Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change
Series VII, Seminar, Culture and Values, Volume 13

Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalization

Global Ethics and Religious Pluralism

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Gibbons Hall B-20
620 Michigan Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20064

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization / edited by John P. Hogan. A set of two volumes.

p.cm. – (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series VII, Seminar – culture and values ; v. 13)

Includes bibliographical references and index/

1. Culture–Philosophy . 2. Identity (Psychology). 3. Ethnopsychology. 4. Pluralism (Social sciences). 5. Religion and culture. 6. Culture and globalization. I. Hogan, John P. II. Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series VII, Seminars on cultures and values ; v. 13.

HM621.C853 2005 2004030939
306—dc22 CIP

ISBN 1-56518-217-0 (pbk.)

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Preface

John P. Hogan

Cultural identity, pluralism and globalization have become the defining issues at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Indeed, around the world, globalization is the new buzzword that seems to color every issue from income to identity, food to fuel, and management to migration. We have also learned to our dismay that terrorism and disease cross borders with impunity. Globalization, while loaded with positive possibilities, has also proven to be laden with negatives for local cultures and the poor. For too many it is a new and more nefarious form of colonialism. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine make the issues discussed here all the more practical and urgent. As George McLean points out, "Like distant thunder, the threat of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilization rolls closer and looms more menacingly." Balancing sameness and difference becomes a high-wire act with serious consequences for any false step.

If we insist too heavily on dramatic dissimilarity then we lose the capacity to understand others (and therefore the capacity to appreciate their difference). If we insist on their dramatic similarity, then we lose the capacity to appreciate and understand difference and therefore see ourselves everywhere we turn. In relating to others the choice is not difference *or* similarity; it is difference *and* similarity (Brian Fay, *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: A Multicultural Approach*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 90).

However, it is necessary to go more deeply than the level of contraries where differences and similarities are mutually and internally exclusive. This is the level of existence. Here, there is some promise in the concept of globalization, which reminds us and calls us to the ontological unity of humanity. That unity, however, will only be teased out in a unity in diversity that not only allows for but also actually promotes, cultural pluralism as the collective basis for existential freedom. Until recently, discussion around globalization has been the domain of economists and business people, with some help from social scientists. However, a deeper and broader approach is called for. Popular accounts and business studies are now a publication boom. But the deeper reflection is urgently needed.

Increasingly philosophers and religious thinkers have taken up this task. Philosophical and intercultural hermeneutics has allowed the pattern of human dignity and freedom, solidarity, and subsidiarity, to emerge from the complex mosaic of the globalization debate. The following essays advance that intercultural hermeneutic and offer promising insights from philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences. Above all, the authors represented here think together philosophically to articulate that ontological unity amidst great cultural diversity.

They also seek to understand the ways in which different religious faiths inspire reason and how that reason can articulate faith. That quest reveals human freedom as an open self-assertion that reaches out to others in the solidarity and subsidiarity on which civil society depends. This philosophical and theological reflection might best be summed up in Pope John Paul's creative call for a "globalization of solidarity."

Some words of thanks are in order. First, gratitude is expressed to the authors from around the world who presented their reflections. Indeed, a unity in diversity is manifested by this global participation. Also special thanks are expressed to Maura Donohue for her expert editorial assistance. Finally, a note of gratitude should be expressed to Professor George McLean, general editor of the series, for his assistance in bringing this volume to publication.

Introduction

Cultural Identity between the Global and the Local

John P. Hogan

A recent *Washington Post* report on the expansion of the European Union to include ten new countries neatly summarized the new millennium's crisis of cultural identity in the face of globalization and pluralism. The front page story began:

Eight former communist countries in Eastern Europe will make history Saturday when they formally join the European Union. But they will enter the group as second class members, scarred by internal political struggles, poverty, and divisions between citizens who embrace the West and those who fear they are already losing ground to it.1

The open highway to the new millennium and globalization has indeed proven to be full of potholes and road rage. Samuel Huntington's gloomy "Clash of Civilizations" seems to be bearing down on us in the form of terrorism, war, the widening gap between rich and poor, and the suffocation of many local cultures and languages. But need this be so?

The interface of cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization demands reflection beyond the limited scope of the economists, politician, and corporate executive. Just as the concept of "god" dominated the twelfth century, and civilization, the nineteenth, so globalization looms as the dominant problematic of the twenty-first century. But indeed both God and civilization are prominent in the problematic. Nonetheless, thusfar, globalization has been the domain of economists and business people virtually steam rolling local cultures and cultural pluralism into a uniform free market and Western cultural model. It has been a mechanistic, one way crusade. But the question must be posed: it is possible to find the soul of globalization and move beyond clash to a common humanity? Can globalization somehow be harnessed as a force to foster unity in diversity and diversity in unity?2 This is indeed a philosophical and theological question and is the burden of the essays which follow.

Globalization and Cultural Identities

Globalization is, to a great extent, a process driven by large corporations, which shrinks time and space, mainly through the use of communications technology, homogenizes cultures and cultural identities, reduces the importance of nation-state and instantaneously transfers financial resources and commodities around the world. This rather negative definition, however, is not meant to indicate that a greater common good cannot come from the process, if human concerns are brought to the fore.3

While the process of globalization reaches far back into the history of ideas, it appears that Martin Heidegger might be considered the modern philosopher who most clearly perceived the emerging discussion around the issue. He described the abolition of distance as a constitutive element of the contemporary condition. He also saw the positive potential as well as the danger of new travel, communication, and information technologies. "Distance sites of the most ancient cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst today's street traffic... the peak

of this abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by television, which will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication."4

Ultimately, however, Heidegger's descriptions of simultaneity and instantaneousness, while accurate, have proved less than helpful – everything became "equally far and equally near." The "abolition of distance" generated a "uniform distanceless" where distinct objects blurred into a "bland homogeneous experiential mass." This loss of distinction between near and far led to a flat leveling of human experience and an indifference that left human experience monotonous and on-dimensional.5

In spite of forays into the mix of globalization, cultural identity and pluralism by Heidegger and others, these phenomena have been analyzed and their meanings constituted, for the most part, from the perspective of enlightenment-modernization thought. Globalization is accepted as an objective given, an inevitable process that is good. It fits the enlightenment principles of reason, autonomy, nature, harmony, and progress. This would be the view of the modern world, the first world that has undergone the scientific and industrial revolutions – the beneficiaries of globalization, and, for the most part, the north and the west. The so-called third or fourth world does not take such a sanguine view. While often they see the potential good in the globalization process, and readily admit the positive economic and political gains or possibility of gain, most in the "developing world" hold out for much more recognition of local cultural identity and cultural pluralism and the existential freedom for which those terms stand. Many in this camp would content that the history of modern thought is peppered with incidences where Kant's "transcendental pretense," meant as a way beyond Enlightenment limits, actually leads to arrogance and even aggression. As Stanley J. Grenz indicates:

They contend that the history of the modern era is strewn with instances in which the transcendental pretense has led Westerners to claim that reason itself confirms that they possess the only legitimate set of morals, the only legitimate form of government, and the only true belief structure.6

As Grenz goes on to point out, Kant accorded very little significance to any role played by human communities, social customs, values or moral education. "[Kant's] philosophy sets forth the self coming to know – and to harness – the universal."7 This, for the most part, has been the western view of globalization – as opposed to cultural identities and pluralism. Get on the train or get left behind.

Cultural Identity, as the self-affirmation of values and belief, and the foundation for existential freedom get short shrift in this approach. Cultural and personal identity, in a very real sense, is mortgaged to a larger economic culture. Capitalism takes on the status of creed. Globalization becomes a "crusade." Political scientist Mary Ann Cusimano Love puts it bluntly, "Identity is therefore just as mobile as the economy; you are not born with it. You can buy it."8 Yet cultural identity is much more; it is the freedom of a people writ large. It is the tradition they hold dear and the cumulative freedom which they pass on to new generations.

Pluralism plays an important role within the concept of freedom. Although an offspring of modernization and globalization, pluralism is often overlooked or viewed as an obstacle. However, it plays an important epistemological and ethical role. It undermines the taken-for granted status of values and beliefs but does not necessarily do away with them. As Peter Berger points out, "Put differently, pluralism does not necessarily change what people believe, but how they believe."9

How might cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization get put into a broader horizon which allows space for subjectivity, the acting person, and particular cultures as the basis for existential freedom? This brings us to the question of hermeneutics – a hermeneutic open to postmodern developments and intercultural communication.

Global Hermeneutics: Beyond Clash

A number of hermeneutical models equal to the task described above have emerged. Some will be discussed and applied in the essays which follow. Those models run the gamut from the Greeks down to our own day, and indeed include figures such as Gadamer, Habermas, Ricoeur, Levinas, and Lonergan. However, an important precursor deserves special mention: Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). At the critical Medieval-Renaissance juncture and in the midst of the fall of Constantinople, Cusa analyzed what it meant to thin in terms of the whole with conflictive and different parts. His philosophy analyzed the unfolding of the global whole as well as the cohesion and complementarity in a global unity. HIs is indeed an apt framework for our own critical juncture and provides the outline of a hermeneutic for a global age.10

More recent attempts at intercultural hermeneutics come from disparate approaches. Philosophical hermeneutics when faced with diverse cultures has drawn upon a number of different areas. First, historical studies have had considerable impact, with the increasing importance of historical consciousness since the 19th century. Cultural differences have been examined from perspectives which provide insight for intercultural hermeneutical reflection. Second, philosophical and theological studies have provided tools for comparative analysis and opened the way to intercultural and interreligious dialogue. Third, social sciences have made their own specific contribution to intercultural hermeneutics. Cultural anthropology, in particular, has provided a lens for interpreting and understanding empirical data. Local cultures' impact on epistemology, ethics and metaphysical world views have engaged the anthropologist. These disciplines have all contributed to breaking down a one-sided objective quantitative, and empirical view of cultural identity. Fourth, and focal for our concerns in this volume, is Western philosophical hermenetucis.11

The hermeneutical model of Hans-Georg Gadamer as presented in his monumental work *Truth and Method*12 frames his approach in a series of metaphors – dialogue, translation, dialectic of question and answer, fusion of horizons, and play. Through a number of questions unfolded in minute detail, Gadamer addresses text or artifact across barriers of time, culture, language, belief, and values. His conversation with the text is most relevant for the conversations in the present volume which link and constitute meaning for cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization. His approach provides the ontological turn for hermeneutics and a corrective to Heidegger's abolition of distance. Heinz Kimmerle tells us:

For Gadamer, hermeneutics no longer means to provide rules for understanding, but to lay bare the ontological structure of the process of understanding of tradition. In conjunction with this, the improper ontological presuppositions of the hermeneutic theories normative until now are exposed. Hermeneutics again becomes universal, but in a sense reverse to Schleiermacher: it does not lead to the abolition of all immediate understanding because this understanding has always to be realized consciously and artifully, but rather it offers the conceptual manifestation of that which always happens in understanding, and which a more rigours scientific undertaking cannot transcend either. This ontological turn of hermeneutics leads to the abolition of hermeneutics as a

special art or methodology. The theory of understanding becomes a central philosophical problem.13

Gadamer's notion of fusion of horizons, his most graphic illustration of the hermeneutical experience seems particularly relevant for our discussion of the global and the local in the globalization process. For the most part, globalization has been anything and everything but a fusion of horizons. The global speaker has completely dominated the local culture listener. To date, the conversation has been one-sided.

The basic parts of the communication event help to point up the value of Gadamer's approach. The interlocutors (speaker and hearer), the context, and the actual message all deserve pride of place. In the current discussion, however, too often speaker and message dominate. Gadamer's fusion of horizon seeks to balance that. To fully grasp meaning, one needs investigate and understand not only the message spoken (globalization) but also the reception of that message by different cultural communities (cultural identity). Out of that conversation, a common good constructed by freedom and tolerance allows for a unity in diversity to emerge. Gadamer claims,

In truth the horizon of the present is apprehended in a constant learning process, in so far as we must subject all our prejudices to continuous testing. Not the least relevant opportunity for this testing is encountering the past and understanding the tradition out of which we come. (For) without the horizon of the past, the horizon of the present would have no form at all. There is as little such a thing as a present horizon per se as there is a historical horizon which one might have had to attain. Rather understanding is always a process of such putative horizons existing in isolation.14

When Gadamer's words above are translated from his context of historical text, artifact, or piece of art to this volume's concerns with cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization, fusion of horizons is a most apt metaphor for what needs to happen from a hermeneutical perspective. The stakes are high and are much more than academic. Development, economics, environmental issues, governance and civil society are all being shaped, in a sense, by this hermeneutical discussion. A World Faiths Development Dialogue report sums up the practical implications:

Just as forests are sustainable thanks to biodiversity, so humankind needs cultural identity for its survival...Relating to the other is a matter of opening up, while remaining true to oneself...Neither cultural apartheid in indifference or enmity, nor total merge into a universal monoculture are sustainable propositions.15

Role of Religion: Transnational Global Actors

A few of the essays in this collection deal with the role of religion in the process of globalization and in intercultural communications. A brief introductory comment is therefore in order. One of the key dimensions of culture is the symbolic dimension – values, symbols, archetypes, myths, spirituality, and most importantly, religion. Most worldviews and cultures have religion at their core. Religion is the embedded software of a culture's social life – its symbolic engine or matrix through which life finds meaning, sufferings and endured, and joys are celebrated. One of the sad ironies of our world is that globalization which draws us closer together at the same time seems to drive us apart. Likewise, religious communities which share so much in common –

shared commitments to peace, justice, and compassion – are perceived as sources of bitter and violent conflict. What role might religions play in the sorting out of cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization?

Important for our discussion is that, to a great extent, religions have been very critical of the one-sided market-based neoliberal globalization process. Although Western missionaries were harbingers of the very process, often contemporary missionaries find themselves as defenders of local cultures, cultural and personal identity, and pluralism. The articles below that deal with religion take a more measured position and for the most part – with many caveats – are more accepting of the globalization process.

One important illustration of this more nuanced stance might be that of Pope John Paul II. He has discussed the globalization and local culture issues at some length and has posited a creative reaction to the one-sided, economic approach which fosters both "super-development" and "underdevelopment." In the face of the new global economy, John Paul has called for a "globalization of solidarity."

The globalized economy must be analyzed in the light of the preferential option for the poor who must be allowed to take their place in such an economy, and the requirements of the international common good. The church in America is called not only to promote greater integration between nations, thus helping to create an authentic globalized culture of solidarity but also to cooperate with every legitimate means in reducing the negative effects of globalization, such as domination of the powerful over the weak, especially in the economic sphere and the loss of values of local cultures in favor of a misconstrued homogenization.16

This quote sums up John Paul's call for "globalization of solidarity." It is similar to the 1995 Jesuit General Congregation's understanding and defense of the poor and the marginalized as well as local cultures, globalization will merely be a new form of colonialism. This call is echoed, in different ways and in different language, by most of the world's religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.17 Harmony, complementarity, stewardship, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the option for the poor form the lenses through which cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization are focused. From the religious perspective, cultural and personal identity are bound up with the sacred kernel at the core of a culture. Thus, transcendence, spirituality, and that divine core need to be at the center of the global mix. Themes linking religious reflection and intercultural communication are taken up by a few of our authors.

Structure of the Book

The essays collected here challenge us to respond to new opportunities for the cultural emergence of peoples by which their identity can be physically assured and aesthetically enhanced – personally, socially, domestically, and globally. We are challenged to enable this sense of cultural identity to prosper relationally in a multicultural context so that diversity and pluralism become strengths rather than weaknesses; and an endorsement of cooperation rather than an incitement to conflict.

The volume is presented in three parts. Part One, "Beyond Clash: Global Pluralism," presents the broad parameters of the discussion and defines the terms of culture and cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization. In Chapter I, "Culture, Pluralism, and Globalization," George F. McLean presents a philosophical tour de force and constructs the context for the essays that follow.

He documents the new appreciation of subjectivity, personal freedom, and tradition, and how these create a civil society that if allowed to flourish will enhance the emerging global pluralism. McLean contends that the work of philosophy has shifted from deduction and abstraction to "deep engagement with life's challenges and human concerns." His structure of "diversity in unity" as a framework for globalization draws heavily on Nicolas of Cusa. Chapter II, "Cultural Identity, Pluralism, and Globalization in Contemporary Philosophical Discourse" by Nur Kirabaev, relates the unitive – the social, economic, and political sphere of globalization to the diverse – the particular, personal, and cultural. Kirabaev poses two broad questions: "Can pluralistic values be pursued within a shared social space?" and "Does the whole globalization process presuppose a merger into 'unified' cultural values?" A.T. Dalfovo in Chapter III, "Some Clarifications on Culture," probes the prevailing understanding of culture and compares that understanding with the original meaning given at the time of the semantic origin of the term. The outcome of this comparison for philosophy is that "the present concept of culture continues to pose the problem of a pre-existing culture conditioning subsequent philosophical thought or the problem of culture reflecting on itself." Culture emerges as a challenge to philosophy.

Chapter IV, "The Concept of Identities" by Anna Krasteva, introduces the problematic of identities. Moving from classical philosophy through Marx, Freud, Ricoeur, and the post modernists, Krasteva traces the shift of focus from objectivity to subjectivity, from reality to the subject. She uses Mead's "symbolic interactionism" to point out that "the individual has a 'self' only in his relation with the 'self' of the other members of his social group." She also works with Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of selfhood." Her conclusion is that identity remains problematic in that it requires constant confirmation. Chapter V, "The Integration of Cultures: Facing the Tides of Modernization and Postmodernization," by Wu Xiaojiang discusses the implications of the globalization process, particularly the business and technology model and its impact on cultural identity, for both Eastern and Western societies. His paper zeros in on two questions: How do developing countries retain their cultural identity and diversity within the rising tide of Western modernization? And how do the developed countries protect cultural identity within the rising tide of postmodernization? In Chapter VI, "Globalization with a Human Face." Joseph Isidore Fernando seeks to off-set the current one-sided economic market emphasis in the globalization debate. He attempts to unearth the roots of Western domination and presents suggestions for a new philosophy of global living. "If globalization does not have a human face, it will be neocolonialism with a grotesque face."

Part Two, "History, Human Actions, and Institutions," deals with some of the larger historical and cultural issues which foster or impede humans as acting, free, responsible subjects. J. Stephen Lupp in Chapter VII, "Civil Liberties and Democracy: Western Ideas or Essential Tools," using the tools for the historian, legal scholar, and political scientist, challenges the notion that civil liberties and democracy cannot be applied to non-Western cultures. Working out of an Eastern European perspective, he defends the application of Western liberal democracy worldview – including Islamic countries. Providing detailed historical and cultural analysis, Lupp sets up a controversial, and often hotly contested, counterargument to Samuel Huntington and concludes that "both in theory and practice, non-Western cultures can accommodate themselves to liberate democracy."

Chapter VIII, Victor Neumann's "The Role of the *Volksgeist* in East-Central Europe," unpacks the importance of the *Volksgeist* "the real and infinite spirit of a people." From the historian's perspective, he traces the concept of *Volksgeist* from Romantic School of Hegel, Schlegel, and

Fichte, and especially Herder. Herder's work became the reference point for East-Central European political writing. German Romanticism with its *Volksgeist* helped the national idea to take root throughout 19 century East and Central Europe. Nation building and culture formation were marred, however, by a romantic and excessive emphasis on the past.

In Chapter IX, "Sanctions, Behavior Control, and Social Order," Charles R. Dechert takes up the complex role of sanctions as a way to order relationships, constrain individuals or groups, and guarantee the rubric of civil society. Sanctions, from child discipline to criminal punishment, play an important role and "lie at the base of civil society." Dechert outlines technical sanctions as well as more generalized formal and informal sanctions on which communities depend. With graphic 20th century examples from Germany, Italy, and the United States, Dechert unfolds the pros and cons of this political, psychological, economic, and cultural tool. He seeks for a new approach to sanctions, less destructive of life, cultural goods and the human conscience.

Part Three "Toward a Global Ethics," offers reflections on some of the ethical implications and intercultural dialogue. Manuel B. Dy in Chapter X, "Ethical Reflections on Globalization," argues for the importance of free human actors responsible for the directions that the process of globalization takes. Rather than throw in the towel on the inevitability of a Western, market-driven process, Dy carefully lays out the pros and cons of globalization and seeks a culturally tolerant pluralism which allows space for cultural identity and pluralism. Applying the value ethics of Mar Scheler and the discourse ethics of Jurgen Habermas, Dy seeks a responsible capitalism where every person has a meaningful chance to participate in the emerging global community. Solidarity and participation are focal concerns. The motto of the Jesuit Volunteer Corps – Living simply so others may simply live" – is the key to solidarity and participation. The ethical challenge is to strike a "healthy balance between preserving a sense of identity, home, and community, and doing what it takes to survive within the globalization system."

Chapter XI, "Discourse Ethics and Issues of Intercultural Dialogue" by Plamen Makariev, discusses a possible discourse ethics interpretation of the dialogue between different cultural communities. The author lays bare a "partial discourse" within a "communication community" including the norms of interaction and eventually exposes certain limitations of applying Habermas's metaethical theory to intercultural matters. Makariev points out the difficulties in applying "discourse ethics to real social life" and concludes that discourse ethics as an intercultural methodology seems unrealistic. He proposes instead "a mediating link between strategic and communicative action" which he calls "creative cooperation."

In Chapter XII, "The Trace of the Other: Globalization and Alterity," Antonio Sidekum discusses the critical relationship between the ethics of alterity – the other in the philosophy of Emanuel Levinas – and the ethical challenges of globalization. He asks, does Levinas's ethics negate the conception of totality that globalization implies? While Levinas's writings do not contain much about society, his challenge to ethics applies also to politics and here might be found his key contribution concerning cultural identity, pluralism, and globalization. Sidekum supplements Levinas with Dussel's ethics of liberation and calls for a globalization with justice where all peoples who are now excluded by unjust systems and structures "will have the right to occupy a place at the table of discussion and to seek solutions to world problems."

Part Four, "Religion and Globalization: Spiritualities and Identities," examines the role of religious-philosophical reflection in the quest for both cultural identity and our common humanity. While religions have been headlined as at the root of many contemporary bloody conflicts, the

positive implications of the world religions's contributions – human dignity, compassion, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the option for the poor – to the global debate have received scant attention. Religious institutions remain one of the few viable, non-commercial global transnational actors. In Chapter XIII, "Religious Pluralism as a Middle Way," Warayuth Srivarakuel argues that in this age of globalization neither religious exclusivism nor inclusivism is the appropriate way to peace and harmony. Building on insights from Buddhism, Christianity, the social sciences, Gadamer, and process philosophy, Srivarakuel proposes a "middle way" and a model for global pluralism. He is a believing Christian, but one not prepared to abandon his Buddhist roots and culture. Being Christian does not put in question his personal and Thai identity or his Buddhist way of thinking. The Buddhist principle of non-attachment allows for more than one identity because "we are new persons every moment." Building on process philosophy, and what he calls the "law of complementarity," the author presents religious pluralism as a model for cultural pluralism. He states, "I am a Catholic in baptism and tradition, Protestant in spirit, and Buddhist in my way of thinking."

Chapter XIV, "Communication across Cultures: Natural Law and Wisdom Traditions" by M. John Farrelly, takes up the tension between cultural, political and economic leaders of the North Atlantic industrial countries and leads in more traditional, developing countries of the South. Citing the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference and the differences which emerged around abortion, teenage sexual rights, and the role of women and the family, Farrelly contrasts the individualistic interpretation of human rights in the north Atlantic with the more communal understanding of rights in traditional societies. In the West, consensus around what is right or wrong has built on natural law. Farrelly sets out to articulate that natural law base for consensus using Thomas Aquinas and demonstrating how that tradition had a positive impact on the civil rights movement in the United States and finally suggesting how the tradition can be updated to address the global issue of our day. Farrelly's analysis begins with Martin Luther King's challenge to white racism in the 1960's and edges out into our current global concerns. The questions are epistemological, ontological, ethical, and theological.

In Chapter XV, "Eucharist and Globalization," John P. Hogan looks at the central symbolic-sacramental action of Catholic Christianity, the Eucharist, and relates it to personal and cultural identity and globalization. Beginning with St. Paul's admonitions in I Corinthians, he moves to St. Augustine's "we eat the body of Christ to become the body of Christ," and asks what that might mean in this age of globalization. How does the Eucharist call us to identify with peoples across town or across the globe. The model discussed is clearly one of global inclusion – "relational wholeness" which calls participants in the Eucharist to a discernment process on human dignity, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the option for the poor. The article illustrates in very practical ways how the Eucharist relates to the globalization process.

Chapter XVI, "Globalization, Philosophy, and the Model of Ecumenism" by William Sweet, explores what globalization is, what challenges it poses, and how philosophical reflection might provide some insights in response to those challenges. Divisions between North and South, the widening gap between rich and poor, and a thinly veiled cultural imperialism all appear to call for new communication and institutional models for assuring a "globalization with a human face." Sweet first lays out some guidelines for "philosophy for global times" and proposes ecumenism as a model for global communication and interaction> he asks the question "what is it about ecumenism that has enabled it to have this success without resulting in relativism or subjectivism, or taking one's own or one's neighbors' religious, or non-religious, commitments any less seriously?" In Sweet's proposal, philosophy can help globalization "invent new structures of

meaning, or to recognize that one may have to express one's thought in a larger reality." The openness of the ecumenical model of discourse offers great promise for constructive participation of different peoples in a fruitful dialogue, "with respect for person and with a significant measure of individual and cultural diversity." Philosophy has an important role in that dialogue.

The chapters can be read in a dialectical fashion, some clearly questions the premises of others. For example, a few of our authors take a clear-cut stance in defense of business, modern technology, market-oriented capitalism and liberal democracy. Others argue strongly in defense of local culture, social justice, and the option for the poor or simply the other. For the latter authors, globalization, for the present at least, has too many victims, both persons and cultures. Nonetheless, the pattern in the mosaic of the chapters is woven by a hermeneutical thread linking unity in diversity, sameness and difference. As Robert J. Schreiter indicates:

Balancing difference and sameness has ethical as well as epistemological significance. Denial of difference can lead to the colonization of a culture and its imagination. denial of similarities promotes an anomic situation where no dialogue appears possible and only power will prevail.18

Patterns converge in the search for a common future. Cultural identities are appropriated, not as arbitrary or superficial, but as the essence of human freedom. Pluralism is not a zero-sum game in which everyone and everything must be compromised but is understood in a relational context in which each person is inspired to go more deeply into his or her own culture and creatively draw out new resources for new times. In this model, the metaphor for globalization shifts from crusade to pilgrimage. Globalization is seen not as a force of suppression or oppression, but as a potential opening to enrich the ability of all peoples to cooperate in convergent pilgrimages – each from their own cultural perspective. That "globalization of solidarity," reflecting the ontological unity of humanity, would be directed towards a common human fulfillment that ascends beyond limited horizons to transcendent promise.

Notes

1. Glenn Frankel and Keith B. Richberg, "Old East Bloc Nations Step Tentatively into the EU," *Washington Post*, April 30, 2004, 1.

2. World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD), *Cultures, Spirituality, and Development* (Oxford: WFDD, 2001), 20-21; Rama Mani, "Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: Rediscovering our Common Humanity," *Faith and Development* 323 (April 2004). See also Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996) and *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

3. John P. Hogan, "Ecclesia in America: Toward a Catechesis of Global Solidarity," *Living Light* 35 (Summer 1999): 16-27. The Popular literature on globalization is enormous. See for example, Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs McWorld* (New York: Ballantine, 1996); Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor, 1990); Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives* (New York: Rutledge, 2000); David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Olivia Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamich, and George F. McLean eds, *Philosophical*

Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001).

4. Martin Heidegger, "The Thing," in *Poetry, Language, and Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 165-166. See Heidegger, "The Speciality of Being in Our World," in *Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 138-148. See also William Scheuerman, "Globalization," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization/.

5.Ibid.

6. Stanley J. Grenz, *A Primer on Postmodernism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 80. Robert C. Solomon, *Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise of Fall of the Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7.

7. Ibid. See Solomon, *Continental Philosophy since 1750*, 40.

8. Mary Ann Cusimano Love, "Globalization, Religion and Culture: Beyond Conflict, Beyond Sovereignty," *The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age*, Paolo Janni and George F. McLean, eds. (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003), 273.

9. Peter L. Berger, "Globalization and Religion," *Hedgehog Review* 4 (Summer 2002): 11.

10. See David J. DeLeonardis, *Ethical Implication of Unity and the Divine in Nicolas of Cusa* (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1998). For a recent and clear overview of the intercultural contribution of Western hermeneutics, see George F. McLean, *Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Change: Lectures in Chennai/Madras, India* ((Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003).

11. Robert J. Schreiter, *The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997), 30-31. For the historical perspective, see John P. Hogan, *Collingwood and Theological Hermeneutics* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989); for the social sciences, see Charles Lemert, *Social Things, An Introduction to the Sociological Life*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

12. Hans-George Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

13. Heinz Kimmerle, "Hermeneutical Theory or Ontological Hermeneutics," *History and Hermeneutic*, Wolfhart Pannenberg, et al. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 113. See also John P. Hogan, "Gadamer and the Hermeneutical Experience," *Philosophy Today* 20 (Spring 1976): 3-12.

14. Quoted in F. Lawrence, "Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," *Language, Truth and Meaning*, Philip McShane, ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), 189.

15. WFDD, *op.cit.*, 21

16. John Paul II, "Ecclesia in America," *Origins* 28, no. 55 (Feb 1999): 566-592; Hogan, "Ecclesia in America: Toward a Catechesis of Global Solidarity." See also John Paul II, *The Social Concern of the Church* (Sollicitudo rei Socialis) (Vatican City, 1988); *One Hundred Years* (Centesiumus Annus) (Vatican City, 1991). For a theological reflection on the globalization-cultural identity interface, see the Global Economy and Culture (GEC) project at Woodstock Theological Center, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. GEC uses the Ignatian method updated in the works of Bernard Lonergan and traces the global and local through a reflective lens of experience, understanding judgement and decision (action). Outcomes sought include "communities of solidarity" as proposed in the 34th Jesuit General Congregation of 1995 to be formed through the network of Jesuit social-theological centers worldwide.

17. See Paul Knitter and Chandra Muzaffar, eds. *Subverting Greed: Religious Perspective on the Global Economy* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2002); Peter Berger, ed., *Religion and Globalization* (London: Sage, 1994); Ira Rifkin, *Spiritual Perspectives on Globalization: Making Sense of Economic and Cultural Upheaval* (Woodstock, VT: Skylight Paths Publishing, 2003); Hans Kung, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics* (New York: Continuum, 2002); Max Stackhouse, *God and Globalization*, 4 vols: *Theology for 21st Century Series* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2002).

18. Schreiter, *New Catholicity*, 43.

Chapter I
Culture, Pluralism and Globalization

George F. Mclean

In this paper culture is taken as the combination of values and virtues that mark the life of a people. In order to see this the paper begins with the currently emerging questioning of the adequacy of objective knowledge alone and the new appreciation of subjectivity. This, in turn, allows for an internal understanding of freedom, not as a matter of choice between external objects or of formal adherence to laws, but as the existential construction of one's life. In this light culture becomes a matter not of things, but of life.

The pluralism of cultures then becomes the central issue of living with peoples of different cultures, which situation is approached here with the tools of hermeneutics. Similarly globalization, while implemented by economics and politics, is seen especially as the new context in which the nation state is transcended. The issue then becomes that of living with all the peoples and cultures of the world.

Analyzing progressively the unfolding of social life, section I of this paper studies the levels of subjectivity and personal freedom; section II investigates the way in which over time existential freedom constitutes cultural traditions; and section III examines how synchronically this constructs a civil society. In the present circumstances this broad human project encounters two major diachronic challenges. Hence section IV will be concerned with how tradition plays a role in the progressive development of society, especially through a democratic dialogue between cultures and traditions. Section V will look at this in the emerging global context which promises to mark the new millennium and section VI will move to the issue of globalization and pluralism.

The Emergence of Subjectivity

The present enrichment of objective knowledge of external objects consists of a new awareness of human subjectivity, self-awareness and freedom.

In the context of the crisis of reason now being experienced at this point of transition between the millennia, it is dangerous to raise the question of the role of philosophy. For if, with Aristotle, philosophy is something to be taken up when the basic needs of the times are cared for, then philosophy is in danger of being shelved for this generation. On the other hand, philosophy may have to do with our nature and dignity – with what we are, and with what we are after – and hence the terms in which we live as person and peoples. If so then philosophy may be not the last, but the first consideration or at least the most determinative consideration for life in our most trying circumstances.

It is the contention here that the role of philosophy today has shifted from being a work of deduction by specialists working in abstraction from the process of human life, to deep engagement with life's challenges and human concerns. What is this difference philosophically, and what difference does it make for work in philosophy.

The Crisis of Objective Reason

One way of approaching this is to begin from the philosophical divide we are crossing as we move on to the new millennium. For this we need to review the history of reason in this epoch. The first millennium is justly seen as one in which human attention was focused upon God. It was the time of Christ and the Prophet – Peace be upon them both! – and much of humanity was fully absorbed in the assimilation of their messages.

The second millennium is generally seen as shifting to human beings. The first 500 years focused upon the reintegration of Aristotelian reason by such figures as Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas.

The second half of the millennium, from 1500, was marked by a radicalization of reason. Whereas from its beginning human reason always had attempted to draw upon the fullness of human experience, to reflect the highest human and religious aspirations, and to build upon the accomplishments of the predecessors – philosophers sensed themselves as standing on the shoulders of earlier philosophers – a certain Promethean hope now emerged. As with Milton's *Paradise Lost*, it was claimed that humankind would save itself, indeed that each person would do so by his or her power of reason.

For this, Francis Bacon1 directed that the idols, which bore the content of the cultural tradition, be smashed; John Locke2 would erase all prior content of the mind in order to reduce it to a blank tablet; René Descartes3 would put all under doubt. What was sought was a body of clear and distinct ideas, carefully crafted on a mathematical model.

It was true that Descartes intended to reintroduce the various levels of human knowledge on a more certain basis. But what he restored was not the rich content of the breadth of human experience, but only what could be had with the requisite clarity and distinctness. Thus, of the content of the senses which had been bracketed by doubt in the first *Meditation*, in the sixth *Meditation* only the quantitative or measurable was allowed back into his system. All the rest was considered simply provisory and employed only to the degree that it proved useful for avoiding physical harm in the world.

In this light the goal of knowledge and of properly human life was radically curtailed. For Aristotle, and no less for Christianity and Islam in the first 1500 years of this millennium, this had been contemplation of the magnificence and munificence of the highest being, God. For the enlightenment this was reduced to control of nature in the utilitarian service of humankind. And where the goals of human life were reduced to the material order, the service of humankind really became the service of machines in the exploitation of physical nature. This was the real enslavement of human freedom.

First, with reason looking only to itself, religion was reduced to the service of the human rather than of the divine, and even then was given the status of a superstructure built parasitically upon the new reductively physical reality or even of superstition.

Second, the religiously contextualized philosophical traditions not built in terms of the modern enlightenment reductionism were not understandable within that more restricted horizon. Hence the great Hindu and Islamic traditions were dismissed as mystifications and, for reasons opposite to those of al-Ghazali, the medieval tradition of Scholastic philosophy was denigrated.

Third, by the beginning of the 20th century humanity felt itself poised for the final push to create, by the power of science, a utopia not only by subduing and harnessing the physical powers of nature, but by genetic human engineering and social manipulation. The power of science was diverted however to two destructive World Wars and to the development of nuclear weapons capable of extinguishing the entire human race. Looking back from the present vantage point we find that history has proven to be quite different from these utopian goals.

Fourth, Hegel's and Josiah Royce's ideals and idealism would give way to William James's and John Dewey's concrete, pragmatic goals which could be achieved by human effort.4 Or at least this would be so until it came to be recognized that in positive or empirical terms it was not possible to articulate such social goals, at which point positivism would succeed pragmatism. But after only two decades it would have to admit that its controlling "principle of verifiability" (and then of "falsifiability") was not intelligible in its own positivist terms.

Fifth, Marxism as a scientific history and organization of society, proved to be cruel and dehumanizing beyond belief, until it totally imploded from its own internal weakness. Suddenly, the ideology on which meaning was conceived and life was lived by half of humankind was extinguished. For many it was as if the sun went down never to rise again.

Sixth, on the other side of the Cold War the consumer society has shown itself incapable of generating meaning for life, but capable of exploiting everyone else, until one is left with the conclusion that its ideology of a totally free market is destructive of the weak majority of the world.

In sum, this century has been marked by poverty that cannot be erased and exploitation ever more widespread, two World Wars, pogroms and holocausts, genocide and "ethnic cleansing," emerging intolerance, family collapse and anomie.

The situation recalls the great meteorite, which hit the Yucatan Peninsula eons ago sending a cloud of dust around the world, which obscured the sun for years, killed off the flora and thus broke the food chain. Life of all sorts was largely extinguished and had to begin to regenerate itself slowly once again.

In this light the present period is misnamed "postmodern," because it is really the final critical period of modernity as it progressively collapses. Having become conscious of its own deadly propensities, modern philosophy begins to attack these evils by the only tools it possesses: power and control. Its attack then is not creative, but destructive. Knowing that it must arrest its inherent destructive urges reason destroys its own speculative foundations, all notions of structures and stages and, of course, all ethical norms. Everything must be trashed because the *hubris* of modern reason closes off any sense that it itself is the real root of its problem. In a paroxysm of despair, like a scorpion trapped in a circle of fire, it commits its own *auto de fe*.

Subjectivity: A New Agenda

To read this history negatively, as we have been doing, is, however, only part of the truth. It depicts a simple and total collapse of technical reason acting alone and as self-sufficient. But there may be more to human consciousness and hence to philosophy. If so in analogy to the replacement of a tooth in childhood the more important phenomenon is not the old one that is falling out, but the strength of the new tooth that is replacing it. A few philosophers did point to these other dimensions of human awareness. Shortly after Descartes Pascal's assertion "*Que la raison a des raisons, que la raison ne comprend pas"* would remain famous if unheeded, as would Vico's prediction that the new reason would give birth to a generation of brutes – intellectual brutes, but brutes nonetheless. And later Kierkegaard would follow Hegel with a similar warning. None of these voices would have strong impact while the race was on to "conquer" the world by a supposed omni-sufficient scientific reason. But as human problems mounted the adequacy of reason to handle the deepest problems of human dignity and transcendent purpose came under sustained questioning and more attention was given to additional dimensions of human capabilities.

One might well ask which comes first, the public sense of human challenge or the corresponding philosophical reflection. My own sense is that they are in fact one, the philosophical

insight, being the reflective dimension of the human concern. In any case, one finds a striking parallel between the social experience and philosophy in this century. From the extreme totalitarian and exploitative repression of the person by fascism and communism in the 1930s there followed the progressive liberation from fascism in World War II, from colonial exploitation in the 1950s and 60s, of minorities in the 1970s and from Marxism in the 1980s. Like a new tooth the emergence of the person has been consistent and persistent.

There has been a strikingly parallel development in philosophy. At the beginning of this century, it had appeared that the rationalist project of stating all in clear and distinct objective terms was close to completion. This was to be achieved in either the empirical terms of the positivist tradition of sense knowledge or in the formal and essentialist terms of the Kantian intellectual tradition. Whitehead wrote that at the turn of the century, when with Bertrand Russell he went to the First World Congress of Philosophy in Paris, it seemed that, except for some details of application, the work of physics had been essentially completed. To the contrary, however, the very attempt to finalize scientific knowledge with its most evolved concepts made manifest the radical insufficiency of the objectivist approach and led to renewed appreciation of the importance of subjectivity.

Similarly, Wittgenstein began by writing his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*5 on the Lockean supposition that significant knowledge consisted in constructing a mental map corresponding point to point by the external world as perceived by sense experience. In such a project the spiritual element of understanding, i.e., the grasp of the relations between the points on this mental map and the external world was relegated to the margin as simply "unutterable". Later experience in teaching children, however, led Wittgenstein to the conclusion that this empirical mental mapping was simply not what was going on in human knowledge. In his *Blue and Brown Books*6 and his subsequent *Philosophical Investigations*7 Wittgenstein shifted human consciousness or intentionality, which previously had been relegated to the periphery, to the very the center of concern. The focus of his philosophy was no longer the positivist, supposedly objective, replication of the external world, but the human construction of language and of worlds of meaning.8

A similar process was underway in the Kantian camp. There Husserl's attempt to bracket all elements, in order to isolate pure essences for scientific knowledge, forced attention to the limitations of a pure essentialism and opened the way for his understudy, Martin Heidegger, to rediscover the existential and historical dimensions of reality in his *Being and Time*.9 The religious implications of this new sensitivity would be articulated by Karl Rahner in his work, *Spirit in the World*, and by the Second Vatican Council in its Constitution, *The Church in the Modern World*.10

For Heidegger the meaning of being and of life was unveiled and emerged – the two processes were identical – in conscious human life (*dasein*) lived through time and therefore through history. Thus human consciousness became the new focus of attention. The uncovering or bringing into light (the etymology of the term "phe-nomen-ology") of the unfolding patterns and interrelations of subjectivity would open a new era of human awareness. Epistemology and metaphysics would develop – and merge – in the very work of tracking the nature and direction of this process.

Thus, for Heidegger's successor, Hans-Georg Gadamer,11 the task becomes the uncovering of how human persons, emerging as family, neighborhood and people, by exercising their creative freedom weave their cultural tradition. This is not history as a mere compilation of whatever humankind does or makes, but culture as the fabric of the human consciousness and symbols by which a human group unveils being in its time.

The result is a dramatic inversion: where before all began from above and flowed downward – whether in structures of political power or of abstract reasoning – at the turn of the millennia attention focuses rather upon developing the exercise of the creative freedom of people in and as civil society as a new and responsible partner with government and business in the continuing effort toward the realization of the common good. This is manifest in the shift in the agenda of the United Nations from the cold war debates between economic systems and their political powers to the great conferences of Rio on the environment, Cairo on the family, in Beijing on women. The agenda is no longer reality as objectively quantifiable and conflictual, but the perhaps more difficult or at least more meaningful one of human life as lived consciously with its issues of human dignity, values and cultural interchange.

What does this mean for philosophy? In the 1980s I was a member of the board of Directors of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), which organizes the quinquennial World Congresses of philosophy. In the 1970s the themes had been the philosophy of science; the *Philosopher's Index* for 1970 had only 32 books or articles on culture. When it was proposed in 1980 that the next World Congress be on culture there was a veritable revolution in the ranks. It was said that culture was an issue for anthropology, not philosophy, but that year the *Philosopher's Index* carried 120 listings on the subject. By 1998, however, there were 300 listings on culture and an additional 100 on values, with almost the same number on hermeneutics. If Marx spoke famously of standing Hegel on his head, in our lifetime the same has happened quite literally for the entire field of philosophy.

An integral human horizon now situates the objective issues of power and profit in a context of human value and subjectivity. This calls upon philosophy most urgently to develop new ways of thinking and interpreting which can enable people to engage more consciously, freely and responsibly these new dimensions of life. Done well this can be an historic step ahead for humanity; done poorly it can produce a new round of human conflict and misery.

Freedom and Existence

Freedom

If freedom is the responsible exercise of our life then it can be understood how the search for freedom is central to our life as persons and peoples. But the term is used so broadly and with so many meanings that it can both lead and mislead. It seems important then to sort out the various meanings of freedom.

After surveying carefully the history of ideas, Mortimer Adler and his team, in *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectic Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958), outlined a number of levels of freedom: circumstantial freedom of self-realization as a choice of whatever one wants among objects; acquired freedom of self-perfection as the ability to choose as one ought; and natural freedom of self determination by which one responsibly creates oneself and one's world. Let us examine these three conceptions of freedom.

1. Empirical Freedom of Choice: At the beginning of the modern stirrings for democracy John Locke perceived a crucial condition for a liberal democracy. If decisions were to be made not by the king but by the people, the basis for these decisions had to be equally available to all. To achieve this Locke proposed that we suppose the mind to be a blank paper void of characters and ideas, and then follow the way in which it comes to be furnished. To keep this public he insisted

that it be done exclusively via experience, that is, either by sensation or by reflection upon the mind's work on the materials derived from the senses.12 Proceeding on these suppositions as if they were real limitations of knowledge, David Hume concluded that all objects of knowledge which are not formal tautologies must be matters of fact. Such "matters of fact" are neither the existence or actuality of a thing nor its essence, but simply the determination of one from a pair of sensible contraries, e.g., white rather than black, sweet rather than sour.13

The restrictions implicit in this appear starkly in Rudolf Carnap's "Vienna Manifesto" which shrinks the scope of meaningful knowledge and significant discourse to describing "some state of affairs" in terms of empirical "sets of facts." This excludes speech about wholes, God, the unconscious or *entelechies*; the grounds of meaning, indeed all that transcends the immediate content of sense experience are excluded.14

The socio-political structures which have emerged from this model of Locke have contributed much, but a number of indices suggest that he and others have tried too hard to work out their model on a solely empirical or forensic basis. For in such terms it is not possible to speak of appropriate or inappropriate goals or even to evaluate choices in relation to self-fulfillment. The only concern is the ability to choose among a set of contraries by brute, changeable and even arbitrary will power, and whether circumstances will allow me to carry out that choice. Such choices, of course, may not only differ from, but even contradict the immediate and long range objectives of other persons. This will require compromises in the sense of Hobbes; John Rawls would work out a formal set of such compromises.15

Through it all, however, the basic concern remains the ability to do as one pleases: "being able to act or not act, according as we shall choose or will".16 Its orientation is external. In practice as regards oneself, over time this comes to constitute a black hole of [self-centered] consumption of physical goods in which both nature and the person are consumed. This is the essence of consumerism; it shrinks the very notion of freedom to competitiveness in the pursuit of material wealth.

Freedom in this sense remains basically Hobbes' principle of conflict; it is the liberal ideology built upon the conception of human nature as corrupted, of man as wolf, and of life as conflict. Hopefully this will be exercised in an "enlightened" manner, but in this total inversion of human meaning and dignity laws and rights can be only external remedies. By doing violence to man's naturally violent tendencies, they attempt to attenuate to the minimal degree necessary for one's free and self-centered choices and hence the supposed basic viciousness of human life. There must be better understandings of human freedom and indeed these emerge as soon as one looks beyond external objects to the interior nature and the existence of the human subject and, indeed, of all reality.

2. Formal Freedom to Choose as One Ought: For Kant the heteronomous, external and empiricist orientation character of the above disqualifies it from being moral at all, much less from constituting human freedom. In his first *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant had studied the role of the mind in the scientific constitution of the universe. He reasoned that because our sense experience was always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from the human mind. This was an essential turning point for it directed attention to the role of the human spirit and especially to the reproductive imagination in constituting the universe in which we live and move.

But this is not the realm of freedom for even if the forms and categories with which we work are from our mind, how we construct with them is not left to our discretion. The imagination must

bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in a unity or order capable of being informed by the concepts or categories of the intellect with a view to constituting the necessary and universal judgments of science. The subject's imagination here is active but not free, for it is ruled by the categories integral to the necessary and universal judgments of the sciences. In these terms the human mind remains merely an instrument of physical progress and a function of matter.

However, in his second *Critique*, that of *Practical Reason*, beyond the set of universal, necessary and ultimately material relations, Kant points to the reality of human responsibility. This is the reality of freedom or spirit, which characterizes and distinguishes the person. In its terms he recasts the whole notion of physical law as moral rule. If freedom is not to be chaotic and randomly destructive, it must be ruled or under law. To be free is to be able to will as I ought, i.e., in conformity with moral law.

Yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous. Hence, my maxim must be something, which as a moral agent I – and no other – give to myself. Finally, though I am free because I am the lawmaker, my exercise of this power cannot be arbitrary if the moral order must be universal.

On this basis, a new level of freedom emerges. It is not merely self-centered whimsy in response to circumstantial stimuli; nor is it a despotic exercise of power or the work of the clever self-serving eye of Plato's rogue. Rather, it is the highest reality in all creation. To will as I ought is a wise and caring power, open to all and bent upon the realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves". In sum, it is free men living together in righteous harmony. This is what we are really about; it is our glory – and our burden.

Unfortunately, for Kant this glorious ideal remained on the formal plane; it was a matter of essence rather than of existence. It was intended as a guiding principle, a critical norm to evaluate the success or failure of the human endeavor – but it was not the human endeavor itself. For failure to appreciate this, much work for human rights remains at a level of abstraction which provides only minimal requirements. The work might initiate processes of legal redress, but stops short of – and may even distract from and thus impede – positive engagement in the real process of constructing the world in which we live: witness the long paralysis of Europe and the world in the face of the Yugoslav dissolution of the moral and hence legal foundations for life in our times.

This second level of freedom makes an essential contribution to human life; we must not forget it nor must we ever do less. But it does not give us the way in which we as unique people in this unique time and space face our concrete problems. Clearly, common need guides, but our challenge is really to act concretely. Can philosophy, without becoming politics or other processes of social action, consider and contribute to the actual process of human existence as we shape and implement our lives in freedom?

When the contemporary mind proceeds beyond objective and formal natures to become more deeply conscious of human subjectivity, and of existence precisely as emerging from and through human self-awareness, then the most profound changes must take place. The old order built on objective structures and norms would no longer be adequate; structures would crumble and a new era would dawn. This is indeed the juncture at which we now stand.

3. Existential Freedom as Self-Constitution and Self-Determination: Progress in being human corresponds to the deepening of one's sense of being. We move beyond Platonic forms and structures, essences and laws, to act as uncovered by Aristotle and especially to existence as it emerges in Christian philosophy through the Patristic and Middle Ages. More recently this sensibility to existence has emerged anew through the employment of a phenomenological method

for focusing upon intentionality and the self-awareness of the human person in time (*dasein*). This opens to the third level of freedom stated above, namely, that of deciding for oneself in virtue of the power "inherent in human nature to change one's own character creatively and to determine what one shall be or shall become." This is the most radical freedom, namely, our natural freedom of self-determination.

This basically is self-affirmation in terms of our teleological orientation toward perfection or full realization, which we will see to be the very root of the development of values, of virtues and hence of cultural traditions. It implies seeking perfection when it is absent and enjoying or celebrating it when attained. In this sense, it is that stability in one's orientation to the good, which classically has been termed holiness and anchors such great traditions of the world as the Hindu and Taoist, Judeo-Christian and Islam. One might say that this is life as practiced archetypically by the saints and holy men, but it would be more correct to say that it is because they lived in such a manner that they are called holy.

In his third *Critique,* Kant suggests an important insight regarding how this might form a creative force for confronting present problems and hence for passing on the tradition in a transforming manner. He sees that if the free person of the second critique were to be surrounded by the "necessary" universe of the first critique, then one's freedom would be entrapped and entombed within one's mind, while one's external actions would be necessary and necessitated. If there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which one can make use of necessary laws, indeed if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be understood as directed toward a goal and must manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, even in its necessary and universal laws, nature is no longer alien to freedom; rather it expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom.

This makes possible the exercise of freedom, but our issue is how this freedom is exercised in a way that creates diverse cultures. How can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating, but free and creative? In the "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," Kant points out that in working toward an integrating unity the imagination is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts as in the first *Critique,* or the regulating ideal of the second *Critique*. Returning to the order of essences would lose the uniqueness of the self and its freedom. Rather, the imagination ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see where relatedness and purposiveness can emerge. This ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities or patterns of actions and natures. Unrestricted by any *a priori* categories, it can integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and creative productions and include scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This is the proper and creative work of the human person in this world.

In order for human freedom to be sensitive to the entirety of this all-encompassing harmony, in the final analysis our conscious attention must be directed not merely to universal and necessary physical or social structures, nor even to beauty and ugliness either in their concrete empirical realizations or in their Platonic ideals. Rather, our focus must be upon the integrating images of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion, generated deep within our person by these images as we attempt to shape our world according to the relation of our will to the good and hence to realize the good for our times.

In fact, however, this is still a matter of forms and categories, rather than of existence. Further it is a matter of the human person in him or herself. It is possible, however, to read this in terms of

existence rather than of essence as well as a matter of relation to the creator and the living of His grace in time. In this light the aesthetic enables one to follow the free exercise of existence in a human life and the third level of freedom becomes truly the work of God with us.

In this manner human freedom becomes at once the goal, the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is *goal*, namely to realize life as rational and free in this world; it is *creative source* for through the imagination freedom unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is *manifestation* because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is *criterion* because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is *arbiter* because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this mode of self-realization.

Thus, freedom in this third, existential sense emerges as the dynamic center of our life. It is the spectroscope and kaleidoscope through which is processed the basic thrust toward perfection upon which, as we shall see, culture as the pattern of public life is based and by which its orders of preference are set. The philosophical and religious traditions it creates become the keys to the dynamics of human life. Hence the possibilities of peace within a nation and cooperation between peoples must depend fundamentally on the potentialities of creative freedom for overcoming the proclivities of the first level of freedom for confrontation and violent competition, for surmounting the general criteria of the second level of freedom, and for setting in motion positive processes of concrete peaceful and harmonious collaboration.

Existence

Just as we saw Aristotle evolving the formal structures of Plato in a more active sense, thought here takes an additional step ahead, moving from the relatively passive level of essence to existence as that by which essences are made to be. Moreover, if for living things "to be" is "to live", then "to be" for conscious, free and social human beings is to live in a conscious, free and socially responsible manner. Existence then is the place to begin in order to be able to understand the renewal in our days of the existential sense of human freedom and the possibilities of social progress this opens.

This existential sense of freedom can be traced from the Greek Church Fathers; it took on systemic form in the Islamic and Christian medieval syntheses of Avicenna and Aquinas; and it has been an object of special attention in this century with the development of the phenomenological method for bringing to light human intentionality. Here we shall look at the first and the third of these, that is, at the classical Greek component and at its contemporary implications.

Let us begin with the Greek Fathers. While the earlier Greek philosophers had supposed matter to be eternal, the issue was merely by which form matter was specified; the issue of existence in contrast to non-existence did not emerge. But by applying the Judeo-Christian heritage regarding the complete dominion of God over all things to the classical Greek notion of matter, the Church Fathers opened human consciousness to the fact that matter, too, even if eternal, also needed a causal explanation. This shortly preceded Plotinus, who was the first philosopher to provide an explanation of the origin of matter.17

Thus philosophical questioning pushed beyond issues of form, nature or kind to existence and, hence, to deepen radically the sense of reality. If what must be explained is no longer merely the particular form or type of beings, but matter as well, then the question becomes not only how things are of this form or of that kind, but how they exist rather than not exist. In this way the awareness of being evolved beyond change or form;18 to be real would mean to exist and whatever is related thereto. Quite literally, "To be or not to be" had become the question.

By the same stroke, our self-awareness and will were deepened dramatically. They no longer were restricted to focusing upon choices between various external material objects and modalities of life – the common but superficial contemporary meaning of freedom – nor even to Kant's choosing as one ought; all this remains within the context of being as nature or essence. The freedom opened by the conscious assumption and affirmation of one's own existence was rather a responsibility for one's very being.19

One might follow the progression of this deepening awareness of being by reflecting upon the experience of being totally absorbed in the particularities of one's job, business, farm or studies – the prices, the colors, the chemicals – and then encountering an imminent danger of death, the loss of a loved one or the birth of a child. At the moment of death, as at the moment of birth, the entire atmosphere and range of preoccupations in a hospital room shifts dramatically, being suddenly transformed from tactical adjustments for limited objectives to confronting existence, in sorrow or in joy, in terms that plunge to the center of the whole range of meaning. Such was the effect upon philosophy when the awareness of being developed from attention to merely this or that kind of reality, to focus upon the act of existence in contrast to non-existence, and hence to human life in all its dimensions and, indeed, to life divine.

Cornelio Fabro goes further. He suggests that this deepened metaphysical sense of being in the early Christian ages not only opened the possibility for an enriched sense of freedom, but itself was catalyzed by the new freedom proclaimed in the religious message. That message focused not upon Plato's imagery of the sun at the mouth of the cave from which external enlightenment might be derived, but upon the eternal Word, Son or Logos through and according to which all things received their existence and which enlightened their conscious life.

Moreover, the Christian Kerygma sees redemption as having been achieved in principle by the cross, but as needing to be accepted and affirmed in a personal act of freedom by each person. The passage here from death to life is symbolized in baptism by immersion in water and resurgence.

Thus the new sense of existence was that of being bursting into time

- it rejects being considered in any sense as nonbeing, or being treated as anything less than one's full reality;
- it directs the mind beyond the ideological poles of species and isolated self-interest,
- it centers, instead, upon the unique reality of the person as a participation in the creative power of God – a being bursting into existence, who is and cannot be denied;
- lived in the image of God this life is sacred; one is sanctified in sharing this with one's neighbors in what is now termed civil society, and with all humankind in what is fast becoming a global society.20

It took a long time for the implications of this new appreciation of existence and its meaning to germinate and find its proper philosophical articulation. Over a period of many centuries the term "form" was used to express both the kind or nature of things and the new sense of being as

existence. As the distinction between the two was gradually clarified, however, proper terminology arose in which that by which a being is of this or that kind came to be expressed by the term "essence", while the act of existence by which a being simply is was expressed by "existence" (*esse*).21 The relation between the two was under intensive, genial discussion by the Islamic philosophers when their Greek tradition in philosophy was abrogated as described by al-Ghazali in his *Munqidh*.

This question was resolved 150 years later in the work of Thomas Aquinas through his notion of the real distinction between essence and existence. Paradoxically this rendered more intimate the relation of the two principles which as principles of being are related as act and potency, and which opened a new and uniquely active sense of being.

This made it possible to carry Aristotle's insights regarding the structure of civil society to the existential level and to see this as a self-creative work of human freedom in the third or existential sense of freedom cited above. This remained, however, objective knowledge but it was able to identify the exalted importance of the human exercise of freedom, the need for all to exercise it and even its eternal salvific implication.

However, this understanding did yet enter into the distinctive inner subjectivity in terms of which freedom is consciously lived. This is the heart of religion as loving response to God and neighbor, and thus the motivation of civil society and of the willingness to work out its challenges. This enables one to take full account of the differences between cultures in terms of which freedom is exercised, of the unique sacrifices and creativity of each person and people, or therefore of the ways in which peoples can relate most deeply even in being most distinct. All of this now has become newly possible by a phenomenological effort articulated in terms of values, virtues and cultural traditions.

Should we say that this philosophical capability has been developed in response to the new sensibilities to these issues or that these new sensibilities have developed as a result of this philosophical insight? Probably the two responses are intimately related such that the philosophical work is the reflective dimension of the broad contemporary evolution of human sensibilities enabling it to be better understood and more responsibly oriented.

In any case, our effort here will focus on an examination of values and virtues as the cumulative exercise of the *arché* that is, of the responsible freedom which is at the heart of civil society. In these terms we shall seek to uncover afresh the conscious exercise of existence as lived over time by persons and peoples in and as civil society.

Values

The drama of free self-determination, and hence the development of persons and of civil society, is most fundamentally a matter of being as affirmation or definitive stance against non-being implied in the work of Parmenides, the first Greek metaphysician. This is identically the relation to the good in search of which we live, survive and thrive. The good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. Basically, it is what completes life; it is the "per-fect", understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through. Hence, once achieved, it is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing. The most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else; we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree, given the right conditions, grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life – fiercely,

if necessary – and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to an animal's sustenance and perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner, things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the well-being of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one's fulfillment upon its achievement. Hence, goods are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense, all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.22

The moral good is a narrower field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to one's own perfection and to that of others – and, indeed, to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or misordered. This constitutes the objective basis for what is ethically good or bad.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless, whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete.

However broad or limited the options, a responsible and moral act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the things involved. In addition, one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term "value" here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term "axiology" whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." It requires an objective content – the good must truly "weigh in" and make a real difference; but the term `value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.23 Thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to, and prizes, a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing, it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors the corporate free choices of that people.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods or values which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through lenses formed, as it were, by their family and culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history – often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses values do not create the object; but focus attention upon certain goods rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for the affective and emotional life described by the Scotts, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, as the heart of civil

society. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values.

Through this process a group constitutes the concerns in terms of which it struggles to advance or at least to perdure, mourns its failures, and celebrates its successes. This is a person's or people's world of hopes and fears in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, their lives have moral meaning.24 It is varied according to the many concerns and the groups, which coalesce around them. As these are interlocking and interdependent a pattern of social goals and concerns develops which guides action. In turn, corresponding capacities for action or virtues are developed.

Indeed, Aristotle takes this up at the very beginning of his ethics. In order to make sense of the practical dimension of our life it is necessary to identify the good or value toward which one directs one's life or which one finds satisfying. This he terms happiness and then proceeds systematically to see which goal can be truly satisfying. His test is not passed by physical goods or honors, but by that which corresponds to, and fulfills, our highest capacity, that is, contemplation of the highest being or divine life.25

Virtues

Martin Heidegger describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and about whom one is concerned. In this process, one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. In relation to these goals, certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one's world of meaning.26 Freedom then becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination in the sense of determining oneself to act as described above. It shapes – the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes – one's world as the ambit of human decisions and dynamic action. This is the making of the complex social ordering of social groups, which constitutes civil society.

This process of deliberate choice and decision transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. Whereas the somatic dimension is extensively reactive, the psychic dynamisms of affectivity or appetite are fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values. These, in turn, evoke an active response from the emotions in the context of responsible freedom. But it is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral and social dimension of life. For, in order to live with others, one must be able to know, to choose and finally to realize what is truly conducive to one's good and to that of others. Thus, persons and groups must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth, both in itself and in relation to others. This is moral truth: the judgment regarding whether the act makes the person and society good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfillment, or the contrary.

In this, deliberation and voluntary choice are required in order to exercise proper self-awareness and self-governance. By determining to follow this judgment one is able to overcome determination by stimuli and even by culturally ingrained values and to turn these, instead, into openings for free action in concert with others in order to shape one's community as well as one's physical surroundings. This can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of my actions. By definition, only morally good actions contribute to personal and social fulfillment, that is, to the development and perfection of persons with others in community.

It is the function of conscience, as one's moral judgment, to identify this character of moral good in action. Hence, moral freedom consists in the ability to follow one's conscience. This work of conscience is not a merely theoretical judgment, but the exercise of self-possession and self-determination in one's actions. Here, reference to moral truth constitutes one's sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which I ought to do.

When this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual in the sense of being repeated. These are the modes of activity with which we are familiar; in their exercise, along with the coordinated natural dynamisms they require, we are practiced; and with practice comes facility and spontaneity. Such patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of our life. For this reason, they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to, or, as is often said, "amount to". Since Socrates, the technical term for these especially developed capabilities has been `virtues' or special strengths.

But, if the ability to follow one's conscience and, hence, to develop one's set of virtues must be established through the interior dynamisms of the person, it must be protected and promoted by the related physical and social realities. This is a basic right of the person – perhaps *the* basic human and social right – because only thus can one transcend one's conditions and strive for fulfillment. Its protection and promotion must be a basic concern of any order which would be democratic and directed to the good of its people.

Cultural Tradition

Together, these values and virtues of a people set the pattern of social life through which freedom is developed and exercised. This is called a "culture". On the one hand, the term is derived from the Latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. Cicero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (*cultura animi*), for just as good land, when left without cultivation, will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained or educated.27 This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (*paideia*) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (*Bildung*).28

Here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a people and their ability to work as artists, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of molding together all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political. The result is a whole life, characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and, thereby, sharing deeply in meaning and value. The capacity for this cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation.29 This leads us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

On the other hand, "culture" can be traced to the term *civis* (citizen, civil society and civilization).30 This reflects the need for a person to belong to a social group or community in order for the human spirit to produce its proper results. By bringing to the person the resources of the tradition, the *tradita* or past wisdom produced by the human spirit, the community facilitates comprehension. By enriching the mind with examples of values, which have been identified in the past, it teaches and inspires one to produce something analogous. For G.F. Klemm, this more objective sense of culture is composite in character.31 E.B. Tyler defined this classically for the

social sciences as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits required by man as a member of society."32

In contrast, Clifford Geertz focused on the meaning of all this for a people and on how a people's intentional action went about shaping its world. Thus to an experimental science in search of laws he contrasts the analysis of culture as an interpretative science in search of meaning.33What is sought is the import of artifacts and actions, that is, whether "it is, ridicule or challenge, irony or anger, snobbery or pride, that, in their occurrence and through their agency, is getting said."34 This requires attention to "the imaginative universe within which their acts are signs."35In this light, Geertz defines culture rather as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of intended conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life."36

Each particular complex whole or culture is specific to a particular people; a person who shares in this is a *civis* or citizen and belongs to a civilization. For the more restricted Greek world in which this term was developed, others (aliens) were those who did not speak the Greek tongue; they were "barbaroi", for their speech sounded like mere babel. Though at first this meant simply non-Greek, its negative manner of expression easily lent itself to, perhaps reflected, and certainly favored, a negative axiological connotation, which soon became the primary meaning of the word `barbarian'. By reverse implication, it attached to the term `civilization' an exclusivist connotation, such that the cultural identity of peoples began to imply not only the pattern of gracious symbols by which one encounters and engages in shared life projects with other persons and peoples, but cultural alienation between peoples. Today, as communication increases and more widely differentiated peoples enter into ever-greater interaction and mutual dependence, we reap a bitter harvest of this negative connotation. The development of a less exclusivist sense of culture and civilization must be a priority task.

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time, and hence depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. The culture which is handed on, or *tradita,* comes to be called a cultural tradition; as such it reflects the cumulative achievement of a people in discovering, mirroring and transmitting the deepest meanings of life. This is tradition in its synchronic sense as a body of wisdom.

This sense of tradition is very vivid in premodern and village communities. It would appear to be much less so in large modern urban centers, undoubtedly in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life there. However, the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as this is passed on in new ways. Attending to tradition, taken in this active sense, allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which Socrates sought, but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future.

Community

Because tradition has sometimes been interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a democracy, it is important to note that a cultural tradition is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community or civil society and enables succeeding generations to realize their life with freedom and creativity.

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. One's consciousness emerges, not with self, but in relation to others. In the womb, the first awareness is that of the heart beat of one's mother. Upon birth, one enters a family in whose familiar relations one is at peace and able to grow. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence, which undergird or undermine one's capacities for subsequent social relations. There one encounters care and concern for others independently of what they do for us and acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.37 Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. As persons we emerge by birth into a family and neighborhood from which we learn and in harmony with which we thrive.

Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. The phenomenologist sees this life in the varied civil society as the new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is in life as lived in the family and in the progressively wider social circles of civil society into which one enters.

If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition as that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. In fact, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history, the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life and, accordingly, make pragmatic adjustments.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too unidimensional. While tradition can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms and might seem merely to concern how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances and constructing and defending one's nation. Moreover, this wisdom is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, i.e., what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted.

This points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history and directs our attention vertically to its ground and, hence, to the bases of the values which humankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize.38 It is here that one searches for the absolute ground of meaning and value of which Iqbal wrote. Without that all is ultimately relative to only an interlocking network of consumption, then of dissatisfaction and finally of *anomie* and *ennui*.

The impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such great epics as the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. All conspire to constitute a culture, which, like a giant telecommunications

dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition, then, is not, as is history, simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. It is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific historical circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and progressively passed on generation after generation. The content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, emerges progressively as something upon which personal character and civil society can be built. It constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community as civil society.39

Ultimately, tradition bridges from ancient Greek philosophy to civil society today. It bears the divine gifts of life, meaning and love, uncovered in facing the challenges of civil life through the ages. It provides both the way back to their origin in the *arché* as the personal, free and responsible exercise of existence and even of its divine source, and the way forward to their divine goal, the way, that is, to their *Alpha* and their *Omega.*

Civilization

Progress

The contemporary process of nation building in Central Asia provides a fascinating and recent study of this process. Since the fabled days of the silk route Central Asia has always been considered the cross roads of the world – the delicate balance wheel between East and West. Great civilizations have been challenged there to play that role: Zoroastrian, Christian, Islamic, Marxist. Now the new states in the region are faced with taking up that role in a context suddenly become global.

This is a daunting challenge: it is necessary to avoid losing the civilizing heritage from all of the above civilizations, yet to establish a clear and firm identity which distinguishes these nations from Russia to the North; to revive the Islamic roots of their identity, yet without falling into, or falling prey to, a fundamentalism which would impede progress; to develop their economic base, yet not at the cost of a new servitude; and to take their place politically in the world, yet to retain and promote their proper independence.

While moving from a centralized to a more open economy, the nations of Central Asia are engaged not only in balancing all the great forces of the world, but in integrating them into a new and viable whole. In this sense, here the future of civilization is in play.

Truly humane progress will be possible only to the degree that these peoples are able to find ways of inspiring their disparate elements with spiritual values in a way that promotes both the dignity of the human person and the social cohesion and cooperation of its peoples. This challenge of our times finds its focus in Central Asia.

Prof. S. Shermukhamedov provides us with an excellent description of spiritual culture. His definition is:

the system in which the values of human society and humankind are reflected, impressed and incarnated with their needs, wishes, interests, hopes, beliefs, persuasions. This is the world of emotions, sensations, aspirations, views, wills, impulses and actions, as impressed upon the internal world of man and realized through the interaction between society and nature in which man is the subject of national and common values. Man is the highest value and his life, goodness, interests, harmony, happiness are the goals of society.

These words reflect an important shift-taking place in contemporary culture. Previously, in fact from the time of the great trio of Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, thought had shifted in an objectivist direction. Concern was centered upon the way things were, rather than upon the human person who knows and engages them. This orientation was radicalized at the beginning of modern times that came thereby to be characterized by rationalism.

It is then of epic moment that in our day we should become aware of not only the achievement of this orientation, but also of its limitations and of the way in which it has held us captive. Now the concerns so rightly underlined by Prof. Shermukhamedov have come to the fore. They are reflected not least in the new freedom of Central Asia and in the new hopes and aspirations of its peoples.

This provides orientation for our search further into the nature of spiritual civilization, its foundations and its significance for social progress.

One of the most important characteristics of human persons and societies is their capability for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communal character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural – quite the contrary. Within, as well as beyond, our social group we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities, which we, as individuals and communities, need for our growth, self-realization and fulfillment.

This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to the will of others, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension – whether this be the doctor's professional skill in healing or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others.

Further, this is not a matter of universal law imposed from above and uniformly repeated in univocal terms. Rather it is a matter of corporate learning developed by the components of a civil society each with its own special concerns and each related to the other in a pattern of subsidiarity.

All of these – the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience regarding the horizontal and vertical axes of life and meaning, and the grounding of dependence in competency – combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages. This is varied according to the different components of tradition and their interrelation.

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent, prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be

merely a matter of compromise and accommodation on any terms, with no sense of the value either of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision the result would be devoid of existential content.

The fact that humans, no matter how different in culture, do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute – even bitterly – the direction of change appropriate for their community reflects that every humanism is committed actively to the realization of some common – if general – sense of perfection. Without this, even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions and, hence, no debate or conflict.

Through history, communities discover vision, which both transcends time and directs our life in all times, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and, thereby, orient life.40 Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time. It is also normative, because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged; it presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. What begins to emerge is Heidegger's insight regarding Being and its characteristics of unity, truth and justice, goodness and love. These are not simply empty ideals, but the ground, hidden or veiled, as it were, and erupting into time through the conscious personal and group life of free human beings in history. Seen in this light, the process of human search, discussion and decision – today called democracy – becomes more than a method for managing human affairs; more substantively, it is the mode of the emergence of being in time, the very reality of the life of persons and societies.

One's cultural heritage or tradition constitutes a specification of the general sense of being or perfection, but not as if this were chronologically distant in the past and, therefore, in need of being drawn forward by some artificial contrivance. Rather, being and its values live and act in the lives of all whom they inspire and judge. In its synchronic form, through time, tradition is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it – just as it belongs to us. Traditions then are, in effect, the ultimate communities of human striving, for human life and understanding are implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity – which Gadamer describes as flickerings in the closed circuits or personal consciousness41 – but by our situatedness in a tradition. By fusing both past and present, tradition enables the component groupings of civil society to determine the specific direction of their lives and to mobilize the consensus and mutual commitments of which true and progressive community life is built.42

Conversely, it is this sense of the good or of value, which emerges through the concrete, lived experience of a people throughout its history and constitutes its cultural heritage, which enables society, in turn, to evaluate its life in order to pursue its true good and to avoid what is socially destructive. In the absence of tradition, present events would be simply facts to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence. This, in turn, could be restrained only by some utopian abstraction built upon the reductionist limitations of modern rationalism. Such elimination of all expressions of democratic freedoms is the archetypal modern nightmare, *1984*.

All of that stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative expression of meaning evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius or Gandhi, a Bolivar or Lincoln, a Martin Luther King or a Mother Theresa. Variously termed "charismatic personalities" (Shils),43 "paradigmatic individuals" (Cua)44 or characters who meld role and personality in providing a cultural or moral ideal (MacIntyre),45 they supersede

mere historical facts. As concrete universals, they express in the varied patterns of civil society that harmony and fullness of perfection which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing – in a word, liberating.

Nor is it accidental that as examples the founders of the great religious traditions come most spontaneously to mind. It is not, of course, that people cannot or do not form the component groups of civil society on the basis of their concrete concerns for education, ecology or life. But their motivation in this as fully human goes beyond pragmatic, external goals to the internal social commitment, which in most cultures is religiously based.

It is necessary then to look into the nature of cultural traditions as constituted of freedom as it forms values, virtues and tradition and to the hermeneutics whereby these can be interpreted in a progressive manner.

Civilizations

At this turn of the millennium we stand at a point not only of numerical change to the series 2000 or even of a change within a system as with a substitution of political parties, but at a point of revision of the very nature of world ordering itself. Earlier the issue was one of the possession of territory under the leadership of great Emperors or of physical resources and the military-industrial power that entailed. More recently we have seen the world divided by ideologies into great spheres. Since the end of the Cold War, however, it is suggested famously in the work of Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*,46 that the world order is being remade on the basis of the pattern of civilizations.

This reflects a deep transformation in interests and epistemology. Before attention was oriented objectively, that is, to things as standing over against (*ob*-against; *ject*-thrown) the knowing subject. In this perspective their quantitative characteristics were particularly salient and were given major importance.

In this century the subject and its intentional life or subjectivity and values, have come to the fore and phenomenological methods have been developed for their identification and interpretation. Whether it was philosophers who brought this realm of subjectivity into central awareness or whether it was attention to subjectivity which evoked the development of the corresponding philosophical methodologies can be discussed. Probably the philosophical methods provided the reflective dimension and control over the new self-awareness of human consciousness. In any case, it is suggested that the new world order will be based not on the resources we have, but on the civilizations we are: not on having but on being.

According to Huntington the notion of civilization seems to have developed in the 18th century as a term to distinguish cultivated peoples from the barbarian or native populations being encountered in the process of colonization. In this sense it was a universal term used in the singular. It implied a single elite standard of urbanization, literacy and the like – necessary for the admission of a people into the world order. When the standard was met the people was "civilized"; all the rest were simply "uncivilized".

In the 19th century a distinction was made between civilization as characterized by its material and technological capabilities or by a more elaborate political and urban development, and culture, which was the values and moral qualities of a people. However, the two terms have tended to merge in expressing an overall way of life, with civilization being the broader term. Where culture focuses on the understanding of perfection and fulfillment and the evaluation of what leads thereto;

civilization is more the total working out of life in these terms. Hence civilization is culture, as it were, writ large.

This appears in a number of descriptions of civilization where culture is always a central element: for F. Braudel civilization is "a cultural arena",47 a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena; for C. Dawson: the product of "a particular original process of cultural activity which is the work of a particular people";48 for J. Wallerstein it is "a particular concatenation of worldview, customs, structures, and culture (both material culture and high cultures) which form some kind of historical whole."49

Taken as a matter of identity it can be said that a civilization is the largest and most perduring unit or whole – the largest "we".50 The elements included are blood, language, religion and way of life. Among these religion is "the central defining characteristic of civilizations",51 as it is the point of a person's or peoples deepest and most intensive commitment, the foundation on which the great civilizations rest.52 Hence the major religions (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism) are each associated with a civilization, the exception being Buddhism which came as a reform movement, and was uprooted from its native India and lives only in diaspora among other nations.

Civilizations perdure over long periods of time. While empires come and go, civilizations "survive political, social, economic even ideological upheavals."53

International history rightly documents the thesis that political systems are transient expedients on the surface of civilization, and that the destiny of each linguistically and morally unified community depends ultimately upon the survival of certain primary structuring ideas around which successive generations have coalesced and which then symbolize the society's continuity.54

But this does not mean that they are static. On the contrary it is characteristic of a civilization to evolve and the theories of such evolution are attempts to achieve some understanding of the process not only of the sequence of human events but more deeply of the transformation of human self understanding itself. Famously, Toynbee theorizes that civilizations are responses to human challenges; that they evolve in terms of establishing increasing control over the related factors, especially by creative minorities; that in the face of troubles there emerges a strong effort at integration followed by disintegration. Such theories vary somewhat in the order of stages but generally move from a preparatory period, to the major development of the strengths, of a culture or civilization, and then toward atrophication. In any case these cycles extend over very long periods.

It is significant that in the end, however, Huntington is not able to give any clear definition of civilizations. Whereas Descartes would request just such characteristics for scientific knowledge, Huntington notes that civilizations generally somewhat overlap, and that while no clear concept can be delineated civilizations are nonetheless important.

Civilizations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes of civilizations change over time. The cultures of peoples interact and overlap. The extent to which the cultures or civilizations resemble or differ from each other also varies considerably. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.55

In this light it can be seen that a shift of world order to a pattern not of empires or commercial blocks, but of civilizations bespeaks a great development in human consciousness beyond the external, objective and the physical to the internal, subjective, spiritual and indeed religions. In

contrast to Descartes, it appears that what is most significant in the relations between peoples, indeed what defines them as peoples, is not a matter accessible by scientific definition, but is a matter of more inclusive aesthetic appreciation, and that it is in these terms that one's life commitments personal relations, and interaction between peoples is realize.

Again we could ask whether this is the result of philosophical advances to open for example the dimensions of phenomenological awareness or whether these philosophical advances are the result of social history. My sense is that the two proceed together with the philosophical providing the reflective dimension to the social process, just as the cultures provides the sense of perfection and values in the progress of civilization. In any case it reflects the crisis of objective reason and the turn to subjectivity as the new agenda. let us look more in detail at this transformation.

Pluralism and Hermeneutics

Interpretation

First of all it is necessary to note that only a unity of meaning, that is, an identity, is intelligible.56 Just as it is not possible to understand a number three if we include but two units rather than three, no act of understanding is possible unless it is directed to an identity or whole of meaning. This brings us directly to the classic issue in the field of hermeneutics, described above as the hermeneutic circle, in which knowledge of the whole depends upon knowledge of the parts, and vice versa. How can we make this work for, rather than against the effort to live our religious tradition in our days?

Reflection on the experience of reading a text, including a sacred text, might help. As we read we construe the meaning of a sentence before grasping all its individual parts. What we construe is dependent upon our expectation of the meaning of the sentence, which we derived from its first words, the prior context, or more likely a combination of the two. In turn, our expectation or construal of the meaning of the text is adjusted according to the requirements of its various parts. As we proceed to read through the sentence, the paragraph, etc., we reassess continually the whole in terms of the parts and the parts in terms of the whole. This basically circular movement continues until all appear to fit and be expressive.

Similarly, as we begin to look into our tradition we come with a prior conception of its content. This anticipation of meaning is not simply of the tradition as an objective or fixed content to which we come. It is rather what we reproduce uniquely in our hearts and minds as we participate in the evolution of the tradition, thereby further determining ourselves as a community of believers. This is a creative stance reflecting the content, not only of the past, but of the time in which I stand and of the overall life project in which I am engaged. In our religious traditions it is a creative unveiling of the content of the Revelation through the Prophets as this comes progressively and historically into the present and, through the present, passes into the future.

