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The Bases of Values in a Time of Change: Chinese and Western

Chinese Philosophical Studies XVI

Edited by
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Preface

Kirti Bunchua

It has been a great honor for Assumption University and especially its School of Philosophy and Religious Studies to host this Symposium with the teams of distinguished scholars from the Institute of Philosophy of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and Department of Philosophy of Fudan University, Shanghai. This is part of a series cosponsored by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) with the Chinese philosophers since 1997.

Assumption University continues to promote the study of values and philosophy, especially the foundations of social life and civil society, with special attention to the way in which Buddhism and Christianity may jointly contribute over time. It is our hope, beginning with this work, to share the results of the research with philosophers in all parts of the world.

Assumption University now has close collaboration with the scholars from mainland China. This project is surely not the last; we look forward to more such a collaboration in the future.

Last but not least, I would like to thank Dr. George F. McLean for facilitating this precious opportunity for our School of Philosophy and Religious Studies to engage in cooperative world and effort of The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) for the restoration of civil society in our times.

Assumption University
Bangkok, Thailand

Introduction

George F. McLean

This turn of the millennia promises to be not only a change in numbers or even an incremental development along familiar paths. Far beyond this, we are living a profound vertical deepening of human awareness to new levels of human life and sacred meaning. This, in turn, enables us to engage horizontally a broadened, even global, diversity of peoples and cultures. This expansion of the dynamism of human awareness both in depth and in breadth opens new dimensions and creates new challenges for the work of philosophy.

To appreciate the extent to which this is true it is important to keep in mind the history of the last millennium. If we turn to Western philosophy we find it to be characterized by the emergence of human reflection and its logical systematization, traced archetypically from Plato and his student, Aristotle. Philosophy in the first half of the present millennium was characterized above all by the rediscovery of the work of Aristotle and its elaboration into the great medieval systems of Aquinas and Scotus, Avicenna and Averroes, Moses Mamonides and others. There, one finds reason in the service of humankind, clarifying and systematically coordinating ideas and relating them to the sources, goals and virtues of human life.

But the history of humankind and of philosophy is also tragic in its destiny, for the capabilities of reason can be the key to progress which bears the needs of its own frustration. Thus, at the end of the Renaissance in a series of delimiting strokes reason was wrenched out of the pattern of integral human life. Francis Bacon went about destroying the "idols" which bore the symbols of cultural traditions as the accumulation of creative human freedom; John Locke would erase the content of the mind and reduce it to a blank tablet, Descartes would bracket by doubt all but clear and distinct ideas — which meant all but the self and what could be built thereupon. This radicalization of reason and philosophy made it possible to work with clearly defined ideas and to develop correspondingly clear structures for science and philosophy. Most thinkers were fascinated by the new achievements made possible by this radical surgery. Only a few, such as Pascal and J.B. Vico, noted from the beginning the costs to be paid for this reductionist approach of rationalism.

What characterizes the depth of the transformation now taking place is the new recognition of how restrictive, and indeed destructive, this reductionism has been. This awareness is made possible negatively by the experience of the violent tragedies of the recent century, the wars hot and cold, the pogroms and holocausts, and the rise of nationalist ideologies. In the first chapter, "The Contemporary Transformation of Chinese Marxist Philosophy," Professor Liu Fangtong magisterially delineates this situation by contrasting modern with contemporary thought. In the former, reason as restricted to clear ideas is apt for attending to what is universal, i.e. to the natures or essences of things. But these are abstracted from what is unique and especially from the freedom of human persons and peoples. Corresponding to this is the restriction of reason to what is distinct; indeed the criterion of clarity is the ability to distinguish one idea as distinct from all others. This entailed, however, a decided turn to analysis which progressed precisely by dividing realities for purposes of conceptual clarity.

What was left unattended was the synthetic appreciation of the unity and integrity of reality. There resulted a pattern of dualisms between mind and matter, subject and object, individual and community. This has constituted the destabilizing fault line of modern thought and generated not

only continual tremors, but the vicious extremes expressed in exploitation, oppression and war. Moreover, marked by this fascination with reason, modern thought neglected the practical and the aesthetic.

This attempt to restrict human awareness to the sciences suggests the extent of the constructive project which lies ahead if philosophy is to retain modern achievements while expanding the structure of reason, recognizing additional dimensions of the person, and making possible authentic growth.

The modern-contemporary schema of Professor Liu Fangtong allows him to rethink the fate of Marxism, to see its humane concerns and to project their retention and development. Indeed he sees Marx primarily as attempting to transcend modernity and its rationalism in order to free the subject from oppression. In that sense Liu Fangtong interprets Marx essentially as a contemporary philosopher.

Unfortunately his efforts became bogged down in the very rationalism he intended to transcend. He was entrapped by the scientistic overlays of Engels who, in attempting to make this thought into a science like others, subjected it to universal and necessary laws which suppressed the freedom and creativity of people. Hence, in the late 70s and 80s in central Europe the great battle was to free the younger humanistic Marx from the later Marx. This is the great shared enterprise of most peoples today. The central importance of the paper of Professor Liu Fangtong to this volume and indeed to our times is to raise the question of just what developments in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical anthropology are required in order for such a project to succeed and hence to allow for a progressive and transformative view of values in a time of change.

Before undertaking these questions, however, there are some cautionary notes. It may be that even Professor Liu Fangtong's analysis is not entirely free from modern rationalism, for he tends to depict traditional metaphysics as a supremely abstract system which loses touch with reality. This was true of the modern rationalist philosophy, which he rightly criticizes. But the classical metaphysics of the Middle Ages and the phenomenological metaphysics of today provide the major study of existence and hence of the nature and reality of human freedom. To discard metaphysics would be to cut off serious investigation into this basic humane dimension of reality, thereby leaving philosophy to be built upon prejudices. For this reason metaphysics, though always discarded by those who would concentrate on some particular facet of philosophy, always has had to be taken up again on new and hopefully more adequate bases. Professor Liu Fangtong points this out in criticizing those contemporary philosophers who confuse "reasonable inquiry into metaphysics with their absolute actions and then simply negate those inquiries."

A similar attempt is recounted by Professor Warayutha Sriewarakul in Chapter II, "Process as a Basis for Philosophy in a Time of Change." He objects not only to the static character of rationalism, but to the substantialist vision of classical philosophy reaching back to the Greeks. In its place he would suggest a process philosophy after the manner of Alfred North Whitehead. Beginning from his joint work with Bertrand Russell, Whitehead took a metaphysical rather than an analytic turn in recognizing the reality of essences. Eventually he developed a full fledged metaphysical system in which the flow of change was seen as the primary nature of reality. This reflected well the nature of the physical or changing universe; the challenge was to extend this to all of being, to being as such, and to Being itself. In any case, Charles Hartshorne and others insisted that the striving and sufferings of humankind had to count or make a difference for God and in God. In this they gave voice to the importance of the human person and the exercise of freedom as prime elements of contemporary thought.

But a philosophy of process must face the issue of what is abiding or perduring in value. This is required in order to know and be attracted/guided toward human good, rather than evil. An abrupt break with past experience means not a decisive step ahead, but rather confusion as to the direction in which human progress can lie and a long period during which this is sorted out.

However, if progress cannot exist either in simple value disjunctions or in standing still, then one encounters here the issue of the nature of change in the human and social order, and beneath this the question of the nature and principles of reality itself. Where these issues have been ignored or suppressed progress is bound to be a tragic effort. Thus, if the chapter of Liu Fangtong referred often to the need to surpass the static and defective metaphysical systems of modern times, the key to the present transformation of values can be expected to lie above all in a renewal of metaphysics integrating the more recent existential awareness with the pre-modern traditions as traced in the chapter of James Loiacono.

The key to this lies in breaking beyond the strictures of modern rationalism, for one can expect that if one undertakes the project in the same terms as a Descartes, Spinoza or Leibniz, one will arrive at the same conclusion. These were great minds, yet, as in the case of Leibniz, they were unsuccessful in their effort to justify human freedom. To avoid the reductionism of modernity while retaining its advances requires a new epistemological dimension. Marx suggested that this be a turn to praxis, which made its own contribution. But Professor Liu Fangtong points out that this has not been unambiguous. Indeed its attempts to achieve control over all by developing a scientific view of history, based upon necessary principles and implemented through an inexorable dialectic, has come generally to be seen to need revision in order to leave room for the authentic humanism of the early Marx. This suggests that modern ideologies are built on inadequate foundations. The contemporary mind stands in need of a whole new dimension of human awareness capable of making room for subjectivity along with objectivity, uniqueness along with universality, and the existential along with the essential.

This is attempted in the Chapter III by George F. McLean, "Freedom and Cultural Traditions as the Basis of Values in a Time of Change." He sees the aesthetic level of awareness suggested by Kant as transcending, but in order to integrate the universal and necessary dimensions of science treated in the first *Critique* (Mr. Science) with the ethical and political dimensions of the second *Critique* (Mr. Democracy). This implies not only that there is room for Confucius, but that his role is necessary in order to enable Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy to live together in a way that is complimentary, humanizing, and hence truly progressive.

For this project to be truly successful, however, one would need to move beyond the formalism of Kant to engage the existential order. Hence Chapter III focuses on freedom as the new center and norm of life. This pioneers new philosophical terrain which consists not merely of patterns of necessary deduction, but of free creativity in working out the manifestation of being at its point of its entrance into time.

Chapter IV by Professor Chen Chaonan, "Aesthetic Culture: from Tradition to Modernity," shows this to have been central in the Chinese tradition, illustrating this by the role of music and poetry in the rituals through which life classically was ordered and lived.

Part II "The Material Basis of Values" looks for the way in which this is rooted in the concrete life of the people. This brings home, in turn, the character of the aesthetic as described above. It is not an esoteric departure from life, but an harmonious ordering and integrating of life in all its aspects. In the material order this has the form of ethics and a number of chapters are devoted especially to the values in the economic realm.

Professor Yu Wujin in Chapter V, "The Loss of the Subject and the Disorder of Values: Critical Reflections on Present Cultural Research," opens this issue in response to those who would attempt to respond to the difficulties of modernity by suggesting a return to the past. For Yu Wujin there is need not only of permanent values which can be learned from the past, but of economic and social developments. These were achieved centuries ago in the West and need now to be implemented in the East as a basis for substantive progress. To those who would say that we need to learn from the past, he would add the need to grasp the historicity and the essence of the life-world in which we are now situated.

He adds other cautionary notes, pointing out that the whole world does not move forward at the same pace, although modern commerce and communication spread styles and ideas at lightening speed. This has two implications for developing nations. Negatively, there is danger of a loss of the subject, either by forgetting the present and returning simply to the past, or by a subjective eclecticism in which one selects at random from a broad pattern of possibilities, thereby destroying one's personal and cultural identity. To this might be added a more common phenomenon, namely, simply replacing one's own identity by a pattern of external behavior tailored to another culture and clime. As a result, one lacks a value foundation for one's life and undertakes an unprincipled pursuit of means for unexamined ends, or with no end or purpose at all.

On the positive side, however, Professor Yu Wujin notes that while it may be time to mount a critique of reason in developed Western cultures, in other parts of the world greater rationalization of life is a requirement of progress. In particular he cites the need to bring forward such positive values of modernity as democracy and freedom, creativity and social justice, and truth in its scientific dimensions.

This, however, raises a number of questions. The development of a market economy may well be a major or even *the* major task of our times, but should this goal be made absolute so that all is subjected to it as means? If one adds to the exercise of political power the pursuit of profit under the control of the blind hand of the market, can it be hoped that the result will be humanizing? Or was not Marx correct in identifying the tragic costs of such a development in his times, as was Marcuse in his *One Dimensional Man*? If it be agreed that humans must be ends and not just means, then the "market" is not an adequate formula and there is need for a third dimension, namely civil society, in order to bring forward responsible personal and group action for the human quality of life.

Professor Lu Xiaohe in Chapter VI "Economic and Ethical Values" would want to insist that this is not merely to identify the mechanics or even the economics of the material order, but must integrate as well the ethical ordering of human behavior. This would not be seen as an external superposition upon business and other economic activities, but rather a more wholistic view of life which integrates the economic order within a larger frame of reference.

Chapter VII by Professor Charn Mayot, "An Approach to Business Ethics: Fact-based Value for Fair Trade," would broaden Adam Smith's suggestion that business is directed simply to profit in order to include not only the internal and external set of stakeholders properly speaking, but the social responsibilities of business in the broader social life.

Chapter VIII by Professor Wang Miaoyang, "Sustainability and a New Civilization," extends these concerns to the environmental order with special attention to the evolving sense of the need to maintain physical nature at least at its present level for future generations. This requires a sense of environmental and ecological values. Beyond this there is need for a development and extension of the sense of fairness, which in turn can take place only within a broad social renewal. All of this

would seem to be beyond our hopes for human perfectibility were it not for the fact that the present attention to the environment is unintelligible unless substantial human progress already was taking pace.

Chapter IX by Professor Xu Hongxing, "The Basis of Economic Values in Chinese Traditional Culture," grounds this value structure in the history of economic development in China. But on the question of which is cause and which effect, Professor Wang Miaoyang would seem to have the stronger position by urging not that the material order is externally ordered by ideal values, but that the effort of humanity to perfect its life reaches out to include not only the human body, but the physical universe. This is not to subject the human to the material in pursuit of purely physical or economic goals as would classical materialism. Rather, he would unite both in a broader, more historical vision characteristic of our times.

Part III on "The Spiritual Basis of Values" turns the issue around. Rather than beginning from the material dimension of reality which has been so strongly advocated in both positivist and Marxist contexts, this section reflects the spiritual dimension which both is found in the ancient traditions and presently is being revivified as the dynamic force of renovation and new life. It is the "step back" of Heidegger to what was forgotten or left undeveloped during the valiant effort to develop the mechanical instruments of modern life and which now promises to be most transforming and innovative for the future.

James Loiacono begins this exploration in Chapter X, "The Dignity of the Human Person as the Basis for Community: Pope John Paul II's Contemporary Catholic Anthropology." He shows how on an existential basis it becomes possible to overcome the series of dualism which long have bedeviled philosophy and which Professor Liu Fangtong identified as characteristic of the modern mind. In this light J. Loiacono analyzes the anthropology of John Paul II. This is an existential evolution of the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition integrating the new subjectivity with objectivity to heal modern dualisms. In a series of deft strokes Loiacono shows how multiple and changing things depend in their entirety upon — and hence reflect — their Creator; how this source is one rather than a dualism of good and evil; and hence how the creatures which derive therefrom are in principle good rather than evil. Further, he emphasizes the unity of human nature in contrast to the modern dualisms of spirit and matter which imposed a choice of one in contrast to the other, leading thereby to idealism or materialism. In contrast, John Paul II would stress the unity of human nature so that all that is material about the human person has the dignity of a free and self responsible being, while all that is spiritual about the human person is realized in time and space.

Central to this is a new phenomemologically developed sense of the human person which reanimates the classical and more objective sense of the person as an existing substance of a rational nature. Phenomenology makes it possible to intensify and extend the notion of rational nature to a broader sense of human subjectivity and intentionality. In this way the human life, classically stated as existing in its own right by the terms substance and supposit, can now be seen more explicitly as free and responsible self-affirmation with others in this world.

The chapter proceeds further to show how the transcendence of the human person reflects the creative power of the infinite Source and the enlivening love of the divine Goal. One can begin to appreciate the true dignity and exciting vocation of human freedom situated between these two. Moreover, in this context there appears the true significance of ethics, not as limitation, but as orientation calling persons and peoples beyond self-interest to a positive and cooperative harmony.

Chapter XI by Professor Andrew Woznicki, "Being and Values," continues this project at once mining and developing the philosophy of the human person by examining in depth the themes of subjectivity, participation and transcendence in modern thought. Together Chapters X and XI

explain in depth the new contemporary sense which Professor Liu Fangtong identified in his opening chapter. There he saw these elements as constituting a distant utopia for Marx which was blocked and even subverted by the scientistic approach of modernity. Elsewhere Professor Woznicki has shown how these were given full play in the writings of John Paul II and bespeak a deep renewal of human life for the millennium now beginning. If so then these two major modern thinkers — Marx and John Paul — were much less opposed than is generally thought; more deeply understood they are amazingly complimentary within the broader human effort.

Chapter XII by Huang Songjie, "Making Religion Ethical: The Value Orientation of Religion in Contemporary Society," relates this more explicitly to religion which he describes well. From the ethical perspective of Chinese culture he is able to bring out with special sensibility the contribution of the moral role of religion to public and private life. As he proceeds in this direction he sees this ethical contribution as supplanting the ascetic and contemplative elements in religion which predominated in the past. It might be asked, however, whether it is not precisely these transcending elements of religion which enable the human person to overcome self-absorption as is required for the realization of an ethical life and for taking up the wholistic outlook indicated by Professor Wang Miaoyang as both characteristic and required for social life today.

Chapter XIII by Professor R. Balasubramanian, "The Basis of Values in a Time of Change," is a magnificent analysis of the great riches of the ancient Hindu tradition on these very topics. Perhaps nowhere is the spiritual character of human life and its foundation in the Absolute plenitude of being more firmly advanced or more intensely analyzed.

Professor Balasubramanian begins by responding to the dualisms or tensions in life from the classical *advaita* (nondual) position of Shankara. This roots all in the Self, which in order to operate in space and time employs the lower self. The latter is rooted in the higher Absolute Self. This is not a distant reality after the manner of Plato, but the deeper, foundational reality reflected in Paul Tillich's notion of the Divine as "Ground of being." In turn, it enables Professor Balasubramanian to stress the permanence or perdurance of values as grounded in, and expressing, non-temporal Being. But as the temporal cannot create the eternal, it is necessary to read the former in terms of the latter, rather than vice versa.

Grounding this in the sense of the self Professor Balasubramanian strikingly echoes themes presented by the chapters of Loiacono and Woznicki as characteristic of the work of the present Pope. Moreover, he takes up carefully the ontological, axiological and epistemological work called for by Liu Fangtong in his opening chapter of the present work. On that firm basis the chapter proceeds to the issue of values in order to identify and reconcile their permanent and developmental aspects.

Chapter XIV by Professor Veerachart Nimanong, "Renewal of Thai Buddhist Belief in *Kamma* and Rebirth," is parallel to the previous chapter, but written in terms of the Buddhist tradition. Chapters XIII and XIV thus constitute an outstanding review of the rich resources of the Asian spiritual traditions.

Part IV "Values and Asian Cultural Traditions" continues their study of Asian cultures as the complexes of values and virtues which emerge from the life experience of peoples. At the same time these constitute the context within which people find the modes of their human interaction and progressively develop thereby the life of their human communities. The first four chapters of this Part concern the distinctive cultures of various East and South East Asian cultures, to which should be added the above Chapters XIII and XIV on Hindu and Buddhist culture. The remaining chapters concern the possibility of diverse cultures for living together.

The issue of Thai philosophy is treated in Chapter XV by Professor Kirti Bunchua, "Is There a Thai Philosophy?," and in Chapter XVI by Professor Soraj Hongladarom, "The Prospects and Justification of Thai Philosophy." Chapter XV illustrates some distinctive content in the Thai understanding of the principles of life and meaning which need to be thematized on a more formal philosophical structure. Chapter XVI suggests moreover that a Thai philosophy needs to be done from within a culture and for a culture, even when done by someone who is not a legal Thai citizen or by a Thai studying the philosophies of other cultures.

Chapter XVII by Professor Nguyen Trong Chuan, "Changes of Values during the Renovation Period in Vietnam," identifies specific values and virtues in Vietnamese culture such as patriotism and respect for scholarship and social rank. It also discusses the present transformations rooted in the emergence of market values.

Chapter XVIII by Professor Fang Songhua "The Modern Significance of Chinese Traditional Culture," reflects the critique of tradition which was characteristic of the May 4th Movement. This should be balanced by the critique of modernity described in Chapter I by Liu Fangtong as the root of Marx's humanism and now broadly accepted as contemporary thought.

Chapter XIX by Professor Vincent Shen, "Existential Relationships and Optimal Harmony: Philosophical Foundations for Values in a Time of Change," goes most deeply into the Chinese tradition to draw forward the elements for its contemporary renewal. This focuses on three basic values of the culture, namely, society or one's fellow humans, the physical universe and the transcendent. The analysis of each of these identifies its classical Chinese characteristics and its relevance for present and ongoing development.

Through a Confucian ethics of virtue, an individual could realize harmony with his fellowmen; through Taoist life praxis, human beings eventually could achieve harmony with nature; through multiple Christian ways in everyday life, religious rites or mystic grace, an individual could return to his original harmony with God. In thus deepening these three levels of existential relations, keeping each free and in peace, together they could form a maximum degree of harmony. Upon the existential relationship and the inner dynamism towards this ultimate harmony can be based a viable value system suitable for this time of rapid change and radical social conflict.

Part V of this volume concerns the possibility of relations between cultures. In Chapter XX, "The Change of Society and the Exchange of Values," Professor Zhang Qingxiong begins this study by pointing out the importance of transcending self-interest and illustrates the possibility of so doing. He notes perspicaciously, however, that the level of communication and interaction between cultures now requires corresponding developments in epistemology and metaphysics.

Chapter XXI by Professor Zhang Rulun, "The Lifeworld and the Possibility of Intercultural Understanding," draws especially upon Edmand Husserl's phenomenology of life worlds and stresses their incommencurability. He sees, but rejects rightly, two ways out of this. One is Husserl's move to a transcendental ego which would surpass the distinctive subjectivities from which this incommensurability emerges, the other is the simple imposition by the more powerful culture of its life style upon others as if it were universal rather than particular. If neither of these is justified or ethical then there remains the need to recognize the distinctiveness of the other and to employ the imagination to grasp it positively and to appreciate its relations to others.

Chapter XXII by Professor Yu Xuanmeng, "On the Unity of Pluralistic Values," recognizes this pluralism as a fact, but also notes how it can lead to conflict, especially in a world of increasing communication and interaction between peoples. He sees then the need for common and universal values. But he notes that these cannot be the limited self-interests of the economic or political order because these are divided between peoples, and left to themselves would generate conflict. Instead

the commonly shared values which are needed are not relative, but absolute and hence able to be shared by all. By a phenomenological analysis he points to the need for an absolute foundation in order to relate not only to oneself but, beyond oneself to others and to the environment. With Vincent Shen and indeed as a recurrent theme since Chapter I above he would point then to the need for developments in metaphysics and epistemology if such values are to be understood and lived.

This is the challenge to philosophers of values in this time of change.

Part I
The Present Shift in Cultural Values

1.

The Contemporary Transformation of Chinese Marxist Philosophy

Liu Fangtong

Hardly anyone in Chinese academic circles now would simply deny that the study of contemporary Western philosophy could positively promote the development of Marxist and contemporary Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, many questions should be probed further. For example, the research level of the studies of contemporary Western philosophy in China has been risen gently and some research results in special spheres, such as phenomenology, even could be compared with those in the West. However, these studies seem not yet to have been used to promote the studies of Marxist and Chinese traditional philosophy; indeed they tend to be separated therefrom. This means that people have not yet a clear understanding of the relation between them and that there is need to probe more concretely into such questions as the following:

- Whether the formation and development of contemporary Western philosophy is an important progressive and revolutionary change in the history of philosophy?
- Whether in the basic pattern of their philosophic thinking they have points in common with Marxist philosophy?
- Whether, in the development of Marxist and Chinese philosophies as we come to the 21st century, it is important to relate to the achievements of contemporary Western philosophy?

This paper will discuss these questions in terms of the transformation of philosophy.

Western Philosophy in Contemporary vs Modern Times

In order to evaluate more appropriately contemporary Western philosophy on the whole, we first must weigh the meaning of the transformation of thought patterns in the development of Western philosophy since the second half of the 19th century.

Many scholars of Western philosophical schools since that time declared one after another that they were opening a new direction for the development of philosophy. Toward the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, there have been, for example, the negation and critique of Nietzsche and others of the rationalistic tradition; the call of Dilthey and others for a methodology of the sciences of the spirit as distinguished from that of the natural sciences; the call of the pragmatists to replace the inquiries about material or spiritual essences by the study of real life and practice; the effort of the phenomenological and existentialist movements to turn to the non-reflective world or to human existence; the appeal of such analytic philosophers as Frege and Wittgenstein to turn philosophy into an analysis of the use of language and its meaning; the suggestion of hermeneutic philosophers to take philosophy as the explanation of texts; the proposal of postmodernism to deconstruct traditional philosophy, and so on. All announce that they had changed the direction of the development of Western philosophy. The concrete implications of these proposals were varied, but they have in common an effort to critique some basic ideas of traditional and especially modern philosophy and to replace them with contrary ideas. They hope thereby to change the direction of the development of Western philosophy and to differentiate contemporary from modern Western philosophy. Opinions vary on whether or not the change is

positive, even revolutionary, but a comparison of modern with contemporary philosophy suggests a positive answer.

The Modern Epistemological Transformation of Western Philosophy and Its Implication

In the past Chinese philosophical circles usually categorized modern philosophies from Descartes (and even from the Renaissance) to Hegel as capitalist ideology in its formative period. In different ways and degrees, most opposed religious theology and medieval scholastic philosophy as deprecating rationality and built upon faith. Instead philosophers of this period generally advocated a rational humanistic spirit and centered philosophy around the human being. The philosophic system of Cartesian rationalism which was the typical expression of this spirit corresponded to the scientific spirit emphasized in the emergence of modern natural sciences. All kinds of natural sciences arose at that time to study nature as an object and to do so the rational human consciousness. As the victory of natural science would be precisely the victory of rationality, this epoch in the history of Western philosophy came to be called the age of reason.

This promotion of rationality entailed an important epistemological change in the development of Western philosophy. Philosophers at that time established a rational epistemology and methodology to guide people's actions and all of real life. While taking the question of the essence of the world and the relation between people and the world as central, the theoretical form of their philosophy was quite different, both from ancient philosophy based in perceptual intuition and from medieval philosophy based on the subordinate relation of people to God. Especially, the modern spirit consciously differentiated between people as cognitive subjects and the world as object, i.e., it contrasted mind and body, spirit and matter, thinking and being. It sought out both how subjects know and effect the object and how the object effects and is expressed by the subject. The basic question of philosophy was manifestly the question of relation of subject-object, mind-body, spirit-matter, thinking-being. For the development of Western philosophy this was a new and higher stage.

The Defects and Contradictions of Modern Western Philosophy and the Emergence of a New Transformation

While achieving great progress, modern Western philosophy remained shrouded in a series of serious defects and contradictions. First, the advocacy of reason became so extreme as to constitute a superstition or blind faith; the omnipotence of God was replaced by the omnipotence of reason which directs in order to control, even in an arbitrary manner. Philosophical systems built on the rationalistic principal often were transformed into a system of speculative metaphysics. Secondly, while overcoming the intuitive character of ancient philosophy through advocating rational (reflective) thinking, modern Western philosophy fell into a dualism as the result of separating the subject and object, mind and spirit, and so on. This dualism led to a dogmatism and skepticism opposed to rationality.

Modern philosophy began by placing the human being at its center: it rejected the limits of the old tradition and authority with the intent of developing in an integrated manner the human personality and creativity, freedom and dignity. However, the separations of subject-object, mind-body and spirit-matter, along the tendency toward speculative metaphysics, led its conception of the human being either into a machine without flesh, blood or soul, or into a link in a metaphysical system merely as the external expression of the concept "human being." As a result its intended

human subjectivity and creativity, freedom and dignity, etc., were dispelled or melded into a rational speculative system, whereby modern philosophy changed into its opposite.

This one-sidedness and contradiction in modern Western philosophy has been called by contemporary philosophers fundamentalism, essentialism, logos-centrism, etc. All express the common philosophical pattern of establishing a comprehensive system of metaphysics as the foundation of all knowledge. This pattern of philosophical thinking was inevitable in that historical epoch and played a positive role in promoting the development of modern Western society and its mental culture, including philosophy. Nevertheless, its defects and contradiction were revealed even from the beginning by philosophers such as Pascal who lived in the time of Descartes, the enlightenment thinker Rousseau, the Italian philosopher Vico, and the German romanticists, especially Kant.

Only the social and cultural environment of those times enabled this condition to exist and even develop. Since the middle of the 19th century, however — following such radical and pervasive changes as the replacement of the classical by the natural sciences as the epistemological basis of thought — the one-sidedness and contradiction of this thought pattern has become ever more conspicuous.

It now must be replaced by a new thought pattern, which means that a new transformation must appear in the development of Western philosophy. The revolutionary change in philosophy realized by Marxism during the middle of the 19th century is an outstanding example of this transformation. The series of new philosophical schools which appeared since that time have been contrary to the direction of modern philosophy; they can be called contemporary philosophy and in various degrees express this transformation.

The Transcendence of Western Contemporary Philosophy over Modern Philosophy

Without any doubt, there is one-sidedness and even error in the theories of contemporary philosophical schools and philosophers. At times they abandon some positive elements of modern philosophy and indeed go backward to some degree. However, a comparison of the general theoretical direction of contemporary philosophy with modern philosophy shows that the former transcend the latter to some degree and in some important respects.

First, most schools of contemporary Western philosophy carry on the critique of Kant and others of traditional metaphysics and reject attempts to establish comprehensive philosophical systems or to take philosophy as the science of science. Although this restricts the sphere and function of traditional philosophy and even dissolves the latter to some degree, it is still very important progress in philosophy. Along with the formation and development of various special sciences, it is necessary more and more to escape philosophy's control of, or even substitution for, the function of the sciences.

People must study again the meaning and function of philosophy. In response to this demand contemporary Western philosophers advance their own views of philosophy: as method of life and action, or scientific methodology; as clarification and expression of the meaning of language and text; as transcending the world and the human being itself to probe the ultimate concern; or as cultureology or post-philosophical culture that transcends the studies of metaphysics and humanities, etc. Although there is some one-sidedness in these opinions, most are new and worthy inquiries into the meaning and function of philosophy, and of the transcendence of modern metaphysics as systematic philosophy.

Second, contemporary philosophers in the West hope mostly to abandon the tendency toward dualism as the foundation of modern epistemology. They do not simply negate the differences and relations between subject and object, mind and body, spirit and matter, thinking and being, but emphasize only that people must take them not as separated but as united processes dominated by the active and creative action of the human being as subject. The so-called "Copernican revolution" of Kant transcended the separation of subject and object, as well as the opposition between empiricism and rationalism and other dichotomies. His theories that practical reason is higher than theoretical reason and about moral freedom also transcended the limitation of the epistemological pattern of philosophy centralized upon the methodology of the natural sciences. Nevertheless, he left an unbridgeable gap between phenomena and the thing-in-itself, between theoretical reason and practical reason. This did not overcome, but in a sense even strengthened, the tendency toward dualism.

Many contemporary Western philosophers attempt to overcome these problems of Kant through emphasizing the activity and creativity of the subject. While sometimes going to an extreme, they attempt to overcome dualism and dogmatism. Some propose taking human practical activity as the starting point of philosophy instead of a dualism of subject and object, or going to the united real life-world rather than to a world in which subject and object are separated, and thereby to transcend dualistic patterns of philosophy.

Third, many contemporary philosophers study and bring to light the non-rational spiritual activity of the human being in various directions and at various levels. They attempt to differentiate such studies of the spiritual activity of human beings as social history and psychology, etc., and then to establish a methodology of these spiritual sciences different from that of the natural sciences. While sometimes going to an extreme, nevertheless their studies criticize the one-sidedness of absolutized and solidified reason, reveal more levels and characteristics of the spiritual activities of human beings, and enlarge and deepen their understanding. Like rational activities, these original spiritual activities, which have not been changed and solidified by reason, are an important door to the world of real life and to perfecting the understanding of the human being. Their study is very important and transcends traditional rationalism.

Fourth, modern Western philosophy began from proposing a humanistic spirit. However, its thought pattern of speculative metaphysics and dualism inevitably objectivized people at the cost of their authentic personality, that is, they were alienated. Contemporary philosophers in Western countries call mostly for understanding the existence of human beings and the value and meaning of their activities. They propose to take the human being as goal rather than means, as the center of philosophy rather than as some special link or part. The fundamental road of philosophical reconstruction is back to human beings. Although also having its one-sidedness, this theory advocates a new humanistic spirit. At least, it reveals and criticizes more deeply the alienation of the human being in Western society and the shortcomings of traditional humanism.

This transcendence of contemporary over modern Western philosophy is not a change in a special theoretical view, a special school or a special philosophy, but a transformation of the theoretical pattern of thinking which has general meaning for the development of Western philosophy. In other words, it is a very important and basic change in the object and method, as well as in the goal of philosophical research. Many contemporary philosophers have been studying and re-establishing philosophy in a manner different from the modern philosophical pattern of thinking with the aim of breaking away from its straits and opening new roads for the further development of philosophy. Generally speaking, their philosophy could coordinate the political, economic and cultural development of Western society, especially with regard to various problems

arising from the speed of the development of the sciences and technologies during this epoch; they have important progressive meaning. Compared with modern philosophy, the appearance of contemporary philosophy means that the development of Western philosophy reaches a new and higher stage.

The Relation of the Contemporary Transformation of Western Philosophy to the Revolutionary Change of Marxism

There are very important differences, of course, between the contemporary transformation of Western philosophy and the revolutionary change of Marxism in philosophy. However, both are modes of negation and transcendence with respect to modern philosophy. They have some common points in their social and historical conditions as well as in ideological and cultural background. The cause that leads modern philosophy in pursuit of its goals is also the main source that brought into being both contemporary Western philosophy and Marxist philosophy. There is hardly any serious contention over this in Chinese philosophical circles. The questions that need to be studied and discussed further are only whether these two philosophies in their negation and transcendence with regard to modern philosophy are in fundamental mutual opposition or share some more important common nature.

Opposition to the Modern Pattern of Philosophical Thinking

There is an important view, generally approved in the past in Chinese academic circles that Marxism founded the scientific system of dialectical materialism and historical materialism by abandoning the idealism and metaphysics of traditional and especially modern philosophy, while critically inheriting their materialism and dialectics. At the same time, contemporary Western philosophy, rejecting both materialism and dialectics, inevitably went backwards to idealism and metaphysics. Therefore, although the two philosophies both negate and transcend modern philosophy, they are quite different in their negation and transcendence, and indeed quite contrary vis-a-vis each other. While in Marxism there was a revolution in philosophy, in contemporary Western philosophy there has been no progress, but only retrogression. In recent years, although more and more people recognized that there are rational elements in contemporary Western philosophy, the basic point of view described above still persisted with some scholars, especially those who majored in Marxist philosophy. The main reason for this is that those scholars interpreted the philosophical transformation of these two philosophies from the point of view of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking.

From this modern point of view one looks into the essence and origin of the world to found a system for the whole; this system is based upon a dualism of subject and object, mind and body, spirit and matter. Taking the opposition between materialism and idealism as the base line of philosophical development, it is difficult to say that the emergence of contemporary Western philosophy is progress in philosophy, because it not only opposes various materialisms, but through opposing dualism, also calls for canceling fully the issue of the subject-object, spirit-matter, thinking-being and other relations as criteria for dividing materialism and idealism. In other words, it negates the foundation where materialism could exist. Its negation of foundationalism, essentialism and a substance-ontology extends as well to materialism.

If one takes the turn towards to materialism as the cardinal standard for evaluating contemporary Western philosophy, its value would be only negative. If one takes the revolutionary

change in philosophy realized by Marxism as having founded only a thorough-going materialistic system, there would be only basic opposition between these two philosophies. If people attempt to find the common points between these two philosophies through seeking elements of materialism in contemporary Western philosophy, not only would they probably not succeed, but they would misunderstand or twist the true meaning of contemporary philosophy.

But transcending and rejecting the materialism and idealism which is characteristic of the dualisms of subject-object, spirit-matter and thinking-being is just one of the basic features of contemporary Western philosophy as a new philosophical pattern distinct from modern philosophy. We can say that in a sense more elements of materialism are confirmed in contemporary philosophy, and that people departing from modern materialism would find more of the real concerns of materialism in contemporary thought.

In brief, following the modern pattern of philosophical thinking, people would necessarily take these two philosophies as basically contrary. In recent years, in their evaluation of contemporary Western philosophy, many Marxist philosophers often felt puzzled; though they did not intend to entirely negate these philosophies it was difficult critically even to draw some rational elements therefrom. The main reason for that is probably that they themselves have not transcended the limits of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking.

From Modern to Contemporary Patterns of Philosophizing

In order to insist upon the true Marxist point of view in philosophy and correctly to explain its relation with contemporary Western philosophy, we must transcend the modern pattern of philosophical thinking, and turn to one that is contemporary.

The central approach to explaining Marxist philosophy according to the modern pattern of philosophical thinking has been to sum it up as a theoretical system consisting of some general laws which can reflect all phenomena in nature and society. Based upon these laws one could work out all the special laws in every realm. This reduces Marxist philosophy to a system that makes a thorough inquiry into the foundation and essences of all beings and of understanding and which then constitutes the ground of every science and of all knowledge. These are precisely the basic ideas of modern philosophy in establishing its theories. Although people emphasized the principle differences between Marxist philosophy and modern philosophy, and sometimes their explanation of Marxist theories transcended the doctrines of such modern philosophers as Hegel, Feuerbach and others, they could not transcend the basic theoretical pattern of philosophical thinking on which the doctrines of modern philosophy were formed. That is to say, they still understood and constructed Marxist philosophy in terms of the thought pattern of traditional metaphysics, according to which people look into the origin and essences of everything and take these as the foundation of their every activity and of all knowledge. As the result, inevitably they deviate from Marx's progress in philosophy and fall back to the level of traditional metaphysics.

What then is the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking expressed by Marxism; in other words how did Marxism sublate and transcend modern philosophy and found a new philosophy which constitutes a revolutionary change in philosophy? This is a very complicated question that should be studied and discussed at various dimensions and levels. Nevertheless, we can confirm that Marxism is part of the effort found also in contemporary Western philosophy to transcend modern thought. For throughout his lifetime Marx radically criticized and insisted upon overcoming the following tendencies of modern Western philosophy: speculative metaphysics, especially the attempt to found a comprehensive system and to take philosophy as a science of

sciences; the tendency to absolutize rationality and the oppositions of subject-object, spirit-matter, thinking-being; and the tendency to treat human beings as means.

The new philosophy founded by Marx after sublating all old philosophy is not only different from past philosophy in its concrete theoretical points, but more importantly it is a thorough break with the premises from which all the old philosophies began. It was concerned not to disclose the material or mental origins of the world, nor to found a strict and full theoretical system for the entire world, but to face directly people's practice and real life. The point of view of practice is the most important and basic. It is not to take practice as origin and substance, nor to attempt to found a comprehensive philosophical system based upon practice, but adequately to develop the activity and creativity of human beings, to promote human freedom and full development. How practice is to be understood as the central conception of Marxist philosophy entails many questions, but we must at least confirm that practice is neither simply material nor spiritual action, but a united action which includes both. Practice is not only perceptual or rational, but the unity of both: it is subjective as well as objective; it is the unity of subject-object. What is coordinated with practice is not only cognition, but also feeling and suggestion — practice is the unity of the three. We can say in a sense that the main reasons why modern philosophy fell into one-sidedness, contradiction and confusion was its neglect of, or inability correctly to understand, the meaning of human practice. Marxism, through deeply disclosing and integrally explaining the meaning of human practice, thoroughly transcended traditional metaphysics and realized a revolutionary change in philosophy.

The Unity and Difference of Marxist and Contemporary Philosophies in Transcending Modern Philosophy

In brief, do not take substance as origin, but take practice as the base and starting point; do not found a comprehensive philosophical system, but transcend all ossified and closed systems and return to the real lifeworld; do not depend on arbitrary reason and its dualisms of subject-object, spirit-matter, and then lead human being into one-sidedness and alienation, but return to living persons united in cognition and feeling, as well as in belief, that is, to concrete and complete persons; moreover, open wide the road for human freedom and creativity. All these are the main points where the modern pattern is transcended by the new pattern of philosophical thinking.

When re-examining the transcendence of contemporary Western philosophy over the modern, one finds that this transcendence does not overstep the boundary of the transcendence realized by Marxism. In other words, the transcendence by various schools of contemporary philosophy from various angles over the impasses and contradictions of modern philosophy was pointed out earlier by Marxism.

In terms then of the transcendence of modern Western philosophy, there is a great similarity between contemporary Western and Marxist philosophies. The two could be said to seek the same end in different ways; both belong to the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking.

This does not mean that there is not an important, even principal, difference between them. Compared with Marxist philosophy, many schools of contemporary Western philosophy often are more one-sided and contradictory in their transcendence over modern philosophy. Sometimes, they repeat and even develop its impasses and contradictions. For example, mostly they radically reject the tendencies of traditional philosophy, but often they confuse reasonable inquiry by metaphysics into truth and ideals with their own absolutizations and then simply negate those inquiries. Meanwhile, they themselves have no choice but to reconstruct some metaphysics in new forms. While incisively and vividly revealing and criticizing the dogmatism and absolutism of traditional

philosophy, they sometimes neglect or even reject the role of reason and then fall into the other extreme of some form of relativism and irrationalism. They point out various defeats of the dualism of subject-object, spirit-matter and especially the objectification and alienation of human beings, and stress development, activity and creativity, but they fall into a subjectivism for lack of considering objective reality. Generally, there are serious limitations in contemporary Western philosophy's transcendence of modern philosophy. There is transcendence only in some individual factor or direction and to some degree, while in other factors or directions they often fall into the old frame of traditional philosophy.

In contrast the transcendence by Marxism of modern philosophy is not simple negation, but a confirmation of what is true and a rejection of what is wrong, i.e., a critical assimilation. While overcoming various modes of the one-sidedness of traditional philosophy, Marxism could avoid falling into another one-sidedness. Based on assimilating the reasonable and positive heritage of past philosophy, it should and could realize a new leap in philosophical development. In this sense Marxism transcends both traditional and contemporary Western philosophy.

How to Treat Marxist Philosophy and Contemporary Western Philosophy

If the above discussion of the contemporary transformation of Western philosophy and the revolutionary change in philosophy by Marxism be accepted in general, at least two important conclusions follow.

Firstly, we can keep our confidence in Marxism, but not in an ossified Marxism: While Marxist philosophy on the whole transcends both traditional and contemporary Western philosophy, more comprehensively and deeply it expresses the features of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking and integrates more the demands of contemporary society in its various respects. We should have a clear idea also of its complications and should not for that reason lose our belief in it. The most important concern is to have a comprehensive understanding of what Marxism truly is. We should not explain Marxism in the modern pattern of philosophical thinking that was sublated by Marxism, but recover its original meaning as the typical form of the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking. In recent years the reputation of Marxist philosophy has been injured, and some have lost their confidence in it. One of the main reasons is that it was understood in terms of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking which misrepresented its original meaning. Thus represented, the theory fell inevitably into various predicaments and even into crisis like the older modern philosophy which Marxism transcended. Only by revealing and overcoming such misrepresentation could people recover their belief in Marxism.

Secondly, we must conscientiously study and audaciously learn from contemporary Western philosophy. If we recognize that contemporary Western philosophy generally transcends modern philosophy, is a higher stage in the development of Western philosophy, and shares much with Marxist philosophy in its expression of philosophical thought, we should re-examine and re-evaluate some contemporary theories which often were simply negated in the past. These theories may be expressions of some kind of transcendence over modern philosophy and may play an important progressive role in the development of philosophy. Generally speaking, the advances of contemporary over modern Western philosophy have not overstepped the boundaries of Marx's own transcendence, but in some aspects it may have more abundant and penetrating content. Considering that Marxist philosophy was distorted and ossified for a long time, and that some of the transcendence which it should have realized could not in fact take place — sometimes it even

was dragged back into the modern pattern of philosophical thinking — it is very important to assimilate the valuable contents of the advances realized by contemporary Western philosophy and add then to what is insufficient in Marxism in order to promote its overall development. In this sense, we could say that to study and to learn from contemporary Western philosophy are indispensable for the enrichment and development Marxist of philosophy.

The Contemporary Transformation of Western and Chinese Philosophies at the Entrance to the 21st Century

How to establish and develop Chinese philosophy for coordinating Chinese society at this entrance into the 21st century is a question that could and should be studied from various levels and angles. For example, as China is a socialist country which chose Marxism as the guiding principle for almost everything, to develop Chinese philosophy means first to develop Marxist philosophy in a manner adapted to the special environment of China. As China is a country with an excellent thousand year old cultural tradition, Chinese philosophy must inherit and develop the original cultural legacies of China. Further, as contemporary Chinese society is experiencing deep changes in almost every important realm, in order for Chinese philosophy to develop it must coordinate with these changes. Various directions and levels must be studied concretely, but I will be concerned only that these studies be connected with understanding the modern-contemporary transformation of Western philosophy.

In Order to Develop Marxist Philosophy in China Western Philosophy Must Be Re-examined and Re-evaluated

We have seen above that to be enriched and to develop Marxist philosophy in China must re-examine and evaluate contemporary Western philosophy. Here I would add only that, as the tendency to understand Marxist philosophy according the modern pattern of philosophical thinking was specially strong in China, in order to recover its original features as a contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking, we must the more study and learn from contemporary Western philosophy which has transcended modern philosophy in various directions and levels.

In China, Marxist philosophy has undergone very important and creative development, but the tendency to deviate from its original meaning, especially the danger of dogmatism and ossification, was also very serious for a long time. The reasons for that are manifold. From the theoretical viewpoint, this was connected with the fact that we could not factually understand the meaning of the contemporary transformation of Western philosophy, and wrongly took it as antagonistic to the revolutionary change of Marxist philosophy. Such modern philosophical characteristics as dualism and dogmatism were copied as they included elements of materialism and dialectics, while simply negating some contemporary philosophical elements which transcended the modern pattern of philosophical, thinking that they belonged to idealism. Time and again the critical movements against Western trends launched by authorities radically criticized content that expressed to some degree the spirit of contemporary philosophy. This is especially evident in the critique of pragmatism.

Among contemporary trends in Western philosophy, pragmatism was reproached for preaching compromise and eclecticism, emphasizing practical benefit, and ignoring principle. Some Marxist critique of this is appropriate. However, pragmatism is also a philosophical school with characteristics of contemporary philosophy, and it is necessary that this be treated factually.

For example, one of the evident features of the theories of Dewey and others is to reject the metaphysical dualisms of subject-object and substance-ontology, and to insist that philosophy and the sciences be shifted to the lifeworld, i.e., the world of experience. Moreover, experience is taken neither in a material nor in a spiritual sense, but as a mutual relation of the human being and his or her objective world, which is both subject and object, both spirit and matter. Experience is not substantial being, but activity and a process of interaction, i.e., of human life and practice. Pragmatists do not generally negate the being-in-itself of the world beyond experience, but insist that it be taken as an object of philosophy and sciences. Starting from here, they consider that philosophers should not establish systems of material and spiritual substance beyond experience, and hence should not expound materialism and idealism in this sense, but should make of philosophy a methodology for the real life and practice of human beings, and indeed of being human. Although there are various onesidednesses in their theories, they move beyond the limits of the understandings of experience and reality of traditional metaphysics, and thus have some of the characteristics of the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking. Compared with modern philosophy, pragmatic theories have more points in common with Marxist philosophy. Hence, though generally rejected as subjective idealism, we should be more positive and learn from them.

The situation of the critiques of other aspects of pragmatism and of other schools of contemporary philosophy is similar. The main result was that people's attention was reoriented from concrete life and practice to general and abstract conceptions of matter and spirit, from a transcendence of modern philosophy back into it. This meant that in the name of defending Marxism people confounded what was right and wrong in modern and contemporary Western philosophy, and especially its transformation. As a result, in some aspects Marxist philosophy was distorted as being similar to modern metaphysics.

In Order to Perdure and Develop, Traditional Chinese Philosophy Must Re-examine and Evaluate Western Philosophy

There are three main reasons why in order to perdure and develop traditional Chinese philosophy must re-examine and evaluate Western philosophy:

Firstly, this inheritance and development was stipulated under the guidance of Marxism. The latter is among the products of Western philosophy, and its wealth and development in contemporary time remain connected with Western philosophy. Therefore, in order more correctly to understand Marxism, people must conscientiously study Western philosophy.

Secondly, this inheritance and development corresponds with the demands to realize Chinese modernization and to establish socialism with Chinese characteristics. Traditional Chinese philosophy and culture were based on individual, narrow and small-scale agricultural economics; it was restricted by the patriarchal clan system and the social constructs characteristic of the integration of family and country. Although a very rich and excellent inheritance, this cannot respond to contemporary demands and hence must be reconstructed. It is essential critically to absorb Western philosophy and contemporary culture for this reconstruction.

Thirdly, this inheritance and development must face the world and the future. Therefore, Chinese philosophy and culture must be open and able to dialogue and interchange with Western countries. This means also that it is necessary for Chinese philosophy and culture to link up with Western philosophy and culture.

Linking and Intermixing Chinese and Western Philosophy Is the Only Way to Develop Philosophy in China for the Coming 21st Century

Both for China and the whole world, coming to the 21st century means that there will be deep changes in the development of science and technology, economics and culture, and the orientation of all sectors of social life. The condition of philosophy will require the same. The direction of the development of philosophy for the 21st century is being discussed very earnestly in philosophical circles both Chinese and Western, but their answers differ. As for the concrete forms of the development of philosophy in the 21st century, it is very difficult to judge exactly. However, it may be necessary to draw together and unite different types of philosophy, including various trends and schools of Western philosophy, Marxist and non-Marxist, with oriental, especially Chinese, philosophy.

If one takes the 19th and 20th centuries as radical, antagonistic and conflictual, then, along with the non-reversible end of the Cold War humanity now faces common problems and the 21st century may be characterized by peaceful competition and dialogue. Antagonism and conflict will not disappear very quickly; they could at times be very radical in special spheres, but they can be peacefully resolved only through dialogue and consultation. Under such circumstances, radical antagonisms in the philosophical realm could relax to some degree, while consultative discussion would be received by more and more people. In fact, this tendency is beginning to appear in Western philosophical circles. More and more philosophers not only are transcending the opposition between various trends and schools, but also are finding common language between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy. This does not mean that various philosophical schools should forsake their own position, but only that each school or philosopher not take one's own viewpoint as absolute, but show a more open and tolerant attitude toward others. As an open type of philosophy, Marxism also should pay attention to friendly dialogue with non-Marxist philosophies and absorb all worthwhile ideas from them, while keeping its own point of view.

For a long time in academic circles issues of the relation between oriental and Western cultures as well as between Chinese and Western philosophy have been objects of intense, even heated, argument. There are many reasons why it is very difficult to arrive at common understandings. The differences in historical and cultural tradition and in thought patterns as well as related biases and misunderstandings of each other are among the main reasons. Generally, while Western countries were rising and at the summit of their modernization, their thinkers had no doubt about Western philosophy and culture as characterized by the spirit of rationality and science, whereas they often ignored and evaluated poorly the excellent oriental philosophy and culture. When China and other oriental countries were in a so-called pre-modern period, their thinkers could not have a profound understanding of Western philosophy and culture. Under such circumstances, it was very difficult to interrelate oriental/Chinese and Western culture and philosophy.

Now, however, as world history is coming to the 21st century, Western countries have experienced the various serious contradictions and crises in "modern" philosophy and culture; they have lost their past superstition regarding rationality and science. Therefore, they look for ways to transcend them, and even to search oriental culture in order to find a way out. Meanwhile, oriental countries have come to a period of "modernization"; people there have a more profound and broad understanding of the spirit of rationality and science which appeared early in the West, even in ancient Greece and demand their original inheritance. In such circumstances, the two parties feel that they should and could find a bridge to link them. Therefore, though the past several centuries

have been times of conflict between oriental/Chinese and Western culture and philosophy, the coming 21st century should be a time of linking and of convergence.

If the above analysis be admitted, then Chinese philosophy in facing the 21st century will be open in type, that is, under the guidance of Marxist philosophy it will absorb and include every worthy theory. Such a philosophy, based on inheriting its excellent traditional legacy, will link up with the characteristics of Western philosophy in the spirit of modern-contemporary times. Western philosophy will become an important resource enriching and developing Chinese philosophy. Traditional Chinese philosophy, overcoming various limitations and developing, will be a treasure of world philosophy. Exporting what is excellent in the Chinese philosophical legacy to the world and importing the contemporary spirit of Western philosophy probably will be the way of philosophical development in China. The new philosophy, re-founded on this base, will transcend both traditional Chinese and Western philosophy.

2.

Process as a Basis for Philosophy in a Time of Change

Warayutha Sriewarakul

Introduction

The saying that old ways die hard seemed to be correct in the past, but seems obsolete in our time of extremely rapid change. All experience change and cannot avoid it for it happens everywhere not only in cities, but also in villages. The only thing certain is change itself. Though it obviously is inevitable, quite a few try to resist or even to stop it. Some in Thailand, especially those who are considered conservatives, are quite worried about change that happens in the country. Their main concern is the mutual relationship among villagers; they feel that wherever electricity and water through pipes reach, brotherhood or fraternity disappears or fades away to be replaced instead by money. However, this paper will deal not with the question: How should we deal with change? but with the question: What should be an appropriate basis of values in a time of rapid change?

Descartes compared physics with the trunk of a tree and metaphysics with its root. If we do not want weeds to grow in our garden, we need to get rid not only of their trunks, but also their roots, for if the roots are not pulled out, the weeds can grow up again. Similarly, if we want to deal with bases of values, we can in no way escape the metaphysical points of view since metaphysics is the root or basis for all values. Thus if we would like to change the world, we need to change its metaphysics.

The task of philosophy is not only to understand the world, but to change it; as Marx put it: "Hitherto philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the thing, however, is to change it." Since change is inevitable, we need to change our metaphysical system. A metaphysical system which is closed with no place for change eventually will die.

This suggests that we look into process philosophy as possibly providing an appropriate metaphysics for a time of change. Historically speaking, modernity originated in the Western world. Monk summarizes modernization as composed of five elements: 1. urbanization, 2. atomization, 3. rationalization, 4. differentiation, 5. institutionalization of an innovative attitude.1

For some people modernity seems to come to an end or at least is in need a deep transformation. Modernism is severely challenged by the postmodernism now popular especially in Europe which Portoghesi refers to as: "A spectre is roaming through Europe." Postmodernism means different things to different persons. For example, according to Lyotard, postmodernism does not refer to a return, flashback or feedback, but to analysis, anamnesis, analogy, and anamorphosis.2 For some people, postmodernism means the rejection of modern European theology, metaphysics, epistemology authoritanism and colonialism. To others, it refers to the attempt to destroy Western civilization. To others, it refers to a collection of hermeneutically obscure writers who are talking nonsensically about nothing at all. To yet others, it refers to so many different kinds of intellectual, social, and artistic phenomena that it is a mistake to search for a single meaning applicable to all instances of the term.3

Cahoone divides postmodernism into three types: historical, methodological, and positive.4 Historical postmodernism argues that modernity is at an end or at least is undergoing deep transformation. Methodological postmodernism rejects the possibility of establishing the

foundations of valid realist knowledge. Positive postmodernism is supposed to offer alternative, though almost none appear from postmodern thinkers. One postmodernist who proposes an alternative to modernity is Professor Rorty. In his book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* Rorty suggests that hermeneutics replace epistemology. But Rorty does not consider himself as a postmodernist, but only a neo-pragmatist: he "does not use the terms modern and postmodern and might very well object to them."5 Thus, if it offers no alternatives, Stiver seems correct when he says:

Derrida offers no escape from the endless play of difference in texts. Foucault offers no escape from the endless play of violent power. . . . The greatest value of these philosophers' work lies in its role as "ideology-critique."6

In this sense Professor Habermas is correct when he considers postmodernity as a radical critique of reason and confirms that Nietzsche is a turning point.7 Yet, though postmodernism, like koans in Zen Buddhism, offers no positive alternatives, it is valuable in that it helps us begin serious reflection on our current ideologies. If postmodernism offers no alternatives, is there then any school of thought which does so in our time? We would suggest here that Process philosophy is one among the appropriate bases.

