reason is had by all and completely, authority could be only an entitlement of some to decide issues by an application of their will rather than according to an authentic understanding of the truth or justice of an issue. This would be the over hastiness of Descartes's fourth *Meditation*. Further, the limited number of people in authority means that the vision of which they are disposed would be limited by restricted or even individual interests. Finally, as one decision constitutes a precedent for those to follow, authority must become fundamentally bankrupt and hence corruptive.13

If then the cumulative experience of mankind is to make a contribution to the development of modern democratic life, it will be necessary then to relocate human knowledge in the ongoing lived process of human discovery and within a broad project of human interaction. The emerging consciousness of the importance of this effort has led to broadening the task of hermeneutics from the study of ancient, often biblical, texts to an inclusive attention to the integral meaning of cultures.

The reference to the god, Hermes, in the term "hermeneutics" suggests something of the depth of the meaning which is sought and its implication for the world of values. For the message borne by Hermes is not merely an abstract mathematical formula or a methodological prescription devoid of human meaning and value. Rather, it is the limitless wisdom regarding the source and hence the reality, and regarding the priorities and hence the value of all. Hesiod had appealed for this in the introduction to his *Theogony*: "Hail, children of Zeus! Grant lovely song and celebrate the holy race of the deathless gods who are forever. . . . Tell how at the first gods and earth came to be."14

Similarly, Aristotle indicated this concern for values in describing his science of wisdom as "knowing to what end each thing must be done; . . . this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature." Such a science will be most divine, for: "(1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others can have. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better."15 Hence, rather than considering things in a perspective that is only temporal or totally changing—with an implied relativization of all—hermeneutics or interpretation is essentially open to a vision of what is most real in itself and most lasting through time, that is, to the perennial in the realm of being and values.

At the same time, while still echoing Socrates by searching for the permanent structures of complex entities and the stable laws of change, in redirecting attention to being in time contemporary attention is open to the essentially temporal character of mankind and hence to the uniqueness of each decision, individual and corporate. Thus, hermeneutics attends to the task of translation or interpretation stressing the presentation to the one who receives the message, their historical situation, and hence the historical character of human life. It directs attention not merely to the pursuit of general truths, but to those to whom truth is expressed, namely, persons in the concrete circumstances of their cultures as these have developed through the history of human interaction with nature, with other human beings and with God. It is this human history as heritage and tradition which sets the circumstances in which one perceives the values presented in the tradition and mobilizes his or her own project toward the future.

Creativity and Tradition

Application

Let us turn now from the permanent depth of meaning and value in tradition to its particular meaning for each new time ordering the present and constructing the future. This is a matter, first of all, of taking time seriously, that is, of recognizing that reality includes authentic novelty. This contrasts with the perspective of Plato for whom the real is the ideal forms or ideas transcending matter and time, of which physical things and temporal events are but shadows. It also goes beyond rationalism's search for clear and distinct knowledge of eternal and simple natures and their relations, and beyond romanticism's attention to a primordial nature hidden in the dimly sensed past. A fortiori, it goes beyond method alone without content.

In contrast to all these, the notion of application16 means that tradition, with its inherent authority or normative force, achieves its perfection in the temporal unfolding of reality. Secondly, it shows human persons and peoples, not as detached intellects, but as enabled by, and formative of, their changing physical and social universe. Thirdly, in the area of socio-political values and action it expresses directly the striving of persons to realize their lives, the development of this striving into a fixed attitude (*hexis*). Hence, as distinct from the physical order, *ethos* is a situation neither of law or of lawlessness, but of human and therefore developing institutions and attitudes which regulate, but do not determine.17

Certain broad guidelines for the area of ethics and politics serve in the application of tradition as a guide for historical practice. The concrete and unique reality of human freedom when lived with others through time constitutes a distinctive and ever-changing process. This historicity means that responses to the good are made always in concrete and ever changing circumstances. Hence, the general principles of ethics and politics as a philosophic science of action cannot be

purely theoretical knowledge or a simple accounting from the past. Instead, they must help people consciously exercise their freedom in concrete historical circumstances which are ever changing and new.

Here an important distinction must be made from *techné* where action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause that is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge (*epistéme*). Skill consists in knowing how to act according to that idea or plan; and when it cannot be carried out perfectly some parts of it are simply omitted in the execution. In contrast, ethics and politics, though similar in the possession of a practical guide and its application to a particular task, differ in important ways. First, in moral action subjects—whether a person or a people—constitute themselves, as much they produce an object: agents are differentiated by their action. Hence, moral knowledge as an understanding of the appropriateness of human action cannot be fully determined independently of the subjects in their situation.

Secondly, adaptation by moral agents in their application of the law does not diminish, but rather corrects and perfects the law. In relation to a world which is less ordered, the law is imperfect, for it cannot contain in any explicit manner the response to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that the freedom and creativity are located. They do not consist in arbitrariness, for Kant is right in saying that without law freedom has no meaning; nor do they consist in an automatic response determined by the historical situation, for then determinism and relativism would compete for the crown in undermining human freedom. Freedom consists rather in shaping the present according to the sense of what is just and good which we have from our cultural tradition, and in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.

Hence, the law is perfected by its application in the circumstances. *Epoché* and equity do not diminish, but perfect the law; without them the law would be simply a mechanical replication doing the work not of justice, but of injustice. Ethics or politics is not only knowledge of what is right in general, but the search for what is right in the situation and the choice of the right means for this situation. Knowledge about the means is not then a matter of mere expediency; it is the essence of the search for a more perfect application of the law in the given situation. This is the fulfillment of moral knowledge.18

It will be important to note here that this rule of the concrete (of what the situation is asking of us) is not known by sense knowledge, which simply registers a set of concrete facts on the horizontal level. In order to know what is morally required, the situation must be understood in the light of what is right, that is, in the light of what has been discovered vertically about appropriate human action through tradition with its normative character. Only in this light can moral consciousness as the work of intellect (*nous*), rather than of sensation, go about its job of choosing the right means.

Therefore, to proceed simply in reaction to concrete injustices, rather than in the light of one's tradition, is ultimately destructive. It inverts the order just mentioned and results in manipulation of our 'hopes for the good'. Destructive or repressive structures would lead us to the use of correspondingly evil means, truly suited only to producing evil results. The true response to evil can be worked out only in terms of the good as discovered by our people, passed on in tradition and applied by us in our times.

The importance of application implies a central role for the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*) or thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means for the circumstances. This must include also the virtue of sagacity (*sunesis*), that is, of understanding or concern for the other. For what is required as a guide for the agent is not only technical knowledge of an abstract

ideal, but knowledge that takes account of the agent in relation to other persons. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as one, in a sense, undergoes the situation with the affected parties. Thus, Aristotle rightly describes as "terrible" the one who can make the most of the situation, but without orientation towards moral ends, that is, without concern for the good of others in their situations.

In sum, application is not a subsequent or accidental part of understanding, but co-determines this understanding from the beginning. Moral consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal to be known and then applied, but rather through discerning the good for concrete peoples in their relations with others.

The Roots of Creativity: Personal and Social

The notion of application can help in sorting out the human dilemma between an absolutism insensitive to persons in their concrete circumstances and a relativism which leaves the person subject to expediency in public and private life. Indeed, the very statement of the dilemma reflects the deleterious aspect of the Platonic view of ideas. He was right to ground changing and historical being in the unchanging and eternal. This had been Parmenides' first insight in metaphysics and was richly developed in relation to human action through the medievals' notion of an eternal law in the divine mind. But it seems inappropriate to speak directly in these terms regarding human life, for in all things individual human persons and humankind as a whole are subject to time, growth and development. As we become increasingly conscious of this the personal character of even our abstract ideals becomes manifest and their adapted application in time can be seen, not as their rejection, but as their perfection. In this, justice loses none of its force as an absolute requirement of human action. Rather, the concrete modes of its application in particular circumstances add to what could have been articulated in merely abstract and universal terms. A hermeneutic approach directs attention precisely to these unfoldings of the meaning of abstract principles through time. This is not an abandonment of absolutes, but a recognition of the human condition and of the way in which this reflects the ultimate richness of the source and principle of social life.

What then should we conclude regarding this root of the good which mankind has discovered, in which we have been raised, which gives us dominion over our actions, and which enables us to be free and creative? Does it come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation's faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. . . . Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought.19

Notes

1. The work of Giovanni Sartori in codifying the various dimensions and understandings of democracy is reflected in his *Democratic Theory* (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1962) on the modern challenges in the realization of democracy; and in his *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987). The work of David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford: U. Cal. Press, 1987) is also a rich catalogue of classical models and their contemporary variants. For the implications of culture for democracy see Alexis de Tocqueville's

classic *Democracy in America* (New York: Schoken, 1961), 2 vols., with introduction by John Stuart Mill.

2. Ivor Leclerc, "The Metaphysics of the Good," *Review of Metaphysics,* 35 (1981), 3-5.

3. G.F. McLean, *Ways to God* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999), pp. 338-339.

4. V. Mathieu, "Cultura" in *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967). II, 207-210; and Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), II, 273-276, and *Culture and Society* (London, 1958).

5. Tonnelat, "Kultur" in *Civilisation, le mot et l'idée* (Paris: Centre International de Synthese), II.

6. See n. 4 above.

7. V. Mathieu, "Civilta," *ibid*., I, 1437-1439.

8. G.F. Klemm, *Allgemein Culturgeschicht de Menschheit* (Leipzig, 1843-52), x.

9. E.B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London, 1871), VII, p. 7.

10. R. Carnap, *Vienna Manifesto*, trans. A. Blumberg in G. Kreyche and J. Mann, *Perspectives on Reality* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), p. 485.

11. H. G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1975), 305-310.

12. R. Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, I.

13. Gadamer, pp. 240, 246-247.

14. Hesiod, *Theogony* trans. H.G. Everland-White (Loeb Classical Lib.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 85.

15. Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* I, 2.

16. Gadamer, pp. 278-279.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid*., pp. 281-286.

19. *Ramayana* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1976), p. 312.

Chapter II
Some Hermeneutic Issues on Democracy from the Point of View of Different World Visions

Joseph Donders

Democracy, of course, is never easy to define. The meaning of the word changes with the vagaries of time, place, and circumstance. The American democracy in 1990 is not what it was in 1890; democracy in France is not what it is in England or Norway or the United States. What remains more or less a constant is a temperament or spirit of mind rather than a code of laws, a set of immutable virtues, or a table of bureaucratic organization. The temperament is sceptical and contentious, and if democracy means anything at all (if it isn't what Gore Vidal called 'the great American nonsense word', or what H.L. Mencken regarded as a synonym for the collective fear and prejudice of an ignorant mob), it means freedom of thought and the perpetual expansion of the discovery that the world is not 'oneself' (Lewis H. Lapham).1

Democracy is an emotional word. It is a word that is closely related to human experience. It is consequently a word that calls up diverse emotions and associations in different people. These differences remain more or less unnoticed and hidden as long as one uses the word in a mono-cultural context. The differences become obvious when one studies its hermeneutics in different cultural contexts.

A simple example from my own experience will suffice to illustrate what this means. Living in an international community together with people from different continents as we did, our Dutch superior one day told us that we should see him as a father. We formed, he said, one large family. He said this to overcome certain difficulties that had arisen in our multi-cultural context. His suggestion only aggravated the situation. The consequences were disastrous to him, as different community members started to treat him in very different ways: Some knocked at his door before entering, and waited till he responded: 'Come in!' That is what they were accustomed to do in their cultural context at home. Another one walked into his room, while he was shaving early in the morning, without any knock on the door at all. Some stood up when he came at table; others did not even greet him, and so on. Within a few days he had to give up his idea of even trying to be a father to us. If we would have stated that we should organize ourselves not as a family, but as a democracy, the confusion might have been just as alarming to him and to us.

It is doubtful whether a merely academic or scientific dialogue or conversation on the use of terms like 'family' and 'democracy' can lead to a satisfactory response to the problems of the use of the term. As Paul Ricoeur states in a similar context—the one of inter-religious dialogue—we probably have to come to a common *experience* as a basis for a common hermeneutic understandiing before dialogue is possible.2

That does not mean that we would not be able to trace and explain some of the issues involved. It is here that I would like to suggest that the distinction originally made by Karl Jaspers in his work *Psychologie der Weltanschauung,*3 and the way his ideas were worked out, might be of help. Jaspers tried to get some clarity about the unsurmountable differences between different philosophical schools of thought. He distinguished an empirical, a psychological and a metaphysical world vision. These differences were worked out by E. Carp4 as regards psychotherapy, and the relations between a psychiatrist and his client. Maarten M. Schlemper5

developed this approach further and devised a scheme in which he came to five different world visions, four empirical ones and one metaphysical one. The four empirical ones are:

- the 'genetic' one in which someone experiences self as part of a kinship group, a family, clan, race or people,
- the 'personalistic' one, in which one experiences oneself in an I-Thou relationship,
- the 'social' one, in which one experiences oneself as a member of a social group or class,
- a 'naturalistic' one, in which one experiences oneself as a part of nature,
And there is a 'metaphysical' one, the fifth world vision:
- the metaphysical one, which does not experience oneself as 'part of' but as 'one with', a kind of holistic 'total' experience that all is one.

Besides the visions as such there is the issue of the different ways in which the adherents of these visions relate to them. One can *admire* them, *submit* to them, or *care* for them.

These visions are not unrelated. In a way they correspond to a development that one can trace in the normal development of a human person. The child, initially bonded to her/his genetic parent, develops its own identity growing into adulthood, discovering as an adult its social relationships, and—growing older—experiencing her/himself in the larger cosmic context; and (s)he normally goes on to achieve a better awareness of an 'own' metaphysical personhood.

In each of those phases, concepts and values change, and it would lead to disorder if this growth and a certain integration were not to take place.

It is interesting to note how the four different world visions seem to have arisen consecutively during this century in the West, and how they—each in its turn—seem to have been playing a central and polarized role in our interpretation of what a concept like *democracy* entails6.

In 1933 Hitler based his idea of democracy on a genetic world vision in which the Fascist German ideology of race, blood and land made any other vision impossible. The polarization of this racist approach to reality even led in certain cases to a reinterpretation of Christianity, the 'Deutschen Christen' believed that their race and nation had to be defended as 'Gottgeschenkte und anvertraute Lebensordnungen', against the Jews, Marxists, and all other forms of 'internationalisms'. It is a world vision that is recognizable in many other forms, for instance when in the Hebrew Bible the order is given: `Now go and crush Amalek; put him under the curse of destruction with all that he possesses. Do not spare him, but kill man and woman, babe and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.7' The same Hebrew Bible corrects that vision, and it is one of the great things about those Sacred Scriptures that an indigestible text like the quoted one, was not censored away.8

There is no need to refer to the continued existence of this vision—and its consequences for democracy—in our actual world. Yet, the West organized itself against this vision in its struggle against the polarizing genetic fascist abomination. It did not only react fighting the violent World War II. This fight led also to the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, a declaration that stressed the individual and personal rights of every human being. A declaration based on another vision, the personalistic one. A vision that eventually even had to be taken into account by an institution like the Roman Catholic Church, compelling it to organize an *aggiornamento* in the form of the Second Vatican Council.

The type of democracy and political exigencies caused by this personalistic and existential vision led to the struggle for the realization of civil rights for everyone, in disregard of sex, race, or religion. It was during this struggle that around 1968 students all over the Western world—and

in some countries together with the working class—started to become aware of the need of yet another approach and vision. One discovered suddenly in those circles something that had been obvious to others long before. Neither the genetic nor the personalistic interpretation of society would be able to remedy the structures that oppressed the majority of the world's population. The student revolts of those years demanded a review of the curriculum of practically all faculties in view of this rediscovered 'social' vision. In theology this development led to `liberation' theology. It started in this country with the Black Theology of James Cone,9 followed by Gustavo Gutierrez in Peru in 1971.10

On March 28, 1979 disaster hit the nuclear energy plant at Harrisburg Pennsylvania. In the same year the NATO countries decided to install nuclear arms in Europe. These developments led to the breakthrough of another world vision in the general consciousness of many. In this new naturalistic, environmental or ecological vision one considers oneself as a part of nature itself. Again the human individual reconsidered her/his position in the world. Values got a new color, the color green. Theologically and philosophically it led to the further development of already existing 'process' considerations.

In those different visions values undergo considerable alterations. Many terms change meaning. One of the more important of these terms is 'democracy'. It is not only a question of different policies, but much more it is a question of seeing one's position in the world in a different way.

What could 'democracy' stand for in the variety of these essentially different contexts?

Historically these developments, here described in their Western context, led to 'polarization'. Some persons are exclusively 'liberational' in their approach, others are only personalistic, or genetic, others are exclusively 'green'. The ideal would seem to be that all visions are considered as *complementary*.

In fact the result was, instead, an ever greater confusion. A confusion that only can be resolved if these experiences serve as a basis for the common hermeneutic dialogue and consequent understanding Paul Ricoeur hoped for.

This dialogue remains possible—even though the empirical world visions are essentially different—on the basis of the metaphysical vision in which we experience ourselves as 'with the other'. It is on the basis of this 'self-esteem' that transcends all empirical interpretations and considerations that we should base the need for hermeneutic dialogue.

This means that we can only hope to progress in this understanding when we pay attention to the 'mystical' dimension of our human existence. That dimension where we meet ourselves in our own 'still-point' as related to the other and to the totally Other, not in a (Thomistic) dualistic, but in a (mystic) holistic way.

In the above considerations we restricted ourselves carefully to our own Western—though in itself very varied—cultural and historic context.

The hermeneutic problems as regards a term like 'democracy' becomes unbelievably more complicated, when we compare the way in which we in the West have developed and elaborated our visions with the visions and developments of other cultures.

In fact one might ask oneself whether a meaningful dialogue is possible. *It is*. It is *on condition that* we really appreciate and honor the *difference* of the different visionary and cultural approaches to our human reality, and that we remain transcendentally or mystically connected with our common metaphysical depth.11

Notes

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1. "Democracy in America?" *Harper's*, Vol. 281, No. 1686, November 1990, pp. 47-58.

2. P. Ricoeur, «L'approche philosophique du concept de liberté religieuse», in *L'herméneutique de la liberté religieuse* (Paris: Cashiers Castelli, 1968), pp. 248-249.

3. Springer, Berlin, 1919.

4. E.Carp, *Psychotherapie op grondslag van wereldbeelden* (De Tijdstroom, Lochem, 1959).

5. M.S.H. Schlemper, "Psychotherapie en wereldbeeld," in *Humanische psychotherapie, Een anthropologische grondslag* (Leuven: Acco, 1980), pp. 84-124.

6. Luchesius Smits, "Bewustzijnsvernauwing en buwustzijnsverruiming," in De *theologie vanuit de theorie van de wereldconcepten*, (STF: University of Tilburg, 1985).

7. 1 Samuel, 15, 3.

8. Smits, Bewustzijnsvernauwing, p. 12.

9. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1970).

10. *A Theology of Liberation*, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1975).

11. J.G. Donders, *The Global Believer* (Mystic CT: XXIII Publications, 1986).

Chapter III
Democracy, Pluralism, and Inculturation

Charles R. Dechert

Democracy

Rule of the people! Gone are the invidious distinctions of family and class, established privilege, rigid hierarchies and entrenched authorities. From Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people, and for the people," to Huey Long's "Everyman a King," to the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings enshrining the principle "one man, one vote"—egalitarian democracy "with liberty and justice for all" has been enshrined as The American political ideal and made the guiding principle of the American institutional and informational presence abroad from post-war Germany to The Philippines, from Vietnam to South Africa. Rest certain that the current (1990) American presence in the Middle East will effectively contribute to the erosion of the more traditional political structures of the Arabian peninsula in the name of Democracy.

Alexis de Tocqueville noted the inherent dialectic of Democracy with its dual emphasis on liberty and equality. The liberal biases of modern democracy's intellectual roots in the English Civil War, Locke, the Glorious Revolution, Whiggery and the Enlightenment were institutionalized in the American democratic experiment. The French revolutionary emphasis on equality produced an instrumentalization of the *canaille*, the urban underclass, by The Committee of Public Safety as a military security measure to destroy the traditional elite. This was followed by an instrumentalization of the entire populace first to save the revolution, and then to diffuse it to all of Europe in Napoleon's secular *jihad*. European popular democracy produced the *levée en masse* that culminated in the suicidal mass slaughter of two World Wars during the first half of the 20th century. American popular democracy opened the continent and culminated in a Civil War whose brave, conscription based armies slaughtered one another over the course of four years. This destruction of much of the nation's Anglo-Saxon and Nordic youth opened North America to southern and eastern Europeans and ultimately to the Latin American Native-Indian/Hispanic ethnic mix now effecting a *Reconquista* of Florida and the Southeast.

Democratic Institutions, Money and Power

What the democratic revolution in Britain, America and France *did* guarantee was the political and social pre-eminence of wealth. The invidious distinctions of birth, rank, culture and intellect were replaced by the solid clout of income from land rents, industry and commerce and the speculative mobilization of wealth through securities and the credit system. The democracies, especially Britain and The Netherlands (following the Venetian example) pioneered western colonialism. Spanish exactions of a limited supply of bullion was replaced by a money commerce in sugar, tobacco, timber, spices and slaves—and in manufactured products, ironware, cloth and clocks. British democracy was dominated by land-owning magnates; American democracy by southern planters and northeast merchants and bankers. The substantive freedom of the new democracies was the freedom to pursue wealth while the political emphasis of elective representation was an egalitarian appeal to the constituents.

As Ferdinand Hermens has spent a lifetime pointing out, the institutional *forms* of Democracy are intimately related to the effectiveness, popular acceptance and longevity of modern constitutional governments. Division of powers, checks and balances, electoral procedures, the organization and aggregation of economic, regional, ethnic, religious and cultural interests into effective party associations, the institutionalized dialectic of individual, family and community with governmental, military police and assistential bureaucracies—all of these are significant and vary from country to country. One thing is sure, the rhetoric and forms of representative Democracy are uniquely legitimate and legitimating in the emerging international polity. Otto von Hapsburg, scion of the *ci-devant* Austrian imperial family, counsels an elective monarch. From pan-European elections for a consultative parliament to Eastern Europe's and mainland China's gropings for a "Democracy" whose content is unknown, the rhetoric and the forms of Democracy have assumed an almost autonomous and controlling significance.

Such purely verbal constructs as "people's democracy" or "guided democracy" as a mask for authoritarian rule by a political or military elite fool no one, least of all the citizen-subjects. Democracy basically means liberal democracy as known in Western Europe and North America and is characterized politically by parliaments and parties, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary; socially by freedom of association, considerable personnel, cultural and economic freedom, markets and exchanges, substantial public responsibility for the education, health, security and welfare of its citizens. Extensive research on who governs suggests that the active, influential political class, those who possess and employ such political resources as wealth, reputation, access to the media, decision-making roles in corporate and associational life, communications skills and *savoir faire* number less than 5 percent of the adult population at the local level, usually much less.

Democracy and the Political Class

Rulership, leadership, authoritative decision-making, establishing the formal rules of social interaction (laws) and allocating public resources for public purposes require preparation, considerable energy, and somewhat rare personality traits that may vary from nation to nation and from time to time within the same nation or culture depending on the regime. We have different expectations of wartime and peacetime leaders, demographic and authoritarian leaders, leaders of rich and poor nations, countries that are large or small, ethnically or religiously unified or diverse—and of diverse popular and/or media based cultures in the contemporary world.

But always the political elite is but a tiny portion of the populace, whether elected or empowered by hereditary or acquired right, whether cooptated into power or possessed of power by persuasion, purchase, force or fraud. Michels has demonstrated how the altruistic instrument of the working class becomes a bureaucratically entrenched party functionary. Mosca and Pareto show how able and energetic elements assume significant roles in the ruling minority, how the liberal elite is characterized by the continuous emergence of newly legitimated elements influencing public policy.

Liberal democracy, characterized by representative government, retains legitimacy and effective control of public resources only by continuing recourse to popular assent. Some rough approximation of the community's intent, however mutable and transient, is reflected in the machinery of government. Democracy is responsive, sometimes irresponsibly, over-responsive. Ultimately the ability to govern in such regimes must reflect a considerable popular assent to the government's policies and practices. Well-constituted regimes possess lags in response, checks

and balances, equilibrating ambitions and organized interests whose interplay smooths the sharp edges of divisive policies and helps assure the modernization and popularly acceptable good sense of authoritative public actions and resource allocations. In the process basic human and civil rights, personal and group liberties find their safeguard. The penalties of outrageous behavior by elite elements are subject, eventually over time, to corrective action. Even willful malice may be deflected by the workings of inhibiting and attenuating institutions.

In this perspective a society, a community, comprises a multitude of individual persons, families and groups whose cross-cutting loyalties and values reflect the richness of the human condition in the polity. The political elite, to be both effective and popular must tap into, communicate with, and reflect the values and aspirations of its components. These are the mediating groups, functional, geographic and (in the broadest sense) cultural that comprise the overall community and link individuals and families to the commonwealth. Leadership elements in these mediating groups serve as communication links in a hierarchically organized (albeit often informal) communications network linking the subjects and objects of political decision-making, the subjects and objects of history.

Human and Civil Rights

There is an increasingly clear international consensus that all persons, as persons, possess a broad range of fundamental human rights (expressed in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights) with concomitant obligations binding every political regime to recognize and protect basic civil rights. Ruler and ruled share a common humanity and hence claim public recognition of their human rights and the civil rights attendant thereon. The philosophical, ethical and political rationale of these rights, their juridical definition and mechanisms of vindication (especially in the area of civil rights) will vary from culture to culture, from regime to regime, and even from time to time depending on circumstances (e.g., immunity from arbitrary arrest in wartime). In more precisely defining these rights it is now clear that their concrete content is dependent on the culture, values, level of welfare and expectations of each polity. Do the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness enunciated in America's Declaration of Independence imply moral anarchy and self-indulgence? What of the newly acquired American right to privacy as construed as unrestricted access to abortion, freedom of expression construed as the right to produce, distribute and display the pornographic, the move to decriminalize drug possession, acceptance of sado-masochistic practices, sodomy and lesbianism as "alternative life styles"? What were previously horrendous, often capital, crimes now enter the realm of the legitimate.

Is there some dividing line, apart from an arbitrary verbal definition, an ephemeral social convention, dividing the licit and the illicit? Can even the distinction between crimes without victims be adduced? The shock and revulsion attendant on viewing, even in passing, the violent, scatological and obscene make the unwilling observer a victim. Are his anxieties for his family to have no redress? May his children be seduced into an alternative life style to which they are attracted by the force of popular culture, mass media, and, even in some cases, by the institutions of public education?

Mediating Groups, Community, and Polity

Apart from the radically divisive ethical and cultural commitment suggested above, it is clear that the global community has a vast range of community-clustering modes of association. Ethnic,

racial and linguistic communities re-affirm themselves even in diaspora,—witness the Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, Lebanese and Armenian communities in North America, to name but a few. These same communities, in their historic homelands, have in this century had a checkered career of affirmation, suppression and resurgence, genocidal persecution and palingenesis. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is quickly becoming (at best) a confederation of Sovereign Republics held together by the peacekeeping forces of an imperial army. There must be institutional responses to the national aspirations of ethnic minorities in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe: Mongolians, the Khmer people, Ibos, Kurds, Balochis, Slovaks, Croatians—the list is very long.

Within geographically based communities there are group divisions based on income, class, education, religion, function, manners and customs. Not infrequently such distinctions are divisive, though fundamentally, in an ordered community, each such grouping (real or imputed) contributes to the multifarious social health, economic well being, variety, interest and stimulation, the diversity and openness of the community, the *res publica* as a whole. In the United States the penchant for equality has led to a whole series of public measures designed forcibly to compel egalitarian "integration" of schools, work places, professions and public and private facilities, while prohibiting the use of "quotas." Much of recent American history has focused on the consequences of those policies that, by making money the uniquely legitimate basis of social differentiation, have re-emphasized the plutocratic bias of liberal Democracy, even, perhaps especially, when legislating or enforcing the egalitarian principles.

As Thomas Lowell has pointed out, differential access to the various trades and industries, educational institutions (and even Schools and Departments within them), neighborhoods and income appears to be "national"—in part the product of each individual's and group's genetic and social endowments, values, culture, socialization and formation, expectations and opportunities (or lack thereof) based on the group's past performance and present situation. Why do disproportionate numbers of Chinese in America excel in mathematics and physics, Jews in law, Italians in the tile, brick and stone trades, Irish in urban politics, for example? Small-scale urban food stores are increasingly in Korean and Vietnamese hands. In Britain, young physicians are increasingly of Middle Eastern origin. The subtleties of occupational, residential and educational selection, the relation of genetics, nurture and social opportunity provide a vast area of prospective, fruitful research. In one area outside the range of effective, direct American political intervention, religion with its broad and clear cultural overtones, it is said that Sunday morning at ten is the most heavily segregated (self-segregated) hour of the American week. Despite many churches' efforts over decades to reduce or abolish discommunication, major differences in style, attitude, custom and usage are reaffirmed and reinforced in a religious context.

The very complexity of a modern society demands a certain pluralism. Division of labor, corporate and associative economic, ideological, professional, religious, cultural and educational identities—differing values, emphases, and orderings; economic disparities; even sex and chronological age—all require and help determine the inherently pluralistic structure of communities from the family through neighborhood, municipality, region, national state, supranational confederation, to the global community as a whole. For men and groups sharing the earth as an environmental system, national and artifactual, an interlocked physical and symbolic system in which human constructs ranging from buildings to languages form an interactive whole.

The Emergence of an Ecumenical Culture

This global society is increasingly unified; an ecumenical society and culture is gradually emerging. Each of the multiplicity of human cultural systems, national, linguistic, ethnic and religious is becoming an object of study and research in the modern framework. In Marshall McLuhan's terms, the medium of culture has become one message in the more encompassing super-culture, the emerging global culture. Institutional science has unified a critical sphere of human inquiry on perceived objective reality, creating shared paradigmatic structures in the Physical and Life Sciences, in mathematics and to a less degree in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Science and the modern universities that protect, extend and diffuse it lie at the core of this ecumenical culture. The divisions of the universe of knowledge are reflected in the disciplinary departments and courses of universities around the world and are much alike in Oxford or Cambridge, Harvard or Berkeley, Tokyo or Moscow, Munich or Rome, Brazzaville or Santiago. The "harder" the science, the more closely course content in disciplinary fields and subfields will be the same worldwide—perhaps with time lags while new discoveries and newer approaches pioneered by "cutting-edge" institutions are incorporated into the curricula, syllabi and professional and graduate seminars of sister institutions around the world. Professors and graduate students globally have much the same mobility and easy communication that in an earlier period united intellectuals in the Christian Europe of the high Middle Ages and early Renaissance. Science itself has now become self-conscious as the sociology of knowledge attempts to unravel the etiology of accepted models and paradigmatic structures, relate them to the experiences of the physical and symbolic environments in which they emerge and affirm themselves, and relate them critically to a "real world" that has both objective physical content and the socio-psychological reality of operative and efficacious symbolism.

Increasingly the cultural, political and economic elites of every nation are university trained and hence participants in the ecumenical culture. Their own inherited national or tribal cultures are often studied from an anthropological or ethnographic viewpoint. Jomo Kenyatta used his university background in Cultural Anthropology to manipulate the totems and taboos of the Cacao to create a terrorist organization, the Mao Mao, consisting of desperados who by willfully violating tribal taboos had excommunicated themselves from a traditional society in order to help create a new one.

Even with the best intent the objectification of a culture, especially one's own, for dispassionate study, analysis and understanding marks an irreversible movement of the personal and collective consciousness. One's very identity, familial, tribal, national, religious—cultural in the broadest sense—is recognized as part of a greater, global human identity, a multiform and multifaceted plurality of which one's own culture is an element, an aspect, a local and more or less limited expression. This is *not* necessarily a values relative, uncritical recognition of all societies and cultures as equally adequate, satisfying, successful or open to development. Just as a recognition of basic human dignity and equality does not imply diverse levels of individual natural ability, beauty and perfection or deny differences in the amount, kind and quality of personal achievement, or negate the evidences of human weakness, sin, perversion and malice - so our recognition of the multiplicity of cultures and their validity as expressions of human sociality does not preclude judgments as to the relative worth, functionality (or dysfunctionality) and level of achievement of diverse cultures and their various elements.

Inculturation

The true and complete description of each of the multitude of human societies must be part of the intellectual patrimony of mankind. But a culture is lived; it survives embodied in persons in community over time. How can living cultures survive the impact of the emerging ecumenical culture? I am far less concerned about the immediate and direct impact of university formation on the scions of traditional political elites (e.g., sons of tribal chieftains in Africa or of Arabian sheikhs) or emerging university trained military or administrative elites (e.g., India's Babus) than the immediate and direct impact of the vulgarized ecumenical culture borne by the mass media in the form of comic books, films, T.V. sitcoms, advertising, modern political campaigns, etc. on the simple, uneducated, unprotected member or participant in a more traditional culture.

In most cases it is those with a better formal education in the Western manner who are most loyal to their traditions and what is best and most valuable in their past. It is no accident that the young cultural nihilists of the Khmer Rouge systematically destroyed anyone with more than an elementary education and in doing so effectively destroyed a culture (presumably the result desired by their Indo-Chinese leaders).

It must increasingly fall to the emerging intellectual leadership, university trained, of more traditional societies to define and describe their cultures; to identify, preserve and transmit what is best and most valid; and to defend, in cooperation with their local political leaders and interested (benevolent and competent) elements of the global community, the patrimony of their peoples. The inculturation process will occur over time as the positive content of the single various cultures and subcultures becomes a part of the global intellectual, artistic and moral patrimony of mankind. What in the ecumenical culture is best and most directly relevant to the local community and culture is transmitted and observed over time. Initially, perhaps, this is by the various applied technologies of buildings, planting, sanitation and transport; later, given increasing popular sophistication, it is by steadily improving and advanced education and exposure to the literary and artistic patrimony of the global culture. Appropriately and sensitively handled with full local participation, one might foresee on a global scale the kind of extraordinary and fruitful cultural amalgams and hybridization that characterized the high culture of 16th century Mexico, for example. In colonial Mexico local languages, usages and traditions survived and were allowed to survive into this century—so much so that cultural historians have been able to reconstruct a rather clear picture of the form and content of pre-Columbian meso-American theatrical productions.

Resisting Cultural Aggression

Unhappily the contemporary mass media are so pervasive and invasive, the products of industrialized mass and popular culture so slick and attractive, that local traditions, products, crafts and folk-art forms such as dances, processions, puppet shows and secular liturgies tend to be swamped and disappear or to be commercialized as tourist attractions and corrupted to satisfy the tourist culture consumers' expectations of the quaint, exotic, strange and foreign (but not too much). During my adult life, over the past 40 years, I have seen the still-viable remnants of Italian rural and village folklore and folk culture largely disappear. I have seen the politicization and instrumentalization of meso-American folk culture in Mexico, and also, in some cases, its utter vulgarization to satisfy North American tourists' (and their tour organizers') expectations (at Acapulco and Cozumil, for example).

The greatest threat to the preservation and survival of traditional cultures as living and lived realities is probably the peoples' own needs and desires, "the revolution of rising expectations." What conceivable combination of political, social and educational forces can inhibit the masses in

more or less democratic societies from wanting more and better goods and living standards—from the packaged foods that extinguish a traditional cuisine to the metered lumber and imported hardware that radically alter traditional building methods; from supermarkets that destroy the picturesque and multifunctional markets of tradition to tractors and trucks that destroy older patterns of agriculture and marketing; from cinema and T.V. that makes local festivals and liturgies look crude and old-fashioned to population control clinics, divorce and social welfare legislation that makes the old-fashioned family and moral standards seem equally obsolete.

Only by retaining on regaining a sense of their own cultural worth can local and national and religiously-based cultures survive. Populist democratic, participative institutions coupled with a profound sense of group identity and the capacity to erect moral (and sometimes physical) defensive barriers seem essential to preserve the world as a cultural manifold in the presence of the cultural homogenization and vulgarization of the mass media and consumer-research based, industrially produced consumer goods that delight, titillate, narcotize and may ultimately destroy their possessors.

Those who have experienced group oppression seem to respond by reaffirming their group identity and are often willing to suffer relative deprivation to maintain that identity, form families and educate children (often with great hardship) to assert and perpetuate that identity. One thinks immediately of the Lithuanians, Poles, Georgians and Armenians in the Soviet Union—even the traditionalist Russians themselves. Palestinian Arabs have forged a nation under unbearable pressure and civic deprivation. Even in the United States Christian fundamentalists whose values are scorned by the dominant political culture are uniting to educate their children and form communities within the larger political community to defend their moral identity. American Negroes are flocking back to the older and nearly abandoned "Negro Colleges" that are sympathetic to their cognitive style, artistic subculture, interests and aspirations.

In Defense of Diversity and Multiplicity

In ultimate analysis, the global political order must be or become democratic in the root sense, responsive to the people or rather peoples of the world as a complex web of moral, ethnic and cultural communities. At the lowest levels of aggregation these may appear to be, and be treated as, "interest groups" whose concerns and aspirations must be factored into the decision-making equation by representative government. At higher levels of suggestion we arrive at regional groupings like the American South or Province, national grouping like France, Germany, Slovakia or Armenia. France and Germany are sovereign states whose sovereignty is now conditioned, in fact restricted and limited, by their participation in the European Community and, in Germany's case, by its NATO commitments. Slovakia is a subject nation in an artificial state, while Armenia is a nation in diaspora, a once persecuted and nearly destroyed ethnic minority in Turkey, a Soviet Republic, and an ethnic minority in other Soviet Republics.

Not only are confederations of semi-autonomous nation-states required but so too are political devices to preserve and protect national minorities subject to alien governance and to provide them a degree of decision-making autonomy in their own interest. The Turkish Empire's millet system made provision for the convenience of a variety of national and religious groups whose local communities were widely dispersed in the manner of shot silk—living side-by-side in peace with other and diverse communities.

At a certain level of aggregation, communities must be capable of self-defense, not only moral and legal and in terms of an image projected through the media, but physical self-defense through

resistance either to the criminal aggression of anti-social elements or the forcible aggression of illicit authority or the planned military action of hostile, alien communities.