In this light time is not a barrier, a separation or an abyss, but rather a bridge and an opportunity for the process of understanding; it is a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The importance of the historical distance it provides is not that it enables the subjective reality of persons to disappear so that the objectivity of the situation can emerge. On the contrary, it makes possible a more appreciative meaning of our religious tradition, not only by removing falsifying factors, but by opening new sources of self-understanding and new perspectives. These reveal in the tradition unsuspected implications and even new dimensions of meaning of which we heretofore were unaware.57

Of course, not all our acts of understandings are correct, whether they be about the meaning of a text from another culture, a dimension of a shared tradition, set of goals or a plan for future action. Hence, it becomes particularly important that they not be adhered to fixedly, but be put at risk in dialogue with others. This is the classical practice in many religious traditions.

In this, the basic elements of meaning remain the substances which Aristotle described in terms of their autonomy or standing in its own right, and, by implication, of their identity. Hermeneutics would expand this to reflect as well the historical and hermeneutic situation of each person in the dialogue, that is, their horizon or particular possibility for understanding. A horizon is all that can be seen from one's vantage point(s). In reading a text or in a dialogue with others it is necessary to be aware of our horizon as well as that of others. When our initial projection of the meaning of a text (which might be another's words, the content of a tradition or a sacred text) will not bear up under ongoing readings or the dialogue our passion to hear the word of God in the sacred text or even to hear the other in a conversation, then we are driven to make needed adjustments in our projection of their meaning.

This enables us to adjust not only our prior understanding of the horizon of the text or of the other with whom we are in dialogue, but especially our own horizon. Hence, one need not fear being trapped in the horizons of our culture, and ultimately of our religion. They are vantage points of a mind which in principle is open and mobile, capable of being aware of its own horizon and of reaching out to the message of the Prophet and to other's experience of God in their lives which constitutes their horizons. The flow of history implies that our religious horizons are not limitations, but mountaintops from which we look in awe at the vast panorama of God's work with humankind. It is in making us aware of our horizons that hermeneutic awareness accomplishes our liberation.58

In this process it is important that we remain alert to the new implications of our religious tradition. We must not simply follow through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, but must remain sensitive to new meanings in true openness. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of the tradition, nor an extinction of passionate concerns regarding action towards the future. Rather, being aware of our own biases or prejudices and adjusting them in dialogue with a text or with others (and quite possibly both of these together, when in our national community we debate the meaning of our constitution, or in our religious community we prayfully examine our sacred texts) implies rejecting what impedes our understanding of others and of our own sacred texts and traditions. Our attitude in approaching dialogue must be one of willingness continually to revise, renew and enrich our initial projection or expectation of meaning.

There then is a way out of the hermeneutic circle. It is not by ignoring or denying our horizons and prejudices, but by recognizing them as inevitable and making them work for us. To do so we must direct our attention to the objective meaning of the text in order to draw out, not only its meaning for the author, but its application for the present. Through this process of application a religious teacher and preacher serves as midwife for the historicity of a text, a tradition or a culture, and enable it to give birth to the future.59

Method of Question and Answer

The effort to draw upon a text or a tradition and in dialogue to discover its meaning for the present supposes authentic openness. The logical structure of this openness is to be found in the exchange of question and answer. The question is required in order to determine just what issue we are engaging – whether it is this issue or that – in order to give direction to our attention.

Without this no meaningful answer can be given or received. As a question, however, it requires that the answer not be settled or determined. In sum, progress or discovery requires an openness, which is not simply indeterminacy, but a question, which gives specific direction to our attention and enables us to consider significant evidence. (Note that we can proceed not only by means of positive evidence for one of two possible responses, but also through dissolving the counter arguments).

If discovery depends upon the question, then the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, whether working alone or in conjunction with others, our effort to find the answer should be directed less towards suppressing, than toward reinforcing and unfolding the question. To the degree that its probabilities are built up and intensified it can serve as a searchlight. This is the opposite of both opinion which tends to suppress questions, and of arguing which searches out the weakness in the other's argument. Instead, in conversation as dialogue one enters upon a mutual search to maximize the possibilities of the question, even by speaking at cross-purposes. By mutually eliminating errors and working out a common meaning we discover truth.60

Further, it should not be presupposed that the text holds the answer to but one question or horizon, which must be identified by the reader. On the contrary, the full horizon of any author and above all of the transcendent source of revelation and the Prophets is never available to the reader. Nor can it be expected that there is but one question to which the text or tradition holds an answer. The sense of the text reaches beyond what any human author intended. Because of the dynamic character of being as it emerges in time, the horizon is never fixed but is continually opening. This constitutes the effective historical element in understanding a text or a tradition. At each step new dimensions of its potentialities open to understanding; the meaning of a text or tradition lives with the consciousness and hence the horizons – not of its author, but of the many readers living with others through time and history. It is the broadening of their horizons, resulting from their fusion with the horizon of a text or a partner in dialogue that makes it possible to receive answers which are ever new.61

In this one's personal attitudes and interests are, once again, highly important. If our interest in developing new horizons were simply the promotion of our own understanding then we could be interested solely in achieving knowledge, and thereby domination over others. This would lock one into an absoluteness of one's prejudices; being fixed or closed in the past they would disallow new life in the present. In this manner powerful new insights become with time deadening pre-judgments, which suppress freedom.

In contrast, an attitude of authentic religious openness appreciates the nature of one's own finiteness. On this basis it both respects the past and is open to discerning the future. Such openness is a matter, not merely of new information, but of recognizing the historical nature of man. It enables one to escape from limitations, which had limited vision in the past, and enables one to learn from new experiences. Thus, recognition of the limitations of our finite projects enables us to see that the future is still open.62

This suggests that openness does not consist so much in surveying others objectively or obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner, but is directed primarily to ourselves. It is an extension of our ability to listen to others, and to assimilate the implications of their answers for changes in our own positions. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our religious and cultural heritage has something new to say to us. The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness is then not methodological sureness, but a active devout listening, a readiness for experience.63 Seen in these terms our heritage is not closed, but the basis for a life that is ever new, more inclusive and more rich.

Globalization

Global Concerns

During the 1950s and 1960s the development of technological capabilities made it possible to design vehicles with sufficient thrust and precision to be able to break the bonds of earth and soar towards the planets. By the end of the 60s, as projected by President Kennedy, Neil Armstrong landed on the moon. What he saw *there* was of little interest – a barren rocky terrain, alternating between great heat and frigid cold. But what he saw *from there* was of the greatest consequence. With a few of his predecessor in space exploration, he was able for the first time in human history to look at the Earth and see it whole. Throughout the millennia humankind had always seen fragments, piece by piece; now for the first time the earth was seen globally.

At the time, astronomers sought avidly to learn about the moon. But for philosophers the questions were rather what would be found about humankind, about relations between peoples and about their presence in nature. More importantly, they wondered if this would change the way in which people understood themselves in all these regards: Would this intensify the trend to see all and everyone as an object? Or could it contribute to overcoming alienation and *anomie*, to transforming antipathies into bonds of friendship? But, if this were to take place, would life be reduced to a deadly stasis? Though the stakes were high, the philosophical questioning at first was languid. Now, at the end of this millennium these questions of globalization emerge with a full and fascinating force.

Why now rather than then? This would seem to relate notably to the end of the Cold War, especially if this be traced deeply to the roots of the modern outlook as a whole. Prof. Lu Xiaohe64 has pointed out how, at the very beginnings of modern times, Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744) identified the limitations of the then new modern way of thinking as bearing the potential to lead to violent opposition for lack of an adequate capability to take account of the unity of the whole. If the cold war was the final denouement of this fatal flaw, and the world is no longer structured in a bipolar fashion, then it is no longer the parts which give sense to the whole, but the converse: the global is the basis of the meaning of its participants.

Proximately, this is a matter of communication and commercial interchange, but their full deployment depends in turn upon a politique of positive human cooperation in an integral human project. Thus today we reread Kennedy's words about bearing any burden in defence of freedom in terms of his positive context, namely, his invitation to all humankind to transcend limiting divisions and join together to make real progress. Of this his promise to break beyond a divided planet and go to the noon by the end of that decade was symbol and harbinger. The process of globalization transcends regional concerns. This is not to deny them, but to respond to them from a more inclusive vantage point in term of which all can have their full meaning and the opportunity to work together to determine their own destiny. This is the heart of the issue of globalization and cultural identities.

Until recently the term 'globalization' was so little used that it warranted only two lines in Webster unabridged international dictionary.65 For the term 'global,' however, three meanings are listed:

- first, geometric, namely, a spherical shape;

- second, geographic, namely, the entire world, with the connotation of being complete. This was extended by the ancient Greeks to signify perfection itself: Parmenides spoke of the One, eternal and unchanging as being spherical; and
- third, qualitative, namely, the state of being comprehensive, unified or integrated.

It is interesting to note that Webster's saw this third character of global as implying "lacking in particularizing detail" or "highly undifferentiated". Today's challenge is more complex and more rich, namely, to achieve a comprehensive vision whose integration is not at the expense of the components, but their enhancement and full appreciation.

For insight on these issues I would turn to Nicholas of Cusa, born almost six hundred years ago (1401-1464) at a special juncture in Western thought. Often he is described as the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns. In the high middle ages Thomas Aquinas and others had reunited the traditions of Plato and Aristotle on the basis of the Christian discovery of the special significance of existence. In this synthesis primacy was given to Aristotle whose structure for the sciences began with *Physics* as specified by multiple and changing things, whence it ascended to its culmination in the unity of the divine life at the end of his *Metaphysics*.66 The ladder between the two constituted a richly diversified hierarchy of being

John Dewey67 stressed – perhaps too strongly – the relation of that ancient hierarchic worldview to the Ptolemaic system in which the earth is the center around which the sun and the planets revolve at a series of levels in a finite universe. He traced the development of the modern outlook to the change in the Copernican heliocentric model of an infinite but undifferentiated universe.

Nicholas of Cusa bridged the two. He continued the sense of a hierarchical differentiation of being from the minimal to the infinite, but almost a century before Copernicus (1473-1543) he saw the earth as but one of the spheres revolving around the sun. His outlook with regard to the relations between peoples was equally pioneering. As Papal legate to Constantinople shortly after the city had been taken by the Turks – much to the shock of all Europe – Cusa was able to see the diversity of peoples not as negating, but as promoting unity. His broad and ranging political, scientific, philosophical and theological interests qualified him as a fully Renaissance man. In time he was made a Cardinal in Rome, where he is buried.68

We shall proceed by looking first at the manner of thinking involved and second at Cusa's reconciliation of unity and diversity in a harmony which Confucius might be expected to find of special interest. Thirdly, on these bases, I will look at the special dynamism with which this endows Cusa's sense of being.

Global Thinking

Any understanding of the work of the mind in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa must be situated in the context of the Platonic notion of participation (*mimesis* or image) whereby the many forms fundamentally are images of the one idea. For Plato, whose sense of reality was relatively passive, this meant that the many mirrored or were like (assimilated to) the one archetype or idea. Correspondingly, in knowing multiple things the mind, as it were, remembers having encountered and been impressed by, or assimilated to, the one archetypic idea, which they image, all converging progressively toward a supreme One. For Cusa, with Plato, this appreciation of the one remains foundational for the knowledge of any particular. Here it is important to note how Cusa reconceives the nature of this one – not only, but also – in global terms.

To this Aristotle, whose thought began from the active processes of physical change, added a more active role for mind. This not only mirrors, but actively shapes the character, if not the content, of its knowledge. As an Aristotelian, Aquinas too considered the mind to be active, but in the end the objectivity of its knowledge depended upon a passive relation to its object: beings "can by their very nature bring about a true apprehension of themselves in the human intellect which, as is said in the *Metaphysics*, is measured by things."69

Cusa's sense of mind unites both emphases: the original measures the image, which in turn becomes like, or is assimilated to, the original. Sense knowledge is measured by the object; this is even part of its process of assimilation to the divine mind.70 But, as E. Cassirer71 notes, Cusa shifts the initiative to the mind operating through the senses, imagination, reason and intellect. Rather than being simply formed by sense data, the mind actively informs the senses and conforms and configures their data in order that the mind might be assimilated to the object. Thus both "extramental objects and the human mind are measures of cognitive assimilation, that is to say, we become like the non-mental things we know, and we fashion the conceptual and judgmental tools whereby we take them into ourselves as known."72

But this view does not seem to have reached the key point for our concerns for global awareness – or of Cusa's, for that matter. This is not merely the classical realist distinction between what is known, which is on the part of the thing, and the way in which it is known, which reflects the mind by which the thing is known. Cusa has added two moves. First, the One of Plato is not an ideal form, but the universe of reality (and this in the image of God as the absolute One); second, the human mind (also in the image of the divine mind) is essentially concerned with this totality of reality, in terms of which global awareness and all its knowledge is carried out.

a. Discursive Reasoning: In his study on mind,73 Cusa distinguishes three levels of knowledge, the first two are discursive reasoning, the third is intellection. The first begins from sense knowledge of particular material objects. This is incremental as our experiences occur one by one74 and we begin to construct a map of the region, to use a simile of L. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

But for Cusa the knowledge of the multiple physical things by the lower powers of sensation and imagination raises the question of the unity of things which must be treated in terms of the concepts of reason and intellect.75 For the forms in things are not the true forms, but are clouded by the changeableness of matter.76 The exact nature of anything then is unattainable by us except in analogies and figures grounded essentially in the global sense had by our higher powers.77

But while sense knowledge is inadequate for a global vision Cusa considers innate knowledge or a separated world of ideas to be unnecessary and distractive. Hence, he concludes: (a) that sense knowledge is required; (b) that both the physical object and the mind are active in the assimilation or shaping of the mind, (c) that in this process the mind with its global matrix is superior in that it informs or shapes the work of the senses, and (d) that it is unable fully to grasp the nature of the object in itself.

As a result discursive reasoning as regards physical objects is limited in a number of ways. First, it is piecemeal in that it develops only step by step, one thing at a time, in an ongoing temporal progression. Hence, on the macro level discursive reasoning can never know the entirety of reality. On the micro level it cannot comprehend any single entity completely in its nature or quality. This is true especially of the uniqueness or identity, which for humans are their personal and cultural identities.

The paradox of attempting to think globally in these terms is that as we try to form overall unities we abstract more and more from what distinguishes or characterizes free and unique persons so that the process becomes essentially depersonalizing. Hence the drama of globalization becomes the central phenomenon at the dawn of the new millennium.

In the 20th century the technological implementation of depersonalization reached such a crises that millions were crushed or exterminated – hundreds of thousands in pogroms, 6 million in the holocaust, 50 million in the Second World War, entire continents impoverished and exploited. In effect the limitations Cusa identifies in discursive reasoning now are simply no longer tolerable and new modes of thinking are required in order to enable life to continue in our times.

Cusa recognizes a second type of discursive reasoning, namely, that of mathematics, which does not share the limitations noted above. But here the objects are not living beings, but mental objects of the same nature as mind. Hence the mind can pivot on itself using its own resources to construct and process concepts and to make judgements which are exact because concerned with what is not changing or material.78 This is Humes's world of relations between ideas.79 But as it deals only with the formal, rather than the existential, it cannot resolve the above human problems, but serves to exacerbate them to the degree that its mode of discursive reasoning becomes exclusive.

b. Intellection: Hence Nicholas of Cusa turns to a third mode of mental assimilation, which is beyond the work of discursive reason, namely, intellection. Eugene Rice contrasts the two approaches to knowledge by likening discursive reasoning to a wayfarer walking through a valley and encountering things one by one, whereas intellection is like being on a hill whence one surveys the entire valley all at once.80 The latter view is global and the particulars are understood as component parts; each thing has its proper realty, but is also an integral constituent of the whole. It is important to note that the unity of the scene as known by intellection is constituted not by a mere assemblage of single entities juxtaposed in space or time, but as multiple participations in a unity. (Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, the multiple things in the physical order are also limited images of the whole.)

To express this in terms of the modern distinction of analytic and synthetic modes of thought would help, but would not be sufficient. With Descartes moderns undertook a search for knowledge that was clear in the sense of identifying the simple natures of each thing, and distinct in the sense that such knowledge should be sufficient at least to be able to distinguish one type of thing from all others.81 This gave primacy to the analytic process of distinguishing all into its component set of simple natures. The supposition was that these were finite in number, that they could all be identified clearly and distinctly by the mind, and that they could then be reassembled by equally clear and distinct links in a process of synthesis.

This has marked the modern mind and set its goals and its limitations. Having determined that only what was clear and distinct to the human mind could qualify for inclusion, due to the limitations of the human mind it was inevitable that the uniqueness of each entity would be omitted as not clear to the human mind. Further, any organic character of the whole also would be omitted, for synthesis could assemble only what was clear and distinct.

For Cusa in contrast, intellection is knowledge in terms not of the parts, but of the whole in which all participate. Here the intellect grasps the meaning and value of the whole. It works with the imagination and reason to work out the full range of possibilities and to grasp how the many fit together: it "depends not upon the number of things which are known, but upon the imaginative thrust of the mind" to be able to know "all the multifarious possibilities which are open to

being."82 Finally it is guided by the senses to know which of these possibilities are actual. The significance of the actual beings is not merely what we can garner by the senses, but what is known primarily in terms of the whole by the intellect.

The Aristotelians build knowledge from concrete, changing and hence limited things. Cusa's more Platonic heritage has him build knowledge rather in the global terms of the whole, and ultimately of the One of which the mind as well as things are the images. Where these were but form for Plato, for Cusa they are existents sharing in the active power of being.

The Enlightenment was so intent upon knowledge that it wound up tailoring all to what it could know clearly and distinctly. As with the Procrustean bed, what did not fit this specification was lopped off and discarded as hypothetical or superstition. Cusa's attitude is notably different for it includes humility before reality, which it recognizes, and even reveres, above all where it exceeds the human capacity for clarity of conception and power of control.

The human mind, he would recognize, has limitations at both ends of the scale of being. Even a minimal being cannot be exhaustively known. Like attempting to make a polygon into a circle, no matter how many sides are added, more remain always possible; a circular shape can never be attained in this manner. Such knowledge though partial and incomplete, is valid as far as it goes, but it always can be improved upon. One can only project the circle by the thrust of the imagination.

Knowledge of the absolute, in contrast, cannot be improved upon. Moreover, it is basically unreliable for there is nothing to which the Absolute can be compared.83 Hence, the negative way of saying what God is not and the recognition of our ignorance in that regard constitute the relevant real knowledge, for which reason Cusa entitled a major work: *On Learned Ignorance*.84

We have seen the limitations of knowledge constructed on the basis of multiple limited beings understood as opposed one to another. Unity constructed thereupon not only never manages to grasp such beings fully but simply discards what is not known. Thus the uniqueness of the person cannot be recognized and is lost. Conversely the unities which can be constructed of such contrasting realities remains external and antithetical. Hence, to the degree that it succeeds discursive reasoning is in danger of oppressing the uniqueness of the participants. This is the classical dilemma of the one and the many; it is the particular challenge of globalization in our day and the basic reason why it is feared as a new mode of (economic) imperialism and oppression.

Cusa's suggestion of another mode of thinking whereby we think in terms of the whole is promising, indeed essential for our new age. But it faces a great test. Can it take account of diversity, and if so how can this be understood as within, rather than in opposition to, unity: Is it possible to conceive diversity as a contribution to unity, rather than as its negation?

Parmenides had shown unity to be the first characteristic of being by opposing being to non being. In these terms each being was itself and nothing less. But such reasoning in terms of the opposition of being to non being bespoke and also contrast opposition between beings, each of which in being itself was precisely not any other being. Today the global reality makes it necessary to ask whether there are more positive and relational modes of conceiving multiplicity.

Global Structures of Diversity in Unity

To summarize then we have seen the new global political, cultural and economic phenomena in which we are situated and in terms of which we are called to act. In looking toward the thought of Nicholas of Cusa we saw that such a global response requires a new dimension of thinking. The characteristic modern discursive reasoning with its analytic approach of breaking all down into its

minimum components and reassembling them synthetically, proposed by Descartes in his *Discourse on Method*, proceeds essentially in terms of parts rather than of the whole, of the discrete components without taking account of the overall unity.

As pointed out by Dr. De Leonardis, this entails that relations between peoples and conflict resolution can be carried out only in terms of compromises which leave no one satisfied and plant the seeds of further conflicts. If now the means for conflict are so powerful as to be capable of overwhelming the means for survival, we are faced with the imperative of finding how to proceed in terms of a capacity to grasp the whole.

This pointed to Cusa's power of intellection, joined with that of the imagination, to project what we cannot clearly conceive of the individual person and the divine, to protect what we can only acknowledge of our creative freedom and that of others, and to promote the growth of which we are capable but which lies hidden in a future which is not yet.

As such knowledge is directed toward an ordered reality – ours and that of the entire globe – the central questions are not merely epistemological, but ontological and ethical, namely, what is the global whole in which we exist, and how can we act in relation to other peoples and cultures in ways that promote a collaborative realization of global community in our times?

a. The Unity of the Whole: In response to this question Cusa would begin by identifying four types or levels of unity:

1. Individual unity – the identity by which each exists as itself in contrast to others.
2. The unity of each individual being as within the whole of being. This is important in grappling with the issue of globalization in our times and is within the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
3. The unity of the universe by which the individuals together form not merely a conglomeration of single entities, as with a pile of rocks, but a unified whole which expresses the fullness of being. This may be the central contribution of Cusa's thought for a study of globalization.
4. Absolute Unity – the One, God or Being Itself, which, being without distinction, plurality or potentiality, is all that being can be, the fullness of being, and hence not subject to greater or lesser degree.85

The fourth level of unity is central and foundational for religions and for a metaphysics of globalization. Here, however, we shall focus rather on the ontology and its ethical implication. This directs our attention to the second and especially the third of Cusa's senses of unity to which the recent development of a global awareness corresponds, namely, to the whole or total universe in which we have our being, live and intersect with nature and with others.

This has been appreciated in various ways in the past: in the totem which was the unifier for the life and universe of primitive peoples, in the myths which united gods and nature in a genetic whole, in the One of Parmenides as the natural first step for metaphysics, and in the eschatologies and the classical hierarchies of being, to cite but a few. Now, however, after a long period of analytic and atomic thinking, under the impact of technologies, which make conflict too costly and inundate us with global communications, there is special need to take up once again this sense of unity.

b. Diversity as Contraction: The situation is delicate however, for in so doing it is imperative to avoid the kind of abstractive thinking in which personal uniqueness is dismissed and only the universal remains.86

Cusa's solution is found in the notion of contraction, that is, to begin from the significance of the whole and to recognize it in the very reality of every individual, so that the individual shares in something of the ultimate or definitive reality of the whole of being. One is not then an insignificant speck, as would be the case were I to be measured quantitatively and contrasted to the broad expanse of the globe. Rather I have the importance of the whole as it exists in and as me – and the same is true of other persons and of the parts of nature.

The import of this can be seen through comparison with other attempts to state this participation of the part in the whole. For Plato this was a repetition or imaging by each of that type of the one ideal form. Aristotle soon ceased to employ the term participation as image (*mimesis*) because of the danger it entailed of reducing the individual to but a shadow of what was truly real. Cusa too rejected the separately existing ideas or ideal forms. Instead what had been developed in the Christian cultures was a positive notion of existence as act87 whereby each participant in being was made to be or exist in itself. This is retained by Nicholas of Cusa.

But he would emphasize that the being in which this person or thing participates is the whole of being.88 This does not mean that in a being there is anything alien to its own identity, but that the reality of each being has precisely the meaning of the whole as contracted to this unique instance. To be then is not simply to fall in some minimal way on this side of nothingness, but rather to partake of the totality of being and the meaning of the whole of being and indeed to be a realization of the whole in this unique contraction or instance. It retains its identity, but does so in and of the whole.

De Leonardis formulates this in two principles:

- Principle of Individuality: Each individual contraction uniquely imparts to each entity an inherent value that marks it as indispensable to the whole.
- Principle of Community: Contraction of being makes each thing to be everything in a contracted sense. This creates a community of beings relating all entities on an ontological level.89

Let us stop at this insight to explore its implications for diversity. Generally multiplicity and diversity are seen as opposed to unity: what is one is not many and vice versa; to have many beings is to imply contrast and even possible conflict. When, however, each individual is appreciated as a unique contraction of the whole, others which are distinct and different are complementary rather than contradictory; they are the missing elements toward which one aspires and which can help one grow and live more fully; they are the remainder of the whole of which I am part, which supports and promotes me, and toward whose overall good my life is directed. Taken together they enhance, rather than destroy, the unity. This, of course, is true not of Parmenidean absolute and unlimited One which is the complete and full perfection of being, the fourth instance of unity cited above. But it is true of the third of the above unities, which are precisely the reality of global unity, and the second type of unity, which is its components seen precisely as members of the global whole.

Forms of Relation

a. Hierarchy: After the manner of the medievals Cusa saw the plurality of beings of the universe as constituting a hierarchy of being. Each being was equal in that it constituted a contraction of the whole, but not all were equally contracted. Thus an inorganic being was more contracted than a living organism, and a conscious being was less contracted than either of them. This constituted a hierarchy or gradation of beings. By thinking globally or in terms of the whole, Cusa was able to appreciate the diversity of being in a way that heightened this ordered sense of unity.

Lovejoy wrote classically of *The Great Chain of Being*90 in which each being was situated between, and in relation to, the next lower and the next higher in the hierarchy. We had, in other words, our neighbors with whom we shared, but there was always the danger that we were correspondingly distanced from other beings. Thus the sense of the human as "lord of nature" could and did turn into exploitation and depredation. Cusa's sense of beings as contractions of the whole unites each one intimately to all other realities in one's being, one's realization, and hence one's concerns. This converts the sense of master into that of steward for the welfare of the parts of nature which do not possess consciousness or freedom. These become the ecological concerns of humankind.

Another approach, built upon this sense of each distinct being as equal inasmuch as each participates in the whole, would image overall reality as a mosaic. But Cusa's sense of each of those piece as also a contraction of the whole went further by adding the importance not only of each to the whole as in a mosaic, but of the whole in and by each being. Unity then is enhanced and is the concern of each being to the full extent of its own reality understood as an integral participant in the whole.

However, both these metaphors of a chain of being and of a mosaic are static. They leave the particular or individual beings as juxtaposed externally one to the other. Neither takes account of the way in which beings interact with the others or, more deeply, are even constituted internally by these relations to others. What Cusa sees for the realm of being is relationships, which are not externally juxtaposed, but internal to the very make up of the individuals.

b. Internal Relations: This internal relationship is made possible precisely by a global sense of the whole.91 For this Cusa may have drawn more directly from the Trinity, but this in turn is conceived through analogy to the family of which individuals are contractions, especially as this is lived as the interpersonal relations of a culture grounded in such a theology. The philosopher can look into that social life as a point of manifestation of being. Indeed, hermeneutics92 would suggest that this constitutes not only a *locus philosophicus* whence insight can be drawn, but the prejudgments of philosophers which constitute the basic philosophical insights themselves. The critical scientific interchange of philosophy is a process of controlled adjustment and perfection of these insights.

In a family all the persons are fully members and in that sense fully of the same nature. But the father generates the son while the son proceeds from the father. Hence, while mutually constituted by the same relation of one to the other, the father and son are distinct precisely as generator and generated. Life and all that the father is and has is given from the father to the son. Correspondingly, all that the son is and has is received from the father. As giver and receiver the two are distinguished in the family precisely as the different terms of the one relation. Hence each shares in the very definition of the other: the father is father only by the son, and vice versa.

Further, generation is not a negative relation of exclusion or opposition; just the opposite – it is a positive relation of love, generosity and sharing. Hence, the unity or identity of each is via

relation (the second unity), rather than opposition or negation as was the case in the first level of unity. In this way the whole that is the family is included in the definition of the father and of the son each of whom are particular contractions of the whole.

To highlight this internal and active sense of contraction and hierarchy Cusa uses also the analogy of a seed.93 This is able to develop and grow only by heat from the sun, water from the clouds and nourishment from the earth. Hence, all of these elements of the whole are interrelated in mutual dependence. Moreover, thereby the seed brings new being into existence – which in turn will be creative, etc. Finally, by this action of the sun and clouds, the seed and the earth, precisely as contractions of the whole, the universe itself is made fruitful and unfolds. But this is identically to perfect and fulfill the universe. Hence, the plurality of beings, far from being detrimental to the unity and perfection of the universe, is the key thereto.

c. Explicatio-Complicatio. Cusa speaks of this as an *explicatio* or unfolding of the perfection of being, to which corresponds the converse, namely, by folding together (*complicatio*) the various levels of being constitute the perfection of the whole. Hence Cusa's hierarchy of being has special richness when taken in the light of his sense of a global unity. The classical hierarchy was a sequence of distinct levels of beings, each external to the other. The great gap between the multiple physical or material beings and the absolute One was filled in by an order of spiritual or angelic beings. As limited, these were not the absolute, yet as spiritual they were not physical or material. This left the material or physical dimension of being out of the point of integration.

In contrast, Cusa, while continuing the overall graduation, sees it rather in terms of mutual inclusion, rather than of exclusion. Thus inorganic material beings do not contain the perfection of animate or conscious being, but plants include the perfections of the material as well as life. Animals are not self-conscious, but they do integrate material, animate and conscious perfection. Humans include all four: inorganic, animate and conscious and spiritual life.

In this light, the relation to all others through the contraction of being is intensified as beings include more levels of being in their nature. On this scale humans as material and as alive on all three levels of life: plant, animal and spirit, play a uniquely unitive and comprehensive role in the hierarchy of being. If the issue is not simple individuality by negative and exclusive contrast to others (the first level of unity), but uniqueness by positive and inclusive relation to others, then human persons and the human community are truly the nucleus of a unity that is global.

The Dynamism of a Global Order

Thus far we have been speaking especially in terms of existence and formal causality by which the various beings within the global reality are to specific degrees contractions of the whole. To this, however, should be added efficient and final causality by which the ordered universe of reality takes on a dynamic and even developmental character. This has a number of implications: directedness, dynamism, cohesion, complementarity and harmony.94 Cusa's global vision is of a uniquely active universe of being.

a. *Direction to the Perfection of the Global Whole*: As contractions of the whole, finite beings are not merely products ejected by and from the universe of being, but rather are limited expressions of the whole. Their entire reality is a limited image of the whole from which they derive their being, without which they cannot exist, and in which they find their true end or purpose. As changing, developing, living and moving they are integral to the universe in which

they find their perfection or realization and to the perfection of which they contribute by the full actuality and activity of their reality.

This cannot be simply random or chaotic, oriented equally to being and its destruction, for then nothing would survive. Rather there is in being a directedness to its realization and perfection, rather then to its contrary. A rock resists annihilation; a plant will grow if given water and nutrition; an animal will seek these out and defend itself vigorously when necessary. All this when brought int

o cooperative causal interaction has a direction, namely, to the perfection of the whole.

b. *Dynamic Unfolding of the Global Whole*: As an unfolding (*explicatio*) of the whole, the diverse beings (the second type of unity) are opposed neither to the whole (the third type of unity) nor to the absolute One (the fourth type of unity). Rather, after the Platonic insight, all unfolds from the One and returns thereto.

To this Cusa makes an important addition. In his global vision this is not merely a matter of individual forms; beings are directed to the One as a whole, that is, by interacting with others (unity 3). Further, this is not a matter only of external interaction between aliens. Seen in the light of reality as a whole, each being is a unique and indispensable contraction of the whole. Hence finite realities interact not merely as a multiplicity, but as an internally related and constituted community with shared and interdependent goals and powers.

c. *Cohesion and Complementarity in a Global Unity*: Every being is then related to every other in this grand community almost as parts of one body. Each depends upon the other in order to survive and by each the whole realizes its goal. But a global vision, such as that of Cusa, takes a step further, for if each part is a contraction of the whole then, as with the DNA for the individual cell, "in order for anything to be what it is it must also be in a certain sense everything which exists."95 The other is not alien, but part of my own definition.

From this it follows that the realization of each is required for the realization of the whole, just as each team member must perform well for the success of the whole. But in Cusa's global view the reverse is also true, namely, it is by acting with others and indeed in the service of others or for their good that one reaches one's full realization. This again is not far from the experience of the family and civil society, but tends to be lost sight of in other human and commercial relations. It is by interacting with, and for, others that one activates one's creative possibilities and most approximates the full realization of being. Thus, "the goal of each is to become harmoniously integrated into the whole of being and thereby to achieve the fullest development of its own unique nature."96

Globalization and Pluralism

If everything humans can do they can do badly then the same is true with regard to tradition. On the one hand, some would hold to it slavishly, seeing the ideal as the past and lacking confidence in the ability of human reason, often because of a sense of human nature as corrupted by sin. The result is holding to the past and an attempt to replicate it without deviation or development. This attitude where found among Christians has been called fundamentalism, a term which has been applied, perhaps by dubious analogy, to other branches of Christianity and to some Islamic groups as well.

Others would respond by seeing fidelity to a tradition as at best not important and hence destined to atrophy with time, or at worst a deterrent to progress which must be suppressed and

removed. They miss the vital importance of culture and tradition for human life and are surprised when peoples defend their cultures as they defend their lives, indeed their souls. Both attitudes can be expected to exacerbate the problem.

Instead, there is need to recognize the vital importance of identity for a people and at the same time to show that this is not static or retrospective, but rather living and prospective. That is, cultural traditions must be engaged consciously in the projects of persons, peoples and nations.

Such consideration of tradition, not synchronically, but diachronically through time, has important implications for two key issues of our day: one reflects the multiplicity of peoples and tradition, namely, pluralism; the other is the interaction of such diverse cultures within the emerging global horizon.

Pluralism

Above we have seen how a tradition grows from the experience of a people and how it includes not only horizontal pragmatic discoveries about the means for living or what works, but also vertical discoveries regarding limitless transcendent meaning and values. This implies that I have not yet exhausted the meaning of such terms as justice or love, nor have my people. If that is the case, then the question is how I can discover more of what my tradition means, and of the value included in my tradition.

This is the positive importance of pluralism, that is, of being able to meet people who share a different tradition and have different stories and texts. To hear repeatedly only one's own stories leaves one within the confines, not only of one's own tradition, but of what is generally already appreciated of that tradition. Thus, to meet someone of a different tradition with different stories enables one to look with fresh eyes into one's own tradition. This stimulates one's imagination in its work as spectroscope and kaleidoscope and thereby enables one to draw more out of one's own tradition. Rather than being a circumstance in which my tradition is compromised or limited, meeting a person or people from a different tradition gives one the possibility of going more deeply into one's own tradition and drawing out more of its meaning.

This was my conscious intent when I had a first sabbatical opportunity to spend time in research away from teaching. It seemed at that time that it would be helpful to go outside of the Western tradition to a totally different culture, which I did by going to India. The intent was not to find there something strange which I would juxtapose to my own tradition, horizon or studies, but rather to be stimulated by Hindu insights in order to go more deeply into my own metaphysical tradition, the better to understand its meaning.

The results for me were striking. I had always followed the Aristotelian pattern of beginning from the physical as that which was most obvious to the senses and proceeding from that to God. On the contrary, I found Shankara and the Sutras beginning from the Absolute which was self-sufficient and self-evident as the basis for the reality and intelligibility of all else. Upon reflection I came to understand this to be the essential message of Thomas Aquinas' classical five ways to God. The effect was not to invert my order of teaching and of discovering, but to deepen immeasurably my understanding of the nature and role of Thomas' five ways to God as a key to metaphysical meaning and to the relation (*re-ligatio* or religion) of all things to God.

Similarly, hermeneutics speaks of the importance of dialogue as the interchange between persons and peoples. This is not at all the same as argument. In an argument one looks for the weakness in the position of the other in order to be able to reject it as a threat to one's own position. In contrast, in hermeneutics one looks for the element of truth in the other's position in order to be

able to take account of it. Indeed one looks for how that can be strengthened and extended. For even if that position is not entirely true, whatever element of truth is there is very important and precious for me. It suggests ways to go more deeply into my own tradition and bring out more of what it means to be, e.g., just, peaceful, truthful, etc.

But even this would not be truly liberative if it meant only going in search of means by which I might overcome other persons in order to gain some advantage and control. This would be still to proceed in terms of contraries as characteristic of the first level of freedom. I would be attempting not to free myself from my limitations, but to solidify them by imposing them on others.

Moreover, to assume a more positive attitude toward other cultures does not suppose that one rejects one's own tradition or considers one's own position to be wrong. It suggests only that one's appreciation of one's tradition is limited, that I have appreciated and made explicit only part of my tradition. This is to honor one's own tradition by the conviction that it has more to say to me than thusfar I have unveiled. In other words, other persons with other experiences are precious in order to liberate me from my restrictions in relation to my own tradition in my circumstances. They enable me to get beyond these limitations, to escape what has deceived me or held me captive and to learn from new experiences. This is to be liberated or free most deeply and personally and in that way to progress. The ability to listen to others is the ability to assimilate the implications of their answers for unfolding my own tradition.

This is the strength of a democracy which allows for the expression of different ideas. A pluralistic society is rich in the cumulative potentialities of peoples with different traditions. Democracy is a situation in which the many come together and interchange their ideas, thereby sharing different horizons and approaches to meaning. Again, it is not to imply that my tradition is deficient, but only that it is historical and that at this moment I have managed to bring to light only part of what my tradition contains and implies.

In sum, this means that to be faithful to my tradition I should work with others, listen to others, live with others. To dialogue with others is not to compromise my commitment to my tradition, but only to recognize that I am limited and that with my people, however rich our vision, we have failed to exhaust the full richness of our tradition. By listening to someone from another tradition one is enabled to go more deeply into the resources of one's own tradition and draw on it in new ways for new times.

Globalization

Beyond being a useful hermeneutic tool, however, the encounter with pluralism has been turned into an essential survival skill in these global times.

Until recently the world had been divided between various nation-state or great empires which were often at war one with another. Gradually these coalesced in ideological terms until there was but the bipolar world structure of the cold war. With that now ended we find ourselves in a single geopolitical world system. Some read this in the economic terms of material profit, others in the political terms of power and control. Both are limited essentially to the first level of freedom as competition and conflict. In these terms a global unity essentially suppresses freedom and imposes domination and control. It is necessary, indeed essential, then for freedom in our time to open to the third level of existential freedom in which unity does not mean suppression of difference.

This may have been stimulated as well by the development of space exploration and the ability to go beyond the world and to look back upon it as one. In launching the program to go to the moon by the end of that decade, President Kennedy spoke of going beyond the divisions of the

world and uniting all in this great adventure. Technically this was a great achievement, but philosophically the challenge it produced may be even greater. What does it mean for humankind to be able to look at the globe as a whole; what does it mean philosophically to be able to look at this world whole and entire.

In this regard I would like to return to Nicholas of Cusa and especially to his sense of the significance of unity in diversity for our pluralistic world.

In this light, individuals are not only singles juxtaposed to others in order to constitute an external composite. Instead the individuals are conceived from the beginning in terms of the whole, each being a unique contraction of the whole. This implies not only that each is important for what it alone is, but that each in itself contains the whole and thus its relation to each and all of the others, and of the whole to each.

Consequently multiple realities are not contradictory one to another, but essentially complementary; that is to say, each provides an element of the whole which is missing to all the others. Thereby each helps the others to live more fully; the particulars are enhanced by the whole and by each of the other members of that whole.

Likewise, the reality of the many components is essentially relational to the whole and hence to the other components, just as the father is not father except in relation to the son and vice verse. Here the differences are by definition relative both to the whole and to the others. Hence particular persons or peoples are not simply different and contrary to each other, but stand in a positive relation of complementarity one to another. Our relations are more positive than conflictual or even competitive, for they are marked not by opposition, but by love and generosity, sharing and unity.

Conclusion

In the past philosophy emerged from the integral life of the people and constituted its reflective dimension. Cumulatively, it was said that philosophers stood on the shoulders of their predecessors.

At the time of the Renaissance a new experiment was undertaken with extremely varied results. The attempt was made to establish absolute control of life by human persons while they restricted themselves to clear and distinct ideas and rejected the significance of anything else. The result was a precise and rich technical analysis for implementing human life. Done in terms of the senses in the Anglo-Saxon manner, this generates the first level of freedom according to which democracy is a matter of reconciling or engaging conflicting individual interests. Done in terms of the intellect in the continental manner this led to a sense of community and of scientific laws of history in which personal freedom counted little, indeed anything else other than the system can only be irrational. It became evident soon after 1989 that freedom could not be lived if philosophers continued to remain within that structure of earlier rationalism and continued to refer to all else as irrational.

It is then the heart of liberation that the mind now broadens its interests and engages fruitfully new dimensions of life. This is shown by the rapid unfolding of interest in values and culture, in minorities and women, and in freedom. The result is the unique yet convergent exercise of existence by individuals and across the globe. This calls now for the development of aesthetic capabilities to integrate the new appreciation of the whole as constituted progressively by the persons and peoples of the entire globe.

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89. De Leonardis, p. 228.

90. Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (New York: Harper, 1960).

91. *Of Learned Ignorance*, I, 9-10.

92. Gadamer, pp. 241-253.

93. *Dato Patris Luminum* in Jasper Hopkins, *Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphors of Contraction* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1983), p. 25.

94. De Leonardis, pp. 233-236.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

Chapter II

Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalisation in Contemporary Philosophical Discourse

Nur Kirabaev

Problem Definition

A philosophical approach to the contemporary problems surrounding globalisation and cultural identity raises the following questions and possible contradictions. How do we relate globalisation, oriented to the values of unity, the whole and the general, as expressed in the social, economic and political spheres, to the very human aspects of particularity, personal identification, specific cultural roots and diversity of opinion. In other words, can pluralistic values be pursued within a shared social space?

Globalisation: Concepts and Problems

Globalisation is the development of economic and political cooperation among nation-states and regions to the level whereby it becomes possible and even necessary to raise the need for common international laws and institutions capable of global economic and political management.

Globalisation of the world economy is a concept, which is wider in content than in actual integration. The concept presupposes interdependence in the world's economy. Moreover, globalisation of world politics has sharply changed our perception of how the world functions. During the "Cold War," the world existed under the struggle between capitalism and communism as well as the split between the "First" and the "Third" worlds. Political globalisation, on the other hand, is the product of economic integration. Until recently nuclear arms had been the major reason for promoting technological development. Nowadays, with the era of globalisation, communication systems (internet, cellular phones, computers, etc.) determine the development and direction of technology. Such technological developments dramatically increase the role of mass culture oriented to more globe-wide "unified" cultural values. These developments provide for both the "content" and "integration" of globalisation.

In the context of the problems under review it is important to answer the question, to what extent and in what form, economic, political and legal globalisation necessarily lead to cultural globalisation. Does the whole globalisation process presuppose a merger into "unified" cultural values? And what are the deeper implications of such a convergence? Let me suggest two ways of approaching this problem.

The First Way

If adaptation of new technologies and ideas to local conditions could be built into the process of globalisation than local culture and the human person could become the determining characteristics of the process. In that case, globalisation need not result in a unified abstract culture rooted in one source. Rather, national cultures would contribute much to the so-called global culture. Globalisation, in this scenario, would be accompanied by a new emphasis on

regionalization i.e. increasing the importance of subcultures (e.g., Africa, Latin America, South East Asia, etc.)

The Second Way

In the second approach, globalisation is oriented to a unified and common set of values and could lead to division, and a new type of inequality. A prime example of this is the widening gap already emerging between producer and consumer nations. That gap, between the passive consumers of a unified culture and the more active producing participants, who shape the culture, is growing dramatically. Globalisation, thus becomes a new form of cultural colonialism. However, with any discussion of culture and globalisation, one must be careful not to simplify a complex process. Globalisation is not necessarily a single whole based on consciously selected common values. On the other hand, however, it is necessary to understand what unifies a culture and makes its values coherent.

Pluralism

In spite of the important role pluralism plays in identifying modernity as a whole, and culture in particular, its meaning is often not clear. In classical philosophical discourse, ontological pluralism is distinguished as first, the existence of more than one basis for being, which, in turn, are independent of each other; and second, epistemological pluralism which allows the possibility of many equally discursive practices oriented to the cognition of a single object. In that way pluralism can be defined as a principal that allows several different answers to the same question, including contradictory ones. Nonetheless, it is necessary to take into account that the basis of each answer has its own type of being and existence that are related to history and culture. Pluralism is, indeed, at the core of current socio-cultural life in all its appearances. In the contemporary world of ideas reality appears as a plurality which cannot be reduced to facile general rules without falling into contradictions. In such a situation, it seems, there are two answers to the globalisation challenge: either to overcome pluralism through a one dimensional democracy (liberal democratic model) or to simply accept the reality of pluralism (postmodern model).

The main problem, both theoretical and practical, related to pluralism, is not the appropriateness of statements declaring the variety of life practices but rather the depth of differences within this variety. Even with the socio-cultural pluralism of Europe, society is still based, to a great extent, on Western cultural values and rationality. Moreover, those values often are considered as universally recognised worldwide standards and values worldwide. But, is that so?

Max Weber perceived the roots of Western rationality in the idea of "salvation" which exists in all the world religions and cultures and is interpreted as an inspiration to relieve suffering. He considered religious development as a rationalisation because it helps to systematise facts and unify opinions and deeds of people in terms of explaining undeserved suffering – a major question of Theodicy. The main result of his comparison of the economic ethics of world religions was his ability to discover the close relation between rationality and cultural type, i.e. rationality provides a means of explaining cultural values in this world. However, culture depends on the character of those values but not on the rational structure behind them. Apparently that is why we have a pluralism of socio-cultural life, which cannot be boiled down to a single cultural base. Finally, cultural identification is based on difference, i.e. the difference from a variety of other cultures

determines a culture's nature and specificity. Thus culture unites people in stable communities and, at the same time, divides them from others. Under contemporary conditions, cultural pluralism has an ontological status which prohibits the working out of a single integrating form, i.e. some sort of average cultural value.

Cultural Identity

Let us begin with a few words about the basis of cultural identity. As is well known, people, individuals and social groups, differ in characteristics: sex, race, language, religion, history, moral values etc. The more the individual and collective self-perception level is consciously experienced, the more people are sensitive to cultural differences. From my perspective, this is mainly related to the fact that identification is based on *difference*, i.e. of one social and cultural group from others. Acute attention to *differences* leads to the separation of further identification characteristics. In turn, distance and separation causes a "deepening" of differences among individuals and groups. The differences may be of an anthropological (racial and ethnic), cultural, religious and/or political character. Socio-cultural identification can be further explained by some of the peculiarities of modern pluralism. This specific feature is related to a certain ambivalence: one side stipulated by cultural status, individual and group values; the other side stipulated by the objective tendency to social unity in the form of globalisation as an answer to the challenges of modernity.

Respect for the *Other* (difference) can be considered as a desire or demand for justice, but orientation toward unity is connected with the idea of social solidarity. By solidarity we understand a quality of life which demands a social harmony or, at least, the quest to overcome disharmony at the level of the individual, group or state. Dichotomy in individual interest and social wellbeing may be overcome in solidarity based societies. It might be noted that this understanding of solidarity goes all the way back to Aristotle.

In the context of values and cultural pluralism, the meaning of justice becomes altered. Justice is understood not as a demand for equal opportunity for all, but rather as the sorting out of competing differences of history, religion, and lifestyles for individuals and social groups in common social space. It should be noted that this understanding of justice contradicts the political and social models of solidarity in liberal theories. For instance, in liberal democracies, legal questions often dominate justice questions. Therefor, in the next section, we will turn our attention to how one might solve this seeming dichotomy between solidarity and justice.

Philosophical Models for Solving Problems between Solidarity and Justice

Postmodernism. It appears that on the philosophical level, postmodernism offers a specific conceptual framework for dealing with this solidarity/justice problematic. That framework comes with metaphysical parameters: time, space and causality (in general, these parameters form the ontological frame of any culture). The main characteristic for modernity is time; for postmodernity, it is space. Time acts as the organising center in modernity. Due to the centralising role of time, various local cultures are lumped into a single whole and experienced with the feeling and sense of being part of one human community. Time not only synchronises events within one culture, it also gives to all cultures a single rhythm of how to function and how to develop. It is in this sense that Fukuyama talks about the end of history, i.e. the end of a definite stage in world history. This time-centered model has been the dominant one for the last three hundred years. And the West has

attempted to make its dominance global. Today however, in postmodern societies, cultural pluralism demands decentralisation. This effects both time and space. But space comes to the fore. Space, in the postmodern context, encompasses different cultures which differ from each other in value systems, and more importantly, in the understanding of time.

Postmodernity rejects the notion of a "general denominator" and considers the cooperation of cultures, not in terms of subordination, but in terms of coordination. Coordination is not linked with a sequence of conditions but with horizontal links. Space is understood as the boundaries among cultures, which separate each from the other, but co-exist in one time. If in modernism space is understood as a field of opportunity, cultivation, and expansion which gives form to the surrounding world and a place with norms and law, then in postmodernism, this center no longer exists. Each local culture pretends to act as the center; and coexistence of different cultures and intercultural communication allows us to talk about common points. Moreover, these common characteristics provide something unique and valuable. *Tolerance* becomes the basis of this multicultural space and its fulcrum for coordination.

On the other hand, the modernist perspective on causality was originated and developed as human domination over nature. Initial principals of modernity were order, effectiveness and prediction. Metaphysical concepts, such as God, liberty and man were expelled from the modernistic picture of the world. Teleology, order, and predictable outcomes dominate in this paradigm, i.e. the past, present and the inevitable future. Thus, Fukuyama's *End of History*.

In contrast, postmodernity with its ontological pluralism rejects a strong determinism as useless in the sense of understanding and explaining events which take place in a diverse cultural space. The early postmodernists proposed to replace ontology with aesthetics. According to them only art with its ideal meaning – beauty and harmony – can pull together all of life's practices. This is debatable, but nonetheless, important, in that it represents the postmodern quest. Here, I should like to call attention to the fact that most probably philosophy is the best equipped discipline to play the role of intermediary and coordinator in these different cultural discourses.

Another approach to solving the problem of justice within a pluralistic culture comes from the "discourse ethics" K. Apel and J. Habermas, who try to rehabilitate the major philosophical values of modernity: rationalism and universalism. That is central to the concept of "communicative rationality" whereby Habermas tries to prove the possibility of a rational foundation for justice and values in a pluralistic culture. Habermas's ideal is a system of communication free of domination. This, he claims is the only way to retrieve human dignity. In Habermas's approach the existence of mutual rights and ethical obligations among participants in a dialogue is based on the internal connection of justice and solidarity. His approach is opposed to utilitarian ethics and supposes that the structure of rational communicative discourse as open to all. Thus discourse ethics originates from two states: 1) normative requirements for adequate dialogue, which require truth at the same time, and 2) moral norms and regulations must pass through real discourse in order to be applicable. In my judgement, it appears that in Habermas's conception, solidarity is more important than justice.

Conclusion

Let me end with some words about multiculturalism. Multiculturalism can be considered as a compromise within a multicultural dialogue. Multiculturalism is a theory, practice and policy for avoiding conflict and promoting coexistence in a vital space peopled by different cultural groups. It pays respect to the differences, but at the same time does not necessarily reject the quest for

universality. Most importantly, it presupposes the possibility of a total incorporation into a society of diverse individuals and groups but without limiting their rights or denying their specific cultural, religious and political differences.

Thus the politics of multiculturalism can be considered as a middle way for creating free civil space without destroying the traditional, ethnic ways of existence, formed by history and local culture. Considering history from the vantage point of multiculturalism one can suppose that the theory of globalisation with its orientation to the linear time-centered progress of human development requires definite correction and change. Development can be seen not only as a linear progressive process but as an oscillating and spiralling coil. It also seems that the concept of asynchronic history should have its place.

Finally, it should be stated, that globalisation is not only what seems to be happening in fact, it is also what humans are expected to think about current ideas and events and their potential linkage – what should be happening. Nonetheless, even though globalisation is daily becoming the accepted worldview, I would like to close with three negative postulates concerning this dominant approach. Although space does not permit further discussion, I find these three postulates concerning globalisation most problematic. They are the aging and gradual passing away of the nation-state; the inevitability awarded to the eventual modernisation and westernisation of the global process; and the preference given to a "unipolar democracy" as a model for self-organization and international structures and institutions. All, in my judgement, deny the potential for working out a *modus vivendi* between solidarity and justice and represent a one-sided "uniform culture" approach. Such an approach will prove unworkable.

Chapter III
Some Clarifications on Culture

A.T. Dalfovo

The increasing awareness of culture at the present time needs to be accompanied by an equally increasing concern for a clarification of its meaning and of its nature. This clarifying exercise needs to be effected within an historical context as culture is essentially historical. This article attempts to do this by analyzing what appears to be the prevailing understanding of culture today and then probing into its original meaning at the time of the semantic origin of the term. A comparison between the original and the contemporary meanings is then attempted in order to highlight both the historical development of culture and the variety of its meanings. These considerations are intended to lead to what is probably the basic challenge of culture to philosophy namely the multifaceted understanding of the former seeking a sense of unity from the latter.

Cultural Awareness

The problems being generally experienced today and bearing, among others, on the economic, political, social, ecological, and religious aspects of social and individual life do not seem to find a solution in the new technologies or the new economics. At the same time, the increasing attention to culture supports the theory that what is required by the present challenge is a renewed awareness of culture and values with the explicit intent of revivifying that same culture and values. This awareness of one's own culture and of other cultures has become a compelling and since human life and society are increasingly multicultural. Such awareness seems to have spread quite widely also in philosophy extending the possibility of a philosophical analysis of culture and the probability of different theories ensuing from it. The awareness stresses above all the need for a debate that should extend beyond the confines of the philosopher's culture, namely it has to be a multicultural debate in which every philosophy is an equal partner. Globalization has the potential of fostering a multiculturalism that moves across cultures without however leveling them. For some, globalization will bring about one global culture, either by propagating the Western one or by causing a synthesis of all or some world cultures. But it actually seems that, contrary to appearance, globalization will foster heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. In fact, as globalization extends a sense of universal belonging, human beings can hardly identify themselves with such a general and vague phenomenon. They will need to be rooted in the specific and the local. Hence, as globalization fosters cultural heterogeneity, philosophers need to come to terms with it.

And yet, according to A.L. Lowell, nothing is more evasive than culture when it comes to defining it and understanding its nature. Culture cannot be effectively analyzed because its components are numberless and it cannot be properly described because it is changeable. Trying to grasp the significance of culture "is like trying to seize the air in the hand, when one finds that it is everywhere except within one's grasp."[1] It is not possible to treat comprehensively such an elusive and emotive word as culture ("when I hear the word culture I reach for my gun," declared

[1] A.L. Lowell, "Culture," in *At War with Academic Traditions in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 115.

the poet Heinz Johst – not Goering as is generally believed.)[2] Johann Gottfried von Herder commented that nothing was more indeterminate than this word.[3]

An indication of the vast range of meanings attributed to culture emerges from, among others, the following list of its synonyms,[4]

1. Civilization, customs, life style, mores, society, stage of development, the arts, way of life.
2. Accomplishment, breeding, education, elevation, enlightenment, erudition, gentility, good taste, improvement, polish, politeness, refinement, urbanity.
3. Agriculture, agronomy, cultivation, farming, husbandry.[5]

There is a need, then, for a clarification of the concept of culture, which is the initial "supposition of terms," basic to any philosophical endeavor. Philosophy cannot proceed to any elaboration on culture – ontological, epistemological, ethical or otherwise, until it has clarified the meaning of the concept it intends to elaborate upon. The evasiveness and unclarity of such an important term as culture that co-extends to cover, practically, the entire span of human existence, poses a unique problem to philosophy which it needs to take up as philosophy cannot exclude any aspect of existence from its critical consideration.

In such a philosophical exercise, the term culture needs to be accepted as the echo of human life both past and present. This requires openness and sensitivity to the increasing multicultural situation of contemporary society, whether by recent migrations or by historical conditions. It also requires knowing the history of the consideration leads to a note of caution about the still fairly widespread assumption, practical if not theoretical, that the significance and the contents of culture are just those in which one has been inculturated. As one clarifies one's understanding of culture, one needs to bear in mind that others may have different understandings of it. Culture is not understood everywhere in the same way.

Today philosophy cannot exclude any particular vision as inadequate. If a philosopher insists that the tools that worked in the past, whether recent or remote, are the standards by which to continue performing philosophical analysis of the present challenges, such a philosopher would actually work against the progress of thought. If a philosopher cannot envisage that his/her basic tenets are liable to questioning, he/she will continue turning over and over again paradigms, systems, and names which he/she can identify with, but that could have little or no meaning for other philosophers beyond his/her cultural boundaries. Western culture is used to a long tradition of philosophical systems and names that have tended to be considered universally relevant rather than particular answers to the challenges arising from its tradition and culture. It is understandably

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[2] A. Bullock, O. Stallybrass and S. Trombley, eds. *Dictionary of Modern Thought* (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 195.

[3] J.G. von Herder, *Works*, Suphan, ed., XIII, 4.

[4] *The Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus* (London and Glasgow: Collins, 1987), s.v. "Culture."

[5] The quoted multiplicity of meanings is paralleled by an equal multiple use of the adjective "cultural." *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, D.L. Sills, ed. (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 3., 527-568. It lists the following articles in it: cultural adaptation, cultural ecology, cultural evolution, cultural integration, cultural lag, cultural relativism. From the beginning of the 20th century there seems to have been a glorification of culture expressed, among others, by such terms as cultural traits, cultural complexes, cultual types, cultural centers, cultural clubs, cultural areas, cultural models, cultural migrations, cultural convergencies, cultural pluralism, cultural education, and cultural industry.

difficult for a Western philosopher, as for anybody else in a similar situation, to distance himself/herself from those systems and names in which he/she has invested his/her knowledge, identity and life.

At the same time, such a philosopher cannot avoid questions about what that personal and cultural world of thought may mean to the rest of the world. It is sometimes felt that philosophy has come rather late to the issue of culture vis-à-vis the reaction of other disciplines. If, besides having arrived late, such attention is now out of focus by being fixed on given categories and methods, then the ensuing philosophical activity becomes irrelevant. The multicultural context in which the contemporary philosopher cannot help to be operating implies that a philosopher cannot continue to stand, so to speak, at the center of his/her personal world. He/she needs to shift to the limits of that world, to the boundaries with other worlds, and be on the divide between cultural differences. It may even be a divide that cuts across the very mind of the philosopher needing to recast his/her mental schemes. Such a multicultural context requires the ability to think among and within multiple identities implying that a philosopher needs to develop the ability to interpret a culture which is beyond his/her own and, to be able to do so, to go more deeply within his/her own culture. The present globalization trend, in itself, does not necessarily lead to multicultural sensitivity. But as already mentioned, globalization seems to foster cultural heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. Namely, the more people are exposed to other cultures, the more likely they are to root themselves in their own culture. This happens in order to safeguard their identity from being diluted into a "global culture" too generic to be able to give specificity to a person.

A Contemporary Understanding of Culture

Widening the Understanding

The present concept of culture finds its roots in 17th and 18th century Europe, at the time when there began a self-reflection that led to, among others, the cultural self-consciousness of modern times. J.G. von Herder points out that human beings are reflective begins namely capable of self-awareness. This capacity makes them aware of their limitations which they try to overcome, setting off in them a continuous becoming.[6] Herder adds that human beings are also characterized by freedom. This ability to choose and the perception of imperfection constitute the human drive at the origin of culture. These characteristics and similar thinking made culture a fundamental human activity enhancing its importance in the mind and in the life of people.

At the origin of the modern understanding of culture, there was also an increasing desire for a better understanding of other peoples and particularly of their history. If was felt that history could not consist merely of the political and military events but also of the social, economic, artistic and similar aspects of life. In other words, there was an increasing interest in the culture of other peoples. That cultural interest was encouraged by the increasing contacts that were taking place with and among peoples through their journeys and migrations, and that produced challenging descriptions of new systems of social life and of new cultures.

The interest in self-reflection and in the life of other peoples was at the origin of the present understanding of culture and thus when E.B. Tylor formulated his definition of culture in 1871 as a "complex whole," there were already theoretical premises and practical needs emerging from history. There was also a critique of the prevalent understanding of culture up to that time that was more restrictive in meaning. As it will be explained below. Tylor actually borrowed the term and

[6] Von Herder, op.cit., 28, 95, 98.

idea from Gustav Klemm who in turn owned it to Voltaire. But it was only about fifty years after Tylor's definition that the new understanding began to assert itself.

The new understanding demanded an almost radical change of perspective in considering culture and consequently a substantial re-organization of one's way of thinking on the matter. The new understanding emerged and expanded through a gradual evolution. This slow process meant that culture continued to be taken in its traditional meaning while at the same time an increasing number of people were discovering and using the new meaning. This overlap of meanings increased the complexity of the concept of culture as the new understanding was not an alternative to the old one but rather an addition to it.

This emerges, for instance, from the definition given 36 years after of Tylor by R.H. Lowie for whom culture was "the sum total of what an individual acquires from his society, those beliefs, customs, artistic norms, food-habits, and crafts which come to him not by his own creative activity but as a legacy from the past, conveyed by formal or informal education."[7] The "sum total" of this definition echoes the "complex whole" of Tylor, capturing the comprehensive nature of the new understanding of culture. Lowie's definition includes a specific reference to "formal or informal education," a dimension that was typical of the previous understanding of culture indicating how the new understanding was trying to combine with the old one. During this transitional phase, some people started using the term "culture" with the new meaning while others preferred to use new terms to avoid the ambiguity that could arise by combining an old term with a new meaning. Among this latter group, Montesquieu, for instance, preferred to use the "spirit of the people," Voltaire the "spirit of nation," Kant the "national characteristics," Romagnosi the "mental character of a people" and "civil culture," Marx the "social conscience," Morselli the "mental life of peoples" and the "mental structures of society," Labriola the "psychology of the classes," Ardigò the "mental formation of peoples," Gramsci the "ideological structure" and the "sentiments of the masses."[8]

The slow recognition of the new understanding of culture was also due to a lack of drive towards a theoretical reflection by the very people who were trying to effect such transition. According to Kuckhohn and Kroeber, the slowness in adopting the new meaning of culture and also its lack of clearness and precision, has to be attributed, to a great extent, to the anthropologists themselves who initially concerned themselves with the collection of data while only recently they realized the theoretical issues related to their science.[9] They continued for along time "to pour new wine into old wineskins," namely to vest the new concept with the old term.

Presently, the new concept of culture has becomes fundamental in understanding contemporary society and it is said to be the cornerstone on which the entire structure of the social sciences rests.[10] According to some scholars, this new concept is a key notion in contemporary thought, comparable to gravitation in physics, to disease in medicine, and to evolution in biology.[11] At this point, one can recall the definition elaborated by Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn from a survey of 164 definitions of culture namely, "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of

[7] R.H. Lowie, *The History of Ethnological Theory* (New York: Rinehart, 1937), 3.

[8] T. Tentori, "Cultura," in E. Pace, ed., *Dizionario di Sociologia ed Anthropologia Culturale* (Assisi: Cittadella, 1984), 154-155.

[9] C. Kluckhohn and A.L. Kroeber, *Il concetto di cultura*, II (Bologna: Mulino, 1982), 89.

[10] S. Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York: Harper, 1948), 23.

[11] Kluckhohn and Kroeber, op.cit., 23. This assertion is made in the cultural context of USA.

culture consists of traditional (namely historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of actions on the other as conditioning elements of further action."[12] C. Kluckhohn simplified this definition as follows. "Culture is the total life way of a people, the social legacy the individual acquires from his group."[13] F. M. Keesing proposed an equally simple but sharper definition according to which culture is "the totality of man's learned, accumulated experience which is socially transmitted, or more, briefly, the behavior acquired through social learning."[14]

The new concept of culture emphases the communal dimension of culture. The subject of culture is the community. Culture is first of all a social resources. The person is in culture and a recipient of it absorbing it by a kind of natural osmosis from the community. Individuals acquire their identity and personality in and from society. Culture is anthropogenic. Hence every person is cultured by the simple fact of being born and reared in society. An uncultured person, namely a person lacking a culture, cannot exist. All the definitions of the new understanding of culture convey this communal characteristic either overtly or covertly. Such a characteristic emerges from expressions like society, group, community, social legacy, social heredity, social transmission, social learning, patrimony, and similar references to group dynamics.

According to the new concept, every society has its culture and thus wherever there is a society there is a culture. Culture is universal in the sense that culture belongs to every society. Every people has and lives its own culture as its particular point of arrival in time and space, namely as its specific historical and geographical heritage, or as the answer to its past and present experiences. Cultures are thus as many as the social experiences of peoples. This concept of culture entails a pluralistic vision within which every person acknowledges a multiplicity of cultural traditions, aware that every society lives and transmits its own culture. Such diversified reality of culture is allowed to exist and to develop so that everyone may be allowed to live and to develop one's culture in the awareness of the universal variety of cultures.

The new understanding of culture started also from a consideration of the outer manifestations of culture, namely customs and traditions, two terms that occur in most definitions of the present concept, thus indicating that one of the interests of contemporary culture is what can be empirically observed in the behavior of people living in society. This attention to behavior extends to the consideration of norms, rules and modes, reaching analysis of the values and ideals that motivate such behavior. However, as already mentioned, the exercise starts and develops from the empirical reality of practical behavior pointing to the practical dimension that characterizes the new concept of culture. One can detect here the influence of positivism, the school that emphasized more than others this empirical aspect pervading contemporary culture and focusing on the "how" of life rather than the "why" of existence.

Whole and Inner-Outer Aspects

[12] A.L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical review of Concepts and Definitions*. Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, vol. XLVII, no. 1, 1952. Though the authors explicitly considered 164 definitions of culture (38-40), they actually used "close to 300 definitions" of it in this book, as they explained (149).

[13] C. Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man: The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life* (New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill, Witlesey House, 1949), 17.

[14] F.M. Keesing, *Cultural Anthropology: The Science of Custom* (New York: Rinehart, 1958), 18.

The definition of culture given by E.B. Tylor in 1871 says, "Culture or civilization is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[15] This definition has been superseded except for one element that remains fundamental in contemporary culture. It is the reference to culture as "a complex whole" that has characterized subsequent definitions ever since, as for instance that of Lowie that speaks of "sum total," Kluckhohn of "total life" and Keesing of "totality."

Tylor's holistic conception of culture was not new, G.B. Vico, for instance, had compared culture to a tree trunk, from which logic, morals, economics, and politics grow. Diderot used the image of a swarm of bees. These early writers however were presenting a kind of monolithic unity or one universal culture. Also Herder had asserted the cultural whole but unlike Vico and Diderot, he underlined at the same time cultural pluralism. "There is no such thing, Herder declared, as a people devoid of culture. To be sure, there are differences but these are differences of degree, not of kind. To apply the standard of European culture as a standard for comparison, let alone as a universal yardstick of human values, is plainly meaningless. Each culture carries within itself its own immanent validity, and hence we have to think of the world as being composed of uniquely different socio-cultural entities, each with its own pattern of development, its own inner dynamic growth." Herder added that "to speak of a cultural whole is not necessarily a way of referring to a state of blissful harmony; it may just as conceivably refer to a field of tension."[16] In other words, cultures have both positive and negative elements. This is not to say that culture comprises anything that happens in life or "all the thrush," as a critic of this idea dismissed it. Tylor's definition of culture with its key concept of "complex whole" had however a better resonance than the previous ones, due also to the fact that so much had gone before it to facilitate such resonance.

A further point made by Herder relates to his rejection of the dualism between material and non-material activity in culture. Artifacts were as much part of culture as ideas, beliefs, and values. Culture comprised all the creative activities of human beings, both what they did and what they thought.[17]

Much of the foundation and evolution of the new concept of culture rested on the empirical datum related to culture. That empirical datum provided the external aspect of the manifestation of culture, the study of which led, in turn, to the values and meanings that constituted the internal or motivational aspect of culture. The essential unity of the two aspects needs to be stressed.

The external or outer aspect or "body" of culture refers to the heritage of a community that is outwardly and easily perceived, consisting of the entire set of material artifacts and forms of behavior. It is described as the total body of material artifacts (tools, weapons, houses; places of work, worship, government, recreation; works of art, etc.); it is seen in distinctive forms of behavior related to the most important aspects in life (birth, marriage, death), to the cult, to family relationships (behavior with children, parents, relatives, kinsmen), to the exercise of government (behavior towards authority, deviants), to the contracts, work, hunting, fishing, war and other organized aspects developed by a society (sometimes deliberately, sometimes through unforeseen interconnections and consequences), in its ongoing activities within its particular life-conditions, and (though undergoing kinds and degrees of changes) transmitted from generation to generation.[18]

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[15] E.B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London: John Murray, 1871), 5.

[16] F.M. Barnard, "Culture and Civilization in Modern Times," in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, P.P. Wiener, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), vol. 1, 618.

[17] Ibid.

[18] R. Fletcher, "Culture," in Bullock, Stallybrass and Trombley, eds., op.cit., 195.

The understanding of culture in this outer aspect is widely adopted in ordering language. It finds an echo, for instance, over the mass media, in the activities of institutions such as Ministries of Culture, Schools of Fine Arts, some University Departments, cultural movements and festivals, much of literature, and various conferences movements and festivals, much of literature, and various conferences and seminars on culture. At the popular level, culture is usually understood in this outer aspect.

The inner aspect, the "mind" or "soul" of culture is the collective mental and spiritual heritage, such as systems of symbols, ideas, beliefs, aesthetic perceptions, values, and the like. Also this inner aspect like the outer aspect described above, is produced by a community in its activities within its life-condition, and transmitted from generation to generation. This inner aspect is sometimes described as a mentality or worldview. Kluckhohn and Kroeber refer to this inner aspect as "the essential nucleus of ideas and values." For Tentori it is "an intangible something."[19] This "soul" of culture finds an echo in the cultural ethos understood as the integral principle present in a culture by which "the cultural material is collected and transferred into coherent models according to definite inner needs developed together with the group."[20] Some perceive a link between the inner aspect of culture and the weltanschauung. Hence, the inner aspect attains its concrete fulfillment in the external aspect can be fully understood only by reference to its inner source which is the *raison d'être* of the outer body of culture.

The new definitions of culture have put the inner and outer aspects of culture in a mutual relation leading to the consideration of the manner and the rationality by which these two aspects interact among themselves and establish culture. Some of these definitions have focused on what constitutes or underlies culture, namely on its inner aspect. This tendency has led researchers to move beyond the material expressions of culture and also beyond the specific models of life and patterns of values that a particular culture proposes, the assumption being that, even though a specific culture is made up of such elements, culture in general should not be identified with them. In this latter understanding, culture should transcend its specific empirical manifestations and be, "a state or condition – sometimes described as extra or super organic – of which all human societies are participants, notwithstanding their particular cultures may have deep qualitive diffrences."[21] This attention to a more abstract should not to be the primacy or the constitutive elements of culture. This constitutive element is rathe the models, norms, rules and criteria implicit in behavior, social relations and artifacts. Hence, in the final analysis, culture consists of systems of meanings, of ideologies, of conventional knowledge, and of the cognitive and unconscious structures that are recognized in society at various levels of consciousness and verbal expression.[22]

Such abstraction of culture is queried by several scholars as having gone far beyond the verifiable. In their opinion, as culture is essentially constituted of both an inner (non-material) and an outer (material) component, its description or definition must remain, in some way, empirically controllable, and therefore quantifiable. Hence, though culture is constituted by a complex whole

[19] Tentori in Kluckhohn and Kroeber, op.cit., 14.

[20] Benedict in Kluckhohn and Kroeber, op.cit. 365.

[21] Kluckhohn and Kroeber, op.cit., 33-34.

[22] M. Singer, "The Concept of Culture," in Sills, ed., op.cit., 539-541. The idealization of culture has lead into identifying it with a religion. T.S. Eliot stated that "what is part of our culture is part of our lived religion" (*Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* [London: Faber and Faber, 1962], 31). The issue here is defining religion as in some cases the meaning of religion has been extended to include also communism that, at the same time, vowed to destroy religion. Eliot, for instance, says that materialism could be a religion in the proper sense.

of meaning and values, of processes and decisions, these abstract components must be concretely verifiable and so, for example, the nucleus of ideas and values (Kluckhohn and Kroeber), the intangible something (Tentori) or the cultural ethos (Benedict) and only e considered if they are measurable.

The existential interest of contemporary philosophy helps to understand the present concern for the experimental dimension of culture. Philosophy abstracts but without loosing its link to the whole of reality. The present field of culture is comprehensive. For philosophy its field has always been so encompassing. Hence, the awareness of cultural comprehensiveness is echoed by a similar concern in philosophy. Today such comprehensiveness has become mandatory for any meaningful discourse, particularly if it is interdisciplinary. Postmodernism itself, with its emphasis on the particular and the concrete, call for the consideration of both the abstract and the concrete in reality, and, in the case of culture, both for its inner and its outer aspects.

An Early Understanding of Culture

Origin and Characteristics

The present awareness of culture would not be fully understood if one did not refer to the semantic origin of culture and try to capture the original meaning of it. The term "culture" derives from the Latin verb colere, meaning "to cultiviate." The term described originally the act of bestowing labor and attention upon the land for the raising of crops (cultura agri, cultiviation of the field). From this agricultural meaning, the metaphorical meaning of "cultivation" or "formation of the mind, of the spirit, of the soul" (cultura animi) was later derived.[23] Culture was thus applied to the progress, to the perfecting, to the refinement of the person, through education or training, by teaching and learning. Hence, when the Greeks and the Romans spoke of culture, they referred basically to an exercise that today would be described as educational. The Greek term for cultura animi was paideia which is today rendered as "education," confirming the educational vision within which culture was originally understood.[24] Culture was originally "scholarship (namely possession of a more or less vast number of notions in the various fields of human knowledge) and education, formation and development of the mind, of the soul and of the body (namely mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and physical development)."[25]

Culture stressed the attention to the person in view of perfecting him/her by cultivating in him/her the ability to speculate, to ponder, to contemplate, and to theorize. Philosophy was the supreme learning that attained its final goal in contemplation. Outside such educational exercise there was no culture. One who was not "cultivated" would be uncultured. Hence, within this early understanding, people could be cultured or uncultured, contrary to the contemporary understanding

[23] Cultura animi philosophia est, "Philosophy is the cultivation of the soul" (Cicero, *De Tusculanibus Quaestionibus*, 8a, 11, 5, 13).

[24] The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy in Boston, USA, August 10-16, 1998, had the title "Paideia, Philosophy Educing Humanity (in French, Paideia, La Philosophie dans L'Education de L'Humanite)." This confirms the understanding of paideia as education.

[25] "Cultura" in B. Mondin, *Dizionario Enciclopedico di Filosofia Teologica e Morale* (Minano: Massimo, 1989), 183.

of culture for which such an alternative is not possible as every human being is born into a culture.[26]

In a debate on this point, one participant stated that, "today there are millions of people who are uncultured, though they are educated." Asked to explain, the participant referred to "the herds of people, of the millions of people, who do things mindlessly, thoughtless people, because others think for them. They are not to be compared to those in traditional societies where people tried not to violate norms. This is an entirely different frame of reference and is strangely self-generated. It does not seem to follow any order of values; just blind imitation. One can think of a kind of nihilism, where, for example, dishonoring parents is deemed a good way to behave."

The answer to this statement seems to envisage three possibilities. First, if one intends culture the way it is generally understood today, then such a statement would not be accepted as every human being is necessarily cultured. Second, if one understands culture as it was originally understood namely as something one acquires through education, then the statement could be accepted, except for the fact that the above objection specifies that the uncultured people referred to are all educated. This opens the third possibility, namely that the objector had a different concept of culture from the ones being considered in this article, in which case the objector needs to clarify such meaning. In each of the cases, what cannot be accepted is the use of a concept of culture to assess issues within another concept of culture, unless one has a clear reason for doing so and specifies the concept or concepts one is using.

As noted, when the ancient Greeks and Romans spoke of culture, they had a set of ideas that related basically to education. Education was centered on the person and passed on from person to person. Hence culture began and developed from the knowledge acquired through personal study and transmitted from teacher to learner, from person to person. Culture was thus eminently a personal exercise. A "cultured" person was one who had studied and acquired systematic notions. Culture was the goal towards which a person strived in order to attain a complete self-realization through the education and the formation of his/her mind and, through such knowledge, a corresponding betterment of his/her conduct. Culture was the activity by which the human being colit seipsum, namely cultivate himself/herself, in order to attain the fullness of his/her humanity. Culture was acquired by assimilating ideals, values, dispositions inculcated by a good educational tradition and transmitted especially by the liberal disciplines. Such a cultured person was given respect and distinction. He/she was considered above the ordinary person or the uncultured individual and he/she could easily be given a privileged treatment. There was an implicit sense of elitism in this original meaning of culture. Even though a person was born into a cultural tradition, he/she needed to acquire and to manage that tradition through an active appropriation. Culture was under the control of the person rather than the person under the control of culture. A person made or generated his/her culture.

Ancient Greek and Roman education conveyed supreme models to be imitated and perennial truths to be adhered to. In the thinking of that time, the classics were immortal works, philosophy was perennial, the laws represented the wisdom of humanity. The cultura animi or paideia was thus assumed to be universally valid and thus necessarily normative. That understanding fostered a unitary vision of reality. People imbued with that concept of culture perceived the pluralism that life inevitably offered but it was seen as being accidental. Beyond the apparent diversity, reality

[26] Culture as cultura animi and paideia, namely educationally understood, has lasted over many centuries in Western history and some persons consider it in this way also at present. The author was told that such understanding may be found, for instance, at Oxford and Cambridge Universities.

was believed to be ultimately and substantially one. People believed that there was a substantial unity beyond the accidental variety. Culture itself was one, namely the one they belonged to.

Cultura animi and paideia referred principally to knowledge that had its climax in speculation and theory. The highest form of knowledge and thus the apex of culture was contemplation.[27] Contemplative life was contrasted to practical activity. It was pure theory, superior knowledge of transcendental realities. Culture had its highest expression in philosophy, which in turn achieved its climax in contemplation. Philosophy could be pursued only by a limited number of people as only a few of them had the necessary ability and endurance of overcoming appearance to reality, immediacy to reach remoteness, utility to reach goodness. Moreover, not everyone who set off on the trail of philosophy attained its final stage of contemplation. If the calling to philosophy was for the few, its contemplative peak was for even fewer. It was for those who, besides having the mental ability to philosophize, were also allowed by their life condition to undertake a theoretical-contemplative activity. It could not be an activity for those who had to labor and fatigue, like servants or slaves. It was for free people (liberi), namely for those capable of attending to the liberal or free arts as philosophy and related disciplines were called. This further highlights the elitism in the early understanding of culture.

With regard to the practical outcome of theory in the field of behavior, cultura animi or paideia attended, first of all, to cultivate ideals and principles to which subsequently the corresponding behavior would have followed. The cultured person had first to know what to do and then later the same person would have testified to such knowledge by behaving accordingly. Culture tended to produce good behavior while an ignorant or uncultured person would have not known what to do and consequently would have not been able to behave properly.

Retrospective Analysis

As one looks retrospectively to history, particularly to ancient history, the cautionary note is that one should not look at the past through one's present categories. When it comes to analyzing differences between past and present, one should avoid the hard or sharp dichotomies that have emerged in modern times. Hence, when saying that ancient cultures emphasize the individual, one may be led to conclude that the ancient Greeks neglected the group while, on the country, they gave considerable importance to the polis within which they had a deep sense of the community. The community and the individual were so intertwined that they could not really be disentangled from that of modern times. Again, when one says that the ancient vision was theoretical and the modern one is practical, one ought to recall that in ancient times, practical wisdom was part of reason, part of what it meant to be rational. Today one thinks of theoretical knowledge within virtue while in ancient times practical wisdom was part of knowledge. Such retrospective assessment may deprive the present of the richness and the manner in which things that are now being separated were once intertwined.

The above cautionary note is a reminder of the possibility of cast one's mental categories on reality, a possibility of which philosophers are generally aware. In assessing the past, as well as the present for that matter, one is conditioned by one's mental categories. A philosopher is aware of the various epistemological problems concerning the field of knowledge and, ultimately, of the egocentric predicament in any mental exercise. When the object of knowledge is in the past or even more so in the remote past, the epistemological problems become even more challenging.

[27] For Plato, the supreme ideal was the contemplation of ideas, especially the idea of good, of beauty and of the one. For Aristotle, contemplation was leading the person to his/her highest perfection.

