Identity and Globalization: Ethical Implications
Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VIII

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Introduction

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This volume explores the twin questions of identity and globalisation drawing largely from a Lithuanian context and from a Lithuanian cultural perspective. It also considers the ethical implications of these two questions. These are important issues, especially for those Northern and Eastern European countries who have relatively recently recovered their independence after fifty years of occupation by the Soviet Union. While a quarter of a century has passed since the recovery of independence, the issue of identity is especially significant, since not only is there the problem of recovering cultures and traditions, but also of forging a new identity in a world that has become increasingly globalised and, after seventy years since the end of the Second World War, a very different place, even if similarities to the old order remain. There are, however, contrary forces emerging which are re-asserting old boundaries and reshaping the existing world order. With Brexit, the future of the European Union has become more uncertain, especially with the rise of nationalist movements, the flood of refugees fleeing various conflicts and renewed military conflict in Ukraine, arguably the easternmost part of Europe. The difficulty of recovering culture and tradition along with identity as a people should not be underestimated, for there are significant pressures from the encroachment of mass culture which work against local culture and tradition.

Against the struggle to maintain a cohesive national consciousness through which cultural identity is maintained are marshalled the forces of not only multiculturalism, but also free market capitalism which preaches the importance of consumerism. Through these forces specific cultures are undermined through the mass marketing of images, symbols and products that are promoted as desirable and necessary in order for individuals to be fulfilled. Education, which some might argue can save culture, is itself subjected to the forces of economic rationalism, and has been reduced to the imparting of measureable technical skills and capacities usable in the workplace. This is not to disparage the importance of such skills and capacities, but to point to the erosion of education understood as Bildung or paideia. Bildung or paideia recognises that education and is concerned with the formation of human persons. This, in addition to skills and capacities, involves individuals understanding themselves as moral beings immersed in a community with others and whose lives are meaningful in that context. In apprehending themselves as members of a community, it is self-evident that this means a specific
culture and tradition, for even the most ardent cosmopolitan is forced to live somewhere specific and in a particular culture.

If culture is to be maintained, awareness of the forces arraigned against the preservation of what is unique in specific cultures and traditions is necessary, since the unconscious adoption of mass culture leads to either the leaching away of cultural practices formerly observed in a specific community or the adoption of alien cultural practices which are not rooted in the traditions of the community, but which are superficial practices promoted to marketing campaigns to encourage the consumption of various products.

Much of the discussion of culture and its preservation depends on what is understood by culture. It should not be supposed that this is a univocal term which has a clear meaning. Culture includes myths, legends, traditions, art, literature, music, history, philosophy and religion, as well as language. It is also associated with a defined territory and often embodied in a particular ethnic group. Though it is possible to speak of culture in universal terms, and to speak of European culture and Asian culture, it is a term which applies for the most part to specific peoples, their language and traditions. Culture is not an abstract concept, it is a lived reality and consists of a variety of practices mediated through language. Culture plays a significant role in the individual’s understanding of herself and in the formation of personal identity.

Cultural identity, which arises through an apprehension by individuals that they belong to a particular culture, needs to be thoroughly grasped if we are to comprehend the deeper motivations and influences that shape the perspectives and values of different individuals, including ourselves. If we really wish to understand what drives individuals or elucidate statements or actions that mystify us, then being able to place them in a cultural context is vital. To say, for example, that someone is a French writer is not simply to place an ethnic label on the individual, but to identify the tradition and the cultural perspective from which he or she writes. It is not merely a matter of writing in French. In addition, identifying the writer as French supplies a means of interpreting his or her understanding of a specific difficulty or challenge that his or her writing addresses. Realistically, awareness of the role of cultural identity facilitates consciousness of the different, nuanced ways in which apparently shared concepts can be interpreted and enables us to realise that the concepts with which we develop our arguments and arrive at our conclusions may be conceptualised by others very differently from our own and employed otherwise to how we use them ourselves.

Problematically, cultural identity is sometimes held to be synonymous with national identity. This is because some of the same criteria for a sense of national consciousness and identification are also relevant
for cultural identity. For instance, some of the criteria for national identity will include traditions, language, territory, religion, history, axiology, political constitution and culture itself. This is not helpful since it blurs significant differences. National identity certainly draws on cultural identity, but the two are not the same. A national identity is closer to political identity. In some cases, political identity is taken to refer to national identity in the way we have characterised it here, but it may also refer to identity politics. That is, the various political struggles within society for recognition by oppressed groups. The movement in the United States, for example, was a result of African-Americans seeking equality within American society. They identified themselves as African-Americans who were the subjects of oppression. Similarly, other groups have claimed a political identity by identifying themselves as being the subjects of oppression by society and hence by standing together are able to seek redress collectively. Here the identification cuts across cultural and ethnic identities. Women, for example, arguing for equal opportunity, politically identify as women, but not as belonging to any particular ethnic and cultural group. Equality is being claimed for all women, not just specific classes of women. More recently still, LGBTQI groups have asserted various kinds of rights, including demanding the re-definition of marriage, by identifying themselves as belonging to a broad coalition of oppressed individuals who have been denied equality by mainstream society. Their membership in the LGBTQI group is not dependent on ethnic or cultural identity nor specific class. Thus, we can conclude that they have specific political identity which is not equivalent to a national identity nor cultural identity. Furthermore, neither political identity nor national identity are the same as cultural identity. Although various interest groups form part of civil society and certainly are among those seeking to transform society by influencing the state, a fuller discussion would take us beyond the point being made here, namely that national identity is not the same as cultural identity.\(^1\) Crucially, as we have suggested, national identity is more directly aligned with political identity, but these are not the same either. Nevertheless, as we have already recognised, in many places cultural identity is intertwined with national identity.

There are two aspects to cultural identity. First of all, there is a consciousness of a collective identity that has its roots in an ethnic group, such as Polish, Lithuanian, German, Korean or Japanese, where people refer to “Poles,” “Lithuanians,” “Germans,” “Koreans” or “Japanese,” as belonging to a specific cultural group. The specific cultural group will be identified, through the criteria already identified, that is, through

\(^1\) For a discussion of the power relations involved in the recognition of gender identity, see McNay (2008).
language, the place or territory where they live, the practice of specific customs and religions, cultural artefacts such as music, art and traditional celebrations, as well as ethnicity. There is also, rightly or wrongly, an identification of particular character traits as pertaining to a particular cultural identity.² The second aspect of cultural identity is the identification that individuals make with a particular cultural identity. In the second aspect, an individual is identified as or identifies herself as belonging to a particular cultural group, for example, Polish, Lithuanian, German, Korean or Japanese. There are, therefore, two separate aspects to cultural identity. The first is concerned with identifying the characteristics of a particular cultural identity and the second, the conditions under which we accept that an individual can be identified as having a particular cultural identity.

Cultural identity forms an integral part of civil society, since as Wittgenstein remarks, language, broadly understood to include bodily cues and non-verbal gestures, forms the world which we inhabit and this will include civil society (Wittgenstein, 1953, para. 19) Gadamer (1989, 235-236) adds that cultural traditions and values form the context in which our thinking takes place. The institutions – rational institutions in Hegel’s terminology – which structure civil society will be based on the values and cultural traditions that frame our understanding of not only what rationality consists in, but which also result in them having a particular form.³ This is not to suggest that institutions of morality, law, education and justice, for instance, do not have a universal character, but to propose that each culture will have a particular lived historical experience of that universal character and so express it in a specific manner. As a result, although all states value the institution of education, educational practices will be different in different places. States which are part of the Confucian tradition, for example, value rote learning far more than states in the Western world (Watkins and Biggs, 2001, 3; Z. Yu, 2002, 71). Civil society will be flavoured by a specific cultural identity.

Cultural identity frames the constitutions of many states. The preambles of the constitutions of the Baltic states, for example, express very clearly the historical origins of their communities and proclaim that the state exists for the preservation of their cultures, languages and traditions, as well as for the protection of the territories that they historically

² For example, characterising Germans as efficient, Spaniards as hot-blooded, and the English as phlegmatic. Whether these accurately describe any of these ethnic groups is moot.

have occupied.4 Similarly, the constitutions of Japan, France and Germany, for example, identify the Japanese, French and German people respectively as being the basis for the existence of their respective states.5 In these constitutions, cultural identity overlaps with ethnic identity, but this will not be the case for every state.6 The American constitution, for example, simply identifies the people as sovereign without mentioning their cultural or ethnic origins, which is also the case for a number of other states. As can be seen, cultural identity intertwines with national identity in a number of different and diverse ways, so that for no two states will the interconnections be the same.

Since the interconnections between national identity and cultural identity are diverse, as we have argued, cultural identity should not be confused with national identity. It is evident, however, that in the cases where there is a culture based on a single ethnic group and the state’s reason for existence is for the preservation of that group, national identity will be largely the same as cultural identity. This will not be the case, however, where there are multiple ethnic groups, cultures and states that have come together in one nation and which occupy a particular territory. Complexities in the formation of states qua political entities mean that national identity is not the same as individuals merely identi-

4 The preamble to the Estonian constitution states, “...the state...is a pledge to present future generations (with) their social progress and welfare, which shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages.” https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide (accessed: 16/06/2017).

The preamble of the Latvian constitution states, “Since ancient times, the identity of Latvia in the European cultural space has been shaped by Latvian and Liv traditions, Latvian folk wisdom, the Latvian language, universal human and Christian values. Loyalty to Latvia, the Latvian language as the only official language, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, honesty, work ethic and family are the foundations of a cohesive society.” http://www.saeima.lv/en/legislation/constitution (accessed: 16/06/2017).

The preamble to the Lithuanian constitution states, “The Lithuanian nation...having staunchly defended its freedom and independence for centuries, having preserved its spirit, native language, writing, and customs,...embodying the innate right...to live and create freely in the land of their fathers and forefathers...proclaims this constitution.” http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm (accessed: 16/06/2017).


6 For example, Latvian passports at one stage indicated the ethnicity of the person holding the passport. Thus, someone would be identified as Latvian or Russian or some other ethnicity. This distinguished very clearly ethnic identity from national identity. Ethnic identity and cultural identity are also to be distinguished and are not synonymous.
fying themselves as citizens of a particular state. States, understood as political entities, can also have fluidity in terms of their composition and could be composed of re-arrangements of different parts of former nations. The term “nation” itself has a number of meanings, with the United States Constitution, for example, recognising that the various American Indian tribes constituted nations in their own right.7

It is simplistic to propose that cultural identity can be defined as vaguely consisting of attitudes, religion and religious practices, dietary habits and traditional dress. After all, each of these could be adopted by someone from another culture who has spent a very long time in a particular culture. It is possible, for example, for a Westerner to live for a long time in a Confucian culture, adapt to Confucian customs, such as reverence for ancestors, adapt to Chinese food and wear traditional Chinese dress. He may learn to read, write and speak Chinese, appreciate Chinese literature, art and music, and to be steeped in Chinese history. Despite this, because of his Western appearance and hence ethnicity, we might hesitate to say that the cultural identity of this individual is Chinese. Yet he may have a vastly superior knowledge of Chinese culture than many individuals who we would agree are Chinese. Contrarywise, someone who is ethnically Chinese may have been brought up entirely within a Western culture and as a consequence, may know nothing about Chinese culture, language or tradition. Nevertheless, we might hesitate to deny her Chinese cultural identity. Superficially, if someone who looks Chinese, we would normally identify her as Chinese and attribute a Chinese cultural identity. In both these cases, the prima facie determining factor in the cultural identity we attribute to someone is ethnic identity, but this attribution is made on the basis of someone’s appearance. This, however, reduces cultural identity to ethnic identity and this is a mistake.

It is a mistake because a claim to have a particular cultural identity is an assertion of belonging to a particular group and involves recognition by that group that someone belongs. This means that someone who does not have a particular ethnic identity can nevertheless be accepted as a member of a particular cultural and ethnic group. A Westerner, steeped in Chinese culture, values, traditions and language can therefore have a Chinese cultural identity because he is accepted as having such. This does not make him ethnic Chinese, since we can distinguish cultural identity from ethnic identity. Likewise, an ethnically Chinese person can be accepted as having, say, an Australian cultural identity because she

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speaks English with an Australian accent and is immersed in the Australian way of life.

In a multicultural society, such as Australia, ethnic origin, while acknowledged, is less important than sharing the common cultural values and traditions that enable identification as Australian.\(^8\) Significantly and of relevance in the discussion of cultural identity, the question of Aboriginality, that is who is Aboriginal, like in Canada, has arisen in Australia and the following three part definition is adopted in order to identify who belongs to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples: (i) descent is from a particular group of Aboriginal peoples; (ii) self-identification as an Aboriginal person and (iii) accepted and known by the Aboriginal community as a member of that specific community.\(^9\)

It is useful since it recognises the multi-faceted nature of how we determine membership of a particular cultural and ethnic community. Human beings are social beings and their cultural identities arise from the social contexts in which they live. While self-identification as belonging to a particular culture can be asserted, it is recognition by others that confirms that we belong to that culture, but we cannot ignore ethnic origins either. The definition also makes clear that being steeped in a particular culture does not mean we can be identified as belonging in the most complete way to that culture. Descent is a necessary, but not sufficient element, in establishing who belongs both culturally and ethnically to a particular people. It also shows that cultural identity can be separated from ethnic identity, even though we grant they are also connected.

For the Baltic states, the question of who belongs is particularly difficult because each has quite large populations of ethnic Russians within their midst.\(^10\) The difficulty is not that the ethnic Russians may not regard themselves as Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian citizens, but in States which are based on the idea that they exist for a particular people, culture and language, there is a significant problem if there is a large population which cannot identify with that specific people, language and culture. Thus, if we use the definition indicated above, someone is say, Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian if they have descended from one these ethnic groups, (ii) self-identify as an Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian and

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\(^8\) This is not to say that there are not significant tensions that arise when newly arrived migrant groups want to maintain their own cultural practices, such as wearing particular kinds of clothes that make them stand out in the community. Various racial tensions exist in Australia, as they do in other parts of the world. Hence there is some insistence that individuals learn to assimilate into the existing society.


(iii) are accepted by the respective community as Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. By this definition, obviously the Russian minorities are excluded from being considered Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. This need not mean that they are excluded from full membership of the community and that they do not or cannot have a national identity as Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian citizens. Neither does it mean that they cannot acquire a cultural identity which includes aspects of the culture and traditions of the Baltic peoples.

Hence the solution is not to abandon the definition and adopt another but to recognise that a cultural identity can be acquired through individuals learning the language and adopting the culture and traditions of the community to which they wish to belong. Just as the Westerner who steeps himself in the Chinese language and in Chinese culture can grow to have a Chinese cultural identity, so too can the ethnic Russians grow to have an Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian cultural identity. It is not a complete identification, since ethnic identity is also a necessary element to be Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian, but it is possible to acquire an appreciation of the native culture. Intermarriage is the means whereby the first condition of the definition can be fulfilled, at least for the second and third generations. It will be these generations who will be able to be recognised as Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian, in the way that Aboriginality is recognised. Where the populations to be integrated are large, however, it is likely that this will take a significant number of generations, and it is possible that there will always remain a sizeable minority that never integrates.11

Cultural identity is a complex interplay of language, traditions, values and rearing, set within a social context, time and place. Human beings are not necessarily restricted to one culture but may move between several cultures. Immigrants, especially their children, will live in more than one culture and their cultural identity will be enriched through their encounters with other ways of understanding the world. Which culture they belong to and so which cultural identity they adopt may, however remain problematic (A.M. Moore, and G.G. Barker, 2012). Cultural identity is fluid and there are a number of different characteristics which we have identified and to which others can be added: (i) Ethnic origin; (ii) language; (iii) culture, broadly conceived and includeing art, music, dance, dress, architectural styles, etc.; (iv) customs, values, institutions and traditions, including religion; (v) individual preferences, for example, wanting to immerse oneself in a culture; (vi) family, community and social milieu; (vii) place, including nation, and time, that is, the period

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11 I do not address here the importance for any ethnic minority to also maintain its own cultural traditions. This issue requires separate treatment.
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of history in which the individual was born and in which he or she lives. Because cultural identity is fluid, not all these characteristics are equally influential on the formation of individual cultural identity but are all factors that need to be taken into account in its formation. Some will have more importance than others, according to the individual. Ethnic origin, for example, is impossible to deny if persons have a particular appearance and fit a particular stereotype. Not all individuals, however, will be identifiable by their appearance as having a particular cultural identity. Ethnic origin may play a relatively minor role in someone’s cultural identity. Immigrants, for example, may be very anxious to downplay their ethnic origins, especially if they live in a community that is not tolerant of differences. Language is important, since this is one of the lenses through which people see the world, as Wittgenstein noted (Wittgenstein, 1953). This means someone who does not know her native language would have a limited connection with a particular culture. Religion also may be a powerful source of cultural identity.

Cultural identity is, as we have proposed, neither uniform nor fixed. The characteristics that we have identified can have weaker and stronger influences on individuals, so that their identification of themselves as belonging to a particular culture can change according to circumstances. For some, it might only matter to them that they are French when Frenchmen are winning a game of football, for others, their sense of belonging is evoked by music or through song. Cultural identity will matter most of all when individuals identifying with a culture feel threatened by a more powerful cultural grouping. Kurds, for example, may feel threatened by Turks and threat itself draws them closer together and makes them feel their cultural identity as Kurds more strongly.12 Baltic peoples, amongst others, will feel threatened by their larger neighbour, Russia, with whom all three Baltic countries share a border. This too, can have the effect of strengthening the resolve to maintain both their ethnicity and their cultural identity.

The idea of borders has become much more topical since the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, who promised to build a wall along the Mexican border in order to keep illegal immigrants from entering the United States. In the last two years, the influx of Syrian migrants fleeing their own devastated country has also forced a number of European countries to tighten border controls. Borders are important, since one of the ways in which a state identifies itself is through the territory which it claims as its own and it is through living in a particular territory that people identify themselves as belonging to a

12 Saatci provides a fuller discussion and analysis of Turkish and Kurdish relationships. He concludes that the formation of the Turkish state was instrumental in the rise of a separate Kurdish identity (2002).
particular state. A nation is defined by its borders, and those within the border are the citizens belonging to that state. In Europe, borders have been fluid, and, in many instances, have shifted over time. For example, the borders of Europe before the First World War were very different to those after it, and in the 100 hundred years since then have shifted many times. In trying to understand the significance of borders, a valuable exercise is to explore identity in borderlands, that is, where territories are delineated. A line on a map, after all, is arbitrary in some ways and people either side of a border may have more in common with each other than those more centrally located within a nation. The question of their cultural identity becomes quite complex.

The establishment of the European Union resulted in the loosening of borders, since one of its effects was to allow for free interchange between member states of their citizens. For the Baltic countries, one of the effects of joining the EU was the large emigration of a significant portion of their citizens to other EU countries in search of employment. This has been particularly the situation for both Latvia and Lithuania, though the rate of emigration has now slowed significantly (see OECD, 2013). This raises anew questions about not only its significance for national identity, but also for cultural identity, since it is not to be expected that large numbers of emigrants will return to their countries of origin. Economic well-being and the possibility of a materially better life has lured many people to a life outside their countries of origin and this has two significant challenges: (i) the effect on cultural identity within the remaining population and (ii) the effect on the cultural identity of the emigrants. Since emigration is usually of working age people, the exodus of large numbers of such individuals means that the state is left with an ageing demographic which may mean a more conservative political landscape, and, in terms of cultural identity, the loss of important cultural traditions and practices. There may be many reasons for emigration, but, as Hegel (1991) proposed, poverty leads to alienation from the community and those with little property have in the first instance a lack of self-esteem and less respect from their neighbours within their communities. This leaves them with less to lose in leaving their communities and more incentive to forge a new life elsewhere. The loosening of the European Union’s borders has raised new challenges about the way in which cultural identity is to be maintained and preserved.

The loosening of borders can mean the dissolution of a cultural identity into its parts. That is, it becomes deconstructed into the various parts identified earlier. For instance, ethnicity or an ethnic identity re-

13 This is despite continuing debate about how emigrants could be enticed into returning to their homelands. For a brief report on demographic trends in Europe see Valentina Romei (2016).
mains for second and third generation individuals whose families have emigrated, but they may have become absorbed by the prevailing host culture, so that they no longer speak their native tongue or follow any of the traditions of their native culture. They may still have some identification with their home culture, for example, some who do not speak their native language may still observe certain cultural customs and others may retain a child’s knowledge of their native language. This may be a somewhat superficial cultural identity that does not go very deep. On the other hand, some second and third generation individuals may identify very strongly with their culture of origin. In some cases, this might be a sinister kind of identification which leads some individuals to identify with radical elements of their home culture, alienating them from their host culture and perhaps committing to violence and terror against it. There could also be alienation from the more moderate elements in their own culture (see for example, D. Rothchild, and A.J. Groth [1995], F. Wali [2011]).

Occupation by a foreign power or a succession of foreign powers creates its own difficulties for cultural identity. Having a foreign language imposed on a nation and foreign culture together with the repression, if not overt suppression of their own language and culture, not to mention values and traditions leaves an indelible scar on a people. Long years of occupation leave their mark and over time a foreign culture may suffocate the original local culture. At the very least certain traditions and practices will be adopted that will have the appearance of local customs, but in fact will be foreign customs and practices. The loss of generations that grew up before occupation will mean a loss of historic consciousness of authentic culture and hence the grafted on foreign culture becomes the only available culture. At best, the local culture survives in a modified form, adapting to the foreign culture. Worse still, there can be an unconscious adoption of the mindset of the occupiers, so that, for instance, Soviet power structures and practices persist long after the disappearance of the Soviet Union itself. In this context, the work of Gramsci about the hegemony of the ruling classes is significant, since it is unconscious, uncritical and unreflective acceptance of the status quo as the only possible reality that prevents the existing community, oppressed or not, from realising that in order to change their situation they have to be able to see that there are viable alternatives (see A. Gramsci, 2011). If they want to maintain their own culture, they have to be aware of the influences that have changed various practices and traditions over time.

For those who are part of a diaspora that was forced to leave their countries of origin, the maintenance of culture, tradition and language has to take place within a host culture in some instances very different
from their own. This is particularly problematic for refugees from small
countries who flee to countries much larger than their own, though of
course there are difficulties for refugees wherever they find themselves.
Maintenance of culture and tradition needs to be consciously practised
and reinforced, especially, language, if it is not to be lost by the succeeding
generations. At the same time, a host culture may or may not be ac-
cepting of the creation of cultural ghettos within its midst, especially if it
is a very different culture to that of the incoming migrants.

Cultural identity is important for those living on the border. With
Lithuania joining the EU, the former ease of crossing into either Belo-
russia or Russia has become more difficult, since the border now is hard-
ened, and it is no longer travel within the Soviet Union, but between two
sovereign states. While border crossings between European Union mem-
ers have become easier, it is the opposite between EU and Russia, for ex-
ample. This affects border regions, such as those between Poland,
Belorussia and Lithuania. Similarly, for Latvia and Estonia. Borders can
be perceived as a barrier between countries, as well as opportunities or
bridges between peoples. In terms of identity, borders can serve as
means of delineating one cultural identity from another, but also as dis-
solving differences, since a border is a human device which to a large
extent is artificially constructed.

It is not easy to determine whether the European Union itself has
led to a weakening of borders between member nations. The Shengen
zone allows free passage between the participating countries, however,
since the influx of refugees from Syria and North Africa seeking a better
life, the result has been a tightening of borders and it is likely Brexit will
further harden borders. Though there has been deterritorialisation, there
is also now some hint of a reterritorialization. The tightening of borders
clearly has an effect on culture, since in re-examining the movement of
people across borders, there is a drawing back from openness and a re-
establishing of delineations between people and hence between cultures
and traditions. The border all at once becomes a wall, rather than a thre-
shold to an encounter with another culture, a celebration of not only
one’s own culture, but the appreciation of another. Instead, otherness be-
comes a source of suspicion, and a culture is drawn around oneself as a
suit of armour, since it demarcates a belongingness for some alien
alterity for the rest beyond the border. A detailed study of the culture of
those living in borderlands can be vert instructive about the nature of
cultural identity.

There is also the question of the extent to which personal identity is
shaped by the geographic boundaries of a country. Europe, for example,
has seen many shifts in boundaries over the centuries, as states rise and
fall. This is particularly problematic for individuals living in border-
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lands, where they may have been born in one country, such as Poland, but due to changes in state borders, find themselves living in Ukraine. Of course, culture and tradition does not follow political boundaries, and the change of state borders does not affect immediately an individual’s identity, except politically. As we have suggested political identity is not the same as cultural identity, but this does not mean that one is not affected by the other. Citizenship changes, but this alters neither the language which he or she speaks nor his or her cultural traditions, values or practices. Despite this, a change in borders may result in confusion about how an individual sees herself and hence subtly alter cultural identity.

Cultural identity can be a source of conflict within a nation-state, as well as within civil society, where different culturally based associations can clash with one another and with the state. Damaging conflicts can be avoided if there is a common narrative to which all groups can relate, and civil society is based on a respect for persons and an acknowledgement of their equal dignity. In Hegel’s terms, if cultural groups are guided by a rational spirit or ethical law, they will be actively engaged in the building up of civil society and, hence, the ethical state (Hegel, 1991). The elements making up cultural identity are diverse and multi-faceted, as we have shown, and for both the emigrant and immigrant there are challenges to be faced in coming to understand who they are and what their place in society is. The same, however, also applies to those who remain in their societies and who experience great changes in the composition of their communities.

The essays in this volume reflect many of the themes discussed here. The very idea of identity is paid some attention and there is a consideration of the various aspects that make up our conceptions of who we are and what this means in relation to our societies and nations. The significance and influence of cultural interactions on a regional as well as global level are also discussed. There are also reflections on the historical antecedents of cultural traditions and how globalisation influences our cultural identity and our sense of our place in the world. The volume illustrates well how cultural identity is not something easily compartmentalised nor simply defined according to a set of criteria but is instead a mosaic consisting of different arrangements of many contributing influences. Its hallmark is complexity and variegated richness. This is brought out very well in the numerous voices heard in this book.

References


Part I
Construction and Deconstruction of Cultural Identity
Lithuanian Cultural Identity and the Power of Modern Nomad

DALIA MARIJA STANCIENE

Introduction

Lithuanian cultural identity, its relationship with European identity and nomadic power is the common topic of the Lithuanian philosophers’ debates. More profound investigation of this problem commenced in 1918 after the Declaration of the Independent State of Lithuania. According to philosopher Alyvydas Jokubaitis (b. 1959) who was born after World War II, the newly established national states of the Middle and Eastern Europe realized that “every nation had its own cultural mission, and therefore its state had to be a well-functioning red-tape mechanism closely associated with the spiritual life of people.”1 Hence, the new national states related their political independence to cultural identity and therefore paid much attention to the cultural education.2 New states had to create the programs of national identity upbringing and fostering which would enrich national culture with the achievements of global culture and science. Cultural modernization demanded the reassessment of human rights and moral responsibility. According to Jokubaitis, the globalization of the economy, the universalization of law, and the propagation of mass culture causes serious problems for national states.3

In 1921, professor Pranas Dovydaitis (1886-1942) issued the first Lithuanian language philosophical newspaper Logos in which he wrote, that the Lithuanian culture is to be developed by means of the Lithuanian language adaptation to the achievements of modern philosophy, theology and science. Dovydaitis saw the importance of the philosophical magazine for the Lithuanian intellectuals and claimed that its mission might be fulfilled if Logos “would provide for its readers not as much philosophy by drilling into their heads the data and principles of philosophy as teach them to philosophize.”4 To its contributors he recommend-

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2 Ibid., p. 70.
3 Ibid., p. 83.
ed that they “learn to discern where problems appear, to make attempts to solve them independently before learning the already proposed solutions either to obtain peculiar, free conviction, or to experience personally the ready-made solutions.”

During the soviet occupation, the philosophers discussed national identity issues relating them to paganism, ethnology and lay holidays. They made attempts of creating soviet identity as combination of national and international symbols. In official discourse, the concepts “nation” and “nationality” were substituted by “folk” and “people,” claims professor Bronislavas Juozas Kuzmickas (1935) a researcher of the Lithuanian consciousness and Signatory of the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania (March 11, 1990). He was introduced into the Soviet ideology attitude to the national question during his doctoral studies in Moscow Institute of Philosophy at the USSR Academy of Sciences. He joined the institute in 1963 and graduated in 1966.

Lithuanian philosophers in exile rose and considered the question of the Lithuanian identity preservation in the conditions of sovietization. In the United States of America in 1961 Dovydaits’ pupil Juozas Girnius (1915-1994) published treatise The Nation and National Loyalty in which he analyzed the development of national consciousness axiological dimensions. In 1974, in the magazine To Freedom (USA), a Lithuanian philosopher in emigration Antanas Maceina (1908-1987) wrote “that linguistic nationalism was the most dangerous thing; for the survival of Lithuanian national identity in exile depends not so much on preservation of the language as on the personal experiencing of that identity.”

When independence was restored, the discussions concerning national identity and its relation to European identity intensified. Soon the global crisis and economically forced emigration sharpened the national identity issue supplementing it with multiculturalism problems.

The multiculturalism embracing the national state gives possibility to a person of choosing at will any identity, even national. This is the beginning of national culture elimination; for, according to Jokubaitis, “the principle of multiculturalism denies the leading position to the national

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5 Ibid.
7 Juozas Girnius, Tauta ir tautinė ištikimybė (Chicago: J Laisvę Fondas, 1961).
culture in its own country and encourages the representatives of other cultures to disregard it and enforce their own rules."\(^9\)

In Lithuania, the authorities associate the problem of multiculturalism with ethnic, religious and linguistic aspects of national identity and try to solve the problem of national identity by means of the policy of education. According to Lithuanian philosopher Algirdas Degutis (1951), multiculturalism is nothing other than “aggression against culture, traditions, morality and customs of dominant ethnoss”\(^10\) aiming even at the elimination of national sovereignty. The final result of multiculturalism will be the liquidation of national state. Therefore, a young Lithuanian scientist in Educational Sciences Lilija Doblienė (1961) believes “that for the meantime Lithuania should not embrace multiculturalism, provided it desires to defend its national culture. Hence, Lithuania’s policy of education should be oriented towards the fostering of national identity and national values.”\(^11\)

Now the questions of double citizenship, national currency, complementing of the Lithuanian alphabet are intensively discussed. In 2013, a Lithuanian philosopher Nerija Putinaite (1971) wrote that “Political alliances could be based on purely pragmatic interests. However, in the Lithuanian identity perspective the political union is meaningful if and only if it has cultural value dimension.”\(^12\) In the internet portal Pro Patria, young Lithuanian philosopher Vytautas Sinica (1990) writes that, “in relation to a person, national identity is not so much natural as social necessity […] for nation is a form of his cultural existence.”\(^13\)

American philosopher of Lithuanian origin Algis Mickunas (b. 1933) claims that in the perspective of cultural identity the modern globalization is a kind of colonization. He argues that the legalization of nomadic individual as general socio-political and economic standard is deadly to local cultures and the means of colonization.

However, the current situation in the European Union, especially after the Ukrainian Euromaidan, forces the European ruling elites to rethink their policy concerning national sovereignty paying much more attention to the preservation of national culture and fostering identity up-

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\(^9\) Ibid., p. 79.
brining. In the interview to the online newspaper Bernardinai.lt, a Lithuanian philosopher Vytautas Rubavičius (b. 1952) said that the renunciation of multiculturalism by the political leaders of England, Germany and France “signify the return to national identities;” for these “leaders maintain that now it is high time to stop pandering immigrants and pay heed to the development of national culture.” It should be remembered that people and nations mature and develop in the context of their own national, cultural and social understanding which determines the perception of their identities (ethnic, religious, language, etc.), the discovery of the Other and the coexistence with the Other.

National Identity

In theory as well as in personal self-identification the models of national identity can be based on the following criteria: traditions, language, territory, religion, culture, history, axiology, politics, etc. Thus, in order to define personal or national criteria of self-identification, we have to evaluate social environment, cultural traditions, axiological attitudes, peculiarities of state’s formation and historical development, socio-political reality, and the consequences of globalization.

According to Putinaitė, “It is possible to find the more universal reading points which would express the ‘ideas’ of the different models of national identity and would direct us towards some key symbols and their meanings.” The researchers of the identity underline that the sovereignty is the basis of national state and that person preserves his/her own unique identity in ever changing socio-economical and cultural life of nation.

For the analysis of national identity, it is important to understand the meaning of identity concept. Martin Heidegger defines this meaning as relation of oneself to oneself and stresses that in this case relation expresses itself through identity, i. e. through unification: “The more fitting formulation of the principle of identity ‘A = A’ would accordingly mean not only that every A is itself the same; but rather that every A is itself the same with itself. Sameness implies the relation of ‘with’, that is, a

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15 Ibid.

mediation, a connection, a synthesis: the unification into a unity.”\(^{17}\) In the tradition of Western thinking, this unity is treated as the expression of identity which is not abstract and monotonous but by means of conjunction “is” supposes to whom the identity belongs. A is A – “is” here shows “how every being is, namely: it itself is the same with itself.”\(^{18}\) That means, concludes Heidegger, that “Everywhere, wherever and however we are related to beings of every kind, we find identity making its claim on us.”\(^{19}\) According to him, identity justifies theses that we are subordinated and introduced “into the order of a ‘together’, established in the unity of a manifold, combined into the unity of a system, mediated by the unifying center of an authoritative synthesis.”\(^{20}\)

Because the human being is not a mere being but the being who thinks, she/his “is open to Being, face to face with Being; thus, man remains referred to Being and so answers to it.”\(^{21}\) Identity relates human being with Being and within that relation Being encourages human being to open to his/her own essence through thinking which uses language as means. Therefore, in antiquity language was called the house of Being.

Influenced by Heidegger, Maceina postulates importance of native language for national identity and claims that through language nations obtains their historic world. As far as a person is concerned, he/she is encouraged namely by historical world to contemplate the relation between onetime, immutable personal self and history. Maceina maintains that for the Lithuanian resident of Lithuania his/her historical identity is not a problem but for the emigrant it becomes a problem produced by the tension between his/her personality and history. According to Maceina, language is the main personal existence in history and the main national tradition at the same time. “We exist in history the same way we speak.”\(^ {22}\)

Language embodies national phantasy, wisdom, experience, and sentiments. “Language integrates person into community and national culture, conditions his/her way of thinking and directs his/her life in certain direction,”\(^ {23}\) i.e. a child is born with national identity in addition to his/her own self. According to Maceina, native language conveys the


\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 26.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 29

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 31.


child not so much words as things, desires, and sentiments. That is why “during childhood, we learn how to know world in which we exist by means of the knowledge embodied in native language.”24 Every national language is the national interpretation of the world and personal native language expresses personalized existence of nation.25

But Maceina maintains that in order to experience the being of nation native language is not enough: in addition, a person needs historical consciousness which enables him/her to experience the national past as his/her own past. Maceina defines historical consciousness as the past of country transferred from parents to children. This consciousness performs the permanent functions of the present. These functions give the person opportunity to join the boundless historical heritage of nation. By means of historical consciousness the present obtains value and meaning for the person. Historiography, says Maceina, supports historical awareness providing it by context “without which it would remain empty.”26

Historical consciousness helps emigrants in preserving national identity. In this case, memory plays important role: “It enables to retain personal identity.”27 To be in the present, according to Maceina, means to move from the past to the future, which means that history is the meeting of the past and the future in the present.28 Personal memory remembers; nation forms historical memory by means of personal memories and performs educative functions. Thus, “memory is the principle which creates nation’s history, actualizes not only the personal but also national past.”29

Time plays certain role in actualization of the pasts and present. It unites all the moments of the past and future in the present which is called perceptible reality or history. According to Maceina, “History is existential time in which we are present not mere moving and perishing but keeping time in our hands, namely by means of our memory of the past and by our resolution in respect of the future.”30 Therefore, the personal identity is at the same time his/her historical identity which can’t be modified by a person, for s/he can’t modify time. The person can change place but s/he can’t change history.”31

Maceina notes that while discussing the nation’s past as living in its present one needs to remember cultural aspect which frequently is called

24 Antanas Maceina, Raštai VI t., p. 375.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 381.
27 Ibid., p. 364.
28 Ibid., p. 362.
29 Ibid., p. 366.
31 Ibid., p. 363.
tradition and understood as the content of nation’s memory. Tradition encompasses “everything that a nation creates: tales, songs, dances, fine art, ways of socialization, literature, philosophy, religion, and, what is the most important, language.” As a historical person, the human being lives and participates in the whole field of national tradition transferring the national heritage from one generation to other.

The Self-Awareness of Lithuanian Identity

After Lithuania regained its independence in 1918, Lithuanian philosopher Stasys Šalkauskis (1886-1941) emphasized the significance of culture to national identity. Paying attention to the fact that Lithuania is located at the intersection of Eastern and Western cultures, he claimed that the honorable mission of the Lithuanian nation was their fusion; and that it was worthy to be pursued in spite of all losses and sufferings. For the development of this project Šalkauskis was inspired by Russian religious thinker and social philosopher Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900) and Thomist Dominican monk, Marc de Munnynck (1871-1945), Professor of Philosophy at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland.

Solovyov maintained that the fusion of Eastern and Western cultures was the vocation of the Russian people. In the article (the) “Russian idea” published in Paris in 1888, he stressed that Russia was a multinational and multicultural state whose historical destiny was the synthesis of Eastern and Western Christian cultures. Šalkauskis envisaged the same mission for Lithuania. He claimed that the Lithuanian nation was able to combine the elements of Russian and Polish cultures and set the external balance between the Germanic and Slavonic worlds. The synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures which reflects the general human context in the Lithuanian national form was regarded by Šalkauskis as the possible survival means for the Lithuanian nation. He believed that the realization of such synthesis would help Lithuanian people to recognize its own identity and claim for the inviolability of its national rights.

32 Ibid., p. 368.
36 Ibid., p. 170.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 256.
From Munnynck Šalkauskis took the idea that a synthesis of civilizations can be implemented on the basis of national form. Analyzing multinational Belgian and Swiss nationality concepts, Munnynck noted that multinational communities of these countries linked their cultural identity with their states. Relaying on this finding, Munnynck maintained that the objective of Belgium and Switzerland was the “synthesis of Romanic and Germanic civilizations.”39 He wrote that multinational states had to unite their present cultures by fraternal synthesis which could serve the whole humanity. There was no need for something more in order to stir fruitful patriotism, dignity and confidence of citizens.40 Šalkauskis was so greatly impressed by these ideas that he tried to apply them to Lithuania as a multinational country.

At the beginning of the 20th century the meaning of patriotism was dear to the meaning of public spirit, and the term patriotism was treated as loyalty to the state for all ethnic communities living in a given country. This way, according to Munnynck, the cultural values of different ethnic communities merge into universal national form. Šalkauskis accepted this idea and claimed that the national education in Lithuania had to integrate the individual ethnic cultures into universal human culture which is national by form and universal by content.