Relations

We may divide human relations into four kinds: ethical, moral, ecological and religious. Here ethics means a system of beliefs or propositions in which one is related to him/herself in terms of the question: "What should be the *summum bonum* or the highest good?" Morality is a code of conduct or behavior for relations between people; its fundamental question is: "How should one do unto others?" In ecology the relation is related to nature and the fundamental question is: "How should one do unto nature or the world?" In religion to the transcendent or, for the Christians, to God and the fundamental question is: "How should one do unto God?" These relations fall into this schema.

Kinds of Relations between

1. Ethical persons and themselves
2. Moral persons
3. Ecological persons and nature
4. Religious persons and God

As we already know, the Golden Rule for all Christians is to love God and to love our neighbors as ourselves. If we interpret this Golden Rule according to Thomas's classical theism, then Christianity has "no place" for nature, and we are expected to love only ourselves, others and God. Nature being ignored, is "raped" by consumerist societies or by societies that adopt what professor Bunchua calls the fourth paradigm.8 But if we interpret the Golden Rule according to Hartshorne's process philosophy, we would have "place" for all.

The Concept of God

Hartshorne notes that theology demands that God be supreme, while religion adds that God must be a being worthy of worship. "To discuss God is, by almost universal usage, to discuss some manner of `supreme' or `highest' or `best' individual (or super individual) being. As a minimal definition, God is an entity somehow superior to other entities" (Hartshorne, 1963: 323). However, in order to be adequate, theology must defend a concept of God which is able to preserve the values which religion emphasizes. Hartshorne says: "By religious value I mean the power to express and enhance reverence or worship on a high ethical and cultural level" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 1). Hartshorne believes that only his panentheism, or neoclassical theism, provides a theological concept of deity which can guarantee or preserve the desired religious values.

Philosophers and theologians who discuss the concept of God usually believe in God's existence. Thus, instead of asking themselves, or trying to answer, the question whether God exists, they deal with other questions which come after their belief in God. Traditionally, there are five major questions concerning the concept of God: "Is God eternal? Is he temporal? Is he conscious? Does he know the world? Does he include the world?" (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953: 16). The affirmative answers to these questions may be symbolized as follows:

E Eternal - in some (or, if T is omitted, in all) aspects of his reality devoid of change, whether as birth, death, increase, or decrease

T Temporal - in some (or, if E is omitted, in all) aspects capable of change, at least in the form of increase of some kind

C Conscious, self-aware

K Knowing the world or universe, omniscient

W World-inclusive, having all things as constituents

"If all the five factors are asserted together, ETCKW, they define the doctrine we call 'panentheism' (also 'surrelativism')" (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953: 16). Hartshorne's panentheism answers the above questions as follows:

1. God is eternal in the sense that some aspects of his reality are immutable. First, God's superiority is immutable. No matter what happens, all entities are always inferior to God. Second, though some aspects of his reality are affected by his creature, others are not. "In this he is completely independent of any given creature" (Sia, 1985: 42).

2. God is temporal in the sense that some aspects of his reality are changeable. Whereas all his creatures may change by increasing or decreasing in value, God can only increase. God can and everlastingly does surpass himself and all other creatures. He cannot become inferior to any other creature, even to himself (Sia, 1985: 40). God increases his knowledge (Sia, 1985: 40) and his "aesthetic" perfectibility because "in the process view there is no final totality of definite events, but a new totality each moment" (Hartshorne, 1973: 136).

3. God is conscious in that he is the maximal compound individual with the highest degree of awareness (Hartshorne, BH, 1975: 172).

4. God knows the world or cosmos in the sense that he knows everything there is to know, but he knows and will know actualities as actual and potentialities as potential. Omniscience means "clear, certain, adequate knowledge whose content is all that is as it is" (Sia, 1985: 68).

5. God includes the world in the sense that he has all entities as his constituents. In other words, God exceeds the world and both have always been in interaction.

Answering all the five questions positively, Hartshorne could define God as "The Supreme Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, knowing and including the world" (Hartshorne, PSG, 1953: 17). The Table shows how Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of God is different from its traditional rivals,

ETCKW The Supreme is Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and including the World. Panentheism. Plato, Sri Jiva, Schelling, Fechner, Whitehead, Iqbal, Radhakrishnan

EC The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, not knowing or including the world. Aristotelian theism

ECK The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Classical Theism. Philo, Augustine, Anselm, al-Ghazali, Aquinas, Leibniz

E The Supreme as the Eternal beyond consciousness and Knowledge-Emanationism. Plotinus

ECKW The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing and including the World (so far as "real"). Classical Pantheism. Sankara, Spinoza, Royce

ETCK The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Temporalistic theism. Socinus, Lequier

ETCK (W) The supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, particularly exclusive of the World. Limited panentheism. James, Ehrenfels, Brightman

T (C) (K) The Supreme as wholly Temporal or emerging Consciousness. Alexander, Ames, Cattell

T The Supreme as Temporal and nonconscious: Wieman

(Hartshorne, PSG, 1953: 17)

Regarding the relation between God and the world, here we will deal with only three schools from the above table: classical theism, pantheism and panentheism. At least three assumptions are commonly acceptable to all three schools:

1. The existence of God
2. The existence of the world and its constituents
3. The relationship between God and the world

All three schools are completely in accord with God's necessary existence in spite of different senses.9 The pair of metaphysical categories which distinctly separates the three schools from one another is "absolute-relative." The table indicates the differences clearly.

Absolute Relative Schools

Classical Theism x
Pantheism x
Panentheism x x

According to classical theism, God is absolute in the sense that he is completely independent of the world. Though the world and all creatures are created by God, God and the world are totally separated. In other words, we can say that God excludes the world. The total exclusion of this kind may be shown in the form of a schema.

God The World

However, for the classical theist, though God, who is spirit, totally excludes the world, he "is a person without a body, who exists every-where, that is, is omnipresent" (Swinburne, 1993: 99). Moreover, though God causes everything to exist, he is absolutely free in that he is never influenced by any other creature, nor by his own action at the previous time. As Swinburne puts it: "God is perfectly free in that nothing . . . acts from without on him to determine or in any way influence how he will act; nor does he act at one period of time so as causally to influence how he himself will act at another" (Swinburne, 1994: 128).

Pantheism, on the contrary, identifies God with the total system of all changing things and consequently denies his absolute, transcen-dent, or independent nature. For pantheists God includes the world in the sense that God and the world are one and the same.

God=The World

Since God and the world are identical, God is not absolute and transcendent but relative and immanent. Though he still can be regarded as a cause or reason, God is related to all changing things in that all changing things or modes derive from him by necessity. For pantheists God, the world, and nature are just different names for one and the same substance. All other entities, including human beings, are but modes or accidents of the divine substance. Spinoza states:

When I say that I mean by substance that which is conceived through and in itself; and that I mean by modification or accident that which is in something else, and is conceived through that wherein it is, evidently it follows that substance is by nature prior to its accidents. For without the former the later can neither be nor be conceived.10

For Hartshorne both classical theism and pantheism are unsatisfactory because both schools consider God in monopolar terms. As a result, the classical theist and the pantheist are forced to accept only one pole of contrary attributes and disregard the other. While the classical theist considers God as abstract, absolute and transcendent, the pantheist considers Him as concrete, relative and immanent. According to Hartshorne, both classical theism and pantheism could not arrive at the most comprehensive concept of God. Unlike classical theism and pantheism, his panentheism or neoclassical theism can include both poles of contrary metaphysical categories. Panentheism can include "absolute-relative," "transcendent-immanent" and "abstract-concrete" within God's nature. To compare panentheism with the other two, let us take a look at a schema.

God
The World

According to panentheism, God includes the world, not in the sense that God and the world are identical, but in the sense that God exceeds or is greater than the world. For Hartshorne only his panentheism can solve all the problems that confront classical theism and pantheism. We may divide God's absoluteness into three views: 1. God is absolute in all aspects; 2. God is absolute in some aspects; and 3. God is absolute in no aspects. While 1 and 3 are extreme, 2 is not. 1 and 3 are the views of classical theism and pantheism respectively, 2 is Hartshorne's view. Hartshorne rejects classical theism and pantheism because they both lead to unsolvable problems. Classical

theism, on the one hand, fails to describe the relation between God and the world consistently. Hartshorne argues that "If, then, God is wholly absolute, . . . it follows that God does not know or love or will us, his creatures" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 16). Since to know or to love means to be influenced, if God loves the world, then he is influenced by the world. If God is influenced by the world, then he is not totally absolute. But for classical theism God is totally absolute; therefore, he is not influenced by the world. Then it follows that God does not know or love the world. Hence if God knows or loves us, then he is not totally absolute as the classical theist understands.

On the other hand, pantheism fails to grasp the aspect of God which is absolute in the sense that some of his attributes are not influenced by, or independent of, all other creatures, for example, his power and his goodness. Hartshorne says: "The error of most pantheists has been to deny the externality of concrete existence to the essence of deity. They have not realized that the inclusive actuality of God, which includes all *de facto* actuality, is as truly contingent and capable of additions as the least actuality it includes" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 89). Hartshorne, then, develops his panentheistic concept of God. His thesis is that God has two aspects, one abstract and the other concrete, and that divine perfection applies to both, but in ways appropriate to each. Hartshorne summarizes:

If "pantheism" is a historically and etymologically appropriate term for the view that deity is the all of relative or interdependent items, with nothing wholly independent or in any clear sense nonrelative, then "panentheism" is an appropriate term for the view that deity is in some real aspect distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items. Traditional theism or deism makes God solely independent or noninclusive. Thus there are logically the three views: (1) God is merely the cosmos, in all aspects inseparable from the sum or system of dependent things or effects; (2) He is both this system and something independent of it; (3) He is not the system, but is in all aspects independent. The second view is panentheism. The first view includes any doctrine which, like Spinoza's, asserts that there is a premise from which all acts are implied conclusions. . . . Panentheism agrees with traditional theism on the important point that the divine individuality, that without which God would not be God, must be logically independent, that is, must not involve any particular world (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 89-90).

In order to understand Hartshorne's panentheism clearly, we may compare it with a theory in the history of physical optics. By analogy, classical theism may be assumed to parallel Newton's *Opticks* which taught that light was material corpuscles. On the other hand, pantheism may be assumed to parallel a paradigm that derived ultimately from the optical writings of Young and Fresnel in the early 19th century which taught that light was transverse wave motion. While the first two schools seize upon one set of contrasting attributes and disregard the other, Hartshorne's panentheism, paralleling quantum physics which holds that light is photons that exhibit some characteristics of waves and some of particles,11 is the synthesis of the two sets of contrasting attributes. In his own words, Hartshorne says:

As the long argument between those who said that light was corpuscular and those who said it was a set of waves seems, in our time, to have ended with the admission that it is both, in each case with qualifications, so the longer argument between those who said: "There is nothing higher than relative being (and thus either there is no God or he is relative)," and those who said, "There is a

highest being who is absolute," is perhaps to be ended by showing a way in which both statements may consistently be made (Hartshorne's DR, 1948: x).

Thus Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of God is the most comprehensive among its rivals. The absolute aspect and the concrete aspect make God dipolar. For Hartshorne relativism and panentheism are the same doctrine with only a difference of emphasis (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 90).

The main thesis, called Surrelativism, also Panentheism, is that the "the relative" or changeable, that which depends upon and varies with varying relationships, includes within itself and in value exceeds the nonrelative, immutable, independent, or "absolute," as the concrete includes and exceeds the abstract. . . . It follows that God, as supremely excellent and concrete, must be conceived not as wholly absolute or immutable, but rather as supremely-relative, "surrelative," although, or because of this superior relativity, containing an abstract character or essence in respect to which, he is indeed strictly absolute and immutable (Hartshorne's DR, 1976:ix).

Hartshorne's law of diporality is so central that to defend it means to defend panentheism itself. This law is one of Hartshorne's most distinctive contributions to philosophy. Allan puts these:

Hartshorne's axiom of dipolar divinity is surely his most distinctive, and most controversial, contribution to philosophy. He follows Whitehead's lead, but has elaborated the notion and its implications in ways that carry him far beyond the brief *obiter dicta* of his sometime mentor. *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God*, his first book-length presentation of the matter, has rightly become a classic in the philosophy of religion (Allan, 1986: 293).

The law of dipolarity paves the way for panentheism to overcome the dilemma confronted by both classical theism and pantheism. In panentheism God is immanent in and includes the world of changing, dependent entities, and is simultaneously an absolute, independent pole which transcends the world.

Advantages of Panentheism

With Modern Physics: An Organic View

First, Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of God seems to be compatible with modern physics, which holds a view of the world very similar to the views held by Eastern mystics. According to Eastern mystics — whether Hindu, Buddhist or Taoist — all entities and events perceived by the senses are interdependent and are but different aspects or modes of the same ultimate reality (Capra, 1983: 24). Where the classical physicist or the Newtonian saw the world as a multitude of separate objects and events, the modern physicist "has come to see the world as a system of inseparable, interacting and ever-moving components with the observer being an integral part of this system" (Capra, 1983: 25). In other words, whereas the classical physicist saw the world as "mechanical," the modern physicist sees it as "organic" (Capra, 1983: 24). Correspondingly, whereas the classical theist has seen God as a ruler who directs the world from above, Hartshorne views "God as the Fellow-traveller" who promises to be with his creatures forever (Aquino, 1994:

6). In other words, whereas the classical theist views God as "absolutely independent," Hartshorne views God as "social" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 25).

Unlike the classical theist, Hartshorne holds that God is not outside reality since God as social includes the world which has reciprocal interaction with him, but simultaneously, unlike the pantheist, he does not identify God with the world since there is so much that is evil and unholy in the world. The panentheistic concept of God seems to be compatible with the concept of God appearing in *the Brihad-aranyaka Upanishad* (3.7.15):

> He who, dwelling in all things,
> Yet is other than all things,
> Whom all things do not know,
> Whose body all things are,
> Who controls all things from within,
> He is your Soul, the Inner Controller,
> The immortal.

Surprisingly, Hartshorne's panentheism and Capra's *Tao of Physics* seem to go hand in hand. Both doctrines argue against Greek atomism and Newtonian mechanism. Both Hartshorne and Capra disagree with the Greek atomists who drew a clear line between spirit and matter, picturing matter as being made of several "basic building blocks." For the Greek atomists the basic building blocks or atoms are purely passive and intrinsically dead particles moving in the void (Capra, 1983: 21) while for Harshorne atoms are "living" entities which have freedom or creativity like all other sentient creatures. Thus Hartshorne comments:

> There is another lesson to be drawn from Greek atomism. This is that the Greek bias in favor of being as more basic than becoming expressed itself not only in Parmenides's denial of real change, in Plato's exaltation of his eternal forms, or Aristotle's doctrine of the Unmoved Mover (or his denial of evolution) but equally in the origins of materialism. Only Heraclitus among the Greeks saw what countless Buddhists in Asia saw (though the Mahayana branch of Buddhism seriously compromised the insight), the primacy of becoming. And Greek thinkers could not quite assimilate becoming into their total view, though Plato and Aristotle tried to do that very thing (Hartshorne's IOGT, 1983: 19).

Hartshorne developed panpsychism and panentheism through the adoption of becoming or process. In a process view, experience is always of experience. As he puts it:

> Process is experiencing, mostly in nonhuman forms, but including the eminent form. Experiencing always has data or things experienced. In a process view, concrete data can only be other processes, other experiences. Experience is always of experience or "feeling of feeling." I held some such view long before I knew about Whitehead (Hartshorne, 1973: 130).

God as an eminent experience or process includes all other experiences or processes. The relation between God and his creatures is, hence, genuinely internal. The way God as social includes the world and all creatures is like the way the living body includes its living cells. God and his creatures interact with each other the same way the living body has interaction with its living cells. That is the reason why Hartshorne considers God as Creator-Creature. This view is

compatible with the view of modern physics which parallels the views of Eastern mystics. As Capra puts it:

In modern physics, the universe is thus experienced as a dynamic, inseparable whole which always includes the observer in an essential way. In this experience, the traditional concepts of space and time, of isolated objects, and of cause and effect, lose their meaning. Such an experience, however, is very similar to that of the Eastern mystics. The similarity becomes apparent in quantum and relativity theory, and becomes even stronger in the "quantum-relativistic" models of subatomic physics where both these theories combine to produce the most striking parallels to Eastern mysticism (Capra, 1983: 81).

Logic of Polarity

Second, compared to its rivals, Hartshorne's panentheism conforms to the most rigorous analysis. Hartshorne's concept of God is the result of a long evolution of human understanding of God. As already mentioned, he was deeply influenced by Whitehead. Whitehead has come so far on the concept of deity, then Hartshorne has come further. In order to see how far Hartshorne's remark:

Whitehead . . . knew fairly well what the Church Fathers had had to say on the subject; he was also acquainted with Plato's and Aristotle's ideas of deity, and the views of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, and Bradley. He had some knowledge of Hindu, Buddhist, and Chinese religious thought. As a son of a Church of England clergyman (and brother of a bishop) he doubtless knew what "God" usually meant to churchgoers and was familiar with the Scriptures. He had done some reading in the anthropology of religion. . . . Thus he was to a considerable extent on his own in working out an alternative to the standard metaphysical concept of deity as it had prevailed for about 18 centuries, to some extent since Aristotle (Hartshorne's WVR, 1981: 11).

Hartshorne has come further than Whitehead in that it is Hartshorne who made the full elaboration of a philosophical theology and resolved some unresolved problems in Whitehead's theism.12 Both Whitehead and Hartshorne view classical theism and pantheism as the two extremes. Both realize that the two extremes finally confront unresolvable difficulties. Where the classical theist faces the problem of God's supremacy, the pantheist faces the problem of God's personality. Hartshorne, hence, suggests the law of polarity, which he says he has taken over from Morris Cohen (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953: 2). According to this law, "ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly one-sided assertion of (ultimate categories such as) simplicity, being, actuality and the like, each in a "pure" form, devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality and related categories (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953: 2). This law maintains that the two poles stand or fall together. Neither pole is to be denied or regarded as unreal. If neither pole is real, the contrast itself is also not real (Sia, 1985: 46).

However, the two poles are asymmetrical: what is concrete includes what is abstract, and not vice versa. Consequently, metaphysical categories as exemplified by concrete realities are always to be found in pairs. No concrete individual is merely simple, but is also complex. There is no such thing as a pure effect. The same entity is, in another aspect, also a cause. No concrete entity can

be considered merely as necessary, for in a different context it can be also considered as contingent (Sia, 1985: 46).

Applying this law to God, Hartshorne can describe Him in such dual terms as "relative-absolute," "contingent-necessary," "effect-cause," "changeable-unchangeable," and "time-eternity." The law of polarity or the principle of dual transcendence places God not on either side of the metaphysical contraries, but on both sides. This law makes Hartshorne's logical analysis the most rigorous when compared with those of the classical theist and the pantheist. Whereas the other two schools regard only one pole of the contraries as superior to its correlative, and neglect the inferior pole, Hartshorne regards both poles as real.

In terms of Hegelian logic Hartshorne's panentheism may be considered as thesis and antithesis respectively. But this must not make us misunderstand, for Hartshorne's principle of dual transcendence is not identical to Hegel's dialectical logic. As Hubbeling puts it: "The relation between the two contrasts is not that of a conjunction, but that of an inclusion: not A and B, but A in B" (Hubbeling, 1991: 359).

In terms of Peircean categories, which Hartshorne may prefer, Hartshorne's panentheism may be regarded as Thirdness (generality) while classical theism and pantheism as Firstness (quality) and Secondness (reaction) respectively. To see this clearly, we may put their views into a schema as follows:

Firstness: God as the absolute (Classical theism)
Secondness: God as the relative (Pantheism)
Thirdness: God as the absolute in the relative (Panentheism)

Hartshorne's principle of dual transcendence, in some sense, seems compatible with Taoist logic which holds that the two poles are interdependent.13

Time

Third, Hartshorne's panentheism conforms to the new metaphysics of time. It is not exaggerated to assume that the Christian tradition is the outcome of Jerusalem and Athens. Most (if not all) Christian thinkers agree that we have a supernatural knowledge revealed by God, though they are not at all of one accord in the contribution of natural knowledge (Miller, 1972: 119). In terms of natural knowledge, the notion of time is no exception. It was some early Greek philosophers who established the dichotomy between change and permanence and identified change with time and permanence with timelessness. This view of time also established the distinction between substances as permanent and accidents as contingent and changeable (Baltazar, 1973: 147). The classical theist views time as did the Greeks. According to Greek philosophy time was seen as negative. It was not thought of as evolutionary or productive. "Rather, things are destroyed in time, which is therefore negative" (Baltazar, 1973: 149). Plato viewed time as unreal because it is just a "moving image of eternity."14 For Plato things in time are mere shadows or copies of the eternal ideas or forms which are empty of contingency and change. For Aristotle time can be regarded as a numbering process associated with our perception of "before" and "after" in motion and change.15 Aristotle realized that the relation between time and change is a reciprocal one: without change time could not be recognized, whereas without time change could not occur (Whitrow, 1988: 42).

In Plotinus's metaphysics, the sensible world is derived by a fall from the One, and time is nothing but the measure of this degradation (Baltazar, 1973: 149). Even though there was no

unique Greek idea of time, the Greeks viewed time as negative. Since time was viewed as essentially negative and contingent, it would be contrary to the nature of God. Hence God's eternity would have to be thought of as absence from time or timelessness, not as endless time (Baltazar, 1973: 150). Similarly, for classical theism "God is eternal" always means "God is timeless."

Hartshorne agrees with this notion of eternity. But he distinguishes between eternity and immortality. Whereas eternity is identical to timelessness, immortality is the same as everlastingness. In contrast to the Greek view of time, Hartshorne, like other modern thinkers, regards time as positive and evolutionary. He uses the modern notion of time with God's concrete aspect. Since time is positive and evolutionary, "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is less concrete than our God now" (Hartshorne, 1973: 133). For Hartshorne, whereas pastness is determinate actual reality, future events are indeterminate potential reality. "The future is the as-yet-uncreated, the partly unsettled or indefinite, that concerning which choices are decisions still to be made, and even now in part are being made. Of course, therefore, the future lacks the full reality or definiteness of the past" (Hartshorne, 1967: 251). But this does not mean that there is nothing at all determinate about it. There must be some determinateness, or else there will be chaos. The determinateness of the future is caused by "will-be's" and "will-not-be's." The nearer the future is to us the more determinate it appears. "That is the reason why at times the future can be predicted, since there are laws which . . . can be observed as having occurred in the past yet have application to the future" (Sia, 1985: 63-64). Hartshorne maintains that time unites determinate, actual past reality with indeterminate, potential future reality. Thus it would appear that the past is indestructible or immortal. In application of this notion of time to God, it follows that God knows more at any one moment than at the preceding moment. That is the reason why he says that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is less concrete than our God now.

Unhappy with Hartshorne's application of the new notion of time to God, the classical theist would argue against it. Contemporary classical theists realize that: "Because the thought pattern of modern man is historical and evolutionary a relevant theology today must adopt the evolutionary pattern of thought" (Baltazar, 1973: 145). Nevertheless, they argue that:

The process philosophers and theologians of the Whiteheadean tradition . . . speak of the temporarility of God. . . . To speak thus is closer to the view of the Scriptures than is the Hellenic view of God's atemporality. Unfortunately, these thinkers equate temporality with finitude, growth, and contingency, so that God is said to grow. . . . Consequently, in predicating temporality of God, they are forced to hold that God grows and is contingent, while at the same time holding his ontological priority as the infinite and the absolute (Baltazar, 1973: 153-154).

What the classical theist fears is God's growth since the divine growth implies his non-absoluteness in the classical sense. But this is a misunderstanding. For Hartshorne even though God is changing in some aspects, he is still absolute. We must not forget that for Hartshorne God is dipolar. While his concrete pole is relative, i.e., changing and related to his creatures, his abstract pole is absolute. By absoluteness Hartshorne means immutability and independence. There are some aspects in God which do not change. First, God's superiority is immutable. He remains superior to all other creatures, no matter what. And since God is not only actually superior to all other creatures, superiority is one in principle (Sia, 1985: 42). Second, God's capacity to be affected by his creatures does not preclude him from having attributes which are unaffected. In

this sense he is completely independent of all other creatures (Sia, 1985: 42). Hence, when Hartshorne says "God grows," what he means is merely:

God can increase in value simply by acquiring new content in the awareness with which he enjoys the new world-states as they come into being. He is not stronger or better or holier, but only richer in experienced content. The gain is aesthetic, not ethical or in power (Hartshorne, 1973: 119).

Religious Values

Fourth, Hartshorne's panentheism can guarantee and preserve the values upon which religion insists. The values upon which religion insists are divine love and goodness. Hartshorne believes that neither classical theism nor pantheism can guarantee and preserve these values. It seems obvious that pantheism fails to preserve these values at the outset since the pantheist God is regarded as impersonal. In other words, the pantheistic God is not the God of religion at all. As Ellwood puts it:

Better, according to impersonalists, to understand God as pure being and consciousness without the hindrance of personality — let the Absolute be like an unstained mirror, out of which all things rise and fall, itself untouched by their vicissitudes (Ellwood, 1978: 153).

Love. But God in the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition is personal. Therefore, the personal monotheist "can speak of God as having a sense of purpose, as loving, as being the eternal friend" (Ellwood, 1978: 153). The personal monotheistic view of God is closer to the view of the Scripture which holds that "God is love" (I John 4:8), than is the pantheistic view. Both Hartshorne and the classical theist are personal monotheists, so they both agree that God is personal. But, as we have already seen there is a significant difference between their views of God. While the classical theist holds that God is a person (Swinburne, 1994: 126), Hartshorne maintains that God is but a social person or compound individual.

Since Hartshorne and the classical theist see God differently, they see divine love differently. Since the classical theist views God as absolute in all aspects, he or she has to make a distinction between earthly love and heavenly love. God's love is heavenly love which is "like the sun's way of doing good which benefits the myriad forms of life on earth but receives no benefits from the good it produces." But this seems to be quite a misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, even though the sun is considered as the center of the solar system, it both affects and is affected by the earth and all other planets which are its subordinates. It happens the same to God. If God is absolute in all aspects as the classical theist thinks, he will never be able to love his creatures since "to love" means "to be influenced by." So even though God is supreme like the sun, he is influenced by his creatures if he loves them. For Hartshorne love is "defined as social awareness" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 36). He understands love as adequate awareness of the value of others. Thus God's love is essentially social. Hartshorne says:

The dilemma appears final: either value is social, and then its perfection cannot be wholly within the power of any one being, even God; or it is not social at all, and then the saying "God is love" is an error (Hartshorne, 1963: 327).

For classical theism it is certain that God's love is not social, i.e., not influenced by his creatures. From this it follows that God's love is not love at all. To see this clearly, we may put the argument into a syllogism as follows:

All love is social.
God's love (for classical theism) is not social.
Therefore, God's love (for classical theism) is not love at all.

Good/Evil. Now let us turn to the other value, namely, God's Goodness. According to Hick, in the New Testament God's good-ness, love, and grace are all nearly synonymous, and the most typical of the three terms is love (Hick, 1990: 11). Here the researcher separates divine goodness from love in order to discuss the problem of evil which has created insoluble difficulties for all theists except process thinkers. This problem has been an important tool for atheists to argue against the existence of God. Since it is obvious that evils, both moral and natural, exist, the atheists conclude that God does not exist.

Both theists and atheists accept the existence of evils. However, the difference between them is that for theists the proposition "God exists" is compatible with the proposition "Evil exists," but not for atheists. The problem of evil may be used to argue against pantheism in the form of syllogism as follows:

The world contains a great deal of evil.
God is the world.
Therefore, God contains a great deal of evil.

If God contains a great deal of evil, then he is not perfectly good. If God is not perfectly good, then he is not worthy of worship. It is true that the world contains a great deal of evil. From this it would finally lead to the conclusion that the pantheistic God is not worthy of worship.

Similarly, the problem of evil may be used to challenge classical theism as follows:

If God is perfectly good, God must wish to abolish all evils.
But evils exist.
Therefore, God is not perfectly good.

If God is not perfectly good, then he is not worthy of worship. It is true that evils exist. Hence from this it follows that the classical God is not worthy of worship. The researcher thinks that in so far as God is regarded as absolute in all aspects and creates the world out of nothing, the above argument does not seem to be refuted. Classical theism always considers God as absolute in all aspects who creates the world out of nothing. Therefore, it seems difficult for classical theists to refute the above argument.

Some people think that the problem of evil could also challenge Hartshorne's panentheism. They may argue, as we have already seen, as follows:

If God includes the world, then he includes imperfect entities.
If God includes imperfect entities, then he is imperfect.
If God is imperfect, then he is not worthy of worship.
God includes imperfect entities.

Therefore, he is imperfect and so not worthy of worship.

The above argument sounds correct, but indeed it is not. The proposition "If God includes imperfect entities, then he is imperfect" is not true. If "God includes the world" meant the same thing as "God is the world," then the proposition would be true. For if God is the world and the world is imperfect, the we can deduce that God is imperfect. But "God includes the world" is not identical with "God is the world." Therefore, we cannot deduce that God is imperfect. For Hartshorne "God includes the world" means "God exceeds the world," as he puts it:

One important reason for not giving up the notion that God literally contains the universe is derived from the theory of value. If A contains the values of B and also some additional values, then the value of A exceeds that of B. This is perhaps the only assumption that makes "better" self-evident (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 90).

According to Hartshorne, "God includes the world" does not mean "God creates the world out of nothing." Hartshorne believes that God is "not before but with" the world. Like God, all creatures even atoms have freedom or creativity. If evils happen, then it is their responsibilities, not God's. Thus freedom is considered as the root of all evil and all good. Hartshorne argues:

The root of evil, suffering, misfortune, wickness, is the same as the root of all good, joy, happiness, and that is freedom, decision-making. If, by a combination of good management and good luck, X and Y harmonize in their decisions, the AB they bring about may be good and happy; if not, not. To attribute all good to good luck, or all to good management, is equally erroneous. Life is not and cannot be other than a mixture of the two. God's good management is the explanation of there being a cosmic order that limits the scope of freedom and hence of chance-limits, but does not reduce to zero. With too much freedom, with nothing like laws of nature (which, some of us believe, are divinely decided and sustained), there could be only meaningless chaos; with too little, there could be only such good as there may be in atoms and molecules by themselves, apart from all higher forms. With no creaturely freedom at all, there could not even be that, but at most God alone, making divine decisions about what? It is the existence of many decision-makers that produces everything, whether good or ill. It is the existence of God that makes it possible for the innumerable decisions to add up to a coherent and basically good world where opportunities justify the risks. Without freedom, no risks — and no opportunities (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 18).

As already mentioned, evil, suffering and ambiguity can be justified as necessary conditions for morality to be significant. The definition of evil as a privation of goodness, as proposed by St. Augustine, is acceptable to not only classical theists, but also pantheists and panentheists. It seems that among theists, no matter whether they are classical theists, pantheists or pantheists, the problem of evil has never diminished their belief in God's existence. All theists or believers have a common contention that God's existence is compatible with the presence of evil. Thus the theists or believers usually sympathize with one another on the problem of evil. But this never happens to atheists. Both theists and atheists are competing rivals who never sympathize with each other. Whereas the theists hold a "conjunction" of God and evil, the atheists hold an "either-or" between the two. Surely, the atheists reject the existence of God and accept the presence of evil. And as we have just seen, the atheists can challenge or even refute divine goodness according to pantheism and classical theism by the problem of evil. Thus among the three schools only Hartshorne's panentheism can guarantee and preserve divine love and divine goodness from the attack of the problem of evil. In sum, Hartshorne's panentheism has advantages over pantheism and classical

theism no matter whether we make our judgment from physics, logic, metaphysics or philosophy of religion.

Notes

1. See Robert C. Monk *et al.*, *Exploring Religious Meaning*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 289-191.

2. See Jean Francois Lyotard, "Note on the Meaning of `Post'," in Thomas Docherty, ed., *Postmodernism: A Reader* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 50.

3. See Lawrence Cahoone, ed. *From Modernism to Post-modernism: An Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 1.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

5. David E. Klemm, ed., *Hermeneutical Inquiry* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), vol. 1, p. 22.

6. Dan R. Stiver, *The Philosophy of Religious Language* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 186.

7. See Jurgen Habermas, "The Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point," in Thomas Docherty, *Post-modernism: A Reader* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 51-60.

8. See Kirti Bunchua, *Contextual Philosophy* (Bangkok: Assumption University Press, 1992), pp. 82-104.

9. For Hartshorne, as a panentheist, God exists necessarily in the sense that his existence is of a non-competitive sort, that is, nothing can exist instead of God. God's existence is not a possibility competing with other possibilities. For the pantheist like Spinoza God exists necessarily in the sense that God is the cause of his own existence (*causa sui*). For classical theism there are quite a few opinions. For example, for Aquinas God exists necessarily in the sense that God as pure form must exist or could not exist. For Hick God exists necessarily in the sense that his existence does not depend on anything else. For Swinburne God exists necessarily in the sense that: 1. God does not depend for his existence on himself or on anything else; 2. God exists eternally and imperishably; and 3. God exists at all moments of time since "any time at which any agent acted would be too late to bring about the non-existence of God." See Richard Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 272-78.

10. See Robert Scruton, *Spinoza* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 35-52.

11. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 11-12.

12. See Charles Hartshorne and Creghton Peden, *Whitehead's View of Reality* (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1981), pp. 21-24.

13. See Arthur Waley, *The Way and Its Power* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 143-144.

14. See Plato, *Timaeus and Critias*, trans. by Desmond Lee (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 51.

15. See Aristotle, Physics IV.222b, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, trans. by Richard Mckeon (New York: Random House, 1941)

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3.

Freedom and Cultural Traditions: The Basis of Values and Peace in a Time of Change

George F. McLean

As we come to the close of the 20th century, the turn of the millennium calls for and augurs profound changes. The last millennium has been characterized by an intensive development of human reason. In the West this began in 1000 AD with the reintroduction of the work of Aristotle and was radicalized from 1500 by the age of rationalism and enlightenment. This now has borne its fruits, which in the last century have been both sweet in the improvement of living standards and the emancipation of peoples, and bitter in devastating ideological conflicts both hot and cold.

Now, however, the peoples of the world seem to be moving beyond rationalism to a great project of social reconstruction. This focuses no longer on ideologies and structures, but on people in their natural communities and solidarities, in an effort to become increasingly creative and to take responsibility for their lives. This is, in a way, the utopian vision of Marx as people achieve the conditions of freedom and begin with others to shape their common life after the classical ideals of justice and peace, harmony and cooperation. As a result the focus of attention reaches beyond the political and the economic to include the people. Now, however, they appear no longer as amorphous masses or tools of industry, but as informed and responsible human solidarities acting responsibly, each in its own field. This is the reality called civil society or civil culture emerging as a newly vibrant reality which promises to characterize a post-modern, more globally sensitive, third millennium.

In order to understand this development and how it can be appropriately promoted we will first look back to Aristotle to understand the place of freedom as basic to community; second, consider how this might be redeveloped in ways which surpass the reductionist structures of modern rationalism by taking into account also the more integrative categories of culture and aesthetics, and third face the challenge of how this can provide the normative power needed to weld people together responsibly in a unity that is truly civil both in its members and in their mode of exercising their freedom.

Civil Society as Exercise of Freedom

Aristotle begins his politics, not historically, but by thematically delineating the elements in which political life consists.1 Both however bring us to the same point, namely, that to be political means to govern and be governed as a member of a community. Most properly the political bespeaks governance or directive action toward a goal. This involves both the source and the goal of governance.

First, governance is expressed by the term *arché*, signifying beginning, origin or first source. This is extended to governance in the sense of sovereignty, that is, of directing the community toward a good or a goal while not oneself being necessitated by others. The focus then is not on autocratic imposition of self-serving will, as commonly has been interpreted but the beginning or origin of social action, which takes responsibility for the overall enterprise as characteristically human; it is the exercise of freedom by individuals and groups in originating responsible action. Though most actions of humans at the different inorganic and organic levels can be performed by

other physical realities, it is precisely as these actions are free that they become properly human acts. This issue of corporate directive freedom — its nature and range — is then the decisive issue as regards civil society. How this can be exercised effectively today is the key to the development of civil society for our times.

The second dimension of the issue of governance in Aristotle is its end, goal or purpose. This is indicated in what many have seen as a correction of his evaluation of types of governance. His first classification of modes of government had been drawn up in terms of the quantity of those who shared in ruling. When ruling is seen as a search of material possessions or property, this tends to be an *oligarchy*; rule is by the few because generally only a few are rich. Democracy, in contrast, is rule by the many who are poor.2 Aristotle needed to improve on this basically quantitative division founded empirically on the changing distribution of property, for conceptually there could be a society in which the majority would be rich. Hence, he came instead to a normative criterion, namely, whether governance is exercised in terms of a search not for goods arbitrarily chosen by a few out of self-interest, but for the common good in which all can participate.3 In this light governance has its meaning in terms of the broader reality, namely, the community (*koinonia*) which comes together for the happiness or the good life of the whole. Community supposes the free persons of which it is composed; formally it expresses their conscious and free union with a view to a common end, namely, the shared good they seek.

The *polis* is then a species of community. It is a group which as free and self-responsible joins in governance or in guiding efforts toward the achievement of the good life. In this way, Aristotle identifies the central nature of the socio-political order as being a *koinÇnia politika* or "civil society."

Civil society then has three elements. First there is governance: *arché*, the beginning of action or the taking of initiative toward an end; this is the free and responsible exercise of human freedom. But as this pertains to persons in their various groups and subgroups, there are two other dimensions of freedom, namely, communication or solidarity with other members of the groups and the participation or subsidiarity of these groups or communities within the whole. The key to understanding civil society lies then in the solidarity and subsidiarity of the community as ways in which the freedom of its members is shaped into the governance of life toward the common good.

Solidarity and Community

Through time societies have manifested in increasing diversity of parts; this constitutes their proper richness and strength and brings quantitative advantage. It is important that the parts differ in kind so that each brings a distinctive concern and capability to the common task. Further, differing between themselves, one member is able to give and the others to receive in multiple and interrelated active and receptive modes. This means that the members of a society not only live their freedom alongside each other, but share in the effort to realize the good life through the mutual interaction of their freedom.

Aristotle develops this theme richly in "On Friendship," in Book IX, 6 of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, stressing that the members of a civil society need to be of one mind and heart for the common weal.4 Such solidarity of the members of society is an essential characteristic. Plato used the terms *methexis* and *mimesis* or participation for this, but Aristotle feared that if individuals were seen as but another instance of a specific type persons would lose their reality. Hence, he used the term `solidarity' which recognizes the distinctive reality of the parts.

In the human body, where there is but one substantial form, the many parts exist for the whole and the actions of the parts are actions of the whole (it is not my legs and feet which walk; I walk by my legs and feet). Society also has many parts whose differentiation and mutuality pertain to the good of the whole. But in contrast to the body, the members of a community have their own proper form, finality and operation. Hence, their unity is one of the order of their capabilities and actions to the perfection of the body politic or civil society and the realization of its common good.

Aristotle does not hesitate to state strongly the dependence of the individual's exercise of freedom on the community in order to live a truly human life, concluding that the state is a creation of nature prior to the individual.5 Nevertheless, in as much as the parts are realities in their own right outside of any orientation to the common good of the whole, society ultimately is for its members, not the contrary.

*Subsidiarity and Community*6

But there is more than solidarity to the constitution of civil society. Community in general is constituted through the cooperation of many for the common goal or good, but the good or goal of a community can be extremely rich and textured. It can concern nourishment, health maintenance, environmental soundness; it includes education both informal and formal, basic and advanced, initial and retraining; it extends to nutrition, culture, recreation, etc. — all the endless manners in which human beings fulfill their needs and capacities and seek "the good life." As each of these can and must be sought and shared through the cooperation of many, each is the basis of a group or subgroup in a vastly varied community.

When, however, one adds the elements of freedom as governance (*archê*) determining what will be done and how the goal will be sought, subsidiarity emerges into view. Were we talking about things rather then people it would be possible to envisage a technology of mass production in a factory automatically moving and directing all toward the final product. Where, however, we are concerned with a community and hence with the composite exercise of the freedom of the persons who constitute its membership, then it is crucial that this responsible freedom not be substituted for by a command from outside or from above. Rather governance in the community initiating and directing action toward the common end must be exercised in a cumulative manner beginning from the primary group or family in relation to its common good, and moving up to the broader concerns or goals of more inclusive groups considered both quantitatively (neighborhood, city, nation, etc.), and qualitatively (education, health, religion) according to the hierarchy of goods which are their concerns.

The synergetic ordering of these groups, considered both quantitatively and qualitatively and the realization of their varied needs and potentials is the stuff of the governance of civil society. The condition for success in this is that the freedom and hence responsible participation of all be actively present and promoted at each level. Thus, proper responsibility on the family level must not be taken away by the city, nor that of the city by the state. Rather the higher units, either in the sense of larger numbers or more important order of goods, must exercise their governance precisely in order to promote the full and self-responsible action of the lower units and in the process enable them to achieve goals which acting alone they could not realize. Throughout, the concern is to maximize the participation in governance or the exercise of freedom of the members of the community, thereby enabling them to live more fully as persons and groups so that the entire society flourishes. This is termed subsidiarity. Thus civil society is a realm of persons in solidarity who through a structure of subsidiarity participate in self-governance.

This manifests also the main axes of the unfolding of the social process in Greece, namely:

(a) from the Platonic stress upon unity in relation to which the many are but repetitions, to the Aristotelian-Thomistic development of diversity as necessary for the unfolding and actualization of unity;
(b) from emphasis upon governance by authority located at the highest and most remote levels, to participation in the exercise of governance by persons and groups at every level and in relation to matters with which they are engaged and responsible;
(c) and from attention to one's own interests, to attention to the common good of the whole.

This thought of Aristotle bore great potentiality which would unfold as the sense of being and of person were enriched philosophically in the context of a Christian culture. This is marked by elements of human dignity based upon creation in the image of God and of human community in the image of the Trinitarian sharing of life as knowledge and love.

From Enlightenment Reason to Aesthetic Awareness

Limitations of Enlightenment Rationalism

Today, as much is said of a post-modern global culture, there is an emerging consensus that philosophy may have overreached itself in the Enlightenment in requiring that all be subjected solely to the technical requirements of clarity before human reason. It should have been noted sooner that this requirement led almost immediately to the two contrary results of Anglo-Saxon empiricism and continental intellectualism. Together these constituted a Kantian antinomy manifesting rationalism to be reductionist, and to that degree dehumanizing.

It is essential to diagnose not the symptoms, but the illness in order to undertake the truly new project of the coming millennium. If the Enlightenment in its achievements has in the end come to prove insufficient, what did it omit which now has emerged as essential — and what new dimension of philosophy must now be developed in order to take it into account.

To see this let us return to the birth of modern rationalism. Something philosophically new took place at that time. Attention moved from a concern with things in themselves, whether these be considered forms (ideas) as in Plato or physical realities as in Aristotle. Instead attention focused upon subjectivity in the sense of human awareness and in particular upon ideas in the mind of the one who knows. What we are concerned about when thinking is ideas, notes Locke.7

Moreover, we find a new approach common to philosophers of the period. They thought it not possible to build upon the foundations laid by the millennia of human experience in its multiple forms. Instead each felt it necessary to remove all previous content of human awareness in order to build a new with clear and distinct ideas. Hence, we live the heritage of the great projects of: (a) Descartes in submitting all to doubt except, and in as much as, it could be established in terms of clear, distinct and indubitable ideas; (b) Bacon in smashing all the idols which bore the long acquired wisdom of the tradition and the broad range of human sensibilities; and (c) Locke in erasing all until there remained but the mind and that as a blank tablet. All three would construct an asceptic laboratory. In which there was allowed to enter only the clear and distinct ideas coming alternately in the Anglo Saxon tradition from the senses, or in the continental sense from the intellect. The task of the mind was to construct a new self-understanding using exclusively these materials. These new laboratory humanoids were fascinating and in many ways useful instruments.

However, as became evident in the Cold War the products of these two traditions were unable to comprehend each other, not to mention peoples from non-Western culture. Possessed of great, but less than fully human, powers their potential for destruction was symbolized in their mutual threat to annihilate not only each other but all human kind. What G.B. Vico saw 70 years after Descartes, — namely, that this would generate an intellectual brute — we came to experience bitterly in the hot and cold ideological wars of the last century.

Aesthetic Awareness as a Further Dimension of the Human Spirit

All of this, together with the existential and postmodern critiques of rationalism, suggests that the task of developing a more adequate notion of civil society must be taken up, but on a new, more open and inclusive basis. To do so will require a richer notion of reason and of freedom, capable of integrating the personal dimensions of moral sensitivity in a broader sense of human life and meaning. This is suggested by the new call for civil society. But if it is to be more than a replay of the past the effort to redevelop the notion of civil society must be moved to a new level of freedom: neither to that of mere choice between alternate objects nor to that of the Kantian effort to will as one ought, but to the freedom "to be able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become."8 It is to this, rather than the proceeding two levels of freedom, that Adler's analysis of freedom throughout the history of philosophy adjoins political liberty and collective freedom.

In initiating the decade in which he wrote his three critiques, Kant did not have the third critique in view. He wrote the first critique in order to provide methodologically for the universality and necessity of the categories found in scientific knowledge. He developed the second critique to provide for the reality of human freedom. But when both of these had been written he could see that in order to protect and promote freedom in the material world there was need for a third set of categories, namely, those of aesthetic judgement. These integrate the realms of matter and spirit in a harmony which can be appreciated in terms not of a science of nature as in the first critique, nor of personal freedom as worked out from the second critique, but of human creativity working with all elements to create life and meaning as an expanding and enriching reality.

Kant was facing squarely a root dilemma of modern times, namely: how can the newly uncovered freedom of the second critique survive when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in the *Critique of Pure Reason*? If held to the terms of the first two critiques alone, he faced the following challenges:

- Will the scientific interpretation of nature restrict freedom to the inner realm of each person's heart, where it is reduced at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others?
- When we attempt to act in this world or to reach out to others, must all our categories be universal and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal?
- Must they be necessary, and, hence, leave no room for creative freedom, which would be entrapped and then entombed in the human mind? If so, then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated, repetitive and stagnant.
- Must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated modes of scientific laws? If so, then philosophers cannot escape forcing upon wisdom a suicidal choice between either being traffic directors in the jungle of unfettered competition or being tragically complicit in setting a predetermined order for the human spirit.

Freedom then would, indeed, have been killed; it would pulse no more as the heart of mankind.

Before these alternatives, Kant's answer was a resounding No! Taking as his basis the reality of freedom — so passionately and often tragically affirmed in our lifetime by Gandhi and Martin Luther King — Kant proceeded to develop his third *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* as a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed, in which necessity would be the support and instrument of freedom.

To provide for this, Kant found it necessary to distinguish two issues, reflected in the two parts of his third *Critique*. In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment,"9 he acknowledges that nature and all reality must be teleological. This was a basic component of the classical view which enabled all to be integrated within the context of a society of free people working according to a developed order of reason. For Kant, if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be directed toward a transcendent goal and manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, nature, even in its necessary and universal laws, is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. The same might be said of the economic order and its "hidden hand." The structure of his third *Critique* will not allow Kant to affirm this teleological character as an absolute and self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but he recognizes that we must proceed "as if" all reality is teleological precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in an ordered universe.

If, however, teleology, in principle, provides the needed space, there remains a second issue of how freedom is exercised, namely, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science? This is the task of his "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment,"10 and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the human person, the task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity and especially with structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating.

There is something similar here to the *Critique of Pure Reason* where, under the rule of unity, the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle, namely, one of the abstract and universal categories of the intellect.11 In "The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In contrast, here the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art, the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations — or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this, the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any *a priori* categories, it can nevertheless integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and therefore creative production, as well as scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This is properly creative work. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one's culture, it chooses the values and orders reality accordingly. This is the very constitution and ongoing development of the culture itself; it is the productive rather than merely reproductive work of the human person living in his or her physical

world. Here, I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity one would exist in the physical universe as another object, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. One would be not a free citizen of the material world, but its mere function or servant. In his third *Critique* Kant unfolds how human persons truly can be master of their lives in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bringing being to realization in new harmonies which make possible further growth in freedom.

In order for the realm of human freedom to be extended to the whole of reality, this harmony must be able to be appreciated, not purely intellectually in relation to a concept (for then we would be reduced to the universal and necessary as in the first critique), but aesthetically, by the pleasure or displeasure, the attraction or repulsion of the free response it generates. It is our contemplation or reflection upon this pleasure or displeasure which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved. This is not a concept,12 but the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection.

The Aesthetic as the New Space for Human Freedom: Civil Society

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and its related judgment of taste13 by looking at it ideologically, as simply a repetition of past tastes in order to promote stability. Or one might see it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter at a level of consciousness available only to an elite class and related only to an esoteric band of reality. That would ignore the structure which Kant laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third *Critique*14 which he conceived not as merely juxtaposed to the first two *Critiques* of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt — and, super-eminently, in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons in their many groupings in a pattern of the subsidiarity characteristic of a civil society, and thereby to evoke appropriate and yet varied responses from each according to the circumstances. The danger is that the example of such a genius will be reduced to formulae, become an ideology and exclude innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and under-stood as the work of the aesthetic judgment, their example is inclusive in content and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes from others.

When aesthetic experiences are passed on as part of a tradition, they gradually constitute a culture. Some thinkers, such as William James and Jürgen Habermas,15 fearing that attending to these free creations of a long cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs and injustices of the people, have urged a turn rather to the social sciences for social analysis and critique as a means to identify pragmatic responses. But these point back to the necessary laws of the first *Critique*. In many countries now engaging in reforms, such "scientific" laws of history have come to be evaluated as having stifled creativity and paralyzed the populace.

Kant's third *Critique* points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon beauty or ugliness as things in

themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential.

Freedom as social sensibility, understood not only morally but aesthetically, is both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of being. As spectroscope it unfolds the full range of the possibilities of social freedom, so that all can be examined, evaluated and admired. As kaleidoscope, it continually works out the endless combinations and patterns of reality so that the beauty of each can be examined, reflected upon and chosen when desired. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only scientific forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free and socially varied responses of love and admiration or of hate and disgust.

In this manner freedom exercised in terms of harmony to construct patterns of solidarity and subsidiarity becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is *goal*, namely to realize social life as rational and free, united and peaceful in this world; it is *creative source*, for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for social expression; it is *manifestation,* because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is *criterion*, because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total social response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is *arbiter,* because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this approach to self-realization. In this way, freedom emerges as the dynamic center of the creation of civil society.

Values and Cultural Traditions as the Creative Work of Human Freedom

Our next task is to uncover how human persons in exercising this third level of freedom emerge in the communities of family, neighborhood and people and in so doing create their public life and its culture. This calls not merely for a sociological description of culture as the compilation of whatever mankind does or makes; it is rather the conscious weaving of the fabric of human symbols and interrelations through which a human group chooses to live its unique process of unveiling being in time. This requires attention to a number of specific issues:

1. the nature of values, culture and tradition;
2. the moral authority of a cultural tradition and its values for guiding life; and
3. the active role of every generation in creatively shaping and developing its tradition in response to the challenges of its times.

Cultural Traditions as the Cumulative Freedom of Peoples

If being stands against nonbeing, then living things survive by seeking the good or that which perfects and promotes their life in the sense of Kant's third *Critique* and its description of the work of the imagination. A basic exercise of this third level of human freedom therefore is to set an order of preferences among the many possible goods. Those are the "preferred" or "values" in the sense that they "weigh more heavily" in making decisions than do other possible goods. Gradually, one becomes practiced in the arts of realizing and/or achieving these values, which competencies

are our moral strengths or "virtues." Cumulatively, our values and corresponding virtues set a style for our action. Together the values and virtues, artifacts and modes of human interaction constitute an integrated pattern of human life in which the creative freedom of a people is expressed and implemented. This is a "culture" taken synchronically as a context in which human life can be cultivated and perfected.

"Tradition" is the further diachronic and cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values and virtues of a culture through successive generations. It is at once both heritage or what is inherited or received, and new creation as we pass on these traditions in new ways. Tradition then is not against freedom, but is rather the cumulative freedom of a people. Attending to tradition taken in this active sense allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths sought by Socrates, but: (a) to perceive the importance and proper weight of the choices or valuations made by preceding generations, and (b) actively to mobilize our own life choices toward the future. Let us look more closely at each of these.

The Moral Authority of Cultural Traditions

In the context of tradition as a people's cumulative freedom persons emerge from birth into a family and neighborhood from which they learn, and in harmony with which they thrive. Horizontally, individuals and groups learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life, and accordingly make pragmatic adjustments through feedback mechanism. Vertically, and more importantly, they learn values, i.e. what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be richly lived. This, rather than all that happens (history), is what is passed on (*tradita*, tradition). The importance of tradition derives from the cooperative character both of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience — even of failure — and of the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have been defined, defended and passed on through time to form the corporate life of the community.

Through time there evolves a vision of actual life which transcends time and hence can provide guidance for our life: past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which points the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orients the life of a person. Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. But it is also normative because it provides a harmony and fullness which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating. For this reason it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged.

What then should we conclude regarding the values and culture in which we have been raised, which give us dominion over our actions and enable us to be free and creative? Do they come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? To this question Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation's faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. . . . Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought.16

The Open Creativity and Interchange of Cultural Traditions

As an active process tradition transforms what is received, lives it in a creative manner and passes it on as a leaven for the future. Taken diachronically the process of tradition as receiving and passing on does not stop with Plato's search for eternal and unchangeable ideals, with the work of *techné* in repeating exactly and exclusively a formal model, or with rationalism's search for clear and distinct knowledge of immutable natures by which all might be controlled. Rather, in the application of a tradition according to the radical distinctiveness of persons and their situations tradition continually is perfected and enriched. It manifests the sense of what is just and good which we have from our past by creating in original and distinctive ways more of what justice and goodness mean. J. Pelican said it well: "Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living."

Further, if one takes time and culture seriously one must recognize that he or she is situated in a particular culture and at a particular time; hence all that can be seen from this vantage point constitutes one's horizon. This would be lifeless and dead, determined rather than free, if one's vantage point were to be fixed by its circumstances and closed. This points to the necessity of meeting other minds and hearts, not simply to add information incrementally, but in order that one might be challenged in one's basic assumptions and enabled thereby to delve more deeply into one's tradition and to draw forth more pervasive truth.

This hermeneutic mode of openness does not consist in surveying others objectively, obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner, or even in simply juxtaposing their ideas and traditions to our own. Rather, it is directed primarily to ourselves, for our ability to listen to others is correlatively our ability to assimilate the implications of their answers in order to delve more deeply into the meaning of our own traditions and draw out new and ever more rich insights. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us and that we are the ones who can enable it to speak.

Here hermeneutic, democratic and critical attitudes converge. The attitude is not one of methodological sureness which imposes its views, nor is it a mere readiness for new compromises or new techniques of social organization — for these are subject to manipulation on the horizontal level. Instead, it is readiness to draw out in open dialogue new meaning from a common tradition. Seen in these terms our heritage of culture and values is not closed or dead; rather, democratic interchange can enable life to remain ever new by becoming more inclusive and more rich.

Philosophical and Religious Traditions a**s Principles of Peace and Cooperation**

The previous sections have enabled us to locate the specific existential level of freedom at which we are able to create a culture and hence the origin, nature and content of a cultural tradition. We saw, as well, the essentially open and dialogic character of cultural progress. It remains now for us to look more closely at the open attitude toward other peoples and cultures to see whether this be a matter of self enhancement in order to dominate and control others or of love and concern for others within an integrating horizon and, indeed, an integrating reality?

Kant himself could say only that to be authentically human life had to be lived "as if" all is teleological. But then its exercise would be restricted to the confines of the human imagination; freedom would be not only self-determining but self-constituting and self-limited. In contrast, if the human spirit strives deeply to realize the life of persons then the transcendent principle it requires must be the most real in heaven and earth; if freedom presents us with a limitless range of possibilities, then its principle must be the Infinite and Eternal, the Source and Goal of all possibility. This Transcendent is the key to real liberation: it not only gives absolute grounding to

one's reality and certifies one's right to be respected, but evokes the creative powers of one's heart, frees them from the confines of one's own slow, halting and even partial creative activity, and plunges them into infinite possibility and power.