Acknowledging this, however, does not entail giving up the attempt to probe, for instance, into the meaning of culture as understood in ancient times. In such analysis, as in any other philosophical activity, one cannot remain stranded in such epistemological doubt. It is possible to move beyond such doubt by proceeding on some working hypothesis which, in this specific case, envisages the possibility to know the past as well as the present. Namely it is possible to know the historical dimensions of culture and to communicate among existing cultures. Surrendering to doubt with a relativistic attitude concerning this possibility frustrates any attempt at an intercultural discourse.

The assertion made above that the personal, unitary, and theoretical dimensions characterize the ancient understanding of culture does not imply that the ancients had no idea of communalism, pluralism, and practice. It simply says that those dimensions were typical of the early concept of culture which differs from the present concept of culture. One obviously admits the deep awareness of communal life as expressed in the polis. Using the present understanding of culture, one can admit that such communalism was highly appraised at the time of the polis. But the point here is that the ancient Greeks and Romans had a different concept of culture from the present one and that in their culture it was the person rather than the community that was emphasized. The remark that their culture (used here with the contemporary meaning) was intensely and characteristically social would convey a different meaning to the minds of the ancient Greeks and Romans from that intended by the same remark expressed in the cultural language of today. The ancient Greeks and Romans could have understood the remark as meaning, for instance, that the elitist cultura animi or paideia was extending to their entire society and perhaps also beyond the social differences that marked off the slaves and beyond the boundaries that sealed off barbarians. But they would have found such a vision not to be true. Ideas related to the communal, pluralistic or empirical aspects of life were definitely present in the minds of the ancient Greeks and Romans. These ideas however were not characteristics of culture as it was understood by them.

The same consideration can be applied to the issue of theory vis-à-vis practice as related to behavior. Cultura animi and paideia aimed at giving principles from which the corresponding behavior would have ensured. Although good teaching was expected to produce good behavior, teaching and learning had a validity of their own. If no good behavior ensued from them, that would have not undermined the validity of the educational exercise which was not per se measured on results. The main concern of culura animi and paideia was to address the mind endowing it with the theoretical framework for proper behavior. This did not entail that they were not concerned good behavior and practice, but only that these aspects were not the main dimension of their cultura animi or paideia. For instance, one supporter of the view that theory and practice could not be separated in the thinking of the ancient Greeks and Romans stated that such a view "was laid down in Aristotle but one could find it more generally in the culture." Such statement was actually using culture with the comprehensive meaning of today and in this case it made sense. But if the person meant to use it within the ancient understanding of culture, then the assertion would not be valid.

This article highlighted some past dimensions of culture that were considered particularly significant in illustrating the different meaning of the same meaning. This selection of cultural aspects does not exclude others that could have also been mentioned. The cultural aspects cited in this article are but conceptual instruments and emphases to explain the dynamics of culture and to help understand contemporary culture. They are in no way to be interpreted as hard or sharp categories.

Culture, Its Comprehensiveness and Its Language

The first problem in dealing with cultural differences, particularly in their historical dimension as attempted in this article, is mainly the present concept of culture itself and specifically its comprehensive dimension together with the language presently used to talk about it. The above remarks concerning the danger of sharp categories in dealing with past culture should be brought to bear ultimately on the present concept of culture in the sense that this concept is actually the most dangerous category likely to be applied to past understandings of cultures. It is assumed, if not theoretically at least practically, that what is presently understood by culture is what has always been so understood. Such an assumption causes one to loose the sense of cultural dynamics and assume that one's own concept of culture is enough to understand other cultures.

A second difficulty in dealing with past cultures arises specifically from the comprehensive dimension afforded to the concept of culture today. Culture is now considered to embrace the entire way of living of human beings in society and thus to pervade human existence in all its dimensions, including the empirical one. Such pervasiveness entails the existence of both positive and negative elements in culture. However, this does not mean that everything an individual does is to be considered cultural. Culture is eminently social, according to its present understanding. Hence, only what has been acquired and is being lived out at a communal level can be considered cultural. A cultural element has to be part of the thinking and behavior of most people in a society. It has to have some historical or traditional depth. Hence, culture is not a mere description of whatever appears to be happening in society.

In connection with the above point, someone recalled a television program in the United States in which the son of a top leader gave a parody of his father. To the question why he would do this to his father, the son responded, "They (the audience) pay for that, that is the American way," The questioner further inquired whether this kind of "garbage" could be called culture. The answer, implicit in the present and popular understanding of culture, is that money controls people's actions and likes; what the son did, does indeed, represent "US culture." The son's use of money as the prime motivator and reference point for culture is telling. If enough people are willing to pay for it, it's culture. One could argue that the son wrongly applied a principle that could otherwise have some value in it. But in the present understanding of culture there are right as well as wrong expressions, values and non values. The wrong expressions or the non values are not "uncultural" by being wrong or no values.

Culture also contains "garbage" that needs to be faced and not just ignored. It includes the above example. Although the example may be dismissed as simply vicious commercialization, this "garbage" is very much an issue of culture. If culture were to focus only on the correct manner to honor parents and the correct hierarchy of values, culture would be neglecting an extensive area which is admittedly negative, nevertheless cultural. The positive area of culture cannot be properly attended to unless its counter side, the negative one, is also considered. To understand and assess both one's culture and that of others, one needs to be aware of both the right and the wrong, good or bad elements of culture. This is not a prejudicial judgement on culture but simply admitting the possibility that cultural elements may be right or wrong, good or bad. Culture is not ethics. Judgements about culture are specifically ethical, but the field of culture extends beyond that of ethics.

A third problem concerning the understanding of culture derives from the language used at present in talking of culture. Such language "gives by default" paradigms and classifications already set in one's mind. Such "default" language and ideas lead "naturally" to misunderstanding other cultures that ought to be considered within different paradigms. An example of such misunderstanding has emerged above in dealing with the early understanding of culture and with

the differences between the early and the present understandings of culture. Another misunderstanding relates to the present understanding of culture when related to the social sciences that have contributed to its development. In fact, the present understanding is sometimes qualified as "sociological" due to its emphasis on the social dimension of human existence. The term "sociological" causes uneasiness in some philosophers who fear that the term makes culture merely descriptive and empirical. In fact, some of them go on to describe the comprehensive concept of culture as being an expression of empiricism and the early concept as indicative of idealism. Such "default" language frustrates the attempt to establish a relation among the two concepts and to understand their development from the past to the present.

Relation between Early and Contemporary Understanding

Coexistence of Meanings

The contemporary meaning of culture as "the whole way of life, material, intellectual, and spiritual, of a given society" appears to be presently predominant.[28] Within it, past meanings or shades of meaning continue to coexist, emerging when emphasized for one reason or other. Among them, the ones that appear to be most referred to, besides the basic one just mentioned, are "a general state or habit of the mind," echoing the early meaning of culture, "a general state of intellectual and moral development in a society as a whole," comprising both the early (intellectual development) and the present (social whole) understanding, and "the general body of the arts and intellectual work," that stresses the visible or outer aspect of culture.[29] One needs obviously to be aware of these meanings and of the emphasis being put on one or the other in order to be able to deal effectively with issues related to culture. The possibility of oscillating among various meanings, even in the course of the same argument, may make it difficult to understand which specific meaning is being employed. The resulting possibility of ambiguity and misunderstanding poses an unavoidable challenge in intercultural relations and sometimes the only way to meet it is by being clearly aware of it. In fact, the best attitude vis-à-vis the multifaceted meaning of culture seems to be that of avoiding overemphasizing a single meaning. With regard to the early and the present meaning, it seems that a balance between the two would give a better reading of the cultural reality. The two concepts ought to be understood in harmonic relation between themselves or as concomitant aspects of the same reality.[30] Thus, while the present-comprehensive meaning can encourage the communal dimension of life, social cohesion, attention to the others, collaboration, tolerance and practicality, an exclusive attention to it could encourage attitudes of relativism, of pragmatism, of libertinism, and of exploitation. On the other hand, the early concept of culture stresses universal and absolute values, attention to the person, to principles, to tradition, and to human rights, but a lopsided adherence to it could make one's outlook monistic, fundamentalist, intolerant, idealistic, and one's life more individualistic than social. Too much stress on the present concept of culture with its emphasis on multiculturalism could lead to a form of relativism that would render communication with other cultures problematic and even impossible. On the other hand, overstressing the early concept could encourage a kind of cultural universalism that would

[28] R. Williams, "Culture and Civilization," in Paul Edwards, eds., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and the Free Press) vol. 2, 273.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Each of the two meanings is given a separate treatment by two different authors in the *Enciclopedia Garzanti di Filosofi*. F. Jesi and I. Magli, "Cultura-civilta," in *Enciclopedia Garzanti di Filosofi*, 190-192.

not allow the recognition of other cultures. Hence, no matter whether the emphasis is on cultural pluralism or cultural monism, the outcome would be substantially the same, namely a radical inability to understand human and social difference. It is thus advisable, as suggested, to develop a balanced view of the meanings within culture and the three sections that follow are pointers in this direction.

Person-Community Relation

In the original understanding of culture, as noted, the person produces and administers culture. Culture is basically a personal value giving a sense of fulfillment and sometimes also of superiority. In the present understanding, culture is produced by society which transmits it to the person. Culture is a social resource equally shared by all. The predicament of this latter understanding is whether and how much a person can influence culture which echoes the one between individual liberty and social cohesion. Human history seems to be marked by a constant sway of emphasis on individual liberty, which are then characterized by an equal emphasis on social cohesion. The climax of individual liberty marks a reaction leading to the assertion of social cohesion, and the peak in social cohesion generates a returning movement towards individual liberty. A similar dynamism could be also detected, to some extent, behind the present communitarian or social concept of culture. The reaction to this social emphasis seems to be at work in a renewed attention to the person. While admitting that culture is an asset of the entire society, it is pointed out that culture is actualized by individual persons. Cultural forms differ according to the way in which individual persons live such forms in their respective life situations. Moreover, persons do not simply receive culture, they seem also to manage it, namely they are not only receptive of culture but also respondents to it. The individual who partakes of a culture exercises on it personal choices and interpretations. Even when these choices and interpretations appear to be prevailingly imitative of social patterns, they still have something in them that is personal and unrepeatable. "The individual is the irreducible variable of every social and cultural situation. He/she is the leaven of the cultural fermentation, and every new element of culture can lead in its final analysis to the mind of some individual."[31] E. Sapir pointed out that the culture of a human group is the whole set of behavioral instances inherited through the society. But the real place of these elements of behavior is not in a theoretical community called "society." The real place of culture is in the actions of particular individuals and it resides in the heritage of meanings which each person abstracts. It is not possible to think of any cultural aspect that can be referred merely to society as such. There is no cultural element that belongs to the political organization, to the family life, to the religious faith, to the magic world, to the technological efforts, to aesthetic works, that coincides with society mechanically or sociologically defined.[32]

The definition of culture in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy is mainly comprehensive, as the present understanding expects it to be. However, the author concludes by stressing that the person is the controller of culture. "While individuals from a given culture are formed by it in all sorts of ways, conscious and unconscious, theoretical and practical, individuals are not prisoners within their cultures, but can affect them, reach against them and contribute to their development."[33] This definition combines both the present and the early understanding of

[31] R. Linton, *The Tree of Culture* (New York: Vintage, 1959), 40.

[32] E. Sapir, "Anthropologia culturale e psichica," in *Cultura, linguaggio e personalita* (Torino: Einaudi, 1972), 121-123.

[33] O'Hear, "Culture," in op.cit., 747.

culture, highlighting once more the need to combine the various meanings of culture especially when it comes to allowing for a more active role of the person in culture. The emphasis on the personal dimension in culture and life is not to be seen as an alternative to the social dimension in contemporary culture. It means regaining the dimension of the person as the balancing element to the dimension of society so that both dimensions complement each other.

Unity-Plurality Relation

The original concept of culture fostered a unitary vision of reality by which the person perceived pluralism as accidental; reality was substantially and ultimately one. Such vision gave unitary system of values facilitating a sense of unity in the person that sustained personal identity. As a result of this, a person felt firmly secure in his/her values and ideals, in his/her sense of purpose and direction in life. The original concept envisaged value in a unitary structure and ordered hierarchically among themselves in a system comprising sometimes a supreme value and a manner by which all other values are related to it and among themselves. However, this asset could have a negative side effect in the sense of leading individual persons to entrench themselves in their respective positions and cultures, closing themselves in self-sufficiency and in a firm sense of security that could become fundamentalism.

The comprehensive concept of culture favors pluralism and nourishes a better attitude toward human and social diversity helping people to perceive more easily the reality of otherness. It may however happen that the intense pluralism in which the modern person is living gives him/her the sense of belonging to more than one group at the same time, while in fact no single group gives him/her a sense of total belonging and fulfilment. As a result, a person feels integrated in his/her society only partially. No one group represents a person totally, namely no single person feels fully responsible to a group or to its members. This diversified attraction splinters the sense of social belonging and can gradually penetrate the person and shatter the sense of belonging to oneself. This disorganizes one's system of values and undermines identity.[34] When the experience of pluralism penetrates into the person it fosters relativism by which values and norms are considered contingent to the cultural context of each person, or it fosters pragmatism by which only what functions within one's experience is valid and true. Such relativism and pragmatism may lead to a form of individualism enhancing individual autonomy and withering one's concern for others. Hence, while pluralism may foster tolerance and coexistence, it may also breed an unhealthy individualism which in turn may undermine personal identity by shrinking relations with others, essential to identity.

The comprehensive understanding of culture considers the monistic, rigid and absolutist vision of values to be unrealistic. This vision is said to be derived from a single culture and it is thus ethnocentric, excluding in principle all other values. One should rather avoid referring to a general or universal hierarchy of values as every society seeks and finds its values within its cultural dynamics. One should not be looking for a unitary or monistic approach to values that would foster elitism, superiority and isolationism. "The day on which the most radical humanists will renounce the claim that the matter within their competence is superior or privileged, and they will adopt a humble and more universalistic human attitude, humanistic studies will cease entrenching themselves on defensive positions in the modern world."[35] The answer to the above

[34] M. Hattich, "Pluralism," in K. Rahner et al, eds., *Sacramentum Mundi* (London: Burns and Oates, 1970), 33s.

[35] Kluckhohn and Kroeber, op.cit., 80f.

remarks, in the words of W. Jaeger, is that the contemporary understanding of culture has degenerated to a merely descriptive function, while culture should above all present the concept of value and the ideal of perfection, according to the Greek vision of paideia.[36]

A way out of the above impasse between unified set of values vis-à-vis a scattered one, would seem to be a concept of culture entailing a truly comprehensive vision of the person. The person must be considered in his/her entirety, namely body, mind, emotions, rationality, and everything else that is, in one way or another, characteristically human. Limiting oneself to what can be physically perceived and described in the person and society, is in principle lopsided and biased. Culture and the person go far beyond a mere classification of kinship, behavior, colors, plants or diseases. More than one theoretical model is needed to do justice to the variety, complexity and richness of a culture and of a people.[37] A wide vision of culture entails a wide vision of the person, and vice versa. A comprehensive vision of culture and the consequential comprehensive vision of the person should eventually lead to a humanism within which people meet each other in those values that unite them and that constitutes them in their humanity. Humanism considers the human being as a supreme value.

The unitary dimension of culture is seemingly encouraged by the present globalization trend. If globalization promotes indeed unity, such unity cannot be a return to the one encouraged by the Enlightenment. Indeed, much of what is contained in the present concept of culture is actually a reaction to such a unity, understood as uniformity. The present trend toward unity needs to move forward not backward, namely toward new goals not to old visions. This novelty requires a rethinking of a unity which today involves the fact and value of diversity. Globalization implies that one person or one group cannot survive by closing themselves in. "We are living in a world in which difference is just a simple fact of life, but our collective thinking has yet to truly come to grips with this reality. This has to change. A workable world mentality means that we are going to have to make peace with those who are different from us."[38] The first reaction to diversity ought to be respect, as one cannot pass judgement on something one does not yet know about, the most important component of respect is an appreciation for another person as different from oneself,"[39] the very nature of a comprehensive understanding of culture must logically accept and act on that respect.

Theory-Practice Relation

Originally the concept of culture emphasized a theoretical approach to knowledge, while the contemporary concept focuses on what is empirically verifiable. This epistemological difference is perhaps the major contrast between the two understandings of culture. Today this problem relates basically to the possibility of a "valid knowledge outside the natural sciences."

M. Arnold explained culture as "a search for our total perfection by apprehending the best that has been thought and said in the world concerning all the arguments that press us more." He specified that the fundamental characteristics of this perfection are beauty and intelligence, or

[36] W. Jaeger, *Paideia, La formazione dell'uomo Greco*, La Nuova Italia, 3 volumes (Firenze, 1953-67), vol. 1, 6f.

[37] Singer, "The Concept of Culture," in op.cit., 539-541.

[38] J. Mohawk, "Epilogue: Looking for Columbus," in M.A. Jaimes, ed., *The state of Native America* (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 442, in L. May, S. Collins-Chobanian and K. Wong, eds., *Applied Ethics. A Multicultural Approach* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1998), 3.

[39] May, Collins-Chobanian and Wong, eds., op.cit., 3-4.

grace and light.[40] G. Sumner considers this description a "degeneration of the language…Arnold has found that culture consists in sweetness and light." Sumner's reaction focuses on "external sweetness" and "softness of contours" in Arnold, bypassing the inner aspect of culture highlighted by Arnold.[41] Sumner's reaction is quite typical of contemporary thinking that considers the inner aspect of culture as too elusive and in need to specify its real nature. "The anthropologists try to distance themselves from the classical (original) concept and to avoid an elusive concept of culture studying and specifying its nature."[42] Along this line of thought, social sciences consider the external manifestations of culture as the basic concern of the analyst. The internal aspects are considered indirectly or experimentally in so far as they manifest themselves externally. Such analysis is thus conducted from a factual rather than a conceptual point of view, resulting in theories like evolutionism, functionalism, and structuralism.

August Comte, the founder of sociology, inspired this approach. He wanted to overcome the inconclusive and metaphysical stage of the "why" and to attain the more fruitful and positive stage of the "how" of cultural phenomena. The impact of this approach has been extensive and penetrating.[43] This tallies with the crisis in metaphysics and the pervasive but deceptive assumption that presently people are generally satisfied with the technological "how," and uninterested in the metaphysical "why." On the other hand, people continue to be vexed by issues that persistently require answers to the "why" of existence to which people try to provide a personal answer which explains, partly, the continuous interest in religion and, of late, in contemplation. Contemplation recalls the sensible, imaginative, or intellectual consideration or "look" that goes directly to the image, to reality, without the mediation of the intellect, mediation which may be at times laborious or impossible.[44] It is an intellectual that has been betrayed by reason itself on account of the way in which some Western philosophers have dealt with reason. This contemplative look reaches or tries to reach a "sublime" object that no intellectual ascent could ever attain. Only direct intuition can arrive at such "sublime" perception.

For some time now, there has been an effort at recovering the contemplative sense, the desire and the capacity to see beyond sensible reality, to perceive the cultural soul beyond its bodily manifestation. As just mentioned, the interest in religion, in monastic life, in Eastern meditation and related experiences, seems to be pointing ultimately to such a contemplative desire.[45] It is an invitation not to fix one's boundaries on the limits of what is controllable but on the limits of what is possible. And who has ever contemplated where what is possible ends and where what is impossible begins for the human being? The evident, the material, the measurable, is too narrow for the person who thinks. The thought that reaches a limit, any limit, soon enough passes beyond it. Empiricism fits too tightly, even for science. The body and the mind, distinct from the inception of the modern era, seem to be together again. Postmodernism, with its skepticism toward the

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[40] M. Arnold, *Cultura e anarchia* (Torino: Einaudi, 1946), 6, 46, 73.

[41] W.G. Sumner, *Essays*, edited by A.G. Keller, M.R. Davie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 22-23.

[42] Kluckhohn and Kroeber, op.cit., 26.

[43] Also philosophy has been influenced by this. A case to the point could be that of ethnophilosophy in Africa.

[44] A Benfenati, "Contemplazione," in *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Milano: Garzanti, 1991), 468-471.

[45] This nostalgia for contemplation may be seen, for instance, in C.J.A. Tolens who would like to establish a "conspiracy" (namely a "breathing together," as the etymology of the term "conspiracy" indicates) of contemplatives. C.J.A. Tolens, "La cospirazione dei contemplative," in *Bozze 8*3, Dedalo, Bari, 1 (1983), 68f.

modern treatment of reason, may ironically salvage the unitary vision of the human being and reason.

A Challenge to Philosophy

Having attempted a clarification of the meaning of culture, the issue facing philosophy now is answering the complex questions arising from the phenomenon of culture. In view of this, Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of culture is briefly presented here as a possible attempt at answering the multiple dimension of the cultural phenomenon. This instance is meant to simplify some intricate explanations that would otherwise be necessary with regard to the philosophical approach to culture. Cassirer tries to explain the variety, the contrasts and the dynamics of culture. One may not agree with the Kantian foundation of his philosophy or with his functional definition of the human being or with his comprehensive idea and appreciates nevertheless his awareness of the philosophical importance of the problem posed by culture and his attempt to offer a solution to it.

Ernst Cassirer

Cassirer starts from the classical or traditional philosopher's approach to reality, namely trying to find an overall explanation of it, a unity in it. Faced with the multiple aspects of the cultural phenomenon, he realizes that philosophy cannot be content with analyzing its individual forms. Philosophy needs to find a synthetic and universal vision that may comprise the many individual forms of culture. The particular sciences have organized, each in its respective field, various manifestations of human culture. Each science endeavors to establish principles, to define paradigms or "categories," by which to systematize the various phenomena of religion, of art, of language, of history and of all other disciplines into a certain order. Philosophy appraises this scientific exercise and actually utilizes it to move beyond it, seeking to attain an overall systematization and unification of cultural multiplicity. Philosophy wants to be able to reveal the unifying element by which the boundless multiplicity and variety of cultural conditions and circumstances (mythical images, religious dogmas, linguistic forms, artistic works, historical events and cultural phenomena) are held together. Philosophy assumes that religion, art, language, science and other areas of human experience are kinds of variations of a common theme that it wants to make audible and understandable.[46]

Ernst Cassirer derives his philosophy from that of Immanuel Kant for whom the objective world results from the application of a priori principles to reality such that it can then be apprehended as differentiated and ordered by them. According to Kant, the fundamental concepts and categories by which we organize experience are universal and immutable. Cassirer developed this static vision into a dynamic one according to which the categories are not permanently fixed but open to constant development. A second important development of Kant's thought by Cassirer refers to the epistemological primacy of scientific knowledge in Kantian philosophy. Cassirer extends his philosophy to embrace all forms of creative human activity, like language, myth, religion, history and, of course, science itself.

Cassirer starts his endeavor from the human being and from human rationality, and he immediately discovers that there is a need to enlarge the classical definition of the human being as a rational animal. Admitting that rationality is an inherent feature of human activities, he argues that reason alone is inadequate to understand the forms of human cultural life in all their richness

[46] E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), 70-71.

and variety. Cassirer then argues that all these forms are ultimately symbolic forms concluding that the human being can be better defined as a symbolic animal. Cassirer clarifies immediately that this definition is a functional one, the only possible definition of the nature or "essence" of the human being that can be given. He specifies that, "We cannot define man by any inherent principle which constitutes his metaphysical essence – nor can we define him by any inborn faculty or instinct that may be ascertained by empirical observation."[47] According to him, the characteristic or the distinguishing mark of the human being is not his/her metaphysical or physical nature, but his/her activity. It is the network of human activities, which defines and determines "humanity."[48]

For Cassirer, symbolic representation is the essential function of human consciousness. It is basic to our understanding anything. Conceptualization is merely a case of symbolization or symbolic representation. The human being is a symbolizing animal living in a symbolic universe. Language, art, history, religion and similar aspects are the threads which weave the symbolic web of human experience. The human being cannot confront reality immediately or directly. Instead of dealing with things themselves, one is, in some way, constantly conversing with oneself. The human being is so enveloped in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or in religious rites that he/she cannot know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium of symbols. This situation is not only in the field of theory but also in that of practice. One does not live in a world of hard facts and immediate needs and desires. One lives rather in the midst of imaginings and emotions, hopes and fears, illusions and disillusions, fantasies and dreams. "What disturbs and alarms man," said Epictetus, "are not the things, but his opinions and fancies about the things."[49]

According to Cassirer, the relation between symbol and meaning expresses itself continuously in two opposing tendencies, a tendency toward the stabilization of symbolic patterns and the tendency toward their breaking up. It is a tension between stabilization and evolution, between stabilizing forms of life and breaking up this rigid scheme. One seeks to preserve the old forms of life while at the same time striving to produce new ones. There is a ceaseless struggle between tradition and innovation, between reproductive and creative forces. Human beings are torn between these two tendencies.[50]

The conclusion of Cassirer stresses the dynamism of culture. "Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man's progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion, science, are various phases in this process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power – the power to build up a world of his own, an ideal world. Philosophy cannot give up its search for a fundamental unity in this ideal world. But it does not confound this unity with simplicity. It does not overlook the tensions and frictions, the strong contrasts and deep conflicts between the various powers of man. These cannot be reduced to a common denominator. They tend in different directions and obey different principles. But this multiplicity and desperateness does not denote discord or disharmony. All these functions complete and complement one another. Each one opens a new horizon and shows us a new aspect of humanity. The dissonant is in harmony with itself; the contraries are not mutually exclusive, but interdependent: "harmony in contrariety, as in the case of the bow and the lyre."[51]

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[47] Ibid., 67-68.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., 25.
[50] Ibid., 224.
[51] Ibid., 228.

Permanence and Change

Cassirer concluded his philosophy of culture with the problem of permanence and change. He indicated how this problem is both the beginning and end of cultural analysis. It is the perennial problem of being and becoming.

The term "culture" is old but its meaning has been evolving. This article has highlighted both the early and the contemporary understandings of culture. The consideration of the two meanings could obviously not have been exhaustive. Moreover, the other meanings that developed between these two historical instances have not been considered. What has been said, however, is hopefully sufficiently indicative to illustrate the dynamism of culture. Such dynamism, at least as far as the Western experience of it is concerned, echoes the complex patterns of social and individual life, what is evident and what is beyond it. Culture is thus a mirror of history and life. The different understandings of culture, with the complex arguments that arise around such understandings, actually reflect the fundamental issues of the people who belong to such culture.

It is only in these constitutive and historical dimensions that the critical issue of culture can be properly understood and analyzed. The consideration of the historical dimension avoids isolating the "complex whole" of a culture at a particular point in time. Culture is a response to particular kinds of social change and challenges. But it would be highly misleading if such a term were to be hypostatized with the result of freezing and isolating culture within an historical or a social instance of it, serving it from its natural continuum. If the meaning of culture is to serve its purpose then it has to remain dynamic in dealing with that "complex whole" that is located in time.[52] In other words, culture needs to remain essentially historical. Deprived of its historical or vertical depth, culture is stripped of a constitutive element that is part of its nature. This is equally true of the horizontal or social dimension of culture which, if missing, makes the discourse on culture a mere conjecture. Tylor started his definition by describing culture as a "complex whole," the emphasis being on the relation between elements in a whole way of life. This stress on cultural unity in Tylor's wholeness, in Lowie's sum total, in Kluckhohn's total life and in Keesing's totality, is not only a significant assertion of such unity but also a strong demand for it, namely for a sense of continuity assumed to be underlying cultural multiplicity. A characteristic of the present understanding of culture is its pluralistic dimension in the sense that it acknowledges a plurality of cultures and also a plurality of elements within a culture. Nonetheless, the present understanding of culture defines it as a unity. In most cases however, the nature of such unity is not clearly defined.

Philosophy, and specifically metaphysics, claims to be working for or toward an ultimate unity. Cassirer started his philosophy of culture on this note, namely trying to gather into a comprehensive understanding the multiplicity of cultural aspects. For Cassirer, the relation in multiplicity was given by the symbolic forms. His approach was epistemological and the nature of the unity achieved was functional. This functional approach bypassed metaphysics. For some philosophers, metaphysics cannot possible be left out of an exercise which is substantially metaphysical. As metaphysicians are not trying to apply their arguments to the unity and continuum of culture, they obviously need to be ready to move across cultures, as already indicated. The present intercultural reality means, among other things, that answers to one's questions could already be waiting in other cultures. "Another of our best resources emerges when we think clearly about the peoples who have alternative answers to the questions that are not the

[52] Williams, op.cit., 273-275.

peoples who have alternative answers to the questions that are not being answers by our society. For the first time…it is possible…to make the world our library."[53]

The attempt of philosophy to analyze permanence and change goes back, as far as Western records indicate, to the preSocratic period. The difference between that early attempt and the contemporary one is that presently cultural change has a marked communal dimension. It is not only change as perceived by an individual human being but change perceived through a communal human being. Namely the human being within the present concept of culture perceives not only himself/herself as a perceiver of change but also the others as perceivers of the same change. Consequently such a human being cannot abide only by his/her perception of change. He/she needs to consider also the perception of others or the communal perception of change. Within this communal or social dimension, cultural change tallies, in many ways, with cultural development. The added dimension which the idea of development brings to change is assumed to be that of betterment. It is a growth toward fulfilment. The eighteenth-century progressivism and the nineteenth-century evolutionism have enhanced the notion of development to the status of an absolute, a universal value, a symbol of modernity and a conscious goal or ideal in many cultures. There are four assumptions underlying the notion of cultural development: the assumption of the continuous improvement of culture, associated with a unified notion of progress; the assumption of a substantiated with a unified notion of progress; the assumption of a substantial degree of continuity between the stages of a culture; the assumption of a final goal toward which culture moves (teleology); and the assumption that culture is a relational continuum, namely both a product of the past and a producer of the future.[54]

The prevalent vision of cultural change today is within this paradigm of development. Several writers see this uninterrupted cultural progress governed by the scientific laws of causality and therefore as unfolding deterministically. One needs to discover the laws of this dynamism in a culture and then one knows its future developments. In line with this, Karl Marx concludes that the laws of development operating in industrially advanced countries "simply present the other countries with a picture of their own future development."[55]

But culture is not only "becoming." It is also "being." Cassirer solved this apparent dilemma by relating both aspects in a dynamic tension. Herder, as mentioned, placed freedom at the origin of culture as a generating force. He explained the stability and change in culture by attempting to reconcile traditionalism and progressivism. Herder used Bildung and tradition in the sense of "building up" and "passing on" respectively. Bildung is an interactive social process in which human beings receive from and add to their distinctive cultural heritage. Building is both evaluation and assimilation. It is not simply a replicative process but also a process of change. Tradition, on the other hand, is not a stock of accumulated ways of doing things but an ongoing process of intergenerational transmission. Tradition and progress are not opposed tendencies but a single continuum. Progress becomes an in-build characteristic of tradition. Development is seen both as part of a given cultural continuum and an instrument for its transformation. it requires not only historical antecedents but also emerging goals pointing to the future. Any attempt at explain change must entails a recognition of persistence and vice versa.[56] In the above explanations, being and becoming are allowed to stay and to be in a dynamic relation among themselves. But the issues of freedom vis-à-vis culture remains. The dilemma is that human beings are born into a culture

[53] Mohawk, "Epologue: Looking for Columbus," 2.
[54] Barnard, op.cit., 619
[55] Marx, "The Preface," *Das Capital*, 1867.
[56] Barnard, op.cit., 620-621.

and they are conditioned by it, yet they appear to be free also within such a conditioning environment. One could argue that even Herder's assertion of the human ability to choose and of the perception of human limitations are actually culturally conditioned. At the same time, it could also be argued that "the individual is the irreducible variable of every social and cultural dimension…Every new element of culture can lead in its final analysis to the mind of some individual,"[57] as noted above. The effective power of culture to mould the human being to be balanced with the latter's ability to mould culture. Human freedom and cultural determinism pose one of the most challenging dilemmas to philosophy and to culture as presently understood.

This leads to the very manner in which philosophy may be said to relate to culture as presently understood. In the early meaning of culture, such relation could be explained rather easily, but within the present understanding, such relation poses a crucial problem to philosophy. It was the very exercise of self-reflection that originated the present understanding of culture. Now, this present understanding seems to include philosophy itself in the sense that philosophy has become part of culture. This raises an important question about the nature of the philosophical reflection on culture. Namely, is it philosophy that reflects on culture or is culture the condition for such reflection? If the latter is the case, then ultimately culture is reflecting on itself. If the philosophical reflection upon culture arises from culture, culture pre-exists and conditions such reflection. In this case, the approach to culture, the choices vis-à-vis the alternatives, the values governing the analysis, the appraisal of the cultural elements and other similar things are from the culture of the philosopher. If the reflection upon culture is seen as deriving from the free action of the human being, then such reflection builds on the subject-object pattern with philosophy as subject reflecting upon culture as object. But might culture itself be self-reflective. This vision would in turn explain the passage from first to second order of philosophy in a culture and also the transition from low to high culture.

While according to the early concept of culture the philosopher was seen as standing at the point of an emerging area of thought, within the present concept the philosopher stands at the point of a converging area of thought. The emerging and the converging areas are those of culture as understood respectively in the early and in the present time. This implies that the present concept of culture continues to pose the problem of a pre-exiting culture conditioning subsequent philosophical thought or the problem of culture reflecting upon itself. One could however ask whether this is not the same problem of the human being reflecting upon itself. The answer to this question, however, would require another article.

[57] Linton, op.cit., 40.

Chapter IV
The Concept of Identities

Anna Krasteva

Man is the Encompassing that we are;
yet even as the Encompassing, man is split.
Jaspers, K. "On my Philosophy."
– Walter Kaufmann (ed.) 1988, *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre*. Meridian Books.

A transcendental philosophy comes to its actual and true beginning only when the philosopher has penetrated to a clear *understanding of himself as subjectivity functioning as primal source* (Husserl 1992:137). However, this ambitious task is not the objective of this article. It, rather, has a more modest task: to introduce the problematic of identities.

Since Galileo, mathematics has been presumed to be the basis of an ideal world as the only real, known and knowable world – our everyday life-world. This world *abstracts* itself from subjects as individuals with their own private life, from everything spiritual, from all cultural properties of things that are generated in human practice. This abstraction results in bare material things that, however, are perceived as concrete realities and thematized in their totality as one world.

Husserl defines the loss of the ontic meaning of science as a "crisis" and notes the change that has been under way since the end of the nineteenth century: this change is not related to the "scientific" nature of science, but to what science might mean *for human existence*.

Objectivism addresses the world that is pre-given by experience as self-evident and inquires into its "objective truth." Attaining universal knowledge – that is the concern of the *episteme* of reason.

Transcendentalism claims that the ontic meaning of the pre-given life-world is a *fiction*, an achievement of the knowing, pre-scientific life. It establishes the meaning and ontic validity of the world, of *this* world which is truly valid for the knower at a given time. Concerning the objectively truthful world of science, it is a *higher-level formation* based on pre-scientific knowledge and thinking. Only an inquiry into subjectivity will allow us to grasp how subjectivity *ultimately* attains the validity of the world, as well as what and how reason makes objective truth comprehensible and opens the ultimate ontic meaning of the world. It is not the being of the world that is primary and important, *subjectivity in itself is primary* – subjectivity that pre-gives the being of the world naively and then rationalizes or, which is the same, objectivizes it (Husserl 1992:96).

The whole transcendental set of problems circle around the relation of *this*, my "I" – the "ego" – and around the relation of this ego and my conscious life to the world of which I am conscious and whose true being I know through my own cognitive structures (Husserl 1992:136).

First, the shift of focus from objectivity to subjectivity, from reality to the subject, is the *primary* dimension of the theoretical horizon of this study.

The *second* dimension is the transition from a singular to a plural subject. In the philosophical promotion of the Self by Descartes, "*Cogito, ergo sum*" (I think, therefore I am), the identity of the thinking and existing subject asserts the principle of *cogito* and, therefore, of a *consisting* in the subject. Certain contemporary interpretations radically divide this identity. Lacan rewrites this classical thought in a new way: Je pense: *Donc je suis* (I think: *therefore I am*). The simple

punctuation difference changes and even inverts the thought. Instead of an identical subject in the two parts of the sentence, there are two different subjects: the subject of the expression "Therefore, *I* am," and of the statement "It is *I* who thinks." They are divided by a punctuation that stands for a time in the unconscious. According to Lacan, philosophical discourse strives to unite what is non-unitable. The subject in psychoanalysis is deeply divided – Freud's last, unfinished text is *Ichspaltung*, the division or split of the Self. The unconscious is the engine of this division. The subject is in internal exclusion from its object. The subject's object is an object of desire (Althusser,Freud et Lacan 1964).

For the purpose of this study, it is the simple fact of Lacan's interpretation – not the details of his concept – that is relevant. His is an interpretation that radically divides the identity and consistency of the Cartesian subject.

Classical philosophy thinks of the self as a basis and essence of subjectivity; and subjectivity as something internal in regard to the externality of the world. For Freud, the Ego is between the Id and the Super-Ego: the subject is no longer in opposition to the world, as well as itself, the external world is internalized by the subject itself. Althusser sums up the evolution of the ideas of the Self: "After Copernicus we know that the Earth is not the centre of the universe. After Marx we know that the human subject, the economic, political or philosophical Self, is not the centre of history. Freud shows us that the real subject, "the individual in his singular essence, does not have the figure of an ego centred on 'Self,' 'consciousness' or 'existence', that the subject is decentered, constituted by a structure that itself has a centre only in the imaginary non-recognition of the Self, i.e. in the ideological formations in which it is identified" (Freud et Lacan 1964).

The *third* dimension, I would note concerns the different figures of the Self that have been constituted by philosophical questions ever since Descartes. In the Cartesian question "Who am I?" the Self is a single but *universal* and non-historical subject. Self is anybody, irrespective of time and place. The question posed by Kant is different: "Who are we, precisely and exactly at this instance of history?" (Foucault 1992:71). The subject becomes *historic*. Today the subject is *particular*: male or female, black or white, member of a minority or majority, Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, etc.

Identity and Difference

Identity is usually defined by the formula A=A. What does that mean? According to Heidegger (1968), this formula represents the equality of A and A. The latter requires at least two terms, one A should be equal to another A. If one simply says one and the same thing, i.e. a plant is a plant, this is tautology. One term is sufficient for tautology. Equality requires two terms.

The common formula of the principle of identity, A=A, as Heidegger stresses actually conceals its deepest essence. He thinks that this essence is expressed more adequately by A *is* A, and formulated best as "*any A is itself identical with itself*" (Heidegger 1968:258). "Identity presupposes a relation denoted by the preposition *with*, i.e. mediation, link, synthesis: interconnection in a unity" (Heidegger 1968:259). This expounded definition highlights the distinction between identical and equal. "All differences disappear in the equal, and appear in the identical" (Heidegger 1968:280). This distinction is of fundamental importance, it is a discovery that took a long *period of thought to develop but represents a* slow and profound maturing.

Western thought thematizes identity as unity. It took a long time to come to the idea that identity does not necessarily have to be thought as simple uniformity and to formulate the principle of mediation. The latter shows the relation of the same to itself – which is at the very heart of

identity. "Thought took more than two millennia to discover and understand such a simple relation as the internal mediation of identity" (Heidegger 1968:275).

The first philosopher who distinctly articulated identity, according to Heidegger, is Parmenides of Elea: the Parmenidean One is actually both thought and being. Two *different* things – thought and being – are perceived as *one*. "Thought and being are contained in identity, whose essence is co-belonging" (Heidegger 1968:273). Parmenides regards being as a basic trait of identity. Later, metaphysics would take the opposite approach, presenting identity as a trait of being.

Heidegger does not attempt to explicate the Parmenidean concept fully. He admits that its central concept –*the One* – remains unclear, but invites us "to let its non-transparency and lack of clarity be" (Heidegger 1968:262). What he ignores in the ancient philosopher's thought is the idea of co-belonging, of plurality in identity.

Identity is "unity *with* itself." Naturally, it is the unity that is important. The *with*-relation, mediation, is just as important. Mediation permeates identity, introduces difference in its very core.

Difference is conceptualized not simply as a central concept without which identity cannot be understood. Difference is conceptualized as a central concept in a certain type of philosophizing. Heidegger explains his distinction from Hegel's thought as follows: "For Hegel, thought refers to total thought as an absolute notion. For me thought refers to difference *as* difference" (Heidegger 1968:282).

Heidegger's position is characteristic of two important dimensions in the evolution of the concept of identity:

· argumentation of difference not simply as a correlative concept of identity, but as inherent to the latter;
· valuation of difference.

Classical philosophy accentuates *identity*, homogeneity. Differences are perceived as a specificity, as an exception that tends to confirm the rule. Leibniz is categorical: "in the natural order the statement that something is what it is precedes the statement that it is not something else" (Leibniz 1974:525-6).

Contemporary philosophy confers philosophical status on the concept of difference – it is a key notion in Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard… Analyzing Nietzsche's genealogical method, Foucault notes that in the historical genealogy of things one will *not* find the inviolable *identity* of their primal source, but *discordance* with *difference*. This is *heterogeneity* (Foucault 1992).

Instead of the "smooth" dialectic between "same" and "other," "identical" and "different" in classical thought, contemporary science dares to talk of differences without identity: Saussure claims that there is nothing but differences in language; Lévi-Strauss articulates propositions in the spirit of an incompatibility of cultures.

Postmodernism sees one of the objectives of deconstruction as the *invention* of otherness. The purpose is to deconstruct closed structures, enabling acceptance of the Other. This other is neither superior to the same, nor entirely new and external. This other rearranges the very oppositions of same-different, internal-external, old-new (Derrida 1992:311). If we feel so fatigued and bored, Derrida wrote in the early 1990s, it is because we are within the range of the same and the possible. In it even new things and inventions belong to the sphere of the familiar and the possible. Derrida wants to deconstruct precisely this type of invention because it makes the person subservient to the economy of the same with its techno-science, politics and institutions. His objective is to

construct a new "us." The latter cannot be simply discovered, nor can it invent itself: "It can be invented only by the Other, who says ‘come here,’and the response of another ‘come here’ is the only invention desirable and worthy of interest" (Derrida 1992:342). Thus the polyphony of the same is replaced with a plurality of voices.

Classical thought regards identity as natural and even desirable: "The mind … loves unity in plurality…" (Leibniz 1974:544). Modern thought feels doomed to difference. Borges writes an essay called "Borges and I".He states, "Spinoza thinks that every thing *strives* to *remain* what it is*forever*; the stone wants to be a stone and the tiger, a tiger, forever. I am *doomed* to remain Borges, and *not myself*" (Borges 1996:268).

Identity no longer has a "unit." If it once was a principle of explaining the world, today it cannot find refuge even in the individual. Since theory can no longer think identity, it has no choice but to concentrate on difference. J. Kristeva wonders, "What could identity mean … in a new theoretical and scientific space, where the very notion of identity is called into question? The only solution is in unravelling the problem of otherness" (Kristeva 1986:16).

Of the many concepts thematizing selfhood and identity from the perspective of difference, I will dwell briefly on two: on George Herbert Mead’s symbolic interactionism and on Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology.

George Herbert Mead’s Symbolic Interactionism

The main thesis of symbolic interactionism is that social interaction is the "natural" and only possible environment in which selfhood may be expounded. The Self may exist only in definite interactions with other Selves. No distinct and insurmountable boundary may be drawn between our own Self and that of the others, because our Self exists and is imported as such in our experience only insofar as the Self of the others exists and is imported as such in our experience. The individual has a "Self" only in his relation with the "Self" of the other members of his social group. The self reflects the general behavioral model of the social group to which he belongs, and this applies to the Self of any of its other members (Mead 1997:249).

Mead identifies a three-tier structure of selfhood:

I – the active agent;

Me – myself as others see me; from a grammatical point of view, "me" presupposes passivity, life as an object;

Generalized Other – the ability to internalize the point of view of others.

One starts experiencing oneself as "Self" or as an individual not directly, by becoming one’s own subject, but also insofar as one becomes one’s own object, just as the other individuals are objects for oneself. One becomes one’s own object only by internalizing the attitudes of other individuals within the social environment in which all are participants (Mead 1997:217-8). The attitudes of the others, organized and incorporated in the "I," are conceptualized through "Me." Of course, if there were only "me" in the "Self", then the latter would have simply been a reflection of the social structure.

"I" is the principle of action and it is the impulse of that action of the "I" which changes the social structure: "the individual is not a captive of society. He constitutes society just as naturally as society constitutes the individual" (Mead 1997:29). "I" is not only active, but also self-reflexive. It faces the world and precisely because it detaches itself from the world since it is not simply an

object among other objects, the "I" is capable of reflecting on the world. The Self may also confront itself – this ability is articulated in the distinction between *me* and *I*.

Both aspects – "I" and "Me" – are equally relevant to the full-fledged realization of the individual. One must accept the attitudes of others in the group in order to belong to the community, one must use this internalized external social world in order to think. Thanks to the person's relations with others in the community and to the rational social processes in the latter, s/he is a *citizen*. On the other hand, the individual constantly reacts to social attitudes and, in the course of this process of cooperation, changes the very community to which s/he belongs. Those changes may be modest and trivial or radical and significant.

Someone is said to be *conventional* when his/her ideas are entirely identical with his/her neighbors': s/he is hardly superior to "Me." The attitude of the genius, the leader, the creator, who effect significant changes, are radically opposite. For them "I" is the more important part of experience (Mead 1997:293-294).

"I" gives a sense of freedom, of initiative. The situation and our presence in this situation are given, but our precise course of action never becomes part of experience before the action has taken place (Mead 1997:266).

"Me" requires a definite "I," insofar as we fulfill the duties prescribed in behavior itself, but "I" invariably differs from the requirement of the situation, therefore there is always a distinction between "I" and "Me."

The different types of societies give priority to the first or second dimension of the self. In traditional society, individuality is built by the *attainment* of a particular social type, and in modern society, by the individual's *deviation* from a particular social type (Mead 1997:320).

"Me" is so important that mind itself is defined by Mead through its ability to internalize the social process in the individual. A person who is incapable of performing a definite amount of stereotypical work is not a healthy individual. Both the health of the individual and the stability of society require a considerable amount of such activity (Mead 1997:309).

"I" is just as important, because it simultaneously challenges and reacts to "Me." "I" belongs to the occurring and is, in a sense, the most charming part of our experience. That is precisely where novelty emerges and where our most important values are localized. Realization of this "I" is what we constantly search for. It is best expressed in the artist, the inventor, the scientist in his/her discovery, the statesman, the religious leader.

Together, they constitute the personality as it is manifested in social experience. The Self is the social process that occurs in those two distinguishable phases. If it did not have those two forms, conscious responsibility would have been impossible and there would have been nothing new in experience (Mead 1997:267).

The "Generalized Other" is our ability to identify with the other's position – a precondition for the universality of signs which, in turn, is a condition for communication and thinking.

Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Phenomenology

Ricoeur's approach to the hermeneutics of selfhood is equidistant from the apex of the Cartesian subject and its dissolution. Ricoeur's comment on this irregular rhythm of overrating or underrating the subject is in the vein of the well-known psychoanalytic assessment of the father, "of whom there is either too much or too little" (Ricoeur 1990:15).

In the Cartesian *Cogito*, the "I" of "I think" is elevated to prime truth and fundamental cause. This subjectivity, which is posited through reflection on one's self-suspicion, is an unanchored

subjectivity that is free of "psychology" and "autobiography". The Self is exalted, but at the price of a loss of the relation with the person, with the *I-you* of dialogue, with the identity of the historical figure, with the Self of responsibility (Ricoeur 1990:22). Is it worth paying such a price for the exaltation of *Cogito,* Ricoeur asks rhetorically.

The shattered *Cogito*: this is the main conclusion and message of the opposite tradition epitomized by Nietzsche. His attack on the fundamental claims of philosophy starts from language, showing how rhetorical strategies are hidden or forgotten in the name of the immediacy of thinking. The truth itself is presented as a dynamic plurality of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms – or, as a sum of human relations which, having been poetically and rhetorically embellished and used extensively, start appearing to be strict, canonical and compulsory. Truths are illusions that have been forgotten as such. To positivism, which believes in the "solidity" of facts, Nietzsche opposes the idea that there are no facts but only interpretations. He takes yet another radical step, postulating a phenomenology of the inner world as well: everything that occurs consciously has been ordered, schematized, interpreted *a priori*. In Nietzsche's aporia, "the Self" is not intrinsic to Cogito, but an interpretation. "To posit substance *under* Cogito or a cause *behind* it, is simply the grammatical habit of ascribing an agent to any action" (Ricoeur 1990:27).

Ricoeur notes that Nietzsche's interpretation is not the opposite of the Cartesian one, it destroys the very question to which the *Cogito* aims to give an absolute answer (Ricoeur 1990:25).

Ricoeur's epistemological distance from Descartes concerns two main aspects: the immediacy of *I am* and its claims to ultimate cause. In Ricoeur's interpretation the self is never separated from its other. "*The autonomy* of self is intimately bound with *care* for the close one and with*justice* for all" (Ricoeur 1990:30). Contrary to the Cartesian subject, Ricoeur thematizes the human being as *acting* and *suffering*.

Ricoeur qualifies his own analysis as fragmentary. The epistemological arguments in favour of his approach are that hermeneutics is immersed in the historicity of the inquiries into selfhood. Ricoeur, however, avoids the extremes of this approach, which leads to a dissolution of the self and reduces discourse to silence. Fragmentariness "is upheld by the *thematic unity* of *human action*" (Ricoeur 1990:31).

Ricoeur conceptualizes identity as a dialectic between two dimensions:

· *identity-idem* – permanence of the invariable substance unaffected by time – sameness (*mêmeté)*;

· *identity-ipse* – the change, transformation – ipseity (*ipséité)*. Ipseity does not presuppose any invariable core of the personality.

Sameness corresponds to the question of *what*, and ipseity, to the question of *who* (Ricoeur 1996).

Sameness is a term for relation and for relation of relations. First comes *numerical* identity – we refer to two manifestations of one thing designated by an invariant name not as two different things, but as "one and the same" thing. Here identity means singularity – the opposite of plurality (one, not two or many things). This first dimension of identity corresponds to the operation of "identification," in terms of reidentification of the same, where to cognize means to recognize: one thing twice, *n* times (Ricoeur 1990:140-141).

Next comes qualitative identity: we say that X and Y, who wear the same suit, are so much alike that we might confuse them. This second dimension of identity corresponds to the operation of "substitution" without semantic loss.

The two dimensions of identity are not mutually reducible, as the categories of quantity and quality in Kant, but neither are they wholly unrelated. Insofar as time is involved in the series of manifestations of one thing, the new identification of the same may cause hesitation, doubt, denial: the ultimate identification of the defendant in court with the perpetrator of the crime is difficult – and, in some cases, impossible – in many trials.

If sameness is expressed best by the term *character*, the essence of *ipseity* is manifested in *the kept promise*. Here self-maintenance (*maintien de soi*) is of a different type. It does not allow itself to be incorporated into something general, but is related only to the question of *who*. "Continuity of character is one thing, and consistence in friendship, another" (Ricoeur 1990:148).

Ricoeur's dynamic concept of identity unites notions which Locke, along with many other philosophers, regard as opposites: identity and difference. Otherness is declared to be as important and primary as selfhood. The identity is posited not just by the self, but by the other too.

Oneself as another – the emblematic title of Ricoeur's seminal work (1990) – raises the problem of the dialectic between *selfhood* and the other, who is different from *selfhood*. This otherness is of a specific type. "It is not just the difference of sameness. The latter is usually thought as an antonym of other, opposite, different, unequal, converse. This otherness is constitutive of *ipseity* itself. *Oneself as another* suggests that the *ipseity* of selfhood incorporates otherness in such an intimate way that the one cannot be thought without the other, that the one tends to converge with the other… I would like to lend strong meaning to this *as* not only as a comparison – oneself similar to another, but as implication – oneself in its capacity as… another" (Ricoeur 1990:14).

I would single out two of the many ideas in Ricoeur's concept. The first is the avoidance of "the alternative of substantialism: either the invariance of a non-temporal core, or the dissolution in impressions, as in Hume and Nietzsche" (Ricoeur 1996:65). The latter is the dialectic of selfhood and otherness, the incorporation of otherness and difference in the very structure of identity.

These main ideas are applicable both to individuals and communities. Many current debates on ethnic and national identities would acquire another character, notes Ricoeur, if they proceeded from the dialectic of change and self-preservation "through vow and promise"… "Let us no longer seek a fixed substance behind these communities; but neither should we deny them the ability to survive through creative loyalty to fundamental events which posit them in time" (Ricoeur 1996:66).

Both concepts noted above perceive the relation of selfhood and otherness as positive. For G.H. Mead this relation is a natural dimension of social interactions, which express the very essence of the social. In P. Ricoeur's concept, the notion of *care for the other* is important. Even when the Other is not the one in a relationship of friendship but perhaps in a faceless relationship through institutions, the latter are thought within the perspective of the ideal of justice.

From this overview of certain concepts of identities, I would like to single out two traits including their construed and their problematic character.

Construed Character of Identities

"If Man had a 'nature,' which was invariable such as that of minerals, plants and animals, we would have known once and for all what his actions meant; but since he does *not* have such

a *nature*, in every age Man stakes his life on different, more or less new, objectives…" (Ortega y Gasset 1993:250-1).

This thought of Ortega y Gasset expresses the main trend in the thematization of identities – namely, their *desubstantialization*. The self is perceived as a process rather than as a substance. We have seen that for G.H. Mead this process is social interaction. According to Sartre, the person does not have a "nature," an "essence," s/he is what s/he makes from him/herself; *existence precedes essence.*

Not bondage but liberty is what Jaspers identifies as the ultimate specificity of man: "the essence of man is in perpetual motion. Every newborn is bound to a predestined course, but is also to a new beginning. The animal only repeats what it has already been. Man cannot be as he has already been" (Jaspers 1995:54). "What man might be, remains hidden in his freedom. He will not cease to reveal himself through the manifestations of his freedom. As long as people live, they will be beings that will have to accomplish themselves" (ibid: 64).

Transition, movement, change are fundamental to understanding identities. Deleuze thematizes them not only as "human nature," but as "becoming": what is actual is not what we are but, rather, what we become, i.e. the Other, our *becoming-other*. We must distinguish between what we are (what we no longer are) and what we are becoming right now: *the part that is history and the part that is actual*. History is the archive, the contour of what we are and what we cease to be, whereas the actual is the outline of what we are becoming. History or archive – this, precisely, still distinguishes us from ourselves; whereas the *actual* is the Other with which we now coincide (Deleuze 1997:121).

M. Foucault's normative individualization fits into this perspective too. It occurs without reference to any essence of the subject and does not aim to reveal qualities that the individual has *per se* and which are typical of his/her species or nature. This is "individualization *without substance*, to some extent as in the system of language the opposition of signifiers invariably refers only to some kind of differences, without being possible to reach some sort of substance of the signifier. Pure relation. A relation without basis""(Eswald 1997:150-151).

Desubstantialization does not mean that "essence," "nature," "substance" are rejected. What is rejected is their determinism, their determinant power over the person. They are limited in order to "expand" the realm of freedom so that the latter could be something more than a "recognized necessity," so that its law could be formulated not only beyond, but also within the person.

Proceeding from literature, Ricoeur points out two extreme cases of consistence and change of identities:

- *permanent identity* – in fairy-tales, folklore, the early classic novel;
- *dissolution of identity* – the character in the novels of Kafka, Joyce, Musil, in the post-classical novel in general. Does this mean that all identity has disappeared? No: would we have been concerned with the drama of the disintegration of the *identity-in itself* if it did not stress the pervasive nature of the question of who am I? In this case, *who* am I is deprived of the reference point of the question *what* am I. *Ipseity* has dissolved in sameness.

Contemporary literature and human studies focus mainly on the second case, but everyday life moves *between* the two poles of almost complete *overlapping* of *ipseity* and sameness, and their almost complete *dissolution*.

I would say that everyday life is much more attached to sameness. The concern of human studies with *ipseity* sounds like a counterpoint, like an aspiration of culture to broaden horizons that are not sufficiently articulated in everyday life.

Problematic Identity

"I often feel a powerful *longing for myself*. I know, the road is quite long, but in my best dreams I picture the day I will welcome myself" (Rilke 1993:11).

"We are *wedded to the self*, to its *poison*. If the belief that you are *unique* stems from an illusion, the illusion is so universal and powerful that we could well ask ourselves if we still have the right to call it such. How could we spurn something that we haven't discovered, this unheard of and wretched thing that bears our name? The said illusion is so deeply anchored in each one of us that we could defeat it only in an unexpected whirlpool that carries off the self and leaves us alone, without anybody, without ourselves" (Cioran 1996:171).

These two quotes reveal the contradictory and dramatic attitude of modern culture to identity: as an existential need and as predestination; as a yearning for self-attainment and an impossibility of avoiding the pitfalls of selfhood.

Paradoxically – and indicatively – the problemization of identities comes from two sources that are different to the point of being opposites. They are related to the two notions that are crucial to the understanding of modern identity: *autonomy* and *authenticity*.

Autonomy is the crucial concept that characterizes the subject of modern society: if the *archaic* person is an *imitator*, the modern person is a *constructor*, an actor, an agent. M. Eliade notes that in the "primitive" ontological conception a certain object or action becomes real only to the extent to which it *imitates* or *repeats* an archetype. Thus reality is attained only through *repetition* or *commitment*; anything that does not have a role model is "deprived of meaning," i.e. lacks reality. Consequently, the person from a traditional culture is perceived as real only to the extent to which s/he stops being him/herself (for a contemporary observer) and is content to *imitate* and repeat the gestures of someone *else (from a dominant culture).* S/he is not perceived as real, i.e. as really him/herself, except to the extent to which s/he truly ceases to be such… (Eliade 1994).

Hume proposes a brilliant theoretical model of the modern perception of the world: in the very essence of things, there is no compulsory relation among various things. True relations in the world may be established by:

a) thinking about things separately, reducing them mentally to their pure elements;
b) establishing empirically what is related in reality and with what it is related.

The position – of both the researcher and of the entrepreneur – has one and the same premise. To be one of the actors in the world of infinite discoveries, the researcher should not be restricted by the natural tendency of *a priori* relations between things. Neither does the entrepreneur want tradition to prescribe his/her ways of linking labour, machinery and land, to force a particular social rhythm on society but to be free to choose the means in the name of profit. This is the position of the autonomous individual.

J. Rawls defines autonomy as the ability to form, revise and rationally pursue a particular notion of good. The individual might not even be precisely aware of this notion of good, but knows that s/he is capable of deciding how to live. Dworkin notes that autonomy is a person's ability of

the second order to reflect on their first-order preference and desires, as well as the ability to accept or strive to change them in the light of preferences of a higher order (Dworkin 1996:360).

If the pole of activity and freedom is thematized through the notion of autonomy, the pole of introspection is thematized through authenticity. Similar to autonomy, authenticity is a modern notion. Both were asserted at approximately the same time, in the late eighteenth century, but their essential meanings are opposite. Authenticity expresses the strong subjective turn in modern culture, the new form of introversion in which we think ourselves as beings with inner depth.

The first philosopher to articulate this cultural turn is JeJacques Rousseau. He sees moral salvation in the rediscovery of the authentic moral contact with ourselves. He calls this profound intimate contact with the self – more fundamental than any moral concept – "sense of existence ".

The *ethics of authenticity* is opposed to disengaged rationality (since Descartes) and social atomism, which ignores the relations of community. It rejects the concept that the knowledge of good and evil is a question of calculating the consequences, including those relevant to divine reward or retribution. The idea that the notion of good and evil is a question of cool calculation is countered by the idea that it is anchored in our feelings and intuitions. Morality becomes "a voice within."

To understand the novelty of this concept, let us recall where the source of good was sought earlier – in God or the Idea of the Good. A relation with something "external" was sought. Now a relation is sought with something "internal." This "internal" is deep within us. It makes us "ourselves" (Taylor 1991).

There is an external-internal opposition in the case of autonomy too, but it is thought of in a different way. In the case of authenticity "internal" is thematized as *activity*, an ability for autonomous decisions and rational choice, whereas here it is *depth*, compliance with internal impulses. This does not rule out the relation with God or Ideas, but it is interpreted as our own way of addressing them. The path followed is the one outlined by St Augustine, who believes that the path to God runs through our self-awareness.

Christian civilization offers a whole series of spiritual techniques for individual reflection. If Greek culture interpreted dreams in terms of their relevance to the future, Vernant cites third and fourth century texts from monasteries instructing young monks, who are telling their dreams to their superiors, to interpret those dreams in view of the purity or impurity within themselves. Greek culture did not use this type of reflection (Vernant 1998:14).

One of the first and best theoreticians of authenticity, Herder, expounds the idea that each one of us has our own original way of being human: every human being has his/her own "measure." Herder applies this concept at two levels:

- the individual;
- the people.

As every individual, a people ought to be true to itself, to its culture.

Prior to the eighteenth century no one attributed such great moral meaning to the differences between human beings. This new concept of the person has become a new moral duty: to be loyal to oneself and to one's own way of being. Lionel Trilling calls this the "*ideal of authenticity"*. I am destined to live my life in my own specific way. If I fail, I am inferior (Taylor 1991).

Sartre talks of an authentic and non-authentic freedom of the individual in a particular situation. Authenticity is the clear and truthful recognition of the situation, acceptance of the responsibilities and risks it entails, the requirement that it be maintained in pride and humiliation

and, sometimes, in horror and hatred. Authenticity requires great courage and, at times, even more than courage (Sartre 1954).

This powerful moral idea attributes great significance to the contact with the self, to the relation with my internal essence. There is heightened sensitivity to the danger of its loss due to *conformism*, as well as an *instrumental attitude to self*.

The principle of *originality* – each one of us has something unique to say – acquires greater importance. The archetype of this notion of the person is the *artist*.

By way of tentative conclusion, it should be noted that autonomy and authenticity make identities problematic but in different ways. The former, by depriving the person of a transcendental foundation and the comfort of shared meanings guaranteed by communities. With the latter, the ideal of authenticity expresses the need of constant self-achievement. It is, however, synonymous with the problematic, because it does not offer any guarantee of identities, but requires constant confirmation.

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Chapter V
The Integration of Cultures: Facing the Tides of Modernization and Postmodernization

Wu Xiaojiang

Cultural globalization is the phenomenon involving the dissemination, exchange, fusion and complimentarity of cultures around the world. Its context includes the huge wave of economical globalization, the open political and economic policies of some countries, and the speedy development of science and technical innovation, especially in information and communications technology.

In the long run, I believe this globalization of culture does not necessarily mean that one culture with the most powerful influence will dominate, but rather that an integration and coexistence of the various cultures of the world will become possible. This, however, implies the selection, identity, renewal, and unity of the diverse elements of different cultures.

At present, the process of globalization is evolving within two movements: the movement of modernization which originated in the West and is now widely unfolding in developing countries; and the postmodern movement recently launched in the developed countries, which, in turn, is gradually gaining more influence in developing nations.

Thus, the integration of cultures in the world today may be seen as unfolding in the face of two tidal waves –modernization and postmodernization. Two major questions arise:

(a) How do the developing countries retain cultural identity and diversity in the tide of modernization originating in West?

(b) How do the developed countries protect cultural integrity in the tide of postmodernization?

Cultural Identity and Diversity in the Process of Modernization

In philosophical terms, the cultures of different nations include three levels: first, a surface level of implementation, how a culture manifests itself in actions; second, a middle level which is that of institution, how culture becomes embedded in institutions; and third, what might be called the core level of a culture, that gets down to the individual and communal spirit, which drives a culture and includes a national mentality, dispositions, customs and values.

The contact, cross pollination, blending, collusion and conflict which occur among different countries in the wave of globalization all unfold on the above mentioned three levels. The identity and assimilation of cultures, or their remaining diverse, also take place on these three levels. Moreover, the identity or diversity of cultures reflect two broad trends: globalization or nationalization – turning out or turning in; cultural convergence or ethnic-religious separatism.

Cultural Identity: From Implementation to Institution

An examination of cultural identity in the process of globalization reveals that an endless stream of inventions and innovations which originated in Western developed countries are being widely introduced and utilized in Eastern countries. Technological inventions are the fruit of a material civilization being spread throughout the world. Modern Western technology has become

the fashion in Eastern countries, and exerts strong influence on life-styles and conventions, even in deeply traditional societies.

The advanced inventions of technology are generally found in the corresponding institutions of the social-economy. In other words, the implementation of culture depends on its institutional level. When introducing and absorbing the fruits of outside technology and industrialization, Eastern countries experience the conflict and fusion between foreign influence and their own native-local cultures. They must live wth the social impact and implications of technology on their own societies.

When opening the tide of modernization at the end of the 1970s, China first took Western achievement at the implementation level as the paragon of modernization. The goal of the movement of modernization in China included industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. The modernization of science and technology was regarded as the key to these "four modernizations" and the foundation for building a powerful nation. This was the first step in opening China to modernization.

However, in China, at that time, the economy, and science and technology, were highly centralized. They were lacking in vitality and it was difficult to arouse enthusiasm and initiative in the people. The creative power of science and technology as productive forces, were even more tethered in this situation. Hence, from the 1980's to the 1990's, the movement of modernization in China had to move from the implementation level to the institutional level.

The institutions of the economy and science and technology had to be reformed. A commodity and market-oriented economy was set up. A public-private joint-stock market and modern management of business were introduced. Privately owned enterprises were developed and various systems of ownership were introduced. The operational mechanisms of the survival of the fittest, in market competition, bankruptcy procedures and business mergers, were adopted. Multiple patterns of distribution of resources and wealth were implemented, including: encouragement for such essential factors as production, capital and technology, as well as worker participation in the distribution of profits.

At the same time the reform of political institutions was stepped up in China. This included replacing rule by men with rule by law, abrogating life tenure for leading cadres, institutionalizing and legalizing democracy, democratizing strategic decision making, management and supervision, and respecting and insuring human rights, and the rights of workers.

The inventions and innovations of science and technology in the West were the primary influences in these changes. This is an important issue in the practice of a market-oriented economy and the legal institutions protecting intellectual property rights. The manifold demands of markets at home and abroad provided for stimulating growth and for invention and innovation in science and technology. Intense market competition promotes the merger between research and enterprise, accelerated industrialization and the commercialization of products. Competition also shortened the period from invention to application, and the speed of updating and upgrading products. The intense competition of markets also forces successful enterprises to think of danger in times of safety, to plan and function more effectively, to challenge limits and to constantly innovate. The market-oriented economy rejects the bureaucratic will and promotes creative innovation.

With guarantees on intellectual property rights, innovative intelligence can render tremendous economic reward through the mechanism of the market. This implies, of course, that society affirm and respect the value of knowledge. The additional impetus encourages invention, innovation and risk. Exploration and progress go on. Because of these circumstances and the mechanism of the

market-oriented economy, major enterprises in computer software, integrated circuits, and internet technology (American Microsoft, Intel and Cisco) were quickly established and rapidly grew.

Technological innovation in Western developed countries is unusually brisk. One cause of this is that industrial circles become the main force of research and development (R&D). In other words, businesses become the focal point for technological innovation and their adaptation to the market-oriented economy. Large and middle–sized enterprises generally possess R&D organizations, or join with universities and research institutes to carry out R&D. They protect their own intellectual property rights and encourage the efficiency to enable innovative products to enter rapidly into the mainstream of industrialization.

In facing the challenges of economic globalization, it is most important that business becomes the main body for innovation and institutional reform. Along with the intensification and unification of the market, globalization reflects the economic competition that has become essential among enterprises both for innovative management and quality products.

In the course of transforming the planned economy into a market-oriented one, most Chinese institutes of research in science and technology have become privatized and independent in management. When a system of shares was set up in the science and technology types of enterprises, stock values significantly increased. Most institutes established a mechanism for competition among scientists, highly qualified technical persons are promoted to important posts. Commercial research products are rewarded according to the level of gross sales. When new institutions are formed, research becomes the motor of the company. A huge amount of venture capital for R&D has been assembled. By the end of 1998, the number of private enterprises in science and technology had reached almost 100,000 with seventy percent of those businesses accounting for 6 billion yuan in income(1).

To sum up this cultural leap from the implementation to institution, let me offer the following points: With the practice of intellectual property rights and a policy of reward, the value of intellectual work has been affirmed and the innovation of scientists and technicians has been stimulated. In 1999, 100 millionaire scientists and technicians had sprung up in Beijing because of the magnate of high technological businesses, e.g. the Legend Group (computer manufacturer). In Shanghai, another 100 millionaires have also emerged in the circles of science and technology (2). In the same year, over 80 risk funds for R&D were established with investment capital of 35 billion yuan(3). These indicators point up the fact that with institutional reform, China can compete within the advanced global standards in business and technology.

Cultural Identity: From the Institutional to the Spiritual Level

As stated above, the institutional level of culture is based on a deeper spiritual level that comprises the national mentality, disposition, custom and values. From the 1840's to the 1930s, China underwent a process of first introducing advanced Western technology and equipment, then abolishing the decaying feudal institution, and finally studying more profoundly, the cultural spirit of Western science and democracy. In this process, after many conflicts, Chinese culture identified somewhat with Western culture at various levels.

When ancient China was awakened to the boom of guns in the Opium Wars (1840-1842), the defeated Chinese recognized the strength of Western naval war power. They recognized that they were behind in material equipment and technology, namely, behind in the level of implementation. Manufacturing advanced machinery was considered of primary importance. Then the middle class – government bureaucrats and business people – initiated the Westernization movement to

introduce techniques of capitalism. Although the Westernization movement had the significance of safeguarding territory and resisting foreign aggression, its major objective was to preserve the feudal rule of the Qing government. However, in the Sino – Japanese War (1894-1895), the North Sea fleet of the Qing Dynasty, armed with powerful equipment, was defeated unexpectedly by a much weaker Japanese navy.

Some Chinese leaders and soldiers with a breath of vision saw through the apparent contest, beyond the technology and equipment, to a deeper level at which the more advanced capitalist institutions competed with decaying feudal institutions. With this insight, the realization of the need for institutional reform was born; this realization initiated the reforms of 1898 that attempted institutional change. However, this reform effort did not prevail.

In order to carry out the needed institutional reforms, Dr. Sun Yat-sen led the democratic revolution of the Chinese middle class – the Revolution of 1911. After establishing the Republic, there emerged a counter-current restoring autocratic monarchy and Confucianism. As a result the New Culture Movement (around the time of the May 4th Movement in 1919) carried out reforms on a more spiritual, as well as a national level. The New Culture Movement fiercely attacked feudal ideology and Confucian culture and enlightened the Chinese people regarding the scientific and democratic spirit of West in order to remold the national disposition.

For centuries, knowledge of the natural sciences was meager in China, and the scientific spirit, and scientific method were lacking in the culture. However, with the New Culture Movement, the progressive intellectuals in China introduced not only the natural sciences from West, but also the modern scientific spirit. Western thought and methods emerged through the translation and study of a great quantity of western academic books, especially science and the philosophy of science. On the philosophical level – or what might be called the spiritual level of science – studies dealt with the origin of science, its foundation, essence, purpose, function, and method.

The core intention of the scientific spirit is that of rationalism. This is the foundation stone of democratic ideas and institutions. The democratic spirit demands that one never blindly follow authority, dogma or tradition. The democratic spirit promotes the idea of the independent personality such as thinking on one's own, free exploration, self–respect and self–support. The democratic spirit respect personal freedom, equality, rights and interests and encourages persons to give full play to one's own initiative and creativity. This is the essential spirit and temperament for engaging scientific activity to search for one truth and create new knowledge. This, in many ways, provided the key for opening the door to a new China. But many obstacles remained.

There is a deep and inherent unity between the scientific and democratic spirits. Since the New Culture Movement, Chinese intellectuals took note of the cultural spirit of the West marked by science and democracy from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This surpassed even the Chinese peoples' sense of Western culture at the level of implementation as was manifested in the Westernization Movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century and then on the institutional level manifested in the Reform Movement of 1898, and the Revolution of 1911.

However, as Chinese society had long been under the rule of feudalism, the feudal ideas of agricultural society and the negative factors in Confucian culture were profoundly inherent in the national mentality. For the intellectuals in the New Culture Movement, it was impossible to accomplish the historical task of remolding the national mentality overnight. Even when China entered the period of Socialism, the negative factors of traditional feudal culture remained as part of the national mentality in varying degrees. Those factors appear in the tendency to obedience, reliance on organizations, repressed individuality, blind adherence to authority, self-inhibition, self-denial, satisfaction with the existing state of affairs, holding fast to convention, opting for the

doctrine of the mean, caution in speaking and acting, and belief that acquiescence brings happiness. Those ideas and dispositions dominated especially under the institutions of the planned economy that were highly centralized. Democratic institutions were weak. Such ideas and dispositions are opposed to the spirit of the new era of reform and opening, especially to the innovative spirit of modern science and technology.

Under the market-oriented economy, a cultural mentality spurred on by the innovative spirit of businesses such as Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco, institutions opened new paths with a sense of adventure and competition. They display an independent personality with self-consciousness, self-support, self-confidence and self-determination in facing the future. These institutions strive for reform, pursue prosperity and create new and unconventional products. In the process they manifest a temperament of daring to do unprecedented things, to legitimate error, and to delight in accepting challenges.

If Chinese scientists and technicians want to begin any undertaking and engage in innovative action in a market-oriented economy, they have to smash conservative ideas, the sense of group obedience and the doctrine of the mean. They must undertake a series of transformations in values and culture that comprise and transform value-orientation from uniformity to diversity, from facing the past to facing the future, from revering authority to striving for equality, and from attaching importance to status to attaching importance to achievement. They must seek to transform the state of mind from dependence to independence, from holding to the golden mean to competition. They need to transform personal dispositions from passivity to initiative, from satisfaction with the existing state of affairs to forging ahead.

There are two types of undertaking or institutions for R&D in the progress of modern science and technology. One is guided, planned and organized by government, such as space flight engineering, application of nuclear energy, accelerators, large computers and weapons, etc. Another is that initiated or established spontaneously by individual innovators under the guidance of the market, such as microcomputers, software, network management, bioengineering and biomedicine etc. Setting up the later type of undertaking requires especially that originators be full of the spirit of initiative, courage, and a sense of self-determination. Comparing the P. R. of China with the United States of America in the undertaking of science and technology, there is some common ground but for the most part great differences. However, at present, China still lacks the scientific and technological type of entrepreneurs who thrive on independent striving and spontaneous undertakings.

If Eastern nations want to catch up with the scientific and technological achievement and economic development of Western modernization, they have to identify themselves with some forward looking and reasonable cultural factors at the institutional and spiritual levels. These are not limited only to the reform of scientific and technological institutions but must extend to the spiritual, human and cultural aspects that influence the reform of educational institutions and ideas in general.

In the course of studying Western civilization, Eastern nations generally at the outset introduce Western science and technology, and only later then move towards Western educational methodology. In other words, first "build up the nation by technology", and afterwards "build up the nation by education."

However, in the course of identifying themselves with Western modern science and technology, Eastern nations did not identify with the institutional factors and ideas in Western education. The Confucian educational ideas and the ghost of the imperial examination system still linger in East Asia. Today the disparity between developed countries and developing countries is

in the gap of innovational and educational capacity. Even though remarkable progress has been made in economy and techniques in the last ten years or so, the countries in East Asia are behind in original thinking in science and technology compared with developed Western countries. The main source of the finance crisis that occurred in East Asia in 1997-1998 was the fundamental imbalance in the economic and class structure, and the lack of technological capacity whose deeper cause was rigid institutions and obsolete methods of education.

The Republic of Korea possesses the largest number of colleges and universities per capita in the world. After the finance crises, some academic leaders of the country rethought the problem of higher education recognizing its crippling rigidity. The Confucian tradition in Korea stressed leaning by rote in order to gain excellent results in standardized examinations. In the educational pattern of memorizing facts mechanically it is impossible for students to develop the talent and gain the capacity for problem solving. This rigid approach to educational helped to bring about the financial crisis.(4)

Japanese education experts considered that one of basis for American success is that its educational system and universities are filled with individual vigor. In American universities, actual capacities are respected, teachers and students are equal as persons, mutual criticism is developed, and students have a strong spirit of self-worth. In Japan students are weaker and less competent, they rely on parents, and the professors are satisfied with the existing state of affairs. Japanese experts in education circles hold that if a splendid system of higher education like that of America is not set up soon, Japan will not be well positioned for the twenty-first century.(5)

The administrators and scholars at the highest level of science and technology circles in China and Taiwan, such as Li Yuanzhe who won a Nobel Prize, also have noted the negative influence of the Confucian tradition in contemporary education in East Asia. Li Yuanzhe feels that the imperial examination system in Chinese history stifled talent. That perhaps is the main reason why China fell behind the West in the last four to five hundred years. At the present time, the culture of the imperial examinations, like ghosts, have slipped into the new type of education through the back door. Marks on exams are still held to be of the utmost importance. The system by which examinations decide all of one's life has seriously twisted the purpose and ideals of education, destroying innumerable young students. The purpose of education ought to be to train students to attack problems not yet solved. Where education is highly uniform, thousands upon thousands of students must adapt to the same standards at the same rate of progress. Present education often is training in some technical ability or ancient knowledge repeated in a mechanical way. It is not learning to think deeply and critically. The student becomes a "mechanic" who can only resolve questions on examination papers. (6)

In contrast, American educational circles encourage and respect individual creativity and non-conventional approaches. These values produce entrepreneurs. Even that system, however, cannot always account for human creativity, e.g. Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, dropped out of a prestigious university and abandoned academia to seize the opportunity and set up a high-tech enterprise that clearly represents the cutting-edge of the knowledge-based economy. To be candid, such outstanding personnel emerge only with difficulty from East Asian cultural soil. That is because the culture is still permeated with the idea of imperial examinations and formal schooling.

However, faced with the challenge of international competition in science and technology, China is embarking on a transformation of its educational institutions and pedagogical ideas. In this process, some Chinese educational experts maintain that college and university entrance examinations don't necessarily identify versatile persons and overall excellence. Rather testing needs to measure the student's conscious capacity for exploration and discovery. Innovators in

science and technology generally manifest strong individuality. Under the Confucian tradition, individuality was often stifled and students were graded according to how well they conformed to general norms. Such an approach was detrimental to the development of society. What is needed is a more tailored education which builds on students' aptitude and the diversity of their interests and aspirations. That should enable students to fully develop their potential and become creative, qualified and useful members of society.

The Significance of Protecting and Promoting Cultural Diversity on the Institutional and Spiritual Levels

As the process of the modernization expands toward global proportions, Eastern countries identify themselves with the advanced implements, institutions and spirit of Western culture. But this does not mean that modernization is only the historical process of taking the West as a model and center. The claim here is not that Western culture is itself the world culture to which all cultures need to conform. Rather, various nations situated in different geographical environments have different historical and cultural traditions comprising social customs, languages, faiths, modes of thinking, and modes of behavior. The forming and continuity of those traditions were and still are based on the historical relations between people and their native land over long historical periods. Those traditions reflect the specific relation between a native people and their environment. They contain the people's attitudes toward life, and form the cultural distinctiveness of the nation. Those diversified cultures have their own reality and reason for being.

No culture should be simply judged as modern or non-modern. The fact that science, technology, economy, culture and society moved faster in the West does not mean that the discrepancy between Eastern and Western cultures is simply the gap between ancient and modern culture. In Eastern countries, some native cultures appear, at times, to have some negative factors such as low regard for life, but they also have positive factors that to this day keep those nations vigorously preserving values while moving forward toward modernization. We should emphasize those positive factors as transformers leading toward modernization.

Japan is a nation that entered the tidal wave of modernization in the nineteenth century. Before the eighteenth century, Japanese culture was deeply influenced by the Confucian culture of China. However, in the 1800s, new Western knowledge, especially the natural sciences was introduced. This undermined the Japanese nation's reverence for Confucian culture. After 1868 Japan began to establish new national institutions that imitated Western capitalism while adapting its own characteristic culture, and launched a capitalist industrial movement. Moreover, Japan introduced Western trends of thought in the humanities and social sciences, especially absorbing ideas and virtues embodied in the Western ethics of Protestantism and the correlated "spirit of capitalism".

That historical process of Japanese modernization, beginning in 1868, is usually referred to by historians as the "separation from Asia and entering into Europe". But, in fact, Japan did not completely separate from the cultural soil of East Asia and undertake a wholesale westernization. Japan is extremely good at imitating and absorbing outside cultures, but it is also good at adapting other cultures to its own needs.