Šalkauskis defined the universality of ethnic content by the transcendentals philosophical categories of goodness, beauty, and truth. These transcendentals give to individuals and nations the opportunity to express their creativity externally and conditionally.41 The national forms are just the means of creativity but goodness, beauty, and truth are universal ideals and indispensable values.42

According to Šalkauskis, the fullness of personal being is attainable only with the condition that a healthy nation33 as a form of social life provides him/her with indispensable well being. Healthy nation, according to Šalkauskis, was characterized by ethnic vitality, idiosyncratic temperament, history and self-awareness. He related the Lithuanian national individuality development to Christianity as the basis for the achievement of cultural universality.43 Šalkauskis’ philosophy of national culture influenced the further development of the concept of nationality. Contemporary Lithuanian philosopher Arūnas Sverdiolas (1949) claims that Šalkauskis’ philosophy of culture leaves the unreflected and unproj-

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39 Ibid.
41 Stasys Šalkauskis, Raštai IV t., p. 26.
42 Ibid.
43 See, Stasys Šalkauskis, Raštai IV t., p. 24.
44 Ibid., p. 538.
ected wide and deep ontological space for national personality.\(^45\) This way the national identity, according to Šalkauskis, gets its expression through the attributes of being: goodness, beauty, and truth.

American and Lithuanian sociologist Vytautas Kavolis (1930-1996) calls Šalkauskis’ project ambitious but at the same time he criticizes it as embraces only the appliqué of spiritual technologies leaving apart existential confrontation.\(^46\) Putinaite claims that in “the debates of those times, the objectives of culture development were related to something denominated the potency of national spirit. Therefore Šalkauskis thought that the creative and personalized synthesis of German and Slavonic (including Polish) cultures is the objective of Lithuanian culture development.”\(^47\) According to Putinaite, in Šalkauskis’ conception, the new Lithuanian identity should be creatively developed on the basis of the old one by means of incorporation of the synthesized elements of different civilizations.

Thus, the concept of Lithuanian identity and self-awareness is inseparable from Šalkauskis’ project of Western and Eastern cultural synthesis. The project is universal. It embraces three hierarchical levels of being: individual, communal, and global.

**Unbalanced Identity and Nomadism**

After the First World War, Lithuania regained its independence and started building a modern national state within which Lithuanian identity was understood as a political nation.\(^48\) A politically mature nation constitutes its own state based on civil and communal values. Lithuania looked for such values in its past and regarded the Grand Duke Vytautas as the skillful leader who managed to combine the advantages of Western civilization with Oriental features\(^49\) and this way ensured Lithuanian state geopolitical stability within Cristian Europe.

According to Maceina, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania performed the most beautiful self-actualization of nomadic spirit represented by remarkable militancy, aristocratic management and legislation. It was attracted more by the conquered territories than by cultural institutions.

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\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 119.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p.121.
That was the nomadic period of the history of Lithuania. Maceina claimed that during this period, the political awareness was shaped and developed by means of legislative and administrative activities.

In Lithuanian culture, the sources of nomadism are associated with nation’s ethnological structure: as one of the oldest branches of the Indo-European cultural Lithuanian nation has a strong nomadic bent. In the Lithuanian consciousness this bent produces the idea that Lithuania should bridge the gap between Oriental and Occidental cultures, between those Eastern and Western countries which belonged to the Grand Duchy from the 12th to 18th century.

As far as the modern identity of Lithuania in the contemporary European Union is concerned, the concept of the “bridge” includes the countries of Norther Europe. This concept is not quite new. In interwar Lithuania, Matas Šalčius (1890-1940) propagated idea of the Union of Baltic and Scandinavian countries – Balto-Scandia. According to Putinaitytė, during the period of Sajūdis movement, the Northern countries, to which Lithuania arrogated itself, were proclaimed as the most reliable and safe way back (“bridge”) to Europe.

In the interwar Lithuania, veneration of the past was accepted as the paradigm of public, legislative, and moral education. Prominence was given to the geopolitical position of the Grand Duchy and its ruler the Grand Duke Vytautas was extolled and perceived as the expression of some identity expectations. Vytautas was depicted as an influential European sovereign of vast Eastern territories. His most important achievements were domination in the East and peace with the West. The idealization of these political achievements gave opportunity of speaking about the continuation of the Lithuanian European traditions.

The Soviet period in the history of Lithuania interrupted the tradition of sovereign statesmanship and destroyed the awareness of Lithuanian identity. Soviet ideology distorted the history and culture of Lithuania. The self-awareness of the people was reduced to the level of peasant folk self-awareness, national culture – to “folk culture.”

Formation of a “people’s culture,” “progressive future,” and “new man” were the main purposes of the introduction of “socialist traditions.” This way the new context of culture, supported by soviet regime,

50 Ibid., p. 458.
53 Ibid., p. 120.
54 Nerija Putinaitytė, Šiaurės Atėnų tremtiniai arba Lietuviškosios tapatybės pateikėkos ir Europos vizijos XX a (Vilnius: Aidai, 2004), p. 147.
transformed the cultural heritage, modified interpersonal relations, axiological awareness, interpretation of the past. Soviet ideology skillfully exploited ancient Baltic culture and ethnographic researches. For instance, ethnographers were obliged to extoll the peasant culture and underlie the folk pre-history of the Lithuanian nation.

In order to argue on behalf of the “folk culture” Soviet research re-interpreted national history relying on the doctrine of Socialist Realism. Historian of culture Rasa Čepaitienė (1971) claims, that historical sources and plots were ideologically infiltrated and used as mere stencils for new ideological content.\(^55\) During the Soviet period, the traditions and values of the past were obstacles to the promotion of the folk identity, therefore “Aesop’s language” held sway in everyday culture.\(^56\)

In 1990 Lithuania regained independence but the stereotypes of the “folk culture” and process of globalization distorted axiological orientation and Lithuanian identity which, according to philosopher Mantas Adomėnas (1972), had become the “contingent collection of idiosyncratic features.”\(^57\) Duobliene thinks similarly. She claims that democratization increased the complexity of the Lithuanian identity when Lithuania entered the common space of European culture and encountered globalization.\(^58\) Relying on the results of representative poll performed in 2006 on the 11th-12th grade high school pupils, Duobliene concludes that the youth is becoming less and less perceptive to the values of nationality, motherland, and patriotism.\(^59\)

Culture historian and literary critic Darius Kuolys (1962) underlines the importance of national identity to Lithuania and treats nomadic culture as the major obstacle to its development. He is convinced that nomadic culture is artificially imposed upon the nation. While arguing for this position, Kuolys quotes Arvydas Juozaitis (1956) who exposes the negative influence of nomadic culture citing one of the Lithuanian Communist Party initiators Vincas Mickevičius-Kapsukas (1880-1935) who claimed that the Lithuanian language is an anachronism and therefore it


\(^{58}\) Lilija Duobliene, *Intercultural Education: Looking for National Identity and/or Dialogue with the Other*, p. 224.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 225.
is not worth preserving and learning. It is better to learn languages of larger nations instead. ⁶⁰

As early as 1938, Maceina wrote that “it is characteristic to the nomadic culture to accept foreign language and foreign forms; for those forms and languages do not change its content and nomadic culture expresses itself through them. Thus, although Lithuanians accepted Belorussian language as the language of administration, they did not reject their own nomadic spirit. This spirit held sway over them and over Slavonic nations ruled by them. And if that nomadic principle would not degenerate, if other factors would not push it into the depths of our spiritual life, now, perhaps, we would not speak Lithuanian language, but, perhaps, would possess land of Belorussia, Ukraine and rule the Lithuanian state with 50 million citizens.” ⁶¹ These observations had become the points of reference in the discussions on the identity of the European states to the younger generation of Lithuanian philosophers. Considering the 25-year development of independent Lithuanian statehood, Kuolys underlines that the mentioned position of Mickevičius-Kapsukas concerning the Lithuanian language represents nomadic culture, which “does not allow us to be free since nomadic culture is based on force but the Western culture is based on law. Therefore, we need to get rid of nomadic culture.” ⁶²

Nomadic mentality presupposes permanent modification of identity here and now. Historic events are treated as conflicting, having no common cultural dimension and, therefore, no future. Every moment new experience erases the anticipated future and makes the world unpredictable, permanent fluctuation of meaning. According to philosopher Arūnas Mickevičius (1965), nomadic thinking “strives to preserve the meaning of Nytschean metaphor of ‘eternal child’ who is fully absorbed by his life and creative game.” ⁶³

According to Gintautas Vyšniauskas (1955), the concept of Lithuanian identity in general “better serves ideological manipulations than genuine analysis of social, political, and historical phenomena.” ⁶⁴ National state makes attempts to shape national identity concept and uses it as the

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⁶¹ Antanas Maceina, Kultūros sintezė ir lietuviškoji kultūra, p. 487.
⁶³ Arūnas Mickevičius, F. Nietzsche ir G. Deleuze, sėslumo simptomatika ir nomadiško mąstymo akistatos (Problemos 69, 2006), p. 75.
means of ideological mind control in order to consolidate power over population. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) well described how the state “by the action of an identity which takes the form of a permanent reac-
tuation of the rules”\textsuperscript{65} imposes upon population norms of behavior and fictional identities.

In history, the Lithuanian identity as a cultural and social complex was defined and described in many different ways. But in the context of globalization and modernization, the Lithuanian identity changes its own stereotypes causing the feeling of uncertainty which unbalances the Lith-
uanian national self-awareness. Therefore, anthropologist Vytis Čiub-
brinskas (1956) claims that in contemporary Lithuania “the question of
national identity policy gradually becomes more and more the critical
question how to preserve and develop national identity not only in the
conditions of Globalization but also in the conditions of European-
ization.”\textsuperscript{66}

**Conclusion**

The Lithuanian cultural identity is closely related to the nation’s historical memory, geopolitics, ethnic symbols, and native language. In 1918 Lithuania had become a national state which related its indepen-
dence with cultural identity. The stimulation of cultural self-awareness was regarded as crucial for state sovereignty strengthening.

The interwar philosopher Stasys Šalkauskis saw the mission of Lithuania in building the bridge between Oriental and Occidental cul-
tures. He related this mission with the geopolitical situation of the country. Lithuania had to unite the elements of Russian and Polish cultures in the national Lithuanian form and to establish external balance between Germanic and Slavonic worlds. The realization of such synthesis would help the Lithuanian nation to become aware of its own national identity.

During the Soviet regime period the Lithuanian identity was related to pagan culture, ethnology, soviet symbols and feasts. Soviet ideology distorted the tradition of sovereign statehood, falsified the history of Lithuania, its cultural ideals and destroyed Lithuanian national self-awareness while imposing new Soviet identity.

In 1990 Lithuania restored its independence. Lithuanian identity got rid of Soviet stereotypes but appeared unbalanced in its axiological


orientations because of globalization process within which it lost its feeling of security. Europeanization strengthened nomadic mentality which permanently reshapes identity here and now. Therefore, the question concerning the preservation and development of national identity is a relevant question of Lithuanian identity politics.

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(De)Construction of Cultural Identity in the Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian Borderland

BASIA NIKIFOROVA

Introduction

Borders and border regions are particularly revealing places for social research, especially in the present era of growing globalization, and the growth of supra-state regions such as the European Union (EU). This article situates the growing interest in Eastern “borderlands” in a set of overlapping contemporary cultural and theoretical concerns. Metaphors are intellectual tools. In present-day research, we can find such definitions as narrating space, mapping identities, the geography of identity, contradictory mapping of space, geographic or place-centered dramas of domination, sovereignty without territoriality, disappearances and strengthening of borders which are very close to metaphors. All of them are connected to the problems of space, territoriality and border. The study of territory and borders now constitutes a multidisciplinary research, drawn by political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, geographers and lawyers. Many authors point to the important links between borders and identity, as well as the cultural meaning of the distinction “us” and “them.” The significance of the Eastern borders of Europe is currently changing. Through the focus on its informal, everyday aspects, the article draws together the existing knowledge and develops new understandings of combined social, moral and cultural elements on how these borders are experienced and perceived. The aim of the article is to develop a new approach to studying changes in the Eastern periphery of Europe through exploring the process in which borders themselves become visible, strengthening, meaningful or disappearing, while simultaneously focusing on what those borders separate and what they bring together, along with the impact of remaking borders, which means studying understandings of possible futures as well as the past.

European Borders and Borderlands

Today there are different ways to interpret what a “border” means exactly, how it works and how it is reproduced. First of all, every border has a double meaning, local and global: it is an accepted, stable, visible line which separates territories forming a “unity of different parts” or “different parts of unity.” Imaginary patterns of space, such as core,
semi-periphery and periphery, center-periphery, have been significant in developing the boundaries of countries and have attempted to forecast the approaching relation between local and global borders.

Today territory as an analytic category inscribes membership and identity in physical space.¹ Nevertheless, borders are an element in the transforming dimensions of culture.

The term “border” is extremely rich in significations. It is undergoing a profound change in meaning. The borders as an attempt to preserve all the functions of the sovereignty of the state are no longer entirely situated at the outer limit of territories; they are somewhat dispersed in all directions. Both border theory and border studies as a field owe much of their cross-disciplinary origins and development to Eastern European scholars. There are many characteristics of border management, border life and borderlands that operate at borders everywhere and inform the comparative and analytical foundations of border theory, wherein Eastern European borders are no exceptions.

Territory, or territoriality, has become an increasingly prevalent notion in the discourse of the EU. We note two tendencies in the dialectical process of the borders: “territorialization” and “de-territorialization.” Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson in the middle of the 1990s emphasized that “borders no longer function as they once did, or at least not in every respect…and globalization of culture, the internationalization of economics and politics have apparently resulted in the opening up of borders and the relaxation of those state controls which limited the movement of people, goods, capital and ideas.” At the same time, they add: “the extent and the depth of these border transformations, which seem to fly in the face of numerous examples of international borders which have been made stronger and more impenetrable.” Today for them borders seen as “process” as much as “product” and nowadays state as “incomplete” and “fragmented.”²

Now the process of de-territorialization and weakening of the importance of territorial belonging is the principal tendency for the EU. It is the possibility of going beyond the form of nation. Europe in its actual historical phase is a new form of post-national construction. As Étienne Balibar notes, Europe is a frontier. This frontier is one of the most im-

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important problems today. For him, this representation of the border, essential as it is for state institutions, is nevertheless profoundly inadequate with the account of the complexity of real situations, of the topology underlying the sometimes peaceful and sometimes violent mutual relations among the identities having constituted the European history. Balibar has, in fact, discovered and made a list of some general features of the European border in our political tradition, territories combine in a single unity the institutions of sovereignty, the border, and the government of populations. Borderlines are a power to attach populations to territories in a stable or regulated manner. The borders are no longer entirely situated at the outer limit of territories, they are somewhat dispersed in all directions, wherever the information, people and things are happening and controlled. Europe is always home to tensions among numerous religious, cultural and linguistic identities, multiple readings of history. Balibar concluded that borders are starting to be a “transitional object,” an object of permanent transgression, and European citizenship is a “citizenship of borders” in a metaphoric sense.3

At the same time, at the end of the 1990s, Benedict Anderson anticipates that both tendencies (de-territorialization and territorialization) will continue to exist, perhaps even gaining in strength in some cases. The tendency to understand borders and boundaries only as a symbol of “past and fixed world” begins to become less popular. The interest in Europe’s multi-ethnic and religiously diverse borderlands has been steadily on the rise over the past two decades.4 The authors explore borderlands as “places of interaction of different ethnic and religious groups” and as “the territories between the Baltic and the Black Sea where four great empires encountered each other in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries along a variety of often changing and contested borders.”5 Such cases in Central Europe as Carpathian Mountains, the


Hungarian-Romanian borderland, Habsburg Galicia and several instances in Balkans give possibility to look at borderlands as a specific geopolitical and social laboratory, in which a flexible category of identity is developing. An identity of a borderland is a “moving target” for some reasons that are at times inconsistent and contradictory. The same conclusion can be found in the article by Philipp Ther “Caught in Between: Border Regions in Modern Europe,” where he states that the nature of borderland identity is “always fluid and transitory.”

The question of Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland identity did not actually exist until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Anything lying beyond “Russia” was to a certain extent equalized, and, as a result of the view, this territory was referred to as Russian-Polish borderland. The national identity of these lands, clearly, could no longer be defined in the Soviet sociology. Only language and confessional affiliation remind us that people who live in the borderland or close to the frontiers have specific characteristics, a separate mentality and historical memory. As Anne Applebaum remarks in her book, Between East and West: Across the Borderlands of Europe, “the history of the borderlands was consigned to dusty bookshops, the languages of the borderlands were banished to small magazines, the borderland emigres retreated into small clubs and churches.” From the viewpoint of Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, borderlands develop their own culture, due to their peripheral position in relation to the center, and to the existence of an ethnically mixed population often connected by economic, social relationships with the populations beyond the borders. “State borders in the world today not only mirror the changes that are affecting the institutions and policies of their states, but also point to transformations in the definitions of citizenship, sovereignty and national identity.” This transformation is more visible in the borderlands where “border people may demonstrate ambiguous identities because economic, cultural and linguistic factors pull them in two directions.” These contact zones, such as the borders, “are not perceived by the population inhabiting

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them as dividing lines between themselves, but as merely resources, and bridges linking them.”

**Culture and Identity Bedrock**

The definition of identity is based on three principal notions: identity is formed and supported through “internal” identification of oneself with one’s own ethnic, cultural or religious group; identity is formed and supported through “external” identification, distinguishing ourselves from Others; Other does not exist outside me. It is the only unique way of one’s self-identification. A person starts the search for identity from the search for the Other within himself or herself.

For instance, after “regaining their independence, the Baltic States have been constructing their political identities in terms of the East/West opposition. They have been creating narratives of belonging to the West, with the East as their threatening other.” Some researchers (B. Anderson, E. Gellner and E. Hobsbawm) consider that identity is something “constructive,” “imaginary,” “made up.” B. Anderson claims that ethnus is an artefact, which has been generated by cultural and political leaders, but the case of Eastern and Central Europe strongly confirms the reality of ethnic communities. According to Zygmunt Bauman, modernity constructed the concept of identity and post-modernity was occupied with its semantic destruction. From his point of view, identity is still “a problem,” but it is not the same problem that was urgent during the entire modern period. The problem of identity in the modern epoch was that of how to construct identity and keep its integrity and stability. The problem of identity in the postmodern epoch is how to avoid inflexibility and to preserve the freedom of choice.

National identity is formed as a symbiosis of national statehood and ethno-cultural background. The dominating criteria for distinguishing differences of national identities are linguistic and religious specificity of a concrete group. They render the deepest influence on maintenance of consciousness of the personal national identity, development and strengthening of its originality, visible difference from other national and ethnic people and groups. The concept of national minority denotes a certain group of people constituting a minor part of a country’s population in the view of their nationality. The criteria defining this concept are

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as follows: possession of a separate language, cultural tradition and religious affiliation. The self-consciousness of a national minority is formed under the influence of the following factors: ethnic and cultural-religious differentiation, presence of a different linguistic group and a state in which the stated national group constitutes the majority. The level of its development depends on the historically formed stage of assimilation and tendencies of tolerance in a specific society.

Assimilation as a process of evening out “otherness,” adjusting oneself to the dominant cultural-linguistic environment is usually accompanied by the weakening of national identity. A policy of assimilation is one that uses measures to accelerate the downsizing of one or more linguistic minority group(s). The ultimate goal of such policies is to foster national unity inside a state.

The conventional typology of assimilation of a national minority includes the following categories:

1) The strong type – dissolution of its mentality in the dominant national environment (identification with the culture, language, history, civic and public-legal status of the national majority).

2) The medium type, which is equivalent to the above type with the exception that the knowledge of the mother tongue is retained, whereas the sphere of its usage is reduced to the level of the family relations.

3) The weak type, which can be characterize by episodic relations with the dominant cultural-linguistic environment, self-identification by means of the minority’s own historical, linguistic and public-legal tradition.

The process of prevalence of one type of assimilation or another depends both on the specific character of a national minority and relations with the host state and its population. There is weakness or absence of religious and linguistic tradition, history of its appearance on the territory and the specific character which helps to constitute homogeneity of the national-religious structure, history of the formation of statehood, manifestation of cultural-linguistic peculiarities. Borderland minorities feel strongly connected with the country of inhabitation and “foreigner motherland.” Lithuanians in the Polish borderland and Poles in that of Lithuania, as well as Belarusians in Lithuania and Poland are multi-level identity carriers. Their identity shows us that everyday life at the frontier gives the inhabitants possibility to be more adaptive to the changing geopolitical situation.

Cultural identity is the most important and visible part of borderlands inhabitant identity. The problem of cultural pluralism is directly
related to the problem of identity. The Constitution of the European Union ascertains that “culture, in a broad sense, is the bedrock on which peoples build their identity.”

**Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian Borderland**

The case of the Polish-Belarusian and Lithuanian-Belarusian borderlands is a good example, which gives us a possibility to understand how important borders and boundaries are today. It is not only a symbol of “past and fixed world.” Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland is the center of Europe and since the disintegration of the USSR it has remained the center of stability and safe coexistence of various ethnos occupying it. In this region tolerance and good neighborhood principle dominate, here separatism tendencies are no source of a conflict, the borders of this region demand both multilateral research and socially responsible policy.

The Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland is a specific area, which can be regarded in three parameters: as a space where several ethno-cultural groups coexist historically, in respect to the historical stability of this phenomenon, and the special type of the inhabitants who belong to several cultures. The prospective areas of current and future enquiry include the meaning of “national” borders in pre-, post-, multi- or trans-national societies. In many senses, the territorial border becomes less of a boundary dividing identities into separate nations than a bridge linking them in mutual dependence. Researchers indicate the three contributing elements of a state border definition: legislatively established, the frontier lines divide the adjoining states; state institutions defining and supporting borders; presence of borderlands regions adjoining borders and absorbing them in the space of a state territory. The process of European integration involving the EU in the activity of border control starts to be “a territorial state.” For Timothy Snyder, “present developments suggest that the EU “as a state – like entity is in the process of being born at its borders.”\(^{12}\)

We describe the conception “cultural borderland” as a space, territory or zone where different cultures, languages and religions are mixed. Cultural borderland includes the meaning of the unique, autonomous identity of its inhabitants, which is a result of diffusion, coexistence and collaboration of many cultures over a long historic period.

Separating and connecting neighboring communities, territorial borders carry out functions of a “barrier” (“walls,” “fence”) and

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“bridge.” Liam O’Dowd adds that the nature and functions of borders have been changing dramatically in Europe and outlines some changes of the key of borders: borders as barriers, bridges, resources and symbols of identity. The author points out that the place of border’s abolition as economic barriers is now occupied by “the barrier of thinking” which is “still very much alive” in the debate and policies concerning the EU external borders.\(^{13}\) Borders also serve as resources: they are places of economic, social and political opportunities for various actors and groups (small-scale cross-border trade). On this borderland, border is mostly perceived as a “wall,” “fence,” “lock,” “barrier” and at the same time, as a “bridge,” “opportunity,” “wet-nurse.” It is connected with the “positive” opinion about boundary functions among the Lithuanian-Polish border inhabitants and the opposite “negative” (divisive) opinion among the Lithuanian-Belarusian and the Polish-Belarusian borders inhabitants who experience “feeling of border” to be strong enough to grow into “feeling of a distance and tension.”

On such a small territory as the Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland, it is possible to investigate two different, reciprocal processes: disappearances (the Lithuanian-Polish borderland) and strengthening of borders (the Lithuanian-Belarusian and Polish-Belarusian borderland). These contradictory processes on the borders are the result of their division into Schengen and non-Schengen zones in the same territory. “Schengen” is the name given to the common external border of the continental members of the EU, as well as absence of border controls among them. Snyder emphasizes that “Europeans who are not citizens of EU member states are no longer simply excluded from a set of nation-states: they are excluded from a unit which goes by the name of “Europe.”\(^{14}\) Indeed, we are dealing with the new dividing lines that emerge from the re-bordering of Europe: the borders between insiders and outsiders.

In the present-day Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland we can find all border functions, which were named in studies on boundaries. Borders in today’s Europe are not only symbols of identity in the traditional sense of exclusive sovereignty but also symbols of cross-border identities: sustained cross-border cooperation often contributes to a shared feeling of “we.” A method of a free narration about life and “we” feeling on the border will allow to create the generalized image of the inhabitant of a borderland and to reveal its peculiar features, such as:


local mobility, domination of local regional self-identification in comparison with the state identification, specific type of people.

The Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland represents a concentration and crossing of several ethnic borders on a rather small territory. A borderland is a specific area where a particular type of inhabitants is born historically; they attain both individual and group consciences, the latter of which is defined as an accessory to several cultures. The peculiar features of the borderland’s inhabitant are the following:

- Local mobility;
- Domination of local regional self-identification in comparison with the state identification;
- Specific type of people who are characterized by features of several in some cultures simultaneously;
- Knowledge of several languages (mostly the languages of neighboring countries);
- Consequently, much more openness to cultural diversity and therefore to cultural innovations;
- Presence of otherness as a norm of daily life;
- The level of tolerance to the different kind of Otherness being higher than in a different area.

Using D. Emily Hicks definition “holographic plate,” which means that borderland produces an interaction between the connotative matrices of more than one culture, we look at the situation in the Belarusian-Lithuanian-Polish borderland as a symbolic image of frontiers narratives which include elements of national, ethnic, cultural, religious identity of majority and minorities. At the same time, we accept Antal Orkeny and Maria Szekelyi’s conclusion that such factors as marriage, linguistic tolerance and ethnic composition of a circle of friends “can have a strong influence on identity building and self-identification”. It plays a “clearly visible key role in the survival strategy of an ethnic diaspora in minority position.”

Deconstruction of Cultural Identity

The process of deconstruction is the mechanism through which adaptation is achieved. It is a process in which a person in the everyday life modifies the meaning of his or her own identity and changes some of his or her ethnic behavior patterns. Mostly, it does not mean a necessity to divesting them but rather it means changing its significance, the place in the hierarchy of values, adaptation to the new social and cultural conditions.

During the process of deconstruction, ethnicity as such does not disappear; it rather includes a variety of new forms. Deconstruction of identity has different forms and manifestations: people do not speak their mother tongue, they do not belong to ethnic organizations, but, at the same time, they are active in ideological activity and ready to financially support their own diaspora or ethnic minority in many cultural projects. “Rebellious identity” as a result of identity deconstruction is popular in present-day Europe in media, literature and cinema. Mostly, it includes people from the second or third generations of diaspora who have been raised in the culture of both ethnic community and the host society but criticize the ethnic community and cultural organizations for their isolationism and restraint. “Rediscovery identity,” “fluid identity” or “stigmatized identity” are all examples and results of its deconstruction.

Before the initiation of our field research with the COST project “Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: Network Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of European Eastern Peripheries” (2010-11) we articulated some hypotheses:

- The peculiar identity of the respondents, whose age is more than 75-80 years and who were born in their mother country but became citizens of the host country. It often was without changing their place of residence, had predominantly one reason: the change of the state borders. Most of them needed to take more care about the preservation of their original identity, try harder to speak their mother tongue and feel closer to their mother country, citizens of which they were more than 60-70 years ago.

- Such an ethnic start for a person as growing in a family where both parents belong to the minority group and attending school in the native language makes it more probable that in adulthood he or she will support the preservation of the original identity, tend to choose friends among the members of the minority, not be limited by speaking and be able to treat the media in the mother tongue.
- The Poles in Belarus feel closer to their mother country than the Poles in Lithuania. The reason is mostly linked with the participation or non-participation in the EU, as well as the level of democracy in the host-country.

- Feelings of closeness and distance to the mother country and to the host country tell us rather much about the ethnic and cultural identity of the respondents.

During the project, we conducted interviews with three people from the Old Norviliškės village, which is today inhabited by merely five very old women. Their narrative stories about their past, changes of borders and states, divided cemeteries, religious and linguistic communities, as well as families. They miss the old border, which gave various economic advantages to the inhabitants of Old Norviliškės (today it is only borderline). To them and most of the village families, the place where people cross the border used to be a “bridge,” “opportunity,” “wet-nurse” and a place of work. “As institutions, borders are markers of identity, and have played a role in this century in making national identity the pre- eminent political identity of the modern state. This has made borders and their related narratives of frontiers, indispensable elements in the construction of national cultures.”17

When both Lithuania and Belarus declared independence from the Soviet Union, the formerly internal administrative line became an international border, yet the possibility to visit neighbors without much restriction remained. Belarusians could come to a church in Lithuania, visit family graves in local cemeteries. Nevertheless, when Lithuania joined the European Union in 2004, the 677-kilometre stretch became part of the external EU and later Schengen Area border, obliging both states to step up smuggling and illegal migration control. Visas, which previously cost 5 euros, now cost 60 euros.

In order to come to Lithuania, the border-zone Belarusian inhabitants must first travel more than 100 kilometers to the nearest Lithuanian Consulate in Grodno, wait in a long line, then return later to collect their visa, cross the border at checkpoint, and return to their own village Old Norviliškės which today is at the other side of the frontier. In other words, “visiting relatives just a hundred kilometers away is more troublesome than spending a weekend in Paris or London.”18

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The Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland appears in the specifics of language, religious belief and attitudes to religious tradition and rituals, as well as time and local history. The researcher's task is to capture this “unintentional intention,” which sometimes isolates from the diversity of different situations and details that often have no links with the aims of research.

**Life on the Borderland and Its Contradictions**

Life on the border “under first and second Germans,” “under Poles,” “under the Soviets,” in the European Union, with visas and without them, with the border crossing right in the Old Norviliškės village and at a distance of 70 km, is an evidence of human adaptability to any life circumstances and ability to give them adequate assessment.

This kind of narrative expresses individual and subjective experience of the respondents and comprises the variety of individual “phenomena of the world” (Husserl). But these individual “phenomena of the world” constitute a holistic phenomenological image of the identity of the borderland inhabitants.

The internal time of our respondents, who are quite elderly people, is paradoxical: past events are presented vividly and emotionally as though they have recently happened, while the recent past and present devoid of emotional coloring. The main themes of their stories are cemetery, funeral and committed last offices. The time “under the Soviets,” when in fact there were no borders, is now seen as funeral “grace time” due to the large processions that took place, the availability of both Catholic and Orthodox cemeteries, absence of bureaucratic obstacles for a funeral.

“Guest visiting” is the second most important leitmotif of the “lost time.” Walking many miles along a country road to meet with family living in Belarus or Lithuania and visiting friends and neighbors from the “distant circle” was an important part of their everyday life. The fact that none of the respondents is physically able to complete such a journey today is slipping out of their minds and does not detract from its importance and the regret for the lost opportunities, which they experience.

The same situation repeats itself on All Saints’ Day in November every year when Catholics and Orthodox want to visit their family graves on the other side of the border. They need to obtain a visa in Vilnius or Minsk and then go a long way to the nearest border crossing. The 90s, when there was a visa-free regime for grave visiting, are called “heavenly time.” This tradition is one of the most enduring and popular
in this part of Eastern Europe and constitutes a significant part of the cultural and religious heritage of the Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland. It is equally important for Catholics and Orthodox, Lithuanians, Poles and Belarusians.

Different dates and names, among which there are “Vėlinės,” “Dzyady,” “Dedy,” “Radunitsa,” but all of them are a source of feelings of “isolation,” “distance” from the “inner circle” and “border tension” for the residents of the Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland.

Richard Muir’s metaphor about “perpendicularity of border” is embodied in the relation to the capitals of the neighboring countries. The respondents perceived it positively only as a space giving their children and grandchildren education and work, where gifts, food and drinks from “overseas” are brought. However, most of the time a contradictory and negative attitude towards the center dominates. To them, capital represents a monster sucking in the youth, almost totally depriving residents of their homes. Mostly due to the influence of television, a negative moral image of capital formed in their minds; it is perceived as a space of sin and violence, where young people do not marry and families divorce. Moral evaluations of the respondents are contradictory: smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol and gasoline on the border is perceived as “work” and “job.”

‘Be2gether’: A Case Study

In our project, we try to find answers for two questions: what do the words “temporary broken border” mean for our Belarusian respondents? What does “eternal closed border” mean to them? The rock music festival “Be2gether” was created under a slogan “Music Opens Borders.” “Be2gether” was the largest annual music and arts festival in the Baltic States. Established in 2007, it took place in Norviliškės, Lithuania, just a few meters from the border with Belarus. In 2007, attendance was estimated to be 7,000-8,000 people; in 2008, it increased until 12,000 people, and in 2009 it reached 13,000.

The area is remote and difficult to reach, as traveling across the border is restricted, since Lithuania is a member of the European Union, while Belarus is not. In 2008, Belarusians could receive the needed visas without a fee if they traveled to the festival. Due to the proximity of the festival to the state border, special security measures had to be undertaken to prevent people from inadvertently crossing the border. The festival is situated in the historic Vilnius Region inhabited by people of Lithuanian, Polish, Belarusian, Russian nationalities. The Renaissance Norviliškės Castle reminds the visitors of shared history under the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
Most of our respondents emphasize that for them “Be2gether” is a unique possibility to feel like Europeans, free travelers, to be cosmopolitan, to be similar to the young Lithuanian people, enjoy shared emotions and music preferences. Almost half of the 47 respondents, whom we have informally interviewed, admit a “negative” (divisive) opinion about the Lithuanian-Belarusian and Polish-Belarusian borders. They feel “tension of border,” separation from European life and culture and perceive the border as a “wall,” “fence,” “lock,” “barrier.” I heard many narratives about the impossibility to create a folio of bureaucratic papers and evidence of financial stability.

This feeling of “border tension” is humiliating for the locals. On one side, one’s self-identification is high; they are well educated and professional. On the other side, one’s self-identification as a citizen and a representative of the Belarusian nation is rather low. At the same time, the Belarusian language represents a contradictory aspect to them; they feel a strong linkage between the political views and the usage of their national language. They feel that their national identity is not complete without the Belarusian language. They envy Lithuanians because for them native language is the most important part of national consciousness and everyday life normality.

**Conclusion**

The Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland is a place of interaction of different ethnic and religious groups. Territory, or territoriality, has become an increasingly prevalent notion in the discourse of the EU. We note two tendencies in the dialectical process of the borders: “territorialization” and “de-territorialization.” Borders start to be a “transitional object,” an object of permanent transgression and borderland identity becomes a “moving target” for some reasons that are sometimes inconsistent and contradictory, and as a result, the nature of borderland identity is “always fluid and transitory.”

The concept of national minority is grounded on such criteria as possession of a separate language, cultural tradition and religious affiliation. At the same time, self-consciousness of a national minority is formed under the influence of the following factors: ethnic and cultural-religious differentiation, presence of a different linguistic group and a state in which this national group constitutes the majority. We conclude that the level of its development depends on the historically formed stage of assimilation and tendencies of tolerance in a concrete society. Our conventional typology of assimilation of a national minority has given a possibility to conclude that the prevalence of one or another type of assimilation depends both on the specific character of the national minori-
ty and on the specific character of the society part which it constitutes. Cultural borderland as a space, territory where different cultures, languages and religions are mixed, includes the meaning of a unique, autonomous identity of its inhabitants, which is a result of diffusion, coexistence and collaboration of many cultures during a long period.

In our sociological survey, we have found that most of the peculiar features of the borderland inhabitants are similar both in the Polish-Belarusian and the Lithuanian-Belarusian borderlands: domination of local regional self-identification, simultaneously in some cultures, knowledge of several languages of neighbors, openness to cultural diversity, feeling otherness as a norm of daily life and a level of tolerance that is higher than in another kind of territory.

Deconstruction of cultural identity gave us broad possibilities to search for different types of inhabitants’ identity in Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland. In this borderland, we have found some marks of “rediscovery” and “fluid” identity as a deconstructing ethnicity result.

References


VASILII VORONOV

Introduction

Identity is the sameness of an existing entity to itself in its being. This sameness remains hidden when not recorded. Recording is only possible when and where there is a recording entity presented as a human being as a specific form of an existing entity (thinking entity). Developing and, at the same time, deontologising the thought of Martin Heidegger, that it is the human who holds the secret that “the existing entity is” and that “the existing entity is as what it is.” In everyday language practice, the expression “It is what” served to define a thing (state of affairs) in its specifics and particularity.

A definition of a thing in thought and language is impossible without sensual perception, however, the very act of identification is impossible solely in terms perception. We can refer here to Heidegger’s emphasis on the mutual belonging of the Logos and being, word (Sage) and thing. We can understand it (mutual belonging), if we remember about the fundamental connection between the expressed or named with what is referred to.

Expression as the Foundation of Identification

An analytical interpretation of the expression as a simple description of what there is rather obscures than clarifies it. This analytical interpretation of language is presented in a batter structured way in early works of Wittgenstein and members of the Vienna Logic and Philosophy Circle. According the Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the world can be defined as a collection of separate elementary facts that can presented as logical images which, in their turn, can be expressed in propositional marks (Satzzeichen), i.e. in sentences expressing some-

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thing. Propositional marks (sentences) are composite and include names or simple marks corresponding to real-life objects. Undoubtedly, the standpoint of the author of the treatise cannot be viewed as definite, since he makes several statements that do not “fit in” the strict analytical interpretation, but the main intention of analytical-descriptive interpretation stays in force. In his later works, Wittgenstein drifts towards an ontological interpretation of the language when addressing the concept of “language game.” In this case, the criterion of meaningful or meaningless questions (and answers) is related not to whether it is possible or impossible to establish a connection, or lack thereof, between the statement and the separate fact (state of affairs), but to the framework of the language game where they are asked. Since a certain language game itself determines the absence of presence of a meaning in the statement, it cannot be viewed as a simple collection of propositional marks.

Following this analytical logic, we miss the statement about the impossibility of creating an expression about what is not. The meaning of this statement can be fully explained by emphasising its positive form that may be stated as follows: what is “acquires” its “is” and “what” only in parameters of an expression. One should not be worried about falling into the trap of an extremely subjectified, if not solipsist, understanding of this idea. We do not mean specific speech practices, but the very fact of expressibility implementation. Heraclitus seems to have been the first to try to comprehend this connection in his message about the everlasting Logos (λόγου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἀξιοῖς), with everything happening in accordance with it (Logos) though hidden form humans.

‘Thatness’ and ‘Whatness’ in Identification

Identification of anything always means not only determining the substance or “essence” but also grasping of the particularity and uniqueness. The essence that makes a “thing” out of “something” is grasped in the parameter of “whatness.” Singularity and uniqueness of a particular “what” is expressed in its “thatness.” It should be noted that, as a rule, a typical everyday reaction to meeting the unknown or incomprehensible is expressed with the question “what is that?”

Various philosophical traditions differentiate “thatness” and “whatness,” individual and typical, accident and substance etc. This logical structure is found in Aristotle’s categories matrix in the form of the first and second substances. We can also remember the Platonic opposition of

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4 F. Heraclitus, 1 (fragments indexed according to S.N. Muraviyov).
immaterial “eidoi” and the sensually perceived essence, better expressed in the famous cave allegory. Here, it is not important whether we understand “eidoi” as hypostatised general notions, i.e. type-category names endowed with characteristics of being or view them as permanent and invisible forms of perception, i.e. a sort of prisms which remain hidden but make it possible to identify particular substances. It should be noted that even the ontological standpoint of M. Heidegger where a thing is defined a point of presence or closing-in of the world⁵ appears to be just an attempt to answer the question: “what is a thing?”