This can be approached through the steps of phenomenological reflection on the person as gift. First, our self-identity and interpersonal relatedness are not made by us, but are givens with which we work. Second, if we reflect on the character of a gift we note that it has a radical character: to attempt to pay for it in cash or in kind would destroy its nature as gift. As gratuitous, a gift is based primarily in the freedom of the giver, not in the merit of the one who receives.

There is here striking symmetry with the 'given' in the sense of hypothesis or evidence in the line of hypothetical and evidential reasoning. This is not explained; rather it is that upon which explanation is founded. Here, there is also a first, as spontaneity which is not to be traced to another reality but upon which the reality of the gift is founded. This symmetry illumines what is distinctive of the gift, namely, that the act from which it is not traced back further, but is precisely free or gratuitous. Once again, our reflections lead us in the direction of that which is Self-sufficient, Absolute and Transcendent as the sole adequately gratuitous source of the gift of being.

Thirdly, as an absolute point of departure with its distinctive spontaneity and originality, the giving is non-reciprocal. To attempt to repay would be to destroy the gift as such. Indeed, there is no way in which this originating gratuity can be returned; we live in a graced condition. This appears in reflection upon one's culture. What we received from the Bible, the Koran or *Vedas*, from a Confucius or an Aristotle can in no way be returned. Nor is this simply a problem of distance in time, for neither is it possible to repay the life we have received from our parents, the health received from a doctor, the wisdom from a teacher, or simply the good example which can come from any quarter at any time. The non-reciprocal character of our life is not merely that of part to whole; it is that of a gift to its source.17

In a certain parallel to the antinomies of Kant which show when reason has strayed beyond its bounds, many, from Plotinus to Leibniz and beyond, have sought knowledge, not only of the gift and its origin, but of why it had to be given. The more they succeeded the less room was left for freedom on the part of man as a given or gift. Others attempted to understand freedom as a fall, only to find that what was thus understood was bereft of value and meaning and a source of violence in human life and its cultures. Rather, the radical non-reciprocity of human freedom must be rooted in an equally radical generosity on the part of its origin. No reason, either on the part of the given or on the part of its origin, makes this gift necessary.

Fourthly, as the reflection of his derivation from a giving that is pure generosity the freedom of the human person is the very image of God. Freedom thus implies a correspondingly radical openness or generosity: the gift is not something which is and then receives, but is essentially gift. It was an essential facet of Plato's response to the problems he had elaborated in the *Parmenides* that the multiple can exist only *as* participants of the good or one. Receiving is not something they *do*; it is what they *are*.18 As such they reflect at the core of their being not the violent self-seeking of the first level of freedom or the passive principles of the second level, but the open, active and creative reality of the generosity in which they originate.

The truth of this insight is confirmed from many directions. Latin American philosophies begin from the symbol of earth as the fruitful source of all (reflected in the Quechuan language of the Incas as the "Pacha Mama"). This is their preferred context for their sense of human life, its relations to physical nature, and the meeting of the two in technology.19 In this they are not without European counterparts. The classical project of Heidegger in its later phases shifted beyond the unconcealment of the being of things-in-time, to Being which makes the things

manifest. The *Dasein*, structured in and as time, is able to provide Being a place of discovery among things,20 but it is being which maintains the initiative; its coming-to-pass or emission depends upon its own spontaneity and is for its sake. "Its `there' (the *da-* of *Dasein*) only sustains the process and guards it," so that in the openness of concealed Being beings can appear un-concealed.21

The African spirit, especially in its great reverence for family, community and culture — whence one derives one's life, one's ability to interpret one's world, and one's capacity to respond — may be uniquely positioned to grasp this more fully. In contrast to Aristotle's classical 'wonder,' these philosophers do not situate the person over against the object of his or her concern, reducing both to objects for detached study and manipulation. They look rather to the source from which reality is derived and are especially sensitive to its implications for the mode and manner of life as essentially open, communicative, generous and sharing.

Cultural Harmony and Creative Interchange

Seen in terms of gift, freedom at its third level has principles for peaceful cooperation, not only with one's people whose well-being is in a sense my own, but with increasingly broader sectors, and potentially and in principle, with the whole of mankind. First, the good is not only what contributes to my perfection; being received, it is essentially out-going. The second principle is that of complementarity. As participants in the one, self-sufficient and purely spontaneous source, the many are not in principle antithetic or antipathetic one to another. Rather, as limited images they stand in a complementary relation to all other participants or images. This means that others and their cultures are to be respected simply because they too have been given or gifted by the one Transcendent source. This is the essential step which Gandhi, in calling outcasts "harijans," i.e., "children of God," urged us to take beyond the first sense of freedom which sees others only as contraries against whom we choose. Conversely, it means that as complementary we need each other.

Thirdly, as one does not first exist and then receive, but one's very existence is a received existence or gift, to attempt to give back this gift, as in an exchange of presents, would be at once hopelessly too much and too little. On the one hand, to attempt to return in strict equivalence would be too much for it is our very self that we have received as gift. On the other hand, to think merely in terms of reciprocity would be to fall essentially short of my nature as one that is given, for to make a merely equivalent return would be to remain centered upon myself where I would cleverly entrap, and then entomb the creative power of being.

Rather, looking back I can see the futility of giving back, and in this find the fundamental importance of passing on the gift in the spirit in which it has been given. One's freedom as given calls for a creative generosity which reflects that of one's source. This requires breaking out of oneself as the only center of one's concern. It means becoming effectively concerned with the good of other persons and other groups, and for the promotion and vital growth of the next generation and of those to follow.

Finally, that other cultures are quintessentially products of self-cultivation by other spirits as free and creative implies the need to open one's horizons beyond one's own self-concerns to the ambit or sphere of the freedom of others and what they freely would be and would become. This involves promoting the development of other free and creative centers and of the cultures they create — which, precisely as such, are not in one's own possession or under one's own control. One lives then no longer in terms merely of oneself or of things that one can make or manage, but

in terms of an interchange between free men and people's of different cultures. Personal responsibility is no longer merely individual decision making or for individual good. Effectively realized, the resulting interaction and mutual fecundation should reach out beyond oneself and one's own culture to reflect ever more perfectly the glory of the one infinite and loving source and goal of all.22

Will this indeed eventuate? Can we overcome the violent conflicts which the recent emergence of a sense of self-identity appears to have engendered? To attempt to do so through suppressing freedom at this third level would destroy life as human. The history of the last half century consists in a studied and consistent rejection of such attempts at social engineering at the cost of freedom. The most recent history in Eastern Europe shows that even the most extreme attempts at forced socialization did not resolve problems of peaceful cooperation between peoples, but merely covered them over, isolated them from the requirements and achievements of human progress, and left them to reemerge in ever more intractable modes.

The alternative is to refuse to allow freedom to be reduced to its first level as an isometrics of violent conflict or to stop at the passive and universalist formalisms of the second level. Rather to be human is to take up the burden of freedom at its existential level and to search deeply into its source and nature for principles of unity and open cooperation. The truth of these principles will be manifest most of all in their call for ever more inclusive patterns of social equilibrium. The progress of cultures will consist in their genius in responding creatively to this call.

Notes

1. *Politics*, I, 1, 1252a22.
2. *Politics*, III, 7.
3. *Politics*, III, 8.
4. *Nichomachean Ethics*, IX, 6, 1167b13.
5. *Politics*, I, 2, 1253a20-37.
6. John Mavone, "The Division of Parts of Society According to Plato and Aristotle," *Philosophical Studies*, 6 (1956), 113-122.
7. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 1.
8. Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1958), p. 187.
9. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1968), pp. 205-339.
10. *Ibid*., pp. 37-200.
11. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A112, 121, 192-193. Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 83-84, 87-90.
12. See Kant's development and solution to the problem of the autonomy of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.
13. See the chapter by Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" in G. McLean, ed., *Moral Imagination and Character Development* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, in preparation) for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant's aesthetic theory.
14. Immanuel Kant, *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

15. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Washington Square, 1963), Ch. I, pp. 3-40. For notes on the critical hermeneutics of J. Habermas see G. McLean, "Cultural Heritage, Social Critique and Future Construction" in *Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America*, R. Molina, T. Readdy and G. McLean, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values, 1988), Ch. I.

16. *Ramayana* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1976), p. 312.

17. Schmitz, pp. 44-56.

18. R. E. Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues" in his *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* (London: Routledge, Keegan Paul, 1965), pp. 43-60.

19. Juan Carlos Scannone, "Ein neuer Ansatz in der Philosophie Lateinamerikas," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* 89 (1982), 99-116 and "La Racionalidad Cientifico-Technologica y la Racionalidad Sapiencial de la Cultura Latino Americana," *Stromata* (1982), 155-164.

20. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 532-535.

21. Joseph Kockelmans, "Thanksgiving: The Completion of Thought," in Manfred S. Frings, ed., *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), pp. 175-179.

22. Schmitz, 84-86.

4.

Aesthetic Culture: From Tradition to Modernity

Chen Chaonan

Aesthetic Culture Does Not Begin in Modern Times

In contemporary China aesthetic culture has already become a hot topic in academia, business, and mass media. Studies and theses concerning aesthetic culture appear frequently; in business transactions the words "aesthetic culture" often are used as a sort of decoration. It has become widely known through the channels of the mass media: newspapers and magazines, TV and radio. Therefore it has been stated that "aesthetic culture is a new phenomenon cropping up in the course of the development of modern aesthetics and arts."1

But as a matter of fact, aesthetic culture is really not newborn in contemporary society, nor is it a special feature of the market economy. The attitudes people take towards the world can be classified generally into three types: knowledge, utility and aesthetics, which correspond to truth, good and beauty. Sometimes these three attitudes cannot be separated clearly in real life. Ernst Cassirer noted: "It is man's special characteristic that he is not limited to take one sole specific attitude towards reality, but can think in terms of images, apart from concepts and utility."2

The attempt to put human activity into images can be seen clearly in "Li" (ritual) and "Yue" (music) in ancient China. The basic significance of "Li" in primitive society is to worship god. But in the process of changing into a slave society the basic meaning of "Li" was turned into recording merit, governing state and holding ritual. In its primitive sense "Yue" does not indicate music but various kinds of artistic activities including music. If used in a broad sense this implies any activity that makes people feel happy. So "Yue" assumes the meaning of happiness. In such events as worshipping god, recording merits and governing the state, in order to cover the apparent religious, utilitarian and political purposes, some proper mode of expression must be found. This can be by turning to images, as this not only makes it easy to accept ideas in a visual manner and to put them into concrete performance, but also is able to inspire one's passion and produce a kind of resonance so as to achieve an edifying effect. For instance, China is well know for its bronze ware, and the "Ding" (an ancient cooking vessel with two loop-handles and three legs) can be regarded as its special representative. The following passage is found in the Chinese ancient literature "The king sent someone to bring gifts to a chancellor in recognition of his service. Seeing the large `Ding' given him as a gift, the chancellor asked about its size and weight. The envoy replied: the significance of `Ding' does not lie in its size and weight, but in its symbolizing things that make ordinary people tell good from evil and loyalty from betrayal." So "Ding"'s function is to display morality and nothing else of importance is attached. Morality is both the spiritual principle and behavioral norm. If one would like to translate this into an image, building a "Ding" is one of the proper methods. The aesthetic characteristics of such images come from their shape and decoration which still are admired by day people.

For E. Cassirer, "Art can be regarded as a painting that implies the meaning of moral truth. It is looked upon as the expression of a sort of metaphor that covers some ethical significance."3 We can see from the "Ding"'s shape, decoration and forging process the moral spirit that is displayed through its image in the form of artistic exaggeration. As this endeavor to bring the features of aesthetic imagery to human activities occurred at the beginning of cultural development, we cannot

say that such practice has nothing to do with an aesthetic culture or that it is a product exclusive to modern society.

The Chinese definition of aesthetic character can be found in *Modern Aesthetic Systems*, a textbook on aesthetics used widely in colleges and universities. Owing to its wide use, its definition is to some extent accepted by most people: "Aesthetic culture is the combination of materialized product, ideological system and behavioral pattern; it is an important focus for the research of aesthetic sociology."4 This definition covers three aspects: 1. artificial products with aesthetic features, including various kinds of artistic works; 2. the ideological system concerning taste, ideas and evaluative standards of aesthetic activity; and 3. the aesthetic activities carried out by man, such as creation, appreciation and so on. According to this definition, no clear line can be drawn between history and the modern age, between East and West. Aesthetic culture appears when a nationality or a country begins to acquire culture; it exists permanently in the course of the historical development of a nationality or country.

The contents listed in the definition focusing on artistic works, aesthetic ideology and aesthetic activity involve the problem of the relation between aesthetic culture and the arts. Undoubtedly, the creation, evaluation and appreciation of materialized products in artistic activity manifest the aesthetic relationship between man and the world. The arts are an important aspect in aesthetic culture, but people have aesthetic needs and make efforts in other kinds of cultural activities which have aesthetic characteristics. Thus, they too are able to establish some kind of relationship with man. It seems inappropriate to restrict ourselves to artistic activity when researching aesthetic culture. These aesthetic cultural activities constitute another important content of aesthetic culture, which therefore is constituted of two basic components: 1. the arts, and 2. other aesthetic cultural elements.

Aesthetic Culture in Worshipping God, Recording Merit and Setting Rituals

In primitive cultures, which had no classifications, music, dance, religion and sorcery were mixed together. In religious devotions sacrifice, worship, fortune telling and sorcery were all accompanied with song, dance and music of primitive artistic form. It is recounted from ancient times that Sheng ordered musicians to welcome with music their ancestor who was a half-man, half-god idol. In this way, worship of ancestors was given sensible form in the rhythm and tune of the music, and thereby attained to social value.

Another ancient Chinese book recounts the story about worshipping heaven. Social leaders should take the lead in paying homage to heaven with song and dance in order to show that their leading position was endowed by heaven. In this turning to singing and dancing the implications of the worship heaven were given artistic expression.

In the transition to a slave society recording merits, governing the state and setting rituals became the primary meaning of "Li." Ling Wu of Zhou dynasty died shortly after he conquered King Chou of the Yin dynasty; King Cheng succeeded the monarch and appointed Duke Shoo to assist in official affairs. Six years later the country was peaceful and thriving, so Duke Shoo began to set rituals and compose music to replace military power with civil administration for the governance of the state. It is said that national accomplishments and social security could not be fulfilled without the composition of music and the establishment of ritual.

In ancient times, ritual and music usually were mentioned together, but this does not mean that "Yue" had as high a position as "Li." "Li" was in the dominant position to which "Yue" was subordinate; "Li" was the goal, "Yue" the means. "Yue" must be in the course of "Li" and serve

its purpose. Nevertheless, "Yue" is not passive or negative. It brings emotional coloring to "Li" and can display figuratively the necessity and importance of "Li" to society. In one story "Li" and "Yue" are used as the same thing. A chancellor of the State of Lu paid an official visit to the State of Jin. The king of Jin arranged to welcome him with music. First, when three tunes of music in (.....) were played, the envoy from Lu did not come forward to meet the king. Then the king ordered the musician to sing three songs in (.....), the envoy still did not advance. At last, when the musician sang three songs in (.....), the envoy came forward to show his respect to the king. The reason for the envoy's action is that the music in (.....) was used for the king to feast dukes or princes, and songs in (.....) were sung when dukes or princes met each other. Only songs in (.....) was music for the king to receive state officials. The envoy knew the rituals and regulation implied in the music very well, and would not violate the regulation to enjoy too high a reception.

Aesthetic Culture in Relation to Virtue, Ambition and Sentiment

The merging of "Li" and "Yue" in the early period of slave society later turned into a long tradition of Chinese culture. Apart from its meaning as worshipping heaven, recording merits and setting rituals, "Li" was used in a broad sense to indicate the moral norms of feudal society. Artistic activity like music played the role of moral edification.

It is pointed out in an ancient book that the purpose of setting rituals is to bring various kinds of social behavior under control and keep society from deviating from the norms. Poems were written in order to express the contents of rituals. This is the origin of the view that music was created for expressing virtues. Such artistic forms as music and poetry should be used to display noble virtues and should become a figurative approach to spread noble virtues everywhere. "Virtue" is the aim of "music" and "music" is the expression of "virtue." Virtue acquires form and feeling through "music," and thereby aesthetic features. In ancient China, some famous tunes have clear moral implications. The work of Qu Yuan Ode to the Orange, "despite its description of the beauty of an orange and the shape and color of the tree, is intended to symbolize such human virtues as selflessly clinging to virtues and independence without following out-of-date models. His works conform to the direction that "music was aimed to display virtues."

An expression similar to "music is aimed to manifest virtues" is "music is used to keep virtues." That is to say, if a king wanted to keep his state in permanent order and long peace, he should be content with moral norms, follow the rituals and practice justice. This relates artistic activity and national politics. Confucius said that if "Li" and "Yue" were not considerably developed in a state, criminal law and the regulation of reward and punishment would not be proper. This is a political function of the arts. (.....) is the earliest work in our country about musical theory. It points out that ritual, music, criminal law and politics, though different, must be unified for the common goal, namely, to enable the people to share a similar aspiration and to direct state administration along a regular track. In rituals, criminal punishment and politics, the arts should not only serve the common purpose, but also endow these events with a concrete visible image.

In ancient China, with the view that music was to display virtue, it was suggested also that poetry be used to express aspiration (.....). In ancient language " " (poem) is equal to " " (aspiration), the two characters expressing the same meaning. The early poems were used to express the intention of gods and ancestors in the events of politics, religion and hunting. Later poetry changed so as to express the author's thoughts and motivation, ambition and aspiration, life experience and internal feelings.

In the Han dynasty " ," an important paper discussed poetry, ."....." affirming its connection with ambition, and at the same time recognizing it as the external linguistic expression of the mind's activity. This enriched the cultural connotation of ."....." and thus established the position of " ....." (sentiment or feeling). Since that time, poetry as an aesthetic form expressing feeling has attracted the attention of ever more scholars and artists.

In the Wei and Jin periods (3rd century A.D.), the scholar Lu Ji proposed that the beauty of poetry came from the rich feeling contained therein. This can be understood to mean that the beauty of poetry was produced by its rhythm, image and metaphor. At that time some artists paid great attention to the expression of sentiment in poetry, painting and music, and also strove for the creation of new artistic forms. In this way, art itself was greatly developed. Lu Xun said: "The age of Chao Pei can be said to be a conscious age of literature or an age of arts, for art as indicated in modern times."5 This is of special significance in Chinese cultural history.

After the Wei and Jin periods, not only did a conscious sense of art appear, but aesthetic features were attached to a person's talents, appearances and speech, which formed the fashion of the times. The speech and behavior of the officials of that time involved one's demeanor and temperament. To find beauty in a person's behavior and manner is to be conscious of one's own beauty.

Aesthetic Culture in Entertainment, Expression of Feeling and Marketing

The long duration of Chinese feudal society enabled Confucian ideology to dominate for a very extended period. It put much emphasis on the edifying function of art and the ethical purpose of culture. In such a context art and other sorts aesthetic culture had very advanced social functions in the service of politics, morality and religion. In the relationship of arts to feeling, taste and leisure, though the Confucian ideology exerted a confining influence, some development took place during that period. For instance, poetry in the Tang dynasty paid great attention to feelings, and some Tang poems are rich in feeling or sentiment and taste. The great poet of the Tang dynasty, Bai Juyi, said: "In what affects people, feeling can be counted as the first." The emphasis on sentiment is very clear here. The man of letters Wang Ruoxu in the late Song dynasty said: the sentiment implied in poetry is quite different from ordinary feelings. It is a "charm and delicate taste," i.e., a kind of aesthetic sentiment. This kind of understanding is very close to the distinction made by modern aestheticians between feeling in daily life and that expressed in artistic works.

In the period of the Ming and Qing dynasty, the Chinese feudal culture reached its mature and final stage. The Confucian influence was marked by "music aimed at displaying virtue, poetry for ambition, and reason applied in poetry." Though this remained very strong, social developments created many conditions for aesthetic culture. Many excellent novels, dramas, paintings, calligraphy, horticulture, and works of music appeared at that time. The standard of literary and artistic creation and criticism were varied as well. Writer Zhu Yunming said: "The situation derives from the contact between the person and the object, while sentiment comes from the contact between the person and situation." The dramatist, Tang Xianzu, said: "Feelings or sentiments and dreams lead to the creation of drama." Writer Yan Zhongdao said: "Poetry is mainly intended for airing one's inborn nature and inspiration." The musician Zhu Zaiyu said: "Elegance is the highest beauty." Thus, sentiment, taste, nature and inspiration, beauty, etc., all took shape and became the criteria for evaluating the arts and aesthetic culture.

What most attracted people's attention was the rise of popular novels and folk art. The popularity of such sentimental and chivalrous novels as *Dream in Red Chamber* sufficiently

demonstrated the improvement of artistic reality and entertainment. The folk printing of large numbers of New Year's paintings fulfilled the demand of farmers for the celebration of the New Year's Festival, family culture and entertainment. The subject matter of New Year's paintings in the Ming and Qing dynasties varied widely from myth, legend, and dramatic story to men farming and women weaving, celebrations and congratulations. They became almost an art gallery reflecting rural life. Behind the popular literature, drama and arts stood the Chinese people who at the turn of the century showed increased demand for aesthetic culture.

In the 20th century Chinese society has undergone radical changes during which the social functions of various kinds of arts has been fully displayed. Worshipping god, recording merit, ritual settings, displaying virtues, expressing aspirations and sentiments still were closely related to the arts. Their social functions drew support through representation in images; they were carried forward by their aesthetic features. Moreover, such functions as entertainment, sentimental expression and marketing which originally were implied in aesthetic culture were developed and resulted in many characteristics of modern aesthetic culture.

Entertainment and the expression of feelings as the original functions of the arts never received as much attention as they have in the 20th century. While the modern industry creates plentiful material wealth, at the same time it imposes the patterns of industrial production upon social life, such as a quick pace, a rigid social order and a noisy urban environment, thereby pushing people into a strange, gigantic social machine. While obtaining material living conditions far better than before, people also have lost many things they once possessed, such as a warm and peaceful environment for the family and close relations with friends and relatives. Now the family has become a market for making money; furniture, electrical appliances, foods and medicine all pour into the family.

More unfortunate is the rise in the proportion of families with but a single parent. Material wealth cannot make up for the spiritual loss and suffering. Modern people need entertainment and leisure to ease the tension of work and to ease their rigid schedules. They need also to break through spiritual repression in order to recover a balance of body and mind. They need not only those arts which create the peaceful and harmonious mood which Henri Matisse compared to a restful armchair, but also the expression of feelings to pacify distorted mental states as, for example, the loud cry as described in *Shout*, the well-known painting of Edward Munch. Since people need entertainment and leisure, the entertainment and leisure industry develops through artistic forms which inspire the sense of beauty. For instance, on TV, programs which integrate games, entertainment and artistic form have a high level of viewers. Such programs would be unimaginable in the 70s. People today need to express their feelings, and cultural and artistic activities are a natural means for this. Shouts in popular songs, though lacking a sense of beauty, vent deeply buried feelings. Though the improvised movements of the disco do not require the basic training needed in artistic dance, still it can display the individual's personality and produce the joy of a balanced body and mind.

The new cultural needs of modern society are utilized by commerce to develop a commercial culture never before known. Industrial and agricultural products are turned into consumer goods through commercial channels. Marketing gives rise to commercial advertisement which under the stimulation of large profits brings various artistic methods into play. Painting, music, movies, sculpture all feed the image approach to marketing. In the commercial streets of Shanghai one can see as advertising not only paintings of all forms, but imitations of Michelangelo's sculptures in front of shops. Female film stars with world reputations can be seen in TV commercial ads. Such marketing requires an aesthetic culture.

John Dewey said: “There is a sort of art which is multiplying fastest which includes structures built in the name of architecture, paintings under the cover of art, novels and drama under the sign of literature and so on. In reality, these works are, to a large extent, the concrete expression of commercialization in production. . . . Their owners’ qualification for catering to elegance is only their economic status.”6 This suggests the huge power of commerce in modern aesthetic culture, both positive and negative.

It is possible, however, that cultural aesthetics has a deeper significance. It already has been suggested that aesthetic culture should be the basic component of the general culture and include its ways of thinking, living and education.7 This would form a new project for research in aesthetic culture.

Notes

1. Li Xijian, “The Structural System of Aesthetic Culture,” *Learning and Probing*, no. 6, 1992.
2. E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New York, 1994), ch. 9.
3. *Ibid*.
4. Ye Lang, ed., *Modern Aesthetic Systems* (Beijing: Beijing University Press), p. 259.
5. Lu Xun, *The Complete Works of Lu Xun*, vol. 3.
6. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1925), p. 296.
7. *News Letter of China* (Aesthetic Society, 1996), no. 1.

Part II
Material Basis of Values

5.

The Loss of the Subject and the Disorder of Values: Critical Reflections on Present Cultural Research

Yu Wujin

In the present circumstances in which everyone is talking about culture and a jumble of all kinds of viewpoints are on display, what is the historic mission of philosophy, now and for a long time to come? It is important that philosophy not follow the fashion and simply drift with the tide, for example, building a new system of cultural philosophy, or translating all sorts of new trends into cultural thought, etc. Rather it must aim at critical reflection to clarify the essential viewpoints which exist generally in present cultural research. Otherwise, the more we talk about cultural research, the further we are likely to wander from the truth. In present cultural research, the coexistence and conflict of many different viewpoints is obvious. Some call this a "multi-cultural state," which, of course, is beyond reproach. Moving from the past "unitary cultural state" to the present "multi-cultural state" is a type of historical progress, but it is not sufficient simply to stop on this point. To admit a "multi-cultural state" and to treat different ideas on culture with lenience and openness, though necessary, does not mean that the existence of each viewpoint on culture is reasonable, or that one viewpoint on culture has no right to think critically about other viewpoints. In fact, without critical thinking, not only will the "multi-cultural state" degenerate into a simple juxtaposition of viewpoints, but all cultural research also will lose its vitality.

The Loss of the Subject

If one looks closely at the very different viewpoints on culture, one finds a general and significant phenomenon, namely the loss of the subject and a disorder of values. Here "subject" refers to the Chinese people in the 1990s; the so-called "loss of subject" refers to the subject's loss of any objective position upon which to stand. This kind of loss of subject or of identity necessarily causes a disorder, and even a reversal of the appreciation of the value of the subject, thus leaving it to float like duckweed on all kinds of different ideas. This loss of subject appears in the following circumstances.

The first is the misplacement of the subject, namely, the subject does not regard itself as Chinese in the 1990s, but replaces its own position by that of other people when researching all sorts of cultural phenomena and problems. Of course, "the people" referred to here are varied, but the most typical or common are the following two kinds: one is the ancients, especially Confucianism as represented by Confucius himself. Although such a research position as "approve the past, not the present," "stress the past, not the present" is not so flagrantly manifest as the school of the quintessence of Chinese culture bitterly attacked by Lu Xun, but its latent appearance in the present cultural research can be found everywhere.

One example is critically to praise the Chinese cultural tradition, unconditionally worshipping such ancient texts as *The Confucian Analects*, *The Works of Mencius*, *The Book of Chang*, etc., while avoiding or concealing the historical limitations of Confucianism, etc. These are instances of the subject misplacing his or her position onto the ancients.

Another example is the attitude toward contemporary representatives of Western modernism and postmodern cultural thoughts. In recent years, Chinese scholars have scrambled for such new

thoughts coming from the West as anti-rationalism, existentialism, the philosophy of the absurd, deconstructionism, post-colonialism, etc. They have employed the position, attitude and methods of these new thoughts uncritically to describe and even to comment on Chinese modernization and social and cultural problems, while neglecting to a great extent their identity. In pursuing modernization contemporary Chinese society has a completely different life interest and value-orientation than contemporary Western society. Therefore, when the subject uncritically replaces his or her own position with that of such representatives of the Western modernist or post-modernism schools on culture as Camus, Lyotard, Derrida, etc., they not only cannot correctly solve the types of problems which contemporary Chinese society is facing, but misdirect the discussion.

A second mode of loss of the subject is prejudice, that is, the subject being unable to master the objective value-orientation needed by the Chinese in the 1990s, replaces this with one that is purely subjective. The subject's prejudice appears mainly in two inclinations: one is that the subject evaluates all sorts of cultural problems and phenomena completely according to one's own liking, for example, the one who worships Lao Zi praises him up to the heavens or those who worship Confucius and Mencius praise them as perfect sages, forgetting that Confucius himself has even said: "I am fortunate that if I have any errors, people are sure to know them" (*The Confucian Analects*). In contrast, people who dislike Confucius denigrate his thought as devoid of any merit. Another example is how often in investigating cultural and social problems people miss the essence of these problems, and grasp only some partial, accidental, temporary or detailed elements. This echoes the common expression that prejudice is further from the truth than innocence. In a word, setting out from a purely subjective value-orientation and writing articles interpreting the six scriptures seems to be a high activity of the subject, but in fact it is a new form of the subject's ignorant, homeless and embarrassed state.

The third is lack of awareness of the subject, namely, when research on the subject's identity and on such cultural phenomena as cultural character, cultural events, texts, etc., attempts to clear up any elements and feelings through so-called purely objectively investigation of all objects in order to make not value judgements, but factual judgements. This research attitude seems extremely fair, and even can be honored by such high sounding terms as scientific research. In fact, it is a timid approach through which the subject avoids the difficultly of researching the life world in which he or she lives and avoids ascertaining the value-orientation he should possess. Actually, factual judgments completely devoid of value dimensions never exist. Even in research on the natural sciences, our choice of research theme and our interpretation of its meaning indicate our values.

From the above analysis it becomes manifest that loss of the subject is a key problem in cultural research. If we leave aside the subject's identity to expand blindly the range of cultural research, for instance, to prostitution, tea, dietary cultures, etc., or argue endlessly on some side issues, we cannot lead general cultural research along a healthy trajectory. Nor can the loss of subject be avoided only by continually using such expressions as "I think" or "I find" or "I believe." On the contrary, the more these sentences are used, the more the rootless, homeless and embarrassed state of the subject is revealed. Besides, as also can be made out from the above analysis, the loss of subject necessarily causes confusion, even disorder in one's value views, as well as errors in one's cultural critique. This deforms "plural cultural states" into purely exterior and pseudo-morphologies.

The Loss of Historicity as the Cause of the Loss of Subject or of Identity

Let us look further into what actually causes the universal phenomena of loss of subject and disorder in values. There are two primary reasons.

Objective Reasons

One reason is objective. With the development of the market economy and the acceleration of social transition all sorts of problems have sprung up. To solve these people resort to various ideas and cultural viewpoints. When all forms of cultural views are chaotically on display, however, contemporary Chinese scholars, who have just freed themselves from the pure ideological cultivation of the style of the "Great Cultural Revolution," are at a loss as to what to do. It is like Grandma Liu visiting a great theme park. Under the clash of the cultures pouring in, the standpoint as well as the monistic axiological perspective begins to oscillate.

By continually translating and introducing new thoughts and using them in a semi-skilled manner some try to indicate that they are continually thinking and in earnest. This unceasing pursuit of new ideas and terms and continued change of one's position seems to some people to be thinking in earnest, but it may be only loss of the subject's identity. Of course, in all fairness, whenever a society is in a period of great transition, the above phenomena are almost inevitable. But this should not continue for long, for drifting with the tide without thinking and criticizing is contrary to the contemporary scholar's mission.

Subjective Reasons

The other reason for the loss of the subject and a disorder of values is subjective, namely, the peeling off of historicity. This appears in two respects. The first is the peeling off of subjective historicity. As mentioned above, "subject" in this article refers to the Chinese person living at the turn of the millennia, or the contemporary Chinese to use an imprecise concept. What is the historicity of the contemporary Chinese, and how can it be peeled off? Generally speaking, this means the historical circumstances in which they have placed themselves. These are complicated, but here we refer not to the whole scope and detail of these historical circumstances, but to the essentials which are its developing trends. To contemporary Chinese, these historical circumstances appear to constitute an extremely rich and concrete life-world. At the heart of this world and promoting its forward development is the emergence of a Chinese style market economy. This is where the historicity of the contemporary Chinese lies. The Chinese market economy possesses both the general characteristics of a common market economy and the particularity formed in the Chinese cultural context. With regard to its general character, the rise and develop-ment of a market economy is bound to lead to the disintegration of the primitive ethical spirit based on natural blood relationships and local connections, and to the rise of new outlooks based on independent personality and centrally characterized by the spirit of democracy, freedom, equality and science. With regard to its particularity, the Chinese market economy emerged and developed under the conditions of a planned economy radically characterized by administrative decree. Therefore the existence of such phenomena as administrative power interfering unreasonably, and even illegally with economic life, and the use of one's political power for one's own profit, corruption, etc., are facts without question. Under the circumstances, it is especially important to advocate equal opportunity and social fairness and to set up and perfect various laws and regulations.

In a word, the inescapable historicity of contemporary Chinese, especially those living in the 1900s, is embodied in the Chinese style market economy. To develop the market economy in a healthy manner, namely, to move it forward in a more perfect and reasonable manner, it is necessary to develop a new value system which cooperates with this style. Its core idea is precisely the spirit of freedom, equality, democracy, science and social fairness which presuppose the establishment of an independent personality as mentioned above. This is the objective value orientation that contemporary Chinese, especially those living in the 1900s, should possess. Those who consciously can apply this value orientation in the analysis and research regarding different cultural phenomena are those who really understand their own historicity.

Otherwise, the subject's historicity is in the state of being peeled off, not to say that this state naturally leads to loss of the subject's identity and to disorder in values. For example, the basic theme of Western modernism and postmodernism is to reflect the social problems caused by a highly developed science and technology. Obviously, this kind of reflection is a profound contemporary Western apprehension of its own historicity. But, these contemporary Western themes cannot simply be moved into contemporary Chinese subject. In contrast to the contemporary West, the Chinese are moving into modernization, that is to say, in contemporary Chinese society it still is very important to devote effort to developing science and technology and to expanding the scientific spirit. Consider how the chaotic state of administration leads to endless bureaucratic delays in the construction of roads and houses, or the superstitions which pervade popular, especially rural, culture. There is reason to repeat Hu Shi's discourse of seventy years ago in the well-known "debate between science and metaphysics." If we look about everywhere there are altars for divine sages and Taoist and Buddhist shrines everywhere with divine prescriptions and ghost photos. With such underdeveloped traffic and industry where do we get the right to exclude science.

Certainly, compared with the time of Hu Shi, contemporary Chinese science and technology has already developed to some degree, but, who will doubt that China still needs to develop a scientific technology and spirit for realizing modernization? In recent years, some mainland scholars have advocated objecting to scientism and expanding the spirit of humanism. Outwardly, they seems to try to let contemporary Chinese society absorb in advance the experience and lessons which Western society have undergone in the process of modernization. However, this is actually the complicated response of a conservative psyche contending with the historical process of Chinese modernization. Indeed, to oversee and contain the extension of scientism in some degree is significant. We should realize also, however, that in contemporary Chinese society the urgent matter is not to prevent the popularization and development of science and technology under the excuse of anti-scientism, but to develop scientific technology and to cultivate the scientific spirit. This goes beyond simple utility and bravely devotes one to truth (such as Copernicus, Galileo, Bruno, Darwin, Huxley, etc., in Western history). To advocate an ill-timed and excessive containment of scientism, to disregard the scientific spirit and expand lopsidedly the spirit of humanism is a typical mode of peeling off the historicity of subject. Inevitably this would lead to a loss of the subject and a disorder of values. Perhaps this state can be called conflict between the life situation of preindustrial society and the cultural state of mind of post-industrial society.

The second peeling off of objective historicity is found when the subject researches such cultural issues as the cultural character, ideas and affairs, etc., but does not organically associate the theoretical side of the object with its social and historical side, thus peeling off the historicity of the object. For example, when some scholars conceal the great difference between ancient

Chinese society and contemporary society in its present historical circumstances, and discuss abstractly the relation in theory, the historicity of the object of which they talk is peeled off.

Equally, when scholars conceal the historicity of Chinese and Western society, abstractly comparing similarities and differences of the two cultures, they make the same mistake. For instance, some contemporary Chinese scholars propose expending the humanistic spirit of the Confucian school, in terms of abstract theory. This is beyond reproach. How can one gain say or contradict such humanistic ideas as "let the father be kind, and son filial" advocated in Confucianism? However, the problem is that we cannot remain on the side of abstract theory, but must present the concrete, social and historical connotation which the Confucian humanistic spirit possessed in the historical circumstances at this time, namely, historicity. Only thus can we bring to light the correct attitude for treating the spirit.

The Confucian *Analects: Xue Er* have the maxim that the superior man bends his attention to what is radical. That established, the practical applications follow naturally. Filial piety and fraternal submission are the root of all benevolent actions. That is, in his time he hoped to found a humanistic spirit based upon "filial piety and fraternal submission." In this spirit a man was taken first for son and brother, in other words, he was regarded as an element of the patriarchal clan system which turned to natural blood relationships for its ties and regarded patriarchy as its center. In the opinion of Confucius, not only were man and woman not equal, but neither were father and son; thus there is the direction that the son conceal something for his father in the Confucian *Analects*.

It is well-known that the humanistic spirit in modern civilized society is based on the independent personality, that is to say, man is not first regarded as son and brother, but as an independent personality. In family life, modern people still advocate "let the father be kind, and the son filial," but this cultural idea has been given a new social and historical connotation, i.e., "kind" and "filial" are discussed on the basis of independent personalities and equal relations between people. To disregard this concrete character of society and history, and to discuss abstractly the humanistic spirit of the Confucian school necessarily obliterates the essential difference between the modern and ancient humanistic spirit, thereby leading to confusion and even a crisis of cultural construction.

For an example in Western culture one might ask why philosophical circles in our country inquire into the identity philosophy represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Often they analyze this in its purely theoretical aspect, namely, as maintaining that thinking and being are identical, thereby denying agnosticism in epistemology , etc. They completely neglect its social and historical characteristics. In fact, identity philosophy was put forward under the influence of the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Its social and historical connotation, in accord with Hegel's view, is to "construct reality according to thought." In other words, it means using the general principles of Enlightenment thought to remodel German social reality. Thus, "identity philosophy" is not an abstract and tasteless philosophical doctrine, but a kind of revolutionary theory expressed by German philosophers in obscure language. In studying "identity philosophy," to disregard this concrete historical intentionality is to peel off the historicity of this research object, leading to a loss of the subject and to disorder in values.

By way of summary, it is not difficult to see that the subjective reason for the phenomena of loss of the subject and the disorder of values is caused mainly by peeling off historicity. This tells us that in any cultural research, it is decisive that the subject clarify in advance its historicity so as to identify consciously the objective value-orientation which the subject should establish.

Two Meanings of Time and the Need for an Existential Ontological Hermeneutics

The main point in all this thusfar has remained in the shadows of negation and critique. Now , we must answer such questions from the positive side, namely, how to avoid loss of the subject and disorder in values in cultural research, in other words, how to clarify historicity in cultural research, and thereby to establish the objective value coordinate of the subject.

Before solving these problems, we need to clarify in advance the preconceived ideas that most easily lead the subject along the wrong path. The "central axis era" theory put forward by German philosopher, Jaspers, is just such a preconceived idea. It seemed to him that from the eight to the second century B.C. was the period in which Confucius, Sakyamuni, Socrates, etc. founded respectively the different normative cultural forms. This age is called the central axis era because the subsequent development of cultures is under the control of the normative cultural forms of this era. If one understands Jaspers only according to the transference and development of normative cultural forms, one cannot say he is wrong. But his error lies in regarding that era as the central axis, which implies that later developments of culture revolve around this "central axis era." This theory is focused on the phenomenon of the misplaced subject. In fact, the "central axis era" lies never in the past, but in the present. The present, of course, is a relative concept; it is what the history human beings attains. Contemporaries are those living at that time: their life interest is the genuine central axis, starting from which one interprets ancient cultures and their character.

The Romans and Greeks lay in tombs; their culture was not aroused until the Renaissance European spirit acquired maturity. Similarly, the sense of long periods of history which we now regard as annals and many documents which are still silent will be made manifest in the light of new life, and will speak once again.

In view of this, Croce put forward the well-known proposition that "all genuine history is contemporary history," affirming the central function of contemporaries and of contemporary culture. In fact, according to Croce's logic, even such a word as "the Renaissance" is not exact, because it easily can cause the misunderstanding that modern Europe is the sudden return of ancient civilization. The real circumstance, however, is just the contrary; modern Europeans employ the slogans and costumes of ancient characters only to play the program of a new life. Here, Croce actually put forward a kind of "new-central-axis-era" theory radically opposed to Jaspers. It proposes that to avoid the misplacement of the subject's position on the ancient position, namely, the replacement of the contemporaries' position by that of the ancients', what is most important is to realize that the central axis lies in the contemporary from beginning to end. Henceforth, to apprehend the essential significance of the contemporary life-world where the subject lives is the prerequisite for keeping the subject independent and free. We should not retain the shallow common sense that "not to understand the past is not to understand the present," but should apprehend the much more profound truth that "not to understand the present is not to interpret the past."

Another preconceived idea which greatly effects us, even in our unconscious psyche, is "to worship chronicle time," namely the internationally current concept of time as the present. The 1990s, as we mentioned above, belongs to chronicle time, which in any case is inevitable for contemporary life. People unthinkingly take this idea of time into cultural research, especially comparative cultural research, thereby extending the faults of isochronalism. This is just one of the profound reasons that cause the peeling off of the subject's historicity and the loss of the subject.

For example, the Chinese in the 1990s usually think that they are in the same time as the Westerners. In fact, the concept of isochronalism here has formal meaning only for chronicle time. To extend this to mean that they are isochronal in their cultural state of mind is an especially great mistake. In fact, contemporary Chinese live in two different kinds of time, one is the chronicle time mentioned above, according to which people arrange their lives and contacts, especially international contacts. Another I would call the time of the form of society, which is decided by the economic relations that hold the dominant status in social life and restrict the cultural state of people's mind. For cultural research, especially comparative cultural research, only this time of the form of society is the radical premise. In accord with such an idea of time we can say that the Chinese in the 1990s are not at the same time as regards the cultural state of mind as are the Westerners in the 1990s; in other words, Western culture in the 1990s and Chinese culture in the 1990s are not isochronical. In this respect, we must not be misled by such exteriors as that there are color TVs, compact discs, thunderbolt-dancing and rock in China in the 1990s as in the 1990s West. Chronicle time may also intrude into the cultural state of mind to a certain extent in a stage of development of a society, but the impact produced by it is next to nothing in comparison with the time of the form of society decided by economic relations.

That is to say, the grounds on which to determine whether two kinds of culture are isochronical is fundamentally determined by the time of the form of society. Up to now, what people have and are undergoing is a pre-commodity economy and social form. Contemporary China is just entering upon the primary stage of commodity economy. Even if reluctantly it is put into the commodity economy or social form, still it lies in a different stage of development from contemporary Western society whose commodity economy has been highly developed. Thus, their cultural state of mind is not isochronal. The cultural state of mind of contemporary Chinese society still remains very deeply a brand of natural economy and planned economy. People often say that the Chinese walking and doing is either sluggish or unpunctual, whereas the Western is swift and punctual. This is just because contemporary Chinese society lies in a different state of time from contemporary Western society. Therefore, investigated from the point of view of the time of the form of society, the cultural state of mind of contemporary Chinese society rather more resembles, or to be more exact, is at the same time as the cultural state of mind of Western society in the 16th to 18th century. Contemporary Chinese society's stress upon the use of transport and technology, it's call for the consciousness of morality and right, it's attention to civil society and social fairness, etc., are the past events which Western society has undergone in the 16th to 18th century. Cultural research, especially comparative cultural research that remains in chronicle time, necessarily leads to loss of the subject. As mentioned above, the subject's misplacing his or her standpoint upon that of the Western modernist or post-modernist school, abstracts from their respective historical background and renders impossible any general comparison of the Chinese and Western states of mind. This research of similarities and differences of thoughts of such Eastern and Western cultural characters as Lao Zi and Heidegger, Zhung Zi and Derrida, Zhu Xi and Hegel proceeds by shallow insight in pursuit of superficial resemblances. All these are closely related to errors in time theory. In fact, comparative cultural research should be based on the foundation of the time of the form of society. If people are blinded to this foundation their research will have no scientific value.

After this de-covering or uncovering, we need directly to probe into the philosophical premises of cultural research. Such premises are ontologic hermeneutics — ontology in the existential sense. This kind of hermeneutics asks the cultural researchers to apprehend in advance their historicity, and grasp the essence of the life-world where they are situated, thereby setting a kind of objective value coordinate. When they do so, before beginning their research, researchers

should have the courage to clear up their own subjective value orientation and avoid any misplacement or loss of the subject and disorder of values.

6.
Economic and Ethical Values

Lu Xiaohe

In his article, "What is `Business Ethics'?," Georges Enderle treats the issue of the relationship between economics and ethics, an issue now receiving increasing scrutiny in the current business ethics debate. He proposes a "model of cooperation, which recognizes both disciplines as being interdependent and of equal value. Ethics should not dominate economics and economics should not overrule ethics. However the disciplines should not be kept completely separate from each other.1 Hence, he suggests another issue, namely, the relationship between economic value and ethical value.

No matter how broad the concept of economics, or how open economics is to ethics, or how many ethical problems previously excluded by a more narrow economics it might now embrace, there remains the issue of the relationship between the two sets of values. Hence, we are faced with the challenge of how to treat their relation. In cases where we could not have both at the same time,2 should we reject one set of values in order to accept the other, or vice versa? If it is a matter of acceptance and rejection, how can one say that they are "of equal value"?

In practice, this issue is also a special challenge to people living in a time of economic transition. In China, since the economic reforms began at the end of the 1970s, the economy has become the central concern of the people and economic values have risen to an unprecedentedly high position. For a time, "money became the only object," economic value overruling all others. However, after the excessive enthusiasm for money and wealth, people gradually miss the charm of ethical values. Once left out in the cold, now they are eulogized in terms of "spiritual civilization."

In the West, before the 1970s, economic gain was the only object of business. "The business of business is business" is a famous expression of this view. However, since the movement of business ethics in the 1970s, driven by many social and cultural currents, people have challenged that view. As a result, economics and ethics came together, and ethical value entered the economic kingdom. Though now many claim that their decisions are affected by considerations of ethical value, others still doubt that this is so. In other words, they believe that economic values still overrule ethical values, that the latter is no more than a means for the former.

Therefore, this issue is still a problem for both theory and practice. If this issue is not solved both the union of economics and ethics and the role of business ethics in practice will make no sense.

Business ethics, notes Richard T. DeGeorge, emerged out of a marriage between ethics and economics, a marriage, as with Romeo and Juliet, with which neither sets of parent disciplines were pleased.2 What is or should be the basis of their union; upon what basis do the two separate disciplines come together? Only upon this basis can or should the two sets of values be properly treated. Hence, this chapter will discuss first the basis of the two values in general, then the issue of their relationship, and finally some basic values of business ethics as a foundation for this interdisciplinary cooperation of economics and ethics.

The Basis of Values

The problem of the basis or foundation of value is related, and often confused, with that of the nature of value. M. Schlich holds that value can be established only on feelings of pleasure, which are identified with the greater value.3 Hence value is identified with feelings. In his recent Chinese version of *A New Approach To Utilitarism*, C.L. Sheng distinguishes two problems. He argues that value is always defined and explained according to the meaning of utility, and utility, in turn, is based on the individual's interests. So, he claims that value is defined in terms of value and that the basis of value is individual interests.4

What is of interest here is not the definitions of value and its basis, but the two problems contained in these claims: (1) upon what is value founded: the problem of the basis of value; and (2) according to what is value defined: the problem of the definition of value. Proceeding from this distinction, answers to those two problems can serve as prerequisites for the discussion of the two values in the next section.

What is value? On this there exists a large literature with many theories and a variety of definitions. I would suggest a very simple definition: value is what is affirmed within objects by subjects. This includes three points: (1) it meets the needs of subjects; (2) it is what a subject willed or created; (3) it is what a subject appreciated or enjoyed. Value is not the same as object. To say a book is valuable is not to say it is value itself. Value is what a subject finds, experiences and enjoys in an object: one finds, senses, knows, cognition, etc.; it is also what a subject needs, chooses, supposes, and expects. In most cases, it is taken as the purpose of an action: by will and feeling it is brought into being. At the end of the process one can experience, enjoy, savor, and thereby affirm it.

The theory of literary value in aesthetics notes that a book is first there before a reader opens it. One reads it according to one's unique aesthetics, needs and expectations, employing one's imagination, life experience and aesthetic experience. With the help of one's imagination and reason one re-imagines and artistically conceptualizes the structure of characters. Thereby, one forms and creates one's own aesthetic image, not exactly like that of the author of the book. That image or concept formed and created in the process of the reading and appreciating is precisely the aesthetic object. It is not the book; nevertheless, it is where the value of the book lies. The book in the natural world is not made by us; but we can find and experience it, and so confirm its value for our body and mind in their process of meeting our needs.

Hence, value is not far from us; it is in our feelings, cognition, experiences and enjoyment. It is what we hold and confirm by use of our body and mind. It might be some utility, function or meaning that is to be found, experienced and enjoyed, but could not be reduced to only one of them; rather it is a general term for all of them. This might be the reason why G.E. Moore thinks that good (value) cannot be defined. He lets us experience or confirm it in our own context, but does not reduce it to a single function, property or meaning.

Thus, value can be of many kinds in relation to a subject's needs, creations and enjoyment. However, though they can be distinguished in terms of their subject as individual or social, they are relative, and rely on wholeness, harmony and compatibility, as will be discussed below.

Change in values is often observed: something already found valuable, if it can be pursued and enjoyed only at the expense of other values, may no longer be considered a value, even a so-called end value. The reason for this might be sought in the needs, activities and pleasures of a subject. Needs are many: material and spiritual, natural and social, basic and non-basic, etc. All of these distinctions are relative and it is difficult to say that some needs, such as that for food and drink, are totally material or natural of a need of a human being can be met by food or drink it is material. But, even such a natural and material need is mixed or interwoven with other needs, in

more social and cultural terms, as with the hygienic, economic and aesthetic expectations of food and drink. Thus there is a so-called "culture of food and drink."

Therefore even the most simple, natural and basic needs are mixed and linked with other needs. In the tree of human needs, the branches can be distinguished from the trunk, and every branch is connected and mixed with others. Every branch extends many leaves for sunlight, water and air. Thus, for example, the human need for aesthetics is connected and mixed with one's need for amusement, knowledge, morality, etc. The human need for wealth is also connected and interwoven with other needs for community, amusement, knowledge, morality, etc. The more a subject develops, the more his needs are varied and mixed; in other words, a subject's needs tend to be varied and harmonious, belonging to an organically developing whole. If a value meets a need that is compatible with other needs, it will be increasingly pursued and affirmed.

A subject's activities are also many, such as economic, political, social, scientific, educational, literary, artistic and theoretical. Any that exclude or stifle other activities will be a problem. Though a subject cannot engage in many activities at the same time, often an activity, instead of being in opposition to others, includes or takes account of the purposes of other activities, so that one can "kill two birds with one stone." For example, labor is taken for granted as the first human need; it is considered characteristic of human life and the most basic value, as is confirmed in a practical way. However, if labor is reduced only to satisfying bodily human needs at the expense of other activities, then it will be a cursed rather than valued.

A subject's pleasures might be divided into feelings, cognition, experiences, utilities and so on. Many people in commerce, though very rich, find themselves split in two. What one holds and confirms with one's body is just what one loses and denies in mind. Since money cannot be used to fill the void in the soul, one doubts if money is really the thing to pursue. Only on the basis of wholeness, compatibility, and harmony of diversity in subjects, do we find the basis for values.

For a subject as an individual, the basis of value is related to that of other's or of society. The social basis of values will influence and restrict those of the individual, and vice versa. Obviously during a time of transition, under the influence of new forces or ideas, there will be dissension and bigotry in the short term. By laying undue stress on a need, one value will overrule an other or even all values; and this unbalanced stress on one social value will influence individual practice, leading to related dissension over values and to prejudice. However, if wholeness, harmony and compatibility are the basis of value then they should create an opening for value, even in an unbalanced situation. From a long term point of view, only values with such a basis can stand because: (a) they are not at the expense of other values; (b) they are related to what we take as an end value; (c) this end value, the survival and development of either mankind or of the individual, opens space for their consideration; and (d) such a value has a firm and balanced foundation.

Economic and Ethical Values

Returning now to the two values: economic and ethical. Economic value is what is found of a subject's material needs in object, and is willed or created, appreciated or enjoyed by a subject. Economic values are efficiency, benefit, profits, richness, prosperity, wealth, well-being, etc. Unlike other kinds of value, usually these require material products and can be measured or characterized by money. In political economics, the classical definition is that value is the social labor of the producer of commodities, which is condensed in commodities (concrete labor creates concrete utility value and abstract labor exchange value). My definition may not conflict with this: economic value can meet the subject's material needs, that is to say, it has use value; it can be

measured or characterized by money, and has exchange value; and it is appreciated or enjoyed by subjects for all these reasons. Since either use or exchange value should be affirmed finally by subjects, for a consumer the use or exchange value of a commodity is only a possible value. Only through one's willingness and behavior, e.g., in choosing, buying and using, is the value affirmed in personal experience and cognition. Thus, economic value is one kind of general value.

Ethical value is affirmed by subjects in human behavior or their spiritual products. This includes three points: it can meet the subject's needs for moral life; it is willed or practiced; and it is appreciated or enjoyed by subjects with moral satisfaction and a lofty feeling. Such ethical values as honesty, loyalty, benevolence, justice, good, and so on, are also categories of ethics. Like all other spiritual values, but unlike economic value, it is carried by human behavior or its spiritual products, but unlike other spiritual values it has unique normative function.

Though, according to the distinction between economics and ethics, economic and ethical values belong respectively to two disciplines, the two values always keep a "connection that cannot be cut." Since ancient times in China, there has been "a debate on Yi and Li." "Yi" is an ethical value, and "Li" is an economic value. Their relationship is a very old and recurring topic in traditional Chinese ethics, but since the economic reform the debate has become a hot topic. Similarly in the West, since ancient times, notes R.E. Freeman, "philosophers and others have questioned the connection between business or commerce and moral life."5

In modern times, suggests Amartya Sen, because of a misunderstanding of Adam Smith the idea that there is no need for ethics is quite widespread among practitioners in the market.6 Ethical value was not being considered until the 1970s. Generally speaking, there are three models for the relationship between the two values:

(1) The single value model: this lays undue stress on only economic value as in the USA before the rise of business ethics, or only on ethical value as in China before the reforms.

(2) The cooperation or means-to-ends model: this is of two types. One maintains that ethical value is end value, and economic value is means value. For example, many in China, since they believe that economy is the basis of society and ethics the superstructure, claim that the criterion for accepting an ethical value is whether it helps advance the realization of economic value. This is called by G. Enderle "instr-centralization": "ethics is misused as a mere means to achieve economic ends."7 The other type of this model holds that economic value should be taken as the means to ethical value which is the end value. This is suggested by G. Enderle in the same article regarding "the role of economic incentives as aids to the implementation of ethical goals."8

(3) The identity model: this also is of two types: one identifies economic value with ethical value: some claim that efficient economic behavior itself has ethical value and therefore that efficiency is identified with ethical value. The other maintains that ethical value is identified with economic value, because Yi is public Li; the difference between Yi and Li is only whether it is public or private.

Which model is right; how should we treat the relationship between the two values? We might deal with it on the basis of values as the last section argued:

First, in terms of the three points of value (meeting needs, being willed, and being appreciated), economic and ethical values are not separate or isolated. The first point is that it can meet the subject's needs, but as mentioned above, this is not isolated or separated from the others, but when a central, e.g., economic, need is met it is mixed and connected with other needs, including ethical needs. If this central need is compatible with helping forward other needs

including ethical ones, then this connections will support and confirm the central need. On the contrary, if the central need is met at the expense of, and opposed to, other related needs, its position will be shaken.

Second, the activity realizing these complicated needs is not isolated. In other words, since each need of a subject is not separate, it is not just economic or material; hence the activity also is not purely economic or by a purely economic agent. When one meets this complicated need in one's actions, one must consider how to adapt to economic, ethical, social and environmental requirements, and hence must deal with ethical, social and environmental relations. Hence, this activity becomes complicated; it is not just making money, but also a kind of moral and public activity.