In the contemporary United States the widespread failure of public authorities to defend the isolated citizen in the presence of a vast criminal subculture has resulted in widespread recourse to household defensive light arms and neighborhood vigilance associations—the community protecting its identity and integrity, cooperating with public peace officers in the presence of a criminal counterculture. At a certain level of social and political aggregation inter-community conflict is ultimately resolved by force of arms. The level of such "sovereign" aggregates varies from age to age: city-states, principates, nations united by shared language and cultures, multi-national states and empires, perhaps eventually a global polity with consistent and effective supra-national peace keeping capabilities.

The principates of Renaissance Italy achieved a stable military equilibrium that lasted some 300 years. By multiplying hardpoints and setting up artillery forts to defend strategic cities and lines of communication these principates made the costs of aggression so great and the probabilities of success so tenuous that aggression was deterred and the political *status quo* maintained until Napoleon's new revolutionary political formula and mass citizen army made feasible the previously unacceptable costs of aggression, costs both human and financial.

Switzerland, though small, has remained sovereign; its mountainous terrain makes it a natural, defensible redoubt protected by a trained citizen militia that makes aggression too costly to contemplate.

In the emerging global community, it appears likely that recognized political entities capable of defending themselves for only a couple of weeks in extensive hardpoints or redoubts may be able to anticipate a U.N. sponsored rescue operation. South Korea, reduced to the Pusan perimeter, was recaptured and restored by forces under U.N. auspices. As this is written (Nov.1990) it may be assumed that the U.N. resolution demanding the evacuation of Kuwait by its Iraqi invaders would have been greatly facilitated if Kuwait had maintained a strong temporary defense capability on its own territory.

A Pluralistic World Order

The organization of Medieval Europe's Christian Commonwealth may have lessons for a contemporary world that wishes to preserve a plural society. A fairly weak imperial government left day-to-day governance to its members while providing a legal court of ultimate appeal. Its military capability was sufficient to enforce the peace against any single peace-breaker or small coalition, but not sufficient to suppress a widespread, popularly based protest against its usurpations. Its moral authority was conditioned by the Catholic Church.

In the modern world one can, perhaps, foresee a somewhat similar role for the United Nations and its peace keeping forces, based upon the sort of universal consensus brought into play against Iraq's aggression. Such a role can only be institutionalized for the long run by institutional changes that modify current veto rights in the Security Council, though even the veto may be conceived as a bow to the power of (in some cases) states beyond any effective international control. The emerging global "spiritual power" is the intellectual "clerisy"—the university-trained, university-based intellectual elite reflecting and legitimized by the emerging ecumenical culture. The universities train the "New Class" of public and business administrators, analysts and researchers, publicists, writers and cinema/TV producers who dominate modern institutions. In the ultimate analysis and at every level of governance support of the intellectual community is increasingly

essential, not only for access to the new *arcana imperii* ranging from weapons laboratories to public opinion sampling and TV political advertising, but also for the creation, justification and diffusion in elite and mass media of the legitimating symbols of rule, not least of which being the very word "Democracy" of which we speak, here, today in a multinational university seminar.

Chapter IV
Culture, Democracy and Constitution-Making: Some Tentative Observations

William Fox

Introduction

Most countries attempt to put democracy into effect in their political system through a written constitution, although Great Britain has survived for centuries with what the British like to call their "unwritten" constitution. The oldest written national constitution was drafted in the United States and has survived with only 26 amendments in over two hundred years. By contrast, the first Polish constitution, written in 1791, and the first French constitution, also 1791, survived only a few years even though they bore enormous similarities to the U.S. model. Since then, hundreds of constitutions have been written by virtually all the countries in the world with varying degrees of success and longevity. Today, some of the most interesting new attempts at constitution-making are taking place in several of the countries of Central Europe.

What is it that makes for a successful constitution as contrasted with a constitution that fails? Is it possible to identify the ingredients of success? Does the establishment and preservation of democracy require a written constitution? How does one explain constitutions such as the 1977 Soviet constitution, that purport to be a democratic document, but which the government simply disregards when the constitution is inconvenient? Does success have something to do with harmonizing the constitution with a country's culture? These are the central issues posed in this paper, but on which the author can offer only some tentative conclusions.

Constitution Making: The Early Attempts

The American Experience

In 1787 during a hot, steamy summer in Philadelphia a number of talented, well-educated American patriots gathered under instructions from the national government to revise the existing political charter of the United States, the Articles of Confederation. Meeting outside the scrutiny of the press, these men decided simply to disregard their instructions and to draft an entirely new document. That document, the United States Constitution, was ratified two years later, and quickly given ten amendments to guarantee a Bill of Rights for persons in the United States. With only sixteen additional amendments, nearly all of which deal only with the process of government, the Constitution has survived, indeed has thrived, to the present day.

But as fundamental as the Constitution is, many people are misinformed as to its origins. There is a body of uninformed opinion that believes the Constitution to be a totally new work of creativity while, in truth, the Constitution borrowed heavily from the British experience with their so-called "unwritten" constitution, from a number of constitution-drafting ventures then going on in the various state governments and from some of the principal political theorists of the day— particularly the French political philosopher Montesquieu, and Great Britain's John Locke.

The final document established, as the "supreme" law of the land, a scheme of governmental powers separated among the legislative, executive and judicial branches with a system of "checks and balances" to insure that no one branch became all powerful. Recall that in both the American Revolution and the 1787 Constitution, the country reacted negatively to the then still considerable authority concentrated in the British monarch. While the Constitution did not create universal suffrage and while it dealt awkwardly and ineptly with the enormously troublesome question of slavery, it did vest a great deal of power in the hands of the electorate to control directly the legislative branch and to control indirectly the executive branch (presidency). By contrast, the judicial branch was to be appointed by the President with confirmation by the United States Senate, and the judges were to be given what amount to lifetime appointments. (1)

The 1787 Constitutional Convention drafted a document that established a national government with considerable power over the states and with few protections for private individuals. When the framers finished their work and presented the Constitution to the states for ratification (through specially convened ratifying conventions in each state), approval was not guaranteed. Under the leadership of such diverse types as Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry, groups that became known as the "Anti-Federalists" developed a burgeoning opposition to ratification. The opposition found its central theme in the lack of any express protection for individual rights in the original document.

In an attempt to insure ratification, and ultimately to obtain unanimous consent among all the states, the proponents of the Constitution agreed to amend the document to include a Bill of Rights in ten separately numbered amendments. Put in effect in 1791, these rights include, among others, freedom of speech and religion, the right to due process of law, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and a prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." These days when Americans think about their Constitution and especially when controversies occur that involve the Constitution, the focal point, more often than not, is some provision in the Bill of Rights.

But the United States Constitution has survived the test of time. Most of its original provisions remain solidly intact as we move into the Twenty-First century. The original document has been amended only 26 times since 1787 with ten of those amendments comprising the Bill of Rights— a group of amendments that we now view as essentially a component of the original document. Since 1791, with the exception of what are called the "Civil War Amendments" (2) and the ill-considered and now thoroughly discredited 18th or "Prohibition" amendment (forbidding the sale, transportation or consumption of liquor in the United States; repealed in 1933 by the 21st amendment), the Constitution has been amended mainly to alter the process of government. Consider, for example: mandating the direct election of senators (17th), fixing a limit of two four-year terms for the President (23rd), providing for presidential disability (25th), granting the vote to 18 year olds (26th).

The fact that the U.S. Constitution has been amended only 26 times reflects two separate components of the American constitutional process: first, the constitution is difficult to amend from a procedural standpoint. The framers recognized that any document establishing the fundamental principles of governance should be extremely difficult, but not impossible to amend. As a consequence, Article Five of the Constitution permits amendments only when they have been promulgated by a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress and ratified by at least three-fourths of the states. Second, the American people are frequently reluctant on substantive grounds to amend the Constitution. Most proposed amendments never make it through Congress (for example, the recent attempt to promulgate a flag-burning amendment) and a number of those that

survive congressional action are not ratified by the states (for example, the now-defeated equal rights amendment [forbidding discrimination on the basis of gender]).

There seems to be an important message here. First, the American people appear to view the Constitution as a document that establishes only the most basic principles of government along with granting certain fundamental political and human rights, but which is not expected to promote or espouse other social or economic goals. The Constitution remains a comparatively short document, as noted above, because the people seem willing to leave the detail of government to the day-to-day interaction of the legislative, executive and judicial branches and to the state governments. Second, the people appear reasonably satisfied with the difficulty of amending the document. Note that it is fully within the power of the American people even to amend that part of the Constitution that provides for amendments, but have never seriously considered doing so. Finally, the recent decline in public interest in altering the First Amendment to permit the government to punish flag-burners suggests that the American people have a greater reverence for the existing Bill of Rights than most politicians might have suspected. In other words, the people do not take lightly tampering with their basic document of governance. In any event, it is clear that, by and large, the people are generally happy with the document and with the government that that document has created.

The Polish and French Experiences

Recall that the U.S. Constitution was the first of three initial attempts to write national constitutions. What happened in Poland and France? Poland's first constitution, written in 1791, developed out of four centuries of struggle between the Polish people and the Polish monarch interspersed with the ebb and flow of national boundaries and sovereignty so characteristic of that part of the world. (3) As in every other case of constitution-making, it did not spring from a political vacuum. The Polish monarchs in prior centuries had guaranteed, by decree, certain rights to the people; and the drafters of the 1791 document were well aware of developments in the United States, in France after the revolution and, perhaps most importantly, were well-versed in the political theories of the Enlightenment.

But at the same time, Poland did not have the luxury and safety of two broad oceans separating it from its enemies and competitors. One Polish scholar of the time noted sagely:

The republic confederated in America is surrounded on all sides by the spheres of safety; we [the Poles] have everywhere the sword of despotism raised over our heads; they have an ocean of savage nations, here the mightiest empires surround the borders of [our] weakened country; there, three million souls own the land, which can comfortably feed thirty million people; here, the soil is not large enough to satisfy the needs of the inhabitants. (4)

This flow of knowledge and information moved in both directions. James Madison was pessimistic about Poland. In the Federalist Papers, he viewed the Polish situation as a "mixture of aristocracy and monarchy in their worst forms unfit for self-government . . . [and] at the mercy of its powerful neighbors." (5) But despite these different views of Poland, it is now clear that the framers of both the American and Polish constitutions shared similar intellectual backgrounds. They all were aware of the French philosophers, particularly Montesquieu, Rosseau and Voltaire. Their educational backgrounds were similar. Classical education for the upper classes was the norm in both Europe and the United States.

The document put together by the Polish constitution-makers was quite similar to, but not a carbon-copy of the U.S. constitution. They diverged sharply on the matter of establishing a state

religion. Where the First Amendment to the U.S constitution was religiously neutral and prohibited the establishment of a state religion, the Polish constitution stated: "The sacred Roman Catholic creed with all rights granted to it will be recognized as the predominant national religion. Deviation from the predominant religion to any other creed is prohibited and will be punished as apostasy." This seems extraordinarily harsh at first glance and by twentieth century standards, but the language was tempered by additional language in the constitution mandating freedom of expression for those who were born non-Catholic. (6) There are other contrasts: the Polish constitution preserved the monarchy and the primary position of the nobility in governing Poland, while the U.S. constitution itself grew out of a deliberate rejection of the British monarch and reflected, arguably, a more egalitarian—or at least a non-aristocratic—approach to government.

There are many similarities between the two documents. Both preserved a strong sense of federalism, recognizing the rights of state or regional governing bodies. Both incorporated a concept of separation of powers, dividing the government into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial, with a consequent notion of balancing the powers of the branches. Both recognized the need for a strong and independent judiciary as an appropriate counterweight to possible excesses of the other two branches.

The Polish constitution was a singular achievement, especially given the temper of the times in Central Europe and the external geo-political pressures to which Poland was exposed. Tragically, the constitution survived only about one year. The document did not please the most fervid of the Polish reformers; and, at the same time, it appears to have frightened the Polish nobility. A number of the Polish nobles fled to the protection of the Russian Czarina, Catherine II; and, in January, 1793 under severe Russian military and political pressure, Poland was partitioned. The Polish parliament ratified the partition under duress in 1793 and simultaneously repealed the 1791 constitution by reinstating the laws and institutions that pre-dated the 1791 constitution. (7)

Still, the 1791 Polish constitution was not regarded as a total failure. The ideas it espoused, in the words of Professor Ludwikowski, "gave the nation optimism and confidence that Poland was capable of creating a viable political and social system . . . ." In the nineteenth century, this conviction accompanied the progressive formation of a strong Polish national consciousness [and today] its legacy is still very much alive." (8)

The French Constitution of 1791

There is a fair amount of controversy as to whether the American constitutional experience had a strong effect on the French attempts to draft a constitution following the 1789 French revolution, or whether it was French philosophy and political science that influenced much of what happened in the United States. The timing of two important documents feeds this controversy. The original U.S. constitution predates the French constitution (promulgated on September 3, 1791) by roughly four years; but the promulgating of the American Bill of Rights occurred just days before the announcement of France's Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789. Many French scholars have insisted that the U.S. constitution has primarily British roots, that the French paid virtually no attention to anything that was happening in the United States and that the roots of the 1791 French constitution are really to be found in French Enlightenment scholarship, not in the fumblings of U.S. political neophytes. (9)

This is perhaps a bit harsh. The American patriot, Benjamin Franklin, was idolized in Paris about the same time and kept French politicians and intellectuals fully apprised of American constitutional experiments. Thomas Jefferson served as U.S. ambassador to France in this same

period and was a similar conduit of information. A better view is probably that there was a fair amount of exchange of ideas between people on both sides of the Atlantic, whether or not current French scholarship chooses to recognize it.

As with the other two documents, the French constitution was not put together out of whole cloth. Many of the provisions that eventually found their way into the constitution had precursors in the pronouncements of the various constituent assemblies in France in the two years following the 1789 French Revolution. The document itself is far longer than the U.S. constitution, perhaps as much as two and one-half times as long, with far more detail than exists in the U.S. document. (10) The French constitution set up a constitutional monarchy with a strong role for the French King. But as in the United States, the constitution provides for a three-branch government of separated powers and contains a set of specifically enumerated powers for each branch of government. The substance of the earlier Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen finds its way into the 1791 document in scattered provisions, rather than as a separate statement of rights.

There are similarities, of course. A close reading of both the U.S. and French texts exhibit a concept of legislative supremacy mitigated by a strong sense of checks and balances among the three branches. Each document uses the device of enumerating specific powers allocated to the government. Each preserves individual rights including rights of free speech, press, religion, right of assembly and due process. However one resolves the conflict as to who influenced whom, it is indisputable that the documents themselves move in many of the same directions, frequently using very similar language. Nonetheless, much like the Polish constitution the French venture survived only a few years although remnants of it remain in the current French constitution.

A Study in Constitutional Contrasts

Since these first three ventures in constitution-making, many other countries have devised written constitutions. The vast bulk of the nations of the world now believe that a written constitution is a mandatory document of governance. But many of these constitutions differ significantly from the U.S. model. Most of them are far longer and much more detailed. Those that have survived any length of time have been amended far more often that the U.S. constitution. Many nations simply abandon an earlier constitution when they see fit and draft a new version, rather than amending an existing document, so a large number of countries have had several constitutions over the years. In terms of both longevity and stability, the United States constitution remains a remarkable achievement.

At this juncture, it may be instructive to compare a few selected provisions from three representative documents to lay some groundwork for the author's final observations and conclusions. The following is a brief comparison of the language of the United States constitution's first amendment (freedom of speech, press and religion) with parallel provisions in the constitutions of the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan.

The United States

First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

Recall the history of this amendment. It is the first provision of the Bill of Rights and was promulgated just two years after the drafting of the original constitution. Its language is unequivocal: "Congress shall make no law . . and while the United States Supreme Court has never interpreted it as a categorical pronouncement (for example, freedom of speech in the Supreme Court's view does not extend to libel and slander laws or to pornography), it is first among all amendments and one the American people seem reluctant to tamper with.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet constitution of 1977 is an elaborate document promulgated to preserve and enhance the principles on which the November revolution was based. It contains 173 separate articles that set out at length the structure and nature of the Soviet government. Among these provisions are two that appear, simply by their language, to be guarantees of civil and human rights.

Article 124: "With a view to securing for citizens the freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR shall be separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and the freedom of anti-religious propaganda shall be recognized for all citizens."

Article 125: "In accordance with the interests of the working people and with a view to strengthening the socialist system, citizens of the USSR shall be guaranteed by law: (a) freedom of speech; (b) freedom of the press; (c) freedom of assembly and meetings; (d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations. These rights of citizens shall be secured by granting working people and their organizations printing presses, supplies of paper, public buildings, streets, means of communication, and other material conditions necessary for their existence."

These provisions, taken from the 1977 Soviet constitution, (11) bear sharp contrasts with the U.S. language. Note that the United States' First Amendment is stated in categorical or absolute terms: "Congress shall make no law. . . ." By contrast, the Soviet constitutional language is filled with qualifications. Beyond this, there are other articles in the Soviet constitution which significantly undercut the protections seemingly afforded by these provisions. For example, Article 39 states: "The exercise by citizens of rights and freedoms must not injure the interests of society and the state." Article 59 notes: "Exercise of rights and freedoms shall be inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties." Thus, many other articles take away much, if not all, of what the "rights" articles give.

India

Gaining independence in 1946, India began the framing of its constitution on December 9 of that year when the first meeting of the Indian Constituent Assembly was convened in New Delhi. (12) Work on the constitution was completed in early 1948, resulting in a lengthy document with a number of provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights. The Indian draftsmen adopted the American thinking on this point, even though a number of participants in the Indian constitutional drafting process believed that no declaration of fundamental rights was necessary. As explained by a prominent Indian law professor: "The history of our country, the composition of its population, ideological differences among the different sections of the population, our social traditions, and the requirements of true democracy, all necessitated it." (13)

But again, the Indian drafters seemed to be unwilling to write a categorical protection for either free speech or freedom of religion. Article 13 provides: "[1] Subject to the other provisions of this article, all citizens shall have the right: (a) to freedom of speech and expression, (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms, (c) to form associations or unions, (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India, (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India, (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and (g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. [2] Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) or this article shall affect the operation of any existing law, slander, defamation, sedition or any other matter which offends against decency or morality or undermines the authority or foundation of the State . . . ." Article 25 provides: "Every Citizen is entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice, and propagate religion . . . ," but reserves to the state certain powers to enact measures to protect public health, morality and public order. This qualification was recently explained by a now-deceased Chief Justice of India as necessary because India was "riddled with a host of anachronistic social customs sheltered behind religion . . . [and thus India] could not leave all 'practice of religion' free from legislative reform." (14)

Pakistan

Pakistan's constitutional history is similar to that of India, each country gaining independence in the same year from Great Britain. Pakistan, it will be recalled, split off from India mainly to provide a sovereign territory that would provide a home for Moslems in the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan's guarantees of fundamental rights are qualified in much the same way as India's. For example, its provision on free speech states: "Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defense of Pakistan . . . ." Note, because Pakistan is now formally an Islamic republic, that the Pakistanis saw fit to add the phrase "the glory of Islam" in qualification of free speech.

Of course, as we review this constitutional language, it is important not to focus exclusively on the document's express language. The U.S. Constitution's First Amendment seems to be absolute on its face, but as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court it is far less categorical. For example, the First Amendment does not insulate pornography from government controls. (15) The government can pay for student transportation programs in religious schools even though the First Amendment forbids the "establishment" of any state religion. (16) And, as so many laypeople are fond of quoting, even the right of free speech does not, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, permit a person "to cry 'fire' in a crowded theater." (17) Moreover, political conditions in a country may negate any language protecting fundamental rights in the constitution of that country. Will anyone reasonably argue that the Soviet Union has a good track record on free speech, notwithstanding Article 125? Nonetheless, it remains important for a constitution to solidly establish these fundamental rights even if they are not categorical. In this regard, the U.S. constitution comes closer to an ideal than most other constitutions.

Some Tentative Observations and Conclusions

These days the most active constitution-drafting is taking place in Central Europe. While it is difficult to obtain solid information on the specific language being debated for the incipient constitutions of Central Europe. Press reports indicate that all these countries will insist on a

document that both describes the basis of government and contains certain guarantees of human and political rights even if those provisions are not necessarily identical with the United States' Bill of Rights. One notable spectacle these days is the flood of U.S. lawyers rushing off to central European countries to help those countries write their new constitutions. Many of these so-called "consultants" are in reality seeking fee-paying clients. Second, most of them are not experts at constitution-drafting. The United States has not written a constitution in the last 200 years. Third, their most common—and probably most egregious error—is to assume that every country in the world wants a constitution just like the one we have in the United States.

One U.S. constitutional scholar, Albert Blaustein of Rutgers Law School, takes a healthier attitude. He believes that a new constitution, to be successful, must be autochtonous—i.e., it must spring from the soil; it must be "designed to meet the needs, wants, aspirations, and cultures, of the people for whom it is written." (18) Moreover, anyone commenting on another country's constitution-making must recognize that "each country presents a different challenge . . . . Fiji needs a new constitution which will protect the rights and power of its indigent people and still meet international democracy standards. Nepal needs procedural guidance . . . And the list goes on." (19)

But beyond this plea for sensitivity to national goals, interests and aspirations, it may be possible to be more specific in one's recommendations. In my view:

1. A written constitution is vitally necessary for virtually every country as the fundamental document of governance of that country. Few countries can utilize successfully the British "unwritten" constitution model.

2. Every written constitution must contain at least two components:

(1) the document must describe the basic structure of the nation's government; and (2) if it intends to preserve and enhance democracy and democratic institutions, it must contain some list of fundamental rights (possibly modeled on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights or the U.S. Bill of Rights) that guarantees such rights as freedom of expression, press and religion and preserves universal suffrage. The United States Supreme Court determined a number of years ago that the unimpeded right to vote was perhaps the most fundamental of all human rights and the one which must be given the utmost protection. That is an idea I hope is adopted throughout the world.

3. Every constitution should, by design, be exceptionally difficult to amend. It should be made nearly impossible for any incoming power-group to change the rules of the game under which they achieved power. Surely, one corollary of democracy is that any incoming political group not destroy the conditions of democracy that they inherited from the outgoing group.

4. Echoing Professor Blaustein, there is not such thing as a "universal" constitution. Each document must be carefully tailored to a particular country's conditions and culture if it is to be successful. Merely trying to transplant the United States constitution—or any other, for that matter—in another country's soil makes no sense. Most countries probably already realize this. Most American lawyers do not.

5. A constitution, by design, should be a relatively short document. This is not the place for an enormous amount of detail. It is probably not too much to say that the most detailed constitutions are the least effective. Lengthy documents fail for at least three reasons: First, their verbosity may be an attempt to hide numerous conflicting and contradictory language that dilutes the basic authority of the document itself (the Soviet constitution is a notable example). Second,

excessive length may be an attempt to be all things to all people (the Indian constitution seems to suffer from this defect). Unfortunately, a document that tries to stand for everything eventually stands for nothing. Third, and perhaps most importantly, a constitution is probably not the place for a statement of elaborate social or economic aspirations. Rather, it should confine itself to stating the process of government. Most economic and social issues should be dealt with by conventional legislation.

6. Finally, no writing can succeed on its own. There must be an atmosphere of acceptance of constitutional principles among that country's people that transcends the mere words that are put on paper. Without this spirit of acceptance, no document can long survive.

Notes

1.Technically, federal judges in the United States serve. under conditions of "good behavior" – meaning that they can be removed from office during their lifetimes by impeachment. However, the impeachment process is so difficult and cumbersome that in 200 years fewer than 20 federal judges have been removed from office.

2. The Civil War Amendments, promulgated beginning in 1865 at the end of the Civil War by the Reconstructionist-dominated Congress, are: the 13th (abolishing slavery), the 14th (imposing the requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws on state governments [prior to the ratification of the 14th amendment, the U.S. Constitution was viewed as controlling the activities of the federal government but not the state governments], and the 15th (granting the right to vote to former slaves). See Fox, "Amending the Constitution to Accomplish Social Goals," *Social Thought* 126 (1981).

3. Much of this section of the paper is taken from a number of separate pieces written by my colleague, Rett Ludwikowski, now set out in a lengthy, multi-authored text, *Constitutionalism and Human Rights in America. Poland and France*, published in 1991, the two-hundredth anniversary of the first Polish constitution.

4. *Id*., quoting the Polish intellectual and reformer, Hugo Kollataj.

5. *Id*. at 187, quoting from *The Federalist Papers*, Nos. 14 and 39.

6. *Id*. at 216.

7. *Id*. at 236.

8. *Id*. at 236-37.

9. Much of this section is taken from Ludwikowski, *The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the American Constitutional Development*, 38 *American Journal of Comparative Law* 445 (1990) which in turn has been modified somewhat and included in Ludwilcowski, *supra*, note 4.

10. This portion of the paper is taken from Fox, *A Comparison of Major Provisions in the United States and French Constitutions*, in Ludwikowski , *supra,* note 4, at 367-73.

11. The English language translation of these provisions is taken from Butler (ed.), *The Soviet Legal System: Legislation and Documentation* (1978).

12. See P.K. Ghosh, "The Constitution of India: How It Has Been Framed" at 31 (1966).

13. *Id*. at 70.

14. Interview with Chief Justice Sabyasachi Mukerjee in the Harvard Law Record at 11 (October 5, 1990).

15. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).

16. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1(1947).

17. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52(1919).

18. Elaustein, "Constitution-Writing: The Role of the Foreign Consultant," *Oceana Law Library Newsletter* (July, 1990).

19. *Id.*

Chapter V
Reform Absolutism of Joseph II in the Austrian Monarchy in 1781

Ronald Calinger

During the last third of the eighteenth century, Europe and North America experienced sweeping, fundamental, and enduring change in governance, society, and the recognition of human rights. Discourse on the *philosophes'* pursuit of liberty, and on costs of warfare from state rivalries, plus poor harvests, all contributed to a series of crises in Europe's Old Regime, based as it was upon monarchical absolutism and noble privilege. These crises culminated in the first age of the democratic revolution, highlighted by the French Revolution.1 Another widespread source of reform came not from social propaganda or popular rebellion but from 'above'—'enlightened despotism' it has traditionally been called.2 Rulers from Portugal to Russia attempted to strengthen their central state administration rationally and adapted selected Enlightenment ideals to improve the welfare of the people. The recent term "reform absolutist" does better than "enlightened despot" in defining the objectives of these monarchs.

Of the three classic reform absolutists — Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine II of Russia, and Joseph II of the Austrian Monarchy — Joseph II is considered the most thorough, most rational, and least opportunistic. Finding the court of Vienna ineffective amid late Enlightenment transformations, he sought above all to establish a unitary and humane state (*Einheitstaat*) to supersede the Theresian ministerial absolutism. For his drastic domestic reforms now known as 'Joseph(in)ism', which attempted to rescind privileges of the two most powerful corporate bodies in the monarchy, the Catholic Church and the nobility, Joseph II has earned the title "revolutionary emperor."3 Writings of the jurist Samuel Pufendorf, ideas of social harmony from Gottfried Leibniz and Christian Wolff, and the cameralist equation of the state with society influenced his distinctive progressivism. This paper will examine the grand project of Joseph II from 1781—relaxation of censorship, religious toleration, closing of 71 contemplative Catholic monasteries, beginning of the abolition of serfdom, and presentation of the monarch as a civil servant—and the determined opposition it provoked.

When the Great Empress Maria Theresa died in October l780, her thirty-nine-year-old son Joseph II inherited a rising Habsburg empire that was the most diverse in Europe in peoples and problems. American historian Robert Palmer has compared it to a "vast holding company." It consisted of not one but five nations: Austria, Bohemia, Hungary (with Slovakia and Croatia), Flanders, and Lombardy, plus Galicia from the first partition of Poland (1772). The nucleus of this mainly Central European agrarian empire was landlocked. It had few important urban centers and a backward mercantile economy. Its society differed sharply from that of the young American Republic across the ocean. Its hierarchical and authoritarian society had an emperor, a privileged nobility, an entrenched Counter-Reformation Church, and peasant serfs. These and the standing army were the pillars of the polyglot Habsburg empire.

In Joseph's youth, he had developed a passion for politics and love of the realm, partly from his parents, that overcame his natural shyness. From tutors under the direction of Johann Christoph von Bartenstein, he had acquired in near seclusion a conservative formal education based on the moderns Bossuet, Fenelon, and most of all Pufendorf, along with the ancient Roman authors Cicero, Horace, and Tacitus. Rhetoric and history were emphasized, and he enjoyed mathematics

and fortification, which were part of his military training. He accepted his tutors' concept of the benevolence of the monarch but rejected the notion of a tranquil reign, seeking instead to direct events. Dangers posed to the Austrian Monarchy by three Silesian Wars with Frederick II's Prussia and an admiration for the efficient Prussian government and military rigor also shaped him. Utilitarian doctrines and a cold rationalism taken from Cartesian thought, the *philosophes,* and *Aufklarer* in Vienna, especially the 'Great Ones' (*die Grossen*), influenced Joseph as well. His mother had nurtured the Great Ones, and during the co-regency he became their patron.

The leader of the Great Ones was the Dutch royal physician Gerard van Swieten, who had treated Joseph from 1745. Maria Theresa championed educational reform as a precondition to strengthening her empire. With her support van Swieten raised standards for examinations at the University of Vienna, introduced modern subjects in the natural and social sciences which were seen as important to state development, and curtailed religious privileges in universities that obstructed new programs.4 After a protracted struggle he removed the last Jesuit from the Censorship Commission in 1764 and argued for the relaxation of censorship. Van Swieten's efforts and Maria Theresa's reluctant suppression of the Jesuits in 1773 were crucial elements in the Theresian educational program that brought new libraries, observatories, and technical schools and reorganized and improved the universities of Buda, Innsbruck, Graz, Louvain, Pavia, and Prague.

Other Great Ones made their mark. Paul Joseph Riegger replaced a Jesuit in ecclesiastical law at the University of Vienna; his student Karl Anton Martini replaced a Jesuit in natural law. A new law governing relations between church and state was based on natural law and social utility, replacing Counter-Reformation canon law. The appointment in 1763 of the Austrian journalist Josef Sonnenfels to a new professorial chair in cameral science (economics and politics) reflected a growing conviction that state power rests primarily on the national economy. The Theresian state was becoming increasingly secular.

Administrative reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II as co-regent weakened potential opposition. In their zeal for efficiency and honest government, they created a state bureaucracy, which lessened the role in government of the provincial noble diets that controlled taxation and were centers of Church power. (This was the origin of the bureaucracy that operated in mid-Central Europe to the end of World War I.) The Theresian government also created a modern standing army whose officer corps served as a unifying force in the monarchy. In addition, the Church hierarchy was divided. A minority of Febronian-oriented bishops, such as Johann Leopold Hay, Karl Herberstein, and Joseph Auersperg, together with Jansenists and academic clerics, especially in Pavia, supported a degree of autonomy from Rome and rejected religious coercion, arguing that persuasion is the legitimate means of conversion. Like other reformers through the Christian centuries, they based their arguments in good part not on later theology but on the teachings of Jesus.

As Vienna grew prosperous after the Seven Years War, its intellectual life became more vibrant and small segments of its population fostered reform. It had coffee houses, and literary salons such as Caroline Pichler's, the start of its musical golden age with Christoph Gluck and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, and the *Realzeitung*, its widely respected literary and scientific journal which enjoyed more freedom than the press. Articles, commentaries, and reviews in the *Realzeitung* championed freedom of conscience. *Der Wiener Freunde*, 'The Vienna Friends', not Quakers but a dozen erudite Freemasons, dominated the city's literary life. Their reading rooms introduced dozens of French and German periodicals, thus helping to break the intellectual isolation in which Austrians had lived under strict Theresian censorship.

Upon the death of Maria Theresa, the image of Joseph II—*das Bild Josef*—dominated the political horizons in his empire. Joseph II, who had been co-regent with his mother from 1765 to 1780, was a cold, brusque, austere, and uncompromising man, in philosopher Bertrand Russell's apt portrayal "an imperial puritan." The death of his first wife Isabella of Parma from smallpox in 1765 had made Joseph II's strident character more angular, and his extensive travels through the empire during the co-regency had brought out the immensity of the task facing him and increased his sense of urgency for change. He set out hurriedly to overcome disjoining forces of differing languages (more than seven), religions, cultures, dispositions, and interests within the empire and to increase the central power of the monarch at the expense of the aristocracy.

Facing these exigencies, Joseph II worked not to achieve that branch of the Enlightenment that spoke for an essentially republican form of liberty and equality but rather to rule a unified realm with an Enlightenment rationality, imposing from above both welfare and a careful measure of liberty. German historian Reinhold Koser's famous maxim: "Everything for the people, nothing by the people," applies exactly. This monarch believed that the sovereign knew the interests of his subjects better than they: his responsibility to them precluded their participation in government.

Before Joseph could move directly and comprehensively against his first target, privileges of the Church, by establishing religious toleration and confiscating contemplative monastic properties, he needed allies against Church opposition. A logical place to find them was among independent writers, whose commitment to freedom of speech had as a natural corollary a belief in liberty of religious conscience. Introduction of freedom of the press by Gustav III in Sweden in 1774 and efforts in that direction in Denmark, Spain, and France had impressed Joseph.

When Joseph came to the throne, the empire was still under Theresian censorship that restricted cultural and educational development. In December 1780 his *Staatsrat* (State Council) discussed the question of granting freedom of expression. In the following spring, Joseph II surprised Europe by abolishing Theresian censorship in all his provinces. This was the first major break with the policy of his mother. He now granted "an almost complete freedom of the press." Pornography, aggressive atheism, and superstition came under restriction, restrictions which he and his senior advisers thought essential to public morality; political writings also remained subject to censorship. Manuscripts were divided into three classes: journals, literature, and political writings. Political or religious works could still be banned under the political heading, and those of Voltaire in German translation were banned, but not in the French originals. The previously banned Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Goethe could now be freely circulated and read.

Freedom of speech and the press unleashed long repressed criticisms beginning with those of local customs, fashions, and public life in Vienna and moving rapidly to problems of religion and clerics, especially clerical failures to meet the monastic ideal. These criticisms appeared in a flood of pamphlets, briefs, novels, plays, poems, descriptions of imaginary voyages, and gazettes that astonished contemporaries. About twelve hundred new titles appeared in 1781 and 1782. The earliest writers were government functionaries, professors, and priests. Before long most were of more common station. Visitors to literary cafes, they created the style later known as 'bohemian', which included the struggles and privations that folklore attributes to writers. They addressed not only a small literary group but the general public. As freethinker Johann Pezzl cogently wrote, "Books educate scholars; pamphlets educate people."5 The Church was forced to respond in kind to attacks on it, but found few men in its ranks capable of effective pamphleteering in the cause of orthodoxy.

The harsh reaction within the Church hierarchy to the law on freedom of the press toughened Joseph II's determination to move toward religious toleration. The emperor found tactless the

protest of Christoph Anton Cardinal Migazzi, Archbishop of Vienna, that the law seriously infringed on his rights to censor. The law further stipulated that secular, not clerical, authorities in Vienna were to review all clerical writings. The Archbishop of Cologne angrily asserted that only "spiritual pastors," not secular authorities, had the right to decide what should or should not be read. The emperor curtly replied that "prohibition of books is more to be feared than bad publications."6 Tensions increased when the emperor silenced discussion of the papal bull *Unigenitus* (1713), which had condemned Jansenism, and in May ordered Cardinal-Archbishop Migazzi to submit to government control any writing that he published.

Initially, the pamphleteers had mostly praised Joseph II for his enlightened policies. Joseph was prepared to tolerate even scurrilous attacks on him and his ministers, except for questioning of his absolute authority, because he needed press exposés of clerical misconduct and perhaps underestimated the potential power of the press. He gave a free hand to Gottfried van Swieten, president of the Court Commission on Censorship and Education from November 1781. Van Swieten, who had met the emperor through his physician father, broadly interpreted and strenuously defended freedom of the press. After Joseph II responded to religious criticisms by prohibiting deistic literature and radical biblical criticism in 1784, van Swieten had to employ stricter censorship standards. Three years later Vienna gained complete freedom of the press.

This freedom was soon retracted. It continued until shortly after mass demonstrations, rioting, and rebellion, which included a host of pamphlets from polemicists of various persuasions reflecting a growing civic opinion and from disaffected students at the seminary in Louvain, defeated Joseph's attempted radical religious and administrative reforms in the Austrian Netherlands in 1786-87. Joseph II then learned the power of public opinion and wrote derisively: "Scribblers and publishers who indulge in libels must be severely punished."7 But Joseph II's earlier policy had given rise to public opinion as a force within the Austrian Monarchy, and once awakened, it could not be put to sleep.8

In October 1781 Joseph II, whose mother had been the last of the Counter-Reformation Habsburg monarchs, issued one of his two great liberating reforms beyond the relaxation of censorship. The Patent of Religious Toleration for Lutherans, Calvinists, and Greek Orthodox9 superseded his earlier partial and implicit removal of restrictions to religious liberty, which officials such as the Court Minister, Count Heinrich Blumegen, had obstructed. It put Vienna further along on reforms than Versailles. Vienna's reading public had a growing aversion to fanaticism after news of the Calas case (1761), which Voltaire made a *cause célèbre*. In a miscarriage of justice in Toulouse, the Calvinist shopkeeper Jean Calas was found guilty of murdering his son to keep him from converting to Catholicism and sentenced to a brutal death on the wheel. Austrian *Aufklarer* also took up Voltaire's 1766 declaration that toleration was the sole basis for a supportable society. Joseph himself was not new to the battle for toleration. In 1777 he had threatened to resign as co-regent when his mother considered using troops to force ten thousand Moravians, who had just become Protestants, to reaccept the Catholic religion or be transplanted at the point of a bayonet to inhospitable regions of eastern Hungary.10

Joseph's Patent extended the toleration from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to Protestants beyond Lutherans and Calvinists by allowing other Protestant communities, such as the Hussites and Mennonites in Bohemia, to register as Lutherans, while still recognizing the primacy of the Catholic Church. These Protestants and the "separated Greeks" could build meetinghouses for worship, hire a pastor, and open a school. But their meetinghouses had to be unobtrusive. They could not have the appearance of churches by including bell-towers or having public entrances on the street. This was similar to the degree of freedom granted to Catholic churches in Holland. The

Catholic Church was integral to the Austrian Monarchy, and public worship was reserved for it. Otherwise, the Patent did establish civil equality. Members of the tolerated denominations were free to buy land, join guilds, take university degrees, and enter the civil service. Most of the Catholic hierarchy formally protested this patent and most provincial diets and senior governmental officials joined with the purple on this issue.