**Specifics of Human Identity: Ex-Pressing and Co-Operating (Co-Being, Co-Event)**

Human identity is specific in the fact that it manifests itself as self-identification. However, we should not think that the challenge lies only in the fact that, while identification of another thing existent is an externally recorded situation (from the standpoint of an external observer), self-identity is an evaluation from the inside. The world, at least starting from the early modern age, is seen by us as an area or object of realisation. The area or object is seen as something opposed to the subject, i.e. centre of analysis of the world. Analysis, control, calculation, forecast and project become specific forms of subject-object relations. Analytical and calculating approach to the world created by these forms is orientated at detecting new ways to explain and transform the world. The challenge of self-identification lies in difficulty, if not impossibility, for the subject to view itself as the object. The issue is relevant both on the level of theoretical reflection in the form of recognising social and humanitarian knowledge as specific and complex and on the level of individual reflection which takes the form of dominant concept of self-knowledge being complicated because of its inevitable subjectivity. This outlook does not consider the simple fact that the true dimension of human existence can be viewed neither as a definite area or object of realisation, nor as a realising subject.

In the New European tradition of I-awareness interpretation as a subject in its modern meaning, i.e. not only the subject of expression but also the unconditional accuracy guaranteed for perceived objects, is elaborated in philosophical constructs by R. Descartes. According to Cartesius, it is only the existence of the “thinking I” (“Ego cogito”) that can be clear and obvious on the metaphysical level. Identification becomes based on the clear instance of consciousness. Here, we meet a

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considerable obstacle connected with the fact that identities have substance by definition. Appealing to instances devoid of substance therefore means disconnection with identities, too. In other words, we should say that the metaphysical “I” has little relevance to the concrete and defined “I” that thinks about it.

The most suitable concept to define the individual human existence is co-operation (co-being, co-event). Co-operation (co-being, co-event) accurately reflect two core features of human existence: participation and unique functioning (operating). The essential singularity (uniqueness) of human existence determining its crucial participation was very well defined by M.M. Bakhtin in thought-images of the absence of human “alibi-in-being,” on the one hand, and the presence of a unique “place in being” for everyone, on the other hand. Co-participation and uniqueness specific for human life and awareness form the basis for identification procedures in a greater measure than the unity of substance or formal logic. The substance unity of human existence presents a problem due to its temporary nature and, consequently, its self-evident inequality between self and self in different time periods. The uneven nature and therefore fluidity of the substance level of human life in the modern age appears so obvious that it becomes a subject-matter not only for philosophical reflection but also for the mass culture. For instance, we can refer to a metaphor by American rock musician Ronnie James Dio: “You’re just a picture / You’re just an image caught in time.” This situation is related to certain socio-cultural trends of the modernity. We primarily refer to the prevailing strategy of transforming identity as well as the phenomenon of en-framed (the notion of Ge-stell by Heidegger) or preformed (the notion of preforming by Marcuse) identity.

Foundations of human identifications are not metaphysical (e.g. thinking “I,” transcendental subject etc.), but existential and ontological and can only be defined in the parameters of expressing and co-operating (co-being, co-event).

**Procedural Forms of Self-Identification**

No less challenging is the issue of identification procedural forms. In our view, the following identification procedures can be specified: self-equating (reference), differentiation, mindfulness, expectation, and participation. These procedures are present in one or another way both in

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content, form or tone of identification expression and in co-operational dimension of human life.

Self-equating is a procedure of “grasping” oneself in the parameters of “selfhood” (conscious uniqueness), “entity” (“essence”), and “relatedness.” Mental linguistic acts of identification rarely manifest themselves as ontological equating like “I am me.” The predicative part of an identifying expression opens the substance of the subject in one or another.

We can understand the situation by broadening the logical category of “reference” or “relation” which was first introduced by Aristotle. For Aristotle, the reference can not exist without something else unlike the entity (essence). A classic example is slave and master analogy because a slave can be one only if enslaved by his master, and the master cannot without a slave. The necessity of being-in-the-world means inevitable relatedness with different areas of Self and Other. Here we can speak of various reference parameters: place (space), time, importance, cause, viability, and necessity. For instance, the tribal mentality is structured on equating an individual to genetic and teleological reasons of existence, with ancestors and descendants. Consequently, the stability of ontological structure of the tribe was not specifically based on dissolution of “I” in “we,” but rather on the prevailing notion of “I in relation to.” That is why the modern emancipation of “I-awareness” cannot be defined in an exclusively positive connotation. The situation may be viewed in the contest of breaking links between a human and the world and, consequently, in the context of a phenomenon that can be preliminarily defined as identity breakdown.

Moreover, selfhood should not be understood exclusively as “I-identity.” The mental dimension of self-identification manifests itself before the structure of “I” is formed. For instance, in their speech practices, children younger than three-four years old usually relate themselves primarily with their own names. The practice of speaking of oneself without using the pronoun “I” is also present in Christian religious asceticism. Consequently, “I-awareness” should be understood as a definite but not the only form of self-equating. Appearance of the structure of “I” seems to be connected to the factor of volition and control.

Self-awareness, like self-equating, is expressed in various forms. Here, we can refer to the omato-ontological approach of P. A. Florensky where the name is a primary expression of human “I.” The name is understood as crucial to real human self-identification, the actual unity of self-awareness of “I.” According to Florensky, “I” without a name can be defined either as an indefinite metaphysical subject, detached from and indifferent to human personality, or as fleeting centres of present emotions and sensations. In this sense, the name can not be viewed as an
empty mark acquiring its meaning with reference to the individual “I” or as a communicative sign connecting the personal “I” with others.

**Differentiation**

Differentiation can be defined as a process of separating what is not self from self. It does not only mean separating oneself from the outer world as an opposition of oneself to the Other (“me-not me” standpoint). The differentiation procedure also makes it possible to dis-equate oneself from certain aspects of one’s Self. For instance, the differentiation between the soul (consciousness, inner world), the body, and the socio-cultural position makes it possible to identify oneself primarily with one of these parameters. Differentiation is therefore a basis for breaking down the identity.

Since the human existence is within time, the processes of mindfulness (retention) and expectation underlie identification. The mindfulness as taking heed of the being (Heidegger) can be understood in a broad sense: as something that lets one identify oneself within both the future and the past. Yet in our view, it is reasonable to separate the function of mindfulness (retention), i.e. connecting oneself to the past (including the past when the human being in question did not exist) from expectation, i.e. connecting oneself to the future. We may acknowledge the shift in importance of these procedures because nowadays primarily relate themselves with the expected future (often becoming tied in this expected future), while earlier the connection to the past used to be primarily emphasised. To exemplify this, we may think of the essential difference between the standpoints of J.-P. Sartre (the human being the project of oneself) and those of A. Augustinus (the memory being “me”).

Expectation, in parameters of daily presence, expresses orientation to a change in the state of affairs. The parameters of control and mood can be specified in this very attitude. Moreover, it is also necessary to differentiate the mood as an existential feature of human event from the psycho-emotional state that people experience in different moment. To explain (clarify) the differentiation, we can refer to root meanings of the Russian language connecting mood (na-stroyeniye) with disposition (na-stroi) and willingness (na-stroyennost).

Expectation as an identification process should not be exclusively related to the parameter of future. It is no less important in the parameters of supposed present, i.e. a construct (relatively stable “state of affairs”) where the “now” of a particular human presence in localised. The

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7 In Russian all three words contain the prefix na- (“on,” “onto”) and the root morpheme -stroi- (“build,” “construct”).
mode of expectation directed at sustaining the present identity may be
defined as conservation mode.

The identification is also based on the human need to relate to one-
self in terms of meanings and values, which was defined as care (Hei-
degger), apprehension and responsibility (J.-P. Sartre), participation
(Bakhtin), etc. Participatory consciousness, according to Bakhtin, is the
need for personal meanings to be present in acts (thoughts, feelings, and
actions). Consequently, if the acquisition of meaning is a foundation of
identification, then the loss of meaning (personal meaningfulness) means
a weakened identity. Consequently, the crisis of present-day act (Bakht-
in) manifested in the loss of personal meaning importance in human life
inevitably results in an identity crisis and increased identity breakdown.

Conclusion

Summarizing the above, it is possible to briefly repeat the main
positions of this paper. The existential and ontological roots of self-iden-
tification are not the assurance of a clean “I-consciousness,” rather the
co-operating (co-event, co-being) character of human life is. Identification
is shown, first of all, not in demonstrations of “I-consciousness,” or
in concern of people for certain aspects of their own existence with
Others (political, ethnic, religious, related, etc.). Ontologically any hu-
man identity can be understood as the first draft of the expression. Con-
crete registration of existential requirements in a certain self-identification
is implemented through various procedural forms. As the main pro-
cedures can be considered: self-equating, differentiation, mindfulness
(retention), expectation, participation. The analysis of procedural forms
of identification from the ontological point of view allows one to count
on development of existential methodology of a research for identity.
The existential view of this perspective allows one to take “average” as a
position between constructivism (instrumentalism) and essentialism (pri-
mordialism).

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4.

Early Heidegger’s Concept of Identity

RūTA MARIJA VABALAITĖ

The problem of identity occupies a fairly important place in contemporary philosophical discourse in Lithuania. After Lithuania’s return to the European space, the predominant aspect of identity analysis focuses on the problems of national identity and its relationship with European identity. On a global scale the investigation of this aspect of identity is one of the many facets in the scope of inquiry. Sociologists, psychologists, ethnologists, and new media researchers argue about racial, ethnic, social, gender, work-based, consumer, online or digital, reflexive, “fractured” and other identities. From the philosophical point of view, reasoning about the foundation of all kinds of identity is of a capital importance. Stemming from this assumption we will concentrate our reflections on the personal identity which serves as a basis for all human self-identification, personal belonging to any possible natural and cultural communities.

As far as we know, contemporary philosophers interpret the personal identity not as something given, stable and constant, determined by objective characteristics but as a permanently shifting self-identification of an individual with various social groups and roles and as parting from them. The understanding of identity as something performative and complex sets in. The very concept of identity presupposes something fixed and stable, thus it is paradoxically expanded when problems of the identity of modern and postmodern person are concerned. The term of personal identity in the contemporary discourses often goes alongside such terms as “self,” “selfhood,” “self-awareness,” “subjectivity.” We consider contemporary human self not as something substantial but as something that appear due to changing relations and forms caused by them. Identity builds itself through self-awareness and activity; it guides and gives a sense to man’s life.

Scientists who investigate into the formation of such kind of identity are mainly concerned with works of William James, Sigmund Freud, Georg Simmel and George Herbert Mead. We assume that early Martin Heidegger’s concept of human being, considering him as rooted in his world and in primordial being-with-others also considerably affects contemporary concepts of identity. Even now, at the beginning of 21st century when we conceptualize the identity of a contemporary consumer, the well-known ideas of “Being and Time” on the authentic and una-
thetic human being appear in a fresh light and acquire new and acute importance.

First, we shall recall that many Heideggerian ideas were born in the context of Husserlian and Nietzschean thinking. In the analysis of the identity we should note that it was Friedrich Nietzsche, who slightly before Freud put into doubts the existence of solid and stable human ego as an existential center. In the book “Beyond Good and Evil” he writes that “the famous old ‘ego’, is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an ‘immediate certainty’;¹ that “our body is but a social structure composed of many souls,”² that we need to create theories on ‘soul of subjective multiplicity’, and ‘soul as social structure of the instincts and passions’.³ These quotations demonstrate that Nietzsche starts by thinking the multiplicity of human selfhood. Alongside with Nietzsche Heidegger criticizes the concepts of solid, unchanging, world-free subject and transcendental apperception, which are bound to ensure the identity.

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl also provides us with an idea of some shift in the considerations on personal identity, its dependence on the acts of changing experience. It is evident that Husserlian transcendental ego is inseparable from the processes which make up his life. According to the philosopher the transcendental subject is twofold. One pole is a pure flow of acts of sensual perception, experience, thinking, memorizing and evaluation. The identity is set by the second pole – that ego, which lives through one or another aspect of experience, one or another cogito and remains one and the same. Due to this ego comes up the synthesis of all consciously lived experiences belonging to the same person. Husserl points out that “the abiding Ego himself, as the pole of abiding Ego properties, is not a process or continuity of processes, even though with such habitual determining properties, he is indeed related back to the stream of subjective processes – since, by his own active generating, the Ego constitutes himself as identical substrate of Ego properties, he constitutes himself also as a “fixed and abiding” personal Ego.”⁴ Thus, our outlooks, beliefs, evaluations often might change, yet ego in those transformations retains the stable pole of identity. This ego is not an empty pole of identity, yet it is not unchanging, contrary, it constantly assumes new stable properties. When we consider for the first time that something or somebody is present and characterize the way of his being, the act of judgment comes to an end, yet we become and

¹ F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (Free eBooks at Planet eBook.com), p. 23.
remain such egos, which have made this decision in this particular way and acquired a relevant belief. Each of us can always restore this belief as “habitually my own opinion or, correlatively, find myself as the Ego, who is convinced, who, as the persisting Ego, is determined by this abiding habitus or state.”

The time of judgment passes by, yet the decision remains intact until we leave it. Hence, we may suppose that through the interpretation of the second pole of ego Husserl initiates a formation of the specific concept of human identity which persists only through the change and changing relations with the world disclosed through our experience.

In the considerations of identity of early Heidegger manifold connectivity of the person and the world acquires central position. He emphasizes that Dasein never “exists” directly and never is given as a pure subject without the world. Well-known American philosopher Steven Crowell writes: “On Heidegger’s view, I understand myself in terms of the typical roles, inherited customs, and standard ways of doing things prevalent in my time and place.”

Hereby the identification with immediate human settings is inartificial. The world opens itself as such wherein you encounter beings which are created, operated and employed by others. Being-in-the-world is blended into the already existing cultural environment, comprehending and functioning there-in together with others. This natural form of identity looks like identity directed to other in other theories. The proper identity is more complicated, it seems as if inner-directed and it secures one’s oneness or unique self. Heidegger analyzes the personal existence as united phenomenon of “being-in” through the question “who is in the mode of average everydayness of Dasein.”

The answer often is that Dasein is me myself, that Da-sein is my being. “Who” might be interpreted as something that retains identity through the change of relations and lived experiences and altogether comes into the relation with this diversity. However, self-identity is never a primordial form of self-awareness. According to Heidegger, that what we think of as of self-awareness, would be a subject which exposes itself only on the basis of being-in-the-world. He points out “that even one’s own Da-sein initially becomes ‘discoverable’ by looking away from its ‘experiences’ and the ‘center of its actions’ or by not yet ‘seeing’ them all. Dasein initially finds ‘itself’ in what it does, needs, expects, has charge of, in the things at hand which it initially takes care

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5 Ibid.


of in the surrounding world." The philosopher warns us that understanding of our given egos as of simple, formal, reflexive egos might be misleading. He notes that “it could be the case that the who of everyday Dasein is precisely not I myself."9

To state that Dasein is the being which is ego we may only in ontic sense. In the plane of ontology the concept of ego might only be used as a formal reference to that what “perhaps reveals itself in the actual phenomenal context of being as that being’s ‘opposite’. According to the philosopher, ontological explanation of human existence might be provided through the structural analysis of the moments of being-in-the-world. The mode of existence of a tool includes the reference to its possible owner, so we always discover “others” in the world, similarly with us obtaining the mode of Dasein. The thinker stresses that “they are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too.”11 The idea of the relation with the Other as constitutive of the person often is attributed to the so-called philosophy of the dialogue; therefore, it is important to note that Heidegger treats the “being-with” as one of existentials. He notes that “being-with existentially determines Da-sein even when another is not factually present and perceived. Being-alone of Da-sein, too, is being-with in the world.”12 Da-sein is essentially constituted by being-with, even our being in solitude is still being-with other persons.

Alongside with later thinkers on otherness Heidegger criticizes the idea that ontological relation with other human being is “a projection of one’s own being toward oneself ‘into another’, the other is a double of the self.”13 However, we may guess that, according to Heidegger, the risk that the first person might reduce the second to oneself is not substantial. Much more important is that neither the former, nor the latter have their authentic identity – even before their meeting, they both are already identical with an anonymous das Man. On the other hand, explaining the cooperative relation of two people the thinker specifies how it is possible for them to retain their individuality. The authentic relation with the other demands to abstain form making each other’s beliefs the same, this relation might get support form serious common engagement into the activity, based on its deep and thorough understanding. In Heidegger’s words, “when they devote themselves to the same thing in common, their doing so is determined by their Dasein, which has been

8 Ibid, p. 112.
9 Ibid, p. 108.
11 Ibid, p. 111.
12 Ibid, p. 113.
13 Ibid, p. 117.
stirred. This *authentic* alliance first makes possible the proper kind of objectivity which frees the other for himself in his freedom. ¹⁴ This idea is important for two reasons. First, with an account of later development of Heidegger’s thought, we may notice that Gadamer specifies the devotion for the truth of the issue as a factor which allows somebody not to try to understand it in the same way as it does the other, thus ensuring both true understanding of the issue and possibility of understanding of different outlook on the same issue. Second, contrary to common opinion on the solipsistic character of Heideggerian interpretation of the authentic being, this quotation testifies for the possibility of human community not losing the possibility of preservation of one’s authentic self.

Explaining the ideas of “Being and Time” in his later article “Letter on ‘Humanism’” Heidegger develops an explanation of human identity telling that we “must recognize the seductions of the public realm as well as the impotence of private.”¹⁵ Meanwhile, as it was already noted above, the natural and quite frequent state of Dasein would be its identification with “general public.” The “who” of Dasein would be the notorious *das Man*. It is evident that such state is not an authentic existence, yet an explanation provided by Heidegger perfectly describes the identity of contemporary man: “in utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of being of ‘the others’ in such a way that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, they unfold its true dictatorship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw from the ‘great mass’ the way they withdraw, we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking.”¹⁶ We shall stress that here, in this quotation philosopher depicts the standard human life and points out the wish of many people not to lose their unique identity in blending with masses. Unfortunately, and then and nowadays this hope most often remains unrealized. The difference might only be found in a contemporary popular paradoxical suggestion when masses of consumers are invited to distinguish themselves as individuals in *standard* ways, as if such a distinction will enable the consumer to part from broad multitude and feel himself as being a unique individuality.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 115.
Heidegger points out that our understanding and feelings are limited by what is commonly chatted about. The advance chatter and curious presentiment appears to us as an authentic proceeding, while the realization and action are marked by the sign of second-handiness and unimportance. Only ever-new things attract our sight thus, their understanding always remains superficial. Noting that “with the ‘radio’, for example, Dasein is bringing about today de-distancing of the ‘world’ which is unforeseeable in its meaning for Da-sein, by way of expanding and destroying the everyday surrounding world”¹⁷ philosopher provides a critical assessment of means of communication which appear due to modern technologies and expansion of the neighboring world. He is no less critical on the impact of other cultures on the formation of personal identity. Heidegger presumes that “the opinion may now arise that understanding of most foreign cultures and ‘synthesizing’ them with our own may lead to the thorough and first genuine enlightenment of Dasein about itself. Versatile curiosity and restless knowing in all masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But fundamentally it remains undetermined and unmasked what is then really to be understood; nor has it been understood that understanding itself is a potentiality for being which must become free solely in one’s ownmost Dasein.”¹⁸ Therefore, to the philosophers’ mind, Dasein is often alienated with the possibility of its being, loses its roots and even does not realize it. Hence the most typical human condition is a lack of authentic identity. Here, we would like to note that the absence of ownmost identity in present epoch expresses itself even more than in times of Heidegger. According to one of the most prominent inquirers of contemporary identity Zygmunt Bauman, “identity building has taken the form of unstoppable experimentation. Experiments never end….You’ll never know for sure whether the identity you are currently parading is the best you can get and the one most likely to give you the most satisfaction.”¹⁹

What are, according to Heidegger, the conditions of possibility of you own authentic existence? We have already mentioned that Dasein is the capacity of being; it is the possibility of itself, being-possible. As well as all Existentialism, philosophy of Heidegger provides a picture of human being who finds himself in place and time that he has not chosen by himself, yet, on the other hand, after he has already chosen certain possibilities of being that which he actually inhibits, since he opts for his own present and future. Human is always something more than himself, since he also owns his projected possibilities, on the other hand, these

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 98.
¹⁸ Ibid, p. 166.
very possibilities depend on his capacity of being. Human being is a
ground of his abilities but not their cause. Being thrown into his own
being he is not the only factor determining his being. This way created,
however not wholly on us depending being Heidegger interprets as a
feature of our meagerness. The finitude of Dasein, according to the phi-
losopher, is a significant feature of ““inner nature’ of our self.”20 We
may say that freedom of Dasein over the possibilities of its existence is
limited. Human beings always opt for one instead of another possibility
and this presupposes that all the rest possibilities have been left aside;
thus, guiltiness for himself always stays as irrevocable feature of human
existence. An anxiety, an apprehension of one’s being limited in time,
notorious “being-towards-death” urges us to choose a mode of being
based on one’s own selfhood. These situations open up Dasein “as its
authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Angst individuates Da-sein
to its ownmost being-in-the-world.”21 The anxiety forces us to return
from the preoccupation with the everyday worries over the world mat-
ters to the consideration of their reason that is to the very capacity of our
being in the world, encourages us to understand and realize our authentic
possibilities. This is to say that while being for the sake of one’s own
selfhood, human as if runs ahead of himself. The selfhood is reminded to
the human through tacit invocation towards his own mode of existence.
The understanding of this invocation is “letting one’s ownmost self act
in itself of its own accord in its being-guilty.”22 The return from the in-
authentic condition Heidegger interprets as a choice. What is it chosen?
One’s own possibility of being, responsibility for it, a determination to
choose one’s own existence. Author incessantly emphasizes that self-
hood cannot be reduced neither to Ego-substance, nor to the subject as
something given, identical and stable. He states that “existentially, self-
hood is only to be found in the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-self, that
is, in the authenticity of being of Dasein, as care.”23 According to Hei-
degger, the phenomenon of the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-self
supposes a constant ground of care, in his terms “constancy of the self”
[selbst-ständigkeit], which “means nothing other than anticipatory reso-
luteness. Its ontological structure reveals the existentiality of the self-
hood of the self.”24 Thus, this resoluteness in Heidegger’s “Being and
time” is the very being-oneself. It is not possible and cannot be strictly
defined what “positively” states this invocation directed to one’s own

20 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana
21 M. Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: State University of New York
23 Ibid, p. 296.
selfhood; it doesn’t provide an action plan, maxims of behavior. Our possibilities remain for us open; we just resolutely need to be authentic selves. But then the question, where we can search for the roots of our authentic selves and hereby escape “powerlessness of private life” remains without an explicit answer.

**Conclusion**

We consider the Heideggerian concept of personal identity as related to Nietzschean and Husserlian concepts of human person and as extending them. He criticizes the notion of already given, immanent, unchanging subject and explains human person as persisting through the changing relations with the world disclosed through our experience.

We can note that alongside with later thinkers of the Other, Heidegger pointed out that the relation with the other preserving his otherness intact constitutes an important aspect of personal identity. The concept of authentic and inauthentic selfhood presented in “Being and Time” adds up to the interpretations of contemporary authors of inner-directed and other-directed identities. Heidegger thinks of selfhood as differing from our social roles and providing us with possibilities to take our own responsibility for our choices of the ways of living.

Another significant aspect of Heideggerian thought on identity is that it discerns spontaneous human being, in other words, the absence of authentic identity, which nowadays spreads around as a dispersion of personality in the society of consumerism. While speaking about technologies which expand the intimate world philosopher as if foresees the danger of inauthenticity and lack of seriousness that preoccupy the theories of multiple identities coming into being due to use of contemporary digital media.

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5.

Sovereignty and Independence Deconstructed

GINTAUTAS VYSNIAUSKAS

Introduction

Jacques Derrida commences his last major opus, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason* (2003) with La Fontaine’s fable *The Wolf and the Lamb* which is the artistic illustration of the plain and clear idea, that “the strong are always best at proving they are right” as it is expressed in the fable, or that “everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger” as it is formulated by infamous Thrasymachus1, or that might make right and therefore “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”2 as Athenian democrats explained the fundamental law of existence to Melians.

The idea that justice is based upon the superiority of the strong against the weak is profoundly substantiated not only by the past and present practice but also by formidable tradition of Western philosophy “that runs, say, from Plato to Carl Schmitt.”3 Since it is supposed that justice is embodied and expressed by law, Derrida asks, who has the ability or right to make the law?

The question is rhetorical, for the answer is known beforehand – the sovereign, or the strong in his capacity to issue, impose and suspend laws.

The power of making laws was long vested in those – and still is vested in their descendants – who followed no trade but war, and knew no handicraft but robbery and plunder. […] The present legislators of Europe are the descendants of men – cherishing their opinions and habits, and acting on their principles – who were unacquainted with any wealth-creating arts, and who lived by appropriating the produce of others. On them nature bestowed no property; all which they possessed

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they took, by force, from those on whom she had bestowed it.\textsuperscript{4}

Thus, according to the 19th century thinker Thomas Hodgskin, laws are sword substitute aimed at transforming robbery into legal, i.e. just appropriation.

But is his claim valid to the 21st century democracy? In democratic countries, the decrease in number of middle class, the increase of wealth concentration and social exclusion, the increasing reliance of governments on law enforcement and total surveillance; the roguish behavior of nation-states in international affairs and powerlessness of international institutions – all these data indicate that, perhaps, it is valid. Maybe because of these facts Derrida in his Essays focuses attention on the “democracy to come” and on “the old-new enigma, of sovereignty, most notably nation-state sovereignty – whether it be called democratic or not.”\textsuperscript{5}

Therefore let us start our examination from the matter at hand – the sovereignty of tiny nation-state of Lithuania and deconstruct its enigma.\textsuperscript{6}

The Problem of Translation

Deconstruction is the most famous of all Jacques Derrida’s concepts. It is derived from his Grammatology and generally accepted as a mode of textual analysis, the short and clear exposition of which is not available but its major attitude is simple and clear: There is nothing outside of the text.

Since the employment of deconstruction presupposes the text, we will speak of Lithuania not so much as of the ontic entity with territory of 65,300 km\textsuperscript{2}, population: 2,935,400, and GDP (PPP): total – $70,840 billion; per capita $ 23,850 but mostly as of the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{7} And there we encounter the problem of translation. The matter is that in the original (that is in Lithuanian) version the verb “to be” is used in present tense meaning that the State of Lithuania is an independent democratic republic, i.e. it is independent now, as a matter of fact. But the official English translation changes the meaning, for, according to the traditional English grammar the use of


\textsuperscript{5} J. Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, p. xii.

\textsuperscript{6} Warning. In some cases, the application of deconstruction leads to quite paradoxical or politically incorrect conclusions.

shall in the second person may express determination, promise, obligation, or permission. But it does not express the fact of presence and therefore questions the reality: shall does not mean is but in the 162 articles, it is repeated 438 times.

The first article of the constitution proclaims that The State of Lithuania shall be an independent democratic republic but does not define when this “shall” (the future) becomes “is” (the present). Therefore the citizens can’t be sure concerning a kind of state they live. If the citizen thinks logically, s/he has to admit that so far s/he does not live in independent democratic republic, for the first sentence of the second article claims that such republic shall be created by the Nation. The Lithuanian rendering of that clause – valstybė kuria Tauta – indicates not the future result, as English does, but the process at present. Nevertheless, even in this case it is doubtful that the desired result is already achieved.

Sovereignty

The second sentence – Sovereignty shall belong to the Nation – causes even more confusion. In the middle of the last century nation was mainly regarded as “a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture” but at the end of the century, some clear-eyed thinkers envisaged the decline of nationalism and nation-state. Therefore nation turned out to be an imagined and abstract community. Since abstractions and phantasms have no legislative power (an essential feature of sovereignty), sovereignty belongs to politicians and legislators. In Lithuania, it occasionally belonged to them for thirteen years: from February 11, 1991, till July 13, 2004. That day they surrendered it to the international institutions by The Constitutional Act “On Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union“ which proclaimed the supremacy of the EU laws over the laws of the RL. Since then the sovereignty and independency of Lithuania is the official lie of the state which, as it is known from Plato and Machiavelli, is the indispensable and legitimate means of governance.

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Roguishness of the Sovereign

The juxtaposition of the two first articles of the Constitution with the Constitutional Act reveals what some intellectuals – Timothy D. Allman, William Blum, Noam Chomsky, Jacques Derrida, Robert Litwak, Don Pendelton, Robert Rotberg, Janna Thompson, William Triplet, just to name a few – characterise as the peculiar trait of democratic state. That trait is *roguishness*. Derrida deduces it from the contradictory relations between sovereignty and democracy. He claims that

these two principles, democracy and sovereignty, are at the same time, but also by turns, inseparable and in contradiction with one another. For democracy to be effective, for it to give rise to a system of law that can carry the day, which is to say, for it to give rise to an effective power, the *cracy* of the world *demos* – of the word *demos* in this case – is required. What is required is thus a sovereignty, a force that is stronger than all the other forces in the world. But if the constitution of this force is, in principle, supposed to represent and protect this world democracy, it in fact betrays and threatens it from the very outset, in an autoimmune fashion, and in a way that is, as I said above, just as silent as it is unavowable. Silent and unavowable like sovereignty itself. Unavowable silence, denegation: that is the always unapparent essence of sovereignty. The unavowable in community is also a sovereignty that cannot but posit itself and impose itself in silence, in the unsaid.\(^{12}\)

In the Constitution of the Lithuanian Republic unavowed, silent, unsaid is negation of both – sovereignty and democracy. As a matter of fact, sovereignty is suspended by The Constitutional Act but the national sovereignty proclaiming articles are not removed from the text. That fact gives deceptive impression that Lithuania still remains sovereign and independent republic.

As far as *demos* is concerned, it seems, that it was bribed into the membership. In December 2002, Lithuania was officially invited to join the EU. All major political parties of the country supported the idea of the membership. Their leaders, being aware that the small and weak nation (arithmetic has no mercy) has no means of preserving its occasional sovereignty, were in a hurry to put it in a pledge and did everything pos-

sible to get rid of it profitably: amended the laws on referendums, allowed postal voting for eleven days before the referendum, added the second voting day and extended voting hours, to say nothing of costly propaganda campaigns. Nevertheless, during the first referendum day (May 10, 2003) the demos turned a cold shoulder on the mentioned attempts: the voting turnout reached catastrophically low 23 percent. Since over 50 per cent were necessary for the validity of referendum, the President, Prime Minister and other famous but less important politicians rushed into mass media to urge demos to vote despite the fact that referendum law forbids propaganda activism 30 hours before voting is due to begin. By such law suspending behavior they demonstrated who are the genuine holders of sovereignty (remember Schmitt’s definition). Nevertheless, the real savors of the referendum and the membership appeared not so much politicians as Lithuanian oligarchs (which is quite natural for the free-market consumerist society): On the second voting day, the supermarkets offered cheaper bear and watching-powder to every man and woman who could prove personal participation in the referendum. This way sovereignty and consumerism corrupted democracy and democracy eliminated sovereignty.¹³

**Pure and Partial Sovereignty**

Until now I spoke of a pure sovereignty which, according to Derrida, is indivisible, does not exist and therefore can’t be shared in principle.¹⁴ That is why I had to draw the conclusion that the Lithuanian ruling elite, the genuine sovereign of the country, forfeited its pure sovereignty by means of bribing demos into the membership and announcing the supremacy of the EU laws over the laws of the LR. But sovereignty surrendering the pure sovereignty (which sooner or later would be taken away by force or fraud) to the international institutions, the national ruling elite grants to itself a limited sovereignty over the nation (demos) and uses it for self-enrichment and internationalization (multiculturalization) of the territory.

The self-enrichment of the Lithuanian ruling elite is regarded as progressive, for it copies what is going on in the most progressive countries of the West – the USA and Great Britain. For instance, in the USA

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there was a time when a company boss earned perhaps 10 or 20 times the salary of his lowest employee. By 2004, that ratio between average chief executive and average worker had leaped to 431 to one, and the gap has got wider. It means that the average worker takes more than a year to earn what his boss brings home in less than a day.\footnote{G. Irvin, Super Rich: The Rise of Inequality in Britain and the United States (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), p. 12.}

The enrichment of the rich policy teaches Lithuanians the simple truth: if you do not belong to the elite, remaining Lithuanian in Lithuania is detrimental: much more profitable is to become a Westerner or at least a European elsewhere. Neo-liberal ideology together with low wages and miserable pensions turned the Republic of Lithuania into the leading labor-force exporting state. According to European Migration Net, Lithuania got rid of almost the third of its inhabitants during the 22 years of independence. Some narrow-minded observers could claim that the ruling elite was killing its own country by blood and brain drain.\footnote{For more detail see: Ona Gražina Rakauskienė and Olga Ranceva, “Strengths of Emigration from Lithuania: Demographic, Social and Economic Consequences,” Intelektinė Ekonomika (Vilnius, LT: Mykolas Romeris University, 2012), Vol. 6, No. 2(14), pp. 89-101.} But now, seeing the perspectives of African immigration, they should restrain their resentment and acknowledge that the substitution of nationals by foreigners will be very beneficial for the promotion of globalization and Western values – tolerance, democracy, internationalism and multiculturalism.

The promotion of these values is the matter of high importance, for the consciousness of native Lithuanian demos is incompletely purged of the elements of politically incorrect soviet mentality. For instance, in spite of the fact that the American Psychiatric Association removed the homosexuality from the mental disorder list in 1973, the majority of the Lithuanian nationals still are certain that homosexuality is a perversion and its propaganda is as harmful for the youth as practice for the rectum and immunity system. Therefore, Lithuania is ranked among the most homophobic countries in the EU and regarded as democratically retarded. The new blood and brain of immigrants would activate it by engrafting the new Arab Spring kind democracy and enrich the local culture by Salafism, Shiism, Sunnism, Wahabism...with their rich adenda, embelish streets by hijabs, niqabs burkas, and mosques, teach natives to respect Sharia law. Therefore Lithuania will cease to be democratically retarded and become the territory of “democracy to come“ or at least the more advanced and progressive outpost of Western civilization, i.e. a melting pot of races, nations and cultures, a kind of tiny US.
Of course, in order to achieve this, the African (or Arab) Europeans should gain very special status in Lithuania. Otherwise they would not survive in this northern country from which the third of natives were forced to emigrate; they would run away to the countries with much higher living standards and the Lithuanian democracy improvement project would fail. In order to prevent this, the German and Britain living standards have to be provided to the immigrants locally. First of all, since not everyone of them like to work, the allowances given to them have to be the same as in Britain and Germany as well as wages to those who will work. Since, because of crisis, the same can’t be granted for the natives, the positive discrimination – positive to immigrants, negative to locals – will arise. But locals has no right to protest, for they have to be proud of sacrificing themselves to the most progressive globalization project and noble derridian idea of “democracy to come”. Someone evil-minded could surmise that the global democracy, which will come, will be analogous to that in nowadays Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. But let us not surrender to such pessimism and be as optimistic as Bush and Blair at the beginning of their democratization mission or, at least, as Fukuyama was when he dreamed of the end of History.

**Independence**

When democracy is corrupted and pure sovereignty lost, what remains of independence? When Lithuanians speak of independence, they mostly keep in mind the independence from Russia which is understood as the main cause of all misfortunes. Therefore, we have to consider the question: Is Lithuania de facto independent from her permanent offender? Let us briefly consider economical, cultural and political aspects of this problem.

The economic independence from Russia would be possible if Lithuania would build nuclear power plant, exploit its own tight or shale gas and oil (provided it has enough) and leave Russian hydrocarbons and electricity market. Such exploits would take a plenty of time. Therefore it is not quite true that at present Lithuania is independent from Russia economically as well as it is not true that it is independent culturally, for until many Lithuanians know the Russian language, Lithuania is open to the influence of high and low aspects of Russian culture as well as to Kremlin propaganda thanks to the ubiquitous internet and a kind of nostalgia for some real imagined advantages of soviet regime. The latter drawback will be considerably reduced (or, may be, completely removed) when the elder generation of natives will die out. But this process also will take some time. Therefore, everyone thinking can conclude that
as far as economy and culture are concerned, the English shall in the text of the constitution is closer to the truth than original (i.e. Lithuanian) is.

Political independence form Russia is less dubious. It is safeguarded by the Constitutional Act prohibiting “any form any new political, military, economic or other unions or commonwealths of states formed on the basis of the former USSR.” But this independence rests on the dependence to the NATO and EU. The juxtaposition of these two abstract nouns reveals the compound structure of the first: “in-” and “dependent.” The structure contains concealed hierarchy: the first component “in-” makes the second one mean diametrically opposite to what it originally means. Therefore, let us, following Derrida’s advice, overturn the hierarchy. And so, in-dependent becomes dependent in. In the latter position “in” changes its meaning from the prefix of negation into the preposition of place; therefore, the independent State of Lithuania becomes dependent in, or, according to Derrida, invaginated. Thus, using Derrida’s terminology, we can say that in order not to be forcefully invaginated (raped) into Russian empire the Lithuanian Republic invaginated itself into EU and NATO and this was the last sovereign act of the state.

Impossible Independence

In his forecast for the 21st century, George Friedman writes: “Lithuania’s goal is to be free of foreign occupation. But its economy, demography, and geography make it unlikely that Lithuania will ever achieve its goal more than occasionally and temporarily.” In short, such tiny country as Lithuania can’t in principle be independent; for it is physically not able to protect its independence, and its survival directly depends on a mercy of whatever union.

Lithuania was de facto independent until the Union of Lublin (1569) by which the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was incorporated into the Polish Crown and ceased to exist as a sovereign political entity and completely disappeared from the political map of Europe in 1795. At the beginning of 20th century, the concatenation of circumstances – the surge of nationalism, WW I and the Great October Socialist Revolution – caused the emergence of the Independent Republic of Lithuania which had nothing in common with the Grand Duchy of the past.

The new Republic was independent de jure but de facto it was a petty item of trade for its bigger and more powerful neighbors – Poland, Russia and Germany. No wonder that its existence was so short (22 years). In the middle of the 20th century, Uncle Joe (the USSR) trans-

formed the Republic of Lithuania into Soviet Socialist Republic by suppression of belated resistance and deportation approximately 120,000 or 300,000 citizens (nobody knows exactly how much). Nevertheless it would be unjust and even stupid to ignore or negate some obviously positive aspects of sovietization: increment of territory by Vilnius and Klaipeda regions; industrialization; formation of the new intellectual and administrative elite, which did not miss the opportunity, opened by Gorbachev’s perestroika, to change the allegiance to the East by the allegiance to the West. As a result, the President and Prime Minister of nowadays Lithuania, the former members of communist party nomenclature, now serve Brussels much more faithfully then they served Moscow, for, contrary to communist ideology, Neoliberalism not hinders but encourages unlimited self-enrichment.18

Conclusion

Thus the past and present of Lithuania show that, all in all, the country is too small and weak element of geopolitics to be independent, and therefore, beginning with the middle of 16th century, it almost permanently was dependent on some big political and economical structure which transformed it at wish, often resorting to soft and hard power. Now the genuine sovereignty over the Republic of Lithuania belongs to the officialdom of the EU, which controls national ruling elites turning Europe into the melting pot of nation-states. In order to promote this project, the ruling elite of the EU has to overcome some rudimental resistance of the national demos. African immigrants are the effective means to achieve that and other ends of globalization.