Third, what subjects appreciate, enjoy, and confirm cannot be only economic or material things: it can be measured by money but also is confirmed by our sense of moral satisfaction and social or public opinion.

The compatibility and harmony of needs, activities and enjoyments in subjects support both economic and ethical values. For instance, efficiency in using and distributing resources usually is considered an economic value. But Li Yining, a famous Chinese economist, points out its ethical restrictions.9 He asks if it is always an economic value even if the products that characterize it are harmful to human health, pollute the environment, etc. It follows that if efficiency does not support the satisfaction of social requirements of human health and protection of the environment, then it is no longer a value.

The same is true of ethical values. In his work, *The Introduction of Value*, Wang Keqian that writes that "ethical value, like value in general, contains utility which is in conformity with moral norms, not general utility."10 In other words, ethical values must meet the subject's moral needs in the form of moral norms. But are these moral needs related to other, e.g., economic, needs? Wang points out that ethical values have two dimensions: one is utility, the other non-utility. The former means that ethical norms concern the needs of certain groups for material resources and their political interests. The latter concerns the need to satisfy human feelings, self-consciousness, will, or the spiritual activities of creativity, and so on.11 So ethical value, are related to various needs, including economic needs; and these relations and compatibilities support and uphold ethical values.

The relation of ethical values to utility through moral norms means that the connection with ethical value with the need for Li is manifested in connection to public Li. Though Li relates to moral agents, due to their connection with public Li, if this is not realized by them, there behavior will lack ethical value. This is not contrary to the above view of the bases of values as relevance, compatibility and harmony of diverse needs, activities and enjoyment on the part of the subject. On this basis we can deal with the relationship between ethical and economic values.

But there seem to be some weaknesses in all the above models. The model of only the value separates one value from another, without seeing that one value can be achieved only if it is compatible with other, related values. The authors of *Business Ethics—Reading and Cases in Corporate Morality*, say:

Traditionally, we have encouraged business to pursue profits because we believed, rightly or wrongly, that profit-seeking violates no rights and is best for society as a whole. This connection has been the source of business legitimacy, and of belief in its right to exist. In the past two decades, however, the belief has been challenged. It seems in such a climate, an investigation of business

values, or the moral dimension of business, and of the role of business in society becomes urgent.12

Business ethics in the USA proposes that we should not pursue economic value without consideration of it being compatible and harmonious with other values, specially ethical values. In China, before the reforms, we disregarded the rationality of economic values, cut off political and ethical values from economic values, and took such political and ethical values as having no relation to economic values and the objects of economic activity. As a result, people not only could not enjoy values from economic activity, but lost their belief in so-called political and ethical values.

As for the model of end-means, the claims regarding whether value is the means to economic values or vice verse all arbitrarily divide the two values into means-value and end-value. But the relationship between the two seems different. All are related to, pursued and affirmed by subjects without distinction of end-means. If helping forward economic value is the basis of rejecting or accepting ethical values, could we say that even cheating is beyond reproach since it too may be used to make money? In the case of ethical end-values, many think there is no cause here for criticism, but in economies, which certainly overlap and connect with other activities, economic value is central for meeting the subjects' needs. Here, the issue is whether this be supported by relevance, possibility and harmony, which are not questions of ends. Without the support of related ethical values, economic values cannot stand. This happens often in the connection of economic with ethical values. To say that economic values have lost this basis does not mean that one should take ethical values as the end of economy. To me, the model for cooperation of the two values should be the pursuit of economic value with the support of ethical values. This model has relevance, comparability and harmony.

As for the model identifying economic and ethical values, it confuses value with the basis of value. To say that efficient economic behavior itself has ethical value is to say that efficient behavior has the support of ethical values; therefore it has ethical meaning, and is affirmed ethically. But it is difficult to identify efficiency with ethical value. Similarly, ethical value can be confirmed in the perspective of public utility, but it is ethical because it meets the subject's moral need in ethical form.

In fact, in our cultural heritage, many economic values were supported by ethical values and solved the problem of their cooperation. They were not reached by a hierarchy of values, but were basic to business ethics.

In English, the word "economy" has three meanings: avoidance of a waste of money; control and management of money and other community resources; a social or household a system of political economy;13 these have nothing to do with ethics. But in Chinese economy, "jing Ji" (Ching Chi, in the old alphabetic system of writing), is related to ethical value for it means "governing the world in harmony to bring about the well-being of the people."14 A Japanese scholar also notes this. Dr. Iwao Taka, in his report "Business Ethics in Japan" points out that:

in Japanese, the word 'economy' is read as *Kei Zai*. This is a compound word consisting of *Kei* and *Zai*, originally stemming from the Chinese word, *Ching-Chi*. *Kei* means governing the world in harmony; *Zai* means bringing about the well-being of the people. Therefore, in this sense, the word economy does essentially include morality or ethics in its wide and fundamental meaning and scope.15

It is a pity that the connection of economy with ethics is now ignored. Not only is *Jing Ji* itself a business ethics value, but also *Yi* (justice), *Lian* (honesty in business), *Qing* (diligence), *Jian* (be thrifty in managing), and the more modernly values of *Gong Ping* (fairness), *Gong Fu*(community wealth), etc. All are economic values supported by ethical values. According to Cheng Qizhi, in his "New Annotation of the Confucian Concepts of Yi and Li," Yi originally was not a purely ethical value, but meant Li conforming with morality. Only when later abstracted from Li did it become an ethical value in opposition to Li.16 But as many argue, especially in a business context, Yi still should be understood as obtaining Li in an ethical way.

I noted that economic values can be either with or without ethical value. Economic values are especially with ethical value. More ethical business values will be found and created if we note this important conjunction. In this much is to be learned from our cultural context as well as from that of other nations.

In changing times, since people's concepts of value and their basic, especially their economic, life is in transformation, their needs, pursuits and enjoyments change, and the bases of values will be influenced. Where some factors were overstressed, the connections will be broken, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper. But from a long term point of view, economic value and ethical value will be revived. It is hoped that business ethics can help people to shorten the time "without" values.

Notes

1. Georges Enderle, "What is Business Ethics?" *Business Ethics: Japan and the Global Economy*. T.W. Dunfee and Y. Nagayasu, eds. (Boston: Kluwer Academy Publishers, 1993), pp. 133-150.

2. Richard T. DeGeorge, "Will Success Spoil Business Ethics?" in R. Edward Freeman, ed., *Business Ethics-The State of the Art* (Boston: Kluwer Academy Publishers, 1993), p. 42.

3. Quote from *The History of Contemporary Western Ethics* (Beijing: The Beijing University Press, 1990), p. 406.

4. C.L. Sheng, *A New Approach to Utilitarism* (Shanghai: Jiao Tong University Press, 1996), p. 136.

5. R. Edward Freeman, ed., *Business Ethics*, p. 1.

6. Amartya Sen, "Does Business Ethics Make Economic Sense?" in Paul M. Minus, ed., *The Ethics of Business in Global Economics* (Boston: Kluwer Academy Publishers, 1993), pp. 51-56.

7. Georges Enderle.

8. *Ibid*.

9. Li Yining, *The Ethical Issues in Economics* (Beijing: The San Lian Books, 1995), p. 3.

10. Wang Keqian, "What is Value?" (Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Press, 1992), p. 134-135.

11. *Ibid*.

12. W. Michael Hoffman and Robert E. Frederick, *Business Ethics* (Waltham, MA: Bentley College, 1990), p. 1.

13. A.S. Hornby, E.V. Gatenby and H. Wakefield, *The Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English with Chinese Translation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 345.

14. *Dictionary Words* (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionaries and Works Press, 1979), p. 1246.

15. *The Business Ethics in Asian Countries and Related Regions* (Tokyo, 1996).

16. *Pong Yue Collection*, no. 6, 1993.

7.

An Approach to Business Ethics: Fact-based Value for Fair Trade

Charn Mayot

The Basis of Business

Profit Alone

The liberal outlook on business equated it simply with profit maximization. The sole function of a firm, including its corporate executives, is to make the highest profit for owners and shareholders (stockholders). The rational grounds supporting this idea is the fact that a firm is an economic institution, the private property of the shareholders and owners who invest and take risks in such investments solely for the highest economic added value.

This idea is not only popular, but is grounded in the philosophical writings of Adam Smith (1776), a moral philosopher at Glasgow University who contends that the sole motive of business transactions is self-interest:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages (*Wealth of Nations*, I. ii).

The moral conclusion drawn by his followers from this statement is that it is a moral duty for the corporate executive to pursue the self-interest of shareholders and owners in maximizing profits:

There is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of game, which is to say, engaged in open and free competition, without deception or fraud (Friedman, 1975, p. 133).

There is no other concern for business than this profit maximization:

Welfare and society are not the corporation's business. Its business is making money, not sweet music. . . . In a free enterprise system, welfare is supposed to be automatic, and where it is not it becomes government's job, and business's job is not government (Levitt, 1958 in Beauchamp and Bowie, 84).

Moreover, they hold that in the long run a pursuit of self-interest does not harm any society; on the contrary, it benefits society. "An invisible hand," a static law like that of physics which regulates economic affairs gradually will lead to common benefits. This leads to the conclusion that, however seriously business persons pursue their self-interest, the invisible hand automatically will bring about the common good of a society; the pursuit of self-interest is morally good because of good consequences.

Dangers of Self-Interest Alone

Undeniably, the attempt of today's world community to establish a free trade association is rooted partly in this ideology. But a poisonous tree produces poisonous fruits; in the same manner an egoistic ideology should bring about egoistic acts. It is self-contradictory to believe that the pursuit of self-interest does no harm at all, but on the contrary, completely benefits society.

Though nowadays the world community advocates free trade, there is not much promise of success without radical change or at least a revision of this fundamental ideology which is the root of the problem. People believe that what is hidden in the mind of each nation is egoism. World trade co-operation is understood as a new form of defence-strategy which developed countries try to impose in order to take advantage of developing nations. Trade associations, global and regional, like WTO, ASEAN, NAFTA, EU, are seen as "trade blocs" in relation to which "many of the countries outside these blocs, naturally including some of the poorest and the least secure in the world, fear being left out in the cold" (Kinnock, 1994, p. 124). The countries outside the blocs realize that any individual country is too weak to rival others and therefore unite only for the purpose of collective defence of trade.

This suspicion is not without justification. When everyone believes that business transactions are rooted in self-interest, why should they not believe that business at the international level, regional and global, are free from self-interest. A change in belief about the root of business transactions is necessary if we want to have a World Trade Association that really works. Cooperation can be achieved only through trust, not distrust. Co-operation in a situation of distrust is only a truce in a war, which awaits combat once again.

The first reason for the need of change in belief is that we are too confident in this paragraph of Adam Smith, while he was neither confident nor consistent. "He is thought to argue that the result of everyone pursuing their own interests will be the maximization of the interests of society. The invisible hand of the free market will transform the individual's pursuit of gain into the general utility of society" (Bishop, 1995). But Smith himself thought that the interests of merchants and manufacturers are basically opposed to those of society while pursuing their own interests. There are numerous passages in the *Wealth of Nations* in which Adam Smith directly states that the interests of business people conflict with the optimal utility of society as a whole, and that business people pursue their personal goals at the expense of the public good. In one phrase of the same book he wrote:

As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value, every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention (*WN*, IN, ii, 9).

Every individual is continually expecting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of society he has in his view. But the study of his own advantage, naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer the employment which is most advantageous to the society (*WN*, IN, ii, 4).

The second reason against Smith's thesis is based on the fact of a business organization. A firm is a legal person which enjoys some privileges like a physical person. In the past man was defined by his social life: "man is a political animal" or "no man is an island." This can be applied also to a firm. A firm cannot avoid this situation for, as Donaldson contends, it is an "artifact" or manmade entity. It is created by humans who can choose to create or not to create it; contemporary people choose to create it, grant it privileges and let it live among them.

The Social Influence of a Firm

Firms nowadays influence life in almost all its aspects: private, social, economical, etc. It depends on people for its creation, but after being created people rely on it in many respects: it hires, rewards, and fires people. It is influenced by people in many ways; its policy and strategy are mandated by an executive board in compliance to the laws and governmental policies. It helps people to enjoy a more luxurious life with goods, and services; but it also can harm man and community with unsafe products, pollution, environmental depletion, etc.

Moreover, many firms nowadays wield tremendous social power. Big firms make tremendous changes in society or even transform it completely. In a small village most inhabitants may be farmers, but if one day an oil company discovers there a reserve of crude oil large enough to be turned to commercial purpose, the small village will turn into an industrial site and the life of the people living in that village will change. In the age of globalization the whole world becomes a small village in which a small flower when cut from its branch can affect the whole world. For example, Thailand is a relatively small country; however, in terms of economy it can influence a giant country like China. Chereon Phokaphan has invested billions of dollars in China and hires there at least 100,000 persons.

At the beginning of this century in terms of politics, we had two kinds of politicians "politicians by profession" and "business politicians." At the end of this decade almost all politicians are "business politicians" and a "politician" with no connection to any business is uncommon.

For instance the ratio of "politicians" to "business politicians" in the 1920s was 124 to 77. This proportion remained relatively stable until the early 90s when it changed to 151 to 116. By 1995, however, it had reversed to 115 to 208.

Before this decade in Thailand politics exerted pressure on business, but in this decade the situation has reversed. Business becomes the pillar of political parties for financial resources, which paves the way for businesses to have their people in the cabinet. Governmental policies nowadays are indirectly set by business policies. According to the traditional democratic social contract theory, parliament represents the population of the whole country which entrusts it with their political power. Now in this country it represents firms which support its members financially, rather than the people who elected them.

Stakeholders

This assures us that a firm by nature is not "an island in the sea" or an "oasis in the desert," but a socio-political entity. By necessity it has certain relationships with other constituencies (stakeholders). These major constituencies (stakeholder) which influence and are influenced by a firm include customers, employees, owners/investors, suppliers, competitors, community, business press (mass media), governmental authorities and creditors. On one hand, business

depends on these to a large extent to execute its goals; on the other hand, it can influence society strongly bringing both benefit and harm.

Each constituency influences and is influenced by a firm in different manners as follow:

1. *Customers* exchange resources for the products of the firm, and in return receive benefits from the products purchased. Customers provide the lifeblood of the firm in the form of revenue. The firm supplies them with goods and services that suit their needs with rational price and quality. In turn they expect the corporation to remain true to the promise of rational price and quality as well as after-sale services.

The sustenance of this relationship depends on a mutual trust between producers and customers. Human consumption behaviors are partly rational. For example a young couple who want a car for their family surely has studied all brands of cars available in their domestic market whose price is commensurate with the amount of money they want to spend. Their decision to buy one of them implies belief in the safety and quality of the car and in the after-sales service provided by the producer or its agent. If the product fails to satisfy this need, trust eventually will be lost.

2. *Employees* exchange their labor, physical or intellectual, for the rewards1 offered by the firms. In return for their labor and loyalty, they expect security, wages, benefits, fair and equal treatment,2 and meaningful work. It is the duty of the corporation to provide them with these and to carry them through difficult times.

To achieve their expectations, employees are expected to follow the instructions of management most of the time, to speak favorably about the company, and to be responsible citizens in the local communities in which the company operates. Wherever and whenever they are used as means to an end, they must be allowed to participate in that decision for as autonomous persons they have a right to decide regarding their future.

3. *Stockholders and owners* are financial stakeholders who have invested their capital in the corporation in stocks, bonds and shares. Their main objective is seek maximum returns in the exchange for their investments. Therefore their special claim in a corporation is legitimate in that the money they give either directly or indirectly to the corporation for investment and expansion is their private property. In addition, they also have to take risks to a certain extent in such transactions. “The firm affects their livelihood or, if a substantial portion of their retirement income is in stocks or bonds, their ability to care for themselves when they can no longer work” (Hoffman, 1995, p. 149).

4. *Suppliers* are vital to the success of the firm, for raw materials will determine the quality and price of the end products. In return the firm is a customer of the supplier and is therefore vital to its success and survival of the supplier. Both parties are so interconnected that they rise and fall together.

5. *The local community* is an interactive aggregate of individuals who grants the firm the right to build facilities; in turn, a community benefits from the taxes levied and the economic and social contribution of the firm. In return for the provision of local services, the firm is expected to be a good citizen, as is any person, natural or artificial. The firm cannot expose the community to unreasonable hazard in the form of pollution, toxic waste, and so on. If for some reason the firm must leave a community, it is expected to work with local leaders to make the transition as smooth as possible.

6. *Competitors* are those who are eager to match or better the corporation’s products, reputation, and price appeal. Competition does not necessarily exclude co-operation and there is much empirical evidence showing that co-operation among competitors can help both side grow

and resolve their defects. One of the major causes for the failure of planned market economies has been the lack of competition.

7. *Trade press* (mass media) reports the positive or negative business transactions of the firm to the public. They are watchdogs who keep an eye on the daily practice of the firms so as to maintain benefits for the public. They can generate both good and bad images of a firm for the public; firms, in turn, can generate their financial well-being through advertising.

8. *Governmental authorities* are representatives of the legislative, administrative and judicial bodies who enforce the laws concerning the business transactions of the firm. They expect a firm to conform to the laws. Firms, in turn, can affect the economic well-being of the state though tax payments.

9. *Creditors* grant loans in order for firms to establish or to expand their business. On the one hand the capability for establishing and expanding a corporation depends on loans granted. And on the other hand, the creditors' survival is dependent on the profit earned and the interest charged from their customers.

By nature this relationship is a complex and multitiered environment. The stakeholders in each circle are closely connected with other stakeholders in the same circle and all, at the same time, are closely connected with stakeholders in other circles.

The very nature of the relationship between a firm and its constituencies reveals the danger of a pure pursuit of self-interest in the system and of violation of the golden rule. As mentioned earlier, a firm is a social unit which influences human life in all aspects. Nowadays, business has entered politics and absorbed some of the administrative and legislative power from individual citizens. If the business is based purely upon self-interest and if its sole responsibility is to maximize profits, as Milton Friedman and Theodore Levitt suggest, this administrative and legislative power will be abused. Keith Davis (1975) argues that:

If business has the power, then a just relationship demands that business also bear responsibility for its action in these areas. . . . The iron law of responsibility is that . . . in the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it.

A firm is not an "island in the sea," but is created to function in a society, among human beings. It is allowed privileges and authority to use for its prosperity almost all the resources which belong to the society, but it is a common ethical practice that one has to give back when one receives. To preach that business is born solely from self-interest and is to act solely in these terms is to tell business to hurt its mother.

In sum, this makes clearer what was stated in the second section, namely, that if the ideology proposed by Adam Smith (including Milton Friedman and Theodore Levitt) be applied to the forum of global trade association, each national representative represents a collective of individual firms of the same nation, and each trade bloc represents a collective of individual firms in the same region, all pursuing their self-interest. They are then just new forms of collective individualists who form an association not for the purpose of real co-operation, but out of egoism. The term "co-operation" is only bait to attract prospective victims into a trap. Everyone in the forum believes the pursuit of self-interest to be hidden behind all trade negotiators, including oneself. This turns business into war between different firms, nations and trade blocs. Negotiations are only attempts to postpone the eruption of a full trade war by maintaining a cold trade war. If trade negotiations are believed to be a disguise in which each firm, nation, or trade bloc tries to draw as much benefit as possible from its rival, negotiations must fail even before they really begin.

Au's Outlook on Business Ethics

Professor Kirti Bunchua (1995) in his "Foundation of Professional and Business Ethics" argues that business transactions should be conducted in such a way that in realistic circumstances it leads to authentic happiness for each individual. Authentic happiness in reality will be possible if, and only if, all the interests of all parties involved (individual persons, local and global community, as well as the eco-system) are heeded.

Goals

By nature, all human activities aim at particular ends, as Aristotle writes: "Every science and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit and undertaking appears to aim at some good: consequently, the good has some well-defined object at which all things aim" (*Nicomachean Ethics*). Authentic happiness is the final end, because this is valuable in itself. We do not seek happiness for purposes other than happiness itself. This authentic happiness does not mean equal economic distribution; difference there is acceptable as long as the happiness of society is maintained. Everyone is happy with the portion he has and no one is left to suffer from lack of basic needs. Authentic happiness is the enjoyment of happiness by all members of the society, with no one left to suffer.

This authentic happiness is possible due to the fact that each human being is inherently endowed with capabilities (creative, adaptive and co-operative) which drive them to strive for the attainment of this goal. These capabilities have been embedded in persons in their untiring search throughout history.

This authentic happiness can be described as "happiness in the happiness of others." If the pursuit of self-interest is for the benefit of the individual, how can it create public well-being. In contract, a good tree bears safe and sweet fruit so that if everyone acts not only for one's own happiness, but for that of others, happiness is more likely to result. This vision paves the way for trust, which leads finally to cooperation.

This vision is based upon the nature of a firm. By the nature of its relationship with its constituencies, the form is a society in which with numerous members each in a different role. Each member is insufficient in himself/herself, but in coordination contributes to the perfection, survival and sustenance of the whole. Each functions simultaneously both for one's own happiness and for that of others. When this perspective is applied to business activities, profit-making is not an end in itself, but a means to the final end which is authentic happiness.

This is not to ignore the vital role of profit in business; indeed it is a moral duty of corporate executives to make profit in a proper rate and manner. Capital invested in a firm is the private property of owner or shareholder (stockholders) and it must be invested so as to generate added valued. Investment in what does not generate added value is an unethical extravagance. However, the freedom to invest for profit is not a license to abuse and bring suffering to others. In line with Friedman, Levitt contends that "the function of business is to produce sustained high-level profit. The essence of free enterprise is to go after profit in any way that is consistent with its survival as an economic system" (Levitt, 1958, in Beauchamp and Bowie, p. 83-84). This statement, though not completely wrong, is only partly correct. Profit is not an end in itself, but a means for authentic happiness. In the traditional free market perspective, the corporate executive believes that his or her "primary responsibility is to the shareholders because they are the owners of the company"

(Sorell and Hendry, 1995). But, moreover, a firm and its corporate executives has the responsibility to make profit that leads to authentic happiness not only for the shareholders and owners, but for all members who affect and are affected by the firm's decisions. Hence, our textbook, *Foundation of Professional and Business Ethics*, the chapters: "Man-for-Himself," "Man-with-Others," "Man-for-Others" and "Man-for-the World" lay out this broad perspective of corporate responsibility.

Areas of Corporate Responsibility

Theodore Levitt contends that corporate activity is limited only by two constraints: economic and legal. But these two are not enough to guarantee authentic happiness. To attain its purpose corporate responsibility must be extended to all areas: economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic.

(a) Economic responsibilities: a corporation must be profitable; this is the foundation upon which all other areas rest.

(b) Legal responsibility: a corporation must obey the law of the country. Law is the social codification of right and wrong. Every corporate transaction must be in accord with these rules.

(c) Ethical responsibilities: a corporation must be ethical. Every corporate transaction, decision and policy is bound by the obligation to do what is right, just and fair. Negatively, it must avoid harm to all parties; positively, it must enhance the authentic happiness of all.

(d) Philanthropic responsibilities: as a legal person in the community a corporation, must be a good citizen contributing resources to the community and improving its quality of life. Though voluntary, this is an urgent need of modern society. Nevertheless, it can never override the three preceding responsibilities. Charitable contributions are not licenses for a firm to do something wrong.

Vision and Ethical Theories

The vision does not dictate any particular ethical theory, but aims at enhancing "authentic happiness according to reality" among members in a society. Our vision starts with the "facts" of the business environment, and draws the "ought" out of such facts. All ethical theories are recognized to contain both strengths and weaknesses. Through due to their different criteria utilitarianism and deontology can lead to different decisions, even on the same issue, neither completely excludes the other. Their conflicting judgments do not necessarily mean that they can be accommodated to each other in no respect. Both supply the other with its missing perspectives.

Both modern approaches are subject to maladies from which their much heartier and more robust ancestor was spared. At the same time, the truth that is missed in utilitarianism, and (some say) is found in deontology, is also found — and found much more richly — in traditional teleology (Macdonald and Beck-Dudley, 1994, p. 616).

W.D. Ross, as cited by Shaw and Barry (1992, pp. 73-4), contends that the integration of different ethical theories is necessary because "we see ourselves . . . under various moral obligations that cannot be reduced to the single obligation of maximizing happiness. . . . We are intertwined with other people in very specific contexts and have, as a result, certain moral obligations . . . there should not be a single answer for all cases." Professor Kirti Bunchua in his *Foundation of Professional and Business Ethics* comments that they are not contradictory, but paradoxical. This means that they seem opposed to each other on first glance, but in depth can be combined.

Conclusion

The above strategy is considered a "win-win" strategy in which all parties are allowed to share the benefits of business activities. In contrast, the vision proposed by Smith and Levitt leads to only "one win," namely, the people who own capital or have greater economic power. Moreover, their vision provides roots for antagonism and distrust making the business world a Hobbesian war or Darwinian struggle for survival by the fittest. This would be but a new weapon of the developed countries to threaten the developing countries in an era of economic war. There can be no free trade without fairness; trade can be implemented only in an atmosphere of fairness, trust, care, and mutual sharing. Hence, the old ideology be replaced by a new vision if the world community is to have global economic co-operation — which, in fact, means world peace in this era.

Notes

1. The rewards can take various forms such as salaries, bonus, retirement pension, fringe and benefits.

2. I admit Immanuel Kant's second principle: "act so that you treat humanity, whether your own person or in that of another, always as an end never as a means only" (Kant, 1969, p. 444). This implies that both employers, employees and human parties involved are to be treated with respect for their human dignity and sacredness. However I do not take the rule absolutely.

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8.
Sustainability and a New Civilization

Wang Miaoyang

Sustainable development has been a very lively issue in our days and has come to be accepted by more and more people. Considering sustainable development ethically and observing the relation-ship of human beings with nature, with other humans and with society, we might say also that it is a new idea not only for development, but for civilization as well. Sustainability is the basis of values in moving from the pattern of industrial civilization to that of a new civilization for humankind.

The Origin of the Concept of Sustainability

Sustainability is not a new concept; it originated from the idea of "natural balance" in the 18th century. There was a saying in the West, that God in his wisdom designed our real world, which enabled people to live forever in a state of natural equilibrium. Although it is bad that the antelope should be eaten by the lion, in this way the lion gets its food and the excessive reproduction of antelopes is con-trolled. However it seems that people have not paid enough attention to the concept of a natural balance.

Sensitive to the damage of the natural environment and the abuse of natural resources through industrialization, Frederick Engels, by the end of the last century, warned that this large scale damage to the harmony between man and nature would at last be punished by nature. With regard to social development the same was noted and criticized by Karl Marx. But still it was not sufficiently recognized by people.

Not until 1962, upon the publication of *The Quiet Spring*, written by Rachel Carson an American marine biologist, did people begin to consider the co-existence of humans and nature. The well-known report of Rome, *The Limits of Growth*, was published in 1972. The question was raised in the report was whether social production could increase indefinitely and whether world development could be sustained. But to the best of my knowledge, the word "sustainability" is not found in the report. Instead, the key words were "balance" or "global balance" which derive from a research forecast based mostly on the system dynamics designed by Jay Forrester, Professor at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This holds that if one takes a series of variables such as birth rate, death rate, resource availability, degree of environ-mental pollution, etc., as data-in, then the data-out will forecast an increasing birth rate, death rate, etc. It should be made clear here that balance here is a "moving balance," not stagnancy or negative balance. That is, using new technology, people hopefully can re-generate resources and recycle minerals. It is from this concept of "natural balance" that we have the more active concept of "sustainability."

It was in *The Protection of the Natural World Program*, 1980, and *Constructing a Sustainable Society*, 1981, that we find the concept of "sustainability." This was defined clearly in the report, *Our Common Future*, presented by the United Nations Environment and Development World Committee in 1987. Since 1990, some additions and principles for realizing sustainability have been worked out.

In the former Norwegian Premier's report, *Our Common Future*, commissioned by the U.N., the key point to the concept "sustainability" is development. The report deals not with sheer

"sustainability," but with "sustainable development." In a broad sense this could be defined as the strategy for promoting harmony among people and between humankind and nature. The "report" reasons as follows:

- The concept of need or "requirement," especially the fundamental needs of the poor of the world, should be given first priority.
- The concept of "limit" is the limit of the possibilities of technology and social organization for meeting human needs.

Therefore, the targets of economic and social development should be determined in view of the sustainability of all countries whether developed or developing, and whatever be the economic system. Sustainability should be the agreed strategic framework. The needs to be considered for sustainability are not only those of economic life, but also of education, health, fresh air and clean water, natural scenery, environmental protection, etc.

Consequently, the essence of sustainable development is, while developing the economy, to pursue the harmony, co-existence and co-prosperity of man and nature. This does not take as the target sheer economic increase. In other words, sustainable development is first of all a reflection on the traditional mode of industrial development, or a criticism to the limitation of industrial growth. The formulation of sustainable development is a great step forward with regard to the outlook on the development for mankind for it shows that human beings seek to create civilization at a higher level. This is the new starting point for the idea of civilization.

Sustainability Requires the Establishment of an Ecological Civilization and the Principle of Fairness

In view of the relationship between man and nature, sustainability as the idea of new civilization requires establishing a new ecological civilization. This requires that development turn from the traditional mode of industrial civilization to a new mode of ecological civilization. The mode of development of traditional industrial civilization was founded on the view that "man is the master of nature," which "he should conquer ." This encourages human beings to draw endlessly from nature in the process of modernization; it maintains that human beings can be more wealthy and happy by continuously exploiting and utilizing natural resources. Dominated by such ideas humans deal with nature in a vicious way, resulting in a "vicious circle."

Ethics should make clear that human beings have also a moral responsibility towards nature. Previously, one talked only about morality in the field of relationships among people or between man and society, but never that man should also take moral responsibility towards nature. This is not only a serious problem in reality, but also an important advanced in moral philosophy.

Regarding the relationship between man and nature. The new civilization demands that people take responsibility to respect nature. It holds also that humans exits in nature and in harmony with nature, and that both develop in a coordinated manner. Humans do not live above or outside nature, but are included in the whole of nature. To love and pay great attention to the whole of nature, to ecological balance, to all biological *genera*, and to the unregenerable resources of the earth — all these are demanded by the new idea of civilization and its new ethics. For survival and development people have to exploit nature, and it is rational to expend a certain amount of natural resources, but we must not take nature as a "slave" or as "something conquered" which is to be treated at will.

Sustainable development is concerned with the civil relation-ship both between humans and nature and among people. The first definition of sustainable development was that "social development should meet the requirements of both contemporary and future generations" (1987). Five years later a complement was added: "The development of some people should not harm others" (1993). This shows that fairness is the fundamental principle for the relationship among the people in the framework of sustainable development. It demands that the present developing subject restrain to a certain degree its own development efforts.

Firstly, it calls for fairness among generations, especially to future generations. This emphasizes that contemporary development should not be at the expense of future generations. What we leave for later generations should be at least more than what our ancestors left us, so that our descendants have enough natural resources to develop further. The basic aim of sustainable development is to enable development to improve over the generations.

Secondly, fairness and equality within the same generations is called for. This stresses that development in any region and country should not be at the expense of development in other regions and countries, and that backward regions and countries should be especially protected. Due to the limitation of natural resources, any uncontrolled exploitive behavior would be harmful to the surrounding regions and countries, and lead to negative consequences. The key point of sustainable development is to prevent and eliminate the polarization between the poor and the rich in a certain region, country or even in the whole world. People in poor areas often exploit resources excessively for food and clothing, while the rich abuse the resources predatorially for luxurious enjoyment. Only by a fair disposition of the resources which reduces the polarization between the rich and the poor can the development of the whole be sustained. As the basic target of development is to meet necessary "requirements," the needs for the survival of the poor should be given greater priority than those of the rich. Only in this way can the aims of sustainable development be realized.

The fairness principle within a generation or between generations represented by sustainability is an extension of the original fairness principle. At first, people understood fairness as equality, for instance, that everyone is to be given equal property. Later people understood it as an equal chance, not an equal result. Now, people understand it as the fairness in exacting from nature and in enjoying what is given by nature. This type of fairness between two generations or within a generation is a new idea of civilization.

Sustainability Requires a Broader Social Renewal

Sustainable development demands dealing correctly not only with the relationship between humans and nature, and among people, but also with the relationship among various fields of social civilization. For sustainable development to be truly realized, the society must advance and the degree of the social civilization improved.

Social civilization includes material, spiritual and system civilizations. The construction of material civilization and spiritual civilization supplement and improve each other. Onesidedness in either of them would be harmful to the sustainable development of the society.

Spiritual civilization is the pursuit of social well being at a high level. Included in sustainable development are the development of spiritual civilization as well as full development in economy, society, environment and the quality of the population. As the level of social civilization advances, human beings, beside their material requirements, require ever more spiritual civilization and the full development of human quality. This would not be possible without the development of

spiritual civilization, which therefore is a topic inherent in the idea of the new civilization of sustainable development.

It would be more in accord with reality and more scientific to distinguish system civilization from spirit civilization, or, to divide social civilization into three parts: material, spiritual and system, so as to make manifest its implied theoretical and practical meanings.

System civilization could be distinguished into various levels as basic system, system, and concrete institutions or specific rules, and so on. The degrees of civilization in the societies with different basic systems are comparable in certain historical conditions. For instance in the present historical condition we say that the basic system of socialism is a better and superior civilization than that of capitalism. But in specific management systems, the West might have something advanced which deserves being followed, or could be said to be more civil and scientific.

The aim of emphasizing the system civilization is to note the sustainability of social development. For some regions or countries without reforming the basic social system, or without a high level of system civilization, it evidently is not enough to emphasize only spiritual civilization and moral norms, because the basic system might be the first obstacle in the way of socially sustainable development.

Hence, to start from the demand of sustainability, it will be necessary to demand the improvement of social civilization in all its dimensions, including the construction of material, spiritual and system civilizations. In constructing material civilization, our main task is to deal properly with the relationship between man and nature; in spiritual civilization to improve the quality of human life and the relationship among people; in system civilization to improve the relationship between the individual and society or group.

What is more, sustainable development must have lofty thought and morality as its impetus. The quality of its morality and thought is the kernel of a nation's civil quality. If we take sustainability as a new idea of civilization, then we have to promote a more perfect spiritual civilization and a more lofty morality for such a sustainable developing society.

Sustainability demands the full improvement of social civilization. This requires strengthening and increasing not only material civilization, but also the construction of spirit civilization as well. This is the starting point and kernel of a new notion of civilization.

The transition from industrial to a new civilization calls for a new axiology, ethics, and outlook toward environment, history and so on. Various new theories will be produced in present and future practice, but from what has been said above we can expect that sustainability will be the norm of values for the new era.

9.

The Basis of Economic Values in Chinese Traditional Culture

Xu Hongxing

From an overall point of view, Chinese agricultural civilization was developed independently in an exceedingly open and rich territory, and under the protection of an advantageous topography able to prevent external invasions from any direction. The principal traits of Chinese culture were accumulated gradually in the course of the continuation and renewal of the Chinese agricultural civilization for thousands of years. Agriculture drew its resources from the land and because cultivated land could not be taken away, the peasants were neither as mobile as nomads who could move from place to place in search of water and grass, nor as free as laborers who could choose their places of employment without limits. They were born, grew up, aged and died here for generations. They made a self-supporting living and obtained enough to eat and wear by intensive and meticulous cultivation, a tremendous labor on a rather narrow stretch of land, supplemented by household handicraft in a close combination with agriculture. The stylized productive activities and nearly solidified economic structure developed in the people such natural dispositions as tolerance of hardship and tenacity, honesty and sincerity, simplicity and an unsophisticated nature. It focused their minds on their native land, leading to careful consideration before migrating. These provide the necessary conditions for the prosperity of society and economy, the development of science and technology, the stability of public order and the flourishing of culture and education, while determining as well their highest possible limit.

In the Middle Ages, the natural economy was also dominant throughout Europe, but based upon serfdom to the feudal manor as its basis. Within the manor there was a definite division of labor among the different serfs and especially the work of agriculture and handicrafts which usually were undertaken by different people. Owing to the division of labor among serfs and the available machinery, the productive forces stagnated for a rather long period and the degrees of prosperity in the economy and of development in sciences and techniques were far inferior to that in China. However, this inherently dual tendency could not quite solidify the natural economic structure so that capitalist industry and commerce could easily emerge and develop. In India the rural commune system was so stubborn that the society was decomposed into many atoms similar in appearance, but among which there were no connections. The rural communes had no intention of social progress and no actions propelled the society forward.

But the natural economic structure in China was different from both Europe and India. Its distinctive qualities were that the component units were based on one family and one household, and that there were fewer divisions of labor among the respective family members. Each household combined the production of the means of livelihood and the most necessary means of production along with that of humankind itself (that is, the multiplication of the race). It possessed far greater social productive forces than the manor economy of serfdom and conversely enabled this economic structure to be exceedingly integrated and solid. The direct combination of agriculture with household handicraft saved so much material and time that these rural households were able to evolve into a landlord economy by annexing land. This economy was the basis for the formation of a unified country. This rural household possessed far more vigor than the Indian rural commune so that it could bring China's civilization to leadership in the world for a rather long period of time.

Its structure, which was far more solid than that of the European manor, enabled China to break through its intrinsic setup and to develop a capitalist industry and commerce.

In the traditional agriculture and handicraft of China, the importation, inheritance and development of productive techniques, and the understanding and the utilization of such natural conditions as seasons and topographical advantages, etc., relied mainly upon oral instruction and the examples accumulated through practice. Thus, an elder of a family who had rather rich productive experience became the authority of this family, and the structure of the Chinese family turned into a typical father-son pattern with the lines of father-son and of mother-in-law-daughter-in-law as its main axes. The principal purpose of marriage was to beget male offspring who could in turn generate successive generations of descendants. The practical roles played by the male labor forces in agricultural production brought made bearing male's to be of supreme importance in human reproduction. On this basis, the Chinese patriarchal clan system was gradually founded. In this pattern of families, clans and relatives a giant social network grew and formed a pattern. What was needed was to follow it and to preserve its knowledge and experience. These usually were the same formula, repeated again and again for generations, and wear directly preserved in the elders' minds. Both descendants and ancestors lived in an identical environment and walked the same route in life, so each person could easily acquire the ready-made keys from the ancestors when he met any question. Therefore, Haven and ancestor worship, the arrangement according to levels qualifications and record of service, traditionalism, age standing for IQ, and antiquity representing truth — all these were the inevitable outcomes in the theory of knowledge created by the families and the pattern of its social structure.

For a thousand years, the people always got up at sunrise and went to rest at sunset, sowed in the spring, looking after the plants in Summer, harvested in Autumn and stored up in Winter. Things were going round and round with no alteration in time other than the change of seasons once a year. This fixed life-style-repeated continuously in simple repetition, accustomed people to being happy-go-lucky, believing in fate and being satisfied with their present condition. All their thoughts and feelings and the whole cultural system showed that they preferred unity, identity and quiet stability to multiplicity, diversity, change and disorder, so that a great unity was formed as the times required. The central mission of the great unification was to ensure unity in all of peoples' lives.

For the bureaucracy which represented the supreme Emperor the ideal was non-governing, i.e., not to disturb the mechanical life of the people. This was the great unification in the field of politics. In ideology the manifestation of the great unification was the development of a single school of thought and worship of the Confucian classics. The people did not seek to show their own originality and to found their own characteristic ideology and system of scholarship, but were satisfied with committing a fixed set of several Confucian classics to memory and expounding them, or at most stating a few of their own views as annotations of the classics in order to defend traditional thought. As a result a tradition of scholarship regarding the study of the classics, commentaries and correct annotations and implications was formed. This great unification excluded multiplicity. It did not require creative or exploratory types but those who would follow in a conservative manner; this was the inevitable outcome of the great unification.

Although invasions and harassment by the nomadic nations several times broke up the usual equilibrium, the solidity and tenacity of the economic structure combining agriculture with household handicrafts were strong enough to digest the invasive alien and, with the passage of time, to recover the fixed setup of the great unification by meekly submitting to oppression and subduing firmness with gentleness. The accumulation and concentration of the social

contradictions were dispelled temporarily by the peasant insurrections and wars which broke the great unification, but it was rebuilt as rapidly as possible.

People now remember a way in which Chinese history and cultural system could develop have been eagerly sought for one and half centuries. In order to relieve China rapidly from the closed cultural system of agriculture based upon household production and to promote the development and wide spread use of productive forces, many persons with lofty ideals sincerely hoped to find a ready-made way from the West. They carried out many explorations and made great efforts to lead China into the path along which Western capitalist civilization developed. In China capitalist industry and commerce, a bourgeois representative system of government and the capitalist social psychology had rather considerable expansion but obvious differences with Western capitalist structures of society, politics, economy and cultural psychology soon appeared. People attributed these differences to the oppression and obstruction of imperialism and feudalism, which indeed is an important reason.

But the big powers themselves tried by every possible means to bring China into the capitalist world market and to colonize her thoroughly with cannons and goods. That, however, produced very little effect. They found that the most stubborn resistance came from the structure of the small-scale productive economy, which closely combined Chinese household agriculture with household handicraft, as well as the structures of the society and the relevant cultural psychology. In China the feudal rulers as well as the so-called reformers also had a try at setting up Western capitalist industry. Since the Qing Dynasty, both the Northern Warlords and the New Warlords of the Guomintang were dramatically enthusiastic about developing bureaucrat capitalism. They had their own golden age and considered themselves unexcelled in the world. But they could not gain a foothold. Still the most broad resistance came from the widespread, traditional and exceedingly solid structure of the small-scale productive economy, of society and of cultural psychology.

However, these traditions have not lacked special vigor and positive effect in the course of China's march toward the new democracy and socialism. The attempt to make a direct transition from an old type of rural society to socialism is an illusion of Populism. But developing conditions in which the antithesis between industry and agriculture is not so serious, the separation between town and country is not so obvious and the capitalist alienation is not so universal will open a broad field to explore for building the Chinese pattern of democracy and socialism. The historical conditions of China, in contrast with the West, will contribute greatly in this respect.

Part III
Spiritual Basis of Values

10.

The Dignity of the Human Person as the Basis for Community: Pope John Paul II's Contemporary Catholic Anthropology[1]

James A. Loiacono

Introduction

The history of this century can be read in terms of the emergence of the human person.

- In Asia, the century opened with China still an empire and all power centered in the one person of the Empress; this was overturned in 1911. Eventually power was transferred to the people; progressively, through mechanisms of the economy and of civil society, personal initiative emerges and the country leaps ahead.
- In Europe, the seemingly invincible totalitarian powers of the 1930s fell due to their oppression of the people and were replaced by forms which respect and promote the person.
- In Africa, the external colonial powers have retired and the peoples struggle to assert their own identity and destiny.

Throughout all of this it becomes cumulatively clear that the central value of our times is the human person. What suppresses the dignity of the person dies, due especially to having deadened creativity from within. What diminishes the life of the person is bad and fails of itself, whereas what promotes the realization of personal life is by definition good and in practice thrives. That, thankfully, is the basis of our hope and confidence in the good. It is crucial then to look for the roots of this sense of the person and for the manner of its emergence in our times.

In this search the new possibilities of communication and interchange enable us now to bring together the resources of the many cultures. Thus the high Confucian sense of the gentleman can be joined with the deep Hindu sense of Self, both of which are broadened by the Buddhist sense of tolerance, the African sense of community and Islam's sense of people. This is the context of our attention to the Christian sense of person, which Professor Nishitani, the great Buddhist scholar of Kyoto, described as follows: "There is no doubt that the idea of man as a personal being is the highest idea of man which has thus far appeared. The same may be said as regards the idea of God as a personal being."

Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II

One of the most widely acknowledged and important contemporary thinkers regarding the Catholic sense of the human person or Christian anthropology is Karol Wojtyla — who, not incidentally, was named Pope in 1978, with the name of John Paul II. His effort has been to synthesize tradition and modernity, enriching centuries of Catholic thought on the human person with contemporary, especially phenomenological philosophy. This provides the foundation for the ethical-moral values of the concrete person as the responsible agent in interpersonal and community relationships. From this anthropological vantage point John Paul II in two major addresses to the United Nations has been the voice of modern aspirations for the respect and

promotion of personal dignity and for a vision of society which would enable human aspirations for the coming millennium.

Personal Experience of Tragedy and Triumph

For Karol Wojtyla, the question of the human person took on particular urgency from his experience as a young man whose country was occupied by Nazi Germany and subjected to brutal humiliation.2 Considered by Nazi ideology to be sub-human, the Poles were reduced to slave status. Polish scholars and priests, as well as its entire officer corps, i.e., the entire actual and potential leadership, were eliminated by summary execution or by killing work in concentration camps; universities were closed and Polish literature and culture were suppressed. Through this period, Karol Wojtyla witnessed acts of great evil and brutality, but also acts of great heroism and good. He witnessed his people and culture subjected to brutal ideologies, but saw also their remarkable resistance to such personal and cultural negation. He witnessed his father die of hardship, but also greatly admired Father Maximiliar Kobe, the con-centration camp prisoner, who died in self-sacrificing love for others.

This led to his quest to understand the dignity of each and every human being and the importance of each culture as an expression of the human spirit. Each concrete, individual person must be respected, but by nature the person is a member of a community to which they have the responsibility of loving service for the common good. For John Paul these two, the dignity of each person and the integrity of community, together provide the authentic bases of freedom, justice and harmony.

As a professor and later as a Cardinal he wrote deeply on the person in many works, the most important being his anthropological opus, *The Acting Person*.3 His own summary of this work and an initial exploration of community is found in the article, "The Person: Subject and Community," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1979/19809), 273-308.4

Addressing the World

All this was clearly demonstrated in his two addresses before the United Nations, first in October of 1979 and again in October of 1995, where before the representatives of the member states throughout the entire world he synthesized and applied his anthropology to the problems facing the person and community today.

In both instances, he emphatically affirmed the infinite dignity of each and every human person without exception. This dignity is predicated upon the reality of being human, from which emerge also his freedom, rights and justice. It applies to every person and encompasses every moment and stage of life. This has implications as well for various contemporary political, economic and technological issues including the significance of culture and tradition, community and nation.

Both times, he spoke at length about the particularly violent character of this century which has experienced a continuous and widespread violation of human and national dignity, as well as the greatest loss of life of any century in human history. While various systems have harnessed great technological advances for humankind, too much of the benefit has been restrict to a privileged few or even turned into instruments of terror and destruction. Catastrophic wars, genocide, colonialism and neocolonialism, attempts to suppress the culture, religion and language of ethnic minorities, all have marked this century on a hitherto unprecedented scale.

The first address to the United Nations had focused on the person, the second built upon its principles and extended the implications to the rights of peoples and nations. In a world of intensified intercommunication he pointed out a path to living together in harmony and cooperation.

Methodology

Here, we shall sketch briefly John Paul II is to response to the questions: (1) what and who is the human person, (2) what is his/her destiny, and in this light (3) what is culture, community and nation. The answers to these questions are of enormous import to the attitude to persons and peoples in our times.

The major philosophical tools of John Paul II's analysis of these questions are ancient Aristotelianism, medieval Thomism and contemporary phenomenology. Through Aristotle, he established an objective realism by which human nature is identified and its attributes explored. Through Thomas he developed the notion of the person as properly existing in his or her own right and acting according to that nature. Through phenomenology he explored the nature and implications of consciousness and subjectivity, in which he drew as well as his deep study of John of the Cross and the Christian mystics. This anthropology spans objectivity and subjectivity to unveil the dynamic reality of being human; conversely, it shows the exclusion of any of these truncates and compromises the truth regarding the human person.

While each of these three approaches contributes its unique and necessary insight regarding the person, the epistemological parameters of each must be respected so as not to stretch them beyond their competence. Nor is any one to be employed to the exclusion of the others. An attempt to grasp the dynamics of the human person through the lenses of only one approach would reduce the full dimension of being human and jeopardize seriously the integrity of an anthropology. John Paul is concerned to avoid such reductionism by integrating the biological, social and behavioral sciences, as well as the approaches to the human spirit. The understanding of the full truth of being human is continually and explicitly stressed as the goal.

The anthropology of John Paul can be described through its answers to a series of fundamental questions.

In The Image of God

Creation as Communication: What is the source of the human being and what does it mean to live?

Though many would think of the human person as closed and combative, Christian anthropology sees the human person as a work of creation and hence to be understood through analogy with the divine. As creator, however, the divine and all deriving therefrom are in principle not selfishly closed, but open, self-transcending and in loving communication with others.5

John Paul II's grasp of the human person is rooted ultimately in the Sacred Scriptures. Of all seventy-three books of the Bible, only one writer is known to be non-Jewish,6 thereby giving Christianity a radically Jewish anthropology. This begins with the notion that the human person is created in the image of God. Hence, the key to understanding the nature of the human person lies not in the nature of matter as inert and closed in upon itself, as unknowing and relating to others only by violent clashes. Rather the person must be understood first of all in terms of the spirit as

vital, conscious and open to others through sharing and cooperation. This divine archetype is the key to a religious anthropology, which it distinguishes from all others.

This begins to appear from the nature of the Sacred Scriptures as revelation. They not only state who God is, who is the human person and what is expected of him. But simply by being revelation they demonstrate the open and communicative character of being in its source. Thus, from Judaism comes the notion of God as communicator. This is found in the first chapter of the first book of the Bible, *Genesis*, which begins with God's creating the various beings of the physical cosmos. Each act of creation is a speech act and begins with the Hebrew words, "And God *said*," "let there be . . . " (Gen. 1), and a creature comes into being. God then is not jealous, but shares his reality out of love.

This character is extended to the human person. At the apex of cosmic creation God creates humankind (in Hebrew, *adam*) specifically in the divine image as male or female, and hence as physically open, communicative and sharing; the very nature of the person is to be open to and for others. Human agency, self-determination and integrity of conscience all are grounded in, and expressions of, the divine.

From this it emerges clearly that for a Christian anthropology, human nature, the human person and human agency are to be understood in terms of the highest Being who is knowledge and love. This, in truth, is an exalted notion of humanity.

Non-dualism of Creation in Judaism and Christianity: Is the human person focused on the good or a compromise between good and evil?

Contrary to dualisms which understand all as a battle between good and evil, the anthropology of John Paul sees everything under the all-powerful divine Providence of a God who is Goodness itself.

An important element of Judeo-Christian anthropology is its non-dualism, a point of extreme importance for John Paul II. The issue arose of Judaism and Christianity since many Middle Eastern religions of the time proposed a dualism in which the cosmos was created by two equally powerful forces, good and evil. The human person was constituted of these warring components and trapped between them. Generally the two forces were the good as the spiritual cosmos of light, and evil as the physical cosmos of darkness. The eternal struggle for humankind was played out between these two.

Judaism, however, rejected this thesis from the first line of its Scriptures, and the anthropology of John Paul continues this perspective. In Judeo-Christian thought, there is one supreme, uncreated, spiritual Being who identifies himself to Moses simply as *I am*. He is reality who brings into being all else, both spiritual and physical, which thus participate in him. As reality, he is also truth and goodness; in him there can be neither falsehood nor evil as both are modes of falling away from what is truly real. Initially, everything in creation reflects the truth and goodness of which God consists and of which alone he can communicate. At the end of each act of creation, God beholds his work and sees that it is *good*; when he finishes, he beholds his creation as *very good* and rests on the seventh day (Gen. 2:1). In Hebrew thought the number "seven" is symbolic of perfection and completion. No evil then is to be found in the work of creation, because everything is created by God, who is all good and perfect (Col. 1:16). There is no counter principle here; in the beginning there was complete harmony between God and the human person, and within creation itself.

It is in these unambiguous terms of the source and hence the nature of reality as being true and good that John Paul proceeds to unfold the substantial reality of human beings as participants in that goodness. This is the inherent basis of human dignity and rights, freedom and justice. Without such a metaphysical-ontological basis, human reality would be epiphenomenal and even ephemeral; the essential nature of the human person would remain out of reach, incomprehensible and subject to dangerous conjecture and reductionism. In contrast, on the basis of the created character of the person and the non-dual, i.e., unambiguous, character of reality, the anthropology of John Paul proceeds on two levels: one is metaphysical-ontological and concerns the reality the human person in itself; the other is phenomenological and concerns this same reality as emerging in human consciousness.

Unity and Integrity

The Metaphysical-Ontological Basis of Being Human: Does the human person exist in its own right with full human dignity throughout?

Continuing the same sense of unity, the human person is not a composite of matter and spirit, but a simple human nature which identically incarnates the spirit and ennobles the body.

Like all creatures, the human person is created as a single substance7 in the image of God. There are not two separate substances comprising one entity as in Cartesian thought, but a radically unitary reality, the human person. The spiritual soul sets the high level of human life, while the body engages it in space and time. The Scriptures do not say that God created a soul and a body, nor does it say that God created a soul trapped in a body; rather, they say that God created a *living being*.

This understanding of the radically unitary reality that is the human person comes directly from Judaism and continues in Christianity. In it the body is not something negative or irrelevant, but is that according to which the person interacts with and experiences the cosmos and other persons. The person experiences him or herself bodily, noted the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel. Indeed, as the body is of a specific sex, male or female, and accordingly is foundationally related to its alternate, the person is essentially relational, that is, social in nature. Finally, the person is fully what he/she is only as the unitary soul-body reality; therefore, the body must share in the dignity of the soul and even in its final glory (1 Cor, 15:36-49).

John Paul II's route to exploring the notion of being human as subject enriches the objective Aristotelian realism with the Christian sense of existence. As the created image of God, the human person is not simply another instance of a specific nature whose whole purpose is merely to continue the species, but exists in its own right or, as it were, stands on its own two feet. Hence, it cannot be under-stood simply as a part of some larger whole to which its meaning is subjected: its reality cannot be negated, minimized or instrumentalized. Nor are its dignity and rights conferred by an outside agency like an academic degree. By the creative power of God the human person exists in the image of His absolute existence and is entitled to recognition, protection and promotion by society. This forceful religious sense of human existence is central to the emergence of the person in our times.

At the same time, the human subject is also rational. This differentiates the human subject from other subjects in the physical cosmos. For Wojtyla it is the interior life of the human subject that makes one a person, and this is precisely because of the soul. Being spirit in the divine image, the human person can understand, plan and direct his/her acts. Thus, the person experiences free

will and in the integrity of conscience understands him/herself as the active source of his/her own acts. The person is then both subjective and objective, "an objective something and a subjective someone." This insight is crucial to the Kantian notion of the human person always being an end in him/herself and never a means to an end. This has profound axiological implications. One's actions are not only facts, but carry meaning (*Meinung*) and values (*Wert*). This one reason Wojtyla's philosophical approach has been called an *existential personalism*. The other is his phenomenological analysis of the human person.

Conscious and Free

Philosophy of Being Human as Conscious and Self-Conscious: What is the key to the interior life of the human person?

The person is not only by nature rational with regard to objects, but self-aware and self-determining as regards one's actions; hence, the human person truly creates him- or herself.

Wojtyla's anthropology adds to the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the person as a rational subject a further phenomenological analysis of conscious life by exploring the foundations of the human person's free agency and self-realization. Throughout the Scriptures, the person is seen to be both conscious and self-conscious. God is reflected in the glory of his creation (Gen. 1; Ps. 19; Wis 13; Sir 12; 42:15-25; 43:1-35; Rom. 1:19-20) and decides to call into being a creative which truly images what and who He is.

The human person8 is the very image and likeness of God and as such has consciousness. This allows it to experience all knowledge in both an objective and a subjective manner. That is, one can not only know what he/she is and does, but explore the free acts themselves through which the subject-person continually constitutes itself through what he/she does.

Wojtyla distinguishes these two levels of knowing: cognition and self-awareness.9 On the level of cognition, the subject receives into his/her awareness as in a mirror that which has been objectively grasped in cognition. This stands outside, or over against, the knower and hence is called object (ob-ject). This form of cognition Wojtyla calls reflective consciousness.

The other kind of consciousness or self-awareness is termed reflexive consciousness. Here the individual returns upon oneself not only to know oneself as an object, but to know that one is knowing and to shape its content. Through this the person constitutes him or herself and understands oneself as subject-person, ego or "I": the person is a "self-conscious self" acting as a "self-conscious being." This can be called a "creative intelligence" because persons thereby freely create what and who they are by their active lives. Throughout their lives they become more and more of the divine image or refuse to do so. This is the real foundation and implication of the ethical/moral order.