Joseph II, besides despising all fanaticism, rejected Maria Theresa's anti-semitism. Alone among reform absolutists, Joseph in edicts in November 1781 and January 1782 extended toleration to the Jews. Throughout Europe the Jews were a despised and persecuted minority. Relative to their former station, the improvement in the position of Jews was greater than that of the Protestants. That these later edicts applied only to Bohemia and Lower Austria reflected partly variations in Jewish population. Vienna and Trieste had about 500 Jews; Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia about 70,000; Hungary 100,000; and Galicia and Bukovina about 200,000. Jews in Lower Austria, particularly the capital, and Bohemia no longer had to wear the yellow star of David.11 The January edict permitted Jews with a useful profession who possessed 10,000 gulden and paid a tolerance tax to reside in Vienna. These prosperous Jews could build homes where they wished, visit public entertainments, and leave their houses before noon on Sunday. Throughout the Austrian hereditary lands Jews could freely rent lands, and schools and universities were open to Jewish youths. The Florentine journal *Il corriero europeo* praised the emperor for these actions:

Thanks to the philosophy of Joseph II, and his true love for oppressed humanity, the Jews have finally obtained rights as men and citizens in his states. The edict in their favor is an illustrious monument, worthy of the enlightened century in which we live.12

The Patent and edicts of Toleration were not simply a usurping of Papal authority, as Church historian Ferdinand Maass held,13 but had deep ethical roots and reflected a nascent strain against Counter-Reformation coercion among Monarchy Catholics. Joseph's tutor Christian August Beck endorsed Samuel Pufendorf's view of the inviolability of the individual conscience.14 Before its official release, the emperor had his court ministers circulate the patent to those Catholic hierarchy opposed to religious compulsion, seeking their comments and their support for it in pastoral letters. In his pastoral letter of 20 November 1781, Archbishop Leopold Hay of Koniggratz defended toleration as the only possible way to unite the different confessions in the Habsburg empire into a single body and asserted, "It is never right to restrain the conscience of others with locks and chains."15

One of the forty-nine "Constantinople" letters, published the year Joseph died with the false imprint of Constantinople, discusses tolerance. We now know that this letter and most in the collection long thought to be by Joseph II actually were not. Although this letter errs in attempting to cast him within the radical phase of the French Enlightenment, it suggests correctly his intensity and work with the Great Ones in Vienna:

[N]obody shall any longer be exposed to hardships on account of his creed; no man shall be compelled in future to profess the religion of the state, if it be contrary to his persuasion, and if he have other ideas of the right way of insuring blessedness.

Tolerance is an effect of that beneficent increase of knowledge which now enlightens Europe, and which is owing to philosophy and the efforts of great men; it is a convincing proof of the improvement of the human mind, which has boldly reopened a road through the dominions of superstition, which was trodden centuries ago by Zoroaster and Confucius, and which, fortunately for mankind, has now become the highway of monarchs.16

The patent also had practical economic roots. Hoping to emulate Frederick II, Joseph II wanted toleration to attract skilled Protestant craftsmen, merchants, and peasants for new

industries in Austria-Bohemia and to settle Hungary. In addition to being granted rights to public worship, they gained exemption from taxation or labor services for from six to ten years. Historians Paul von Mitrofanov and Ernst Wangermann have argued that the basis for Joseph II's toleration policy was purely utilitarian, but this ignores the influence of the emperor's education and the evolving support for toleration within Catholicism in the Austrian Monarchy.17

Some critics claimed that the Patent of Toleration did not go far enough. After granting civil toleration, it did not challenge the dominant status of the Catholic Church and toleration was withheld from some minor Protestant sects. Bohemian Deists, for example, continued to be persecuted. They were transplanted to Transylvania until Joseph learned of the appalling conditions there and allowed them to return home. In the future they received "twenty-four lashes with a leather whip on [the] buttocks" whenever they stated their faith, in part because the emperor thought they did not know what a deist was. Secular humanists known as the Vienna Friends had earlier condemned intolerance and espoused freedom of conscience. Among them, historian Heinrich Watteroth denied the need for a state church, while Viennese poet and radical Johann Baptist Alxinger criticized the ambiguity in the emperor's Patent of Toleration and urged going beyond toleration to religious equality.18

Joseph II's correspondence indicates that his principal interest in ecclesiastical policy was not in religious toleration but in establishing controls over the Catholic Church and reducing its privileges. Like his mother, he was an unequivocal Erastian. She had transformed relations with the Church, informing the Papacy that in any remotely temporal matter the state dictates to the Church, introducing the first tax on the Austrian Monarchy clergy, and working to prohibit the Church from taking more lands and wealth out of circulation. Joseph II was also a Febronian. A controversial book of Nikolas von Hontheim, bishop of Trier, entitled *The State of the Church* (1763) and written under the pseudonym Justinius Febronius, had attacked the position of the Catholic Church, especially the Papacy. Febronius argued that bishops should have powers independent of the Papacy and that princes had the duty to promote reforms in the Church, limit monasteries, and prevent Church acquisition of new lands. From the 1760s other German states had begun to pass laws preventing the Church from receiving land donations.

Attacks of *philosophes* upon the personal, social, and economic effects of monasticism must also have sharpened Joseph's ideas. A remark by the Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) was especially telling:

I call those politically idle, who neither contribute to the good of society by their labor, nor their riches; who continually accumulate but never spend.19

Joseph II believed that the number of monasteries in the Austrian Monarchy had "risen to an extravagant height" and, by standards of the day, monastic holdings were quite large.20 Monasteries, for example, owned half the province of Carniola and three-eighths of Moravia.

Extending Theresian policy, Joseph II and his *Staatsrat* under Kaunitz prepared to enact amortisation laws, dissolve certain monastic houses, and make a concerted effort to control the clergy, even to oversee their education. Kaunitz had already prohibited publication of papal pronouncements in Lombardy unless they had approval of the ruler.21 In November of 1781 Joseph's Edict of Idle Institutions ordered all houses of purely contemplative orders dissolved. The edict was supposed to reinvigorate the economy and save the government from bankruptcy by circulating their frozen wealth.22 A scandal at the Carthusian monastery in Mauerbach, which brought the provincial vice-governor's recommendation that the cloister be abolished, was the precipitating cause. Joseph's Edict of Idle Institutions immediately closed 309 monasteries and

104 convents. Systematic dissolutions through 1784 brought the number to 700 out of a total of almost 2200 houses, which reduced monastic personnel from roughly 65,000 to 27,000. Only houses involved in charitable social services, education, or nursing were allowed to continue. But even their personnel had to be reduced by one-third. Older monks and nuns from contemplative houses were retired on pensions, while younger members were expected to be parish priests or teachers.

The vast properties, perhaps one-fifth of the Church's wealth, seized by the state were applied largely to benevolent purposes. Joseph II used funds from dissolution (including 1.6 million gulden in Lower Austria and l million gulden from Bohemia) and vacated buildings to found orphanages, maternity hospitals, institutions for unwed mothers, and places to make the blind, deaf, and crippled self sufficient.23 This was an early system of public welfare. Like Henry VIII of England, Joseph used dissolution funds to underwrite a state system of primary education and pay teachers proper salaries. Schools for 200,000 new students were opened, and parents were paid for letting their children attend regularly. Funds were also expended to create a pension fund for retired contemplative monks and to close existing seminaries and replace them with state-controlled general seminaries in provincial capitals, in which clerics were to follow modern courses of study designed to make them effective public servants.

With his deep baroque piety, Joseph II attempted to raise the material and educational standards of parish priests and built many new churches. Repelled at the discrepancy between the income of the hierarchy and that of the local parish priests, he contracted the annual income for archbishops to 20,000 gulden annually and for bishops to 12,000 gulden. Saving over 660,000 gulden in Hungary alone, he partly used these funds to pay parish priests respectable salaries. In addition, new churches were built at a rate faster than under any of Joseph's predecessors. Parish boundaries were redrawn, so that no parishioner was more than an hour's walk from church. Finally, Joseph revised the six-year education of seminarists, following the principle that "the Church must be useful to the state." For example, priests were expected to encourage new agricultural techniques in the countryside and to support government programs from the pulpit.

A famous but unwelcome visit by Pope Pius VI in 1782 failed to dissuade Joseph from his ecclesiastical policy. Pius VI, known as the "*peregrinus apostolicus*" for his travels, rode with Joseph in a carriage to a tumultuous welcome, participated in continual ceremonies, and found religious enthusiasm in Vienna during his visit in March and April. Several pamphlets greeted the visit. The most notable was Joseph Eybel's "What is the Pope?" Eybel, a critic of past powers of religious orders to ban books, did not want the emperor to give in either to religious fanatics or to people who mocked the papacy without understanding history.24 The emperor did not weaken and Kaunitz refused to see the Pope. Pius VI proceeded from Vienna to Bavaria, where he worked to crystallize opposition to the Habsburgs among Catholic German princes.

Relations between Joseph II and Pius VI soon worsened. In 1782 Gregory Ernst Waldatt's *Joseph II und Luther*, supposedly "printed in Peking," praised Joseph's freedom of the press and his "unequaled courage" in attempting to reform the church and religion.25 Official courtesy briefly hid the reality of the outcome of the papal visit, but that become clear by 1783 as the emperor persisted in confiscating contemplative monasteries and had his Ecclesiastical Commission continue to reorganize seminaries, require the study of history and law there, order the Mass to be said in German, and make marriage a civil contract.

Joseph's other great domestic reform—the abolition of serfdom (or as he indignantly termed it, *Leibeigenschaft*, that is, bondage through inherited, centuries-old feudal duties, *Erbuntertanigkeit*) came in a series of decrees from 1781 to 1789. Serfdom, not convention,

was the foundation of social privilege and absolutism in the Alpine-Danubian Habsburg empire. The aristocracy gave support to the monarch and received freedom to rule their serfs as they wished. Maria Theresa's basic response to serfdom had been to reduce *Robot*, the forced labor exacted by the lords from serfs, to a total of no more than three days per week. Joseph II found serfdom insufferable and attempted to abolish it through an extension of civil rights. Peasant serfs were freed to marry, move about, and choose a trade. These rights were inalienable. This program extended not only to Joseph II's own estates, but gradually to all noble estates. Not long after the American Declaration of Independence and shortly before the French Revolution issued its Declaration of the Rights of Man, Joseph II's agrarian policy attempted to break the bondage of the remaining feudal system throughout the provinces of the Austrian Monarchy. In addition to the nobility, towns that owned landed estates opposed abolition.26

Joseph II's government recognized that the development of peasant property as an economic basis and legal protection were indispensable to consolidating the rights associated with abolishing serfdom, to providing an incentive for peasants to industry, and to their acquiring a new dignity. It thus offered peasants material support to gain tenure on the lands they worked and to purchase them, which increased small and middle-sized peasant landholding. This support helped convert servile peasant serfs into free landowners. The power of seigneural lords (*Gutsherren*) to exploit tenants through monopolies, like milling, retailing, and hunting, or to act on related complaints as judge or local official, were also sharply curtailed. To put teeth into these decrees, Joseph's government attacked the manorial courts of landlords by creating state-licensed judges to whom peasants could appeal to resolve local agrarian disputes.

Efforts to abolish peasant servitude suffered from an initial distrust of the monarch on the part of numbers of peasants offended by his efforts to simplify Church liturgy and curtail the observance of saints' days. Peasants, moreover, did not understand their new monetary obligations and opposed the continuing work services of *Robot*. Joseph II undoubtedly wanted to maintain a measure of close connections with the nobility, so essential to the fabric of his empire, and thus had not revoked all dues that peasants owed lords. Peasants also remonstrated against a census for conscription for the army. Conscription fell heaviest upon the poor and amounted to a life sentence.

Abolition decrees brought turmoil to the countryside. The decrees were crafted for the hereditary lands and first applied with few disturbances in Upper and Lower Austria, Bohemia, Carinthia, Galicia, Moravia, Silesia, and Styria. As old patterns of submission ended, however, discontent grew among the peasants who still lived in misery. They rose against landlords over interpretations of their rights or millennial expectations that Joseph II would abolish all dues. When Joseph II attempted to extend the abolition of serfdom to Hungary and Transylvania in 1783, their nobles revolted fearing a loss of revenue and refusing to pay taxes, while mountain Wallachian peasants in Transylvania joined to fight against the nobles in a long continued quest for freedom and justice. The Wallachian peasants saw the emperor as an ally, and their leader Horea went to Joseph II in Vienna for support.27 There were massacres both by the national militia the nobles formed and by rebel forces. The Wallachian uprising calls to mind the rural upheaval of the Pugachev revolt a decade earlier in Catherine II's Russia.

As revolutionary to the privileged social structure as the abolition of serfdom was Joseph II's plan to impose a uniform tax on land based only on the quality of the soil and without regard to the social status of the owner. This plan would shift more of the tax burden onto the nobility and Church. It thus extended the work of Maria Theresa, who had first taxed both in Habsburg lands, but at half the rate of the peasants (1 percent:2 percent), and that of State Chancellor Kaunitz, who sought equal taxation rates. No other absolutist monarch had proceeded so far in the attempt to

equalize taxation as did Joseph II. It took from l784 to l789 to complete the necessary land registers (*cadastre*), but the full implementation of the uniform tax based on nine levels of soil quality had to be postponed and was later revoked. Joseph II's government expected the nobles to attempt to recoup tax losses by imposing heavier compulsory days of work services or seigneural dues on peasants and sought to counteract this. In order to make peasants more secure, the emperor experimented with substituting on Crown lands an annual rent for *Robot.*Finding this approach useful, he extended Maria Theresa's policy by commuting *Robot* in 1789 to a cash tax, only part of which went to the lords. His efforts to free the peasantry culminated in 1789 in a radical law for the time that decreed that peasants could not be required to pay more than 30 percent of their gross income in taxes to the state and local lords. Of this, the state was to receive a fixed tax of 12 2/9 percent and the tax for the seignural lords could not surpass 17 7/9 percent.

In administrative reform Joseph II rejected old theories of monarchy and imparted a new coherence to governing. Maria Theresa had believed in majesty and that God's grace resided in the ruler; Joseph II considered himself a civil servant—a modification of Frederick II's concept of the "first servant of the state" (*le premier serviteur de l'etat*). In directives for educating royal children, Joseph and his younger brother Leopold advocated convincing them that they were ordinary people, no better in law than their subjects, and that their privileges could be justified only by untiring work on behalf of the people. Joseph forbade servile practices, such as kissing the emperor's hand, as beneath the dignity of man. He worked to make his administration and civil servants more efficient and less corrupt. The notion of the impersonal state separate from the ruler, which became ascendant after the French Revolution, was taking root in the Old Regime.

The reforms of 1781 clarify a major issue in the historiography of Joseph II—the relation of his grand project reforms to Theresian policies. Were they logical extensions or a break? In their sum, they were both. But the relaxation of censorship, the extension of religious toleration, and the abolition of serfdom along with the redefinition of the monarch as a civil servant are reorientations or abrupt, decisive breaks. To be sure, there were also substantial continuities in Joseph II's pursual of Erastian relations between Church and state, his dissolution of contemplative monasteries, his reduction of religious processions, and his replacing of *Robot* with a cash tax. He additionally extended a spectrum of Theresian domestic reforms. Joseph revised the legal code to abolish torture and have equality as the cornerstone of the law, reaffirmed the independence of Maria Theresa's *Oberste Justizstelle* (high court of appeal), and completed the consolidation of courts into three types, including the *Stadtgerichten* (city courts), which diminished the welter of provincial courts with conflicting jurisdictions and had judges with more formal legal training.28 He also fostered economic development by abrogating guild control over parts of the economy, importing foreign craftsmen, and funding early industrial efforts.

Resolving another important historiographical issue, the portrayal of Joseph II by his mid-twentieth century biographers as a tragic hero, requires going beyond 1781.29 The depiction has failed to stand up to scrutiny. Joseph II's 1781 decrees, to be sure, aroused a storm of protest from Church leaders and subsequent revolts by the nobility in Hungary and Transylvania. His brusqueness of manner and autocratic disregard for local opinion further alienated aristocratic bureaucrats deprived of their feudal privileges and lessened the support that the emperor needed from this sector of society for his program to succeed. Old aristocratic burueaucrats also opposed, if not despised, Joseph's new bureaucrats. The presentation of Joseph II as tragic hero suggests that his quest was hopeless against the powerful corporations of aristocracy and hierarchy. But both the Church and nobility had splits within their ranks and did not alone defeat him.

Joseph II systematically gathered information and countered opponents of his reform project. In 1784 he issued detailed instructions for district commissioners to report and provide intelligence on his programs. As opposition to his reforms grew, two years later Joseph II unified the police, except for Hungary, under Count Johann Anton Pergen. Within the new central police directorate, Pergen took under his control the *Kabinettskanzlei*, which traditionally guarded state secrets. He modified it into an unsavory secret service to inform on the emperor's opponents and writers and uncover sparks of rebellion. Joseph had to win over the peasants. Although his liturgical changes had upset them and their living conditions remained miserable, by 1785 he was gaining their trust and his agrarian reforms were widely seen as their chance for emancipation.

To have the time and financial resources to establish his domestic reforms, Joseph II needed stability in foreign affairs. It is a well-tested maxim that war stops reform. Joseph's predatory foreign policy, however, joined with that of Catherine II, led to a war against the Ottoman Turks from 1787 to 1790. This war devastated his domestic economy. In l786 the Austrian-Bohemian budget had a small surplus. The next year the national debt soared to 22 million gulden, and in 1790 it reached 400,000 million. As food prices and taxes rose and a new conscription was implemented, the mood in Vienna turned ugly. Bread riots erupted after the bad harvest of 1788/89 and the emperor's popularity plummeted.30 Critics were dismayed at his setbacks in the war and his lack of scruples in foreign policy. The iron-willed Joseph II, who had fallen ill from a fever that swept his troops in the Balkans, returned to Vienna to die in 1790.

The 1781 reforms of Joseph II make him the foremost reform absolutist and model of a distinctive Central European progressive tradition. In his drive to form his diverse Alpine-Danubian empire into a unified, humane state, Joseph II had pursued ecclesiastical and agrarian policy that reduced privileges of the powerful Catholic Church and nobility. Supported by the Great Ones, writers, and Febronian Catholic bishops, in 1781 he relaxed censorship, granted religious toleration that extended to Jews, suppressed contemplative monasteries, began to abolish serfdom, and followed a civil servant concept of monarchy. When the French National Assembly on 4 August 1789 voted to abolish vestiges of feudal practices and create a bill of rights, Joseph II declared this with some justification a plagiarism of his policies. On the emperor's death, Beethoven set an ode to music: "[He crushed] a monster whose name was fanaticism. . . . Then mankind rose up into light."31 Neither his strident personality nor the domestic opposition that forced the partial revoking of his reforms after his death prevented the growth of Joseph II's reputation in the years following his death. He became a model for progressive change in the l848 revolution and the late nineteenth-century pursuit of freedom of the press in Austria.

NOTES

1.See Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, trans. by Lydia C. Cochrane (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); Robert Darnton, "An Enlightened Revolution," *The New York Review of Books* XXXVIII, 17 (1991), pp. 33 - 36; and R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 2 vols.

2. See Eberhard Weis, "Enlightenment and Absolutism in the Holy Roman Empire: Thoughts on Enlightened Absolutism in Germany," *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 50, Suppl., 1986, S181 -182. Historians still vigorously debate whether enlightened absolutism or despotism is a conceptually meaningful political classification, and thus it lacks a consensus. "Enlightened despotism" goes back to the Enlightenment debate between partisans of the so-called royal and noble theses. Voltaire and the French physiocrats looked to a "despote éclairé" or "bon tyran" as

agents of liberating reform, while Montesquieu in *De l'Esprit des Lois* (1748) depicted the nobility as guarantors of freedom against arbitrary monarchs. [See Peter Gay, *Voltaire's Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 309 - 333.] By the time of the mature Enlightenment, the notion of an all powerful "despote éclairé" in the manner of Louis XIV was no longer a reality.

The term "enlightened absolutism," *aufgeklarter Absolutismus*, was first introduced in 1874 by the German economist Wilhelm Roscher, who used it to distinguish between the court absolutism of Louis XIV based upon divine right rule and the final form of absolutism in which monarchs viewed themselves as civil servants laboring to improve the welfare of the people. [See Wilhelm Roscher, *Geschichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutschland* (Munich, 1874), pp. 380 - 381.] The main argument about the validity of this term focuses upon these monarchs' motives and sense of social responsibility. The "French thesis" of Francois Bluche, Roland Mousnier, and others disputes these monarchs' conversion to benevolent motives, citing instead their desire to increase taxes and reduce internal opposition. Essentially the French thesis considers "enlightened absolutism" an oxymoron. [See Roland Mousnier, *Histoire generale des civilisations*, vol. 5, *Le XVIIIe Siecle* (Paris, 1953), p. 173.] Marxist historians similarly believe that enlightened despots simply made belated reforms to compete financially or to avert a bourgeois revolution. German and Austrian historians of the eighteenth century mainly accept enlightened absolutism as a clear evolution in monarchy, while French, British, and American historians mostly accept the French thesis. German and Austrian historians acknowledge the primacy of state needs among these monarchs and contradictions in their programs. They also observe that *Aufklarung* thought from Gottfried Leibniz to Immanuel Kant influenced them more than Anglo-French thought. Fritz Hartung, Eberhard Weis, and the late American Leonard Krieger are among the scholars who have believed that at least a degree of benevolence motivated the programs of these monarchs.

3. Three twentieth-century biographers have so labeled him. They are F. Fejto (1953), H. Magenschab (1979), and S. K. Padover (2nd ed., 1967).

4. See Frank T. Brechka, *Gerard van Swieten and His World, 1700 - 1772* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 111-147.

5. Ernst Wangermann, *The Austrian Achievement 1700 - 1800* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 137.

6. Saul K. Padover, *The Revolutionary Emperor: Joseph II of Austria* (New York: Archon Books, 1967), p. 155.

7. Ernst Wangermann, *The Austrian Achievement*, p. 162.

8. Opposition to Josephist reforms began the Brabant Revolution that lasted to 1793. Power of the press was but one element in this complex situation. Traditionalists composed mostly of nobles, church hierarchy, artisans, and *ancien-regime* lawyers defended their privileges and liberties, while Democrats consisting mainly of lawyers, merchants, bankers, the lower clergy, and members of professions supported reforms. Both groups were angered at Joseph's disregard for local opinion. The loyalty of the Brabant's prosperous peasantry to the Church and perhaps the nascent nationalist opposition to foreign Austrian soldiers also must be considered in the Brabant Revolution. See Janet L. Polasky, *Revolution in Brussels, 1787 - 1793* (Brussels: Academie Royale de Belgique, 1987).

9. In the 1770s, out of a total population of 20 million in the Monarchy, non-Catholics numbered 3.4 million. See Charles H. O'Brien, *Ideas of Religious Toleration at the Time of Joseph II* in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 59, part 7 (1969), p. 12.

10. See Charles H. O'Brien, *Ideas of Religious Toleration*, p. 21.

11. T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), p. 66.

12. Franco Venturi, *The End of the Old Regime in Europe, 1776 - 1789* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), trans. by R. Burr Litchfield, vol. II, p. 646.

13. Charles H. O'Brien, *Ideas of Religious Toleration*, p. 5.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

15. Franco Venturi, *The End of the Old Regime in Europe*, p. 649.

16. "Letters of Joseph II," *The Pamphleteer*, vol. 19 (1922), p. 290.

17. Charles H. O'Brien, *Ideas of Religious Toleration at the Time of Joseph II,* p. 5.

18. Charles H. O'Brien, *Ideas of Religious Toleration*, p. 67 and Ernst Wangermann, *The Austrian Achievement 1700 - 1800*, pp. 139 - 141.

19. As quoted in T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, p. 60.

20. T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Absolutism*, p. 60, and Saul K. Padover, *The Revolutionary Emperor,* pp. 158 ff.

21. Derek Beales, *Joseph II: In the Shadow of Maria Theresa 1741 - 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 444.

22. Saul K. Padover, *The Revolutionary Emperor: Joseph II*, p. 160.

23. T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, p. 71.

24. Franco Venturi, *The End of the Old Regime*, pp. 658 - 59.

25. Franco Venturi, *The End of the Old Regime*, p. 667.

26. T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, p. 81.

27. Franco Venturi, *The End of the Old Regime in Europe*, p. 686.

28. While Maria Theresa had in 1758 stopped the beheading of a Slovenian woman named Magdalena Lagomer, who was accused of being a witch and tortured, the new Theresian law code a year later still listed sorcery as a crime. Joseph's ending of punishment of alleged witches thus broke with the past. See Paul P. Bernard, *The Limits of Enlightenment: Joseph II and the Law* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 13 ff.

29. See endnote 3.

30. T. C. W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, p. 89.

31. Derek Beales, *Joseph II*, p. 6.

Chapter VI
Individual Freedom and Political Power

Algirdas Degutis

Regarding the scope of political or state power the doctrines of totalitarianism and anarchism are two extreme points on the same line. Totalitarianism requires that the entire power of decision-making be invested in the supreme political body or sovereign with the result that all aspects of the individual's life become politically relevant and thus non-private. Anarchism vests all power of decision-making in the individual person, with the result that all political power is privatized and thus made non-existent. In relation to these two points classical liberalism has been labeled methodological anarchism (R. Nozick).1 Its postulate is: political decision-making is unnecessary or even harmful, unless proven to be necessary for unhampered private decision-making.

Here, political power is the power to make decisions in the name of all and enforcing them, if necessary. The postulate of methodological anarchism is but a different formulation of the postulate of individual freedom: every one is his own master. But in society each person's freedom faces the other's. One's unlimited freedom is the others unfreedom; one's indefinite freedom is danger to the other's freedom. To provide for the secure freedom of all, therefore, everyone's freedom should be set some limits which it must not transgress. To put it in a Kantian manner, everyone's freedom can be secured only if no one's freedom extends further than is compatible with a like freedom of the other. Thus some general law-like constraint on all is needed to make freedom possible in a society of men.

This is the requirement of non-aggression or non-interference with the other individual's domain. All liberal rights proceed from this fundamental requirement of non-aggression or non-interference, and liberal law is essentially a means of preventing aggression. The only lawful use of coercion is to prevent coercion—retaliating but never initiating coercion.

According to the liberal sense law is not concerned with achieving a positive good, but only with preventing the evil of unfreedom. The liberal idea of freedom is entirely negative: one is free if not coerced by another. The positive contents of one's freedom are in no way prescribed by the law. The choice both of the ends and of the means in leading one's life is left to the individual. Accordingly the entire responsibility for the success or failure of one's choices belongs to the individual; neither success nor failure may be coercively distributed to other individuals.

The concept of individual freedom is intimately related to the concept of (private) property; in fact, individual rights can be defined simply as property rights. Property is the right to have one's actions and their products at one's exclusive disposal, and the duty to respect a similar right for others. Property makes responsibility for the use of one's freedom definite. It individualizes responsibility so that all the fruits of one's use of reason or choice--both the sweet and the bitter— go to the owner. In this sense property is the foundation of individual freedom. It is not wealth, but it makes the search for wealth worthwhile.

Individual liberty and property, if secured by the law, open the space for non-coercive relations between individuals. In this space all pursue their private goals as they think fit; indeed goals can be pursued only voluntarily or by consent.

On this voluntary basis, relations of love, care, charity and self-sacrifice are grounded. Coercion is incompatible with their nature, with the feeling of sympathy which underlies them. As

essentially non-coercive these relations are also intimate and person. Hence, it would be incongruous for the mother to care for strangers at the expense of her small children. All of these features make it evident that relations of sympathy cannot universally relate all the individuals in the great society.

Universally applicable non-coercive relations between free individuals are the relations of mutual or reciprocal services based on a rational calculation of utility, rather than on a feeling of sympathy. These are the exchange or market relations par excellence, where the parties are thought to be capable of judging the utility of the exchange for their own good and where no other motives of exchange need have any relevance.

Free exchange, if it takes place, is advantageous to both parties to the exchange. This is the axiom that grounds the liberal political economy and the free market ideology.

Indeed, the value of things or actions depends on their utility for the individual's goals and those which are relatively scarce are the more valuable. Because of the differences in people's goals the things and actions at their disposal are of different subjective values. The same thing or action is valued differently by various individuals relative to their scarcity or plenty in respect of the goals pursued. It is always advantageous to exchange my (relative) plenty which is your (relative) scarcity for your plenty which is my scarcity. Since this kind of exchange is mutually advantageous, it will take place, other things being equal; correlatively if it takes place—in a free, non-coercive way—it is mutually advantageous. In this way everyone's serving his own private goals serves the goals of others, so that in the end all are better off.

Whenever free exchange is not interfered with and property is protected there emerges spontaneously a general system of demand and supply or free market. Each act of exchange by making its participants better off stimulates further acts of exchange. All human action and its fruits come to be potential objects of free exchange as goods and services. The price of the good offered in the market—what and how much is given in return—reflects its utility for other people or their evaluation. Prices inform participants of the most profitable directions for expending one's resources, namely, where the need is the greatest. Hence, obtaining economic power or getting rich is possible only by better serving others, by offering the most desired good for the lowest price. Economic power is thus acquired in a non-coercive, lawful and most 'democratic' way: it simply reflects the number of money votes given for a good or service (cf. A. Rand). Prices neither command nor coerce, but merely put up the bill leaving to everyone his or her freedom of choice.

The most wonderful feature of the free market is that in leaving everyone his freedom of choice and the right to pursue exclusively private goals, it spontaneously generates an overall order in which the goals of all are satisfied to the greatest possible degree. This feature was first brought up as a theoretical discovery in the monumental work of Adam Smith, at the time when there were but modest manifestations of the free market. Once made, however, the discovery served as an impetus for a powerful propaganda that ultimately turned state policy in Britain and elsewhere towards liberalization in different domains of life.

The liberal movement led by the doctrine of laissez faire and supported by the emergent bourgeoisie started demolishing the system of feudal ranks, and the legal barriers to free trade. Freedom of trade and employment, replacement of "kingly" prices by market prices, spread of hiring, freedom of movement, and the abolition of protectionism and of privileges of rank—all these and many other liberties have been won over from the state by the individual. Their legal recognition meant also the limitation of state power; in fact, these were but two sides of the one coin. The ideal of what was later called the 'minimal state', that is of a state that merely protects

individual freedom and property without interfering with the individuals' private life or private exchange was being gradually approached.

The liberalization of social life went hand in hand with the democratization of political power. The interests of these two movements at first supported each other as both were directed against the absolute monarchical rule in Europe at that time. But it is important to keep in mind that by nature the two movements are different, though not necessarily opposed, phenomena. The goal of the former is to limit the scope of political power in order to make room for the private action. The goal of the latter is to make political decisions representative of all interests. Note that the goal of democracy, taken by itself, is not that of liberalism for it sets no limits at all on the scope of political power, even if it broadens its basis. If we keep in mind also that the ideal of democratic decision-making, unanimous consent, is hardly ever feasible and thus always tending towards simple majority vote, then we are sure to see that democracy is imminently menaced by the specter of the majority oppressing the minority. This is absolutely unacceptable if individual freedom is the only reason for political arrangements, for, as A. Rand2 puts it, the smallest minority is namely the individual.

This menace was the reason why liberal theory and practice took great pains to set constitutional limitations on the otherwise unlimited democratic political power. No legislative acts, however democratically arrived at, could be accepted as just if they infringed on the individuals freedom or property. Individual freedom and property rights were to be the bastions at which the sovereign's power ends. The English *habeas corpus* and the American Bill of Rights were to serve precisely as such bastions. In the old liberal understanding the political sovereign can neither create nor give any rights, but can only recognize and defend the rights individuals already possess. This is the most and the best it can do; it is simply the trustee of the individual's right to defend against aggression. Having this role, it may be given physical power—the army and the police—maintained by a pooling together of some of the individual's resources. As in an individual's case, the coercive power of the state is to be used only in response to coercion: not for any positive goal, but only for the negative one of putting down any internal or external aggression.

True, even classical liberals often conceded that the state, or the government, may provide some positive services for the public, namely, those that are generally useful, yet for some reason not provided by the market. These services were to be given as 'free', i.e., from the pool collected by taxation. In providing these 'socialized' services the state was presumed to act in a non-coercive way (except for the element of coercion implied in the idea of taxation) and with no monopoly claims on the services in question. In this positive function, in contrast to the retaliatory one, the government was presumed to act on a par with the private individual and to have no right to coerce individuals to do or to forebear anything.

The purely negative concept of freedom which could be provided equally for all has often been met with the objection that it does not provide the 'positive' or 'material' freedom for all. Socialists have been exemplary critics of liberalism in this respect. In the critics' view, one's possession of negative freedom is always grounded in, or leads to, a condition where some have more opportunities for the achievement of their goals than others, more 'positive' freedom than others. What is meant here by differences in 'positive' freedom is, in fact, differences in the economic power of men that of necessity are generated in the free market based on principles of negative freedom. It is these differences that are thought to be unjust and to be removed by political means in the re-distributive or the welfare state. Accordingly, the government is supposed to take measures that rectify the difference, even if the measures in question curtail the rights of individual freedom and property. Later on, the demands for re-distribution came to be known under the label

of demands for 'social' rights and 'social' justice. It is in the name of 'social' justice that the massive attack on the liberal conception of justice was launched in the 20th century.

The attack began as a more or less successful attempts at 'socializing' the market, at forcing it to operate in a way that made the results of market transactions conform to re-distributive patterns set up by political decisions. Since the attempts were hampered by principles of limited state power and the sanctity of property inherited from the liberal age, they collapsed as either "abstract," "merely formal" or even "undemocratic." Their place was mostly overtaken by all kinds of "social development programs." In thus becoming the seat for the management of economic interests of different groups within society, political power has gradually regained the ground lost during the hey-days of liberalism. The replacement of individual freedom by 'social' rights could only go hand in hand with the extension of state power beyond the purely defensive tasks. For the rectification of differences in economic power requires the initiating, and not merely the retaliating, use of force. Yet the danger of state power becoming arbitrary was somehow overshadowed by the hope of more equal welfare to be brought about by it.

From the classical liberal point of view, the process of 'socializing' the private exchange within the market had to be pernicious both for individual freedom and for everyone's welfare. From A. de Tocqueville and Lord Acton to L. von Mises and F. von Hayek liberals both prophesied and predicted the calamities in wait from this development, the dangers it would bring for the very existence of Western civilization. All these predictions, so improbable at the time when first made, can now be repeated as recent history.

The erosion of the more or less liberal societies began with the spread of the idea of 'socialization'. Starting with disparate and well-intended projects it ended in nearly universal subjection of the private to the public. To speak nothing of the countries where the private was simply abolished, the attack on the private everywhere led to pretty much the same (unintended) results. First the legislatures were eroded and idea of the law devalued, for as legislatures came up with the tasks of "social development" they ceased to rule by long-term, general rules and, instead, gradually came to rule by specific commands, prescriptions and decrees. The executive with its monopoly of coercion, which is now governed by legislative decrees, received *carte blanche* the power and right to initiate the use of force in its activities. Property rights gradually receded to the rank of secondary importance.

The very concept of right that previously meant mostly property rights and freedom from coercion gradually evolved into its very opposite: the freedom to coerce. One needs only consider any of the so-called "positive" or "social" rights (the right to employment, the right to housing, the right to decent living conditions, etc.) to see that they are not merely claims for non-interference (like liberal rights); they are, rather, claims on others' positive action. If, for example, I have a right to a house, then somebody has the duty to provide it for me. Who is he? If it is my neighbor then it seems that outright violence and robbery is being propagated under the cover of "social" justice. The fact is only concealed and in no way changed if the state or the society proclaimed to have the duty in question, for the state can carry out the duty only by forcing an innocent individual to serve my needs. Of course, he need not be made to labour on the building site of my house; it well suffice if he is made to transfer to me a part of his income, by way of, say, progressive taxation. In any case the state, or rather government officials, are thus allowed to do things which on all counts are simply criminal.

Once the quagmire of "social" rights is made the basis of state policies, the society starts along a road which can only lead back to slavery. First of all, sooner or later traditional liberties must go, for by taking up the responsibility for the welfare of particular social groups the state can in no

way remain within circumscribed bounds. Gratuitous giving can only be done through forced taking from others and this surely means that the state is going to violate property rights. Then, in order to preserve the resulting re-distributive pattern it must be isolated from the spontaneity of the market. This again requires coercion which violates the rights of individual freedom, of non-interference.

Next, welfare must go. Indeed, property rights and individual freedom are constitutive of the legal framework that underlies the free market efficiency. Only if the exchange is free does it result in mutual advantage and a rise in the welfare of the parties to the exchange. If the freedom of exchange is hampered or the wealth acquired through exchange is not protected by property rights, then the spontaneous order of the market is destroyed. Resources do not go where they are most needed and thus mostly highly priced. Instead, they go where the bureaucracy thinks fit, and since the bureaucracy acts on political motives, rather than upon considerations of profit, its interference is always harmful and costly. In its attempt to cut a bigger share of the pie for some the state ends only with everyone's share being reduced. It makes no difference whether the state's interference with the freedom of the market is undertaken in response to a democratic vote. Though this may better conceal its injustice, it cannot make it more right or more beneficent.

Hardly less pernicious are the consequences of pursuing "social" justice for political authority itself and for the moral atmosphere surrounding it. To out the matter briefly, in declaring itself the guardian of "social" justice the state assumes a task that undermines its very foundations. In its attempt to even out the material differences the state both destroys the spontaneous system of evaluating everyone's efforts and creates the temptation for using political means for economic ends. For if the level of one's income depends upon the government's decision, then the individual pays more to try to influence the decision than to seek more efficient solutions to his economic problems. There are all kinds of means leading to this end, from political strikes to bribery. The more ambitious the government "development" projects, the more tempting becomes the misuse of political power, and the more numerous the possibilities for oppressing and exploiting the politically less influential. Instead of serving as a means for the prevention of coercion, the state itself becomes the main source of coercion—the most powerful invader of individual rights.