Indeed, the argument can be made that Japan has protected its basic culture within the process and progress of modernization. It has selectively absorbed Western culture, organically fused native with outside cultures, and creatively transformed cultural resources to endow them with a new vigor.

As mentioned, Japan, historically, was influenced by Confucian culture that regarded "family as base" and respected the "hierarchical system". This formed a traditional social structure with a family type of community as the center of life. Traditional cultural values were regarded by the group as the basis of society. The individual ego yielded to the group – family, firm, society or community of interest – all within the hierarchical system. However, after the Second World War, group values yielded more to independent and individual characteristics of western democratic thought.

Nonetheless, Japan did not completely convert to the Western individualistic values of self-centeredness or egotism. Japan established cultural values according to which the independent self was able to be harmonized with responsibility for the group and society. This cultural transformation allowed individual talent and ability to enter into cohesion with the group and norms of society. The culture is still deeply permeated by Chinese Confucian ideas of "harmony" and "faith". Japan refers to itself as the nation of "great harmony". The Confucian spirit there attaches great importance to the harmony between the individual and the group, and stresses the need for the individual to keep faith with the group (7). In Japan's modern business culture, entrepreneurs believe in the integral superiority of the group, and that the harmony of the whole generates higher efficiency. In a very real sense businesses retain a tender side and family-type ethic. They generally adopt strategic decisions collectively beginning from the ground up. While preserving individuality, every staff member retains a sense of identity and a feeling of a permanent home in the enterprise. The entrepreneur and staff are closely connected by common belief, destiny and interest. Staff members wholeheartedly serve a business throughout a whole career. This greatly adds to the efficiency of the enterprise.

Whereas America and the West promote the competitive capacity of the individual, Japanese society encourages that of the group. Japanese enterprises maintain a higher working efficiency by way of mutual cooperation, help and encouragement, but this is not by competition among staff members. This organically integrated efficiency of the group is usually higher than that in an atomized individualistic division of labor. The Japanese pay attention to harmoniously managing staff members while allowing for their individual diversity. It is then possible to foster healthy domestic competition as well as compete with foreign enterprise.

While discovery and invention have been essential to the West's success, they are not the only elements that are important. Industrialization and marketing are also central. These require an integration of all of the various sectors of the economy such as management, strategic decision-making, design, technology, manufacture, sales and after-sale services, etc. Optimizing the whole requires a spirit of group harmony. Although lacking originality in invention, Japan has superiority in its business management culture that joins harmony and high efficiency. This culture enables Japanese enterprises to succeed at "secondary innovation" by improving technological design, quality control, and reducing production costs. Enterprises continuously expand their percentage of the market by the high quality and low price of their products. At the same time, they closely track the needs of the market to improve products and supply quality after-sale service. They thereby optimize their market competition. Such management made America and the West who are strong at "first innovation" fall behind the Japanese in the improving of industrialization and marketing of inventions.

Though retaining some positive, vigorous characteristics of its native culture on the level of spirit and institution, Japan achieved success in the innovation of technology, industry and marketing at the level of implementation. This enabled them to catch up with the West technologically and economically by the mid-to-late 1970's. By the beginning of the 1990's the

per capita GDP of Japan had surpassed that of America. The total value of the Japanese economy surpassed that of Germany, France, Britain and Italy, becoming the second ranking economy in the world.

The success of Japan provided an illustration for Eastern countries of how to protect and integrate their native cultures with Western culture and thus open themselves to modernization and a better quality of life.

Western Cultural Selection and Integration in the Tide of Postmodernization

In the West, modernization originated in the eighteenth century with the process of industrialization. The first characteristic in that process was the application of science and technology to material production. This began as a way to reduce the need for human physical labor. Second, populations were largely migrating from agriculture to industry, from countryside to city, Agricultural society was transformed into an industrial one. Third, feudal autocracy was being transformed into capitalist or socialist democracy.

Later on in the West the rising tide of postmodernization followed what can only be called postindustrialization. The symptoms of this movement first appeared in the United States in the mid 1950's. When the number of white-collar workers surpassed the number of blue collar workers in the 1970's, the information age began. This marked the coming of the era of postindustrialization as well as the beginning of the movement of postmodernization.

Some clear characteristics postmodernization stand out. First, most workers are in the service sectors. Second, more than half the workers are in professions related to the production, collection, management and transmission of information. Third, science and technology are continually being applied to reduce human mental labor. Rather than capital and labor, the most important resources are knowledge and information. When the industrial economy is transformed into a knowledge-based economy, the material economy is transformed into an informational one.

Moreover, the tidal wave of postmodernization in the West is changing values. A major change is that Westerners increasingly identify their values with Eastern (notably Chinese) values of pursuing harmony. The harmony between the human and nature is the supreme goal of Eastern, especially Chinese, philosophy. This hope is now being pursued in the West.

Let us now turn to some of these new values of postmodernization emerging in the West.

The Value of Innovation in Pursing Triple Harmony

In September of 1996, the vice president and chief scientist of Bell Labs of Lucent Technologies in America, Arno Penzias, a Nobel Prize winner in Physics, came to Shanghai and lectured on "The Technologies of Information Today and Tomorrow". He was extremely respectful of the Chinese idea of harmony and appreciated the Chinese diagram of the Supreme Ultimate and its profound implications for dialectical harmony. He spoke about his new book entitled, *Harmony: Business, Technology and Life after the Era of Paper Work.*(8) There he advanced a new idea about establishing a "triple harmony" between technology and the human, technology and nature, and technologies and themselves. Arno Penzia's viewpoint represents, to a great extent, the Westerner's attitude towards, and respect for Eastern and Chinese cultures in the contemporary era.

According to this view, the economically developed countries have undergone the process of transforming the "era of quantity" into the "era of quality"; and at present are transforming from

"quality'' into "harmony". Each of the three eras has a different set of values. The main feature of the era of quantity was to seek large-scale production to insure a development plan. This was accomplished through the use of technology and exploitation of the environment. The principle features of the era of quality are to gain efficiency in production, respond to customer feed back while seeking value from technological structures and protecting the environment. The chief features in the era of harmony will be to seek a balanced economy which puts human needs first but pursues the value in coordination, fusion of technologies and renewing the environment.

I think, in the West, the era of quantity essentially represented the primary stage of industrialization, the era of quality represented the advanced stage of industrialization, and the era of harmony represents the era of postindustrialization, namely the era of postmodernization. The values in the era of quantity and quality represent the value-orientation of innovation in the process of modernization, while the values in the era of harmony represent the value-orientation of innovation in the movement of postmodernization. Both are cutting-edge but in different direction.

The following is how I see this triple harmony functioning:

First, harmony between Technology and the Human. The harmony between technology and the human essentially is the state of rendering high technology more suitable for humanity or the personal. Information technology in the present era is the most prominent example of this direction. Originally the development of computer technology was to liberate humans from manual work. But the operation of computers became more and more complicated following the increase in computer capability. Hence, an important direction of innovation was to improve continuously the design of computers in order to make them more user-friendly for operators. Further innovation will eliminate harmful radiation from computers and render the screen more lightweight, portable and soft.

In the postindustrial society, seeking harmony between technology and the human means that factory owners not only pay close attention to the feedback from workers and customers, but also to the after-sale service of products and technology. The latter includes providing guides and training in technology for customers. This will also improve the marketability of the product.

In contrast with the productive values of industrial society that sought mass standardized production, postindustrial society makes products that are more suitable to people's individualized and diversified needs. The former reduces cost of design and manufacture by mass and standardized production, while the latter, adopts informational technologies such as Computer Aided Design (CAD) and the Soft Manufacture System (SMS) in order to lower costs for producing diversified and small batch products according to the demands of the consumer.

Second, Harmony between Technology and the Environment. The dominant factor of the industrialized era was the material economy. This era was marked by values that call for large-scale production and that "life ought to fully enjoy material resources". Those values caused a series of negative consequences: the limited natural resources in the earth were over-consumed and wasted; the non-renewable energies were nearly exhausted; the biosphere came close to being destroyed; the relation of economy to technology and the ecological environment reached an apex of intense conflict.

In the postindustrial civilization, exploitation and utilization of energy has turned to the energy forms such as solar energy, on which agriculture, of course, has always relied. Postindustrial civilization will not rely on largely consumed non-renewable energy sources such as coal, oil and natural gas. Rather, it will have to utilize renewable, clean energy, especially solar power. This

increasingly will also include, not only the transformation of water power, including seawater, and wind power, but also the immediate utilization of solar energy through the efficient transformation of light and electricity.

In this new postindustrial civilization, the sophisticated development of information technology will reduce material and energy consumption to the lowest level. Civilization will achieve the ideal state that consumes the least amount of resources to create the most wealth. The commercial and productive administration of the computer web can trace feed-back and forecast information on supply and demand in the market, implement goal-directed management for production and sales. Thus, we can avoid enormous waste of resources as a result of blind production and overproduction in industrial society. Particularly, electronic commerce and virtual shops can engage in the production and sale of specified assortments and limited batches of goods, saving on large investment in warehouses, storage and shipping.

New developments include internet, multimedia, virtual technology, electronic mail, electronic money, net-trading, net ordering of goods or tickets, video conferencing, distance learning, technological services, even medical counseling, and most importantly perhaps, telecommuting. These approaches can reduce the flow of material, energy and people to the lowest degree. They also will serve to greatly decrease environmental pollution caused by traffic.

The fusion of printing with publishing by computers and the increase of the multimedia electronic publications reduces the relevance of newspapers, magazines and books; it also saves trees.

The widespread application of informational technologies in agriculture and manufacture can transform the extensive waste in production into more meticulous and parsimonious production. This promises to lighten the pressure of economic exploitation of the environment.

The postindustrial society will fully develop the technology of "green" manufacture and the technology for protecting the environment. This will reduce the harmful waste material emerging from the process of production.

In the postindustrial society, the values of innovation do not mean simply a quest for the new and abandonment of the old. Rather, many old products will be reproduced but in a more ecologically sound way, which avoids excessive waste of natural resources.

Third, Harmony between the Technologies Themselves. At present the development of informational technology obviously represents the cutting-edge of harmony between technologies themselves.

In the initial stage of information technology, the different departments of business such as marketing, sales, production planning, product design, quality testing, storehouse management and transport used separate computers and classification techniques. In the advanced stage of information, Computer Integrated Manufacturing System (CIMS) fuse these different "isolated islands of automation" into an efficiently coordinated system of management and operation.

The technologies of the net with digital and multimedia capability fuse not only with computer and communication, but also with electrical home appliances. This fusion of telecommunication, cable television and computer nets has produced a new cultural information-industry which merges press, book publication, music, film and television into one system. The fusion of computers, *Global Information System* (GIS), the *Globe Position System* (GPS) and the radio communication net constitutes a global intellectual system.

The Values of Moderate Consumption

The values of industrial society entailed the conquest and exploitation of nature. Generally it was thought that the sole purpose of a person's life was the possession of more wealth, and better and more material goods. Production and consumption in great quantity became the ultimate aim. Commodity fetishism was widespread. Consumerism was regarded as embodying one's personal social status. However, as we have seen, those values caused disastrous consequences in that natural resources were nearly exhausted, obsolete goods rapidly increased, and the environment was seriously polluted. In the meantime greed and material enjoyment multiplied; people became the servants of goods and ever more spiritually barren.

This rapacious desire is perhaps the developing motive force of industrial society, but it is not the motor of postindustrial society. The latter values demand a change from immoderate consumption and production, the development of a new pattern of life. This will rely less on the limited resources in the earth and search harmony with the bearing capacities of the earth. For nature, this requires that people to adopt attitudes of appreciation, reverence and eulogy, protection and moderate exploit for this, postindustrial civilization in the West can draw upon Chinese cultural values because Chinese classical philosophy, poetry and prose are imbued with the cultural resources for appreciating, revering and eulogizing nature, for a fusion between person and nature, and permeated with a mood for personifying nature.

For the above reasons, the classic culture of China also advocated a thrifty or unadorned life and spirited pursuit of riches. The people of postindustrial society can draw on those cultural factors, shake off values filled with material desire and enter a state of life permeated with poetic flavor.

The Values of Global Common Interest

The industrial movement that originated in West from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century was a process of globalization in which Western capitalist countries oppressed and exploited Eastern countries. This process was filled with plunder and exploitation. In the 1960's Western colonialism basically ended but owing to economic and technological repression, many poor countries have cheaply to sell natural resources to Western developed countries. Forest reserves were destroyed, grassland rapidly degenerated, soil seriously erodes and desertification spread.

Since the developed countries dominate the rules of game in economic globalization, the developing countries find it hard to engage in fair competition in the world market. Usually they have to accept industrial transfers from Western countries that seriously pollute the environment and largely consume material and energy. This brings about pollution of the atmosphere, rivers, seas and oceans. Given the ecological system of the earth as an organic and dynamic whole, any ecological environmental damage in developing countries will worsen the ecological environment in developed, countries. Global environmental problems, from hothouse gases to desertification, transcend national boundaries. These are some of the lessons we are learning about common interests.

Therefore, the environmental problem has become a global challenge that touches all of humanity. It links the interests of developed countries with those of developing countries. In view of this situation, developed countries should not only take account of the narrow interests of their own nation-states. They should help developing nations with their economic and technological issues to improve production but in an ecologically sound way.

Various countries, owing to the imbalance in the distribution of natural resources, and the disparities in the structure of the labor force follow different patterns of complementarity, dependency and common interests. Hence, developed countries should adopt a "win-win" strategy in treating economic and political relations with developing countries. If they stubbornly apply a policy of containment and sanction against developing countries, developed countries, in turn, will suffer economic and political. Only identifying with the interests of developing countries, indeed with the whole world, can developed countries advance their own self-interest.

Eastern Cultural Selection and Integration in the Tide of Postmodernization

Eastern countries generally began the movement toward industrialization in the 1950's. At that time industrialization meant modernization. Since the late 1970's Western developed countries began the movement to the of information age, and entered the postindustrial society. With that development came the tide of postmodernization. Thereupon, Eastern countries, such as China, were still transforming an agricultural society into an industrialized one. But very quickly China was faced with the challenges brought on by information technology and postmodernization.

Hence, in catching up with the information age, China will not be able to remain at the level of the older type of industrialization, but needs to rapidily assimilate postindustrialization to its modernization. In other words, if China want to change its less advanced state in the process of economic globalization and realize the twenty-first century goal of "modernization", it will have to select and identify some implements, institutions and values of postindustrialization, including some elements of Western postmodernization.

In the last few years, the Chinese information industry and computerization of social-economic life have experienced speedy development. The Chinese strategy of development, on one hand, lays stress on the adoption of information technology to implement and improve industrialization; on the other hand, it stresses information technology as a means to reform traditional industry. Both processes lead to building new business/industrial institutions. In other words, at present China has to simultaneously take the information revolution as a new starting point for development, develop an industrial and knowledge-based economy, and advance both industrialization and postindustrialization. Let us now look at what that multilayered process might entail, at least from the perspective of values.

Values of Efficiency

An information society is dependent on efficient operation. Economic globalization, based on the information revolution, demands ever more efficiency. Efficiency, in turn, calls on people to fully value time and trust. Transparency and good governance are essential. This calls for reforming the pyramid type of bureaucratic apparatus and substituting an efficient network type of social/management structure. The rapid development of the Internet provides a powerful technological tool for forming such a network type of social structure and organization. This horizontal net is quickly being constructed in China. From 1998 to 2000, the number of Chinese Internet users increased from 100 thousand to 17 million.(9)

Values of Innovation and Diversity

The rise and fall of a civilization or a nation depend on its capacity to respond to the challenges of its environment. The capability of response essentially is one of creation or innovation. In other words, the destiny of a civilization or a nation is decided by its ability for innovation. In an information society, knowledge is the most important resource. The concept of knowledge implies flow and alteration, but not constancy. The flow of knowledge demands innovation and diversified thought, which, in turn, implies cultural pluralism and diversification within national cultures.

Ecology suggests that preserving the diversity of species on the earth is a most important step for the whole ecological system and for the continued existence of the biosphere. Biodiversity preserves the capacity of an ecological system to adapt to the environment and support the coexistence of different species.

Similarly, preserving the cultural diversity not only is favorable to every nation's adapting to its special environment, it is also beneficial to all of humanity in responding to challenges from the environment. No culture or civilization can retain hegemony in the world over a long period of time. There might be a lesson here from the Mesozoic Era where temporarily supreme dinosaur became extinct.

Even if Western culture represents the mainstream of modernization, the various national cultures of Eastern or other areas remain of great value for human life in the contemporary era. The "Manifesto of Environment and Development" published by the United Nations in the June of 1992 declared: "Aboriginal and other communities possess significant effectiveness in the management of environment and development issues due to their knowledge and traditional customs. Every country ought to admit and appropriately support their peculiarities, cultures and interests, entering them efficaciously into the work of continued development."(10)

Developing countries ought to select their own pattern of life according to their own national conditions. A developing country such as China should not imitate the pattern of life and culture of consumption of the developed Western countries simply because its per capita resources are lower.

In the face of the broad dissemination of Western culture following economic globalization, Eastern countries should keep their distinctive aesthetic values. For example, in China, urban reconstruction has imitated Western styles. New buildings and other features of urban renewal follow similar patterns designed in the West. Such buildings, lacking cultural distinctiveness, diminish Chinese identity.

Values of Humanism

In the current Chinese context, the values of humanism can be related to the values of the market. In recent years, China more and more has identified with the values of a market-oriented economy. Indeed, the market sensitively reflects various signals of the economy; it regulates the relation between supply and demand, optimizes the disposition of resources, and promotes competition and enhanced efficiency to stimulate increases in the economy. But the market also has its blind spots. The market-guided economy often deviates from the direction of values of the ecologically sound and sustainable development. The values of the market consider enormous consumption as good for the unlimited growth of the economy, and regard uncontrolled consumption and production as economic goals. Persons living in a market society often regard a high level of enjoyment of goods to be life's main value and goal. A high level of consumption is the mark of social progress. Those values ignore the fact that enormous consumption will bring

about consequences of exhausted resources and a worsened environment. The market is the initial measure regulating economic operation, but is not the only or final norm of economic activity.

Although the market-oriented economy appears to have magical power that evokes enormously productive forces, it is not omnipotent. It cannot harmonize the relation between unbridled economic growth and limited natural resources or ensure a happy and prosperous social life. Therefore development needs not only to take seriously the market as an engine, but it also needs to respect transcendent values that guide one's life.

In the process of identifying the market-oriented economy, we should persist in the values of humanism that demand that one deal correctly with the values of commercialization.

A market-oriented economy affirms the significance of competition for breaking monopolies and promoting technological progress and economic development. But, this does not mean that any competition will certainly bring about progress. Excessive competition brings about a waste of nature and human resources. Excessive competition brings about a waste of natural and human resources. Excessive competition also gives rise to the destruction of harmonious interpersonal relationships, and lowers efficiency. The development of technology, the economy and society need cooperation and coordination as well as competition. For instance, the progress of a society requires concern and care for its weakest members. Competition should never means misusing such principles as "the struggle for existence" and "the survival of the fittest". Moreover, competition does not mean that "the weak are the prey of the strong," or that "the law of the jungle" should rule.

The market-oriented economy fully affirms individual interests and eliminates unrealistic collective interests. That enables everyone to have a chance to realize individual values. But the market-oriented economy is also able to reduce interpersonal relationships to cold monetary interests. Extreme individualism will bring about a degeneration of morals and the corruption of social values, which could entail a destabilization of the social order. While affirming individual values, we must promote the spirit of community and solidarity and the virtue of respect for the public interest. We should extend to the weak and their families concern and support. Every society has to be concerned for those who are marginalized.

A market-oriented economy often tries to put a commercial value on cultural activity. Although this commercialization might be beneficial for the development of popular culture, it encourages the trend to raise up the basest elements of popular culture. Once cultural behavior becomes economic behavior, refined culture loses its foothold in society. When the loftier elements of a culture have difficulty in surviving, people cease to nurture noble sentiments and are reduced to a kind of "dumbing-down." Such societies can be left without any spiritual or transcendent sense.

Thus, culture should not be completely sold to the mechanism of the market-oriented economy. Government should support cultural activities, especially in the humanities, such as philosophy, history, and literature. Refined culture can thus provide an opening to life's ultimate meaning and outlets for beauty and truth. In sum, a loftier sense of culture can provide an orientation toward the highest human values, a deeper sense of self, and a communal awareness.

Conclusion

My paper has attempted to discuss the problems of cultural identity and diversity as they are unfolding like a massive tidal wave: in the East, Modernization; in the West, Postmodernization. Both East and West, in their own way, need to embark upon a process of selection and integration

to protect and build upon their respective cultures. The discussion, unpacked above, indicates that there is a dialectical relation between cultural identity and cultural diversity.

Cultural identity and diversity are essential forces that promote various national approaches to progress and prosperity, as well as a harmony of coexistence among nations. This is especially important within the present horizon of globalization. A unilateral stress on identity is not beneficial to innovation, competition and development; a unilateral stress on diversity is not beneficial to global harmony and prosperity. Balance is needed to ride the tidal waves. Cultural globalization calls for the integration of cultural diversity and identity within a context of cultural pluralism.

Notes

1. "Forecasting China in Future Fifty Years," Hongkong, *News Daily*, 1999, 10, 7; *Reference News*, Xinhua News Agency, P. R. China, 1999, 10, 28, p. 8.
2. "Making Huge Money by Knowledge," *Wenhui Daily*, China, Shanghai, 2000, 1, 18, p. 9.
3. See, "Forecasting China in the Next Fifty Years".
4. Asians studying method of mechanical memory cannot test global economy, *Christianity Science Maxim Daily*, USA, 1998, 4, 15; *Reference News*, 1998, 5, 28.
5. "What Should Japanese Education Use for Reference from America?" *Everyday News*, Japan, 2000, 1, 10; *Reference News*, 2000, 1, 17, p. 6.
6. "Chinese Culture and Education," *Ming Daily*, Hongkong, 1999, 10, 2; *Reference News*, 1999, 10, 11-12, p. 8.
7. *Japanese Civilization*, ed. by Ye Weiqu (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publishing House, 1999), 10, 1st edition.
8. Chinese translation, (Chinese Science/Technology Publishing House, 1996), 7.
9. "China Is Marching toward the Global Net," *Frankfurt Daily*, Germany, 2000, 8, 12; *Reference News*, 2000, 8, 17, p. 1.
10. "Stride forward toward 21st Century," *Collection of Documents on the Meeting on Environment and Development of the United Nation*s (Chinese Environment Science Publishing House, 1992), p. 32.

Chapter VI
Globalization with a Human Face

Joseph Isidore Fernando

Problem Definition

Globalization is a key word in contemporary discourse. We tend to understand it primarily in terms of the market economy. This is not a broad view as it focuses mainly on one, though very important, aspect of human life, that is, the economic. It would be much more interesting to see globalization as a multifaceted phenomenon. Humankind has entered a new epoch. At the dawn of a new century we find ourselves joining the conversation of humanity facilitated by a stupendous communications network. This is a new beginning and could be a great leap forward for the global community if only we can learn how to truly globalize.

The question "What is the goal of globalization?" cannot be answered without reference to "How does globalization take place at present?" Obviously, it is the West that benefits most from globalization. Globalization is a natural consequence of science and technology in the West. Thanks to science and technology, the West has an edge over the rest of the world. As Samuel P. Huntington remarks, "The West is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations."1 How did the West come to acquire such enormous power and wealth? What are the causes of the superiority of the West? I consider these questions highly relevant because globalization is not an entirely novel phenomenon of our times. It has its roots in history supported by various philosophies.

The Roots of Western Domination

By way of tracing the roots of Western domination, an examination of the American creed will reveal there is something fundamentally wrong with the understanding of such a creed. The core of the American creed as expressed in the Constitution is the pursuit of happiness. What is happiness? To the American mind, happiness consists of good living. What, then, is good living? Good living, for most Americans, is having prosperity. But, what is prosperity? Prosperity means primarily consumption of material goods, more precisely, maximum consumption of material goods. Thus happiness is equated with maximum consumption of material goods. And how can we pursue happiness? One can do so by accumulating a lot of material comforts. But everyone cannot possess as much wealth as one wants. If some possess more, others have to possess less or, in the worst case, nothing. If the European-Americans want to be prosperous and be in pursuit of happiness, then obviously some other group has to be deprived of its legitimate share of wealth. A scapegoat has to be found. In the history of America, Jews, Irish immigrants, African-Americans and Latinos have all been placed in positions as scapegoats. The Jews and the Irish eventually found their way out of the economic dungeon.

Why did the Europeans consider themselves superior? Did their sense of superiority stem from their Judeo-Christian tradition? If so, how? Judaism claimed exclusive revelation from God and the Jews considered themselves the chosen race. Their attitude toward the non-Jews was contemptuous rather than friendly. The Old Testament of the Bible provides ample evidence of the assumed superiority of the Jews. Since Christianity was an offshoot of Judaism, the former was

colored by the jingoism of the latter. Christianity claims to be the only true religion and till recently Christians considered all non-Christians as pagans. Historically, the attitude of Christians toward people of other religions has not always been commendable.

The West inherited the Judeo-Christian tradition and considered it superior to all other traditions of the world. The superiority of the Europeans, which had its origin in their religion, gradually extended to other areas of Western civilization. The sense of superiority of the Europeans had come to stay permanently. The industrial revolution in England further inflated the ego of the West. The West was all set to control and exploit nature. To boost their economy the Western nations hungrily navigated in search of new lands. With the discovery of new lands colonialism emerged. Thus the Europeans not only began to subdue nature and rule over alien nations but also thereby ruthlessly affirmed their so-called superiority.

When the Europeans colonized America after its so-called discovery by Columbus, they grabbed land from the native Indians, drove them into jungles and deserts, and finally almost exterminated them. The Europeans were born to rule, to enjoy the good things of the earth. How could the natives stand in the way of the Europeans? Many have traced the Europeans' assumption of superiority to their misconstrued notions of Judeo-Christian culture. There is no society or nation wherein some philosophical belief is not operative to such an extent that it manifests itself in social institutions and processes. Obviously, there must be some philosophy behind the American creed, the core of which is pursuit of happiness. What, then, is that philosophy which influenced the thinking of the founding fathers of America?

Philosophy in Britain has been chiefly empiricism and British ethics has been markedly utilitarian. As America was once a British colony and many settlers were from Britain, culturally the former was an extension of the latter. Therefore, the dominant philosophy of Britain became the dominant philosophy of America. What is, in brief, utilitarian ethics? Utilitarianism was founded by Richard Cumberland in 1672 and it reached full expression in David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature in 1739. The writings of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick in the nineteenth century dominated utilitarian thought.

The two principles of utilitarianism are: 1) the consequentialist principle that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the goodness or badness of the results that flow from it and 2) the hedonist principle that the only thing bad in itself is pain. The greatest good and happiness of man is the sum total of pleasures. The utilitarian doctrine can be expressed in the form of a single principle, the greatest happiness principle: the rightness of an action is determined by its contribution to the happiness of everyone affected by it.2

Utilitarians teach that of the various possibilities open to men, they ought to choose that which will produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. Moral acts are determined in terms of the consequences they produce. Utilitarianism is a teleological ethics because of its emphasis on consequences and because the idea of the "right" is defined in relation to the good. Bentham suggested that moral terms like justice have no meaning except in relation to pleasure and pain.

Bentham states, "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question".3

John Stuart Milll adds, " The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure."4

Allied to the utilitarian tendency of America is her native philosophy, pragmatism. The leading pragmatists like C. S. Pierce, William James and John Dewey, under the influence of Darwinism, conceived philosophy in down-to-earth terms. Pragmatism is an expression of empiricism. Experience and experiment are the key to reality. In his pragmatic theory of meaning, C. S. Pierce advocated that concepts have meaning only when they are related to effects. Concepts of meaning are the same as concepts of effects. Take, for instance, the term "fragile" which means, " If we were to strike a thing, it would snap or shatter". William James converted the "pragmatic theory of meaning" into the "pragmatic theory of truth". According to him, truth is that which works. That which is useful and leads to success is true. " The true is the verified". Truth has to be tested in experience and experiment. If a thing cannot stand the test of experience, it cannot be true. For John Dewey who advocated a pragmatic instrumentalism, the human intelligence is a tool for successful adaptation to conflicts arising out of man's encounter with new situations. Dewey attempted to apply instrumentalism to society, education and so on in order to make human life happy and successful. Like the utilitarians, the pragmatists believed in happiness or pleasure as the goal of life.

A crucial question now arises: Is there a connection between the oppression of the natives by the Europeans and the philosophies like utilitarianism and pragmatism? The answer is in the affirmative. On closer examination of this connection one can come to know that Western domination arises out of the implications of these philosophies. What are these implications?

First, the "greatest happiness principle" justifies an act if it produces happiness, which is the goal of life. Happiness has to be obtained if human life is to be meaningful. Adhered to seriously, this principle would result in one's accumulation of pleasures in a competitive society where survival is most important. In a society where utilitarian ethics is in practice, excessive selfishness, cutthroat competition and exploitation would be rampant. Economic advantages are most desired and certain groups have to remain disadvantaged and marginalized. It would be no exaggeration to say this is what happened in America. For the happiness of the European-Americans, the Afro-Americans have remained disadvantaged.

Second, the greatest happiness of the greatest number implied the greatest happiness of the European-Americans, the majority in America. So the minority Afro-Americans would be deprived of the greatest happiness. Third, pragmatism with its equation of truth with success and usefulness has worsened the plight of the Afro-Americans. After all, in America, who could be successful and make things work for their greatest benefit except the European-Americans? The natives as victims of utilitarian ethics have been continuously affected by pragmatism, which upholds success as everything. Its implication would be that the success of the Europeans is of paramount importance and the depravation of the Native and African-Americans insignificant. When success becomes a supreme value, it hardly matters how one achieves it.

Need for Remedial Measures

How might the West, and especially the U.S., offer an anecdote for its received philosophy and help to put a human face on globalization? Justice demands rectitude. Globalization will be fruitful if the West comes forward to rectify the consequences of the colonial past. Many poor nations are still bleeding from the wounds of colonialism. Poverty has to be wiped out on an international scale. We now have the resources to eradicate poverty. " There is no deficit in the human resources, the deficit is in the human will."5 The rich nations are called upon to use their wealth for the development of the poor ones. No nation could be great, if it is not a compassionate

nation. Aid is not a favor. The affluent nations have a moral obligation to help in the growth of poor nations through a consistent effort over many years. Global poverty can be wiped out, if the wealthy nations allocate certain percentage of their gross national product annually for a decade or two for the development of poor nations.

The aid program should not be with strings attached. No poor nation should be treated as a beggar nation. If aid were used as a subtle form of neocolonialism, no self-respecting nation would accept it. The ultimate reason for aid is commitment to wipe out poverty, ignorance and disease the world over. The real reason for the use of Western resources against poverty should go beyond material concerns to the quality of our mind, hearts and character. Persons are precious because of their dignity and worth. The West needs to repent in humility for its colonial exploitation.

I agree with Martin Luther King, Jr. that injustice needs to be rectified in various ways: in the widening gulf between poverty and wealth; in the millions of workers being rendered jobless as a result of automation while the profits of employers increase; in the deeds of the multinational corporations which reap huge profits in the Third World countries without contributing to their social betterment; in the alliance of America with the rich of Latin America; in the Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others and nothing to learn from them; and in waging war to settle differences with others. Nations that increase their military budget year after year while spending on social welfare and educational programs are cut are heading towards spiritual death. A new world order demands that the historical wrongs be righted and ongoing oppression stopped.

Technology has been not only instrumental in aggravating exploitation, but also life threatening. The contemporary technological threat is rooted in violence. Violence has entrenched itself in the world. There is violence in our thinking, in our attitude toward others, in our interpersonal relationships and finally toward nature resulting in ecological catastrophes. Overpowered by violence, modern man has lost his sense of justice, balance, respect and tenderness. Instead, he is filled with lust for power, hatred, anger, ruthlessness and covetousness. We have a tremendous task to do, to transform everything on the basis of nonviolent, universal, unselfish love. This alone can guarantee not only the survival of the world and of the species but more basically for humans a joyful, meaningful and rich experience of life and its rewards.

In our increasing confrontation with the abuse of technology by the rich and the mighty, we need a powerful means to achieve the desired end: just, rational and human use of technology. Violence in our technological practice cannot be countered by violence, as it will lead to more violence. Therefore, we have only one strategy to adopt, that is, the strategy of nonviolent resistance. It is imperative that the technological process be brought within the moral domain of nonviolence. Failure to do this will spell chaos and tragedy.

One of the great virtues of nonviolent resistance is that it reduces hostilities to a minimum. Nonviolent coercion not only produces good will, but also offers the greatest opportunities for evolving communal harmony. It maintains moral, rational and cooperative attitudes amidst conflict. Another important merit of nonviolent resistance is its practicality especially for oppressed minority groups. The nonviolent tactics put enormous pressure on the governments and force those in power to act justly. Nonviolence can be employed to resolve all conflict situations. Nonviolence is not a mere tactic, but a moral imperative and a way of life. It seeks to restore the wholeness of community. It reconciles the oppressor with the oppressed. Nonviolence can liberate us from hatred, selfishness and lust for power. It can mould us together as fit members of a global home. Nonviolence is an excellent remedy for many of our ills such as fear, domination and exploitation. We have progressed so much in our pursuit of science and technology, but regressed

in the moral and spiritual realms. The external cannot be allowed to overtake the internal. To establish harmony between the two, we have to rediscover our moral and spiritual moorings. Otherwise we will perish by our own technological inventions.

Toward a Global Home

The great new challenge for humankind is that it has to learn to live together – black and white, yellow and brown, Hindu and Muslim, Jew and Christian, Buddhist and Zoroastrian – a family – pluralistic and rich in ideas and values has to celebrate diversity and live in peace. Humankind has to be open to new ideas of change in a world of science and technology. The world has shrunk into a global home. The worldwide neighborhood needs to become a worldwide sisterhood and brotherhood. Each nation has to strike a balance between its loyalty to humanity as a family and the imperative of preserving the best in its own society. A global fellowship surpassing one's race, class and nationality can be realized only with an all-embracing love. A global fellowship based on love is essential for the survival of the human race. *Love is the key to ultimate reality*.

Ironically, nowadays there appears to be a tendency to love things, sometimes at the expense of people. We must shift from a thing-oriented society to a person-oriented society. Things are to be used and persons loved; and not the other way about. When machines, property and profit are treated more important than persons, consequently racism, materialism and militarism cannot be conquered. A civilization can easily disintegrate if moral and spiritual bankruptcy sets in. It is possible that the self-centered, consumerist, racist Western society may collapse prematurely. Love has to become the order of the day because we literally cannot afford to hate any longer. History teaches us that hatred leads to destruction and, indeed,. We clearly have the tools for that destruction. Perhaps this may be our last chance to choose between peaceful coexistence and violent annihilation, between chaos and a global home because we know only too well what would happen in the event of a nuclear war.

We may lament over the collapse of moral values in Western technological societies. At the same time, we know too that moral bankruptcy is gradually eating into developing societies as well. Overemphasis on materialism in the form of a consumer culture weakens the moral and spiritual fabric of humankind. If it goes unchecked, the monster of materialism may swallow civilizations. There is an urgent need to reorder our priorities. We need to accept life in its wholeness and an integrated value system with its rightful place in society. The physical is no substitute for the moral and the spiritual. Materialism is certainly not the whole of existence.

In order to survive in a global home we must put an end to war. Nations are feverishly piling up deadly weapons. The arms race is a lucrative business. Global poverty will not be removed by the aid of rich nations, unless the poor nations stop their own arms shopping spree. All the nations are caught up in a fear psychosis of war. In the name of national security each nation is arming itself against its neighbors. A considerable percentage of national income is spent on arms purchase. The rich nations are keen on selling arms to the poor nations. With nations becoming impotent to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, obliteration of humankind from the face of the earth is again a frightening possibility. Nuclear war is a great danger for humankind today. Even a mechanical error in a computer can trigger off a nuclear holocaust. The arms race seems relentless. But we cannot fatalistically accept this gloomy situation.

As President Kennedy said, " Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind." How to put an end to war is the crucial question in the age of globalization. Though the

post-cold war era looked bright with possibilities of arms reduction, will the nations renounce their arsenals in favor of more sensible conflict resolutions? Will the rich nations stop leading the arms race? Who will keep them under check? The U.N. seems the only viable institutional hope. We cannot emphasize merely the eradication of war without the affirmation of peace. Peace is not just the absence of war but a positive condition for human development and well being. Any peace-oriented endeavor should primarily aim at disarmament as a precondition for the creation of peace.

Globalization cannot be achieved, if human rights are violated the world over. The West blames the Third World for flagrant violation of human rights. The Third World nations retaliate by blaming the West for pointing an accusing finger at them when all is not well with the human rights record in the West. The Third World tends to view human rights as a Western import or imposition. Mutual accusations aside, we have to look at human rights objectively.

No one in his right senses would say that he advocates the violation of human rights. Violation of human rights amounts to utter disregard for the worth and dignity of the human person, denial of freedom, and subjection to torture, cruelty and privation. However, the human species is the cruelest species on earth. Man is the victim of man. We are proud of our scientific and technological achievements and rightly so. At the same time, has our scientific rationality been matched by refinement in our sensibilities, decency, fairness and compassion? The definition of the human as a rational animal may not be a good definition at all as we witness the senseless and irrational behavior of so many members of our species. One might think that the human is basically an irrational animal with some capacity for rationality and not, necessarily, a rational animal with some tendencies to irrationality. Science and technology may not be the right yardstick to measure our greatness. The violence we inflict on one another is the affirmation of our savage nature. We brand primitive people as barbarians and savages as if we can have a great claim to civilized behavior. It is imperative for humankind to become more and more humane and gentle in order to live happily in the global home. Hence, the unquestionable importance of the affirmation of human rights.

We cannot talk about globalization without talking about the globe. In fact, the globe-talk precedes the globalization-talk. We need a globe so that we can globalize. What sort of globe do we have now? We have a globe with nature ruthlessly ravaged, choked, poisoned, and polluted, where the flora and fauna are gradually becoming extinct.

The parts of the globe, where the Third World countries are situated, are brimming with slums, and filth. Mother Earth is under violent attack. The globe with all its beings is the only home we have. Man behaves as if he is the lord of beings and can treat beings as he likes; he has forgotten that he cannot arrogate lordship to himself. Instead, he is called to be a "shepherd of being,"6 its custodian and caretaker. A radical change in our attitude towards the globe is necessary or eventually we may not have a globe to live on; nor the possibility to love, to dream, to discover, to create, to care, to share, to achieve, to sing, to dance, and yes, to globalize. Hence, the call to love and cherish the world, to respect and preserve it, and not to choke and destroy it. How beautiful it is for us brothers and sisters to celebrate our humanity on the globe, our home!

Ultimately, all our endeavors must lead to the realization of *agape*. *Agape* in Greek means love. *Agape* forms the core of the moral community. *Agape* is understanding, good will for all, an overflowing, disinterested love that is genuine, spontaneous and creative. It is God’s love operating in the human heart. In *agape* a person does not seek his own good, but that of his neighbor. *Agape* reaches out to all, to both friends and foes. *Agape* seeks to preserve and promote community despite efforts to tear it down. *Agape* is sacrificial love going to any length to restore community. It gladly forgives not seven times, but seventy times seven to rebuild

community. *Agape* recognizes the fact that all life is a unity. All human beings form an interrelated whole. If I harm my brother or sister, I harm myself because all of us as brothers and sisters are one. Only agape can hold humankind together. It counts no cost too big, no task too formidable to build up a global home.

Conclusion

To conclude, conflicts between persons/groups/nations arise chiefly due to domination. Domination is excessive preoccupation with the ego. Domination can be individual, national and cultural. It is the denial of the worth and dignity of the other. Domination is justification of privileges and vested interests. Domination is perpetuation of injustice, inequality, misery and poverty. Unfortunately, the history of colonialism has been one of domination. The wrongs of colonialism cry out to be righted. The philosophies, which indirectly justified exploitation, have to be revised and purified. A new philosophy of global living incorporating the finest traditions of cultures and values has to be evolved. The time has come for humankind to live together as a family or perish together as fools. If globalization does not have a human face, it will be neocolonialism with a grotesque face. Social life and globalization would be impossible without adherence to moral values. Lastly, it is one thing to say that globalization should have a human face and quite another to actualize it. Although the actualization of a truly human globalization is a marathon task, creating awareness of that possibility would be a great leap forward.

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" (New York, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 1993), p. 39.
2. Anthony Quinton, *Utilitarian Ethics* (London, Macmillan, 1973), p. 1.
3. Jeremy Bentham, "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation", in Anthony Quinton, *Utilitarian Ethics*, p. 1.
4. John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism", in Anthony Quinton, *Utilitarian Ethics*, p. 2.
5. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community*? (New York, Harper and Row, 1967), p. 177.
6. The term "shepherd of being" is borrowed from Martin Heidegger.

Chapter VII
Civil Liberties and Democracy: Western Ideas or Essential Tools

J. Stefan Lupp

Framing The Issues

Introduction

The idea of the universality of human rights, including fundamental civil liberties, appeared to be in the ascent long before the end of the cold war. In 1981 Louis Henkin wrote:

Today, the human rights idea is universal, accepted by virtually all states and societies regardless of historical, cultural, ideological, economic, or other differences. . . . The Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . has been accepted by virtually all of today's 150 states . . . no government dissents from the ideology of human rights today or offers an alternative.1

Of course at the time that this was written, the ideological challenge posed by Communism was not over. In fact, the three documents to which Henkin refers, when he speaks of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, represent a political compromise with Communism. The Declaration not only included the civil and political rights associated with classical liberalism, but also economic, social and cultural rights, which were added at the insistence of the communist and third world states, which often used the latter rights as justifications to restrict the former. This challenge seems to have finally been put to rest with the fall of Communism. Yet, challenges based on cultural grounds seem to be in the ascent. Jürgen Habermas stated

The program, with which the United Nations was founded after the catastrophe of the Second World War, speaks of the international implementation of human rights and democracy. This human rights politics has raised the suspicion that it is simply disguising the imperialism and domination of Western culture.2

Rajendra Ramlogan makes a similar point, stating:

Strong claims, both explicit and implicit, that culture, religion, or ethnicity define the proper boundaries of a sovereign state, and the appropriate content of its legal rules, are rampant. On the battlefields of the former Yugoslavia, in the latter-day Confucian pronouncements of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, and in the proliferating struggles over the place of Islam in society and government throughout much of Asia, there emerges a broad challenge to the relevance of an international legal order that does not take as a central concern cultural differences among and within nations, and the substantive and substantial diversity in approaches to domestic and international law and politics that such differences entail.3

According to Josiah A.M. Cobbah, writing in 1987, "[t]here is no doubt that the Declaration was a product of Western liberal ideology."4 Cobbah raises the following question: "Can we really expect non-Western peoples to embrace the international human rights instruments which are by

and large Western in character?"5 Similar to the criticism of many cultural relativists, this question is primarily aimed at the restatement of fundamental civil liberties and democratic rights, though also at the idea of individual rights generally. This paper is an attempt to challenge the notion that civil liberties and democracy should not be applied to non-Western cultures.6

The Ubiquity of the Modern Nation State

The first premise upon which this paper is based is that the modern nation state is now an undeniable worldwide phenomenon. There are indeed places on earth outside the reach of any state power, sometimes entire states have been reduced to anarchy, such as Somalia and Liberia for a time. At the time of this writing, parts of Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and parts of South East Asia fit this description. Yet these seem to aberrations rather than the rule. In any event, most libertarians or even many anarchists would not even advocate such arrangements. Therefore, an alternative to the modern nation state seems inconceivable, beyond the gradual absorption of the states into overlapping webs of interconnectedness.

This creates a unique problem for modern humans, with which their ancestors were not faced. Pre-modern cultural forms are usually not readily adaptable to address the phenomenon of the pervasiveness of the modern nation state. The principal premise of the argument that follows is that monopolies of power tend to be detrimental to human societies, regardless of cultural values. One could cite extensive examples of the harm caused by totalitarian regimes to their own people by such states as the Stalinist Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, China during the Cultural Revolution, Khmer Rouge Cambodia, and others. On a lesser level, one could cite monopolistic or oligarchic business structures. If this is not sufficient, then it might be worth noting that a check on absolute power is not a modern idea. Most, if not all, traditional societies had some checks on absolute power. In any event, what follows is clearly premised on the notion that the absolute monopolization of power by the state must be checked.

The modern nation state, whenever it has appeared, has everywhere replaced traditional sources of authority with its own. Abdelqadr Zghal. a well known Tunisian sociologist, noted the phenomena of the state displacing the traditional sources of authority, as it applied to Tunisia. He pointed out how "the state has attempted to radically alter our notions of where authority should lie or, to put it differently, what are the legitimate sources of ultimate, ‘sacred’ values." He continues "Under the declared aim of modernization and development, the more specific political aim was to take power away from all its traditional centers – from the religious scholars, from heads of families, from leaders of craft guilds, from all traditional authorities – and to consolidate national power at their expense."7

Part of the reason for the exaggerated power of the modern state is that the individual person has become ever more isolated as industrialization has taken hold. These persons are progressively less protected by the traditional communities, which are everywhere fading into history.

Civil Liberties and Democracy: A Necessary Tool to Limit the Power of the Modern Nation State

Peter Berger, who argues that civil liberties and democracy are not universal values, nevertheless, makes an important admission. He agrees that modernization weakens or destroys traditional restraints on the arbitrary exercise of political power, noting that "[i]n pre-modern societies there existed a variety of restraints on the arbitrary exercise of political power: religious authority, custom, kinship and tribe, and (most important) the sheer inability of government to

extend its controls into every remote corner of society. Modernization weakens or destroys these restraints." 8 He then makes the important transition by accepting the fact that "[i]t was, indeed, precisely in order to impose restraints upon governmental power that modern democratic institutions arose in the West."9

At this point it might be useful to define the terms 'civil liberties' and 'democracy'. I would define a state as 'democratic' which holds regular, periodic, multi-party free elections based on universal adult suffrage, to replace or confirm its government. I define 'civil liberties' as the classic set of liberal rights or freedoms from government control, which are based on a rule of law. These are clearly negative liberties in that they do not require positive duties on the part of the government; the government simply has to refrain from certain actions. They represent the first portion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Civil liberties can be divided into two basic categories. The first is that of liberty of conscience and expression. It includes such liberties as freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly, association, etc. The second category contains minimum due process protections in the event that the state threatens an individual's life, liberty, or property. It includes the right to a fair trial, protections against unreasonable searches or seizures, just compensation for the taking of property, etc.

It is important to note, that this list of 'fundamental civil liberties' is not the same as the general sense of limited government incarnated in the Anglo-American tradition. In the latter, one can argue that there is a general presumption that the state is prohibited from interfering in individual activities. There is a difficult burden that the state has to meet to overcome this presumption. However, this is a broad interpretation of liberalism, which goes way beyond what is necessary for the purposes of this paper.

The main thesis of this paper is that civil liberties and democracy, narrowly defined, are essential tools for all societies, regardless of culture, to limit the power of the modern nation state. Henceforth in this paper the general term 'liberal democracy' will be used to mean the form of government which is limited by civil liberties and democracy as defined herein.

While this author believes that it is essential that a basis of compatibility with liberal democracy be found within native cultures, it is quite clear that liberal democracy presents certain problems for all traditional cultures, just as it represented a social revolution in the West.

With the introduction of liberal democracy one sees the gradual development of a civil society of a free press, religious institutions, professional and trade associations, labor unions, charitable associations, etc. This civil society then replaces the traditional limits on authority in combination with a court system, which enforces civil liberties, and with the electorate which propels the democratic institutions. These three forces, the civil society, civil liberties and the democratic processes, place a check not only on the state, but also break down the exaggerated isolation of the individual.

Liberal Democracy is not a Morality

This paper is clearly premised on the assertion that within the legal and political realms, the concept of an 'individual' is essential. The basic civil liberties posited by classical liberalism can not be fundamentally modified without serious negative consequences. The acceptance of the idea that the state can not violate the autonomy of individual atoms, is a necessary abstraction, in order to limit the power of the ubiquitous modern state. Deviations from this abstraction in regard to modifications of the generally accepted set of civil liberties tend to destroy the possibility of the

development of the human personality. Yet, this often leads to a confusion of categories. People tend to equate this legal/political structure with a generalized morality of individualism. Some argue that since the state has no right to limit their freedom of speech, that it is perfectly permissible in every sense, including morally, for them to say anything they please. This is of course obviously false. However, it is the role of moral leaders and institutions in society to check the content of speech, by criticism, rather than for the state to ban it. The main point is that if one agrees that the state should not be allowed to limit the individual in certain ways, this does not mean that everything that the state has to tolerate is morally permissible.

This brings us squarely into the rights vs. obligations controversy. As a 'rights' mentality spread in the West many have argued that people have lost sight of the need for respecting obligations as well. However, this is again a confusion of levels. Indeed, individuals have many obligations both legal and moral. Legally, an individual always has an obligation to obey the law [though this may sometimes conflict with a moral obligation leading to civil disobedience]. Morally, he may also have an obligation of good citizenship, requiring him to vote and to participate in society in a productive manner. Beyond this he may have moral obligations to his family, his friends, his community, to less advantaged individuals, etc. All of this is perfectly consistent with restricting the state through the enforcement of civil liberties.

Beyond Utility: The Sacredness of the Human Person

Thus far the main thesis of this paper has been founded on purely utilitarian grounds. It has been argued that the modern state is an undeniable worldwide reality and that it actively seeks and acquires an absolute monopoly of power. It has been further asserted that on the one hand, absolute power has created such intense human suffering that it is absolutely unacceptable, and on the other hand, all functioning societies have limited power in various ways. Finally, this paper has made the point that the main, if not the only, method of limiting the power of the modern state is liberal democracy, as defined herein.

However, it may have already become apparent that this paper hints at something more fundamental than utility. I believe this 'something more' will become increasingly clearer as the paper unfolds. What we are getting at here is that what is implied in the set of fundamental civil liberties, is a fundamental respect for the human person. This is not a respect for the individual as an absolutely separate atom. Instead it gets at the realization that the human person can only grow if he finds his path without being forced, if he is allowed freedom of conscience and freedom of expression of that conscience, and if he is given some support [due process protections] against extreme intrusions by the state. This is what is at the heart of the fundamental civil liberties. I believe our journey around the world in this paper will touch on the value placed on the seeds of these ideas in all major cultural traditions.

Of course this "something more" leads us to the nebulous place of the concept of "human nature," to the beings we all are before we become creatures of a particular culture. While the paper will continue to hint at this, it is important, that it is not fundamental to the main thesis of the paper that we clarify the universality of the 'sacredness of the human person', or that we define human nature. Ultimately, those who disagree with the universal application of liberal democracy, as defined herein, will be faced with the stark choice of either accepting the state's monopoly of power, or of proposing an alternative method of limiting the modern state. If they accept the former, they will also be rejecting the time-honored idea that there should be no monopoly of power. Furthermore, they should be required to explain how they intend to guard against the total

destruction of society by the abuse of such power, keeping in mind, for example, Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot and others.

Liberal Democracy and the West

Let us first of all examine why it is asserted that the ideas of liberalism and democracy are essentially Western. According to Peter Berger, "contemporary notions of human rights are historically and intellectually derived from the Enlightenment, a specifically Western phenomenon".10 Berger then continues this line of argument by saying that "antecedents" of the Enlightenment are to be found "in the Temple of Jerusalem, in the *agora* of Athens, in the schools of Jewish rabbis, among Roman jurists and medieval moral philosophers".11

Berger then goes on to accept the idea that civil and political rights, economic rights, women's rights, and the rights of children are "specifically western values".12 Berger then attempts to identify certain core violations of human rights as "universal", including, among others, genocide, the massacre of large numbers of innocent people, abandonment to starvation, terror, torture, enslavement, and desecration of religious symbols and the persecution of religious adherents.13 To justify criticism of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the extremes of the Cultural Revolution in China, and the excesses of Muslim rulers, he points out that traditional cultural values of these countries are consistent with this criticism. He notes that "Buddhism . . . has as its highest moral tenet the 'respect for all sentient Beings.'" He points out that many of the practices of the Chinese Communists were "violations of the entire corpus of ethics of the Chinese tradition, which holds, among other things, that government should be 'human hearted' . . . ". He then notes in regard to Islam that "every call to prayer, from every minaret from the Maghreb to Java, begins with an invocation of God who is *al-rahman al-rahim*, whose nature is to be compassionate and who has compassion, and who commands men to be compassionate also."14

There is a major flaw in Berger's acceptance of the proposition that large portions of the established human rights norms, specifically liberalism and democracy, are "specifically western values", and therefore, arguably culturally relative. One must concede that there were ideas in Western Civilization, which could be used as crutches for the new ideas of liberalism and democracy. Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that these new ideas were consistent with Medieval Christianity. Fukuyama describes the profound chasm between these ideas and the world out of which they arose. He admits that for Christians freedom implies universal human equality, however he notes that this is for very different reasons than for Hobbesian-Lockean liberals, since for Christians it is limited to the faculty for moral choice.15 Furthermore, in Medieval Europe the individual was viewed as simply a component of the larger social organism.16 Margaret Ng develops this thought by noting that the "[w]riters of classical liberalism, in so far as they were original thinkers, were not reporting values prevalent in their society (they were if anything attacking contrary values), but rather proposing principles which they believed should be recognized as having universal validity."17 Isaiah Berlin has also asserted that the evolution from a chivalrous morality to a liberal democratic one was a fairly recent event.18 If it is true that these ideas represent a dramatic break with the culture of Medieval Europe, in fact a cultural revolution, then it becomes possible to argue that liberalism and democracy were adopted in reaction to social and economic developments largely independent of the cultural factors of Medieval Europe. In a careful essay, Thomas Franck shows how religious tolerance, a prime enlightenment value, has only recently taken hold in such liberal states such as England, the United States, and Sweden. He thereby raises the following point: "Even a cursory investigation of 'Western' history can readily

demonstrate that autonomy and freedom of conscience are not any more indigenous to the West than to the East. Rather, Western concerns for first admendments rights are still only the recent, imperfectly realized and hard-won culmination of a long struggle."19

It is important to consider at this point that while the creation of liberalism and democracy was motivated by social and economic factors, the ideas may also be compatible with human nature. Fukuyama argues that there are two forces moving human history, economics (the desire to have security, shelter, food, etc.) and the desire for recognition. The latter is an attempt to take into account all non-economic human motivations, basically the desire to be recognized by something outside ourselves, be it other persons or God. Fukuyama argues convincingly that liberal democracy is the political system which best satisfies this fundamental aspect of human nature. While a detailed discussion of Fukuyama's views on this subject are beyond the scope of this paper, the underlying concepts are definitely woven into the its fabric.20

The Industrial Revolution proved to be fertile soil for the development of liberalism and democracy. While it occurred in the West first, it is now clearly spreading around the globe. With the Industrial Revolution comes an inevitable bias towards individualism. Fukuyama describes this process by explaining how the mobility of labor increasingly undermines traditional social groups, which are replaced by modern bureaucratic forms of organization which are organized according to the rational principles of economic efficiency.21

While the information revolution may in some sense be argued to produce new forms of community, it is clear that these forms are very different than the stable closed communities seen in most traditional societies. Therefore, the radical acceleration of communication seems to create a further bias towards forms of individualism and toward the idea of freedom of expression.

The Cultural Factor

A Clash of Civilizations

Samuel P. Huntington has alleged that cultural conflicts will be carried out between what he perceives to be different civilizations. He defines civilization as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species."22 He then states that "[t]he civilization to which [an individual] belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies."23 However, he acknowledges that this status is not immutable and notes that "[p]eople can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change".24 Nevertheless, in Huntington's view, these changes occur so slowly that they would not be relevant for our purposes. Huntington then goes on to identify the following civilizations in his original article: "Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization."25 In his recent book, Huntington changes 'Confucian' to 'Sinic', changes 'Slavic-Orthodox' to 'Russian Orthodox' (but at times seems to be talking about simply 'Orthodox'), and first discusses and then rejects a possible 'Buddhist Civilization'.26 While this author believes that significant cultural variation is actually much more complex than Huntington's civilizational map would lead us to believe, the map is nevertheless of some utility to begin to explore the thesis of this paper. Therefore, we will, with some variation, use this map on our journey.

We will now spend a short amount of time on each alleged civilization to make several determinations. First of all, whether a culturally specific alternative to liberal democracy is being

suggested. In this regard we will keep our eye on the choice made by the alternative, to accept the states monopoly of power or to propose an alternative. Secondly, we will examine whether liberal democracy can find a fertile soil in the particular cultural heritage in which to grow. Here we need to keep in mind that this soil of the traditional culture must not be judged by some absolute standard, but should be reasonably compared to the problems faced by Western traditional societies, when they attempted to introduce these ideas. While I am obviously not an expert on these rich and diverse cultural traditions, I hope that I may be permitted to venture onto this foreign soil to make only this limited point. Furthermore, the length of each section does not reflect on the relative importance of each civilization, but only on the complexity of the issues we face in this context.

African Civilization

Huntington's language seems tentative, but he does seem to allow for the possibility of an African Civilization. Africa's dismal human rights record seems to mirror its severe economic problems, both of which distinguish it from much of the developed world. However, to attribute these differences to its status as a distinct civilization, which must be judged by different standards is more problematic. In a detailed work on Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, Rhoda E. Howard takes issue with the idea that there is an African Civilization separate from Western Civilization, which requires a unique perspective on human rights. She points out that Africa's cultural uniqueness has been undermined by five centuries of contact with the Western world. She argues that as African society has evolved, it has created "human rights needs and ideals closer to the Western model than to the 'traditional' models of privileges and obligations of indigenous Africa."27

An African Perspective on Human Rights?

Nevertheless, Cobbah attempts to articulate what he calls "an African Perspective" on human rights. Cobbah begins his discussion by analyzing the roots of liberal democracy. He notes that in the medieval Western conception of society the individual was seen as part of society and "[e]very individual made a contribution to the organization or community to which he belonged and society functioned based on these contributions. . . . The political philosophy of liberalism was largely a reaction to this medieval thought."28 He then proceeds in an attempt to discredit Hobbes and Locke in the words of Hegel as "leaving aside everything contingent until, finally, one comes by analysis to the abstraction called natural man."29 Cobbah then seems to find fault with the theory since an important part of being human is having cultural attributes.

However, a more careful look at what Cobbah is trying to say, reveals his profound discomfort with the idea that the individual should be the basic unit of analysis for all societies. Cobbah's criticism of Hobbes and Locke's state of nature as an abstraction unrelated to the condition of humanity, is consistent with view that the focus on the individual is somehow unnatural. According to an African philosopher, Cobbah tells us, the basic unit in society is the extended family.30 He goes on to say that ". . . the average African's worldview is one that places the individual within his community. This worldview is for all intents and purposes as valid as the European theories of individualism and the social contract."31 However, what is Cobbah really doing here? He has just asserted as a fundamentally African perspective, what he had earlier described as the medieval European point of view. Aren't both those perspectives simply the views held in pre-industrial

societies? Howard argues that there is nothing specifically African about the communitarian ideal, but that "it represents typical agrarian, precapitalist social relations in no-state societies."32

Anticipating the above criticism, Cobbah counters by arguing that Africa is still predominantly rural and claims that "[f]or these people the communal lifestyle with its responsibilities and entitlements has great meaning and value." 33 However, realizing that the trend is toward urbanization in Africa, as it is elsewhere, he also argues that "[r]esearch indicates that the communal spirit is alive and thriving in the urban areas."34 Howard takes a different view and believes that urbanization is breaking down the African extended family. She explains how extended families are more suited to rural than to urban areas and how certain traditional kinship obligations are proving to be too onerous to the new urban privileged classes in Africa.35

Therefore, what both Howard and Cobbah seem to be describing is a society in transition, not quite urban, but no longer completely rural. The history of the West is filled with movements urging a return to the glories of rural values. Cobbah fails to show how the African experience is different in this regard.

Jack Donnolly states that "[a]rguments of cultural relativism regularly involve urban elites eloquently praising the glories of village life – a life that they or their parents or grandparents struggled hard to escape, and a life to which they have not the slightest intention of returning."36 As Africa becomes increasingly urbanized a new social ethic must evolve adapted to the new social realities. As urbanization increasingly breaks down traditional loyalties, new forms of social organization must take their place. A more individualistic ethic will have to be the inevitable byproduct.37

Howard, writing as early as 1986, argued that the process of urbanization was well on its way in Africa, with the resulting cultural consequences. She noted that "the process of urbanization . . . has detached many people from their primary kin/clan and village communities and has removed them to heterogeneous, multiethnic, and culturally novel environments."38 She argued that people were leaving the rural areas and being attracted to urban areas, not just for economic, but also for cultural reasons. She stated that "many people find the cohesive, integrated rural life so extolled by some of the African intellectuals . . . extremely repressive. The cities offer more personal freedom: the chance to attend the cinema, to listen to new music, to meet new people, and above all to escape the authority of family or village elders."39

While Cobbah does not seem to be rejecting the idea of international human rights norms out of hand, his rejection of individualism as a universal basis for those norms would indicate a tremendous departure. While criticizing the relevance of "Western" human rights norms to Africa, he fails to present a viable alternative vision. It is unclear exactly how a non-individualistic rights framework would function and how it would deal with an increasingly individualistic African society.

The Modern African State

Furthermore, there is a more urgent issue in regard to Africa, which Cobbah's analysis has distracted us from. The modern centralized state, though in ruins in some parts of Africa (e.g. Somalia and Liberia), is a reality with which Africans are currently being confronted. As Hedley Bull tells us, it is not the pre-colonial political entities which emerged at the end of colonial period, but new states with "their boundaries inherited from the external (and in some cases the internal) boundaries of the colonial territories, their demands for self-determination or national liberation put forward on behalf of the populations defined by these territories rather than on behalf of

traditional communities, and the claims of some of them to have inherited the mantle of pre-colonial African empires carrying little conviction."40

Limitations on the power of the modern state are a necessity required by the displacement of traditional limits on authority. Howard noted that "[i]n the new national societies of Commonwealth Africa, traditional checks on the powers of chiefs in small-scale, homogeneous societies have long disintegrated. In contemporary Africa, the state and its occupants control all the different institutions of authority and economic distribution: law, government, police, defense, administration, education, and social welfare."41 Donnolly notes that in this context ". . . appeals to traditional practices and values all too often are a mere cloak for self-interest or arbitrary rule." 42 He then quotes the condemnation by the All Africa Council of Churches of the fact that "some leaders have even resorted to picking out certain elements of traditional African culture to anesthetize the masses. Despite what is said, this frequently has little to do with a return to the positive, authentic dimensions of African tradition."43 Donnolly points out that procedures where all the judges are controlled by the head of state, where no defense attorney is allowed, and where the only appeal is to the head of state, have little to do with traditional practices.44 The immense concentration of political power in a modern state, even in an African context, requires strategies for creating counterbalancing forces, which mitigate the abuses that the state is, capable of.

Howard noted how the new institutions of civil society, which have been evolving in some African states, have come into conflict with attempts to impose totalitarian rule.45 Then, citing Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia as an example, she goes on to question whether the rejection of "such new associational ties as disintegrative of traditional communities" is not simply motivated by the ruling class's fear that this may mean the establishment of independent bases of power and independent bases of thought.46

Liberal Democracy in Africa

A look at democratic developments in Africa is instructive. Kaunda ruled Zambia for 27 years, but was ousted when he allowed multi-party elections to take place in 1991. He challenged President Frederick Chiluba in elections held in October 1996. The Chiluba government had been criticized for undemocratic maneuvers to stay in power, but no major figure in Zambia, especially not Kaunda, wound up challenging the validity of the democratic idea.47

The introduction of liberal democratic government in South Africa stands as a defiant example in opposition to the idea that liberal democracy is a Western concept, which is incompatible with African culture. The new South African Constitution is clearly a model of liberal democratic ideals.48

Democratic developments elsewhere in Africa tell a similar story. Namibia, with a flat economy and a poor population, has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to democratic institutions. The country has been holding multi-party elections since 1990 and has a functioning free press.49 Even the independence of a respected judiciary appears to be part of the Namibian system. The Namibian High Court ruled in August of 1994 that the government had acted illegally and unconstitutionally in deporting the 29 former Koevoet (the disbanded counter-insurgency unit) members and 64 dependents who illegally crossed the lightly-patrolled frontier a few days earlier.50 Nico Smit, spokesman for the opposition Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), explained the government's motivation for the deportations as follows: ''SWAPO . . . has an immense fear of Koevoet . . . when our government hear the word Koevoet, they immediately think about a coup.''51 Despite the fact that the executive branch viewed this issue as a national

security matter, it complied with the ruling.52 Namibia has an excellent record overall in implementing civil and political rights.53 Democracy is spreading throughout the continent. From impoverished Mali to Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania the democratic idea is taking hold.54

The arguments that Africa has a civilization that is distinctly separate from Western Civilization and which requires a rejection of liberal democracy, appears to be highly suspect. At the most one could say that Africa is a society in transition from an agrarian to an urban culture. Most attempts to resist the introduction of liberal democracy in Africa appear to be motivated by a desire to preserve political power for certain elites. Numerous examples have shown that African culture is not necessarily incompatible with functioning liberal democratic institutions.

Latin American Civilization

The Doctrine of National Security

During the 1980's it became quite fashionable to point to the presence of so many military governments in Latin America as evidence that there existed a Latin American culture hostile to liberalism and democracy. The doctrine of national security, to which the various Latin American military governments adhered, represented a challenge to liberal democracy that could be construed to be ideological and possibly cultural. The doctrine was to a large extent the outgrowth of the Cold War anxiety of the United States. George F. Kennan, the author of the famous U.S. containment policy, delivered a speech in Rio to American Ambassadors stationed in Latin America in 1950, in which he argued that it was "better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government" since the latter might be penetrated by Communists."55 This represents one of the earliest and simplest formulations of the doctrine.

The United States was very forthright about its attempt at the indoctrination of Latin American military officers. During the Kennedy Administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified before Congress in 1963, and asserted that training Latin American military officers was a good investment, since they were likely to enter centers of power, where they would prove to be helpful to the US.56 It is interesting to note that U.S. Army intelligence manuals, which were used in training Latin American officers from 1982 to 1991, and which were allegedly based, in part, on training instructions out of the 1960s, advocated certain counter insurgency methods employed by numerous Latin American military governments. A Defense Department summary of the manuals notes that they instructed counterintelligence agents to use "fear, payment of bounties for enemy dead, beatings, false imprisonment, executions and . . . truth serum."57

According to Emilio Mignone, a noted critic of the Argentine military, despite the American influences, the doctrine was also heavily influenced by German theorists like Clausewitz and Ludendorff, and later by the French veterans of Indochina and Algeria who developed their own counterinsurgency warfare doctrine.58 As one can see from these non-Latin sources, the evolution of the doctrine appears to have had little to do with traditional Latin American culture, though one might argue that a particular sub-culture evolved out of the doctrine within a certain segment of Latin American culture.

The doctrine essentially taught that the International Communist Movement was the enemy, who was operating covertly everywhere. Therefore, the threat was not seen in terms of conventional war, but rather as subversion. In 1981, at the Fourteenth Conference of American Armies, the Uruguayan Army offered a paper in which it defined subversion as "actions, violent or not, with ultimate purposes of a political nature, in all fields of human activity within the internal

sphere of a state and whose aims are perceived as not convenient for the overall political system."59

General Bretano Borges Forte, the Brazilian Chief of Staff of the Army, elaborated on a central feature of the doctrine at the Tenth Conference of American Armies in 1973, stating "[t]he enemy is undefined . . . it adapts to any environment and uses every means, both licit and illicit, to achieve its aims. It disguises itself as a priest, a student or a *campesino*, as a defender of democracy or an advanced intellectual, as a pious soul or as an extremist protester."60 As noted by the Uruguayan sociologist Carina Perelli, from these premises, it is easy to deduce that everyone is suspect and "only a closed and total institution that resocializes and permanently controls its members," like the military, "has sufficient degrees of purity to take charge of a fight of this sort. . . . [while] [t]he rest of the social and political actors . . . are susceptible to subversive contamination, . . . since they bathe in the enemy's favorite cultural medium: liberal democracy and the open society that the regime implies."61 The doctrine's focus on the military as the central institution of society was also articulated numerous times in military magazines, like *El Soldado* in Uruguay.62

Another feature of the doctrine was that the Catholic Church was seen as a traditional cultural force capable of challenging International Communism. A 1985 issue of *El Soldado* addresses this point by embracing an interpretation of the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.63 Based on this aspect of the doctrine, Lawrence Weschler concluded that it was in a sense a continuation of the Inquisition.64 Pamela Lowden develops this thought somewhat, when she notes that Chile's former military ruler, General Augusto Pinochet believed that Marxism was conceived by a diabolic mind, and that it needed to be confronted by the Catholicism of Leo XIII and his encyclical of 1878.65 The religious aspects of the doctrine could also be understood as an attack by the remnants of European traditionalism on the Enlightenment, and in that sense an attempt to protect Latin America from the dangers that were consuming the rest of Western Civilization, thereby protecting a unique culture. However, the attack on liberal democracy by these Latin American ideologues, rather than representing a defense of a domestic culture from a foreign culture, represents an attempt at preserving a traditional culture, which in many ways no longer existed, against domestic cultural evolution brought on largely by economic circumstances.

The doctrine clearly goes beyond advocating authoritarianism by advocating a totalitarian regime. The central aim of all totalitarian systems is to subject all aspects of life to the scrutiny of the state with the goal of imposing some central unifying idea. It should be obvious that the doctrine represents a radical attack on all aspects of traditional society and could in no way be considered an expression of Latin American Civilization. Alfred Stepan, in the introduction to *With Friends Like These: The Americas Watch Report on Human Rights and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, describes the ideological character of the doctrine as follows: "Implicit in these analyses was the assumption that democracy, in the sense of representative government and open debate about social and political issues, the free play of ideas and agendas, carried a risk of chaos, and that a system of tighter control was more capable of resolving social challenges."66 Furthermore, it implied that the military was needed as a 'bulwark' to confront this threat.

Liberal Democracy in Latin America

The replacement of military dictatorships with liberal democratic governments throughout Latin America should indicate a clear compatibility between international human rights norms and Latin American culture.67 The fundamental problem for military governments in the region, as

elsewhere, was a crisis of legitimacy.68 Tina Rosenberg notes that "it was largely the economic failure of military governments that forced them to hold elections in the late 1970s and early 1980s in many countries, . . . People will voluntarily make the sacrifices needed for liberalizing reforms only if they believe in their government and its legitimacy."69 Rosenberg cites the example of Chile where "the democratic government of Patricio Aylwin has enjoyed greater labor peace than did Pinochet's authoritarian regime, because the principal unions want Aylwin to succeed."70 These arguments seem to be consistent with the idea that a well functioning modern economy requires liberal democratic institutions.

However, to view the transition to democracy in exclusively economic terms would be an over simplification. Clearly there was something else going on here. In *With Friends Like These: The Americas Watch Report on Human Rights and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, Robert K. Goldman provides a detailed analysis of Uruguay's transition to democracy.71 Goldman's discussion clearly shows how the military government's protracted efforts to gain acceptance of a system without the fundamental protections of liberal democracy failed, due to the persistent opposition of the population. This seems to illustrate how Latin Americans just like people elsewhere seem to reject local innovations in favor of universal norms. It appears that the desire for recognition is a fundamental human trait and can best be expressed by the introduction and maintenance of liberal democratic government.

Obviously there are still tremendous difficulties being faced by Latin American democracies, not the least of which is the continued institutionalized presence of the military in the governmental structure in some of these states. In Chile for example, the president was for a time constitutionally prohibited from removing the top military and police commanders, such as Pinochet, as army commander.72 However, the Latin American military establishments are beginning to be reformed. The symbolism at the second Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in Bariloche, Argentina was informative in this regard, virtually all the generals were forced to sit in the back, a reminder that power had shifted to the civilians.73 Escobar notes as well that these military leaders are now faced with cooperating to combat the drug trade and "some are adjusting to the end of compulsory service and many are under strict budget constraints."74 In further signs of modernization, Argentina's military has now agreed to take on the responsibility of providing air transport logistics in Iraq for UNSOM and is now admitting women into its ranks.75

Fukuyama noted that the argument was once made that to "hold Spain, Portugal, or the countries of Latin America to the standards of liberal democracy of Western Europe or the United States was to be guilty of 'ethnocentrism'."76 Yet Spain and Portugal are now stable democracies deeply integrated in a liberal democratic European Union, and a similar development seems to be unfolding in Latin America.

Indigenous Culture in Latin America

It is also important in this context to note that Latin American culture is not identical with Iberian culture, but is rather a mixture between indigenous American and Iberian culture. In fact, for most of Latin America's indigenous population, the Iberian component is probably the lesser of the two. While armed uprisings by indigenous groups in Mexico have received much attention lately, it is noteworthy that there are examples of the compatibility between indigenous groups and liberal democratic institutions.

In what can only be described as a political revolution, an alliance of Ecuador's Indian groups, known as the National Indigenous Confederation of Ecuador (CONAIE), elected 76 congressmen,

mayors and councilmen in elections held in July of 1996. While the alliance stopped short of complete political power, this development foreshadows future changes in a nation that by some counts is 45 percent indigenous. One of the foremost authorities on Ecuador's Indians, Jose Almeida, who is the director of the anthropology department at the Catholic University in Quito, put it this way: "They are going to be taken into account, and that is irreversible for a simple reason: Demographically they are one of the more important groups in the country. From now on, we will have governments that will take the Indians into account."77

Escobar, writing again for *The Washington Post*, notes that this democratic development represents "an alternative to the sort of revolt staged in Mexico's Chiapas state, where the lives of Mexico's Indians have yet to improve despite the insurgents public relations success."78 Considering this contrast, it would be difficult to argue that the indigenous population should avoid democracy for cultural reasons.

However, some members of Ecuador's indigenous population assert that they should remain separate in order to preserve their culture. Auki Tituana, a Quichua Indian who was elected mayor of Cotocachi counters by arguing that Indians have not preserved their system in tact in any event. He states that "[t]he laws of capitalism, the democratic system, have reached the communities. . . . Our ability and only our ability, will be able to destroy the walls that have been constructed to keep us out. This will not be accomplished by laws in Congress written by people who have always repressed us."79

Luis Macas, the president of CONAIE, and probably the most important newly elected member of the national legislature, makes the argument for a changing and living culture. According to Macas the election "shows that the indigenous movement has taken a qualitative step in contemporary history, and I think that is extremely important. We are no longer Indians that you go to see in a museum. We are not only present, we are also here with proposals for the future."80 Macas and Tituana seem to be making the argument that given the modern realities, democracy is the necessary tool for indigenous people to overcome oppression. While Ecuador has seen its share of political instability since these developments, they nevertheless demonstrate that there is no inherent incompatibility between indigenous culture and liberal democracy.

These developments do not appear to be confined to Ecuador's indigenous community. Escobar notes that "[t]he triumph at the polls has its roots in the organizational efforts that swept Indian communities in Latin America in the 1980s and produced some significant changes, particularly in Columbia and, to a lesser extent, Brazil."81 He adds that "[t]he election here [in Ecuador] is similar to what occurred recently in Guatemala, for example, where a change in the law allowed Indians to run for office for the first time."82

It seems that Latin American culture, whether we consider its Iberian component or its indigenous component, is not inherently hostile to liberal democracy. In fact, recent developments give further support to the idea of universality. Most importantly, the extreme perversion of society caused by the followers of the doctrine of national security clearly demonstrates the dangers posed by the modern state when left unchecked by liberal democracy.

Orthodox Civilization

The Mystical vs. the Ethical / Constantinople vs. Rome

The Orthodox faith presents some difficulties for the adoption of the rights oriented discourse of civil liberties. The Orthodox world was more fundamentally concerned with man's relationship

with God, or more properly, with the ‘mystical’ dimension of religion. Clearly, the rights oriented discourse emerged out of a ‘Western’ world, which was more influenced by the Protestant preoccupation with the ‘ethical’ dimension of religion. While Catholicism can be said to mediate to some extent between these two extremes, it may find itself to be more ‘Western’ than ‘Eastern’ in this respect.

Huntington apparently includes Slavic-Catholic culture within Western Civilization since he originally singled out a Slavic-Orthodox culture as a separate civilization. In his book he seems to modify it to Russian Orthodox, but also simply Orthodox [if one looks at his maps], which would then include Romania and Greece as well.83 The significant split between the West and the Orthodox world obviously was evident long before Huntington, and was described well by Adda Bozeman in 1985 as follows:

[T]here is a culturally and strategically important line separating communities Christianized by Rome from those Christianized by Constantinople. Russia’s control over the former – whether Tsarist or marxist-leninist – has therefore invariably led to revolts and thus to regional instability, since the fundamental sustaining ideas of these two cultures are discordant in their essentials.84

The recent events in the Former Yugoslavia might at first glance appear to confirm this assumption. However, upon closer examination it would seem to make more sense to argue that the ethnic violence of the Former Yugoslavia represented massive violations of fundamental norms common to all identifiable cultural groups, rather than being an example of a clash of the Western and Orthodox ideas on human rights.

Russia in Europe or Russia vs. Europe

Any discussion of an Orthodox Civilization has to focus on Russia, since it is its dominant representative. Coming off its early post-Cold War pro-Western tilt, Russia has been under increasing pressure internally to assert a more nationalist course. From guarded support for the wayward Serbs, to the less than perfect human rights record at home, to the military engagement in Chechnya, Russia seems to be charting a course away from the early promise of democracy and human rights. Nevertheless, all of these problems are a long way from the presentation of a coherent alternative political vision.

Furthermore, it is unclear where this new course for Russia might ultimately lead. Former President Yeltsin had called for the development of "a new national idea to unite all Russians."85 Russian democrats, such as Galina Starovoitova, point out that in a free society the state can not generate values. She states: "We are in a very natural, slow process of growing our values, . . ." She explains: "It can’t be ordered up immediately by the state. . . . The solution is not in building an official idea, but in continuing to build a civil society that will generate" values.86

Some Russian politicians, like former security chief Alexander Lebed, seem to be providing the beginning of an outline of Russia’s future. Lebed, also a former general, became Yeltsin’s security chief after coming in a strong third in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections.87 Lebed has described himself as a ‘semi-democrat’.88 Exactly what that means is unclear, though he has expressed a dissatisfaction with parliamentary government and has attacked religious minorities.89 When Lebed was asked to clarify his views on this matter, he said "We used to have a czar, then he was replaced by a general secretary of the Communist Party, and now we have a president. It all fits our mentality. If we attempt to create a parliamentary republic,

nothing will come out of it. . . ."90 Though he has sometimes been identified as a nationalist, his views clearly do not accord with the more extreme perspectives of some Russian nationalists. His efforts to end the first Chechen war and his comments concerning that conflict clearly bring this out. Lebed stated:

No military leader no matter his genius, has ever won a war against the people. Such a war must be stopped resolutely with tough measures, and a political dialogue should begin. There is no other solution to this military conflict. That is why I reject all the talk of Russia's integrity and indivisibility. Is it possible to ensure the integrity of Russia by killing hundreds and maiming thousands of people every day?91

In any case, Lebed's vague philosophy does not amount to a clear alternative Orthodox view of law and politics.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, first in the 1970s and again in the 1990s has made comments that seem to suggest an Orthodox vision. Daniel Sneider, of *The Christian Science Monitor*, stated "Solzhenitsyn combines a doctrine of anti-Communism with a warning to avoid Western models of liberal democracy and market economics. He offers in its place a paean to Russian spiritualism and a return to the values of pre-revolutionary Russia, including the need for semi-authoritarian government during this time of change."92 However, in his own words Solzhenitsyn pays homage to the idea of democracy, when he states: "If we find ourselves on top of the cold cliff of totalitarianism, we just cannot jump down to reach the valley, we should, having a firm and confident authority, slowly zig-zag down the slope to the valley of democracy."93 In other words, while he may advocate authoritarianism for Russia at this time, he appears to be considering it only as a transitional measure. In a speech to the Russian State Duma, on October 28, 1994, he stated: ''We must admit honestly, this is not a democracy. Now we have an oligarchy since the power belongs to a limited number of people.''94 He then suggested creating something like the 'zemstvo' of pre-revolutionary Russia, which were grass roots, self governing bodies.95 Decentralization by transferring political authority to local democratic bodies, would not in itself be inconsistent with liberal democracy. Therefore, it would be hard to conclude that Solzhenitsyn has articulated a coherent culturally based alternative to liberal democracy.