The person then apprehends the truth objectively and understands it subjectively, objectivity and subjectivity being necessary epistemological compliments of one another. Thus, objectivity is protected from the danger of objectivism wherein fact alone is accepted and value is given no more meaning. Such a truncated objectivity results in the denial of value, tending solipsistically to negate the interior personal reality. At the same time, its complimentarity with subjectivity prevents the latter from degenerating into a subjectivism whereby fact and value take on a radically individualistic sense and devolve into solipsism. Ultimately, both objectivism and subjectivism trap the person in epistemological isolation. This deprives the individual of the full sense of his/her

subjectivity and personhood and breaks the community bonds of shared value and meaning which arise from the spirit of the constituent persons.

Both objective and subjective reality are perfectly and eternally communicated by God because the uncreated Being is both knowing and communicative. As self-consciousness which is pure existence, the perfect act knows itself absolutely and communicates goodness, truth and love. Hence, it does not grow in self-knowledge which is already perfect; it does not become more from creation, because it is the fullness of being; existence is not indifference or randomness. Rather, from its source all being is purposeful, creative and intelligent; this is the key to subjectivity and personhood, and the foundation of its being relational and loving.

The genius of Wojtyla's anthropology is to evolve the sense of the human spirit while maintaining the objectivity of value and meaning; in this he bridges tradition to modernity and points the way to a new global awareness which is sensitive to the range of cultures and unfolds new levels of human meaning.

Being Human as Free and Self-Determining: What is the relation between one's self-consciousness as image of God and the exercise of freedom as "self-determining"?

Karol Wojtyla understands self-awareness as "creative intelligence," namely, as constituting the freedom whereby the person consciously shapes or determines him- or herself.

This is experienced interiorly as the person knows him or herself to be the cause of his or her acts. This is the spiritual dimension of the human person; it is the ontological foundation of the intellect, self-reflexion and self-determination, that is the ontological basis of one's free will. The person alone, as *sui iuris* or the one who freely generates the law from within, is the master of his or herself. Therefore in a very real sense one is self-governed rather than determined by another person or a government.

The issue of freedom versus determinism persists. Immanuel Kant's second critique attempted to grasp the spiritual or metaphysical dimensions of the human person in order to validate free will at its ontological or metaphysical roots, and thereby to establish the transcendence and dignity of the person. With the rapid progress of the empirical sciences, there was anxiety that the sciences of the human person would be subsumed under the sciences of nature so that the human would be seen as but one creature among many driven by the laws of nature. Nature would no longer be controlled through knowledge of its laws for the progress and betterment of humankind, for but the human person, being part of nature, also would be controlled "for the greater humanization of society."

Jurgen Habermas clearly saw this problem in his critique of modern philosophy and science. His colleagues from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, saw bitter irony in the fact that the thrust of the Enlightenment and modernity would enslave humankind within the laws of science, rather than achieve its original goal of human liberation. Habermas rejects this pessimism, since he believes that the historical thrust of humankind is toward an ever increasing freedom, realized through reason's expanding grasp of the truth (increased rationalization) about man and nature. Historically, humanity has tended to liberate itself from the constraints and necessity of nature, as well as from the oppression that exists in various socio-political models, by moving away from ignorance in the former and rejecting dogmatism in the latter. This process both validates one's transcendence and freedom, and increasingly constitutes one as free.

Habermas is concerned at the use of the analytic-empirical sciences beyond their scope, whereby the science of the human being is subsumed under the science of nature. Therefore, he seeks a science with a different epistemological scope, in this case a critical science of communication which will allow universal participation in the critique of social structures and the "truth" statements which validate them.

In his address before the United Nations in October of 1995, John Paul II spoke of the need to work for a true culture of freedom. Freedom as self-determination is an essential attribute of being human, rooted in the human spirit. Hence, the quest to understand freedom cannot be pursued within the parameters of the physical or natural universe, precisely because there physical laws hold absolute sway. Freedom is a spiritual, transcendent mode of being, for which reason John Paul II has insisted on an ontological, metaphysical foundation for his study of the human person. He employs also a phenomenological approach in his investigation of the human person in order to learn from the content of our interior consciousness, being careful to use the various methodologies according to their proper scopes and competencies.

In this light he is able to bring out the special significance of a transcendent God who is free because he is spirit, whereas if God were only immanent in nature he would be trapped within the very laws which he ordained. As divine image the human person also is transcendent, as can be seen in the person's self-awareness and hence self-determination. Certainly, being human means being in the physical universe and being subject to its laws within the parameters established for physical human survival in the cosmos; nonetheless, being human signifies also transcendence as the divine image and a reality which extends beyond physical natural.

Sacred Scripture also makes clear that the human person has free will and can choose one's course of action, what to do or not to do, good or evil (Gen 4:7; Sir 15:11-20; 17:1); thus there is ethical and moral content to human action. The will is oriented to something apprehended by reason in order to realize or achieve an end or good. The issue is why that good is chosen and is therefore a free action. Commonly it is thought simply that God determines what is good and evil, which he communicates to the person who, in turn, has but to obey. Certainly, God is creator and ground of all being in whom every creature participates for its very existence. Yet, if the human person simply obeys, of what use is free will? Nor do moral laws and norms arise only because God wills them, for then obedience would be a voluntarism in which the will acts in total autonomy from the intellect or reason. The Scriptures sight no instance where God impinges on the freedom of the person.

Wojtyla points out how Jesus does not force, but as a teacher points to what must be done, as in the story of the rich young man (Mt 19:21): "If you will be perfect, sell what you have, give to the poor and follow me." In this dialogue, God who is all-knowing and the ground of all truth offers that truth to the person, but does not force it; the person is free. The moral code found in Scripture is given to humanity as the means by which each person can choose freely to realize him/herself according to the truth of who he or she is; that is, according to the truth of his/her human nature as the divine image: "If you would be perfect." The person must reflect self-consciously to understand this and what act to choose in order to realize his/her personhood.

Thus, freedom must be ordered to the truth about God, the self, other human beings and creation in order that the individual realize and constitute who and what he or she is. One can choose to act contrarily to this truth but this is to deform what one is, namely, the divine image.

The truth of what a person is, what is good and evil, right and wrong, is not arbitrary; directly and ontologically it is related to the very nature of the one under consideration, apprehended objectively and subjectively. Thus, the basis of true freedom is constituted in reason precisely

because of the relations of freedom to truth: it is the truth that makes one free and God is Truth (Jn 8:32; 14:6). Thus, the moral law of God is not imposed, but offered as the way to self-actualization in truth; this is the way to authentic freedom with its infinite possibilities. To act outside this truth is a false freedom which harms and destroys.

This dignity and integrity of the person demands respect for personal decisions that do not harm persons or the commonweal. A person cannot be forced to want what another wants. Thus, person must be respected in his/her conscience which is the sanctuary of personhood. The conscience is the place of the person's unique subjectivity and freedom. John Paul insists that this is to be regarded seriously by other persons and institutions, who must never violate the conscience. Anything to the contrary strikes at the core of one's personhood and subjectivity.

If personal freedom is expressed as self-determination, it is also realized as self-governance. This means that one is master of oneself, not only freely determining what one wishes to do according to one's conscience, but also governing oneself in the sense of being self-controlled. One does not give free vent to self-indulgence, lack of discipline or egotistical desires; rather, through self-governance, the person wills to do what he or she must do in truth, in order to be the divine image, to develop one's human nature and to act for others; in fine, to act in the full truth of who and what one is.

But if truth is love, then it must be understood as self-giving, symbolized by God's own self-giving in creation and on the cross. Authentic freedom is not an egotistical pursuit, but total openness to others and their well-being. Hence the person is not only self-determined and master of oneself; freedom orients this mastery to self-giving.

This contrasts to radical individualism where freedom is freedom from anything or anyone that might limit one's ability to do whatever one wishes. Legal and personal barriers protect the person from commitment even to family, friends and community; this is radical "freedom from." True freedom is relational; it is always a freedom for others, following the example of Jesus who came to serve and to give his life as a ransom for many (Mt 20:28). Authentic freedom in the truth of being human builds family, community and nation; it rejects radical, self-centeredness. Only in transcendent acts of freedom for others does the person constitute him or herself as human in the divine image.

Morality and Values

Freedom and Morality: What is the nature of good and evil in human life?

Through self-reflection in the truth of one's subjectivity, the person freely wills to act or not to act; thereby one becomes oneself by one's act, which as such has moral contents.

This moral content is not arbitrary, but objective, for the conscience operates under the principle of synersis by which we are commanded by the law of God, written in our hearts, to "do good and avoid evil" (Rom 1:15).

This law of our nature urges, but does not force us to act in accord with our human nature as the divine image. It is the means God offers us to realize who and what we are. Thus, one does not act according to a moral norm just because it is willed by God, but acts in the freedom of one's heart because such a self-determined act realizes the self in its full truth.

What is evil is precisely that which is against human nature and disfigures the divine image. This would be to act in an egotistical freedom, ignoring the truth of God, of oneself, of other persons and of nature. Such an act breaks community and harmony, and is the cause of strife and

conflict; hence it is immoral or sinful. Sin is the rejection of the objective truth of self and others. When closely considering the very first recorded sin in the Sacred Scriptures one finds not the breaking of an arbitrary rule and a punishment for this act of disobedience, but in highly symbolic language God telling the first humans to avoid breaking their relationship with the divine. This becomes more apparent in the deceitful words of the serpent (read "Satan") who suggests that God is jealous of his Godhead and wishes to keep the human person from being divine. Here there are three untruths: 1. that God is jealous; 2. that humans will be gods; and 3. that they will not die. The all-encompassing lie is that God is deceptive, when in fact he is truth.

In committing this act of defiance, Adam and Eve declare that they are now gods and no longer have any need of the God who created them. They declare total independence and in so doing have break their intimate relationship with God. But since God is the only source of life, being Life itself, they suffer death. Similarly, since God is the source of love, being Love itself, the original harmony is broken. The original justice and its harmony having been lost there succeeds conflict between the human person and God, between human persons, and between the human person and nature. This is not a threatened punishment; rather, God warned the first persons to avoid this course of action in order not to suffer the consequences of their own freely willed act. Their decision to act in a way which ignored and rejected the truth of self and of all else, including God, was an act of "freedom from" others, and the source of oppression in humankind.

If God's intention was to punish, this is not apparent from the analysis of Sacred Scriptures. It was the human persons who cast themselves out the symbolic garden of original justice, love and harmony through the abuse of their freedom. God as Love and Life had created them for love and life. Therefore he intervenes to reveal to spiritually blind persons, lost in arbitrariness and egotistical "freedom from," who they are. In revealing himself in Sacred Scripture, God communicates the truth of who we are as his image; we learn about God and ourselves. He also gives us the moral law in order that we might freely will to accept it and thereby to image God by our acts, namely, to live the truth of who and what we are.

The Christian vision is that God reveals himself as a divine Community of Persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit — a community united in perfect and infinite justice and love, truth and goodness, beauty and harmony. Seeing the frailty of humanity before evil, the Father sends the Son in the flesh through, and in, the power of the Holy Spirit. This is because God, in being true to what he is as justice, love, truth, goodness, beauty and harmony, looks upon the dignity of the human person created by him in love in the divine image. He sees the suffering and evil which afflicts the human person and, in a profound act of "freedom for" others, reaches out for our welfare.

This is seen in the words and deeds of Jesus who reveals the Father to us because as God he is the perfect image of the Father. Further, as man he also reveals the Father because in his human nature Christ is perfectly the divine image. In revealing the Father, he reveals who we are so that freely we can will to follow his example in living the truth of who we are.

Being Human and Values: What is the implication of existing in the image of God for human being and value?

From the ontological perspective the notion of value is the subjective side of the objective good founded upon being: axiology is rooted in ontology.

Value has both a divine and a human aspect. The human person knows the good at the objective level, but linked to knowledge is an emotive level. The object elicits positive or negative

emotion to the extent that the individual perceives something as good or evil, as a value or a disvalue. It is terms of this subjectivization of the good that one speaks of value and meaning. The personalizing of the good in terms of the self adds the axiological dimension to the object by which the fact of its existence is given specific value or meaning.

Acts or objects are of value or have meaning inasmuch as they realize the person's good as the image and likeness of God. As such, their objective goodness must be seen in the whole truth of being human; they are freely chosen only in that light. Some acts or objects have an attraction and value because of their specific goodness, but, because if done or chosen they would compromise the whole truth of being human as divine image; hence they carry an objective disvalue. Sex itself is an important good and has great value and meaning in marriage by realizing the divine image in married love and children, but as adultery it carries a negative value in relation to the specific person, severely compromising the divine image and falsifying the person.

Because value is related to the ontological good as it relates to being, the more good an object/subject is understood to contain the more value it has for the person; conversely, the less good or the more evil an object/subject has the less value or greater disvalue it has for the person. This is the subjectivization of objective good and evil. Therefore God has the greatest value because he is the greatest good. Each man and woman must be seen in their goodness and inviolable dignity as the divine image in their uniqueness and irrepeatability and in their relationship to God. In this light the true objective good of the person is seen and properly subjectivized in value.

Thus, every person carries a supreme value which never can be measured. Though some can be perceived as of less good and therefore be less valued, as human persons they have the same inviolable dignity and should enjoy the same rights as all: the unborn; women; the handicapped; minorities; persons of other races, nationalities, religions or language groups; the poor and marginalized; and immigrants. This is precisely where the axiological fact is related to its ontological base in the good of particular beings.

Being Human in Community: What is the relation of individual dignity to life in community?

While the person is the principle instance of being human, persons cannot realize their humanness outside community. Because God is a Community of three Persons united in love, the human person also has relatedness as an integral part of his or her nature as divine image.

Though God creates animals to be companions, none is found sufficient for the person, for as image of God who is a trinity of persons one communicates from the depth of one's subjectivity or personhood. No other creature can reach into the depths of what it is and reflect upon it; this is given only to the divine image.

God makes two persons from one, and for the first time the words man (*ish*) and woman (*isha*) are used. They are both persons of the same human nature: flesh of flesh and bone of bone. God creates them as radically equal; they become one flesh and are radically complimentary as helpmates to one another. Reflecting the self-giving love of the Divine Community of Persons, they are the image of that mutuality by which each exercising his or her "freedom for" wills the good of the other. Each is an "I" who looks upon the other as "thou," i.e., as one who is also subject like oneself and with whom one exists in an intimate bond of justice, love and harmony. In their love, bringing forth children is not simply procreation as with other animals, but cocreation with God of their children as the divine image. Hence, each child is unique and unrepeatable in their relationship to God and has an eternal destiny.

Distinct from the community of the family is the larger community of society, nation or world for their relationships are not "I-thou" but "we" in character. They do not carry the intimacy of sacramental marriage in one flesh, though there is mutual commitment in justice and love to respect one another and to work together for the common good. Here as divine image the person is called to exercise "freedom for" in terms of the commonweal, to recognize everyone in the community and the larger world as a divine image. Therefore, justice must be realized as a demand of love and love as a demand of justice — two sides of the same coin. Only in this way can there be harmony or peace (*shalom*). More than an absence of war, this harmony comes from a society and world rightly ordered in justice and love as each lives the full truth of the divine image; this is a radical call to live "freedom for."

The community of persons arises as culture and nation. Though these are not the primary ontological reality of being human, nonetheless they are imbued with their own subjectivity due to participation in a collectively shared history from which language and culture are born. Due to collective self-reflection, self-cognition and freedom in the divine image, nations, ethnic groups and minorities bear their own dignity and integrity. The bitter experience of colonialism or the brutal occupation of nations and peoples still lives in the collective consciousness.

Religion

Being human and religion: What is the grounding of the special dignity of the human person?

The metaphysical dimension of human spirituality and relation to God are necessary in order to understand the wonder of the human person.

To ignore the spiritual would be to truncate the understanding of the person and remove the source of personal value and meaning; it would miss the full understanding of self and reality as deeply personal and relational; it would remove the very basis of the profound dignity and integrity of person and nation.

In contrast, by grasping the religious grounds of the person one sees the value of human life from its first moments and how persons need to live according to their human dignity, to express their creativity as the divine image, and to contribute to the common good by their work.

The person's dignity calls for respect for one's conscience and the need for truth. Hence, the political process should be fully open; the participation of all the members of a nation, and all countries should have their say in what effects their destinies.

In this light technological advances and economic and political structures must be seen as serving human persons and the community. Technology, with all its wonders, must be used in the full truth of being human. Political, social and economic structures too must serve the good of every person as a member of the community of humankind.

In Judaism and Christianity, there is an insistence upon justice — to consider the laborer, the vulnerable, the poor and the indigent. they proclaim a moral code and demand that all live accordingly; thus prophets have confronted the ruling class. Religion must never allow itself to be used as a legitimating force of oppression; rather it is called to a meta-critique of structures so that a true community of justice, love and harmony can prevail. God made the goods of creation to be shared by all, not by a few privileged persons or nations.

As humankind enters a new epoch of interaction and cooperation, as markets expand and technology advances, the truth of the human person and the nation must be considered in all its dignity and integrity. Without justice and love, there can be no genuine harmony. Technology,

politics and economics are for the human person, not the reverse. In the eyes of John Paul II Catholic anthropology is to illuminate the full truth of being human so that humankind can construct a "civilization of love and life" after a very bloody century of death. In this world the human person will not be shaped to technology or to political or socio-economic systems, but vice versa. This is the conclusion of thousands of years of reflection upon the nature of being human; it is grounded in the divine and expressed in community as "freedom for."

Notes

1. In order to avoid possible misunderstanding, it might be helpful at the outset to note six points which are found in Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christianity: (1) The human person is basically good and not totally corrupt because of sin. (2) In spite of the absolute goodness and transcendence of God, absolute alienation does not exist between God and the human person. (3) From the beginning God continuously seeks intimacy with the human person and unity with all creation. (4) While God is totally other in his transcendence, in his love for the human person he has freely entered into a paradox of simultaneous immanence through his incarnation as Jesus Christ. (5) The physical and social dimensions of being human are not ephemeral or negative. (6) Family, community and culture are not seen as incompatible with faith or authentic Christian commitment. Catholic and Orthodox anthropology finds its roots in Judaism.

2. Poland was for centuries one of the greatest and most important kingdoms in Central Europe. It saved most of Central and all of Western Europe twice from Turkish conquest and domination under the Ottoman ruler, Sulayman, the Magnificent. In the 1700's, Poland was divided through conquest and occupation by the Prussian, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. There was a harsh attempt to suppress the Polish culture and language, and the Catholic faith was persecuted in the parts dominated by Russia and Prussia. After World War II, Poland was again an independent nation, but this was short-lived because of the Nazi occupation which began another long oppression by foreign occupation and ideologies. This has certain parallels to the experience of the Chinese people under European and the Japanese domination.

3. Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Osoba/CZYN), trans. Anna-Teresa Tymiencka (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidl, 1979).

4. John Paul II, "The Person: Subject and Community" ("Osoba: podmiot i wspolnota") in *Catholic Thought from Lublin*, vol. 4, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (1993), pp. 219-261.

5. John Paul II, "The Fabric of Relations among Peoples," *Origins*, 25 (no. 18-19; October, 1995), 300.

6. The Evangelist Luke, who wrote one of the *Gospels* and perhaps the *Acts of the Apostles*, is believed to have been non-Jewish.

7. The three terms, substance, supposit and subject are closely related linguistically in Latin (substance: *sub*-under, *stare*-to stand; supposit: *sub*-under, *ponere*-to place; subject: *sub*-under, *jacere*-to throw). The first two terms traditionally have been used interchangeably in the philosophy originating from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Karol Wojtyla's anthropology seeks to develop and link with that the contemporary idea of subject in order to give it a ontological basis and thereby to protect this important contemporary concept from possible subjectivism through a philosophical realism. For him, the subject is a substantial reality in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense precisely because it is a substance or supposit. Thus, the human being is a substance, supposit or subject of a specific kind, that is, with a nature that makes him/her a person. See Karol Wojtyla, *Love and Responsibility*, 1981, chap. 1.

8. The notion of person had been developed and generally applied in reference to the Christian concept of the Trinity as found in the New Testament. In the attempt to explain how three divine entities, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, could be understood in monotheistic religion, the concept of person was used; i.e., three persons in one God. The word "person" is derived from the Greek for an actor's mask (*prosopon*; in Latin: persona or personare-to speak through. This was not to imply that one entity was speaking in three modes; i.e., using three masks. Rather each divine person expresses himself in an absolutely distinct manner through his relationship to the other two; each is a distinct person and yet of one substance with the other two.

Since each divine person is a supposit (subject) who possesses consciousness and self-consciousness, freedom and agency, and since the human subject is created in the divine image who also possesses consciousness, self-consciousness, freedom and agency, Wojtyla's application of the term to the human subject constructs an anthropology of a dynamic human reality.

9. Wojtyla comments that "self-knowledge" may not be the best term since knowledge can refer to a more generalized knowledge, whereas self-knowledge has only the ego or I as its focus. He suggests "self-cognition" as a more correct term, which is used in this paper (see *The Acting Person*, p. 40).

11.
Being and Values

Andrew Woznicki

Contemporary existential philosophy, in trying to overcome the rationalistic tendencies of the past, aims to reverse the process of human knowledge by reaching truth not in objects, but in man himself. As such, it bases its search for truth in human subjectivity. Truth and Being can be found in subjectivity within one's very act of human consciousness. The central theme of existential thought consists, then, in a search for the ontological foundation of the existential condition of one's beingness.

The meaning of Being should be sought in subjectivity because we are in Being ourselves.1 Not being outside of Being, we cannot search for Being without personal involvement. The fallacy of modern philosophy since Descartes consists in negating this fact and treating Being as an object of thought.

Moreover, our own being is the proximate object for ourselves. Therefore, being ourselves in Being, we can search for the meaning of Being in ourselves, namely in our own selves. Consequently, the starting point for the ontological search for Being must be our own subjectivity.

Existential philosophy tries to find both the meaning and the ultimate foundation of Being in subjectivity. The search for Being in ourselves is not only an ontological problem, but a phenomenological investigation into man's being. This search for Being in man's being cannot be solely ontological, because not being outside of ourselves and being rather for ourselves, man cannot go beyond himself for other beings. The search for Being then must be phenomenological, because being embraced in himself, man by experiencing his subjectivity grasps at the same time the meaning of Being.

The search for the meaning of Being should be sought in subjectivity because we are not only in Being, but are also being for ourselves: man is a being that makes himself: "*un être que se réalise*."2 Our own being is always its own becoming: we always are what we are not, that is, our own actuality consists in our own potentialities.3 In this sense, the search for Being is always a searching for our own being. Louis Lavelle says in this respect: "The function of consciousness is to force me to take possession of myself. This taking possession resembles a creation, since it consists of giving reality to a potential being which has, so to say, been put at our disposal."4

In searching for his own self, however, man is always facing the possibility of missing the very meaning of his subjectivity, and not being able to decipher the authenticity of his existence. This danger is not only ever present, but relates itself to both 'meaning-content' as homo natura, and 'meaning-value' as *homo persona*. Realizing his existential situation, man's consciousness evokes a feeling of uneasiness as to the permanency and value of human existence as such namely, the feeling of absurdity.

Human Subjectivity

The original Latin word absurdus means 'harsh-sounding,' and more generally, 'contrary to reason' or 'inconsistent with truth.' In philosophy this inconsistency with truth can be either logical or ontological. Generally speaking, logical and ontological absurdity consists in rejection of the principle of intelligibility. It means that truth is for us inconsistent with both the knower and the

thing known. In other words, absurdity means disruption between mind and thing, and the negation of any conformity between intellect and being. In short, absurdity in both its logical and ontological senses, means the impossibility of knowing and understanding reality, that is, deprivation for the human intellect of the possibility of obtaining any truth.

Existential evaluation of the problem of absurdity, however, is neither logical nor ontological, but is mainly phenomenological, and consists of 'an absurd reasoning' surrounding the conditions of man's life, and the meaning of human existence.5 The phenomenological approach to the absurdity of man's life stresses that the question about the meaning of human existence takes absolute precedence over any other philosophical problem.6 The reason for the absolute priority of the question about the meaning of man's existence consists in the unique and significant role of human subjectivity.

The phenomenological search for being in man's subjectivity reveals, however, that the very conditions of human life are meaningless, because human subjectivity is at the very core a 'self-divided-self' which consists in a "divorce between man and his life."7 Thus, in the 'self-divided-self' man is separated from both his inner and his external self. This condition of man's subjectivity evokes in him "the feeling of absurdity,"8 which consists in "divorce between the mind that desires and the world that disappoints."9

Moreover, in man's existence there is no definite goal to be obtained and there is no motive power for man's 'self-realization' as such. As a matter of fact, any realization of the ultimate perfection of one's self is impossible, because should there be any attainable final end at all, then it ought to be already reached. However, if it were reached. There would be no change. But there is change in reality. Consequently, no final state has been reached, and therefore will never be reached.

Man not having any definite goal in his life becomes permeated with wasteful passions, and his subjectivity is subjugated to the useless and perpetual process of existential leaps through which man is always becoming something other than himself. In this constant and perpetual flux, man's life becomes a habit rather than a creative disposition for self-realization.

The habit of living, according to Nietzsche, is grounded in man's laziness or fear, which changes man into "a thoughtless accident."10 This habit of living is absurd, because there is in it an "absence of any profound reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation, and the uselessness of suffering."11 But without reason for existence man is living in an "incomprehensible condition."12 Consequently absurdity means a total rejection of the principle of intelligibility.

The incomprehensible condition of man's life as living without any reason for existence pertains to both meaning-content and meaning-value. The meaning-content of human existence is incomprehensible, since the very conditions of man's life are constantly reshaping his spiritual as well as his physical self without any motive power. Motive power would have enabled the individual person to control the direction of his own self-realization and self-actualization. Not having any motive power for existing, however, human reality becomes senseless and is unable to convince man to continue to exist both in regard to his perceptions and his emotions.

In perception, man's reason is alienated from the inner nature of objects, because "the object reveals itself only in a series of profiles, or projections,"13 and not as it is in itself. In this way the objects of our perception take the form of appearances only, without revealing themselves as they are in themselves. In fact, the appearances of objects are infinite, and as such require infinite time and "an infinite number of relations with other things."14 This infinity of appearances in our intellect disables us and makes us unable to "exhaust the overflowing richness of our actual

perceptions."15 Any selections of particular appearances of objects as the essential characteristics of particular reality would be an arbitrary judgment and deceitful.16 In other words, one may ask how we can be certain whether or not perceptions are deceiving us all the time. But if they are, then any perception is deceitful, thus realizing both the logical and ontological absurdity.

The inability of man to convince himself of the value of his existence is also grounded in the very nature of human emotions. Generally speaking, human emotions consist in man's sensations of some affections, thus constituting "a structure of human consciousness."17

Emotions thus understood are constructed by an infinite series of phenomena of objects which man's consciousness can experience. But the infinite possible series of phenomena are undifferentiated and instantaneous, since, by their very nature they are not the property of consciousness but of their objects. In view of this fact our human consciousness is overflowing with an infinite number of things and their phenomena.

However, the encompassing phenomena of the objects appear and disappear in our consciousness, and constitute "the magical world of emotions."18 The phenomena of objects are infinite in number, and undifferentiated in man's consciousness. The phenomena also appear and disappear independently from our consciousness, which makes our emotions meaningless, since they are found in neither the object itself, nor in man's subjectivity alone.

In the consciousness of contemporary man all values and things are successively disappearing: "Today the values vanish successively from persons, from accomplishments, cultural products, and noncultural objects. . . . All belief in values becomes spurious, forced without firm support by personal insight."19 In this de-valuation of all values even those with value in sight are becoming uncertain, "so that they themselves become dubious about the existence once they have viewed them themselves despite the prevailing value-blindness and the prevailing spurious belief."20

This value-blindness is leading contemporary man to the twilight of the whole world of values, consequently causing indifference in human consciousness towards any positive as well as any negative values: "As the positive and negative values become invisible everywhere, even all respect for the valuable and all aversion for the valueless vanishes."21 Being indifferent toward any value, both positive (goodness) and negative (evil), man ceases to have any motive power for his existence: "With the vanishing from sight of positive and negative values and with the indifference towards them, the world and man's actions become meaningless and empty."22

By being indifferent towards values, man suffers spiritual atrophy in regard both to his intellect and his will power. Man cannot overcome the emptiness of his existence, because any attempt to 'transvalue all values' would mean that it is possible to insert and posit into the things some purposive value and objective reality which could afterwards be revealed to our intellect. Even if there were a possibility of revealing such 'objective reality' in things, this insertive value posited on things would not be found in things, but in the human intellect. In this situation, however, man would deceive himself and his 'transvaluation of all values' would be pure fiction.

Moreover, it is impossible to escape from existential emptiness by will power and thereby fulfill and satisfy all desires of human consciousness. This also is an illusion, because it would mean that there is such a power in man's will, which could penetrate the innermost reality of things. In his own words Pfänder says that:

Merely asserted positive and negative values never stick to the objects but always drop off again. Even God could not confer value on objects which they do not have by themselves unless He first changed the objects in their factual properties. Even less can a human being, be he ever so powerful, make things good that are not good, and make objects bad that are not bad. The value characteristics of objects lie beyond all immediate human power. The word 'valuing' cannot

designate any human or divine activity creative of values, since there is none. Likewise there is no transvaluation of objects in the sense of an immediate change-over of the values of objects.23

Not having any motive power to escape from a nihilism of values, man cannot realize his happiness: "As soon as one has destroyed in a person the opinion that the object of his emotions are good and valuable and has led him to the opinion that they are not good, hence are in no sense good and valuable, the joy, love, respect and veneration with regard to these objects cease."24 Unable to free himself from illusions and deceptions, a human being ceases to have any reason for his existence: "The binding of value sight introduces everywhere the specter of despair and meaninglessness of life."25 This meaninglessness of human existence reveals the absurdity of man's subjectivity as `self-divided-self,' and as such, man's life becomes "*une passion inutile*."26 The only solution to the meaninglessness of human existence is to terminate one's own 'self-developing-self' by committing suicide. Suicide then can resolve man's incomprehensible condition of human existence, because by committing suicide man is taking his death on his own terms. However, suicide is an illusion, because it would mean a lack of courage for `to-be.'27

The reality in which contemporary man lives is, according to the absurdists, non-existent. George E. Wellwarth characterizes Genet's vision of human reality in terms of a paradox: "His paradox is that there is no reality within society. Anyone who acts within the structure of society is literally unreal -C non-existent; what we call reality is only illusion piled on illusion. When all the layers of illusion are stripped away, what is left is emptiness."28 Thus, being itself is an illusion, there is absolutely nothing in the very structure of things, that is, nothing that is really real. As a result, being is identified with nothingness, and consequently goodness is the same as evil. Nothingness and evil became identical, and man's existence absurd.

Participation in Being

A philosophical venture into the subjectivity of one's own being can take different forms of expression of human consciousness, and various modes of human existence. In the search for his own subjectivity, man must question his being, by raising the question of Being as such. The reason for this is that in order to be able to search for his own being and subjectivity, man has to realize that he is always both in and for Being as such.

However, before he can begin to search for the being of his subjectivity, man has to find a proper access to Being by establishing a specific relationship of his being to Being, and in this manner find a way in which human being will have something in common with Being as such. However, this element which human being has in common with Being is not the being of Being as such, but only the access to Being, namely, the very ways of human participation in Being. Consequently, we can provisionally describe man as a 'being-who-participates-in-Being.'

Man understood as a 'being-who-participates-in-Being' presupposes, however, that there is not only some meaningful and intelligible content through human perceptions and emotions, but also that human existence is valuable in itself. The value of human existence can be understood and approached either ontologically or phenomenologically. In the former, values are understood as the "determinate characteristics of a thing,"29 and in the latter as the correlation between artifacts and things, on the one hand, and the world of objects and the world of subjects, on the other.

Values as the determinate characteristics of a thing constitute the "sole ultimate ontological source"30 in a twofold order: in the order of becoming and in the order of being. In the order of becoming, values as the determinate characteristics of a thing indicate that in a particular thing

there is something which can and has to be done. Values so understood presuppose that in a thing there is something which can be transformed into another mode of being, that is, this or that kind of reality. Consequently, values in the order of becoming are found in a state of various potentialities which are ready for `self-realization,' that is, as something which has to be done: *ta pragrnata*.

However, in the order of being, values are determinate characteristics through which a thing is understood as something which is already done in the form of an objects product, artifact, deed, action, etc. In this order, a thing is invested with those values which appear as something which is accomplished, fulfilled, particularly as some actuality: *praxis*. Consequently, a thing in the order of being consists in 'self-actualization.'

The ontological understanding of values as determinate characteristics of a thing point only to the entitative structure of being and becoming, mainly as a composition of potentiality and actuality. Things in their process of 'self-realization' and 'self-actualization' are found according to various modes of participation in reality. As applied to man, his participation in Being shapes his being in such a way that he is his own being and at the same time he is having something which is not as such his own. In other words, as a being 'who-participates-in-Being,' man is constituted of his own being as a unified inner-self from within; and having an access to Being for receiving something from without, he constitutes a diversity of outer possible selves. Therefore man is a 'being-who-is-participating-in-Being' both in regard to his own finite inner-self as unified from within, and as an infinite outerself as diversified from without.

The unified inner-self of man constitutes the actuality of human finite human being by a constant 'self-integration'. The diversified potentialities of man consist of the infinite possibility of becoming himself by a permanent 'self-separation.' Man, then, as a 'being-who-participates-in-being' finds himself in a continuous process of 'self-constituting-self' by mutual separation from others and integration with his own beingness. This mutual and gradual separation and integration establishes various modes of participation of man in Being through which human beingness is shaping his own subjectivity.

As a 'being-who-participates-in-Being,' man is both a diversified unity of his outerself, and a unified diversity of his own inner-self. This diversified unity of his outerself and unified diversity of his inner-self conditions man to be a 'self-divided-self.' But this 'self-divided-self' as constituted from the unity and diversity of being and becoming, in the ways of participation in Being, indicates the way according to which man's subjectivity is shaping his own identity

Man's 'self-divided-self as 'self-constituting-self' and 'self-revealing-self,' establishes a specific dialectic of 'self-reference-co-its-own-inner-self' and 'self-reference-to-its-outer-self.' Man's own inner- self is the immanent self given *a priori* to each individual and every particular human person. The immanent *a priori* given self which constitutes the individual human person, relates its own inner-self to the outer self in a twofold way: (1) vertically as 'integrated self from within ('inner-consciousness') and (2) horizon-tally as 'separated-self' from without ('outer-consciousness').

The dialectic of man's subjectivity, then, as being 'inner-integrated-self' and 'outer-separated-self' consists in an existential tension of the 'self-creating' and self-destructing' power of man's being. Creation and negation, therefore, are the natural conditions of human subjectivity. In this dialectic of human being, man's subjectivity both projects itself to its own inner-self, and discerns its own inner-self apart from other seizes as such. The immanent a prior given self of individual man as both 'self-integrated-self' and 'self-separated-self establishes a specific order of

transcending; human existence through which man constantly creates and negates both the-inner-and-the-outer-self.'

Man's subjectivity, conceived as 'self-creative-self' and `self-negating-self,' reveals constant changeability of human existence, because in man's search for his own a priori self he is always compelled to resign from his own self in order to create his new self. In addition, man renounces his own self over and against the infinite possibilities for 'self-realization' in order to obtain and realize some finite self by negating the totality of all other possible selves.

This 'self-divided-self,' as being both an integrated and a separated entity each with its own inner and outer self, reveals man as something in which his human inner-self and his outer self are found as belonging to each other in the way of participating in Being, particularly as something which is 'self-opposed' and 'self-identified.' But this 'self-opposed' and 'self-identified' entity of human subjectivity are both the 'self-constituting-self and 'self-revealing-self.'

Now, the 'self-constituting-self' of the inner and outer self of man consists in both human existence and human consciousness. Consequently, human existence and human consciousness are correlated with each other, primarily as the actuality of one's own unified inner-self, and as the factuality of one's own diversified outerself Therefore, human consciousness is the 'self-revealing-self' and human existence is the 'self-constituting-self.'

The correlation of consciousness and existence is the basis of shaping man's identity as both *homo natura* and *homo persona*. The human identity as a mode of participating in Being as a diversified unity of 'self-constituting-self,' results in 'naturalization' of man as a person, that is, by extending the inner-self towards the outer self. The human identity as a mode of participating in Being by unifying diversity of 'self-revealing-self,' results in 'personalization' of man as a natural being, that is, by integrating the outer self towards the inner-self.

Being and Transcendence

Man as a material and spiritual being displays existential ambiguity between the possibility of saving life and the certainty of losing it between the needs of his body and the needs or his spirit; namely, an ambiguity between searching for being and finding nothingness.

In this ambiguity man realizes that his existence is both dependent as a material being, and independence as a spiritual being. In his bodily dependence man experiences the contingency of existence as a being among other beings, endowed with spontaneity in sustaining and developing his own existence. But in his spiritual independence, man realizes the necessity for form and solid ground for his existence as a being without certainty of his beingness.

In order to resolve this ambiguity as between a bodily and a spiritual being, man must transcend himself, find permanency in his existence, and fulfill his insufficient being. In this way, man's ambiguity becomes a condition for 'self-realization' and the necessity for a total fulfillment for his existence by finding an authenticity of his individual life.

In the human consciousness, contemporary man realizes that in his being there is an existential tension between the need for stability and the factual contingency of his existence. Man is compelled to search for this necessity and stability, because otherwise he would exist without justification, thus becoming an ontological absurdity, in which 'to-be' would mean 'not-to-be.' In his search for Being man must find ultimate foundations for his quest, and for this reason he must live in a constant state of anxiety and dissatisfaction.

Man's basic human need, then, is to gain what he does not have, that is, tranquility within himself. But, if man is searching for inner peace, then by the same token he must have the hope of

finding some solution, because otherwise his existence would be futile, that is, absurd. Consequently, in the very structure of searching for something which he is lacking, man has a hope for fulfillment of his existence.

The futility of man's 'self-realization' as both a bodily and a spiritual being can be seen in two ways, that is, as they are opposed or related to each other. When considered as opposed to each other, body and spirit are insufficient, and when analyzed as related to each other they seem to be incompatible. This paradoxical situation of man cannot be resolved by the immanent order of human existence alone. The only solution of the paradox of human existence consists in the order of transcendence. In other words, in his immanent order, man's being is insufficient and incompatible, but in the order of transcendence human existence can be fulfilled and completed.

The basic source of an existential ambiguity of man, under-stood as a lack of total integration of his own nature, consists in a tension between the immanent and the transcendent order of human destiny as both bodily and spiritual being. As a matter of fact, the contemporary man tries to reduce the transcendent dimensions of his existence into an immanent order of his human nature alone. However, lacking transcendence leads man either to believe that he is elevated to 'superhuman' reality or to realize that he is down-graded to a 'sub-human' level of his human nature.

Justification of human existence cannot be found in man's immanent order, because of both the insufficiency and the incompatibility of his nature. But, being insufficient and incompatible in himself, man persists in being rather than in not being. Consequently, man is oriented towards being, and not towards nothingness. Since going into infinity to search for justification of his existence is impossible, there must be an ultimate fulfillment of man's need for absolute resolution. Otherwise man's existence would be futile, that is, absurd. ln other words, the immanent order of man's existence requires that in his 'self-realization' man must transcend his limitations, and his human existence can be resolved only in/by the Absolute Being.

The very structure of existence indicates, according to Jaspers, the need for Transcendence.31 In its classical meaning transcendence opposes immanence and means 'going beyond.' But in 'going beyond' Marcel distinguishes two types of understanding of transcendence: horizontal and vertical. The horizontal under-standing of transcendence means 'going beyond' in spatio-temporal reality in the order of becoming. The vertical understanding of transcendence means 'going beyond,' not in becoming but of being, and consists in an authentic change in man, which is directed toward the universal. This universal is not an abstraction, but rather a "polyphonic" universality which consists in harmoniously functioning parts. Transcendence means participation of being with the Absolute Thou in which man's existence can be completed.32 The need for Transcendence, according to Marcel, arises out of dissatisfaction. However, there are many types of dissatisfaction which do not lead us to Transcendence, e.g., possession of power which disappears once this power is attained, or spiritual growth which is directed inwards, not outwards. The very nature of dissatisfaction consists in an absence of something: "the dissatisfaction has to do with the absence of something which is properly speaking-external to me, though I can assimilate it to myself and in consequence make it mine."33 Dissatisfaction understood as the lack of something is the basis of the experience of Transcendence.

An experience of 'going beyond' is not a transcending experience but an experience of Transcendence. Experience is not "to enfold into one's self, but to stretch out towards . . . consciousness, always being more conscious of someone else than of one's self."34 The reason for experiencing something other than one's self derives from the fact that beyond experience there

is nothing. In the experience of a Transcendence, man's existence is present with the Absolute Thou, which leads to conversion into being.

The conversion into being means participation in Being through which man can attain Transcendence. In attaining Transcendence man realizes his freedom. However, freedom is possible only under the condition that man is a created being who needs transcendence for his completion rejection of the fact of being created would lead man to negation of being and would reduce Transcendence to trans-descendence.35

Participation in Being and Transcendence is neither a physical nor a psychic event, but intentional, as it points to something which is beyond a particular subject. But as an act of intentionality, transcendence is "a property which is only conceivable in terms of a participation in a reality which overflows and envelops me, without my being able to view it in any way as external to what I am."36

In the very act of transcendence through which man is oriented toward something which goes beyond his own existence, man experiences himself as being put into question as to the very authenticity of what and who he really is himself. More personally, with what can identify myself as myself? By putting myself into question as to my own authentic beingness, I experience that there is nothing in myself as such and all my reality is always what it becomes by an act of transcending in every possible way of fulfillment and completion.

In experiencing the problem of what I am to myself, I would have to raise the question as to who am I, to question myself on what I am. In answering this question I realize that I am insufficient in myself and in order to ultimately fulfill my existence I must realize the need and necessity for the other as the other. The resolution, then, of human existence can be realized only by the act of love.

Love is an existential disposition for 'self-realization' of my being through an act of recognition and affirmation of the other in the order of goodness. Love considered as an act of `self-realization,' however, does not belong to the order of becoming only, but also to the order of being. As such it is based on a twofold type of diversified unity: unity with oneself and unity with others. This twofold orientation of love indicates that I am myself to the degree in which I am oriented to the other as my Thou.

Love as an existential disposition for 'self-realization' through the other as my Thou, is a dynamic principle of 'self-perfection' of my being Nikolai Berdyaev describes these dynamic characteristics of love as follows: "Real love is what one bears towards another; debauchery is love and affirmation of self, conducing to the ruin of self."37 This heterocentric character of love reveals an inter-subjective, *nexus* of all being which is mutually interconnected. Consequently, love is the ultimate principle of unity through which the multiplicity of all beings is gathered together and constitutes a universal bond.

The inter-subjective *nexus* of all beings in reality is the ontological foundation for establishing the ground of what and who I am. I am myself to the degree that I participate in others as my Thou. In this way the resolution of my existence consists in an orientation of myself to the others, and I am myself to the degree that I participate in Being and Transcendence.

Notes

1. *Cf.*, Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963), p. 12.
2. Louis Lavelle, *L'erreur de Narcisse* (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1939).
3. *Cf.*, St. Augustine, *Sermo* 46, 27; *CCL* 41.

4. *L'erreur de Narcisse*, p. 53.
5. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 8.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
10. *Cf.*, Walter A. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Pscyhologist, Anti-Christ* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 158.
11. *The Myth of Sisyphus*, p. 5.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
13. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'imaginaire*, p. 18.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, p. 21, "Ma perception peut me tromper, mais non mon image. . ."
17. *Ibid.*, *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (Paris: Hermann & Cie, 1939), pp. 29-31.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
19. Alexander Pfander, *Philosophie auf phänomenolo-gischer Grundlage* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973), pp. 128-129.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
26. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, p. 708.
27. *Cf.*, Gabriel Marcel, *Man Against Mass Society*, p. 19.
28. *The Theater of Protest and Paradox* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 114.
29. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 93.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Philosophy* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), vol. III.
32. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (Chicago: Gateway, 1960), vol. 1, p. 53.
33. *Ibid.*, p. VII.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
35. *Idem*, *Man against Mass Society*, pp. 67-68.
36. *Idem*, *The Creative Fidelity* (New York: Farrar & Strauss, 1964), p. 144.
37. *Dostoevsky* (Cleveland & New York: Meridian Books, 1962), p. 123.

12.

Making Religion Ethical: The Value Orientation of Religion in Contemporary Society

Huang Songjie

Ever since human history came into being, religion has been one of the most universal and complicated social phenomena. Seen historically, it has coexisted with human society at every stage of its development; seen realistically, it accompanies every country, region and nation whatever be their social systems or characteristics. It can produce great cohesive force and solidify people to overcome all kinds of disasters and vices. On the contrary, it can also provoke conflicts among people which cause social disorder and even war. At present, the number of religious believers is increasing with the development of material production. People's religious consciousness has not been weakened with the high development of science and technology. So religion is one of the fields most worth studying, whether considered from the perspective of social development or from that of academic culture. As far as social development is concerned, what is most important presently is neither creating conditions to encourage or promote religion nor taking measures to constrain or remove religion, but actively to lead it on the road of benign development so that it is in harmony with social developments. What then is the road of benign religious development? This is an important problem to be explored by scholars from different cultures. Here it is suggested that ethicizing religion is the necessary road both to benign religious development and to the value of religion in modern society in a time of great change.

Belief and Value Belief

Religion is based upon people's beliefs, of which moral belief is an important part closely connected to religious belief. Certainly, moral belief can be totally independent of religious belief, for morality does not presuppose religion. However, when moral belief is developed fully, it can develop into religious belief. On the other hand, religious belief can never leave aside moral belief for religion must presuppose morality and take some moral concepts as its own. Morality should become the central content of religion. Without morality, religion would assume crooked ways which would be rejected by human kind. So religious ethicizing is first decided by its own characteristics.

Belief consciousness is a kind of spiritual activity rooted in human practices. Humanity needs not only the direction of reason, but also the support of belief to continue to exist and develop. As a matter of fact, it is impossible for us human beings to be controlled by reason at all times, in every place and about every matter. On the contrary, belief is indispensable to our life. Reason and belief are at the same time two important factors of human spiritual life. Moreover, they are two indispensable spiritual pillars of human existence and development. Without reason, it would be impossible for human society to keep on developing in a healthy and reasonable manner; and without belief, human society would also be held back. If we can say that human beings are rational animals, then it could be said also that human beings are animals with belief. Reason and belief are two components of human nature.

Though religion is a kind of belief, belief does not equal religion. Belief is complicated in its characteristics and varied in its content. As far as its characteristics are concerned, beliefs can be

scientific and unscientific; rational, irrational or anti-rational; realistic and ideal; self-conscious and blind; real and unreal; true, false or absurd, etc. As to content, beliefs are ethical, religious and political and regard many subjects from tradition, convention and daily life. The origins of religious belief are various, among which one's inner consciousness is important. Under certain conditions conscious belief which is universal among all human beings can be provoked and developed into religious belief. This is one of the most important reasons why religious believers are so universal throughout the world. Thus, what is important is how correctly to guide people's belief consciousness so that it can harmonize with reason and accord with social development.

Religious belief is included in all different types of cultural systems in the world, although its manifestations and degree differ in the various cultural systems. Western culture includes such strong religious belief, of which Christianity is the most important, that Western culture is said to be a Christian culture. Compared with this, the religious belief included in Chinese culture is far weaker. Although Confucianism has developed so strong a religious coloring that some define it as Confucian religion, it has neither formed a set ecclesiastical hierarchy or a strong church like Christianity, nor has it developed to the extent of standing up to the secular sovereign as an equal like the Christian church. As a result, quite a few scholars deny that Confucianism is a kind of religion.

From another perspective, the spirit of scientific reason in Western culture is similarly strong. Compared with this, it is weaker in Chinese culture, in spite of brilliant achievements in science and technology. As far as Confucianism is concerned, what is prominent, however, are creeds of ethics, morality and the ways of settling down and getting on with one's pursuit. In Western terms this would be a kind of "practical reason." Scientific reason and religion, these two opposite poles, have constituted the basic connotation of every great cultural system of which philosophy is the deep kernel. This is most obvious in Western culture.

Western culture's inclusion of strong religious belief is closely connected with its mode of thought in pursuing the absolute (the ultimate reason, the end and the highest substance) which has been forming ever since ancient Greek philosophy, the cradle of Western culture. Ancient Greek philosophers devoted themselves to seeking after the *arché* of all the things in the universe from the very beginning. This pursuit of *arché* by philosophers from different schools has always concerned the absolute, which is the highest essence, the ultimate reason and the ultimate truth of all things. This pursuit of the *arché* has led necessarily to the idea of God and finally formed a monotheism. In fact, Western philosophers have insensibly led Western culture on such a road since Socrates. He began the Western tradition of emphasizing reason while at the same time leading reason toward a search for ends. Because he believed that since all things in the universe were well arranged by God according to His will and all correspond to some definite end, the search for reasons should be a search for ends. Thus God is, in effect, the full reason of the universe, that is, a rational God.

Plato and Aristotle succeeded Socrates, and developed his rational God and theological teleology. Plato built a cosmology of creation; Aristotle built a philosophical system in which logic, ontology and theology form a trinity. His first mover is indeed God (*Metaphysics* XII): the ultimate reason, highest end, absolute truth, eternal reason and highest good. Although the rational God of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle is different from the God in Christianity, the two are consistent. The theological teleology was absorbed and utilized by early and medieval Christianity. Of course, during its course of formation Christianity also absorbed many ethical ideas from post-Aristotle Greek and Roman philosophy, especially the Stoic ideas of asceticism, obedience and fatalism. Thus, Christianity has absorbed from ancient Greek and Roman philosophy thought of at

least two types: one is metaphysics, ontology and cosmology; the other ethical and moral thought. After its formation, it soon integrated social, material and spiritual life. It also provided the West with spiritual food of at least two types: one is the idea of the ultimate metaphysical reality and ultimate concern which has become the West's spiritual pillar; the other is a whole set of ideas of ethics, morality and value which have become the principle means to regulate interpersonal relations and deal with those contradictions in the Western society.

Comparatively speaking, the religious position and role have not attained the same extent in Chinese culture and society. Although Chinese philosophy also carries on an inquiry after the root or base of all, it has not formed the thought mode for pursuing the *arché* or absolute like the West. This may constitute a reason with regard to thought why there has not been in China so strong a civil religion as Christianity.

Chinese philosophy stresses ethics and morality. Connected with this, it has formed a whole set of Confucian ethical codes and value norms compatible with patriarchal relations based upon the natural economy, which has been realized also with a religious coloring. Whether or not an alien religion or culture could be rooted in Chinese society depends, to a great extent, on whether it could blend with this set of ideas of ethics, morality and value. The reason for Buddhism's being rooted in China and being accepted by Chinese society and the Chinese people lies just in its harmonizing with Confucian ideas of ethics and morality. Compared with this, the circumstance of Christianity is far worse than that of Buddhism. This could be attributed mainly to its attitude towards Confucian ideas of ethics, morality and value, which has been more of conflict, exclusion and opposition. From the above, we can say that the spread of religion is connected with the ethical and moral ideas in the place and at the time.

Religion and Other Fields of Human Endeavor: Economy, Politics, Science and Art

Once religion has developed into a social organization, it must be tightly connected with the social economy and social politics. If religion wants to play a role in the human mind, it must do so based upon some material conditions; every religious organization or church must have a good economic background. Under the conditions of natural economy, religious organizations feed themselves on the occupation of such natural resources as land. With the development of a commodity economy, religion must reform correspondingly in order to be rooted in the modern market economy. However, religion should not become commercialized or marketized, and religious organizations should not control those main national economic lines. Religion's main function is not to develop the economy, so it is not a correct mode either of social or of religious development to utilize religion to make money or develop the economy. On the contrary, that gradually would corrupt and degrade religion, leading it into vice. Certainly, this does not mean that religion is unconnected with socio-economic development or totally independent of the economy; religion can and should care about, participate in, and promote socio-economic developments. But this means mainly that it can overcome those defects in economic development caused by the shortcomings of human nature through educating people and cultivating good morality, fine character and civil behavior.

As a social component, religion cannot get beyond politics. Ever since their formation, all the greater world religions have been bound with politics. In history, religion has sometimes acted as the banner or horn of popular uprisings, insurrections and social revolutions; sometimes it has acted as a tool to rule the people. Religious organizations at times united with the secular power, and at other times stood up to it as an equal, even resulting in bloody accidents. Till now, many

bloody conflicts and insurrections in some countries and regions have involved religious factors. These facts remind us that we must deal seriously with the relationship between religion and politics. With the development of our society, more and more people from more and more countries have realized the necessity and importance of a separation between religion and the regime. Many countries have made definite stipulations about this in their laws. Of course, religious organizations should have their own definite political attitudes and standpoints, but they should not interject religious beliefs into politics. What is more, they should not unify the regime and religion so that religious conflicts are politicized. On the other hand, the state also should refrain from getting involved in religious conflicts. In a word, religious politicization should always be avoided.

Religion and science are in essence opposite to each other. In history, many scientists were so cruelly persecuted by religious organizations because of their persistence in scientific truth that quite a few gave their lives for this. But because of the brilliant achievements of science and technology and its great force, all great religious organizations have changed their opposition to science. They not only allow the free development of science, but also make efforts to engage it in proving their own doctrines. However, the truths of science have been a great shock to religion. The essence and particular functions of religion keep it from ever becoming a science. To make religion into science would be to negate it and change its own identity to its opposite. Scientizing religion is not possible.

The relation between religion and art is different from that between religion and science. In the course of their formation and development all the great religions have created many works of art in all forms, including literature, poetry, drawing, music, sculpture, etc. Religious art is an important component of the resources of art and culture, quite a few of which are still brilliant today and exercise great attraction and appeal. This charm is a great help in promoting the spread and development of religion. The reasons for this link of religion and art are that religious yearning for the future world and the religious imagination are compatible with the pursuit of the ideal by art and its imagination. Furthermore, the religious compassion for the sufferings in present society is also communicable by art. However, making religion artistic is after all limited, because art cannot in the end replace religion's own characteristics and functions. Excessive attention to making religion artistic could also dilute the divinity of religion, and change people's belief conscious-ness into aesthetic consciousness, thereby concealing the religious connotation and losing religious meaning.

In a word, religion must build upon economic development, but must never become commercialized or marketized; religious engagement in the economy should be controlled and guided. Religion cannot escape politics, but religious politicizing is a most dangerous tendency. Religious scientizing is in effect impossible. Religious engagement in art is possible, but also limited for religion itself can proceed too far by way of art.

Moral and Ethical Functions of Religion

Making religion ethical is not a new topic, for ethics and morality are themselves the central content of religion. The doctrines and classics of the three greatest world religions: Christianity, Buddhism and Islam, have made much of ethical creeds, commandments, principles and norms. Fraternity, justice, equality, benevolence, succor, thrift, honesty, etc., are familiar ethical concepts in religion. One of the reasons for religion's appealing and confirming power for people lies in the force and role of its ethical and moral concepts. An important function of religion in society is just

the ethical means to adjust interpersonal relationships. Through emphasizing such creeds as that all people are equal before God and that people should love and help each other, religion tries to reconcile contradictions, disputes and conflicts between different classes and levels, and between members of society with different status and amounts of property. Why then should we now particularly emphasize religious ethicizing?

Firstly, in many countries and regions, religious organizations are still instruments for seeking economic benefits or means for carrying political struggles to different extents. It has been a universal phenomenon during the course of its modernization to commercialize and marketize religion in order to seek money and material benefit. It is not rare either for religious organizations to utilize political power to control the economy through collaboration with the regime. One of the greatest vortexes in the present world political situation is to utilize religion to instigate conflicts, to incite contradictions between nations, to create divisions and to bring on political insurrection and bloody wars. The amalgamation of religious radicals and terrorist organizations has incited people's wrath universally. The more the religious organizations engage in the economic and political order, the further they deviate from their own ethical ideas. Then ethics and morality become not only hollow words, but a great irony in those religious organizations which have power and weapons and use them to massacre masses.