Yet, precisely this unlimited power that the state acquires on its road to "social" justice is the latent cause of its ultimate impotence. For all its power is itself dependent upon the unstable balance of competing interest groups and, consequently, on the unceasing confusion of decisions and counter-decisions, exceptions and privileges. All this squabbling for power drains the resources of society and poisons all trust in politics, government and law. The democratic camouflage hardly conceals the immodest spectacle of power-struggle. Sooner or later the hour of decisive choice arrives: either total state control (socialism) or radical reduction of the "social" functions of the state (liberalism).

Hopefully, it is the second alternative that yet remains to be tried. There has been enough flirtation with socialism; it has given birth to the most dangerous chimera of the 20th century, "social" justice. For justice can only be individual: a collective (state) can have no more rights against the individual than any other individual.

Notes

1. R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
2. A. Rand, *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* (New York: New American Library, 1967).

Interconnections Between Science, Reason, Freedom, Democracy and Tradition: Remarks

Richard K. Khuri

- I –

Many aboard the worldwide democratic bandwagon appeal to some combination (or confusion) of reason with science to turn back "the long shadow of tradition," hold the arbitrary use of force in check and guarantee their freedom. Among those who have recently shed their totalitarian burden and those who still hope to rid themselves of their oppressors, reason often beckons as a supremely fair arbiter. Where there is much material prosperity to be gained, the comforts and technological brilliance that are the fruit of science may appear epiphanic. Science itself is widely perceived as the symbol of successful collective rational activity.

Once reason gains center stage in a people's drive for freedom, the two are likely to become bonded in a way that would be reflected by the democratic institutions built in part to guarantee freedom. It thus becomes possible to subtly and surreptitiously steer the exercise of freedom into the domain of rational choice. This process may also shed light on Western history with regard to how reason and science have risen to such prominence in democratic institutions and practice. In either case, it becomes important for us to ask whether reason really is what it is made out to be. In particular, we may ask: "How rational is science? And is reason indeed the protector of our hard-won freedom?" We can then consider the consequences of the answers for democratic practice and the prevailing attitude towards tradition.

- II -

Some rationalists on the retreat in the face of rising evidence against the applicability of their more ambitious systems or methodologies withdraw into the safety of basic fundamental principles and processes, such as the identity principle, the principle of contradiction, and deduction. "Everyone," they say, "at least must abide by these whenever there is linguistic communication." The question is: What kind of linguistic communication? Puns, jokes and some comic acts are successfully communicated precisely when they violate those venerable principles. Even if we were to put aside such exotic counterexamples, while no one has contested deduction (except with regard to its scope), the others have not escaped internal controversy. Ever since Leibniz declared and argued for the identity of indiscernibles, the identity principle has drained considerable resources available to philosophical logic. The principle of contradiction has been more severely tested. Heraclitus long ago transcended its restrictions to divine a higher logic at the metaphysical level, one according to which opposites *must* simultaneously coexist. His divination has not been condemned to a philosophical museum. On the contrary, Hegel and Heidegger have made it an awesome *philosophical* task for anyone to insist on the inviolability of the principle of contradiction. This task has effectively been rendered moot by Niels Bohr. The eminent Danish physicist, far from blinking in the face of contradictory evidence--that matter at the elementary level has both wave and particle behavior patterns (contradictory, among other reasons, because

waves are continuous whereas particles are discrete)--drove his mind straight into it and broke through with a rare thematic innovation in science: the idea of complementarity. Bohr accepted the contradiction as an irreducible fact and simply stated that elementary matter has either the form of waves or particles *depending on the experimental point of view* (Holton, 1973, 115-149). This idea has been tremendously successful in quantum physics.

So a simple-minded withdrawal into basic principles and processes does rationalism no favor. For rationalism to be as rigorous as it claims, it would have to forego important developments in physical science (not to mention much larger areas of philosophy, theology, art and just about any human activity that matters). Only thus is the principle of contradiction retained as an inviolable rule. A rationalism that combines this with deduction (induction has far more problems than the principle of contradiction) and the identity principle (forgetting the headaches that Leibniz and others have caused) may provide us with logically tight theories. But these theories will hardly touch on what is of living interest to human beings. (Think of what remains of the phenomena when they are fitted into elementary logical systems.)

The dilemma is this: The more rigid the logical constraints of reason, the less the phenomena it can capture (and the less it has to do with science); and the more the phenomena it attempts to capture (and the more it has to do with science), the looser the constraints, and the more open it therefore is to criticism *on its own terms.* Let us see how this works in the case of Popper, which will also be our entry into the wider discussion of the relation between reason and science.

- III -

The five pillars of Popper's critical rationalism are as follows (Feyerabend, 1978, 173-174):

1. Scientific research begins with a problem that arises when our expectations and observations are in conflict. Our observations are constituted by our expectations. For example, the ancient Greeks expected planetary motion to be regular (circular with constant angular velocity). Only then could they observe that such regularity did not in fact obtain in the motion of the planets. Thus, they were confronted with the problem of devising a kind of regular motion (as defined above) that corresponded with the phenomena. This was the role eventually played by the epicycles. In general, once such a problem is formulated, a solution is attempted.
2. The solution to a formulated problem must be in the form of a theory that is relevant, falsifiable, but not yet falsified.
3. The theory, in the nature of its composition, is immediately open to criticism. Successful criticism would (a) remove the theory once and for all, (b) create a new problem and (c) give the reasons for the success and failure of the refuted theory.
4. The new theory can then pick up where the old left off, reproduce its successes, avoid its failures and make additional predictions.
5. A sequence of such theories thus broadens the scope for expectations, hence also observations, which allows for the discovery of more and more facts. So is the content of theory increased and human knowledge expanded.

These pillars constitute a neat dynamic model. We are far from the lore of the neutral observer who coldly gathers objective facts into inductively formulated hypotheses. We must now see whether this model holds up well in the face of science (quite apart from the implication that whatever lies beyond the reach of critical rationalism is meaningless).

1. Many scientific ideas and theories begin quite haphazardly. Nowadays, in an environment of close co-operation between scientists, industry and the military, it frequently happens that theories have their origin in techniques, methodologies and observations made in the course of work that ostensibly has practical aims (Holton, 1986, 166-7). A famous example is the radiation stumbled upon by Penzias and Wilson while testing an ultrasensitive microwave detector at the Bell Telephone Laboratories in New Jersey in 1965. Since this radiation, which we now believe to have travelled across most of the observable universe, was the same in every direction and in the microwave range, it turned prior speculation about the origin and directional properties of the universe into a theory that enjoys much support among contemporary physicists (namely that the universe looks the same in every direction and was very hot and dense in its early stages) (Hawking, 1988, 40-42). In this case, research did not begin with a problem, but a chance observation in the course of testing a device allowed what had previously been a matter of speculation to become a well-supported theory. In general, if we only consider the scientific research instigated by problems, we would have a truncated view of science.

2. For a variety of reasons, falsifiability is not a useful criterion for theoretical progress in science:

- Theories that are eventually vindicated (weak currents for instance) are often blocked or delayed because of apparently credible experiments that falsify them and later prove to be flawed (Holton, 1986, 168).
- The prerequisites of current scientific teamwork, the cost and complexity of experiments, and the ephemerality of the reported phenomena on the basis of which new theoretical terrain is opened up make the repeatability of the phenomena, on which truth or falsehood hinges, a practical impossibility (Holton, 1986, 171). It is now more profitable for science to let open theoretical work freely run its course and reach an equilibrium along a path altogether different than that set by the falsifiability criterion (I shall say more about this later, when the discussion turns to how science eventually steadies its course for all the attendant chaos).
- For us to decide that a theory is falsifiable relative to the relevant given class of statements, both the theory and the statements must be formulated in the language of the logical system that forms the basis for our decision. In fact, neither condition is met. Scientific theories, as one glance at quantum or relativity theory would tell us, are never completely formalized, nor is the class of statements relative to which a relevant theory is falsifiable simply given (much less so in a manner amenable to perfect translation into the language of the appropriate logical system). What is amenable to such conditions is not science, but a theoretical abstraction that has little to do with its purported subject (Feyerabend, 1987, 170).
- Moreover, science sometimes progresses through the sheer collective weight of the arguments put forward in support of a new theory. This is how the atomic theory was kept alive and Newton's gravitational theory gained currency (Feyerabend, 1987, 171).

The foregoing forces us to conclude that the falsifiability criterion, if taken seriously by scientists, would practically destroy their work.

3. The old theories are not always refuted by the new. For example, the plenum theory was never refuted because it *could not be*. For how is it possible, whatever instrument at one's disposal,

to consider a space in which there is absolutely nothing in *any* way? However we experimentally encounter a space, the *fact* of the encounter suggests *something*, even if no more than a single photon of light, *in* that space. Any space that we see, literally or metaphorically, is occupied by the waves/particles that enable us to see it. Thus whoever required the vacuum for their theory proceeded *on faith* and *ignored* the plenum theory. In the same way, some of Aristotle's theories were never refuted, but simply disappeared from astronomy and physics (Feyerabend, 1987, 172-173). Another case in point is the failure of the steady-state and evolutionary theories of the cosmos to refute one another. Ever since Pre-socratic times, it has rather been a case of one lying dormant while the other has its day in the sun, then the other way around (Holton, 1973, 60-63).

4. New theories do not necessarily reproduce the successes of the old. They leave the old behind as *irrelevant* (Feyerabend, 1978, 176-178). Modern astronomy completely divorced astronomy from biology. Even the founder of positivism lamented the disregard for the effect of the solar system on life. If astrology did not provide results we can take seriously, then the *idea* to which astrology was an early response remains valid--for today, we are certainly aware of the expanding boundaries of what we define as our ecosystem, where events well beyond the earth's atmosphere are known to influence terrestrial life. An analogous change took place in medicine with possibly graver consequences. Modern medicine threw out psychopathology, made great strides within a narrower field of inquiry than its traditional predecessor, then found itself initially speechless before the "discovery" of psychosomatic illnesses and holistic medicine. Had medicine "reproduced the successes" of psychopathology, today's physicians would have been far better prepared to deal with long recognized medical phenomena given the appearance of discoveries by the limitations of their theoretical horizons.

5. Some problems that arose within the context of the older theories have also been cast aside, and correctly so; for what does it now mean to discuss the base on which the earth rests or the specific weight of phlogiston?
Even the facts are no longer the same. Motion today is not what it used to be for Aristotle (He equated any change from matter to form, and from potentiality to actuality, with motion). Facts that are there are sometimes *not admitted*. Heat and sound were left out of Galileo's physics. In general, modern physical science *leaves out* "most types of single-event occurrences that do not promise experimental control or repetition." (Holton, 1973, 55) So it is absurd to speak of a steady accumulation of facts and solved problems as Popper's theory (combining 4 with 5) would have it. Some facts and solved problems are retained, others are discarded. Each time new facts are discovered, the context that makes their discovery possible already submerges other facts that had been taken for granted. There may be an overall increase, but its manner is far untidier than Popper's neat progressive model would have us believe.
There is also the general epistemological problem rooted in how a new way of thinking abruptly distorts our perception of the old. Once a new way sets in, the content of the old can only be imagined. It becomes the intersection of its remembered consequences with the newly recognized domain of problems and facts. So again, it is absurd to speak of an overall increase in theoretical content when we no longer even have enough access to the theories whose successes and failures we respectively claim to reproduce and avoid (Feyerabend, 1978, 178). Knowledge does not expand such that each new field completely encloses the old. What we do have is some overlap between successive fields, perhaps a common area of overlap between all fields, and large

areas of older fields that have been banished from our theoretical work. Signs of expansion may well appear in this picture. But they clearly do not follow the linear pattern enunciated by Popper.

-IV-

After every pillar of Popper's critical rationalism has been toppled, we may ask: "What does that leave us with?" Science, for one thing. "And how is science adequately portrayed?" By the scientists themselves. Here is a sample of what they say.

Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford Henry Harris affirms that Popper's work undermines itself; denies that the empirical content of hypotheses can be known in advance (so that the one with the greater content might be preferred) since what is gradually revealed as a hypothesis is put to work; notes that scientists deliberately introduce changes into experiments so that they may obtain more information (which makes repeatability besides the point); describes scientific problems as being "kicked around" rather than methodically investigated (because this methodological openness has proved productive in research); and claims that there simply is no "logic of scientific discovery," but rather an evolutionary, *ad hoc* procedure through which the value of hypotheses is determined *after the fact* (Holton, 1986, 169).

In general, physical science since the end of the Second World War has made spectacular advances in an atmosphere of methodological skepticism, free invention, theoretical boldness, dissent encouraged even among junior members of the community, and metaphorical terminology (Holton, 1986, 170). (Note terms such as "up" and "down," and "red," "green" and "blue" to distinguish among quarks, interpreted as the building blocks of matter, themselves modishly named entities so tentative that it is no longer possible to decide whether one is talking about a hard physical substance or mere mathematical expressions.)

Lest it be thought that only contemporary physical science overthrows critical rationalism, one again need only turn towards the words of past scientists themselves. There was Ernst Mach's call for young scientists to study the work of the masters and use it as a playground for their imagination. He explicitly rejected the use of formal and inductive logic for scientists because of the constant fluctuations in the situation under study. Bohr underlined the impossibility of canvassing *new* fields of experience with principles that worked in the *old*. An order brought adequately to new areas of research creates new principles. Boltzmann advocated a pluralistic approach in which the older principles are retained for the domain where they are useful and new principles are invented for new domains. Duhem believed that science is best served by allowing each intellect to freely realize itself according to its own disposition (say to an experimental approach or to one that is at home with mathematical equations, the difference between Faraday and Maxwell). Finally, Einstein went so far as to declare flatly that epistemological concerns are a *hindrance* to scientists (Feyerabend, 1987, 187-189).

How is it therefore possible to capture the work and attitude of scientists in a rational scheme, however dynamic, elaborate or ingenious? Not only is Popper's critical rationalism in another world so far as physical science over the last two centuries (at least) is concerned, but *any* rationalism that we can reasonably identify as such is bound to leave out precisely those factors that have accounted for physical science's surge to new heights of invention. For the first time in our history, we stand before a suggested convergence between the experimental-theoretical and our metaphysical beliefs about the origins of the universe. At a metaphysically equally pregnant level, space and time are suddenly more fluid concepts, the distinction between the physical and mathematical aspects of matter is breaking down, and complementarity assures us that even a total

scientific picture (whatever that would or could be) might only be seen as *one* interpretation in need of its complement (so that all we can ever be told about the brain by neurophysiology becomes a single point of view that can never refute the other, namely that which considers the brain *as a whole* and takes it to be mind or spirit). With such a rich, complex and dynamic framework, far less violence is done to the phenomena than by any conceivable rational scheme.

The science that critical rationalism would leave us with stands to real science as reason itself does to the full array of human capacities. To the extent that science is a human activity and thereby reflects the errors, intuitions, prodigality, ingenuity, aptitudes and passions of its practitioners--all of which keep science well away from the glorified concentration camps where all grind through endless permutations along a logically prescribed path (as critical rationalism would have it)--it evades rational reconstruction.

- V -

If we are to take seriously the implication that what stands outside of the constraints imposed by critical rationalism is effectively meaningless, then little more than the busywork of science becomes meaningful. What we have here is an irony: Critical rationalism and like-minded theories ride on the coattails of science to adjudicate upon the meaning of our various pursuits. If we then adhere to their rules, we end up committed to the judgment that what makes science worthy of admiration is meaningless. It is bad enough to put up with theories that force *arguments* in favour of the meaninglessness of art, ethics and religion. It is intolerable that these theories should be dismissive of the very ground for the success (in science) that gives them an audience in the first place.

To return the judgment, it seems that critical rationalism is only meaningful to those theoretically ensnared by it. From the standpoint of the scientists who push their field to ever new horizons, critical rationalism, if not meaningless, is certainly useless (Holton says as much). Now I take it that most scientists would consent to the judgment that their work is meaningful. If so, there is no *rational* way to deny a similar judgment for artists, moral philosophers, metaphysicians and theologians. Reason can no longer convincingly use science as a club to beat off the aesthetic, moral and religious points of view (If argument alone were decisive, it is similarly possible to vindicate mythology, astrology and parapsychology). Note that this argument pertains to the *theoretical* content (or intellectual dimension) of art, ethics and religion. If one should turn to their *existential* content, then no argument is even necessary. The point here is simply to show that *there is no good argument* that strips non-scientific worldviews of their meaning. There are many different kinds of worldviews that would pass the implicit criteria of modern physical science. Even Popper speaks of reliance "'for all practical purposes' on what has been severely tested and has survived all tests." (Feyerabend, 1987, 164) If this is not true of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and ancient Greek philosophy, what is it true of? (Communism, in contrast, has not been so severely tested, and failed.)

- VI -

Such methodological chaos or epistemological anarchy may frighten even those not disposed to flee into rationalist safehouses. A more temperate consideration of our various pursuits suggests otherwise. Let us once more begin with science then turn to what concerns human life as a whole on the way to showing how this all connects with freedom and democracy.

In his excellent essay *The Thematic Imagination in Science* (1973, 47-68), Holton presents a new perspective on the radical difference between the public image of a science that follows a well-defined logical sequence from observation to theory, and what really lies behind the actions and decisions of an *actual contributor* to science on the road to the theory. Scientists, it turns out, rely on thematic hypotheses which can neither be verified nor falsified, and without which they can go no further. Newton could not point out a medium through which gravity could be communicated, yet this did not prevent him from getting on with his gravitational theory (He believed God to be the real cause of gravity). Bohr and contemporary physicist Paul Davies both believe that a consideration of pure number is enough for building up an understanding of the regularities of nature. Relativity theory holds the speed of light to be constant and unsurpassable.

Physical science itself moves along the broad lines of themata that can neither be verified nor falsified. The thematic conception of a unifying principle for the whole universe has been with us since Pre-socratic times and has returned to the fore in the present quest for a Unified Field Theory. Atomism also appeared among the ancient Greeks, receded, reappeared and is now at best the basis for one of two complementary viewpoints. Equally long-lived has been the dispute between steady state and evolutionary views of the cosmos. Other themata are conservation, the plenum, the vacuum, formalism, materialism, continuity, symmetry, simplicity and economy.

These thematic guidelines that give science its ultimate meaning and shape its empirical content and logico-mathematical form take on an added role with the new situation that has arisen in physical science since the Second World War to steer it clear from chaos. With all the intellectual freedom now available to potential *contributors* to science, equilibrium is reached pragmatically. The acceptance of a hypothesis has become future-bound, contingent on the disciplined thought of a *community* of scientists who scrutinize it and make it corrigible. However, no hypothesis is today seen as a potentially flawlessly carved block to be added to the Temple of Science. An accepted hypothesis becomes a plausible basis for the next stage of development in a building project without a central planning authority (Holton, 1986, 171-173).

The centrifugal force inherent in such pragmatism is then counterbalanced by the broad thematic lines along which physical science unfolds and between which it oscillates. Thus a formalist who assumes the plenum and continuity and allows his thought to be shaped by the rules (or intuitions) of symmetry, simplicity, and economy, with respect to all of which *he cannot be refuted*, allows his theoretical viewpoint to evolve accordingly, however haphazard it may otherwise be. And once those among his peers who share the same thematic guidelines are satisfied that the theory accords therewith and has passed the relevant *ad hoc* tests current among the scientific community, the theory becomes established.

The longevity and small number of themata further guarantees long-term order in science. Thus we find the modern scientific style, for all its freedom, still in the service of ancient themata. What is of special interest to us is that even the *order* that science has is not based on anything within the compass of reason. In addition to what has been noted about the work and attitudes of scientists, even the overall framework that gives science its sense is not subject to any tests that reason might devise, other than a vague criterion like "eventual accountability to shared experience" (Holton, 1986, 176).

- VII -

As there is a center around which science finds direction and meaning, and because of which the freedom allowed at the frontier of the pursuit does not degenerate into aimless fantasy or

narcissism, so it is for human life as a whole. And as reason can only capture the sub-region of science that must be turned to the thematic center to grow into the fullness of scientific activity, so is reason unable to lay hold on the center around which human life evolves.

If only those who have followed in Kant's footsteps and found themselves on the near side of scientism and positivism did not exile the first part of his first Critique from its home, they would have seen, if for no other reason than to render Kant truthfully, that what they call "reason" is only the "understanding," and that the "understanding" is *twice removed* from the center of human activity.

In the first place, the understanding--which unleashes its logical predilections on nature and reconstructs it in ways that lend themselves to critical rationalist analysis--is helpless without the concepts of reason (the transcendental ideas) that enable us to conceive experience in the first place (Kant, 1965, 308). These ideas, quite similar in their role to the thematic conceptions highlighted by Holton, can never be the object of experience (i*bid*., 308), are unconditioned (i*bid*., 316), determine how the understanding ("reason" for us) is to be employed *in its totality* (i*bid*., 315), and are imposed *by the very nature of reason itself* (i*bid*., 319). This is a much more sophisticated description of an unverifiable and unfalsifiable center for our rational activity (and is a reminder that "reason" in the Kantian philosophy had a far broader range of meaning, sometimes beyond what is reasonably plausible, than it does for us). As for what these ideas are, Kant mentions (1) the absolute unity of the subject, (2) the absolute unity of the sum total of all "appearances" (read: "the universe as science approaches it") and (3) the absolute unity of the being of all beings (which is the condition of all objects of thought), to which correspond (1)' the transcendental doctrine of the soul, (2)' the transcendental science of the world and (3)' the transcendental knowledge of God (Kant, 1965, 323). All this is completely beyond the understanding ("reason" for us).

Kant then goes further near the end of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There he points out that the reason (in his much richer conception) in possession of the transcendental ideas *is itself in need of direction* (from a moral- religious point of view) *for its correct employment*. Reason orients itself towards the fundamental ideals in which it takes the greatest interest: (1) The freedom of the will, (2) the immortality of the soul and (3) the existence of God (Kant, 1965, 629-631). These are not speculative interests, which can then be systematically pursued, but *practical*interests (read: "eschatological issues"). They define what we ought to do (he should have added "and be") *given* that the will is free, there is a future world and God exists (*Ibid*., 632). [The psychological evidence for these is reason's desire to find a center (*Ibid*., 629)]. These three great practical ideals of reason, which constitute the canon for its employment, permeate the whole of nature (including ourselves) with purposiveness. They drive the collective moral employment of practical reason towards the idea of the supreme good (*Ibid*., 642).

From a Kantian standpoint, neo-Kantian activity is doubly meaningless: The pursuits it describes within its rationalist criteria are not acknowledged to have any center internal to the pursuits (the themata or "transcendental ideas"), nor are these pursuits themselves seen in the overall context of purposive human activity (oriented towards the "ideals of reason"). Neo-Kantianism has only the appearance of being related to Kant.

We may dispute Kant's ontology and optimism in the following way: It is not reason (even broadly understood) that takes a practical interest in freedom, immortality and God, but the human being *as a whole*. However we choose to criticize determinists, materialists and agnostics or atheists, I doubt that it is appropriate to call them *irrational* (Besides, the foregoing discussion about reason and science does not make the epithet 'irrational' a pejorative to its bearer). Just as science grows and oscillates around themata that often are antithetical, the same is true for human

life as a whole. There is no guarantee that we shall strive towards the supreme good, nor is the ideal itself spared dispute. But the ideal *refuses to go away*.

There is much that we can nevertheless retain from the peaks of the Kantian philosophy. The insight that reason itself (the Kantian "understanding") is thematically guided is beyond reproach. As for the ideals that give Kantian reason (and our specific pursuits) an altogether extraneous center, we can replace his unwarranted optimism and false attribution of the ideals to the practical sentiments of *reason* with the insight that human life *as a whole* is centered around fundamental questions which, like thematic conceptions in science, are durable and irrefutable. These are questions such as: "What is the purpose or meaning of life?"; "What is the relationship between humankind and God?"; "What is the nature and origin of the universe?"; "What is the best,— individual or communal life?"; and so on. Around each of these questions are clustered thematic options, which may be quite mutually antagonistic, but that also have staying power.

Science itself has recently undergone a crucial change. The rise of the collective scientific quest has wrought a gradual shift from the individual concern with epistemological to the communal concern with ethical questions. Thus the community of scientists takes a vivid interest in the human rights of scientists abroad, the moral implications of military research, and the quality of the practices of individual scientists (with regard to whether they are ethical or not). The discussion is thus being transferred from questions about rationality to questions about value (Holton, 1986, 176-177). Those like Holton and Feyerabend who care to look at science as it is (and not as theorists dream it up), with Aristotelian eyes, show the scientific quest colorfully spread across the broad spectrum of thematic concerns. Scientists, like other alert human beings, do after all admit both an internal and an external center to their activity respectively in their scientific (and metaphysical, one must admit, for formalism, say, is ultimately a metaphysical position) thematic conceptions and the values for which they openly care. Even before communal science came to the fore, it has always been possible to complement the scientific lore surrounding an individual scientist with a portrait of the scientist as human being.

- VIII -

We have just come across three different levels that give three different points of view for the consideration of a given activity. The first is the rational (for Kant, what lies within reach of the understanding), the second is the thematic internal to the given activity (for Kant, the rational), and the third is the thematic external to all specific fields of inquiry except for those which explicitly and primarily orient themselves towards such themata (for Kant, the ideals of reason, for us the fundamental, eschatological concerns that a human being *as a whole* relates to). We have seen that the latter two levels are beyond the scope of reason. Even the first is not adequately covered when we call it "rational"--for the description of science that Holton and Feyerabend provide, of science as it is, tells us that even at a level prior to the internal themata that play a centering role within a given field of inquiry, much that goes on is a matter of play and chance, subject to the experimental and human idiosyncrasies of the case at hand. Thus we may subdivide the first level into two complementary areas, one within the scope of rational analysis, the other outside of it and amenable only to case by case description. Rationalism as we know it, then, captures one sub-region of the least prior level in the tentative ontology that can be extracted from the account I have given.

How does this relate to our freedom? *The exercise of freedom is relative to the level at which it is exercised*. Let us imagine what would happen were we to accept rational constraints on our

freedom. Since reason has no say in the area of empirical play, and at the levels of internal and external thematic choice, these must be ignored. Ideally, what reason must provide instead are the means for self-perpetuation within the sublevel where it reigns supreme. This would amount to little more than endless sequences of permutations within well-defined logical spaces. This is at the intellectual level. What would rational choice amount to practically if taken to its logical conclusion (which its own terms allow us to do)? Since we would be left without a transcendent center for reason, we would gradually sink further and further among *things*, then begin to act upon and choose among things in a manner analogous to self-perpetuating intellectual permutations. The simple expression for this practical situation is well-known. It is "consumerism." The freedom that supremely reigning reason would give us amounts to intellectual games totally abstracted from reality or consumer choice for non-intellectuals.

This will strike most readers as a purely hypothetical limiting case. But such readers must reconsider their judgment. The limit may be very distant from our reality, but trends in its direction can be easily pointed out. For instance, a culture stripped of the purpose it would otherwise have if open to the level of eschatological themata will drift towards the least common denominator at the level of life among things (for it would no longer be possible to consider life beyond things). It would drift towards a common materialization and objectification of things (with no spiritualizing agency recognized and no way to lift things from the banishment of objectification and the subjectivist narcissism that is its eternal companion). Everywhere in our culture, we can observe signs that such drift is no longer in its early stages (which is when Hegel and Marx, to their great credit, already sounded the alarm, never mind the very serious problems with their responses). We can even see the rise in fundamentalist sentiment as a *symptom* of rather than a cure for such drift. Another example is the extent to which academic work has become the kind of busywork that turns critical rationalism and its ilk into self-fulfilling prophecies.

As for the prevalence of rationalism itself, we see it in the peculiar form of the bureaucratic and economic imperatives that are sweeping the world (perhaps, later historians will one day tell us, in democratic disguise). It is these imperatives that, on the one hand, penetrate academia and distort the conditions for free scholarship and inquiry (the same goes for much that we call "science") and, on the other, turn society into a marketplace for an ever more dazzling cornucopia of consumer goods. How those imperatives came to dominate our lives is a huge subject about which I shall only make a passing remark in a while.

It is the worldwide prevalence of the bureaucratic and economic imperatives and their rationale that gives the combined *illusion* of rationality and universality. The possibility that the distillation of that rationale is suspiciously similar to what reason has become for us must be investigated. In any case, reason, while not necessarily subverted by such imperatives, now permeates our lives in their form. And it is in this context that the accomplishments of science are exploited. Furthermore, those imperatives are communicated by means of a universal calculus that, again due to the illusion of fulfilling reason's highest aspirations (Leibniz would turn in his grave if he could see what has become of one of his dreams) and tacit submission to the rationalist credo, has engendered perhaps the most intellectually intolerant elite humanity has ever known--for now, dissent is silenced because it is "objectively false," "subjective," or worthy of some other intimidating epithet.

- IX -

Democratic institutions are now underpinned by a certain idea of rationality that distorts the original aspirations they have been meant to mirror. Perhaps these aspirations also disguised the truth about the change taking place at the outset of the modern era. Again, this is a vast subject and it may never be correctly treated.

Democracy in itself is not worth very much. *What gives it its worth are the values that it is intended to guarantee* with popular consent. Thus a people who are free not only to wander like automata among elaborate circuitry, but are free to grow along the broadest thematic lines that enable them to fully realize themselves as human beings, will shape a radically different democracy than those who are passive in the face of rationalist propaganda and gradually lose touch with any sense of eschatological purpose. The question is not whether democracy is the best institutional guarantee for freedom, but the *kind* of freedom (as measured by the ontological level at which it is *exercised*) of which democratic aspirations are a *partial* expression. The more collapsible freedom is to the level of rational choice, the more *subversive* the democratic institutions shaped by such a diminution of freedom are to human possibility.

It is noteworthy that the bureaucratic and economic imperatives must still be clothed in democratic vocabulary (the same is also true for the sterile academic discussions more and more in evidence at our universities and the attempt to win over converts to the consumer paradise). This amounts to a *recognition* of the original intuitions of freedom and liberation that we believe underlie democratic movements in their early stages, and which remain potent for all the distortion they have suffered. But perhaps we must look elsewhere to tap this potency. This is where tradition comes in.

- X -

Since 'tradition' has come to stand for so many different things, ranging from the fine service offered by a restaurant for decades to an organized worldwide religion that has endured for centuries, it is best to evaluate the role of tradition as guarantor of freedom from the standpoint of the most fulfilling exercise of freedom. This will enable us to single out only those traditions in whose context human being can freely express itself *as a fulfilled whole*. Such expression occurs at the eschatological level.

The eschatological level is distinguished by the fact that freedom not only regards choice of answer (to a question such as "What is the meaning or purpose of life?"), but, much more substantially, the exercise of our freedom *grows with the answer that we have chosen* or otherwise found ourselves living with. The depth and finality of the eschatological level is such that the questions can only offer a choice at the surface level where they appear as mere questions and have not yet begun to involve our being as the potential (1) for answering a question and (2) for absorbing the implications of the answer which is beginning to release itself. Human freedom becomes truly realized upon full acceptance of a set, usually very small, of eschatological questions and a definite direction to be followed within the life that such questions take on for us. When we ask "What is the purpose or meaning of life?" we are free to answer in many ways. We are even free to reject the question. But this freedom pales before that gained when, perhaps without a clear answer, perhaps without ever having consciously asked the question, we sense the presence of meaning and purpose in our lives. As what we sense becomes clarified, and its implications are more appreciated, we are freer still, despite the surface restrictions to one path among many. (*This does not in any way mean that a single political path must therefore be imposed. Politics and eschatology have never really mixed very well. The only eschatology that matters in politics is for*

a political community to have a reasonably clear image of itself and of its aspirations.) In the event the path followed gives way to another along which the limitations of the first are overcome, our freedom is further enhanced.

This process, whether consciously repeated by every individual or subliminally shared by a community, unfolds in a world of ideals, values, parables, allegories, laws and beliefs that give reference points to the pursuit of a position within an eschatological frame. These have a twofold origin, the singular and the common.

The first origin is the appearance and works of figures around whom the world's major religious traditions are centered. These appearances have in common not only their historical singularity, but their simultaneous transcendence of history. Thus we can appreciate, in our ecumenical setting, individuals like Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Confucius and Buddha (I do not belittle the profound differences between them, but these are irrelevant to the present discussion).

The second origin is the quest among human beings for reference points within an eschatological frame. Were this absent, the vast and enduring traditions built around the singular individuals just mentioned would not be with us. This popular quest intersects with those singular historical events to cumulatively provide the reference points that allow free growth within an eschatological frame. These reference points need not always be of a religious nature. They could be ethical. They could be pastoral or folkloric. Maxims, proverbs, tales and other lore among which people come to live are no less important to the definition of their eschatological path. In fact, these localized atmospheres are often the means through which the more abstract religious dimension is interpreted and communicated. This is why Jesus Christ, for instance, is widely believed to have opened the way to God far more effectively than philosophers.

Thus we have the great religious traditions, and local popular traditions, as two cornerstones for the exercise of freedom at the eschatological level. The two can overlap, complement one another, and be mutually hostile or indifferent.

- XI -

Eschatological questions are paradoxical in that they carry with them positions that are both final *and* open. This is the key to their potency with regard to human freedom. For their definite and sometimes terribly decisive frame, *because of its transcendence*, allows boundless freedom for those who dwell within it.1 Instead of the planar, quantitative infinity offered by rational and consumer choice, where freedom is the freedom to disperse oneself, we have the freedom to gather ourselves and stretch our being over the abyss that separates us from transcendence (which constitutes a qualitative infinity). This is where science, however brilliant and colorful, *must remain silent*. This is where the asymmetry between the scientific and religious traditions is most glaring: For religious tradition can accept the entire honest findings of science without the slightest perturbation as it seeks and scales the transcendent. It can freely engage in all the steps peculiar to scientific inquiry. But someone hypothetically stuck within the scientific worldview *cannot even make the first step* towards transcendence. Any step outside of the scientific worldview can only be silence, the denial of transcendence, or the hilarious attempt to reduce the transcendent to mysterious physical phenomena as yet theoretically unaccounted for (unless these be taken as *signs* of transcendence rather than be *confounded* with it).

Even if the eschatological level at which freedom is fully exercised were only to offer the possibility of transcendence, even if 'transcendence' itself were reduced to the humbler sense of

the purpose, identity and dignity that individuals find within a cultural frame, the justification for distinguishing that level of freedom as its most fulfilled form remains.

- XII -

If we are to articulate the role of tradition as the true setting for freedom in our modern democratic context, we must have some understanding of how tradition itself subverts freedom and how this becomes the avenue through which reason makes its claims on our priorities, and how the bureaucratic and economic imperatives then make claims on reason. I can only broach the subject with very broad strokes here.2

Great religious traditions are necessarily antinomical because they have to submit to organizational imperatives for their proper functioning as worldwide, cross-cultural, -ethnic, -national, -racial propagators of a given religious faith. There is an unavoidable antagonism between the strictures of organization and the freedom that openness to the ultimate points in a religious worldview offers. There is further antagonism between the imperative to maintain the faith within a center reasonably recognized as the same by its greatly diverse followers, and the unavoidable ambiguity of a center whose terms must always remain open to the transcendent. Should the organizational imperative and that attendant to keeping the faith near its agreed-upon center (which I shall call the "uniformity imperative") take on a life of their own and unwittingly lose sight of their true *raison d'etre*, they inevitably subvert the unique dimension of freedom for which they had given a vast international haven. Organized religion has its own rationale. When the *organization* becomes *prior* to the *religion*, and the *uniformity prior* to the *faith*, the paradoxical situation emerges in which people who believe themselves to be the propagators and guardians of religion (and the special freedom that is exercised within its authentic practice) are actually in the service of the organizational and uniformity imperatives. Thus the modern bureaucratic imperative had some of its roots in the organizational imperative to which the Church had to submit, and the modern universal calculus partly grew from the logic of the uniformity imperative. Equally at play, but far better known, were the expansion of markets and the subsequent emergence of industrial society. In a general environment of rising commercial and industrial power, it became a simple matter to put the bureaucratic imperative and the universal calculus to economic use. Meanwhile, popular discontent with what had become the organized subversion of the freedom that the turn to transcendence uniquely opens up made it possible to find fault not only with the men who unwittingly placed the organizational and uniformity imperatives (in short, power and reason) before their faith, *but with the religious faith itself*. Only thus could reason be seen as the liberator from religion in the name of freedom, individual religious experience as deliverance from the repressive tendencies latent in an organizational, hierarchical approach, individual choice as preferable to communal harmony, rational choice as the best formalization for individual choice, and economic choice as the best embodiment for rational choice. This was Europe on the eve of democracy. Hence democracy as we have known it so far can only be heavily biased towards the multifarious transition that has brought it to the fore.

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In the same way that people whose sense of their freedom is violated by current practice will become an eager audience for those who offer them an attractive alternative, those who now feel denied the means for the expression of their eschatological quest will welcome any apparently

plausible renewal of that quest. Lest cults, charlatans and fundamentalists fulfill that need, the great religious traditions have perhaps a better opportunity to play their noblest potential role than they have had in a long time.3

This must in the first place be done by remembering that those traditions became great not only because of the singularity of the individuals around which they have revolved, but because these individuals reached directly into the heart of the popular quest for reference points within an eschatological frame. Vatican II, for example, is a resounding acknowledgement of this fact. However, it is also necessary to keep abreast with recent intellectual tools for the articulation of those reference points and the construction of the appropriate worldview. These tools, ironically in part as developed in the natural sciences, have an elasticity and dynamism far more appropriate to the linguistic expression of transcendence than the austere, static, atomistic language used in the past. There is room for a new Aquinean project, but this time, instead of the *reconciliation*of faith with reason, the possibility for the *expression* of faith with the help of elastic and dynamic intellectual tools that readily interface with spiritual insight, is now there.

The situation with other religious traditions such as Islam is somewhat different, for the sequence of events briefly described above on the eve of democracy does not touch the Islamic world--nor for that matter places like China and sub-Saharan Africa--in the same way. But these have inherited the *problematic* of modernity, especially the illusions and delusions surrounding science, reason, democracy and their interconnectedness with human freedom. Their traditions will therefore be seen in the same light in which the modern movement in Europe placed Roman Catholicism. Thus the need to clarify the conditions for the emergence of modernity at every level, and the need to see tradition in its proper place, then revitalize it, is no less urgent in other parts of the world.