Nevertheless, it is in the opposition to the Yeltsin/Putin governments that one can find a coherent challenge to liberal democracy, which is allegedly more consistent with Orthodox values. To examine this challenge and consider its significance we need to investigate the philosophies of three men: Gennady Zyuganov, Aleksandr Andreyevich Prokhanov, and Aleksandr Dugin.

Of the three, Zyuganov represents the most obvious threat to liberal democracy. He was the candidate of the Russian Communist Party and its allies in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. Zyuganov ultimately lost both elections,96 but was at one point during the '96 election leading comfortably in the polls.97

During the campaign, Zyuganov represented a contradictory picture, which seems as philosophically insubstantial as the other views we have examined coming out of Russia. While capitalism was denounced at his campaign rallies, political pluralism and economic reform was sold to foreign investors.98

Zyuganov's more serious written work reveals much more. In a 1995 dissertation for a doctoral degree in philosophy, Zyuganov stated that Russia was faced with the choice of the restoration of "a great empire and socialism, or further breakup of the country and its final transformation into a [Western] colony."99 In a book written the same year, entitled *I Believe in*

Russia, he commended Stalin for replacing strict Marxism with "an ideology of patriotism."100 Zyuganov argued that if Stalin had not died prematurely, his policies would have led to a restoration of Russia and would have "saved it from the cosmopolitans."101 According to Andrew Nagorski of *Newsweek*, this was a reference to Jews.102 In a book entitled *Beyond the Horizon*, Zyuganov alleged that during the period prior to the Second World War, Jews owned a "controlling interest in the entire economic system of Western civilization."103 According to Zyuganov's view of history, Stalin killed only 500,000 people and there was no repression under Brezhnev.104

Probably a more revealing picture of Zyuganov is painted by the fact that after the 1991 collapse of the Communist Party, he forged an alliance with the extremely nationalistic Prokhanov.105 As an affirmation of his nationalist credentials, Zyuganov was awarded the 1996 Mikhail Sholokhov literary award by Russian ultra-nationalists.106 Previously, the award went to Fidel Castro and former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, whose indictment for war crimes was apparently no obstacle to receiving this honor. Zyuganov and 11 others signed an open letter in 1991, drafted by Prokhanov, which attacked Gorbachev's reforms. The letter, which was followed by the failed coup attempt the next month, seems to have cemented the alliance of nationalists and Communists, 107 and appears to represent the most coherent threat to liberal democratic development in Russia, and possibly beyond Russia.

According to Adrian Karatnycky, president of Freedom Hose, Zyuganov "has a deep historical view of Russia's mission as the opposition to the dissolute West."108 Karatnycky goes on to argue that Zyuganov is "a big believer in the decline of the West and the emergence of a new civilization."109 These views stand in sharp contrast to the picture of Zyuganov painted by one of his foreign policy advisors, Sergei Ayvazyan, as "a progressive, democratic, pragmatic politician."110

The significance of Prokhanov lies in his instrumental role in helping Zyuganov to reach the brink of power in Russia. Michael Specter of *The Austin American-Statesman* describes Prokhanov as "one of Russia's most dangerous men,"111 because he "foresaw – and then helped forge – the powerful alliance of Communists and nationalist groups that has made Gennadi Zyuganov . . . the main challenger for the presidency only five years after his party was banished from Russian life."112 Prokhanov is not shy about his role in the process. He states: "Zyuganov emerged, if you will, from our laboratory."113 This is an apparent reference to the group of Communists and nationalists, including Zyuganov, who used to meet in Prokhanov's apartment and formed mock cabinets.114

Considering Prokhanov's political significance, we need to closely examine his philosophy. The mixing of Communism and nationalism seems to have been a struggle that Prokhanov engaged in with himself for some time. In 1991 he attacked Communism as he wrote about "the destruction of the empire by the ferocious International."115 He complained about a "white movement cut to pieces by the razor blades of red terror."116 Nevertheless, he admitted that "the patriotic movement pinned its hopes on an alliance with the Russian Communist Party and on its structure, the organizational experience of its seasoned leaders, and its ties with the workers and peasants."117 In fact, in 1992 he stated that he was a 'Stalinist'.118

Aleksandr Yanov explained Prokhanov's core beliefs as follows:

Prokhanov is in love with Empire.

Empire is his romantic dream, his passion, his promised land. He is utterly convinced that what is good for empire – whether it be white, red, Stalinist or fascist – is right, legitimate and justified. . . .

Prokhanov is deaf to the idea of freedom. Furthermore, he is convinced that in fact there is no such thing as freedom, that it was concocted by the enemies of empire.119

Prokhanov's dreams of empire are driven in large part by a hyper defensiveness. He asserts: "We are a toppled, vanquished and captive civilization in a noose fashioned by an alien civilization; . . ."120 Prokhanov defines this ideology of empire as follows:

Ever since the time of Novgorod the Great and ancient Kiev, the Russian people have been obsessed with the idea of statehood. As social formations have changed and ruling classes have shifted, this idea has undergone alteration, but now it has been reinvigorated. This is why the newspaper Den actively publishes monarchists and Communists, Russian entrepreneurs and Orthodox clergymen, émigrés and generals. This is not ideological confusion. It is a clear-cut and carefully considered ideology of state self-awareness.121

If Prokhanov's ideology sounds like Mussolini's fascism, he will not contradict that interpretation. He states: "Yes, it is Mussolini's program, a program for shifting from rigid structures to soft, plastic ones. Mussolini had no opportunity to arrive at democracy because everything ended too fast."122 Alain de Benoist, who is acknowledged as the intellectual leader of the European new right, is also a friend, ally, and frequent visitor of Prokhanov.123 Prokhanov, Dugin, De Benoist and Robert Stoikers, the Belgian advocate of 'continental autarky', have founded a new magazine called *Elementy (*Elements). *Elementy*, which calls itself a 'Eurasian review', has even had kind words for Heinrich Himmler.124

Dugin, who is described by Yanov as one of Prokhanov's assistants,125 provides us with the most detailed philosophy. While his intellectual connection to Prokhanov is firmly established, it is unclear exactly how much of Dugin's philosophy would be acceptable to Zyuganov. Nevertheless, Dugin's consistent philosophy is unambiguously hostile to liberal democracy.

Dugin adopts de Benoist's view that there are three types of democracy: liberal democracy, egalitarian democracy [encompassing both totalitarian nationalist and socialist regimes], and organic democracy. Dugin states that the first two types are based on "a quantitative view of society as an aggregate of autonomous, atomistic individuals."126 The difference between them is that liberal democracy accepts the notion that "important state decisions should be made by a numerical majority of human atoms," while egalitarian democracy accords priority to the "quantitative conglomerate" of such human atoms. 127

Dugin advocates organic democracy as an alternative to the other two. While he criticizes "nonorganic forms of democracy" for utilizing "plebiscites, elections, referendums and systems of representation without any real participation [*souchastiye*] by the people in making its own societal decisions,"128 he is somewhat unclear how such real participation could be achieved.

He is less ambiguous about what organic democracy would mean for minorities. He agrees with the German jurist Karl Schmidt that "true democracy is possible only in a homogeneous society."129 Dugin argues that "[a]n organic society must qualitatively distinguish between citizens and non citizens, relegating to its periphery those who have only a secondary, fortuitous or remote relation to the organic unity of the people."130 Dugin calls this "democratic discrimination" and states that it "is absolutely essential to the preservation of homogeneity, which

in reality is always under the threat of interference by ethnic, religious, economic and cultural minorities (slaves, vagrants, sectarians, emigrants, etc.) which can fracture a people's organic unity in the event that they are granted equal rights in its government."131

Dugin unambiguously rejects individualism. He asserts that there exists a "special national or popular consciousness," which he calls the "collective unconscious."132 Dugin distinguishes this from the concept used in Jungian psychology by saying it represented "the social soul of the people, on which its sacred, historic memory is imprinted, and which has preserved since antiquity the psychic archetypes of tradition in the form of enigmatic symbols, vague images and typical dreams."133 He asserts "the priority of the collective unconscious over individual opinion."134 It is in regard to his concern for the collective unconscious that Dugin's fear of ethnic mixing is most clearly manifested. He states that "as soon as a society's homogeneity is disturbed and intensive religious, ethnic, racial and class mixing begins, the collective unconscious starts to become deformed much more than under the most drastic and radical change in outward ideology."135

Dugin argues that the East is more 'ethnoculturally homogenous' than the West. He claims that this explains the success of liberal democracy in the West. He has little hope that the West could achieve organic democracy. He states that "[i]n order to realize the genuine participation of the people in determining its destiny, the West would have to first return to small ethnocultural forms and put an end to its traditions of national and religious mixing."136 In contrast, he argues that "the East is 'ready' for organic democracy."137 Furthermore, he writes:

There is no chance that mondialist plans to establish liberal democracy could ever succeed for long in the East, since liberal democracy is not only directly contrary to all the distinctive psychological characteristics of Eastern peoples but generally incompatible with the existence of a collective unconscious in any people. Liberalism can only be firmly established in a society of machines, robots or mechanical dolls.138

His indictment of liberal democracy is quite pronounced. He writes: "Even for Western nations, liberal democracy can end only in disaster, since it is the direct path to the dictatorship of materialistic, plutocratic oligarchies."139 However, he saves his strongest language to argue for the incompatibility of liberal democracy with Eastern cultures. He continues:

And attempts to export this bankrupt liberal model to the East cannot fail to produce a sociopolitical explosion since the East will regard them as attempts at "ethnocide carried out on the level of the collective unconscious," and hence the deep underlying forces of the ancient and powerful Eurasian ethnic groups will be mobilized to combat liberalism. This time the East will not make a mistake, as it did in the case of communist egalitarian democracy, since liberalism contains absolutely nothing that could be mistaken for the expression of the genuine organic democracy that accords with the ancient archetypes of the collective unconscious.140

To show how compatible organic democracy is with Russian culture and the incompatibility of liberal democracy, Dugin takes us through a historical journey.

The vast majority of populist Russian revolutionaries were (consciously or not) spokesmen for the Conservative Revolution, that is fighters not for Western innovations but for a return to the people's national roots. Organic democracy inspired the vast majority of Russian ideological tendencies, from Russian monarchists to Russian socialists and communists, since they all, as Russians, expressed the collective unconscious that is so strong and enduring in our great people. The revolutionary upsurge was prompted not so much by a nihilistic impulse as by a popular national reaction against the purely Western secular and liberal elements that the Tsarist government, alienated from the people, had been introducing in imitation of the Western countries. What all Russian nationalists, from extreme rightists to extreme leftists, opposed was the

development and spread of a capitalist, liberal sector in Russian economic life. And they all, in their own ways, expressed a single popular will, a desire for organic democracy, for the people's participation in History, for Tradition, and for fidelity to their own Russian God, who was incompatible with the liberal 'Mammon of Injustice'.141

Interestingly enough, Dugin asserts that organic democracy can lead to either authoritarian government or a system of popular representation, because, as he says, "[t]hat is something our people must decide."142 Dugin gives us little further detail on what sort of government organic democracy might produce.

Dugin's philosophy could in theory be applied to any homogeneous society, if such societies really still exist. In fact, one could argue that Dugin's ideas do not represent a culturally based challenge at all. He does not really articulate a particular Orthodox, or even Russian, view of law and politics. Instead his ideas seem to be a restatement of fascism.

Fascism represents a modern ideology that is in conflict with all traditional societies. It advocates the subservience of all elements of society to the state. Therefore, it requires the destruction of all traditional sources of authority since they represent a reservoir of potential dissent. To the extent that Dugin's philosophy can be considered Fascist, his views would be quite incompatible with traditional Orthodox culture. Yet, he has failed to clearly distinguish his views from fascism.

The irrational nature of racial and ethnic politics should present a significant problem for Dugin and those who share his views. Who decides which person really belongs to a people and which person does not? In any event, while ethnic and racial prejudice have been factors in all societies, it seems to be stretching the point to argue that they are an integral factor in some cultures and therefore a more tolerant system should not even be attempted.

Dugin's embrace of collectivism is a point of convergence between his views and other culturally based challenges. However, the collectivism evident in the former Communist countries is different from that seen in the developing world. Industrialization has already broken down traditional social groups like the extended family in most former Communist countries. However, the Communist Party's attempt to enforce a collectivist ethic in an industrialized society ultimately ended in failure.

Dugin argues that the Communists simply enforced egalitarian democracy and thereby did not allow a true expression of Russian culture. However, Russian culture today is a mixture of the former traditional Orthodox society combined with the Communist legacy. Furthermore, capitalism and individualism are beginning to take hold within this existing structure. Therefore, the true Russian culture to which Dugin appeals, if it ever existed, would seem to be rapidly fading into history.

Despite the tremendous problems faced by Russia in building liberal democratic institutions, progress has been made. Geoffrey Hosking143 stated that "[o]ne of the great gains of post-Soviet Russia has been the relative liberty of the media."144 While he admitted that "Yeltsin's regime has not been blameless, . . ."145 he noted that "compared with any predecessor, its record on freedom of speech is estimable."146 Most importantly, he pointed out that the sole reason for this development is not just greater state tolerance, but that "[j]ournalists, writers and editors have displayed great courage in widening freedom of expression and then defending the newly won frontiers."147 Hosking recognized that this courage has not been displayed without costs. He reports that "[l]acking traditional means of censoring newspapers and television, those anxious to conceal compromising news have resorted to threatening, attacking and even murdering journalists, ..."148 These heroic efforts speak to the idea of something fundamentally human

driving the development of a liberal democratic system, something that cannot be culturally limited. The Putin government seems to be threatening press freedom, but again is doing so without advocating any coherent philosophy.

Sergei Kovalev, Yeltsin's former Human Rights Ombudsman,149 noted that the major political forces in Russia today have little real interest in human rights.150 However, he stated that "democratically oriented politicians, social and human rights activists and ordinary, decent people" are causing a free press and civil rights organizations to exist in Russia. Furthermore, he sees continued movement in the direction of "the establishment of an alternative political model for the country, opposed to the policy of the present political authorities and, even more, to the Communist and nationalist models," a model that embraces human rights.151

We should now take a step back to see how the Russian intellectual world has evolved in relation to the West. It may be helpful to consider the thought of Isaiah Berlin in this regard. In *Russian Thinkers*, a book that compiles a number of essays, Berlin makes a strong case for the view that Russia was an integral component of the development of Western thought, rather than some deviation. He explores the ideas of Herzen, Bakunin, Vissarion Belinsky, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, and others. He carefully shows how these thinkers find their raw material in so-called 'Western' ideas, and then they in turn exert a further influence on the 'Western' ideas, which follow. Berlin argues that Russia, rather than representing a civilization alien to the West, was actually an integral component of the development of Western thought. Therefore, if liberal democracy can be seen as the culmination of Western political thought, then these ideas should be equally applicable to Russia.

Orthodoxy and Liberalism

This brings us to the ideas of the Romanian historian, Alexandru Dutu. An underlying theme of Dutu's work echoes Berlin by asserting that the Orthodox tradition was always an important component of the larger European tradition.152 Dutu at times addressed the Orthodox world as a whole, and sometimes limited his analysis to Southeast Europe, but always with an emphasis on the Orthodox experience.

It is important to realize that Dutu was not someone who was ready to sacrifice the Orthodox tradition in order to adopt western institutions. He eloquently conveyed the significance of what is at stake in the Orthodox tradition and why it should not be simply abandoned for political or economic reasons:

The painted churches introduced the believers into a universe in which the unseen and eternity continued to be present and helped men to understand that biological rules and political regulations did not exhaust the meaning of human life: the message was too important to be abandoned for the sake of political agreement.153

Dutu claimed that the problem for Romania, at least, was that it tried to artificially introduce Western ideas rather than to develop its own roots. He noted how the Transylvanian School compared the Romanians to other Romanic peoples and therefore attempted to tie Romania to the West and to ignore its Eastern roots. Byzantium was then accused of being responsible for poverty and other ills. On the other side, figures like Nicolae Iorga attempted to explain decay as a symptom of the long period of foreign domination. However, Dutu stressed that "[t]he emergence of national states in Central and Southeastern Europe was due to hasty adaptations of Western

forms rather than to the maturation of conclusions drawn from patient and thorough analysis of the local situation." Most significantly, he emphasized that "[m]odernization had not brought in a civil society . . ."154 From this he attempted to explain why the Church in Southeast Europe was unable to react: "It is the lack of a civic spirit that hindered the development of an Orthodox political theology."155 This, according to Dutu can be attributed to the fact that this church was in captivity, and could only retreat into the spiritual realm. Nevertheless, Dutu believed that the Orthodox Church might be the institution which could "encourage the formation and the development of a Civil Society in those countries in which the communist regimes have destroyed all normal and organic relations."156

Despite the difficulties faced by the Orthodox world, Dutu directly challenged Huntington by reconciling the Orthodox identity with the European identity. He asserted that "there does exist a single civilization in Europe – the Christian one."157 Dutu then took this a step further by examining the challenge of pluralism. In this regard he confronted three issues.

The first is the question of whether there is a political unit called Orthodox Europe. He answered this question in the negative, and asserted that at best one could say the term refers to "a part of the continent that maintained a specific cultural and religious legacy."158 He noted how the war in Yugoslavia between Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Serbia was not fought over issues of religion and but rather was based on conceptions of ethnicity.

Next, he explored the history of the extent of collaboration between the Orthodox Church and the state. Here he found a tradition of keeping the two powers apart, noting that neither the Byzantine Emperor's nor the Sultan's power was ever truly merged with the Church. He saw the conflict between the Church and the Communists in a similar vein. However, he singled out the period of the 19th Century, when Religious Affairs Ministries were set up, as the root of this conflict.

Then, he took the next step and asked the question whether the Orthodox tradition is hostile to pluralism. He opened this issue by recalling the periods of totalitarianism: "The dramatic experience of the last four to seven decades has told the people of Eastern Europe that the attack against pluralism is an attack against the human person, privacy, solidarity, the sacred."159 After having set the stage for the common ground between Orthodoxy and pluralism, he again paid homage to the undeniable value, which the Orthodox tradition has brought to Western Civilization:

. . . the Orthodox heritage brings into the modern world a concept of 'reality' with deeper and larger meaning than the one proposed by modern philosophy: the Orthodox rationalism of the 17th century, modernity and hesychasm in the 18th and 19th centuries, defense of inner wisdom against the pressure of political power in the era of totalitarianism represent a contribution to European thought and, more than that, to the European way of life.160

Finally, Dutu gave a prescription to the Church for harmonizing its legacy with pluralism by making "a double movement: to review its attitude towards the modern state and to develop a social and political code that would inspire those who do not harmonize easily the Orthodox tradition with contemporary efficiency nor the intimate life with public activity."161

Dutu tackled Huntington by pointing out according to the Harvard professor's own criteria, except for the Reformation, the differences between Orthodox Europe and the West do not have a religious character at all. He then took issue with Huntington's assertion that "[a] Western Democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist,"162 but could not do so "with a Russian Traditionalist"163 since they shared the goals of "freedom, equality and

prosperity."164 On the contrary, Dutu asserted that "[a] traditionalist would never accept dictatorship, except if he uses tradition for political purpose." In effect, he argued that the traditionalist is within the 'European' tradition, while the Marxist is outside of it. One can compare this with our overall theme that in traditional societies there were always checks on the monopolization of power.

Finally, Dutu distinguished between the communitarian model of the Orthodox tradition and the one proposed by Communism. He argued that both the contractualist model and the communitarian model are consistent with pluralism. Furthermore, he insisted that both may be necessary. In other words, the Orthodox tradition has something to contribute to the larger European culture, or as I would prefer say, to the larger 'universal culture'.

We have noted that the Orthodox emphasis on the 'mystical' aspect of religion over the "ethical". This could arguably present some barriers to the adoption of the rights oriented discourse, which evolved out of a Protestant influenced environment. Nevertheless, one would be hard pressed argue that the Orthodox world has an alternative to liberal democracy. The most coherent alternative philosophy may be that of Dugin, but as we have seen, this view is not only problematic from a practical point of view, but could be argued to be fundamentally in conflict with an Orthodox Weltanschauung. Furthermore, we have shown that Russia, along with the rest of the Orthodox world, has contributed as an integral participant to the evolution of 'Western' thought. We have also noted that there are foundations within Orthodox thought, which may be able to independently support a liberal democratic perspective. Finally, we have seen that in the Orthodox world people are actively engaged in the development of ideas and institutions which will make possible the further evolution of a liberal democratic society. Therefore, there is little to support the notion that the Orthodox world requires a non-liberal democratic constitutional structure.

Hindu Civilization

In Hinduism, Huntington seems to have found an ancient civilization with its own philosophical tradition, where his thesis might appear to be more applicable. Nevertheless, India, the center of Hindu civilization, has had a functional liberal democracy for a considerable period of time. After Indira Ghandi declared a state of emergency, she was promptly punished during the next free elections for violating liberal democratic principles. While there has been increased agitation for a greater influence of Hinduism in Indian politics, there is little indication that India is poised to move away from its democratic tradition any time soon.

A Hindu Perspective on Human Rights

Nevertheless, a significant voice has been raised for a Hindu interpretation of rights. Raimundo Panikkar presents a philosophical Hindu perspective, which questions the core concepts of the international human rights instruments. He writes: "The individual as such is an abstraction, and an abstraction as such cannot be an ultimate subject of rights".165 He goes on to argue that "Human Rights are not human only. They concern equally the entire cosmic display of the universe, . . . "166 Interestingly enough, after having stated that individuals cannot be the subject of rights, he goes on to argue that "Human Rights are not Rights only. They are also duties and both are interdependent."167 It is unclear who exactly would be the subject of these duties, since by analogy it could not be the individual.

Western philosophy has also questioned whether the individual is a substantial category, however countless examples where respect for the individual has been ignored by modern states have resulted in disaster for the human condition. Panikkar's criticism, though consistent with traditional Hindu philosophy, fails to state how a Hindu conception of life would be applied to a unique non-liberal democratic constitutional framework, until such a viewpoint is clearly articulated it would be difficult to argue that Hindu civilization is in conflict with liberal democracy.

The Bharatiya Janata Party

A more immediate concern is the appearance of Hindu fundamentalism on the Indian political scene, particularly in the form of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In the May 1996 elections, the BJP won approximately one third of the seats in the Indian Parliament.168 Being the party with the largest number of seats allowed the BJP to briefly form the government. However, an alliance of the defeated Congress Party and a left-center coalition called the Third Force launched a campaign to "Save India From Communal Forces" and prevented the BJP Government from winning the necessary confidence vote.169 Nevertheless, the BJP did manage to lead a coalition government in 1998, and shored up its status by conducting new nuclear tests.170

In an effort to claim that the BJP is not a force directed against other religions, their leaders have claimed that their brand of Hindu nationalism is cultural, rather than religious.171 However, this may be small comfort to those who have different cultural traditions. Party spokesman K.R. Malkani described the party's goals vaguely as follows: "There should not be a denial of your roots and your culture. . . . There are people over-anglicized, rootless, deracinated, we would like to strengthen their roots. We should know what we are, what is our culture, what is our heritage.172

The party's actual platform, though directed against Muslims, does not seem to be in direct conflict with liberal democracy. The party would ban the slaughter of cows, substitute civil laws for the special Islamic laws now in force for Muslims in regard to divorce and marriage, repeal constitutional autonomy of the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, and abolish a government commission concerned with the rights of religious minorities.173 Of much greater concern from a human rights standpoint is the history of the party. The BJP was originally created in the early 1950's under the name Janna Sangh, as the political wing of a Hindu brotherhood, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Service Council or National Volunteer Corps), whose paramilitary posture has reminded some critics of the Nazi's. 174 Most leaders of the BJP have been members of the brotherhood. Mohandas K. Gandhi's assassin, Vinayak Godse, also a member of the brotherhood, allegedly felt that Gandhi was favoring Muslims.175 The brotherhood's membership still honors Godse.176 An early brotherhood leader, M. S. Golwalkar, was an admirer of Hitler's views on racial purity.177 Over the years the brotherhood and affiliated organizations have been implicated in many violent incidents.178 Before Atal Behari Vajpayee, the BJP candidate for Prime Minister, formally took control of the government, both he and the BJP leader called on the brotherhood's current leader, Rajendra Singh.179 More recently, in 1992, the BJP incited the demolition of a 16th-century mosque in Ayodhya. The rioting all across India, which followed, resulted in 2,500 deaths.180 The BJP and other nationalist groups claimed that the mosque had been built on the purported site of the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram and they wished to replace the mosque with a Hindu temple.181

Despite its spotty record, the BJP has not articulated a strong anti-liberal democratic position in the name of Hindu culture. In fact, Vajpayee announced that "India will never be a theocratic

state".182 It appears that for the moment, at least, that the BJP has chosen not to directly attack liberal democracy being inapplicable to Hindu culture.

In any event, the BJP is not in a position to represent all Hindus. The bulk of its support rests with upper caste and merchant Hindus.183 Of India's population of 920 million, approximately 70% belong to lower castes, which in the past have supported the Congress Party and in the May 1996 elections voted in great numbers for regional parties.184 Many lower caste Hindus live in southern India, which has a cultural heritage fairly distinct from northern India.185 Many southerners have in the past been annoyed with the Indian government's promotion of the Hindi language, which is spoken primarily in the north.186 Therefore, even if the BJP supporters rejected certain liberal democratic norms, it would be difficult to say that this cultural analysis would be applicable across the diverse cultural terrain of Hindu India.

Finally, it is clear that not even the BJP has proposed scrapping liberal democratic checks on the modern state. Furthermore, there is no significant alternative Hindu perspective being proposed.

Japanese Civilization

While Japan has often been grouped with the West, many authors besides Huntington have noted that its unique culture is quite unrelated to the culture that arose in the West. Furthermore, the recent appearance of the movie, 'Pride', in Japanese theaters, which attempts to whitewash Japanese war crime, might cause some concern that Japanese nationalism is on the rise.187

Nevertheless, Japan has had a functioning liberal democracy since the end of World War II. Furthermore, no significant voices have been raised in Japan with regard to the inapplicability of internationally recognized human rights norms to Japanese society.

Rajendra Ramlogan has written a comprehensive work concerning how Japan, a country with a non-Western culture and a Western style constitution, "is an ideal subject for a study on the controversy of universalism versus relativism in the application of human rights standards."188 In fact, Japan is a party to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.189 Ramlogan acknowledges that the Japanese legal system has integrated the language of human rights, in that the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "largely are mirrored in the Showa Constitution or in existing statutory language."190

In an interesting essay, Alex Gibney describes how a small group of Americans were given six days to create the current Japanese Constitution.191 Most of these Americans had no knowledge of Japanese culture. This is obviously clear-cut evidence that this Constitution was nothing more than an alien imposition. However, Gibney notes that during the entire postwar period, the Japanese have never seen fit to amend this document.

Ramlogan makes the claim that evidence indicates "that human rights are interpreted more in line with Japanese culture and traditions than with the Western interpretation." 192 He goes on to argue that "individual rights remain subject to group or collective rights, as exemplified in the public welfare doctrine. The courts still evoke the traditional right of the community to live in a safe and secure environment."193 Ramlogan further notes Japan's "strong police service and prosecution system, which find their legitimacy strengthened by the Japanese traditions of respect for authority and belief in the hierarchical structure of society".194 Ramlogan states that the Japanese judiciary narrowly interprets fundamental rights. Furthermore, Ramlogan questions the courts "less than stellar record" of judicial review.195 Ramlogan's fundamental conclusion seems

to be that "Japan appears to conform to the practice of advocating universal human rights principles, while interpreting them according to its own culture and traditions".196

It is important to realize that Ramlogan's criticism seems to focus on the due process rights of liberalism, while there does not seem to be a similar problem with freedom of expression. For example, according to the 1998 survey of press freedom, conducted by Freedom House, Japan's press is rated as freer than that of Britain, France or Italy.197 Furthermore, while Japanese democracy may have been a one-party affair for most of the post-war period, a recent increase in competitive elections seems to have irrevocably changed this picture.

Let us return for a moment to the issue of Ramlogan's criticism of the application of due process rights. In this regard it is important to note that Japanese prosecutors appear to be quite reluctant to charge anyone with a crime until they have a fairly convincing amount of evidence. While this may not be the best method for protecting due process rights, there does not seem to be significant evidence that Japanese citizens are being unfairly judged. In any event, it is important to note that having due process rights enshrined in a legal system, which makes efforts to apply the rule of law, is not without consequences. Even Ramlogan acknowledges that "the fundamental human rights embodied in the Showa Constitution have brought positive changes in Japanese society in the area of protection of human rights."198 While the Japanese example may illustrate that there may be some room for variation in the application of civil liberties, it is hardly an example of an alternative to them.

Ramlogan's findings indicate that influences from traditional Japanese culture have served as obstacles to the full implementation of liberal democracy. However, the same could be said about elements of traditional Iberian culture, addressed above.199 The authoritarian militarist tradition that the new German state inherited in the 1870s from Prussia were a clear cultural barrier to liberal democracy. Nevertheless, today Germany is a well functioning liberal democracy. Therefore, as in the case of Iberian, Latin American, and German culture, there is little indication that liberal democratic values will not continue to become more deeply imbedded in Japanese society.

Sinic Civilization [Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist]

Huntington first posits a 'Confucian civilization' in his original article,200 while in his book he changes this to the more inclusive term of 'Sinic'. 201 He also at first discusses and then rejects a possible 'Buddhist civilization'.202 For purposes of this paper it may be permissible to discuss a Sinic civilization, but with a significant emphasis on the Confucian component.

Confucian Culture

With the death of the ideology of Communism, the governments of the surviving Communist states of Asia (i.e. China, Vietnam, and North Korea) have begun to search for a new justification for their existence. China in particular has shown some interest in the idea that traditional Chinese culture is in conflict with human rights norms.203 China's official views concerning human rights were articulated by Liu Huaquin, the head of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, who stated that "the concept of human rights is a product of historical development. It is closely associated with specific social, political and economic conditions and the specific history, culture and values of a particular country. . . . Thus, one should not and cannot think the human rights standards and models of certain countries are the only proper ones and demand all other countries to comply with them."204 One might argue that the heirs of

the Cultural Revolution, which was an unmitigated war on much of traditional Chinese culture as well as other cultures,205 are rather inauthentic defenders of a Confucian Weltanschauung and that their only motivation is to find a justification to stay in power. Nevertheless, to fully address the challenges to human rights norms we need to assume that the conversion of the Chinese Communists to Confucianism is sincere, and confront it accordingly.

The convergence of ideas coming out of Singapore and China in regard to human rights seems to give the idea of the existence of a Confucian Civilization some credence. Ramlogan argues that their attempt to "articulate a doctrine of Asian rights bear testimony to the enormity of the problems faced in analyzing the human rights situation in Asia. Asian countries frequently have taken the view that civil and political rights should be interpreted in accordance with the culture and traditions of Asia."206 They have asserted the presence of social and economic rights. Singapore, as an advocate of such rights, has pointed to its economic successes as a way to counter criticism of its questionable human rights record.207

At the United Nations sponsored Asian Regional Meeting on Human Rights, held in Bangkok from March 25 to April 1, 1993, China insisted that human rights must be interpreted within a framework of cultural relativism, while Japan insisted that human rights are universal.208 The outcome of the conference as witnessed by the Bangkok Declaration appears to endorse the concept of universality supported by Japan. However, Ramlogan points out that the Declaration "did not define universality; thus the reference to universality may endorse a concept more akin to "regional universalism".209

The most well known proponent of a Confucian view of human rights is the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew. DeLisle comments on the now 'Senior Minister's' approach to the topic: "[T]here is little tone of excuse, request for temporary indulgence, or even much interest in dialogue to be found in Lee Kuan Yew's exegeses on the superiority of an Eastern way in law and politics that stresses order and community over rights and extreme individualism."210 Lee Kuan Yew argues that the complaints of human rights groups are unfounded, since in his view what is really important is providing better economic opportunities for the future.211

He sees the concept of individual rights as being fundamentally flawed. He states: "The expansion of the right of an individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East, the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms."212 Similar to other culturally based challenges, he sees the family as the fundamental unit of society. He states: "The fundamental difference between Western concepts of society and government and East Asian concepts . . . is that Eastern societies believe that the individual exists in the context of his family. He is not pristine and separate."213

However, Lee Kuan Yew's views are based on other Confucian principles beyond the reliance on the family. He describes the economic success of Singapore in the following terms: "Again, we were fortunate we had this cultural backdrop, the belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety and loyalty in the extended family, and, most of all, the respect for scholarship and learning."214

Nevertheless, the authoritarianism advocated by Lee Kuan Yew is not well defined. When asked whether the idea of democracy and individual rights will spread to East Asia, he admitted that things would change, but denied that something similar to the European or American systems would be the result. He also speculated that the one-man, one-vote system might have to be replaced, since he believed that it would be better if we gave "every man over the age of 40 who has a family two votes because he's likely to be more careful, voting also for his children. He is

more likely to vote in a serious way than a capricious young man under 30. . . . and at 60 they should go back to one vote. . ."215 It is interesting to note that the lack of respect for senior citizens evidenced by the above passage is actually very un-Confucian.

Fareed Zakaria argues that the culture, which Lee Kuan Yew leans on, is being transformed by economic, social and technological changes. He notes that the West had many of the attributes that Lee sees as Asian. However, "[f]our hundred years of economic growth changed things. From the very beginning of England's economic boom, many Englishmen worried that as their country became rich it was losing its moral and ethical base."216

It is important to note that there are actually two distinct forms of Confucianism, the Chinese and the Japanese variety. While Confucianism in China placed loyalty to the family above loyalty to the emperor, it was imported into Japan with the important revision that loyalty to the emperor was to supersede loyalty to the family. One can then contrast Japan's long democratic history with the authoritarian rule in China. In other words, if Confucian culture is the major determinant of modern political culture in Confucian countries, then China should have the more democratic system, because its form of Confucianism is less authoritarian. Lee Kuan Yew's model can then be turned on its head, by arguing that due to its more orderly philosophy, it is easier for Japan to utilize democratic institutions, since there is less fear that it will generate social chaos than in China.217

Developments in Taiwan point to a more positive interpretation of the compatibility of liberalism and democracy with Confucianism. Concerning the 1996 democratic presidential elections in Taiwan, Joe Klein writes in *Newsweek*: "Strategic realities remain unchanged, but the *moral*balance of power in the region had been altered fundamentally; a favorite Asian intellectual parlor game – whether democracy and human rights are universal human values or 'Western' impositions – had taken a profound turn toward universality."218 Despite military intimidation by China, Taiwan held its first free presidential elections with overwhelming public participation.

In a very thoughtful essay, two Chinese scholars, Du Gangjian, of the People's University of China, and Song Gang, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, challenge the notion that human rights are not compatible with Confucianism.219 They attempt to find the basis for what they call the ideology of human rights, the ideology of tolerance, the principle of resistance to oppression, and neo-constitutionalism in the benevolence theory of the *Confucian Analects*, particularly in the paths of benevolence (*ren dao*), tolerance (*shu dao*), justice (*yi dao*), and government (*zheng dao*).220 They analyze the path of benevolence and find a basis for modern human rights in the concepts of benevolence (*ren dao*), humanism (*ren ben zhu yi*), individualism (*ge ren zhu yi*), and activism (*zuo wei zhu yi*).221 In the path of tolerance they find a strong argument in favor of free speech when they state that "[i]t is noteworthy that the freedom of speech advocated by Confucius referred mainly to the right to criticize government and to be a dissident."222 In analyzing the path of justice, they note that there is a firm foundation for dissent and personal conscience in Confucianism when they quote Confucius as saying "[o]ne serves his prince according to what is right, and when he finds he cannot do so, he retires."223 However, their idea of neo-constitutionalism is a view that favors liberalism, in other words, protection of individual rights from state interference, but concedes that "[m]odern democracy is . . . somewhat alien to Chinese soil."224 Nevertheless, they surmise that "[m]ulti-party competition has become a much more universal way to reflect public opinion than the one-party dictatorship. Confucian logic would lead to a similar conclusion and would certainly not support the notion of a one-party dictatorship."225 In their defense of liberalism they note that "the *Analects* focused on the

restriction of the rulers' power by moral standard rather than by the legal system . . ."226 They conclude by stating: "What we call the new theory of benevolence is rooted in the traditional one and thus in Chinese soil. The close relationship between the *Analects'* four paths and the four principles of the new theory of benevolence provides a bridge between classical Chinese culture and modern human rights."227

Wang Gungwu argues that the system of obligations inherent in Confucian philosophy implies individual rights as well. He states: ". . . The subject's rights were expressed in terms of the rules of propriety due to him, and the ruler's rights in terms of the subject's loyalty which he could expect. . . . Propriety and loyalty were not simply duties; they were also, implicitly, rights in a given reciprocal relationship."228 In any event, it would be hard to argue that individual rights would somehow be incompatible with such a system.

President Lee Teng-hui, the democratically elected leader of Taiwan, also argues that Lee Kuan Yew doesn't understand classical Chinese thinking. He appeals to the "warring states" period, which preceded the imperial era, to find a more humanistic Confucianism.229 In his inaugural speech, Taiwan's Lee asserted: "We have proved eloquently that the Chinese people are capable of practicing democracy. . . . Taiwan is set to gradually exercise its leadership role in cultural development and take upon itself the responsibility for nurturing a new Chinese culture."230

The political system in Taiwan should now be considered "fully democratic by the norms of the international system", according to Columbia University Professor Andrew J. Nathan, a long time Taiwan scholar. 231 According to the 1998 survey of press freedom, conducted by Freedom House, Taiwan's press, along with that of South Korea's is rated as 'free', in fact, Taiwan's is rated as freer than that of France or Italy.232 Anne Thurston, in an article in the *Wilson Quarterly* asserts that this refutes Lee Kuan Yew's argument that democracy is incompatible with Confucianism and Asian values.233

Thurston explores the notion that Taiwan, as well as Hong Kong, may be more culturally Chinese, than China itself. She points out that "[i]n the mid-1960s . . . Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The country descended into a decade of political chaos. Traditional Confucian values were attacked, tearing the moral fabric of society, and many of the country's cultural artifacts were destroyed." Therefore, even if we accept the Chinese Communist's desire to reclaim their cultural heritage as sincere, there may be some question of how much of that heritage is still in an unadulterated form. Or, in any event, that heritage would seem to have been under less dramatic assault in the Chinese communities outside of the reach of the Cultural Revolution.

Thurston notes that some Chinese intellectuals believe that China can emulate the model of Taiwan, by taking the Confucian values of family, harmony, education, and good-heartedness, and combining them with a modern liberal society.234 At a conference in Beijing in 1995, Taiwanese scholars compared today's China with Taiwan at time of Chiang Ching-kou's death. They asserted that the Kuomingtang only survived because it introduced democracy first at the village level and gradually moved up to the Presidency. Today's Communist Party in China, they claimed, has a similar option.

The Chinese Communists clearly are not advocating traditional Confucian values in an unadulterated form, but rather what Steven Mufson, of the Washington Post, described as ". . . a ladle of militarism, a pinch of Maoism, a spoonful of Confucianism; one part modern, one part traditional . . ."235 What they are arguing for is as much of a mixture of modern and traditional ideas as are those advocated by the leadership of Taiwan. This of course runs counter to the

assertions of the former that liberal democracy and human rights are to be resisted because they are ‘western’ ideas. While on the one hand, the example of Taiwan shows that liberal democracy is not necessarily incompatible with a Confucian Society, it also illustrates how modern economic developments force a traditional Confucian society to accommodate liberal democracy.

The conviction of former South Korean Heads of State Chun Doohwan and Roh Tae Woo for mutiny and treason for the 1979 coup and other acts after they were in power should give food for thought to those arguing that cultural relativism will shield them from an international value system. It seems that at least in South Korea the view has taken hold that there are values, including liberal democracy, which override the new found Confucian authoritarianism. South Korea is a party to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 236 Tara Sonenshine and Lee Pyung Chong writing for *Newsweek* comment on the trial by noting that "[a]ll of Asia’s authoritarian regimes have reason to be uneasy. They lack legitimacy, their power having come from the barrel of a gun. And they all have something to answer for . . ."237

As we have seen, there are foundations within Confucian culture, upon which liberal democracy can be constructed. Furthermore, the example of Taiwan shows that this theoretical view can be brought out in actual practice. Most importantly, it seems that the alternative points of view being proposed all fail to offer an alternative method of limiting the modern state.

Industrial Revolution – Information Revolution

Thurston points to the Taiwanese example as proof for the theory "that long-term economic development and the rise of a middle class lead eventually to demands for political participation and democratic reform."238 Between 1978 and 1994 China had an average growth rate of 9 percent a year, similar to Taiwan’s growth rate at a similar stage of development.239 Approximately 120 million Chinese have left the villages for the cities.240 Despite the fact that two-thirds of China’s 1.2 billion people still live in rural areas, many of them now work in light industries.241 China’s urbanization and industrialization is proceeding rapidly. There is no reason to believe that these changes will not usher in demands for political participation in China as well. According to Winston Lord, the U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: "The Chinese are going to recognize that you can’t have open economics and closed politics."242 U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher asserts that "[t]rade and investment are helping to create a more open China. . . . Recent economic and legal reforms have somewhat diminished the arbitrary power of the Chinese government over the daily lives of its citizens."243

A debate within the Communist Party leadership recently addressed the issue whether its economic modernization will threaten the power of the party. An article known as "The 10,000 Character Essay" was circulated among the leadership. In the article its authors warned that state control of the economy was being eroded by economic liberalization and that a bourgeoisie was being created which will demand political rights. The article is said to have been inspired by former party propaganda chief Deng Liqun, though he denies authorship.244

Yet beyond industrialization, a more significant socio-economic development is the introduction of what Alvin Toffler calls ‘The Third Wave’245 or what might be referred to as the communications revolution. Clearly any society which does not embrace this development will fall behind others in terms of economic development. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks used the printing press as a revolutionary tool and feared it accordingly, as the later Soviet and Chinese rulers would learn to fear copy machines, fax machines and personal computers.246

While China and Singapore are charging full speed into the information age, they are rediscovering the dangers posed to closed societies by the free flow of information. Both countries

have been busy trying to block particularly offensive web sites from access to their countries they are facing tremendous difficulties. Steven Mufson writes that "[c]omputer analysts here note that while China can hinder the free flow of information, it cannot stop it completely."247 He then quotes Tang Mingfeng, president of International Network Platform, a Beijing computer consulting firm, to make the point: "They can't do it. They can control several sites that are not friendly or are pornographic. . . . But they can't control the whole thing."248 Chris Kern, a computer expert at the Voice of America, elaborates on this issue by noting that "many other institutions, including foreign universities, copy the contents of the VOA web site and make it available on the Internet through their own sites. That way, even if the government blocks the address of the VOA web site, Chinese can see the information on a different and probably uncensored site."249

As difficult as blocking information from a foreign web site is, it is even harder to restrict the messages and bulletin board postings originating within a country. Mufson explains that "[t]o block such material, the government would have to stall messages in transit and then scan them for key words or phrases that would indicate they were objectionable."250 This difficulty is compounded as is explained by Peter Long, a manager at Cisco Systems Inc., of San Jose California, one of the leading makers of routers: "A government bent on censorship could put delay in the forwarding of mail and start to look at the content," yet he notes that such electronic searching programs are useless when messages are written in code or encrypted.251

With the explosion of on-line material, things are only getting worse for the censors. According to the New China News Agency by the end of 1996 China was expected to have 120,000 Internet users, which was expected to increase to 1 million by the year 2000.252

As societies industrialize their population growth tends to slow. China attempted to address its booming population problem in an accelerated manner, by spending the last two decades promoting a one-child per family policy. The results of this policy seem to be hastening the cultural changes that accompany industrialization. With the first generation of only-children coming of age in China's urban areas, one can see certain changes occurring.253 A recent poll of young people indicated a pronounced shift toward individualistic values. Victor Yuen, who runs Horizon Research, the first Chinese organization to conduct nationwide opinion polls, reported the findings as follows: "When we look at what young people value these days, we see that topping the list are independence, learning and courtesy. Now, learning and courtesy have always been high among Chinese values, but independence is something that's very new."254 Those who would invoke the cultural values prevalent in the population to promote an authoritarian political system, should find little comfort in Yuen's findings. Apparently obedience and loyalty are on the low end of the list.255 While Chinese young people seem to be maintaining some traditional Confucian values, there does seem to be a marked shift towards a more individualistic ethic.

In reaction to this development, the Chinese government has set up special counseling centers for parents across China. The idea is to encourage parents to instill in their only-children a respect for authority.256 Whether this will slow down social changes which were only accelerated by the one-child policy, only time will tell. However, it seems unlikely that the trend can be stopped altogether.

Buddhist Culture

The Chinese government's actions in Tibet raise a fundamental problem for the supporters of at least one type of cultural relativism: Who's cultural values are to prevail? This is a problem for

those who frame the question in terms of the rights of cultures to their own values. In this regard it is important to note that the Chinese government's attack on Tibetan culture has not ended. Maura Moynihan points out how the Chinese government is attempting to "purge Buddhist monasteries of teachers, students and pilgrims."257 She further asserts that "[t]he destruction of Tibet's urban culture continues apace; I have witnessed the near demolition of all traditional buildings in Lhasa, Tibet's capital."258 She notes that "[t]he influx of Chinese accelerates. In April of this year, the South China Morning Post reported that 500,000 Chinese laborers were settled onto the Tibetan plateau to work in copper mines. The object, plainly, is to overwhelm the Tibetan populace."259 The Dalai Lama summed the matter up as follows: "The reality today is that Tibet is an occupied country under colonial rule. . . . Tibet, an ancient nation with a unique culture and civilization, is disappearing."260 Nevertheless, this does not present a problem for Huntington. He first of all does not believe that Buddhism generated a substantial civilization, and in any case, the 'clash' between Confucian (or Sinic) Civilization and Buddhist Civilization simply confirms his thesis.

Huntington seems to have decided that Buddhism never build a distinct civilization, yet those who are living in that rather large portion of the world, where Buddhism is the most significant cultural influence, may beg to differ. While in much of the Buddhist world oppressive political systems are in place, this may have little to do with cultural preferences. We have already examined the issue of Tibet. The tragedy of Cambodia is clearly traceable to superpower competition during the cold war. Also, a popular opposition continually confronts the authoritarian government in Burma. Despite the turmoil of the Southeast Asian region, Thailand has managed to maintain a somewhat stable liberal democratic system.

When we consider Buddhist values, we will be hard pressed to find any noticeable dissent from liberal democracy. The Dalai Lama, who is clearly one of the most eminent Asian Buddhist leaders, has consistently been one of the most forceful spokespersons for the universality of human rights." 261

Islamic Civilization

Islam and the West

Islamic civilization represented a relatively tolerant society when compared with the Christian West throughout much of their early mutual histories. It provided refuge to the Jews expelled from Catholic Spain, it sheltered the Classical and Byzantine cultural heritage, and generally contributed to the development of Western thought.262

Nevertheless, Islamic fundamentalism, in its various modern forms poses a challenge to liberal democracy. Many voices have been raised in recent years asserting that human rights concepts are Western and therefore do not apply to Islamic countries. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister stated after the 1993 Human Rights conference in Vienna that "human rights has come to mean Western culture and that human rights is a tool [for Western powers] to whitewash their intervention and aggression against the weaker countries."263 Similar comments were made by the Saudi Arabian Minister of the Interior just before the Conference. He stated:

The democratic system that is predominant in the world is not a suitable system for the peoples of our region. Our people's make up and unique qualities are different from those of the rest of the world. We cannot import the methods used by people in other countries and apply them to our people. We have our Islamic beliefs that constitute a complete and fully-integrated system.... In

my view, Western democracies may be suitable in their own countries but they do not suit other countries.264

In fact, the debate has often been cast in terms of a major confrontation between Islam and the Western World. 265

The Problem as Seen from Within Islam

To truly evaluate whether liberal democracy is incompatible with Islamic culture as a whole will require a more careful analysis. First of all we need to appreciate the perspective of a devout Muslim. According to Joseph Schacht, "Islamic law is the epitome of Islamic thought, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core and kernel of Islam itself."266 If this is true, then it presents a difficulty in setting aside the dictates of Islamic law in favor of secular law. While the early Christians separated the realm of God from the realm of the Emperor, Islam began largely as a legal code. Furthermore, the Islamic world lacks the experience of the Protestant Reformation and the resulting religious wars, which forced Western Civilization to make the distinction between religious and secular law. David Westbrook presents the dilemma in the following manner: "Islamic scholars, who locate legal authority with God, cannot so easily separate law and belief. The public international law solution of order without shared belief is not available to Islamic scholars, insofar as their work is informed by Islam."267 As a result, for the Islamic scholar, Westbrook continues, "international law is a continual attempt to reconcile Islamic authority and Western categories. . . . The arguments they make within Western categories are not authoritative to a Muslim. The arguments they make from Islamic authority do not confront the political organization of the contemporary world."268

However, as Westbrook points out, "[t]he Qur'an does not constitute a legal code."269 Therefore, we need to look beyond the Qur'an in our search for authentic Islamic law. Again, Westbrook writes: "The text of the Qur'an is supplemented by reports (*ahadith*) of the speech and actions of the Prophet and his companions. Collectively these reports form the second body of revelation and the second source of Islamic law, the sunna."270 However, this is exactly where the confusion begins. As Westbrook writes: "Unfortunately, the opinions of scholars vary regarding both the authenticity and the meaning of individual hadith. Moreover, subtleties of meaning abound, as do questions of application."271 As a result there is a tremendous opportunity to find in Islamic law what one is looking for, often motivated by reasons totally unrelated to Islamic culture.

An Analysis Based on Political Science

In response to the assertion that civil liberties and democracy are incompatible with non-Western cultures, one may begin from the perspective of political science and look for political motivations behind such assertions. Ann Mayer begins with such a standpoint. She argues that the formulation of so-called Islamic human rights schemes, such as the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam in 1990, "are products of the political context in which they emerged. Their Islamic pedigrees are dubious."272 Mayer further indicts the authors of the Islamization policies, by arguing that these policies may be "no more than a strategy adopted by beleaguered elites in an attempt to trump growing Muslim demands for democratization and human rights."273 For instance, Mayer notes that "[t]he most extensive conflicts between past interpretations of Islamic requirements and international human rights norms lie in the area of women's rights." Muslim

feminists support her position when they argue "that it is actually patriarchal attitudes and misreadings of Islamic sources, not Islamic tenets, that inspire the patterns of discrimination against women."274 Clearly it is difficult to accept the proposition that the women who participated in the demonstrations for the right to vote in Kuwait believed that for them to vote would violate God's law.275

Mayer raises the issue that the two regimes that have been the loudest proponents of the view that Islamic values are inconsistent with international human rights norms, Iran and Saudi Arabia, refuse to recognize each other as legitimate voices of Islamic government. She writes: "Neither Iran's clerics nor the Saudi royal family recognize each other's claims to constitute an Islamic government even though each regime is by self-designation Islamic; indeed, Iran's and Saudi Arabia's rulers routinely anathematize each other in the name of their respective Islams."276

Due to the growing influence of international human rights norms, those state actors in the Islamic world who were opposed to such norms, felt a need to respond to them since it was impossible to ignore them. Therefore there were several attempts to develop alternative human rights schemes which were not objectionable to those concerned. The most prominent is the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam in 1990, described by Mayer as follows:

The central feature of the Cairo Declaration is its implicit conception of international human rights in the civil and political arena as excessive – with the concomitant need for Islamic criteria to restrict and reduce them. After asserting that "fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam are an integral part of the Islamic religion," the authors proceed to enumerate rights and freedoms on which "Islamic" qualifications have been imposed, indicating that in reality the authors saw in Islam justifications for restricting or denying rights and freedoms. Article 24 provides that: "All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah" – without any attempt at defining what limits the Shari'ah would entail. No added clarity is provided by article 25, which states: "The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration," because there is, as previously noted, no settled jurisprudence on the question of how reference to overriding Islamic criteria should affect modern rights norms.277

Mayer then proceeds to critique these schemes as follows:

Such Islamic versions of human rights have tended in most respects to fall far below the standard of protections for civil and political rights guaranteed under the International Bill of Human Rights. Protections of religious freedoms and guarantees of full equality and equal protection of the law for women and religious minorities have been notably absent.278

While Mayer acknowledges that concerning religious freedom and equal rights for non-Muslims and women, these schemes are consistent with "principles found in traditional interpretations of Islamic requirements,"279 she notes that some of the provisions have highly questionable Islamic roots. She states that these provisions "have either a tenuous or nonexistent connection to the Islamic sources or Islamic tradition." She points out that in areas where modern human rights provisions address issues "not prefigured in the Islamic legal legacy, these schemes may resort to outright borrowing from selected international human rights provisions – but with a distinctive twist. They subordinate the borrowed international human rights provisions to newly-fashioned Islamic derogation clauses, circumscribing them by subjecting them to 'Islamic' conditions."280 In probably the most devastating critique of the so-called Islamic human rights schemes, Mayer notes that

. . . because the permissible scope of the Islamic qualifications was left undefined by the authors of the new Islamic human rights schemes and because there were no settled historical guidelines for how to integrate Islamic conditions with modern human rights norms, the Islamic qualifications in practice left governments free to determine the scope of the rights provided and potentially to nullify the rights involved.281

She then questions "why granting the government of a modern nation state, an institution borrowed from the West and unknown in Islamic tradition, such great latitude in defining the grounds for denying and restricting rights should be deemed appropriate in a system based on Islam."282

At the second World Conference on Human Rights, in Vienna in June 1993, there were various challenges to the universality of human rights by Asian and Middle Eastern States. Samuel Huntington argued in a subsequent article that his paradigm of a 'clash of civilizations' was substantiated by the confrontation at the conference between 'the West' and "a coalition of Islamic and Confucian States rejecting Western universalism".283 U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, asserted that "we cannot let cultural relativism become the last refuge of repression."284 Another major advocate at the conference for the universality of human rights was Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian Copt.285 The countries allied in opposition to the universality of human rights all had problematic human rights records. The countries included Iran, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Syria, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Yemen.286 One could of course argue, as Mayer does,287 that all of these governments had political reasons to take the positions they took, independent of their native cultures.

At this stage we should return to Mayer, who argues that both Iran and Saudi Arabia represented particular forms of Islam and could not be said to speak for all of Islam. Furthermore, China, in Mayer's view was not well qualified to speak on behalf of traditional Asian culture or religion due to its extensive record of suppressing the same. Therefore, Mayer argues that it is more appropriate to see the confrontation as representing oppressive states attempting to find cover for their human rights abuses than as a clash of civilizations.288 Mayer also points out that "the Dalai Lama, one of the most eminent Asian Buddhist leaders, emerged as one of the most forceful spokespersons for universality."289

Mayer's point that these regimes seem to be using cultural relativism as cover for their desire to preserve their autocratic forms of government, obviously casts considerable suspicion on the sincerity of these regimes. Therefore, considering the probable motivations of the advocates of cultural relativism in this instance, the Islamic-Confucian Connection looks much less like a confirmation of Huntington's thesis.

Nevertheless, we can not stop with the assumption that Islamic opposition to the international human rights norms is exclusively originated by state leaders, who wish to preserve their political position. There is clearly an Islamic popular movement well outside the confines of established Islamic regimes. The assertion of an Islamic identity seems to continue to challenge the notions of a secular democratic state in much of the Islamic world. The recent Civil War in Algeria, which began with the cancellation of the 1992 elections when the Islamic Salvation Front appeared likely to win, seems likely to continue.290 Islamic fundamentalists led a democratically elected coalition government in Turkey for a time, beginning what may be a fierce struggle for the soul of the Turkish state between the fundamentalists and the followers of the secular vision of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, with periodic interference by the military.291 Islamic fundamentalist continue

attacks on Westerners in their attempt to destabilize the Egyptian regime. Therefore, it would be difficult to argue that the only advocates of Islamic fundamentalism are the rulers of autocratic states.

Who Speaks for Islam?

We need to further explore Mayer's point that "there is no real consensus on the part of Muslims that their religion mandates a culturally distinctive approach to rights or that it precludes the adoption of international human rights norms."292 Without such a consensus it is difficult to make the argument that the conflict over human rights is between the West and Islam, it appears more reasonable to assume that the conflict is within Islam itself.

There is considerable evidence that pressures for liberal democracy have been appearing in much of the Islamic world along side the Islamic movements. While the elections that have taken place throughout this geographic space, with various degrees of fairness, are examples of the continuing influence of democratic ideas, the elections in Kuwait (October 1992) and Yemen (April 1993) represent something of a turning point.293 These elections seem to have been at least partially responsible for the forming of a human rights committee in Saudi Arabia, called the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, by conservative elements of society on May 3, 1993.294 While the Committee indicated that it intended to realize "the difference between human rights as decreed in Islam and human rights in other countries", indicating a relativist position on human rights, it nevertheless called for human rights – democracy, the right of men and women to vote, and for change in the judicial system and labor laws.295 The Committee claimed that its actions were inspired by Islamic law. But this indicates further dissent in Islamic ranks. Despite the fact (probably because of the fact) that that more than 10,000 Saudis had signed a petition supporting the Committee, it was banned after thirteen days and about 400 supporters were arrested.296 It is interesting to note, that while the Saudi government secured a ruling from the Council of Senior Religious Scholars to the support the banning, these scholars offered no evidence to support their finding.297

The Kuwaiti elections of 1996 have helped to cement the foundations of democratic values in that country. However, it is clear with only Kuwaiti men born to Kuwaiti fathers eligible to vote, we are not dealing with universal adult suffrage. Also, the limited power of the parliament indicates that this is something short of popular rule. John Lancaster of *The Washington Post* sums up the limitations of Kuwaiti democracy as follows:

By Western standards, democracy still has a long way to go in a country where women cannot vote, political parties are banned, broadcast media are run by the government, and criticism of the emir, who appoints the cabinet and under the constitution shares legislative authority with the parliament, is forbidden. And the parliament, which is heavily influenced by Islamic fundamentalists, has little to show for its efforts, with its internal disunity keeping it from mounting a united challenge to the ruling family.298

Nevertheless, Lancaster argues that freedom of expression in Kuwait is in marked contrast to other states of the region. He cites an example of how a National Assembly candidate in the 1996 elections "delivered a scorching attack on government officials, including members of the royal family, charging corruption and other misdeeds."299 He then describes the even more surprising response from the audience.

Afterward, a man stood up and proposed, "We should get them and beat them with sticks." Applause rippled through the audience.

Almost anywhere else in the Arab world, such open disdain for the government would be an invitation to arrest, or worse. But it hardly raises an eyebrow in Kuwait, where freedom of expression is among the most striking aspects of a fledgling democracy that is sowing envy and, some say alarm among its autocratic neighbors.300

Lancaster then cites the case of Lubna Abbas, who in an effort to protest the lack of voting rights for women, organized a day-long work stoppage. Abbas works as an advertising executive for the state television network and is a graduate of American University in Washington, DC. According to Abbas: "If we had been in any other country in the Middle East, we would have lost our jobs like that."301 Clearly, given time, these democratic developments will have a dynamic of their own and will multiply just as they have in countless other places.

In fact, Kuwait is already spreading democratic ideas beyond its borders. Lancaster writes: "To the irritation of its neighbors, Kuwait likes to trumpet its relatively democratic system: Earlier this year, for example, a group of Kuwaiti legislators infuriated Bahrain by calling on its leadership to refrain from human rights abuses."302 Another indication that democracy may be having an impact in the gulf states is that Qatar may be moving toward elections.303

Yemen is another good example of democratic evolution on the Arabian Peninsula. Its civil war a few years ago almost spoiled this promise. However, its elections in 1997 seemed to have brought it back on track. Its broad franchise clearly is a contrast to the more limited electoral process in Kuwait.304

Further evidence of dissent within the conservative gulf states is the existence of the Gulf National Forum, a movement set up in 1992 to promote democracy and freedom of expression in the Gulf region. Members representing states from all over the gulf, including Saudi Arabia, have met in Kuwait.305

A significant dissenting voice has come from within the Iranian Islamic revolutionary movement. Mehdi Bazargan, was the first Prime Minister of Iran after the 1979 revolution. Bazargan was one of the founders of the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), which advocated human rights and democracy using Islamic references. However, Iran's clerical regime refused to grant the organization legal recognition and persecuted its members. Bazargan then complained of the silencing of dissenting voices, the elimination of all opposition, the lack of freedom of assembly and association, asserting that the Islamic revolution had been betrayed by Iran's clerics.306

The Iranian presidential election of 1997 was an event which again reinforced the idea that there is a seemingly organic process which pushes societies in a more democratic direction in all parts of the globe, including within the Islamic world. The council of guardians did approve of the candidacy of Mohammad Khatami, but it may not have realized that he would be able to overcome the lead of the heir apparent, speaker of the parliament, Nateq-Noori. Nevertheless, by campaigning for more personal freedom, Khatami managed to galvanize women and teenage voters and win the election.307 While Khatami's hands are still largely tied by Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his election clearly represented a popular endorsement of greater personal freedom.

Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous state and its largest Islamic state, after a period of sustained economic growth, recently exploded in a popular democratic revolution.308 While Indonesia is clearing now experiencing extreme cultural strife, some of which relates to Islamic

identity, it seems that the democratic forces have a resonance in the Islamic world along side the Islamic resurgence.

Turkey clearly represents a society where democratic forces, Islamic forces, and a military committed to upholding the secular state through draconian suppression of Islamic elements, have all been competing to determine the destiny of the country. Significant elements of society, notably women, have showed consistently that they do not approve of any radical curtailment of individual rights justified by reference to Islam.309 While religious forces have campaigned largely for greater freedom to express their Islamic beliefs. The military has curtailed democracy largely to prevent Islamic fundamentalists from gaining the upper hand.310 However, democratic forces, including business groups have argued for full democracy.311 This turmoil in this predominantly Moslem country shows that there is still significant debate within Islam about its proper role in government.

A similar battle is playing itself out in Pakistan, which encountered tremendous resistance to the move to amend the Constitution by giving blanket powers to the government to institute its interpretation of Islam. The provision was to override "anything contained in the constitution, any law or judgment of any court."312 While there is clearly public support for embracing the moral teachings of Islam, it is not clear that this should take a form inconsistent with liberal democracy.

Which Culture has a Right to its Own Values?

The Taliban takeover of Kabul, in September of 1996, is another graphic example of a fundamental problem for those advocates of cultural relativism who claim that all cultures have a 'right' to determine their own value system. The Taliban, an Afghan rebel group formed in Pakistan, imposed a strict form of Islamic law in the areas which they controlled. Their seizure of the Afghan capital was to prove no exception in this regard.

The Taliban have forbidden all women and girls to go to work or schools. This included nearly all of the 30,000 widows of Kabul, who often were the sole support for their families.313 Women have been required to wear traditional clothing concealing their entire bodies, with even their eyes covered by cloth mesh. Men have been forced to wear turbans and to grow beards. The Taliban have also carried out criminal punishments such as amputations and executions.314 In one instance, Taliban fighters threatened to hang any Afghan women who they found working at a Red Cross compound.315 The Taliban have also forced people to attend mosque at gunpoint.316 Music,317 photography, video recorders, white socks, soccer, kite-flying have all been banned.318 Women have been banned from public baths319 and windows have to be painted black to a height of six feet.320

However, they were imposing their own values on people who had been living a quite different life. According to Kenneth Cooper, of The Washington Post, prior to the Taliban takeover of Kabul, women made up "70 percent of the teachers, half of all civilian government workers and 40 percent of physicians."321 Furthermore, in most relief agencies, such as the U.N. refugee agency, about half of the work force was female.322 Not only are the economic and basic humanitarian consequences of the ban on women working problematic, but it seems quite clear that this is not an instance of 'Western Values' being imposed on a native culture. It appears that in this case the urban society of Kabul, with its recognition of some basic rights for women, represents an established culture, while the introduction of the cultural values of the Taliban represents the imposition of a foreign set of values. This view is reinforced by the rejection of the changes by the population, evidenced by the massive exodus following the Taliban takeover.323

The Taliban will of course counter by arguing that traditional Islamic culture in the capital had been corrupted by 'Western Values' and all they were doing was reintroducing what had been lost. However, this view ignores the reality that cultures are continually changing. The changes brought on by the urbanization of parts of Afghanistan are part of this process.

Islam's Compatibility with Liberal Democracy

Arguments can clearly be made that some of the reasons for opposing liberal democracy can be traced to motivations by autocratic political forces, which desire to cling to power. Furthermore, if one casts the argument in terms of the rights of cultures to have their own values, one finds a difficulty in determining exactly which culture has this right. However, we still have not addressed the issue of the compatibility of liberal democracy with Islam. In the beginning we noted that an Islamic scholar would have difficulty accepting a legal system, international or otherwise, unless it is consistent with Islam itself. Therefore, an appeal to a secular legal system, which would provide room for different religions is not an option. As a consequence, we still need to examine Islam itself to determine its compatibility with liberal democracy.

Mayer states that "[t]he principles of freedom of religion – notably the right to convert from Islam to another faith – and equality for all, regardless of religion or sex, seemed to pose particular problems for many Muslims, and in these areas they could point to Islamic authority, albeit contested authority, for their resistance to international standards."324 Mayer then notes that "[i]n the past, Islamic sources have been construed as barring conversions from Islam, requiring apostates to repent and return to the fold or face the death penalty, for males, or imprisonment, for females." However, she counters this stating that "[c]ontemporary Muslims have questioned such interpretations, pointing out that there are principles in the sources that also ban compulsion in religion."325

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im is a figure worthy of inclusion in any review of Islamic culture. He can not be described as either an Islamic modernist or an Islamic fundamentalist. Unlike the modernists he is not trying to integrate Western and traditional Islamic thought, and unlike the fundamentalists he is not trying to return to pristine principles. An-Na'im appears to be attempting to change our understanding of the foundations of Islamic law.326

An-Na'im notes that Shari'ah does not represent the whole of Islam but rather an interpretation of its fundamental sources, which must be understood in their historical context. He allows for the possibility of an Islamic Reformation, since in his view, Shari'ah was simply constructed by its founding jurists, which would permit certain aspects of Shari'ah to be restructured. He recharacterizes Shari'ah in terms of a social system similar to Western positivist ideas of law as a juristic structure.327 He further asserts that the power politics of the Medinan tradition of Islam should be abandoned in favor of the Meccan tradition of Islam, as a model for a humane international polity.328

Another figure who is attempting to work from within Islam within the same general framework is Abdol Karim Soroush, a lecturer at Tehran University. Soroush argues that there is "no authoritative" interpretation of Islam and claims that "all believers are entitled to their understanding of Islam."329 This is clearly reminiscent of the ideas of the Protestant Reformation. However, this is coming from a scholar who is working within the Iranian academic world and "was an ideologue of the Islamic regime in the 1980s."330 Soroosh makes the significant point that "[s]uch issues as democracy and human rights did not exist in early Islamic society."331 He goes on to argue that "today, they are popular ideas that are compatible with Islam, . . ."332 Saroosh

notes that "the language of religion is the language of obligation, . . ."333 He attempts to make the transition by asserting that "we need a paradigm shift . . . a shift that makes a synthesis from obligations to rights."334

There is even considerable evidence that individualism is not as alien to Islam as is sometimes asserted. According to Kamal Abu al-Magd, an Egyptian law professor:

[I]n Islam there is of course the general principle of individual responsibility before God and before the community. . . . And there are injunctions in the same direction by some of the best known Islamic reformers. For example, Muhammad Iqbal argues that Islam doesn't ask people to deny themselves, but to strengthen their egos by being strong, working hard, undertaking difficult tasks. In one of his books he particularly focused on strengthening the individual ego and the collective ego.335

He attributes the submissiveness of the people in some Arab Muslim countries, not to Islam, but to a history of colonialism and autocratic rulers.336 He also finds support in the Qur'an for freedom of speech, as he quotes a passage from the chapter called The Cow: "No witness or writer should be made to suffer because of his testimony."337 Clearly it would be difficult to find such a clear endorsement of freedom of speech and press in Christianity as this.

We have seen that liberal democracy and human rights are not necessarily inconsistent with Islam. In fact, interpretations of Islam compatible with liberal democracy are increasingly being advanced. One could compare the Islamic emphasis on law with the Protestant emphasis on ethics, which might make it in some respects easier for Islam to adapt to liberal democratic structures. Similarly the emphasis on law is important in grounding liberalism, which is dependent on the rule of law. In this same light, the Iranian system is in many ways already a constitutional democracy. However, rather than having the popular will limited by civil liberties, it is limited by a particular interpretation of Islam. If civil liberties can be added to that interpretation, or at least not found to be in conflict with it, then Iran may actually be further along towards liberal democracy than many of its Arab neighbors. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that as industrialization and the information revolution take hold in Islamic countries, they will be immune to the effects on culture that these developments have had and are having elsewhere. How long these movements will have to struggle to bring democratic changes is uncertain, but it appears that democratic values have taken hold of the imagination in much of the Islamic world.

In any case, the strong centralized state, which is a reality in most Islamic countries, must be addressed. Traditional Islamic culture did not have to deal with such an entity. The so-called Islamic human rights schemes fail to provide any realistic check on its power. Therefore, a reexamination of Islam, to reassess its compatibility with liberal democracy, may be the only realistic answer.

Conclusion

Contrary to Huntington's assertions, or to those of other cultural relativists, liberal democracy does not find itself in hostile territory in the non-Western world, however this term may be defined. Instead we have seen that the ubiquity of the modern state creates an undeniable imperative for the adoption of liberal democracy, narrowly defined, as a check on unlimited state power. Our brief survey of the allegedly separate non-Western civilizations, which was by no means exhaustive, nevertheless was sufficient to show that most candidates for alternative views lean heavily on a

traditional society that has in many cases disappeared or is rapidly doing so. Furthermore, the proponents of such views often have a conflict of interest, since they are trying to preserve their special status in a rapidly changing world. In the absence of credible alternatives there is a tremendous argument in favor of utilizing liberal democracy to limit the modern state. We have seen that while there is some conflict between the values of traditional societies of non-Western cultures and liberal democratic values, this conflict is not necessarily greater than the one between the latter and the values of pre-modern Europe. Finally, we have seen that both in theory and practice non-Western cultures can accommodate themselves to liberal democracy.

Notes

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Das Program, mit dem die Vereinten Nationen nach den Katastrophen des Zweiten Weltkrieges gegründet worden sind, verspricht die internationale Durchsetzung von Menschenrechten und Demokratie. Diese Menschenrechtspolitik hat den Verdacht hervorgerufen, das Hegemoniestreben und die blanke Vorherrschaft der westlichen Kultur nur zu verschleiern. Nach dem Zerfall des Sowjetimperiums . . . werden Konflikte zunehmend unter kulturellen Gesichtspunkten definiert . . .

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12 *Ibid.*,. 62.

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14 *Ibid.*

15 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 196-7 (1992).

16 *See* Cobbah, *supra*, note 4, 312.

17 Margret Ng, Are Rights Culture-Bound?, *Human Rights and Chines Values: Legal , Philosophical, and political Perspectives,* 65 (1995).

18 *Ibid.*, 67.

19 Thomas M. Franck, "Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?" *American Journal of International Law*, October 1997, 593, 608.

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Chapter VIII
The Role of the *Volksgeist* Concept in East-Central Europe

Victor Neumann

Introduction: *Volksgeist* and the National Idea

In the context of assimilation of the "nation" and "nation-state" concepts, History will be asked to become the promoter of *Volksgeist* –the real and infinite spirit of a people. That means that History should demonstrate the active role of culture, especially folk culture, the culture of race and modern social class, in a word – the higher role of collective structures. (Berlin, 1992)

The status of "modern regulator" gained by History is due to the Enlightenment and to the effects of the French Revolution. There was elaborated the modern and reflective content of history through scholarly discussions. The cultivated *bourgeoisie* kept the contact between the two levels of language, namely the social and the political. (Koselleck, 1975) The *bourgeoisie* would become the social segment to which the defining of the collective identity represented an obsessive concern. The new bourgeois society thinks about itself as representing the *Volk*. In East-Central Europe there was both an aristocratic intelligentsia committed to the ideas of modernization of the administrative and economic structures, and a *bourgeoisie* formed from 1830 to 1848, as well. In both cases attendance at local schools or at western universities made the flow of information about the bourgeois world possible. The justification of the ideas of *"Volk,"* "Nation," and "State" were given by the Western world. France – with its revolutions and Napoleonic wars – influenced Prussia, then, less directly, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldova. The fundamental model for the East-Central European intelligentsia was that of the Prussian *Volksgeist*.

The generation of historians from the first half of the nineteenth century sought to connect the various fields of history. A certain interest could be perceived, namely, that the history of *Volk* had to serve the history of state. The case of Prussia is the most relevant for the Romantic period (Koselleck, 1967). German philosophy from the end of the eighteenth century was excessively concerned with the definition of the concepts of "nation" and *"Volk."* According to Hegel, the institutional representation of *"Volksgeist"* is the state. But, being linked with state, *Volk* gets an exclusively political meaning, unlike "nation" which has social or cultural meanings. The contradiction between these two concepts was highlighted by the evolution of German political thought during the Romantic period.

Paul Ricoeur considers that Hegel's *Volksgeist* in his *Principles of the Philosophy of Law* is "extremely complex," claiming that it refers to the "active," "efficacious," "effective idea." Hegel's "effective idea" seems to be neither an ideal as in the case of Plato, nor an acknowledgement of experience as in the case of Machiavelli. It is rather something that works by passing through history like an embryo, something that is gifted with a sense of reality and rationality. (Ricoeur, 1997) The following question should be raised: was Hegel concerned with the existence of the collective spiritual being? If the answer is affirmative, then the sense of the eternal *Volk* endowed with spirit is the reason for his highly speculative search. Herder's *Volksgeist* could be the equivalent of the above. The infinite reality of this being is the reality incarnated by State. In fact, however, this was really an attempt to build a façade, a fundamental reference point for Prussia's political ideology. This explains how History takes on an autonomous framework and demands to

be recognized as a science. Along with its own scientific liberty that allows it to unearth important contributions, to collect documentary testimonies, and to formulate specific theoretical and critical reflections, History really gains importance by structuring the philosophical and political language that embodies ideas. (Koselleck, 1975)

As the Romantic school blossomed around 1800, Friedrich Schlegel deliberately chose the history of Central and South-Eastern Europe as a topic for analysis.1 The Hapsburg Monarchy seemed to him to offer a way of understanding the idea of Empire. In fact his reflections on it allowed him to develop his own opinion concerning the emancipation of the constituent nations and led to an early awareness of his ideas in German and Austrian schools and universities. (Schlegel, 1980)

Contacts between Eastern and Western Europe only truly began to grow with August Ludwig Schlötzer's pioneer work. He initiated modern scholarship on the subject. He was the first to approach the history of the peoples of Central and South-eastern Europe using the new historical method. He rearranged its previous fragmentary history and established the chronological development of human communities in these areas. He investigated the diversity of traditions and the organization of social life. He also studied Hungarian, immersed himself in the Saxons (Germans living in Transylvania), and exercised influence over their historiography and literature. Schlötzer's *Kritische Sammlungen zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen* (Gottingen, 1795-1797) was known in the circle of Samuel von Brukenthal (the former governor of Transylvania). It exemplified the exchange of information and increased the range of German culture at a time when both Prussia and Austria had political interests in East-Central Europe.

Herder and Fichte: Language of Culture and the Nation-State

It should be noted that during the first decades of the nineteenth century those German theorists and philosophers who advocated the nation-state won great sympathy, becoming the most read scholars and reference points for generations of educated people in East-Central Europe. Among them, Johann Gottfried Herder fascinated not only his generation, but especially the next one – the revolutionaries of 1848. Together with Fichte's work, Herder's ideas became known especially through his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*.2 An obvious question to ask is what was so remarkable in this romantic philosopher's work and how did it succeed in becoming such a reference point in East-Central European political writing. The question is even more useful as it invites unconventional answers.

Herder devoted attention to all the fields of science of his time: the philosophy of history, the history of culture and of humanism, the history of religions, and popular mythology. The pursuit of greatness, in the sense of the cultural ideal, is foremost in his mind. People's happiness or unhappiness, demeanor, physiognomy, even their conversations and occupations, depend on that search. This same aspiration determines a taste for poetry, epic stories, and cultural expression. It even gives rise to an interest in speculation and philosophy. The propensity towards language and folklore, specific to the Romantics, has a very clear political motivation, namely nation-state building. According to Herder's viewpoint, language is the motive stimulus of the soul's resources, the possibility for culture and for "the deepest education." His enthusiasm for his own language has no limits. In his understanding language had to be the point of contact between different provinces; a good education can only be had in the language of the people and the country where you were born. He established a subtle way of approaching individual biography through the person's place of origin. We are defined by space and language. But they are also the sources of

creativity. Such viewpoints were quite simple to assimilate, all the more so in societies where individualism had been rejected *ab initio.* While Voltaire encouraged individual emancipation from under all servitude to authorities, Herder would impose language and *Volksgeist* identity. However, his Enlightenment ideal, with all its victories, would be contradicted and annulled by the romanticists' radical aspirations.

For Herder, the attraction for Southeastern Europe was his interest in ethnography and ancient languages where people are envisioned as individuals or super-individuals.3 This contributes to his grounding of the nation-state theory. The German philosopher conceives unity and diversity as perfect features describing all the lasting creations of nature. He also said that the education, formation and the human being's way of thinking are genetic, that is resulting from the existence of outstanding national characters. Herder saw himself as a witness to the end of an era. Political systems were in crisis. From his viewpoint the old political practices were not flexible enough to adapt to nation-state theories. In fact, Herder wanted to teach people to understand matters through their historical context. The success of his ideology was to surface with the elaboration of the nationalist doctrine in many of the Habsburg Empire's regions, and also in territories of the Ottoman Empire.4 Recent studies emphasized that there existed and still exist many variants of European nationalism, likely those of Herder, or the Fichte-Herder type.5

Fichte himself was a similar presence in the modern history of political thought, by widely promoting certain myths. It is not the Fichte of *Wissennschaftslehre* but the Fichte who wrote *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* in 1807-8, a work that contributed to the elaboration of the "nation" concept, more exactly the concept of "romantic autopoetic nationalism." For example, Fichte's image of the Frenchman as the archetype of the enemy is a quite notorious example of inciting and manipulating German public opinion. The irrational nationalism formulated by Fichte had been taken over and adapted in Central and Eastern Europe by the intellectuals who became the teachers of the nation; this concept can still be found at present in mental images about alterity, majority-minorities relations, and in relations with neighboring nations. Also from Fichte was taken over the idea that it was not the concrete reasons but the metaphysical status, which ensured the outstanding historical achievements of a nation.

Among the first scholars in East-Central Europe to assume this German teaching was the Italian Alberto Fortis. He disseminated these ideas within the Austrian Monarchy, impressed by the romantic essayist's exaltation of a peoples' genius. In Hungary, Kossuth and Petöfi's political thinking was also strongly influenced by Herder. "The romantic autopoetic nationalism" of these two important representatives of the 1848 revolution was due in large part to Herder's thinking. In his works and his academic and parliamentary speeches, Széchenyi promoted the idea that the ethno-national aspect is tightly linked to culture and language advancement. The reforms stipulated by the Magyar politician are marked by the attempt to clarify the national question, respectively the nation-building advanced by Herder. Unlike the revolutionaries, however, the reformist Széchenyi introduced in his doctrine some new elements that attempted modernization. In his work *A kelleti népek* [*The Peoples of the East*], István Széchenyi resorts to the understanding of the *Volk* concept in the sense conferred on this term by Herder. He was inspired by the idea of ethnic differences and by the overestimation of the Magyars' ability for self-government. He overlooks the idea of understanding and co-operation with neighboring ethnic groups – the Serbs and the Romanians. However, he objects to the revolutionary endeavors with respect to common identity and common citizenship (Széchenyi, 1830). As far as the emancipation of the Jews is concerned, he adopted an extremely conservative position, by identifying the Jewish community as being representative of another race in comparison with the Magyar. Other representatives of

the 1848 revolution in Hungary, Bohemia and Transylvania assert with self-confidence that it is necessary that the "racial instinct" of peoples to be satisfied. They would take as a model the radical ideas emerging in the Prussian *Volksgeist*.