The first articles of The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, that declare independence and national sovereignty, appear null and void in light of the more recent Constitutional Act, “On Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union” and the above discussed Derridian deconstruction. Nevertheless, independence and sovereignty are and will remain useful elements for the official line designed for the satisfaction of a retrograde nationalistic mentality, still widely spread among former soviet republic demos.

18 The roguishness of communism consisted in discrepancy between exhortation of demos to self-sacrifice for the sake of the better future and enormous privileges of the party nomenclature. The roguishness of neoliberal capitalism consists in discrepancy between declaration that it safeguards the interests of society and enormous privileges for the financial and corporative tycoons.
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6. The ‘Life/Death’ Border as a Mechanism of Identification

ALEXANDER SAUTKIN

For several years, together with colleagues from the University of Nordland in Bodø (Norway) Murmansk State Humanities University, we have been implementing an educational and research program named “Borderology.” The purpose of this project is comprehension of the border phenomenon in a variety of aspects. Of course, we do not mean the state’s boundaries only. We explore socio-cultural boundaries, and, at the suggestion of Norwegian philosophers, the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin have become the methodology of these studies. This is quite understandable, because the “border” is one of the key concepts of Bakhtin.

Bakhtin wrote that “…the interior does not prevail itself, but is turned outward, in dialogue, each inner experience is at the border and meets another, and in such tense meeting is the whole sense. […] To be is to be for the other, and through the other – for yourself. A man has no internal sovereign territory, he is all and always on the edge, looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another, or through the eyes of another.”1 Our contacts reveal the boundary. The boundary starts to produce a difference, it is the difference itself, and when it becomes the object of reflection, then there is what we call identity. (In principle, we cannot even say that there is a boundary or there is not: the boundary distinguishes, that is the most appropriate word.) Obviously, not every distinction generates identification. To become the basis of the identification process, the distinction should be reflected and defined by certain social mechanisms. Identification is a dialogue in the sense of Bakhtin.

In our opinion, the primary identities playing the role of the “strongest” value mechanisms are particularistic (private) identities. They are formed on the basis of everyday life: everyday social practices define the most local and at the same time the “strongest” identities, occurring by the person’s comparison to a specific gender, certain occupation, small territorial community, and so on.

More abstract identities (I am a human being, I am mortal, I am a living being, etc.) can be considered as “weak” ones, or a “background.” They influence the value-oriented behavior of the individual to a lesser

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1 Mikhail Bakhtin, 1961 год. Заметки, in Mikhail Bakhtin, Собрание сочинений в 7-ми т. т. 5 (Москва: Русские словари,1997), рр. 343-344.
extent, but they are the basic elements of the worldview, and we can consider them as fundamental. The boundaries forming these identities obviously have the same fundamental character, and they define the parameters of the value structures to which one is attached by “strong” particularistic identities.

However, in archaic societies these identifications did not have a universal character, they were not abstractions, but were understood privately and in a quite concrete way. The phrase “I am a human” for the archaic society means “I am a member of my tribe,” but not “I am a human in general.” “People in general” did not exist. The identity of “I am mortal” indicated not only the extremity of someone’s life but occurred at the boundary with the class of “immortal beings” (gods, spirits, etc.), which is also significantly different from the modern understanding.

Modern societies differ from the archaic ones by the universality of many identity categories, as well as by the increase of the degree of their abstractness. The most significant border for the Man is the border separating existence from non-existence, life from death. The death should be comprehended first of all as an anthropological phenomenon, but also and as a sociocultural phenomenon. In this case we mean understanding of death by society, we mean a social representation of death.

The border “life/death” is the general one for all people, all living persons are “on one side” of this border, however each culture, each nation builds own axiological attitude to death, and this attitude is extremely important element of culture which in many respects defines its other elements, for example, Ancient Egyptian culture was focused on the idea of death (it is possible to call such cultures as “tanathocentric”).

Research of the border of life and death assumes the characteristic of concrete social mechanisms, by means of which people conceive themselves at this border. Exploring cultural facts, expressing the ratio of the living to the dead, we can make a lot of important observations in terms of changes in ideology and identity. As an American researcher Mike Parker-Pearson said: “Burials reveal more about survivors than they do about the dead.”

The difference of dead and living, on the one hand, has a completely empirical nature and means a clear distinction between the two worlds, but on the other hand, the world of the dead is not completely impenetrable. On the contrary, the dead are largely integrated into the community of the living, although it may sound paradoxical. It is especially typical for traditional archaic cultures. People of other eras lined up their attitude toward death differently, which might not be seen as an

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absolute alternative to life. For example, the already mentioned ancient Egyptian culture, in which afterlife was conceived as a special kind of existence. Likewise, the ancient Celts perceived death as merely a transition to a different quality of life, as reflected in the categories of death in the Celtic languages. As T.A. Mikhaylova notes (with reference to the A. Ross’ book “Folklore of the Scottish Highlands”3) that the modern resident of the Scottish village never tells about the man ‘fuair sè bas’ (this expression is applied only to animals). He tells ‘do caochail sè’ that means “he changed.”4 A.I. Falileev guided by the analysis of language data writes: “It is possible that in medieval Welsh culture the death associated rather with a state, than with action.”5 The researcher writes that Welsh expression ‘mae hi wedi marw’ can be understood not as ‘she died’, but as ‘she is after death’. In Slavic-Baltic cultural area we find similar examples.

The perception of life in continuous union with death is the most characteristic feature of pre-modern cultures. The Modern era, in our opinion, loses this continual perception of life and death and it fundamentally changes the identification procedures.

“I am alive” identity implies the delimitation of the dead, of those who are not alive. But, paradoxically, the awareness of belonging to a certain race or tribe as a community of those living here and now, means belonging to the “community” of those who have departed from this world, i.e. the ancestors. For archaic cultures the “life/death” border was not absolutely irresistible; it was rather the border connecting this world and otherness: the dead members of the community were considered to participate in the life of the living. This view was reflected in a variety of rituals, traditions, and customs, and served as one of the most important mechanisms for identification. Particularism of archaic social life suggested that identification with the world of the ancestors also meant identification with the concept of “human being,” because people outside of “their circle” are other beings. A human being for me is someone who has a common origin with me.

The dead person is still a member of the community not only as a purely symbolic figure. The dead “lives” not just in memory, but also

4 Т. Михайлова, Отношение к смерти у кельтов. Номинация умирающих в гендерных языках, in Представления о смерти и локализация Иного мира у древних кельтов и германсцев (Москва: Языки славянской культуры, 2002), pp. 24-25.
5 А. Фалилеев, А. Несколько слов, обозначающих ‘смерть’ в валлийском языке, in Представления о смерти и локализация Иного мира у древних кельтов и германсцев (Москва: Языки славянской культуры, 2002), p. 65.
directly affects the life of the living community. Similarly, the “living” take care of the posthumous fate of the dead. The figure of “the living dead” is very interesting in this sense. “The living corpse” is a textbook example of an oxymoron. In the modern mass-movie world, there is specific subgenre of horror films – the films about the living dead, from the classic movies of George Romero and Lucio Fulci to the modern ones. What caused the horror of the un-dead?

In the modern society, the “life/death” border is posited as insurmountable, and that is why the living dead strike fear into the heart. In archaic cultures this limit also exists, and the undead is regarded as an anomaly, a deviation, a violation of the natural border, because its place in the other world, on the other side of the invisible barrier fencing off the dead from the living. But at the same reviving of the dead was conceived as undesirable, but nevertheless possible event.

Icelandic sagas tell us of draugr, the insidious dead who live in the mounds and can harm the living. Slavic legends about malicious upyrs, or vampires also depict the living dead, and their pseudo-life is the result of sin, deal with the devil, etc. In the Russian folk there existed a representation of the dead who died an unnatural death and live the remaining lifetime after death (that part of life that they did not have time to live, having died suddenly). Russian folklorist Dmitry Zelenin notes that they inhabit a place of their violent death or a grave (the same as the Icelandic-Scandinavian draugr), but they can move and harm the living. They are in possession of evil spirits. These characters include, for example, the mermaids.

However, members of the community of living have certain technologies of dealing with such undesirable returnees from the other world, such as special ways of burial, special commemoration ceremonies (D. Zelenin reconstructs them in detail), as well as some means of neutralizing the dead. Meanwhile, for us the reviving of a corpse is an impossible event, as it still happens (as in Romero films), we find ourselves in an absurd or an irrational unnatural nightmare. It is noteworthy that the archaic living dead is still a human being retaining his personality, but the movie zombie of the modernity era is just a walking decomposing corpse, a killing machine, having no consciousness or human traits (at least, in the classic films of the 70s and early 80s).

Not all dead are evil for traditional society people. “Our own” dead, ancestors departed in a proper way and are supported in the other world. They are not pests, but defenders. They are invited to feasts and asked for advice, they are honored and pleased (e.g. a custom of “warming the dead (parents)” with fires described by D. Zelenin).

The described social practices, of course, are a way of mastering of life/death border, and at the same time they serve as the identification
mechanisms. The use of these rituals does not just “restore” the disturbed order of being, a defect, a failure in the life of the Cosmos, caused by the death of a member of the community, but this member is reinstated into the community with a modified status and gained ambivalence, since death is still seen as a threat and danger from which one should protect himself. The Christian paradigm of the intercourse between the living and the dead is different from the pagan one. This paradigm reinforces the dualism of the spiritual and outward worlds but retains the fundamental idea of the unity of these two worlds (as noted by Philippe Ariès, in particular). Death is not seen as something final, because Christ conquers death by his Resurrection.

Antanas Maceina wrote in his book, The Mystery of Iniquity, “Facing the final death, history becomes purely worldly. The human look is sent to this earth, but not finding meaning and seeing the end of everything, it is overshadowed and expresses painful hopelessness. Ancient despair is reflected in the eyes of every person not believing in the resurrection. Therefore, it is understandable why the first Christians clung so hard to the truth of Christ's resurrection…. They felt that the resurrection is essentially linked to human immortality. For them earthly life was not the despair and hopelessness, but only a preparation for the future ecumenical renewal.”

Here we see the idea of the essential connection between the two worlds. The Church is the bearer of Christ spiritual might, its Saints are conductors of this might, who provide the beneficial effect on the living even after the end of their own earthly lives. And this influence is carried out not only spiritually – through prayers and intercession of the Saints at the God’s Throne, but also through the materiality of their dead (and at the same time alive!) bodies, i.e. relics. The full liturgy may only be celebrated on a altar containing relics of the Saint. As we can see, the identity as a membership in the Ecclesia (Church) is ensured through the mechanisms of mastering the life/death border. In this case the living and the dead are also connected in a community.

Basic differences in pre-modern and modern rituals of farewell to the dead reveal a significant difference in cultural worldviews and identity models. Modern identities are usually defined as identities of the alive only, there is a rupture in the intercourse between the dead and alive. The dead begin to perform purely symbolic, if not allegorical functions. Tombs of famous historical figures are only allegories of their glory and (in a metonymic way) of the national or state fame.

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The very nature of funeral rites becomes more streamlined and functional. Their main goal is to quickly dispose of a dead body. Of course, nowadays ritual practices are heterogeneous: there are substantial differences between urban funerals and funeral practices in the rural hinterland, where many archaic elements still remain (sometimes in a mixed Christian-pagan form). However, the urban style dominates. As the modern researcher Irina Razumova notes in her article “Necropolis as a social space: functional aspects,” “many family or church functions in preparing the dead for burial and in the (funeral) rites…have passed to organizations such as the mortuary ritual service.”

Urban style is pipelined. A person dies; the relative calls a doctor to ascertain death, and then the deceased is taken to the morgue, where all manipulations with the corpse are carried out impersonally by the morgue employees. For them, the deceased is only an operation unit. Further, there is the work for the ritual offices. The relatives see the deceased only at the funeral: half an hour or so during the farewell and even less – before the coffin is put into the grave. As you can see, the intimate relationship to death is gone here. And funeral traditions themselves are reduced to a set of sustainable services from the ritual offices’ price lists. (The very combination of the “ritual” and “bureau” words sounds like an oxymoron, if we consider it.)

This practice drastically separates the dead from the living, dissolving the dead as members of the community (even if the church exequies are present in the price list). Their last journey becomes the path of exile beyond the community. Therefore, the life/death boundary sets the identification of living not through their relation to the dead, but by the radical opposition to the dead.

The dialogue between the living and the dead stops, and therefore alive are closed in the unilateral perception of the world. The world is reduced to earthly material being. Even modern Christianity moves in this direction in some cases. Maceina writes: “Christianity is also connected to the service of the earth. And from Christianity they begin to expect happiness, even in this reality: education of mind and society, ordering of social relations, exercise of democracy, emergence of large families, perfect health, success in one’s craft, etc….The idea of resurrection is almost considered an absurdity which no one dares to speak publicly. Overshadowed idea of the resurrection is a victory of the Anti-christ in the individual mind and in the minds of historical periods.”

8 Антанас Мацейна, Оп. сіт.
In a somewhat different context, Bakhtin wrote about this in connection with the grotesque body images of Rabelais. Rabelais, according to Bakhtin, “emphasizes continuous, but contradictory unity of the life process, not dying in death, but being rather triumphant in it, for death is the rejuvenation of life.” Identification with the dead, with the past generations is carried out primarily through identification with the carnival image of the collective body. Bakhtin writes: “The individual soul, having done its concern, grows old and dies with the individual body, but the body of the people and humanity, fertilized by the dead, is always updated and is steadily moving forward on the path of historical perfection.” The defection from the eternally renewing collective body begins to occur in modern times.

This change in attitude towards death became the subject of comprehension more than once. Desacralization of public life in the modern world significantly alters the perception of the base boundary, so death is displaced to the periphery of social life: in the words of Jean Baudrillard, we have the deportation, or “extradition” of the dead.

Jean Baudrillard wrote in “Symbolic Exchange and Death” that comparing modern and primitive societies reveals this fact: the dead gradually cease to exist as soon as the living cease to identify themselves with them. The dead are placed beyond the limits of the symbolic; they are put farther and farther from the living. Baudrillard wrote: “At the very core of the ‘rationality’ of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death. There is an irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own: little by little, the dead cease to exist. They are thrown out of the group's symbolic circulation. They are no longer beings with a full role to play, worthy partners in exchange, and we make this obvious by exiling them further and further away from the group of the living.”

Thus, Baudrillard says that today being dead is not normal. Death becomes antisocial behavior. But repression of death is deeply integrated into society, which itself is slowly becoming a graveyard of the living, who believe that they are in no way connected with the dead. Perhaps the phenomenon of “the living dead” terrifies our contemporaries because, in that concept, we recognize ourselves – the dead living.

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10 Ibid., p. 433.
Sociocultural understanding of life and death are cornerstones of the processes of social identification. Identification with the genus includes knowledge about dead ancestors. Archaic cultures designed their communities based on idea of the unity of life and death; modern European culture, however, largely separates the dead from living person. This practice strengthens the European neuroses in relation to death and deprives humans of feeling of their roots in the world.

The operation of the “life/death” boundary as the identity mechanism is now marked as an archaic phenomenon. However, on the other hand, modern society is so fragmented, and some of its fragments show a definite tendency to archaism. Nonetheless, this is beginning to be regarded as a strategy that might get rid of some of the modernity era phantasms; thus, the identifying function of the border is urgent again.

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Lithuanian Identity: 
Traces and Trends of Change

ELIGIJUS DZEZULSKIS-DUONYS & JUDITA DZEZULSKIE

Introduction

Any attempt to think of ‘identity’ puts us into trouble, for it is always an especially complicated concept and never appears as a uniformed reality or as a thinking product of a unified design. Nonetheless, all types of human identity usually are clear until the circumstances and events do not impose looking carefully at oneself, trying to identify the core of “Self.” In this paper, we are going to be mindful of the problems related to modern Lithuanian identity formation, it’s relevance to the modern world as well as making more transparent the events and circumstances currently and significantly challenging this modern and relatively fresh identity. In the process, we hope to shed some light on their power of determination.

Emancipationist philosophy that generally well characterizes Modernity relentlessly traces the trajectory of increasing subjectivity, finally leaving abstract individuals (the reconstruction of modern philosophy) alone in the “silent world” to deal with their “own” values and meanings. We tend to think what used to be the principles of the classical constitution of every man or woman and a community to which he or she belonged – metaphysically: soul, thinking, consciousness, or belief; culturally: historical, ethnic, or civil association, language, or social class, in terms of the prevailing free-market ideology and practice, are no longer the factors that may play a crucial role in defining essence and singularity (legitimization) for scattered individuals. In the postmodern approach, a human being is to be treated as a human without any substantive identity, as a religious man without any particularly expressed religion, as a national entity without any specific state. A power shift from political state to the ‘unknown’ market forces turned the state itself to a mere formal juridical structure serving the business mechanism needed for the capitalism and proper business functioning. As a result, the always present social economic and cultural conditionality of human activities aims to become the full determination that does not provide a solid ground either for a personal identity, or for the general consciousness, being able to unite and to maintain people in community. Uncertain about their identity and place in the world, people are trying to gain these things, in a variety of ways and thus fall into contemporary forms
of addiction, such as consumerism, social dependencies, brand fetishism and the superstar life imitation.

That is a brief introductory general picture of many variables containing todays’ circumstances and conditions, aggravating seriously ‘natural’ identity forming (maintaining) process. This leads us to formulating the following thesis which makes the starting point of this philosophical reflection – a contemporary Lithuanian identity is on the move at a much higher speed than it has ever been before (considering the last century up to the present day) and this now appears as the ‘normal flow of events’, obviously having huge ethical and cultural implications on modern the Lithuanian mentality, attitudes and behaviour. This, undoubtedly, implies the possibility of a certain dismissal of a former natural (native) loyalty to national identity. We would like to suggest that all this occurs mostly under the sway and constant pressure of two major (objective) factors: one may be called the fragility of modern Lithuania’s historical narrative and the other – the desire and commitment for consumption – at the beginning of independent Lithuania reinforced by the former shortage of consumer goods and commodities under the Soviet Union as well as later by the global ruling of capital in contemporary Western democracies. Thus, the roots and / or causes of todays’ ‘illness’ can be found in the modern epoch, i.e., in the previous centuries, meanwhile its ‘symptoms’ can be clarified only in the light of todays’ reality.

‘Objective’ Assumptions of Disloyalty to the National Identity

The development of the thesis stated in the introduction above is required to place it in a culturally and historically larger perspective. Looking for crucial factors that can clarify the actual conditions for identity expression and the identity itself, we must be aware of the fact that in the end of 19th and in the beginning of 20th centuries Lithuanians made a successful effort to forge a modern ethnically based Lithuanian identity. Namely, this relatively very recent (re) construction of a national identity refers both to the fragility of the modern Lithuania historical narrative and to the difficulty of maintaining this identity in the contemporary conditions and circumstances, that contributes largely to the questioning of the adequacy of the existing national identity paradigm. To be more precise, one can find several (objective) reasons for the dismissal of a natural loyalty to the national identity.

First, one should remember that modern national identity in Europe (especially in the 19th and 20th centuries) was created (or adopted) as a long, life or eternal, engagement of individuals belonging to national,
stable and relatively closed state. The latter engagement like the existence of national state itself in the prevailing nationalistic perspective was naturally understood as something going beyond individuals’ or even their families’ lifetime. This vision (for better or worse) is out of date in our days’ world, for it does not stand properly against the speed governed and globally opened world in which a ‘change’ is set as an absolute norm and value at the same time. Moreover, what was admittedly clear before the rise of nationalism, and sorted out as an undisputed evidence during the epoch of the ruling of modern nationalism, regarding the national state and common political identity, i.e. the need for everyone to belong to ones’ own country, coincidence of territory and national entity, national will and natural boundaries, and other similar things – appear to be a kind of the wrong affirmation or became doubtful at least about their naturalness and necessity needed for each and every individual personality. In other words, national (ethnic) or (even) religious purity turns out to be merely a sort of national myth or only a desirable thing for those who are willing to keep the purity control in their hands. This, very likely to a significant extent, was a case of the formation of modern national Lithuania, for, one always needs to remember, any vision of the common good is always somebody’s vision, not something just fallen from Heaven. All this clearly reminds us how much the things, concerning identity issues, nationality, etc. depends on political decisions and identity formation politics.

Further, the same purity deconstruction method can be applied regarding the concept of ‘monoculture’, related to so far most often praised and pure monocultural Lithuania, as this vision also is not at home. As many anthropologists suggest, cultures are always in motion: they either borrow certain elements and ideas from other cultures or try to defend their own elements or ideas confronting with other cultures. In this everlasting process of cultural exchanges every culture needs to protect its exclusiveness, but not only an imaginable purity, that is to be considered as a norm; otherwise it will not have what to offer soon to other cultures in exchange. As C. Levi-Strauss clearly points out, both

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the lack of communication as well as the excess of communication is extremely dangerous to every culture. This evidence presupposes that in reality we cannot find ‘monocultures’, but, on the contrary, every time we are dealing with a certain coexistence of diverse cultures. Therefore, every actual culture always appears as a more or less original synthesis of many coexisting cultures in a particular space.⁵

As a matter of fact, modern Lithuanians went against these broadly acceptable presuppositions. Modern Lithuanian political and cultural identity exclusively pretends to be the creation of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. Using the solid idea of that time turned into the right of a nation’s self-determination, Lithuanian identity was closely and firmly related to the Lithuanian language and ethnical customs and was supported by the idea of a compulsory ethno-cultural, cultural and language standard – homogeneity and uniformity. The ancient Lithuanian language at that time was not literally and philosophically developed enough and was not a language of culture and politics and religion in the long-lasting tradition of the former common Polish-Lithuanian statehood, which culture was successfully spread throughout the middle of Europe in the 16th-18th centuries. According to the new paradigm, it is not the history – in Lithuania’s case especially complex and unclear (not documented enough) – and common culture that unites the people, it is rather the beauty of the ancient language and the native land that unite and hold people together, newly discovering their identity.⁶ That means historical, cultural and religious community, matured through ages and used different languages for different purposes in different spheres of the common Polish-Lithuanian Republic, was mostly changed by a common language speaking one linguistic entity. The clans, professional and confessional groups and communities with which people typically identify themselves were neglected, as well as different peoples cultural and historical backgrounds were neglected in one way or another. The one who speaks Lithuanian and lives in the area of Lithuanian-speaking population (mostly located in rural places) is an individual and (by replacing the family into the national community) social and political Lithuanian. A multinational, multicultural and multilingual state ceased its existence to the ethnically based state. A larger entity was transformed and reduced into a small entity. Former political loyalty that did not require language or even religious uniformity was changed to political loyalty implying new cultural and national identity based on standardized ethnicity and nationality (generic oneness) and resulting in a compulsory ethnical and language standard. All this led to the Lithua-

⁵ Ibid., p. 173.
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nian statehood and national identity paradigm, so far dominating in Lithuanian political and cultural thought.

This way of thinking and acting in organizing personal and societal lives in the area covered by the modern Republic of Lithuania has successfully lasted for one hundred years, not to mention fifty years of the forced interruption made by Soviet Union. At any rate, common culture and history, required by definition for the common political and national identity, in the long run became more and more problematic and caused even some internal tension (that would be an issue of different reflection). Moreover, huge external pressure from globally opened world of the 21st century and the fact of economic backwardness to compare with well-developed Western countries (that is not a completely new thing, attributing only to the present-day reality), no doubt, on a large-scale call many natural (naturalized) things into the question. Here we come to another side of the fragility of modern and contemporary Lithuanian identity related to the difficulty of maintaining it. As we know, any affirmation of national identity means that the unity of the nation needs to be more than merely constitutional; it also needs to be cultural. But what could make a profound cultural unity for the nation of one hundred years old, especially when independent development is enjoyed only half of this time? It seems that the contemporary Lithuanian national community does not have (cannot mobilize) enough resources and the abilities to properly understand and meet its own needs, not to mention taking seriously cultural unity issues. The absence of the long-term valid social political and cultural strategy as well as the ability to free substantial intellectual energy and to put it in this activity reveals well the current situation and Lithuanians capability. Unfortunately, most energy of contemporary Lithuanian citizens (living in Lithuania or abroad) is rather devoted to the survival, but not for cultural creation ensuring the normal continuation of various forms of identity practices, rooted in everyday life. The lack of a real and self-autonomous political, cultural and economic entity, while making a part of the European Union and the pressure of global economy, is another crucial factor considering the capability to maintain and to strengthen national identity and it will be reflected more broadly in another chapter of this paper.

As it was pointed before, a fragile, mostly language-based, modern Lithuanian identity survived successfully more than a century, being an inspirational model for several generations of Lithuanians of the 20th century. However, for the time being, the systematic development of

capitalism, and the problems caused by had been a ‘society in transition’ and a new multilingual environment are pressing this identity too powerfully. In other words, these factors are threatening seriously to violate the language-based foundation. Notwithstanding the fact that the Lithuanian language in the course of history basically always existed in the real bilingualism (multilingualism) conditions, its today’s confrontation with English becomes more complicated, for the challenge, provided by the development of information technologies and global business activity in the English language, puts the Lithuanian language in a really hard situation. Moreover, this issue is strongly assisted and strengthened by an uncritical acceptance of the popular Western culture and large-scale emigration to other Western countries, leaving less and less Lithuanian speakers on the spot.

To be clear, the Lithuanian national culture (whatever way it could be seen and/or understood) is not and cannot be as strong and famous as, say, the American or French (Mediterranean) culture. In fact, identity sometimes can survive without a strong cultural support and/or its background. That is, for instance, a case of Jewish identity, which lies in belonging to the covenantal community and the core of the covenant is a commitment to living according to God’s commandments in having a dual individual and collective obligation.8 Obviously, this is a very special case and it is not a matter of Lithuanian identity not even dreaming to have such strong collectivism clearness and force. As there is no Lithuanian way of life, just like ‘American way of life’ that is broadly transmitted and mediated in all over the world, so there is no effective cultural support for the identity continuation. Speaking more generally, the emergence of a uniform and mediated public sphere influences all citizens of the world without any exception and very often makes their first initiation via this influence into the world of values and meanings. The openness to this sphere today leads to an open possibility of ethical, cultural and national identity crisis: even distinct cultures, say, proposing different attitudes of moral and immoral things, different behaviour practices and decision-making procedures towards the same issues, etc., long-time going together, become more and more similar, not to mention a powerful influence of a strong and dominating (popular) culture. The actual promotion of the so-called ‘open identity’ – a sort of combination of ‘essentialism’ and a postmodern approach – contributes to the enhancement of the practices of the elements of the popular (American) culture by using ‘soft’ power upon individuals. Open identity, it goes without saying, is suitable exclusively for a ‘big and strong (dominating)

culture’ and its major actors, but not for a ‘small culture’ and can only deepen the dismissal of a natural loyalty to the national identity.

This part of reflection puts us directly in front of, perhaps not enough thought reality: for this time now, we are the actual part of modern Western Civilization that can be characterized as a ‘permanent revolution’ – a project of a personal and societal liberalization from all sorts and forms of dependence, not excepting all sorts of identity. “We are dealing here with one and the same tendency […] to destroy elementary ties in society and progressively uproot its ethical foundations,” underlines contemporary Polish thinker Z. Stawrowski.\(^9\) Beginning with the Enlightenment, there is a continuous and radical reinterpretation of the basic values of Western world. For example, actual treating of Human Rights (generally good things), the postulation of absolute freedom and political correctness, etc. in one way or another jeopardize the former harmony of communal living in a certain society, forms subclasses in it and as a result introduces moral and cultural relativism, at the same time necessarily raising much more doubts on so far naturally acquired human identity.

**Ideological Pressure and Fragmentation**

As very probably, there is no ideology free area for human activities and as, what was pointed above, Lithuania makes an actual part of a contemporary Western culture, one should take seriously into account the ideology grounding for the functioning of an actual economy, culture and politics in the West. Therefore, in this chapter we would like to concentrate ourselves rather on ideological issues, caused by the implementation and development of current capitalism in Lithuania, as they are to be considered of extreme importance regarding the actual national and human identity fluctuations, general peoples’ feelings and attitudes. The reflection upon the role of ideological issues and the importance attributed to them also are strongly justified by the fact that many Lithuanians (like other Eastern Europeans) still remember well the functioning and pernicious impacts of disappeared Soviet ideology, which to a certain extent could and should be compared to the contemporary dominating ideology in the West. The economic backwardness, caused by low productivity culture and influencing highly the not satisfactory level of living in Eastern European countries, no doubt, also plays a significant role. Even so, the ideological issues are no less of importance.

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In fact, the very liberation from the Soviet ideology turned into the traces of neoliberal propaganda of ‘management economy’ and ‘free market’ ideology. According to it, capital freedom and its well-being is treated as a condition of freedom of any particular individual and as well-being of the whole society (nation), as well as a ‘natural’ means of its social, cultural and political organization. In other words, capital power reshapes any Western society by commoditization and resourcification of life and all living substance: the creation of “human resources departments” in private as well as in public sectors serves an excellent illustration of this process. What sort of identity could be attributed to the recourses, which basically have the only one purpose – to be completely used and depleted? Notwithstanding the similar type of contradictions, the current (free?) Lithuanian education system develops the ability to sell oneself in the market (=to satisfy the needs of the market), supposing, “the better you sell yourself, the freer you are.” All this can be attributed to the functioning system requirements to reproduce itself what is true for all types of known systems. However, on the other hand, all this can be easily treated as an attempt to remake a human being according to unhuman system’s requirements – an attempt already well known in the humankind history in which the Soviet creation served as one of the newest versions. Thus, the aim of the education system is to prepare the (remade) man to serve as a professional in the labour market and this professional is treated just as a special sort of resource needed for the production (and the consumption of the latter) process. Of course, every modern economy needs a mobile and educated workforce – even so, the action highlights could be arranged differently. What probably strikes the most Eastern European is the fact that liberal capitalism ideology uses the same arguments (as Marxists did) about the inevitability of globalized and liberalized free market all over the world. The commonly recognized objectives of labour flexibility and the investment environment improvement in whatever place in the world show the acceptance of this inevitability and the submission to the overall deregulation process from the state’s side, started in the West that can be compared to the releasing the break in ‘free’ capital favour in all the spheres of the former state control.

Total commoditization and resourcification based on and strengthened by the liberation ideology aims to introduce whatever type of identity construction and reconstruction into the consumption area all together with consumable life styles, beliefs, their practices and world sense-

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tions by making a special sector of identity market. It rests on the pleasure received from the transgression and rejection of older identities for the construction and experiencing the new ones.\footnote{Rubavičius Vytautas, \textit{Postmodernus kapitalizmas} (Kaunas: Kitos knygos, 2010), p. 79.} Handling for consumption various innovations of temporal subculture or group identity into the identity market, market society first increases a general supply and secondly creates a need for these special things and attitudes. Consequently, the rise and consolidation of consumption and consumer society encourages the deep fragmentation of whatever identity by making it a simple supply for the market consumption of different sorts of temporal identities based on particular brand, job, food, sex, life style or other consumption goods, what serves as a good means for multiple identity construction and reconstruction in never-lasting consumption regimes. In the long run these temporal identities are willingly considered to be more important and desirable to compare with long lasted engagement for the national identity: there is no time and necessity to obtain any form of (constant and solid) self-consciousness, for you need to consume without any break in order not to drop out of the established societal and cultural institutions where, as it was already mentioned, a ‘change’ and a satisfaction of any desire is set as an absolute cultural and ethical norm and the ultimate value at the same time. A solid human identity becomes a real obstacle for consumerism in the never-lasting consumption regime. Expectations, closely connected to the opportunities to changing my nearest future and / or to get whatever type of immediate satisfaction, become more important than identity I am sticking to forever (or similar) or solid and constant self-conscious, not to mention linking myself to a collective conscience.

Indeed, consumerism as a ruling mode of living pretends to lay down as the basis of ever developed Western-type society and culture. In its perspective human (and national) identity is going to be reduced to an ID card – a document (in the nearest future, we guess) without any reference to a place of birth, nationality or sex. It looks like in the future we all shall be dealing with a certain living being, somehow successfully deliberated from all sorts of the encumbrances, coming from his or her past. Just like former national and sovereign states have to do with the ‘toys’ or symbols left to ‘satisfy’ their needs: the national flag, animal, meal, colour or song, etc., the same destine very probably is waiting (prepared) for the individuals as well. And that is it. While according to the global media message “all you need is fun and entertainment,” the only ‘real’, fun and satisfaction providing identity left is media related the virtual profile, which is a kind and a very good example of liquid
identity\textsuperscript{13} (=opposition to former solid identity) well represented by always temporal and often changeable Facebook or Skype profiles.

All this undoubtedly results in an every time deeper cultural fragmentation and certain ethical isolation. As everyone seeks his or her own interests and goals pursuing most often the consumption pleasure, treating all the rest as the instruments for achieving this pleasure according to the principle of prevailing instrumental rationalism, the good of the individual naturally is not bound up any more with the good of the whole community or common culture.\textsuperscript{14} Not as it was during the nation domination era, people very often do not identify themselves any more to a certain political or cultural body connected to a particular language, collective memory and traditions (culture). Consequently, they are not able to mobilize any democratic majority around any valuable and achievable program (strengthening national identity, for instance). Individuals and their groups are damned to lose as long as the whole society does not get certain importance of the issues raised by the individuals and / or their groups (an example of commonly appropriated ecological awareness). Thus, a vicious circle is formed: people do not want to be engaged in something common and when they do so and in most cases, they lose, they start to think that better not to start at all.\textsuperscript{15} It is true for any Western Society: would it be Lithuanian or Canadian.

The relevant question arises immediately – who could properly link emancipated individuals to a common basis having society and serve as a social and cultural glue; especially as individual emancipation and overall liberalization and constant pursuit of pleasure do not seem to be not enough to make all people feel really happy? And it seems to be answered or can be seen as a good and quite successful trial of answering in a very special way, at least for in this paper discussed things. Capital (run) democracies have found and developed a very specific and powerful tool of individual integration into the existing system of values and meanings of contemporary culture. National governments and bureaucracies, very probably, are not sufficient representations of power and legitimacy in contemporary Western culture, especially when citizens are not active (or not allowed to be active) as they used to be. While the democratic ideal of an active and reasonable citizen, willing to participate in and through political action, does not work properly anymore and as citizenship does not refer anymore clearly to the participation in public affairs as well as to the acceptance of public (democratic and / or national) values, there is an urgent need to find public substitutions to cement the society and political body. Public individuals or Celebrities

\textsuperscript{13} See Zygmunt Bauman, \textit{Vartojamas gyvenimas} (Vilnius: Apostrofa, 2011).
\textsuperscript{14} Charles Taylor, \textit{Autentiškumo etika} (Vilnius: Aidai, 1996), pp. 103-104
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 114.
are a power that operates very efficiently in a contemporary (popular) culture. In the public sphere celebrities usually exercise their power in less politically defined ways. This power is articulated through famous film stars, singers, TV heroes or (more rarely) businessmen, politicians or religious leaders who are seen regularly on the public stage, while the rest fits entirely for observing them. No need to leave home and to take part in political action or whatever cultural activity any more, for everything you need is a contemporary electronic devise just in front of you or in your hand. What is also important to our here proposed reflection is the fact that the so-called elite (upper-class) people constantly try and like to live today all over the world without any disjunctive (national) marks and, one can say, they are successful in doing this. Needless to say, most often they and their way of life well transmitted in today’s media serve as an aspirational model as well as an object of admiration for all the others, turned into “audience-subjectivity.”

As P. David Marshall claims, recognition of the unique status and importance of celebrities is like a celebration of the whole humanity through a unique public personality. “Celebrity status operates at the very centre of the culture as it resonates with conceptions of individuality that are the ideological ground of Western culture.” As a public individual, he or she serves as a powerful type of legitimation of living conditions – many a time personally not acceptable at all – as well as of the political economic model of the existing system including the individual into the basis of capitalism. Notwithstanding the fact that they are only fabricated commodities of the entertainment industry, celebrities (or stars) play a crucial role in representing individual success and achievement within the actual social and cultural world. Thus, they truly legitimate the myths of total success of actual Western culture and society, putting away all local cultures and putting an enormous impact on their audience in whatever part of the world. Elaborated “audience-subject” concept, as P. David Marshall points out, shows the importance in constructing and developing the individual subjectivity from the mass layers or “demographic aggregates.” Summarizing we can say that the concept of celebrity, taking the public sphere firmly in its hands and in its overall control, represents a system of meaning and communication of this meaning to all people living in the same type of cultural society and that is a very significant and powerful factor of current ideological pressure as well as really smart tool of its exercising that any national identity has difficulty to sustain.

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17 Ibid., Preface X.
18 Ibid., p. 65.
Conclusion

As a matter of fact, mostly because of the explosion of modern media activities (as well as our effective explosion to it) constantly promoting endless emancipation, self-construction, consumption-based happiness and the total globalization of the contemporary world, there are no secure islands either for ‘individuals’, or for collective ‘individuals’ – nations and cultures. Almost everyone is deeply affected by the prevailing ideology of liberalization and the ruling free market economy, since the institutionalized order and vision of the world as well as the Western way of living – distinguished from other ways and visions – are forcing to accept them obediently and uncritically. Thus, philosophical reflections on consumer, gender, migrant, fluid (liquid) or digital identity in the public sphere – and, unfortunately, most frequently even in the intellectual run sphere – are wider spread and more expected than any kind of reflections on the national (human or cultural) identity. As we know the strongest identity is based on everyday life practices provided by people living locally, side by side, and at a slow pace, without unexpected and undesirable changes. This clearly goes against the theoretically and practically dominant ‘fast food’, ‘desire of change’ and immediate satisfaction guaranteed by the consumption regime and ideas.

Needless to say, there is no way and no need to come back to the safe and comfortable 19th-20th century national identity model. In addition, this model in Lithuania’s case is characterized by relative weakness and fragility, for it has been created quite recently by neglecting at tangible extent the history and former common culture and by resting it merely on the ancient and not much literary and philosophically developed Lithuanian language. Therefore, this sort of identity, one could say, is being transferred without a reliable and long lasted tradition that selects, saves and transmits. At the same time, it seems that any modern identity in today’s so complicated and unclear world cannot be based on and / or explained by only one principle: ‘organically’ bound nation or, say, consumption-based happiness. The task should be to somehow wisely combine different methods and different means of identity maintaining: self-realization and community dependence, all sorts of reasonable tolerance, individual rights and national duties, freedom and obligation, etc. Speaking more generally, we need a new ‘cultural engagement’ between the groups and individuals living together on a special spot of the Earth called Lithuania. ‘Readjusting identity’ or voluntary membership of the common terrain also means acknowledging the possibility of limited loyalty to the former Lithuanian identity as the foundations of communal existence currently appear not to be solid enough to organize properly common public life and to form good and decent citizens. There is an
obvious need for more reasonable integration, probably leaving room for different language or ethnic groups residing or willing to reside permanently in the territory of the modern Republic of Lithuania, not excluding the possibility of multiple or multilevel membership in future. Admittedly, to a certain extent we cannot seize protecting one special group (Lithuanians) at the expense of others that could receive fierce criticism from the radical liberal side at the same time.