Secondly, it has become a common aim of most people all over the world to develop all types of commodity and market economies. The market economy is one of good order, legality and morality. On the one hand, it implies hot competition; on the other hand, it demands that people be trustworthy, honest and thrifty and reasonably utilize and protect all kinds of resources. It has been proven in practice that the basic quality and moral character of the members of society have great influence on the formation and development of the market economy. Facing this situation, religious organizations should exert their ethical and moral functions without hesitation so as to find their place in a time of social development. There is no other way.

Thirdly, with the development of the market economy, democratic freedom and rights will be expanded, independent personalities will emerge and become ever more expressive, and social life and activities will be richer. This will generate in the material and spiritual-cultural dimensions many contradictions and problems which cannot be solved totally by the state or government. In other words, there are some important complex problems such as natural disasters, charities, the promotion of culture and education, and building up public utilities, etc., in the solution of which the political powers need the aid of social forces. There are also other problems in which state power should not and cannot conveniently intervene, such as academic disputes, competition in cultural and physical educational activities and judgement upon some moral actions, etc. These are what scholars speak of as the role of "civil society." Whether we agree with this concept or not, undeniably there are such contradictions and problems which need to be solved by social forces. Religious organizations can play some mitigating and grass roots role in this respect, mainly with regard to ethical and moral aspects.

Fourthly, with the rapid improvement of modern science and technology, people's adoration of a supernatural Lord, omniscient and omnipotent, gradually has been diluted, the attraction of paradise as a life ideal has fainted step by step, and the overpowering force and absolute authority of God beyond human kind also has been gradually weakened. What members of society need now is harmony and development in real life, and a good moral quality has become the necessary quality of contemporary people. Religion should and must contribute to humankind in this respect.

However, it must be realized that religious ethical and moral functions are limited. Because the religious ethic and morality belong to all kinds of religious doctrines as their proper

components, one must firstly submit to the aim and benefits of these religions. Besides, not all religious ethics and moralities are positive and beneficial; indeed many such ideas may be wrong and absurd, still more are out of date, such as the ideas of asceticism, pessimism, negative escapism and submission to destiny. So, to emphasize exerting religious, ethical and moral functions never means accepting all the historical and present religious ethical ideas without exception. On the contrary, we must firstly get a clear understanding of the situation, tendency and needs of present social development and then develop those ethical ideas which fit the needs of social development and improvement. As for those ethical and moral ideas which do not fit the needs of our times and social developments, we must constrain them, get rid of them, or endow them with new connotations. Religious ethical ideas should not be unalterable and ossified; on the contrary, they should develop historically. Secondly, we must admit that religious ethics and morality cannot take the place of nonreligious social ethics and morality.

What is more, we cannot impose our own religious ethic and morality on members of society who do not belong to our religion. Presently, while material wealth is increasing rapidly, spiritual civilization has not developed with the same speed, and the moral crisis is a fairly universal phenomenon. Certainly, the problem of the improvement of the social ethic and morality cannot be solved exclusively by religion. But, religions, especially those with a long history, need to fulfill their own responsibilities in this respect. Our aim in emphasizing the ethical function of religion is to enable religion to realize its own value orientation in this time of radical change. Thereby it can affirm and exercise its own value in a multi-valued social development and a multi-cultural world.

13.

The Basis of Values in a Time of Change

R. Balasubramanian

Here the approach to this theme is from the Indian perspective and focuses on three issues. The first is the basis of values and argues that human beings who pursue and realize values are essentially spiritual; that all values, secular as well as spiritual, are not only meaningful in the human context, but also are grounded in human nature. Whether values are permanent or impermanent is the second issue. The Indian mind holds the view that values are both permanent and impermanent. Drawing a distinction between higher and lower values, I shall show that, even though there are changes in society, higher values remain the same while lower values by their very nature are transient. Though human beings pursue both higher and lower values, what distinguishes them from animals is the pursuit of higher values, rather than their indulgence in lower values. Notwithstanding the rapid changes that have taken place in Indian society from the beginning of the 19th century due to the impact of Western education and culture, scientific and technological development, it continues to be traditional without renouncing the characteristics of modernity. The third issue is then the impact of tradition, whose hallmarks are the higher values, on a rapidly changing society. Though it seems paradoxical, I shall argue that tradition and modernity can and should coexist, that tradition is meaningful only in a society which cares for continuity and change, and that these are guaranteed by the system of values.

The Self as the Basis of Values

The Axiological Issue

We distinguish between a fact and a value. A fact is what is apprehended, whereas a value is what is desired; a fact is something existent, whereas a value is what is to be accomplished. It may be noted that this distinction is not absolute because a fact which is desired and realized becomes a value, and what has become a value to someone may be viewed as no more than a fact by someone else. If what is desired and achieved is a value, what is disliked and avoided is a disvalue. Moreover, it is not only that the end that is accomplished is a value; the means to an end is also a value. If health is a value, nutritious food which is a means thereto is also a value. That is why we speak of intrinsic as well as instrumental values. By the same token we may say that any object which is a hindrance to achieving an end is a disvalue. Our concern here is with the concept of value, and not that of disvalue.

What we have stated above introduced two factors in the explanation of value: one is desire and the other is realization. It is necessary to add one more factor in order to distinguish the activities of human beings from those of animals. It is well known that animals, like human beings, fulfil their desires for food, water and shelter, to mention only a few of their desire-prompted activities; but unlike human beings, they are guided by their instincts in all these activities. They pursue and achieve their ends without an idea of the satisfaction they are seeking. But human beings desire certain objects knowing what they are; they consciously pursue and realize them, and derive a sense of satisfaction after realizing them. This difference arises because of the mind, the most precious instrument humans possess. The emergence of the mind in the process of

evolution has placed human beings at a level higher than the one reached by animals. In the course of explaining the pre-eminence of humans among all living beings Sankara points out that the deliberate goal-seeking activities of human beings reveal their capacities for knowledge, desire, and will, which enable them to pursue and realize the ends they choose.1 The mind is characterized by the power of reasoning necessary for the choice of ends as well as the means thereto, the capacity for self-reflection, and the ability for reviewing the past, understanding the present, and projecting the future. All of these help human beings to pursue and realize their goals with a clear awareness thereof. So, in addition to desire (*ista*) and realization (*apti*) we have to add the human factor (*purusa*) in order to get the full significance of the term "value." It is not enough to say that "what is desired" is a value; we have to say that "what is desired by a human being" is a value. That is why in the Indian tradition we use the term "*purusartha*" as the equivalent of value; this term associates the human factor (*purusa*) with the object (*artha*) which is desired and realized.2 The term "*purusartha*" will help us to understand the basis of values.

Human nature is different from the human condition. Human beings who live in this world are conditioned by space, time and objects. This means that the different kinds of activities, secular and spiritual, which they perform in their daily life are conditioned by these factors. Generally speaking, human beings are subjects of knowledge, agents of action, and enjoy the consequences of their action. In all three spheres — knowledge, action and enjoyment — they are totally conditioned by space, time and objects. The sum total of the conditioned life constitutes the human condition. In the words of Hannah Arendt:

The human condition comprehends more than the conditions under which life has been given to man. Men are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their existence. The world in which the *vita activa* spends itself consists of things produced by human activities; but the things that owe their existence exclusively to men nevertheless constantly condition their human makers. In addition to the conditions under which life is given to man on earth, and partly out of them, men constantly create their own, self-made conditions, which, their human origin and variability notwithstanding, possess the same conditioning power as natural things. Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of a condition of human existence. That is why men, no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings.3

A little reflection is enough to show that the human condition is never constant. It changes from time to time, place to place, and context to context. It is the very nature of the human condition to change. Worldly life, called *loka-vyavahara* in the Advaita tradition, will come to a standstill if there is no change in the human condition.

While the human condition involves change, human nature ensures continuity. A human being is a complex entity consisting of two components which are totally different in nature. These two components are Spirit and matter, better known in the Vedanta tradition as the Self (*Atman*) and the not-Self (*anatman*) respectively. For the sake of convenience and clarity, I prefer to use the latter terms.

A brief explanation of the nature of the Self is necessary at this stage. The Self is of the nature of consciousness. It is one and eternal; it is not a composite entity, but a homogeneous whole. Only a composite substance made up of parts or characterized by qualities is divisible and mutable. Since the Self is homogeneous, it is neither divisible nor changeable. In short, it is free from birth, development, decline, and death, which are the characteristic features of any material entity, whether subtle or gross. The Self is infinite, but it appears to be finite because of the not-Self with which it is associated.

Though the not-Self which is material is made up of several constituents, it is enough in the present context to refer to three of them, viz. the mind, the senses, and the body, which account for the various kinds of activities performed by a human being. Of these three, only the body is visible and gross, whereas the mind and the senses are invisible and subtle. The Vedanta tradition holds that the mind and the senses belong to the subtle body (*isuksma-sarira*) which is differentiated from the gross external body (*sthula-sarira*).4 As material the not-Self is perishable. This means that as material the mind, the senses, and the body, which along with some more factors are the constituents of the not-Self, are therefore perishable.5 For all practical purposes we can say that the mind and the senses are located in the gross, external body. The Self, too, which is invisible and subtler than the mind and the senses, is housed in the body. So according to the Vedanta tradition, a human being is the Self-in-the-body.

The concept of the Self-in-the-body brings out the limitation to which the infinite Self is subject because of its association with the non-Self, the material component of the human being. Under the influence of the mind-sense-body complex the infinite Self becomes the individuated self in such a way that it is spoken of as having birth and death even though it has neither, and as having name and form even though it is devoid of both.6 The individuated self which is identified, for example, as David or Devadatta, is given a date and place of birth, and ceases to exist at a particular time and place. Here is a case of illicit transfer or false ascription to the Self of what is true of the mind, the senses, and the body. The point to be noted here is that the Self of the human being remains unaffected not only by space, time, and objects, but also by the mind-sense-body complex with which it is associated during its empirical journey. Nevertheless, the mind-sense-body complex which is the material outfit for the Self undergoes change from time to time.

What is amazing in a human being is the co-existence of the unchanging Self and the changing body. It is the Self of the human being that ensures continuity while the not-Self which has to function in the space-time-cause world accounts for change. The combination of Spirit and matter as the human condition is the pre-condition for the pursuit of values. Values are pursued for the sake of the Self, and the pursuit of values is facilitated by the mind-sense-body complex.

Human beings not only make the distinction between higher and lower values, but also prefer the former to the latter because they are essentially spiritual. It may be added that the Self itself is the highest value and that there is nothing higher than the Self. A text of the *Katha Upanisad*says:

The sense-objects are higher than the senses, and the mind is higher than the sense-objects; but the intellect is higher than the mind; and the Mahat is higher than the intellect. The unmanifested is higher than Mahat; the Purusa is higher than the Unmanifested. There is nothing higher than the Purusa, who is the culmination, the highest goal.7

The Metaphysical Issue

The axiological question about the basis of values can be answered only at the metaphysical level. This problem calls for a close analysis in three stages. First, it will be shown that anything that is valued is relative to the Self. Secondly, I shall argue that the acceptance of anything as a value is for the sake of the Self. Thirdly, it will be shown that the Self which is the source and support of everything is the highest value.

Values are Related to the Self. There is an interesting dialogue of great metaphysical significance between Yajnavalkya and his wife Maitreyi in the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*.8 Yajnavalkya had two wives, Maitreyi and Katyayani. With the resolve to take up the life of a *sannyasin*, he called Maitreji aside and informed her that he would bequeath his property

to her and Katyayani and give up the life of a householder. When the philosophically oriented Maitreji asked her husband whether wealth which was of no use to him would be of help to her to attain immortality, she received a negative reply. As she was desirous of the Self as the means to immortality he taught her thereafter the knowledge of the self as the means to immortality. As a prelude to his teaching that the Self alone is worthy of knowing because by knowing the Self everything is known, he said that "everything is dear for the sake of the Self." The following is his argument:

Verily, not for the sake of the husband is the husband dear, but a husband is dear for the sake of the Self. Verily, not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear, but a wife is dear for the sake of the Self. . . . Verily, not for the sake of wealth is wealth dear, but wealth is dear for the sake of the Self. . . . Verily, not for the sake of all is all dear, but all is dear for the sake of the Self. The Self, my dear Maitreyi, should be realized — should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon. By the realization of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection and meditation, all this is seen.9

Yajnavalkya's argument is that everything in the world — material possessions such as wealth, gods and goddesses who are objects of worship and devotion, one's personal and social identity, one's kith and kin, one's spouse — is valued and loved, not for its own sake, but for the sake of one's Self. It is necessary to make a few comments on the significance of Yajnavalkya's argument.

First of all, the Self that he is talking about is not the individuated self, the little ego which is puffed up with pride, but the absolute Self which is the source and support of everything. So his is not an argument in justification of selfishness.

Secondly, every object is valuable; however, its value is not absolute, but relative to one's Self. How far the objects of the world, the social hierarchy, and the network of human relations help a person to realize his/her goal of Self-realization, which is the highest value, is the criterion for judging the value of any of these things. However, this does not mean that we have to treat not only objects, but also human beings as mere instruments or means to one's own progress. One of the prescriptions of Kant's categorical imperative is that everyone should act in such a way as to treat humanity in one's own person or in that of others always as an end and never as a means only. One should not, for example, evaluate the worth of one's spouse merely as a means; on the contrary, one should treat one's spouse as an end in himself or herself. Without devaluing the humanity of a person, without jeopardizing the end-in-itself-character of a person, I may and should consider the relation between myself and the other person in the context of my goal of Self-realization. What I wish to do or demand for myself has to be conceded to others as required by another maxim of the categorical imperative: one should act as if the maxim of one's action becomes a universal law.

Thirdly, Yajnavalkya's argument does not lead to subjectivism or solipsism. I exist and function in the space-time-cause world which is not my creation; I am conditioned by the system of objects and the network of relations in which I am placed; and so the life-world in which I carry on my daily business is real to me. What is suggested by this argument is that, without being overwhelmed by these external conditions, I should pursue and realize my goal, helping others at the same time to realize their goals.

The Realization of Values is Dependent on the Self. So far I have shown how values are relative to the Self. I will now proceed to the second step in the analysis. Of the two components in human beings, the Self and the not-Self, it is the Self which reveals the presence or absence of anything, because it is of the nature of consciousness. The mind-sense-body complex cannot

perform this function. By themselves the three entities of this complex cannot reveal anything because they are material. It is true that the mind and the senses are the instruments of cognition. The real situation is that they are ultimately dependent on the Self for doing their work. The senses cannot perform their functions of hearing, seeing, smelling, and so on without the help of the mind; and the mind in its turn cannot perform its manifold functions without the help of the Self. Though the mind is material, unlike other material objects, it is capable of reflecting the light, the revealing power of the Self and performing its functions by virtue of its purity, on the one hand, and its proximity to the Self, on the other. Serving as the effective medium for the Self, it takes credit for its extensive work as *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect), *citta* (memory-stuff), and *ahankara* (egoity) as if it has revealing power, though the illuminating power belongs to the Self.10 It is against this background that we have to analyze the process which leads to the acceptance of anything as a value. Given the Self, it is possible to think of something as a value, to pursue and realize it; whereas in the absence of the Self, this is not possible. There are three links in the causal nexus connecting the human being as a subject and the object as a value. Because of the Self functioning through the mind and the sense-organ, a human being becomes a knower (*jnata*).

This means that a relation between the Self, on the one hand, and the mind and the senses, on the other, must be accepted such that the nature of the Self is superimposed on the mind and the senses. As a result of this superimposition of the power of illumination on the mind and the senses, it is possible for a human being to cognize something as a fact. So it is not enough to presuppose the Self alone; we have also to presuppose the transfer of the nature of the Self on the mind, the senses, and the body. It will be helpful in this connection to refer to two passages from Sankara's commentary on the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*. Referring to the illumination of the entire mind-sense-body complex by the Self, Sankara observes:

The intellect, being transparent and next to the Self, easily catches the reflection of the consciousness of the Self . . . ; next comes the *manas* which catches the reflection of the Self through the intellect; then the organs, through contact with the *manas*; and lastly, the body, through the organs. Thus, the Self successively illumines with its own consciousness the entire aggregate of body and organs.11

In another passage while drawing our attention to the fact that all our activities take place through the help of the Self, Sankara highlights the status of material objects. He says:

when the external lights that help the different organs have ceased to work, the Self, the infinite entity that is the light within the intellect, helps the organs through the mind. Even when the eternal aids of the organs, viz. the sun and other lights subserve the purpose of some other agency, and the body and organs, being insentient, cannot exist for themselves; this aggregate of body and organs cannot function without the help of the Self, the light that lives for itself. It is always through the help of the light of the Self that all our activities take place.12

According to Sankara, everything other than the Self is material and the general principle which he formulates in this connection is that every material object, be it the sun or the moon, be it the tree or the table, be it the mind or the body, exists not for itself, but for the sake of something else (*parartha*), whereas the Self alone exists for itself (*svartha*).13 So, the cognition of a fact as something worth attaining is the first link in the process of value realization. Then the valuing subject develops a desire to attain it. The arousal of desire is due to a feeling of pleasure

experienced by the valuing subject in the past. The arousal of desire, which is the second link, is followed by an effort or endeavor on the part of the valuing subject to attain the object. The activity which the valuing subject performs to realize the goal is the third link in the process.14 So, the cognition, desire, and activity of a human being, which lead to the realization of an end which is cherished as a value, are made possible by the Self, the inner light of a human being.

The Self, the Highest Value. So far I have shown that values are not only relative to the Self, but that their final realization is also dependent on the Self. I shall now proceed to the third step in the analysis of the metaphysical basis of values. Just as human desires are manifold, values also are manifold. A little reflection is enough to show that all values are not of the same kind. Values are classified into higher and lower, and the hierarchy of values is worked out in different ways. The classification of values can be taken up later. The point to be emphasized here is that the view that "everything is dear for the sake of the Self" highlights not only the centrality of the Self in relation to values, but also the status of the Self as the highest value. This means that, without making a distinction between the Self and values, we have to include the Self in the list of values. What, then, is the place of the Self in the system of values? The Self is at the top of the hierarchy of values. The pursuit of higher values should prepare the ground for the realization of the highest value, for only when the highest value is realized is there the sense of fulfillment. Also when the highest value is realized there is the fulfillment of all desires. That is why the Upanisad, using the language of an imperative, declares: "The Self should be realized — should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon."15 Scripture does not and need not tell us that we have to pursue lower values such as food, water, shelter, and so on, which are necessary for our survival, because we pursue them on our own as do animals. But scripture exhorts us to pursue higher values, and also gives the reason why the highest value should be realized.

The Convergence of the Ontological, the Axiological, and the Epistemological

One and the same entity is viewed from three perspectives — ontological, epistemological, and axiological.

- *The Ontological: the Self and the Non-self*. Advaita holds that the supreme reality, known as the Absolute in metaphysics, is immanent in everything, living as well as non-living. Adopting the technique of cause-effect inquiry one may arrive at it as the First Cause or the ground of the world and call it Brahman. This is also called the objective approach to the Absolute. Instead of this, one may approach it through an analysis of the experience of a human being and call it the Self or Atman. Here the approach is subjective. Both approaches take us to the same reality which is referred by two different names for the sake of conceptual analysis and clarity. So Advaita holds that Brahman is Atman. It is not necessary to go into further details about this metaphysical analysis except to say that Advaita presents the basic metaphysical problem of the one and many in terms of reality and appearance. Or, if we use the terminology of the Self and the non-Self, we can say that, while the Self is the reality, the not-Self (comprising the aggregate of the human body and the external world) is an appearance.

- *The Axiological Issue: the Good and Pleasant*. From the side of axiology, the highest value is called the good (*sreyas*) whereas all other values are called the pleasant (*preyas*). Here the dichotomy is between the good and the pleasant. Referring to this dichotomy, the Upanisad says:

Both the good and the pleasant approach a man. The wise man, pondering over them, discriminates. The wise man chooses the good in preference to the pleasant. The simple-minded, for the sake of worldly well-being, prefers the pleasant.16

A brief explanation is necessary to understand the connotation of the good and the pleasant as used in the Upanisadic text. Human beings face the existential problem of suffering which is bondage. A human being, as stated earlier, is a complex entity consisting of Spirit and body, or the Self and the not-Self. Since the Self by its very nature is ever free and never bound, the source of suffering is the body or the psycho-physical organism. The goal of every human being is freedom from suffering. Since it is not possible to get rid of the body in empirical life, it is necessary for a human being to achieve freedom or liberation with the body. It is not enough if one is free from economic, social, and political restraints as the absence of these restraints does not terminate suffering. What is required is spiritual freedom, i.e., freedom of the Spirit. Without identifying oneself with the body, one should remain as the Self which is by its very nature free. To be the ever free and never bound Self is real liberation. It is this freedom or liberation, which is called *moksa* which is the highest value. The good and the pleasant about which the Upanisad speaks stand for liberation and worldly prosperity respectively. Sankara in his commentary on this Upanisadic text points out that there are two goals available to human beings viz. liberation and worldly prosperity, and that it is impossible for a person to pursue both of them at the same time. The choice of one means the rejection of the other, though there is no compulsion as to which a person should choose. However, no one can escape from the predicament of value preference as one has to choose between them through exercising one's discrimination. To choose the good is to choose the Self because the Self of metaphysics is the good of axiology.

- *The Epistemological Issue: Liberating Knowledge and Blending Ignorance*. The axiological approach to Brahman or the Self is reinforced by means of epistemology. Dividing knowledge into two broad categories, higher wisdom (*paravidya*) and lower knowledge (*aparavidya*), Advaita holds that the supreme reality can be realized only by higher wisdom.17 The epistemological distinction between the two kinds of knowledge corresponds to the axiological distinction between the good and the pleasant. That which is conducive to the attainment of the good, i.e., the Self, is called higher wisdom whereas the knowledge of the objects of the world, which is the means to the attainment of material prosperity and happiness, is called lower knowledge. One who pursues values of various kinds belonging to the sphere of the pleasant is ignorant of the highest reality. Such a person, notwithstanding his or her knowledge of things empirical, is, therefore, said to be in the state of ignorance. For this reason lower knowledge itself is called "ignorance" by Sankara. The terms "lower knowledge" and "ignorance" are not used in a derogatory sense. From the standpoint of higher wisdom, it is called "lower knowledge." Since the scope of lower knowledge does not extend to the highest reality (highest value), it is given the label "ignorance" with a view to emphasizing what is and what is not comprehended by it.

So, the distinction between the Self and the non-Self, the distinction between the good and the pleasant, the distinction between the liberating knowledge and the binding ignorance — all these converge on the same point, viz. the Self which is the source, support, and goal of the human endeavor.

Values: Permanent and Impermanent

That there is a plurality of values is accepted by all. However, there is difference of opinion with regard to the classification of values. I shall first of all refer to one classification which has been accepted by quite a few in the Western tradition. This is a classification based on the two levels of life, organic and hyper-organic, of human beings. At the organic level the basic needs of life such as food, water, and so on, which are necessary for survival, become the values of life for all without any distinction whatsoever. So far as the pursuit of the basic values is concerned, there is no distinction between human beings and lower animals. Without being confined to the organic level, human beings lead their lives at another level which is characterized as hyper-organic. The hyper-organic level consists of two layers, social and spiritual. The purpose of human life is manifest at this level. The Indian mind never thought of knowledge as an end in itself; pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge has never been the Indian ideal. A celebrated Vaisnava teacher, Vedantadesika, said that the knowledge which human beings possess is to help them secure the goals of life and for adopting the appropriate means to secure these goals.18 The point to be stressed here is that the goals of life at which humans aim must be fully reflective of their nature. The life-activity of man should not be confined to the cultivation of the senses, which has already been achieved at the animal level. Man cannot be considered to be "human" unless his senses have become "human" or refined. His senses should not be subservient to the basic needs alone. So at the hyper-organic level, being fully aware of his life in the social community of which he is a member, he pursues social values such as friendship, fellowship, and so on. In addition to the social dimension, he has also a personal dimension of life which collectively are called spiritual values. While the basic values are at the bottom of the scale, the highest values are at the top.

The Indian Classification

The value system that has been adopted by the Indian mind takes note of this two-level life of human beings. Surprisingly, it contains only four values — wealth (*artha*), pleasure (*kama*), duty (*dharma*), and liberation (*moksa*) — which are arranged in a hierarchy. While the first two values belong to the organic level, the last two belong to the hyper-organic. Bodily and economic values which contribute to material well-being and happiness have been emphasized right from the Vedic times. Prayers and sacrifices which we come across in the Vedas are for a happy, healthy, and full life of a hundred years. The spiritual side of man, which is not satisfied merely with material prosperity and happiness, is interested in other values as well, which are higher in the scale.

Artha and Kama. It is necessary to make a brief comment about the status of the world for the correct understanding of the first two values, *artha and kama*, which are very much concerned with this-worldly life. There is a strong criticism that the Advaita tradition has devalued the world by reducing it to the status of an illusory appearance. A dream-lion and a rope-snake are always cited as examples to explain the ontological status of the world. It is true that Advaita holds that Brahman is the reality of which the world is an appearance. But when Advaita says that the world is an appearance, it is only to affirm the empirical reality of the world. The world is illusory (*mithya*), but it is empirically real, regulated by space, time and causality. Like other Vedanta systems, Advaita upholds the spiritual heritage of the world. Since Brahman is spiritual, the material world which is its manifestation cannot be deprived of its spirituality. Consider, for example, the way in which the Upanisad narrates the emergence of the different elements, one after another, from Brahman:

From that Brahman, which is Atman, was produced ether. From ether emerged air. From air was born fire. From fire was created water. From water came earth. . . .19

Again, it says that Atman, which is identical with Brahman, desired to become many. It created the world consisting of gross and subtle objects, and then entered into its own created thing.

He (the Self) desired: "Let me be many; let me be born." So he deliberated. Having deliberated, he created all this that exists. That (Brahman), having created (that), entered into that very thing. And having entered there, it became the formed and the formless. . . .20

This means that the world which is a manifestation or creation of Brahman cannot be but spiritual, for Brahman is none other than Atman (Self) which is spiritual. Brahman exists as the Self in all beings, sentient as well as insentient. If so, the physical world cannot but be spiritual. It must be borne in mind that the spiritual heritage of the world is not inconsistent with its empirical reality or its dependent nature. Though the world is real enough for all practical purposes, providing scope for all kinds of purposive activities, secular and spiritual, it is not ultimately real. It is against this background of spiritual-rootedness-cum-empiricality of the world that we have to assess the status and character of *artha* and *kama*, which are treated as lower values.

Artha generally is translated as wealth. Any useful material object can be treated as *artha*. *Kama* means pleasure or happiness. If we keep in mind the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values, *artha* is an instrumental value whereas *kama* is an intrinsic value. Instrumental values are so many that one cannot enumerate all of them. For the sake of convenience all are brought under the heading of *artha*, and the ends they serve, under that of *kama*. Though it is admitted that happiness is an intrinsic value, the question whether happiness is one or many is controversial. Philosophers like J.S. Mill speak of qualitative distinction among pleasures, so that according to them it would be wrong to say that all pleasures belong to the same kind. Though there are many modes of getting satisfaction or pleasure, pleasure *per se* may be treated as one. It is not necessary here to enter into this controversy.

The problem to be considered here is whether these two values are permanent or impermanent. Let us first consider the case of *artha*. It is well known that what serves as an instrumental value in one context may not be so to the same person in another context. This means that there is no guarantee that an instrumental value will secure the end which is sought through it. This limitation reveals the undependable character of an instrumental value. The difficulty is different in the case of *kama*. The satisfaction or pleasure derived through a particular means does not last long because sooner or later it is replaced by a desire for some other mode of satisfaction. So, while the instrumental values are precarious (*anaikantika*), the intrinsic ones are unstable (*anatyantika*).21 In short, there is always uncertainty about both values, *artha* and *kama*.

However, there is no such uncertainty about the other two values, *dharma* and *moksa*; and that is the reason why they are characterized as higher values. *Dharma*, which means what is morally right or good, never fails to secure its fruit; and *moksa* is, in itself, eternally satisfying. Thus, while the lower values are impermanent, the higher value are permanent.

Dharma. No other term is used so frequently both by scholars and the common people in the Indian tradition as *dharma*; at the same time no other term is so complex and confusing as *dharma*. The etymological meaning of this word is simple, but profound. *Dharma* means "what holds together," what supports or protects.22 So in the Indian tradition *dharma* is understood as the principle which is the basis of all order, social and moral. It is the principle which is binding on all — the ruler and the ruled, the strong and the weak, all sections of people. Citing a text of the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*23 which gives an account of the evolution of the social classes (*varnas*),

Hiriyanna explains how the principle of *dharma* as a universally binding principle was invoked for the maintenance and preservation of the social order. In the words of Hiriyanna:

What was originally but a simple social structure, it is said, came, in course of time, to be differentiated into four classes or castes, viz., Brahmins, Ksattriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras. Of these, the Ksattriya or warrior is represented as the chief support of society, since it is to his prowess and control that it owes its preservation from external danger and internal disorder. But physical might and external control do not adequately explain social order. The former may end in the tyranny of the ruler and the enslavement of society, placing might thus in the place of right. The latter may fail to evoke from the ruled a willing response, which is the only true response. Hence the need arose, it is added, for creating something better or higher (*sreyo-rupam*). It is this higher principle that is *dharma*.24

The scope of *dharma* is not restricted to human beings alone. On the contrary, it is applicable to all sentient beings. It means that the aim of *dharma* is the good of all understood in the widest sense. This will be obvious if, for example, we consider the duties of a householder who is called upon to perform the "five great sacrifices" (*panca-mahayajna*). A householder has to study the Vedas, sacrifice to the gods, offer oblations to ancestors, honor guests, and offer food to beasts. His duties make him realize his cultural, spiritual, biological, social, and evolutionary heritage.

The prescriptions of *dharma* are manifold because it has to deal with all sections of people. It assigns duties common to all people, known as *sadharana-dharmas*; also it assigns duties specific to the stages and orders of life, known as *viÑesa-dharmas*. Further, it suggests ways and means of achieving worldly prosperity and happiness through the performance of sacrifices. It also acts as a regulative principle in respect of acquiring *artha* and enjoying *kama*. It shows the way to *Ñreyas* or *moksa* through purification of the mind (*citta-Ñuddhi*). It is also viewed as an end in itself and not as a means to something else.

Moksa. Excepting Carvaka, all systems of Indian philosophy, Vedic and non-Vedic, accept liberation (*moksa*) as the highest value. There are two ways in which the nature of liberation may be understood — negatively as liberation from, or cessation of, suffering; and positively as the state of bliss. Human suffering is threefold:

- that which arises from intro-organic causes (*adhyatmika*) such as bodily and mental diseases;
- that which arises from extra-organic causes (*adhibhautika*) such as men and beasts;
- that which arises from extro-organic supernatural causes (*adhidavivika*) such as rain, famine and earthquakes.

Though there are remedial measures which help human beings overcome suffering arising from any of these courses in a temporary way, liberation from suffering totally and forever (*tyantika-duhkha-nivrtti*) can be attained only through the knowledge of the supreme reality, Brahman or the Self, because knowledge alone can destroy ignorance which is the root cause of bondage. It is not necessary to go into the details with regard to the nature of *moksa* as well as the means thereto as explained in the different systems.

Three points are to be noted here. First, all systems which accept *moksa* as the highest value hold that the beginning of the empirical life of the *jeeva*, which is suffering, is not known, and cannot be known because the present empirical life of the *jeeva* is said to be beginningless (*anadi*). It does not follow from this that it has no end. Second, all these systems maintain that the cycle of

birth and death can be broken by attaining the saving knowledge of the supreme reality. The attainment of liberation is the termination of empirical life. Third, it is wrong to think that the ideal of *moksa* cannot be realized and that it has been projected for the purpose of the self-improvement of human beings. All these systems maintain that the ideal of *moksa* is not only worthy of realization, but can be realized. This leads to the question "when." These systems differ in answering this question. According to some, however earnest the spiritual aspirants may be in their practice of moral and spiritual discipline prescribed therefor, the goal cannot be reached in this life. As against this eschatological conception of *moksa*, which is advocated by theistic systems, there is the view advocated by Advaita that *moksa* can be attained here in this life. There is no more empirical life for a person who is liberated. The bliss of the liberated is the highest and ever-lasting. It may be noted that this view of liberation-in-life (*jeevan-mukti*) is unique. Inviting our attention to the significance of the ideal of *jeevan-mukti* vis-à-vis the eschatological conception of liberation, Hiriyanna writes:

Whatever basis there may be for this eschatological view of *moksa* in early Vedic literature, we must say that the conception of it, viz. that the final ideal of man can be attained here and now, marks a great advance. The habit of contemplating a future life engenders an attitude of "other-worldliness" which is most detrimental to proper behaviour in this world. The thought of a future life is sure to tend to dwarf the present. But the other view, which presents *moksa* as the contemplation or consummation of mundane life rightly led, infinitely deepens the significance of the present life. Socrates is stated to have brought philosophy down from heaven to earth; the seers of the Upanisads and those among the later Indian thinkers who follow them in this respect, we may say, discovered that heaven itself is on the earth, could one but realize it.25

Tradition and Change

From Vedic times the Indian mind was enraptured by the holistic vision which would explain everything in terms of the primal Being which is one, infinite, and eternal, which encompasses everything, sentient as well as insentient. What gives unbroken continuity to the Vedic tradition is the persistence of the holistic vision from the beginning down to the present time. The Vedic seers, as we notice in the celebrated "Hymn of Creation," spoke of "That One" (*tad-ekam*) which is the ground, the prime mover, the uncaused cause, of everything. Consider the following passage from the "Hymn of Creation":

That One, breathless, breathed by its own nature. Apart from it there was nothing whatsoever. . . . Therefore rose desire in the beginning: desire, the primal seed and germ of mind.26

It is not necessary here to go into a detailed explanation of the various ideas contained in this hymn. What requires special emphasis here is that the idea of the one as the immanent spirit in everything is the basic principle of the *philosophia perennis*. From this can be derived two other principles. One is that all living things are divine, and the other is that nature is spiritual. A tradition is a mixture of the essentials and the non-essentials. It can survive only if it allows the non-essentials to change while it preserves the essentials. A healthy tradition will provide scope for conservation of the essentials and change of the non-essentials. It petrifies when it becomes rigid without flexibility. *A* cannot remain *A* all the time. *A* becomes *B*, which means that a part

of *A* remains the same while another part is subject to change. Explaining the need for conservation and change, Whitehead observes:

Mere change without conservation is a passage from nothing to nothing. Its final integration yields mere transient non-entity. Mere conservation without change cannot conserve. For after all, there is a flux of circumstance, and the freshness of being evaporates under mere repetition.27

In the language of axiology, the essentials are the higher values and the non-essentials are the lower values. The primal Being or Spirit, known as Brahman or *atman* in the Indian tradition, is the highest value. It is the source and support of all values, higher and lower. Also, other values are meaningful only in relation to it. It is, therefore, worthy of realization. Hence there is the imperative, as stated earlier, that Brahman or the Self ought to be realized. However, whenever there are changes in the human condition, the vision of the essentials becomes blurred and the non-essentials tend to usurp the place of the essentials. These times call for a renewal of the tradition by changing the non-essentials without prejudice to the essentials. In the Indian tradition a series of renaissance took place in order to conserve the tradition in the midst of changes in its long history of over five millennia spanning the pre-axial, axial and modern periods.

The first renaissance is associated with the Upanisads. Though it is difficult — indeed wrong — to consider the different parts of the Vedas in terms of chronological development, the fact remains that the Upanisads, found as the concluding portions of the Vedas, have renewed, reaffirmed, and vindicated the essentials of the tradition. When there was a shift in the focus of attention during the transition from the Mantras to the Upanisads, sacrifices of various kinds which are the means of *preyas*, i.e., worldly prosperity and happiness, became dominant with tremendous impact on the role of men and materials. The result was that the non-essentials became more important than the essentials. At this time the Upanisads not only emerged and renewed the tradition, but also strengthened it by deepening the earlier concept of One by spiritualizing nature and divinizing man.

The second renaissance of the Vedic tradition took place about 200 BC after the fall of the Mauryan empire. During that empire, Buddhism, which was dominant, challenged the Vedic religion. Jainism also questioned the Vedic religion and weakened its authority. In spite of threats and challenges, the Vedic religion reasserted its supremacy. Cultural historians are of the view that the *aÑvamedha* sacrifice performed by Pusyamitra, the founder of the Sunga dynasty on the ruins of the Mauryan empire, may be taken as heralding the second renaissance of the Vedic tradition which began about 200 BC and continued till the end of the seventh century AD. During this period, the Vedic tradition was renewed by the two epics, the *Mahabhaata* and *Ramayana*. The hold of these two epics on the masses is, in fact, stronger than that of the Vedas.

The *bhakti* movement which began in the beginning of the eighth century AD ushered in the third renaissance. Buddhism was on the decline from the middle of the seventh century AD. The anti-Vedic attitude was still prevalent in some pockets of India. Kumarila Bhatta and Đankara who were critical of Buddhism tried to consolidate the tradition from different directions — the former from the side of *karma* and the latter from the side of *jñana*. There was need also to popularize the teachings of the Vedas among the people. The teachings of the Đaiva and Vaisnava mystics played a decisive role in this regard, because they were able to establish rapport with the people through their hymns which were in the vernacular. The *bhakti* movement which started in the South spread to the North stage by stage, and finally became a pan-Indian phenomenon, a pervasive and deep-rooted force to be reckoned with. When the *bhakti* movement was at its peak, the historical

situation witnessed the establishment of the Muslim kingdom and the Moghul empire, and then the British rule.

Notwithstanding the *bhakti* movement, there was an all-round decline. There was urgent need for renaissance in all spheres of life. The essential principles of the Vedic tradition came to the aid of the social reformers, political leaders, and religious personalities; and what we call the modern renaissance took place in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Great personalities associated with Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, and the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement, sages like Ramana Maharshi, mystics like Sri Aurobindo, academics like Radhakrishnan, and political leaders like Mahatma Gandhi — all these charismatic leaders continued the tradition by affirming the validity of the essential values of the tradition in a changing socio-political situation.

The leaders of the renaissance movements were neither dogmatic nor skeptical in their attitude towards tradition. They subjected the entire tradition they inherited to a rational critique. The Vedic tradition has two structures — essential and non-essential. The essential structure which has endured through the vicissitudes of time contains the higher values which constitute the *philosophia perennis*. Rituals and religious practices, social norms and conventions, and situation-related specific moral principles, which are not universally binding and which change from time to time, constitute the non-essential structure of the tradition. The leaders of the renaissance movements examined both the structures of the inherited tradition and came up with two kinds of responses, positive and negative. Their attitude was positive with regard to the essentials of the tradition: they affirmed their validity and accepted them since they fulfilled the demands of the rational critique. But they were negative in their response to some of the variables of the tradition: they questioned their tenability, rejected some of them, suggested modifications in others, and gave some a new meaning and significance, taking into consideration the changes that had taken place in the social, political and economic spheres of society.

There are two lessons that we have learned from the series of renaissance which have taken place in India from the Vedic time down to the present day. The first is that we cannot break with tradition in the name of change. The second one is that we cannot use the tradition as a weapon to crush the changes in the human condition. Continuity and change must co-exist. Both are necessary. While the one is concerned with the perennial elements of the tradition, the other is connected with the changing human condition. Radhakrishnan's evaluation of the importance of both continuity and change is helpful. He observes:

We cannot restore the practice of the Vedic period, for that would be to deny the dialectic of history. Again, we cannot start *de novo*, as if India has no history and as if people could change their nature merely by taking thought. Possibilities must be grounded in the nature of the actual. Civilizations must live on the lines of their own experience. Like individuals, even nations cannot borrow experience from others. They may provide us with light, but our own history provides us with the conditions of action. The only revolutions that endure are those that are rooted in the past. We can make our own history, but we cannot do so at will, in conditions of our own choosing. . . . Culture is tradition and tradition is memory. The duration of this memory depends on the continuous appearance of creative personalities.28

Notes

1. See his commentary on the *Taittireeya Upanisad*, 2.1.1: *purusa eva hi Ñaktatvat arthitvat aparyudastatvat ca arthee vidvan samarthah karmajñanayoh adhikriyate*.

2. *Purusena arthyate iti purusarthah*.

3. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 9.

4. Only two are mentioned here. Actually there are three bodies — gross (*sthãla*), subtle (*sãksma*), and causal (*karana*). Avidya or ignorance is the causal body.

5. The syllogistic argument is: all material things are perishable; the not-Self is material; therefore, it is perishable.

6. Advaita uses two terms to bring out the difference between the Self in its unconditioned and conditioned aspects. The former is called *Atman*; the latter, Jeeva.

7. 1.3., 10-11.

8. *Brhdaranyaka Upanisad*, 2.3.4.

9. *Ibid.*, 2.4.5.

10. Though I have been using the popular term "mind," the technical term for it in the classical texts is "internal organ" (*antahkarana*). Though it is one, depending upon its functions it is called by four different names — *manas, buddhi, citta,* and *ahankara*.

11. *Brhdaranyaka Upanisad*, 2.4.5.

12. *Ibid*.

13. *Ibid*.

14. That is why we say: *janati, icchati, yatate*.

15. *Brhdaranyaka Upanisad*, 2.4.5.

16. *Katha Upanisad*, 1.2.2.

17. See *Mundaka Upanisad*, 1.1.4.

18. See his *Ðreemad Rahasyatrayasra* (tr. M.R. Rajagopala Ayyangar) (Kumbakonam, 1956), p. 53.

19. *Taittireeya Upanisad*, 2.1.1

20. *Ibid*., 2.6.1.

21. See M. Hiriyanna, *Indian Conception of Values* (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1975), p. 15.

22. *dharayati iti dharmadh*.

23. 1.4, 11-7.

24. M. Hiriyanna, *op.cit*., p. 153.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

26. *Rg-veda*, 10.129.

27. A.N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p. 250.

28. S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 113.

14.
Renewal of Thai Buddhist Belief in *Kamma* and Rebirth

Veerachart Nimanong

Introduction

In this chapter an attempt is made to deal philosophically with the Theravada Buddhist concept of *Kamma* and Rebirth, as believed and cherished by the Thai people. The search for evolution of the Thai Buddhist belief in the doctrine of *kamma* and its collorary doctrine of rebirth can be somewhat more easily understood by the approach of Thai Buddhist scholars' work in a particular period of time than that of the historical outcome of its mission. It has been said that the history of Buddhism is that of the Thai nation; this is true, for Buddhism has helped the Thai elites establish the country since the time of its arrival in the fourth century at Suwannabhumi, now known as Nakorn Pathom province in the central part of Thailand. Hence all kinds of crises experienced in the Thai citizen and nation cannot categorically be separated from that of Buddhism, and as such they will be of real concern to Buddhist reflection.

At present the process of modernization has had significant impact on Thai society. The system of education is organized after a Western model, and the philosophy of education is related to the economic and political structures. In theory, some Buddhist principles may be quoted, yet in essence it is a pragmatism, which corresponds to a capitalist society. The younger generation is growing up in a confusing environment. Teenagers and children today form the majority of Thai population and they are, thus, the major target group for the consumer society (*Seri Phongphit*, 1988, pp. 3-29).

In Thailand, Buddhism existed alongside Hinduism, especially in the royal court where Hindu priests had a leading role in all royal ceremonies. Hinduism has less influence on the daily life of the ordinary people, where it is overshadowed by Buddhism and popular belief. Nevertheless Hindu elements exist in different ways in Buddhism itself. The interpretation of Buddhist doctrine, the emphasis on mythological stories, the application of these in Thai literature and the justification of the status of the kings are in one way or another related to Hindu concepts.

Amidst the rapid changes in Thai society today and the developments in Buddhism, a small number of monks and laity try to reconsider and apply the Buddha-*Dhamma* to this changing society. The search for a middle path applicable to modern life has been continuous and constant in all classes of Thai society. Generally it is acknowledged that the Most Venerable Buddhadasa Bhikkhu and Phradhammapidok or P.A. Payutto Bhikkhu's interpretation of Buddha-*Dhamma* and way of life have inspired individuals and groups in various social sectors to rediscover the meaning of Buddhism and to search for appropriate means to apply it in their daily lives and activities. Their main aim was to go back to the source: to follow the Buddha's path.

Thai Buddhists today confront two important enemies, namely, materialism and superstition. The two factors are growing so strong that traditional Buddhism, as it actually is, will not be able to become a real liberating force. It has ben found that the crisis and confusion of Buddhism with popular belief resulted from the people's ignorance of the real *Dhamma*. Hence an education in the real Buddhism is needed.

Both Venerables are the authors of many publications, mostly in Thai, with some books and articles translated into English and other foreign languages. Some of their principal views

especially the doctrine of *kamma and rebirth*, which serves as the principle of renewal, will be brought into our discussion here.

The Development of the Concepts of *Kamma* and Rebirth in Early Theravada Buddhism

It should be noted that Theravada Buddhism differs from Early Buddhism. The former covers all kinds of treatises ranging from the *Tipitaka* to its sub-commentaries and later texts, which are the work of some prominent Buddhist scholars in Thailand and in some other Theravada Buddhist countries. Therefore our discussion of *kamma* and rebirth here will be necessarily supported by the commentaries, such as *The Path of Purification*, written by Buddhaghosacariya of Ceylon.

The Doctrine of Karma and Rebirth in Buddhism

Strictly speaking, it is correct to say that the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth as based on *Anattavada*, *Paticcasamuppada* and *Vipassanabhavana* is peculiarly taught only in Buddhism as it was completely enlightened by the Buddha in the night of his Enlightenment, (*MN*, I, 183). A more reliable fact is that the operation of *karma* had appeared in the Buddha's second knowledge, called *cutupapatanana*, at the time of his Enlightenment. It is said, with his pure, paranormal clairvoyant vision, he saw beings, noble or mean, happy or unhappy, dying and getting reborn in accordance with their *karmas* (Sn. 654).

In the *Culakammavibhanga-Sutta*, it is related that a young Brahmin Subha who was a Todeyya's son approached the Buddha and asked him for an explanation as to why among human beings some were short-lived while others were long-lived, some were sickly while others were healthy, some were ugly while others were beautiful some had little power, others were influential, some were poor while others were rich, and some had little wisdom while some possessed insight. He further asked the Buddha for the reason and cause for the lowness and excellence which were seen among men despite their being human. The Buddha's reply was thus: "Beings possess their own *karmas*, beings are heir to their *karmas*, *karmas* are their congenital cause, *karmas* are their kin, *karmas* are their refuge, it is *karmas* that divide beings in terms of lowness and excellence" (*MN*, III, 202-203).

When the young Manava asked the Buddha to explain at length the cause of such differences, the latter did so in accordance with the law of cause and effect (*karma*). It may be put in a simple manner as follows:

The killing of living beings leads to a short life, the non-killing of living beings leads to a long life; the persecution of living beings leads to a sickly life, the non-persecution of living beings leads to healthy life; elasticity, anger and hatred lead to an ugly figure and bad complexion, the opposite ones lead to a beautiful figure, attractiveness and loveliness respectively; envy leads to powerlessness, non-envy leads to powerfulness; selfishness leads to poverty, alms giving and generosity lead to wealth (*MN*, III, 203-206).

Once the Buddha was asked by Queen Mallika, a very devout and wise lady well-versed in the *Dharma*, why in this world some women are not beautiful and are poor; why some women are not beautiful but rich; why some women are only beautiful but are poor; and why some women are both beautiful and rich. The Buddha's reply was:

Firstly, a certain woman becomes both deformed and poor because in the past she was ill-tempered and stubborn, and she was no giver of charity to monks and others, she was jealous-minded and revengeful. Secondly, a certain woman becomes only deformed but she is wealthy

because in the past, she was only ill-tempered, but she was a giver of charity to all. Thirdly, a certain woman becomes beautiful or well-formed, but she was poor or needy, because in the past, though she was not ill-tempered, she was no giver of charity to monks and others. Fourthly, a certain woman becomes both beautiful and rich because in the past she was not ill-tempered, was not stubborn, and she did give monks and others food, drink, clothing, vehicles, flowers, scent, ointment, bed, lodging and light; nor was she jealous-minded (*AN*, II, 202).

The above passage clearly shows that the doctrine of *karma* and the theory of rebirth which are interrelated can explain rationally the causes of the inequalities in human life. The Buddha stated that the fruit of *karma* is one of the four unthinkables (*acinteyya*) that transcend the limits of thinking and over which one should not ponder (*AN*, II, 90).

Volition is Karma. The *Anguttara-Nikaya* defines *karma* as deeds or actions associated with the mental state of volition (*cetana*), (AN, III, 63). All volitional actions involving mentality (*mana*), word (*vaca*) or body (*kaya*) are regarded as falling within the domain of *karma*, which is constituted by good, bad and actions that are neither good nor bad. According to Buddhism, *karma* without volition, namely, the instinctive actions such as sneezing, respiration and so on, is not regarded as *karma* because it does not consist of a volitional consciousness, which is the most important factor in determining the nature of *karma*. Generally, volitional *karma* always consists of either good or bad, and such a *karma* does not vanish without producing its effect, as the Buddha quoting the words of ancient *Rsis* proclaims: "Those who do good receive good and those who do evil receive evil, man reaps according as he has sown," (*SN*, XI. 1. 10).

The Classification of Karma

In the *Anguttra-Nikaya*, (*AN*, II, 230-231). Buddha classified *karma* into four kinds corresponding to their nature and results:

Four kinds of *karma*, Monks, I have realized by my own wisdom and then made known to the world. They are black *karma* having black result, white *karma* having white result, both black and white *karma* having black-and-white result, and neither-black-nor-white *karma* having neither-black-nor-white result and leading to the cessation of *karma* (*AN*, II, 231).

The first means the action done by body, word and mind with ill will, and it will make the doer take birth in a world dominated by ill will. This is the plight of beings such as those in a hellish world. The second kind refers to the kind of *karma* which is not conducive to ill will, and its results lead only to happiness. It indicates the life of beings who take place in the realm of *Subhakinha*. The third *karma* implies the actions, some of which are spurred on by ill will, whereas others are not. The doer of this *karma* is surrounded by both suffering and happiness. This signifies the life of human beings, of some classes of celestial beings, and of some classes of hellish beings. The fourth category denotes the action that leads to the cessation of the first, the second and the third *karma*. The last one is mostly emphasized by the Buddha. The person who has attained the cessation of all *karmas* is called *sabba-kammakkhayam-patto*. Buddhadasa Bhikku remarks that the fourth type of *karma* is never discussed by Westerners in their analysis of *karma* and rebirth.

In the *Mahakammavibhanga-Sutta*, the Buddha who foresaw that in the future some members of other sects may discover the Buddha's great analysis of *karmas*, tells Ananda that there are four

categories of *karma*, (*MN*, III, 215), viz., (i) 'Inope-rative apparently inoperative' (*abhabbam abhabba- bhasam*), which means that an action that has little ethical significance is superseded by an action of greater ethical significance; (ii) 'Inoperative apparently operative' (*abhabbam bhabbabhasam*), refers to an action the effect of which is interrupted by another *karma* of the opposite character when one is on the point of death; (iii) 'Operative apparently operative' (*abhabbam bhabbabhasam*), which is an action of greater ethical significance which renders its result as has been accumulated and awaited; and (iv) 'Operative apparently inoperative'(*abhabbam abhabbabhasam*), which is an action cultivated on the point of death and is prevented by a past deed of greater ethical significance, (*Papancasudani*, p. 20).

The first three kinds of *karma* are in tune with the three kinds of *karma* mentioned in the *Anguttara-Nikaya* (*AN*, I, 121), viz., that good actions bear good fruits, bad actions bear bad fruits, and actions partly good and partly bad bear fruits partly good and partly bad. The third type does not refer to the manner of individual acts, but rather to the series of acts which define an individual life. There is no such thing as a black-and-white *karma* or partly good and partly bad *karma*, but a certain person accumulates acts of body, speech and thought that are both discordant and harmonious, (*GS*, I, 105).

The above classification of *karma* is made in accord with their nature and results. But if *karma* is looked at from the point of view of the channels through which it is generated, it is classified into three kinds, namely, bodily action, verbal action, and mental action (*MN*, I, 373). Each of these covers all four categories of the former classification, that is, *karma* performed through any of the three channels will be good or evil, or both, or neither. From the Buddhist viewpoint, even mental *karma* is wrong, and it is more important than the other two *karmas* (*AN*, III, 414). It is further stated in the *Nikayas*, (*AN*, V, 264-266; *DN*, III, 214-215) that bad *karma* performed through body, speech and mind is called *duccarita* (evil conduct) or *akusula* (unwholesome state), which are of ten kinds divided into three groups, namely, (i) Threefold action of the body, namely, killing of the living beings, stealing, and sexual misconduct; (ii) fourfold action of the word, namely, false speech, backbiting, harsh speech, and frivolous talk; and (iii) threefold action of the mind, namely, covetousness, ill will and wrong view. These ten are all called*akusalakammapatha* (unwholesome causes of action). But on the contrary, the good deeds performed through the three channels are called *succarita* (good conduct) or *kusala* (wholesome state), which are the opposite kinds of the above men-tioned ten *karmas*. It is to be noted that the classification of *karma* into ten kinds is made in accordance with the moral point of view.

In the *Anguttara-Nikaya*, (*AN*, I, 136), a twofold classification of *karma* is mentioned, namely, fruitful and barren. The former refers to actions performed under the influence of covetousness, hatred and infatuation, which are regarded as the root-cause of *karmas* in order to bring about their results. The latter denotes actions performed without the influence of the three root-causes as mentioned before. These three root causes are regarded as the root cause of ignorance, which is itself the root cause of *karma*. As has been stated, man is born of *karma* or ignorance. From the standpoint of fruitful and barren *karma*, the former is called *sasavakammas* which bring about good and bad consequences, the latter is called *anasavakamma* which is a kind of meditation on the Four Noble Truths, that lead to Arahantship and does not generate good or evil results. On the other hand, while *sasavakamma* will bestow the five *khandhas* in the future, the *anasavakamma* will eradicate the round of death and birth.

It is said in the *Samyutta-Nikaya* (*SN*, IV, 132), that the eye and other sense organs are understood as old *karma* (*purana-kamma*), but the action which one performs now is called new *kamma* (*navakamma*). Man's present situation is derived from old *kamma*, but he remains free to make what he will of his present. The Buddhists believe that man has every possibility to mould his own *karma* and thereby influence the direction of his life.

In connection with the old and new *karma* as mentioned above, it is necessary to mention the two punishments of *karma* (*kammaka-rana*). Like the old *karma*, the new *karma* too will have its result in this life (*ditthadhammika*) or in some future life (*samparayika*), (*AN*, I, 48). Take a robber for example: he is captured by authorities and tortured for his crime. This is called a wrong deed with immediate retribution. Other acts born of body, word and thought will be rewarded through appropriate rebirths. Likewise the fruit of a good deed may have both visible and future results; for example, the result in this life of liberal almsgiving is that the giver becomes dear to many and gains a great reputation, yet the results of his generosity will come to full fruition only following his death when he is reborn in a heavenly world.

The Doctrine of Rebirth in Relation to Karma

According to Buddhism, *karma* in its *cosmic aspect* is the natural law (*Dhammata*), the law of conditionality (*idappaccayata*) or of relativity (*paccaya*), which governs the whole universe. The law of *karma* in its *moral aspect* is concerned with the theory of rebirth (*punabbhava*), which is its corollary and proof. Rebirth is a result of *karma* (*kamma-vipaka*): *Karma* and *vipaka* being inevitable concomitants. It implies that according to Buddhism, one's present life cannot come out of nothing, but must be the outcome of the previous existence or the past *karma*.