The neo-Greeks and the Romanians immediately took Herder as a milestone as soon as they found out that he had referred directly to their right to express themselves in their own languages. Living in the 1848 revolutionary milieu of Paris and having at his disposal the French edition of the main work *Idées sur la Philosophie de I 'Histoire de I'Humanité,* the Romanian politician Nicolae Bälcescu was deeply committed to concepts like people, historical destiny, and "greatness," assimilated both from Herder and from Quinet. All of these ideas revolved around the question of ethnic unity. Herderianism, more than any other political philosophy, gave rise to a passion among intellectuals and politicians. The concepts – among the most attractive being that of *Volksgeist* – came to be known through books and magazines circulated during the first half of the nineteenth century. Fragments from the German romantic scholar's work are now translated into Hungarian, Romanian, and Greek. An important role, too, in spreading ideas must be attributed to the revolution of 1848. The ideas became so popular that many politicians in Central and Eastern Europe who appropriated the ideas elaborated by Herder did not even know his name.

During this period, there emerges an irresistible aspiration of the people of the eastern half of the continent to become fully European and enter what was then seen to be civilized society. At the same time, there was a certain loss of the critical spirit, a rote copying of methods from the most advanced countries and regions, accompanied by an ignorance of their own economic, social, and administrative possibilities. The intellectuals became the leaders of the political class of the area. This partially explains the ideological confusion born on the eve of the 1848 revolution that for so long marked the philosophical meaning behind political thought. The ambiguity of the ideals advanced by the revolutionaries of 1848 – liberalism and nationalism – were to generate the great theoretical disputes which still mark the political life of the region. In East-Central Europe, some aspects of Enlightenment political rationalism had penetrated deeply. However, the penetration never developed the elements necessary for coherent political thinking based on reason and individual responsibility. This had dramatic consequences in economic thought, where the promotion of liberal doctrines is at stake, and in the social field, where the opening to diversity and pluralism becomes important. In this arena, the concept of ethnicity substituted for the liberal and the social-democratic values spread by the French Revolution of 1789.

The process of state-building took such an ethnic turn, once the main role in creating a cultural and political identity was given to the rural community, and rather than the cities. The peasantry represented the ideal of purity of the people. The French "*peuple"* has other connotations than those known in the West. While for Western politicians and scholars *"peuple"* defined the rising social dynamic, for those in the east, the same term connoted national specificity and the preservation of the criteria of national affiliation (language, rural customs) in a purer way than the mixed ruling class could ever achieve. (Bibó, 1981) This may be seen in the way that the generations of the middle and later nineteenth century approached the issue of citizenship by focusing on the emancipation of certain cultural and religious minority communities.

Despite this, there was a short period during which the revolutionaries of 1848 exhibited the influence of French liberalism, promoted by the Great Revolution. This can be noted in a few programmes after 1848, in cultural and political debates, in articles, books and brochures of the time. The failure of the 1848 revolutionaries' approach in East-Central Europe was due to the late penetration of liberal ideas and the low number of public and private institutions who absorbed the

century's political orientation. Another reason was the lack of certain mediating social groups, able to perceive and multiply the message that revolutionized the Western political system.

A number of factors were important: the lack of a proper public administration at the beginning of the modern epoch; the widespread ignorance of how a capitalist economy functions; the lack of a dynamic bourgeoisie connected to the market of the time; the very thin layer of urban society; and the persistence of the traditional rural collectivist way of life. These all had an important role in preserving discriminatory structures within the regions under discussion. Those factors also affected relations between peoples and communities within countries as well as external relations with socially and politically advanced nations. The difference between the elite and the mass of people in these regions was tremendous and in some areas remains to this day.

Conclusion

It is important to emphasize how this background made possible the speedy assimilation of German romanticism and helped the national idea to take root. Diverse cultural and political pedagogies turned the works of Herder, Fichte, and Hegel into reference points for the Eastern intelligentsia. We can readily recognize such sources when groups started a distinctly political crusade in the name of the "collective soul." The *historia magistra vitae* phrase was used to great advantage by writers, historians, and politicians throughout East-Central Europe in Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldova, and Greece. The romantic reconstruction of the past, imperceptibly, was turned into a way of thinking about politics. Scholars tend to impose upon their present reconstruction of the past an impulse to political mobilization. Thus, from the revolutionaries of 1848 until today, the phrase "*historia magistra vitae"* has remained active in the states of East-Central Europe. It is ideologically implicated in almost all regime-changes. This scholarly myth has made possible an excessive emphasis on the past, as well as the political manipulation of the so-called historical argument.

Notes

1. For a historical description of the facts, see: "Les lumiéres en Hongrie, en Europe Centrale et en Europe Orientale," in: *Actes du Troisième Colloque de Mátrafarud*, September 28-October 2, 1975, (Budapest, 1977).

2. *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menscheit* was the work that stirred positive comments in East-Central Europe. It is a primary reference for the region's Europeanization. Its political message met the aspirations of the forming nations in the region. German culture and civilization was in great vogue amongst the populations of these areas. The lack of a critical spirit and possibilities for comparison – explicable through the long-continued isolation within a folk culture – encouraged a shallow and one-sided reception. Anglo-Saxon political and philosophical thought played no role in East-Central Europe. For Herder's reception by Romanians and Hungarians, see Victor Neumann: *Convergence spirituale. Studii privind istoria rela;ii/or po/itice ~*,ci *cultura/e in Europa Centralã ~i de Est, 1750-1850* [*Spiritual Convergences. A Survey of the Political and Cultural Relations in Central and Eastern Europe 1750-1850*], (Bucharest 1986, pp. 16-38, 38-56, and 84-103.

3. Isaiah Berlin: *Four Essays on Liberty*, (Oxford University Press, 1992). This book is now being translated into the languages of East-Central Europe (Romanian and Hungarian editions by Laurentiu Scalat and Ivan Zoltán Dënes, respectively).

4. In the Balkans, Greece, and Romania, the French translation of Herder's main work *Idées sur la philosophie de 1'histoire de 1'humanité,* translated by Edgar Quinet, (Paris, 1834), was widely circulated. In Bohemia, Hungary, and Transylvania, the work was read in the original. For its influence in Transylvania, see, for example, Iosif Wolf: "Die rumänische Herderrezeption im Vormarz and Perspektiven," in *Cahiers roumains d'etudes litteraires,* nb. 2, 1979. For Herder's influence on neo-Greek political culture, see C. Dimaras: *Neoellinikos diafotismos,* (Athens, 1977).

5. See Endre Kiss, "A Typology of Nineteenth Century Concepts of Nationhood," in *East European Quarterly,* XXX, 1, Spring, 1996, pp. 27-62. Future research will probably cast new light upon the philosophical and political errors of the Frichte and Herder. There is already quite diverse interpretation of their concept of nation-building.

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Chapter IX
Sanctions, Behavior Control and Social Order

Charles R. Dechert

Introduction: Control And Interdependence

The notion of sanction involves the order of relationships within a community. The application of sanctions to constrain individuals or groups to follow desired courses of action falls under the more general notion of coercive behavior control.

"Sanction" inherently implies community, indeed the community in its spiritual dimension, the ordering of society in conformity with natural or divine law. Its etymological root is *sanctum,* holy; recall that Romulus slew Remus for his sacrilege in violating the sacred precinct of the newly founded city. Most basically a "sanction" is the authoritative permission or approval that makes a course of action valid; supported or encouraged by law, custom or opinion. By extension it becomes a penalty for non-compliance and may include moral pressure to ensure compliance or conformity. Within the global community, it is a coercive measure (usually by several nations) against a nation, a person or group violating international law or a consensual norm of appropriate behavior.

Applied to its individual and corporate members sanctions lie at the base of civil society and are its guaranty. They lie at the base of that personality and character formation termed "socialization." Political authority is characterized by its ultimate legitimate recourse to force, to compel or regulate human behavior. Within the family small children are guided, convinced, forcibly persuaded, and even coerced into civility, and the process is life long as the broader human communities exercise normative controls.

The core requirement of civil society is to motivate its individual and corporate members to accept the roles and perform the inter-related activities that make a living social system survive and thrive in a process of continuous adjustment and adaptation to its natural environment and the human communities that form its social environment. When the Roman plebeian population moved to Monte Sacro to protest the oligarchic abuse of power, they were persuaded to return by appeal to the organismic analogy and the assurance of effective representation. Interdependency is natural to man born into society; and he is lost without it.

In some very basic sense the social control of mature persons' behavior relies on accepted authority and persuasion, the symbolic universe expressed in written law, custom, priestly and civil office, formulaic prayer and convincing rhetoric. In both interpersonal and societal relationships physical compulsion is normally a last, rarely used expedient. It is costly in both material and moral resources. Although the ultimate guarantor of public order, it is more effective in its symbolic presence: the lector bearing axe and rods, the marshal or sergeant-at-arms bearing baton or mace, the uniformed policeman or soldier, the robed magistrate.

This is simply to say that most human behavior is the product of internal, motivated, individual decision-making in response to proximate or more remote symbolic inputs. Written law, custom and usage, the learned behaviors and internalized modes of modeling, interpreting and responding to reality that characterize a culture (or subculture) can account for the habits, routines and autonomous patterns of decision that govern our lives. Coercive control is largely exercised by structuring the physical environment (e.g. fences, doors, barriers to prevent U turns) or through

symbolic communications backed by sanctions. The Roman citizen's motivation to patriotic military service was backed by the threat of loss of citizenship, execution or enslavement. Was it entirely by accident that in US Air Force basic training our Tactical Instructors would refer to the unpleasant prison life at Leavenworth? On the other hand, Eisenhower's assent to the execution of Pvt. Slovik for desertion created a crisis of army morale in the European Theater in WWII. Assassination of officers by "fragging" became commonplace in Vietnam, and the 1970's amnesty of draft dodgers, deserters and voluntary émigrés has tended to make traditional coercive threats less relevant to military service.

Technology and Coercion

In contemporary America, automated photo-backed fines for speeding and traffic light violations has introduced an expensive automaticity into the civic sanction system; fear of a Treasury Department audit does much to keep taxpayers honest. As Michel Foucault points out, punishment is a specific form of power, a "political technology."

The coercive impact of informal social norms and usage can be impressive; choice of language, politically incorrect actions or sentiments, inappropriate expressions of emotion or affection (e.g. "losing one's cool") can bring about informal sanctions affecting career, friendship and neighborly relations.

Much of the contract research on behavior control done in the 1950's and 1960's under the auspices of the United States' Defense establishment was undertaken by the Human Ecology Society, with the cooperation of the Smithsonian Institution and such universities as Cornell, Brown, John Hopkins, Ohio State, and Wisconsin. Controlled environments, physical, symbolic and interpersonal were studied as sources of attitude, motivation and behavior. "Paradise," after all, is a Persian garden. What are the effects of sensory deprivation? What are optimal learning environments? For whom and for what subject matters; and, as what function of culture? Can behavior be controlled by modifying the person's internal environment? Pharmacological Warfare got its start in the late 1940's when Professor Alsoph Corwin of John Hopkins University pointed out the incapacitating potential of enzyme deprivation. CIA's experiments on the behavioral consequences of ingesting amphetamines, LSD, BZ, carbamate, etc. by both witting and unwitting subjects were revealed at the Church Committee hearings of the 1970's. The drug culture of the 1960s and 1970s was a massive uncontrolled social experiment-experience in the effects of modifying the human internal environment.

Behavior control through hypnosis was extensively studied as part of the Defense Department's concern with alleged Chinese "brainwashing" – as the communist ideological mental hygiene program was translated. By appropriately structuring the symbolic environment, the context of action that gives it meaning and significance, virtually any action may be successfully suggested under hypnosis. More fundamentally, however, when policy requires violent or treacherous actions by someone, anyone, the simpler approach is to employ modern tools of personality and values assessment to identify, recruit and motivate congenial types; if necessary those "rough men" instrumentalized by governments, and not only governments, for rough work. The convicted criminal, Lucky Luciano, was brought to Sicily by the OSS to re-mobilize the Sicilian Mafia in support of the Anglo-American invasion; the Mafia had been destroyed by the Fascist regime in the 1920s.

Among the more significant public institutions characterized by coercive controls are prisons whose role and constitution have been the objects of Anglo-American social meliorism for two

centuries. Soviet labor camps were created in the 1920s for re-education since crime, ideologically speaking, was held to be the result of the exploitative relations in a class society. Nazi concentration camps announced above their gates, "*Albeit macht frei*." The Panoptical Prison, the Auburn and Philadelphia systems, juvenile facilities and Borstals were to have provided ameliorative super controlled environments. There is now general agreement that "re-education" and reform has failed; the punishment in prison consists largely of the abuse inflicted by the stronger, more violent, more manipulative, better organized prisoners on the weaker within a perverse social structure tacitly assented to by their managers. Recent thinking makes the prison's role one of social protection; the decline in violent crime in America in recent years is at least in part attributable to a doubling of the prison population.

As controlled environments, prisons provide conditions for human experimentation. An Italian warden in a short course I gave at the Carceri Nuove in Rome was working on the behavioral effects of color in the environment. "Volunteers" are readily available in prison for medical experiments. German and Japanese terminal medical experiments in WWII produced some results that still influence treatment, of hypothermia, for example.

Formal and Informal Sanctions

The application of formal and informal sanctions apply not only to interpersonal relations within a group but to inter-group relations within the larger community or communities with their characteristic culture(s) and a more comprehensive set of written and unwritten norms, formal and informal sanctions.

In my study of the international oil industry some forty years ago, (*Ente Nazionale Idrocraburi: Profile of a State Corporation*) I was struck by the existence of an unwritten, almost unconscious code that seemed to govern the activities, policies and even the mode of interaction of the major oil companies, then the so-called "seven sisters." Their organizational structures, characterized by vertical integration, and policies governing corporate interactions (best expressed in the Achnacarry "as is" Agreement) and most state relations gave the impression of a highly adaptive behavioral code, largely self-enforcing, assuring members' survival and prosperity. For example, when Iran's Mossadeq government nationalized Anglo-Persian Oil (BP) and tankers carrying that "stolen oil" entered into European national waters they were immediately placed under judicial seal, awaiting settlement of ownership rights – at very great legal and storage expense to ship owners and leasees, purchasers and, of course, the newly formed Iranian national company. When Purfina's Egyptian properties were taken over for international political reasons, Purfina was permitted to negotiate the sale of these assets to Italy's ENI, a partner of the Egyptian government in a joint exploration/exploitation effort.

Interestingly enough, during the Seven Day War of 1967, the ENI crews in the Sinai militarily defended their installations against Bedouin bandits under the corporate flag, not a national flag – and when the fields were returned to Egypt in 1982 as a consequence of the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the Italian corporation was reimbursed for its share of the oil extracted during the Israeli occupation.

Considered at the personal level, negative sanctions normally involve deprivation: of life, well-being, freedom, fortune, status and/or reputation. Sanctions against persons include execution, more or less stressful incarceration, and fines, lost of mobility and/or civil rights.

When such deprivations are imposed at the interpersonal or intra-familial level, i.e. without authoritative sanction, we speak of common crimes or private justice; murder, self-defense, feuds,

vendettas, defamation, slander, robbery, fraud, etc. The judicial process requires at least tacit assent to the public authority that imposes such sanctions for a breach of the peace, a violation of constituted order. Who or what institution possesses such authority at the global level?

In this century, the introduction of the notion of war crimes, conspiracy to commit acts of aggression, violations of human and civil rights is, in effect, an effort to personalize responsibility for the social evils of war, injustice, exploitation of persons, and degrading the natural environment. In some sense it is a secular version of the power of judgment assumed by St. Ambrose in the presence of an imperial crime, of Gregory VII and Urban II in the face of Muslim denial of access to Palestine, of Boniface VIII and of Innocent III in the face of imperial or royal usurpations, or indeed of the moral objections of Pius IX to amoral liberalism and secularization, or those of Pius XI and XII to Fascism, Communism and Nazism. It may be significant that Rome has not seen fit to prohibit participation in research, production and preparation for the operational deployment of weapons of mass destruction. Catholics in the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command and the Navy's Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile force were not authoritatively excluded from such service during the period of "massive retaliation" and deterrence by a counter-values strategy of "city busting."

Who Is Included in Sanctions?

Historically, of course, social decision-makers, kings and emperors, presidents and prime ministers, generals and magistrates have been personally and de facto largely immune to sanctions.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, personal attacks on political and military leaders were prohibited by international accord, even in wartime. Kaiser Wilhelm retired tranquilly to the Netherlands. In WWII, Britain and America refused to cooperate in the German military elite's efforts to assassinate Hitler, probably more from ideological hatred of the traditional German aristocracy than from moral or legal scruples. In brief, in international disputes formal sanctions, military, economic, political or diplomatic are far more likely to punish the powerless citizen, in or out of uniform, than social decision-makers. Holders-of-power, almost by definition, can externalize the social costs of their decisions. Deep bunkers, privileged access to food, shelter and transport, a sycophant media, internal amnesty and friendly asylum providers abroad assure their physical and emotional well-being. Intellectual apologists, political partisans and revisionist historians may excuse, minimize or cast doubt on their crimes.

Realpolitik, from Sun Tso through More's Utopias to Lenin's Chekists, OSS' William Donovan, CIA's Richard Helms, and the KGB, views assassination as simply another instrument of policy. Was U.S. bombing of Sadaam Hussein's or Qaddafi's Headquarters personal? Of course not, we are assured, the U.S. Congress has a statutory prohibition of assassination considered as simply another instrument of national policy.

Let us consider military sanctions for a moment. These are coercive, compulsive in nature; they eliminate the physical and so ultimately the moral and cultural obstacles to the imposition of one's political will on an adversary. Counterforce strategies are directed at his military establishment, personnel, foreign and military intelligence capability, communications, command and control, weapon systems and installations. Countervalue strategies are directed at the general population, natural and built environments (especially cities, infrastructure, transport, industry, and cultural goods). Interestingly, the internationally authorized aerial assault on Milosovic's Serbia was designed to dismantle civil society by the destruction of its built physical base without human casualties.

War World II exemplified both strategies. Dresden as a German cultural capital was destroyed to prove to Stalin that Anglo-American intent was not to negotiate a separate peace; Japan's cultural capital, Kyoto, was on the nuclear weapon target list. Hostage-taking, massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction and even doomsday weapons are, at their various levels, compulsive strategies designed to effect one's will without the need to be implemented by violence. These strategies neither require nor desire to effect the evil threatened. Paradoxically this approach must necessarily be coupled with the will and intent to follow through with the threatened evil in order to be convincing. A study of mine on "Nuclear Weapons and the American Catholic Conscience" appeared in *Civilta Cattolica* in 1978, pointing out the significance of the American bishops' insistence that public policy statements must, in fact, reflect intent – as opposed to J.Bryan Hehir's position, at that time, that the nuclear deterrent threat might be made if, in fact, it were not intended to be carried out. Operationally, strategic policy is institutionalized in regulations, operating procedures, equipment and drill by reliable Launch Control Officers. Like the German mobilization of 1914, once initiated the process becomes irreversible. A threat of assured destruction is automatically realized, hence the logical clarity and convincingness of the doomsday weapons conceptualized by Herman Kahn.

The orchestration of coercive threat requires both cool nerves and considerable insight into the culture and personality of the adversary, whether an individual or a group and its leader(s). Northern Ireland and the Israel/Palestine situations illustrate the dynamics of coercive adversarial strategies backed by force and will.

A major problem and threat is emerging in the combination of two factors: a) an increasing number of individuals and groups holding strong, uncompromising beliefs they are willing to impose by righteous force. *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus*. b) The increasing interconnectedness, accessibility and vulnerability of the people and critical systems and subsystems characterizing global society.

There need be no local famines given the global availability of food and transport. Yet there are (e.g. Sudan and Ethiopia) and they're man-made to serve social, political, ethnic and ideological interests.

The World Wide Web interconnects everyone, and spreads computer viruses. Global air traffic interconnects; may it not spread viruses that attack man. How did West Nile fever arrive in New York from which it now spreads through the eastern United States? Technology can alienate; it detaches man from nature and often from other men. It seems to be producing a new Ludditism. In its extreme pathological form it produces a homicidal Ted Kaczinski. A current academic witticism comments: "Just be glad Ted Kaczinski was a mathematician and not a microbiologist, then he could really have caused damage!" A few weeks ago I was down at the Penn Camera shop, across from the FBI Building, in Washington, to buy film. I saw a mobile weather station and, as a onetime Air Force Weather Observer, I expressed my surprise to the technician at their making observations in town at street level. I learned that this contract research is directed at the micrometeorological phenomena in high risk, high security-sensitive urban areas; winds at various levels, temperatures and temperature inversions, humidity, effects of streets, traffic, and the built environment. Clearly they were providing data relevant to the threat of chemical or biological agents released in the nation's capital. Imagine Ted Kaczinski with a gallon of Anthrax spores or smallpox virus on the MIT or Caltech campus, or outside the FBI Building

Conclusion: A New Approach

Let me conclude on a positive note, a "new world order" will not be based on coercion, sanctions, or the imposition of a dominant will. What is needed in a "minds and hearts" strategy, if you will, but without the cynicism of Nixon's aides who maintained that, "when you've got them by their {private parts}, their minds and hearts will follow." Even in a fallen world rational self-interest is conducive to the tranquility of order at every level of community from the family to global civil society.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a beginning as does the ever more complex fabric of principle, treaty, convention and custom that provide a normative structure for conduct and help define sanctioned behavior for persons and groups. Something akin to the Roman notion of a *jus gentium* is required to define the modalities of inter-group relations in a global community comprising not only sovereign states but continental associations (often functionally defined), corporations, financial agencies, transnational parties and associations, NGOS, religious groups, cultural institutions, etc. whose relations are increasingly determined both by contract and customary usage, by operational codes amenable to empirical definition. Efforts to harmonize national legal codes in such areas as contract, property law and taxation characterize an ongoing process.

In this emerging world, and in a world culture whose characteristic institution is the modern university, the Anglo-American dream of a "new world order" based on "one remaining superpower", the American hegemony, is simply unacceptable. Russia, China and India self-consciously insist on political polycentricism. The European Union clearly has a mind of its own and will soon have substantially independent military forces. The moral authority of the Catholic Church finds support in Islam and much of the developing world in questioning the official U.S. positions pressed at the global level on contraception, abortion and the legitimacy of prostitution as a vocational choice while refusing to acknowledge the nuclear family as a natural institution possessed of role, rights, and obligations.

I suggest that the emerging world order may very well be pluralistic in nature, possessed of multiple hierarchies of legal authority, increasingly compatible and cooperative, capable of imposing sanctions – basically oriented toward the containment of disorder, especially physical, moral, and economic violence unjustly directed at persons and groups, force and fraud, lies and cultural aggression.

Physical, institutional and moral frontiers must be respected while the movement of persons and goods, intercommunication and symbolic exchanges are encouraged. Our experience of the past century suggests that disorder, violence against nature and human nature over time and in the presence of countervailing forces tends to prove maladaptive, to implode, to end in the dustbin of history.

We can only hope that these processes of sanctions, control, and order will prove less and less destructive of life, cultural goods, and the human conscience and that the forces of benevolence and beneficence in accord with the rationale side of human nature will prevail.

Chapter X
Ethical Reflections on Globalization

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

The intent of this paper is to provide some reflections on a moral accounting of globalization. Such a task is dauntingly difficult for globalization is a fact that is still in the making, and given the enormous literature and conferences devoted to it, the battle between the pros and the cons has not been settled. Some have contended that globalization being inevitable, it makes no sense to approve or disapprove of it, much less to go against it. Others argue for the human liberty that is the source of globalization, and thus advocate for its transformation. I tend to lean to the latter view, that while globalization is indeed the climate of the times, our historicity, it is brought about by human beings who are social actors responsible for its direction. The stakes are so high that no moral philosopher can escape making ethical judgment(s).

This paper then is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the essence of the phenomenon of globalization. The second examines the positive aspects of globalization and the third the negative effects of globalization. The final part proposes some possible solutions to the dilemma.

But first, a clarification on the ethical framework used in this paper. The ethical framework I am applying here is a combination of the value ethics of Max Scheler and the discourse ethics of Jurgen Habermas. For Scheler, the morality of an act, the moral value of good or evil, "rides on the back of the deed," and not in front of it. What is in front of the deed is the end or the result of the deed. The moral values of good and evil cannot be found in the end or results of the deed because that would be tantamount to "the end justifying the means" and waiting for the results of the deed before one can make any moral judgment based on the deed itself. By "riding on the back of the deed" Scheler means that an act is good if it realizes a higher value in place of a lower one or a positive value in place of a negative value. On the other hand, an act is evil if it realizes a lower value in place of a higher value or a negative value in place of a positive value. For Scheler, values form a hierarchy. The lowest rank consists of sensory values: the pleasant and the unpleasant, technical values, and luxury values. Higher than sensory values are the vital values of the noble and the vulgar, pertaining to the well being of man. Higher than the vital and sensory values are the spiritual values: justice/injustice, truth and falsehood, and the aesthetic values of the beautiful and the ugly. Highest in the rank are the values of the holy and unholy.1

The moral issue of globalization cannot be discussed solely on the "back of the deed itself," without taking into consideration the consequences of it. Thus, the discourse ethics of Habermas is relevant. Habermas's ethics of discourse uses the Kantian criterion of universalizability on social issues. The principle of the universal states that for a contested norm to be valid and consented to, "all affected must accept the consequences and side effects of its general observance which can be anticipated for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to alternative possibilities for regulation.)."2 The morality of globalization cannot be isolated from its effects on peoples and societies. The universal and the particular, the global and the local, the one and the many, need to be kept in balance. Those effected by globalization somehow need to be consulted and give consent.

The Essence of Globalization

Globalization started first as a material or economic phenomenon that has become global. The economic order is none other than capitalism or free trade. That free trade is now being conducted globally, that is to say across national boundaries, is not new. The countries of Asia, Europe and the Americas have long been trading with each other for more than a century. What is new is that the world economy is heading towards a single, integrated free market.3 Markets are becoming "denationalized," that is to say, "national markets are increasingly mere subsets of a world-wide international or…transnational marketplace."4 This is true of goods and services, finance and capital, and labor. Many manufactured goods, for example, no longer originate in one country but are the composite products of an "elaborate international web of suppliers and assemblers."5 Capital can move freely across nations at the speed of electricity.

This global free trade has been made possible by the new electronic technology of information and telecommunication. The instantaneous, inexpensive communication and abundant information readily accessible through the internet and the mobile phones, plus the plentiful highly mobile investment funds, have removed the natural barriers to free trade and have made it global.6

Economic globalization, however, is not all of globalization. Marx's insight, reconstructed by Habermas, that the mode of production can never be isolated from social relations points to the influence of the material on the cultural, political and spiritual aspects of human existence. Global free trade demands that people change their working habits and lifestyles and retool themselves if they are not to fall behind. States must be prepared to liberalize their trade and investment policies, relinquishing part of their sovereignty to such international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).7 Globalization has so to say overcome the limitation of place, resulting in the homogenization of cultures, where the particular is universalized and the universal is particularized.8 Globalization consists in the "interpenetrating processes of socialization, individualization, the consolidation of the international system of societies, and the concretization of the sense of humankind."9 What is happening in globalization is what Paul Ricoeur calls "universal civilization".10

The essence of globalization can be summarized by Ricoeur's term. Universal civilization is first of all characterized by a scientific spirit, which "unifies mankind at a very abstract and purely rational level, and which, on that basis, endows, civilization with its universal character."11 The scientific spirit accounts for the second characteristic, the spread of technology. The accumulation of tools and their improvement, with the help of the scientific spirit that disseminates them, enable mankind to develop like a single artificial being, approaching in the process a certain cosmopolitanism, making the earth truly round. The third characteristic is rational politics, often meaning that states evolve from a dictatorial form to a democratic form of governance. The fourth factor is a rational economy; economic science and technology integrate and converge because of their cultivation by the human sciences, which are not limited by national boundaries. The last characteristic is perhaps the most obvious: a universal way of living manifested in standardized housing and clothing, transportation, news programming, comfort, leisure, a world-wide culture of consumption.12 All these factors contribute to make a universal civilization, the phenomenon that we now call globalization. In the words of Vaclav Havel, "we live now for the first time in human history – in a new era when our planet is enveloped by a single civilization."13

The Positive Values of Globalization

A universal civilization is a positive value in itself. A universal civilization is good because as Paul Ricoeur points out, it makes available the basic necessities of life to the greater masses of people. This is not only true for material needs such as food, clothing and shelter but also for non-material needs of human existence such as literacy and communication. Because of globalization, more people can now read and write, can relate and communicate with one another in greater speed than before. Even the necessity of work is given more access in the migration of workers to foreign countries, in increased trade and economic cooperation, and in the transfer of technology.

Not only is it a positive value in itself but it also brings out certain truths or values whose validity is universal.14 Foremost of these values is liberty. This is readily seen in the removal of barriers to free trade. With liberalization of the economy, everyone is free to do business with anyone else in the world. With the deregulation of domestic economy, markets are open to foreign competition, and the whole world becomes a marketplace. State-owned assets are privatized, giving them to private individuals and firms to manage unhampered by government bureaucracy. Companies can move from one country to another or can engage the services and materials of several countries in the different phases of production. Capitalists can bring their investments to anywhere they want with the click of a mouse at the computer. Indeed, globalization has proven that capitalist economy works better than socialist economy.

Global capitalism, however, works on the values of fairness and transparency, honesty and integrity. Investments will only flow to a country where the rules of competition are fair and transparent, where graft and corruption and cronyism are not prevalent. The Asian crisis of 1997 was not a failure of global capitalism but a failure of capitalism in the region to be truly global.15 Overall, the failure of most of the Asian countries affected by the crisis then can be traced to a breakdown in the fundamentals of economics. In general, there was a lack of confidence in government accounting; a corporate culture that did not value transparency and stockholder input; insider trading, nepotism, influence peddling, cronyism; and an overall lack of openness coupled with over-reliance on technocratic elites.16

On the socio-political level, together with freedom, globalization promotes the value of democracy and human rights.17 The free-market economy has given rise to the flourishing of civil society and the gradual erosion of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in many East and Southeast Asian countries.18 The flourishing of civil society is the necessary structural condition for the creation of democracy. Civil societies serve as the mediation between the government sector which can curtail individual human rights for the sake of the public good and the business sector which can promote individual interests at the expense of the common good. The autonomous formation of civil society is a testimony to the promotion of the value of democracy and human rights by globalization.

Another example of this promotion of democracy and human rights is the enhancement of the power of consumers and private citizens to influence corporate behavior.19 Because of the wide dissemination of information available on the internet, individuals and private groups can voice their criticism against poor quality products, graft and corruption (e.g.Transparency International), violence (e.g. 1997 Nobel Prize winner Jody Williams's campaign against land mines) and other human rights violations.

It may be objected, how can globalization be said to promote democracy when individual nations have to submit to the demands of regional or global free-trade agreements, thus surrendering their national sovereignty?20 Where is the will of the majority of the people when they have to be curtailed by international commitments and obligations to the world community? The answer to this objection lies in the notion of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy respects

the rights and liberties of individuals and its most important element is the rule of law. The presence of the rule of law makes a society free and stable, reducing if not eliminating bribes, kickbacks, and other forms of corruption. The more stable the global economic order becomes, the more long-term stable growth in all countries concerned is enhanced.21 And with global economic growth, the prospect for a global democracy is not far behind.

The democratization and liberalization of globalization brings about a cultural homogenization.22 Homogenization of cultures is a direct consequence of globalization.23 With homogenization, cultural differences are leveled off, resulting in increasing similarity in lifestyles, popularly expressed as "McDonaldization" or "Cocalization" of cultures.24 But is there a positive value to homogenization? I believe there is; it is one of civility. One can see this in the polite table manners, cleanliness of restrooms in McDonald eateries and no more spitting and throwing of garbage on the floor or street.25 On a deeper cultural level, civility means the avoidance of ethno-nationalism, ethnocentrism, ethnic rivalry, bigotry, racism, and the violence that results from them. Civility "is the necessary condition for 'spiritual civilization' (as the Chinese call it), as well as being, along with democracy, a necessary condition for genuine world peace," the "perpetual peace" that Kant once dreamt of in his notion of cosmopolitanism.26

Globalization helps promote global peace and solidarity. An example of this is the Philippines' people power revolution which was beamed live all over the world and inspired other peaceful transitions of power, such as the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the restoration of democratic rule in South Korea, the fall of Milosevic in Yugoslavia. When famine or a natural disaster strikes, globalization brings it to the attention of peoples all over the world, enabling countries and organizations to mobilize and fly in food, medicine and clothing to the affected country. In the cultural *milieu* globalization enriches human interaction and mutual understanding. In today's global-wired world, we are now able to see how all people live. The literature, music, arts of peoples and countries are now transmitted and picked up across borders, bringing a better understanding and appreciation of the human family. We now know that our aspirations do not greatly diverge: we hurt where others hurt, weep where others weep, rejoice where others rejoice, desire freedom where others desire freedom. Such a knowledge of our common humanity and such heightened interaction with other cultures help create greater global cooperation and peace.

The Negative Values of Globalization

In the economic sphere, the first negative effect of globalization is massive poverty. The intent of globalization to expand markets and increase production efficiencies with the minimum interference has resulted in billions of people, mostly in developing countries, being left behind. Globalization "has been a major factor in rendering increasing numbers of the world's people hungry, homeless, destitute, illiterate and powerless in all areas of their lives."27 About 22% of the world's population, or over 1.3 billion people, survive on less than one dollar a day, and around 1.6 billion live on $2 a day.28 Income inequalities have increased with the world's richest 20% sharing 85%, the powerful players being the transnational corporations (TNC) or multinational corporations (MNC). The top 300 TNCs of 40,000 TNCs account for about 25% of the world's assets.29 The Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), originally established as a mechanism for rebuilding the economies of the nations devastated by World War II, continue to exist to provide loans to developing countries already with huge debts30 but at the same time dictating their economic policy, often in the service of the TNCs.31 With the use of the new

telecommunication technology, capital can readily be transferred from developing countries, "speculation replacing investments, thus destabilizing developing countries, and disproportionately rewarding a select few who are already immensely wealthy."32 Globalization has only created extraordinary opportunities for a few and uncertainty for many.33

In developing countries, the gap between the new, urban, affluent class of entrepreneurs and those at the lowest income levels is increasingly growing. This gap, in turn, seriously threatens the middle class. "Global capitalism has created the *nouveaux riche* and the new destitute, overpaid executives and underpaid workers."34 The many who have suffered from globalization are laborers, peasants, women and children. Increasingly stiff competition in the global market has resulted in the proliferation of sweatshops, underpaid workers, inhuman working conditions, child labor, exploitation of women, forced prostitution, undervalued domestic labor, decline in the number of people working in agriculture, migration of labor, constant downsizing, and unemployment.

Poverty marginalizes and fragments people, societies, and nations. Poverty is immoral because it degrades their dignity and deprives them of their right to survive, of their right to life. The right to life is the source of all other rights. The *Human Development Report 2000* says, "A decent standard of living, adequate nutrition, health care, education, decent work and protection against calamities are not just development goals. They are also human rights." As globalization expands, many poor countries are being marginalized.

The neglect of human rights that globalization has spread also brings out the concomitant loss of freedom, democracy and social justice**.** In the first place, the new technologies are not free. Many countries have few libraries, computers, and telephones, depriving many people of access to knowledge and technological amenities. Furthermore, scientific research and application are increasingly privatized and commercialized.35 The domination of TNCs in the global economy has meant the loss of national sovereignty as well as the loss of freedom to do business for individuals and small firms. Many of these big firms are not only in the business of production but also of managing money on the international scale. Their decisions on the huge movements of short-term capital affect the living conditions of millions of people but are made by a few shareholders and speculators.36 Moreover, their decisions can influence, even dictate a nation's tax and environmental regulations. And when they are in trouble, they look for a bailout from their country of origin or country of investment, which they can count on getting because they are so large that they have become essential to the economic systems of those nations.37 To compete with them, smaller firms have to resort to mergers and/or cut the cost of production, and always the first sector to be sacrificed is labor.38 Labor standards and basic worker's rights are neglected for the sake of company advantage.39

At the societal level, globalization has created a market society. This is because global capitalism "feeds on values that permeate the mentality of people across the world, notably through mass media and advertising."40 A market society emerges "when the attitudes, norms and values attached to economic transactions and economic efficiency invade all domains of public life and permeate all social relations."41 Globalization in its move towards an integrated free market economy "submerges the richness of human values and diversity into the single dimension of economic value or just doing business for its own sake or for the sake of profit."42 A market society is characterized by a culture of materialism and consumerism, by the cult of money.43 Relationships, scientific research and technology, even time, are monetized and motivated by profit and power.44 Happiness is identified with the satisfaction of material needs, with self-gratification, and freedom is equated with individualism without responsibility.45 This

narcissistic hedonism has given rise to the growth of criminal activities, corruption, piracy of trade secrets, dishonesty, avoidance of taxes, get-rich-quick schemes like legalized gambling, and the decline of activities and organizations based on dedication and generosity.46 "The global economy unleashes all that is selfish about human nature without a global sensibility necessary for the well-being of humans and our natural environment."47

Globalization has brought destruction to our natural environment. Ironically, globalization, which should have made people aware of the oneness of nature, has mindlessly over-exploited the earth's common resources: the minerals, farmlands, petroleum, trees, the air we breathe and the water we drink. With what will the next generation have to contend? The culture of wasteful consumerism has brought problems of garbage disposal and pollution, to such an extent that countries have resorted to exporting their garbage to developing countries in need of dumping fees.

In the cultural sphere, global homogenization has resulted in the dismantling of social diversity and pluralism of cultures. Just as bio-diversity is essential for the survival of life in the planet, social diversity and pluralism are critical elements in the survival of vibrant societies and communities of human beings.48 Globalization in its drive for economic efficiency homogenizes cultures through the power of mass media to create mass markets for products of mass production, destroying social diversity in art, music, education, health-care, economic development, agriculture, textile, pottery, etc.49 The standardization of life styles undermines the culture's self-reliance and identity50 and weakens the sources of connection and means of participation of a distinctive culture in the global community.51 This crisis of cultural identity is accompanied by the subtle destruction of tradition52 and the domination of a centralized culture.53

But more important than the loss of a particular tradition is what Paul Ricoeur calls the gradual destruction of the "creative nucleus of great civilizations and great cultures."54 This nucleus is the "basis on which we interpret life…the ethical and mythical nucleus of mankind."55 Without this creative nucleus, we remain on the cultural level of mediocrity even while we surf the web to know of other cultures, or worse, become intolerant of other cultures. Without this nucleus, we can lose our critical mindedness and become passive consumers of the mass media and public opinion polls. Democracy thus becomes a sham, lacking substance.56 Without this creative nucleus, we can lose our connection to the transcendent Being, our spirituality.

Towards a Moral Rectification of Globalization

Our consideration of the negative values wrought by globalization brings us to the question of what ought to be done to correct or prevent these negative effects. I propose to outline some measures based on the role of the various actors in the globalization process: the business/economic sector, the cultural community, civil society, government and international organizations, and the individual person.

The Business/Economy

The biggest challenge facing global capitalists is to work out another form of capitalism other than the two extremes of state-directed capitalism and laissez-faire capitalism: responsible capitalism.57 A responsible capitalism is "a capitalism that is responsible for promoting the well-being, both economic and political, of all, of society' as a whole."58 In such a capitalism, "the good of society and the good of individuals are inseparable and mutually reinforcing…to bring about genuine solidarity, based on an ethic of mutual recognition of rights."59 Concretely,

corporations must not be just concerned with making profit but also consider the long-term interests of consumers, workers, stakeholders, the wider community and the environment.60

Another alternative to both Marxist socialism and free market capitalism is the economics of community. The community is a natural economic unit.61 In the economics of community, localism is emphasized. "Localism is the urge of individuals and groups for a concrete and physically and psychologically limited expression of their interests, emotions, and aspirations."62 In economics of community, economic power is decentralized, distributed and rooted in the local community.63 Spirituality and the community, and not money, define the dominant ties in such an economics. Long-term and communal returns are more important than short-term returns for individual investors. There is a priority on the ecological resources of the community.64 Management practices, including accounting, follow the principle of subsidiarity.65 In such a non-monetary economy, wealth is stored in things that have intrinsic value, e.g. human relationships, wisdom, productive land, animals, etc.66

In both responsible capitalism and the economics of community as well as in private enterprise, business ethics is imperative. Business transactions must be governed by the ethical principles of the common good, human rights, justice and fairness, virtue ethics and the ethics of care. The commitment to the value of equity is central to alleviate poverty and to establish a sustainable relationship between the human economy and the natural ecology.67 Concretely, this means the establishment of businesses that generate employment and produce essential goods for society's marginated populations, and promote democratization and economic justice in terms of protecting worker's rights and welfare.68

Culture and Society

Next perhaps to the problem of poverty and the neglect of human rights effected by globalization is the problem of homogenization of cultures which often give rise to uniformity of lifestyles or counter movements such as non-western religious fundamentalisms.69 The upsurge of religious fundamentalist movements is perhaps related to the increased search for the "fundamentals" such as tradition, identity, home, in a changing global context.70 Cultural identity and diversity need to be preserved because "culture structures and orders everyday life…imbues personal experience with meaning and significance."71 By culture is meant the complex of values and evaluations emerging in the concrete attitude towards everyday life: e.g. tradition, change, fellow-citizens, foreigners, and technology.72 Culture is expressed superficially in the habitual customs and factual morality of a society, less superficially in the traditional institutions, and deeply in the symbols and images making up the basic ideals of a nation, the cultural resources of a nation.73 It is in culture that we find the civilizing and humanizing values of hard work, self-reliance, filial piety, respect for life and nature, thrift, prudence, honesty and integrity, values which exist in all cultures and have stood the test of time.74 It is in culture that "religious traditions offer indispensable 'ethical resources' for the provision of common goods that transcend the single human being,"75 and provide the spiritual conviction and motivation for people to promote peace, development and democracy.76

How does one preserve cultural identity and diversity in the homogenizing tendency of globalization and in the encounter of cultures found along the information highway? The problem is crucial for Asian cultures known for their central values of spirituality, community, bonding to place or habitat, harmony – values that are under siege by globalization. How does a culture persist in the technological changes of history?

The obvious answer to the first question is clearly that of taking genuine pride and possession of one's culture but imbued with the spirit of tolerance of other cultures. This begins in the family and extends to the school and the community. Learning, whether at home or at school or in the work place, is not only learning a trade but also learning human values embodied in one's culture, literature and art. One example of this for Asian cultures under the pressure of global modernization, concerns the need to preserve their architectural heritage: the Angkor Wat of Cambodia, Indonesia's Borobudur, the Golden Pavilion of Kyoto, Manila's Jai Alai Building, and many others. History and tradition are embodied in these structures.

Moreover, the value of tolerance is important in the encounter with other cultures. Tolerance begins at home, when siblings are different from one another yet learn to accept one another. But genuine tolerance is not simply a passive acceptance of a different culture but a celebration of that difference which gives it the right to participate in human development. This is feasible through good communication, sensitive translation, and the transformation of the information highway into a two-way street.77

Nonetheless, how does a culture persist? The response to that question calls for a critique of tradition, as emphasized by Habermas in opposition to Gadamer, as well as a critique of the creative cultural nucleus proposed by Paul Ricoeur. The critique of tradition is necessary because tradition can be a source of domination and dogmatism. At the same time, a "cultural tradition stays alive only if it constantly creates itself anew."78 This creativity calls for orienting the population at large "with a scientific orientation and technical know-how, even as it nurtures their grounding in ethical values which have sustained ancient cultures and advanced civilization through millenia."79 "Only a culture capable of assimilating scientific rationality will be able to survive and revive…only a faith which integrates a desacralization of nature and brings the sacred back to man can take up the technical exploitation of nature."80 This means, concretely, that the use of technology to preserve and document one's oral tradition is necessary, "not just in order to repeat the past but to take root in it in order to invent."81

Civil Society

Civil society plays an active role in the promotion of democracy, protection of human rights, and service to the common good. As against the uniform, homogenous strategies of globalization to diverse conditions, civil society ensures a more tailored response to particular needs and situations.82 As the interface between the state and the economic/business sector, civil society provides space for dissent to the domination of the state and/or the large corporations, and includes but is not limited to environmentalists, labor unions, consumer watchdogs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs). They are able to provide critique and pressure on national governments, corporations, and international organizations and work for reform focused on the people's welfare and basic needs rather than policies favoring international capital.83 As long as they embrace the values and norms expressing social concerns and seek solutions, they embody democracy from below, drawing their mandate from local communities.84

Globalization has made possible the growth of civil society and has increased its global reach through networking and alliances. Nevertheless, the danger for civil society groups lies in the potential to be engulfed being in the abstract developmentalism of capitalist modernity that ignores human rights. As the political conscience of society, civil society must guard its separate identity and autonomy, avoid assuming direct governmental responsibility while maintaining its critical cooperation with government and business corporations.85

Positively, civil society needs to take the posture of advocate for the "local".86 Locally-grounded consciousness is the radical other of globalism. The politics of place critiques and offers space for new kinds of activity that reaffirm the priorities of everyday life. Place advocacy is grounded in a locality but boundaries are flexible and porous, and do not exclude the "extra-local".87 Place advocacy by civil society organizations "must insist both on openness of places to the outside world, and the need to transform places to resolve questions of inequality that are internal to them. On the other hand, essential to place consciousness is recognition of the diversity of places (especially but not restricted to urban versus rural places), which requires local solutions to place problems, rather than imposition of an abstract blueprint."88 Some examples of place advocacy by civil society are indigenous, ecological and social movements, urban neighborhood movements, elitist communitarian groups, and organizations of displaced farmers.

Government and International Agencies

The task of government and international agencies in globalization should be to alleviate poverty and reduce the gap between the rich and poor countries. This can be done directly by increasing overseas development aid. Indirectly, competition should be tamed and markets regulated. One concrete proposal is to revive the proposed "Tobin Tax" on international currency transactions to discourage short-term speculation and introduce some stability to financial markets.89 Another proposal is to cut arms spending and recycle foreign exchange reserves within a region so that poor countries can benefit from lowering high interest rates.90 Certainly, nations can find new ways of cooperating with each other to fight poverty instead of cutting each other's economic throats.

Together with the challenge of fighting poverty is the promotion of global democracy. By democracy is meant the real "material" democracy in contrast to the formal one. Real democracy includes the individual freedom of economic initiative and the provision of economic opportunities to a maximum number of people. No real democracy exists in a country with widespread misery and excessive inequalities in income and wealth distribution.91 The democratic nature of the market economy has to be protected and restored through regulations and incentives.92 To promote democracy, it is imperative to promote economic and social justice at all levels of the world economy. 93 The challenge of governments and international organizations is to balance regulation and free initiative with the need to protect the resources of the world.94

Promoting global democracy includes promoting the large variety of institutions and cultures.95 Globalization ought not to reduce the world to a small homogenous village. Local cultures and cultural diversity add to the richness of the world and they should be protected and joyfully accepted in the globalization process, allowing for multiple "modernities" and alternative visions of modernization and democratization.96

To undertake this twofold challenge of alieviating poverty and promoting democracy, institutions with global responsibility need to be created and strengthened. For the global economy, they include the IMF, World Bank and the Bank of International Settlements; for the environment, the UN Conference on Environment and Development; and for international law, the International Criminal Court.97 Stronger links should also be established between and among regional entities like the European Union and the ASEAN.98

For the state, promoting social justice means creating the conditions and framework for as many people to contribute meaningfully to economic activity and for equitable distribution of income and wealth. The technological innovations of globalization should not lead to massive

unemployment and the disappearance of small enterprises and independent professions.99 Promoting democracy means treating individuals or citizens as equal in terms of political participation, respecting their dignity irrespective of wealth, status, knowledge and power.100 Institutional arrangements are needed to carry out this democratic ideal, by making government officials transparent and accountable, allowing freedom of expression and association of citizens, ensuring respect for the rule of law, respecting rights of minorities, and nurturing traditions and multiple forms of life.101 And for Asian cultures, the state must safeguard the value of the family.102

The Individual Person

At the outset it may asked, what can one individual person do to rectify the negative effects of globalization? One answer to this question lies in Max Scheler's notion of the person. For Scheler, every person as a moral subject is a "person acting with others, as a man with others."103 Every finite person is both an individual person and a collective person.104 Also, "globalization…is not only or even primarily about economic interdependence but about the transformation of time and space in our lives. Distant events, whether economic or not, affect us more directly and immediately than ever before. Conversely, decisions we take as individuals are often global in their implications."105 Thus, paraphrasing Scheler with Giddens notion of globalization, every person is also a global person.

Rectification begins with the self. The first challenge to the global person is to live simply, so as to slow down the expanding spiral of wasteful, luxurious living and social/global competition.106 One positive sign of increased awareness of the need for more simple living is a growing sense of volunteerism on the part of youth. "Live simply so others can simply live" is the motto of the Jesuit Volunteer Corps. If living simply "produces surplus income…let it be given to those for whom the necessities of life are still luxuries beyond their reach."107

Secondly, the individual person must "draw no profit whatever from clearly unjust sources," and "diminish progressively our share in the benefits of an economic and social system in which the rewards of production accrue to those already rich, while the cost of production lies heavily on the poor."108

These two suggestions were made by Fr. Pedro Arrupe, S.J. to a gathering of Jesuit alumni from Europe in 1973. In the context of the current discussion on globalization, I would add a third suggestion – "a healthy balance of cultural rootedness and cosmopolitan outlook." Cultural rootedness means becoming life-centered. It does not mean rejecting modern technology or returning to pre-modern living but restoring the social, spiritual and economic connections of the individual to nature, place, and community that global development has disrupted.109 A cosmopolitan outlook, on the other hand, is necessary for survival in the global order. A cosmopolitan outlook opens up to a planet-wide mental and emotional horizon. It means internalizing universal values, especially human rights and fundamental freedoms, having a sense of active solidarity with the achievements or problems and suffering of people of different regions and cultures, and believing in the common heritage and common good of humankind.110 The challenge of the individual person in globalization is to strike this "healthy balance between preserving a sense of identity, home and community and doing what it takes to survive within the globalization system."111

Conclusion

Where do all these proposals for rectifying globalization lead us? I would suggest that they lead us back to Scheler's notion of true solidarity. Genuine solidarity is the "unity of independent, spiritual, and individual single persons 'in' an independent, spiritual, and collective person."112 (One could readily substitute 'global' for 'collective'.) In genuine solidarity, every finite person is at the same time a member of the global person. In genuine solidarity, everyone is responsible for oneself and for the other, and everyone is ultimately responsible to God. Essentially, what makes solidarity possible is the mutual reciprocity and reciprocal value of all moral and social acts, especially love. It is love that builds solidarity, for my love for the other increases my capacity to love all others, and the other's response of love effects not only the value of self but of all others.113 Needless to say, love presupposes justice, and genuine justice leads to love. In solidarity, globalization assumes a human face.

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110 1998 Copenhagen Seminar for Social Progress Report, p. 104.
111 Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), p. 42.
112 Max Scheler, op. cit., p. 246.
113 Ibid., p. 250.

Chapter XI
Discourse Ethics and Issues of Intercultural Dialogue

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Introduction

In this paper I shall present a viewpoint, drawing on Habermas and Apel, of a possible discourse-ethics interpretation of the dialogue between different cultural communities. I shall try to expose certain limitations of the applicability of this metaethical theory to intercultural matters, and elaborate on the implications of those limitations.

However, let me begin by clarifying what I mean by "intercultural dialogue." Most generally, intercultural dialogue is an interaction among representatives of different cultures,1 which is oriented towards understanding, and ultimately, if necessary, harmonizing cultural differences. This is by no means the only possible constructive relationship between cultural communities. A liberal point of view minimizes cultural differences in such an interactions. When representatives of different cultures live together, they should approach each other as individuals with common basic rights and civil responsibilities. The cultural differences among them should not matter in their relationships. They can "consume" their culture in their private lives, and with other individuals, who share their traditions and values. The manifestations of a particular way of life are not afforded public social space.2

The dialogical relationship between cultures is not self evident. From a liberal point of view it is indeed problematic. Also, it is important not to identify as intercultural dialogue ordinary interactions between cultural communities, which involve elements of negotiation, i.e. bargaining-like adjustment of positions.3 It is in this respect that discourse-ethics methodology can be most helpful – to outline the "differentia specifica" of intercultural dialogue, and set the standards for its effective realization.

Criteria/Norms for Intercultural Dialogue

If we consider intercultural dialogue as a kind of "practical discourse" within a "communication community", then it should correspond ideally to the following criteria:

1. Concern for the norms of interaction among the parties in the dialogue, i.e. not one or another concrete, particular issue. Once norms are agreed upon (which in reality can never be a final result, the norms are always open for revision), the concrete issues can be resolved based on them. The norms must be agreed upon and considered as legitimate by the parties involved, i.e. as morally binding for them.
2. Be "communicative action", i.e. not oriented towards egoistic benefit for one actor, but towards mutual understanding among the parties in the dialogue.
3. Be dialogical in the sense that each of the participating parties represents its own position, i.e. no one decides what is in the other's best interest, or what is not – even with the best intentions.
4. The positions of the parties in the dialogue are self-reflective, i.e. each of the parties is sufficiently aware of what it needs. A norm cannot be considered legitimate, if its acceptance by all the parties in the community is due to self-deception or naiveté of one or more of the parties.

5. Norms cannot be legitimate, if they are agreed upon against the interests of individuals or groups, which do not take part in the actual discourse, but are affected by these norms.

6. The agreement about norms is achieved in a rational way, via rational discourse, which follows certain rules:

- None of the speakers may contradict himself. 4
- Any speaker ascribing predicate A to subject B must be ready to apply A to all other subjects resembling B in all relevant cases.
- The different speakers may not use one and the same expression with different meanings.
- The speaker must assert only what he really believes.
- Any actor who wants to discuss a matter, which is not on the agenda, must justify his request.
- Any interested subject capable of speaking and acting must be allowed to join the discourse.
- Anyone may question any assertion.
- Anyone may express his attitudes, desires and needs (cf. Habermas's comment on the list of conditions for valid argumentation, compiled by R. Alexy – Habermas 1991).

As can be seen, in order to place the interaction between or among cultural communities on a morally legitimate basis, i.e. on the basis of norms, which are considered by the parties as morally binding for them, intercultural dialogue should – at least from the point of view of discourse ethics – meet a complex set of requirements. In other words, not every episode of constructive interaction between cultural entities should be considered an instance of intercultural dialogue. In some cases mutual interests of some communities coincide due to historically contingent circumstances. The positive relations between them, which might involve mutual appraisal, intensive contacts, elements of acculturation, etc. cannot be considered to be intercultural dialogue (although they can be a positive condition for such a dialogue), because a change in the circumstances can bring about a quick and radical deterioration of these relations. A clear example for such a development can be seen in the so-called "brotherly" relations among cultures in the former federal socialist states, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Another possible "pseudo-dialogue" is the rather stable positive relationship, which can be established at the expense of the interests of a third party. Such cases can be found in countries with more than one ethnic and/or religious minority. In some countries a minority group may be in a privileged relationship with the majority group (and usually therefore in with the government), but often, at the expense of the other minorities. In other cases two or more minorities might form an alliance against the majority. Although such relationships may enjoy genuine support among the members of the communities involved, they contain an antagonistic element vis a vis other groups with considerable conflict potential. A third kind of positive intercultural relationship, which cannot be considered legitimate, and therefore as a stable basis of intercultural harmony, are ones, which are confined to the level of relations among the elites. Such are, for example, the instances of "consociational democracy" (to use the term of A. Lijphart – Lijphart 1977 : 25), where political alliances among ethnic and/or religious communities usually are also "projected" to the level of cultural interactions. However, this does not necessarily involve widely and rationally accepted agreement among the groups involved.

In sum, this is the picture, we get, when we interpret intercultural dialogue as an instance of practical discourse within a communication community. It should be noted that all the standards for such a discourse, formulated within discourse ethics, are counterfactual. They are an answer to the question: "under what conditions can universal ethical norms be legitimate". 5 A second

question, quite naturally follows – "is there at least one norm, which meets all these requirements". Such a question most probably should get a negative answer. It is difficult to imagine that somewhere on earth, in a real community such a practical discourse has taken place, and one or more norms have been agreed upon according to the rules of practical discourse. But, in spite of the difficulty in imagining that, the standards of practical discourse are not meaningless, because they can serve as regulative principles – as an ideal for grounding of such moral norms, which can aspire to legitimacy. More concretely, the claim can be made that if a process of regulating social interactions in a given case, could have any chance of reaching a lasting result, based on genuinely moral grounds, every effort should be made that such a regulation follows the standards of practical discourse.

Communicative Action vs. Strategic Action

The connection between discourse ethics and real social life is quite problematic with regard to some of its basic postulates – especially that the participation in practical discourse must be a kind of communicative action. The very definition of communicative action contrasts sharply with strategic action. The former is oriented towards understanding, and the latter – towards accommodation and success in a strictly egoistic sense (i.e. establishing a harmonious relationship with the Other cannot be regarded as a "success" in the meaning, used by Habermas in the "Theory of Communicative Action" and "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action"). More precisely, Habermas sees communicative action where "actors are prepared to harmonize their plans of action through internal means, committing themselves to pursuing their goals only on the condition of an agreement… about definitions of the situation and prospective outcomes" (Habermas 1990 : 134).

The problem here comes from the obvious presence of strategic action in practically all real life situations, including all kinds of social regulation. The self-interest of the participants in these interactions plays an important role. Put simply, we do not have two kinds of social processes – one in which the actors play selfishly, against each other, and another, in which they play with absolute fairness.

It is not only certain imperfections in the processing of the norms of interaction which make real social process different from the discourse in an ideal communication community. Thus, how can we expect actors, who act strategically, to follow the regulative principles of communicative action? This contradiction has been pointed out by K-O. Apel, who, in the context of differentiating between "level A" and "level B" of discourse ethics,6 has questioned the sharp distinction between strategic and communicative action, drawn by Habermas.

I shall return to this distinction, but before that I would like to consider another difficulty in applying discourse ethics to real social life, which is more directly related to the task of structuring intercultural dialogue according to the principles of this metaethical theory. As can be seen from the criteria for legitimacy of moral norms, listed above, the participation in practical discourse is possible only if the actor distances himself self-reflectively from his own interests. Otherwise his behavior would not be a kind of communicative action. Practical discourse would not meet the standards of the ideal communication community even if only one of the parties involved insisted that all the others adjust their positions to its interests, while offering no compromise in return. In such a situation no norm could be agreed upon by participants in the discourse, let alone by all affected individuals or groups. The discourse would simply be blocked by the selfish position of one party.

In order to prevent such developments, the so called "principle of universalization" has been formulated, according to which a participant in the communication community presents and defends only such valid claims, which are acceptable for all the other participants. This means both that an anticipation of the others'interests should be among the factors determining the formulation of his initial proposal, and also that he should be ready to reformulate his claim if it meets additional objections from the side of one or more of the other participants. In other words, the position of the participant, based on the norms discussed, should represent his own interest but within certain limits – that the finally accepted norms should correspond to his interest but not at the expense of the others' interests.

Actually this limitation is analogous to the well-known "golden rule" of liberal ethics and with Kant's categorical imperative. The novel, discourse-ethics element is that the answer to the question, whether a given norm would not hurt one's interests more than the interests of the others, is sought within an actual discussion, in which the positions of all the parties, affected by the norm, can be presented by the parties themselves. Whereas, according to the transcendental-liberal methodology, the answer to this question is a matter of monological anticipation by each of the parties. 7 The resulting difference is that the liberal position is much more restrictive with regard to the public acknowledgement of the contingent content of the parties' interests. Let us imagine that we have to formulate a norm, which can function as a legitimate instrument of regulating the relations within a circle of actors, without prior knowledge about the concrete content of the interests of each of them. In such a case this norm would restrict as much as possible the realization of the particular elements of these interests, in order to minimize the risk that in some situations one set of interests would dominate. In other words, the balance of the interests of the actors, which the norm – in order to be recognized as legitimate – should guarantee, is achieved by a minimizing particular interests. In reality, this is expressed by the priority of the Right over the Good, which is emblematic for the liberal social methodology.

If, however, the formulation of the same norm is formulated with some mitigation of the actors' particular interests, it might prove less restrictive in its public manifestation. Moreover, if in actual discussion a particular given element of these interests is incompatible with other elements, and its inclusion would cause conflict, participants in the discussion whose interests would be hurt, can state what is acceptable and what is not. As a result the conflicts of interests are clearly identified and the number of imagined conflict zones reduced. And therefore the norm, which helps to eliminate the conditions for conflict can be much less restrictive concerning contingent, non-essential elements of the parties' interests.

As mentioned earlier, this difference between liberal and discourse-ethics approaches concerning the right of public manifestation and implementation of the actors' particular interests is very important for intercultural relations. If the priority of Right over Good is accepted, this would justify the limitation of manifestations of cultural specificity to private life only. If the contradiction between Right and Good is resolved within the communication community, the result would be a balanced public realization of cultural specificities. According to Apel, discourse ethics

…leaves free space for a plurality of individual and collective projects of the good life or of self-realization…At the same time, though, the postulated procedure of solving all deontological questions of morality through practical discourse of all affected people (or their advocates, if necessary) indeed imposes constraints upon all maximalistic positions. For if it comes to the question of inter-personal or inter-cultural justice…, all maximalistic positions have to subject

their interests of self-realization to the discursive test, concerning their compatibility with the interests of all the other maximalistic positions…(Apel 2000 : 149)

It remains, however, to answer the question: what are the benefits for a real social actor of a communication-community-like discourse pattern, for the realization of his interests, and not the ordinary strategic approach of trying to get the best results for himself at the expense of others.8It can be argued that such a benefit is the legitimacy of the norms, which are agreed upon in a consensual manner within the communication community. They have greater binding force for all the parties involved, than the contingent demands, which usually guide the behavior of individuals and groups. In the sphere of intercultural relations such legitimate norms are clearly superior over the empirically given ethos-forms, which can be considered by the external observers as "conventional facts from which no binding norms and hence no moral commitments can be derived." (Apel 2000 : 141)

Actually, the sophisticated methodology of discourse ethics offers a solution to the dilemma, which bothers a lot of thinkers in our postmodern times: if we admit that, what once seemed to be self evident universal moral norms, turned out to be nothing more than the contingent ethos of the Western culture – one among the many world cultures – then what can save us from ethical relativism? How can we identify morally binding norms, about which we can be confident that they will be kept by anybody, including people from cultures that are distant from ours? Without such a stable basis for the relations among cultural communities, there is little chance of overcoming ethnocentrism, discrimination, the applying of double moral standards to "us" and to "them".

Moreover, this solution to the dilemma has another advantage in comparison with standard liberalism: the commitment to a moral norm, which has been agreed upon within the communication community, does not presuppose a radically hypothetical attitude towards one's own cultural tradition. As it was already mentioned, discourse-ethical universalism, unlike its liberal counterpart, is much less restrictive towards the realization of particular interests in public social space. In a very real sense, it allows one to be at home in one's own culture but open to others.

However, in order to place the harmonization of cultural differences on a legitimate basis, each of the parties in the discourse should abstain from promoting its interests in a maximalistic way. In the terminology of discourse ethics, it should keep to the "principle of universalization". In other words, it should be ready to make compromises with its own interests for the sake of achieving stable positive relations with other parties. In that sense discourse universalism guards against radical violations against all interests. But even if there is no doubt concerning the legitimacy of the norms, accepted in a consensual way within the communication community,9 we stumble upon another problematic issue. How can the reciprocity of the compromises within the community be achieved? How can we measure which party sacrifices how much for the sake of the harmonization of interests?

This is precisely the novel element in discourse ethics – the right of everyone to represent their own interests in a practical discourse, but also a source of insecurity. There is no "objective" third party, by which to evaluate impartially the relation between the needs and interests of participants in the community on the one hand, and their claims concerning the discussed norm, on the other. How do we apply and balance interests and norms?

Applying Norms: Limitations, Interpretations and Problems

It is true that a basic motivation for participation in the community, as was discussed above, presupposes relationships among parties on the basis of morally binding norms. However, if we are interested in the regulative effect of the discourse-ethics standards on the real interactions between cultural communities, we need to include the possibility that an actor might try to benefit from the consensus in the communication community by deliberately misinterpreting his needs and interests; to be blunt, by "bluffing".

It is worth noting, that all the conditions for the legitimacy of the norms, resulting from the practical discourse in a communicative community, are empirically identifiable, with one exception – the communicative attitude of the participants. Everything else, whether the participant may express freely his claims, whether the discourse is open to all relevant suggestions (no one may be excluded without justification), whether the arguments of the participants correspond to the criteria, listed above (note the quotation from Habermas's *Erlaeuterungen zur Diskursethik*above), can be empirically checked. The only condition, about which we can merely guess, is whether the moral attitude of the participant is genuine. In other words – whether the speaker asserts only what he really believes. The truthfulness of statements, concerning one's own cultural needs is not something that is verifiable.

The position of each party in the practical discourse can, indeed, be questioned by the other parties. Positions need to be supported by convincing arguments. But the basic element in this argument is the interpretation, which the party gives to its needs and interests. If the discourse takes place in a democratic country with established social relations, where the participants in the discourse know each other's problems, the parties are so-to-speak "transparent" to each other. Nonetheless, the self-interpretation of one's interests can also become a matter of argumentative discussion. Such is often the case, for example, in the debates concerning labor legislation, e.g. minimum wage, retirement age, and health insurance. Likewise, the discussion about affirmative action, or women's and gay rights have become more complex and contentious.

Transparency cannot be assured. If practical discourse is to take place in the sphere of intercultural relations, the interests of each party will not, necessarily be "transparent" to others. Such a discourse would be a meeting of different worldviews, different value systems, different codes for deciphering meanings. If one of the actors insists that a norm must be accepted, which gives him a privileged position in some respect, substantiating his claim by referring to a specific cultural need, how can the others know whether he is speaking the truth? If the others do not share this particular need, or if it is not a priority, they cannot argue against the claim, because such is the "nature" of culture – what is important for me might not be important for you, and vice-versa. Apel admits that in real discussions, in a communication-community-like pattern, the element of mutual distrust, posturing and strategic attitudes, are usually present. Even if one has the best intentions, one cannot accept automatically every claim of the other. There is no come-back argument.

One cannot give up a strategic attitude totally, because, at a minimum, one cannot be sure that the others have already given up their's. This is not because they are bad guys, but rather reflects the lack of transparency in intercultural relations, a kind of given on all sides. (Cf. Apel 1988 : 146)

Apel gives an example for such a vicious circle – I cannot disarm myself unilaterally, because I do not know whether you will disarm. Thus, I take into account the possibility that you suspect that I will not do it. This is at the core of strategic disarmament negotiations. However, in order to be nearer to the problems of intercultural relations, I will return to the examples of affirmative action, women's and gay rights. How can anyone rationally object to a claim for privileges for

racial minorities, which have been discriminated against in the past? How can someone, who does not belong to such a group, know what psychological damage members of such a minority have suffered. How might one formulate a rational position, concerning the means by which these damages can be repaired? Are there other choices except to believe the victims' claims? One cannot put oneself in their place. The same logic is valid also for the issue of sexual harassment. How can a man object, if a woman claims that she feels deeply hurt by a man's action. The man simply cannot know what she feels about that action as a woman.

J. Habermas offers an interesting reaction to this kind of problem. He proposes that the two types of questions are too different to be analyzed together. For the so-called "ethical-existential questions", i.e. questions about the good life for an individual or a group, it is necessary that they are discussed in the context of shared cultural traditions and values. These are questions of self-clarification of the type, "who are we" and "who would we like to be" (Habermas 1993 : 151). The self-assessment of needs belongs to these kinds of questions.

However, questions, concerning the maximization of the satisfaction of needs and interests of all persons affected are of an entirely different sort. These are moral questions, which deal with working out rational and just regulations, which are equally compatible with the needs and interests of all the participants in the communicative community. The discussion of such moral questions presupposes a communicative attitude, i.e. a "selfless empathy" in the relations among the participants (Habermas 1993 : 154), which means that it is not at all necessary to justify one's claims by revealing one's needs in the light of shared values. A matter of discussion here is how to include all needs and interests of the participants in the discourse in an optimal regulatory framework, which does not leave out anyone. In other words, the claims of the participants for recognition of their cultural needs and interests are to be taken at face value. It is quite obvious, however, that these considerations are relevant to the presentation of the discourse in the communicative community only as an ideal, and not as a regulative factor negotiating norms.

Hermeneutic of Norms: Real and Ideal

It seems justified in this situation to refer to another "instrument" for finding out whether the participant's interpretation of his cultural needs and interests is an adequate one – the hermeneutical (in a broad meaning) understanding of cultural otherness. Methodologies of such understanding are developed at different levels – philosophical, socio-psychological, anthropological, linguistic, etc. However, they presuppose a mutual will for understanding. They do not provide instruments for a unilateral understanding of cultural otherness – analogical to the methods of researching inanimate objects. And if we are dealing with a deliberate mystification of cultural difference by someone, who wants to use the difference as an instrument to manipulate the good will of the other parties in a communication community, cultural understanding cannot be a solution. Even if a general "transparency" of cultural specificity is achieved, it will always be relative, inconclusive, and potentially manipulative.

Besides, the methods of intercultural understanding, both on philosophical level (hermeneutics proper), and on the level of intercultural communication, involve the cultural traits as regulators in the behavior of group (community) members: customs, norms, values, etc. However, many of the claims for identity recognition are based on culture and ensue from the concrete history of the identity in question. Sensitivity to certain issues – importance of certain symbols, special attitudes towards one or another ethnic group or religion – these and many other idiosyncratic traits are not a matter of principle, but nevertheless may be relevant to a community's

cultural needs. Another factor, that is important in this respect, are inter-group relations, which often bring about differences in the cultural needs and interests of communities, belonging to the same culture. Intercultural understanding alone, and especially, in its present form, is not an adequate conceptual basis for understanding the influence of historical and contemporary circumstances on cultural identities.

If we return to the issue of motivation for *bona fide* participation in a communication-community-like pattern of social interaction, we shall again have to consider the issue of the difference between strategic and communicative action. As was already mentioned, K.-O. Apel questions the opposition between these two types of action by Habermas. He does this in connection with introducing a "B-level" of discourse ethics, i.e. a level of metaethical theory, which is applied to real social life. Apel writes about the necessity to seek ways of mediating between "Zweckrationalitaet"10 and "konsensual-kommunikative rationalitaet" as between two ideal-type modes of the actor's orientation. Actually, he does not argue against this differentiation in principle, but points out the necessity to mediate between the extremes (Cf. Apel 1988:147).

However, we cannot find in this text of Apel (in the collection *Diskurs und Verantwortung*) a clarification of the concrete ways to mediate between strategic and communicative action. It seems rather that he is recommending that the opposition between these types of action not be exaggerated. This is necessary in order to justify the possible relationship between real-life situations of discussing norms of behavior on the one hand, and the ideal of practical discourse within a communication community, on the other; between social reality and a regulative principle. Such a relationship would involve strategic action with follow-up as the ideal standard of communicative action. But that would only be possible – if the real and the ideal – the action and the principle – are not contradictory.

In such a simple form the solution to the problem – how to provide motivation for genuine participation in a communication-community-like pattern of social interaction – does not seem satisfactory. Even if strategic attitudes are not opposed to communicative attitudes, and even if the prospects of achieving a harmonization of differences among the parties in a real social interaction rests on legitimate moral basis, we cannot rule out that this development could be blocked by one party's attempt to shift legitimate norms of cooperation in a direction to their own benefit. In the field of intercultural relations the tools of such a manipulation are readily available and readily applied. As I have indicated, such happenings are best characterized as a lack of transparency.

It seems that the difficulty here comes from the great "distance" between the ideal and the real, i.e. between the realm of the "ought" and the realm of the "is". The prospect of benefiting from genuinely fair cooperation – when the communicative ideal is realized – is too far away, and the prospect of profiting directly from misusing the communicative benevolence of some of the partners in a communicative-community-like pattern of interaction is too near. As the examples cited with the racial and gender differences have shown, the temptation to act strategically in response to the other's communicative attitude is too great. If there is not a more immediate risk of punishment for "cheating", and a more immediate positive stimulus for keeping to the standards of communicative action, the prospects that real-life interactions will evolve smoothly towards the communication community ideal are greatly diminished.

Creative Cooperation

If we agree with Apel that what is necessary to provide the motivation in question is a mediating link between strategic and communicative attitudes, between "is" and "ought", we can

seek more carefully among the forms of real-life cooperation. Such is the approach of J. Bohman, athough in a somewhat different context. In his book, *Public Deliberation,* he complements the procedural theory of deliberative democracy (which to a great extent uses discourse-ethics methodology) with an interpretation of public deliberation as a "joint social activity" (Bohman 2000 : 32). This makes it possible to replace the maximalistic requirement that all can agree with the outcome of deliberation by the more realistic one, that "… agents are sufficiently convinced to continue their ongoing cooperation" (Bohman 2000 : 33). Here we can see the possibility of additional motivation, which can complement the general good will to interact with the others in a communicative manner. This can be the value of cooperation with regard to the strategic interest of participants.

Discussing the capacity of cooperation to synthesize elements of strategic and communicative action, I shall refer further to an idea, formulated in a small publication by A. Andonov (1998). There he draws a distinction between two types of cooperation. We can cooperate with the other by treating him as our resource (this relation can, but need not be reciprocal – for the purpose of our analysis this difference is not relevant). In this way we utilize what he already possesses, what he already is and knows. In this kind of cooperation, which is obviously a kind of strategic action (although it can indeed be reciprocal, i.e. on the basis of mutual benefit), we miss the chance to use the other's own potential, which has not been realized thus far, but which can be much richer in content, and greater in scope than what is already at hand. The other's potential can be utilized by another type of cooperation, which I will call "creative cooperation", and which, I would claim, can be a link between strategic and communicative action. It is strategic in so far as the other is being used by us. It is however communicative, because it presupposes that the other's self-determination and the realization of his potential are not violated by us. On the contrary, we must assist and support the other – if we want to benefit from them as much as possible.

The first, purely strategic type of cooperation is the one that predominates in real life and has been emblematic for industrial society. In the field of intercultural relations, this is the colonialist and imperialistic treatment of other cultural communities. This is a treatment of the other, which does not take into account the inherent logic of his behavior, does not care about his traditions and his own worldview. This is a mechanical-instrumental approach towards the other, which corresponds to the level of development of industrial society. This society really does not need more from the other. It is enough if his labor can be utilized and his elementary skills exploited for a standardized output. In our times the postindustrial development of the advanced economies makes this method of cooperation more and more obsolete. It is not that the economic actors have become more altruistic. They do not seem to have replaced their strategic attitude towards the other with a radically communicative one. As before, their own profit is the main motivation for them. But the very nature of postindustrial economy demands that the other's initiative, insight, and creativity is "utilized" – even in the most prosaic fields, such as engineering or information science. However, this kind of "making use" of the other cannot proceed as before, along the line of depriving him of his own character, and reducing him to a mechanical instrument in the hands of the "master". Rather, a quasi-communicative attitude towards the other is proffered, in order to provide him with the necessary status and capacity for contributing to the system of the "ex-master."11

In that way, albeit a somewhat negative way, we can link strategic and communicative action. We can thus promote proper participation in community with a pattern of real-life regulated social processes. I think that such "creative cooperation" can provide the immediate stimuli for this kind of participation. Without such cooperation, as I have argued, the "B-level" model for the

application of discourse ethics is unrealistic. If "creative cooperation" is at stake in a normative discussion, one could not rely on an uncritical communicative attitude of the other parties. If someone's claim seems radically unacceptable to the others, even if they cannot provide valid arguments against it, they can simply leave the discussion – just as is the situation in ordinary strategic negotiations. However, the difference with such negotiations would be that neither of the parties would strive to dominate the situation – to profit from the eventually accepted norms at the expense of the others. Because by "creative cooperation" it can benefit more from the full utilization of the partners' potential, than from an ordinary (purely strategic) "deal", which is harmful for the partners' interests.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I want to be clear that in discourse ethics we certainly find moral standards for intercultural dialogue. These standards are quite promising when grounded on a morally legitimate foundation. Nonetheless, the application of discourse ethics as a methodology for intercultural dialogue seems unrealistic, since strategic and communicative action appear to be contradictory opposites. In that case the normative discussions in real life and the standards of discourse ethics are divided by the difference between "is" and "ought". In real-life instances of intercultural dialogue built on the principles of discourse ethics, the risk of being blocked at any time by unfair claims is always present. Such claims are immune to rational objections because of the lack of transparency in cultural differences. The distance between real and ideal can be bridged by a mediating link between strategic and communicative action, which I have described as "creative cooperation".

Notes

1 Without engaging myself in the controversies about the essentialization of intercultural relations, I shall write further about the latter, for the sake of simplicity, as about relations between cultural entities (groups, communities). This does not mean that I deny that these relations are established and reproduced by concrete representatives of these communities, i.e. by unique human beings. The complexity of the relations of representation in this respect is undoubtedly worth discussing, but the logic of my argumentation does not require that.

2 A representative panorama of liberal views on cultural differences can be found in the collection *Communitarianism and Individualism,* edited by Sh. Avinery and A. de-Shalit, A. (s. Avinery/de-Shalit 1992).

3 When this is done, a risk appears that intercultural dialogue is compromised – if a relationship of the kind just described transforms itself into conflict. In such a case the very desirability of the dialogue of cultures is called into question.

4 Here I shall use "he", "his", "him" as gender-neutral, in order to avoid the linguistically heavy forms "s/he", "his/her", etc.

5 A leitmotif in the works of Habermas on discourse ethics, which is an analogue to Kant's categorical imperative, is that only norms which are (or could be) approved by all parties concerned in their capacity as participants in the practical discourse may claim validity.

6 "Level A" is primarily the self-justification of discourse ethics as a totally rational way to ground legitimate universal moral norms, and "level B" concerns the matter of application of discourse ethics to the reality of social life (Cf. Apel 1988).

7 J. Rawls makes an attempt to revise this monological solution in his "Political Liberalism".

8 The latter approach is not outside the sphere of all morality – a number of ethical theories, e.g. contractarian ethics, build upon a primarily strategic attitude of the individual.

9 This can be an interesting subject to be discussed also, but is beyond the scope of my paper.

10 By using the term "Zweckrationalitaet", i.e. "ends-rationality" Apel obviously refers to the theory of the types of rational action of M. Weber, which can be regarded as the prototype of the differentiation between success-oriented (including instrumental and strategic) action and communicative action, which is so important for discourse ethics.

11The Hegelian dialectic of master – slave relations seems to be relevant in this case. See also the work of the Brazilian writer Paulo Freire.

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Chapter XII
The Trace of the Other: Globalization and Alterity

Antonio Sidekum

El diálogo entre culturas exige no
Sólo el respecto mutuo, sino también
Un mínimo do conocimiento mutuo,
que no es posible sin simpatía y amor.
Raimón Panikkar

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to discuss the critical relationship between the ethics of alterity in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the ethical challenges of globalization. The question is: does Levinas's ethics disrupt or even negate the conception of totality in globalization?

The paper focuses on the concepts of totality, *alterity*, ethical responsibility for the other, and the ethical challenges of globalization.1 I would like to discussion the philosophical development of alterity by Emmanuel Levinas as presented in his work *Totality and Infinity*.2 Thanks to globalization, a new historical consciousness is emerging in the countries that were formally excluded from the globalization debate. These countries are outside the North Atlantic Democracies.3 There is emerging a new consciousness of the structural situation in economics and politics. Globalization refers to a phenomenon that presents, a rapid international spread over the past decade of two entirely different elements: 1. The flow of finance capital through multinational and cross-national corporations. 2. New technologies, such as computer and telecommunications used worldwide.