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Where democracy is well established, the freedoms guaranteed by it can be exercised more meaningfully when it is complemented with revitalized religious and non-religious traditions sensitive to popular needs and culture and open to the possibilities provided by recent intellectual developments. This must be accompanied by enlightenment of the popular culture regarding the errors with which the standard view of the interconnectedness between science, reason, freedom, democracy and tradition is replete.

Where it is not, the same recommendations may prevent the emergence of democracies that superficially guarantee freedom while denying its more fulfilling exercise to those who still dwell decisively within their traditions in other parts of the world. Or it may at least prepare those traditions for taking modernity, including democracy, in their stride.

Here and elsewhere, the failure to revitalize tradition will bring shallow democracies to the fore that force the issue in the long run between the equally horrifying extremes of fanaticism and spiritual death.

Notes

1. There is, of course, the eschatological position of the denial of transcendence. But materialism, for example, has nothing to lose by remaining open to the transcendence of matter, except perhaps the assertion that it is right. If we understand materialism as the deliberate decision to close off transcendence, then we must also understand it as the deliberate decision to exercise

freedom only at the surface of the eschatological realm. The choice is made, period. This may explain the frequency with which materialists are determinists. Despair runs its course. The same applies to non-materialistic rationalists uneasy with freedom beyond the walls of the prison of reason.

2. The story of this transformation, the importance of which can not be underestimated, has of course been told many times, and in many ways, by people such as Weber, Hermann Broch, Heidegger and Habermas. They provide the food for thought that we need to combine with the most recent historical and sociological research in order to continue to clarify the events that seem to have gone out of control to utterly defeat their original purpose. As I suggested earlier, suspicion about the real purpose of modernity is itself a matter worthy of extensive research. I only include a miniscule version of my own here to complete the picture that I am trying to draw in this short work.

3. But they may have to accept much more decentralization and a more pluralistic approach to avoid the pitfalls of the organized propagation of a strictly unified faith across a vast spectrum of different races, cultures, ethnic groups and nations and to be more directly responsive to their indispensable popular bases. The residue of paganism and polytheism may thus be seen as a bulwark against the tyranny of facile universalization--so this can be argued (by those who find it necessary) to have a divinely ordained role. A lot can be learned from how this residue has mixed with Christianity, Islam and Buddhism throughout what is called the "Third World".

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Chapter VIII
In Search of the Human Sense of Dwelling

Jozef Pauer

Introduction

Postmodern efforts may appear Janus-headed. One face appears turned back to search the past for foundations upon which to build the language of meaningful forms. The other face looks ahead into an emptiness which implies nihilism in which forms come and go like acts in a delusive play. However, as both faces emerge in reaction to the same modernism they have there a common head.

Generally, modernism is a product of the enlightenment with roots reaching back to the Cartesian *cogito* and to Plato's world of ideas. In the Enlightenment rationalism became the basis for modern western culture. There human reason became an instrument for the search of truth in the sense of a "scientific" investigation of an objective world. What was not recognizable in this way was rejected as an illusion, superstition or prejudice. This does not mean that everyday life became rationalistic and pragmatic, for man also relates to the world with its qualities in a poetic as well as scientific manner. Nevertheless, thinking as *ratio* became dominant; reason became the "official" approach to exploring the world and achieving practical goals. Utilitarian relationships became the basis for social life.

While the "enlightened" man enjoyed the "better life," there was a growing skepticism regarding the nature and possibilities of human understanding. Even Kant realized the limits of pure reason when he said that absolutely inevitable truth—which we so persistently require regarding the ultimate basis for all things—is really an "abyss" for human understanding into which things themselves disappear in impenetrable darkness. This, rather than a solid basis of the inevitable truths, came to be considered the source and goal of the knowledge we search: for Nietzsche knowledge is "the greatest lie of all lies." To the question of what things themselves are Nietzsche answers innocently: ". . . look, there are no things themselves!".

Nietzsche's nihilism (or overcoming of nihilism?) did not shake the faith in the Enlightenment and progress, but after the Second World War many philosophers came to consider an exact representation of the world to be impossible. This nihilism is shared, despite various differences, by most postmodern philosophers in whose opinion the entire work of understanding is not meaning but merely interpretation. These attitudes reflect the present state of things: the world in which we live no longer consists of topologically defined ethical domains, but has become an open plurality of fragments of the most varied origin.

A pluralistic society such as is common to all of western democracies, goes hand in hand with the decay of the traditional notion of place. Not only have a number of places lost their own character and become "victims" of spatial homogeneity, but the new communication media allow us to experience a simultaneity of places. This disturbs our sense of distinctiveness and identity, and threatens basic psychic functions of human beings in the world as orientation, identification and transcendence. Originally culture meant cultivation of a place as an integrated "here," whereas at present it indicates only a collection of separated forms and memories. The disparate fragments can be represented as "signs" which gives importance to semiology as the theory of signs. But as the "language of signs" is the result merely of usage and convention, its validity is thus limited for

those "users" who are able to understand the "codes." Universal or eternal meanings are thereby abolished and replaced by a total relativism.

Eco's novel ends with: "The former rose is here merely as a name. Only the names are in our power."1 This does not seem to mean that the postmodern search for meaning ends inevitably in nothingness, or that the search of origins is only an illusion, but rather a line of thought which (conscious of the collapse of pure reason) opens up the possibility of rediscovering meaning. This is recollection, remembering the psychic and even anthropic functions of orientation, identification and transcendence. It is the consciousness of a spiritual dimension of human beings in the world. It is in connection with this that I want to discuss the human sense of "dwelling-in-the-world" and an architecture which is not only a physical construction, but above all a work of art, a cultural phenomenon with implicit meanings.

Human Sense of Dwelling

For I have lit on a great truth; to wit, that all men dwell, and life's meaning changes for them with the meaning of the home. (Antoine de Saint-Exupéry)

Interrelationship of Man and Environment

A man lives in a certain space to which he has adapted, and which in turn he has adapted for his life. To live his human life a man inevitably needs a definite place in which he can dwell. A man dwells in a village or town and in a house. The meaning of his life is made incarnate in building and dwelling in these and he thereby creates a meaningful relation between himself and his environment, society and universe. The meaning of this relation began with the origins of biological adaptation and continued through the process of purposeful human activity, based in our creatively-adaptable nature.

A mutual relation between building and dwelling therein is essential for defining the nature of architecture. Here architecture is taken as a kind of location which shelters or houses men's lives. In constructing locations architecture founds and joins spaces. It helps a man to dwell by providing a stable place in space and time.

A man acts upon his environment and transforms it into a new shape upon which he impresses his own structure. At the same time the environment acts on man. In the case of organic adaptation the interaction between subject and object involves an interpenetration between some part of the living body and some sector of the external environment. Psychological life, on the other hand, begins . . . with functional interaction, that is to say, from the point at which assimilation no longer alters assimilated objects in a physico-chemical manner but simply incorporates them into its own forms of activity (here accommodation only modifies this activity). We can understand then that, superimposed on the direct interpenetration of organism and environment, mental life brings with it direct interaction between subject and object which takes effect at ever increasing spatio-temporal distances and along ever more complex paths.2

A man transforms a given environment and actualizes his own image of a place suited to his activity. It is as if the process of building falls asleep upon the completion of the construction process. But the action of dwelling in its various forms reawakens this process in the spaces defined by the house (or settlement, town or streets . . .).

In a building and dwelling a man finds a sense of belonging to a certain place in a world or community. The belonging is first of all to the place in which he dwells, and through his dwelling

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his concrete life is determined also according to given social conditions. On the other hand, a man is not immobilized in a single place. In social praxis the stability of his existence is dialectical, for one is also on a road down which he wanders from place to place, man to man.

On the road he develops an affinity with people, phenomena, things and events, and makes a choice of his place and certain commitments to a community. From this dialectic of road and goal, departure and return, quest and repose there arises a "spaciousness" of a human life. Architecture introduces this spaciousness into human activities. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry expresses its poetic truth in his *Citadelle*:

But I am a builder of cities. It is my purpose to lay well and truly, here and now, the foundations of my citadel. For here I have halted the progress of the caravan, which was but as a seed borne in the wind's lap. The wind wafts like perfume the seeds of the cedar tree, but I withstand the wind, burying the seeds in the earth, so that cedar trees may rise in their beauty for the glory of God.3

There, in the Citadel, the land of sand creates an environment for all men. In this way Saint-Exupéry emphasizes the plain truth that man's dwelling on the earth is possible on the assumption that he cares for the earth, cultivates it and himself, as well as his relationships with the community. In this way the earth becomes a home for the men. At every moment of his life, step by step, a man creates his home in order to persist in it, to exist. To be able to dwell in one's home on the earth as a human being it is not sufficient merely to possess it, to use it, to occupy it, to lock oneself in it as in a shelter, and to live an illusion of ownership of that shelter. To dwell as a human being, and hence to find oneself in the dwelling, a man must continually recreate that dwelling. Further, he must bind his acts in community with his neighbors for only in community can he exercise self-determination and identity. The community alone is the "nodal point" which makes his house habitable. Were this bond to be broken, his house would become a shapeless, uninhabitable dump.

In shaping a dwelling as a human endeavor the aim is to create a human, neighborly environment constituted by a man for a man. As a bird shapes a nest with its breast, so a man "plants" his own intrinsic nature in a space. There is a strong affinity between man and the space in which he dwells. The nature of human existence is defined by this unity of his life and the place he creates. Naturally, it is not only the horizon of one individual that is in play here. This relationship acquires its actual features through the intersection of the concrete historical, cultural, social and economic coordinates of social structure. The complex function of a dwelling relates to all social forms of life.

Modes of dwelling

A man resides in a multitude of worlds between earth and sky. His dwelling is realized in a variety of ways within which we can differentiate certain layers. Christian Norberg-Schulz4 distinguishes four modes of dwelling, each bound always to a certain place: a settlement, urban space, institution and house.

In a settlement one finds a *natural dwelling*. This does not mean only a dwelling in nature. Even though we are born within already existing man-made surroundings to which we have adapted, we cannot avoid the need to understand these surroundings as a settlement, as a certain solution of an original problem of providing a stable place in which we will settle. When we build a new settlement on the outskirts or a new building in the historical core of a town, in a certain way we too create a settlement.

After settlement, there follow other modes of dwelling which relate to the basic forms of human life, for the settlement is a whole in which are interrelated the fundamental activities of

human society (e.g., production, nourishment, education, thinking, habitation, government, business, distribution, etc.). The settlement serves as a place of meeting where people interchange their products, thoughts and feelings. Urban space has always been a scene for men's meeting. This does not imply an unanimous consensus, but the meeting of human beings of all kinds. Hence urban space is basically a place of discoveries, a certain milieu of possibilities. In it man dwells in the sense of experiencing the abundance of the world.

This existential mode is called a *collective dwelling*.5 We use the word "collective" to express that the dwelling in urban space is the meeting of people from various parts of society, that it is a mode of gathering and grouping the community. It could seem that a dwelling in the sense of a town results from some spontaneous process, since it does not presuppose prior agreement. We should not forget, however, that the mode of dwelling is constituted not by the urban space (though evidently there is here a feedback process); but by people who act according to certain patterns in terms of a coherent social system. The opposite would imply that the court-building invent the law or that cathedrals invent religion.

In this activity the modes of meeting are defined, the patterns of communication are constituted, and the meeting of people takes place in structured social dimensions. Common interests, values and opinions develop, according to which a set of various social subjects coalesces and creates a forum for retaining, asserting and expressing common values (and not only in a closed axiological sense). Such a forum is an institutional or public building, and the mode of dwelling it serves we call public. Because the public space embodies a number of views and values, it can serve as an explanation or proclamation which makes visible a common public world.

This implies as well decisions of a more personal nature, for the life of every individual proceeds in its own way. Therefore a dwelling must possess also a certain aloofness needed for the definition and preservation of its identity. This mode can be called a *private dwelling*.6 The word "public" had been used for the mode of dwelling in the spaces of institutions to reflect that this is shared by society. The private dwelling points to activities isolated from interaction. Note, however, that here isolation means rather a certain aloofness or retirement rather than the exercise of any unsocial activities. Indeed, private life interrelates with patterns of social behavior.

A scene where the private dwelling takes a place is a house or a lodging. These can be characterized as a "refuge," where a man gathers and interchanges the original experiences which create his personal world.7

In exploring the dwelling we must remember all these levels, for the essential determination of the modes of dwelling are not the architectural structures, but the dimensions of a man's being in the world which reach from deep within the practical branch of the biological, through the psychic, to one's spiritual functions.

Constituents of Dwelling

In architecture a man builds a space that helps him gain a certain existential refuge in the world. The task of architecture does not end in the formation of spaces in which a man shelters himself from adverse influences and escapes into isolation. On the contrary, the spaces should be for him a means for confronting and becoming familiar with the world. They should become a place from which he enters a world of relations with nature, other persons and community and to which he returns in order to reintegrate these relationships with his individual life and activities. These keep their meaning in virtue of their social, cultural even spiritual roots.

All of our acts and experiences grow out of a relationship between men and the world. They always refer to something in space and time and are somehow situated. Every situation invites us to find our place in a certain level of world organized as a "cosmos," either as universe, country,

house or body—that of others or our own. A common sign of these inhabited "universes" is that they have a certain system of openings, as a rule at an upper level or at the top. The system of openings breaks the homogeneity and impenetrability of their surface and makes possible their interrelation. A body has a mouth, eyes and ears with which it enters the world to which it opens itself. A house disposes of a chimney and windows, while the heavens open over a country.

The functional and cultural meaning of the openings may change, but their spiritual meaning is the will to communicate with other levels of existence, to transcend the spatial and temporal limits of own "situatedness." I assume that architecture, building and dwelling, as well as any work of art, originate from the very center of the interrelation between man and world. They are consequences of man's will to transcend his own "situatedness" defined in the time and space of his terrestrial existence. In the works of art a man constitutes for himself a certain system of "openings" through which he starts on his way to solving the conflicts and uniting the opposites of the interrelationship "man <—> world." He proceeds to an understanding of things, men and himself and then to an identification with the things of this world. Beyond this he adds orientation within this world, and finally a relation to transcendence.

For his dwelling a man chooses a certain place where he is situated in a space and influenced by the character of the surroundings. To become a refuge for man's existence this place must enable man to know where he is and be able to orientate himself in space and to experience a given environment as a meaningful place in which he finds a sense of himself, and of the world with which he identifies.

The actions of identification, orientation and transcendence constitute then the general structure of dwelling.

Identification belongs to things, their character and their physical form. Orientation expresses the spatial organization of things. Transcendence is the vertical dimension, a power that opens the physical situation to wonder and engenders pleasure in gazing at a world. This has been forgotten, but must be learned again. Within transcendence, the powers of identification and orientation can meet anew and gain transcendent meaning for the one who dwells. In transcendence existence takes up and transforms the *de facto* situation. Thus transcendence founds and constitutes the implicit meaning of truth of being-in-the-world. It is (or should be) eternally present within identification and orientation as their internal spiritual dimension, though in the following text I will not mention this explicitly.

The functions of orientation and identification are always present and inseparable in a process of dwelling. It is meaningful, however, to distinguish them as different aspects of dwelling because in particular situations one of them predominate. We can be orientated in a space without full identification with things there, and we can also identify with certain qualities of things without full orientation. Finally, we often experience the appearance of insufficient identification and orientation in the architectural and urban structures of the present time. This is related to several circumstances. Today's surroundings are quite different from the era in which a neighborhood was located in a natural setting with which it constitutes an authentic scene of human life. The environment is multilevel, including in its make up both nature and a "synthetic" world of technology and culture. We no longer live immediately in nature but in a world of man-made things. In nature the shape of things indicates their essence and functions.

At present, however, we learn nothing substantial or important from the shape of some things. We know what they are only when they manifest their structure through the way in which they function. Whereas in ancient times the perception of the shapes of things was the gateway to their substantial definition this is no longer the case because the shape no longer correlates to a specific

object. A silver pyramid can be a monument, a computer, hi-fi equipment, a chair, a cupboard or even a time bomb. To recognize the object we have to "grasp cognitively the interactions of its constituents."8 Only after entering into the "interior" of things by understanding their structure does their dynamic structure open for us.

In today's architecture we often experience the loss of a sense of place, the disappearance of an affinity between man and space on the level of identification as well as orientation. In traditional societies habitation emerged from the intersection of land, ground, climate, materials and the influence of a collective memory. There a determining factor was always an image of a certain vision of the world and community that made architecture concrete. The architecture visualized and then embodied the world image held by the community through which an affinity of a man and a space was preserved. If the present lacks these dimensions of architecture then a number of powers are hidden. Industrial culture exerts an entropic and standardizing influence which cuts across the roots of local building forms. It is one-dimensional, aiming at comfort and luxury without meaning and value. The homogeneity of space formatted by the modular network of an industrialized building kills the sense of place. These are only some of the symptoms of today's loss of the sense of place for human life.

Likewise in evaluating architecture, often more attention is paid to the economic, technical and technological circumstances on the one hand, or on the other, only to the circumstances of artistic form so that architectural work is appreciated only as the art of organizing space. The human meaning, whether conscious or unconscious, embodied by the spatial order is forgotten. The environment, space and things are considered to be neutral, as objects between objects in the continuity of geometric space without interrelationships between them and a man. This separation of man from space is destructive in architectural formation. The roots of this malignant situation consist not only in reasoning at the level of "engineering"; they reside deeper within man in the network of social relationships in which he is shackled or in the soil from which he grows and makes progress. In these troubles an aesthetic approach apparently is not sufficient. Architecture should not be superficial utilization of spatial qualities or stop with adopted archetypal meanings. It must include an appreciation of creative human abilities which are evident; for example, when one looks into history; architecture must include as well the determination of a primary sphere of meaning in human existence.9

Identification. It is impossible to think of things without humans. Things are here only by means of the activity of women and men; they are not independent existents but internally interrelated. The relation of a man to things is not based on a use or ownership. The mere ownership of a house or apartment and simply living there do not yet mean that a true human relation of dwelling has begun. For this the house must have the set of transactions with a person (his physical, vital and spiritual dimensions, with his socio-culture patterns of behavior) and surroundings. A dwelling enables a man to experience these surroundings as meaningful.

The contact of a man with his surroundings is based on an analysis of the utility of reality for life, and on the meaning of the perceived object. This is required by the defensive function of consciousness even if we are not directly aware that this is the case, for perceptions and cognitions in their life-functions are not mere "objective" unconcerned registrations of facts, but have biotropic value and function."10

In living contact with architecture from which there emerges a certain experience, it seems as if a space, objects, and time flow together in the same stream that flows through our consciousness. Space is no longer an emptiness, but is full of smells; it becomes laden with lights and shadows

which we can touch and feel. At times the pace slows, life becomes intimate; a silence absorbs us. In this experience we evoke also extra-emotional creative relations; we identify with place, space, things, and situations we are experiencing. Our relationship to our surroundings becomes familiar; things speak to us in our own language. Such a process reveals to us the importance of suitable surroundings for our personal life. Such significant space resonating with our experiences, memories and ideas, embodies not only our relation to our place in the world, but also strengthens our self-awareness. Things, tables, beds, fireplaces, chairs, wardrobes, bookcases, etc., become unique and irreplaceable focus points which unite the spaces of our daily life. A multitude of poems, novels, paintings testify to this.

The towns in which we live , buildings, objects, apartments, things help us to understand our world and ourselves and to remember who we are. The human life takes place at a certain place as well as in the flow of time. Hence, in the active process of dwelling, place comes to be experienced as an effect of our awareness of the interconnection of the place with ourselves. In this way is born the experience (and the *need* of the experience) of time. A person coordinates his activity by virtue of an awareness of a certain situatedness in a space and time continuum. Time, like space, is a basic dimension of human self-awareness mediated through architecture and art. This is not so much in the sense of the contemporary scientific notion of time-space nor of a mechanical flow of time, but in the sense of a mental, multilevel dimension in which time-levels overlap.

In architectural spaces, revived with dwelling, time exists in condensed form in which a man holds his own past, present and future in dynamic interrelationship. (Here memory plays an important uniting, structuring role.) A creative cognitive grasp of a work of art activates forgotten feelings of our body and mind. Deeper layers of associative relations awaken within a gathering of images which touches even man's biological past. An experience of time resonating in one's *prise* of a work does not drive us to a future, but ties us to the past even if it reflects the present and can be oriented towards the future. Psychologically, the basic essence of the work is not the awareness of something "uncommon" never before experienced, but a reconstruction of ancient associative contents of consciousness, deep bio-cultural layers of life experience.

We often witness the enrichment of architectural expression with its variety of forms, external organic character and elements of historical styles. In spite of these efforts such attempts are not the most important contributions to the human dwelling in the world. From the beauty of crystal, from a visual play with forms, there still cannot be born the meaning and associative capacity capable of bringing a human order into a world and saying it to man.

That architecture cannot be exhausted by a mere play of forms is due not only to the self-evident fact that it is bound to its practical ends and a number of other external circumstances. It is due also and above all to its inseparability from one's sense of the function and meaning of dwelling. From the above it is evident that this meaning is a formation of a certain defined space (not only in the sense of neutral geometrical space or physical time-space) which becomes a refuge for a man in his socio-human existence within the unlimited spaces of the universe. Villages, towns, buildings, houses, lodgings form the limits through which a man finds his place in the world, in a space, in community. The place where he resides or dwells through time, that is familiar to him and an embodiment of his own intrinsic powers, is able to become his refuge from which he departs to enter the world inhabited by his neighbors.

The work of architecture represents the universe filled with living people, defined by people for people according to their physical, vital, social, spiritual dimensions. A given space familiar only to one person or group differs from a space "outside"; it is humanly identified because it embodies the meaning of human existence, which in turn gathers in the openness of the world. In

this identification man disposes of his world and at the same time of his own identity. To do this it is necessary to be open to one's surroundings.

Identity is not as an "internal" quality of every individual; nor is the dwelling a realization of a hidden Me. Identity resides rather in an interiorization of the things understood. By it a dwelling implies an openness of a man towards the surrounding world.

Orientation. A building/dwelling forms both a place in which human identification occurs as a man finds a sense of himself, and a world whence he departs and to which he returns to fulfill his life in cooperation with others in the community.

There inevitably the man creates a certain order which helps him to defend himself against the chaos of "alien" world and enables him to orient his activity.

Like identification, orientation is always connected with our acts. A man has to know where he is in order to be able to be at all. In his building and dwelling one is situated in a certain space, surrounded with things and events between which he introduces the interactions which enable him to create and develop himself. Thus he is able to walk down the roads which lead into the world, to create various modes of participation in life, and fulfill this life in a community with his neighbors. Truly human activities are possible only when one's surroundings are not chaotic. Given a certain intelligible structure, however, one is able to form a clear image which serves not only as a practical aid in everyday life, but also to protect him through a certain psychic security. "A good environmental image gives its possessor an important sense of emotional security. He can establish an harmonious relationship between himself and the outside world. This is the obverse of the fear that comes with disorientation; it means that the sweet sense of home is strongest when home is not only familiar but distinctive as well."(11)

Christian Norberg-Schulz (12), starting from Lynch's analyses, and some general principles of Gestalt psychology and phenomenology, concentrates on defining the meaning of "centers," "paths," and "domains" as the basic elements of the environmental structure enabling and defining orientation. Comprehending interaction between these elements constructs an environmental image, in which every space of human activity constitutes a center at which occur the important events of human life. At the level of a landscape, the center of an entrance to a land begins to form. A public square is the center of people`s interaction in the contact of a settlement. An institution is the center of communication of opinions in the context of a more extended and integrating structure such as a town or district; while a house represents the center of personal life. The center represents a place that is familiarly known; there it is not necessary to discover something; there we are secure. We persist and live by virtue of the security it provides. We can set out from there along paths that lead into an unknown world which is sometimes full of dread, and based upon the security of our dwelling we can recognize and appropriate the unknown and act therein.

The center is directly bound to meaning that emerges in one's union with a certain place in a space and community. The concentric order of a human world becomes manifested in the stream of the whole of human history.

Every worldview from the cosmogonies of the Ancients to contemporary scientific cosmologies is built around the idea of a certain center. Similarly, images bound to towns demonstrate the role of the center in human environment; the town of Delphi was the "navel" of the world (*omphalos*) for ancient Greeks, and Romans considered their Capitol to be *caput mundi*. The center serves as a certain linking element between various spheres of a human world; it is the place where these spheres meet and penetrate one another. It is as if all horizontal movements and the tension between "exterior" and "interior" end in that place, governed by the vertical dimension. The center cannot be totally closed for then the human dwelling in its defined limits would lack its

special meaning. This enables a man to be enclosed and to fulfill his life in relation with others at the same time; with its openings, "gates," "doors," "windows," it enables him to dwell, to exist in the world and to transcend the limits of separation: to "enter" the center or to "leave" it.

Paths are inevitable supplements of the center. They are present at all levels of an environment and allow movement in certain intended directions, while removing the possibility of "getting lost." Paths represent the concrete world of human activity. The directions of the paths combine to constitute an area where a man makes choices and determines the direction of his life, thereby introducing into the space of life its characteristic structure. The path continues with the movement of a life and takes on a characteristic rhythm. This rhythm supplements the tension connected with the verticality characteristic of the center. Thus, both tension and rhythm are general qualities of the human orientation.

The less structured domains provide the "background" for the concrete shapes or the figurative quality of the centers and the paths. The two domains are differentiated by a certain characteristic atmosphere which unites the spaces of human dwelling. The domains provide space for a network of paths so that a man imagines every spatial whole as consisting of the domains which compose a mosaic of the whole: just as when we think about our country there emerges in our thought the fields, rivers, lakes, meadows, mountains of the country. As the domains are the potential places of human activity, orientation integrates the structures of environment into the domains by the means of the centers and paths.

The Egyptian hieroglyph for town is the cross inside of a circle. This motif is repeated in depictions of a number of historical towns. The depictions of Rome, and of medieval towns, and the calling of contemporary town districts by the term "quarters," point out the ever present necessity of spatial order formed by means of a center, a network of paths, and of the domains between them in the framework of a delimiting "circle". The circle represents a certain horizon that is the fundamental element of the orientation.

This seems true despite the evidence the designed towns originated either from reality, from "mythical ideas," or from religious geography. Further, it is impossible to identify it with certainty: for from Egyptian towns there remain only fragments and even what has remained is never circular. Jerusalem was square with high walls and twelve gates. But all these towns have a center and a network of streets which divide the town into different domains, sections, or neighborhoods. Each domain with its special atmosphere takes on a quite definite material character in virtue of which it is accessible and open to understanding and identification, thus allowing the orientation which completes human dwelling in the spaces of the world. Through dwelling with harmoniously developed aspects of identification and orientation, a man belongs consciously to a certain concrete place which becomes an "enclosed" refuge, on the one hand. And on the other hand it becomes the point of departure for uninterrupted contact between a man and his surroundings.

The place becomes one of departure and continual return. It is the place where we are eternally returning like Ulysses to Ithaca. The place is then not a mere instrument for lodging, but is the proper human dwelling, the home of a Man. In this "place," with the complexity of its levels, our house and family, our town streets and the various dimensions of our professions and in the atmosphere of our country we develop the exclusive relationships through which we create the proper human sense of dwelling, and the very sense of human life itself. In these relations to "have" a home does not mean to inhabit a house and waste away in its luxury, or to escape relationship to one`s neighbors, for it is in these relationships that to have "my" home means to cultivate a world-for-me, and to cultivate myself for-the-world. It means to protect the luxury of dwelling in a *neighborly* fashion.

When these relationships atrophy and one forgets himself, his being slips away: he becomes forsaken and is lost to the community. In such oblivion he can arrive at a terrible sense of personal meaninglessness.

Notes Towards a Conclusion: Architecture and Totalitarianism

Czechoslovakian architects and town-planners complain about the lack of a conceptual approach to the architectural and town-planning design during the last forty years. They are totally right. But it is also true that a "conceptual" approach did operate from the side of the totalitarian political structures. These structures probably were more aware of the implicit existential socio-cultural meaning of architecture than were the architects. Only on that basis could there have developed such architectural and urban monsters in which we have been forced to reside, work and live. This "conception" resided in a nihilistic destruction of the historical town-cores, their distinctive outskirts and finally, of the countryside as well. All these "crimes" were "crowned" by sowing the poisonous mushrooms of satellite housing quarters.

Building and dwelling represent the total relation between a man and his environment. In the materializations of the relation are embodied both the biological adaptation and the mediated action of a man upon the environment. Human dwellings fulfill both the biological protective function and these with implicit existential, socio-cultural meaning. Towns, buildings, lodgings, objects, etc., are not only physical phenomena, but, above all, cultural phenomena of the human society. They are the extension of the collective memory of a society and its individuals.

Claude Levi-Strauss in the book *Tristes Tropiques* (13) describes how the circular lay-out of Bororo Indian villages in Brazil embodies their vision of both the universe and the social organization of the tribes; the lay-out "constitutes" a comprehensive pattern of social interactions and the social status of a person: "A man is not, for them, an individual, but a person. He is part of a sociological universe: the village which exists for all eternity, side by side with the physical universe." (14) In the structure of the clan, economic functions, family ties, and sexual activity are determined or expressed through the geographical location of one's hut in the village. Here is immediate interconnection between social and spatial organization as is reflected in concentric, diametric and triadic plot structure.

So vital to the social and religious life of the tribe is this circular lay-out that the Salesian missionaries soon realized that the surest way of converting the Bororo was to make them abandon their village and move to one in which the huts were laid out in parallel rows. They would then be, in every sense, dis-oriented. All feeling for their traditions would desert them, as if their social and religious systems (these were inseparable) were so complex that they could not exist without the schema made visible in their ground-plans and reaffirmed to them in the daily rhythm of their lives."(15)

It is not right then to apprehend human settlements: villages, towns, streets, houses, as mere objects. They are a certain spatial and social organization that establishes a place of human dwelling in the world. The identity of a town, village or quarter is not determined either by the land on which they stand or by the buildings which participate in their formation, but by a certain implicit structure which (in the case of Bororo villages) every village reproduces: "That is why, in putting a stop to it, the missionaries destroyed an entire culture." (16)

Though this example may seem rather more bizarre and quite remote from the patterns of developed societies, it makes clear the existential, socio-cultural and spiritual meaning implicitly residing in architecture. In the structure of human settlements and dwellings there is involved not

only a mere "expression" or "symbol" of social organization; structure embodies (surely in the case of the Bororo village) a social organization (or in the case of totalitarian regimes often only social destruction and greed for manipulation). The structure transfers social organization from generation to generation, though the inhabitants need not realize this fact. This makes it the more necessary for every architect and town-planner to realize these circumstances.

In its affirmative dimension architecture has the ability to preserve an openness of being, communication in social interactions, the social existence of a man, and his collective memory and will. These are the requisite conditions for socio-cultural reproduction and development and it is here that the sensitive nerve of architecture resides. The nerve reaches to bio-cultural layers of human consciousness and subconsciousness, and the power structures of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes were quite aware of the fact. Various totalitarian regimes used a formal convention of the classical canon and language of architecture, or traditional regional forms of architecture, as the vessel into which they "poured" their ideologies.

Thus the Doric column was for Hitler an expression of a "New Order." The mythology of Nazism and ideology of Marxist communism were easy and readily worked out in the forms of neoclassicism. Stalin is quoted as saying: "The people too have a right for columns." Herbert Read expressed this aphoristically: "Behind every Dictator stands a blood-stained Doric column."

Authentic tradition, however, was here replaced by analytical historicism. The spontaneous character of creativity was replaced by demiurgic commands from which grew up the phantoms of malignant power. The common goal of mid-war totalitarian regimes was to express power. Its architecture was to embody and help to strengthen the authority, order, stability, the "noble," the "greatness" of the given form of government. This was accompanied by a devaluation of symbols, taking possession of the glory, e.g., of ancient Rome, etc.). Similarly, the postwar "Communistic gangsters" moved into the residences abandoned by the aristocracy and bourgeoisie and built for themselves the new objects—the vast, gigantic witnesses of their own "greatness." They routed the "awkward terrestrials" from the town centers cut out by the main traffic routes and the stench of fumes, and drove these "terrestrial simpletons" into tight jackets made from chaotic satellite quarters which offend the sensitive nerve of architecture. In these pseudo-housing quarters a man is dis-oriented and loses his own identity. He becomes there a feather at the mercy of the manipulative force of the wind.

Today's return of the new citizens to the squares represents their rebirth as a forum of public life with its diversity of views, its complementarity and toleration. It manifests that not even many years of steady brain-washing did not empty the mind of its memory which found shelter under the wings of hope. Many groups of people have cultivated the hope of defending their human existence even under conditions in which a man was driven out from the human sphere and driven into one of mere utility and false social relationships.

The use of historical motives as well as, at the opposite extreme, a "clear" play of building materials and light without a feeling of home and continuity were accompanied by a proclaimed goal of creating a more humane environment. Often this disclosed a more or less hidden will to manipulate. The resulting architectural hybrids and monsters often serve as shelters of the last resort composed of a shapeless building mass. These shelters serve as a means of bare subsistence and nothing more. Such "houses" are rather "killing engines" than "engines for dwelling." The awkward experiments with so called "art-panel" (art-concrete slabs) painted with doves, bunches of flowers and other strange configurations which should glorify some sort of Eden on earth revealed an absence of minimal taste, for in this world of shattered collective will there was nothing to glorify. But the cynical nihilistic caricatures of "experts" in the affairs of community indulged

themselves by imagining this environmental and socio-cultural disaster to be an Eden and the only sane society.

The "modern" housing development, a degenerated heir of the modern movement's mainstream, encloses all towns in our republic with huge groups of houses without face, constructed by the same 'prefab' system and stretched like ugly jewelry along the roads. This endlessly monotonous chain evokes an image of a "NO ONE" memorial in "NOWHERELAND" where it is impossible to descry "WHO" lives here or indeed, even "WHERE" we are. Such a way of building human dwellings is impossible to excuse, even by the most acute shortage of apartments. Nonetheless, whether Prague, Brno, Bratislava, Kosice or the little towns, the beautiful town spaces remain which, even after years of various mutations of a social equalization process, did not lose their face, the integrity of their tradition, or their rootedness in a stream of life, their meaning. For meaning springs not from a nominal historical value of these town and spaces, but rather (though not only) from context in which the spaces have "lived" through the decades and centuries. Despite this, most of the new housing quarters built with prefabricated blocks shook off the authentic beauty of the original culture and surroundings, and succumbed to an infection of one-dimensional utility and to megalomaniac will of power to manipulate.

But this cannot be regarded as architecture; that had been replaced with a certain compensatory building of flop-houses without a face.

When you cease to know your way about house, you are no longer dwelling in it. . . . Little matters if one use or the other be the more productive or expedient. Man is not livestock for fattening, and love for him counts more than the use to which this place or that is put. You cannot love a house which has no visage, and where footsteps have no meaning.17

And this means not only your house or mine.

The fundamental task and aim of architecture is to visualize a world, to gather and to preserve a soft swirl of the earth and the sky, of the divinities and the mortals in the simple union.

To preserve the fourfold, to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await divinities, to escort mortals—this fourfold preserving is the simple nature, the presencing, of dwelling. In this way, then, the genuine buildings give form to dwelling in its presencing and house this presence.18

The end of totalitarianism is a chime that flashes an appeal to a man for a true human dwelling in its physical, vital and spiritual dimensions. It is the appeal to a man for the trying to reunite in himself all of the variety that has an effect on him between the earth and the heavens. Even if it is simply the endless task, each of us has to decide for this task despite its endlessness. And each of us has to look for his road and to walk down this road. Towards a home. Towards the home of neighborly dwelling human beings. To live in this Home is Christ.

Notes

1.Umberto Eco, *The Name of the Rose*. Czech ed.: Jméno ruze, (Praha: Odeon, 1985), p. 481.
2. Jean Piaget, *The Psychology of Intelligence* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 8-9.
3. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *The Wisdom of the Sands*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Comp., 1950), p.12.
4. Christian Norberg-Schulz, "Auf der Weg zur figuerlichen Architektur," *Bauen und Wohnen* (no. 5, 1985), pp. 55-60.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

8. Igor Hrusovsky, *Dialektika bytia a kultúry* (Bratislava: Tatran, 1975), p. 45.

9. Compare: A. Pérez-Gómez, "Abstraction in Modern Architecture, *Arkkitehti* (n. 2/3, 1986), p.107.

10. Ján Albrecht, *Eseje o umení* (Bratislava: Opus 1986), p. 95.

11. Kevin Lynch, *The Image of the City* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 4-5.

12. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence, Space and Architecture* (London: Studio Vista, 1971).

13. Claude Levi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques* (New York: Atheneum, 1971).

14. *Ibid.*, p. 218.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

17. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, pp. 16, 17.

18. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 158,159.

Chapter IX
Philosophy of Violence and Its Aftermath

Bohumila Kozelouhova

Questions

The final period of the official power of Communist parties, the 'Real Socialism', affected remarkably contemporary post-totalitarian societies in Central and Eastern Europe. K. Popper's critical rationalism provides a reliable methodological basis for an analysis of this influence. His social philosophy is an analysis of both Marx's method and Marxist ideology. But it leads also to another especially important dimension, namely, the warning found in many places in Popper's works, that

The simple truth is that truth is often hard to come by, and once found it may easily be lost again. . . . The theory that truth is manifest - that it is there for everyone to see, if only he wants to see it - this theory is the basis of almost every kind of fanaticism.1

Popper stresses testing, falsification and refutation of ideas as the very basis of a scientific methodology.

The clear formulation of questions is an inevitable presupposition and first step for all regions of human thought, especially in meditating about man, human values and society. Certainly we are not able to find a satisfactory answer to each question and probably only part of the answers which first seemed satisfactory would pass the test of history. But the history of human knowledge is one of asking questions, testing of their legitimacy and acceptability, reformulating or refuting them; correlatively it is a quest for answers, their testing, adoption or refutation; finally in the process emerge new questions, new problems to solve.