To conclude the reflection, one may say that only further philosophical and theoretical investigations combined with collected empirical data could show whether the new indefinable and contingent identity conception basically spread in the contemporary Western world could really become normative and legitimate for everyone, not excluding future Lithuanians. That means only later we shall see what specific role in the future of Lithuanian identity would be attributed to the usage of Lithuanian language as well as for the attachment to the native land and to the “local” culture.

References


Part II
Interchange of Cultures: Political, Legal and Historical Dimensions
8.

The Proposal of Ancient Greek Cynics to Global Society:
The Universal Virtue of Temperance

VYTIS VALATKA

Introduction

The philosophical school of Cynicism founded in Athens at the end of the 5th century BC\(^1\) by Antisthenes and Diogenes of Synope is one of the most original and interesting phenomena of Ancient Greek philosophy. This school earned fame mostly because of the uprising against the whole Ancient Civilization, which was the first total uprising against civilization in the history of western thought. According to the Cynics, civilization annihilates radical temperance – the essential feature and universal virtue of human nature, leading to a healthy, tranquil and happy life, or in modern words, a high-quality of life. Moreover, civilization replaces natural temperance with surplus of pleasures, which is especially pernicious to human nature. The cult of pleasures and tools for hunting them is also an evident vice and disease of contemporary civilization sunk in consumption. As Ecclesiast once said, “nothing under the sun is new, neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: for it has already gone before in the ages that were before us.”\(^2\) Therefore, it is highly plausible that diagnosis of antique variant of the perpetual malady of civilization and the proposed medicine may be also beneficial to contemporary global society. The article attempts to grasp these benefits.

The ‘Civilized’ Principle of the Flywheel

Let us begin with the identification of the above mentioned malady linking the ancient world with the contemporary one. Why, according to the Cynics, is the chase of surplus of pleasures such a huge vice and such a complicated disease? Why did the founder of Cynics school,

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1. This philosophical school was founded in Athens at the end of the 5th century BC and ended its existence in 529 AD, when Emperor Justinian I closed all philosophical schools in Athens.
Antisthenes maintain: “I'd rather be mad than feel pleasure?”

It is the subtle analysis of pleasures made by Cynics that elucidates the matter. Such an analysis employed a fundamental principle, which could be entitled “the principle of the flywheel.” This principle runs like this: “the greater surplus of pleasures a person achieves, the greater surplus of pleasures he desires in the nearest future.” Such a person, little by little, loses his/her natural freedom and becomes a total slave to this surplus of pleasures. He/she permanently chases pleasures, constantly desires them, having no possibility to live out of their reach. Nevertheless, no surplus of pleasures can fully satisfy him/her, no indulgence in pleasures can procure for him/her happiness – the permanent state of a tranquil and undisturbed soul. Cynical philosophers compare the hunter for pleasures with a man possessed with dropsy: this man is constantly being tortured by an unappeasable thirst, and the more abundantly his thirst is satisfied, the greater it grows.

Such a person is always discontented; he/she is permanently tormented by anxiety and terror that he/she will never reach so desirable a quantity of pleasures or even, because of a sinister twist of fortune, will lose the pleasures he already possesses.

According to the cynics, the means for pursuit of pleasure also never suffices. There is no limit and, moreover, there can be no limit either for fame, or for power, or even for comparatively small gains. These things never suffice, they are never enough, there is no sufficient quantity of them. A person is never satisfied with wealth and fame he/she possesses, there is no end to striving and strengthening of power, and a libertine never finds the ultimate woman to provide him with pleasures in which he could finally calm down.

According to the cynics, human nature, under conditions of civilization, is severely ill. To prevent it from death it is necessary to heal that serious disease. But what kind of treatment is required? According to the Cynics, there is only one medicine for this malady: a return to the natural temperance – the essential and universal human virtue.

The ‘Cynical’ Concept of Radical Temperance

It is important to notice that Cynical philosophers do not mean an ordinary temperance, i. e. the sense of proportion in everything. In fact, they are talking about a radical temperance – the ultimate constraint of

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human needs. In modern terms, such a variant of temperance may be called the ultimate reduction of consumption. According to Cynics, only a minimal quantity of food, drink, sexual pleasures, clothes, shoes and other goods can entirely content human nature. It is a minimal quantity of these goods alone that is capable to provide human being with self-sufficient pleasures not leading to the surplus, which, according to the principle of flywheel, permanently requires more and more new and more intensive pleasures. On the other hand, minimal human needs are the most necessary ones, which actually can be fulfilled always and everywhere. At least they may be easily fulfilled in the living world of Cynics – Ancient Greece, where mild climate and exuberant nature do not allow Cynical philosophers to starve and freeze, where simple barrel can serve as an elementary shelter, as in the case of Diogenes.

Radical temperance allows a person to confine himself/herself only to the most necessary needs, which, on the other hand, can be always satisfied. Such a minimal number of needs easy to fulfill guarantees the absence of anxiety and fear of the future. In turn, this freedom from fear and anxiety vouchsafes tranquility and good disposition of human soul that, as Cynics believed, is nothing else but human happiness itself.5 

Such is the radical temperance, which, according to Cynics, is the only medicine for surplus of pleasures. How is this medicine produced? Cynics offer the only recipe for production of this remedy. In their opinion, it is asceticism (askesis) that leads step by step to the desirable temperance. What did cynics mean by such a mysterious word “askesis”? It is the term of ancient Greek language, and the principal meanings of it are “practice,” “training,” “exercises.” Cynical askesis was a certain kind of exercise.

Cynical philosophers distinguished two species of askesis: training of body and training of soul. For example, “Diogenes used to affirm that training was of two kinds, mental and bodily: the latter being that whereby, with constant exercise, perceptions are formed such as secure freedom of movement for virtuous deeds.”6 Both kinds of training perfectly complement one another. Moreover, “one kind of this training is incomplete without the other.”7 We face here very important question. Namely, which exercises are designed for body and which ones are attributed to soul? It is a laconic phrase of Antisthenes that delivers the precise answer: “who wants to get a virtuous man ought to strengthen

5 For example, Diogenes maintained: “true happiness consists in perpetual tranquility and joy of mind and soul,” Joannes Stobaeus, Florilegium (Lipsiae: In bibliopolio Kuehniano, 1824), Vol. III, Ch. 103, 21, p. 294.
6 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers [interactive], Vol. II, Ch. 6, 70.
7 Ibid.
his body by gymnastics and exercises of endurance and his soul by education." It is important to notice that such an education must include numerous myths about ancient heroes having practiced radical temperance (Hercules, Theseus, Odyssey etc.) which in modern terminology may be named the stories of success. As for exercises of endurance, they include learning to suffer pain, heat, cold, thirst and hunger. Among exercises, designed to body, cynics also numbered manual work, which was honoured with status of important moral virtue.

According to Cynics, it is physical and spiritual askesis alone that can lead the human being to virtue of radical temperance. As an unknown Cynical philosopher maintained, “temperance is achieved by training and, contrary to vice, does not penetrate into the soul by itself.”

The Relevance of ‘Cynical’ Temperance to Global Society: Mild Temperance vs a Radical One

And now let us analyse the relevance of that temperance to the modern global world. The main malady of ancient Greek civilization, that is, the hunt for pleasures, is obviously as well characteristic of the contemporary global consumer civilization. Modern science, technologies and telecommunications make variegated pleasures easily ‘accessible’ to global consumption. The delectable objects permanently tempt us from TV, Cinema and computer screens. Our ears are constantly delighted and vibrated by sounds flowing from CD players or even live concerts. Plenty of pleasures, even the most piquant ones, can be lightly ordered hic et nunc by telephone, internet etc. On the other hand, the insufficiency of these lightly available pleasures is more than evident – the contemporary society faces numerous cases of diverse depressions, psychoses, neuroses, suicides, various forms violence, racial, ethnic, cultural, religious discrimination, etc. Moreover, the surplus of pleasures, being broadcasted, propagated and ideologized via various channels, diminishes the quantity of creative energy and critical mass in society as well as immunity of the latter to different ideological, political, economical and the other manipulations and black technologies. There is no doubt about that. But there is some doubt as to whether the remedy proposed by Ancient Cynics could be pertinent and effective in the modern world as well.

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Even in Ancient Greece the imperative of radical temperance sounded extraordinary. Even more extraordinary it would sound in contemporary civilization where human beings have considerably greater number of needs, where consumption is refined, globalized and deified, where the tempo of life is evidently faster etc. True, even nowadays it is possible to meet people with extremely restricted their needs. For example, the author of this paper knows a person who walks in the same shabby shoes for 20 years and is very satisfied with that. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a modern man to utter sincerely the words once said by an unknown Cynical philosopher: “my dress is a thin Scythian cloak, my shoes are the soles of my own feet, my bed is the whole earth, my food is seasoned by hunger alone, and I eat nothing but milk, cheese and raw meat.”\textsuperscript{10} It is hard to believe that in cold wintertime the author of this paper could walk barefoot, thinly dressed; that \textit{in modo Diogenis} he could live in barrel etc.

Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that permanent consumption, the constant hunt of pleasures, fast tempo of everyday life, a desire to be, to have, to do more and faster wears and exhausts contemporary human being. These factors of modern civilization do not allow the modern man to contend himself with simple things, to enjoy life, to experience the beauty of the moment. These factors sow continual anxiety and fear to be late, to miss, to lose, not to consume and so on. One of possible means to mitigate these negative aspects could be the choice of more temperate way of life, i.e. the reduction of consumption. True, modern man is accustomed to luxurious and comfortable life; he is used to desire, having and consuming plenty of things. Nevertheless, it is possible just to try to live more temperately refusing what is not necessary, indispensable, what can be postponed for tomorrow and even declined when tomorrow comes. In any case, at least a minimal temperance, a minimal reduction of consumption could leastwise minimally improve the quality of life bringing more health, sanity, tranquility, stability, consistency and elementary joy. And what is more to say, such a minimal temperance would help people not to feel totally helpless in the face of various local and global crises.

The remedy proposed by the ancient Greek cynics would not fit in its original radical form in the contemporary global consumerist world. In a figurative sense, radical temperance would be just a too bitter and tough pill for the over-squeamish stomach of a citizen of the modern world. Whereas milder and softer form of such a pill could hopefully contribute to facilitate the permanent malady of civilization. Of course,

not to heal, but at least to facilitate. Consequently, not radical but a mild variant of temperance, which could be entitled as a sense of proportion in everything; not the ultimate restriction of human needs but just a reduction of consummation could become a contemporary prophylactic.

What recipe can be proposed for the production of this important remedy? In other words, which way leads to that mild temperance? Ancient Greek Cynics sought their radical temperance by *askesis* – exercises for body and soul. It is widely known that without learning, practice and training it is impossible to achieve positive result in any activity. Temperance is also no exception to this rule. True, reaching no longer for the ultimate constraint of human needs but simply for a sense of proportion in everything, practice of enduring heat, cold, hunger and thirst, so emphasized by ancient cynics, loses its former relevance. Still, body training by gymnastics, moderate exercises of endurance and manual labour, and, on the other hand, training of soul by sciences and letters also nowadays lead to proper sense and attitude of proportion. Therefore, it is safe to say that *askesis* of ancient Greek cynics deprived of its radical dimension could become one of the possible ways to achieve a reduction in consumption – the type of temperance relevant to the contemporary world.

**Conclusion**

The cult of pleasure is a conspicuous illness of our modern global consumer society. Yet the remedy proposed by Ancient Greek Cynics, i.e. radical temperance, would not suit us nowadays. The qualities of contemporary world (considerably greater number of needs, refined and deified consummation, evidently faster tempo of life etc.) would turn radical temperance into a too bitter and too tough a pill for the unduly squeamish stomach of the modern person. Nowadays another type of temperance is required to mitigate the eternal malaise of civilization. It is a mild temperance, which could be defined as the sense of proportion in everything leading not to the ultimate constraint of human needs but just to a reduction of consumption. Nonetheless, *askesis* of Ancient Greek Cynicism, deprived of its radical dimension, could become one of the possible means to achieve mild temperance.

**References**


9.
From Liberalism to Globalism

ALGIRDAS DEGUTIS

We are all liberals now here in the West. As philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre put it more than twenty years ago, “The contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place in such political systems for the criticism of the system itself, that is, for putting liberalism in question.” Liberalism in its various guises has become the common ground for politically correct discourse and the benchmark for distinguishing mainstream politics from marginal politics.

What is liberalism, what is its basic idea? Like other ideologies competing for dominance in public life, liberalism is seldom found or presented in its pure form. Compromises with elements belonging to other modes of thought are often made so that the very identity of the doctrine gets blurred. However, to understand the driving force of an ideology we need to look to what that ideology seeks prior to all compromises. Prior to compromises, and in its essence, liberalism is the view that the ultimate goal of political and moral life is to promote the satisfaction of individual goals as much and as equally as possible. The basic idea is that human will or human preferences determine value. The good is what people want. This is the bedrock liberal assumption. The assumption is poised against any idea of ultimate goods or values going beyond, or transcending, particular wills. That belief means the acceptance of individual wants as the measure of things, and therefore the elimination from public life of all standards that transcend the preferences particular individuals happen to have. In the end, the only legitimate public standards are standards that tell people how to resolve conflicts among individual goals so that no person and no goal are left out in the cold.

Principles that tell people what the goal should be, which purposes are better and which are worse, are considered indemonstrable, if not false. That is why they drop out of political and even moral consideration. On this view, individuals are sovereign. They are seen not so much as agents grounded in common reason but rather as black boxes of independent wills, each choosing and expressing his own concept of mean-

ingful life. What is actually chosen does not matter much. The big thing is choosing for yourself, autonomously, your own good. This activity is extolled as ‘freedom’. As Judith Shklar puts it: “Every adult should be able to make as many effective decisions without fear or favor about as many aspects of her or his life as is compatible with the like freedom of every other adult. That belief is the original and only defensible meaning of liberalism.”

Liberalism regulates this freedom by the application of its principle of ‘equality’. Rather than referring to equal participation in some common substantive goal, liberal equality means an equality of wills, among which no distinctions in value should be made. Indeed, making such distinctions would imply reliance on some objective or transcendent good, which is deemed as an unacceptable imposition on individuals’ wills. The demand for equal freedom is considered intrinsically or prima facie just simply because all desires are equal as desires and therefore are all equally worthy of satisfaction.

Whatever defines us in ways that we do not choose for ourselves is thought of as something oppressive that we must get rid of or be liberated from. In the absence of an overriding good, any value ranking or value hierarchy should be treated as a purely subjective preference. That means it should not be imposed on other people. That also means that removing restrictions from the satisfaction of wants is prima facie reasonable and just. In a succinct formulation of Leo Strauss, for liberals “our inability to acquire any genuine knowledge of what is intrinsically good or right compels us to be tolerant of every opinion about good or right or to recognize all preferences or all ‘civilizations’ as equally respectable. Only unlimited tolerance is in accordance with reason.” This is what liberal rationality and justice mean.

It is thought that the inherited social order is a flawed human construct that can and should be reconstructed to bring it ever more into conformity with the liberal ideal of rationality and justice. This implies continuous remolding of social life to put everyone more and more in a position to get what one wants, as much and as equally as possible. The quest for the liberation of desire from restraint by other people’s understanding of the good is thus central to liberalism. For the last several centuries, it has engendered a whole lot of movements of emancipation. The very idea of social progress subscribed to by the modern mind is basically the liberal one. It is the vision of ever-wider liberation of for-

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3 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
merely suppressed desire, or, sociologically, of ever-wider emancipation of groups deemed oppressed by the inherited non-liberal social order.

Liberalism combines the promotion of its ultimate principle, equal freedom, with readiness to compromise with existing arrangements while the implications of that principle gradually erode the whole social order. Societies are supposed to ‘progress’, that is, gradually to extricate themselves from the grip of the dead hand of the past and move to the ultimate state of totally free individuals interacting across the globe impeded by no coercive restraints.4 It should be noted that liberalism has been the breeding ground for communism, the most radical attempt at implementing that ultimate principle. The difference between the two is not so much about the end as about the means for achieving that end (incremental reforms versus a whole-sale revolution; markets versus centralized economy). That is what it means to say that liberalism is reformist, and that is why liberals have a permanent bad conscience with respect to the Left (pas d’ennemi à gauche.)

Now, the obvious problem with equal freedom is that people’s preferences and goals are often incompatible. As a result, some of the goals and thus some freedoms have to be sacrificed. Which of any two conflicting freedoms should be suppressed? Attempts at dealing with the problem while remaining within the framework of individual preferences are doomed to failure. Glib formulas such as “One person’s freedom ends where another person’s freedom begins” are useless unless the scope of one’s legitimate freedom is defined independently of the preferences involved. Minimalist criteria such as John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle” likewise fail because harm cannot be merely a matter of frustrated preference, for otherwise a mugger might claim being harmed by the victim’s resistance.

Since some freedoms are always at loggerheads, the call for equal freedom is to no avail. An objective criterion of the good is always needed, a criterion that cannot be distilled from conflicting preferences. “To deal rationally with conflicts of goals we must be able to place the goals within a larger system of understandings that tells us what things are, how they relate to each other and what they are worth. We discover and do not create the system. Liberalism denies there is a system to discover, and by doing so makes itself unable to discuss questions of the good.”5

4 The end-state has already been extolled as “realm of freedom” (Marx), and ridiculed as the bliss of “the last men” (Nietzsche).
Indeed, the very *raison d’être* of liberalism is the evasion of the issue of the Good by assumed agnosticism concerning ultimate ends. Because of this, liberalism has always relied on some traditional standards of the good – while at the same time attacking them at the edges, one by one. Indeed, ‘classical’ liberalism could function relatively well only by accepting the bulk of established religious and cultural traditions. However, eventually liberalism came up with another kind of solution – distilling from its own claim of value agnosticism a system or a project of morality and public life that it called *tolerance* (a.k.a. non-discrimination, openness, inclusiveness, diversity).

The liberal theory is that public life has limited scope. It relates only to the coordination of particular goals men have, while the goals themselves can be pursued privately. Those goals, we are told, can be as lofty or as lowly as you want. You can practice any religion, promote any cause, live any way of life. Liberalism is said to be neutral and only forbids you to force your views and way of life on others: “Let a hundred flowers bloom.” But isn’t that too good to be true? Is liberal neutrality real? Let us consider how it works.

Consider some typical cases of conflicting freedoms. Take religion first. The idea that fundamental religious commitments can be made strictly private is implausible, since denying them public expression is tantamount to their suppression. On the Christian worldview, there is a standard by which some acts are inherently right and others wrong. For liberals this aspect of Christianity is an imposition on sovereign individual wills, a situation to be rectified by requiring Christians’ non-interference in public life. Obviously, this is not neutrality; this is enforced secularism. As a matter of fact, in many Western countries religious freedom of Christians has been increasingly curtailed for the sake of freedom of unbelief (and even of non-Christian beliefs). As all symbols of religious belief are gradually expunged from the public space, the fake neutrality of liberalism on matters of religion is clearly exposed.

Analogously, the liberal demand for sexual freedom, or the privatization of standards of sexual morality, has ultimately led to the prevailing attitude that views traditional standards as harmful and bigoted, not something to be promoted in public life. Many Western countries have, therefore, introduced compulsory sex education that attacks traditional standards by emphasizing equal value of sexual orientations and the right of free choice among them. The intention behind the liberal demand has been the emancipation of those discriminated against because of traditional standards of sexual behavior. But this has led to the enforced downgrading of traditional sexual mores and the upgrading of formerly marginalized behavior, a result that is in no way neutral.
Here we have two instances of how the liberal solution works. We have two deep-rooted traditional ways of life that are increasingly attacked and suppressed in the name of the equality of all ways of life. If this is a paradox, the paradox is inherent in the very idea of emancipation. The project of emancipation is not at all neutral. It is extremely biased against inherited modes of life and standards of evaluation.

From the liberal point of view, all standards, hierarchies and associations that rank desires in value or discriminate among people on the basis of traditional distinctions are artificial, oppressive and unjust. Indeed, the principle that human desire is the measure of things requires the eradication of all standards of value except for the recognition of equal dignity of all desires. It requires the suppression of all authorities that compete with it, such as family, custom, religion, or nation. This is why the liberal agenda gets more and more expanded. The liberal state takes on an ever more active role of liberating all those individuals who are prevented by traditional restrictions from making wholly free choices.

The current inflation of ‘human rights’ is one of the means for implementing the agenda. As ever new allegedly oppressed groups are empowered with rights against their alleged oppressors, the latter are ever more burdened with duties and find their liberties ever more curtailed. The notorious ‘political correctness’ now reigning in the West provides a whole plethora of means for fighting non-liberal standards, branded as bigotry and oppression. Liberalism aims at a comprehensive overhaul of all human relations. Like the leftist of which it is part, liberalism leads to tyranny as it builds up an infinitely detailed network of supervision and compulsion to make sure people do not oppress each other. It is only because of the incremental mode of its operation that the process is seldom perceived as tyrannical.

As an ideology now prevailing in public life, liberalism has to perform the function of providing the grounds for social cohesion. The function is vital, since every viable society has to be based on a system of common understandings about man, the world, and the common good. People need to believe in something absolute. A religion or a functional equivalent of religion is always needed. Without a hierarchy of values and beliefs terminating in something ultimate, social life is hardly possible.

That gives liberalism a headache, since liberalism is suspicious of all alleged higher goods and in fact denies that any ultimate good is better than any other. Liberalism is at best agnostic about substantive ultimate goods. As a matter of fact, in its pursuit of an ever more non-discriminatory social order it must progressively eliminate them because such goods involve value ranking and thus discrimination. And yet a
society needs a *sumnum bonum*. What does liberalism offer in this function? Briefly, it offers an inversion of the normal orientation toward the highest good to its contrary – to an orientation away from the worst evil. What is that evil, the *sumnum malum*? It is the denial of equal freedom, or discrimination, which is involved in the pursuit of common or higher substantive goods.

The notion that discrimination is the greatest evil and that all other goods should ultimately bow to the good of advancing the ideal of *non-discrimination* (tolerance, inclusiveness) is thus established as the ruling principle of Western liberal elites. The goal of fighting the evil of discrimination is thus set up as the highest good, the *sumnum bonum*, to be sought by any progressive society. Since such substantive goods as God, traditional morality and family, natural and traditional sexual relations, country, ethnicity are by their very nature discriminatory they stand in the way of progress and thus constitute evil. Since all the attitudes, habits, historical loyalties, authoritative cultural and religious understandings on which traditional institutions and arrangements depend are also necessarily discriminatory, the liberal agenda is immense.

The main feature of the agenda is the rejection or condemnation of all ‘intolerant’ or ‘absolutist’ positions. As an essentially negative creed liberalism is defined by what it opposes and fights against. It always needs an enemy in order to provide itself with a definite purpose and meaning. Fortunately for liberalism, there are plenty of enemy positions in any real society. Accordingly, Western elites now fight ‘Christian fundamentalism’, ‘patriarchy’, ‘sexism’, ‘homophobia’, ‘renophobia’, ‘racism’, ‘nativism’, ‘ageism’ and what you have on the expanding list of traditional higher goods, now turned into evils. The ‘progressive’ liberal state is on the march against the ‘reactionary’ society. In this battle, elimination of traditional restraints is always followed by inversion of restraints, by encouragement of that which was previously restrained. A veritable revaluation of all values is taking place, all for the promotion of an ever more inclusive, non-discriminatory Open Society.

Since, as a matter of logic, there can only be one Open Society, the project of liberalization is coextensive with that of globalization. Current liberalism, with its principled demand for the elimination of all discrimination, becomes more and more comprehensive and intrusive, continually moving forward and sweeping aside the remaining ramparts of exclusion. Any ethnic, cultural or national heritage, or any attachment to the inherited historical community, is supposed to disappear as things of the benighted past. All of these are supposed to stand in the way of greater individual autonomy, and it is the obligation of the liberal state to root them out. In the name of individual emancipation, all social structures and collectives of the individual and the state are to be eroded.
Paradoxically, yet again as a matter of logic, the liberal state should consider itself being among the enemies, since the very existence of a multiplicity of nation states is a deficiency in respect of non-discrimination and universal inclusiveness. The deficiency is remedied through the emergence from national ruling classes of the global elite that is increasingly gaining more and more power over national units of control. Accordingly, the sovereign power of nation states is continuously eroded. The notorious New World Order, a lively subject of conspiracy theorists, need not be the end-state sought by clandestine puppeteers, for that end-state is already implied by the ideology now dominant in the West. As early as in 1964 the renowned political scientist James Burnham dubbed liberalism as “the ideology of Western suicide.” By this he meant that the success of liberalism as an ideology would be the defeat of the West as a civilization. The Communist Manifesto prophesied the defeat of the bourgeois West by the revolutionary upheaval of proletarians, who ‘have no country’. Ironically, instead of native proletarians fighting for globalization we now face what Christopher Lasch called “the revolt of the elites” against native populations. 7

Conclusion

Liberalism is intent on the promotion of ever greater individual freedom and the creation of ever more inclusive, non-discriminatory open societies. Since truly open societies must ultimately converge into one global society the liberal agenda implies globalism, the creation of one-world humanity ruled by the liberal elite. The price of the success of the liberal agenda would be the end of human diversity, including the loss of Western civilization.

References


10.

Two Legal Identity Trends in Europe:
From Secularization to Integration

DARIJUS BEINORAVICIUS & JOZAS VALCIUKAS

Legal Knowledge – Multi-Process

The increasing openness of legal science to neighboring disciplines, especially the economy, sociology and history, becomes more and more surprising, but also an inevitable phenomenon in modern law. Ongoing movements of law and economy, law and society in the world promote interdisciplinarity of the legal sciences and by that demolishes any type of isolation created by traditional legal formalism. This changed approaches to the primary function of law. This transformation turns from conflict resolution into legal public administration. Influenced by ideas of individualism and realism, the legal regulation of society is no longer just an object of legal science analysis.

Recognition of individualism and realism as fundamental ideas promoted a discussion of legal science with other sciences. The theoretical paradigm of legal instrumentalism turned towards modernization: started to look for relations with post-structuralism, theoretical criticism and that stimulated socio-legal discourse. To match strictly to the reality is the requirement posed to legal regulation due to the very reason that law must be effective to social reality. The law has to find a causal link between legal regulation and regulated social environment. When thinking about legal regulation of society, there is a need to construct the models of legal effectiveness that are suggested by history, sociology and legal economy.

The stronger legal interdisciplinary approach and an epistemology of legal realism is gradually replaced by the new social constructivism. This movement complements the methodology of individualism with the rational factor – a social discourse, social self-reflection and auto-organization.¹ What does this new methodological paradigm mean to legal science? Legal constructivism for legal knowledge provides tools of society awareness and rejects implied or unknowable society hypothesis. This does not mean that law must fully reflect social system, which is hardly possible with modern society that is characterized by high fragmentation and social differences, however, not getting into deep discus-

sion on dependence or independence of legal science to other discourses, legal discourse is focused on knowledge, directing cognitive search through autonomous or heteronomous and other systems.

The oldest critique, where the search between scientific arguments and interpretation can be seen, is the critique of law. Critique of law as a legislative technique was known in ancient times, this is to say that not every legal rule was considered as the law. During the Renaissance, influenced by outlook of individualism, the legal rule dissociated from law, so legal rule faced various legitimacy and other problems, and it is a reason for crisis in the 19th century. The ideological cause of the crisis can be associated with the so-called “sacralization” of legal rule. Since the French Revolution in 1789 throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, Rousseau’s statement that a law is infallible has still dominated.

The rule of law is the rule of a legal rule: the concept of legality concurs with the concept of legitimacy, that is to say, public authorities’ and private persons’ practice is in compliance with the laws adopted by the parliament. The law is increasingly identified with the statutes or laws passed by the parliament. However, according to H. Kelsen, if all legal rules (laws) are considered as the law, legality collides with legitimacy, and it becomes unclear how to further develop the concept of legality. Positive criticism was and is a condition for the improvement of legal rule. Based on the classical concept of legal rule, legislative power derives from the sovereign, nation or its representatives. According to this concept, power is legally recognized only within the validity of legislative power, directly appealing to the need of general will.

However, such a proactive concept of legal rule was frustrated by a new public law doctrine in the beginning of the 20th century in Europe, which developed a concept of conduct rules under which formal legislative power (parliament) is no longer a creator of law. A legislative power was demythologized in the West. Even supporters of proactive concept acknowledge that the principle of representation, which is based on the organization of legislative authority, in this respect, is open to criticism. Parliamentary legislation was recognized as unable to express general will, and its expression was recognized as a doctrinal myth.

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The legal concept of legislative power begins to look for a starting point at sociological concept of legislative power. According to E. Durkheim, a common consciousness reveals this concept, so we have to deal with (and reinforce) social phenomena, separating them from the actors considering themselves as conscious. Social facts are not a result of our will, they are also described from a side.\(^8\) Therefore, sociological legislative power does not determine those facts, but it gives them a form of the legal rule.

In the development of the sociological concept of the legislative power it was recognized that the state does not exist as an individual (I have never had dinner with a legal entity), so, according to L. Duguit, common will inevitably becomes a cover for the individual desires of public power. Duguit defines legal rule not by the author, but by the content: the law is the common needs expression of the active conduct rules.\(^9\) In the beginning of the 20th century, the content and purpose of the law is emphasized, thus refusing a classical category law of the common will. The form of the law was not important to A. Eismen, L. Duguit. Any rule, even if it would be released by a sovereign, is not a law, if it does not reflect the common needs,\(^10\) – wrote Duguit.

Such a scientific approach demystified a will of legislative power and the criticism of parliamentary activities promoted to re-evaluate and justify its functions. Western Europe faced crisis of parliamentarism in the third decade of the 20th century.\(^11\) As parliament gets its power from the nation and establishes that power in the Constitution, so competence of the parliament must be limited within constitutional control of laws. As a result, legislative power is not a sovereign and it is possible not to accept its will. On the other hand, the will of legislative power is a myth because:

- Members of parliament cannot discover it during parliamentary debates – each expresses their own subjective opinion and no one can claim to express what is called the spirit of law.\(^12\) Also, members of parliament are not competent enough: only a few of them are lawyers.

- A group of people that is too large cannot effectively engage in legislation. Today Aristotle’s thought on this question is still relevant: The best regime should consist of democracy and tyranny, even though that

\(^10\) Ibid., p. 12.
\(^11\) Bécan and Couderc, *La loi*, p. 79.
some would consider them as regime. Righteous ones are those who combine more [regimes], because a better regime is the one consisting of different models. Law regime seems to have had no element of monarchy, but only oligarchic and democratic, and is more inclined to oligarchy.\textsuperscript{13} Signs of oligarchy arise where the laws are expressed in stronger and more influential interest groups, in which case the representative democracies are, in fact, just fiction, whose real name is an oligarchy.

- Laws arise from anonymous procedures and are often characterized as false, incomplete, with unclear will, so jurisprudence and doctrine become the real legislator, filling the content of these laws.\textsuperscript{14} Doctrine is managed by the concept: if not the express attributes of purposeful law, then the doctrine does not focus on them, but is directed to the formal description of attributes.

After the Second World War, legal-concept criticism was supplemented by legislative practice criticism. Proponents of legalism supported the idea that law will always find a way of self-improvement until there is an opportunity to release those laws and increase the number of laws making various modifications, additions and changes. However, this legislative practice will inevitably violate the principles of legal technique: constancy of laws, generality, its coherence and others. On the other hand, democracy development leads to legal inflation, which is particularly intensive during social change period. A huge number of adopted laws, its dynamic change creates instability of the social process as well as reduces establishment and effectiveness of human rights and freedoms.\textsuperscript{15} Law moved away from its essence due to the abundance of laws, as it became more specific, rather than general, temporary rather than stable, a law became not an expression of legal rule, but a tool of management. The legal concept of law became a political law that expresses not public needs, but the will of managing group, which expresses impact on groups’ interests. In this way, the opposition between different society groups is growing.

Legislation of this kind is a cause and consequence of social skepticism.\textsuperscript{16} Locke has noted that the first and cornerstone of natural law, which is subject even to legislative power, is society and (as far as it is compatible with common good) protection of every individual of that society.\textsuperscript{17} In order to reduce social skepticism due to legislation, it is necessary to protect each individual’s needs and interests of all social

\textsuperscript{14} Bécan and Couderc, \textit{La loi}, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{17} Džonas Lokas, \textit{Esė apie pilietinę valdžią} (Vilnius: Mintis, 1992), p. 115.
groups and combine them. A compromise of different social groups’ interests is one of the most important requirements for the content of law.

Social sciences in their empirical studies confirmed a need for legislature to have more knowledge of the social reality. Society order, due to the knowledge of sociology, is transferred to the laws that cannot be in conflict with general social order and express interest of only one or a few powerful groups. Social criticism of legislative practice has opened opportunities to develop the modern concept of law and procedural requirements of law adoption process. In the second part of the 20th century, polemic has started between the initiator of the sociology of law, Ehrlich, and the author of The Pure Theory of Law H. Kelsen; this polemic still remains highly relevant today and incites discussions. Summaries of these discussions emphasized that the law must respect not only formal, but also the law’s content criteria.

According to Hegel, in legislature’s image [...] it is important not only to recognize that the law is binding rule for all, but it is more important internal moment – to the content in the defined universality. It means that legal rules by their content must express the essence of law, so it aims to turn to the concept of law and to develop it.

By defining law, it is important not to make it equal to what is determined by one or another statute, because then any statute will not be only a form of the law, but also its content, so to say, the law itself. In other words, the law will not be necessary; any order in a legal form will be called as the law. In such a case, it would be meaningless to discuss what law is and this article (ratio of law and legal order, so to say, ratio of content of law and its form) would be rendered meaningless. When law is separated from legal order as content from the form, we can talk about the characteristics of the form and content requirements to the form. In this respect, it is important to know what the law is and to identify its basic, most important features. Determination of the concept of law becomes a necessary precondition for assessing the content of law. Therefore, the concept of law is very important and relevant: from this point creation of laws and criticism start.

The concept of law gets much attention in legal science. To understand what the law is becomes relevant after Lithuania regained its independence, when there was a need to develop its national legal system, which is free from political dictate and oriented to the regulatory re-

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quirements of a democratic society. There are several reasons for the relevance of concept of law. First of all, long prevailing of etatistic law concept, that maintained every governmental imperative, turned into a binding rule, as law. Volitional orders of political authorities, rather than theoretical considerations, led to what law is and what law is in need for a political authority. Questions on the essence of law were “removed” from the competence of jurisprudence. Separated from the original concept of jurisprudence, it has become one of the most damaged areas of science by political regime, one of the most ideological social sciences.

Secondly, transition to a different system of values reveals the inadequacy of legal definitions. Therefore, it is necessary to rethink how these valuable priorities influence the security of human rights, how it is consistent with the prevailing law concept in Lithuania.21

Thirdly, any legal order was considered as law because of the influence of the etatistic law concept. Today we do understand the risk of such an approach. Legal order was assessed whether it complies with the Constitution, the principles of law. Only knowing what law is, we would be able to know what legal orders will be considered as lawful; only answering what is law we will be able to understand the relation between law and legal order and we will be able to deal with the challenges posed by this relation.

Problem of the Concept of Law

The concept of law always gets a lot of discussion, because only when the right idea of law is formulated, it is possible to identify the object of legal science. The concept of law is determined by the rules of procedure, in practice resulting from legal proceedings and other legal phenomena, so the concept of law is very important because it is the basis for us to understand the legal phenomena surrounding us and to distinguish them from non-legal.

The matter of the concept of law is always relevant and will receive the attention of legal theorists. The concept of law becomes particularly necessary when for the legal imperatives you want to bend not only the application of law but also the legislation, when this concept is based on the values that can bind the legislature.22

It can be stated that the general law concept is dynamic; it depends on natural and changing actual situations. And just because of that legal theory will remain dynamic and fueling the debate on science.

The same term of law is not unambiguous: we have human rights, natural rights, object-oriented law (legislative framework), positive law (defined in the state), individual right (duties of a particular person’s self-imposed permissible behavior).

Law is a social science. Social life is characterized by diversity and pluralism of opinions. The concept of law also feels the pluralism of legal ideas, therefore, the concept of law has to take into account the semantic pluralism. Many authors agree that talking about law and its implications we observe two most noticeable extreme obstacles in its definition: the first – definition commonality, and the other – terms has various meanings. In order to find the right definition, it is necessary to overcome these obstacles, i.e. to identify common features. Requirement of such versatility greatly complicates the search for the concept of law. Moreover, legal anthropology shows the limits of boundaries of the concept of law because different societies have very different legal traditions. In order to open up the search of common attribute, the concept of legal universalism must take into account legal history and comparative law. The law also includes two different terms: one that talks about a system of rules of conduct, establishing some order in society, and the other that defines the word as a science.

Given the legal definition of these two areas, we see two different perspectives for their solution. If the system of rules of conduct dictates “natural” direction of investigation to science, then these two concepts of law coincide and are no longer negotiable. In the opposite case, the law as a science is constantly constructed, developed and criticized, and it also impacts the law as a system of rules of conduct.

Law as a system of rules of conduct historically evolved by following the needs of society. This is why we may say that society itself creates the law and then the same society obey to it. It should be immediately noted that that definition of the law as a system, outputted from observation (empirical). Law as a system is a product of culture, it is constructed by public. Animal communities have no rights; the principle of force dominates there. Every society by their behavior recognizes and upholds what is law, in accordance with certain rules – the rules of conduct. However, modern society is characterized by the fact that the legal system has become autonomous. Historically, little by little law was secularizing (some features that belong to the Church were transferred to the state, layman disposition, or in the other words, separation of law

and religion), as well as the liberalization of the law (separation of law from political dependence).

All this has led to talk about the law as a system with relative autonomy, allowed the formation of a new legal mechanism and new authorities and their service staffs. Interpreting Max Weber, it can be said that such historical processes were the rationalization of social relations. It is important to understand the processes that led to such a result. For such an outcome the biggest role, undoubtedly, was played by the legal formalization. This was started to gain more control for the state. However, the legal system, which began to form rapidly in the 18th century, today receives a lot of radical criticism. It was caused by the development of new technologies, which influenced social processes and new ideology of the end of the 19th century.

Renaissance man, it was believed, gradually realized him/her self as the center, where all of the earth and sky connected, where divine and human mind, and spirit meet. Changes of theological attitudes are accompanied by changes in the concept of law. The law also had to be thought of; it was no longer set as a part of the order of creation. Like everything else in the world, it had to be understood by the spirit of the human. With the spread of the Renaissance and other numerous 16th century ideas, the freedom of the individual is exalted, but it is possible only in the state where social life is based on the contract, under which everyone waives their rights in favor of close person. The law is only a normative expression of this contract: the law is the only force that melts crowd into one nation body. A. Volanus stressed that the law must be helpful for all and, in any way does not serve for someone else will.

The progressiveness of Lithuania’s legal doctrine in the 16th century was determined by the fact that its authors were referring to the principal provisions of Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. The ideas of the democracy of antiquity and Christian humanism were clearly embodied. The task to link the concept of the laws of antiquity and the Christian concept of law was achieved with the name jus naturale, natural law.