In examining the ethical challenges of globalization, I shall use the Latin American paradigm for Globalization4 and the "victims of exclusion"5 from Liberation Ethics as well as an intercultural perspective.6 According to Enrique Dussel exclusion means also negation and alienation of alterity.7

Emmanuel Levinas: The Ways of Philosophical Development of Alterity

Emmanuel Levinas was born in Kaunas, Lithuania in 1905 and died in Paris in 1995.8 In 1923 he went to France, to the University of Strasbourg, where his studies included the philosophy of Henri Bergson.9 From 1928 to 1929 Levinas was in Freiburg's Br. University, where he studied first with Edmund Husserl and later with Heidegger. In an interview Levinas said that these years in Freiburg, with Husserl and Heidegger were for him as if he was standing in front of the day of reckoning for philosophy, so important were those experiences for the development of his thought.

The studies with Husserl led him to publish in 1933, *La Théorie de l'Intuition dans la Phénoménologie de Husserl,* (*The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology,* 1973), a reading of Husserl that was informed by Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's intellectualism. Levinas often speaks in a more specifically Husserlian language of intentional thematization,10 and of the correlation of *noema* and *noesis*. Since that time almost all of Levinas's philosophical works have taken their point of departure from either Husserl or Heidegger.

If the practice of a philosopher like Levinas can be summarized in a phrase, one would say that it works on the limits of phenomenology by investigating the enigma behind beings; for Levinas, it is the excess of being, or in Plato's phrase, the good beyond being.

Levinas first presented his own thought in his essay on "*Evasion"* 193511 and two short studies published immediately after the Second World War, *De l'existence à l'existant* (1947), (*Existence and Existents*, 1978) and *Le Temps et l'Autre***,** 1947, (*The Time and the Other*, 1987). These works offer analyses of nausea, fatigue and insomnia, as well as of the alterity found in death, fecundity and Eros. "Consciousness has already broken with this disinterestedness. It is the identity of the Same, the presence of being, the presence of presence. We must think of consciousness beginning with the emphasis of presence. Presence is only possible as a return of consciousness to itself, outside of sleep – and consciousness thus goes back to insomnia".12 These works were already an attempt to go beyond the thought of being. With the publication of *L'Ontologie, est-elle fondamentale?* 1951, (*Is Ontology Fundamental*?), which was largely a criticism of Heidegger, it became apparent that Levinas intended to issue his challenge to the dominance of ontology within Western philosophy. He did so specifically13 in the name of ethics and the alterity of the human being. "Ontology becomes ontology of nature, impersonal fecundity, faceless, generous mother, matrix of particular beings, inexhaustible matter for things".14 During the war, Levinas had been imprisoned in Germany in a camp for French soldiers. On his release and in response to the Nazi persecution of the Jews, in which none of the members of his family in Eastern Europe survived, he renewed his involvement with the Judaism of his childhood. According to his own words, the foreboding, the reality, and the memory of the Holocaust have always accompanied him in his work. Since that time his studies developed along two trajectories: The Totality and Infinity.

His main philosophical works, *Totalité et Infini* (1961), *Totality and Infinity* (1969), and *Autrement qu'être***,** 1974 (*Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, 1981), which increasingly stretched the language of Western philosophy to its limits, were accompanied by confessional writings, such as *Nine Talmudic Readings* (1990) and *"L'Heure des nations"***,** 1994, (In *Time of Nations*, 1998). These works translate Hebraic wisdom into the language of Greece, by which he meant, the universal language of the West. Although Levinas insisted, especially at first, that the two kinds of writings were entirely distinct and appealed to different kinds of evidence, their separation is far from straightforward. Terms like '*election", widow"," face-to-face"," substitution", " persecution"," poor", "strange"," orphan" and "hostage"* that Levinas explored in his works on the Talmud have found their way into his philosophical studies. His contributions to philosophy seemed far outweighed by his numerous essays on questions related to Jewish spirituality, mainly from the study of Martin Buber (1878-1965)15 and Franz Rosenzweig (1883-1929). " We were impressed by the opposition to the idea of totality in Franz Rosenzweig's *Stern der Erloesung*, a work too often present in this book to be cited."16 Although Levinas has refused to describe himself as a Jewish philosopher, the unity of his thought lies in his attempt to address the nonsectarian question of ethics after the Holocaust by employing the resources of both phenomenology and Judaism.

We can focus on his contribution to ethics as the portion of his work that has attracted most attention, mainly by the new concepts which he brought into philosophy like as the "absolutely Other", the Alterity.17 Levinas's philosophy and anthropology derive from the Husserlian Phenomenology.18 Phenomenology was understood more from intuition than from deduction. This philosophy seeks to find a deep justification "arche" by the phenomenological way of reduction, which leads us to the truth. This way is not only a logical conclusion but also an event

of the human being in his ethical relationship with the other. Levinas tries to surpass pure intellectualism and, in order to ground his thought, he departs from the ways of intentionality. "The world I live from is not simply constituted at a second level after representation which is spread before us as a backdrop of a reality simply given, and after "axiological" intentions have ascribed to this world a value that renders it apt for habitation."19 To live a life in a transitive way means to have an experience of life as an object of itself.20 To live means already to have the experience of the separation from the self and from the Alterity. "The communication of ideas, the reciprocity of dialogue, already hides the profound essence of language. It resides in the irreversibility of the relation between me and the other, in the Mastery of the Master coinciding with his position as other and as exterior."21

The Trace of the Other: Justice and Alterity

The work *Totality and Infinity* is divided into four main sections. The first section is an introduction to the concept of the Same and the Other. In this section, Levinas introduces the concepts of Metaphysics and Transcendence, Truth and Justice. The second section, on Interiority and Economy is dedicated to a series of refined phenomenological analyses in which Levinas confronts his thought on Interiority and Alterity with Heidegger's famous description of 'being-in-the-world" (*Sein und Zeit*). In the third section, Levinas analyses "exteriority and face-to-face relations as an ethical dimension of the relationship between time and the epiphany of the Other as absolutely Other". In the fourth section, Levinas summarizes the phenomenological experiences with the life of Ethics and the phenomenological experiences of Alterity and ethics.

The initial insight of *Totality and Infinity* is that the other human beings in their separation call me into question.22 To encounter another is to discover that I am under a basic obligation: the human Other's infinity reveals itself as a command: the fact of the other's "epiphany" reveals that I am his or her servant before all relationship with the Other. In the face-to-face relation my self-assurance disappears and I find my self in bad conscience. Levinas does not look to ethics to restore good conscience. On the contrary, I never have the luxury of knowing that I did the right thing in any given situation. Nor is it simply a question of knowledge. I can never do enough. My obligations to the other are unlimited, as well as being asymmetrical in the sense that I have no rights to ask of the Other what the Other asks of me. What does infinity mean in Levinas's philosophy? " What, in action, breaks forth as essential violence is the surplus of being over the thought that claims to contain it, the marvel of the idea of infinity. The incarnation of consciousness is therefore comprehensible only if, over and beyond adequation, the overflowing of the idea by its ideatum, that is, the idea of inifinity, moves consciousness."23 For Levinas,

The idea of infinity is not an incidental notion forged by a subjectivity to reflect the case of an entry encountering on the outside nothing that limits it, overflowing every limit, and thereby infinite. The production of the infinite entity is inseparable from the idea of infinity, for it is precisely in the disproportion between the idea of infinity and the infinity of which it is the idea that this exceeding of limits is produced. The idea of infinity is the mode of being, the *infinition*, of infinity. Infinity does not first exist, and *then* reveal itself. Its *infinition* is produced as revelation, as a positing of its idea in *me*.24

In his discussion on the ethics of social life, Levinas thinks that society does not proceed from the contemplation of the true; the relationship with the Other makes truth possible. Our master truth, justice, is thus bound up with social relations.

Consciousness is born as the presence of the third party in the proximity of the one for the other and consequently, it is to the extent that it proceeds from this that it can become disinterestedness. The foundation of consciousness is justice and not the reverse, Objectivity resting on justice. To the extravagant generosity of the for-the-other is superimposed a reasonable order, ancillary or angelic, of justice through knowledge, and philosophy here is a measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-the-other of peace and proximity, and is like the wisdom of love.25

Levinas presents justice as recognizing the Other as my master.26 In society, furthermore, every effort to meet my obligations to one person comes at the expense of my efforts on behalf of others. "That the Other is placed higher than me would be a pure and a simple error if my welcome consists in 'perceiving' a nature. Sociology and Psychology is thus deaf to Exteriority. Man as the Other comes to us from the outside, a separated – or holy-face. His Exteriority, that is, his appeal to me, is his truth."27

Levinas refuses all the standard ways of diminishing the impact of these impossible demands, such as conceiving ethics in terms of intention or employing the model of legal responsibility where I am only answerable for what is in my power. Levinas has readily conceded that he does not provide an ethics but only an account of the condition of ethics. It should be added that for him, ethics is very different from what has hitherto gone under that name among philosophers.

The reciprocal system of obligations that usually passes for ethics most often goes under the name of justice in Levinas's thought. Levinas finds the system of justice to be in accord with reason, but he finds that just as the Other within the face-to-face relation puts the me in question, so justice is put in question by the face-to-face of the Other. The ethical relation with the Other exceeds the third-party perspective of neutral reason. As a result, Levinas is quite explicit in his account of the ethical, and is not constrained by what he calls "formal logic".

Since Derrida's 1964 criticism in his essay on Levinas, "*Violence et Métaphysique*", questions have been raised about whether such an account is possible. These inquiries, far from being uniformly negative, have led to some of the most far-reaching developments within continental philosophy, not least in the works of Derrida. But in Levinas we have another position and a response.

…The relation with the Other breaks the ceiling of the totality. It is fundamentally pacific. The Other is not opposed to me as a freedom other than mine, but rather is similar to my own, and consequently hostile to my own. The Other is not another arbitrary freedom like my own; in which case it would cross over the infinity that separates me from others and place us under the same concept. However, this Alterity is manifested rather in a mastery that does not conquer, but teaches.28

The way in which ethics questions justice also serves as an answer to the frequently heard criticism that Levinas's thought has little to offer to political theory. It is true that Levinas has not said much about society, but his challenge to the good conscience of ethics applies equally to politics. It is here precisely that a way might be found to develop a new concept of society in the era of globalization – a globalization with justice. That means all peoples who are excluded29 by an unjust economic and political system will have the right to a place at the table of discussion and to seek solutions to world problems.

This material and critical universal principle makes it possible to fundamentally orient the direction of political organizations, conferences, fora, and debates raised by ethical discourse that take place in reference to the process of globalization. However, with respect to this material and

universal principle, the victims ought to become aware of their asymmetric situation; they should be moved to struggle for recognition of their rights, so that the impact of their acquired awareness moves beyond the restricted space of these gatherings and, thus, becomes useful in their daily lives. Liberation Ethics, then, quite beyond its formal principles will also articulate a material principle which can be exerted negatively as a critique of the World System that, due to its contents, becomes increasingly globalize at these levels: economic, ecological, psychological, etc.30

Thus this way of totality of an unjust world can be broken. "It is only approaching the Other that I attend to myself. This does not mean that my existence is constituted in the thought of the Other. An existence referred to as objective, such as is reflected in the thought of others, and in which I include universality, the State, History, and the Totality, does not express me, but rather denies me. The face I look for makes me move from phenomenon to being in another sense; in discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and the urgency of self-response and of the present engenders my own responsibility; as responsible, I am brought to ultimate reality."31

Levinas draws attention to what grand schemes overlook. The relation between ethics and justice is not one-sided in favor of the former. Just as ethics in Levinas's sense keeps justice from being overshadowed, so justice can also serve as corrective to ethics. If there was only one other person in the world, I could devote myself to that person, but because I live in society, I realize and address my obligations to the Other only by neglecting the Others. It is here that the place of reason and calculation becomes important also for ethics. "The face in which the other – the absolutely other – presents himself does not negate the same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the thaumaturgic supernatural."32 Levinas found a formula that encapsulated the interruption of ethics by justice when he described how the third party, in the sense of the whole of humanity, looks at me through the eyes of the Other.

There is no doubt that in *Totality and Infinity*, and in earlier works as well, Levinas constantly describes the Other. Indeed, for Levinas the Other and the absolutely Other are synonymous. "The absolutely other33 – the other – does not limit the terms of infinitely other", "the infinity of the other's transcendence". The question, the absolutely unique question in interpreting Levinas, then becomes: What does Levinas mean by "absolutely" and "infinitely" Other? With these words "infinitely" and absolutely" Levinas means that the other is purely other, is purely alterity itself, is pure difference without pollution or corruption of having anything in common with the ego that the other confronts in the encounter. The Other presents him there, from the first, as an absolute. "The face is present in its refusal to be contained. It is neither seen nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object. Which becomes precisely content... The alterity of the Other does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me, for distinction of this nature would precisely imply between us that community of genus which already nullifies alterity."34 The other is totally " absolved of a relation to an ego."35 Derrida says that Levinas, by referring to the other, as pure alterity itself, has absolutely nothing in common with any relation to the ego before which the other expresses her/himself in an encounter.

The Otherwise Than Being: Subjectivity and Ethics

In his *Otherwise Than Being*, Levinas returned to the way that the other questions the identity of the I; to be for the other is to be without identity. This led Levinas to introduce a new structure that he calls "substitution", and which he summarizes with Rimbaud's formula: "The I is an Other". Levinas also says that subjectivity is being hostage. He means by this that subjectivity is not the isolated ego of modern philosophy, but the restlessness of being disturbed by the Other. For

Levinas, questions which would seem to many to be the most fundamental of ethical questions, such as "Why does the other concern me"? Am I my brother's keeper? Or with reference to Shakespeare's Hamlet, "What is Hecuba to me?" are already too late for ethics. These questions presuppose a concept of the ego, which is derivative from my proximity to the Other. In this way Levinas makes more precise the goal, announced in 1951, of having ethics supplant ontology as first philosophy. According Adriaan Peperzak, Levinas's article *Enigma and Phenomenon* marks an important stage in the transition from *Totality and Infinity* to *Otherwise Than Being.*36

In *Otherwise Than Being,* Levinas explores the realm of selfhood that previous philosophy had left undermined. In *Totality and Infinity* he described how the ego is put in question by the Other.37 In *Otherwise Than Being* he puts the concept of the ego in question, not by denying the substantiality of the subject but by locating alterity within selfhood, so that it can be said to be 'in myself" only through the Other.

Levinas himself has indicated that it was his rejection of the ontological language of *Totality and Infinity* that led to *Otherwise Than Being*. However, he did not renounce the earlier analyses, which he has often repeated in essays that postdate *Otherwise Than Being*. Regarding the conceptual foundation of politics, ontology, universality, totality and justice, Levinas attempts to connect them with transcendence. The infinite lies in the fact that one is thereby rooted in, and preceded by a "more original", "pre" or – as Levinas prefers to say – "an-archic" infinity (or "*origin"* or "*non-origin"* or *"an-archy")* and not in a (onto-) logic of the universal (or the total).38

According to Levinas, the needs of the Other make demands on me that are impossible for me to fulfill. Most traditional ethical systems reject any such multiplication of my responsibilities on the grounds that they are destructive of good conscience. Traditional philosophies leave no room for Levinas's insistence that one is responsible, even for that which took place before one was born. They would see Levinas as over-extending the concept of responsibility to the point that one's personal sense of responsibility is beyond one's power and therefore diminished. However, Levinas regards all such attempts on our part to limit responsibility as basically a reduction of ethics to justice. "The infinite obligation now becomes the duty of justice. I must be just in the distribution of my attention and devotion. I must compare and calculate, correct and order, treat others as equals and conduct myself with careful judgement. This presupposes a synopsis and synchrony and gives a foundation for rule of law. The order of consciousness and its totality can consequently be derived from language and "substitution". The ethical relation of the One-or-the-Other obligates us to the rational organization of society, in which justice is exercised and violence suppressed. "… The radical inequality of the infinite responsibility for the Other does not exclude reciprocity on the level of justice but rather "founds" it."39 It amounts to limiting the demands I make on myself to the same standards that it is reasonable and proper for me to apply to others.

From Levinas's perspectives, what ordinarily passes for ethics is an evasion of the ethical, but he is well aware that it would be impossible to live constantly according to his conception of ethics. He was aware that this account of the face-to-face description of being obsessed by the Other could amount to a psychosis. Even though in interviews Levinas has questioned whether his work is properly called ethics, his questioning of the ontological basis of Western Philosophy40 has succeeded in raising the question of whether what passes for ethics in that tradition should really be called ethical.

The Ethical Challenges of Globalization

By Globalization we understand the economic and political interchanges in contemporary life. This concept reflects the sense of an immense enlargement of the world communications, as well as of the horizon of the world market, both of which seem far more tangible and immediate than in earlier stages of modernity. Enrique Dussel focuses modernity within three limits:

The first absolute limit: the death of life in its totality, through the indiscriminate use of anti-ecological technology constituted progressively through the sole criterion of the *quantitative* management of the world system in modernity and the increase in the rate of profit. But capital cannot limit itself. In this lies the utmost danger for humanity. The second limit of modernity is the destruction of humanity itself. "Living labor" is the other essential mediation of capital as such; the human subject is the only one that can "create" new value (surplus value, profit). "…The third limit of modernity is the possibility of the subjection of populations, economies, nations, and cultures that it has been attacking since its origin and, indeed, has excluded from its horizons and cornered into poverty… I want to emphasize that the globalizing world-system reaches a limit with the exteriority of the alterity of the Other, a locus of 'resistance' from whose affirmation the process of the negation of negation of liberation begins."41

The impact of globalization in recent years has accelerated all dimensions of history. We cannot value the real dimensions of the current phenomenon of globalization without understanding the historical development of societies and communities in the past. Our analysis of globalization includes social life, economics, politics and values that are instituted in the life of human persons as individuals and as members of society. The process of globalization dates back to the beginning of modernity. Globalization is an emergent vision of the human being, nature and history enhanced by new knowledge and the conquest of new worlds. On the one hand, globalization promotes a changed cultural vision and on the other, the expansion of eurocentrism and the hegemony of West Culture. This concept is the result of economic expansion and colonialism.

We can view globalization from the historical experience of violence in relation to the structures of economic exploitation. "The despotic dominance over the bodies of the new colonial servants was structured on the basis of an economic system which was founded not even on unequal exchange, but rather on the simple extraction, pillage, and illegal appropriation of all resources that could be exploited through military dominance. In the system of *encomiendas* – a system characterized by gratuitous labor, Amerindians were sent to work in the fields and later work in the *haciendas* (farms) where they received no salaries; they were sent to mines where they labored their lives away in the *mita.* Africans were commodified as slaves, used and slaughtered like animals (treated as pure merchandise) and deprived of fundamental rights such as marriage, paternity or any other right known to humans."42

In the history of modernity we can see how globalization has induced a new kind of violence and political domination. It now limits the political power of states. That creates a deep crisis of identity for nation-states. We have to understand the development of capitalism in the context of expanded markets as well as the need for human space between capital and wage-labor providing a new foundation for international politics. The process of globalization as we understand it today, is built on economic development which began with the politics of huge economic investment immediately after the Second World War. "The period after the Second World War was a period of hope for many people. There were those who believed in Socialism and thought it was being built in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and in parts of Asia. There were those who believed in democracy and freedom and thought we were on the way to achieving them. There were the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America moving rapidly towards independence.

Today, most of these hopes have collapsed under the assault of a global transnational imperialism."43 That system achieved its goal of modernization in Latin America, and in some parts of Africa and Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. The military regimes in Latin America were sustained by national security doctrine. This political agenda has stretched its domain over many countries and markets. The perspective was greatly advanced with the end of the Cold War and the fall of Socialism and the Soviet Union. At that juncture, the widespread introduction of the market economy as a definitive form of life, the exclusive option for history was labeled "the end of history". Immanuel Wallerstein observes: "The destruction of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolution of the U.S.S.R. have been celebrated as the fall of the Communism and the collapse of liberalism and our definitive entry into the world 'after liberalism".44 Marxist-Leninism as an ideological force in the modern world was thought finished. This is no doubt correct. But these events were also celebrated as the final triumph of liberalism as an ideology. This is, not only incorrect, but a total misperception of reality. Quite the contrary, these same events marked even more the collapse of the concept of globalization. Globalization includes the process whereby merchandise surpasses all political social, ethnic and cultural boundaries and consumption is universalized in a one-dimensional and one-directional global village. Materials and money override everything. Economic imperialism even consumes Liberalism. The positive potential of globalization has been hijacked!

In the present context of globalization the economic crisis of capitalism should be seen as a crisis yet to come but also as something from the past. In this way the anti-cyclical economic policies proposed by Keynes would be valid. We know that the economic and political system has obtained the abilities to distribute wealth with more social justice, extending the benefits also to the very poor. The workers (the proletariat) are able to be integrated with more justice into the economic system. They have ways of participation in effective and just conditions for improving their lives. The working class can be integrated in a just manner into the orbit of capital, not only as important consumers but also as being able being to freely negotiate work conditions, salary and effective participation in the profits of the enterprise. With this new historic situation of the relation of the worker to capital, trade unions have less power to defend the rights of the workers. This is a universal phenomenon. That means that trade unions are integrated in the same process of globalization as economics and ideology. All the political processes are integrated in global strategies.

This economic model of capitalism runs parallel with the political management model. This model is also called liberal democracy or neo-liberalism. The economic model appears as an outcome of the conflict of the ideological differences concerning the distribution of social justice and the power to overcome possibilities of any economic crisis in the world. From the point of view of economics, globalization poses a greater danger for the life of society because many social problems result from the globalization of the economy. The countries of the periphery face social problems like the increase of poverty, misery, hunger, unemployment, low salaries, the insolvency of educational systems and social exclusion; these problems are perceived as being caused by attitudes and policies linked to globalization. Latin American philosophy of liberation confronts this perspective. Instead of a global village and a face-to-face human community, we have a humanity, more egoistic, competitive, consumerist and corrupt. In a sense, Latin America has seen the future. Our crisis is a structural crisis.45 This process of perverse globalization has as its base the unity of technology and the convergence of time and information in the world.46 But the same technique can be used in other ways for better goals.

We can be optimistic about globalization if it is considered in other ways like promotion of universal justice. We want globalization to promote ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, pluralism, worldwide communications, democratization of information, and elimination of fundamentalism and eurocentrism. These particular cultures, while retaining their specific values, can participate in a universal culture with shared values.

Conclusion: The Principle of Ethics in Globalization

Human rights groups should be encouraged as ethical reflection, in the context of globalization, emerges. Ethics can be a revolutionary force for people's rights. In society there is also emerging a political and economic consciousness in relation to the new world situation. People seek to claim greater participation in democracy, in political and economic resolutions. With the development of the globalization of economics and politics, there also appears to be an increased consciousness of social exclusion and the demand for a real and effective participation of all under equal conditions. The people who live now in total exclusion demand to become subjects of their own history as protagonists of life.

Liberation Ethics must still warn that the function of ethics in relation to globalization does not end in the provision of discursive regulations needed to reach a consensus from which specific measures can be implemented. Its function does not end either in offering abstract guidelines for the principle of reproducing and helping to develop the life of any human subject – a principle that is universal and from which the discursive principle functions as its moral mediation of application. Liberation Ethics must still take into consideration the factors in its decisions based upon the fulfillment of the two principles already discussed: the material and the formal principles.47

According to José Luis Gómez-Martínez, we need an intercultural and interdisciplinary way in which to analyze globalization. Only in the interdisciplinary grasp of daily reality can we integrate the complexity of thought involved in globalization and cultural pluralism. Globalization creates a new consciousness of difference. It is in that difference that we find both an individual and collective ground of cultural identity.48

Intercultural philosophy is a new orientation in philosophy and serves as a response to the great ethical challenges in the era of globalization. Every human culture has developed typical ways of philosophizing and offers an explanation of the world, human nature and right relations between human beings. In this period of globalization, problems for many people have increased and become more ethically complex. The question then arises as to whether there will be one single form or method of philosophy in the future. Intercultural philosophy has to confront itself with characteristics of the present world; the plurality of cultures, worldviews and special interests, as well as the existence of socially mobile and politicized societies. In intercultural philosophy we can find procedures for a "polylogue" to overcome the centrist universalism and separatist particularism in philosophy.49

Thanks to the positive aspects of globalization, there is a new possibility of respect for human rights and of recognition of the alterity in the Third World. Globalization demands an active, purposeful, and ongoing intercultural dialogue because of the nature of the realities of a new world in which we find ourselves today. We are not at the end of history. True history is only just beginning. This is history which hears the voice of the people who are in exclusion. History becomes now a universal history of conscious participation in pluralism and multiculturalism adding a true human dimension.50 This is also the history of the poor crying for justice in an ethical context. The political recognition of the other's alterity can be worked through an

ecumenical perspective of the elements of infinite responsibility. In the past the understanding of universal history was only the pretentious or instrumental view of dominant countries and cultures toward the other cultures and people who were considered barbarian or irrelevant.51

Globalization has been always accomplished by the capitalist system as a world system, but today it presents other aspects such as polarization, social exclusion, globalization of capital, segmentation of work, supremacy of speculative capital, acceleration of the communication's network, and readjustment of capitalism under neoliberal hegemony. Our world is a complex world due to the creation of new relations effected by the communications web. This communication is a way of producing new elements for human life and also a contributing to the recognition of human rights. It is necessary to create a new paradigm to understand the value in human dignity and in the implicit values of the human community.

The fundamental elements of alterity, infinite responsibility for the other and subjectivity need to be translated into concepts for new ethical values. This leads also to a new conception of "discourse ethics": community for the communication of life.52 We can see today an ecumenical movement. Postmodernity is characterized by emphasis on new and more ample space for multiculturalism as a paradigm of philosophy – the recognition of the infinity of the other. Globalization is not merely an economic phenomenon, but it is also the form of a new development in human relations for the upcoming period in history.

It is only today that humanity can identify itself as a totality and recognize its unity. The excluded will have their voice in the world politics. Thus, many Latin American authors occupy themselves in defining and discussing cultural identity. Democracy will be realized only with an universal and effective system of justice, a universal, recognition of human rights, and a foundation for subjectivity and freedom.

These concepts are fundamental in the world of E. Levinas from which one can derive a better understanding of the new thought about the universality of culture and of the value of human dignity. "The first consciousness of my immorality is not my subordination to facts, but to the Other, to the Infinite. The idea of totality and the idea of infinity differ precisely in that the first is purely theoretical, while the second is moral. A freedom that is not ashamed of itself finds truth."53

As we have seen, the concepts of "Totality and Infinity" and the phenomenological method in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas do not necessarily present sufficient elements for a radical critique of globalization. However, Levinas offers much in terms of understanding and criticizing a one-sided view of globalization – a perversion of what globalization could be, but his critique does not undermine globalization as such.

Notes

1 See León Pommerantz. La Cultura de la Incertidumbre. In Antonio Sidekum. *Corredor de Idéias*; *integração e globalização*. S. Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2000, 34. " Los problemas económicos que padecemos ya no se fundan con exclusividad y primordialmente en los aciertos o barbaridades de nuestros gobernantes. No es que ellos deban ser eximidos de responsabilidades, ni hayan abandonado ambiciones bastardas, ni prescindan de privatizar en su favor bienes públicos".

2 Emmanuel Levinas. *Totality and Infinity*. (TI) The Hague, 1969.

3 See Thomas Bridges. *The Culture of Citizenship. Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture*. New York; State University of New York Press, 20.

4 Mainly the concept of the book from Milton Santos: *Por uma Outra Globalização: do pensamento único à consciência universal*. Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo: Record, 2000.

5 Enrique Dussel introduces this concept of Victims of Exclusion. In: Enrique Dussel. "Globalization and the Victims of Exclusion: from a Liberation Ethics Perspective". In *The Modern Schoolman*, LXXV 1998, 119-155.

6. Raul Fornet-Betancourt. *Kulturen der Philosophie.* Aachen: Augustinus Verlag, 1996.

7 For the discussion on ethics of liberation, see Enrique Dussel. *Ética de la liberación*. Barcelona, 1998.

8 I use basically the biography of Levinas from the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London Routledge.

9 Bergson is very often present in *Autrement qu'etre "* Bergson is an essential step in the movement which puts in question the framework of a spirituality borrowed from knowledge and therefore from the priv*i*leged and primary signification of presence, being, and ontology." Emmanuel Levinas. *Transcendence and Intelligibility*. Edited by Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi. *Emmanuel Levinas Basic philosophical writings*. Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1996, 154.

10 " The Other, the signifier, manifest himself in speech by speaking of the world and not of himself; he manifests himself by proposing the world, by *thematizing* it." TI, 96.

11 " Without resolving the general problem of the relations between thought and existence, it can be safely stated that a least some acquaintance with the personal and cultural background of Levinas's thinking is useful, if not necessary, to understand his criticism of the western philosophical tradition as well as his own very original thought. I will therefore start by approaching his work in a rather external way in order to ask to what extend he mentioned facts are relevant for a correct and sympathetic understanding of his text. One of the advantages of his approach is that it can reveal a great variety of traditions or histories toward which Levinas had to take a stand by wholly or partially integrating, rejecting, or transforming them. It will be enable us to ask what, in this case, it meant to become a part of or 'under the influence' of such different traditions." Adriaan Peperzak. *To the Other: an introduction to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*. Lafayette, Indiana, 1993, 2.

12 Emmanuel Levinas**.** *Basic Philosophical Writings.* Edited by Peperzak adriaan, Critchley, Simon & Bernasconi, Robert. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996, 133.

13 " Western Philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being." TI, 43.

14 . TI, 46.

15 . TI, 68.

16 . TI, 28.

17 That is the central theme of the opus *Totality and Infinity*.

18 . TI, 29.

19 . TI, 130.

20 . "Life is love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being but more dear than my being: thinking, reading, working, warming oneself in the sun. Distinct from my substance but constituting it, these contents make up the worth of my life." TI, 112.

21 TI, 101.

22 "The conscience welcomes the Other. It is the revelation of a resistance to my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being. Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified

by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent. The search for the intelligible and the manifestation of the critical essence of knowing, the movement of a being back to what precedes its condition, begin together," TI, 84.

23 TI, 27.

24 TI, 26.

25 Emmanuel Levinas. *Basic Philosophical Writings: Peace and Proximity*. In Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi. Emmanuel Levinas. Basic Philosophical Writings, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1996, 169.

26 TI, 72.

27 TI, 291.

28 TI, 171.

29 See Enrique Dussel, *Ética de la Liberación*. Barcelona: Trotta, 1989. Also the reflection by Dussel: " It is in this precise sense: assuming ethically and practically the position of the victims in the very social structure that oppresses them, that the social scientist become a hostage – the central ethical category in Levinas philosophy – of the dominant system functionally studied by the standard social sciences. Whoever "takes the side of" the victim runs the risk of persecution and repression"? "Globalization and the Victims of Exclusion; From a Liberation Ethics Perspective". *The Modern Schoolman*, LXXV, January, 1998, 141.

30 Idem, 150.

31 TI, 178.

32 TI, 203.

33 TI, 39.

34 TI, 194.

35 J. Derrida. "Violence et Métaphysique", in: *L'Ecriture et la Différence*. Paris 1967, 136.

36 Adriaan Peperzak et alii. Emmanuel Levinas: *Basic Philosophical Writings*, 65.

37 "To approach the Other is to put into question my freedom, my spontaneity as a living being, my control over things, this freedom of a 'moving force," this impetuosity of the current to which everything is permitted, even murder. The "You shall not commit murder" which delineates the face in which the Other is produced submits my freedom to judgment." TI, 303.

38 See in TI, 93.

39 A. Peperzak *To the Other*. West Lafayette, Indiana, 1993, 229.

40 Levinas "integration ' of ontology, however, differs no less from Hegel's *Aufhebung* than from Heidegger's retrieve. More than Heidegger's thought, Hegel's systematic "completion" of Western tradition. This may be the reason why Levinas sometimes seems to Hegelianize Heidegger's thought. If however, this impression were the whole truth about Levinas's interpretation of Heidegger, the question would arise whether they are not allies in this anti-Hegelian attempt to renew the paths of philosophy, or even whether Levinas does not simply continue Heidegger's search for the beyond of totality". Idem., 14.

41 Enrique Dussel. *Beyond Eurocentrism*: *The World-System and the Limits of Modernity*. In Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, *The Cultures of Globalization*. London 1998, 20.

42 Enrique Dussel. Globalization and the Victims of Exclusion: From a Liberation Ethics perspective. In The Modern Schoolman, LXXV, January 1998, 131. In this perspective is very important what Jean Paul Sartre wrote in the Preface of the work from Frantz Fanon *The Wretched of the Earth*, London 1990.

43 Sherif Hetata. *Dollarization,Fragmentation, and God.* In Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi. *The Cultures of Globalization*. London, 1998, 281.

44 Immanuel Wallerstein *After Liberalism*. New York: The New Press, 1995, 1.

45 "Neste período histórico, a crise e estrutural. Por isso, quando se buscam soluções não estruturais, o resultado e a geração de mais crise" Milton Santos. *Por uma outra globalização*. Rio de Janeiro, 2000, 35.

46 . See also Frantz Fanon, op. cit., 252. Frantz Fanon created a new methodology for the analysis of history. History from the point of view of victims. The same thematic about the recognition of the other as an other is used by T. Todorov.

47 Enrique Dussel, op. cit., 151.

48 José Luis Gómez-Martínez *La Cultura Indígena como realidad intercultural.* In Antonio Sidekum. *Corredor de Idéias; integração e globalização*. S. Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2000, 226. See also, *La Posmodernidad y el Discurso Antrópico de la Liberación*. In: Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, *Kulturen der Philosophie*. Aachen: Augustinus Verlag, 1996, 181-194.

49 See Raúl Fornet-Betancourt. *Hacia una Filosofía Intercultural Latinoamericana*, San José-Costa Rica: DEI, 1994.

50 Immanuel Wallerstein said about the Human Rights: " We need, in addition, to take the concept of human rights and work very hard to make it apply equally to "us" and to "them", to citizens and to aliens. The right of communities to protect their cultural heritage is never the right to protect their privilege." Immanuel Wallerstein, op .cit., 270.

51 See Leopoldo Zea. *Discurso desde la Marginación y Barbarie.* Barcelona: Anthropos, 1988.

52 See the discussion of Factibility of Discourse Ethics by Apel, Habermas and E. Dussel in: Antonio Sidekum. *Ética do Discurso e Filosofia da Libertação*. São Leopoldo: UNISINOS, 1994.

53 TI, 83.

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Chapter XIII
Religious Pluralism as a Middle Way

Warayuth Sriwarakuel

The middle way as proposed by the Lord Buddha is the way between the two extremes. He discovered that either too much strictness or too much looseness would never lead to enlightenment. Like the strings of a guitar, beautiful music is impossible if they are too high-strung or too slack. In this paper I try to argue that both religious exclusivism and inclusivism are not the appropriate ways to peace, but that only religious pluralism will lead to peace and to a civil society, especially in this age of globalization.

The Age of Globalization

We are now in the age of globalization. Some people may doubt what I mean by "we." What I mean by "we" is neither "the West" nor "the rest." "We" refers to all human beings no matter whether they live in the West or in the East, no matter whether they are conscious or unconscious that they are in the age of globalization, and no matter whether they are for or against globalization. In Christian terms, we are all children of God, and in Buddhist terms, we are all fellow friends who fall into the cycle of life. "We" to me includes what Huntington calls "us and them" and what Buber calls "I and thou." We live in an age when the whole world is becoming a global village. Improvement in telecommunications and transportation facilitates travel and communication among peoples of different parts of the world.

When I was a young kid in the fifties, I still remember that there were only a few cars coming to my village to show movies in the open field by the church. This meant that I would see cars and watch movies only two or three times a year. Now it is very different. If I, living in Bangkok, would like to know what movies are being shown in Hollywood, I just click my computer mouse a few times. What a wonderful world we live in! However, the world is not a paradise. It has been filled with conflict and violence since the beginning of human history. This new age is no exception. Thus Huntington is partly correct when he says, "...the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural"(Huntington, 1993: 22). Why only partly correct? Because the principal conflicts of this age will occur not only "between nations and groups of different civilizations" but also between humans and nature. In other words, the main conflicts in the new world will be both cultural and ecological. Huston Smith wrote:

There are...three great civilizations: Western, East Asian (Chinese), and South Asian (Indian). Historically, in their main periods, each of these specialized in one of these three problem areas: the West on nature, China on social relations, and India on psychological relations. If the above hypothesis is true, each civilization stands to learn from the other two in the areas it has neglected. We can take from China respect for family, attitude toward age, and attitude toward the personal sphere as opposed to the empire, i.e., a higher loyalty to the community centered in the home. From India, as Gordon Allport has observed, of the four goals of man which India recognizes, i.e., pleasure, worldly success, duty, and liberation, the West has been concerned almost entirely with the first two, with slight attention to duty and no attention to liberation...the new civilization will be more ecological. As noted earlier, the West has been preoccupied with nature. China and India

have also been concerned with nature, but in the spirit of Wordsworth rather than Galileo. The Western sense is one of dominance over nature...I believe that we will come back to the glories of simplicity in the ecological aspects of the new civilization…we will be entering into the new world civilization to the extent that we are able to achieve a new pattern of life that is some kind of synthesis of these three emphases from past civilizations – nature, fellow man, and self. (Arroyo, 1975: 4)

It seems to me, however, that non-Western civilizations today, when dealing with nature, are turning away from the spirit of Wordsworth to a more Western perspective like Galileo's. Huntington is, thus, quite right when he says:

[M]odern societies could resemble each other more than do traditional societies for two reasons. First, the increased interaction among modern societies may not generate a common culture but it does facilitate the transfer of techniques, inventions, and practices from one society to another with a speed and to a degree that were impossible in the traditional world. Second, traditional society was based on agriculture; modern society is based on industry, which may involve anything from handicrafts to classic heavy industry to knowledge-based industry. (Huntington, 1997: 69)

Modernization was born in Western civilization, and now it is being spread out in every part of the world. When more and more societies become modernized in the Western sense, nature is more and more exploited and broken into pieces. Alvin Toffler pointed this out in his foreword to Prigogine and Stengers' *Order out of Chaos*:

One of the most highly developed skills in contemporary Western civilization is dissection: the split-up of problems into their smallest possible components. We are good at it. So good, we often forget to put the pieces back together again. This skill is perhaps most finely honed in science. There we not only routinely break problems down into bite-sized chunks and mini-chunks, we then very often isolate each one from its environment by means of a useful trick. We say *ceteris paribus* – all other things being equal. In this way we can ignore the complex interactions between our problem and the rest of the universe. (Prigogine/Stengers, 1984: xi)

If it is true that we need dialogue to avoid the clash of civilizations, then it is also true that we need to dialogue with nature in order to avoid an ecological crisis. We have had a monologue with nature for hundreds of years, and now it is time for us to dialogue with her. In other words, we have been "talking and doing" unto nature since science was born in the West. Now it is time for us to start "listening" to her. However, my main concern in this paper is not ecological, but cultural. Nonetheless, as we will see, nature is inevitably relevant to our concerns. The central problem I will discuss is: how ought we to live together in the age of globalization?

One Nature and Many Cultures

In his book *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science*, Brian Fay raises an important question: do people in different cultures live in different worlds? His answer to the question is negative. Why? Because "people recognizably living in different cultures cannot be living in a different world; but they may well be living differently in the same world." (Fay, 1996: 90) Fay makes a distinction between "world" and "culture." He argues that there is only the one and the same world for all different cultures; otherwise understanding among different peoples would be

impossible. The same world is, fundamentally, the ground for all agreement and disagreement. If there is nothing in common at all, how can people discuss and have dialogue with one another? People in different cultures may hold different paradigms, but this does not mean that we have nothing in common. "Competing paradigms," says Fay, "must be about the same world, and must share sufficiently similar vocabulary and canons of investigation, in order to be in competition with one another. One might say that disagreement among paradigms presupposes a fundamental background of agreement." (Fay: 84)

I agree with Fay and would like to go further. Here I will use the terms "world," "universe," and "nature" as referring to the same reality. Ontologically speaking, there is one nature, but, phenomenologically speaking, there are many different cultures in this one nature. Even though nature is one, it seems to have a pluralistic character as Prigogine and Stengers put it: "Our universe has a pluralistic, complex character. Structures may disappear, but also they may appear. Some processes are, as far as we know, well described by deterministic equations, but others involve probabilistic processes…We are living in a single universe. "(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984: 9) Questions may be raised here. What are nature and culture? What do we mean by nature and culture? In his book *The Concept of Nature*, Whitehead gives us a clear definition when he says, "Nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses. In this sense-perception we are aware of something which is not thought and which is self-contained for thought." (Whitehead, 1926: 3) Culture, on the other hand, is more difficult to define. However, a definition given by Fay may be sufficient. He says, "According to a standard view, a culture is a complex set of shared belief, values, and concepts which enables a group to make sense of its life and which provides it with directions for how to live…In perhaps the most influential variant of this standard view, culture is pictured as a text the vocabulary and grammar of which its members learn." (Fay: 55) From the above definition, we can see that a culture and a group or a society are closely related. However, one may ask what a society is. A society may be defined as "a system which determines how its members behave and relate." (Fay: 63) Since culture and society are closely related, I will use both terms together and sometimes interchangeably.

We are born into different societies and cultures. Each society or culture has language and religion as central elements. Therefore, we have different languages and different religions. Our cultures shape and structure us with different paradigms, models, or maps. These different maps make us see nature differently. Therefore, in principle, we cannot and never really see nature directly as it is in itself. It is helpful to make a distinction here between "shape" or "structure" on the one hand and "make" or "determine" on the other. We may say that our cultures and societies "shape" or "structure" our social identities in the sense that they provide necessary conditions for us to develop or create ourselves. Our cultures and societies do not "make" or "determine" who we are, as determinists might understand it. It is our freedom which is a sufficient condition for us to develop, define and redefine who we are. Humans are always free to create something new. Dictionaries, for example, are good evidence of that. Later editions always have more new words and concepts than earlier ones. Since humans are free, they are able to "shape" culture too. Thus humans and cultures, we may conclude, have free interactions with each other in terms of the hermeneutical circle, namely, the wholes affect the parts (in fact, smaller wholes), and vice versa.

In Gadamer's terms, these paradigms, models or maps are prejudices which are indispensable. We are always with our prejudices, and these prejudices come to us through living traditions. Hermeneutics allows us to be aware and clear about these prejudices:

At the beginning of all historical hermeneutics, then, the abstract antithesis between tradition and historical research, between history and knowledge, must be discarded. The effect of a living tradition and the effect of historical study must constitute a unity, the analysis of which would reveal only a texture of reciprocal relationships. Hence we would do well not to regard historical consciousness as something radically new – as it seems at first – but as a new element which has always made up the human relation to the past. In other words, we have to recognize the element of tradition in the historical relation and enquire into its hermeneutical productivity. (Gadamer, 1992: 266)

One may ask: what are these paradigms or maps for? It seems to me that Huntington provided a very good answer to this question when he wrote:

Simplified paradigms or maps are indispensable for human thought and action… We need explicit and implicit models so as to be able to:

a. order and generalize about reality
b. understand causal relationships among phenomena;
c. anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future developments;
d. distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and
e. show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals.

Every model or map is an abstraction and will be more useful for some purposes than for others…With no map, however, we will be lost. (Huntington, 1997: 30)

In dealing with these paradigms or maps, we need to keep in mind the distinction between science and nature, and also between religion and reality. Science is not identical to nature and religion is not identical to reality. Obviously, in our life we need both science and religion. Both should go together, as Einstein put it: "Science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind." (Einstein, 1993: 149) What we need to do is to have the right attitude towards science and religion. What I mean by right attitude here is the attitude that does not fall into the extremes. Right attitude implies a middle way. To see it clearly, let us look at the following schema.

Positivism	Probabilism	Relativism
Only one	All scientific	All scientific
Science	scientific maps may	maps are true.
map is true.	be false.	

Exclusivism	Pluralism	Inclusivism
Only one	All religious	All religious
Religion	religious map	maps may
is true.	be false.	maps are true.

From the above schema, probabilism and pluralism are considered as right attitudes. In science, why are positivists and relativists considered as holders of wrong attitudes? Answering this question satisfactorily would take more space than this paper allows. I will provide only a brief and rough explanation. According to positivists and logical positivists, only a certain group of

people who use "the scientific method" can discover truth. There are at least two main problems with this assumption: the scientific method and the discovery of truth. First, the positivists and logical positivists talk as if there were only one single method of science. In fact, at least throughout the history of Western science there have been different scientific methods in different periods and even among different groups of scientists in the same period. Darwin, for example, was criticized by the scientists of his generation that the method he used was not scientific. Second, truth is a main problem for the positivists and logical positivists. They believe that truth or objective knowledge is reachable or attainable if and only if scientists can rid themselves of their biases. Truth or objective knowledge is something like the land of America waiting for someone like Columbus to discover it. In fact, it is factually impossible for scientists or anyone to have their empirical observations and testing free of preconceptions, presuppositions and prejudices. Columbus himself did not view America with a "blank mind." He did not see America as the land in itself. In fact, he was filled with his presuppositions, and as we all know, he thought that the land he discovered was India. The positivists and logical positivists, in my opinion, need to either totally reject or partly adjust their map.1

The relativists, on the other hand, go to the opposite extreme from the positivists and logical positivists. Truths for them are nothing but subjective conventions. In other words, truths are made rather than discovered. According to extreme relativism, all cognitive, ethical and aesthetical beliefs, sensations and experiences are no more than particular tastes. This is like sophism in ancient Greece. X can be true, good and beautiful for one person or a group of people, and simultaneously, it can also be false, evil or ugly for another. Like a dish of food, even though it is the same dish, it can be delicious for one person but distasteful for another. Relativism seems to be a very popular position with many adherents. To the best of my knowledge, no philosopher or scholar refers to himself as a relativist. But it seems to me that there are more and more philosophers and intellectuals whose ideas can rightly be considered as relativist. This happens not only among contemporary philosophers, but, as Wolfgang Smith points out, among contemporary physicists as well:

[S]o the celebrated debate between Einstein and Bohr goes on, and will presumably continue until the central issue has been resolved: the question, namely, whether the universe is deterministic or not…From a strictly scientific point of view...it appears that one has a choice in the matter. One can opt for a deterministic or for an indeterministic view of reality, for a neo-classical or a quantum model – it seems to be more or less a question of taste. And tastes do differ. There are scientists of first rank who see ..."There is at present no occasion and no reason to speak of causality in Nature"; and again there are others, beginning with Einstein, who find it unthinkable that "God would play dice." (Smith, 1995: 85-86)

There seems to be little space for reason or rationality in our time. In his famous work *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Kuhn seems to confirm the collapse of rationality when he asserts that a shift from the old paradigm to the new one is not based on rationality at all, for example, a shift from geocentric to heliocentric astronomy. Kuhn said, "To be accepted as a paradigm a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted"(Kuhn, 1970: 17-18). Is it true that rationality collapses? Is it true that truths are based on particular tastes only? I do not think so. Then some people may ask, "What, then, are we to say? If the matter cannot be settled on a scientific basis,

by what means – other than 'taste' – can it be resolved at all?" (Smith: 86) Probabilism may be an answer if and only if we adopt a logic of polarity or the law of complimentarity.

Truths are not either discovered or made; rather truths are both discovered and made. Truths, it seems to me, are matters of degree between two poles, namely, subjectivity and objectivity. They are not subjective or objective, but both. There are neither pure data nor pure biases. Our sensations and perceptions are always mixed in with our preconceptions, presuppositions, and prejudices. This is the reason we should not be so sure about whether our maps are true or false. This kind of attitude, namely, probabilism, will open our hearts to dialogue with others. This may even make it possible for truths to gain more in objectivity rather than subjectivity. To have dialogue with others will help us to find a way to solve problems. As in the case of the debate between determinism and indeterminism, physicists who are open to dialogue with Eastern scholars could find a way to solve the problem posed by Wolfgang Smith:

The interplay of determination and indeterminacy … happens to be exactly what the yin-yang doctrine demands…. Contrary to our classical expectations it thus appears that determination and indeterminacy are not in reality opposed or mutually exclusive, but seem in fact to imply each other in a certain high and marvelous sense. (Smith: 89-90)

Given this background, let us turn now to religion. In religion, why are exclusivism and inclusivism considered as misleading alternatives? Why do I propose pluralism as the correct paradigm? We will consider these questions in the next section.

Christianity: The Religion or a Religion?

The central elements of any culture are language and religion. I would agree with Huntington that "Language is second only to religion as a factor distinguishing people of one culture from those of another"(Huntington, 1997: 70). Why is religion considered the most important factor? Huntington's answer is:

People do not live by reason alone. They cannot calculate and act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self-interest. Politics presupposes identity. In times of rapid social change established identities dissolve, the self must be redefined, and new identities created. For people facing the need to determine "Who am I?" "Where do I belong?" religion provides compelling answers, and religious groups provide small social communities to replace those lost through urbanization. (Huntington, 1997: 97)

Religion deals with life's goals and ends, whereas language is usually considered as an instrument to communicate. But sometimes people give priority to language rather than religion. It seems to me that most, if not all, schools of philosophy in both the analytical and continental traditions put too much emphasis on language. Concerning philosophy, it is not an exaggeration to call the twentieth century the century of the linguistic turn. Probably this turn will continue in the twenty-first century, at least in Western philosophy. This is not so in Thailand where most, if not all, people give priority to religion. In universities, philosophy of language is one of the least popular subjects among students, whereas philosophy of religion is one of the most popular. Attempts to merge speaking and doing, talk and practice, as J. L. Austin did in his book *How to*

Do Things with Words, are considered harmful rather than useful. Speech and action, for the Thai people, are different in kind, not in degree.

Buddhadasa Bikkhu, a distinguished monk, once said, "Fifty percent of people could not reach enlightenment because of their cravings, and another fifty percent failed because of their falling in love with philosophy." According to Buddhadasa, enlightenment is out of the reach of scholars and intellectuals who limit themselves to the university. He identifies philosophy with talk and religion with practice. However, not all scholars agree with him in this matter. Is it true that we cannot talk about religion? Is it true that the only way to know religion is by practice? Mystics like Maimonides, Wittgenstein, and St. Thomas, in his later life, and anyone who follows the *via negativa*2 would probably say yes. As mentioned above, we need to distinguish between religion and reality in the same way we distinguish science and nature. Obviously, we can and do talk about science; why not religion?

Thailand has a population of about 65 million people. About 90 percent of the people are Buddhists, five percent Muslims, one percent Christians (both Catholics and Protestants), and four percent others. Geographically speaking, Thailand can be divided into four main parts: North, Northeast, Central, and South. The North, Northeast, and South have their own dialects, but almost all people in every part can understand and speak the central Thai language. Surely, there are exceptions with some minorities such as hill-tribes who have moved around and across the borders with Burma and Laos. Most of these people are not able to understand and speak Thai. Only a small number of Thais learn English.

In spite of differences in religion, languages, and ethnic groups, generally Thais have few conflicts. This would seem to be the result of a strong sense of identity – belief in one nation and a kind of liberal democracy under the reign of the King. Basically, there are no clashes among believers in different religions because the Thai people believe that all religions are good, and that all religions teach and train people to be good persons. In the Ayuddhaya Period, some Portuguese Christians were killed not because they were Christians, but because they were soldiers under the king of a different dynasty. In the Rattanakosin Period, Thailand and France went to war over colonization. During that time the Thai government and some people believed that French missionaries and Thai Christians were spies for the French government. Such a misunderstanding caused grave difficulties for Christians, and eight of them were martyred. Pope John Paul II has recently beatified the Thai martyrs.

In terms of culture, religion, and identity, I can use myself as an example. I am a Christian. I believe in God, and no one can take my faith from me. However, does being a Christian put in jeopardy my Thai identity? I will hold off on answering this question until the end of my paper. For now, let me turn to some relevant points in the history of Christianity. Here, I only wish to remind the reader of the history which made Christianity "the Religion" and how exclusivism has played such an important role in Western civilization. Generally, we may divide the historical development of Christianity into five stages, or what I refer to as the 5 D's.

1. Doing. This stage refers to the time of the Lord Jesus Christ. His life, teaching, miracles, death, and resurrection.

2. Documenting. This stage began when the Lord Jesus' apostles and disciples preached and spread the Good News in different parts of the Roman Empire. Like Lao Tse, Confucius, the Lord Buddha and Socrates, the Lord Jesus wrote nothing, rather his followers became his chroniclers.

3. Dominance. This stage began with the conversion of Emperor Constantine and his subjects. The climax of this stage was in the eighth and ninth centuries when Christianity was spread all over Europe. Christianity at this time could be called "European Christendom."

4. Diversity. This stage began with the sixteenth century Reformation which separated Catholicism and Protestantism.

5. Dialogue. This stage began with Vatican Council II.

According to Huntington and others, Western civilization began in the eighth and ninth centuries in the stage of dominance. At that time Christianity was considered "the Religion" because it was the dominant religion in the West. In the minds and hearts of Christians before Vatican II, to the best of my knowledge, there was very little room for dialogue. The mission of all Christians, whether clergy or lay persons, intellectuals or common people, rich or poor, was evangelism. Most Christians at that time believed that there was no salvation outside the Church. Their motto would be: "To have salvation, you must be like us; our way is the only way." All the councils before Vatican II, from Nicaea I to Vatican I, are witnesses to this kind of exclusivism. People who hold to this exclusive approach are cocksure that only their map is true, and that all other maps are false. They are not ready to listen to or have dialogue with others who seek a different route. Throughout the history of Christianity, many Christians, even saintly people, accepted this limited "anathema" view of their faith. Even powerful Christian leaders and intellectuals acted as if they rejected or ignored the warning from the prophet Isaiah: "Woe to those who think themselves wise and believe themselves enlightened." (Isaiah 5: 21)

From this brief historical excursus, we have learned at least two things. First, Christianity has developed and changed through time. Second, Christianity has been influenced by the Greek way of thinking – a point to which I will return.

Now let me turn to the place of Christianity in our present world. Christians in Europe finally found that they were not the only people in the world. Even as far back as the Crusades, they found "others," namely, the Muslims. In the period of commercialism and colonization, they met "others" all over the world who held to and lived by different maps. Christians who faithfully held the exclusivist perspective were enthusiastic in trying to convert "others." Some succeeded, some failed. The Protestant Reformation and modern science presented new challenges to that exclusivist understanding. What happened when intellectuals like Freud, Darwin, Marx, Durkheim and others had their works published? What happened when people started to believe that religion was just an illusion or defense mechanism; that man was not different in kind from animals; that religion was no more than an opium of the people; and that religion is just a means or instrument to rule people? Some Christians lost their faith, but most did not. What happened when quite a few philosophers, whose works are still influential, bravely pronounced themselves atheists? What happened when Nietzsche said, "God is dead," when Russell reasoned why he was not a Christian, and when Sartre asserted that God and human freedom are incompatible? Again, some Christians lost their faith, but many did not.

Indeed many Christians may have deepened their faith in God because they wrestled with those works as a great challenge. What I could say is that Christianity, like other great religions of the world, has never been in want of defenders. As a joker put it, "God is not dead, Nietzsche is." Some scholars like Karl Rahner tried to justify why he was a Christian, and Whitehead argued that God and human freedom are compatible. In regard to the question of the relation between God and our own freedom, Griffin made it clear when he wrote:

While the idea of "cooperation" or "synergism" has always been anathema to Augustinians because of their denial of theological freedom, many other Christian thinkers have also been uncomfortable with it. The problem seems to arise from the fact that most theologies have portrayed divine and human power as competitive. On this model, the more efficacy God exerts in our lives, the less freedom we have; the more freedom we affirm for ourselves, the less we are influenced by God. Augustinian theology, fearing that the affirmation of genuine human freedom in relation to God would demean the sovereignty of God, denies theological freedom. In reaction, atheists usually assume that the affirmation of genuine human freedom requires the denial of divine efficacy in our lives. Doctrines called synergistic have usually been compromise positions within the competitive model. They limit the divine influence to make room for some human freedom. The reluctance to speak of divine-human cooperation in Western (as opposed to Eastern) Christianity, manifested even in Christian thinkers who affirm theological freedom, is due, I suspect, not only to Augustinian prohibitions but also to the belief that cooperation implies a diminution of divine efficacy. (Griffin, 1992: 378-9)

It seems to me that whenever there is a challenge from an atheist, there is always a group of faithful scholars who respond. For example, in "the game of parables" after John Wisdom had asserted that religious language is meaningful, he was challenged by Antony Flew, an atheistic philosopher. Then Richard Hare, Basil Mitchel, and John Hick jumped into "the game" to defend the meaningfulness of religious language in their own ways. We have seen the number of practicing Christians in Europe rapidly diminish and many seminaries permanently close. Indeed, seminaries have transformed into factories and even nightclubs. It is difficult to say how many Europeans are still believers in God. This question requires empirical research. What is clear, however, is that Christianity has experienced radical changes throughout its history. As Whitehead states:

In the early days of Christianity, there was a general belief among Christians that the world was coming to an end in the lifetime of people then living…it formed an impressive part of the popular religious doctrine. The belief proved itself to be mistaken, and Christian doctrine adjusted itself to the change. Again in the early Church individual theologians very confidently deduced from the Bible opinions concerning the nature of the physical universe...In the seventeenth century the doctrine of the motion of the earth was condemned by a Catholic tribunal. A hundred years ago the extension of time demanded by geological science distressed religious people, Protestant and Catholic. And today the doctrine of evolution is an equal stumbling-block. These are only a few instances illustrating a general fact. (Whitehead, 1929: 260-1)

With the rise of science some Christians lost their faith in God and turned to science instead because they thought that religion is always wrong whereas science is always right. But their confidence in science, in turn, is threatened by the challenge from relativism. Since the beginning of the twentieth century the world has been impressed with Einstein’s general theory of relativity and quantum physics. Since then many great works in social sciences have supported the belief that each society has its own map which is relatively true according to its context or "form of life." There seems to be no place for universalism even for science itself. All ideals and values belong to particular groups. According to relativism, scientific thinking necessarily occurs within a particular paradigm. Each paradigm makes people see nature differently as Kuhn put it: "Lavoisier...saw oxygen where Priestly had seen...dephlogistinated air and where others had seen

nothing at all…At the very least, as a result of discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature differently"(Kuhn, 1970: 118).

Furthermore, when each group holds a different paradigm or map, there seems no way to judge who is right or wrong, better or worse, because there seems to be no neutral, absolute, universal or transcultural criterion or measure for assessment. Metaphorically, we may use a yard to measure the height of the table, but we cannot use it to measure the weight of the stone. Similarly, we can use a scale to measure the weight of the stone, but not the height of the table. This is what Kuhn called "incommensurability." Feyerabend, although he does not completely agree with Kuhn's ideas, analyzes his ideas as follows:

Kuhn has observed that different paradigms (A) use *concepts* that cannot be brought into the usual logical relations of inclusion, exclusion, overlap; (B) make us see things differently (research workers in different paradigms have not only different concepts, but also different*perceptions*); and, (C) contain different *methods* intellectual as well as physical instruments of research) for setting up research and evaluating its results. (Feyerabend, 1978: 66)

Christianity today is one religion among other major religions. It is no longer "the Religion" as it was in the past. Moreover, Christianity is now divided – Catholicism, Protestantism and the Orthodox. Indeed, there are further and continuing denominational splits. If we view Christianity as a unity, then this unity is composed of diversity. Christianity today, therefore, needs dialogue among its own different groups and also with other religions.

Under the logic of a non-compromising dualism, which has dominated Western civilization, if exclusivism as universalism is rejected, then inclusivism as relativism must be adopted. If inclusivism as relativism is adopted, then it will follow that all religious maps are true even though they conflict with one another. If each group is absolutely sure that their own map is correct, then is a genuine dialogue possible? I do not think so. Moreover, relativism will eventually lead to conflict, violence and war. As mentioned above, no one in a Western context wants to be labeled a "relativist" even though his/her works support relativism. It seems to me that the ghost of Aristotle is still haunting the West. Western scholars and intellectuals seem to be afraid of the danger of sophism, and they behave as if they remember well Isaiah's admonition: "Woe to those who call what is bad, good, and what is good, bad, who substitute darkness for light and light for darkness, who substitute bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter." (Isaiah 5:20)

In fact, both exclusivism as universalism and inclusivism as relativism are based on the same attitude: dogmatism. While exclusivists are absolutely cocksure that only one map is true, inclusivists are extremely dogmatic that all maps are true, according to their own contexts and tastes. This kind of attitude in religions will prevent people from having genuine dialogue with one another, and thus mutual understanding will never occur. Both exclusivists and inclusivists are not well prepared to listen to others, because they believe that their ways are right. They are well prepared only to defend their ways. Pluralists as fallibilists, on the contrary, are always ready to listen to others because they hold and practice the virtue of humility in their own way. Pluralists believe that all major religions have their own canonical works and traditions, but that people may be wrong in some of their interpretations. Pluralists further argue that since no one absolutely knows whether their map is true or false, it is better to hold that their map may be false rather than that it is always true.

This kind of attitude in religions will also help prevent people from arrogance and dogmatism. Arrogance and dogmatism forces people to shut the door to self-reflection and reassessment of

their maps. If all people in the world, not only Christians, adhered to this kind of attitude, genuine dialogue leading to self-improvement, mutual understanding, peaceful coexistence, and fruitful cooperation would follow.

Why Process Philosophy Matters

Process philosophy has been ignored by most philosophers and scholars in the Western world, both in the analytic and the continental traditions. It is no exaggeration to say that in metaphysics Parmenides's Being has dominated over Heraclitus's Becoming in the West. Likewise Aristotelian logic has dominated over Hegelian logic. There are, of course, some process philosophers and scholars in the West. However, the words of Whitehead, Bergson, Teilhard de Chardin, Hartshorne, and others are too often ignored among Western scholars. That is not to say that Western scholars and intellectuals ignore process thought, at least not in modern physics. What I mean by "modern physics" includes Einstein's general theory of relativity and quantum physics. Modern physicists have found a consensus that everything in nature is in process. This idea corresponds to Buddhist thought that everything in nature is impermanent or changing.

If it is true that everything in nature is in process, then process thought matters. If life is in process, then thought about life is also in process. This implies that we should always be ready to improve, adjust, correct or even reject our own maps. This means that our maps can be fallible, corrigible, and can even be rejected. Process philosophers view the world or nature differently from non-process thinkers. Charles Birch makes this clear when he says,

Bertrand Russell said that either life is matter-like or matter is life-like. A proposition of process thought is that matter is life-like. The proposition that life is matter-like leads to the traditional reductionist analysis of living organisms that goes on in biological laboratories…In the process perspective, biological evolution is seen not just as involving mechanical changes say to the heart as a pump, but internal changes whereby the experience or internal relations becomes richer in a human being as compared with a mosquito. (Birch, 1998: 280-90)

Process philosophy reconciles binary opposites or contrastive pairs because it is open to a logic of holism, or a logic of polarity, or what I would call "the law of complementarity." In other words, process philosophers can transcend the conflicts or clashes between the competing sides because they learn how to use the law of complementarity. The following schema is to show the list of some certain pairs, which are often found in philosophy. These pairs are considered as dipolar in process philosophy.

God vs Nature
Absolutism vs Relativism
Emptiness vs Existence
Transcendence vs Immanence
Reality vs Appearance
Ontology vs Phenomenology
Mind vs Body
Freedom vs Determinism
Subject vs Object
One vs Many

Ought vs Is
Universalism vs Particularism
Abstractness vs Concreteness
Energy vs Matter
Time vs Space

Aristotelian logic3 , or what I would call a logic of non-compromising dualism, has dominated Western scholarship both consciously and unconsciously. The law of the excluded middle usually leaves only one choice between the two rivals. One is not allowed to choose both. Therefore, I am not surprised at all why two geniuses, namely, Einstein and Bohr, debated and disagreed on the question whether "God plays dice" with the world or not. I am not surprised that Catholics and Protestants in Ireland fight each other. I am not surprised that a physicist like Stephen Hawking would write:

With the success of scientific theories in describing events, most people have come to believe that God allows the Universe to evolve according to a set of laws and does not intervene in the universe to break these laws. However, the laws do not tell us what the Universe should have looked like when it started – it would still be up to God to wind up the clock and choose how to start it. So long as the Universe had a beginning, we could suppose it had a creator. But if the Universe is really completely self-contained, having no boundary or edge, it would have neither beginning nor end: it would simply be. What place, then, for a creator? (Hawking, 1985: 140-1)

According to the law of the excluded middle, either freedom or determinism is true, not both. Between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, and perhaps in other countries also, only one of them can have the truth, not both of them. In cosmology, it is either God or the universe; only one exists, not both of them. Apart from the list above, it is not hard for us to look for binary opposites or contrasts, for example, either God or evil, science or religion, reason or faith, Babylon or Jerusalem, heavenliness or worldliness, cause or effect, deduction or induction, self or other, us or them, and so on. The law of the excluded middle has been important for Western civilization. I am not dismissing the law of the excluded middle as useless; it obviously is helpful for a kind of reductionism, which can make for progress in science. My point is that the excluded middle has limits which are overlooked or ignored by most Western scholars and intellectuals. Process philosophers and modern physicists have begun seeing its limits and are learning how to use another kind of logic.

It is Hegel who first presented a dialectical logic, or what I would call a logic of synthesis, in contrast to Aristotelian logic. Some process philosophers and modern physicists have learned to use Taoist logic and Nyaya logic, or what I call a logic of holism. While Taoist logic links the*yin* and *yang*, Nyaya logic combines deduction with induction. Both Nyaya and Taoist logic share the same law, namely, the law of complementarity which is different from the Hegelian law of synthesis. Some examples may make this clear. Let us look at the Hegelian law of synthesis first.

White
Black
Gray
Now let us turn to the law of complementarity.

White
Black
Both white and black

Thus we can see that holism may be divided into two kinds: synthesis and complementarity. Process philosophers and scholars need to learn not only different kinds of logic and their uses, but also their limits. As Khajornpat Tangyin,4 one of my students, stated, "Reduction without holism is blind, but holism without reductionism is blurry."

"We": Either Us or Them, Both Us and Them, and Neither Us Nor Them

Process philosophers and scholars should not limit their ways of thinking to only these three kinds of logic because, though they are somehow useful, they cannot help us solve every problem. But here let us turn to exclusivism, which holds that only one map is true, and inclusivism, which holds that all maps are true. Supposing that we use the law of the excluded middle, we would have the following results:

Either exclusivism or inclusivism
Not exclusivism
Therefore, inclusivism
or
Either exclusivism or inclusivism
Not inclusivism
Therefore, exclusivism

Now if we turn to the law of complementarity, we would have a conclusion that includes both exclusivism and inclusivism. Similarly if we use the law of synthesis, our conclusion would be a synthesis of exclusivism and inclusivism. In fact, however, we should not accept both exclusivism and inclusivism because both of them are based on dogmatism. How can we avoid or escape from dogmatism? Buddhist logic can be an alternative to solve this problem. Buddhist logic, or, as I would call it, the principle of non-attachment. With the principle of non-attachment, we can avoid all kinds of dogmatism and attachment.

With these ways of thinking, we can talk about "we" in different ways. "Either us or them," according to the law of the excluded middle, implies differences among peoples. "Both us and them," according to the law of synthesis, implies unity. "Both us and them," according to the law of complementarity, implies interdependence. "Neither us nor them," according to the principle of non-attachment, implies impermanence and emptiness.

As a Christian, I view Vatican II as a "good sign" for Christians, especially Catholics, to throw away dogmatism and adopt a more humble approach. The Lord Jesus Christ himself was very humble and non-dogmatic. He once said to the Pharisees, "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." (Mark 2: 27) I would like to paraphrase that as: the maps were made for man, not man for the maps. So why we do we remain so attached to and dogmatic about our maps, despite the fact that we can never be sure whether they are true or false?

If we are attached to the law of the excluded middle as the only way of thinking, we will only care for "us and ours," and finally only, in Buddhadasa's terms, "me and mine." It is a threat that this way of thinking now seems to dominate not only Western ciivilization, but almost the whole

world. We often hear phrases like "Christians or Muslims," "Muslims or Hindis," "Israelis or Arabs," not both. In fact, actually and potentially, we have both similarities and differences. As Fay indicates, if we emphasize only one side, we will lack real understanding.

If we insist too heavily on dramatic dissimilarity then we lose the capacity to understand others (and therefore the capacity to appreciate their difference). If we insist on their dramatic similarity, then we lose the capacity to appreciate and understand difference and therefore see ourselves everywhere we turn. In relating to others the choice is not difference *or* similarity; it is difference *and* similarity. (Fay: 90)

We are living in different cultures but in the same world. According to Whitehead and Hartshorne,5 God is dipolar, both absolute and relative, both abstract and concrete. His concrete pole is nature. Nature includes all of us as living cells in different parts of the same living body. As Whitehead wrote:

[A]nalogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The consequent nature of God is conscious; and it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom. The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts...Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity. (Whitehead 1979: 345 – 350)

If Whitehead is correct, then all of our actions, both positive and negative, will always, more or less, affect one another.

Life is a journey. This metaphor, on the one hand, implies dynamic process. This means that we should always be prepared for change. On the other hand, the metaphor presupposes end and means. Religion deals well with ends, whereas science deals well with means. This implies that we need both science and religion. Mark Tamthai's definition of wisdom helps us to clarify. He defines wisdom as:

1. To use reason as far as it can go.
2. To recognize its limits.
3. To allow love or compassion to work in our life.

We may put his ideas in an equation as follows:
Wisdom = Reason + Love (Tamthai, 1999: 28)

Although I agree with Tamthai, I would like to go a little bit further. In our journey of life we do not travel alone. We travel with others. In our journey we fall often. "To err is human." Therefore we should learn to forgive one another in order to keep closer to God. "To forgive is divine." Thus in our journey of life we need not only reason (science and philosophy) and love (religion and spirituality), but also good will (morality and ethics). All of them, namely, reason, love, and good will, should be based on humility. My equation would be as follows:

Wisdom = Reason + Love + Good Will
Humility

In fact, reason or rationality has not completely collapsed as some relativists, deconstructionists and nihilists might imagine. Reason has its own limits, and these limits need to be recognized. A nuclear-bomb formula, for example, is culture-neutral and universal in the sense that it can do damage no matter whether by the hands of liberal capitalists or communists, Americans or Chinese. Cultural, national, and political labels can exaggerate differences.

In case of religion, we cannot say that one religion is better than another. What we could humbly say is that the world is indebted to the West in terms of science and to the East in terms of religion. I agree with Huntington when he says, "The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do." (Huntington, 1997: 51)

On a personal level, Buddhist principles have helped to keep me balanced. Being a Christian does not make me put in question my personal and Thai identity because I use the Buddhist way of thinking. With the principle of non-attachment I am not only attached to one identity because I am conscious that we are new persons every moment. To understand this, let me make an analogy. Supposing that we light a candle in the night. Our common sense would tell us that there is one light in the night because we lit only one candle. In fact, there is not only one light, but many new lights which are born and extinguished every moment. So if someone happens to ask me, "Who are you?" in terms of religion, I would respond, "I am a Catholic in baptism and tradition, Protestant in spirit, and Buddhist in my way of thinking."

Christianity has its own tradition, but this tradition takes many forms and is open to many interpretations. Other religions are similar in this aspect. Phenomenologically, the universal is found in particulars, but ontologically, all particulars are in the Universal, the One. As Lao Tse long ago told us,

> Without stirring abroad one can know the whole world;
> Without looking out the window one can see the way of heaven.
> The further one goes, the less one knows.

This may be interpreted as the One or Universal which is recognized by higher levels of consciousness but appears as the many when it is reflected into the lower levels of being. (Arroyo, 1992: xi) In so far as our consciousness does not develop into higher levels, we have to be guided by limited maps. In order to improve our maps we need to dialogue with others. True dialogue is possible only through pluralism and realizing our limits. Thus neither exclusivism nor inclusivism is the answer.

I cannot agree with Samuel Huntington when he says, "A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim." (Huntington, 1993: 27) This is a reflection of those who are dominated by the logic of non-compromising dualism. Christianity and Islam are not like oil and water. In fact, even though they are different, they have many things in common. Incommensurability should not exclude commonality and similarity. It is true that we need different measures to measure the height of the table and the weight of the stone. But those different measures share at least two commonalities, namely, numbers and the concept of measurement as quantification.

Life is a journey. As long as the journey continues, we should ask ourselves these questions as often as possible: 1) Who am I? 2) Where am I from? 3) Where am I going? 4) Where am I now? 5) What am I doing? 6) How should I live? And when attempting to answer, we should

always keep in mind that "To be is always to be with others in the Other," or "To be is always to be relational."

I realize that what I have said in this paper might evoke many questions and challenges, but I wanted to share this view of religious pluralism as a middle way and a model for cultural pluralism.

Notes

1. It seems to me that here the positivists and the logical positivists face dilemmas. If they decide to totally reject the map, they can turn to either pragmatism or realism. If they choose pragmatism, they have to adopt the concept of usefulness and throw the concept of truth away. If they choose realism, they still keep the concept of truth but must be open to metaphysics. If they decide to partly adapt their map, they will finally accept what van Fraassen called "Constructive Empiricism," which holds that scientific theories seem to be nothing more than fictions based on evidence. (See van Fraassen, *The Scientific Image*, 1980)

2. The negative approach is contrastive to the other two traditional approaches: univocal and analogical.

3. According to Aristotelian logic there are three laws of logic: the Law of Non-contradiction, the Law of Excluded Middle, and the Law of Identity. We may symbolize these laws as follows:

(1) The Law of Non-contradiction: ~ (P · ~ P) (It is not the case that both P and not-P are true)
(2) The Law of the Excluded Middle: P v ~ P (Either P or not-P is true, but not both)
(3) The Law of Identity: P ÉP (If P, then P)

Among the three laws, the law of the excluded middle is considered as the most fundamental because we can deduce it from the other two laws. For example, first, let us look at the law of non-contradiction.

(1) ~ (P · ~ P) Non-contradiction
(2) ~~ P v ~ P 1, De Morgan, Replacement Rule (RR)
(3) P v ~ P 2, Double Negation, RR

Second, let us turn to the law of identity.

(1) P ÉP Identity
(2) ~ P v P 1, Material Implication, RR
(3) P v ~ P 2, Commutation, RR

4. See Kajornpat Tangyin*, Ilya Prigogine's Perspective on Nature: A Critical and Creative Analysis*, an unpublished MA Thesis, Assumption University of Thailand, 1999.

5. See my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: *Hartshorne on God: A Defense*, Chulalongkorn University, 1996 and my article "Process as a Basis for Philosophy in a Time of Change" in *The Bases of Values in a Time of Change: Chinese Philosophical Studies*, XVI, RVP, 1999.

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Chapter XIV

Communication across Cultures: Natural Law and Wisdom Traditions

M. John Farrelly

One salient factor in our present experience of "Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalization" is the tension that exists between, on the one hand, many cultural, political and economic leaders in the countries of the North Atlantic and, on the other, many leaders and people in more traditional societies. The peace and human progress of our world during the twenty-first century depends largely on the capacity and willingness of such leaders to find bases for consensus on issues now addressed on a world level.

Examples of conflict between these diverse perspectives and of an emergence of a significant degree of consensus are found in the 1994 World Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.1 The initial documents and proposals for decisions for both of these conferences were drawn up largely by political leaders in the North Atlantic countries and were marked by an excessively individualistic interpretation of human rights – for example, the acceptance of abortion as a method of family limitation, the rights of teenagers to sexual self – expression independent of family, and the view that women's progress depended on a subordination or avoidance of family responsibilities for personal advancement. In Cairo the worst of the initial proposals were defeated by a coalition among nations of the southern hemisphere, Moslem countries and the Vatican. And in Beijing, the worst of the proposals were defeated by parts of this coalition and by an appeal over the heads of governmental and nongovernmental agency representatives in Beijing to the people of European countries, who did not know that their governments were proposing in Beijing commitments opposed to their own constitutions that favored the family.

In these Conferences countries that were very distinct in cultures were able to agree on much because of a significant consensus on what was morally right and wrong, based on grounds beyond the civil law or traditions of their own countries. In the West this basis of consensus has traditionally been called 'natural law.' In this paper I would like to look at the value of this tradition of natural law as a help in fostering or enabling communication across cultures and so forestalling a conflict of civilizations. We will first (1) take a twentieth-century example of its impact in transforming a society, then (2) show some stages of the tradition of natural law, with particular emphasis on Thomas Aquinas, and (3) suggest how this tradition can be updated in a way to answer some major objections to it in our time. This is a hermeneutical task, because we are interpreting past documents and practices from the perspective of present-day issues.

A Twentieth-Century Example of Natural Law Transforming a Society

In the 1960's in the United States there was a massive movement that broke down discrimination against African Americans in many areas of public life like voting, housing, the use of public accommodations and employment. We may imagine a Southern white in the mid 1960s who has the option to discriminate or not when he employs another or defines the practice of a hotel or restaurant. He may decide not to for economic reasons, or because he fears revenge if he does discriminate, or because the law is now against it, or because he may imaginatively put

himself in the position of a black person and recognize that he himself would not like the demeaning experience of being discriminated against. But even further he may think that the other, in spite of his racial difference, has a *right* to be treated with respect and not be subject to demeaning experiences that discrimination on the basis of color entailed. After all, he is a human being with his own dignity, his own goals and legitimate needs. And the person who comes to think this way may also recognize that it is part of his own duty as a human being to respect the rights of another; to live by this responsibility is part of his own dignity as a human being and it is essential for the building up of a human community. To live without accepting this responsibility is to act against something distinctive of himself as a full human being.

Martin Luther King, who was such a central figure in bringing about this massive social change in the United States at the time, appealed to Scripture, human dignity, and natural rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution in his efforts to bring justice to his people.2 The resulting transformation of consciousness and the revolutionary change in laws and practice were due in part to a raising of people's minds and hearts beyond the immediate to a greater sense of what united the two races, namely their humanity. And this was, therefore, an appeal to natural law. We are not saying that this change resulted only from an appeal to natural law, because there were other factors involved in it. But we do see in this experience that people can be effectively appealed to on the basis of a common humanity; this can overcome the clash of civilizations. This is an instance of a task described by George McLean as follows:

> [In regard to] relations between peoples and conflict resolution. . . we are faced' with the imperative of finding how to proceed in terms of a capacity to grasp the whole .
>
> [T]he central questions are not merely epistemological, but ontological and ethical, namely, what is the global whole in which we exist, and how can we act in relation to other peoples and cultures in ways that promote a collaborative realization of global community in our times?3

The process of overcoming discrimination in the United States in the 1960's called on free acts that involved a new consciousness and a dramatic change in what was considered as acceptable behavior. Separate but equal was no longer considered equality. So a good was involved, a good for those who had been discriminated against, a good for those who were discriminating against others, and a good that bound these people together in society, that is, the common good. This good contested the good and structure of the earlier culture, and so called for cultural change. This call depended on norms that were larger than that culture; they depended on what we may call a constitutive human good. This culture was not the ultimate norm; there was a criterion for the good other than tradition. In fact, Martin Luther King and others at the time called on a longer and deeper tradition than that of the southern culture, namely the Constitution of the United States that accepted natural rights that were God-given and that the government had a duty to defend, and Scripture with its teaching that all human beings are God's children and its stories of how God led the enslaved Israelites from Egypt to the freedom of the promised land. This call was not a denial of cultural differences between blacks and whites nor a plea for homogenization between these ethnic groups; it was rather a call to recognize a good beyond cultural differences that would itself respect these differences and integrate them into a larger social whole.

Some Stages in the Natural Law Tradition

To consider the foregoing twentieth century instances of calls for social justice and cohesion across cultural boundaries as examples of the effective tradition of natural law is to acknowledge that this tradition grows as it is interpreted from new perspectives and applied to new issues. We can see a bit of this growth by taking soundings from this tradition.

The Greeks had a sense that there was an order in the cosmos that was antecedent to human beings' judgments and that this order was reflected too in the nature of human beings and how they should act. There was consequently a justice and law distinct from those which a particular people enact. Aristotle depended on earlier Greek thought when he classified just and unjust actions by the two kinds of law that exist:

By the two kinds of law I mean particular law and universal law. Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other.4

The Greeks saw an analogy between the order that is found in the cosmos and that which is incumbent upon human beings to acknowledge and live by. Laws of the political and social order can be evaluated and critiqued by this law of nature. Aristotle interpreted the development of human life within the context of the Greek city-state, to which individuals should contribute; and he accepted slavery as consistent with the law of nature.