In this manner human knowledge grows and by means of his own reason man gradually returns to the world which through pride he once willingly and irrationally left. We once isolated ourselves by asking the question: What kind of relation do we have to this world? And then for a long time sought a satisfactory resolution through an incredibly complicated network of questions and answers. It seems that the resolution has now been found and strangely in the form of a question: What is my place in this world? Though long and difficult this quest did not simply replace one question with another, but led to an understanding that a man does not stand against the world but is in it as a part. The new question deserves an answer.

Contemporary Marxism is a remarkable contrast for it could be described as a set of statements for which there are no questions. Without any doubt Karl Marx created his philosophy in the hope of answering some disturbing questions, never mind in the present case that he did not succeed. What his pupils have made does not have even this value. Contemporary Marxism is constructed as a set of "categories" to which nothing corresponds and nobody needs; it proclaims "historical laws" that neither have the character of laws nor are able to stand as empirical statements.

The basic and lead question is: What is contemporary Marxism, not only its philosophy but its whole ideology and social-political practice usually called "real socialism"? From this follow questions on the aftermath of Marxism among which the influence upon people of historicism and totalitarianism seem the most disturbing. Those questions are vital for the new-born democracies

in the whole former "socialist world" because a free society can be built only step-by-step by free people. The present situation is extraordinary and unprecedented because return of these countries to Europe (or better to the free world) is not mere restoration but involves something deeper and more substantial, namely the retrieval of human values and freedom from within a half-forgotten tradition into a new world with its new cultural situation. In these circumstances the examination of the roots of the preceding slavery is the only way to liberation.

Contemporary Marxism and Real Socialism

The common misunderstanding is that Real Socialism is the realization of Marxist ideas or, in more Marxist terms, that it is the application of those ideas in social practice. In fact the connection between classic Marxism and Real Socialism is much vaguer and complicated than is usually expected:

Of all the varieties of nineteenth-century materialism the most influential, if influence can be assessed by counting the number of professed disciples, has been the 'dialectical materialism' of the Marxists. But the influence is a result of what can only be described from the standpoint of a history of philosophy as 'an accident of history' . . . it is a philosophy which is immediately associated with a particular set of social institutions - in this case with the Soviet Union and the Communist party - exerting very little influence except on philosophers who are committed to those institutions, but claiming their unconditional allegiance.2

The crucial point of K. Popper's criticism of Marxist methodology is based on his theory of falsifiability as a criterion of the scientific value of a theory:

(1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory - if we look for confirmations.
(2) Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions.
(3) Every 'good' scientific theory is a prohibition: . . . The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
(5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. . . .
(6) Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. . . .
(7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers - for example by introducing *ad hoc* some auxiliary assumptions or by re-interpreting the theory *ad hoc* in such a way that it escapes refutation.3

The Marxist methodology is strictly 'anti-falsifiabilistic' and its theory of society is of the same nature, which is much more serious. Every part of Marxist ideology is a justification. Instead of severe testing of utopian dreams we find the justification of socialism; instead of a quest for a dignified life there is a justification of terror; instead of building of a free society there is the justification of totality.

Justification of Socialism

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles 4

It can be argued that there is no sense in dealing with something so out-of-date as Marxism; nevertheless, having influenced and changed the lives of one quarter of mankind for three quarters of a century its power is not dead. Therefore it is useful to analyze and criticize it in order to reveal its nature and point at it explicitly and to identify the crucial points which gave birth to the evils of totality and terror.

K. Popper cites two main evils in Marxism: its historical approach to society and its dialectic method.5 But the most serious weakness is its violation of the criterion of falsifiability. Though Karl Marx yearned for a better future for mankind and dreamed of finding a way to make this come true, good resolutions are not enough. In his quest to realize his utopian dream he was equipped with very fallacious tools: belief in general laws of social development, dialectic method and great self-confidence. The result was an inadequate dogmatic theory of social development which at heart was reluctant to be tested and perhaps refuted.

According to Marxist opinion there are universal laws for the evolution of society which Marx succeeded in revealing. Nothing could be more honest than to help in the birth of the new society by any means including terror. Once having discovered its laws (i.e., its future) a society "can shorten and lessen its birth-pangs."6

Continuing in Marx's own metaphor: to shorten birth-pangs one may shorten the pregnancy itself by premature birth, and when one adds immature parents and possible inherited defects this produces a very strange child. It can survive in the intensive care (e.g., of the dictatorship of proletariat) but can achieve not full human life but only the suffering of all. This happened to Marx's ideas due to his failure on two points, first: his prophecy did not come true; second: he did not predict (or even conjecture) the possible consequences of that failure. Consequently, we can say that he was mistaken in his methods of constructing both his theory and the new society as well.

Justification of Terror

Only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat.7

The historical situation had changed and with it had changed the leaders. The naive visionary was replaced by the fanatic revolutionary longing for power. In the name of a utopian theory of the former there was enthroned the real dictatorship of the latter. The way to a utopian goal is usually a very long heavy way for an unexpected social change and with it a change of ideas as well. If we are persuaded that our ideal is the only one and we are chosen to fulfill it, then "the only way to avoid such changes of our aims seems to be to use violence, which includes propaganda, the suppression of criticism, and the annihilation of opposition."8 This is the starting point of the second life of Marxism; with the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat there emerges a new phenomenon in human culture: the glorification of violence, terror as something desirable, and oppression as a goal.

Lenin soon recognized that in Marx's economic research there is nothing useful for a constructive economic policy for his new state. After the unsuccessful experiment with so-called "war-communism," he partly and temporarily returned to private enterprise in so called NEP (New Economic Policy). But in theory he insisted on the principles of `Scientific Socialism' and the

power of the working class. Julian Martov made a remarkable and very early criticism of the discrepancy between the theoretical picture of the new society and reality:

Reality has cruelly shattered these illusions. The 'Soviet state' has not established in any instance electiveness and recall of public officials and the commanding staff. It has not suppressed the professional police. It has not assimilated the courts in direct jurisdiction by the masses. It has not done away with social hierarchy in production. It has not lessened the total subjection of the local community to the power of state. On the contrary, in proportion to its evolution, the Soviet state shows a tendency in the opposite direction. It shows tendency towards intensified centralism of the state, a tendency toward the utmost possible strengthening of the principles of hierarchy and compulsion. It shows a tendency toward the development of a more specialized apparatus of repression than before. It shows a tendency toward the greater independence of the usual functions and the annihilation of the control of the functions by the elector masses. It shows a tendency toward the total freedom of the executive organism from the tutelage of the electors. In the crucible of reality, the 'power of the soviets' has become the 'soviet power', a power that originally issued from the soviets but has steadily become independent from the soviets.9

The very fate of Martov confirms his observations. He was a collaborator of Lenin at the turn of the century, then a spokesman of the left wing of Menchevism (Russian social democracy). After the revolution he tried to serve as a loyal opposition and in 1920 left for exile in Germany. His pamphlet, *The State and Socialist Revolution*, was written in 1921.

Justification of Totality

Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists.10

The longer the double-life of Marxism lasts the greater the distance between its two lives. Marxist philosophy is petrified despite its proclaimed perfect and developmental understanding of society and knowledge. Though purporting to be an application of Marx's philosophy the ideology is nothing but a set of *ad hoc* justifications of totality by means of a vulgar-Marxist interpretation of dialectic. The third life of Marxism—the Real Socialism as a new form of institutionalized violence by the state gradually emerged. There is manifest continuity from Marx's disrespect for the ability of persons, through Lenin's disregard of personal opinions and Stalin's disregard for human life to the total indifference of the post-war communist regimes to the fate of human society.

Any justification of violence and arbitrariness results in shaking the basic scale of values. The values Marxism offers to replace the original values of European culture correspond in theory, but the theory is dead. Actually there are no firm values except that of a bare living. K. Popper speaking about his very early and short experience with Marxism wrote:

There is a mechanism of getting oneself more and more deeply involved: once one has sacrificed one's intellectual conscience over a minor point one does not wish to give up too easily; one wishes to justify the self-sacrifice by convincing oneself of the fundamental goodness of the cause, which is seen to outweigh any little moral or intellectual compromise that may be required. With every such moral or intellectual sacrifice one gets more deeply involved.11

This is precisely what was done, although there were many shades and levels of such involvement. But this is true of only a minority of society; the great majority really did not believe in 'the fundamental goodness of the cause', but everybody was involved in the 'moral and intellectual compromise'. A third very small but very powerful part of society, the ruling minority, did not believe and was not involved because they adored only one value, that of power. This is the reality of the unjust society.

Unjust Society

We are unshakably loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to that undying teaching, which we are creatively developing and enriching by our work and which we defend and protect steadfastly against all its enemies, come they from the Right or the Left.12

Freedom of public expression is inhibited by the centralized control of all communication media and of publishing and cultural institutions. No philosophical, political or scientific view or artistic activity that departs ever so slightly from the narrow bounds of official ideology or aesthetics are allowed to be published, no open criticism can be made of abnormal social phenomena.13

To summarize the results of over long Marxist "struggle for the best future of mankind" and omitting the fact that formerly poor countries are still poor while countries which had higher standards are also poor let us focus upon some subtler results. Medical care became so unsatisfactory that sometimes it was dangerous to go to the hospital; neither birth nor death were dignified moments of human life. Education was based on memorizing untrue information about one's own history and future in overcrowded classrooms. Culture lived three separate lives, the sum of which was not yet one full life. Christians were treated as inferior citizens. Most unjust of all were the socialist laws and justice.

The total indolence of the totalitarian state in developing the wealth and dignity of society issued in a corresponding indolence of the citizens toward improving their own lives and their own attitudes to the world.

Old People in a New Situation

The sympathy is ending and the hard struggle begins.14

My thesis is merely that our own social world is the best that has ever been - the best at least, of which we have any historical knowledge. . . . I have in mind the standards and values which have come down to us through Christianity from Greece and from the Holy Land; from Socrates and from the Old and New Testaments.15

What follows is said from the point of view of Czechoslovakian reality and can to some extent differ from the situation in other countries of the former Soviet block. Though we differ in our historical backgrounds and cultural heritages and our wounds may be not of the same depth, still they are of the same kind. Now we are in a new situation in which the old false emphasis on collaboration among nations assumes a new sense. We must begin a real dialogue, with give and take, about our destroyed human wealth in order to reconstruct our values and through them our societies.

Our common problem is that of lost values. Much depends upon the 'moral climate' of a society. Most people behave according to this and do what is considered 'advantageous' or praised by the society, whether morally or materially. If the moral climate of the society is well founded

and firm, such things as being generous, helpful, truthful, tolerant, etc., are advantageous, whereas if the moral climate is shaky and based on the idea of intolerance, then it seems advantageous to be hypocritical, selfish, deceptive, etc.

The moral climate of a society can be changed only by its members; this is the crucial point of the change from a totalitarian to an open society. While the totalitarian state was destroyed quickly, its effects last in the citizens and through them in the society. We are only at the stage of articulation of the problem; there is long way to go to being free, but it must be traveled. A free society is a society of free citizens. Freedom is the duty of deciding for oneself and being responsible for one's decisions; most of all it is the duty of respecting the freedom of others. And real freedom is based on a firm scale of values valid in the whole society.

This is the greatest challenge and duty. The post-communist society needs market economy, good medical care, improvement of science, etc.; but most of all it needs to rebuild its values. Its members must search carefully in history, in their conscience and in contemporary free societies to discover a firm basis for the new society.

Notes

1. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 8.

2. John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 42.

3. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 36.

4. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *Collected Works*, vol. 6 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 482.

5. In many places, mainly in the volume 2 of his *Open Society and Its Enemies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). His analysis of the dialectic method is in *Conjectures and Refutations*, chap. 15, "What is Dialectic?"

6. Karl Marx, *Capital* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), Preface.

7. Vladimir I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution, Selected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishard, 1969), p. 287.

8. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 260.

9. Julian Martov, "The State and the Socialist Revolution," in *Essential Works of Socialism*, I. Howe, ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 271.

10. J.V. Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 123.

11. K. Popper, "Intellectual Autobiography," in P.A. Shlipp, ed., *The Philosophy of K. Popper* (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court 1974), vol. I, p. 25.

12. Vasil Bilak, Speech to the 7th Congress of the Czechoslovak union of journalists, June 1977, in B. Szajkovski, ed., *Documents in Communist Affairs 1977* (Cardiff: St. Martin, 1978), p. 233. V. Bilak was the member of the presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party, one of the so-called 'invitors' of the Soviet army in 1968 and prominent normalisator in the 1970s; now retired.

13. *Charter 77*, January 1977, par. 3, Engl. translation in B. Szajkovski, ed., *Documents in Communistic Affairs 1977* (Cardiff: St. Martin, 1978), p. 271. *Charter 77* was the first document of the new Czechoslovak dissident movement by the same name. Its members were among the initiators of the "velvet revolution" in November 1989. The first spokesmen of *Charter 77* were Prof. Jiri Hajek, minister of foreign affairs in 1968, then worker, now retired; Prof. Jan Patocka, philosopher, professor at Prague University in the 60s, died in Spring 1977 after interrogation by

police; Vaclav Havel, dramatist, unemployed, several times imprisoned, now President of Czechoslovakia.

14. Vasil Mohorita in his speech to a session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, October 1990. V. Nohorita is the chairman of the Czechoslovak communist party. His remarkable statement refers to the 'national sympathy' motto of the `velvet revolution'; the first post-revolution government was called 'the government of national sympathy'.

15. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 396.

Chapter X
The Path of the Czechoslovak People towards Democracy

Jana Gasparikova

The History of the Civic Movement

If a revolution is to be smooth as velvet, it must be based upon high cultural values on the part of the people. Hence, the Czechoslovak revolution of 1989 illustrated the importance of spiritual values for democracy and concrete humanity. The motivating energy of these democratic values typical of both our nations explains the speed in toppling the totalitarian regime and establishing a democratic contemporary pluralistic system of political life.

The democratic political movements were developed by the Civic Forum in Czech regions and Public Against Violence in Slovakia. Both can be traced back to the political and civil activity of the well-known Charta 77 Movement, which from underground influenced political life for nearly 13 years. Beyond this, however, these democratic values oriented towards the defense of basic human rights can be traced back through the whole history of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia (1948-1989).

The main stream of this civic activity was centered on the fields of literature, philosophy, etc. For example, in the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak writers in June, 1967, the communist regime was criticized in the following statement:

It must be admitted that not one human problem has been solved in the last twenty years - from such elementary needs as housing, schools and economic prosperity to more subtle needs, which the undemocratic systems of the world cannot provide: a feeling of one's full worth in society, a feeling that politics is subordinated to ethics, a belief in the meaning of humble work, the need of confidence among people, the advancement of education for the people.1

During the Prague spring, 1968, there was strong support for human rights in intellectual, cultural and political circles. The first stroke appeared in the document called "Two Thousand Words," which was signed by the most prominent people of Czechoslovak society. It included as well the signatures of ordinary people because its main goal was to express the real attitude of Czechoslovak people in the June of 1968, several months before the Soviet invasion, towards the real situation. The author was the prominent Czech writer Ludvik Vaculik:

We are all responsible for the state of affairs; and the Communists among us are more responsible than others. The main responsibility rests with those, who were the component parts or instruments of uncontrolled power. It was the tenacious power spread with the help of party apparatus everywhere from Prague to each district and community.2

The direct questioning by intellectuals of the good will of the former leadership, and concentrated upon the democratization process within the Communist party, had a deeper goal. It concerned not only the mistakes made by the Dubcek's regime, but the whole organization of political, cultural and economic life as strongly influenced by the party apparatus throughout the

whole period of the Czechoslovak republic under the communist regime (1948-1968) and the violence done during the Stalinist era in the name of the communist party.

On the other hand, the process of consolidation within the Communist party in 1968 enabled people to speak more freely about topics which before had been absolutely forbidden, and to look publicly for continuity to the attitudes and values respected during the First Republic (1918-1938). This enabled the younger generation in 1968 to breath "something new and adventurous," which in turn during the later years of consolidation (1969-1989) helped them not to lose a common sense of the main principles of civic order and rights in a civilized society. The pathetic unity of people during the days of Soviet invasion revealed their discipline and strong will to survive. This civil resistance had to persist until the departure of Soviet soldiers from the Czechoslovak republic.3

Charter 1977 was signed in March 1977; it was widely published abroad and quietly duplicated by citizens within the Republic. The prominent signers of the Charter were playwright Vaclav Havel, professor Jan Patocka and professor Jiri Hajek. Its main aim was the proclamation of human rights which had been systematically violated during the consolidation period in the Czechoslovak republic (1969-1989). Charter 77 points out how illusive in Czechoslovakia were freedom of expression. For political reasons thousands of people were barred from the jobs for which they were qualified; freedom of speech was prevented by central censorship of the mass media, publishing houses, cultural institutions, etc.; and freedom of movement ceased as there was no possibility to travel abroad. This Charter was not only a protest against the violation of civil laws and rights in Czechoslovakia; it revealed also the perfidious and sophisticated way in which all this violence was carried out. The document was inspired by the international conference in Helsinki in 1976, where official representatives of Czechoslovakia were among the signers of the Helsinki conference. They proclaimed the full support of these ideas, but in reality suppressed them.

Comprehending the profound critique launched by the chartist movement, the Czechoslovak authorities decided to intensify their sophisticated torture not only of the signers of Charter 77, but of the whole nation. Against Charter 77 they organized so-called protest actions which resembled Dürrenmatt's play, "The Judge and His Hangman," which asks: Who feels more sorry and accused, the judge or the hangman?

Officially, during the whole period of consolidation, there existed a small group of dissidents, while the mass of people apparently was apathetic. But this was a false and superficial impression; for during the whole period of consolidation there existed underground movements in all spheres of cultural activity. People recognized the double talk and the double reality familiar to all readers of Orwell's book, 1984. What had been under the surface exploded abruptly in November, 1989.

The emergence of very strong civic activity was inevitable. From its beginning Civic Forum and Public Against Violence stood for democracy, a legal state, and a pluralistic parliamentary system with balanced legislative, executive, and judicial powers. They proclaimed "the free individual to be the basic unit and full human and civic rights and freedoms of the individual to be fundamental to democracy. Civic forum and Public against violence stand for the development of individual initiative, enterprise and creativity, and its legal protection."4

When the revolution opened the way for citizens to participate on public life, the civic movements initiated dozens of associations, unions, and self-help organizations, and offered them special advice, support and place to cooperate.

At the head of this civic activity stood a former signer of Charter 77, Vaclav Havel, who was then elected by the Parliament in December 1989 as the first non-communist president of Czechoslovakia since 1948.

Cultural Background

Typical of the civic movement was its deep harmony with the overall worldview of those who officially proclaimed it. There was not only an irresistible impetus to speak out about these problems. Beyond this their relation to the values of Masaryk's democracy, European cultural background, national values and their conviction regarding goodness and truth enabled them to speak effectively, indeed eloquently. Without claiming to be the leaders they presented their attitudes as ordinary people worried about the destiny of their nations.

Civic activity during the period of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia was always rooted in the memory of the first Czechoslovak republic, when to be a citizen meant to be a free citizen with access to the entire European cultural heritage and background, rather than to be only a part of an artificially created so-called East Europe. This may be the reason why especially artists and intellectuals felt this discrepancy, and inevitably spoke urgently about it. Surely it is one of the reasons why it is important now to proclaim once more a participation in Europe. This means first of all to be an integral part of Central Europe and then an integral part of the whole cultural continuity of a unified European conscience.

The leading representatives of our contemporary political and cultural life are inspired also by the humanistic ideas worked out by our first president Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, whose deepest persuasion was that democracy is the most humane way of life for civilized society. He expressed his views in the dialogues with our famous writer K. Capek:

Democracy is not only a form of our government; it is not only what is written in constitutions; democracy is a view of life. It rests on faith in men, in humanity and in human nature, and there is no faith without love and no love without faith. I said once, that democracy is discussion. But the real discussion is only possible where men trust one another and honestly seek the truth.[5]

Democracy must be joined not only with tolerance, but also with love. "I accept democracy also with its economic and material consequences, but I base it on love - on love and justice, that is the mathematics of love, and on the conviction that we should help in the world, towards the realization of the rule of God, towards synergism with divine will."[6] These words resemble the words of our contemporary president Vaclav Havel: to live in love; to live in truth.

Masaryk combined these words with moral incentives: "It would be a strange democracy, if there were no place for individual moral initiative."[7] This echoes the Kantian imperative. Vaclav Havel writes:

In principle, moral motivation means that what we do, we do not for so called 'utilitarian motives', but because we believe it to be good. Moral motivation leads us to do good as such, for its own sake and in principle. It is based on a very different confidence than a 'utilitarian' one - on a fundamental conviction that the good is always worth doing.[8]

The essential message, to live in truth, is based not only upon spiritual values, but also upon the inspiration of both Presidents. It arises from their personal character and in its most sublime form unifies the special historical heritage of the humanistic ideas developed through history in Central Europe. It is continuous with Komensky's teaching that life in truth is humanity at its most creative form; to be good is to live the ideal of humanism. The good then is not something

subjective based on an arbitrary relationship to reality; it is the essential feature of reality. Hence, the difference between good and evil is not reducible to cultural preferences.

This cultural heritage is typical of Central European thinking. The moral values based upon the implications of the good were very important for all spheres of cultural life and distinguished Central European thinking from that typical of Western Europe. The philosopher Erazim Kohak notes that whereas the "Atlantic littoral has grown increasingly secular, regarding the world as random and constrained only by conventional morality, Central Europeans are flocking to churches, rediscovering the world as a morally ordered place."9

This difference between Western and Central European thinking is traced by Kohak to the rationalist heritage of Descartes' ideas which regarded objective reality as a complex of facts without relation to values and meaning, as is typical of French and English philosophical thought. In contrast the most famous Central European philosophers typically sought the hidden meaning of the reality. It is not by chance that one of the most profound spirits of 20th century philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl, was born in Central Europe and was the professor at the German University in Prague; or that one of the best Czechoslovak philosophers Jan Patocka (the most prominent signer of Charter 1977) was a professor at Charles University at Prague. Both sought for humanitas in the world of ideas.

This makes more comprehensible the cultural background of the Chartist movement in Czechoslovakia, whose signers had a world vision of harmony and goodness which helped them through difficult times of persecution and prison. It reveals also why Jan Patocka decided to sign this document with Socratian will and conviction, and why as the first victim he became a symbol of unfulfilled expectations.

In the light of these foundational principles of transcending humanity it is possible to comprehend the interest in unification in countries belonging to Central Europe and in a broader sense the unification of the whole Europe. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier who also was one of the signers of Charter 77, tries systematically to work out this ideal in various meetings on the international diplomatic level. The concept of a unified Central Europe does not mean the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian empire, but the creation of democratic civic societies based upon civil rights and the freedom of individuals.

On the other hand, there is a very heavy historical burden called the complex of Central Europe, which is based upon the shared feeling of living on the very edge of Europe. People experience a special kind of provincialism in their worldview, thinking they are not in the center of cultural life. Further, they have been unable to continue a dialogue on cultural, political and economical cooperation. It is urgently necessary to continue that dialogue, especially at this level, because it helps overcome many problems and obstacles which cannot be solved on a more general level. Many nationalistic problems such as that between Czechs and Slovaks arise on this level: inability to solve them exaggerates them and makes them more difficult.

Dienstbier's conception of a unified Central Europe understands these problems and seeks to rebuild a new and creative Central European area without hostility and enmity. This explains Havel's recent official apology on the part of the Czechoslovak people to the Germans for having after the Second World War blamed the German minority in the territory of Czechoslovakia for collaboration with the Nazi occupiers.10 Such efforts to transcend the local boundaries are important, both from the cultural point of view because the states in Central Europe have a similar cultural and historical heritage, and for economic reasons as well.

The Present Situation

The above mentioned themes, namely, how the civic movement in Czechoslovakia was led by the best intellectuals and how it influenced and motivated people from the underground during the consolidation period and after the revolution directly by our prominent politicians, do not explain the behavior of our people in our new situation. In spite of the unification of both nations in Czechoslovakia during and after the days of the revolution things are now changing. This raises the question of how the collapse of the communist regime will influence the present situation.

Inevitably for economic revitalization both our nations decided in favor of the market economy as the system and adequate mechanism for achieving prosperity. On the one hand, there is the problem of how to decentralize our economic system and, on the other hand, the consequences of socio-economic development upon social life. This last question raises a set of social problems, typical of every modern society where the economy determines the most axiological problems within society.

The optimistic forecasts for Czechoslovakia in the coming period are complicated by the very values which have made it possible to open our society to the world, to look quietly ahead. Such values as open spiritual creativity and human rights and equality joined with practical efficiency can be real only if they express real value preferences on the part of a nation or society. But economic and moral development have a different dynamic: privatization and liberalization do not help to recover and strengthen the values which enabled us to be an example for the world.

The values connected with the market economy are set upon three important pillars: freedom, individualism and inequality. They reflect the most important points of contemporary liberal policy based on the theory of Milton Friedman whose most important conclusions would be stimulating for the social perspectives of the new Czechoslovak market economy.

Freedom and individualism are connected very tightly in this system. "The sense of freedom as almost free of any coercion is based upon the competition of individuals, but does not defend or protect special interests against somebody else's. Freedom is accepted as a general principle, whose application to particular instances requires no justification."11 This principle is right and very stimulating for the market economy; it opens people in their economic activities to be free and uncoerced. The main goal is not the political liberty of the average man, but the freedom to release one's inner individual will and power for competition and enterprise. But this stress upon only economic freedom and prosperity can be very depressive in everyday life, and not stimulating for such other aspects as for instance the socio-psychological. People can feel neglected and afraid and cannot believe in their own abilities. A strong base is indispensable for an adequate social policy, but the emphasis on the individual forces rather than social manifests the latent danger of this social tendency.

On the other hand, there is the danger of losing the humanistic qualities of freedom in society. Real freedom of society must be connected with the respect for human dignity and human truth and lack of economic coordination in the difficult contemporary transitional period in Czechoslovakia can represent a certain danger for the mental and spiritual freedom of our people. The hidden support of the chartist movement before the revolution and the subsequent open support during the revolution showed that the real reasons for this sympathy were support for basic human rights connected with a belief in humanistic ideals based upon human and national dignity. Only a well balanced economy can guarantee this level of human rights and help to avoid, later, the danger of moral corruption in our society.

Friedman and Hayek see the free market as the real place where the competitive instincts of human enterprise can be realized. People must be left on their own to follow their own rules and

processes. Only through free competition can their efforts be multiplied. Individualism is strongly related to a special understanding of *inequality* which these economists see as essential to stimulating the inner economic power of man.

These values connected with free enterprise focus upon consumption, promote the spread of mass taste and patterns of conventional behavior and mediate the development of the material culture such as a technical civilization and mass society. Acceptance of these values bears the danger of negatively influencing the spiritual and cultural life of our nations . This is a danger which each modern society must overcome.

The third claim of Hayek is the claim of inequality between people. This is a very stimulating claim which can motivate people positively, but only up to a certain point. From the psychological point of view this struggle and competition require both self-centered self-oriented people and a strong social policy in the case of unemployment. On the contrary, real democracy is based on full employment, public control of investments and what might be called equal opportunity for all. It is important to have public discussion about the direction of a social life which guarantees the principles of justice and democratic legitimacy. Real democracy depends not only upon discussions between political parties, but upon the good organization of work, which is a very important task in Czechoslovakia. This ideal of democracy must be based not only on economic competition, but also upon a stable political order.

Political tasks are influenced by adequate social policy.: Thus the task of the democratic conception is not a utopian conception, dedicated to the ideal of perfectly harmonious community and the burden of conception is not to outline a political order in which such an ideal is realized. The burden rather is on the outline of the political order, in which disagreements over the direction of that order could be socially addressed through free deliberation.11

This may sound too utopian even for politicians from the developed countries, but this scenario approaches the ideals of West European countries and in a certain way is very similar to the social ethos of the people in Czechoslovakia: equality of people supported by adequate social policy, the right to one's work, political self-determination, etc.

This suggests why we have concentrated here on the problems of human rights, for in Czechoslovakia that movement was always connected with the demand of equality in the political and social sense.

This does not contradict the basic claims of Friedmann and Hayek, that people must inevitably compete in the economic sphere. On the other hand, this competition must have certain directions in order not to corrupt people. This standard is the Kantian imperative which lies hidden behind the original civic movement. In this period we must endure the difficult times of our economic transitional period with courage and dignity and not be corrupted in everyday life. This is the most important thing; to understand it means to be a good citizen and a human being.

Notes

1. Document 1, "Speech by L. Vaculik to the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak writers," June 1967, in *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), p. 7.
2. Document 29, L. Vaculik, "2000 Words" Statement, in . *Winter in Prague,* p. 197.
3. With the Soviet invasion (1968) came the reimposition of censorship, the banning of opposition parties or clubs, renewal of the security police, the return of Soviet advisers in the defense, intelligence and political areas, a purge of the conservatives and the removal of liberals.

Most important, there followed continued Soviet military occupation until Moscow agreed that the situation was normalized and thereafter the permanent stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia was reduced.

4. "A Chance for Slovakia: Information About the Movement," (Bratislava: Public Against Violence, 1990), p. 1.

5. *Masaryk on Thought and Life: Conversation with Karel Capek* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938), p. 120.

6. *Ibid*., p. 192.

7. Erazim Kohak, "What's Central to Central Europe?" *Harper's Magazine*, June, 1990, p. 193.

8. *Ibid*., p. 24.

9. *Ibid*., p. 18.

10. The term Central Europe means the territory of the states created after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1918), viz., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria and Germany.

11. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, *Towards a Transformation of American Society* (Harmond, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 149.

Chapter XI
Threats to Democracy from Within:
A Psychological Perspective

Ivo Reznicek

When Timothy Garton Ash surveyed the prospects for possible change in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, he compared the situation there to the plight of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire and characterized it as *emancipation in decay*. Speculating about the viable outcome of the economic and political reform that had been already well underway in 1988, he took inspiration from the then ruling Communists of Poland and Hungary: "What would be 'success' for these reforms? A minimal definition is easily given: *to have averted revolution* [emphasis mine]. A maximal definition is more difficult. For Communist reformers, . . . maximal success means fulfilling the forty-year-old promise of modernization, making their states respected, competitive members of a larger European community, while at the same time retaining the maximum possible amount of power in their own hands."1

Both of these hopes have been thoroughly frustrated, at least in the former East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. They were in turn replaced by similar hopes for a full economic and political liberalization according to the western model, symbolized by the concept of *the return to Europe* now espoused by the new rulers of the post-Communist Central Europe. Ash, one of the more perceptive analysts of historical trends in that part of the world, views these hopes sceptically: "One can, alas, paint with a rather high degree of analytical plausibility a quite dark picture of the prospect for the former Eastern Europe in the 1990s: a prospect in which the post-communist picture looks remarkably like the pre-communist past, less Central Europe than *Zwischeneuropa* . . . a dependent intermediate zone of weak states, national prejudice, inequality, poverty, and *Schlamassel*."2

The societies of the countries that embarked on a journey toward political democracy and economic liberty have to pursue the same prerogatives as before—prevention of social upheaval and a complex modernization. A mere year after the fall of the old regimes, however, they are facing the spectre, if not the reality, of sharp economic decline, growing prices, falling real incomes, rising unemployment, polarization of the political spectrum, increasing criminality, escalating racially and ethnically motivated violence, awakened national prejudice, eroding public solidarity, expansion of social and economic disparities among individuals, growing administrative instability, general psychological uncertainty, and organizational chaos. Despite these warning signs, the new governments remain confident about their ability to secure the "social certainties" that their fellow citizens had taken for granted during the years of the Communist rule and to weather the conflicts implicit in the process of societal change.

In this respect, they are not unlike other societies that had managed in the past to throw off the yoke of authoritarian or totalitarian rule and attempted to establish democratic governments, liberate economic activities from previous controls, and at the same time protect the most vulnerable segments of their citizenry. It is no small irony that the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians who now search for successful models of such transformation are, in fact, retracing their own post-war histories of emancipation from the legacies of authoritarianism and that they have to confront the same divisive threats that plagued them four or five decades ago,3 before they

were suppressed by the heavy hand of Stalinism. (The East Germans are an exception to the extent that they may directly appropriate the accumulated democratic experience of their western fellow citizens.)

There are, of course, the unsuccessful models, including those of the post-war "socialist revolutions" in these very same countries. The Communist strategy of subverting democracy under the promise of egalitarianism, however effective it proved to be in the past, is now largely discredited in Central Europe and will remain so for at least a generation. Thus its chances, in the absence of Soviet support (the major and decisive factor in the success of past antidemocratic left-wing campaigns in East Central Europe), are doubtful. However, the Communist parties in the region have preserved their organizations, have effectively managed their election campaigns, are known to have strong support among less skilled workers in industrial areas and have already shown a revived ability to disturb, sabotage and frustrate democratic aspirations of their citizenry, particularly at the level of local administration and in industrial enterprises. It may be useful to remember that the party apparatus has been historically a very effective mobilizing and organizing force among the discontents of many kinds. Even today, the Communist parties can claim loyalty of high- and mid-level managers, educators, administrators, army and police officers, workers, and, in particular, the *Lumpenproletariat*. The party recruiters have been traditionally very successful among the ethnic minorities, the incompetent, the marginal and the uprooted.4 Although the option of the Communist recapture of power in Central Europe seems unrealistic in the near future, the capacity of the Communist parties to undermine nascent democratic governments there cannot be underestimated.5

One of the most studied and perhaps most instructive examples of failed democratic regimes is, of course, the Weimar republic. A combination of large reparation payments, economic slowdown, harsh stabilization measures, relatively costly social assistance measures, and the shock of the Great Depression contributed to a situation in which the income, social status and traditional cultural identity of large groups in the population had been severely eroded. Large numbers of the young unemployed fell prey to social anomie, street violence, and later to organized Communist and Nazi pressure tactics. Older workers threatened with joblessness tended to polarize, weakening the Social Democratic party and strengthening the extreme left and right. Economic and social stresses to which the middle classes, including intellectuals, became exposed, contributed to their abandonment of traditional bourgeois politics in support of activist single-issue fringe parties at first and Nazism later. The democratic, reform-oriented leadership of the republic lost effective power and was replaced at first by an authoritarian and later a totalitarian regime. Attempts to restore social balance were doomed by the sheer magnitude of economic forces beyond control of traditional liberal regulation. Hitler's promises to restore public order and introduce effective economic controls had an irresistible appeal for the majority of German electorate. After the experience of being governed by decree, they voted the ineffective, fragmented and compromised democracy out of power.6

A similar combination of factors brought an end to the democratic experience in the pre-war Italy: her coalition government was divided and unable to control inflation and unemployment; Socialist violence in the streets and in factories weakened it further; it had failed to attract middle-class support and, in order to regain strength, had coopted the Fascists; this gave the Fascists an opportunity to undermine the democratic order from within (in the parliament) as well as from without (in violent street encounters with the Socialists) until the final takeover of power by Mussolini.7

The collapse of the Spanish republican government was caused by extreme political polarization and volatility as well. Economic hardship, including unemployment, was also present. Both the radical right and the radical left incited and encouraged violence. Political center became factionalized and ineffective, in consequence of which a highly heterogenous Popular Front was installed in power, containing several undemocratic elements with ties to antidemocratic forces outside the government. Continuing and escalating violence eventually provoked an insurrection of army officers (unique for western Europe) and installation of Franco's dictatorship. Two additional factors played an important role in the undermining of the Spanish pre-war democracy: the Catalan and Basque nationalism, and foreign intervention prior to and during the Spanish Civil War.8

Intervention of armed forces, in contrast to the violence of paramilitary forces created by extremist political associations, has been a phenomenon typically following the rule of relatively weak democratic regimes beset by social, economic and political problems of underdevelopment. This has been the case of pre-war Poland, Hungary and Rumania, and a cyclical phenomenon in Latin America.9 Perhaps the most striking example from among these is that of Chile, the country with much longer-standing democratic traditions than those of its neighbors or its Southeastern European counterparts. One of its paradoxical features was the initial absence of a long, crisis-precipitating economic decline. Allende's government of the Popular Unity had inherited growing economy, manageable inflation, low unemployment, balanced trade and a relatively generous system of social welfare. Mobilization of support for this government was achieved politically, by the relaxing of electoral and labor controls. The Christian Democrats, intent on politically weakening both the left and the right, implemented a "third way" of economic development. The Christian Democrats failed, strengthening the leftist coalition in the process. The newly elected government then moved quickly to redistribute income, strengthen the social programs, and socialize the economy. These policies, together with the fall of prices of copper, Chile's prime export commodity, caused severe economic problems, depriving Allende of middle-class support, and seriously polarized the Chilean political life. Subsequent sabotage, mismanagement, labor indiscipline, strikes, and open resistance against socialization of production facilities paralyzed the economy. The governmental coalition began to crumble and political violence began to rise. To resolve the impasse between the Front and the opposition, the military was invited into the government. After it failed to forge a compromise, the political cleavage between the left and the right kept on increasing. Finally, to end the crisis, the army staged a coup.10

The Argentinean example is emblematic for the cyclical process of disruption, defeat, and reinstallation of democratic or quasi-democratic governments in Latin America. In this process, the military, the civilian political parties and other political groupings may play alternatively pro-democratic as well as anti-democratic roles, often in mind-boggling combinations and permutations. This fact accounts for the suddenness, lack of control, unexpected outcomes and discontinuities that have been observed in the political life of Argentina. The pattern of changes includes succession of contradictory economic policies resulting in explosive social conditions, popular revolts and their violent suppression, opening and contracting of electoral processes, wild swings in constituency support, fragile coalitions with gradually diminishing effectiveness, frequent governmental fragmentation, uncontrollable heterogenization of politics, and corruptibility of the ruling elites regardless of their ideological backgrounds.11

Analysis of the manner in which democracies lose vigor, become disrupted and suffer decline of support suggests a pattern that may lead to their ultimate breakdown (crisis, loss of power, creation of power vacuum and takeover of power by force), although the process is by no means

blindly deterministic and fully predictable once it is set in motion. Observation of historical traditions, socio-economic factors, legitimacy and effectiveness of the government, roles played by its leading personalities, character of the opposition and style of its work must be taken into account in order to explain why certain crises lead to revolutionary upheavals while others do not.12

Political sociology and political science rarely venture into the field of explanatory analysis of individual behavior, limiting their analytical approach to political, social and/or economic processes influencing group behavior. There is a good reason for this reluctance: emotional chaos provoked by a prolonged civic crisis translates into political action through several mediating steps (recognition, organization, tactics, strategy, crisis resolution) and by itself is an ungraspable element in the larger methodological approaches of these disciplines.