However, when the Reformation started, the legal thinking acknowledged until then has faded. The Protestant concept of law conflicted with the Catholic one. The tendencies to limit the reformation of the church and its influence started to spread in the Western Europe. The reformers were skeptical about the human ability to create a human law, which would be reflected in the eternal law, and explicitly denied that the task of the church is a human law establishment. Because of such

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25 Ibid., p. 43.
skepticism, legal positivism as legal theory emerged on the scene. According to legal positivism, law made by state is morally neutral. This legal theory treats the law made by state as a tool, not as a goal. More precisely, it regards the law as a way to impose the sovereign will to which obedience is to be ensured. Another side of the matter is also important because by it, law was liberated from the theological doctrine and direct influence of the church.

Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Grotius, then Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel moved away from theological doctrine because they insisted on the derivation of natural law from reason and experience, not from theology. Among these and many more authors was growing tendency to spread the general idea of the relationship between the law and the statute as the form of the law within society.

The famous Dutch lawyer Grotius had no doubt that a lot depends in law on what he called “free will,” i.e. introduction of a law, and may very well be changed without coercion of the mind. However, some relationships are necessary, neither the will nor the authority can change them. A concept of natural and positive law was commonly recognized. More than a century later, it was still a common practice, and this is evidenced by the words with which Montesquieu began his treatise “The Spirit of Laws”: Laws in most general sense are necessary relations, arising from the nature of things.27

Science stated a revolutionary idea that the physical world is a mechanical system in which everything that happens can be explained in terms of geometrically interrelated body movement. Based on this principle, the great triumph of science – Newton’s theory of planetary motion – was still in the future, but Hobbes understood the principle and made it the center of his system. In his view, each event is a movement, and all natural phenomena must be interpreted in the digestion of complex phenomena in their constituent elementary movements. So, Hobbes attempted to associate social phenomena with the natural sciences, structurally dissociating and analyzing them. Only mind can create real laws, a way of deduction from axioms. What is the axiom in the science of law? Law is a social phenomenon, in a society, primary cell is a human being, so you need to find the key features of human nature, and by setting them, it is possible to create all particular legal system. This work must be done by the state, which determines the social contract to ensure the welfare of the people – of human beast make real human being.28

The change in the relation between the law and the statute, especially with regard to the sources of law, was clearly revealed when the parliament, not the monarch or a small group of people, as the representative organ of the interests of the nation became responsible for the order of the state. Rousseau especially focused on this principle, who by developing the social contract theory, argued that the nation – all citizens, must participate in the legislative process. Since the end of the 18th century, legal systems of Western European countries are developed in accordance with this law concept. In spite of the nation’s criticism, this concept of law has become one of the major elements of Western European countries legal systems.

According to Rousseau, the law is an act of common will. Since the law cannot express personal interests that do not coincide with the general will, laws have commonality character. When nation – the sovereign – expresses the common will, it is reflected in the law. Rousseau’s thoughts show a new turn toward the active society, urge people to actively contribute to the legislative process, to express a common will.

Rousseau has the biggest fault for the ‘will’ concept usage in a political context. However, it is often forgotten that the Enlightenment author pointed out that in order for will to be fair, it must be common. However, most modern parliamentary decisions, of course, are not required to have the necessary commonality. Consequently, any solution occurs if it helps to increase the number of votes, for supporting the government measures. With the all-powerful sovereign parliament, which is not limited only to the authorization of common rules, we have arbitrary power.

Rousseau transferred sovereignty to the nation, which delegates it to the elected representatives, who were responsible for the creation of the statutes in the parliament. Because of this, the statutes received an undisputed legitimacy. In this light, the statutes become a ‘legal law’. Sovereign act, based on the social contract, according to Rousseau, reflects justice and is socially useful. The act of parliament, the statute as an act of common will is a legitimate law, the only real imperative that was inherited by the proponents of democracy. However, as rightly pointed out by Rousseau, universal will is different from the will of all, as a universal (general) will includes all the common interests, therefore will of all only covers part of summed personal interests. Rejection of extreme interests from will of all, everything that is left is general will. In other words, Rousseau talks about the rudiments of social compromise or, more precisely, the need to look for the different interests in the different social groups. Later, the concept of the rule of law has deve-

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29 Ruso, Rinktiniai raštai, p. 97.
Two Legal Identity Trends in Europe: Secularization and Integration

oped the concept of the social compromise, as an alignment of different interests.

Rousseau strongly criticizes organized social groups (political parties, public organizations) that are trying to compete with the sovereign—the nation. These groups will become common within the group, but partial in respect of the state. Since people voting in parliament are less than people living in the country, a threat occurs to manipulate the general will. In order to respect the common will, it is necessary for every citizen to express his opinion.

In modern times, the relation between the law and statute started to be measured on rationalism point of view. You have to do only those things that our mind is able to know for sure and definitely, said the creator of the modern philosophy Descartes. Kant, the contemporary proponent of liberalism, proposed to set up a tribunal to confirm the legitimate demands of mind, on the other hand, to remove unjustified claims—not orders, but on the eternal and immutable laws of mind.30

Hobbes, Rousseau and other philosophers before Kant treated law empirically (the analysis of nature and human characteristics), Kant, Fichte—formally (ideal and real formalization), and Hegel distinguished the original absolute assessment of statute and the law itself.31 According to Hegel, legal laws, differently from the laws of nature, are not absolute. They can be accepted or not. In cases of conflict, the question is what is law? Hegel argued that people in conflict situations must search for mind in law.32 This has to be done by legal science. In modern times (which is also represented by Hegel’s view), the law and statute of the parliament are not merged and standing against each other, because any statute created in the parliament is regarded a ‘qualified’ law.

Such an anti-positive concept, especially strong in the last century, began to oppose legal positivism. Legal positivism as the concept of law rejects not only the concept of natural law, but also any type of metaphysics. Because of this, it makes no different between the law and positive law-making (state legislative). The term ‘positive’ used in respect of law, derived from Latin *positio* (established). Attempts to derive law from the well-intentioned idea clearly visible from the beginning of the modern legal positivism or from Hobbes, who defined law as the command of the one who has the legislative power.33 Legal positivism was grounded on the doctrine which recognizes only law made by state

because there is no other kind of law. Any statute of the parliament is recognized as the law.

Berman considers the modern period of time before the Second World War, and the contemporary period – after 1945. Over the past century in both East and West Europe, legal positivism was useful for government, which by any statute could express its will. It was not limited by any criteria of the law. At the same time, legal positivism began to use the key achievements of the natural sciences. By rejecting ‘speculative’ philosophical metaphysical methods, positivists switched to the real (positively existing) facts ‘strictly scientific’ observation. The proponents of legal positivism refrained from creation of any theoretical abstractions and engaged in such activities as description and commenting of legal norms, as well as the logic formal construction and systematization of those rules.

Legal positivism represents the concept that any statute created in the parliament is the law. Although the history of legal positivism (determined by law) doctrines takes only a moment in the whole history of law compared with the naturally formed evolution of law, legal positivism today retains significant positions. It is necessary to note that during the evolution of legal positivism such institutions as parliament, constitutional court, etc. and the principles that enable to function were formed. We could not imagine a contemporary legal system without any of these institutions.

According to the proponents of legal positivism, this concept of law is empirically observed, formally and officially recognized obligatory reality (determined by excluding metaphysics). The very sense of the rule of law lays in that quality of law that it is obligatory and it is obligatory because of the fact that sanction of the state guarantees it. Law is mandatory in its nature, and understood, according to J. Austin, as a sovereign order. If the sovereign commandment is positive (is ‘positive law’), then what is negative (not positive) with respect to ‘positive law’? Maybe that what is not regulated by law? Of course, this question cannot be answered by positivism itself, and its name is the most absurd.

During theoretical discussions, the proponents of legal positivism, remains within the legislature: all what is the law, is merely related to one or another legal rule (legal relations, subjective rights, etc.), so the law is derived from the same legal rule (normativism), i.e. legislative norms. Thus, any kind of relations that arise from the legal norms are to be called statutory relations. Normativism sets full attention to the form

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of statutes (link with the state, formality, global binding, etc.), so positive law could be declared as issued by the State, official rules (statutes), form of expression. If equate the law with the statute, normativism loses its essence – the contents, its genesis, the status of the relationship with other social norms.

Talking about the positive law, law as an objective value materializes and formalizes, so this positive law, which already has the legal form of the typical characteristics of one of the most important features – the role of the state and its law. However, it should be noted that the state is already not pithy, but formal, not law in general, but the element of positive law. Only in legal state, positive law may become a legal law. Positive law can become a legal law only if the positive law is limited by law pithy requirements; the law will be equipped by revealing the content of the legal nature, a combination of different social interests, in order to express the social compromise and evenly distributed exercising of rights and duties.

The above-mentioned content of law, i.e., the concept of law, legal statute as a societarian law, etc., necessarily requires the concept of form that its contents have to be seen, interpreted, and not only the volitional nature, the legal statute – it is not just the formal attributes corresponding to the concept of positive law, but manageable by purposeful, valued criteria concept of law. The modern legal statute is the initial act of all binding norms, which formulates common law rules, representing the public interest in different social compromise, the state adopts the highest representative body by special legislative procedures, or the whole nation referendum, with supreme legal force in relation to other acts, regulating the most important social phenomena of public life.

Any concept becomes tested hypothesis only when it is weighed in practice and evaluated in experimental criticism. Only the conceptual origins of the legal effectiveness of the law is not enough, legal state provides the legal tools, that can be effective only in one case – if the government itself will be real. If you will be passing the laws and their implementation is left for amateurs, these laws will be only ‘legal movement for movement’. Democratic legislation requires implementation of regulatory rules, the procedural provisions. Legal values enshrined in the implementation of the law is crucial not only to the laws and other normative acts, but the individual’s needs and technological environment of the public and other criteria.

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36 Darijus Beinoravičius, Teisės samprata kaip metodas. Logos (Vilnius, 2013), 75.
37 Ibid., p. 48.
With regard to the requirements of the laws, regulatory limits, of course, we have a pragmatic sense to talk about the positive law, which establishes birthright legal values and requirements for them. Probably the longest remains the only approach that analyzes the substantive law, and is rounded off with the practical applicability, which links the concept of legal analysis to the facts of exploration of jurisprudence.

Today, the most important aspects of the control of law in positive law are the problems of constitutionality of the law because any law or any other act must not oppose the Constitution. The Constitution is value which expresses the positive law, and its evaluation and interpretation have to be seen through the prism of the concept of law, it must be evaluated, come out of the limits of positive law. Then the Constitution becomes flexible, pithy rights, and at the same time valuable features, giving meaning of highest power legislative act.

The so-called ‘positive law’ ‘victory’ was partially recognized by the anti-positivist (Hegel, Kant’s followers, existentialists, phenomenological law, anthropology school representatives and others). However, according to them, this is what is called a ‘legal positivism’ and can be explained only by the principles of law, in the context of the most important ideas. Law in modern times, in Western Europe, is going through an interchange of the two concepts – positivism and anti-positivism.

Conclusion

One of the most important achievements in the discussion about the concept of law is that a growing number of legal scholars support the idea to search for legal features without legislative limits. It promotes the research in law from different aspects and calls for complex analysis. Questions are being asked: how law differs from non-legal areas, the laws from other rules. This separation in modern legal philosophy continues to promote the development of neo-positivism.

Individualism becomes more important during the period of Renaissance, exaggerating the importance of the individual and subjectivity valued on the basis of individual’s freedom. A part becomes more important than the whole, so the legal rule becomes a small, independent and important center, law as a whole dies off, because any legal rule becomes a law.

The legal rule aims to create an objective law, so to say to have law reflecting the needs of the whole society, but with a weakening of law and its influence, the legal rule cannot break free from subjectivity: it often propagates the interests of the influential groups or classes. From a perspective of society needs, such legal rules remain subjective, because are limited to the subjective will of legislative power, which in specific
cases cannot be objectively measured. Such legal rule is detached from the law being an independent small ‘center’, it isolates itself from a search of the whole social compromise of society.

Due to the significant number of legal rules, it moved away from its essence, as it become more specific rather than general, temporary rather than stable, the legal rule has not become a rule expressing the law but became a management tool. Legal rule became a political rule that is not expressing the needs of society, but the will of managing groups, which expresses the interests of group power. In this way, the opposition of different society groups becomes stronger, the social order is destabilized, because it is directed not to create a social compromise, but to make an influence.

The most important aspect of legal control in positive law becomes the problem of constitutionality of legal rules because legal rule or any other act cannot be valid if it is contrary to the Constitution. The Constitution is a legal value that expresses positive law and its evaluation; interpretation must be explained through the prism of the concept of law. It must be evaluated and it should cease to be limited by positive law.

Legal constructivism of legal knowledge provides instruments for society’s knowledge and rejects the hypothesis of implied or unknowable social rules. This does not mean that law must fully reflect a social system, which is hardly possible in modern society, characterized by high fragmentation and differences of social systems. Legal discourse is to be focused on knowledge directing the cognitive search through autonomous or heteronomous systems.

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11. Dialogue of Cultures as a Prerequisite for Inter-Ethnic Peace

ALISULTANOVA SABINA ISAKOVNA

Dagestan as a Unique Region of the Russian State

Russia emerged and evolved over the centuries as a multinational State. Currently, it represents a multiethnic and multi-confessional State where the Russian language and Russian culture constitute a unifying and cementing factor. Nowadays, it is sad to note the increase in religious and ethnic tensions in our society. The recent events such as the riots in Kondopoga or on Manezh Square in Moscow, accompanied by hateful anti-Caucasian slogans (“Stop feeding the Caucasus!,” “Russia is for Russians!”), demonstrate that the interethnic situation in Russia is far from calm and stable. At the same time, it is clear that attempts to play the ethnic or religious card will weaken and compromise the integrity of the State and split Russian society. Attempts to affirm one’s own ethnic or religious superiority at the expense of other groups demands a strong rebuff from the authorities. In addition to punitive measures, which are necessary, promotion of ethnic and religious tolerance, a deep dialogue of cultures is also needed. Despite its amazing ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious diversity, the peoples of Russia have very much in common in terms of history and cultural values.

Dagestan is a unique region of the Russian Federation in many ways. Geographically, it is the largest North Caucasus republic, and the only one that has access to the sea. Representatives of different ethnic groups and religions peacefully coexist for many centuries in the region. “Dagestan’s civilizational status is ambiguous. It seems to be unenviable if we compare it with Switzerland, Turkmenistan and Laos. These countries have a particular civilization that gives stability, continuity and progressiveness to their culture and politics. Dagestan is at the crossroads of many civilizations – it passes through the boundary between East and West, North and South, Christianity and Islam, man-made and traditional civilization. Historically, this geographical region proved to be the original epicenter of the world’s spiritual streams, but it can be considered as the periphery of each of these civilizations.”

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1 M.I. Bilalov, Dagestan in Culture and Civilization (Makhachkala, 2010), p. 97.
Located at the crossroads of civilizations, the national character of the people has incorporated the features of both Muslim and Christian cultures. Dagestan’s special characteristic values, cemented in the traditions and customs, form the basis of a spiritual culture. The peculiar features are hard work, hospitality, respect for elders, compassion, a warrior mentality, and personal bravery, etc.

However, in recent decades, many of these ancestral traits were skewed. Adat and customs, which were almost overcome and obsolete in the 20th century, came to the culture’s surface. This can be seen as the result of de-modernization of all spheres of social life of post-Soviet Russia, when there was ‘archaism’, ‘patriarhalizatsiya’ of Daghestan’s culture. As a result of acculturation relapses, the mix of Russian, European, Islamic national cultural traditions has developed. Thus, was formed the eclectic, not harmonized, inorganic whole.

**Ethnic Identity**

For the preservation of ethnic identity, the erasing of local cultural traditions and their replacement by Western-style traditions should not be allowed. In its history, Russia has experienced several waves of borrowing Western liberal values. They have played a positive role in the formation of the Russian Empire during the reign of Peter the First. A number of upgrades occurred on the basis of these values, some positive results in the democratization of the political life were recorded in the post-Soviet Russia. But it should be noted that blind copying of the whole West is very unproductive. To our mind, the events of 2014 in Ukraine prove this idea. There is a clash of civilizational values.

**Ethnonymical Vocabulary**

Ethnic culture has deep roots. Representatives of a particular ethnic group are inherent in the generalized coherent vision of being, which forms the ethnic picture of the world having expression primarily in ethnonymical vocabulary. Ethnonymical vocabulary is involved in the representation of the world and finds its direct expression in set word combinations. The study of many languages shows that acquisition of connotations by ethnophraseological units is due to historical and cultural development of society, it reflects the mentality of a particular ethnic group, cultural traditions and national identity.

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The ethnonymic vocabulary reflects surrounding world and finds its immediate expression in stable combinations.

The use of ethnonyms in phraseological fund has a number of specific features in terms of valuation connotations. The process of formation of connotations is due to historical, cultural development of the society; it reflects the features of the mentality of a particular ethnic group, its cultural traditions and national identity.

Idioms with etnokonnotative content can be divided into several groups based on the different aspects of lexical meaning:

Ethnonyms: “хитрый как сто китайцев, бледный как якут” (cunning as a hundred Chinese, pale as Yakut)

Lingvonyms derived from ethnonyms: “я тебе русским языком говорю” (I tell you in Russian)

Toponyms: “швед под Полтавой, взойти на Голгофу, в Мекку идти” (Swede at Poltava, ascend to Calvary, to go to Mecca)

Ethnonyms expressing attitude to mother tongue/ foreign language: “немецкая аккуратность, немецкая точность, злее злого татарина, цыганский пот пронял.” (German thoroughness, German precision, more angry than a wicked Tatar, Gypsy sweat getting through).

Ethnonyms denoting the concept or object of material culture: “туманныйАльбион, китайская головоломка, вавилонская башня” (foggy Albion, Chinese puzzle, the Tower of Babel). Speech cliches, expressions and proverbs: “курский соловей, на всю Ивановскую кричать, это не Рио де Жанейро, казанскай сирота” (Kursk Nightingale, scream at all Ivanovo, this is not Rio de Janeiro, Kazan orphan).

For example, there is an expression “Mamma, I turchi” in the colloque Italian. Historically, for Italians the word “Turks” was synomynous with cruelty, savagery, ruthlessness and bloodthirstiness. This perception was also fixed in French “Les amis ne sont pas les turcs, traiter a la turque” (friends are not Turks).

The invasion of the Tatars to Russia in the 13th century and the establishment of a system of political and tributary dependence of Russian society from the Mongol-Tatar khans were reflected in Russian quotations and proverbs of the time: “Не дай бог злому татарину; злее зла честь татарская; незваный гость хуже татарина; ешь медведь татарина – оба ненадобны; нет проку в татарских очах; люблю молодца и в татарине; татарин либо насквозь хороши, либо насквозь мошенник; татарскому мясосуд нет конца.” (God forbid evil Tatar; angrier evil honor Tatar; an uninvited guest worse than a Tatar; Bear eat Tartar – both of unnecessary; there is much good in the eyes of Tartar; like good fellow in Tartar; Tartar, or good, or a swindler)
As we can see, negative connotations are well represented in the ethnic phraseologisms of any language. So, drunkenness, condemned by any ethnic communities, the French attributed to Russian, Poles, British, Swiss: boire comme un polonaise/anglais/Suisse; boire a la russe (drink like a Pole, an Englishman, a Swiss, a Russian).

It should be noted that ethnophraseological units connote positive qualities of people, their achievements to a lesser extent. If we compare the Russian and French languages, these idioms are more frequent in French: le dernier des Romans, fort comme un turc, aller a pied comme un basque, hospitalite ecossaise. The negative attitude towards other people is most relevant in phraseology, this is due to the fact that the negative qualities are remembered better and cause the greatest interest than positive. The most widespread attitude in the language is irreverent, sometimes even hostile one toward other ethnic groups. Predominance of pejorative connotations is related to the principle of ethnocentrism, which manifests itself in an effort to evaluate the world through the prism of the traditions and values of their own ethnic group. Such ethnocentric vision of the world often becomes the source of conflict between various ethnic groups. However, a healthy integration of Dagestan in the world space, being a subject of Russia, the update of economic, political and natural resources is vital to Dagestan’s society. Increasingly, regions in which such conflicts arise are associated with potential subjects of international terrorism.

Through Mutual Concessions to the Dialogue of Cultures

Politicians in the West hang tags left and right. These, especially concern the Muslim regions of Russia. But the world is changing. “Today rationalistic West turned to irrational East. The weakness of the European scientific mind, even if it sounds paradoxical, is in a unilateral accentuation of its advantages and characteristics that make up its power, which discredited classical rationalism and scientism. The best minds in the West – Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Guenon, Deleuze, Derrida, and others, grasped this fact and subjected it to devastating criticism, not only metaphysically as eclectic, sophist, deterministic, but also dialectical, probabilistic and as cybernetic thinking styles, which were used by European science and culture.”

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We believe that the social philosophy and political science come into postmodern stage of its development and a common feature of the various theories is an indication of the civil society as to the future of civilization nations. We associate the formation of a civic nation in Russia not with Western civil societies of liberal type, but with the global civil society. Here we are ready for a dialogue of cultures through mutual concessions. We are also ready to move towards the European values, ready to change and overcome its shortcomings, as the emergence of a civic nation is a victory over self, “over internal feuds and rivalries, when classes and nationalities treat themselves as one nation.”5

As noted above, the prevalence of pejorative connotations is associated with the principle of ethnocentrism. Dagestan society is set up to overcome it, to abandon aspirations of evaluating the world around us through the lens of the traditions and value of a narrow ethnic group. A healthy integration of republic in the world space, being a subject of Russia, is necessary for the development of civil society with basic regional values. This tendency should be given the status of the national idea.

Conclusion

Russian society is multiethnic and polytheist with hundreds of ethnic groups and all major world religions represented. The interethnic situation in Russia is quite unstable and scenarios of ethnic conflicts cannot be ruled out. It is clear, that this kind of conflicts would have devastating effects on the unity and integrity of the country and on the future of its peoples. To prevent such things from happening, the federal and regional authorities in Russia have the obligation to fight against interethnic tensions, promote ethnic and religious tolerance, and ensure equal political and economic rights to all the citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious origins. The fast-growing Russian civil society can potentially play a key role in establishing peaceful and harmonious relations between various ethnic groups and religions. In fact, interethnic peace cannot be imposed by the authorities through administrative sanctions or legal arrangements. The Russian Constitution and the existing national policies on these issues underline the multiethnic and multi-religious character of the country considered as its richness and uniqueness. The Russian Constitution emphasizes that all citizens of the Russian Federation are equal and enjoy equal rights regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation.

5 V.V. Putin, Russia: The National Question (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2012).
However, interethnic peace is a very fragile delicate issue and could easily be disrupted as demonstrated by recent events in Russia and some other places, such as Libya or Syria. There is a need for a generally-accepted consensus, and this is where civil society could play a significant role. It is hardly imaginable that relations between ethnic and religious groups could be peaceful and friendly without common values, mutual concession and zero tolerance towards xenophobia and ethnic or religious discrimination.

The Republic of Dagestan is an amazing region where dozens of ethno-linguistic groups which have been living peacefully side by side for centuries. These traditions of peaceful and friendly coexistence should be preserved and further developed. At the same time, the region should be ready to face challenges of the fast-changing and globalizing world. Efforts should focus on building a strong civil society in the region. Dagestan must preserve and cherish its unique culture and traditions, but, at the same time, open up to the world in order to absorb the best that Western and Russian cultures can offer.

References


Part III
Sociocultural Identity and Globalization:
Linguistic and Ethnographic Dimensions
12. Immigration Process and Immigrant Identity: Example of Armenian Immigrants in Lithuania

LIGITA SIMANSKIENE & ERIKA ZUPERKIENE

Introduction

In Lithuania and in other different cultures, the issue of national identity was analyzed by both Lithuanian and foreign researchers, who emphasized certain traits and qualities typical of individual cultures.

Due to the scale of emigration, the diversity in the labor market has been constantly increasing: Lithuanians have been leaving to work in other Western European and Scandinavian countries, while the Lithuanian labor market has been increasingly joined by immigrants from the Middle East and Asian countries. The Armenian community is one of the oldest ethnic minority groups that have lived in Lithuania since the times of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and was famous for their jewelry art, textiles for manors, embroidery, and leather tanning.

As for Klaipeda Region, the majority of the Armenian community came to it in the 1970s, stayed there after the restoration of independence in Lithuania, settled down, and started families. The Lithuanian national identity has been affected by other cultures, as well; especially ethnic minorities, therefore, the changes in the identity of the Lithuanian ethnic minorities are significant for the analysis of the changes in the Lithuanian identity. Nationality is what unites people of one nation, and not what separates them. However, the individuals who emigrate face a new culture, learn the new culture and language, and gradually forget their own principal national values and customs. This article raises a problem: how is the national identity of the Armenian residents in Lithuania changing? That is an important research problem aiming to evaluate the identity of Lithuanian residents of Armenian nationality; moreover, these changes in identity are turning into an essential issue of survival for both the Armenian and Lithuanian nations.

Theoretical Insights into National Identity

The present article makes use of a wide diversity of ethnicity and identity-related concepts (identity, sameness, self-consciousness, ethnicity, etc.). As the use of the said terms in social sciences has not been
established yet, in the present article, identity and sameness will be used interchangeably and understood on the basis of the definition presented by Čiubrinskas, in which it is semantically understood broader than the concept of identity: “not only as same-ness, but also as a difference juxtaposed to the term, to the making of difference, and to other-ness.”

The concept of ethnicity refers to the identity based on a common origin and the feeling of communal solidarity, which enables one to speak of ethnicity as of a chameleon-like term, given the subjectivity, identity, and social construction, differently from the concept of nation which is more related to unique linguistic, cultural, and ideological layers.

The term identity is rather widely used and therefore may mean totally different things to different people. Identity means continuous drawing of boundaries, limiting oneself, and simultaneously distancing oneself, through certain identification tags, dimensions, and symbols, i.e. through different codes of mentality, behavior, and emotion.

As argued by Munck, it is obvious that the countries which boast the most homogeneous cultures have also numerous significant differences in personality, values, beliefs, and practices of the members of that culture. The term national identity means certain most important qualities (traits) mainly shared by the representatives of a certain nation which distinguish them from other nations. The analyzed identity may not be understood and explained as a stable, unchanging reality. Both the ethnic and national identity are not static or fixed. Their content and the forms of expression and (self-) confirmation have been regularly transforming/transformed, changed, created, and adapted to the newly emerging needs or interests of the group. National identity is a dynamic, multidimensional construct which forms and functions in accordance with certain social-psychological regulations and performs certain functions.

2. Ibid., p. 7.
National identity is formed by national self-consciousness and, vice versa, national identity is the content of the national self-consciousness. After maturing and perceiving one’s own belonging to one or another nation, an individual adopts the values, traditions, customs, a system of symbols and historical experience, attitudes, norms, etc., cherished by the nation over centuries. We understand the system of national identity as a phenomenon constantly changing in its content and affected by time and social, economic, political, and cultural changes.9

As noted by Paulauskas,10 national identity should not be taken as eternal, true, and unchangeable. An attempt to create an exclusive narrative of national identity means artificial search for ever new people “different from us” which may cause unnecessary tensions. National self-consciousness encourages both an individual’s identification with a group and his exclusion from it. Conscious self-identification with national community requires clear understanding of the place of one’s own as an individual member of the group.11 Asakavičiūtė12 also states that identity is not a closed substance; it is open and receptive to different (historical, geographical, and cultural) outside influences. Ethnic identity is both a fact and a value, as ethnocentric behavior is consistent with human’s natural inclinations.13 With the “globalization” of the intergovernmental power balance and the economic and status competition of nationalist intellectuals, the global system of the state’s increases nationalist tension.14 The author emphasizes that one should not contrast internationalism and nationalism. People should be entitled to the expression of their national identity if they are willing to. Therefore, Smith draws a conclusion that the very attempt to uproot nationalism helps it to continue to thrive and encourages it to periodically rise.

11 P. Subačius, Lietuvių tapatybės kalvė (Vilnius: Aidai, 1999).
13 N. Statkus, Tapatybės politika etniniams konfliktams reguliuoti (Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2004).
14 A.D. Smith, Nacionalizmas XX amžiuje (Vilnius: Pradai, 1995).
Migration as a Cause of Changes in Nationality

Migration has been emphasized as one of the causes of the changes in the Lithuanian nation. National culture and the national mentality are shaped by national individuality, constantly changing and evolving. Not to stand out, emigrants try to adapt to new ethnic communities and foreign cultures. In the analysis of his own and other authors’ research, Norvilas reports that an emigrant tends to lose his native language in the USA not as fast as in Europe. That is explained by the fact that, due to historical circumstances, the USA also have a compound identity, while in Germany one is either a German or a foreigner. In that case, people try to adapt to the local customs and learn the language of the country as fast as possible. However, some authors argue that the stronger one perceives one’s own identity, the stronger they also perceive an alien identity, and vice versa. People who are deeply interested in the issues of identity and self-consciousness are thought to evaluate others in a different way and to better understand them and assign them to certain groups. Meanwhile, Kuznecovienė in her research established that the majority of her respondents related denationalization primarily to the forgetting of one’s own language, renunciation of citizenship, disrespectful comments, non-national upbringing of children, and indifference to the events in their homeland. The very fact of emigration has not been associated with denationalization; it happens when an individual seeks to assimilate with another nation of his own free will. However, in Lithuania, some solutions are unfavorable for emigrants, e.g., the law on dual citizenship; therefore, one may agree with an idea that Lithuania nurtures its unique position of national isolation.

Kraimer, Shaffer, Harrison, and Ren analyzed the issues of the changes in identity when changing countries. The authors found that long-term work experience in other countries tends to change one’s self-identification with the Motherland. Anteby, Molnar established that self-identification with an organization may be stronger than with a na-

16 M. Kundrotas, Tauta amžių kelyje (Vilnius: Vilniaus pedagoginio universiteto leidykla, 2009).
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tional country. It means that, when working for a national organization, the employers are also prouder of their own country; however, it may happen that when they work for an international organization and self-identify themselves with an organization of that type, and thus they tend to self-identify themselves not with their native country, but rather with a parent-international organization. On the one hand, work in an international organization provides an opportunity of getting to better know other cultures and to learn new methods of work, on the other hand, new values that belong to a different culture are introduced which may contradict the prevailing national values, and that may cause a conflict.

A belief exists that globalization is dangerous for small and economically weak countries. They are unable to compete; they fail, and do not manage to stand against economically and politically powerful countries. Schulze20 analyzed migration processes from an intercultural viewpoint, by evaluating the problems a man faces on coming to a new country. As stated by the author, cultural differences and different national traditions present the greatest obstacle to the adaptation, next to the emotional load and the expectations related to a new and more successful future in another country of both the newcomer and his family and friends. Similar insights were also offered by Tereškinas21 in his analysis of the articles about immigrants in foreign periodicals. It should be noted that the term immigrant refers to an individual who faces a new culture and learns that culture and the language.22 In that way, one masters the values, attitudes, and traditions of another culture and gradually adopts them as his own.

The Research Method

Having evaluated the above ideas, we conducted a survey to establish the changes in the national identity of the Armenians living in Lithuania and to compare the insights of other authors into the analyzed issue.

On the respondents. The information was collected from the respondents during a group interview, with the participation of two interviewers and five interviewees. Before the talk, a meeting of 1. 5 hours


with the chair of the Armenian community took place: we agreed on a common approach to a survey of that type, and he was asked some questions related to the aim of the research in order to develop and refine the basic questions of the survey. After the development of the questionnaire, a group interview was held whose outcomes are presented in the current article.

The respondents were members of Klaipeda VAN Armenian community. The selection of the respondents was random, with the principal selection criterion being a Lithuanian resident of Armenian nationality.

As the survey interview took place during a monthly meeting of the community, with exclusively men present, we did not manage to interview women. The age and the duration of the respondents’ life in Lithuania differed. The respondents gave an oral permission for their jobs and other demographical data to be named in the survey, however, in order not to violate the confidentiality of the survey respondents, their names were not disclosed.

Respondent No. 1: age 31, a lawyer, an executive in a small business, married; he has lived in Lithuania for 26 years and arrived in it together with his immigrant parents before the independence of Lithuania had been declared.

Respondent No. 2: age 57, an architect, the head of a production company, married; he has lived in Lithuania for 27 years and arrived in it before the independence of Lithuania had been declared (had been appointed to a company in Lithuania after the graduation from the university).

Respondent No. 3: age 56, a representative of a small business with the experience of an executive position, married; he arrived to live in Lithuania 26 years ago, as he liked the country.

Respondent No. 4: age 44, a small businessman-craftsman (amber processor), the head of a group of 9 people, married; he has lived in Lithuania for 20 years and named the following reasons of coming to it: more opportunities to achieve personal aims, unsatisfactory living conditions in the Motherland, better conditions in Lithuania for children to live and learn, moreover, he liked the country and the people.

Respondent No. 5: age 47, a builder by profession, director of a company of 20 people; he has lived in Lithuania for 25 years, and he did not disclose his marital status or the reasons of immigration.

During the interview with the respondents, a certain behavior model was observed: when the elder people were speaking, the younger ones waited for a pause and only then interfered, provided they had something to say. The younger ones never took the initiative to be the first to answer the question and always waited for their elders to speak; in turn,
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the latter were inclined to take the lead and to ask questions of interest to them about Lithuanians, therefore, it took some purposeful effort to manage the process of the interview and to keep focused on the aims of the research. The interview took place in Lithuanian and Russian, depending on which language was easier to use for the speaker to express his ideas; in some cases, the same respondents would express some ideas in Lithuanian, and others in Russian. In informal conversations between themselves, the members of the community preferred to speak their native Armenian language.

Analysis and Interpretation of Research Results

Armenia-Lithuania: a historical context. The geographical location of both Armenia and Lithuania predetermined their serving as bridges between Asia and the West. Both Armenia and Lithuania were at different times the trophy of different empires and suffered the religious oppression and the consequences of wars. In the memory of Armenia, the most painful experiences were the first mass murder of 1894-1896 and the losses of genocide in 1915. To survive and to find a quiet refuge, a significant part of Armenians emigrated. The consequences of historical events resulted in 60% of all Armenians (8 to 10 million people) living outside Armenia. Over 70 Armenian communities are known in different countries all over the world, with the most numerous in Russia (over 3 million), the USA (about 1.5 million), as well as in France, Canada, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Argentina, and Georgia. The Armenian communities are famous for their activity, especially when dealing with the issues related to Armenia and its neighbors: Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Armenia stands out by its distinct national identity: the old statehood traditions, their own language, the Church established in the 4th century, and the writing system developed as early as in the 5th century. All that offered an excellent platform for the fostering of democracy after the collapse of the USSR, however, differently from Lithuania, Armenia failed. Partly due to the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, to maintain the processes for the creation of an independent state, it became a member of the CIS. The current political, economic, and social situation is painful for the Armenian community in Klaipeda: they are offended by the selfishness of the authorities in their Motherland and their ignoring of the needs of the people: “all the authorities in Armenia should be arrested and jailed, and their property nationalized, as they made their wealth by stealing from people” (Respondent No. 3); “we are not satisfied with the current situation in Armenia, and we are pained because of our homeland….Politicians in Armenia are more engaged in commerce than in the politician’s duty to work for the nation” (Respon-
dent No. 2); “Motherland and our own blood still attract me, even though I grew up in Lithuania (Respondent No. 1); “we do not renounce our roots” (Respondent No. 4).

The geographical positions of both Armenia and Lithuania in geopolitically unstable regions predetermined a complex development of relations with the neighboring countries. For the respondents, the following historical dates remain relevant: commemoration of 1915 Genocide Day; commemoration of 1988 earthquake victims; and 1989 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Even though Armenians are frequently assumed to have no friends among their neighbors (enjoying friendly relations with Georgia alone), the respondents, after being asked to name the countries friendly to Armenians, named more than one (definitely, with the predominance of those having the largest Armenian communities). France was the first to be mentioned (“due to the similarity of religious beliefs, we have friendly relations with France… currently it hosts the largest Armenian community” (Respondent No. 2); Russia (the relations between Russia and Armenia are the friendliest of all the countries of the Southern Caucasus. Russia supported Armenia at the time of the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh), Argentina (“…here is a large Armenian community there” (Respondent No. 2); the USA (“Los Angeles hosts the largest Armenian community” (Respondent No. 3). Even though historical disagreements and hostile relations with such countries as Turkey and Azerbaijan were remembered, in Lithuania, Armenians socialize with the immigrants from those countries without any anger: “here we get on well and socialize, and together with the communities we celebrate national holidays” (Respondent No. 1).

The role of religion. Armenia, just like Lithuania many years later, became a Christian country as early as in 301, due to reasons of security and desirable support from the West. The Armenian Church, without any great control over the still young Roman Catholic Church, took root in the regions of Middle East by combining the images of the new and the old religions. Thus, in the 4th to the 5th centuries, a khichari, an Armenian cross-stone, appeared. The appearance of similar images in Lithuania could be observed from the 18th century in the symbolism of Lithuanian crosses – suns.23 Solar motifs typical of both the Armenian and Lithuanian cross compositions merge the images of the old-world outlook and the Christian culture in one symbol.

The Armenian Apostolic Church is the oldest state church in the world and one of the oldest Christian communities to which about 94.7% of the Armenian Christians belong. That is a very conservative

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church which strictly observes rituals, ignores all amendments, and recognizes only the first three Ecumenical Councils. Armenians are proud of being one of the first Christian countries and know important religion-related historical facts.

“Religion is undoubtedly a factor of the retention of the Armenian identity, that is the essential cause why Armenians have not assimilated into neighboring nations, while other minor nations who lived in the neighborhood of Armenia became extinct” (Respondent No. 2);

“We are an old Christian country. St. Gregory was the first Armenian Catholic” (Respondent No. 3);

“Religion, writing, and language: those are the three principal factors that define the Armenian identity” (Respondent No. 2);

“When the Catholic Church looks for answers in difficult religious cases, it frequently turns to the Apostolic Church, as it is the oldest and the least changed, the least deviated from the primary sources” (Respondent No. 2).

As the significance of religion was especially emphasized by the respondents, we asked which church the members of the Armenian diaspora go to in Lithuania. The members of the community stressed the universal character of their religion and tolerance to other religions:

“We can go to and prey both in Catholic and Orthodox Church, or any Christian prayer house”; “Easter worship service was held in St. Frances of Assisi Catholic Church, the Bernardine parish” (Respondent No. 2).

“Presently we pray in Klaipėda and Palanga Orthodox churches, as we were allowed to put up an Armenian icon there” (Respondent No. 5).

“In general, we are not against any religion, and it does not matter whether one is a Buddhist, a Christian, or a representative of the Islamic faith, unless one is an extremist, as all the religions cherish common human values” (Respondent No. 3).