Later, the Stoics had a sense that there was an order coursing through the universe that reflected the divine, and that human beings were more a part of this larger order than of a particular political society. A broader society than that of their particular political society unites human beings. This order can be discerned by human reason, and human beings are more human if they live by this. For example, Cicero writes:

True law is right reason in agreement with nature (Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens); it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting. . . It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.5

The Roman tradition tended to see the natural law in relation to the juridical order, and as such was developed by Roman jurists as a speculative body of universal laws. They distinguished the *ius civile* under which Romans lived from that law which they developed from a common denominator of the varied peoples they governed in their empire, the *ius gentium*. They considered this latter as a codification of the natural law. "Thus Ulpian (d. A.D. 228), the great Roman jurist, stated that insofar as the *ius civile* is concerned, slaves are not regarded as persons; nevertheless, this is not true under natural law because under that law all men are equal (*Digest* 50.17.32).6

St. Paul also had a sense of a law inscribed in the nature of human beings, and that they could have some significant knowledge of this. He writes:

For when the Gentiles who do not have the law by nature observe the prescriptions of the law, they are a law for themselves even though they do not have the law (i.e., the law of the Old Testament]. They show that the demands of the law are written in their hearts. . . (Rom 2:14-15).

This view is not unique to Christianity. The Confucian classic, *The Unvarying Mean*, begins by stating:

What is ordained of Heaven is called the essential nature of man; the following of this essential nature is called the natural law; the cultivation and refinement of this natural law is called culture.7

And in recent reviews of books on Islamic law in studies of comparative ethics, reviewers approve of an author, A. Kevin Reinhart, who studied medieval Muslim writers on the issue of whether people could know the will of God before the coming of revelation through Mohammed. Among diverse views on this issue, there were those,

who held that most actions were innately good or bad (e.g. gratitude and lying, respectively), so that reason was a roughly adequate guide to action before revelation made final distinctions (e.g., the proscription of pork). . . Reinhart finds confidence in the power of reason to assess actions to be more characteristic of the early period, when the Muslims were still an expanding community, therefore optimistic, but also a minority, therefore forced to reckon with the morality of non-Muslims. The Mutazilis are the famous rationalists of early Islamic theology, but a similar confidence showed up in Hanbali, Shafi'i, and other early theologians.8

In the medieval West interest in natural law surged in the twelfth century, partially because the social situation was changing with the emergence of cities. There was a need for some criteria other than feudal tradition to adjudicate ethical issues among contending Christian parties concerning economic, social and political divisions. Scripture and traditional Christian images such as the Body of Christ were appealed to by diverse sides of the same question. Also, there was a revival of Manicheanism in the Cathars of southern France who condemned the flesh. On the other hand there was a revival of interest in nature, as we see in Francis of Asissi. For all these reasons, there was a revival of interest in natural law among canonists and Scholastic philosophers and theologians. This revived understanding was used to evaluate conventional practices, that were normally accepted as legitimate determinations of natural law even though they differed among themselves. Scripture too was a basis for the acceptance of natural law, because it taught that creation and human beings were created by God as good, and it was thought that the ten commandments were basic prescriptions of the natural law.9

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas developed an interpretation of natural law that has been very influential among Catholics since then, and, indeed, not only among Catholics. First of all, natural law is a special kind of law. Thomas concludes his study of what law is by writing, "Law is nothing else than a prescription of reason for the common good made by the authority who has care of the community and' is promulgated."10 Thus, a law is a direction for human action, and so is in the order of practical reason, as distinct from speculative reason. There is an authority behind it from someone or institution that has responsibility for the community. It is for

the common good; if it, indeed, were inimical to the common good it should be changed or, in some cases, it would not be morally binding at all. And finally, it must be promulagated.

There is, of course, civil law and Church law. But there is also a law that God prescribes for us by the fact of constituting us as human beings. This law can, at least in part, be understood by way of understanding our human nature. Here too this law, natural law, is a prescription of our practical reason. There is a law inscribed in lower nature such as animals, but that is not followed freely. Practical reason is ordered to action, and so what falls first in its apprehension is the good, since everything seeks the good:

This is, therefore, the first precept of law: that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. And upon this are founded all other precepts of natural law; so that whatever practical reason naturally apprehends as a human good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of natural law as something to be done or avoided (ST I-II, 94, 2).

Though natural law is properly a prescription of practical reason, Thomas does not split reason off from the rest of the human person; it is our whole human nature that shows us the good proper to us. We share the nature of all material things, and so as part of our nature we have an inclination to conserve our being: "inasmuch as every substance seeks to conserve its own existence according to its nature . . . there pertains to natural law those acts through which human life is conserved and its contrary resisted" (*ibid*.). With animals we have a natural inclination to propagate our species: "And according to this, those things are said to be of natural law which nature teaches all animals: e.g., the conjunction of male and female, the education of the young, and like things" (*ibid*.).

Thirdly, there is [also] in the human an inclination to good according to the rational nature which is proper to it: thus humans have a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to natural law: for example, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination (*ibid*.).

All of this natural law is a participation in God's eternal law or providence, and has been promulgated by him who has care of the whole human race through the very act of creating human beings and giving them a capacity to know something of who they are as human beings (see ST I-lI, 93).

Thomas recognized that there are individuals and indeed peoples who, whether from passion or lack of knowledge, did not know everything that the natural law prescribes; he was aware that Caesar had reported that the Germanic tribes did not think that stealing was morally wrong. Thomas said that the basic principles of the natural law could be known by all (e.g., do good and avoid evil), but that secondary precepts, which are "like particular conclusions close to first principles" (ST I-Il, 94, 5), would be known by some and not by others (ST I-lI, 94, 4).

Also, there are times when there are exceptions to the natural law because of some larger consideration. For example, stealing is against the natural law, but if a family is starving and there is no other way to relieve their need they may take what another has, because the first purpose of the goods of the earth is to meet the needs of all (see ST 11-Il, 66, 7). And it is the natural law to obey the laws of legitimate civil authorities. But when such authorities enjoin the citizens not to open the city gates during a siege, the citizens may disobey this if people on whom the city's defense depends are outside the city, fleeing attack and seek to enter the city (ST I-Il, 96, 6). Similarly, it is natural law that one must return what has been deposited with one by another. But if someone has deposited a weapon, and now wants to use it against the fatherland, one need not

return it (see ST Il-Il, 57, 2, ad 1). In reference to this last case, Thomas notes that "human nature is mutable" (natura hominis est mutabilis), and therefore the prescriptions of natural law do not always hold as such.

Thus Thomas does make provision for different interpretations of natural law, because of the influence of the passions, the deficiences of human reason in practical as well as in speculative knowledge (see ST I-II, 99, 2, ad 2), and the diversity of circumstances. In his philosophy of history Jacques Maritain speaks of the "law of the progress of moral conscience" as an important principle.

He speaks, of course, of progress in the knowledge of the moral law, which does not mean that men necessarily behave better. He gives as examples of this progress the present – day awareness that slavery is contrary to the dignity of the human person, that prisoners of war have rights, that child – labour is intolerable, that labour itself has its dignity, that authority does not need to be ruthless:

The sense of duty and obligation was always present, but the explicit knowledge of the various norms of natural law grows with time. And certain of these norms, like the law of monogamy, were known rather late in the history of mankind, so far as it is accessible to our investigation. Also, we may think that the knowledge of the precepts of the natural law in all of their precise aspects and requirements will continue to grow until the end of human history.11

Thomas recognized that there was a need of an historical revelation of elements of the natural law, because the human mind is clouded over by sin and ignorance (see ST I-Il, 99, 2, ad 2). And so we have the precepts of the ten commandments. Many of the injunctions of the ten commandments are found in other religions as well. And we can acknowledge that they too come from a kind of divine revelation. In the Old Testament there is not only the revelation mediated by the prophets but also that mediated by the Wisdom writers. These writers found lessons about how human beings should live in relation to God and to one another in creation and in the experience of human beings, and they ascribed this knowledge frequently to Wisdom or Lady Wisdom. Some exegetes speak of Lady Wisdom only as reflecting the order of creation. But the exegete Roland Murphy writes:

One may question whether the lyrical description of Lady Wisdom is adequately captured by the concept of order. She certainly cannot be viewed apart from the Lord from whom she originates. Her authority also suggests that she is the voice of the Lord, the revelation of God, not merely the self – revelation of creation. She is the divine summons issued in and through creation, who finds her delight among the humans God has created (8:31). Lady Wisdom, then, is a communication of God, through creation, to human beings.12

Many Catholic theologians have reduced what could be known through nature to a natural theology, but this does not seem an adequate interpretation of the Wisdom literature of the Bible. And to see Wisdom literature as reflecting a divine revelation can help us see much wisdom of other religions of the world as having the same source. 13

Some Contemporary Objections to Natural Law, and Growth of the Tradition

The radical historical changes brought about in cultures recently by the industrial revolution, worldwide communication and exposure to other ways has called into question much of traditional ethics. What a Western philosopher who has taught for many years in Taiwan writes is true of much of Asia and Africa:

Industrialization and the process of modernization have within decades changed the face of this country. The many rapid changes in the socio-economic field have become a challenge to the traditional value system which has led to a rather widespread disorientation in matters of morals. A new value order is not yet in sight. This period of transition from a formerly well established order, which lasted unquestioned for hundreds of years, to a new order of which the contours are not yet clearly visible, affects all members of society in general and adult students in particular.14

For many Catholics in the North Atlantic countries it was Pope Paul VI's reaffirmation of the Church's condemnation of contraception in *Humanae Vitae* (1968) that evoked this crisis, and its consequences continue today, and indeed have broadened. Contraception was condemned as objectively morally wrong because by this act one engaged in the marital act and at the same time acted directly against one essential meaning or purpose of this act, namely procreation. This judgment was in accord with the natural law tradition.

There have been efforts to find an alternate answer to this moral dilemma by many Catholic theologians and philosophers, some of which have led to a rejection or a rather radical reinterpretation of the natural law tradition.15 And these efforts have had repercussions in other areas of moral philosophy and theology. I too have written in this field, and I offer the following as a summary of my understanding of the modification of the natural law tradition called for by this moral problem.16

With this tradition and the Church's teaching I hold that the marital act does indeed have two essential meanings, the unitive and the procreative. It is true that the marital act is not always fertile, but for man and wife to engage freely as persons in such an expression of love is for them not only to express their love for one another but also for them to accept in principle their commitment to the child who may result from their love. It is an act proper specifically to marital love that is open to a larger community, namely the family. And contraception is directly against fertile marital acts. There is a meaning intrinsic to certain human acts that is not dependent simply on what an individual or culture may wish to say by the act; some things they may choose to say by these acts are intrinsically opposed to what the act symbolizes or says, and so are lies or distortions. Rape, for example, is not an act of love.

However, Catholics and many others have held that the meaning of the marital act also includes commitment to raise the child who may be born as a result and expression of the husband and wife's love for one another. The main traditional argument against intercourse outside marriage was that a child needs the environment of marriage for its appropriate growth toward adulthood. On the basis that the marital act is oriented by its nature toward the raising and not only the procreation of children, one can conclude that its full meaning includes the expression of mutual love and both the procreation and the raising of children. But there are at times circumstances when the *full* purpose of the marital act cannot be preserved from serious harm by the birth of another child at the time. In these circumstances there are reasons to say that one may act against the immediate purpose of the act, namely the procreative consequences of the individual marital act, when the full purpose cannot be preserved from serious harm by lesser means.

An analogy helps here. In certain circumstances one may allow an excision of one kidney when another person will die unless he or she has a kidney transplant. To allow an excision of a kidney is to act directly contrary to the intrinsic meaning of our use of our organs, since they are for the support of the life of the person to whom they belong. But there is a larger purpose of our use of our organs that includes the welfare of others as well. And the support of the life of the donor in this case can be preserved sufficiently by the other kidney. So to allow this excision is

not to act against an essential goal of our use of our organs, since that can still be preserved by the other kidney.

Similarly, in some circumstances to engage in marital intercourse and to seek to prevent the procreative consequences of the individual marital act from taking place is not to act against the essential good of procreation since that does not depend on the individual marital act and can be preserved by other marital acts. Thus it is the full meaning of the marital act that is morally controlling, and not simply the immediate meaning. This view does not morally justify intercourse outside of marriage, because that would be to act against the full meaning of this act for the purpose of a partial meaning.

There is a certain similarity between this answer to the question of the morality of contraception and Thomas Aquinas' answer to questions about the return of a deposit to a person who will use it to harm one's country. Even though the natural law prescribes that one should return the deposit, larger circumstances justify one not to do so in this case. Implicitly, these larger circumstances are the greater good than simply justice between two individuals, namely the good of the country. Also, it is similar to the case of taking what belongs to another when one would starve otherwise, because the deeper meaning of the material goods of the world is for the needs of all rather than the property rights of an individual. Thus, acts within immediate structures or relationships cannot be judged wholly without reference to the good of larger structures or relationships that are affected by the act or the deeper meaning or purpose of the relationship. The Church has used this principle again and again in its social teaching, as historical circumstances change and call for new relationships between owners of property and workers, or among countries. In principle, the prescriptions of the natural law change as the meaning of individual human acts depends on enlarging social environments.

Another contemporary objection to natural law comes from the view that in our evolutionary world, it is naive to think that our humanity originated in some set design by God; it is rather the result of chance mutations and survival of the fittest in the course of evolution. Thus one cannot see in ~nature' some moral norm of what one should and should not do. In answer, we can say that the above objection raises the physical sciences into a metaphysics, since its proponents are saying that God is not operative at all in the evolutionary process, and that simple physical acts are wholly adequate as an explanation for what has occurred. Without going into the philosophical issues here, we can limit ourselves to saying that God could bring about the existence of human beings through the structure of physical reality as he originally designed it along with the resulting dynamic process that includes both necessity and chance under his providential care. Recent explorations of evidence for the "anthropic universe" have supported this view in the minds of many scientists.

Finally, the objection can be raised that "nature" is no longer an adequate context to judge the morality of a human act; such a judgment must be made in the context of the human being as person, as a subject who freely and autonomously seeks his/her fulfillment. In answer, let us briefly return to the historical phenomena we presented at the beginning of this article, namely that of a white adult in the southern United States in the mid 1960's who judges that he should not discriminate against blacks. He gradually comes to the point where he recognizes that the black man or woman is a person who has inherent human dignity. The white man must recognize and respect that dignity both in himself and the other. There is an absolute injunction, not in the sense of being hypothetical upon some consequence one may choose to achieve but rather in virtue of which one senses a responsibility to another as a human equal. The other is a person because he has a human nature. There is no dichotomy between person and nature as the context for moral judgment.

Indeed, natural law viewed through a contemporary hermeneutical lens opens vistas for ethical communication across cultures.

Notes

1. See George Weigel, *Witness to Hope. The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999) 715-727, 766-771. Documentation is provided there.

2. See David L. Lewis, *King. A Critical Biography* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971); and Andrew Reck, "Natural Law and the Constitution," *Review of Metaphysics* 42 (1989) 483-511.

3. George McLean, "Culture, Pluralism and Globalization," 24.

4. *Rhetoric*, 1373b 4-9; see also *Eth. Nic*. 1134b 18-1136a 9.

5. Cicero, *De re publica*, III, xxii (in the Loeb series translation).

6. B.F. Brown, "Natural Law," *New Catholic Encyclopedia* vol. 10, 252.

7. Quoted by John C. H. Wu, "Natural Law. Thomistic Analysis," *NCE* 10, 256.

8. Christopher Melchert, "Discerning the Will of God: Four Recent Books on Islamic Law," *Religious Studies Review* 23 (1997) 14. His reference is to A. Kevin Reinhart, *Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995). Also see in the same issue of RSR, John Kelsay, "Islam and the Comparative Study of Religious Ethics: Review of Selected Materials, 1984-1995," 3-9.

9. See Jean Porter, *Natural and Divine Law. Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics* (Grand Rapids: Win. Eerdmans, 1999) 34-4 1.

10. Thomas Aquinas *Summa theologiae* I-lI, 90, 4. The translation I am using, with some adjustments, is that of the Blackfriar's edition (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1966) vol. 28. My adjustments usually follow those found in John Boler, "Aquinas on Exceptions in Natural Law," in Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (ed.), *Aquinas's Moral Theory. Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1999) 161-204.

11. Michael Crowe, *The Changing Profile of the Natural Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) 187-188. His quotation is from J. Maritain, *On the Philosophy of History* (London: 1959) 82-83.

12. Roland Murphy, "Introduction to Wisdom Literature," *New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990) 450.

13. See, for example, David Carpenter, "Revelation in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Interreligious Dialogue," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 29 (1992) 175-188. He finds a similarity between revelation in Hindu tradition and that which comes through Wisdom in Scripture.

14. Arnold Sprenger, "Higher Moral Education in Taiwan," Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development, ed. Tran Van Doan, Vincent Shen, and George McLean (Washingon, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991) 176.

15. See Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (ed.), *Natural Law and Theology* (New York: Paulist Press, 1991); Michael Allsopp and John O'Keefe (ed.), *Veritatis Splendor. American Responses* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1995).

16. See M. J. Farrelly, "The Principle of the Family Good," *Theological Studies* 31 (1970) 262-274; "The Person and the Human Good," *God's Work in a Changing World* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985; now available through Washington D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy) 77-160; and "An Impasse in the Church," *America*, May 24, 1986.

Chapter XV
Eucharist and Globalization

John P. Hogan

Introduction

In this paper, I will attempt to relate Eucharist to globalization, the dominant problematic of our new century. I will also present some of the corresponding implications for cultural identity, pluralism, and social justice. Given the breadth of the issue, I can only hope to stimulate some questions and perhaps widen the scope of the Catholic eucharistic lens. Rather than look at many examples, I have chosen to look at the foundation of Eucharist and how it relates to globalization. I was prompted to this approach by Langdon Gilkey's comment of many years ago that "the Eucharist needs no redirection... it is the center; but it needs... an infinite widening and extension over the whole earth."1

My approach has been formed from two perspectives. The first is my own career which has focused on third world development issues in a rapidly globalizing economy. My particular interest centers on the relationships that exist among religions, cultures, and development. The second perspective has to do with the crystallizing debate around the linkage between Eucharist and justice. My steps in pursuit of that linkage were quickened by Kathleen Hughes' pointed question, "When Jesus said, 'Do this in memory of me,' what was the *this* he had in mind?" John Coleman, S.J. recently reminded us that social justice finds its roots in and is fed by the eucharistic imagination. He adds, "How then have we so lost our way that such claims can seem provocative?"2 Eucharist is the essence of Christian praxis, the fulfillment of Baptism, a thankful yes to Jesus' life, death, and resurrection which incorporates us as a spirited community to do as he did – seek and build the Kingdom of God. Indeed, this understanding runs throughout our tradition. What went wrong?

Could it be that we have let a too individualistic and therapeutic emphasis on "real presence" obscure the deeper meaning of Christ's presence and action in us as a community of believers? St. Augustine said, "We eat the body of Christ to become the body of Christ."3 What in the world might that mean today?

To a great extent, globalization has been a western big business and particularly U.S.-dominated process. However, that does not mean that if human concerns, and particularly concerns for the poor, are brought to the fore that a greater common good cannot come from the process. That is the message Pope John Paul II creatively set forth in *Ecclesia in America*. In response to globalization, the Pope counter-proposed the "globalization of solidarity."4

Traces of all of the received meanings of Eucharist, in the face of globalization, need to be teased out: global covenant community, thanksgiving, sacrifice, reconciliation, table ministry and the banquet of human destiny. If a few little pieces of the globe, bread and wine, "fruit of the vine and work of human hands," can be Christ's presence, then so can the rest of the universe. As Michael Himes tells us, "The Eucharist is the tip of the iceberg. It is the first step in the transubstantiation of all creation...the destiny of the universe."5

When and how does Eucharist call us to be open to the positive potential of the emerging global economy and culture? On the other hand, when and how might Eucharist be a real symbol of a needed resistance to a global homogenization of local cultures that desecrates the environment

and discards human beings as "collateral damage" of economic "progress?" How might Eucharist provide the theological basis for Catholic social teaching on solidarity, subsidiarity and the option for the poor? How might it be coupled with a discernment process that rests on the eucharistic imagination, builds community, and takes action on behalf of justice?

With the dominant problematic of globalization in mind, the following sections will try to get to the "this" in Jesus' mandate. How does it relate to the cultural identity, economic and environmental issues of globalization? Section one will highlight St. Paul's treatment of Eucharist in I Corinthians as a basis for solidarity; section two will present some examples of globalization with implications for Eucharist; section three will sketch steps for a critical eucharistic discernment process; a short conclusion follows.

St. Paul: Discerning the Body of Christ

For most Americans, the age of globalization with its computers, cell phones and stock market seems to have arrived whether we like it or not. What does sharing the body and blood of Christ say to this new uncharted course? Eucharist means gratitude, thanksgiving, a commitment to take on the attitude of Jesus toward his Father. How does Eucharist call us to stewardship and global solidarity with the poor?

The New Testament is replete with stories of invitations to homes and fellowship meals. There were lots of dinner parties. At these affairs, Jesus can be heard constantly reminding his friends to be "thankful." He also used such occasions to reach out to hookers and hustlers. One thing jumps out: participants in the dinners and picnics are all treated as equals; all receive the same meal. There was no first class!

In like manner, Jesus' last meeting with his disciples was a meal of thanksgiving and blessing that stretched back to earlier covenants and particularly the passover from slavery. However, this time, he changed the blessing before he broke the bread, saying, "This is my body." In effect, he was saying that this bread is not only a reminder of the passover bread our ancestors ate, this bread is me. He announced that "this wine was his blood, the blood of the new covenant."6 The participants in the new covenant became blood relatives, not only of Jesus but of one another; and with that comes responsibility for the extended family. The new covenant has some demanding terms. In John's Gospel, a foreshadowing of those terms is laid out when the master washes the feet of his disciples. He reverses the whole social order and scandalizes his closest followers, especially Peter.

Two clear lines emerge. The first is table ministry as a foretaste of the eschatological banquet, "a taste of eternity in time," and the second, the memorial of his redemptive sacrifice. Both lines have been beautifully depicted on film. *Babette's Feast* is a parable of thanksgiving and grace. God's presence arrives among the stern, pious community in the form of a woman's free gift – a gourmet meal, a feast. Although grace comes as it always does, free of charge, no strings attached, on the house – the participants in the feast are changed.7

The sacrificial element of Eucharist has also been graphically illustrated in the life of Archbishop Romero. That too has been captured on film. He ended his last homily with the words, "May this immolated Body and his Blood sacrificed for the world nourish us, that we may give our body and our blood to suffering and pain as Christ did – not for self but to bring about justice and peace for our people."8 Both examples speak to our concerns today, the deeper meaning of "real presence" and the "this" in a global context.

I would like to turn now to St. Paul's treatment of the eucharistic celebration in I Corinthians 11:17-34. John Haughey does an excellent job of unpacking that text. The lessons to be learned from Paul clearly apply to our task. Here Paul is seeking to get to the root of the insensitive behavior of the Corinthians. He aims for the deeper meaning of the "real presence" as the body of Christ identified with the community. "Defective perception of the mystery of the Lord's presence in the community led to defective internalization, and, in turn, to deficient projection or social behavior."9 The Corinthians, in spite of their belief in the real presence, didn't get it. Their understanding was very much tied up with an "individuated Christ." There was little or no grasp of "being members of one another in a whole which is his sacred presence..."10 Paul's concern gets behind interpersonal behavior as well as racial, cultural, national, economic, ideological and social divisions. Maybe we still suffer from the Corinthian myopia!

Had the Corinthians understood Eucharist as the presence that unites members in the body and creates a single entity, they would have realized how sacrilegious their behavior toward one another was. We can only imagine what it might have been toward non-Christians! "A nascent gnosticism was developing in Corinth which had some portion of the community of believers verticalizing and spiritualizing their faith in Christ."11 This manifested itself both in inflated egos and lack of concern for the less educated, the stranger, the poor, and the slave. Then as now, Jesus' humanity seems to have posed more of a problem than his divinity.

Paul invites the Corinthians to a discernment process of self-examination around Eucharist. "Their sin was not a lack of faith in Jesus... They were in error about who they were, because they were wrong about who he was now. Their belief was in a disembodied Jesus. They believed in one not bodied the way he said he would be."12 Paul is reminding the community that Jesus said he would be there in the poor, the prisoner, the foreigner but he is also raising the trinitarian dimension, "…that they all may be one in us..."(John 17:2 1).

If the above textual reasoning is accurate, as it appears to be, Jesus' mandate would then be: "Do this again and again by remembering me at your table fellowship. But you remember me if you know my presence with you is through one another whom I am fashioning into so many members of my own body."'3 In Paul's view, the private, individual possession of Christ comes at no cost and is selfish. Rather, he understood Eucharist as participation in a very concrete, communal way. Haughey refers to this as "relational wholeness" which makes us Christ's body and members of one another. "The knitting together of individuals would be their redemption and at the same time would be the beginning of the recapitulation of all systems in Christ."14

This understanding of Eucharist offers intriguing food for thought for realizing Christ's presence on a global scale. Paul sees the concrete working out of real presence in a community of people who are open and identify not with the few, the like-believers, but with all – with Christ himself in the whole body. But there is great movement and freedom within that body – precisely because "They were Christ's body."15 To grasp what Paul seems to be saying is startling! Together we are Christ! We are one with the "social flesh" of the word of God. Christ's death and resurrection can now become the determinants of our lives. If we are truly members of his body, he is now us.16

How should this view of Eucharist as "relational wholeness" affect us? If we are one in the Spirit – no longer Jew or Greek, slave or free – what does that call us to in relation to the emerging global system and those who people it – especially the poor? Should our "corporate" presence, in some way, be a challenge to that other corporate presence – the multinational corporation? Paul's views clearly touched the political, economic and environmental issues. He had profound respect for all created reality and was not afraid of the local, the social, the foreign, the body.

Clearly this approach to eucharistic presence puts theological flesh on the theoretical bones of Catholic social teaching – solidarity, subsidiarity, and the option for the poor. It provides the "body" – head, hands, feet – for the Church as a transnational, global actor. It is a much more "real" presence than a privatized, individuated Jesus in a host. If we can realize this "relational wholeness," we could be a lot more effective in terms of global social ecological systems. But first, what kinds of situations might that body walk into?

Embodying the Globalization of Solidarity

In addressing the multicultural and multiracial aspects of the western hemisphere in *Ecclesia in America*, John Paul II bids us to travel three paths: to conversion, to communion, and to solidarity. The globalization of solidarity is the key to his vision. Solidarity is a term with a rather long history in Catholic social teaching. Theologically, it reflects the ontological unity of humankind redeemed as a new creation in Christ. It signifies the responsibility of all to stand with and promote human rights, economic and social development, and environmental concerns. It calls for a special commitment to those in need – in a very real sense, an identification with them. John Paul's linkage of solidarity with globalization is truly ingenious and a challenging call to American Catholics.

The Church in America is called not only to promote greater integration between nations, thus helping to create an authentic globalized culture of solidarity, but also to cooperate with every legitimate means in reducing the negative effects of globalization, such as the domination of the powerful over the weak, especially in the economic sphere, and the loss of the values of local cultures in favor of a misconstrued homogenization.17

Without defense of the poor and marginalized, both individuals and nations, globalization could end up being merely a new and perhaps more deadly form of colonialism. The Pope's analysis of global solidarity unfolds in light of foreign debt, corruption, drugs, the arms race, environmental degradation, racial and cultural discrimination, and immigration. These problems – the dehumanizing outcomes of a misguided economic globalization – lead to a culture of death where the powerful can relegate certain peoples to the dustbin of history.18

This is a direct challenge to the American Church, but what I find missing is a theological, sacramental and liturgical base that unites the paths of conversion, communion and solidarity. The path to solidarity would be greatly enhanced and supported theologically by applying Paul's notion of bodily eucharistic presence in the sense of "relational wholeness" to the community of believers and to the whole globe.

In order to understand better the current global context, especially from the perspective of the poor, I would like to turn now to a few snapshots of globalization from Africa and Latin America.

I begin with a case study from Nigeria: "The Ogoni and Oil."19 You hear the same story in every home you enter. You see it in every corner of the villages you visit. The pitiable and scandalous tale is the same: "My once productive farmland," a farmer laments, "now lays fallow, barren – forever infertile. It is as though concrete has been poured over and cemented the surface of my means of livelihood. Large chunks of tar cover many of the farms." This predicament is not the plight of only the farmers in Ogoniland. The fishermen and women also suffer. The rivers are red, covered with "blood" from oil spills. The fish are dead or can no longer produce offspring.

The Ogoni are subsistence farmers or fishermen that live in the coastal delta of Nigeria, the area of the country's oil production fields. Nigeria obtains ninety percent of its foreign earnings from oil and has contracted European and American firms to manage its oil fields. Oil pollution

has had devastating impact on the territory's agricultural land and rivers. The effect on families, children, and the work force has been disastrous. Neither government nor the corporations have done anything to improve conditions. Unemployment has increased; no hospitals, schools, water systems, or roads have been built. Employees of the foreign firms live in spacious quarters and employ Ogoni as servants. In spite of their oil-rich land, Ogoni men and women consider themselves a "forsaken" people. A popular saying in Nigeria, one which a person might say to an enemy, is "may oil be discovered in your backyard" – a blessing turned sour. Moreover, when a non-violent movement was organized to address these concerns to the government, its leader was assassinated in 1995 by the president-dictator. Oil profits continue to flow out to Europe and the United States.

It is a sad parallel, but, from the perspective of many African theologians, the extractive function of the oil industry in some ways mirrors the role of Eucharist. One could apply Cameroonian theologian Jean-Marc Ela's twenty-year-old comment on the Eucharist to the plight of the Ogoni: "the rigid rules on the eucharistic matter [legislating wheat bread and grape wine] oblige the African churches to 'resign themselves to being a tool for the prosperity of someone else's commerce."'20

This case study can only give a hint of the tremendous complexity involved in the globalization process, as well as the devastating impact on family life, culture and the environment. Since Americans, for the most part, are the winners in the globalization race, it is hard for us to hear that side of the story.

To a great extent, our ability to identify with the poor and the local from our own context of affluence and the global is a eucharistic question. If, indeed, the "Eucharist is where Catholics are educated," we must move beyond our current grasp of real presence as limited to the elements of bread and wine and widen our scope to Paul's embodied eucharistic presence in the community – a "relational wholeness" that stretches around the globe.

Unfortunately, our recent global track record has not been good. Indeed some situations might indicate a failure of Eucharist. One need only think of Chile under Pinochet, Central America, Rwanda before and during the genocide, Northern Ireland and the Balkans.21 All were situations where Eucharist became symbolic of division and exclusion rather than unity and inclusion. How many opportunities for reconciliation and forgiveness were missed? And perhaps when we look at our own issues of segregation, the plight of our cities, and tax structures, the global neglect of the poor comes closer to home. Paul's concerns are both local and global. "Examine yourself, and only then eat of the bread and drink of the cup. For all who eat and drink without discerning the body, eat and drink judgment against themselves." (I Cor 11:28-31) If not properly discerned, Eucharist can be dangerous to our health!

William T. Cavanaugh writing of *Torture and Eucharist* in Chile draws on the writings of Henri de Lubac and Dom Gregory Dix to indicate the dire effects of an overly individualized concept of Eucharist. This had the effect of isolating individuals and rendering the Church ineffective in dealing with oppression until an understanding of the "true" body of Christ became present in the community. Only when this presence was lived in the community would the Church find the courage to stand up to torture.22

A renewed sense of Paul's embodied Eucharist is needed to infuse a global Catholicism capable of being incorporated in each culture yet open to the potential goods of a global culture. Robert Schreiter writing on *The New Catholicity* for a global age calls for a theology of culture constructed on a foundation of intercultural communication and hermeneutics.23 He points out that this theology of culture started with *Gaudium et Spes* and has continued with John Paul II.

Two central doctrines provide key resources for such a theology of culture. First, the trinity, "The mission of the Second and Third Persons in the world, and God's reconciliation of the cosmos to the divine Being are themes that take on new significance in a globalized world." Second, the Paschal Mystery provides Christians with a "master narrative" for an epoch without master narratives. "The passion narrative itself brims with post-colonial ironies of betrayal, denial, mistaken identifications, and abandonment. And it ends in great surpise.24

I fully agree with Schreiter on the importance of these two themes for a theological response to globalization. However, I would hasten to add Eucharist understood as a visible sign of Christ's bodily presence expressing "relational wholeness." We reenact *our* master narrative every Sunday. Without a broader understanding of the central act of Christian worship, we run the growing risk of aiding and abetting the growing separation of the rich and poor – the Church of the rich and the Church of the poor. Indeed, Eucharist is where Catholics are educated.

I will close this section with a brief account of Eucharist as applied to globalization – in this case, resistance to globalization because of its impact on the poor. This example comes from El Salvador. Cavanaugh offers a cogent illustration of how and when Eucharist might function as resistance to a negative globalization which compresses space and time and, under the pretense of a united world, enslaves the poor. He quotes a homily of Father Rutilio Grande of El Salvador.

The Lord God gave us... a material world for all, without borders... "I'll buy half of El Salvador. Look at all my money. That'll give me the right to it" No! That's denying God! ... Christ has good reason to talk about his kingdom as a meal. He talked about meals a lot. And he celebrated one the night before his supreme sacrifice... And he said that this was the great memorial of the redemption: a table shared in brotherhood, where all have their position and place... This is the love of a communion of sisters and brothers that smashes and casts to the earth every sort of barrier and prejudice and that one day will overcome hatred itself.25

One month later, Grande was murdered. Archbishop Romero declared, to the disgust of the rich and the military, that only one mass – the funeral mass – would be celebrated in the Archdiocese that Sunday. The elites were outraged. But Romero was using the power of the Eucharist to collapse spatial barriers separating rich and poor not by simply declaring the Church universal and united but rather by calling the faithful together to one particular location around one altar and expressing the *Catholica* in one place at one time.26

Hence the body of Christ has to be properly discerned. Otherwise Christ is betrayed. This perhaps helps to explain something of the failures of Eucharist mentioned above. In the face of globalization, the body might call for support or resistance, depending on local circumstances. If our eucharistic celebrations are to have anything to say to our new global situation, they will have to be accompanied by a reflective communal discernment process. The next section introduces that process.

Critical Discernment and Relational Wholeness

The jury is still out as to whether globalization will prove a blessing or curse to humanity. Thus far, however, it is had a killing effect on the world's poor, local cultures, and the environment. In a sense globalization has become a liturgy writ-large – with matching vestments, rituals, music, drama, food and text. It has its rubrics, hierarchy, acolytes and parishioners – only the poor are left out.

What I propose is an understanding of Eucharist, with a corresponding discernment process which allows, even compels, the believing community to become aware, get involved, and exert

influence on the globalization problematic with its implications for economic and environmental issues. The "relational wholeness" understanding of Eucharist provides the identity and work plan for us as a Church to travel the path of conversion, communion, and solidarity with the poor. Christ's presence is global, therefore, we as a community are global and should so act. In a very real sense, we should feel the suffering of the Ogoni! After all, their plight, to a great extent, is generated by our oil consumption, but, more importantly, the Ogoni and we are one in Jesus' body.

Solidarity needs to be more than a principle and an attractive slogan. For it to really reflect the ontological unity of humankind redeemed in Christ, our embodiment in him and him in us needs to be preached and reflected on during liturgy, emphasized in the prayer of the faithful, and discussed in communal discernment sessions. Such discernment needs to include honest, open interreligious and intercultural dialogue. Whether we like it or not, "global" is in.27 The Church's articulation of Christ's presence and uniqueness needs to move beyond the negative defensiveness of *Dominus Jesus*.28

"Eucharist makes real the presence of Christ both in the elements and in the body of believers."29 The majority of Catholics would probably agree with the former but scratch their heads at the latter. For too many of us, Eucharist is an interior retreat – a "spiritual" thing. A corollary of that is the virtual absence of liturgy and Eucharist in official Catholic social teaching, as well as the relatively recent separation of liturgy from social thought and activism.30 (A strange twist, indeed, a narrowly defined reversal in this trend, is the recent threat, of some U.S. bishops, to deny the Eucharist to some American politicians over the abortion issue.) Such moves are, for the most part, serious betrayals, not only of the liturgical movement but also of the New Testament and patristic traditions. Such moves only serve to deny the Eucharist its rightful educational and inclusive role.

Moreover, I would contend that an inductive, practical discernment process has to be built into our eucharistic celebrations that brings out the communal, bodily nature of eucharistic presence and relates that presence to justice issues in the global age. We need to begin with the experience of the local community. How do we experience community? How do we experience globalization? How do others around us or across town experience it? What about others around the world? How and why does being the body of Christ call us to seek solidarity in this situation? Are we in need of conversion from our habits, way of life, way of thinking? How do we reflect on our own experience when we have pulled it together into a personal and communal story? How do we judge our story, our situation? Do we need to change? Can we act on our judgment? What action should we take? What do we do about the situation?

Obviously, the above is a shorthand version of Lonergan's method: experience, understanding, judgment, decision (action). It is not the only discernment process which could serve our purposes, but it is one that maps clearly the cognitive and hermeneutical process and has been put to excellent use in examining the globalization process at the Woodstock Theological Center in Washington.31

This process is akin to the discernment to which Paul was calling the Corinthians but broadened to global horizons. In the Eucharist, we "put on Christ" and relive his story, and, in doing that, discover our own. This is what we are called to do at every Eucharist. Outcomes of the process might take many forms: support for the UN, fair trade practices, and even, one day, a global tax; or, at other times, it might mean aiding the resistance to a crass globalization process that tramples on local cultures and the poor. Decisional actions might run the gamut from advocacy to volunteer efforts, to parish twinning, to support for CCHD and CRS efforts.

Such an approach implemented within the context of eucharistic presence as "relational wholeness" could ignite communities to take up some of the difficult socio-economic questions. The stock market, WTO, energy policy, sweatshops, AIDS, drugs, racial, religious and ethnic conflict, immigration, and global warming are defining our globe. Distance no longer cleanses dividends. Since, so far at least, we are the "winners," we need to understand our role as members of the body of Christ and our responsibilities to the "losers." That might be what Augustine meant by "We eat the body of Christ to become the body of Christ."

Conclusion

I readily admit that this broadening of horizons is a tall order for pastors, liturgists, religious educators, and parishioners, but it seems to me absolutely necessary given today's world. We take on Jesus' body and re-live his life every time we participate in the eucharistic liturgy. At the same time, we find ourselves in a world thrown together, culturally, religiously, economically, and environmentally. Unfortunately, as Haughey points out, we seem to continue to follow "a Christ who looks more like the one our Corinthian forebears concocted than the one Paul preached." We allow Paul the eschatological horizons pointing to the future but fail to see that "they are also political [cultural, social, economic, environmental] vistas pointing to the present and to possibilities in the Christ mystery we have even stopped imagining."32

Together – globe-wide – we are the Christ – members of one another. The problems of the Ogoni, as well as, the U.S. poor, are our problems as well. To mirror our eucharistic people of faith image with socially responsible global citizenship, we need a Eucharist that calls us not only to inner change but also to a different set of relationships with each other, a different relationship to nature, an openness to work with other religions and secular organizations, and a willingness to discuss and discern life's tough issues in the context of global justice.

I am convinced that, for the overwhelming majority of Catholics, education to solidarity, subsidiarity, and the option for the poor will not happen unless it takes place within the context of Eucharist. "The whole of Catholic praxis is training in sacramental vision."33 These are uncharted waters but eucharistic liturgy provides a compass pointing to the "infinite widening and extension over the whole earth" that Gilkey mentioned.

Christ's eucharistic bodily presence allows us to take risks and calls us to these tasks. As Gutierrez reminded us many years ago, "the Church should rise to the demands of the moment..." He added wryly, "Some chapters of theology can be written only afterwards."34

Notes

1 Langdon Gilkey, "Symbols, Meaning, Divine Presence," *Theological Studies* 35 (June 1974) 266-267. This paper was first presented at the University of Notre Dame on June 19, 2001; see John P. Hogan, "People of Faith and Global Citizens: Eucharist and Globalization," in Anne Y. Koester, ed. *Liturgy and Justice: To Worship God in Spirit and Truth*, Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002, pp. 47-61. See also John P. Hogan, "The Eucharist and Social Justice," Romero Lecture, no. 2 (Romero Center, Camden, NJ, March 23, 2002).

2 John A. Coleman, "How the Eucharist Proclaims Social Justice," Part One, *Church* (Winter 2000) 5, also Part Two, *Church* (Spring 2001) 11-15. Kathleen Hughes, RSCJ, "The Liturgy That Does Justice," Video, Preaching the Just Word Series 4, Liturgy Training Publications, 1995. [See also Nathan Mitchell, "Justice and Beauty," *Assembly* 27 (May 2001) 17 and 24, Kathleen Hughes

and Mark R. Francis, eds., *Living No Longer for Ourselves: Liturgy and Justice in the Nineties* (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1991) and Keith Pecklers, S.J., *The Unread Vision: The Liturgical Movement in the USA 1926-1955* (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1998), Enrique Dussel, "The Bread of the Eucharistic Celebration as a Sign of Justice in the Community," in Mary Collins and David Powers, eds., *Can We Always Celebrate the Eucharist?,* Concilium 152 (New York: Seabury Press, 1982) 56-65. *The Catechism of the Catholic Church* (New York: Paulist Press, 1994) 353, no. 1397 tells us, "The Eucharist commits us to the poor."]

3 Michael J. Himes, *Doing the Truth in Love: Conversations about God. Relationships and Service* (New York: Paulist Press, 1995).

4 John Paul II, "Ecclesia in America," *Origins* 28 (February 4, 1999) 566-592. See also John P. Hogan, "Ecclesia in America: Towards a Catechesis of Global Solidarity," *Living Light 35* (Summer 1999) 16-27.

5 Himes, *Doing the Truth in Love*, 129. For anaphora, preface, and epiclesis, see Catechism, 34 no. 1353.

6 Ibid., 124-125.

7 John Paul II, "The Eucharist, 'a taste of eternity in time,"' *L'Osservatore Romano* (1 November 2000) 11. For "Babette's Feast," see Philip Yancey, *What's So Amazing About Grace*? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997) 26.

8 For an excellent discussion of the film "Romero" including an explanation of some of the "license" taken, see Rowena Hill, "Poured Out for You: Liturgy and Justice in the Life of Archbishop Romero," *Worship* 74 (Sept. 2000) 414-432. See also, Ricardo Ramirez, C. S.B., "The Unfinished Eucharist," *Maryknol*l (Nov. 2000) 24-27.

9 John C. Haughey, S.J. "Eucharist at Corinth: You are the Christ" in Thomas E. Clarke, S.J., ed., *Above Every Name: The Lordship of Christ and Social Systems* (Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1980) 108. For this section I depend on Haughey's insightful reading of I Corinthians.

10 Ibid., 109.

11 Ibid., 113.

12 Ibid., 117.

13 Ibid., 120. See Haughey, 118-120 where he refers to William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, *I Corinthians: A New Translation* (The Anchor Bible; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) for discussion on the "uses of the neuter demonstrative this."

14 Haughey, 123.

15 Ibid., 125.

16 Ibid., 127.

17 "Ecclesia in America," no. 5. See Hogan, "Catechesis of Global Solidarity," 20.

18 Ibid., no. 63. Hogan, 21.

19 This case study is taken from the "Global Economy and Local Cultures" project ongoing at Woodstock Theological Center, Washington, DC. The project works with Jesuit research centers around the world and is managed by Gasper LoBiondo, S.J. and Rita Rodriguez.

20 Jean-Marc Ela, *African Cry* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1980) 6, see Chap.1, "Eucharist in the African Churches: Sign of Salvation or of Dependence?" 1-8. See also Msgr. Anselme Sanon, "Dimensions Anthropologiqes De L'Eucharistie," *La Documenation Catholique* (Aout 1981) 721-729; Tissa Balasuriyia, O.M.I., *The Eucharist and Human Liberation* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1979) and Nicholas Paxton, "The Liberating Eucharist," *New Blackfriars* 64 (April 1983) 180-187; Leonardo Boff, *Los Sacramentos de la vida y la vida de los sacramentos*, Coleccion Iglesia Nueva, 19, 2nd ed. (Bogota: Indo-American Press Service, 1975).]

21 See for example: Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God* (New York: Knopf, 2000), Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000) and *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), Woodstock Theological Center, *Forgiveness in Conflict Resolution: Reality and Utility – The Northern Ireland Experience* (Washington: WTC, June 18, 1997). There are numerous studies covering the churches and the Rwanda genocide; see for example African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance* (London: African Rights, 1995 rev. ed.).

22 William T. Cavanaugh, *Torture and Eucharist* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) pp. 205-207; 229-234, 252 ff.; see also Henri de Lubac, *Corpus Mysticism: L'Eucharistie et L'Eglise au moyen age*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Aubier, 1949); Dom Gregory Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy* (New York: Seabury Press, 1982) and Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991).

23 Robert J. Schreiter, *The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1997) 130.

24 Ibid., 60. For one of the early theological references to globalization, see *Gaudium et Spes* no. 54.

25 William T. Cavanaugh, "The World in a Wafer: A Geography of the Eucharistic as Resistance to Globalization" in Sarah Beckwith, ed., *Catholicism and Catholicity: Eucharistic Communities in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 85. See also "Bishop Threatens President with Excommunication in *Houston Catholic Worker* 31 (May-June 2001) 1 and 8. Bishop Hesayne challenges the President of Argentina's neo-liberal economic policies that crush the poor. He indicates the insincerity of many communicants by alluding to the street-term "host-eaters."

26 Cavanaugh, "World in a Wafer," see James R. Brockman, *Romero: A Life* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989), 9-18.

27 Schreiter, *New Catholicity* 11-27.

28 CDF, *Dominus Jesus: On the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church* (Vatican City: CDF, August 6, 2000).

29 Cavanaugh, *Torture and Eucharist*, 205.

30 See Coleman, "How the Eucharist Proclaims Social Justice," 5, for a brief sketch of the liturgy-justice linkage set in motion by Virgil Michel, OSB. For an excellent overview of theological themes and their relation to CST, see Michael J. Himes and Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., *Fullness of Faith: The Public Significance of Theology* (New York: Paulist Press, 1993).

31 Woodstock uses the Ignatian exercises updated with the methodology of Bernard Lonergan. For helpful introductions to the approach, see "Theological Reflection: Woodstock's Way of Working," interview with James L. Connor, S.J., *Woodstock Report* (December 1992) 3-7, and James L. Connor, S.J., "Global Economy and Cultures," *Woodstock Report* (October 1999) 3-8. For Lonergan, see *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1970) and *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

32 Haughey, 111.

33 Himes and Himes, *Fullness of Faith*, 113. At their June 2001 meeting, the U.S. Bishops drafted and adopted a statement, *The Real Presence of Jesus Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist: Basic Questions and Answers* (Washington, DC: USCC, July 2001). The statement emphasizes the theory of "transubstantiation" and is apparently a response to concerns raised by a survey about "real presence" in the eucharistic bread and wine. There is only brief mention of

Christ's presence in the scriptural word and "assembly" (no. 13). See also Jerry Filteau, "Bishops explain Christ's real presence in Eucharist," *Catholic Standard* (June 21, 2001) 3.

34 Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973) 272.

Chapter XVI
Globalization, Philosophy and the Model of Ecumenism

William Sweet

It is difficult to read a newspaper or a magazine, or listen to the radio or television, without coming across some mention of the phenomenon of globalization. What is meant by globalization, however, is not always clear; what is clear is that it is something that presents a number of challenges to existing institutions (and to those affected by these institutions), and to which one must respond. In this paper, then, I want briefly to explore what globalization is, to identify what some of these challenges are, and to suggest how philosophical reflection provides some insights and a means by which one might appropriately respond to such challenges.

Globalization

What is globalization? While the term 'globalization' is relatively new – the word 'globalize' was coined only in 1944 – the phenomenon of globalization itself is not. To 'globalize' – meaning "to make global; especially to make worldwide in scope or application"1 – entails action and interaction, across borders and across continents, and the spread of cultural, economic, and political ideas (particularly by way of trade, industry, technology, the arts, letters, music and religion) throughout the world. Thus, perhaps the earliest, genuinely worldwide, wave of globalization was not, as some claim, that marked by the series of economic, social, and political changes which followed the Second World War or the recent collapse of the Soviet Union, but that of the empires of western Europe – Spain, England, France, and Portugal – in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the concurrent missionary activities of Christianity. There have been other waves of globalization since then, such as secularization, which originated in Europe around the time of the French Revolution, and which has had or is having an impact in almost every country on the planet.

Today, "globalization" is thought of as predominantly economic, i.e., as being principally focused on trade and investment, and, particularly, global competition and deregulation.2 Yet, as the preceding definition indicates, this economic trend or process is intermingled with a number of underlying political and cultural conditions and values, and it is primarily because of these conditions and values that globalization has had the effects it has. This interplay of the economic, the political, and the cultural has, of course, always been the case. For example, early waves of globalization, fueled by missionary zeal and supported by the territorial ambitions of European rulers, changed or replaced or built not only political, but religious and economic institutions in lands far distant from their source. Globalization, then, generally produces changes in the economic, the political, the social, and the religious environments – though not all of these are affected at the same time and to the same degree.

Today's globalization has elicited a mixed response, but again this is not surprising for this, too, has always been the case with movements that have a globalizing character. Eighteenth century secularism (that, in many respects, continues to be present) brought with it ideas of individual liberty, autonomy, democracy and, later, socialism. In so doing it both challenged existing traditions and changed the ways of understanding one's place in the world. While some welcomed these changes to social, political and religious institutions, and to how individuals

understand themselves within these communities, others were left confused, disoriented or feeling marginalized. The response to contemporary globalization has been similarly mixed – though it is worth noting that this response is *not* one that is divided just along 'east/west' or 'north/south' lines, but reflects a division of opinion that exists within many of the nations of the world.

Perhaps the principal reason why contemporary globalization has given rise to such a divided response is that, as an economic process, it is often identified with international capitalism and, as a political and cultural process, it has generally been associated with interests that have their origins in 'the West.' According to many, the underlying rationality of globalization is 'instrumental rationality,' its underlying principles are 'universal' principles, and the mass culture it is said to bring with it, seems not to respond to, but merely to replace the cultures it encounters. Those who are opposed to globalization hold that, as these interests and principles spread, they marginalize local traditions and practices, and impose not only the answers and values of 'others,' but come to dominate even the way in which communities and nations pose questions that relate to their self-understanding. Because globalization is not controlled by any one country or government (and, certainly, not by many of the countries affected by it), critics further insist that it undermines local political institutions and is fundamentally non- or anti-democratic.

Yet some have insisted that these putatively negative features of globalization are not as extensive and pervasive as has been claimed, and they have argued that there are aspects of globalization that are quite positive. While they may lead to the disruption and the transformation of some values, the vehicles of globalization also bring some positive values and provide means of preserving 'local' culture and traditions. For example, consider the existence of the electronic media and, more recently, the Internet which allow members of national and cultural groups new and more effective ways of communicating with one another and of promoting their culture and traditions. These means have not only helped maintain language and culture, but have permitted community, even with those who, through emigration, are in "the diaspora."3 More importantly, perhaps, globalization has brought about an increased consciousness of principles of justice, equality, and rights (e.g., through human rights declarations, conventions, and education), has encouraged people to demand that these rights be respected, and has even led to the creation of institutions that are broader than the nation state, whereby life, liberty, and security of the person can be defended, and whose authority leaders of nation states cannot simply ignore. It has also brought about the means of effecting reform. More and more, capacities exist that allow people to remove themselves from the arbitrary restrictions of local authorities, to pursue and to exchange knowledge, information, and ideas internationally, and to bring their concerns to the notice of a wider community. Through the communications technology that comes with globalization (and a socially responsible use of this technology), for example, it becomes increasingly easier for a people to express its will. Furthermore, environmental action, and international safety and security (e.g., versus terrorism) are more effectively pursued when individuals and groups can draw on the information technology that globalization depends on and promotes. In bringing together not only a wide range of ideas and practices but of people from radically different backgrounds, globalization has contributed to the creation, in many countries of a much more pluralistic ethos. These positive results, then, are also consequences of globalization, its underlying forces and ideas, and the technologies it has encouraged and employed.

In any event, however positive or negative its effects, globalization is a fact. There has admittedly been a strong reaction to it. Think, for example, of the work of scholars, such as Saskia Sassen and Mahdi Elmandjra,4 who have advanced a sustained theoretical critique of globalization. Think, as well, of the demonstrations in developing countries, such as India, over

policy decisions made by the World Bank;5 there have been many like responses. Still, given the ever-increasing levels of integration of national economies, the existence and the insertion into daily life of new technologies – particularly, information technology – and the opportunities for travel and trade throughout the world, globalization and its accompanying forces and features are not going to disappear. To oppose it unequivocally would be no more successful than the Luddite opposition was to industrialization. There seems to be, then, no question of whether we should reject globalization; it is, rather, whether we can effectively manage or control it.

Globalization, therefore, presents us with a number of challenges – and these challenges include: how to react to the ideas and values that seem to be part of globalization; whether one can find a way of directing, transforming or redeeming the process of globalization in order to address such problems as poverty, disease, oppression, and lack of education, that affect people the world over; and whether it is possible to limit the influence of globalization in certain spheres and, thereby, allow for the continuity of local cultures and traditions. Responding to these challenges is not an easy task, since we must also acknowledge that there are positive effects of globalization and, therefore, take account of the concerns of both those favoring and those opposing it.

Indeed, some might say that the parties and the interests here are so far apart that either there can be no solution, or the solution can only be "political" or a matter of mere expediency and compromise, and not rational or principled. This is, perhaps, one of the greatest challenges occasioned by globalization – that is, to determine whether we can articulate general, fundamental principles which will enable us to manage or control it.

In the next few pages, I want to suggest that one *can* meet the preceding challenges of globalization – i.e., find ways to "redeem" it, to ensure that it is responsive to basic human needs, and to direct it so that it can address at least some of the concerns of those who find that they have benefitted little from it – without rejecting it. Specifically, I will argue that philosophical reflection shows that there is, or can be, common ground shared by critics and proponents of globalization alike, and that this can provide a basis for a constructive response to the challenges globalization presents.

In Search of a Philosophy for Global Times

The key to a constructive response to globalization, then, is to find a point from which a broad range of groups and individuals – including those who, to varying degrees, already have a role in promoting economic, political, and social globalization – can identify common interests and use them to decide how to direct it. How might philosophy be helpful here?

Some philosophers, such as John Rawls,6 Norman Daniels,7 and Kai Nielsen,8 have claimed that decision making within a pluralistic ethos requires us to abandon ‘foundationalist’ strategies – i.e., strategies which restrict reasoned discussion to inference from axiomatic and universal "first principles." They hold that interlocutors – individuals and collectivities alike – can arrive at certain common principles via a kind of *wide reflective equilibrium* (WRE). Thus, if individuals from different cultures and different perspectives can find some ‘neutral ground’ from which to start discussion, the process of WRE will allow them to come to a consensus about the ideas and values that are appropriate to the discussion and – in the present case, for example, – to address such questions as the character and direction of globalization.

Now, some consider this approach to be just the importation of another ‘western’ ‘rationalist’ perspective into public debate, under the guise of "neutrality."9 Consequently (though without making a judgment on the appropriateness of the strategy of WRE), I want to suggest another

option – that we take the example of ecumenism and inter-religious dialogue, and that, through a philosophical analysis of what is involved in this, we see whether we can discern or articulate a way of decision making that would allow ongoing discussion of the relative merits of globalization and of directing (redeeming, if you will) its activities. Such an approach could, I would also suggest, allow a wide range of potential participants to "have a place at the table," and ensure that the ideologies of a few do not arbitrarily make a rule for all.

The Ecumenical Model

What is "ecumenism"? Webster's Dictionary defines it as a movement "promoting cooperation and better understanding among different religious denominations;" the new Oxford Dictionary states that it is "the doctrine, or quality, of universality (especially of the Christian church)." The etymology of the word is Greek. It is ultimately derived from the word *oikos* (household), which might thereby suggest something narrow and insular, though its actual root is *oikoumene* – "the whole inhabited world." Though there is a tension of 'household' and 'world' in the etymology of "ecumenism," this etymology also suggests a kind of unity where, despite the differences among communities, all can live and work together.

The origins of ecumenism are in the early twentieth century within the Christian religious tradition and, as it is generally understood, it aims at Christian unity (though, in fact, it has come to extend beyond that). As a religious movement, ecumenism professes to try "to know, understand, and love others as they wish to be known and understood."10 It seeks to avoid confrontation, to "find what is shared," but also to locate where, exactly, individuals or groups disagree, to find ways of bringing the parties together to live and work in harmony or cooperatively, and perhaps to discern 'new' (or previously unrecognized) truths.

The ideal of ecumenism rests on certain presuppositions about the nature and character of the traditions and perspectives it addresses, though it would take these to be fairly non-controversial. It presupposes, for example, 1) that different religious (and, similarly, non-religious) perspectives or faiths are ultimately committed to the recognition of truth, and of acting on this; 2) that these different perspectives – and particularly those which have lasted over time – actually do contain "truth" (either in terms of propositions affirmed or, in a more extended sense, of commitments); 3) that there is, therefore, a truth or set of truths which all do or can come to share, and that therefore all faiths or discourses share in some truth; 4) that no one group has articulated or can articulate all the truth – that there can be a growth in one's understanding of one's own truth; 5) that these truths are to be found in the values and the facts present in the experience, discourse, and other practices of believers; 6) that one's "local" or "personal views" – that is, one's religious or other basic commitments – are inseparable from what one is, and cannot coherently be "hived off'"or separated into a private sphere, independent of the public realm; and 7) that it is with these basic commitments that all discussion must begin. Thus, ecumenism would challenge the claims that a "secularist" separation of the public and private is possible, that a separation of private conviction from public discourse is necessary for social harmony, and that a secularist position is neutral – viewing this instead as another 'commitment' to be brought into dialogue.

Though ecumenism is, admittedly, a "western" institution or practice, as we see in the preceding paragraph, what distinguishes it from a number of other approaches is that it acknowledges the fact and the legitimacy of diversity, and it acknowledges that one need not search for a 'neutral' territory, independent of one's basic beliefs and commitments, for discussion with others to begin. It also reminds us that no one has a complete understanding or an exhaustive

knowledge of the ideas and values of one's own tradition, and it notes that it is sometimes through contact with others that we may come to be able to arrive at a more complete understanding and articulation of them. As suggested above, ecumenism requires that the participants deal with one another in a spirit of humility.

But while respecting differences, the aim of ecumenism is not just cooperation, but finding what unites. Moreover (and unlike those who advocate wide reflective equilibrium), it presumes that the participants actually do or can share something fundamental, and it sees its range as "global" – as "worldwide in scope or application." It is also neither relativistic nor an approach that is ultimately contractarian or conventional. Further, while it recognizes that there are differences – legitimate differences – among traditions, it also holds that this diversity does not extend so far that the different groups, i.e., national, cultural and religious are incommensurable with, or irredeemably separated from, one another. In short, while ecumenism acknowledges the legitimacy and value of difference, it aims at the mutual recognition of unity, but this unity is not identity or uniformity.

The "participants" in the ecumenical enterprise can and do, then, have radically different religious commitments. Indeed, ecumenism is not just an inter-Christian activity, but inter-religious; one sees Christian-Buddhist, Hindu-Christian, to a lesser degree Muslim-Christian, and even Christian-atheist, e.g., Christian-Marxist exchanges. Yet, it has had at least some measure of success – and so it is worthwhile for philosophers to ask what it is about ecumenism that has enabled it to have this success without resulting in relativism or subjectivism, or taking one's own or one's neighbor's religious, or non-religious, commitments any less seriously.

Ecumenism as Openness

What underlies the possibility, and the success, of ecumenism? It is not that the participants believe that their respective religious perspectives are somehow "reducible" to one or another or are subsumable under one umbrella-like religious denomination. Undoubtedly, success depends on the respect of others in their "differences," noted above. But more than this is necessary for people of sometimes quite diverse backgrounds and traditions to be able to meet and find common ground on which they can build. A central factor in the success of ecumenical dialogue, I would suggest, is that those involved accept that there are interests, values, and concerns among people of different religious, political, and cultural traditions that all share, and – on a more theoretical plane – that these values, interests, and concerns are shared because there is a fundamental non-arbitrary relationship between them and how the world – reality – is. Specifically, they are shared because they reflect something basic about what it is to be a human person, e.g., the kind of being – physical, mental, moral and spiritual – that humans are, and the kinds of needs such beings have. That these interests and values and so on are shared is, in short, not coincidental.

What are these basic interests and values?

At the most elementary level, there is the recognition of the nature and value of life itself. To have human life there must be certain objective and material conditions, e.g., the presence of food, water, related resources, shelter and security, as well as the possibility of satisfying not only fundamental physical, but also intellectual, moral and spiritual needs. At an equally elementary level, for a people or any group of persons to live and thrive, they have to recognize that these interests, needs and goals, are common interests, needs and goals, and have to share or be capable of sharing a discourse and sets of practices with others that enable these interests to be pursued. They must also recognize individually the importance of these needs and, perhaps, interests and

goals, and the superiority of some values to others, though they can, at least, begin to disagree about which values are superior to others.

However, but there is another set of material or quasi-material conditions that must exist, and that is necessary for the immediately preceding elementary conditions to exist. First, there must be a recognition of one another as human beings with whom we can live and act and, second (which is not actually independent of the first), that we do or can share a number of beliefs, attitudes and opinions about how nature works, what basic human needs are, how we might or must satisfy these needs, and so on. We might call these "dominant ideas."

It is important to recognize that these "dominant ideas," or the kinds of beliefs that human persons must share in order to interact with other persons, are not arbitrary or casual. Since many of these ideas are about the nature of reality and, specifically, about human needs and basic desires, they are not things that people can simply choose to have or not have. Indeed, they are also often the kinds of beliefs from which one derives one's sense of self and which determine or allow conscious and purposeful action in the future. The details or specific character of these beliefs can, of course, vary – they can be ideas reflecting gender, ethnicity, religion, and so on – and some become more or less dominant, depending on the surrounding circumstances. In broad terms these ideas – for example, our understanding of "person," "need," "life," and "future," and, arguably, "like us" and "not like us," which reflect gender and ethnicity – are the kinds of ideas that, if we gave them up, we would (as one might in conversation say) no longer be who we were before. These dominant ideas have, in fact, a claim on us and provide a way through which we understand the world around us.

Finally, the success of ecumenism depends on the shared recognition that our basic interests and values are rooted in, or include, something fundamental that accounts for what we are and what we need, explains the relevance of these values, and so on – something that is not explained solely by, nor is reducible to, the set of presently existing human individuals. This recognition seems to be essential to those who participate in any ecumenical discussion though there is more to the faith and religious belief of the participants than this.

Ecumenism recognizes, then, that religious belief is not just about a transcendent reality, but is also about this world. It holds – as many, if not most, religious believers hold – that the truths of religion are truths which concern and affect human life and flourishing *in concreto*. These basic interests and values related to our understanding of ourselves and our world underlie our distinctively religious beliefs as a whole, and it is because these interests and these values are or can come to be seen as also basic to the religious beliefs of others, that discussion and dialogue among those of different religious denominations can begin. Ecumenical dialogue generally does not start off by asking, "What is the divine?"; a more productive starting point may be the question, "What is it to show love to our fellow human beings?"

The success of ecumenism – that it is able to go beyond a superficial level of coexistence and cooperation – requires not only that there must at least be a mutual readiness to "be open" to others, but also a mutual recognition of others as human beings with whom we share, or are capable of sharing, certain dominant ideas – ideas which reflect or come to reflect a common understanding of what human beings objectively are, and of at least some of the things that are necessary for such beings to live and flourish. This openness and this recognition can, however, take place from within the perspective of one's own religious tradition. Moreover, as noted above, while ecumenism acknowledges that there are basic ideas and values that are objective and authentic, it also allows that these values are i) not always fully articulated, and ii) in some sense incomplete and that they grow and evolve (and must grow and evolve) because the world in which we live is incomplete

and grows and evolves. This is consistent with, if not demanded by, the view that if there is a god or absolute principle that is not reducible to the finite, then no one interpretation or set of interpretations of that "being" is sufficient to express it. Thus ecumenism admits that there can be some "truth" in the views of others.11 Thus, there can be inter-creedal or inter-cultural discourse and debate about these ideas and values, without calling into question the objectivity of values; one can come to a deeper and more enriched understanding of one's own values and can acquire a greater knowledge and appreciation of what is of value through this interaction with others.

Of course, it may well be that, at times, one group will not be able to go far in communicating with another on certain issues because sometimes the circumstances under which the discussants meet have become rather complex, and the interest in discerning or finding what does or can unite must be rekindled. (Here we might think of the difficulties involved in bringing together warring ethnic groups who live in the same country.) But there is no reason to think that such difficulties are insurmountable and such breakdown in communication irremediable.

In short, then, the project of ecumenism rests on the presupposition that it is possible for individuals from disparate groups to come to recognize together the existence of certain shared interests and dominant ideas. As I have suggested above, there is good evidence to believe that such dominant ideas do exist and are, or can be, shared with others. At the same time, the success of ecumenism reminds us as well that the presence of such ideas is not inconsistent with a diversity in national, cultural, and religious origin.12

Philosophy in an Ecumenical Model

Now how can this "ecumenical" model help philosophy or philosophers in addressing the challenges of globalization? Can globalization be pursued in a way that respects both basic common values, e.g., about the interests and needs of human beings, and cultural diversity?

Let us recall certain characteristics of globalization, and what, exactly, these characteristics imply or might entail.

As noted above, the process of globalization leads to an interdependency among institutions in different countries, and may even lead to the establishment of new social, political and cultural institutions on a worldwide basis. In doing so, many practices and institutions previously existing will inevitably disappear. In general, globalization is a complex process that reflects a number of features, including features that we can describe as "values," and it both presupposes and tends towards establishing certain values as universal.

Now, such a move towards interdependency and unity is obviously not based on mere force and obviously not opposed to many of the values people have. Globalization assumes that there are human interests, needs, and wants that are common or general and which already exist, or must come to exist, on a global level. This is plausible, as the example of ecumenism suggests. Indeed, some values involved in globalization are consistent with, or are the same, 'local' values. It is, arguably, because of these features that what globalization brings or does has been able so quickly to 'take root' in different economic or political environments. Still, this is not to say that all the ideas and values accompanying globalization are ideas and values that should be dominant.

Moreover, while globalization presupposes that there are values that are or can be global, this does not entail that it is monolithic in character. Because it is not the product of a single, comprehensive set of static cultural and political ideas and values, globalization can take root and develop in a country in a variety of ways. But it is not just because the precise circumstances of its origin vary (e.g., what specific 'globalizing' phenomenon is being referred to, and what particular

interests and needs give rise to it) that the process of globalization will differ somewhat from one culture to another. It is also because, when it "arrives" in a new environment, it does not enter into a vacuum. Globalization must take account of both the material reality and the dominant ideas in a society; it has to respond to 'the environment' into which it enters, and so its effects will inevitably be different. One sees this as well when one considers previous waves of globalization where, based on the specific character of the societies it came into contact with, one later found distinct manifestations or variations of Christianity, e.g., Latin American Christianity, or democracy, e.g., Indian democracy, or economic system, e.g., African Socialism.

Again, it is important to recall that not all of the values that have accompanied globalization are values that are unique to, or inherent in, globalization. Because some may actually be incidental to globalization in general, they can be rejected without thereby rejecting globalization itself. Even where core values of globalization differ from or conflict with local values, in order to succeed, as we have seen, globalization has to be brought into contact with and, to an extent, accommodate itself to the basic values and interests characteristic of the cultures into which it enters. At least some of the values that accompany globalization have to be open to change, for the process of globalization to continue.

Finally, it is important to recognize that globalization itself does not carry with it a complete set of values and ideas. Because globalization is a process and a product of a range of interests and 'forces,' it is to some degree incomplete and possibly (inevitably?) inconsistent with certain needs and basic values. So, it is by no means unreasonable to consider bringing such a process into line with these needs and values.

The preceding points then further suggest or entail three things. First, they suggest that some – perhaps many – of the values that have accompanied globalization are open to modification and change and, therefore, that they can be changed. For example, the way that competition and commerce are engaged in can be consistent with a respect for the well-being of communities. The preceding account also reminds us that globalization is not an impersonal or natural force, but it involves the conscious actions of human agents and, so, can be controlled by them. Finally, these features of globalization suggest that even if there is a tendency towards interdependency, this does not eliminate or preclude all diversity. There is no obvious reason why global economic strategies cannot accommodate national and local 'differences;' national cultures and institutions can retain a distinctive character even with the existence of international markets.

Given these features of globalization, one can say that globalization is (at least in principle, and very likely in fact) consistent with pluralism. Indeed, one might argue that the preceding account of globalization entails that, to be truly global, it must be pluralistic. For, if one holds that no single set of ideas, beliefs, commitments, and practices can exhaust all human possibilities, and if one acknowledges that individuals do live and develop in different geographical, economic, social and political circumstances, it would be inconceivable that, even where there are common features, all would or could end up with a monolithic or static cultural, social, economic or political structure. Further, given the preceding features, globalization need not – and, in fact, should not – be anti-democratic and inattentive to local conditions. The existence of the information technology that has accompanied globalization can in principle, as noted at the beginning of this paper, ensure the continued presence and development of local and regional cultures – though this development may lead at times in unanticipated directions.

Still, it is clear that globalization also leads to changes in values and in dominant ideas. It challenges established institutions – ut, of course, all that is new and different does so. Nor is challenge to local values and ideas an obviously bad thing, because it is far from clear that local

culture is something that ought to be protected from outside influences or ought to be entirely controlled by local authorities.

These features and consequences of globalization show then that the interdependency or the unity that globalization may bring is consistent with the recognition of basic human needs and values or of the value of cultural diversity. Globalization is not monolithic, and it is not likely to be inflexible and static. Besides, globalization is not a blind force, but the consequence of acts of individual agents, and it is a process that, as we have seen above, can be responsive to other values and interests. If this is correct, then it is possible to consider orienting, or re-orienting, the forces or values accompanying globalization and, arguably, to "redeeming" or reforming the process of globalization itself. Still, the fundamental question is: How is this to be done? This again is where philosophy comes in.

A Philosophical Response to Globalization

So what is the role of philosophy in addressing the challenges of globalization? The central claim of this paper is that philosophy can help to discern and, thereby, provide a 'discourse' – modeled after that implicit in ecumenism – that can serve as a context in which a reasonable response to these challenges can be achieved.

Specifically it is by identifying and pointing to the basic interests, dominant ideas, and values that we can or do already have in common with others, that philosophy can help to locate shared, though not neutral, ground, and articulate or make clear a space or discourse in which discussion can take place with those of other cultures and, by extension, with those having different stands on globalization. Indeed, for even the most elementary communication with, let alone criticism of, those having other perspectives to be possible, there has to be such a shared discussion. Philosophy also reminds us that, given the "open-endedness" of human life, we will inevitably be 'called out' from where we are – that we have much to learn, that what we have to learn is not simply arbitrary or purely subjective (because it can involve human needs and interests), and that this learning involves entering into relations with those 'not like us.' Ecumenical dialogue – a dialogue that has these features as well – can, therefore, plausibly be a model for an exchange that can lead not just to consensus, but to the mutual recognition of a course of action as objectively best.

Philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of globalization itself indicates, furthermore, that the values that one finds in globalization are not, and cannot be, complete and exhaustive and that – because they need to be consistent with certain basic facts about the world and about the nature of human persons – an attempt to bring them into coherence with these facts is appropriate. It shows as well that it is possible that one could 'redirect' or reform some of the values and trends that have accompanied globalization, specifically those that have come into conflict with other important values and traditions. Given the model of ecumenical dialogue, philosophy can discern or arrive at general fundamental principles to govern discussion between both those who can be described as agents of globalization and those who would oppose them.

Nevertheless, in showing how one might go about responding to the challenges of globalization, philosophy also reminds us that more is involved here than having globalization conform to an *a priori* set of universal values, principles or dominant ideas. For example, it indicates that the influences of globalization – the influence of the knowledge of other cultures, of scientific discovery and of spiritual or religious experience – may entail that we must enunciate or "invent" new "structures of meaning"13 that will allow us better to take account of, and more fully grasp, the changing and evolving environment in which we live. Of course, this is not done in a

vacuum; such activity will reflect existing dominant ideas, principles, and values. As the model of ecumenism suggests, no one has a complete or fully articulated set of values and ideas, and the presence of globalization in a society may in fact be an occasion for one's dominant ideas and values to develop or change.

This last point does not mean that individuals or societies must concede or capitulate to all of the influences of globalization. Still, we have to understand not only the negative but the positive aspects of globalization if we wish to have some control over it. No culture should long refuse to engage these influences – nor, in fact, can it since the present wave of globalization is so significant that one's views and even commitments may develop without one being aware of it. Consider how the presence of computers affects how many understand or talk about the mind or consciousness. Just as societies have to respond to the material conditions of reality, i.e., the material and quasi-material conditions for life, so, in order to grow and flourish, they have to address the challenges presented by changes in the social, political, religious or economic environment. No society and no individual has any ground for holding that all of what one believes and is committed to is exactly the way it should be and is infallible. And we should note as well that even those who seek to avoid certain aspects of the world around them, e.g., Hutterites and the Amish in North and Central America, still have to take up an explicit attitude towards what is happening in the world. It is in elaborating a model and criteria for discussion, then, that philosophy can help to identify and determine what responses to these changes and challenges are appropriate.

Of course, the experience of globalization may be unsettling because, as noted above, our present commitments and beliefs cannot remain just as they are. And even though some of the values and ideas of globalization are open to change, it does not follow that we will be able to pick and choose from them as it suits us. And so we might even challenge Mill's *justification* for pluralism in *On Liberty*. Since globalization brings with it new values and ideas, we may be forced to ask questions we do not know how exactly to answer and we may be challenged to answer why our old questions are in fact appropriate or useful questions. Indeed, one may find oneself having to express one's thought in a larger "reality," i.e., a context that includes elements 'foreign' to those to which one is accustomed. All the same, one should not take the preceding remarks as implying that one must simply accept the fact that one can be forced to express one's thought in "another reality."

This call to invent new structures of meaning, or to recognize that one may have to express one's thought in a 'larger reality,' is, however, really nothing more than a demand of the character of conscious life – which reflects, after all, the influence of the culture, ideas, and material environment around it – and it is a demand that one cannot escape. Taking globalization seriously and responding to its challenges, are simply features of acknowledging the existence of the ideas and values of others, and of taking other persons seriously. As one comes to put one's thought into coherence with this "larger" experience, one's ideas will inevitably change and develop. But, even if this is unsettling, the preceding analysis assures us that globalization is not something that we must fear.

If, however, after all of this, one still claims that his or her culture must exclude or reject external or "foreign" influences, and that an "ecumenical model" of discourse – along with the recognition of shared concepts of life and human flourishing – must be rejected, it is unclear not only how one can constructively, or even effectively, deal with the phenomenon of globalization, but also how one's own culture and values can develop and flourish, i.e., survive.

Conclusion

Globalization and the ideas, forces and technologies that it brings with it are here to stay. What I have tried to defend in these pages is the claim that there is a positive way in which one can respond to globalization – one that calls for a "participative construction"14 and transformation, rather than a mere rejection or fatalistic acceptance, of it.

Specifically, I have argued that there is no epistemic impediment to globalization, and that the success of ecumenism gives us a reason to believe that those involved in and affected by globalization can enter into fruitful dialogue with one another in order to 'orient' the process of globalization so that it is consistent with respect for persons and with a significant measure of individual and cultural diversity. Philosophy, drawing on the model of ecumenical dialogue, can help to define or describe this discourse, by identifying values and dominant ideas which all do or can share, and by ensuring that these values and ideas are coherent with the material and quasi-material conditions for human flourishing. Moreover, using a discourse modeled on ecumenism to engage the challenges of globalization not only would be compatible with, but also would promote cross-cultural community and mutual understanding; it would not entail ignoring diversity or starting from some "neutral" ground where individuals have to abandon their own basic values, dominant ideas and commitments, and it would not produce a bland homogeneity.

Thus, the interdependency and unity that globalization brings may be consistent with – and may even demand – diversity. But the ecumenical model of discourse, described above, is also one that, though respectful of people's "starting points," acknowledges that they must – whether they like it or not – sometimes reevaluate what their basic beliefs and dominant ideas mean and, when necessary, go beyond them and, thereby, better reflect values and interests which make a genuinely human life possible.15 We can have confidence, then, that there can be a constructive response to the challenges that globalization presents, and that philosophy has an important role in this.

Notes

1. *Merriam Webster Dictionary*.

2. In this sense, globalization is 'a process of increasing economic activity towards the integration of national economics into a single world economy, for example, with increased trading opportunities.'

3. See Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo, "Syncretic sociology: towards a cross-disciplinary study of religion," *Sociology of Religion* 59 (1998): 217-20.

4. Mahdi Elmandjra, *Premiere guerre civilisationnelle* (Casablanca, Maroc: Toubkal, 1992). For some other recent critical studies, see Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: New Press, 1998), and Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, *Globalization: Theory and Practice* (New York: Pinter, 1996).

5. One evidence of economic globalization is the presence of multinational or transnational corporations and the influence of international economic agreements in countries such as India. A number of nationwide movements have arisen, however, with the aim of opposing this presence. Recently, in 1995, Enron – the world's largest natural gas company – began work on a $US 2.8 billion, gas-fired power plant, just south of Bombay. Villagers in the area were concerned that the effluent from the plant would destroy local fisheries and damage some crops, and hundreds of them stormed the construction site, injuring construction workers and some foreign advisers. Again, during the Uruguay Round of talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), one of the issues under discussion was a section on Trade Related Intellectual Property

Rights (TRIPS). People in India became concerned that this section, if approved, could affect plant genetic resource conservation and farmers' rights and, during a massive rally at Delhi on March 3, 1993, demonstrators presented a charter of demands, saying that "we should not give up our sovereign right to frame our own system of invention for the development of new varieties of plants. Intellectual property rights should not be made part of GATT negotiation."

6. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971). The initial articulation of reflective equilibrium is found in his "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," *Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 177-197.

7. See Norman Daniels, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics" in *Journal of Philosophy* 76 (1979): 256-282; "Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 10 (1980): 83-103; *Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also J. Raz, "The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium," *Inquiry* 25 (1982): 307-330.

8. See "In Defence of Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in *Ethics and Justification* (ed. Douglas Odegard), (Edmonton, AB: Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 19-37, and "Relativism and Wide Reflective Equilibrium," *Monist* 76 (1993): 316-332.

9. See, for example, Hendrik Hart and Kai Nielsen, *Searching for Community in a Withering Tradition: Conversations between a Marxian Atheist and a Calvinian Christian* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990).

10. See Decree 12 of the Mission of the Society of Jesus, General Council 34 (1995).

11. As Aristotle writes, 'No one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely, but everyone says something true about the nature of things' (*Metaphysics* II, 993a27-993b2).

12. I have argued elsewhere as well that this is compatible with pluralism. See my "Communities of Values and Ecumenism," in *The Future of Value Inquiry*, (ed. Matti Häyry and Tuija Takala), Nordic Value Studies, (Amsterdam: Rodopi Publishers, forthcoming 2000). I would, therefore, argue against the claim of Zygmunt Bauman that we are effectively unable to direct events, and that globalization inevitably produces a culturally and economically homogeneous world (See his *Globalization: The Human Consequences* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1998]). I tend, rather, to favor some aspects of the view of Robert J. Holton (see his *Globalization and the Nation-State* [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998]).

13. I owe this notion to Professor H. Daniel Dei of the Universidad de Morón, Argentina.

14. See Vincent Shen, "Construction of Meaningful World in I Ching: On the Origin of Chinese Philosophizing," in *Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization* (ed. George F. McLean) (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999).

15. By way of illustration, some societies make efforts to ensure that basic human needs are met, but fail to recognize basic individual human rights; other societies may explicitly recognize human rights, but in a way that is simply formal and not substantive. For human life to flourish, however, it is clear that there must be both the satisfaction of needs and the recognition of rights, and so these societies must move beyond where they are.