However, the psychopathology of individual human behavior in critical situations can be useful for gauging the magnitude of potential challenge to democracy, assessing its dynamics, and planning for its possible resolution. As we have seen, the breakdown of democratic regimes is often precipitated by severe economic hardship, followed by initially random and then organized violence. At the level of individual psychology, loss of economic and physical security translates into a severe emotional stress. Reasons for the gradual erosion of support of weakened democratic governments among citizens threatened to the core of their existence are related to unusual defensive reactions of individuals exposed to such stress.

Theories of personality attempt to explain how motivation for action arises from needs. To take an example from humanistic personology, Abraham Maslow divided them into lower (deprivational) and higher (self-actualizing) needs. Although he was not always consistent in their classification and allowed for their overlap, the deprivational needs meant to him requirements for food, water and air as well as needs to avoid pain and physical damage through external forces. The higher needs encompass those for belongedness, love, esteem, self-actualization and cognitive understanding.13 There is a hierarchy among these needs: satisfaction of the lower needs, stemming from the basic biological imperative to survive, is necessary if the higher needs, which originated in later stages of human development, are to be met.

Persons deprived of means to satisfy their basic needs "yearn for their gratification persistently, (and) their deprivation makes (them) sicken and wither". A person prevented from satisfying one's higher needs may postpone their gratification indefinitely. The self-actualizing motivation, then, typifies a "healthy human specimen", persons capable of clear perception of reality, openness to experience, spontaneity, possessing firm identity and a *democratic character structure* (emphasis mine) with "preference for values of truth, goodness and beauty". In contrast, the deprivational motivation characterizes stunted personal growth in an individual and a preference for "regressive, survival and/or homeostatic" values.14

Although Maslow based his otherwise speculative theory on limited laboratory experimentation with free choice, he knew about preceding empirical studies concerning human deprivation. Bruno Bettleheim, in particular, pointed to the devastating dehumanizing effects of the German concentration camps on its Jewish inmates.15 Long internment, severe hunger, total loss of privacy, brutalization by guards and incessant threat of death had a depersonalizing effect (denial of reality) on prisoners, accompanied by regression of personality (concentration on basic biological functions, descent to child-like behavior) and a strong identification with the oppressor (aiding in persecution of less conformist inmates16). (Similar reactions, that is, denial of reality and identification with the enemy, have been observed more recently in victims of hijackings and hostage situations in the form of the so-called Stockholm syndrome).

At a less extreme level, complex stress reactions often result from a prolonged joblessness. Work, to be sure, is one of the most important components of life, at least in industrial societies. Employment is not merely the source of income, but, equally importantly, contributes to the sense of personal worth and dignity, often facilitates self-realization, is an organizing focus of daily activities and an important point of reference, offers group identification, provides opportunities for informal support and may offer formal social support and assistance. This self-identifying, protective and supportive network of personal ties disappears quickly after a layoff. As empirical studies from the time of the Great Depression17 and the oil crisis of the early 1970s18 have shown, long-term unemployment sets in motion an adjustment process that may result in a traumatic reaction. The process usually starts with denial or disbelief and is followed or accompanied by a considerable anxiety attack. Later, a phase of relaxation and relief sets in, characterized by efforts to find new employment. If these efforts fail within a reasonable time, the unemployed person may experience vacillation and doubt with occasional incidence of psychopathological symptoms, such as depression, paranoia, irritation, aggressivity, suicidal tendencies and various psychosomatic ailments. The final stage of adjustment to permanent unemployment is characterized by malaise and cynicism, resignation and apathy.

Starting from a less complex, but experimentally controllable vantage point, attempts to explain violence as a defensive reaction to stress yielded the frustration-aggression theory. According to Dollard and collaborators19 aggression is always a consequence of frustration. Its strength and direction depend on the relative intensity of "instigation" (desirability of some goal), the relative degree of "interference against the goal-response" (obstacles in the path toward the goal), the number of "frustrated response-sequences" (previous failures to attain the goal) and an availability of "substitute response" (sublimated or diverted reaction to the inaccessibility of the goal; interpretations mine). The frustration-aggression theory awakened considerable controversy due to its exclusive emphasis on environmental factors. Ethologist Konrad Lorenz, in contrast, stressed an innate disposition for aggressivity in complex organisms and pointed to the dangers inherent in the "spontaneity of the (aggressive) instinct" which, to him, follows natural cyclicity of charging and discharging the energy of natural drives.20

More to the point of innate or inherited psychological traits, Theodore Adorno and his colleagues attempted to document, through empirical measurements, the existence of a totalitarian personality.21 This concept, based on assessment of expressed biases in personal opinion, was though to consist of a combination of personality traits such as conventionalism, submission to authority, aggressive tendencies, stereotyping, preoccupation with power, destructiveness, (paranoiac) projectivity and alienated sex concerns that were measured on opinion scales. The findings of the studies were doubted because of their methodological imperfection and because their replications failed to support the notion of more or less stable and unchangeable individual characteristics, allowing for more dynamic notion of individual tendency to "authoritarianism" susceptible to environmental influences. However, authoritarian beliefs, as measured on Adorno's F-scale, were found to be related to rigid cognitive functioning, submission to authority, hostility to "outsiders" and lower socioeconomic status.22

The above concepts and theories of reactivity to stressful conditions or dispositions for it do not postulate a direct and/or linear relationship between the deprivation and its effect on individuals. They do not, and possibly cannot, explain why similar levels of deprivation and frustration elicit widely different adjustment reactions not only among individuals but also among various groups. At least one explanation was advanced in regard to dynamics of paradoxically differentiated reactions to stress. Known as the theory of relative deprivation, its can trace its

origins to de Tocquville's description of the demise of the Old Regime in France. According to its tenets,23 the potential for violence varies with the perceived discrepancy between value expectations (what people think they are entitled to) and value capabilities (what they actually get). Hence the paradox of uprisings of people that took place after their living conditions had already improved. The deprivation that leads to rebellion may be "decremental" (expectations remain the same but capabilities diminish), "aspirational" (expectations rise but capabilities remain the same) or "progressive" (value expectations rise and value capabilities rise with them but only to a certain point after which the value capabilities begin to diminish).

Explanation of reasons for which men rebel in groups when their individual well-being is threatened is more complicated than explanation of individual defensive reactions to stress. Although general social psychological theories of revolutionary behavior are available,24 analysis of influences that lead to the collapse of democratic (as well as undemocratic) regimes usually requires a case-study approach. Similarly, theoretical explanations of revolutionary processes25 have to rely heavily on idiosyncratic historical examples.

At the risk of undue simplification and with the aid of a long and dangerous methodological jump from the realm of the individual to the social behavior, we can offer a preliminary typology of threats to democratic values embodied in the existential prospects of various interest groups of contemporary East Central Europe.

First, there are the persons who have cherished or who have profited from living off the totalitarian Marxist practices and whose former privileges of "nomenclature" are being taken away. They will discretely or openly challenge the new order at any given opportunity and actively sabotage it. They are the strongest potential agents of polarization of the political spectrum.

At the other end of this spectrum, there are the exponents of the authoritarian or totalitarian right who will attempt to sway the public orientation toward nationalist or populist ideals of social homogeneity and unity. While not strong yet, they may attract sizeable following in times of crisis.

Then there are the elite representatives of political interests lying away from the center who have been included in the new heterogenous ruling coalitions but whose visions for political rearrangement cannot and/or will not be accepted as practical. When sidelined, they may deny support to the nascent democracies.

Further, there are the pro-democratic elites who may, in the context of competing political interests, lose orientation and add to the growing instability and volatility of the civic life.

Quite importantly, there are persons of essentially middle-class orientation from whom it is most expected to uphold the new order and create its strongest base. However, these people have been until recently kept in dependency on their paternalist benefactor, the Communist state, and despite their preferences to the contrary, could not have developed strong habits of personal initiative, individual responsibility and tolerance for competition. They will have to bear the brunt of the transformation of societal values and their expectations for general improvement in conditions of life may be most severely tested. Should these expectations be frustrated, they might throw their weight behind defenders of particularist, and later even authoritarian interests. The youngest among them, who will become particularly vulnerable to expected unemployment or underemployment, may refuse democratic values most radically. Perhaps even more importantly, there are the regular wage earners in factories, offices and agricultural establishments, many of whom had been accorded relatively nonchalant treatment by the previous regimes, including subsidized wages in protected occupations, unsupervised work schedules, opportunities for illegal appropriation of goods and services related to their occupations and, above all, full income security. To a greater extent than the others previously mentioned, they will see their living

standards fall because of expected decline of real wages, unemployment, and/or inability to supplement their income by officially tolerated misconduct. Under extremely stressful conditions, these people may challenge democratic regimes directly by violent means, particularly the youngest and the least educated among them.

If the proportion of people who will find themselves on the margins of the society (and this may include cultural minorities within them) expands well beyond current projections and if the economic situation for the East Central European societies as a whole fails to improve within a reasonable time after the initial decline, the individual deprivations may indeed trigger a groundswell of strong sentiment against the current governments in the region. Eventually, this may or may not translate into the defeat of these new democracies, not to speak about abandonment of democratic values by the people who have, after all, yearned so long for their realization. However, if the *Schlammassel* so feared by Garton Ash should prevail in that part of the world, it might prove difficult to practice and cultivate them there.

Notes

1. Timothy Garton Ash, "Reform of Revolution?", *The New York Review of Books*, September 29, 1988.
2. Timothy Garton Ash, "Eastern Europe: The Year of Truth", *The New York Review of Books*, February 15, 1900.
3. Ash, *ibid.*; and Adam Michnik, "The Two Faces of Eastern Europe," *The New Republic*, November 12, 1990.
4. See, for instance, Chapters Nine and Ten in Josef Korbel, *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977; Chapter VI in Stanley M. Max, *The United States, Great Britain, and the Sovietization of Hungary, 1945-1948* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985); and Chapter 2 in Michael Charlton (ed.), *The Eagle and the Small Birds* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
5. According to as yet officially unconfirmed news from informed Czech sources, some representatives of the Slovak National Party, thought to have been heavily infiltrated by Communist agents, are being suspected from preparations of a coup d'etat in Slovakia at the end of October, 1990).
6. For a complex argument concerning social stratification and its relation to a group political orientation in Germany see namely Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York: Anchor Books, 1969). In regard to history and effects of unemployment in pre-war Germany, see, for instance, Richard J. Evans and Dick Geary (eds.), *The German Unemployed* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987). Dangers of populist policies are analyzed in Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism*: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
7. Paolo Farneti, "Social Conflict, Parliamentary Fragmentation, Institutional Shift, and the Rise of Fascism: Italy," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978).
8. Juan J. Linz, "From Great hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *ibid*.
9. Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 51-88.
10. Arturo Valenzuela, "CHILE", in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *ibid*.

11. Aldo C. Vacs, "Authoritarian Breakdown and Redemocratization in Argentina," in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson (eds.), *Authoritarians and Democrats*: Regime Transition in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

12. Compare, for instance, analytical approaches in Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*: *Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1978); and Guillermo O'Donnel, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead (eds.),*Transition from Authoritarian Rule*: Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1986).

13. Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).

14. Abraham H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, Second Edition (New york: Van Nostrand, 1968).

15. Bruno Bettleheim, "Individual and mass behavior in extreme situations". *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 38, 4, October 1943.

16. Elie A. Cohen, *Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp* (New York: The Universal Library, 1953).

17. Bohan Zawadski and Paul Lazarsfeld, "The psychological consequences of unemployment," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 6, January, 1935, 224-250; and M. Jahoda, P. Lazarsfeld, and H. Zeisel, *Marienthal: The sociography of an unemployment community* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).

18. M. H. Brenner, *Estimating the social costs of economic policy: Implications for mental and physical health, and criminal aggression*. Report to the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and Joint Economic Committee of Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976); William Strange, *Job loss: A psychosocial study of worker reactions to a plant closing* (Washington, DC: Employment and Training Administration, August, 1977); and Terry F. Buss and F. Stevens Redburn with Joseph Waldron, *Mass Unemployment: Plant Closings and Community Mental Health* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983).

19. John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, O.H. Mowrer and Robert R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).

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22. John P. Kirscht and Ronald C. Dillehay, *Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

23. The concept is developed extensively by Ted Robert Gurr in his book, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

24. See, for instance, Gustav LeBon, *The Psychology of Revolution* (London: Unwin, 1913); Pitrim A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of revolution* (Philadephia: Lippincott, 1925); and Hannah Arendt, *On revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963).

25. David D. Schwartz, *A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior*, New York: Free Press, 1970; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", *American Sociological Review*, 27, 1: 5-19; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 53: 69-105.

Chapter XII
The Anatomy of Science and Democracy in Modern China

Ji Shu-Li

Science can be looked upon as the incarnation of man's highest values. As a culture, a pattern of activities and a form of life, indeed, science has made incarnate some time-honored ideals, such as creativity, open-mindedness, aggressiveness, authenticity, verifiability, falsifiability, equality, applicability, and, all in all, rationality. As a human enterprise it seems obviously pro-democracy and pro-freedom; already it has been an engine of material and spiritual progress for human society.

At the same time, as a kind of human activity, it cannot evade some of the failings of human nature which are counterparts of these values. Creativity may display *hubris* and subjectivism. Authenticity can lead to infallibility, which would exclude all the merits of open-mindedness and falsifiability. Verifiability may generate hegemony and dogmatism. Finally, rationality could become the utterly non-rational shackles of dogmatism; indeed, in certain cultural *milieux*, it could be employed for political domination and absolute despotism.

This has been the ordeal of modern China. It shows that Kant's time-honored antinomy between free will and necessary law could not be solved so rashly. In the West, its temporary solution left a number of problems which promise to continue to embarrass mankind.

The Chinese "Five-Four" Dream

The protean May fourth Movement, commonly expressed in the Chinese-style numerical name, "Five-Four", has long been regarded as the title of an important epoch in modern Chinese history. It denotes not only in its narrow sense the event that occurred on May 4, 1919, [1] but also the whole colorful and distressful epoch in which the educated elite of China sought a new way for national salvation under the impulse of intensified domestic troubles and foreign invasions. This was a pluralistic cultural search for an adequate cultural structure, and one carried on more intensely than ever before. Measured against this 'homophony' of the age, the parallel and discordant phenomena of warlords, National Revolution, the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, and the setting-up of the National Government all seemed during the 1915-1928 period to be subordinate.

The May 4th movement in its broad sense as a cultural movement began with Chen Duxiu's establishment of *New Youth* Magazine and the publication in its first issue of his epoch-making article "My Solemn Plea to Youth,"[2]. He began by "weeping to state that the Chinese society had been corrupt and degenerate, and [was] facing elimination through competition." Hence he called youth to be "conscious to struggle for national salvation." Thereupon, he issued his famous invitation to Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy to participate in the great cause, the national salvation of China. For this precise purpose, he proclaimed at the same time a radically iconoclastic attitude to the Sinic heritage.

Proceeding from emotional nationalism and patriotism, he eagerly pleaded with youth to resort to the Western concepts of "human rights" and "scientific reason" as "the two wheels of the vehicle" of human culture. In an earnest tone Chen advised the youth of China to choose "free and

autonomous personalities, and never to be self-enslaved or to enslave others." He suggested that the Chinese adopt human rights or freedom as an ideal of value rather than as a merely political institution or program of manipulation.

Meanwhile, he again summoned all young people always to "comply with reason and resort to scientific laws," and never "to fabricate in the air presenting unverified hypotheses as factual truth." By means of science Chen Duxiu also provided a criterion for human thinking and behavior rather than restricting it to a technological system or a cognitive system of mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology. A deadly despair had been generated in China by almost one hundred years of continuous military and political failures and the frustrations of socio-cultural reformations. He was seeking a new paramount value to fill this value vacuum.

Indeed, science and democracy had not been strangers to China. As early as in the latter half of the 19th century, the earlier Sino-reformists had been aware of the value of science *per se*. Feng Guifen wrote in 1860: "We want strong weapons and effective armor, but, what is more, we want astronomy, the calendar, mathematics, acoustics, optics, chemistry and electricity." Later, when Zhang Zhidong proposed the slogan of "Chinese learning as the substance, Western learning for application," Western science as well as technology were already esteemed.

On the other hand, down to the new decade of Constitutional Reform (1890s), the new generation of modern Sino-reformers headed by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao aimed chiefly at establishing Western parliamentarianism in China. Western democratic institutions had been an aspiration of Sino-intellectuals.

Nevertheless, this was the first time that the two "gentlemen" had been invited together as the chief representatives of a brand-new culture. That is, they were to be introduced together as a new value system to supersede the supposedly outdated one, rather than being separately introduced as valid instrumentation in respectively the economic and political fields. More exactly, the May-4th *avant-gardes* attempted to introduce the values of freedom and reason which were widely believed to have been absolutely non-existent in the Sinic legacy.

When Chinese transformers became anxious to find a way out of China's predicament, there seemed to be no other alternative but that experienced by 18th-19th century Western-Europeans. They found no other way but to reenact the Western Enlightenment in China. Chen Duxiu asserted:

Modern European history, as is generally recognized, is "a history of emancipation": it claims political emancipation by destroying royal right, religious emancipation by denying missionary right, economic emancipation by the rise of the theory of property equalization and the emancipation from male supremacy due to the rise of feminism. [3]

From this point onward the mental climate characteristic of Five-Four developed an iconoclastic crusade against Sinic legacy more enormous and powerful than had ever before been experienced. It might be called a Sinic Enlightenment mentality even more radical than its prototype in 18th-19th century Western-Europe. Its spearhead was directed at the whole of Sinic tradition comprising nearly all of its elements. According to those enumerated by Chen himself, these were Confucian religion, national quintessence, ceremonialism, old ethics, old superstitions, old literature and art, and even the Chinese character. The range of these elements was even wider than the hodgepodge of the culture or civilization defined by Edward Burnett Tylor, the father of anthropology, as: "that complex whole which include knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." [4] It implied an even more radical transplantation or reconstruction of the value system.

This system, indeed, found something of an ideal in the Western European Enlightenment. The same general traits were also exhibited in both the Old (the 18th century) and the New (the 19th century) Enlightenment. Franklin Baumer notes that

the same aversion from the supernatural and from metaphysics; the same emphasis on science and "free thought"; the same preoccupation with social problems and social activism; the same optimism about human nature and history. The New Enlightenment, like the old, was at its core realistic rather than romantic, despite borrowings from the Romantic Movement. [5]

The general intent of the spirit in the Old Enlightenment was to turn from the Middle Ages to "modern times," marking, as Ernst Troeltsch was later to say, the passage from a supernaturalistic-mythical-authoritative to a naturalistic-scientific-individualistic type of thinking. It seems clear that the process of the all but total secularization of culture, well under way in the 17th century, was greatly accelerating; science was prevailing ever more over theology and metaphysics and mounting the summit of culture. The motif here is scientific reason and individualistic liberty, with the latter frequently being regarded as an extension of the former. Thus, one of the signs of modernity, if not the most important, is the use of science; the Enlightenment mentality in Western Europe, if such indeed existed, has to some extent certainly comprised a cult of science from the very beginning.

In the 19th century, the advent of Darwinian evolution endowed the Enlightenment with some new characteristics. The evolutionary world furnished by the discipline of reliable sciences seemed to have verified the existent "cosmic process," in which all of the social and human evolutions, as well as natural processes, must observe iron-bound scientific laws. Thus, scientism in its mature form integrated with evolutionism was found clearly not only in social Darwinism but also in Marxist historical materialism. Both promised an ever-advancing process of natural and social worlds leading to the acme of perfection. That is exactly what Enlightenment implies, as John Dewey reflected long after his return from May 4th China: it "marked the optimist faith of the Enlightenment; the faith that human science and democracy would advance hand in hand to usher in an era of indefinite human perfectibility." [6]

This is the very origin of the beautiful dream of the Sino- intellectuals. Defining "the meaning of the new thought," Hu Shi set its essential meaning as a critical attitude to the "transvaluation of all values", and its final aim as the "reconstruction of civilization." He advocated for the first time in a very strong phrase "wholesale Westernization" and in a somewhat weaker one "wholehearted modernization" as the prospect for Chinese civilization. [7] Despite the disparity between these two phrases and the complexity, incongruity and changeability of Hu Shi's thought, they reflected one of his convictions that, at least in certain respects and during certain periods, China's modernization was equivalent to her Westernization.

He was convinced, even in his later years, that the trend of the development of world culture for the past three hundred years had been mainly in scientific and industrial development and in democratization and liberalization. He emphasized this as "the main avenue to the evolution of world culture," and thus "also the avenue China should adopt." [8]. Making clear the sharp contrast between modern Western and traditional Chinese cultures, he concluded therefrom that "in hundreds of aspects of culture China could not be compared with the other." He enumerated the unmatched "treasures" of our culture:

essays with strictly matching words, poems with tonal patterns and rhyme schemes, eight-part essays, bound feet, court eunuchs, concubines, big families with five generations living in one house, memorial archways for widows' chastity, hell-like jails, flogging with a stick at the royal court, and courts with corporal punishment, etc., which abound but are finally a system of cultural relics and institutions that make us hang our heads in shame.

In our tradition, he went further,

indeed, there float a few saints and heroes, and there are surely some people worthy of our admiration among them, but merely a few stars could not, in the final analysis, illuminate the darkness of the whole sky. Our glorious culture does not lie in the past but in the future when, after the sins of our ancestry have been totally wiped out, it will have been thoroughly remolded. [9]

For either Chen or Hu, what must be noted is that the reason why they chose Occidentalism is its scientific character. Chen was an admirer of Auguste Comte and repeatedly quoted Comte's theory of "three stages" of social development to show the triumph of the present-day scientific positivist epoch: "everywhere, philosophy, morality, education, literature are suffused with scientific positivist spirit." [10] Hu Shi emphasized that science is the first distinct feature of modern Western civilization. [11]

The origin of iconoclasm was twofold, both political and cultural. It was an excessive reaction to the political and cultural state of affairs at that time. Unfortunately all the political reactionaries, including some of the reformers since the mid-19th century, had drawn somewhat upon cultural conservatism. Zhang Zhidong, the principal designer of the late Qing's reform in its last days, described with extraordinary frankness the real aim of his principle of "Chinese learning as the substance": "the first is to *maintain the reigning Dynasty*." Thus was the general consensus of Yuan Shikai and all other warlords at that time who advocated "revering Confucius and reading Classics," and retaining the innate morality for the only purpose of maintaining their powers and reigns. Hence, for them "preserving the inherent culture" meant nothing but maintaining their vested interests; correspondingly, it could not but invite the most indignant repercussion mounting to an iconoclastic extreme. Political fervor often screened an alternative cultural attitude to the Sinic legacy, and neglected some of the truth concealed therein.

The opposition, or antiquarianism as the derogatory term, focused on the merits of Sinicism and the ills of Occidentalism: "Chinese learning is moral." Let us again quote from Zhang: "Western learning is practical. Chinese learning concern itself with moral conduct; western learning with the affairs of the world." Or more radically, Sinic culture, or even more generally Eastern culture, is spiritual, while the Western is material. In a word, it emphasized Sinic basic values or the "national quintessence," while depreciating the Western as only useful devices which had nothing to do with basic values. Thus, apparently, is a simplistic point of view based upon a superficial understanding of modern Western civilization, for Sinic culture is not only spiritual and the Western is not only material. To claim the contrary would be simply unfair and not only could provide no modern interpretation of Sinic heritage, but would foster its total repudiation. Those who conceived similar views were labeled the "faction of national quintessence," "faction of Eastern culture" and so forth, and were looked upon as backward elements or even as reactionaries.

In terms of cultural evolution, the controversy mirrored the internal tension of culture *per se*. As an evolutionary whole any culture desires at once both self-preservation and self-improvement, that is, it wants to preserve its own basic values while adapting itself to the new circumstances.

This tension usually expresses itself in terms of controversy over cultural vehicles; in modern China it became so intense that it lodged as an agonizing thorn in the hearts of Sino-intellectuals. From a strong nationalism and patriotism, they seek to save the deeply humiliated nation, and, at the same time, want to reform an exceedingly backward country, to change its sickly tradition. They are ever wavering between these two extremes.

The May-4th era concentrated all of these conflicts in a homophony of politics and culture. There were, indeed, two "Five-Four"s in this sense, one political and the other cultural. They are distinct from each other in their content but closely interconnected with each other in their ultimate patriotic aim. Having been by and large a response to the alien invasion and colonial control, the latter in the final analysis is indeed some vehicle to achieve this aim. The paramount values hidden in these activities could only be independence, autonomy, wealth, prosperity and power for the country.

Evidently, the action of Chen Duxiu's invitation itself is both the very beginning of the cultural Five-Four and an integrant of the second one. Instead of antagonizing the two Five-Fours in his later year's autobiography, Hu Shi wrote even more clearly of the interaction between them:

The most imminent question for our present is to save the country. . . . Whatever culture could snatch our dying country from the jaws of death, that could rescue our youthful vigor from our decrepitude, should be adopted to that extent, and appropriated for saving and constructing the country. Just as a great master who is building a house will be only concerned with what material will be useful to him, no matter where it comes from. [12]

But still it is Hu Shi who had regretted in his oral autobiography in his later years:

Five-Four is originally a cultural movement; only the political interruption turned it into a political movement. Such a point of view had been also that of some scholars in mainland China; in accordance with their parlance, national salvation "prevailed over" the original enlightenment.

The communist apologists maintained the political nature of Five-Four which was essentially an anti-imperialist and patriotic movement. This defense surely is not all groundless, for it is the actual historical road the communist party traveled from the May 4th and the successive victories to achieving country-wide power. This was a miserable but historical result. History unfortunately deviated in appearance from the original call for science and democracy, though it might also be regarded as the actualization and materialization of that call.

The Tension within the Bi-Valent System

There was, however, a fatal neglected antinomy inherent in the Five-Four attitude. The cultural importation is for the sole purpose of saving the nation from alien invasion, but the means suggested for this purpose precisely *further* cultural invasion. If a nation is indeed devoid of any merit in culture, then on what basis can she build her confidence and independence? Even if an alien culture could be "grafted" on, can the host culture which is supposedly rotten to the core supply a stock to accept the vital twig? The ideals may have been noble, but they were doomed to adopt a series of metamorphoses in this distinctive cultural *milieu* and to drift in the cultural evolution.

Liang Qichao, one of the heroes in the Constitutional Reform of the 1890s and an ardent admirer of Western civilization at that time, posed a series of essential questions in this direction. After the 1911 Revolution, he reflected upon his past and turned to indigenous values. In particular, upon returning in 1918 from Europe where he personally had witnessed the post-War Western cultural situation, he made an unprecedented and serious challenge to the Sinic iconoclasm in his pamphlet, *Reflections and Impressions of my European Journey*. Disillusioned by Europe's post-War pessimistic climate, he sensed the negative role modern Western culture had played, especially its cult of science following the Enlightenment:

Mankind, however, not only did not gain in happiness but experienced many disasters which were brought about. We are like travelers lost in the desert; we see a huge black shadow in the distance and strive to catch up with it, thinking that it might be relied on as a guide. But after we catch up a little, the shadow disappears and we are in utter despair. What is this shadow? He is none other than Mr. Science. The Europeans have had a grand dream of the omnipotence of science, but now they are talking about its bankruptcy.

He further explained that he did not intend to recognize "the bankruptcy of science *per se*, but the bankruptcy of the omnipotence of science." This might be the first stroke against the Western scientism and its Sinic copy.

More worthy of note, Liang might be also the first to have sensed the antagonism between the necessity of nature incarnated in science and the freedom of will as the value foundation of democracy. He regretted that "Religion and traditional philosophy have been defeated and are in utter confusion, but this Mr. Science has barged in and wants to build the great new law of the universe through experimentation." This gentleman, however, seemed to Liang so incompetent to be charged with this heavy responsibility that it makes "the whole society succumb to doubt, depression, and fear; it resembles a ship lost in a fog without a compass." Thereafter, the Sino-elite begin to wonder: "Without freedom of will whence comes the existence of good and evil?" [13] and essentially reject the possibility of science serving as a commitment to values.

When the May 4th pioneers imported the dual value system, they seemed at first to have found only the contrast between Sinic and Western value-orientations, but not the incongruity within the system itself. Neither Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi or any other initiator of their rank seemed to have perceived any instability in the idealized system. They did not even sense any contradiction in Chen Duxiu's juxtaposition of the two formulations: "To choose free and autonomous personality" and "To resort to scientific laws." The doubts in the course of late European Enlightenment seemed to escape them totally; they had felt completely at ease and justified in their beliefs until debate suddenly befell them.

The great Debate triggered further antinomy within the bi-value system *per se*. It proved inherently unstable, for the weights of the two values are not equivalent but favor the more helpful Mr. Science, a guest generally well received in China during the past half-century. This preference was well formulated in Hu Shi's significant statement at the apogee of that era:

During the last thirty years or so there is a word which has acquired an incomparable position of respect in China; no one, whether informed or ignorant, conservative or progressive, dares openly slight or jeer at it. This word is "Science." The worth of this almost nationwide worship is another question. But we can at least say that ever since the beginning of reformist tendencies in China,

there is not a single person who calls himself a modern man and yet dares openly to belittle Science. [14]

Such a "nationwide worship" of science or scientism in China, although it shared some basic traits with that of 18th-19th century European scientism, is not simply a copy of its European prototype. It is a Sinicized scientism—scientism with "Chineseness." Whether desirable or not, it was a Sinic choice in the May 4th environment.

At the first sight it includes at least two traits. The practice-oriented tendency has long been one of the value-orientations latent in Sinic legacy; it had been conspicuously embodied in Wang Yangming's theory of the unity of knowing and doing. At the urgent need of Chinese society as early as the beginning of the 19th century, the more practice-orienated school of New Text versions of Confucian Classics had been revived to the detriment of the school of Ancient Text versions, or the neo- Confucianism, which generally was regarded as more theory-oriented. Sinicism has all along a facet of secularism, attaching importance to this life and the present world and stressing mundane interests. So Sinic scientism spontaneously chose its practical aspect as "the materials for building a house" in Hu Shi's words. Not at all surprisingly, it naturally drew close to technocracy and industrialism.

The other trait has deeper roots. Sinicism implies a tradition of the worship of heaven. Certainly, "heaven" is an equivocal term open to a series of interpretations. The first is its metaphysical implication, somewhat synonymous with "Tao." This implies, or at least is usually secularized as, a natural heaven: "The Lord of Heaven" (*Lao Tian Yie*) is exactly the God in the Chinese populace. It is easy to identify this Sinic Heaven with Occidental Nature, the absolute objective natural world in classical sciences. When the May 4th apostles expelled the paramount Sinic value, Tao and its secularized form of Heaven, they automatically resorted to such Nature, consciously or unconsciously, to fill up the value vacuum.

Such an aspiration for Heaven gained a complete expression in the most significant debate during the whole period. Although many of its observations were not so relevant, the focus of the debate was: whether science could or could not determine all the human activities and thus fashion the outlook of human life, or Life-View. Obviously, this is the question of the status of science in the structure of culture: Whether science could or could not provide the highest value within culture or even without culture as a super-cultural entity to dominate all the forms of human life. It was indeed an assault upon the core of Sinic scientism.

The blasting fuse was a provocative lecture on "The Life-View" delivered on February 14, 1923, at Qing Hua University in Beijing by Zhang Junmai, one of Liang Qichao's disciples and admirers. There he sharply indicted the tendency to regard science as all-powerful and urged the students to turn back to concern for spiritual values. Following his reverend teacher, he also charged the Western worshipers of science of indulging in the pursuit of externality and, as a result, of losing their immanent freedom as well as their sense of responsibility. He hit upon the vital point.

Notwithstanding, he advanced his view along an old neo-Kantian route once rife at the end of the 19th century, that is, to carve out spheres of "spiritual science" and "material science" (really an awkward translation of "Geistwissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften"), an outdated demarcation under the hegemony of science, as ignoring the new development in philosophy of science since then. He thereby split the world into two spheres, the one dominated by freedom of will, the other by laws of nature, and correspondingly into two civilizations, spiritual and material. Placing the question within the latter sphere, Zhang was not in divergence with any Sino-

scientisists; what he had done was but to ask from the empire of science place for the freedom of the human will.

The application was contemptuously refused by Ding Wenjiang, a well-known representative of the Chinese scientific community at that time. He jeered at Zhang's fatal weakness, his simplistic and naive dichotomy. Ironically, he instead defended free thought in "material science," a world judged by Zhang as being immune from freedom. Ding Wenjiang and some of his fellow scientists in the community maintained, by means of the new trend in the Western scientific circle with which they were more familiar, that "exact science" was exempt from fixed and invariable laws and axioms in Zhang's terms. But with some exceptions Ding and his fellow-thinkers did not at all intend to affirm the independent or superior value of freedom. On the contrary, to them it seemed that science *per se* had involved free thought within it, and thereby could mightly dominate all human behaviors, primarily people's life-view, the guide of everyone's activities. Ding had written a typical scientist apology:

Science is not only not external, it is the best tool for education and cultivation of the personality; the reason for this is that through the constant search for truth and the incessant desire to do away with prejudice, the men of science not only gain the ability to look for truth but also acquire sincerity about truth. No matter what they are confronted with, they can study and analyze with dispassion, seeking the simple in the complicated and order in disorder. Their imagination increases the more as their imagination is trained by logic; their perceptive power becomes more alive as this perceptive power is guided by experience. True awareness of the pressure and happiness of life can be acquired only when the manifold relations of the universe, of the biological and psychological realm, are known. This kind of "vibrant" state of mind can be thoroughly enjoyed only by those who use a telescope to survey the vastness and the infinity of the heavens and by those who use the microscope to peer into the minutiae of the living world. How can this [state of mind] ever be dreamed of by those who sit meditatively talking about Zen, and by those who speculate metaphysically? [15]

This passage is no less than a manifesto of the Sino- scientisists, which both indicated the level of Chinese scientific community's understanding of science at the time and exposed their true understanding of freedom. Ding labeled his own view of science as "skeptical idealism," and extensively cited such important late 19th century philosophers of science as Ernest Mach, Karl Pearson and others to lend strength to his position. But he really did not understand the most significant achievement in philosophy of science--science as "hypothesis-deductive system" instead of the traditional purely inductive system. The former promised much more freedom than Ding had supposed. "Hypothesis" covered all prejudice, imagination and so on, which need not be derived from experience and logic. Science is not only nomothetic as the neo-Kantists allowed, but also ideographic as they rejected. Freedom here as nothing but the freedom to obey the requirement of inductivism was exactly one of the general characters of Sino-scientisists; another is to try to elicit a general pattern of human activities and the highest ideal of human life from but one of them, namely, from scientific activity.

There are indeed, Ding Wenjiang confessed, human emotions beyond the sphere of knowledge, and consequently the advent of religion and aesthetics; this also is an outcome of biological evolution emerging from human nature. But the most important outcome for Ding is the emergence of a kind of religious impulse shared by mankind and other animals, namely, the nature of sacrificing the individual in order to serve the whole species and all ages. He held that the goal

of scientific education is exactly to "transform religious impulse from unconscious to conscious, from dark to bright, from general to analytic." [16] His scientist belief was, at last, to substitute science for religion; he was not really against metaphysics, provided it would be replaced by science.

Thus far the debate had remained within the relationship between the science-view and the life-view. Hu Shi expanded it to an all-inclusive world view, and thus pressed on towards politics. Not contented with Ding's counter-attack and the participants' ignorance, he put forward the most fundamental question: What exactly is the scientific life-view? In his reply, from out of his consistently flaunted stance of "skeptical pragmatism" he developed a systematic extremely materialist world view. He propagandized his view at first by eulogizing Wu Zhihui, who had reduced the debate into two questions: 'What is Man?' and 'What is Life?'; and answered them as follows: Man is nothing more than a featherless biped, possessing a comparatively more elaborate nervous system than other animals; while human life is a great theatrical act in which the actors are those featherless bipeds with large brains.

Surprisingly, Hu completely left aside his long commitment to Huxley's skepticism and Dewey's pragmatism and turned to such a naive 18th-century materialism. This could not be explained simply as a temporary impulse in the tide of the debate. Rather, it is a Sinicized pragmatism, or pragmatism in the Sinic *milieu*. It is true that John Dewey, perhaps the most influential American thinker in China, had once been engrossed in the Chinese Five- Four, and even attempted to use the new "Authority of Science to replace the Authority of Tradition" to break the grip of classical orthodoxy. But his theory of creative evolution has nothing at all in common with such naive materialism, not to mention the reflection on the Enlightenment as quoted above.

Hu Shi summarized the fundamental spirit of science as seeking truth:

A man living in the world, undergoes the oppression of the environment, suffers the domination of habit, is restrained by superstition and prejudice. Only truth could free you, strengthen you, make you wise and sage; only truth could free you from all the restraints in your environment, enable you to pacify the heaven, to shrink the earth, enable you to fear neither heaven nor earth, and to be a dignified and impressive man. [16]

In the tide of the debate, he elaborated his view into an all-encompassing definition of the so-called "scientific life-view," containing as many as ten items:

1. On the basis of knowledge of astronomy and physics, one should appreciate the infinity of space.
2. On the basis of knowledge of geology and paleontology, one should know the infinity of time.
3. On the basis of all the sciences, one should be aware that the universe and all things in it move and change according to natural laws--in the Chinese sense of the term, "being so of themselves"--and do not depend on a so-called supernatural Ruler or Creator.
4. On the basis of knowledge of the biological sciences, one should realize the waste and ruthlessness of the struggle for existence in the biological realm; hence the indefensibility of the hypothesis that there is a benevolent Ruler.
5. On the basis of the science of biology, physiology, and psychology, one should be aware that man is but another form of animal and is differentiated from other animals only in degree [of development] and not in kind [of species].

6. On the basis of the biological sciences and the sciences of anthropology, genetics, and sociology, one should understand the historical evolution of living organisms and human society, and the causes for such an evolution.

7. On the basis of the sciences of biology and psychology, one should learn that all psychological phenomena have causes.