For Lithuanians, as well as for Armenians, religion is important, however, a rather difficult to define nation-unifying factor. Although the majority of the Lithuanian population in the census claimed to be Catholics, in the state ideology, Catholicism and ethnography (paganism) are closely intertwined: ethnography with its pagan elements is supported at a state level, and their ethnographic (pagan) meaning is explained and emphasized much wider than the Christian one. Thus, religion in Lithuania is a difficult to define syncretic compound which holds together most controversial elements. However, in the opinion of the Armenian diaspora members, “there are no pagan monuments in Lithuania, and we do not feel it” (Respondent No. 1); “we do not see any pagan heritage” (Respondent No. 2).
Changes in the national character and mentality when living in Lithuania. The respondents were asked how they see a Lithuanian resident of Armenian nationality.

“An Armenian is enterprising and independent. In the city of Klaipeda, there are no unemployed Armenians: they all are able to earn their living…there are no dysfunctional or criminal people, either…there were some, however, the community made them leave to where they would be better off, as there was no place for them here” (Respondent No.3);

“Lithuanian Armenians are friendly, proactive, well-organized, and focused” (Respondent No. 2);

“In Klaipeda, we are not just members of the community, but rather like family members…the elder members of the community have been ‘uncles’ to me from my childhood, and I could address them as my own family” (Respondent No. 1);

“We are independent and enterprising, we are able to maintain ourselves…We are like a family and celebrate both the family and national holidays together” (Respondent No. 5);

“We are educated and enterprising, and we do not ask for benefits” (Respondent No. 4);

“We are a nation of fighters, and historically we had to struggle and constantly fight for our survival…Armenia with the population of 2,5 million during the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh defeated Azerbaijan with its 9 million population…we won a victory, and did not occupy…How could a smaller country occupy a country with a thrice larger population?” (Respondent No. 3).

In response to how they were affected by life in Lithuania, they named changes in values, mentality, patriotism, and even personality traits:

“Our way of thinking, attitudes, and values have changed in comparison with our compatriots in the Motherland, and such changes take place naturally” (Respondent No. 2);

“We who grew up in Lithuania are of a different mentality and have a broader view…from Lithuanians, I learnt to check myself when socializing with friends or dealing with business issues” (Respondent No. 1);

“We are able to control ourselves, our temper, whenever necessary” (Respondent No. 4);

“We are greater patriots of Armenia than those living in the Motherland” (Respondents No. 1, 4, 5);

“We are patriots of our own country, probably even more than we were in the Motherland” (Respondents No. 2, 3).
We were interested whether the community provides assistance to the compatriots coming to live to Lithuania. As emphasized by the community members, there are almost no arriving Armenians, and it is difficult to invite even the members of one’s own family or the relatives due to the strict visa regime: “politics aggravates the situation” (Informant No. 2). The principal reason of incidental cases of immigration, according to Respondent No. 4, are “family circumstances (marriage to an arriving person).” Due to the strict immigration control, the community gets no new members, except for its natural increase – babies born in the families of Armenian residents of Lithuania. In rare cases when a compatriot arrives, “the community seeks to provide them with all possible legal assistance” (Respondent No. 2); “provides assistance in the adaptation to the new environment” (Respondent No. 1); “we help them to find a job and to learn new skills necessary for the job” (Respondent No. 4). When a compatriot arrives in Lithuania even for a visit, the community seeks to make a contact and provide any necessary assistance: “an Armenian from Krasnodar, after complicated surgery in Germany, came to the rehabilitation hospital in Palanga. I went to visit him but was not allowed to without his parents’ permission. I phoned his mother in Armenia, and she was very happy to hear that we want to keep him company on our own initiative, to help him feel better, and to provide the necessary assistance. Later we helped his family get the visas, and they were able to visit the young man in hospital” (Respondent No. 1).

The respondents were also asked about their adaptation to Lithuania, the changes in their habits, nutrition, and behavior, and what they found the most difficult. They named the differences in nature and adaptation to the same, however, different foodstuffs. “Armenia is much higher above the sea level than Lithuania, therefore, even the air is different there” (Respondent No.2), “we miss mountains, nature, lakes, and fruit” (Respondents No. 1, 3, 5); “initially I failed to understand how in these plains people are able to orient themselves: where to go, to drive, or where to turn, as you are going along the road and all you can see is a forest; not a single hill or a lake” (Respondent No. 2); “in the Motherland, the air is different, as well as food, meat, or milk” (Respondent No. 1); “the fruit is not so juicy here” (Respondent No. 5); “my grand dad came to visit me and said: I see no fruit-bearing cultural tree, how do people live here?” (Respondent No. 1); “we eat national food practically every day” (Respondents No. 1, 2, 3), “we make Lithuanian dishes as well, but in our own way, e.g. cepelinai (balls of grated potatoes) with mushrooms and herbs, and we use more spices” (Respondent No. 1).

To foster their national identity, Armenians use national symbols: “there is not a home that would not have a painting with Mount Ararat; it is a symbol of our being” (Respondent No. 3), “Mount Ararat sym-
bolizes new life, life at large; that is the mountain where Noah after the
great flood of the world started a new life for the world” (Respondent
No. 1); “wherever possible, an Armenian will plant an apricot tree by his
house” (Respondent No. 5); “even the national color in the flag is called
not orange, but apricot” (Respondent No. 1). Armenians, just like Lith-
uanians, are proud of their old language, as well as writing: “there is not
a home without Armenian books; we value and cherish them” (Respon-
dent No. 3); “Armenians value their own writing and books…in Armen-
ian writings, not only the history and myths of Armenia are perpetu-
ated, but also the myths, legends, and tales of ancient civilizations (Per-
sian or Jewish, etc.) that were not written down in the language of the
original” (Respondent No. 2). As for the life in Lithuania, one can ob-
serve the respondents’ self-identification: “Our country, our Government
…our laws…” (Respondent No. 3); “here (in Lithuania)…there (not in
Lithuania)…” (Respondent No. 5); “the food is better here, when I go to
Armenia, I need to get used to different food…later it is OK again” (Re-
spondent No. 1); “as much as we can, we buy Lithuanian food” (Re-
spondents No. 1, 3); “Lithuania is our Motherland, as well as Armenia”
(Respondent No. 1), “we have two Motherlands: Armenia and Lithua-
nia” (Respondent No. 4).

“When we have visitors, we try to show everything what is best and
most beautiful in Lithuania” (Respondent No. 4).

Conclusion

Ethnic identity issues are relevant to all countries of the world as
emigration and immigration have become common because of the glob-
alization and the free movement of people. On the one hand emigration
encourages people to exchange new ideas, explore new cultures, and to
create a better future together. On the other hand, it is a challenge to the
governments of various countries of how to ensure equal rights and how
to integrate foreigners into the labor market and social life of the coun-
try. It is not simple as immigrants have different needs and intentions
when coming to one or another country. Therefore, to understand people
of other ethnicities and to evaluate the change of identity is extremely
important. Once the areas in which foreigners identify with a new coun-
try fastest are found out, it can be used to improve their integration in the
new culture and labor market.

After empirical study, we find that Armenian identity in 1700 fos-
tered the Christian religion, the old language and alphabet, and the pre-
servation of traditions. Key features distinguish Armenians from other
nations’ focus of fighting efficiency, pride but at the same time, entre-
preneurial skills, penchant for crafts, and sensitivity to the surrounding
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Respondents of Armenian nationality, who were participating in the research, claimed that their mentality had obviously changed. They stated that while adapting to the mentality of Lithuanian residents they had become calmer and gained a more diverse approach to world politics. While they are proud of their Armenian history and traditions, but they are also proud of living in Lithuania.

References


13.

Media Myths on Migrants and Formation of the Image of the Other in Russian Culture

OlgA ChIstyakova & DenIs Chistyakov

Introduction

Modern-day Russia goes through the social and institutional transformations that are connected to the process of global migration. Russian society endures an unstable migration situation determined by uncontrollable waves of illegal migration and unsolved problems of access to the quality labor-market, to the institutions of education and public health services for legal migrants. The intolerance, tension and ethnic conflicts between indigenous population and incoming people take place in many regions of Russia. The incoming migrants are spontaneously forming the ethnic enclaves. There are minimal conditions of life and high risk of deviant behavior.

At the same time the attitude of the native population towards migrants is socioculturally limited due to the historical traditions, deep-rooted habits, empirical views, and religious identifications that had formed in Russian society. But most of all, this attitude is determined by the way mass media represent migrants and how they explain the necessity of migrants’ being in the Russian regions. Worth noting that media does not represent migration objectively having mythological and simulational basis instead.

The media products are differentiated, aimed at different strata and target audiences, aimed at creating symbols and images of the social facts rather than covering the reality. The problem of the modern-day Russian society (also shared by the other societies that have hit the post-modernity) is that created media products are alienated from the end users, making the media knowledge independent from the social, cultural reflection on it. J.-F. Lyotard pointed out that the postmodern era would see an extreme exteriorization of the knowledge in regard to a “knower,” no matter what step of cognition he or she occupies.¹ In our context exteriorization (alienation) of the knowledge is one of the key features of the societies that have reached the postmodern condition.

Alienated from the recipients, information still has its own power, *autopoetic* might and is able to mold the public opinion, stereotypes and impressions existing in the Russian society, despite being of a mythological descent. By the means of mythological creation, stable social typology of migrants is being formulated and consolidated in the social consciousness. In our opinion, the formation of the migrants’ images is a simulation process, using J. Baudrillard’s categories. This process is not founded on objective analyses or scientific research, but instead on shallow empirical material and isolated communicational experience with the migrants.

Thus, in the modern-day Russian society the image of the Other – the Migrant of a different culture – is being created. Many economic and sociocultural problems are connected to these symbolical images of the migrants. The understanding of the face of the Other, a person of another culture and religion, depends mostly on the narration and submitting of media images of migrants. Negative perception of migrants is being constructed mostly because of the specific information found on them in both national and local media.

Russian mass media create mainly the negative myths about migrants and construct their social images stressing the criminal background. We may mark out the following media myths on migrants existing in Russia. We should once again point out that these myths form the Face of the Other, culturally different from the locals and whose expectations contradict the ones of the indigenes.

### The First Myth

Migration is closely connected to the *ethnical basis*, i.e., all of the migrants are of a *different ethnicity* and represent *other* culture, religion, customs, etc. than those of the indigenous population. Media interprets the different ethnicity as the root of all evil for the local people, but the facts are that the groups of migrants do not differ that much from the multinational Russian regions.

The thesis of migrant’s different ethnicity is represented as a priori-based phenomenon. An overstatement of this phenomenon generates the diversity of phobias and fears of the migration processes in Russia. Despite the fact that national economy is in need of the new labor resources from neighboring countries, from the Central Asia and Caucasian regions, the anti-migrants’ emotions, xenophobia and ethnical conflicts have seen a major spread in almost all Russian regions.

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To some extent this tension is created by the weak involvement of migrants into the sociocultural life of a host country. Sometimes incoming people do not feel the need and willingness to follow the accepted standards, to recognize the cultural and religious traditions of the indigenous population, so they sometimes contradict the rooted habits and ethical behavior. Frequently migrants do not know the cultural and economic specifics and the language of a host country. Unfortunately, sometimes they also do not strive for this knowledge.

However, the Russian social practices also do not encourage the integration of the newcomers into the new society and keep them out from successful adaptation into other psychological and economic conditions. The indigenous population divides the representatives of the new ethnic groups (diasporas), which are being formed under the pressure of social, economic, political, juridical, psychological, and media factors from the representatives of the same ethnic groups that have historically been deep-rooted on the different territories of the Russian Federation. The specific perception of such a complex phenomenon as external migration by native population and municipal authorities is determined by antagonistic definitions created by mass media. The necessity of migrants is discussed in two polar notions – either as “evil” or as “welfare, blessing” for Russia.

Consequently, the identification of ethnicity proceeds as opposed to another ethnos, “Us and Them.” This archaic opposition is closely connected to an excessive prevalence of forms and ideas of nationalism. Many problems in social, political, and economic spheres are considered in the context of the mentioned contraposition of ethничal cultures. Such identification of ethnos does not only take place in scientific literature, but in ethnic consciousness as well. Russian migration policy is also based on the aforementioned notion “Us and Them” and suffers from the influence of public opinion.

It is important that in this case a universal idea may originate inside the ethnos stating that a specific nation is better than the other ones, that it is opposed to a different ethnos “for a reason,” as its culture, traditions, the way of life are more “correct.” A whole complex of economic, political and social-psychological factors can be conditionally designated as “selfness.” The idea of “Us” can be within the limits of the norm distinguishing as healthy by a group or ethnic consciousness. But under certain circumstances it can get features of exaggerated “selfness” as opposed to “Them,” while “our” ethnos can be overemphasized and positioned as the best one. In this case, it becomes possible that ethnos is used for political purposes by politicians, businessmen, clan groupings, and quasireligious figures.
A danger of transition to the forms of extreme nationalism lies in the overwhelming or excessive use of ideas of ethnic nationalism when excessive reference to ethnocultural uniqueness forces the ethnos to position itself as the best one, to oppose itself to other, ostensibly “lower” nations. Here, a way out can be found in the values and norms of life of all nations that are defined today as tolerant and open-minded.

Generally speaking, in Russia the phobia of migrants has acquired the features of xenophobia because “Them” are all who had recently settled at the territories of historically native people. The fact of “alien” is mostly a provocative factor of social conflicts between indigenous and migrants but not ethnical or religious ones. In other words, the stereotype of notions’ merging is effective when the understanding of the other ethnicity is mixed with the understanding of the newcomers. The prevalence of the idea “Us and Them” in ethnocultural relationships is a basis for constructing media myths that are widespread on the empirical level.

Now let us head back to the typology of the media myths.

The Second Myth

Media construct the images of enemies fixing upon defined ethnicity of migrants. Under certain circumstances this myth can end up with xenophobia directed at defined ethnicities. Such constructs point out which migrants are closer to “Us,” i.e., are “friends,” and which are “Them,” i.e., “enemies.” In modern-day Russia, the extremely negative attitude towards the migrants from North Caucasus and the Middle Asia is being formed.

According to the data collected by Yuri Levada Analytical Centre in 2012 and Polytechnic Research Centre in 2013 “extremely negative attitude” was registered towards migrants originating from North Caucasus – Dagestanis, Chechens, Cherkes, etc. and towards Transcauscians – Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians. Respondents were a bit more tolerant (app. 4-6%) towards the migrants originating from the Middle Asia (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz) and Chinese. It is worth noting that xenophobia is more apparent among inhabitants of large megalopolises.

Sociological research shows that youth is more liable to the nationalistic ideas as they do not feel themselves economically and legally

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3 V.S. Malakhov, Nationalism as Political Ideology (Moscow: KDU, 2005).
guarded by the state. Their search for an enemy is successful as their uncertainty and Angst (German) are being fed by media broadcasting constructed images of migrants as corrupted and thus economically successful. Lacking real-world physical contact with the other ethnics, youth is more liable to the external pressure, exerted by Internet and media. This liability to xenophobia, migrantophobia and extreme forms of nationalism is alarming, yet being unnoticed by the establishment.

The Third Myth

The third myth is forming disloyal public opinion towards the migrants in perspective of the comprehension of economic consequences of migrants’ coming to the Russian regions. Media are developing the ideas of resource loss, i.e., the loss of economic and social competitiveness on the labor markets stemming from consolidated migrants (usually from North Caucasus). At the same time the case of “resource loss” ideas (migrants take the jobs, make profit out of indigenes, are connected to the criminals, etc.) may easily be demolished with bare facts, statistical knowledge and logic at hand. E.g., it was revealed that the most positive attitude towards the migrants is registered among respondents living in the regions with high density of migrants.7 We may suppose that the prolonged contact with the migrants demolishes the described myth.

The Fourth Myth

The fourth media myth is the possibility of loss of cultural identity by the indigenes. This myth empowers the aversion to the migrants from Asia (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Chinese). While the danger of resource loss is not in place, complex constructed sociocultural factors come in handy. This myth is much harder to debate as it is irrational at its core and is based not only upon media messages or political declarations but also upon shallow personal experience, including irritation from migrants, their lack of knowledge of vernaculars, their foreign everyday culture, and so on. The myth of cultural identity loss settles on the danger of migrants forcing out the indigenes and setting their own ethnic enclaves, cultivating social norms alien to the Russian traditions, speaking foreign languages without knowing the Russian language and getting involved into ethnic gangs.

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6 Angst means existential fear, anxiety, intense feeling of apprehension or inner turmoil. It is attested since the 19th century in English translations of the works of Søren Kierkegaard and Sigmund Freud.

7 Vladimir I. Mukomel, Russia’s Migration Politics. Post-Soviet Context (Moscow: IS RAS, 2005), p. 84.
Valuable philosophical ideas allowing us to analyze socio-psychological conditions of migrants and the host communities may be found in phenomenology, in Alfred Schütz’s works in particular. While reviewing the media myth of “identity loss” because of the Asian migrants, we should mark out Alfred Schütz’s work “The Homecomer,” as it seems to be pretty up-to-date in the context of researching the migration processes and forming of an image of the Other in a new social environment. The Austrian thinker points out a definition of ‘home’, extremely important to those who are migrating constantly for some reasons. ‘Home’ is a count zero, null point for everything that serves as a departing point for every human being trying to find his or her own place in the world and as a place to return. Schütz connects ‘home’ notion to the ‘Us and Them’ categories that are of a special interest to us concerning the problematics of migrating ethnical communities and their cultural identifications. At the unstable conditions of constant migration, the definitions of ‘home’ and ‘Us’ obtain a special value for an individual. Interestingly, it is almost impossible to classify the aforementioned definitions as they include emotions, affects and existential experience that prevent from a logical and methodological description.

Speaking from the phenomenological point of view, media myth of cultural loss becomes a phenomenon, more suitable to the migrants and not to the indigenes. A migrant leaves his home, tearing the established social continuum and maybe even leaving it for good. No one can guarantee that he will ever return home, and if he does, he will be ‘the Other’. The accepting of “the homecomer” society will also differ from its previous, so there is a possibility that “the homecomer” will be alienated from home once again. A. Schütz writes: the one who has left his home “enters a new social dimension, not covered by the coordinates used as a referential scheme at home. He doesn’t experience living social connections that were present at home. As a result of breaching the unity of space and time with his own social group, the field of interpretation available to him converges rapidly.”

The social functions of one system (‘home’ system) may not stand against the host system, where a person finds himself or herself after leaving the ‘home’. That is what happens in the Russian society. A new sociocultural environment perceives the newcomers as bearers of the alien norms incomparable to the ‘home’, as ideal of external ‘Them-group’, alien by default. Such perception is getting fed by the ever-present media adapting it to the current migration status. It turns out that entire groups of migrants get into the impossible situation of not inte-

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9 Alfred Schütz, *The Homecomer*, p. 553
grating culturally into the host society. It is also possible that a migrant may lose his own identity if he decides to return home. As A. Schütz put it, “not only Homeland will show its alien face to the homecomer, but he himself will seem strange to those awaiting.”\textsuperscript{10} The ‘home’ gets totally destroyed.

**The Fifth Myth**

The fifth myth being supported by the society and even formalized by the official use is a phantom – “a Transcaucasian national” and “Asian.” We should mention that “a Transcaucasian national” supposes some “ethnic mix” from migrants coming from Russia-controlled Caucasus-region, Transcauscians as well as Caucasians long ago assimilated into the Russian society. “Asians” are the Tajiks, Turkish, Uzbeks, Chinese and others. This image later transmits upon every person anthropologically or culturally different from the general body of the indigenes: from illegal migrants to ethnic minorities living in Russia and being Russian citizens (e.g., the Kalmyks, Buryats).

The problem is that the Russian culture and social sciences have not yet elaborated the scientific category validating equality of ethnic and civic identity. The aforementioned constructs “a Transcaucasian national” and “Asian” at first sight equalize two human values – the one of citizenship and the one of ethnical. Such categories, recording the interdependence of ethnic and civic identities, exist in many megalopolises of the USA and Western Europe, but in Moscow and other Russian cities another categorization is in play, a simulative one – “a Transcaucasian national” replaces partially ethnic and civic identities.

Such a constructed mythoreality, for example, allows Azerbaijani people positioning themselves as Moskovites, because there is no other adequate category in the every-day communicative space. Sociological studies showed that Azerbaijani migrants, in order to integrate into the Moscow society, were more likely to associate themselves with “Transcaucasian nationals” than those their compatriots were not going to integrate. Those who were ready for integration were also less likely to identify themselves as “Azerbaijani.”

We have reviewed the myths emerging on real migration problems found in Russia. These myths prevent migrants from integration into the new society and alienate them into the ethnic enclaves. Impossibility (and, sometimes, reluctance) to integrate starts the process of enclavization. Enclaves demonstrate forms of self-organization and dwelling of people of one ethnicity following the standards of their own culture in-

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 555.
side another sociocultural environment. Enclaves are not identical to ethnic diasporas and are formed depending on the aims of the arriving migrants.

Oriented at settling at a new place, migrants try to enter the new society, adapt socially and psychologically, perceive the culture and traditions of the peoples new to them. Migrants integrate and broaden their living-space culturally, economically, politically and religiously.

There is another kind of migrants arriving for a temporary stay having an economic goal. In this case their motivation is exactly opposite. Having only economic goals in mind (to earn some money) they do not accept the sociocultural surroundings that should accept them. Accepting society is a temporary economic resource for them. It is more convenient and psychologically comfortable for them to live in enclaves, i.e., locally limited ethnical settlements. Exactly the image of the second group (irrespective of its ethnicity) lays ground to the construction of the images of hostile migrants and supporting the stereotypes of the newcomers being dangerous towards the indigenes.

Such media images of the migrants cause negative emotions in mass perception, intolerance towards some ethnic groups, xenophobia, and form the destructive type of an ethnic migrant connected either to illegal structures or to the shadow economy. Objectively, media contribute to converting the aversion to migrants from the trivial level of empirical stereotypes typical to the host society to the higher level holding enough reasons to justify the motives of the Other.¹¹ There are in-depth publications that reflect on those complex problems of migration. Nevertheless, absolutization of negative effects that migration has, all the way to drug trafficking, terrorism and threat to national security, takes place and adds to the mass xenophobic hysteria.

Recent Biryulevo (October, 2013) and Pushkino (May, 2014) events in Moscow showed that Russian people are under power of such kind of media myths. The destructive actions of native people in Biryulevo, and earlier events on the Manezhnaya square (Moscow, 2010), and ethnic conflicts in Sagra (July, 2011), Pugachev (July, 2013), and so on, let us claim that the migration policy in Russia has to be revised as soon as possible. Mass media must create positive images of migrants based on a realistic analysis and economic needs of the country in labor migrants. This is an important aim of Russian federal and local regional policy because mass media impact on social life and individual consciousness a lot.

In conclusion, we would like to once again point out that our perception of the world is being vastly influenced by the media, blurring the visions of reality. Having an impressive level of trust and power on people, Russian media creates negative images of the migrants preventing them from integrating into the welcoming society. We reviewed the “menaces” supposedly coming from the ethnic migrants, myths, lying at the base of the created stereotypes of the aggressive aliens (e.g., “Transcaucasian national”). Such stereotypes are getting caught up by the pop culture, mass media and getting transmitted further into the media space. The constant retranslation of the simulation unreal facts, images, myths, connected to the migrants coming to the Russian regions, causes anger, aversion, intolerance towards the migrants, strengthens the anxiety and alarmism in the host society.

There are cultural, social and psychological distances among the migrants and the indigenous people. And we do not see any steps to resolve aforementioned contradictions. The lack of an effective migration policy does not allow the destruction of the negative myths causing the social tension and aversion to the newcomers legally coming to the country. We think it is a task for academics to involve everyone into the discussion of the current state of affairs.

The problems with the integration of legal migrants into the new society can be solved in Russia through civilized ways. Government and social organizations have to demolish the social and cultural barriers between native people and the indigenous population. The experience of the Eastern countries can be a learning opportunity for our state in the process of the creation of a more civil nation. The society itself should be interested in creating such a socio-cultural basis and not dividing people into “Us” and “Them,” “better” or “worse.” When the possibility of such media constructions vanish, ethnic stratification will become obsolete.

References


IRENA DARGINAVICIENE

Introduction

Language is the exclusive backbone of every nation. Many outstanding writers, poets, politicians have spoken about the vital relationship between the language and the nation which speaks that language, about the endless struggles of a nation for the purity and the rights of a native language. Already in the 16th century Lithuania Dauksa, one of the founders of Lithuanian writing, said: Eradicate the language and you will kill the sun in the sky, you will destroy the order of the world and you will deprive a human of life and honor.\(^1\) Dauksa was one of those outstanding writers who already in the 16th century multilingual environment of Lithuania wrote about the identity of the nation and understood how important language is for the survival of the nation and the state. Arndt,\(^2\) a patriotic poet of the 19th century Germany, also wrote that nothing is more spiritual and sincere in a nation than its language and if a nation does not want to loose the essence of its existence it has to protect its language from damage and destruction. The idea of the relationship between a language, nation and the whole world disclose the significance and the fundamentals of the issue under discussion. The Lithuanian language in the course of the history has experienced russification, germanizing, polonization.

After the restoration of independence in Lithuania in 1990 there is no open pressure as related to the national language. However, now the Lithuanian language, similarly to other world languages, faces other challenges, which are mostly associated with globalization and integration processes. Many loan words from other languages come into Lithuanian and they fill in the gap that is caused by a nonexistent term. People tend to use loan words because they need to nominate new concepts or new objects and a native language does not provide accurate equivalents or if an equivalent is coined it may not match the exact meaning and then a foreign word, which is used more often, becomes a loan word for a new concept or an object. Besides, very often it is easier to borrow

a foreign word and apply it in a recipient language than to look for a new
term. We probably will not find a language which would have managed
with its own word corpus and would have not lent words from other lan-
guages. English is a fundamental source of borrowings and plays a main
role as a donor language. In this respect translation is one of the corner-
stones in the development performance of a national language.

Language and Culture

Translation has always been of great interest in human societies. It
is one of the key tools, which helps to communicate between countries,
carry information from one nation to another, and transfer and receive
knowledge between different cultures. For a long time, it has been
thought that a translator’s key focus is language. The first definition of
translation was presented by Catford and it was understood as the pro-
duction of textual material taken from one language (source language)
into an equivalent textual material in another language (target lan-
guage). In most early translation theory studies linguists emphasized the
concept of equivalence in translation and there was no indication of cul-
tural aspect in translation. Some evidence of culture related description
of translation appeared in Nida and Taber’s research. They wrote that
“translating consists of reproducing in the receptor language the closest
natural equivalent of the source language message, first in terms of
meaning and secondly in terms of style.”

As the illustration of this view the authors of the book provided a
well-known example of the translation of the Bible into Eskimo lan-
guage. In the Bible, there is a phrase ‘Lamb of God’, which creates diffi-
culties when it has to be translated into Eskimo language because Eski-
omos do not have the word ‘lamb’. Nida suggested to translate ‘Lamb of
God’ into ‘Seal of God’ as Eskimos are very well familiar with the con-
cept of ‘a seal’ as it is a culture-bound concept. In this example, the au-
thors distinguished cultural aspect in translation which may cause great
problems for a translator if unspotted. The tight relationship between
language and culture was also analyzed by Edward Sapir who affirmed
that “language does not exist apart from culture, that is, from the so-
cially inherited assemblage of practices and beliefs that determines the

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texture of our lives.’’\textsuperscript{6} Sapir stated that close relationship between language and culture means that without the knowledge of the one it would be impossible to get the knowledge of the other. However, linguists keep to different approaches in considering the relationship between language and culture. Wardhaugh, a sociolinguist of today, points out that in the linguistic literature three major claims towards the relationship between language and culture can be identified.\textsuperscript{7}

The first claim, which was outlined by Sapir, puts emphasis on the structure of the language specifying that the structure of a language influences the way the world is considered by the speakers of that language. In his works E. Sapir wrote: “The fact of the matter is that the ‘real world’ is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group….We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.”\textsuperscript{8}

The second claim on the relationship between language and culture stated by Wardhaugh, is associated with the consideration that culture affects the language that people of that culture employ. “…the culture of a people finds reflection in the language they employ: because they value certain things and do them in a certain way, they come to use their language in ways that reflect what they value and what they do.”\textsuperscript{9}

Finally, the third claim, which by Wardhaugh is seen as ‘neutral’, states that there is little or no relationship between language and culture.\textsuperscript{10} Yet, most linguists do not support this claim and tend to state that the relationship between language and culture always exists.

In the present article, we keep to the idea that language and culture are interrelated, no matter how strong or weak their relationship is. Then we can look further into the role of cultural knowledge as an essential point in translation process.

\textbf{Culture Awareness and Language Development}

Learning the language does not mean that you will understand that language in the same way as native speakers do. Language is not only words, phrases, sentences and grammar, it is something more. It is the verbal expression of the culture and different cultures can signal a totally

\begin{itemize}
  \item R. Wardhaugh, \textit{An Introduction to Sociolinguistics} (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 222.
  \item R. Wardhaugh, Ibid., p. 222.
  \item Ibid., p. 222.
\end{itemize}
different way of looking at the world around you. An Estonian semiotician Peeter Torop focuses on the relationship between culture and translation and states that “culture operates largely through translational activity, since only by the inclusion of new texts into culture can the culture undergo innovation as well as perceive its specificity.”

Such understanding of the relationship of translation and culture leads to the viewpoint that a translator needs to be in good possession of knowledge on culture, social settings and customs of both the source language and the target language. This culture awareness benefits the quality of a translation to a great extent.

When new ideas appear in cultures, languages develop new words to express these new ideas. There are different ways of developing new words and the most common of them are borrowing a loan word or manufacturing a new word. In the first case a loan word is borrowed from another language to describe a new idea or a new concept. In the second case, a new word, which suits the requirements of a target language, is coined. In translation process, we often encounter a problem, which is caused by the cultural gap between a source language and a target language. Franco Aixela describes this cultural gap as “cultural asymmetry between two linguistic communities reflected in the discourses of their members” and which creates some opacity and inaccessibility in the target culture system.

Every culture expresses its special features in a way that is ‘culture-specific’, which means that culture-specific items denote notions, concepts and realities, which are uniquely bound to the culture concerned. Therefore, equivalence as a translation strategy usually becomes an unreliable way if it is not grounded with cultural understanding of a source and target languages. In such situations linguists suggest certain translation strategies, the most common of which are domestication and foreignization. If a translator tries to keep the translation closer to its origin and to the source text, so that the reader encounters culture-specific items and understands that the text is foreign – it is a “foreignization.” When culture-specific items are translated and changed into more famil-

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Domestication according to L. Venuti usually helps to adapt the target language to linguistic and cultural values yet may involve the loss of the information communicated by the source language. Foreignization, on the contrary, retains the message of the source text, however this translation strategy often does not follow the rules of the target language and always breaks down the established language conventions.

Another translation studies theoretician Eirlys E. Davies looks deeper into the relationship of the language and the culture and suggests seven methods that are applied within domestication and foreignization translation strategies. He names them as preservation, addition, omission, localization, transformation and creation and points out that they are used to translate culture-specific items, i.e words and expressions that function in a source text and create translation problems because they do not exist in a target text or they have a different intertextual status in the cultural system of a target text. The same translation strategies (domestication or foreignization) are applied in translation involving the words and phrases that come because of international relationship between countries, new discoveries in science fields, the appearance of new products, etc.

Nowadays the characteristic feature in the development of the Lithuanian language is the appearance of new lexical items which reflect the social development of the society. The major part of the new lexis are loan words which come from the English language or through the English language. However, linguists try to control this process by creating new words – neologisms. The analysis of the words and phrases that have recently been acquired by the Lithuanian language and became the norm of the language has shown that preservation, localization and creation methods are the most frequently used in translation.

Preservation method is usually employed by a translator when a word or a phrase do not have any close equivalent in the target language or culture. In Lithuanian, we have a lot of loan words that have been established applying preservation method. They have been accepted and became the norm of the language. (see Table 1). Most of these words are considered to be international and their origin is not exactly specified.

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Preservation is one of the easiest methods but not always the best. In some cases, it may cause confusion or misunderstanding, therefore a translator should carefully consider the effect of the preserved vocabulary items on the target language readers. Sometimes, to avoid the false impression a translator can use addition method which means that the original word is preserved, but it is supplemented with some explanation. Two subdivisions are distinguished within the addition method: addition inside the text occurs when the explanation is inserted directly in the text and addition outside the text, which occurs when the explanation is provided outside the text in a form of a footnote, ennote, glossary, commentary, translation in brackets, in italics. The use of addition method does not affect or change a target language because explanations are provided applying the rules of the target language.

Localization method is another commonly used method and it occurs when a translator instead of providing a ‘culture-free’ description, uses the word or phrase which is used in the culture of the target audience. Or it can be a totally new word which is linked to a new product or a service (see Table 2).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>English</th>
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<td>hamburger</td>
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<td>bureau</td>
<td>biuras</td>
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<td>computer</td>
<td>kompiuteris</td>
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<td>converse shoes</td>
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<td>cluster</td>
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<td>football</td>
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<td>fireworks</td>
<td>fejerverkas</td>
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<td>weekend</td>
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Creation method is favored by Lithuanian linguists who tend to create neologisms for each new concept coming from other languages. However, there are quite a few vocabulary items that did not survive the challenges of the modern world in the areas of science, business and leisure. Very often neologisms are coined with great delay after foreign
words have occupied their place in everyday use and they are slowly promoted. The examples provided in Table 3 demonstrate the successful use of neologisms that have been created following the rules of word creation in Lithuanian.

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<td>basketball</td>
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<td>file</td>
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<td>manager</td>
<td>vadybininkas</td>
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<td>printer</td>
<td>spausdintuvas</td>
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<td>business</td>
<td>verslas</td>
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<td>media</td>
<td>žiniasklaida</td>
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<td>puzzle</td>
<td>dėlionė</td>
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<tr>
<td>marketing</td>
<td>rinkodara</td>
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<td>image</td>
<td>įvaizdis</td>
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The provided examples are just a few that evidence the formation process of new Lithuanian lexis, which is the result of globalization. Globalization fosters to adopt new technologies and new existence forms specified by world information infrastructure. This leads to the appearance of new lexical items in the national language.

**Diagnosis: Threat or a Challenge**

The most zealous linguists ring the bells and cry that the Lithuanian language is changing for the worse. They become unhappy when people use foreign words. Therefore, they suggest building barriers to protect the national language from foreign influence. However, there are linguists who say that nowadays the language is modernizing and that this is a natural process. They claim that the Lithuanian language has to be open, it has to adapt itself to new world changes, yet altogether the language regulation process needs to be applied. This regulation process does not mean that the use of foreign words, expressions or names has to be banned, it means that either a loan word or a neologism have to fill in the language gap that appears because of the modernization of the world.

According to D. Crystal a national language can survive globalization or the influence of other languages. The biggest threat comes from within the language itself. He points out that English is not going to kill the Lithuanian or any other language. In his opinion, it will be a certain change that will affect a national language. D. Crystal says that loan words do not create danger to a national language, new words stimulate language change and not language death. As the example of this think-
ing he provides the English language where 80% of lexis is taken from other languages.\textsuperscript{15}

**Conclusion**

Globalization expresses itself through various communication links between countries and people. It encompasses almost all states in the world and affects their languages and cultures. Lithuania and the Lithuanian language is not an exception. Because of intensive globalization process the Lithuanian language has recently undergone great changes in its lexis corpus. A lot of new words as loan words have been adopted, which endanger the purity and authenticity of the Lithuanian language. However, the majority of linguists agree that it is impossible to build the barriers which would stop the foreign influence on the national language. In their opinion, the national language has to be open to new challenges, but its development has to be regulated following the rules of the language functioning. They recommend a reasonable choice of the methods with the understanding that today we have a global world and that globalization and identity go hand in hand.

**References**


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A natural process of language change tends to intensify during the times of political, economic, social, and cultural changes. Such changes are typical to natural languages of the world and are best observed through the changes in lexicon, i.e., when new, often borrowed words occur along with the new reality to be named. Naturally, the intensified spread of loanwords can signal the end of stagnation in the recipient country and herald the beginning of change and progress. On the other hand, a spread of loanwords can also be seen as a warning signal and a threat to the uniqueness of a national language. The main stream of loanwords is coming from or through the main donor language – English as a lingua franca, which has nowadays gained worldwide popularity. As English is often affecting a few national languages simultaneously, English loanwords tend to turn into international words, assimilated and rooted as a part of the native lexicon, successfully competing with the native vocabulary, especially with the linguistic items which are in less frequent use (Weinreich 1953/1979, 57). Thus, the problem of loanwords is obviously twofold.

After the accession of Lithuania to the EU, this problem has gained special importance among Lithuanian linguists. A recent flow of loanwords to the Lithuanian usage is coming, among other things, through translation of EU documents. Naturally, the changing political and social situation brings new realia to the EU member states along with new concepts, and translators have to respond rapidly to fill in the emerging linguistic "gaps." Consequently, this leads to the spread of newly-coined words and loanwords, which eventually may appear to be underdeveloped or unmotivated, and often unwelcomed by the public as being incompatible with the Lithuanian perception. Moreover, borrowing of foreign words may not only impede perception but also cause changes in the system of a recipient language, and therefore it is seen as a practice in need of careful analysis.

The terms loanword and lexical borrowing are used interchangeably in the paper and are understood in a broader sense as any borrowed lexical unit used either in its adapted form (international word) or in a non-adapted form (quote).
Concerns about the Lithuanian Language

Prior to getting into linguistic detail, it is worth remembering the specificity of the EU legislation drafting and translation. The Principle of Multilingualism, established in 1958 by the Council Regulation No. 1 of the European Economic Community resulted in “unprecedented multilingualism, institutionality and hybridity” (Biel and Engberg 2013, 6) of EU translation due to the “concurrent drafting and translation, collective translation processes, and the replacement of source texts by authentic language versions” (Ibid.). This means that once officially adopted, a translated text is no longer viewed as a translation but as an original. In this view translation in the EU context resembles drafting of law.

Not much freedom, however, is left for translators’ creativity due to strict regulations of the European Commission for drafting and translation of EU documents with the purpose to harmonise all translations (or, in other words, originals of the same source document) within the EU. Since translated EU documents belong to the prestigious standard language variation, their language is often seen as exemplary. In fact, similar requirements concerning linguistic borrowing in document drafting and translation have been issued at both levels – the EU and Lithuania. For example, the English Style Guide (2014) provides recommendations to avoid loanwords and such complicated vocabulary as Latinisms and French-origin words (especially if general audience is addressed). It advises drafters and translators to use a year instead of per annum (Ibid., 32), or to substitute acquis by a more understandable English expression the body of EU law (Ibid., 52). These are only preventative measures, though. Therefore, recently a general tendency has been observed that loanwords are successfully competing and replacing native words, even though we can find good counterparts in the national language (Mikulėnienė 2004, 83, Rudaitienė 2011, 46-47, etc.), and this tendency is especially true if good native words are in less active use (cf. Weinreich 1953/1979, 57).