The Buddha, when asked by Ananda Thera as to what are the causes of rebirth, replies that it is caused by the *karmas* of their respective nature, that is, the *karmas* of sensual nature produce sensual planes; the *karmas* of meditation-levels based on Form produce the planes of Form; and the *karmas* of the nature of meditation based on Formlessness produce the planes of Formlessness. Therefore, *karma* is comparable to a field, consciousness (*vinnana*) to a seed, desire (*tanha*) to the sap or life-force within the seed. For, *karma* or the volition of beings hindered by ignorance and bound by desire takes place in sensual planes, material planes or immaterial planes. Thus there is repeated rebirth, (*AN*, I, 222-224). It is evident from the above discussion that re-becoming is made possible through the combined functions of three conditions, namely, *karma*, desire and consciousness. It is consciousness that is reborn. As it is said, it is the seed that will grow if planted in the soil of *karma* and watered by desire — and if some external conditions are also present. The Buddha also comments that through the entry of the consciousness of a departed person into a womb of a suitable woman, the personality of a new individual is reborn (*DN*, II, 62-63).

Dealing with the process of rebirth, the Buddha states that where there are three conditions combined together there a germ of human life is planted, that is, the mother's ovum, the father's sperm and the being-to-be born (*gandhabba*). According to the Nyanatiloka Mahathera, the*gandhabba* (skt. *gantavya*) is none other than *kamma-vega* (*karma*-energy), which is sent forth by a dying individual at the moment of his death. He said:

The dying individual, with his whole being convulsively clinging to life, at the very moment of his death, sends forth *karmic* energies, which, like a flash of lightning hit at a new mother's womb ready for conception. Thus the so-called primary cell arises (*Nyanatiloka*, 1964, pp. 2-3).

It may be noted that Theravada Buddhism denies that an indetermediate-state exists between death and birth. This being the case, Piyadassi Thera maintains that *gandhabba* is simply a term for the rebirth-linking consciousness (*patisandhi-vinnana*), rather than for a discarnate spirit of any kind (*Piyadassi*, 1972, p. 20). It can really be said that human beings are born from *karma*, while parents merely provide them with a material layer. But this should not make us misunderstand that parents do not have any merit at all (*AN*, I, 161). Since they do much for children — they bring them up, nourish and introduce them to the world- they are teachers worthy of offerings; they are *Brahma* (*AN*, I, 131). It is, however, said that at the moment of conception *karma* conditions the initial consciousness or *gandhabba* which vitalizes the foetus (*Narada*, 1980, p. 400).

Remarks on the Belief in Kamma and Rebirth. Although Buddhism attributes the law of *karma* as the chief among a variety of causes, it does not assert that everything comes out from previous *karma*. The Buddhist doctrine of *karma* merely taught that there was a correlation between moral acts and their consequences, without implying any sort of fatalism. The Buddha once warned his disciples not to throw away their own efforts and responsibilities by assuming that all good or bad was experienced was due to some previous *karma*, due to the creation of God or due to no cause. It is clear that the implications of the Buddhist doctrine of *karma* were the very opposite to *kiriyavada*, fatalism and materialism.

According to Buddhism, the volition or feeling or conscious-ness is the doer of *karma* and the receiver of the *karma*-result, but not all feelings are *karma*-born. As the Buddha told the wanderer, Sivaka Moliya, there are certain experiences originating from bile, from phlegm, from wind, from the humours of the body, from changes of the seasons, from stress of untoward happenings (*visama-pariharajani*),1 from sudden attacks from without (*opakkami-kani*),2 and also from ripeness of one's *karmas* which are considered as truth by the world. If anyone were holding merely the *karma*-born theory, he would be regarded as going beyond what is personally known and what is considered truth in the world. Such a person would be considered by the Buddha as holding wrong views (*SN*, IV, 230-231).

In the *Sutta-Nipata*, (Sn. 666), it is declared that a man's *karma* is never lost, it comes back to harass him, but in the *Culaka-mmavibhanga-Sutta* and *Maha-kammavibhanga-Sutta*, as mentioned earlier, it is possible to do good in order to dilute or dissolve the effects of evil. There is thus a second opportunity to turn over a new life. In fact, what has been done cannot be undone, but it can be nullified by the counter-balancing force of good. In Buddhism, the intense force of good deeds, such as that of Arahantship, can uproot all the evil force in the mind. It can also neutralize the results of bad *karma* in the past such as in the case of *Angulimala Thera* (*MN*, II, 98-112).

Also, according to Buddhism, the result of *karma* ripens not only in accord with the *karma*, but also with the character of the doer of the *karma*. The *Anguttara-Nikaya* shows that the same *karma* has varied results in accord with the character of the doer. A trifling evil deed done by a certain individual, who is generally careless in the culture of body, speech and thought, who had no developed insight, who is insignificant, and whose life is restricted and miserable, will drag him down to a hellish world, but the same deed done by another individual, who possessed the opposite characters, will work its result out entirely in this very life and will not push him to the hellish world. It is just like a small amount of salt when put in a cup of water, will make it undrinkable, but it is not so when the same amount of salt is added to the water of the Ganges. Likewise, a poor man has to go to prison for a debt of a halfpenny, but a rich man, who owes the

same amount, does not have to go to prison, (*AN*, I, 250). It is, therefore, not surprising that in our practical experience we find that the wicked men do not always suffer for their deeds in this very life. This should not lead to the wrong assumption that "those who do good do not receive good but evil, that those who do evil do not receive evil but good, and that we reap what we have not sown." If this were the case, then the basic law of *karma* that "it is impossible that the fruit of a bad deed should be pleasant and lead to the heavenly world; and the fruit of a good deed should be unpleasant and lead to the hellish world" will be meaningless and implausible, (*AN*, I, 27-38).

The wrong assumption stated above must be removed by considering the details of the way in which *karma* works its result out when the time comes as elucidated in the *Mahakammavib-hanga-Sutta* (the discourse on the greater analysis of deeds), (*MN*, III, 207-205). The *Sutta* suggests a reason that a murderer in some instances gets pleasant results and is reborn in a heavenly existence, in spite of his act of murder. This is because he has either sometimes in the past done good deeds, which have resulted in these experiences or at the time of his death he has changed his own ways and has adopted the right view of life. This amounts to saying that the Buddha never accepts the view that everyone who kills and lies, and so on, will be reborn in hell and that everyone who refrains from immoral acts will be reborn in heaven. According to him, indeed, some such individuals may even be reborn in heaven or in hell as well respectively because of their past deeds.

In this *Sutta*, the Buddha further criticizes the limited knowledge possessed by others. The heavenly life enjoyed by one person after his misconduct should not be the basis for the conclusion that everyone, in spite of his misconduct, will be born in heaven after death. According to the Buddha, this calls for a different explanation. He maintains that this particular man must have done either good deeds or bad deed in the past, or have been right or wrong views at the time of his death. The Buddha proclaims himself to have the knowledge of the "operation of *karma*" superior to those who form generalization on the basis of one or a few observations without examining a universal aspect of the case. It is accepted that in daily life an individual is capable of doing both good and bad deeds till his death, and on death he may be reborn in a heavenly world, if the result of his accumulated good *karma* is sufficient to supersede the result of his wrong action, or he may be reborn in an unpleasant existence if the effect of his bad deeds supersedes the result of good *karma*. However, the accumulated deed-will finally produce that fruit when the result of the deed which has superseded it has been exhausted.

Karma apart, if "one does not receive what one has done" it depends on the following four pairs of failure (*vipatti*) and accomplishment (*sampatti*), which affect the ripening of *karma*. The four kinds of failure *(vipatti*) are: (i) *gati-vipatti* (failure due to the place of birth), which means unfavorable environment, circumstances or career; (ii) *upadhi-vipatti* (failure due to defectiveness of body), which means the person is born deformed and has unfavorable personality and health; (iii) *kala-vipatti* (failure due to deficiency of time), which signifies unfortunate time; and (iv) *payoga-vipatti* (failure due to lack of effort), which denotes the shortcoming of undertaking or inadequate endeavor. As against this, there are four opposite factors favorable to the ripening of good *karma* called *sampatti* or accomplishment.

The Casual Law of Karma as the Uninterrupted Continuity of Man. In Buddhism the *karma*-doctrine is recognized not only as a part of the law of *Paticcasamuppada*, but also as one of the 24 *paccayas*. This amounts to saying that the *karma*-doctrine is closely related to, and is as important as the law of *Paticcasamuppada*. That is, the *Paticcasamuppada* describes all the *karma*-process and the *karma*-result in accordance with the Three Cycles *(vatta*), namely, "depending on defilements *karma* arises, and because of the *karma* the result (*vipaka*) is derived."

In terms of the Four Noble Truths, *karma* is taken as the cause of suffering and its result is the suffering itself. The *Paticcasamuppada* has been seen in terms of cause and effect, in which there is no self to be taken as permanent.

The Buddha's proof of the non-existence of *name and form (nama-rupa)* or the five *khandhas* is essentially equivalent to his denial of the self or soul. For everything is dynamic being subject to the causal law, that is, everything is subject to change, and by changing it can persist. The persistence of a thing cannot be called permanence, but continuity; things exist through their continuity. The law of continuity is sometimes called the theory of momentariness (*khanikavada*), and is also known as the theory of change (*aniccavada*). For instance, that our mind is changing every moment is difficult to comprehend, but in the case of body it seems to be more obvious than in the case of mind. Let us turn our attention to the problems of *karma* and rebirth in connection with the five *khandhas* or man. As has been seen, man is the combination of the everchanging five *khandhas* and there is no permanent self in them. As long as his ignorance is not uprooted, he has to undergo the round of birth and death again and again. In this connection there arise two questions: "If a man is merely the combination of five *khandhas* in which there is no essential substance, who is and will be the doer of *karma* and the receiver of its result? At the end of this life, who dies and will be reborn?" These two questions were asked since the time of the Buddha till now. At first the Buddha points out to the questioner that the question is wrong, for, once we personalise the problem by asking, "who" meaning "what person or self is or will be the doer and recipient of the *karma* and its result," confusion usually follows. The Buddha, being aware of these two questions, preached the doctrine of *Anatta*, which to be understood through the *Doctrine of Paticcasamuppada*.

Considered from the point of view of the *Anatta*-doctrine, or "the teaching of the absence in the human being of a soul," it does not mean that the Buddha preached annihilationism. For, apart from the *Anatta*-doctrine, the Buddha also taught the theory of relation (*paccaya*), otherwise called the doctrine of "dependent origination" (*Paticcasamuppada*), in which is contained the doctrine of the transmitted force of the bodily, verbal and mental acts known as *karma*. The karmic force is the link that preserves the identity of the agent through all countless changes in its process through *samsara*. When one dies the *khandhas* of which one is constituted perish, but by the force of one's *karma* a new set of *khandhas* instantly starts into existence, and a new being appears in another world. Though possessing different *khandhas* and a different form, he is in reality identical with the man just passed away because his *karma* is the same. The new life is neither the same since it has changed, nor totally different because it has the same stream of karmic energy; they are actually different but causally related by *karma* like an unbroken succession of different flames of the burning lamp and a mango seed in a mango tree grown out of another mango seed (*Milinda*, I, 40, 50-51).

The character of man is in reality the sum total of the subconscious propensities produced partly by the prenatal, partly by the current volitional activity or *karma*. This amounts to saying that according to the *Paticcasamuppada* or *Paccayas*, the psycho-physical personality (*nama-rupa*) on the one hand and the volition or *karma* on the other serve as a 'dependent condition (*nissaya-paccaya*) to consciousness and *vice versa*.

The question to be considered is how the volition or *karma* renders its support to the continuity of man. In the *Samyutta-Nikaya*, volition is treated as a food that sustains man's life to take birth in the beginningless *samsara*, while the remaining three foods, namely, material food (*bhojana*), contact (*phassa*) and consciousness (*vinnana*), serve only as the food for the man who has already been born in a particular existence. It is said that volition or *karma* plays a major role in the

prolongation of samsaric existence of man (*SN*, 2, 11). To the question how it can play such an important role, the reply is that it plays its role in accordance with the law of *Paticcasamuppada*. Like Buddhism, the *Rg Veda* (*Rg.*, X, 129) and the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad* (*BU*, IV, 4, 5, 6), also admit desire as the primal seed of the origination of all things. While a man with desire is subject to transmigration, another without desire unites with *Brahman*. According to the law of *karma* and *karma-vipaka*, the Buddhists are convinced that no organic entity, physical or psychical, can come into existence without the preceding cause.

The Buddhist doctrine of rebirth (*punnabbhava*) is a novel theory in so far as it speaks of re-becoming without a self-identical substance. It is significant to note that the English word "rebirth" is generally translated from the *Pali* word "*punabbhava*." But in the actual meaning, the term "*bhava*" should be rendered as 'becoming' or 'coming to be', as its root is derived from "*bhu*." Thus "rebecom-ing" is the real meaning of "*punabbhava*," which describes the progression from existence to existence. According to the Buddhist doctrine of rebecoming, there could be continuity of individuality in various places of existence. Such a rebecoming is either in the Sentient Existence (*Kamabhava*), the Form Existence (*rupabhava)* or the Formless Existence (*arupabhava*) (*DN*, II, 57).

There is, according to the Theravada Buddhism, no intermediate existence (*antarabhava*) apart from the above three planes of becoming. The doctrine of rebecoming refers to the law of change in the light of continuity of individuality, which meant a stream of consciousness (*vinnanasota*) or a stream of becoming (*bhavangasota*), consisting of karmic energy that renders the rebirth or rebecoming possible. Buddhism holds that the existence of life does not depend on its being perceived. Life exists in a state of perpetual flux or becoming and is impermanent (*anicca*). Matter in Buddhism is a changeable thing (*ruppatiti rupam*), (*SN*, XXII, 79). The material object arises and perishes at every moment; it is momentary (*khanika*). Matter appears as relatively permanent due to the continuity of consciousness, kept flowing by the inherent force of *karma*. A being is so-called because it is fast entangled with desire and attachment, which are concerned with the five *khandhas* (SN, III, 188). Both consciousness and matter, it is said, have the same type of existence, that is, instantaneous being; they are momentary. Both are neither being nor non-being; rather it is becoming (*bhava*), which keeps on moving according to the *Paticcasamuppada*.

The Thai Buddhist Vision for Renewing Kamma and Rebirth

As we have known already, the above-mentioned explanation of *kamma* and rebirth is especially from the Early Theravada Buddhism supported by the arguments and evidences taken from the *Tipitaka* and its popular commentaries rendered in the conservative manner. Let us now turn our attention to the renewed interpretation of *kamma* and rebirth by the two wise monks on contemporary Thai society, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu and Phrad-hammapidok (Bhikkhu P.A. Payutto).

Kamma and Rebirth according to Buddhadasa Bhikkhu

In earlier Thai history, all monks were to be seekers of truth according to the general principles of morality, concentration and the development of wisdom, totally called the Three Trainings (*tisikkha*). They were products of various family backgrounds and they were given the opportunities to become the monastic members by teachers, local traditions, etc. Although the Pali Canon exists as a constant reference for monks, often they are steeped in the commentaries and

the needs and demands of the local folk. It is, therefore, easy for monks to become involved in predicting lottery ticket numbers, conjuring magical cures, and blessing new businesses, cars, and air-planes. Aside from the activities already mentioned, monks in Thailand have been observed to be engaged in activities as various as the art of writing, composing poetry, curing drug addicts through herbal cures, and making rubber stamps.

Buddhadasa's questioning of the scope of Buddhism and the status of certain commentaries and commentators, including the well-known Buddhagosacariya, the fifth century commentator, who wrote the book of 'the Path of Purification', challenged many young minds engaged in the study of Buddhist doctrine. Buddhadasa Bhikkhu's primary concerns compelled people to turn their attention to freedom, or *Nibbana*. He moved the notions of *kamma*, heaven, and hell into the present. According to his teachings, in no way one should postpone the possibility of attaining enlightenment until the next life; falling into hell or going to heaven is the direct result of actions performed from moment to moment.

In his famous book, entitled *Two Kinds of Language*, he interpreted *kamma* in two senses, namely, the everyday meaning and the *Dhamma* meaning. According to him, the *Dhamma* meaning is eventually admitted as intended by the Buddha. The word *Dhamma* itself has two meanings, in everyday language *Dhamma* means the actual books containing the scriptures, but in *Dhamma* language it means the Enlightened One, as the Buddha said, 'He who sees the *Dhamma*, sees the Enlightened One, and he who sees the Enlightened One, sees the *Dhamma*.' The word 'work', taken as *Dhamma* language, refers to mind training (*kammatthana*), that is the practice of *Dhamma*. The actual practice of *Dhamma* is the Work. Work or duty is *Dhamma*. But in everyday language, it means earning a living out of necessity.

In his opinion, in everyday language religion means temples, monastery buildings, pagodas, yellow robes, and so on; in *Dhamma* language religion is the Truth which can really serve man as a point of support. Regarding the relationship between all religions, he said, 'Although someone may say there is Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, etc., when he has penetrated to the essential nature of his religion, he will regard all religions as being the same'. For him, Buddhism is identical to the main tenets of other religions; for all true religions seek to reduce self-importance. Theistic religions teach the faithful to submit themselves to God. This obviously coincides with decreasing the significance of self and removing the causes that give rise to egoism, (*Right Approach to Dhamma*, p. 13).

We come now to the word, '*kamma*'; in everyday language, *kamma* means 'bad luck' or punishment for sins committed by the ordinary person, but in *Dhamma* language it refers to action, i.e. bad action is called black *kamma*; good action white *kamma*. There is another remarkable kind of*kamma* which is neither black nor white, a *kamma* that serves to neutralize the other two kinds. It consists in perceiving non-selfhood (*anatta*), emptiness (*sunyata*) or that the self is done away with. He further points out that the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path is *kamma* neither black nor white, but the way to wipe out all *kamma*. According to Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, *kamma* itself becomes its result; *kamma* is the result in the same was as the Madyamika's idea of *samsara* is nothing but Nirvana. He said, 'doing good is good; it is not that doing good receives good'. Buddhadasa Bhikkhu equates *Kamma* or *Dhamma* with God. In everyday language, God is understood as a celestial being with various creative powers, but in *Dhamma* language, God is a profound hidden power, which is neither human, nor celestial being, nor any other kind of being. It is Nature, for the law of nature is responsible for creation and for the coming into existence of all things. Buddhadasa Bhikkhu considers the natural law or *kamma* or *Dhamma* to be God who can bequeath both merit and demerit to living beings:

The Natural Law is comprised of six qualifications which all people regard as the qualifications of God: The Creator, the Controller, the Destroyer, Omnipotent, Omni-present, and Omniscient. We Buddhists have this natural Law as God. This is only God accepted by modern science. It creates both the positive and the negative, because it is only the Natural Law. If he were a personal God, he would choose to create only the positive (*The A, B, C, of Buddhism*, p. 11).

Therefore, the law of *karma* as the first cause of the universe admits that everything which comes into existence must have a cause: "Because of this being, that arises; whenever this disappears, that also disappears, (MN, III, 63).

Rebirth or birth in everyday language refers simply to physical birth from a mother's body; in *Dhamma* language birth signifies a mental event arising out of ignorance, craving, and clinging. The kind of birth that constitutes a problem for us is mental birth. The Buddha taught, 'Birth is perpetual suffering.' This clearly meant the arising of the idea 'I'. It refers not to physical birth from a mother of flesh and blood, but to mental birth from a mental mother, namely craving, ignorance, clinging. No matter what type of existence one is born into, it is nothing but suffering, because the word 'birth' refers here to attachment unaccompanied by awareness. If there arises in a person's mind the idea 'I am such-and-such' and he is aware that this idea has arisen, that arising is not a birth. Thus the Buddha advised continual mindfulness. If there is awareness, there will be no suffering. Buddhadasa's idea of birth is confined to the present moment with the belief that if the present is good, then the future will be good. As is obvious in his saying: "If we can master this kind of birth here and now we will also be able to master the birth that comes after physical death," (*HM*, p. 218). He discourages us to concern ourselves with the birth that follows physical death; instead encourages us to concern ourselves seriously with the birth that happens before physical death, the kind of birth that goes on while we are alive, which happens dozens of times every day.

Regarding the concepts of a celestial world and world of woe, Buddhadasa interpreted them in a patently present manner, i.e. one can enter into it within the present moment, here and now, for which he thought it will come close to what the Buddha did teach. The woeful world normally known as the woeful states, are four: (i) Hell (*naraka*) in everyday language refers to a region under the earth; in *Dhamma* language it means anxiety which burns us just like a fire. Whenever anxiety afflicts us, burning us up like a fire, then we are really in hell; (ii) Birth as a beast (*tiracchana*) means in everyday language actual physical birth as a pig, a dog, or some other actual animal. In *Dhamma* language it has a different meaning. At any moment when one is stupid, just like a dumb animal, at that moment one is born into the realm of beasts; (iii) Hungry ghost (*peta*) means in everyday language a creature supposed to have a tiny mouth and an enormous belly. He can never manage to eat enough and so is chronically hungry. But the hungry ghosts of *Dhamma* language are purely mental states. Ambition based on craving, worry based on craving-to-be, afflicted with these is to be born a hungry ghost; and (iv) Frightened ghosts (*asuras*) in everyday language means a kind of visible being, going around haunting and spooking, but is too afraid to show itself. In *Dhamma* language, it refers to fear in the mind of the human being, to be afraid without good reason, to be excessively fearful, etc. Some people are afraid of doing good. Some are afraid that if they attain Nibbana, life would lose all its flavour, and would be unbearably dull. According to Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, if we live and practice properly we avoid falling into the woeful states here and now, and we are certain not to fall into the woeful states supposed to follow death.

For Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, 'heaven' in everyday language means some wonderful, highly attractive celestial realm up above, where angels are found by the hundreds. In *Dhamma* language 'heaven' refers first of all to infatuating sensual bliss of the highest order. This is the lower heaven, the heaven of sensuality. Higher up is the heaven called the Brahmaloka. This is absence of any object of sensuality. Comparing the two kinds of heaven by a limit, it is as if a certain man with a hunger for sense objects had indulged and satiated himself and become thoroughly fed up with sense objects. He would then want only to remain quite empty, still, untouched, in Buddhism, the *Paranimmitavasavatti* heaven are completely full of sensuality, while the heavens of the Brahmaloka are devoid of disturbance from sensuality, though the 'self' is still there.

Kamma and Rebirth according to Phradhammapidok (Bhikkhu P.A. Payutto)

It is less difficult to grasp Phradhammapidok's exegesis of the Buddha's doctrine of *kamma* and rebirth, for the style of his invariably accepted contribution to Buddhism though a deeply critical analysis and systematical creative exposition, gets along with the scriptural line of Buddhism. Having passed the Thai Sangha traditional education system to the highest Pali grade nine, equipped with the knowledge of the language of the material source and his own much more critical mind, he based his investigation on direct references taken from only the Tipitka, as his Royal Name deserved. With some more additional ideas never before discovered, he moves the doctrine of *kamma* toward the social dimension of the contemporary world. Let us now consider his view on *kamma* and rebirth in comparison with the others' views.

The Natural Law (Niyama): At the outset of his explanation of *kamma*, Phradhammapidok relates it to the course of the law of nature or *niyama* in the Buddhist terminology, which literally meant 'certainty' or 'fixed way'. This referred to the fact that specific determinants inevitably led to corresponding results, in which both the material and the immaterial are entirely subject to the direction of causes and are interdependent. The five natural laws are thus: (i) The natural law pertaining to physical objects (*utuniyama*), such as water, winds and rainfall, etc.; (ii) the natural law pertaining to heredity (*bijaniyama*), such as the seed and the fruit; (iii) the natural law pertaining to the workings of the mind (*cittaniyama*), such as the process of cognition, etc.; (iv) the natural law pertaining to human behaviour (*kammaniyama*), i.e., the process of action and its results, especially referring to the working of intention or volition; and (v) the natural law governing the relationship and interdependence of all things (*Dhammaniyama*): that is, the way all things arise, exist and then cease.

It is said that the first four *niyama* are derived from the fifth one. The reason is that the *Dhammaniyama* is not exhausted by this four-fold categorization. We should bear in mind that Kammani-yama is given as only one among five different laws, reminding us that we should not immediately write off all events, pleasant or unpleasant, as the workings of *kamma*. *Kamma* is that force which directs society, or decides the values and lives within it. Although *Kamma* is simply one type of natural law, it is the most important one for human beings, because it is their particular responsibility. Human beings are the instigators of *kamma*, which shapes the fortunes and conditions of their lives. *Kammaniyama* is a strictly human responsibility. The other *niyama* are entirely the domain of nature (*Good, Evil and Beyond* [*GEB*], pp. 1-4).

The Law of Kamma and Social Convention: Apart from the five kinds of natural law mentioned above, there is another kind of law which is specifically manmade and is not directly concerned with nature. These are the codes of law fixed and agreed upon by society, consisting of social decrees, customs, laws, and so on. They are the products of human thought and as such are related to *kammaniyama*, but they are not the same. In general we might state that the law of *kamma* is the natural law which deals with *human actions*, whereas Social Convention, or social law, is an entirely *human creation*. In essence, with the law of *kamma*, human beings receive the fruits of their actions according to the natural processes, whereas in social law, human beings take responsibility for their actions via a process established by themselves (*GEB*, pp. 5-6).

The Meaning and Values of Kamma: In the section on the meaning of *kamma*, the Buddha enlarges it into another three points of view, the details of which are worth mentioning here thus:

1. *Kamma as intention*. Essentially *kamma* is intention, which includes volition, will, choice and decision, or the energy which leads to action. Intention is that which instigates and directs all human actions.
2. *Kamma as conditioning factor*. *Kamma* as a component within the whole life process, being the agent which fashions the direction taken in life. This is *kamma* in its sense of '*sankhara'*, as it appears in the Doctrine of Dependent Origination, where it is described as the agent which fashions the mind.
3. *Kamma as personal responsibility*. This refers to the manifestation of thought through speech and actions, that is, behaviour from an ethical perspective, either on a narrow, immediate level, or on a broader level including the past and the future. This is the meaning of *kamma* which most often is encountered in the scriptures where it occurs as an inducement to encourage responsible action and the making of good *kamma*.
4. *Kamma as social activity or career*. In this respect, *Kamma* is concerned with the perspective of social activity as work, labour or profession, such as farmer, artist, merchant, servant, etc., (*GEB*, pp. 6-9).

The problem of the law of kamma and social convention: Phra-dhammapidok raised the perennial question: are ‘good and evil’ human or social inventions? One action in one society, time or place, may be said to be good, but in another time and place may be said not to be good; one kind of action may be acceptable to one society, but not to another. Some religions teach that to kill animals for food is not bad, while others teach that to harm beings of any kind is never good. Some societies hold that a child should show respect to its elders and that to argue with them is bad manners, while other societies hold that respect is not dependent on age, and that all people should have the right to express their opinions.

In answering these questions, he held that it is true to some extent that good and evil are matters of human preference and social decree. Even so, the good and evil of social conventions do not affect the workings of the law of *kamma* in any way, and should not be confused with it. According to him, good and evil as social conventions should be recognized as such whereas 'good and evil' or, more correctly, *kusala* and *akusala* as qualities of the law of *kamma* should be recognized as attributes of that law.

Phradhammapidok holds that the point of difference between natural law and social convention is intention. To clarify this point, he divides the conventions of society into two types:

(i) Those which have no direct relationship to *kusala* and *akusala* as found in the *kammaniyama*, and (ii) those which are related to *kusala* and *akusala*.

1. *The conventions which have no direct relationship to kusala and akusala*. These are established by society for a specific social function, such as to enable people to live together harmoniously; these take the form of accepted values or agreements. These kinds of conventions may take many forms, such as traditions, customs or laws, in which respect good and evil are strictly matters of social convention. If a person disobeys these conventions and is punished by society, that is also a matter of social convention, not of the law of *kamma*. For example, this might be social codes of dress, such as before entering a Buddhist monastery in Thailand it is appropriate to remove shoes and hat, whereas to enter a Christian church it is usually required to wear shoes, (*ibid*., p. 23). Sometimes these social conventions may overlap with the domain of the law of *kamma,* such as when one member of a society refuses to conform to one of its conventions. In so doing, that person will be acting on a certain intention, which is the first step in, and therefore a concern of, the law of *kamma*.

2. *The conventions which are related to kusala and akusala in the kamma-niyama.* These conventions established by society are either *kusala* or *akusala* in accordance with *kammaniyama*. The society may or may not make these regulations with a clear understanding of *kusala* and *akusala*. However, the process of *kammaniyama* continues along its natural course and does not change along with those social conventions. For example, in one society it might be acceptable to imbibe intoxicants and addictive drugs. Extreme emotions may be encouraged, and the citizens may be incited to be ambitious and aggressive, so that society will prosper materially. Or it might be generally believed that to kill people of other societies is not blameworthy. He concluded that the ability to establish a social convention in conformity with the law of *kamma*would seem to be a sound gauge for determining the true extent of social progress or civilization.

Finally, he summarized the standards for good and evil, or good and bad *kamma*, strictly according to the law of *kamma* and also in relation to social convention, both on an intrinsically moral level and on a socially prescribed one by asking:

1. In terms of direct benefit or harm: Are these actions beneficial to life and to mind; do they contribute to the quality of life; do they cause *kusala* and *akusala* conditions to increase or wane?
2. In terms of beneficial or harmful consequences: Are they harmful or beneficial to oneself?
3. In terms of benefit or harm to society: Are they harmful or helpful to others?
4. In terms of conscience, the natural human reflexive capacity: Will that *kamma* be open to censure by oneself or not?
5. In terms of social standards: What is the position of actions in relation to those religious conventions, traditions and customs, including such social institutions as law and so on, which are based on wise reflection as opposed to those which are simply superstitious or mistaken beliefs, (*ibid.*, pp. 22-39).

The Fruition of Kamma: It is noted that Phradhammapidok like Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, considers and admits the result of *kamma* in this present living moment and in quite a realistic manner rather than in the after life. He therefore divides the *kamma*-result into two aspects:

1. *Results of kamma on different levels*. In mentioning this, his purpose is to clarify the problem of the relationship between the law of *kamma* and social convention. According to him, *kamma* can render four different levels of fruition as follows:

a. *The inner, mental level*: *Kamma* results in the mind itself, in the form of accumulated tendencies, both skillful and unskillful, and the quality of the mind.

b. *The physical level:* The effect *kamma* has on character, mannerisms, bearing and behavioral tendencies. The results on this level are derived from the first level, and their fields of relevance overlap.

c. *The level of life experiences*: This denotes how *kamma* affects the events of life, producing both desirable and undesirable experiences; specifically, such external events as prosperity and decline; failure and success; wealth, status, happiness and praise, and the many forms of loss which are their opposites. Together these are known as worldly conditions (*loka Dhamma*).

d. *The social level*: This means the results of individual and collective *kamma* on society, leading to social prosperity or decline, harmony or discord. This also includes the effects resulting from one's interaction with one's environment, (*ibid.*, p. 39).

Phradhammapidok remarks that levels 1 and 2 refer to the results which affect mind and character, which are the fields in which the law of *kamma* is dominant. The third level is where the law of *kamma* and social convention meet; it is at this point that confusion arises. The fourth level means *kamma* on the social level, which is his point of renewal.

He observes that people tend to look at the law of *kamma* and social convention as one and the same thing, interpreting 'good actions bring good results' as meaning 'good actions will make us rich', or 'good actions will earn a promotion,' which in some cases seems quite reasonable. But things do not always go that way. To say this is just like saying, "Plant mangoes and you will get a lot of money," or "They planted apples, that's why they are poor." These things may be true, or may not be. But what can be said is that this kind of thinking jumps ahead of the facts a step or two and hence is not entirely true. It may be sufficient for communication on an everyday basis, but if you really want to speak the truth, you must analyze the pertinent factors more clearly.

2. *The fruits of kamma on a longterm basis — Heaven and Hell.* Phradhammapidok is like Buddhadasa Bhikkhu in criticizing belief in heaven and hell. People normally tend to devote more interest to the results of *kamma* on the longterm basis. They are not interested in knowing the results of *kamma* in accord with the law of nature, i.e. the actual nature of the mind, the seat of intention and the way intention affects life and mind. On account of this obscurity and ignorance, when confronted with seemingly random or unexplainable events, they are unable to see all the relevant determining factors and then proceed to blame other things, rejecting the law of *kamma*.

He suggests that to work with the law of *kamma* in a skillful way, it is necessary to develop *kusalachanda* (desire to act skillfully) or *Dhammachanda* (desire for what is in accord with the *Dhamma*). Excessive stress on rebirth into heaven and hell results in neglect of the good which should be aspired to in the present. In addition to this, our original intention to encourage moral conscience at all times, including future lives and an unshakable faith in the law of *kamma*, will result instead in an aspiration only for future results, which becomes a kind of greed so that good actions are performed for the sake of profit. Over-emphasis on future lives ignores the importance of *kusalachanda* and *Dhammachanda*, which in turn becomes a denial of, or even an insult to, the human ability to practice and develop truth and righteousness for their own sakes.

Kamma on the social level: Normally the Buddhist understood *Kamma* in the quite conservative sense that everyone has his own *kamma*: one's own *kamma* cannot be shared by others and *vice versa*. But according to Phradhammapidok *kamma* moves outwards, that is, in

practical terms the human world is a world of intentional action because human thinking is guided by intention. Our way of life, whether on the individual or on the sophist level, is directed by intention and the thought process. For example, the way intention affects the society can be considered from the negative side. Intention negatively is that which is influenced by defilements. Here there are three kinds of defilements which play an important role in directing human behaviour, namely, (i) craving personal gain (*tanha*), (ii) desire to dominate (*mana*), and (iii) clinging to views (*ditthi*); which are the active forms of greed, hatred and delusion. When people=s minds are ruled by selfish desire for personal gain, aspiring to pleasures of the senses, their actions in society result in contention, deceit and exploitation, as for example with the problem of drugs, pollution, and corruption, etc.

The enormous amount of natural resources on this planet, amassed over a period of hundreds of millions of years, mostly have been consumed by humanity in a period of only one or two hundred years. All these problems stem from the problem of hatred or violence perpetuated under the power of what in Buddhism is called 'aversion' (*dosa*) and 'desire or greed' (*lobha*). Technology has become a tool of greed and hatred. Science, technology and the development of information and communications technology have been used to lull humanity into heedless consumption, dullness and intoxication in various forms, rather than for the development of human beings or of the quality of life. Greed and hatred, which are natural conditions within the human mind, would be much easier to control if it were not for the influence of (wrong) views, in other words, different ideologies and social values, because by adhering to such view it becomes *kamma* on a social scale, which has far reaching effect over long periods of time, (P.A. Payutto, *A Buddhist Solution*, p. 5). Greed and hatred are maintained and prolonged by the influence of *ditthi*, making them much harder to resolve. Human beings in the twentieth century have created much bad *kamma*, which is going to exert an influence on humanity in the twenty-first century. The citizens of the twenty-first century are going to have to deal with problems which are the legacy of the twentieth century. In order to help solve these problems and ensure that the twenty-first century will be safe, we must adapt our own actions and behaviour. If we can adapt our views as mentioned before, we will be able to solve these problems successfully, (*ibid.*, p. 29).

According to Venerable Phradhammapidok, views or beliefs that have held control over modern human civilization are grouped into three main perceptions:

1. The perception that humankind is separate from nature which it must control or manipulate according to its desires.
2. The perception that fellow human beings are not own ‘fellows’. Rather than perceiving the common situations shared among all people, human beings have tended to focus on their differences.
3. The perception that happiness is dependent on an abundance of material possessions, that human beings will find happiness only through a wealth of material possessions with which to feed their desires.

The first perception is an attitude towards nature; the second is an attitude towards fellow human beings; the third is an understanding of the objective of life. Being held under the power of these three perceptions, the resulting actions become *kamma* on the social level. That is, the development of human society is guided by the *kamma*, or actions, of human beings blinded by these three wrong views. Under their misdirection, human beings also have developed the lifestyles that lead to the broad spread of such social ills as drug abuses, violence, stress, mental illness,

suicides, and AIDS. The people of the twenty-first century will receive the fruits of our actions in the 20 century (*ibid.*, p. 9).

Ethical systems in the modern world, such as restraint toward nature, religious tolerance and human rights, are reduced to an attempt to preserve or sustain the world, but they are merely a compromise. These must be supported by more positive ethical standards and a new way of thinking. Buddhism teaches that:

1. Human beings are one element within the whole natural system of cause and effect in which all elements play a part. All actions within it should therefore be harmonious and beneficial to that system.
2. All beings, both human and animal, are co-dwellers within this system of natural laws. Buddhism encourages universal love, harmony, mutual help and unity.
3. The finest and noblest kind of life is that endowed with freedom; this is true happiness. Over and above external freedom, which is related to the natural environment and the four necessities of life, and freedom from social harassment, the highest level of freedom is the inner level, which results from inner development, mental and intellectual maturity. This idea of freedom is explained by him as development (*bhavana*) and appears in the *Tipitaka* (A. III. 106).

When we speak of views, we are coming into the domain of religion, because religion is view. For religion to be effective in addressing the problems of the world it must be based on good or right views, and must encourage the propagation of such views in the world in order to cultivate good kamma for the society.

Notes

1. F.L. Woodward gives its example as when one goes out hastily at night and it bitten by snake. The Kindred Sayings, IV, 155. n. 4.
2. For example, one is arrested as an obber or adulterer. The Milindapanha gives an example the wounding of the Buddha's foot by a splinter of rock. The word means 'chance external happenings'. The Kindred Saying, IV, 155, n.d.

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Part IV
Values and Asian Cultural Traditions

15.

Is There a Thai Philosophy?

Kirti Bunchua

In a recent meeting of the Thai instructors of philosophy, it was observed that thus far we do not have a Thai Philosopher or a Thai Philosophy on the basis of which to develop a course.

No one denies that we have a Philosophy in Thailand for the Thai people. Buddhism has been the way of life of the Thai people throughout its history, but we all know that Buddha was a native of India and never came to Thailand. Buddhism as well as Western philosophy was imported into Thailand and has become a subject of study up to the level of a doctoral degree.

That we do not have a Thai philosophy, like Indian, Chinese, American or German philosophy is both true and false at the same time, but not in the same respect. True, there is not yet a subject called "Thai philosophy" in any curriculum and the Thai name has not yet appeared in any philosophical manual. Nevertheless, if we take the definition of philosophy in its broad meaning as the search for new understanding, there is no lack of philosophical thoughts coming from creative Thai minds.

Though the Thai people are good followers of Buddha, the Thai Buddhism is unique in the world, both in both its explanations and in its practices. The Thais have accepted Buddhism with adaptation, knowing how to adapt in a proper way its philosophical capacity. Hence, the Thai traditional beliefs and practices are not void of philosophical questions and answers.

In the metaphysical domain, the traditional belief in "the Kwan" is not of Buddhist derivation, but an intellectual product of Thai culture. It differs from all the realities the Thais have learnt from Buddhism. It supersedes the human soul whose capacities it supplements. It is not a part of the soul because it can separate itself from the soul, as it sometimes does during sleep, especially when the soul is discouraged by fear or threat. Thais, therefore, are very careful to keep the Kwan with them by many strategies, because with it they feel more secure and strong. They have a special ceremony to increase the Kwan when they feel weak in their psyche.

The Kwan does not die with a person's death, but it leaves one before hand for some unknown destiny. It is not known whether it has a self separate from the person it inhabits, or only is a part of the impersonal World Soul. However, when a child is born, the Kwan immediate inhabits it and plays its role throughout the life of that person. No one asks whence it comes.

We know the role of the Kwan by the traditional strategies for keeping the Kwan with the person. When a baby is frightened, grown-ups comfort it by saying "Kwan please come, please come," meaning that with the Kwan the baby will never be frightened. The King is said to visit the rangers at the frontier to increase their Kwan. If a lady loses her husband, her friends would come to comfort her Kwan. In a shock, I would say that my Kwan leaves me. And when a girl wins an international contest beauty, she is said to increase the Kwan in the hearts of her people.

In the domain of epistemology, all Thais know their traditional standard of truth: "Ten hearings are less sure than one seeing, ten seeings are less sure than one hand-touching, and ten hand-touchings are less sure than one's experience of accomplishment."

The above mentioned are only part of the Thai philosophy. There is much more in the minds of the Thai scholars which can be known more or less from their published works. Only time and effort are needed in order to spell out those intellectual philosophical thoughts.

To expose or explain requires that one systematize in one way or another. My *Contextual Philosophy* systematizes the history of Western philosophy into five paradigms. The same method can be applied to Thai philosophy which is found in all kinds of intellectual works under the general heading of "love of wisdom." This is an effort to nurture new vision and opinions, even when the authors intend to expose old subject matters. Thai philosophy might be sketched initially in the following paradigms:

1. Ancient Thai literature, where mysterious powers or other-worldly beings play an important role, such as *Khun Chang Khun Phaen, Phra Abhaimani*, etc.
2. Religious literature like *Trai Bhum Phraruang* which emphasizes the strict laws of Karma.
3. The spiritual books which emphasize the uselessness of life in this world and that the most desirable happiness (Nibbhanang Paramang Sukhang) is to be found in the transcendental life. All the Buddhist books on meditation belong to this category. The *Phra Morakha* which was popular among the Catholics during the first half of this century can also be included. Though its author is unknown, its spirituality has greatly influenced Thai Catholics.

The fourth paradigm is the richest target for research and is expressed y the first Thai scholars to be educated in the Western Universities. They returned with enthusiasm to share the fourth paradigm they had learned especially in France and England. The most prominent among these were Samak Busawas, Luang Vichit Vadakarn and Pridee Phanomyong. They attempt to rationalize Buddhism and naturalize it as scientific knowledge. Their references to other religions were the positivistic views learned from the Enlightenment.

The fifth paradigm was sketched by Kirti Bunchua while at Chulalongkorn University (1968-1993) and later at the School of Philosophy and Religious Studies he founded at Assumption University. It is found in the 25 manuals published at Chulalongkorn University and subsequently in other manuals.

For lack of relevant printed material it is too early to categorize the orientations of the several Doctors now teaching philosophy in various Universities of Thailand.

16.

The Prospects and Justification of Thai Philosophy

Soraj Hongladarom

Introduction

The relationship between the disciplines of philosophy and area studies seems tenuous. Philosophy is a normative discipline *par excellence*, while area studies is an empirical investigation in search of a detailed understanding of the area in question through observation and theory making. This does not mean, however, that philosophy has absolutely no role to play, for area studies, being interdisciplinary in nature, has a tendency to include disciplines which can shed light on the main problems of the field. Its role, nonetheless, is usually limited to a kind of expository or explanatory investigation of the systems of thought or ways of thinking of the people in the area. That is not the same as philosophy, for were philosophy to be so it would be no different from intellectual history or cultural anthropology. Were philosophy unable to be distinguished from these disciplines that would constitute a very strong case against retaining philosophy today as a viable discipline. If philosophy can only describe the ways of thinking of various people at really would be redundant.

In this paper I shall present a rather brief argument against such a tendency. More specifically, in order to show that philosophy is still viable and autonomous, I shall try to demonstrate how Thai philosophy is possible. I would like to suggest a foundational path for Thai philosophy the same way Kant did in laying his foundation for metaphysics. To answer questions of the type how X is possible is to demonstrate how X comes to be and what limits define the boundary beyond which X is not possible. That is, in the Kantian way of speaking, to show how X is possible is to show the condition of its possibility.1

In this sense, the condition of possibility of Thai philosophy, as will be shown in more detail below, is that Thai thinkers and philosophers begin to search for the optimal way of living, the best direction the community as a whole should take, while acknowledging that there can be no final answer to the question. This is different from the sort of investigation usual in other disciplines in that there is no assumption of finality. Philosophy consists of an unending process, which is necessary for the health of the community.

The reason why there is need to show how Thai philosophy is possible is, firstly, that philosophical study in Thailand is still mostly limited to teaching the ideas and arguments of past or contemporary philosophers, both Western and Eastern. While this kind of study is very important, indeed indispensable, it is not a substitute for the kind of philosophical activity that should take place along side, namely an exercise in problem solving where each party presents its own ideas regarding the issue in question and tries to convince the other through reason and argument. The lack of such activity can be seen in there being only a very few Thai philosophers who are active in proposing their own ideas to solve philosophical problems.2 Another and related reason which might help explain this is that Thai culture is so imbued with Theravada Buddhist thought that people generally do not see any need to look for solutions elsewhere. It seems to them that Buddhism provides the solution to every possible philosophical problem and one has only to look back to the tradition to uncover them. If Buddhism really has nothing to say on a particular

problem, they tend to conclude that the problem itself is not worth investigating, a pointless waste of time.

However, the present situation in Thailand and elsewhere demands that this complacency in thinking be revamped. If Thai culture is to surge forward and be responsive to the changes brought about by world conditions, then it has to be adaptive. This does not mean merely that Thai culture has to change and embrace elements from foreign cultures; Thai culture is always doing that. What needs to change is the feeling of complacency regarding Buddhism as providing the solution to every possible philosophical problem. To be complacent in thinking means to be stuck in ones own attitudes and ideas and unable to see beyond them. If one believes that Buddhism provides every answer, then one does not need to think for oneself. If one believes that the authority that provides justification for philosophical beliefs comes from Buddhism alone, then it is not as responsive as it needs to be external circumstances. For philosophy does not limit itself only to the primary concerns of Buddhism, but is much broader and is concerned more with the complexities of the mundane world than is religion. Thus, for example, Buddhism does not seem to have a clear cut answer to such vexing present philosophical problems with strong bearing on the lives of people as the problem of just distribution of limited resources. To depend wholly on Buddhism in the belief that it can provide a real solution would only mask the tendency to stop thinking and finding answers for oneself and ones own society. Present world circumstances with their interconnection and strong dynamism demand that members of each society be alert, active and responsive to change. Philosophy must play a role in creating such an atmosphere.

Two Senses of Cultural Philosophy

Before we take a close look at this, however, a rather important point needs to be clarified. In order to find out how Thai philosophy is possible, one has to be clear on the sense in which one uses the term, "Thai philosophy." One is reminded of terms like "Chinese philosophy," "Indian philosophy," or "Greek philosophy," which mean, of course, the philosophies of the respective traditions, each one having a long history. What these philosophies share in common is that the philosophy is an integral part of the cultural tradition in which each is found. Thus I chose to call them collectively "cultural philosophies." This is simply a catchword to call all instances of "Y philosophy," where "Y" denotes a cultural or national entity. The philosophy constitutes what could be called the philosophical tradition, defined through shared canonical texts and sets of problems and methods. Examples are Plato's and Aristotle's writings in the case of Greek philosophy, Confucius' and Lao Tze's in Chinese philosophy, and the Vedas in Indian philosophy. These texts partly define what it means to do philosophy in their respective traditions; they set out the problems and methods of philosophizing. What is significant is that anyone can become members of these traditions, not by privilege of birth, but by subscribing to the same set of shared problems and methods constitutive of the respective traditions. That is the first meaning of "cultural philosophy" — a way of doing philosophy consisting of a shared set of problems and methods such as those of a Plato or a Confucius.

However, there is another meaning which does not rely exclusively on the shared set of texts. According to this meaning, derived from Hegel's idea concerning the organic character of the social,3 the culture or national identity of the philosophers is the criterion of cultural philosophy rather than the shared texts and methods. Thus a Chinese philosopher working on a problem in analytic philosophy, intended for a Chinese (possibly scholarly) audience, would be doing Chinese philosophy in this sense, for what matters now is neither the problems nor the shared methods, but

the nationality or cultural identity of the philosopher who does the work. A Thai philosopher working on an interpretation of Confucius is not doing Chinese philosophy either. If he intends his work to be a service to the Thai people, and puts his own cultural identity into his interpretive work, then he is actually doing Thai philosophy in this sense.

So a cultural philosophy can be construed in both ways. Indian philosophy thus becomes either the philosophy defined mostly by the Vedic tradition, or any kind of philosophical activity done by Indians for Indians. The second meaning might not seem at first glance to be a serious one. For what is so important about the nationalities of philosophers involved in a project? Perhaps this sense could be made clearer if one understood it to be an expression of a cultural or national entity in terms of philosophy. Thus Thai philosophy in this sense is an expression, a manifestation, of the whole culture engaging itself in philosophical activity. This does not sound as grandiose as it appears because the manifestation here is only what members of the cultural or national entity talk about, engaging themselves in a problem they find valuable and interesting. Here the focus is on the cultural entity, not the canon-based tradition. Thus, to say that a cultural philosophy is such a manifestation is only to say that it is the activity of talking, discussing, arguing by members of the entity in question on a common topic. What makes the talk philosophical is that it is based on rational persuasion and the topics concern general matters about what is really valuable or whether the direction the society as a whole is taking is really good.

This topic on the nature of philosophy will be discussed in the next section. The philosophical topic about which a cultural or national entity talk is here of less importance than the activity of talking and discussing itself. Hence, since such an activity generally occurs within the limits or terrain of a cultural or national entity, it defines the philosophy of that culture.

Consequently, the example of the Thai engaging in interpreting Confucius can be seen as part of the concrete manifestation of the Thai culture in its reflexive activity of extending beyond itself in order to adapt itself so as to be responsive to changes. There is a caveat to this, however. The Thai who undertakes to interpret Confucius must do so in the context of Thai culture. That is, merely possessing Thai nationality or ethnicity is not a sufficient criterion to quality one to be doing Thai philosophy. One has to "live within" the culture in question. This sense of living within is rather difficult to define, but one aspect of it is that one has to be a full member of the culture. For example, the Thai interpreting Confucius has to be Thai culturally. It will not do if the Thai grows up abroad and has little or no cultural ties with the homeland. In a word, living within a culture includes the sense of belonging to that culture, a willingness to identify oneself as a member of that culture. Otherwise the Thai here would really be doing Chinese philosophy had he grown up and imbibed aspects of Chinese culture so that he became another Chinese. Another aspect of living within a culture is that the philosopher's intended audience has to be members of the culture to which he or she belongs. This point is not difficult to grasp because if a Thai philosopher transmits his or her own philosophical viewpoints, not to members of his or her own cultural entity but to those of another culture, then it could hardly be said that he or she is doing Thai philosophy.

Which sense is the correct one, then? The answer may depend on our decision, and therefore the question is not an interesting one. What we really need, on the other hand, is a way to know how to achieve something valuable for us (read Thais) through the activities of talking, discussing and arguing. One has to realize that the authority of the self as basis for epistemological certainty is a thing of the past — at least that is my philosophical position, which of course cannot be argued for in full detail here.4 Certainly it does not lie within oneself, nor can it be found in an individual's relation to an outside reality. This does not mean that reality has no role, but that the relation to reality always is mediated by aspects of ones own cultural identity, webs of beliefs constituted not

by an individual alone, but by the community of which one is a part. If this position really is tenable then the activities of talking, discussing, etc., are crucial for gaining at least an insight on whether the direction in which the society or community as a whole is heading is the right one, or the most appropriate considering the circumstances at hand. These activities are what philosophers have always done, and not only philosophers, to be sure. But it seems that, by the nature of their discipline, philosophers are particularly apt for the job. Since these activities occur within the confines of a culture or a community, we can get the general picture of how a cultural philosophy such as the Thai one is possible.

Philosophy as a Reason Based Activity in Search of Value

The two senses of cultural philosophy described above share a common trait in that they are both activities of talking, discussing and arguing among interested parties. In the former sense, the interaction and arguments center around the core of sacred texts or accepted practices and the interpretations and viewpoints offered are operative within this framework. In the second sense, the activities are more loosely based. They are not necessarily tied to a particular set of texts or practices. But since one cannot walk away from ones own cultural identity, the two senses of cultural philosophy converge at this juncture. On the one hand, merely sticking to the canonical texts and following canonical interpretations is hardly a way to remain responsive in the modern world; on the other hand, without such ties to the tradition, it appears that members of the cultural community are cut loose and have no one to hold on to except oneself. Were that so, there really would be no sense in which an activity could be termed Thai philosophy.

Hence, there is a sense in which both are correct; they are equally correct as instances of what philosophy is or should be. The aim of the discussions and arguments is ideally to arrive at consensus on whatever topic in which the participating parties are interested. But the ideal is not necessary, for it is the activity itself which is important. Philosophy in this conception is not a state where one is at one with Reality, nor a movement toward that Reality, but a contested, conflicting condition where parties agree on some very basic condition needed for arguments to get going, such as the use and rules of logic, but disagree on almost everything else. Richard Rorty has argued that philosophy is actually a conversation among whomever is interested and has enough leisure to participate, with the purpose of just continuing the conversation.5 However, if that is the only purpose there is for philosophy, then it is impossible to see how the conversation should be allowed to go on. If it is really the case that knowledge consists in individuals in a community depending on one another for challenge, revision and support, then the activities of conversing and arguing become an important tool for the community to revitalize itself, to turn back upon itself so that it would not become redundant in a rapidly changing world. Philosophy consists of just such activity of arguing, discussing, talking, etc., in other words activity whereby participants join in when they want to enter the debate, when they have something to say to the whole, when they either agree or disagree with any of the viewpoint offered to the members.6 All occur under the umbrella notion that knowledge is to be found in such an activity. Since "knowledge" is a value term, in that to say of a proposition believed that it is a piece of knowledge is to commend it highly, then philosophy in this conception has a strong affinity with value.

I have argued elsewhere for this conception of philosophy as a rationally based activity consisting of debates, discussions, refutations, justification, etc., on topics of a general nature that concern what the rest of the community finds valuable.7 From the viewpoint of the community — a Hegelian perspective — the activities of the philosophers are manifestations of the community

in its role as reflective thinkers and skeptical doubters. Philosophy for the community here is not a state whereby the community can claim that it has got in touch with Reality, whatever that may be. Philosophy explicitly attempts to dissociate itself from such finality. When there is finality, there is really no philosophy. Philosophy is a process, an activity.

Therefore, the possibility of Thai philosophy is straightforward. It is the activity of discussing, arguing, debating, refuting, affirming, etc., all through the use of logical reasoning, to arrive at some kind of value which the community finds appealing. If such an activity happens in Thailand, that is Thai philosophy.

Thai Philosophy as a Reflective Activity by and for Thais

As mentioned above, Thai studies aims at understanding various aspects of Thai society and thus is an empirical investigation. Philosophy, being a normative discipline, seems to have a tenuous relationship with that. However, a Thai conducting an investigation in Thai studies is an instance of the Thai community reflecting on itself, which is as it should be. If the reelection eventually consists in rational debates (for it is hardly conceivable that when the community reflects on itself it would involve only one individual) on the question of values or some broad questions a methodology for which has not been settled, the activity of philosophizing results. That is the way Thai philosophy is possible. Consequently, philosophy and Thai studies seem to be in much closer relationship than previously appeared. A normative and an empirical, descriptive discipline seems to be much intertwined.

As Thai it is never possible to stand back and try to look at our culture and way of life as if we were a foreigner. The distance afforded a foreigner never materializes for us. This is the same for other people reflecting on their own culture. But this is not the same as saying that it is not possible for a foreigner to understand Thai story, or to have a detailed knowledge of it, for that would commit the fallacy of basing the authority of knowledge on one's individual self, a philosophical theory which I am trying to dismiss. It is entirely possible that foreigners can have as thorough a knowledge of Thai society as the best Thai scholars. However, since a Thai's perception of his or her own society is always clouded by his or her own cultural identity, while a foreigner's is not, what happens is that the foreigner can see something that Thai perhaps fail to see since it lies too close to take notice. Thus sometimes we need to read what foreigners have to say about our own culture and society in order to put ourselves in their shoes and see things through their eyes. We gain fresh perspectives this way which may help us break free from the ties of culture and habit. Thai studies by a Thai is, then, in principle different from what foreigners do in studying our society. The former is an instance of self-reflection, while the other is not. Neither is superior, or inferior to the other, they are just different.8

An implication of this for Thai philosophy is that, since Thai studies by a Thai is an expression of the community's reflection on itself, the discipline has a strong affinity to philosophy, despite the obvious differences. Thus philosophy can indeed be a part of the collaborative, interdisciplinary effort of Thais to understand themselves, as well as that of members of the world community to understand Thais. What sets it apart is that philosophy is by nature reflective and skeptical, not, as usually understood, a mere set of doctrines to be described and catalogued. In this sense Thai philosophy, let me emphasize, is not just such set of doctrines, but activities of Thai people when they enter into rational argumentation in order to understand deep questions that other disciplines find too intractable to study.