8. On the basis of biology and sociology, one should know that ethics and religion are always in evolution, and that the causes for this evolution can all be located by scientific methods.

9. On the basis of the new knowledge of physics and chemistry, one can find out that matter is not dead, but live; not static, but dynamic.

10. On the basis of knowledge of biology and sociology, one should realize that the individual--the Smaller Self--is susceptible to death, but humanity as a whole--the Large Self--is undying and immortal; that religion, the highest religion, is "to live for the sake of the whole species and posterity," and that those religions which seek heaven and the Pure Land after death are religions of the most selfish kind. [17]

By opening every item with "On the basis" Hu Shi seemed to underscore the faith in science. Such a significant conclusion is, however, really problematic. Even some scientists themselves had held the infinity of space and time, some adopting rather the hypothesis of a finite universe. Biological evolution and the immortality of humanity had been challenged by a part of the academic circle. If the law of causality had been challenged in physics, how could it be so definite in psychological phenomena? If even scientists *per se* had never erected a "scientific life-view" from these bases, how could common people do so?

Like Ding Wenjiang and Wu Zhihui, Hu Shi was at last also reduced to calling for a new religion, a "scientific religion" to replace the old ones. As a religious belief, it would no longer be just the experimental sciences: how could one exclude metaphysics from the life-view? From Hu Shi, the question shifted from that of *whether* or not religion or metaphysics is needed, to that of *which* religion or metaphysics is needed. Along the way, Hu Shi had paved a broad way leading straight to Sino-Marxism, really a new religion in the name of science.

It is true that neither Hu Shi nor Wu Zhihui nor Ding Wenjiang were communists; rather they were anti-communists. Hu had insisted upon an anti-communist liberalism all his life, which apparently was irreconcilable with naive materialism and absolute determinism. Hence, the only feasible explanation for the result seems to be, first of all, the propensity of Sinic culture *per se*. In his later years he had even spoken of religious ideas of the Chinese, who "believe only in heaven, either the heaven standing high above or God," and who "worship the great powers of nature, and believe there are gods behind the sun, the moon, the heaven, and the earth." Of course, what he said here is concerned only with the secularized Sinic popular culture, but still it is so powerful a cultural restraint that such celebrated scholars as Hu Shi could not be immune from it. Surely the result is due also to Hu's idiosyncrasy. Completely different from Chen Duxiu, and also not at all like Wu Zhihui and Ding Wenjiang, he was by and large a pure scholar all his life. As a patriotic youth in Five-Four, he had been involved in the iconoclastic vortex; while as an erudite but not so deep scholar, he could not utterly evade his profound nostalgia as many *philosophes* in the Western Enlightenment had done. Therefore, at the same time that he resolutely deserted the Sinic heritage to seek an alien substitute, he was, consciously or unconsciously, driven by his intense nostalgia to resort to some inheritable values. He discovered a new Nature in Western sciences, which was in fact the innate Heaven implicit in his Sinic heart.

Hu Shi's value choice is representative of Sino-intellectuals. Most who have been enchanted with the Marxist law of social development, have acquired a commitment to some novel values, but have retained and identified with their implicit Sinic dependence on heaven.

However, Hu's philosophical view-points could not yet sufficiently meet the more intense political requirement of his times. To articulate this requirement, Chen Duxiu re-appeared on the scene and opened his argument by asking the god 'Nature' to descend to the world of social life, that is, to be further secularized as god Society or god History in order to be more applicable to the present China.

Chen Duxiu jeered at Hu Shi who immersed himself exclusively in delineating the scientific life-view, but ignored the various mostly non-scientific life-views such as the life-view for power and money, that of 'living off' heaven, that of beseeching divinity and divination, etc. Science must not only describe the scientific live-view, but, most importantly, it must explain how such and such life-views are generated. This question exceeds the capacity of the natural sciences, and appeals instead to another superior science, the social sciences or more exactly, the economical monism of Marxist science. He professed that by using this talisman we could be able to discover the causes of these various life-views or the causal relation between one's class economic status and one's life-view, that is, what the economic class status one is in and the life-view to which one is doomed. An invisible hand manages all individual actions and social history, and thus determines all individual and human destiny. It is no other than god History who directly lends a hand in man's social life instead of having a hand in nature, and therefrom influences social life as god Nature does. This is exactly the alleged method of class analysis, self-styled as being based upon the iron-bound laws of class struggle and social development, and thus capable of explaining all social phenomena including the most complicated phenomena in the intellectual sphere. Down to the rule of Mao Zedong, it turned out to be the strongest pretext for creating varied class struggles.

Chen, out of genuine friendship, cordially advised Hu to take still one step further from the extreme to which he had arrived, that is, from Hu's naive materialism and absolute determinism to Chen's "Scientific Materialist Outlook of History." Hu politely declined the offer: "I cannot take the step further," and therefore refused to follow the way which Chen was adopting. Nevertheless, he and his companions had indeed prepared a stepping stone for the Chinese communists to go further.

Qu Qiubai, a young communist who had just returned from the Soviet Union, finally accomplished the "one step further," that is, to completely dismiss free will and democracy, and exclusively to venerate necessary laws and science. His argument concentrated directly upon the question: Whether there is or is not a law of causation within the social phenomena? If there is, then the social phenomena would be as same as the natural phenomena, and must strictly obey the homogeneous laws of causation within the course of history. In the face of historical laws, freedom could be nothing other than the knowledge and obedience of these laws. "The more one is based upon facts and obeys laws, the freer one would be." Qu wrote, "One's obedience is exactly the source of one's liberation."

Therefore, the more all the heroes, idealists and talents serve as historical instruments needed by the social changes, the freer and greater they will be. Hence, the greatest sophism in fashion for a whole period: freedom is simply obedience or necessity. Obey whom? In appearance, to historical law independent of human will. But this law must be expressed by someone who masters it, and so law must be incarnated in some real physical persons. He who masters the law will

become this incarnation or simply god History, while all the common people will necessarily become his subjects or instruments.

The Debate of Science vs. Metaphysics or Life-View might be entitled the most representative of the May 4th Enlightenment. It began with the call for Science and Democracy, and ended in the exclusive veneration of science and the complete depreciation of democracy; in other words, it began with the call for freedom and ended in willing obedience. The overwhelming triumph of the Sino-scientists in the Debate was, as John K. Fairbanks puts it, "unconsciously preparing the ground for the triumph in China of Marxism as a 'science of society'." [18]

Since then, Democracy and Freedom seemed to have turned out to be a question not worth treating. A lot of the May 4th *avant-gardes*, except Hu Shi, converted. Not long after inviting Mr. Democracy, Chen Duxiu spoke against "the superstition of the omnipotence of liberalism," and held that "hegemonism which is hated bitterly by most people can sometimes be taken advantage of for good, while liberalism which is eulogized ardently by most people can also be taken advantage of for evil." [19] Here liberty had already been deprived of basic value.

Ding Wenjiang converted even more undisguisedly. In the 1930's, he claimed openly that he "has no superstition of popular politics, especially the prevalent system of parliamentary government." Furthermore, he invented a so-called "new-style dictatorship," which is chiefly characterized by this: that its dictator is able to understand the meaning of science, to believe in science and technology, and to discern and manage specialists and engineers. He concluded:

I have said already, it is still impossible for the present China to produce such a kind of dictatorship. But all of us should endeavor to make it possible in the shortest term. To give up the opinion of democratic politics is really the first step of these endeavors.

He even regretted:

The Sinic dictatorship turns out to be not so radical. Therefore, we taste to the full the bitterness of autocratic monarchy, but could not gain any benefit of dictatorship. [20]

Here the problem is not which political institution is fitted for the 1930's China, the "enlightened despotism" which the 19th century Sino-elite had conceived or the centralized elitism and technocracy of which some modern Westerners had spoken. The problem is why such Five-Four champions without hesitation would abandon liberty or freedom as a basic value without hesitation; and what changes of value-orientation deep beneath the structure of culture fostered their conversion.

The Debate of Science vs. Metaphysics is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, debate in modern China. There were a series of debates in the May 4th era, but none more significant and penetrating. There had been the debate on Eastern and Western civilizations, or of the Old and the New Learnings. That was important but more superficial and simplistic, for Sinic culture could neither simply return to the past, nor simply shift to the Occidental. Another famous debate was on social development in Chinese history, which was a part of the propagandizing of the materialistic historical outlook. The Science-Metaphysics Debate, however, mirrored in a considerable depth the Sinic cultural choice: to retain humanist Sinic values or to desert them in order to take up alien natural values. This is really the big issue, concerned with where Sinic culture as well as the entire human civilization will go. It concerns the tension between scientism (or naturalism) and humanism which had been debated endlessly since the late 19th century till now.

No wonder Liang Qichao summarized the debate as concerning "the greatest problem in the universe."

Having faced the fatal Western challenge, Sinic culture was caught in an unprecedented dilemma: it must at once preserve itself and adapt to brand-new circumstances. This was manifested as the internal anxiety and agony of Sino-intellectuals and their external debates. The debate had terminated, but the solution of the problem was far from over. In essence it was not a problem that could be solved by a debate among some intellectuals. Sinic culture would have to pave its own way.

From Scientism to 'Scientarianism'

The Five-Four's internal conflict manifested in the Debate of Science vs. Metaphysics has been unfolding throughout the consequent history of modern China. The Debate was a watershed in the evolution of Sinic culture and opened two distinct value-orientations which have since bifurcated into two evident offshoots.

One descends from Liang-Zhang's ideas and has led to a flourishing school of neo-Confucianism, entitled "the development of the third period of Confucianism" in Taiwan and overseas. Liang, Zhang and a few others have been venerated as the first generation of this school. The liberal tradition stemming from Dewey and Hu Shi, especially in his later years, also resorted to liberal resources within the Sinic legacy. There was some convergence of these two trends under the Guomindang rule.

On the political level of the Guomindang rule, the iconoclastic attitude to tradition has been rejected and some of the traditional humanist values have been preserved. There remain some complicated problems for them about how to re-interpret these values in a modern vision, or how to reach a fusion of Sino-values and modern Western culture, in particular modern democracy. This seems doomed, in practice, to go a long way for China.

Sun Yat-sen made every effort to accomplish this. In the later years of his life, as the "Principle of Civil Rights" had been repeatedly frustrated, he began to prefer "national liberty" to individual liberty. "The individual," he once wrote, "should not be too liberal, even while the nation demands absolute liberty." He even wondered if Western democracy could ever be a solution to Chinese problems, and leaned toward Soviet Russia to learn the Soviet "technology of revolution." On this basis, he argued that the unreadiness of the Chinese people for democracy forced the Guomindang to rule on their behalf. Hence, the well-known statement of a "period of tutelage" representing the only feasible form of government. Fully democratic system was to be regarded as a long-range goal.

Chiang Kai-shek inherited both the success and the failure of Sun. It was a great loss that he did not make further efforts to settle China's democratization on the basis of Sinic values. He cast aside the flag of May 4th democracy, while undisguisedly invoking dictatorship, claiming "one theory, one party, one leader." Once he remarked: "I believe that unless everyone has absolute trust in one man, we cannot reconstruct the nation and we cannot complete the revolution." In his representative work, *China's Destiny*, published in 1943, he insisted on an absolute centralization of the nation:

China's destiny hereafter will depend upon whether or not internal politics can be unified, and whether or not the strength of the state can be centralized. . . . If our internal affairs are unified, if the strength of our state is centralized, and if, in addition, all the citizens can join in a united effort,

then China's destiny may be epitomized by the following words: "Be sincere and united, uphold the Government and obey the law," and if this is done, China's destiny will be independence and liberty. [23]

This might be the greatest mistake of Chiang's life. He had only passively inherited tradition without developing a modern interpretation of it. He had not created an inviting system of theory to combine the present desires of science and democracy with traditional Sinic values, thus handing over the popular flag to Mao Zedong. Chiang had not found an appropriate direction for the spontaneous drift of Sinic culture in the 1930's-40's when the value of freedom, latent in the cultural structure, was activated by extraordinary conditions which forced the Guomindang into deep self-questioning as a result of the military fiasco.

The other offshoot of history is a natural offspring of the scientisist faction in that Debate. When some Sino-elite, anxious to response to the Western challenge, tried to forsake basic Sinic values and commit themselves to an external wellspring of values they represented an alternative re-orientation of Sino-culture,namely, by way of this external value to activize its other dimensions: faith in heaven and its secularization and personalization. This was the very road from the May-4th scientism to the consequent scientarianism of the Chinese Communist Party.

The brilliance of Mao Zedong consisted, along May 4th scientist lines, in his creation of a new "science" in which he seemed to have solved the antagonism of science with democracy. By and large, this is a science for expounding and proving the inevitable law of Chinese social development, to which the Chinese revolution must tend. He believed that Marxism is a discipline of precise science and universal truth applicable everywhere in the world, although meanwhile it must be combined with practice, that is, applied creatively to every concrete situation.

When he gained a firm foothold at Yanan, he set about the great work to have Marxism systematically Sinicized. Primarily he took advantage of Marx-Engels's ossified pattern of social development to forge a new formula suited to alleged "Chineseness." That is, China is in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society in transition from feudal society to bourgeois society. But because the chances for the colonial and semi-colonial countries to build an independent country on the imperialist stage had gone by, it is absolutely impossible for them to carry out an "old" democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie and to build bourgeois democracy or, its synonym, bourgeois dictatorship. The only way out for China and countries in similar situations is to carry on a kind of "new" democratic revolution led by the proletariat.

This is an historical mission entrusted to the Chinese proletariat, the Chinese Communist Party and all the people with broad vision to carry it out. In "On the New Democracy" he said almost nothing on what the special democracy as an institution really implied and what individual rights it would guarantee. He merely defined it as the nature of the revolution he led, namely, as a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution led by a proletariat which would resulte in "the establishment of a new-democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all Chinese revolutionary classes headed by the Chinese proletariat." Here the term "democracy," whether old or new, is but a mark of the stages of historical development or an expression of scientific law; factually, it is not a political institution at all, not to mention the value it implies. All of these are determined by science.

It is true that Friedrich Engels' theory of scientific socialism was derived from some theories of natural sciences, chiefly the theory of productive forces derived farfetchedly from Isaac Newton's mechanics, and the theory of class struggle and social development from Darwin's theory of evolution and, more relevantly, from its variation of social Darwinism. On these basis,

Engels constructed a general pattern for the development of human society: Productive forces propel the change of productive relationships embodied as class struggles. Hence, human society is doomed to proceed from primitive commune to slave, feudal, and capitalist societies, and finally into socialist society as the junior stage of communist society. Engels bragged that his pattern was so "scientific" an objective social law as to be as accurate as physical or chemical laws.

Descending to Mao's peasant followers, such belief in science *de facto* has been deformed into something like a divine edict or mandate of heaven in the successive peasant revolts in China's history century after century. When the party announced that Mao and a few of his close comrades-in-arms had fully mastered the iron-like scientific law of social development, it seemed that they really had accepted Providence to save the miserable nation, just as Hong Xiuquan became a militant evangelist in response to the call of God the Father as His younger Son one hundred years ago.

In this perspective, men and their activities are but the expression of iron-like laws — estranged from all the mankind, but instruments of history. As masters of historical law the party leaders, of course, could also master all the common people. That is why Liu Xiaoqi, the head of the more pragmatic faction within party officialdom, also went so far as to call the people to serve consciously as "the tractable instruments of the party." This argumentation was seen for the first time in the works of such 18th century French materialists as La Metre and Holbach, and then in the clear statement by Hegel that "man is the tool of Absolute Spirit." Even Marx and Engels themselves could not be entirely responsible for this argumentation. Engels did not make such a clear and distinct remark, not to mention Karl Marx himself. It is rather a vicious development of historical materialism: a somewhat Sinicized or more generally Easternized offspring. It is rather Sinicist than Marxist. The peasant revolts dynasty after dynasty in China's history frequently saw similar enchantment by their leaders in the mass peasantry.

The first thing first, then, for the communist party, as it came into power even within a limited area, was to teach this lesson of science to the vast masses, especially to intellectuals. Since the 1930-40's in Yanan and through the 1950's in the whole of China, they had taught the scientific history of social development, the so-called "change of monkey into man" and "the five social types." Recently, when Deng reflected on the occurrence of the 1989 pro-democracy demonstration, he still regretted the "faults" of teaching this lesson too little.

Such an interpretation of science is, obviously, far beyond what habitually is called "scientism," a conviction of the omnipotence of natural sciences. Rather, it has been enlarged and politicized into a totalitarianism in the name of science, or, in my terminology, 'scientarianism'.

Nevertheless, Mao Zedong had indeed arrived at a certain coordination of the tension between science and democracy. He was not so stupid as to cast aside the flag of which the Sino-intellectuals had long dreamt. In accordance with the requirement of science, he called for a new democracy more superior and progressive than the old. To struggle with the Guomindang, Mao, in striking contrast with Chiang, appealed for democracy which he took as a noble ideal described in his address on "Coalition Government" (at the 7th Communist Party Congress at Yanan on April 24,1945):

to unite the entire nation, to abolish the dictatorship, to effect democratic reform, to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese forces, to defeat the Japanese aggressors completely, and to build up a new, independent, free, democratic, united, and prosperous China.

This seems to signify what is generally recognized as democracy, but *de facto* it was only the particular type of "new" or "people's" democracy derived from the particular "Sinicized science." Such a democracy belongs only to "people," not at all to enemies. Mao held that democracy could not be separated from dictatorship, because it is concrete, not abstract; that is to say, it is of a class nature and not universal to all people. Bourgeois democracy is only for the bourgeoisie; 'dictatorship' is for the proletariat. Similarly, people's democracy is special to a number of specifically defined "people"; by their enemies it is called 'dictatorship'. Therefore, the full expression should be "people's democratic dictatorship" as he proclaimed on the eve of the founding of the People's Republic of China. This is exactly a combination of the two opposites, or, in the party's terms, a dialectical combination of opposites. Mao Zedong's call for democracy, thus, could not be looked upon as a deception or tactical consideration. It had a consistent and plausible argumentation, which, in a sharp contrast with Chiang Kaishek's plain call for dictatorship, was more appealing and tempting to Sino-intellectuals hungry for democracy and lacking alternatives. This is one of the primary factors why since the 1930s the mainstream of Sino-intelligentsia had leaned more and more to the left.

Unfortunately, this democracy could, seemingly, only turn into the opposite in its execution, and into a sheer pretext for Mao's one-party dictatorship. The crux is that there is no legal ground for judging whether one is "people" or enemy; instead, this depends upon temporary policy or even the individual who is in charge of carrying out that policy. A typical "people" may turn into an enemy all of a sudden upon changes in the policy or the explanation of the policy by the person in charge. That is especially the case during the various political movements when a number of persons, as a general rule, would be turned from "people" into newly-discovered enemies. Most of the white-collars workers in mainland China might have experienced one or more times of being a "people's enemy" in this or that movement. Because the dividing line between people/enemy is so changeable and ambiguous, even the legal "people" usually live under a sword of Damocles, so that the "people's democracy" becomes all hot air.

Another even more important trait of this democracy consists in its character of being "people-masses." This implies that such democracy is collective, not individual; everyone must act in groups and mobs in which the isolated individuals would not stand out and the different voices would usually be submerged. This type of democracy is without guarantee for individual rights and really does not deserve to be called by that name in any Western perspective. This is not simply a creation of Mao Zedong, but an offspring from the course of the Chinese communist revolution, or more exactly, an offspring of the activation of some Sino-legacy during the course of the revolution.

Since the split with the Guomindang in 1927, the Party went underground in cities and launched guerrilla warfare in villages, thus fashioning the basic life-forms of secret societies and roving bandits. Mao had called the revolution he led as essentially a peasant revolt. This is so exact in both of these respects that it may be described as a contemporary peasant revolt under the cloak of Marxism. The former determined its esoteric propensity, from which derive the strict organization of a hierarchy and the high secrecy of the party. The latter determined the dominance of mob politics, from the movement of beating local tyrants in the Red-Army era (1927-1937) to the various political movements after 1949. These culminated in the "great democracy" in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a most telling example for Mao's concept of democracy. The unity of the rigorous or "iron" disciplines of organization from top to bottom, on the one hand, with the mass democracy of mob politics from bottom to top, on the other, is ensured by the party's organizational principle rooted in Mao's idea, which further assures the central unified control.

Last but not least, Mao's "democracy" is a link in the "mass line" put forward in 1943. It claims, "Start everything from the mass's interests," a slogan something like the utilitarian slogan in the 19th century, "For the greatest interests of the largest majority," and expresses a democratic spirit. But there really is nothing in common. The basic principle of the mass line is "come from the mass, go to the mass," and behind this metaphorical statement is the homogenous principle of organization "democratic centralism", namely, "centralism on the basis of democracy, and democracy under centralized guidance." This is double-edged, for asserting the need of consulting the masses and having mass participation of some sort in the government really more emphatically re-affirm the need for central control and leadership. Democracy here could only play a supporting role for centralism. In other words, it is but a means to the end of centralism or a preparation for centralism, which in turn is to "guide" all the people's actions. Democracy here loses its status of value. Chiang Kai-shek only claimed centralism, whereas Mao Zedong claimed it by way of democracy; that is the central difference between sheer dictatorship and "scientific" dictatorship.

Surprisingly, why such a kind of "science" and "democracy" could fascinate most Sino-intellectuals and be identified in combination by them since the May 4th era cannot be explained except by communist deception. On the ruins of Sinic traditional culture, Mao Zedong provided as a substitute a combination of transcendent existence in 17th-18th century's natural sciences and some of the traditional remnants concealed deeply in the mind of every Chinese.

Totalitarianism in the Name of Science

The creation of Four Basic Principles, namely, party leadership, socialist road, proletarian dictatorship, and Marxist guidance, by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980's is actually borrowed from Mao's more succinct Two Principles, party leadership and socialist road, stated in the 1950's. They have been, no matter how they be formulated, the foundation of communist rule for forty one years and have been publicly defined in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. The fatal challenge of the pro-democracy demonstration of 1989 is to question exactly where their legitimacy and rationality lie.

According to the official explanation, they lie nowhere but in the historical necessity revealed by science, primarily the science of Marxism, for the orthodox Chinese communists believe that science, either natural or social, is capable of bringing to light objective laws independently of man's will. They are accustomed to justify all of their actions, including that at the Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, through their interpretation of science.

Such a belief in science for the Chinese Communist Party has been consistent. As early as 1940 in one of his major writings on the national reconstruction, *On New Democracy*, Mao Zedong wrote:

[Communism] is the most complete, progressive, revolutionary and rational system in human history. . . . The introduction of *scientific* [my italics] communism into China has opened new vistas for the people and has changed the face of the Chinese revolution.

The seizure of country-wide power unprecedentedly intensifies the very belief in conformity with science, or even "the science of science"--the science of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. They not only prescribe it as the theoretical basis of their actions, but also compel all of the people, especially Sino-intellectuals, to remould their thoughts in accordance with such a science. The 'orthodoxists' probably believed indeed that all their achievements were the rewards

of science. Whenever they fell into a predicament, they would never fail to resort to this talisman. For example, in the years of the great famine of the earlier 1960's Mao was still confident: "What do we depend on to eat? We can depend on nothing but science."

The rule of 'scientarianism', although an intensified or rather politicized scientism, goes far beyond its original sense. The ideology-oriented group within the party headed by Mao in person has been tired even of science and technology *per se.* Mao himself seemed to have never really believed in prototypical scientism. He once epitomized various Marxist doctrines into a simple phrase: "to justify rebelling." Marxism for him is only a pretext to seize and keep power. For him science is but a necessary evil which might weaken his ideological domination. By his hand prototypical scientism has been "Sinicized" as a Sinic totalitarianism which is far from a mere cult of the natural sciences. Mao in person had a horrible charisma. At the time when he called for a radical break from the "Four Olds", namely, old ideas, old culture, old customs, old habits in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, he himself was publicly revered as a genius. Although he himself rejected this out of tactical considerations, among the vast peasantry he was more simply worshiped as "the real dragon, the Son of Heaven."

The highly centralized rule of the party needs something complementary from the Sinic popular political legacy. It requires among its tools not only the passively tractable (that is why Liu Xiaoqi suffered fatal criticism for it in the cultural revolution), but, what is more important, the actively fanatical for the holy mission. It needs to rekindle intermittently their mania, and hence the endless spasms since the founding of the new state. "Movement"--a particular type of mobilization original to Mao—is rather religious than scientific, and might still be traced back to the scientisist ideal of Ding Wenjiang, Wu Zhihui, and Hu Shi. It is typical of Mao's "mass line" and "new democracy," but devoid of the human rights of the Five-Four dream.

It was, in appearance, not entirely the case for another party faction headed by Liu Xiaoqi and Zhou Enlai during Mao's life, and by Deng Xiaoping after Mao's life. This faction might be termed 'productive force'-oriented, most of whose members had been cultivated, to varied degrees, by Western influence and believed in the strength of science. On the other hand, they have not such great charisma as Mao, and thus are not so confident in a single ideological domination with intermittent movements. They must appeal to science and technology as the first basis for their power. As early as Zhou Enlai's proposal of the "Four Modernizations" in his lifetime, they already had assigned their main talisman to science-technology. In this way they continued to some extent the classical scientism.

It is, however, still a scientism with "Chineseness." As the only surviver of the chief leaders of this faction, Deng has the fortune to be able overtly to give full play to their aspiration. In Deng's interpretation, science is nothing but 'productive forces', that is, nothing but science materialized and technicalized, while the spirituality of science has been largely neglected. In correspondence, intellectuals are but a part of the working class, that is, a part of living productive forces. Deng has been committed to some kind of Sino-pragmatism, quite different from American pragmatist philosophy, as indicated in his well-known saying: "No matter whether the cat be black or white, it is a good cat as long as it can catch a rat." In his light, science is revered only by its usage to build his "socialism with Chineseness," or rather to retain his own power. The first thing he did when he came back to power after Hua Guofeng's relegation, was to convene the First National Conference of Science, a grand gathering of unprecedented size. He announced there a series of his scienticist and 'productive-force'-oriented programs, and reaffirmed that science- technology is the key of Four Modernizations. Above all, he re- interpreted the core of Marxism as being "to

seek truth from the facts," instead of Mao's "to justify rebelling," thus differentiating himself from his predecessor.

Nevertheless, to the seemingly more enlightened faction the Chinese people , especially Sino-intellectuals, remain tools under ideology-oriented control. In dealing with the ruled, both are scientarians, committed to the same Sinicized and politicized scientism. Deng, like Liu and Zhou, has long been proficient at running movements while carrying on his scienticist reform; he also uninterruptedly mobilizes anti-liberalization movements. That is exactly the essence of the present party's general policy: "one center and two basic points," a policy once again double-ended and ambiguous enough to apply in either of two ways. He can at once talk glibly about reform, and issue the edict for a massacre without the least hesitation, as he did when the 'tools' dared to play some role at Tiananmen Square. Others of this faction, it seems, would likely do the same thing given the same situation. Surely Liu Xiaoqi would have, as would have Zhou Enlai, who played the first violin to Mao. Even Zhao Ziyang would have, I suspect, if he had not been deposed early before the Massacre.

Scientarian rule has been plunged into an all-encompassing crisis after the thirty-year's ordeal. The ten-year long Cultural Revolution had exposed most of the sinister details of the party. The Party's lofty image was waning through the disclosure of the degenerate life of the party bureaucrats and their mutual intrigues for power. The Lin Biao Incident began to smash the personality cult of Mao. Suspicion began to be generated, though for a time mainly restricted to the bureaucratic institutions, rather than being extended to the whole 'scientarian' rule.

It has been a major contribution of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to arouse, in a preliminary fashion at least, the Chinese from their enchantment. Even some of the Communist leaders themselves, including some cadres, obtained a new perception, "greatly limpid and greatly realized" as one of them once confessed, when they got out of the "cowshed." Deng and a few of his fellow cadres had once acknowledged: "What on earth is the thing called socialism? Frankly speaking, we have not yet made it clear." The bankruptcy of scientarianism already had been generally received as a matter of fact at the turn of the 1970's-1980's. As a prevalent formulation goes, the Chinese generally admitted that China is once more in "jeopardy of being expelled from membership on earth." It is really equivalent to the statement prevalent half a century ago: "the frightful calamity of national subjugation and genocide." It implies that the search for prosperity and strength has failed after forty years of effort.

The Tiananmen Square massacre further manifested some facets of scientarian rule. Some Communist bureaucrats have been regretting their tactical faults, but primarily it is a moral catastrophe, an exposition of the present value-vacuum in China. The gravity of the situation is that the society has long been riddled with absolutely incorrigible gaping wounds. There no longer are criteria to norm human behavior; by taking advantage of power everything could be done unscrupulously and in particular for personal benefit. It is so serious that it can be said, "all society is corrupted."

The so-called "culture fervor" of the past ten years has really been an essential challenge to the forty year's rule, for Sino-intellectuals soon found one of the main roots of the problem in the perduring Sinic totalitarianism. The exploration, which began with the aspiration for culture in the mid-80's, was a first attempt to look for substitutes for the scientarian ideals to which the party has long been committed. Many papers on "cultural reflection" focused on the dark side of Sinic heritage which Lu Xun had disclosed critically as early as a half century ago. These, of course, have been carefully selected to match the present party's monopoly rule. Most writers, especially young ones, shared the conviction in the universal Enlightenment road for all nations and all

cultures, and hence the same desire to hearken back to the May 4th origin, and continue the interrupted search for Science and Democracy. Some bitterly considered communist China to be still a Sinic feudal society dominated by a great patriarch, for the so-called "Sinicized Marxism" is really feudalized Marxism. What we badly need at present is to "make up our missed lesson" in order to accomplish the unfinished behest left by the Five-Four pioneers.

This aspiration reached a symbolic zenith with the nationwide broadcast of a controversial television essay, "River Elegy." It shocked the vast Chinese audience with its unreserved criticism of the Sinic tradition in the same sense as had the May 4th iconoclasm; and it, in turn, placed its hopes once again upon Western "industrialized civilization." "Today, at the end of the twentieth century," it went, "although foreign attacks are no longer accompanied by cannons and cruel oppression, our ancient civilization can withstand them no longer. Our civilization is already moribund. It needs new cultural forces to reinvigorate it." It concluded with the sentiment:

Ancestors of the dragon, what the Yellow River could give us, it long ago gave to our forefathers. The Yellow River cannot again bring forth the civilization that our forefathers created. What we must create is an entirely new civilization. It will not stream from the Yellow River. The sediment of the old civilization is like the sand and silt that accumulated on the bottom of the Yellow River; it clogs our arteries. It needs a great flood to wash it away. The great flood is already upon us. It is none other than industrialized civilization. It is calling us.

Iconoclastic totalism, on the one hand, and appeal for Western industrialism, on the other, exactly manifest the mentality of the reformers of the new Chinese generation, among whom are the party's reformers. History seems to be running a big circle and ending in a return to the May 4th origin.

Delving into the problem beneath political superficiality might prove to be much more complicated than it appears. Some significant changes have occurred in the values of modern China; a profound cultural drift is occurring in its structure. From this perspective, the root of the cultural disaster seems to lie in an unfortunate combination of extremes. Radical iconoclasm of decade after decade has not, and could never, result in an abolition of the whole Sinic legacy, but only conceal its most fundamental and superior values and expose the dimensions of that which was most secularized in its structure. An elegiac couplet of condolence for Hu Yaobang at the start of 1989's democratic demonstration could vividly express our cultural *status quo*: "Those who should have died have not died; those who should have not died have died." This is exactly the case of the non-superior selection of Sinic tradition.

The other extreme is the Enlightenment mentality following Five-Four, which might be expressed by another symmetrical couplet: "Those things which should have been imported have not been; those things which should not have been imported have been." [21]

The problem might be explored further, for the way in which the antinomy of science and democracy has unfolded in modern China seems to be related to a more fundamental combination. An the one pole, the bifurcation of nature in western legacy through Marxism turns into a dichotomy of society, the 'universal' and 'permanent class- struggles' generating estranged deterministic laws in the name of science as its value source. At the other pole, the unity of heaven and man in the Sinic inheritance, through the Sinicization of the Occidental bifurcation, is transformed into a great unification of political rule, an absolute totalitarianism accompanied by an antagonistic contradiction between the rulers and the ruled (which by and large is created by the communist party). Hence, the cultural metamorphosis in modern China.

Towards a Sinic Enlightenment

Friedrich August von Hayek wrote in his *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*:

Never will man penetrate deeper into error than when he is continuing on a road which has led him to great success. And never can pride in the achievements of the natural sciences and confidence in the omnipotence of their methods have been more justified than at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . . . .[22]

That is the reason why the Chinese Five-Four dream has experienced disillusionment over and over again. In view of such lessons, some Sino-intellectuals discovered gradually that the invited stepfathers were in the end not equal to their own father. As a result, they, either like Lu Xun, fell again into an agony of loss after refuting all legacies or, like Hu Shi, returned quietly to tradition after the fervor of the May 4th tide.

Only a few years after the May 4th era, Hu Shi appealed to the very sources he had so resolutely opposed, Confucianism and Taoism. In "A Talk about Confucianists" delivered in 1934 he earnestly urged that Confucius and, on the basis of his own textual criticism, Confucius' forerunner Lao Zi were "the earliest to open the atmosphere of free thought," and that "the political ideas of Mencius might be termed the earliest initiation of liberalism throughout the world." In his later years he was inclined to define a Sinic classical age (600-220 B.C.) as the time of formation of the basic characteristics of Sinic culture through a synthesis of Confucian humanism and Taoist naturalism. This awakened the Chinese nation from its non-rational, superstitious and world-renouncing lethargic sleep at that period, and since then has done so each time the Chinese nation has been plunged into such a sleep.

If we turn to another offshoot of Chinese history, we may find some evidence of Hu's point of view. It shows, at least, that it is not entirely impossible for the main Sino-traditions to identify with modern Western culture, including the values of science and democracy, and to be re-interpreted in a modern horizon. Sinic values seem to be playing some new roles in the present unstable world. Perhaps, the tradition of the unity of heaven and man might offer some fresh solution for Kant's old antinomy, healing the bifurcation of the world. The ten years "culture fervor" in mainland China, despite the re-appearance of May 4th iconoclasm, set off an upsurge in the study, by Chinese, of their own tradition. It is in fact a reflection of Sinic culture *per se*. Even the Communist Party itself is covertly invoking the traditional value resources when it discovers that it has nothing at hand to make use of.

All of these might show that there is emerging a tendency towards a Sinic Enlightenment which will in some way restore Sinic classical humanism instead of following the Western path. This would be rather a cultural selection than mere willfulness on the part of some people.

Notes

1. By 1919 China's body politic was suffused with frustrated patriotism. Japan's seizure of the German position in Shandong in 1914 and her 21 Demands of 1915 were fresh in the memory. National concern had been mounting that the Versailles peace conference might let Japan stay in Shandong. Hundreds of groups from all over urban China and among Overseas Chinese abroad had been telegraphing their protests to Paris. It was humiliating to find Japan's claim based, not only on secret wartime agreements with Britain, France, and Italy in 1917, but also on a similar

secret deal by Japan with the corrupt Anfu Government in Beijing in 1918. News of the adverse decision triggered, on May 4, 1919, a demonstration by three thousand Beijing students from thirteen institutions in front of Tiananmen. They manifestoed: "China's territory may be conquered, but it cannot be given away! The Chinese people may be massacred, but they will not surrender. Our country is about to be annihilated! Rise up, brethren!" In the ensuing demonstration, one pro-Japanese official was beaten and the house of another burned. This spark of violence touched off a nationwide conflagration of many elements: merchant closures and boycotts, labor-union strikes, and a student movement that became steadily more organized, patriotic, vociferous, and active. The Beijing warlords' jailing of 1,150 student agitators, using part of the university as the jail, raised the tension. When widespread public pressure forced their victorious release, nationalism was triumphant and China turned a corner.

2. Chen Duxiu, "A Solemn Plea to Youth", *New Youth* (1915), p. 6 of the first article.

3. Hu Shi, "Preface to Science and the Philosophy of Life," *Science and the Philosophy of Life* (Shanghai, 1923), p. 2-3.

4. Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art and Custom* (New York: Gordon Press, 1974), p. 1.

5. Franklin L. Baumer, *Modern European Thought--Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950* (New York: Macmillan, 1977), p. 304.

6. John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1939), p. 137.

7. Hu Shi, "The Cultural Conflict in China", in *Yearbook of Christianity, 1929*.

8. Hu Shi, "The Trend of the Development of World Culture for the Past Hundred Years and the Direction China Should Adopt," A Speech in Taiwan, Jan. 3, 1953.

9. Hu Shi, "Confidence and Reflections," *Independent Review*, (no. 103, May 28, 1934).

10. Chen Duxiu, "Modern Western Education--A Lecture in the Nan Kai School in Tian Jin", *New Youth* (v. 3 n. 5, July 1,1917). 11. Hu Shi, "Our Attitude to the Modern Western Civilization," (June 1, 1926).

12. Hu Shi, "The Meaning of the new Trend," 1920.

13. Liang Qichao, *Reflections and Impressions of my European Journey*.

14. Hu Shi, "Preface", *ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

15. Ding Wenjiang, "An Answer to Zhang Junmai."

16. Hu Shi, "Our Attitude to Modern Western Civilization," (June 1, 1926).

17. Hu Shi, "Preface", *ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

18. J. K. Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 185.

19. Chen Duxiu, "Reply to Tu Songhua" (May 1, 1917).

20. Ding Wenjiang, "Dictatorship and Democracy," 1933.

21. The elegiac couplet emerged in the early morning of April 16, 1989, to eulogize Hu Yaobang, the news of whose death was announced on the previous late night. The Communist official media interpreted it as a hostile assault by Beijing students. It was, in fact, an expression of the generally shared sadness and anger. On that sad morning when I entered the East China Normal University in Shanghai where I lived, what struck my eyes was precisely this couplet and, as a further explanation of it, the pieces of crushed bottles covering the earth. These were two aspects of the same thing: to show sympathy to Hu and hatred to Deng by smashing countless little bottles (*xiao ping-zi,* "little bottles," sounds like Deng's prename, and thus is a pun). It was a common act shared broadly among the youth without prior planning on their part.

22. F. A. von Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), p. 185.