For decades Lithuanian researchers have observed the tendencies of lexical borrowing and the ways loanwords accommodate to the Lithuan-
Lithuanian language. Linguistic borrowing was often seen as an evil practice threatening the uniqueness of the Lithuanian language rather than an opportunity to enrich it. A few decades ago not only Lithuanian but also foreign linguists openly expressed their concern that Lithuanian, spoken by a small community of around three million native speakers, would soon be studied exclusively for scientific purposes, thus forecasting Lithuanian the future of a dead language. Nevertheless, once Lithuanian has established itself as one of the 24 equal languages of the European Community, the future of the Lithuanian language has become more promising.5

**Motives for Linguistic Borrowing**

The constantly changing world is bringing new concepts and terms to name new realia. Unfortunately, terminologists are far behind the real-life situation, often being too late to introduce new terms fitting in the language system and welcomed by the public. As a result, such vague terms as *prudencinis* (for prudential), *paneuropinis* (for pan-European) or *proaktyvus* (for proactive) have recently emerged in the Lithuanian language through translations of EU documents. As a rule, language users are unwilling to accept new words that have not been conceptualised in their linguistic or psychosocial worldview, and therefore an invasion of new words is often deemed as a threat in the traditional Lithuanian perception (Zabarskaitė 2013).

Lithuanian researcher Vaicekauskienė, summing up the findings of other Lithuanian and foreign scholars, has introduced a classification of four major motives of linguistic borrowing: *designative*, *semantic*, *stylistic* and *sociopsychological* (Vaicekauskienė 2007, 43). In Vaicekauskienė’s view, *designative* motives mean that loanwords are introduced due to the need to name new cultural realia for which no adequate term can be found in the recipient language. *Semantic* motives occur mainly in case there is a need for the internal meaning differentiation. *Stylistic* motives are at place when artistic affect is needed to achieve stylistic purposes. And *sociopsychological* motives can be found when linguistic borrowing can be associated with willingness to demonstrate one’s intelligence or identification with another culture (*Ibid.*).

Grosjean (1983/2001:292/308) placed the first two motives — *designative* and *semantic* — under the heading *language borrowings*. These

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are said to have influence on the changes in the language system, and therefore deserve special attention of linguists. Meanwhile, the last two motives — *stylistic* and *sociopsychological* (or *speech borrowings* in F. Grosjean’s terms) — are said to have no significant influence on the language system changes as these are typically of a temporary nature.

In addition to the aforementioned motives, Graedler (1998)\(^6\) introduces *inattentiveness* of translators as yet another motive for linguistic borrowing. This is the primary cause for such unmotivated borrowings as *semantic loans* getting into the language, i.e., when a word, seen as international is received by the recipient language not only with its form but also with a new meaning which has never existed in that language before. For example, one of the recent semantic loans is found in the combination of words *delegated regulation* or *delegated act*, which are translated to Lithuanian respectively as *deleguotasis reglamentas* or *deleguotasis aktas*. In fact, the Lithuanian word *deleguoti* (EN to *delegate*) means *to send somebody as a representative*, and therefore, this word cannot be used in other contexts but that of people being sent somewhere for a specific purpose. However, *delegated regulation* means a certain type of document, and therefore, the use with the meaning of delegating a regulation (not a person) seems wrong and unmotivated in the Lithuanian usage.

Another group of unintentional borrowings is pseudo-equivalents (or *false friends*), i.e., when a misinterpreted word is wrongly rendered, e.g., *discreet ≠ discrete*, but in translation such confusing words are wrongly substituted. As in the case above, the primary reason for pseudo-equivalents to occur is a similar form of confusing words. On the other hand, pseudo-equivalents can also occur in the cases of identical spelling but different meanings depending on the context. For example, the term *conference* traditionally referred to as a “high-level meeting for consultation or exchange of information or discussion with a number of speakers, often lasting several days,”\(^7\) in the EU documents can mean “a simple talk or lecture, where one speaker comes to impart his knowledge on a given subject” *(Ibid.)*.

Yet another reasonable motive for linguistic borrowing is presented by Šarčevic (1997/2000). We can name it *inadequateness* of terms between different languages, i.e., there are cases in languages when native words are incapable of rendering an exact concept in a different language. As Biel and Engberg (2013, 3) put it, legal translation is not only


operation between several languages, but also between distinct legal systems and legal cultures, as legal systems have their own history, patterns of reasoning, social and moral background. Thus, different legal systems develop their own systems of concepts adjusted to their own needs, and this may cause (un)translatability problems. In this respect Šarčević’s claim (1997/2000, 257) that loanwords are at place “in the parallel texts of international instruments adopted for the purpose of establishing uniform laws” seems well-reasoned.

**Socio-Psychological Motives**

Let us take a closer look at the seemingly ‘harmless’ socio-psychological motives of linguistic borrowing. The use of archaisms in EU legislation (likewise in the whole of the legal texts) can stand as an example of socio-psychological motives for linguistic borrowing to be well-preserved in legal texts. Tiersma (2000) assumes that Latinisms or French-origin words are a manifestation of archaic traditions in legal writing, and identifies a few motives for archaisms to be enshrined in legal language. These socio-psychological motives can be summarized as follows:

- **Dignity and solemnity** of the profession. If legal terminology has been preserved over centuries, it naturally deserves great respect.
- **Formality** of language. Legal language striving towards great formality “naturally gravitates towards archaic language” (Tiersma 2000, 95).
- **Veneration to authoritative texts shares common grounds with religion.** Lawyers’ respect to the original Constitution and other legal authoritative texts resembles the sacredness of Holy texts.
- **Safety and convenience.** The use of the same outworn phrases, despite their problematic perception, form some sort of the “‘insiders’ language” (term coined by D. Eades [2010, 196]). In the case of EU texts, *Eurojargon* serves as a safe and convenient “‘insiders’ language” for the people working in the EU institutions.
- Finally, this safe and convenient language helps to preserve lawyers’ monopoly. Ordinary people, facing difficulties in understanding legal texts, are inclined to seek advice of lawyers. To prove his point, Tiersma, quoting Mellinkoff, states that there is no “better way of preserving a professional monopoly than by locking up your trade secrets in the safe of an unknown tongue” (Tiersma 2000, 28).

Although socio-psychological motives are generally believed to bring no harm to the recipient language, archaisms can cause problems
other than complicated perception of a foreign word. Indeed, there are more challenging problems affecting deeper layers of the language system, including the backbone of the language – grammar, for instance, when trying to analyze the word with regard to classification (general or specific? abstract or concrete? countable or uncountable?), number distinction (singular or plural?), gender distinction (feminine or masculine?), to name but a few.

Let us take a closer look at one French-origin word – *acquis* (or *acquis communautaire*), which is frequently used in EU documents, and analyze it from the gender distinction perspective. This term is often left untranslated in Lithuanian as well as in other EU national languages for the sake of harmonizing the term in translations of all the EU member states. When the word is found in its original form, the first problem to be faced is that of perception.

However, even if we happen to understand the meaning of the word, still some practical problems may occur while trying to integrate the term in longer linguistic units. In the given example, there are a few options to translate the word *acquis* in Lithuanian. One option is *teisynas* as proposed by R. Vladarskienė (2004:184). In this sense, the term *acquis* (= *teisynas*) is supposed to be used in the masculine gender and consequently determine the syntactic agreement further in the Lithuanian sentence.

However, there is at least one more option to translate the aforementioned term. Lawyers and linguists of the EU Council propose to translate the term *acquis communautaire* in Lithuanian as *įgytis*, which is of feminine gender in this respect. Since the Lithuanian language system requires distinguishing between masculine and feminine genders which determine the syntactic agreement in the sentence, the fact that the term *acquis* can be translated as both *teisynas* (masculine) and *įgytis* (feminine) causes grammar- and syntax-related problems. And therefore, this problem results in the term *acquis* (if left in the original form) being used in the masculine form later in the sentence, while elsewhere the same term can be used in the feminine form. For example, the term *acquis* is used in feminine in Title IV of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (C 115/28 [9.5.2008]):

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They shall not be regarded as part of the acquis which has to be accepted by candidate States [...]9

Meanwhile the term acquis is used in masculine in the translation of the following document issued by the Council of the European Union (Brussels, 18 June 2014):

Commission is also screening the acquis in respect of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters [...]11

Such different approaches to the term acquis indicate that the use of loanwords in national languages can cause not only perception problems but have a much wider scope of influences on the language.

Threats and Opportunities Depending on the Motive of Borrowing

In addition to sociopsychological motives, the use of Latin or French words in EU translated texts can be associated with other motives. For example, if Latinisms are used to name new realia, which are non-existent in Lithuania, then obviously the designative motive for borrowing will play the key role with the purpose to fill in an existing linguistic gap. According to the recommendations of the European Commission, in the case of realia (names of plants, animals, etc.), translators are given a choice either to leave the realia in the original Latin form, or to insert the original form in the brackets next to their translation.13 Ty-

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pically, if uncertainty arises regarding the correctness of translation, the borrowing translation strategy resulting in a loanword (either in its original or adapted forms) becomes one of the most convenient choices for translators.

Problems of translating cultural realia, however, may lead to a few negative outcomes: first, translation problems may result in unwelcomed variation of terms in EU texts, as translators have a choice to apply different translation techniques to name the same realia (e.g., to borrow a concept together with the term denoting it in the original form, or to coin a new word, or to use a translation followed by its original form, or vice versa). On the other hand, such freedom of choice can result in a situation when different concepts are covered under the same term. Naturally, this causes ambiguity and misunderstanding which is highly unwelcome in administrative style, including EU documents.

Generally, if loanwords occur due to the designative motives, they undoubtedly enrich the recipient language. However, one of the frequent motives for using linguistic borrowing is translator’s uncertainty of the capacity of the national language to express foreign notions (the idea was expressed by Vaisnienė in the fourth Conference of the Lithuanian Terminology Forum14, also cf. Šarčevic 1997/2000, 256-258). Moreover, translators are inclined to borrow lexis in order to avoid deviations from the legislator’s intention enshrined in the legal acts (Vaičiukatė 2006). As a result, the use of the borrowing translation strategy leads to the occurrence of new loanwords in the recipient language.

Challenges and Problem-Solving

An unregulated increase in linguistic borrowing may have a few impacts on the recipient language. These can be summarized as follows:

1. International words tend to win competition over their native counterparts. Therefore, before borrowing a word a few aspects should be taken into consideration: surplus words (as well as meanings of words) are to be avoided:

- when good counterparts can be found in the national language, as this leads to the occurrence of unnecessary variation which is highly unwelcome in administrative style;

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- when the introduced words look odd, or sound strange, or are difficult to pronounce, or have wrong associations, as this leads to the rejection of the word by the public;

- when the word is difficult to distinguish from similar looking words, as this leads to the occurrence of pseudo-equivalents (*false friends*) in translation.

2. **Word meanings tend to be extended, and semantic loans occur.** The extension of meaning has to be harmonized with the existing meanings. For example, Vladarskienė sees the word *green product* as misleading in the Lithuanian language.\(^{15}\) In Lithuanian, the word *green* has a rather wide range of meanings: it can denote color, freshness, or indicates that something is unprocessed (raw material), etc. However, it lacks the meaning used in the English language denoting that something is not harmful to the environment. Therefore, the term *green product* may sound ambiguous in Lithuanian, as it can mean either an unprocessed product or a product friendly to the environment, if used in the meaning borrowed from English, thus resulting in the occurrence of semantic (or meaning) loans.

3. **Terms start migrating over different fields.** For example, the use of words *virus* or *donor*, once having belonged exclusively to the field of medicine, is no longer restricted to this field. Now we can read about *computer viruses* or *donor countries*, and even *donor languages*. On the one hand, such changes in the language use can be regarded as language enrichment. On the other hand, if excessive loanwords or underdeveloped terms start getting into the language usage, they are prone to be treated as a threat. Practice shows that once loanwords get into the usage, it is complicated to nearly impossible to replace them by newly-coined, though friendlier, Lithuanian counterparts (cf. Zabarskaitė 2013).

Perhaps there is only one rational solution to this situation – to **take a more responsible approach when introducing new lexis** to the national language. It seems, however, that it is easier said than done because, firstly, translators are often afraid to deviate from the legislator’s intention enshrined in the original text and lack (or are deprived of) a more creative approach to translation of EU documents; and secondly, terminologists are not quick enough to follow the pace of the changing world, and therefore are unable to rapidly assist translators before the word gets into the regular use.

Nevertheless, a few positive aspects can be observed with respect to the change of the Lithuanian language. It goes without saying that language change is a natural process leading to progress, but for a language to be preserved and to remain stable in its structure, the backbone of the language – or grammar (morphology and syntax) – has to be preserved. Various research works on the Lithuanian language prove that in this respect Lithuanian is slow to change. This can be explained by the fact that Lithuanian, being a synthetic language, is less vulnerable to language changes due to easier adaptation of words to the language system.

**Conclusion**

Over the last decade, since the accession of Lithuania to the family of the EU member states, the greatest changes in the Lithuanian language can be observed in the lexical layer. This is due to the fact that cultural exchange brings new words and concepts to a recipient language along with the new realia. Meanwhile grammar of the highly inflected Lithuanian language is slow to change due to its capacity to adapt words easier to the language system.

It has been observed that linguistic borrowings lead to the following changes in the Lithuanian language:

- expansion of meanings, e.g., green (product);
- migration of terms over fields, e.g., donor (country, language) (computer) virus;
  - semantic loans, e.g., deleguotasis aktas for delegated act;
  - new words (or neologisms), e.g., prudencinis for prudential, pan-europinis for Pan-European, proaktyvus for proactive;
  - pseudo-equivalents (false friends), e.g., conference (konferencija) ≠ conference (pasitarimas, posėdis), discreet (diskrečias, taktiškas) ≠ discrete (atskiras, pavienis);
- unwelcomed variation (synonymy), when different variants are used to name the same concept (e.g., variations of acquis in Lithuanian translations of EU documents include acquis / acquis communautaire / teisynas / įgytis), or the same variant is used to name different concepts.

In translation of EU texts the borrowing translation strategy is often employed to avoid deviation from the legislator’s intention enshrined in the original document. Moreover, strict requirements for translators make translation a mechanical process, almost word-for-word, thus depriving it from a very important element – creativity. Such excessive ‘copying’ of the original text lexis often leads to the occurrence of un-
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derdeveloped or unmotivated words in translation. Therefore, cultural exchange through linguistic borrowing can be viewed as twofold: a threat if there is a lack of a more responsible approach when introducing new lexis to the recipient language, and as an opportunity if employed purposefully and creatively.

And finally, although sociopsychological motives for linguistic borrowing are said to have no significant impact on the language system, there are cases when they result in more complex linguistic problems (e.g., in relation to gender distinction, number distinction, etc.). Therefore, not only designative and semantic motives but also sociopsychological motives for linguistic borrowing should receive more attention of linguists and researchers.

References


16.

Men’s and Women’s Tombstone Epitaphs in the Klaipeda Region Cemeteries of the 19th and Early 20th Century: Linguistic Aspects

ASTA BALCIUNIENE & EGLE BUKANTYTE-GREVERE

Introduction

The expression of differences in men’s and women’s characters and behavior from the viewpoint of language has so far been a relevant theme to be investigated. In the present epoch of globalization, the issues of woman’s and man’s equality and the exploitation and underestimation of women, raised by the feminist movement in the late 19th and 20th century, has remained important and frequently discussed. As argued by Povilionienė, science, religion, and different social institutes have always emphasized the male gender as predominating.1 Badinter and Tamošaitytė related the beginning of men’s predomination to the emergence of patriarchy: “Since the very emergence of patriarchy, man has always been defined as privileged, endowed with something more, and misunderstood by woman. He considers himself to be stronger, smarter, braver, more responsible, and more creative or rational.”2 The emergence of Christianity allegedly exacerbated the issue even more, as “with Christianity having become an official religion, the status of woman in the society underwent even more rapid decline, and the Patristic literature tended to form an approach towards woman as an inferior being, even a witch, and a source of all the bodily evil.”3 Given this position, one can hypothesize that in the Klaipėda Region (the 18th to the 20th centuries) the views on woman could have been even more complicated than in Lithuania Major, as in that province of Eastern Prussia, the Lutheran Evangelical faith got established that did not recognize the cult of saints and the Virgin Mary.4 Therefore, if the Catholic theological

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structure (the greater part of the area of Lithuania Major) presented the Virgin Mary as an antithesis to the sinner Eve and thus elevated the institute of woman-mother5 to a divine level, the Evangelical Lutheran theological structure was oriented merely towards the masculine concept of the divine trinity. Another important aspect was the relations between the German and Lithuanian nations, as the Lithuanian nation “since the second half of the 19th century, increasingly succumbed to the inertia of acculturation and the predominance of forced Germanisation after the rise of the German element in the German Empire in 1871.6 Hence the status of a Lithuanian woman could have been even lower than that of her German counterpart. Therefore, it is interesting to see what kind of approach to man and woman is revealed in the Lithuanian and German inscriptions on the 19th-20th century tombstones of the Klaipėda Region (Klaipėda Region is a part of Lithuania Minor, see Map 1).

Map 1. Regions of Lithuania

True, one has to admit that the posthumous inscriptions cannot reveal the factual view on gender or the true situation, as from ancient times Europe enjoyed a universal view De mortuis nil nisi bene. Moreover, as laid out in the law of the Kingdom of Prussia of the 18th century (1721) and in Friedrich’s draft law (Projekt des Corporis juris Fridericiani) of 1749-1751, “criminals could not be buried next to the buried Protestant Church, see Viktoras Gidžiūnas, “Marijos kultas Lietuvoje iki protestantizmo atslūgū,” http://www.aidai.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6887:is&catid=414:3-gegu-birelis&Itemid=470.

5 True, only a very limited consideration of the divine level of woman can be identified, however, through religious practices (e.g., May prayers), a Catholic woman could at least psychologically “identify herself” with the divine mother.

honest Christians [...], and there should not be place for suicides,” therefore, no inscriptions existed that would record any negative information about the buried individuals. However, given the fact that in that region the themes of tombstone inscriptions were not regulated either by the Church or the state, one could expect to form a prototypical picture of man and woman of the region. Furthermore, hardly any of the indigenous people remained in the area (due to the emigration to the West after World War 2, Soviet repressions, the extinction of dialectal points, and other, and it was no longer possible to conduct a thorough questionnaire survey or a psycholinguistic experiment. The cemeteries in Klaipėda Region were especially badly damaged during the Soviet period.

Picture 1. A Lithuanian epitaph

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The object of the research is men’s and women’s tombstone inscriptions in old cemeteries of the Klaipėda Region. In terms of their origin, the tombstone inscriptions can be classified into two types: 1) the authentic old ones and 2) the new ones. The first type includes the authentic tombstone inscriptions or the reconstructed ones that boast precisely rewritten authentic inscriptions before the early 20th century, while the second one includes the inscriptions dated back to the mid and the late 20th century. In terms of their structure, they also fall into two types: 1) of a minimal structure (with merely the principal data about the deceased person presented), and 2) epitaphs (recorded wishes or passages from hymns or the Bible).

The Theoretical Provisions of the Research

The theoretical provisions of the research are based on the views of cognitive linguistics on the relationship between language and thinking. The expectations and awareness as to which qualities or character traits should be identified with man or with woman are especially clearly reflected in the language. That is related to the categorization of thinking. In accordance with a provision of cognitive linguistics, the attributes that link the members of one category do not necessarily have to be common. The said provision was observed in the studies of man’s and wo-

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9 In terms of gender, one could thoroughly study the linguistic expression of the inscriptions on children’s (boys’ and girls’) tombstones, however, due to the definiteness of the material, children’s inscriptions shall be analyzed by differentiating them in accordance with gender (with the age stages neglected).

man’s identity expressions in the tombstone inscriptions. The image of the members belonging to one category is best revealed by a prototypical member of the category, therefore, we sought to reveal what kind of Lithuanian/German man’s and woman’s prototypical images were reflected in the tombstone inscriptions.

German semantic and sociolinguistic research revealed gender stereotypes formed in the society. Male characters were identified with physical strength, success, and triumph, while women in the area were pushed to the periphery; moreover, they were granted the opposite image of helplessness, and they were compared to an object of hunting (food or a prey animal), or even to a child.\(^\text{11}\) Motherhood was considered to be the most prominent role and function of woman. Woman – even a childless one – was expected to possess the qualities necessary for looking after a baby and for feeding it. The greatest moral value of woman was devotion and self-sacrifice. A dedicated, self-sacrificing woman was frequently transferred onto a martyr plane.\(^\text{12}\) Meanwhile, man in the family structure performed the role of a neutral observer. Not only did woman self-critically reflect on whether she performed her role sufficiently well, but she was also observed and evaluated by man. She was constantly suspected of being an insufficiently dedicated *Rabenmutter* (heartless mother).\(^\text{13}\)

In the worldview of the Lithuanian language, the differences between men and women were similar to those reflected in the data of the German language. A Lithuanian woman was expected to be tender, emotional, sentimental, and caring, corresponding to “a woman’s stereotype formed over centuries,”\(^\text{14}\) while “masculinity was inseparable from the motif of power and the need to regularly confirm one’s identity […]. with efforts made to defend one’s own exclusivity, sometimes possibly too sharp.”\(^\text{15}\) The data of psycholinguistic research also confirmed the linguistic conclusions: as indicated in the *Dictionary of Verbal Associations of the Lithuanian Language* (1986) by S. Steponavičienė, in the association field of the word *woman*, the most frequent responses were *tender and tenderness, beautiful, and mother*,\(^\text{16}\) while the associations of

\(^{11}\) Harald Weinrich, *Sprache in Texten* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976)


\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 149.


\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 116.

man – tall, strong – presupposed physical force.\textsuperscript{17} The association between man and father was much less frequent than between woman and mother.

Thus, the materials of the tombstone inscriptions were compared with the research in the linguistic characteristics of genders in the Lithuanian and German languages with the aim of identification of similarities and differences.

Moreover, for the interpretation of the passages from the Holy Script or hymns chosen as tombstone inscriptions, theological analysis was used.

**Linguistic Expressions of Tombstone Inscriptions**

The linguistic expression fairly well reveals the actual attitude towards a concrete or an abstract phenomenon. In our case, it was important to find out whether, and how, the linguistic expressions of men’s and women’s tombstone inscriptions differed.

**Diminutives.** In the Lithuanian inscriptions,\textsuperscript{18} the definitions of women’s kinship were mainly expressed by diminutives: motinėlė, duktikė, duktelė, seselė, which revealed that woman-mother, a child of the feminine gender (a girl), and woman-sister, were identified with kindness and affability (see Fig. 1):

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig1}
\caption{Diminutive forms in the epitaphs of female individuals}
\end{figure}

Fig. 1. Diminutive forms in the epitaphs of female individuals

Czionai ilsis / mano miela / Moteriskė / bey mūsų mylima / Motynelė / Anna Naujoks / gim. Storost / *9. Juli 1890 / † 27. Sept. 1913 (Liaunai Cemetery)

‘Here rests my dear Woman and our beloved Mother Anna…’

Czoin ilsis Deweje musu mielema Duktele /

Elsike Stubbra

* 24. 5. 1927

† 25. 1. 1928

‘Here rests in God our beloved Daughter…’


\textsuperscript{18} For more details about Lithuanian inscriptions, see Asta Balčiūnienė, “Klaipėdos krašto liuteroniškių kapinių paminkliniai įrašai lingvistiniu aspekту,” Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis, XXV (Klaipėda, 2012), pp. 62-76.
However, not a single diminutive derivative of the lexemes žmona, pati ‘a wife’ was found. Thus, the image of woman-wife was not so clearly associated with the above-mentioned qualities.

The lexeme moteriškė (Moteriszkė, see Fig. 1) ‘a wife’ is an inflection – ja derivative from the adjective moteriškas – a ‘female, femininum’¹⁹ (from the diachronic viewpoint), and this type of derivation revealed the emphasis on femininity.

Not a single diminutive form of the masculine gender lexeme vyras ‘husband’ was found in the ancient, authentic inscriptions. Incidentally, the linguistic expression of the image of man-father by diminutive derivatives of the noun tėvas ‘father’, differently from woman-mother, was not typical. Merely two cases of such expression were found; moreover, their authenticity was questionable, as one inscription was found in a rebuilt tombstone with an authentic inscription, and another one, on a new tombstone (see Fig. 2). The recorded diminutive of tėvas (tėvelis) presupposed a tender attitude of children / wife towards the man as father (see Fig. 1.). The new inscription most probably reflected the epitaph tradition that spread all over the area of Lithuania since the mid 20th century (in the Soviet period, inscriptions of a religious character were avoided; a formula liūdi žmona / vyras ‘mourned by the wife / husband…’ was related to that period).

Fig. 2. Diminutive forms in the epitaphs of male individuals

Mano mylimas draugas,
Mano mylims tėvelis
Martin Kalvys

gim. 29. 12. 1887 mir. 28. 8. 1953
‘My beloved friend, my beloved Daddy Martin Kalvys…’

MARKSAS JURGIS
1904-1969
TĖVELI, ČIA TAVĖS JOKS SKAUSMAS NEPALIES, KURIE TAVE MYLĖJO – AMŽINAI LIŪDĖS
LIŪDI ŽMONA IR VAIKAI
‘Marksas Jurgis / 1904-1969 / Daddy, here no pain will touch you, and those who loved you will feel eternal sorrow / Mourning wife and children’.

The difference between the epitaphs of male and female individuals was evident: not a single diminutive derivative of brolis, sūnus ‘brother’, ‘son’ was found (Cia ilsis mūsų Sunus Kurt Pranz Gerullis/ 1924-1925 ‘Here rests our Son Kurt Pranz Gerullis’/ [Žydeliai Cemetery]; Czonai ilsis Deweje /musu mielims / Sunus er musu mielims Brolis Jonis Datz ‘Here rests in God our beloved Son and our beloved Brother Jonis Datz’ [Lyveriai Cemetery]). The findings proved that the attitude towards man as a representative of the strong sex was manifested from the boy’s childhood.

In the German language, diminutives were rare, however, it was found out that the German tombstone inscriptions used diminutive forms to define children: Söhnchen, Töchterchen. That was an obvious difference from the Lithuanian inscriptions, as the differences in the children’s gender were not reflected in the expressions of the German language. Special emotionality related to the attitude towards a child was marked by the abundance of diminutive forms, although those forms in German were infrequent.

To sum up, one could state that the concept recorded in the tombstone inscriptions of the 19th to the 20th centuries with femininity being inseparable from tenderness and emotion, and masculinity from strength, corresponded to the perception of the identity of man and woman in the 21st century, as tenderness and emotionality were considered to be the qualities untypical of men. Thus, an obvious link of diminutives merely with the children’s and women’s tombstone inscriptions revealed the fact that femininity shared common qualities with childhood and the qualities of child character and, from that viewpoint, was totally different from man’s image. The essential nationality-related difference between genders was the fact that, in the consciousness of Lithuanians, boys were probably attached masculine characteristics as early as in their childhood (a boy = a small man, a prospective man), while in the German culture no such clear identification could be found (rather, the age category was emphasized: a boy = a child, and a girl = a child).

The Expression of Kinship by Syntactical Constructions

The majority of syntactical constructions recorded in the tombstone inscriptions were typical of both languages, as the Lithuanian constructions were most frequently literal translations from the German lan-

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guage. Those constructions were usually trinomial (possessive pronoun + adjective / (past) participle + noun), however, some binomial ones were also found (pronoun + noun: *Cia ilsis mūsų Sunus* / ‘Here rests our Son’).

Thus, the nouns indicating kinship relations were used in combinations with possessive pronouns (Lith. *mano, mūsų* ‘my’, ‘our’; Germ *mein(e), unser(e)* ‘my’, ‘our’) and adjectives (Lith. *miela, – as, gera, – as* ‘dear’, ‘good’, as well as their pronominal forms). In German, the equivalents of those adjectives *liebe(r) and gute(r)* were accompanied by *(innig) geliebte(r)* ‘dearly beloved’ and *unvergessliche(r)* ‘unforgettable’.

In Lithuanian inscriptions, wife was called *mano miela pati* ‘my dear wife’ or *mano miela moteriškė* ‘my dear woman’; and husband, *mano mylimas vyras: milims Wiers* ‘my beloved husband’, etc. That kind of a trinomial (more seldom, binomial) construction not so much defined the qualities of the deceased (and, most probably, did not define them at all), but rather expressed the emotional relations of the family members with the deceased and indicated that the family and close relations between its members were a great value in the society of that time.

Incidentally, the tombstone inscriptions of men and women were mostly related by the kinship categories. Family relations of the deceased were equally frequently indicated in the tombstones of both men and women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lithuanian inscriptions with the kinship indication</th>
<th>German inscriptions with the kinship indication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 (14%)</td>
<td>12 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 (27%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kinship relations were not indicated in 68 Lithuanian and 131 German inscriptions (73% each).

Most frequently, the tombstones reflected the relationships of husband and wife and of the successive generations of the direct line, i.e., parents and children. In the third place by frequency one found the reflection of the relationships of the same generation of the direct line, i.e., brothers and sisters.

Although the amount of the Lithuanian and German inscriptions with the indication of kinship relations was surprisingly similar, it has to be emphasized that the German epitaphs stood out by a much wider range of those relationships. Thus, in the Lithuanian inscriptions, merely the *successive* generations of the direct line (mother, daughter, father,
and son) and relatives of the same generation (sister, brother) were indicated. The German inscriptions indicated not merely the relatives of the same and successive generations, but also ones separated by two generations, i.e., grandparents and grandchildren. Some cases occurred of the indication of the lateral line of the successive generations, i.e., nephew, and non-blood relationship, i.e., father-in-law. There was also a case of social relationship, i.e., an adopted son. Moreover, the definitions were infrequently more detailed, e.g., unsere jüngste Schwester ‘our youngest sister’ (Vilkyškiai Cemetery K043). The German inscriptions happened to indicate the person who funded the erection of the cross or the tombstone, e.g., Gesetzt von ihrem Neffen ‘erected by her nephew’ (Pozingiai Cemetery K015). After World War 2, the relationship with the deceased on the tombstones came to be expressed by the naming of the living members of the family in the formula mourned (by her husband and children…).

As witnessed by the discussion of the expression of relationships, it is evident that there were no cases of gender inequality or exclusivity related to the family member institution either in the Lithuanian or German inscriptions. Incidentally, one could note a certain difference from the current research data that presupposed a poorer link of man with family in the Lithuanian and German conceptions.

Spelling of Lithuanian Female Proper Names

The impact of the German language was especially distinct in the spelling of Lithuanian female proper names: Hier ruhet in Gott / Charlotte Plogsties / geb. Stepputat / geb. 28 Ferbr: 1826 / gest: 6 Maertz 1902 ‘Here rests in God / Charlotte Plogsties / born Stepputat….The form of the masculine gender, Plogsties, was used, while the maiden surname Stepputat was written without an ending. The tradition was also observed in the new tombstone Anna / Gurgsdies / 1920-2003, etc. The forms undoubtedly violated the system of the Lithuanian language and indicated the interference of the German language. On the other hand, the fact that in the literal translations from German a woman’s maiden

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21 Unsere liebe Mutter und Großmutter ‘Our dear Mother and Grandmother’ (Mantvydai I Cemetery K049); Unser unvergesslicher Sohn, lieber Bruder und Enkel ‘Our unforgettable Son, dear Brother and Uncle’ (Mantvydai I Cemetery K099).

22 Gesetzt von ihrem Neffen ‘Erected by your nephew’ (Pozingiai Cemetery K015).

23 Mein lieber Gatte, unser guter Vater und Schwiegervater (Mantvydai Cemetery K081).

24 Unser geliebet Pflegesohn (Katyčiai Cemetery K077).

name was also indicated in the Lithuanian inscriptions (Anne Užpurvis Jūrat / 28.8.1861-5.5.1943), witnessed a more respectful attitude towards woman. Woman was perceived not merely as belonging to her husband, but also as having her own family line which after her marriage was not ignored or forgotten.


**Social Status and Profession in Tombstone Inscriptions**

As proved by the studies of indication of the profession and activity of the deceased, the references of that type were more frequent on men’s than on women’s tombstones. That was especially evident in German inscriptions. Frequently the post in the army and the military rank were indicated, as e.g., gunner, rifleman, Landsturmann, or Rottenführer (Obergefreiter). The epitaphs on the military tombstones were frequently especially emotional. The causes of death (other than perishing in the war) were seldom indicated, and exclusively on men’s tombstones, e.g., *ertrank beim Baden im Memelstrom* ‘got drowned by swimming in the Nemunas stream’ (Sokaičiai Cemetery K036).

Both in the Lithuanian and the German inscriptions, the references to profession or the type of activity predominated on male tombstones, however, as observed, the inscriptions referring to the professions of a higher status, such as priest, teacher, or forester, were usually provided merely in German, even if an individual was of the Lithuanian origin, e.g., *Hier ruhet in Gott /mein lieber Gatte, unser / guter Vater der Lehrer / Julius Juschka, / geb. 24. Mai 1841, / gest. D. 23. Mai 1895* ‘Here rests in God my dear Man, our good Father teacher…’ (Baltupėnai I K63). The Lithuanian inscriptions recorded merely the status of a farmer: *Czonay ilsis Kaulai Ukininko / Martino? Laumaus isz? Smilti-ninkû* (Lankupiai) ‘here rest the bones of farmer…’. One reconstructed tombstone was found with the reference not only to the man’s type of activity, i.e., farming, but also to the exclusive activity of a spiritual character (Cionai ilsis Dievuje / Jonas Lukaitis / Ükininkas, Surinkimo

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27 Schuetze Žukai Cemetery K045.  
28 Ldstm Sokačiai Cemetery K052.  
29 Obergefreiter Kalveliai_girininkija K010; Katyčiai II Cemetery K004.  
31 der Lehrer Žukai Cemetery K063; Katyčiai Cemetery K057; Der Pfarrer Katy-čiai K078, K080, K081, Pfarrer emer. Katyčiai Cemetery K079.
The Themes of Passages of the Holy Script and Hymns Recorded on the Front Face

The inscriptions on women’s tombstones were more frequently characterized by the motif of misery and pain. It could be found both in the Lithuanian and German inscriptions:

32 Unser Stiefvater, der Hausbesitzer ‘Our Stepfather, the House Owner’ Girininkai Cemetery K048.
33 Unsere liebe Mutter, Muehlenbesitzerin ‘Our dear Mother, the mill owner’ Katyčiai II Cemetery K011.
34 Hier ruhet in Gott Frau Lehrer Ida Mann geb. Staschull *19.3.1877+13.1.1905 ‘Here rests in God Mrs. Teacher Ida Mann born Staschull’ Žukai Cemetery K062.
35 Silva Pocytė, “Mažlietuviai Vokietijos imperijoje 1871-1914” (Vilnius, 2002), pp. 73-75.
201 Tombstone Epitaphs in the Klaipeda Region

Sviete kentėjau daug ligų
Dangų esmi tarp angelų
Linksmybę, džiaugsmą tevišką,
Džiaugsmą sulaukiau amžingą.
‘I suffered from numerous diseases, and now I am in the heaven among angels. I have received merriment, fatherly joy, eternal joy’.
(Vilkyškiai I Cemetery K013).
The rhymed inscription on the front face of the cross emphasized the hardships experienced during the lifetime:
*Tretet her zu meinem Grabe,
Stört mich nicht in meiner Ruh’.
Denkt was ich gelitten habe,
Gönnt mir doch die ew’ge Ruh’.
‘Come to my grave, yet do not disturb my rest. Think of what I have suffered and wish me eternal rest’
(Žukai Cemetery K062)

In the Lithuanian inscriptions on men’s tombstones, poems frequently occurred, related to brave, honest, and moral life and its crowning:
Kova jau atlikta,
 vainiką jau laimėjau,
linksmybę dangišką
prie Jėzaus jau laimėjau.
‘The fight has been done, and I have won the crown and heavenly joy with Jesus’
(Vilkyškiai I Cemetery K001).

That essentially reflected stereotypical differences between the images of man and woman, however, the Christianity-inculcated view on human being (irrespective of gender differences) as on God’s creature, God’s beloved child, or a member of the Church as Christ’s bride formed an equivalent and respectful attitude towards a Christian. That was witnessed by an inscription in the Girininkai cemetery where a young woman was referred to as Christ’s bride, thus elevating the status of a woman-Christian from an earthly to a heavenly level:
Kristus, kurs ją išsirinko per marčią savają,
mato, kas jai kenka, linksmín jos karčias smūnysb
vesdams ją ant kelio saldžiausios linksmybės.

‘Christ, who chose her as His bride, sees what harms her and cheers up her bitter sorrows by leading her onto the way of the sweetest joy’.

(Girininkai Cemetery K048).

In one case, man was equated to a bride and her beauty:

Ak ger man, aš esmi danguj su jum jednotas, dabitas kaip marti, Gražiausiai vainikuotas, aptwitas su linksmybe, nespaus mane smūtmybė.

‘Oh, good people, I am united with you in the heaven, dressed up as a bride, beautifully crowned, surrounded with joy, and not depressed with sorrow’.

(Laugalai Cemetery K041).

In the new monuments, the passages from the Holy Script were not usually related to specifically man or woman’s inscription:

BARANAUSKAI
Kristina 1909-2001
Vladas 1894-1980

Laimingas aš žmogus, kurio viltis yra Viešpats. ‘Happy am I whose hope is Lord’.

(Kisiniai Cemetery)

In the Klaipėda Region, the tradition of common family tombstones got established, with especially laconic data of both men and women recorded. The current Klaipėda Region tombstone inscriptions of a minimal structure in terms of the awareness of gender differences are non-informative. One can only observe the trend of gender equality and non-differentiation that reflects the conception of the late 20th to the early 21st centuries.

Conclusion

The linguistic expression of tombstone inscriptions in the Klaipėda Region in the 19th to the 20th centuries proved that a prototypical woman’s image was related to the following character traits: tenderness, emotionality, and sensitiveness, and the status, to woman-mother, woman-wife, or woman-sister /daughter. In the hymn passages for women on the front face, the motifs of hard life and pain frequently predominated. A stereotypical Lithuanian man’s image, related to emotional coldness, was revealed by the unproductivity of diminutive derivatives of the lexemes husband, father, and brother. Both the German and Lith-
uanian man’s prototype was associated with physical strength: that was revealed by the *fight* motif emphasized in the hymn passages. Man’s active social life was witnessed by the professions and activities recorded in the inscriptions.

The syntactical constructions of the inscriptions (a possessive pronoun + an adjective / Past Participle + a noun) not so much named the qualities of the deceased, but rather expressed the emotional relationship of the family members with the deceased and revealed that family and close relationships between its members were a great value in the society of that time.

Woman’s inequality with man was especially obvious in the inscriptions that recorded socio-economic information. The reason of the gender inequality was neither the Lutheran faith that predominated in the Klaipėda Region nor Germanisation. It was actually Christianity that would “raise” woman’s status to the divine level. Woman’s inequality with respect to man was reflected in the dominating view on woman in most of the European states in the 18th to the 20th centuries.

The German and the Lithuanian inscriptions, in terms of gender interpretation, were similar (both nations emphasized the importance of family and its relationships both for man and woman); more distinct differences could be observed in the approach towards boys (the German language did not record the gender dominant and emphasized the aspect of boy-child), while the Lithuanian language demonstrated a predominating view on a boy as a prospective man.

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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Purpose

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

Projects

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.
2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 10 week cross-cultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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