Conclusion

So Thai philosophy is possible through its consisting of activities of arguing and discussing. Continuity with the past is also important, and plays a strongly formative role. This is what sets the activities occurring in Thailand apart from those of the same type occurring in other cultures. Whatever is distinctive of Thai culture is formative in the sense that it provides a scheme by which talk and debates concerning deep value take place. However, since the activities themselves are by nature not limited within these horizons, the tradition thus affords only a starting point, a frame of reference which can be adapted or modified by the members of that tradition themselves. This is just a fancy way of saying that the tradition is alive and responsive to outside developments. In this way, there is no need to be concerned that Thai philosophy in this conception is a break with the tradition or the past. It is merely the tradition itself, but in its active, dynamic role. Thai studies thus become in part an activity of Thais to understand themselves. There is no need to boast that this is the only way to understand Thai culture; in fact foreigners may have a better perspective than we do, since they are not hampered by biases or prejudices that shadow us. But without the Thai community reflecting upon itself and trying to see its role in the scheme of things, as well as the overall meaning of what there is and what it means to be Thai, then such a community would remain locked within its self-imposed prison of tradition. Thai culture would thus become no better than a show piece in a museum.

Notes

1. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Norman Kemp Smith, trans. (New York: St. Martins, 1929), e.g., A2/B6-A6/B10.

2. This can be seen from the small amount of research being done by members of philosophy departments throughout the country. Most research written and published within these few decades is expository in nature, and draws mostly upon Buddhist sources. Some reasons for this depends on individuals, but a more interesting and deeper reason would seem to be that being Thai and thus integral parts of the culture, their philosophers feel that there really is no need to philosophize.

3. See, e.g., Charles Taylor's discussion of the Hegelian concept of *Sttlichkeit* in *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 376-387.

4. I have argued for this point extensively in *Horizons of Philosophy: Directions for Philosophy in Thailand* (In Thai, forthcoming with Chulalongkorn University Press).

5. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 377-379.

6. Thus my conception differs from that of Jürgen Habermas, who in "Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter" (in Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy, eds. *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987], pp. 296-315) argues for a conception of philosophy as retaining a place for "empirical theories with strong universalistic claims" (310). That is, philosophy will provide place for such theories when they are capable of demonstrating their justified occupation. Thus philosophy in this sense has a strong universalistic overtone. For Habermas this points to a way whereby universalist claims are possible. However, for philosophy to be able to hold such a place seems to presuppose that it could in some way point to the universal, even though philosophy does not in fact grasp it. But that is a very different conception of philosophy than presented here, which is derived from situations where visions of

what constitute good life and so on collide. This conception changes the aim of philosophy from establishing truth to seeing what good could come out of the unfinalizable arguments.

7. Soraj Hongladarom, *Horizons of Philosophy* (forthcoming).

8. Thongchai Winichakul, in *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of Nation* (Chiang Mai: Silkworms Books, 1994, pp. 6-9), argues against claims made by traditional scholars of Thai studies that Thai people know better about their subject matter than anybody else. I agree with him on this point. However, what seems to be missing from his account is that he does not provide a full support of the thesis, nor does he see any merit in the conduct of Thai studies by Thais on the methodology based on what he called "the researchers" predetermined notion of what constitutes a Thai worldview" (8). I happen to disagree with him on both points. The first point seems to presuppose that Thongchai disapproves of a Thai studying her own society, but that is ironic, for Thongchai himself is a Thai, and thus necessarily subject to the same criticism he levels on the workings of other Thais studying their own culture. Thonghai supposes that these Thai scholars uncritically, think that they know what "Thainess" means, and this forms a core of his criticism, having rejected the idea that "Thainess" can have any fixed meaning (9). But "Thainess" does not have to have fixed meanings in order for these Thai scholars to be able to do what they are doing and doing well. The word could be defined extensionally, as logicians say. That is, there is no need to find a fixed meaning for the word, what is required is only that there be some tangible criteria to separate all Thai people from others, such as holding Thai passports, living within a certain geographical region, and so on. These requirements are not abstract and are actually in use to find out who is Thai and who is not. To press for any deeper meaning than this seems to me a case of philosophical illusion.

On the second point, Thongchai seems to be denigrating somewhat attempts by Thais to understand themselves. But what is wrong with having such a predetermined notion of Thainess? Apart from the notion of fixed meanings mentioned in the previous paragraph, the works of these scholars can well be seen as manifestations of the Thai community's attempts to understand itself, and as such there is hardly any need to justify the meaning of "Thainess" involved in the projects, for that is always assumed. Viewed from this perspective, Thongchai's own works, *Siam Mapped*, and other works aiming at understanding Thai society or its history, are equally such manifestations. Thongchai, to be sure, has a point in his criticisms, but one has to be aware that in a group's reflecting upon itself there is hardly any point in trying to separate oneself from the reflection as if it were possible to stand back outside the circle of one's own cultural identity and to find out which way of looking is the most truthful.

17.

Changes of Values During the Renovation Period in Vietnam

Nguyen Trong Chuan

Preface

The world is changing and Vietnam also is changing very rapidly. From a subsidiary, bureaucratic and concentrated economy, Vietnam is shifting to a market economy, industrializing, modernizing and integrating into the world. From a philosophical point of view, this is not only a socio-economic change, but also a change in value standards. This entails a search for new value standards that are more general, more suitable and able to serve better the progress of the entire society as well as each human individual. It must be suitable for an era of development and the trend toward globalization and multi-faceted international relations. In the course of this change a number of issues emerge, such as how to define real, fundamental values; what are the counter-values; how to maintain good traditional values and keep them from sinking into oblivion; which values should be received, and more importantly how to orient values, especially in term of the younger generation.

Through reviewing Vietnam's recent situation this study would hope to contribute to the clarification of these issues.

Definitions

The concept, "value," is used widely in many different scientific branches such as: philosophy, psychology, ethics, sociology, aesthetics, etc., and with different content. As it is difficult to have a reasonable definition which can be accepted by everybody, it is necessary to determine firstly the inner content of the definition to be used here. When speaking of value it is necessary to attend to the concrete socio-historico-practical aspects, namely, to its applicability and capability for promoting human behavior by obtaining, maintaining and protecting it. At the same time, though it is not necessary to moralize all values, in speaking of value we want to reaffirm its positive character as attached to the right, the good, the interesting and the beautiful.

On the other hand, values have objectivity because objects, processes and relations themselves include the ability to satisfy multi-faceted human demands, bringing multiple benefits to humans. At the same time, human groups express their attitude, point of view and evaluation of those abilities, as well as the level they can accept. However, human demands and benefits are extremely varied and diversified, — even extremely complicated. Hence, things that create value through their ability to satisfy the demands of most human beings have a definite stability.

When people choose some value as essential or fundamental, or say that a value comprises material and spiritual dimensions, or is of high quality, they are talking about a system of values. In this way we see that some values are common for humankind, while others characterize a nation or a community (village, commune). Some values are long-standing and respected and inherited through generations; but the impact, scale and time of others may be shorter. Some values will fade or even disappear completely when the historical situation changes, and newly formed values will replace them. The scale of values used by a nation, community, group or individual in the conduct of its behavior serves in effect as a measure for surveying values.

The attitude, arrangement and selection of material or spiritual values to be pursued, believed in, and followed as a duty is the orientation of value. Such value orientation is a very important factor in forming and confirming personality, helping an individual to find meaningful things, to avoid what is meaningless for oneself and harmful to the community, to be firmly targeted on ideals, to stimulate personal demand and interest, to adjust behavior and to motivate action. Obviously, beside its moral and aesthetic character, value orientation also is closely allied to awareness, feelings, emotion, will and desire.

In terms of nations as human communities traditional values have an extremely important role. Tradition includes the composition of the ideology, emotions, customs, habits, lifestyle, ways of behavior, and the will of the human community. Formed in history this becomes stabilized and is transferable from generation to generation. Hence traditional values concern what is considered the active, and typical of the national culture which should be maintained, protected, and promoted. The content of tradition is very diversified and varied, but can contain positive and negatives aspects simultaneously. Hence, from traditional values one must extract the positive, the good, the beneficial for the life of the entire nation today and tomorrow, as well as for the international community of which the nation is a member.

Changes of Values During the Renovation Period in Vietnam

The Diversification of Vietnam's Traditional Values

Vietnam's traditional values originate from traditions formed a thousand years ago under multiple influences: the natural environment and geographical conditions, labor production and socio-economic structures, historical circumstances and the international and regional cultural environment. That includes the traditions of a community with the spirit of solidarity and mutual help, whether in peace or in war or other difficult times; traditions of village democracy whose clearest symbol is the right to select a representative to control the works of the village or commune; and the tradition of standing firm in difficulty, hard work, love of children and respect for the aged.

Thanks to the contact with China and especially the reception of Confucianism with India and the reception of Buddhism, and with French culture Vietnam has traditions of love of learning, respect for titles like being a mandarin, altruism, leniency, as well as of freedom, equality and fraternity.

However, Vietnam's traditional values have been formed mainly on the basis of the Vietnamese nation. Being a small country and experiencing too many wars of national defense the features highlighted in Vietnam's tradition are patriotism, nationalism independence and self-reliance. Although Confucianism has been studied and many things learned therefrom, its great moral system does not touch patriotism. On the contrary, for the Vietnamese people patriotism is a value, indeed a spiritual motive for which many generations have sacrificed, and thanks to which they have won. Through struggle against extremely severe natural conditions and foreign invasions the tradition of flexible behavior, quick adaptation and easy adaption to existing conditions has been formed. All those good traditions form values which have been preserved by the Vietnamese.

Beside that positive, good side, the prolonged existence over many centuries and even until today of the small peasant economy also contributes to forming traditions which are not so good. These include being unfamiliar with economic accounting, carelessness, distraction, lack of tight

discipline, sectionalism, localism, egalitarianism, low aspirations, and dislike of being surpassed by others. Those features have created negative aspects in the Vietnamese tradition.

Great Changes in the Socio-economy and Their Impact on the System of Traditional Values

Vietnam's renovation since 1986 has been in all fields: economic, political, social, cultural and external relations. In the economic field the shift from a concentrated, bureaucratic, subsidiary structure to a market economic structure has quickly changed the face of socio-economic life, created the existing economy, led to rapid growth, and patently improved peoples' standard of life in almost every field of activity. Many traditional professions have been restored and many new jobs created. The way of earning money to become rich also has changed and been diversified. The expansion of external relations also has created big changes in many influencing the outlook, the way of thinking, the attitudes and behavior of people, especially the young.

However, these changes have given birth to not a few com-plicated social issues and negative phenomena. The major concerns are the great difference between the poor and the rich which risks becoming conflictual, disrespect for tradition, and looking down on public opinion and law. Along with that, many social evils and crimes which had disappeared for many years or been greatly reduced now rise again.

In fact, those changes have impact on the system of traditional values, though estimates of the level of that impact are not quite in agreement. A few people consider that under the big changes in the economy not a few traditional values have been inverted, fallen into crisis or even into oblivion. In contrast to the past, economic, material values now carry more weight than spiritual ones; personal benefit is a stronger motivation than collective benefit. However, as confirmed by many researchers, seen calmly and with vigilant precautions, this phenomenon is obviously a necessary adjustment. If in previous times spiritual collective values were highly considered, material values were forgotten; readjusting the balance is quite reasonable, and should not be a matter of concern.

This adjustment itself has its positive side in that it promotes self-control and the ability for self-improvement; it stimulates independence and creativity. This overcomes passivity and reliance on the state and the collective in order to seek a better material and spiritual life for oneself on the basis of an assured material life. Instead of relying on the collective, society, and the state, people have recognized that they need to be active, to calculate economic results, and to improve their knowledge so as not to fail in the severe competition of the market economy.

However, extremism is also a reality in present day Vietnamese society. This trend threatens the traditional values mentioned above. It rates highly a comfortable material life, looking down upon altruism and not paying attention to other people. It honors technique while disregarding human beings. It blindly follows Western and foreign values. It looks only to oneself, forgetting the collective and the community which long have been precious traditions of the nation. Although these trends are not dominant it is necessary to recognize them in order to take measures of prevention and to avoid the extreme turns which cause harm to the society.

Trends in Value Changes: the Statistics

Many sociological surveys have been conducted regarding changes in the value outlook caused by changing historical circumstances. Among 20 values commonly popular, the Vietnamese polled indicated the following ten as leading values:

1. Peace: 86.0%
2. Freedom: 76.8%
3. Health: 72.6%
4. Employment: 64.9%
5. Justice: 64.4%
6. Education: 62.0%
7. Family: 57.3%
8. Belief: 57.3%
9. Security: 56.0%
10. Profession: 52.9%

From this the following conclusions can be drawn:

- The high percentage of people who chose peace reflects the sincere aspiration of a nation that has lost too much to war. The high rank of this value probably corresponds to other nations all over the world. That value has power to gather and unify all nations, North and South, East or West, whether developing or developed. It is a common value of humankind without which such other aspirations as wealth, strength, happiness and development cannot be realized. Peace is a key to independence, freedom and employment.
- Other values such as health, education, justice, belief, family and security remain traditional values which are highly appreciated.
- Survey results show that the values of one's profession are in the greatest need of change. Above we have commented that in the Vietnamese tradition the weak point is economic accounting for fear that one's neighbors will consider one to be rich. However, this tradition of egalitarianism is rapidly weakening. People turn to a number of values which motivate people to enrich both them selves and the country according to the motto: "A rich people, in a strong country, with an equal and civil society."

It has been more than ten years of renewal, and the way of getting rich and choosing an occupation have changed greatly. Seventeen percent of the people chose an occupation with high income despite difficulty, while only a few people chose an easy job with low income. Interestingly people preferred a practical occupation with high income, but one that did not harm the community and family responsibilities. Concretely, 64.2 percent chose occupations which enabled them to take care of their family and 57.8 percent chose jobs that could help others. People seem not to pay great attention to the economic sector or office where they will work: working for the state or for private or foreign companies all are acceptable, provided the job is suitable and renders high income.

This is a remarkable change in the Vietnamese psychology and value-orientation. However, the point is that when people become accustomed to change they do not lose their traditional values, but still stay close to family and community. This is easy to understand because to the Vietnamese people's mind, if the family is happy and stable the community (village, commune and the entire society) will be stable and peaceful, and people will be able to face the great waves of difficulties in life. Maintaining family values is a firm guarantee in the struggle against the merciless, cold-blooded competition of the market structure.

This has the following implications:

- As becoming rich is a popular value, the older mandarin values of respect for titles and positions now lessen remarkably.

- Traditional values continue strong while at the same time bearing new content. For example, if in the past the value of "freedom" meant mainly freedom for the entire nation or national independence, nowadays it means also freedom in business, work, learning, improving knowledge and selecting one's private activities in fields not prohibited by the laws. Such freedom is close to the individual and his or her improvement.

- Some values which in the past were quite ordinary now have become urgent, for example, employment. This value can be found in all nations, but now in Vietnam it is urgent because of the shift in the economic structure. It is certain that not only in the present, but also in the future employment and profession will remain leading values, especially for young people and particularly in countries with high populations.

- Further, the survey results identify some spiritual values which people honor, praise and consider highly such as: creativity, love, justice, beauty. Many Vietnamese now value these only to a middle level, some grade them below other values. This is obviously the "negative" side of present value orientations. Probably it reflects also that in a life full of difficulties the Vietnamese must first solve their urgent problems, rather than dealing with other values.

Conclusion

Life is changing very fast and human awareness too does not stop at any one point. The above survey results are only preliminary and can serve only as points of reference. Other changes surely will take place in the future. But today's life allows researchers to confirm that the fundamental orientation of the scale of values measuring what Vietnamese believe and seek, in other words, things that create the present pattern of Vietnamese values, are still the traditional human values. However, these shift from patriotism in battle to patriotism in the construction of peace, in industrialization and modernization; these are the present sense of the national culture and national pride. Together with respect for other good traditional values, the newly formed values and those common to all humankind provide a foundation creating the shape of current life for the Vietnamese and their society. That is the base also for ensuring the dialogue and integration for peace and development in this region and in the world. Knowing how to respect and preserve the good values of this and other nations, while maintaining one's own identity is the key to improving the quality and meaning of life in an era full of change and tension.

18.

The Modern Significance of Chinese Traditional Culture

Fang Songhua

There have been numerous periods of great transformation in human history, such as the upsurge of the scientific revolution, changes from war to peace, and the mega movement from agricultural to industrial society. Every great change in the social economy brought sharp conflict between new and old ideas as well as their value basis, and was accompanied by various problems regarding ideals, ethics, welfare and ultimate concern.

Late in the last century Nietzsche said that "God is dead: It is necessary to rebuild a whole world, a morality, an aesthetics, a belief, a new humankind and to reassess all values." Accordingly, early in this century there was a social change in China symbolized by the slogan "Down with Confucius and His Sons"; the new culture under the title "May 4th," became a milestone for a new China. However, as this century comes to a close, Christianity remains the value basis of the West, though during this time there has been great destruction from war and changes of regime. Confucianism has not been rooted out, but assumes the new form of Modern Confucianism. Can this be proof that the traditional ideas have solid footing, as had been held by the Chinese for so many years?

As a result, the main method for mastering the characteristics and the spirit of this period of change depends principally upon the research on the basis of values. With a view to revealing this basis for Chinese values this chapter will review the modern meaning of Chinese traditional culture.

Values as the Main Feature of Chinese Culture

China has long been among the civilized countries of the world. Its brilliant civilization is signaled by the Great Wall and countless inventions, though Chinese civilization is far more than this. Put in a modern way, Chinese culture cannot be valued by how many modern cities it has or how many nuclear weapons it holds; the value of Chinese civilization expresses itself principally in its morality, i.e. in the cultivation of the human.

Based on non-religious values, Chinese civilization is quite different from that of Western countries, based on religious values. Confucianism as the mainstream of Chinese culture, along with Taoism and Buddhism, has established the framework of Chinese traditional culture and also has built the mentality of the Chinese people. With the consolidation of the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius, Confucianism gave structure to the ideological system of "Modern Confucianism" through the Han Dynasty, especially in the Song and Ming Dynasty. "Benevolence" was its core, and ethics its standard. Adopted and reinforced by various kings and governors during this period, the system was applied in Chinese politics, economy and laws, which strict disciplines formed the indispensable center of Chinese traditional culture. Accordingly classic Confucianism became the theoretical pattern of this culture, whose ultimate concern was how to become a noble man or gentleman, how to cultivate one's attitude or outlook.

Confucius says: A man with benevolence is the one who loves all men. The way to carry out benevolence is to establish others if one wishes to be established oneself, and to enhance others if one would enhance oneself. Do not do to others what you would not wish done to yourself. The

great learning teaches to enhance illustrious virtue, to renovate the people, and to rest in the highest excellence.

The core value of Chinese culture is to achieve a moral ethics and improve one's spiritual state. Confucius says: though in the morning one hears the right way, he or she may die in the evening with regret. Another thinker, Meng Zi, states: I am skillful in nourishing my vast, flowing passionate nature. For over 2000 years, the value basis of Chinese society was made up of Confucian ideals, due to which China became one of the cultural and economic centers of the ancient world.

To the virtuous ancient Chinese, human interests and desires were of less importance, and hence not worth pursuing. Confucius states it thus: The one with virtue seek rightness, whereas the one without virtue seeks benefit.

Entering the Song and Ming Dynasties there arose Confucian arguments over whether human desires or heavenly principles should be chosen, and such slogans as "Survive on heavenly principles; root out human desire." All these had a negative effect upon the development of China's economy and science, which finally led to recent underdevelopment in China's commerce, industry and science.

Social Vicissitudes and Value Conflicts in the Modern History of China

The traditional Chinese basis for values, with its principles in Confucianism, fell into dire straits in modern times, especially in the late 19th and early 20th century. Having been invaded by Westerners with comparatively strong guns and fire power, along with Western culture and thought, China was forced to open its door after the Opium War. Confucianism, which had been the support of Chinese culture for so many years, faced a crisis and challenge it had not seen for hundreds of years. After being prosperous in the Song and Ming dynasties, Confucianism was on the wane at the end of Ming. From then till the later Qing dynasty, many researchers could work only by copying and consulting from ancient books due to the monopolization of politics, deadlock in culture and such other reasons as the imperial exam system and the literary inquisition carried out by the Qing government. Fang Dong Mei, a modern Confucianism master, noted that "the philosophy of China was lifeless at the beginning of the Qing Dynasty. All creative ideas ceased to function, and from then on philosophy has been dead for nearly three centuries." Though this is a bit of an exaggeration, unquestionably Chinese traditional values lost their vitality in recent centuries.

Now in the 20th century, disputes over the destiny of modern Confucianism can be categorized according to three directions: total Westernization, conciliation of Western and Eastern cultures, modern Confucianism. Besides the leading position of Marxism (China-style) during this century, the May 4th leaders and modern Confucianists probed most deeply into the relationship between the traditional Chinese value basis and modernization.

As the Qing dynasty came to an end, Confucianism, which once had functioned as the government ideology and the foundation of values was declared bankrupt. It was May 4th thinkers who made the real criticism of Confucianism. Represented by Chen Du Xiu, Hu si and Lu Xun, outstanding intellectuals emerging during May 4th period mounted a thorough attack on Chinese traditional culture without prior dialogue. They were brought together through the magazine *New Youth* under the watchword: "Down with Confucius and Sons."

The May 4th New Culture Movement in the early 20th century can be described as a grand and progressive period of thought. Its great historic achievement was to have accomplished what

had taken the West several hundred years from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. With a fierce criticism of Chinese feudal culture and the call for "Science and Democracy," these thinkers brought ancient China into modern times, and made it possible to confront the fundamental challenge, namely, modernization.

Secondly, the core subject of the May 4th period, "Science and Democracy," is still of great value these days. Why had China always found itself in difficulty in the process of modernizations. One crucial reason lies in the constant contradiction between the basic factors for modernization, such as "Science and Democracy" and the Chinese tradition, especially Confucianism. This finally led to such miseries as the "Cultural Revolution" which frustrated China's step into modernization.

Nonetheless, unforeseen circumstances do occur. Those May 4th thinkers would never expect that after almost one century of revolutions and reformations, when the Chinese people are turning their dream of modernization into reality, there would arise a modern Confucianism.

With the purpose of restoring and revitalizing traditional Confucianism as values, modern Confucianism as a new school of thought is profoundly timely owing to its concern to reform Chinese society, especially though modernization. Modern Confucianism has undergone many changes in accord with the difficulties it experienced, especially in the May 4th period. Facing the crisis in Chinese culture and society early this century, Liang Su Ming, a representative of Modern Confucianism, boldly raised the question of how to relate Confucianism's future with that of China, by combining the "problem of life" and the "problem of China." "Western culture is a culture based only on matter, which cannot set free its own spirit; only the life directed basically by Confucianism can provide people with the real taste of life. . . . Therefore Confucianism is actually the result of human life and one only destiny of world civilization."

During recent decades there has been a basic change in the historical background of Confucianism. Modern Confucianism has been particularly strengthened by the soaring East-Asian economy, backed by Confucianism. The examples of Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and other Asian countries have in common a cultural background basically represented by Confucianism. In conformity with the historic background mentioned above, the new generation of Modern Confucianism pays more attention to the modernization of China. They think that modernization which is world-wide in scope must be diversified and China must have its own style. This is not merely a difference of terms between "modernization" and "Westernization," since the modernization modelled by Western countries has come up against many problems. The combination of traditional and modern society leaves its mark on the Chinese value system, which shapes all aspects of social life as does the blood in a body. That is why it cannot be discarded simply or turned aside violently, which may end in an impractical "Westernization." Hence modern Confucian thinkers hope that Confucianism can become once again a part of the Chinese value system when the traditional system is revised.

The Future of Confucianism and the Contemporary Significance of Chinese Traditional Values

At the turning point of the century and the transition to a new millennium great thinkers can be expected to look backward and for-ward. Nothing is more intriguing than fortune-telling for world culture and in this "the revitalization of Confucianism" is a key subject. "The 21st century will be the century in which the revitalization of Chinese culture takes place," projects Ji Xianlin, a renowned Chinese scholar, in his *The 20th Century in China and I*.

Guy Alitto, a U.S. philosopher, asserts that Chinese Confucianism will be the world culture in the future instead of a Western culture base on material goods and technology. Alitto's reason is that, despite the appearance that the economy, transportation and mass media unite the world, social cultures are falling apart. Western technical achievements never provided a blueprint for society in the Third World; rather "Westernization" has brought about a corrosion of their inner order and ethics. Most are crime-ridden. Except for some Islamic societies, families and religions have failed to stabilize society. People get more and more confused and frustrated regarding the meaning of life and have lost the ethics which once had been accepted universally.

In contrast, societies effected profoundly by Confucianism (e.g. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, including the overseas Chinese) have experienced modernization, industrialization, urbanization and business expansion many times faster than most Western countries at comparable points. Eastern societies have never encountered the problems experienced in the West despite a more rapidly developing political democracy.

In a word, the various problems existing in Western societies and their modernization may well force them to adopt Confucianism as their core ethics. This will neither hurt any individual, nor interfere with the development of modernization and the economy.

People can hardly believe that Confucianism, having undergone catastrophe and been regarded by Max Weber as keeping China from developing a capitalist economy, out of steps with the requirements of modernization, ridiculously out-of-date, and totally corrupt, can now be regarded by many researchers as helpful to the modernization of East-Asian countries.

Levenson, once asserted: "So long as China wants to possess science and make use of it, Confucianism must first be discarded and its social rank lowered. Confucius and Sons must be locked up. . . . Confucianism is already only a record in books which can no longer inspire its followers. It has completely fallen apart." However, Confucianism is now in fashion in China and even in the world. All kinds of Confucian books are written and related conventions are held everywhere. This can be attributed partly to East-Asian industrialization and the effect of modern Confucianism, but what the real weight is Confucianism itself, its perduring value and significance.

In fact, before the publication of the books of Max Weber and Levenson, Liang Suming had estimated that "Chinese culture is going to revive in the near future' (1921). In the "Dialogue between A.J Toynbee and Chi Tian Da Zuo," the historian expresses his viewpoint that it will not be Western or Westernized countries which will reunite the world, but China. Its present prestige is because it promises to fulfill that future task. China's government has always united its millions of people for the past 2200 years, except for some very short periods. So long as it is united, its suzerainty has been accepted. Even some remote areas have been touched by the traditional culture. Since 221 B.C. China has been the center of half of the world, exerting influence almost all the time. In the last 500 years the world has been united on Western terms. Only China can undertake the task of politically reuniting its half of the world, indeed even the whole world, and of bringing peace.

"As for the Chinese people, several thousand years witness that they rally hundreds of millions of people, not only culturally but politically, and more successfully than any other nations. The wits and skills they possess and their constant experience are the indispensable requirement for the union of today's world. This is the precise reason why the cooperation of Chinese and East-Asian people will perform a leading role in the absolutely necessary and unavoidable reunion of different peoples."

Considering Confucianism, it is difficult to agree with those who speak of a "revitalization of Confucianism," or of the world of the 21st century turning out to be Confucian in style. I would hope rather that Confucianism would become part of a diversified world culture. For all the reasons above it would be a new endeavor to rebuild the Chinese cultural spirit and its value basis from a modern view point at this turn of the millennia. A developed Western market-oriented economy is based upon individualism, it was an individualistic life-style and ethics that created the Western "civilization disease." Statements from Hobbes's "Man is wolf to man" to Sartre's "The other is hell" suggest that Western ethics has deviated far from civilization.

The style of East-Asian modernization, modeled upon Japan, has its essence rather in "teamwork," which actually is a kind of modernization grounded in a combination of Western economy and Confucianism ethics. The miracle of East-Asian civilization indicates that Confucianism could be a "supporting ideology" for developed countries.

A modern cultural spirit and a basis for values featuring Chinese socialist modernization will go beyond both "individualism" and "teamwork." With the connotation of "one's own free will" and "complete free development of the human" from Marxism. This combines the essence of Eastern and Western cultures, faces directly the greatest error of Chinese culture, namely, its overlooking the individual, and upholds the idea of an individualized modern period whose goal is to set people truly free. The cultural heritage passed down from the ancient Chinese ancestors provides abundant content for this.

One of the exciting developments at the very end of the 20th century is the strong development of China's economy. This quickens the pace of the development of Chinese culture and ethics by overcoming many cultural conflicts and transforming society. Needless to say, the rules of the market-oriented economy greatly strengthen the people's desire for money and a utilitarian spirit. This is accompanied by rapacity, drugs, environmental malpractice, spiritual barrenness, etc., all of which generate ethical deviations which become more than mere words to scare people. A.J. Toynbee stated that until now, people's ethics have always remained on a low level, whereas the level of technical achievement has risen tremendously and at a speed faster than ever experienced heretofore. As a result, the gap between technology and ethics looms large. This is not only disgraceful, but of vital import. As has happened in many periods of human history, certain ethical problems now stand out for ethics in modern China regarding wealth, ideals and even ultimate concern. There now exists for Chinese intellectuals the challenge of serious research on modernization, such as how to rebuild a corresponding value system. Though Confucianism and modern Confucianism are not going to play the leading role in developing this value base, modern Confucianism can render positive service when Chinese culture and values are rebuilt through a creative reformation and transformation which cannot be separated from Chinese traditional culture.

19.

Existential Relationships and Optimal Harmony: Philosophical Foundations for Values in a Time of Change

Vincent Shen

Introduction

In a time of rapid change and social conflict, values that are worth being pursued must be based upon our existential relationship and a new idea of harmony. The idea of harmony is based upon humankind's existential experience and the ideal state of existence for which longs. One could not live long without harmony, although for earning one's autonomy and a better life, one might struggle with his or her fellows, nature and God. But the harmony we have in everyday life is merely fragmentary. Once a bit of harmony is happily tasted, we fall again into the bitterness of struggle and conflict.

But, just as we are envious of health when actually ill, human-kind specially longs for harmony when caught up in social disorder or psychological disequilibrium. For example, Confucianism cherishes the harmony between an individual and his fellowmen, but it emerged in the decadence of social norms in the Chou dynasty. Taoism, in emphasizing harmony between humans and nature, came into being during a time of vehement war and social disorder. Christianity, reminding us above all of the harmony between humans and God, concerns itself most with human suffering and evil.

The idea of harmony should be analyzed with regard to the relation between an individual and other fellowmen, the relation between human beings and nature, and the relation between human beings and God, for all three constitute the essential framework of human existence. This means that the idea of harmony could be understood now only in the context of an ontology of relation, which means that all existents, all beings, are in some kind of dynamic relation in which they turn towards one another to constitute the meaningfulness of their existence.

As we know, ontology of substance has been replaced in this century by an ontology of event, for example, by Whitehead's concept of event1 or by Heidegger's concept of *Ereignis*.2 But the ontology of event3 is only transitory and must now cede its place to the ontology of dynamic relation in which the idea of harmony is more pertinently situated. We can say that Taoism, Confucianism and Christianity each proclaim a certain kind of ontology of relation. But to affirm relation is to affirm the irreducibility of the other,4 either an impersonal other such as nature, or a personal other such as human beings and God.

The structural framework of the relations between human beings and reality is constituted by the relations between the individual and his fellowmen, the human and nature, and the human and God. Among all three relations, there is a contrasting tension between harmony and conflict. Hence, we must, on the one hand, retain the harmonious relations one already has with others and, on the other, maximize or optimize harmony in realizing oneself in the totality.

Harmony with Fellowmen

On the human level, all are born into the world in the relational contexts with our parents and the social world. That is the reason why Confucianism concerns mostly the harmonization of a

human being's relations with his fellowmen. One of the main concerns of Confucianism is the meaning of the social order and the meaning of human existence therein.

The Transcendental Foundation of Harmony

Confucius himself had endeavored to re-vitalize the ancient social order instituted by Chou-li by rendering it meaningful in a transcendental way. In pre-Confucian China, Chou-li embraced both the ideal and the actual aspects of religious, ethical and political life in ancient China. For its actual meaning, Chou-li saw three essential aspects, the sacrificial ceremonies, the social and political institutions and the code of daily behavior. Ideally speaking, this represented an ideal image of the cultural tradition as Order imbued with a sense of beauty or Harmony. It represented for Confucius a comprehensive ideal of human life in general, similar to the role of the concept of *Paideia* for ancient Greece.

But the time of Confucius, the period of Spring and Autumn, was a time of political turmoil leading to social disorder, a time qualified by Confucius as "without order and justice." For example, Confucius said,

In the government of an empire with order and justice, the initiative and final decisions in matters of religion, education, and declaration of war form the supreme prerogative of the emperor. In the government of an empire without order and justice, that prerogative passes into the hands of the princes of the empire, in which case it is seldom that ten generations pass before they lose it. Should that prerogative pass into the hands of the nobility of the empire, it has rarely happened that they have retained it for five generations.5

In this state of political disorder, Chou-li began to lose this deeper meaning while still keeping its realistic and superficial meaning as a code of behavior with social and political institutions and religious ceremonies. Confucius tried to revitalize Chou-li by translating its ideal meaning into the concept of *Jen*, which signified and represented for him the sensitive interconnectedness between the human being' s inner self with other human beings, with nature and even with Heaven. Jen manifests man's subjectivity and responsibility in and through his sincere moral awareness; meanwhile, it means also the inter-subjectivity which supports all social and ethical life. That is why Confucius said that Jen is not remote or difficult for human beings; one needs only an individual will, for Jen is there in oneself. Thus Confucius laid a transcendental foundation for the interaction of human beings with nature, with society and even with Heaven.

From this concept of Jen, Confucius deduced the concept of Yi or righteousness, which represented for him the respect for and proper actions towards, others. That is why Confucius said, "A wise and good man makes Righteousness the substance of his being. He carries it out with the ritual order; he speaks it with modesty; and he attains it with sincerity — such a man is a really good and wise man!"6 Righteousness is also the criterion by which are discerned a good from a base person. On righteousness were based all moral norms, moral obligations, our consciousness of them, and even the virtue of always acting according to them. From the concept of Yi, Confucius deduced that of Li or ritual, the proprieties which represented the ideal meaning and actual codes of behavior, political institutions and religious ceremonies. You Tzu, a disciple of Confucius, once said that "The function of ritual consists best in harmony." Li or ritual, as an overall concept or cultural ideal, is then a graceful order leading to harmony.

Through this procedure of transcendental deduction, Confucianism reconstitutes and thereby revitalizes the ethical and social order implied in Chou-li and the meaningfulness of human existence therein. The dimension of meaning in human existence is therefore to be understood

within the context of a totality constituted of relations between human beings imbued with a sense of orderly beauty or a sense of harmony

Personal Excellence and Harmonization of Relationship

In Confucianism, a life of harmony must be concretized as a life of virtue. Virtue is to be seen as both the excellence of natural human abilities and the harmonization of human relationships. Obligation is considered as necessary when it helps to form and achieve virtue. Confucius cherished such virtues as wisdom, humanness and bravery. I would interpret the virtue of wisdom as the excellence of human intellect, the virtue of Jen or humanness as the excellence of human feeling, and the virtue of bravery as the excellence of human will. For Mencius, human nature possesses four beginnings of goodness, which could be seen as four natural capacities of humankind tending towards goodness. Virtues such as humanness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are the fulfillment of these four beginnings of goodness in human nature. Hence, righteousness as virtue precedes always righteousness as obedience to moral obligations.

In the case of Confucianism, virtue as excellence of human abilities never limits itself within the individual, but instead always refers to relations with others. For example, Confucius, when asked about a life of Jen by Tzu Chang, answered that,

A man who can carry out five virtues leads a life of Jen. . . . They are earnestness, consideration for others, trustworthiness, diligence and generosity. If you are earnest, you will never meet with want of respect. If you are considerate to others, you will win the heart of the people. If you are diligent, you will be successful in your undertakings. If you are generous, you will find plenty of men who are willing to serve you.7

It is clear that all these virtues refer to others and the reactions from others. They are ways of harmonizing human relationships and are therefore relational virtues.

Virtues also are to be formed in the five essential relationships, consisting always in the harmonization of human relationships, whether this concerns the relation between husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, friends and lovers, or individuals and society. These are not to be seen merely as biological or social relationships; on the contrary, they are to be realized as ethically meaningful. The meaning of good relationships, such as piety, fidelity, loyalty, . . . etc., could be interpreted differently according to the custom of the times, but its essence as the harmonization of relationships remains always valid now and forever.

From Reciprocity to Universality

The process of harmonization of relationship is a process of enlargement from reciprocity to universality. Reciprocity is essential for human relationships according to Confucianism. Dzaiwuo proposed two arguments against the maintenance of funeral rites, one based upon the necessity of maintaining social order, the other based upon the cycle of natural processes. Confucius's answer was based upon human reciprocity, namely, that in our earliest childhood we were taken care of by our parents, and that this is the reason why we observe funeral rites in response to the love of our parents for us. The form of these ritual practices could be changed according to the demand of times, but the essence of reciprocity in human relationship remains.

But good human relationships come to fulfillment when enlarged from reciprocity to universality. That is why Confucius, when asked by Dzu Luh concerning how a paradigmatic individual behaves, answered: "by the cultivation of oneself, first for one's dignity, then for the

happiness of other's, and finally for the happiness of all people." From reciprocity to universality means that we should transcend the limit of special relationship to universal relationship, even to the point of seeing the people within the four seas as brothers. This means that humankind would treat other fellowmen without regard to their family, profession, company, race and country, but just with Jen, a universal love, but only because they are members of humankind. This is the way by which Confucianism enlarges the harmonization of human relationship, the full unfolding of which is the process of the formation of a virtuous life, not merely a life of observing absolutized obligations.

Confucian ethics is an ethics of virtue, rather than of obligation as some contemporary Neo-Confucians such as Mou Tzong-san would think. But virtue consists in two things, the excellence of human abilities and the harmonization of human relationships. Beginning from the priority of virtue, Confucian ethics could accept also the helpful ideas of an ethics of obligation and even of an utilitarian ethics. The most important principle is that a life of harmony could be achieved only by attaining the full excellence of one's ability in harmonizing human relationships, or, the other way round, by harmonizing human relationships one accomplishes the excellence of one's abilities.

Harmony with Nature

Human existence stands on the support of nature. Not only does the relation between an individual and his fellowmen need to be harmonious, but the relation between humans and nature and that between natural beings is also in need of harmony. Especially with the deepening of the industrialization process, the abuse of technology has brought about environmental problems and ecological disequilibrium. This makes the harmony between man and nature more urgent. Here we can learn from Taoism.

Forgetfulness of Tao as Origin of Deterioration of Relations

Taoism emerged also in a time of social disorder and frequent war. Under Lao Tzu's penetrating criticism, the society of his time was revealed to be full of social problems provoked by political domination. He wrote

The people suffer because their rulers eat up too much in taxes; that is why they starve. The people become difficult to govern because those in authority have too many projects of action; that is why they are difficult to govern. The people take death lightly because their rulers have too many desires; that is why they take death lightly.8

This severely critical text shows us that, for Lao Tzu, social problems were produced by the political domination of rulers themselves rather than created by the insufficiency of channels of realization for desired values in the society. Chou-li was, in Lao Tzu's eyes, but a means of social domination hindering and distorting the human being's communication with others and, most seriously, with Tao. Domination by violent power was manifested especially by violent wars. He wrote again, "Whenever armies are stationed, briers and thorns become rampant. Great wars are inevitably followed by famines." "The weapons of war are instruments of evil, and they are detested by people. . . . When a multitude of people are slaughtered, it should be an occasion for the expression of bitter grief. Even when a victory is scored, the occasion should be observed with funeral ceremonies."9 The mentioning of famines and the fact that briers and thorns became rampant shows that the deterioration of human relationships also brings about problems.

Deeper critical reflection by Lao Tzu suggested that power domination came from desire and the instrumental rationality it manipulated. At that time lust for goods and desire for power were highly elevated. People strove for fame and position. Intellectuals rendered service to political power and became themselves instruments of political domination. People sacrificed their spiritual freedom for lustful desire and instrumental rationality. Lao Tzu even criticized Confucian ideology saying that it emphasized too much deliberate actions taken with anthropocentric self-consciousness, which inclined one to forget the spontaneity of the human being and its rooting in Tao. Thereby, instead of Confucian deduction of Yi from Jen and Li from Yi for the revitalization of Chou Li, quite the contrary, Jen would degenerate into Yi, and Yi would degenerate into Li, which as a form of domination and violence, would become the origin of social conflict.

The Taoist concept of critique has an ontological dimension in the sense that it bases all social critique and critique of ideology on the human being's relation to Tao. Domination, instrumental rationality and ideology are but consequences of the human being's forgetfulness of Tao. What Heidegger calls forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*),10 Lao Tzu would call "forgetfulness of Tao." It means that the human being's self-understanding should refer ultimately to Tao or Being in Itself. A human being's forgetfulness of Tao means that he cannot fully understand himself Ultimately, the function of critique is to bring the human being to his own full self-understanding in transcending all unconscious dissimulation by critical reflection.

The Scarcity of Body versus the Richness of the Possible

Seen from the perspective of Taoism, when we talk about the harmonization of man with nature, we should refer to the Way Itself. In the philosophy of Taoism, the Way Itself is called Tao. Etymologically, the word Tao is composed of two elements, the head and the act of walking on a way; together they mean a way on which one could walk in a direction or a way out. As Heidegger says, it is improper to represent Tao as a physical way, as the distance relating two loci. However, Tao might be "the Way which puts all things on their ways."11

On the one hand, while one must say "Tao" in order to express it, once said it becomes a constructed reality and not reality itself. In order to keep open to reality Itself, all human constructions should be ready for further de-construction. That is why Lao Tzu said, "The Tao that could be said is not the Eternal Tao."12

In order to know the Way of Tao, it is necessary to know how Tao becomes body. According to Lao Tzu, Tao manifests itself first as possibilities, as nothingness; then among all possibilities, some are realized, and to be realized is to take the form of body. This engendered a realm of being. Therefore we can say that the possible is infinitely richer than the real, and nothingness is infinitely more vast than being. On the ontological level, there is a kind of scarcity of being in relation to nothingness. In other words, nothingness or the possible is rich, whereas being, as the real, is scarce.

Creation in the Taoist sense consists in the process through which Tao self-manifests, first as the whole realm of possibilities, and then some possibilities become real. To become real is to let the possible realize itself and consequently to be incarnate in the form of body. Being means the incarnation of the possible. Whereas the possible is liberated from all constraints, the real is always being in a certain concrete form of body. Creation is therefore a dialectical process between being and nothingness, between freedom and constraint.

But, if to become being is an essential aspect of creation, the scarcity of body is also essential for grasping its truth. It is because of the scarcity of body that we are in search of other bodies in

our perceptual, sexual and social life. As to our ultimate concern in such questions as life and death, they are to be seen from the cosmic process of realization of Tao in the body. On the one hand, to live means to take the form of a living body: according to Taoism this is the effect of an organic accumulation of cosmic energy. On the other hand, to die or to perish is the effect of dispersion of cosmic energy. Even if to live, or the fact of being able to take the form of a living body, is in itself a joy of existence, to die is not a lamentable occasion. It is for this reason that Chuang Tzu said, "The Great Clod *(the* Earth) burdens me with the form of body, labors me with tiresome life, eases me in old age and rests me in death. So if it makes my life good, it must for the same reason make my death good."13 In this way one is liberated from the worrisome concern of life and death; the freedom thereby effected is essential for a life of sanity. Chuang Tzu said, "I received life because the time had come; I will lose it because the order of things passes on. Be content with this time and dwell in this order and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you."14

The openness of mind leading to the ultimate harmony is not limited to this liberation from all attachment to the differentiation between life and death. For Taoism, human beings should follow the rhythm of cosmic creativity instead of imposing oneself upon a specific form of existence. In the process of cosmic creativity one should not impose one's subjective will in discriminating the human body from other kind of bodies. This is to say that the scarcity of body does not mean the superiority of human body. For Chuang Tzu there is an ontological equality among all living bodies, which is why in Taoist eyes there should not be any preference for the human body. Chuang Tzu would even accept to be transformed into a rat's liver as well as a bug's arm. This ontological vision of body transcends our anthropocentric preference. Chuang Tzu relates:

"Why should I resent? " Answers the ill, " If the process continues, perhaps in time he'll transform my left arm into a rooster. In that case I'll keep watch on that night. Or perhaps in time he'll transform my right arm into a crossbow pellet and I'll shoot down an owl for roasting. Or perhaps in time he will transform my buttocks into a cartwheel. Then, with my spirit for a horse, I'll climb up and go for a ride. "15

Unafraid of death, even with a joyful acceptance, there is then produced an ultimate freedom, ridding oneself from all horror of illness. This is supported by the Taoist thesis of the scarcity of body, which is complemented by the thesis of equality of all bodies. As locus of the appearing of Tao, all beings are sons of Mother Tao, consequently all beings are equal. In terms of Chuang Tzu, since all beings are specific incarnations of Tao, there is no need to discern the noble from the mean, the true from the false, the rational from the sensible. There is but one ontology, that of the Tao, which penetrates and immerses itself in all beings. This enlargement of existence brings us to a kind of open mind, supportive of a life of sanity.

Man-Nature Harmony and the Taoist Life Praxis

But, even if Chuang Tzu, due to his ontological visions mentioned above, does not make any distinction between the noble and the mean, the true and the false, the rational and the sensible (he would accept even to become a rat's liver as well as a bug's arm), nevertheless, in the profundity of his soul, he has a beautiful dream. It is to become a butterfly, for him the most beautiful and free being wandering and playing in nature. He says:

Once Chuang Chou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He did not know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakably Chuang Chou. But he didn't know if he was Chuang Chou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Chou. Between Chuang Chou and a butterfly there must be some distinction. And this is called the transformation of things.16

Becoming a butterfly, being free and beautiful, wandering and playing in nature, this symbolizes the golden age of existence when human beings are in union with nature. Instead of becoming a rat or a bug, Chuang Tzu prefers to become a butterfly. On the ontological level, there is no distinction between Chuang Chou and the butterfly though on the ontic level, there must be difference between the two. But the free and beautiful style of existence surpasses all differentiation and returns to the original union with Tao, with the Way. This is achieved through a profound life praxis. According to Lao Tzu, this life praxis begins by unifying one's bodily and spiritual functions of soul in meditation, and then, by a way of natural breath, purifying one's spirit to its softest point. This clarifies one's consciousness to the point of becoming a metaphysical looking glass in order to have an intuition of the essence of all things by letting them be, and then, through a kind of mystical passivity, returning to union with Tao Itself.17

According to Chuang Tzu, this life praxis begins from the spontaneous control of breathing to the point of minimizing the unconscious desire and its unconscious expression through dreams.

The True Human of ancient times slept without dreaming and woke without care. . . . The True Human breathes with his heels, the mass of men breathe with their throat. Crushed and bound down, they gasp out their words as though they were retching. Deep in their passions and desires, they are shallow in the sensitivity to Heaven's working.18

For Freud, dreaming is a disguised way of expressing one's unconscious desires. But for Chuang Tzu, to be too much immersed in passions and desires would render shallow one's sensitivity to Heaven's working. But there is still a way out, that is, by a profound and natural way of breathing, as deep as breathing with one's heels, by which one could minimize one's desire to the extent of sleeping without dreaming and waking without daily care.

But a more profound way of life praxis19 is symbolized by the narrative concerning the butcher Ting who, cutting an ox, behaves in such a marvelous way that he slithers the knife along with the musical rhythm of dancing, as good as an artist's practice. "All was in perfect rhythm, as though he were performing the dance of the Mulberry Grove or keeping time to the Ching-sou music."20

According to my interpretation, an ox is a living being constituted in a very complicated way, signifying thereby the complexity of life, individual as well as social. But, with an art of life praxis which is capable of grasping the complexity of life, one could eventually follow the natural rhythm and learn the way of freedom. As the narrative of the butcher says,

And now — now I go at it by spirit and don't look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I go along with the natural laws, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are.

There are spaces between the joints, and the blade of the knife has really no thickness. If you insert what has no thickness into such spaces, then there's plenty of room — more than enough for the blade to play about it.21

The praxis of life, as illustrated by the narrative of the butcher, makes its progress from the technical level to that of the Tao, and thereby becomes art. It is in fact an art of life praxis which realizes itself in the dynamism and movement of body. The body is the locus for this praxis; it is the incarnation of the art of life praxis. The scarcity of body is only one reason for which a human being should entertain and economize his body so as not to get lost in the vicissitudes of events. In concentrating oneself and in following the natural way of life, a free and fresh way of life could be achieved which would be the fulfillment of a life of harmony.

Harmony with God

Besides the relation of an individual with his fellowmen, and that of the human with nature, there is, ultimately speaking, the relation between the human and God. For Christianity, harmony with God is the original foundation of all other harmonious relations. This is based upon the Christian concept of God as creator of all things and it's concern for human suffering and evil. In the Bible, these were expressed in different forms such as jealousy, murder, war, illness, death, slavery, exile, natural calamities, etc. It is for saving humankind from suffering and evil that Christianity talks about salvation. Christianity, in its essence, explains the origin of suffering and evil in referring to the constitution of human nature, of which the relationship between the human and God is an essential constituent.

Relation with God as the Foundation of All Other Relations

When thinking of the Christian vision of human nature and the God/man relation, one might think of the doctrine of original sin. For some theologians original sin represents the original darkness in human nature inherited from Adam and Eve after they acted against a prohibitive rule of God. But, taking into consideration the Biblical context in which the narrative of so-called "original sin" appears, it would be better to interpret it as the defilement of a human nature which is originally created by God as good and in harmonious relationship with God.

The narrative of Adam's fall in *Genesis* shows us that human nature is originally created to be good, because it is situated in an ontology of goodness and a theology of the *Imago Dei*. First, the environment of human existence is constituted by all things which, after each was created by God, were proclaimed as good by Him. This is the ontological foundation upon which human beings emerge. Second, human beings are created by God according to the image of God: "God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them."22 Since God is supreme Good, his likeness should also be good, not evil in itself. And third, human beings are created with a cognitive faculty and free will and are responsible for their own action. This is the transcendental foundation of all moral good and evil.

Evil came when human beings abused their free will and interrupted their intersubjective relation with God, as represented by a covenant of the rule of action. By this interruption of relation, human beings were enclosed in the arrogance of their own subjectivity, cutting themselves off from their relation with God. Right after this interruption, human beings began to suffer. Evil and suffering were then consequences of the degeneration of human nature as *Imago Dei* and the ungrateful refusal of one' s relation with God. After original sin, humankind began to experience suffering and evil. Cain murdered Able, and other evils on and on. Humankind now must work in order to survive; it must make an effort in order to return to a harmonious relationship with nature and with God.

In Christianity, human nature as created in the likeness of God is originally good, but in the empirical exercises of this free will the human being could both possibly and actually choose to be self-enclosed to the point of denying the good relationship with God and thereby falling. This is similar to Chinese philosophy where Confucianism asserts that human nature is transcendentally good, but the Taoist critique by Lao Tzu points to its empirical process of degeneration due to negligence and forgetfulness of Tao and Teh.23 The difference is that Confucianism had to wait for Taoism for such a critical reflection on the human fall, whereas we find in Christianity a comprehensive image of the originally good human nature and its fall.

It should be noted here, that, since Christianity recognizes more liberty for human free will, and therefore more responsibility for human action, it recognizes great autonomy for human subjectivity, to the extent that it might seclude itself from all else, even to the point of rejecting God. So-called "hell" is the state of existence in which the human individual refuses God, cutting himself off from all relation with the other, and thereby excluding himself from his own salvation, not to mention his own possibility of perfection.24 But even if the human being could exclude him or herself from God, the love of God is infinitely immense so that such a state of existence could not refuse being penetrated by God's love. Just as St. Augustine, who defended in the most vehement way the existence of Hell, said, "Even if I were in Hell You would be there for if I go *down into hell, Thou art there also*."25 God's love will never abandon any being whatsoever. Because of this Jesus came to the world to save humankind. In Christianity salvation is the process of divine grace corroborating the self-transformation and enhancement of the human spirit towards the divine perfection from the state of self-exclusion of all human beings rooted in their finitude and selfishness.

Immanence /Transcendence and the Christian Ultimate Reality

For Christians, God is the Ultimate Reality. There is no salvation without God. As St. Augustine puts it: "Our hearts find no peace until they rest in you."26 He means that the human heart could not be calmed until it finds itself in the presence and grace of God. This sets up a principle of transcendence for the fulfillment of human potentiality. But the human soul still is related to God in its most profound being, and thereby to a certain degree the principle of immanence is recognized by Christianity. On the one hand, the dynamism of human nature is important for salvation, because this demands one's free will and virtuous efforts. On the other hand, this dynamism is not to be kept enclosed within itself, without openness to the other, and ultimately to an absolute Other, otherwise human beings find no fulfillment and therefore no salvation. In this sense, Christianity embodies also this wisdom of contrast, which profoundly grasps the dynamic tension within human nature and the relation between God and man. Jesus Christ clearly articulated this truth when he said:

Believe me, woman. The hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem. You worship what you do not know; we worship what we do know; for salvation comes from the Jews. But the hour will come — in fact it is here already — when true worshippers will worship the Father in Spirit and truth: that is the kind of worshipper the Father wants. God is spirit, and those who worship must worship in spirit and truth.27

Here Jesus proclaims a general salvation history, which begins from Jesus; and the only worship revealed by God through Jesus is to worship God in spirit and truth. For those who worship God in this way their salvation is not limited to external factors such as any place or racial or cultural group. In this sense, "worship" means a way to bring out what is most sincere in one's

own spirit, and to experience the truth as revealed to the human subjectivity in question. This recognizes the immanence principle by which human beings worship God with their most sincere spiritual dynamism.

In Christianity, the so-called immanence principle is based upon the fact that all men are created an *Imago Dei*. In some sense we can say that, for Christians, there is also certain divine nature in human beings, by which we should be as perfect as our Father in Heaven. This divinity of human beings is affirmed by Jesus when He says, "Is it not written in your Law: `I said, you are gods?' "So the Law uses the word `gods' for those to whom the word of God was addressed, and scripture cannot be rejected."28 Therefore, it is a common affirmation in Judeo-Christian tradition that human beings are created in *Imago Dei*. They are also children of God. In this sense human beings could be seen as gods. This divinity of human beings is therefore related ontologically to God and could be seen as the inner light, the locus of enlightenment and of human existence.

Nevertheless, in Christianity this immanence principle claims also a transcendence principle by which a human being will not be limited and thereby enclosed in his or her own subjectivity, because there always will be God, and truth and spirit are openness to God. Human spiritual illumination is never limited to itself and by itself because in human enlightenment there is relation with, and participation of, divine illumination. In this sense St. Augustine said, "God hath created man's mind rational and intellectual, whereby he may take in His light . . . and He so enlighteneth it of Himself, that not only those things which are displayed by the truth, but even truth itself may be perceived by the mind's eye."29 By this openness to God and enlightenment from God, human beings will never be enclosed in the *"Man, all too human*" type of humanism. In this sense, "worship" means to enhance one's self in the spirit of God and in the truth as enlightened by God himself to us. This is to say that in Christianity the immanence principle is always related to and enhanced by the transcendence principle, and is never to be separated therefrom.

For Christians, God is the most perfect Spiritual Being. He is the creator of the whole universe, including human beings, other sentient beings and all other things — a God unexplainable and unfathomable by all human discourses such as science, philosophy and theology. As the first cause and final end of the whole universe God has created all its beings. In it are human beings who, after a certain age, become selfish and egocentric, and tend to indulge themselves in enclosure within an arrogant self, to the exclusion of relationship with God. This is the beginning of a sinful life. Because of this God Himself came to the world and became truly man in order to deliver human beings from their self-exclusion or self-arrogance. His universally altruistic suffering and death on the cross was in order to liberate them from this sinful existence. The last end of human life and the world is to return to God, where there will be a New Heaven and Earth.

To say that God is the creator and the fulfillment of all beings is not to identify Him with Being, as would some scholastic philosophers. St. Thomas distinguished Being, which is the act of existence of all beings but which could not be seen as self-subsistent, and God, who is *Ipsum esse subsistens*.30 Besides, we should add that in God there are also unfathomable possibilities, which could be but not yet are. Here God could be conceived only in a negative way, as taught by negative theology. For lack of a better term, we could term these unfathomable possibilities as "nothingness," without which there would be no possibility for further fulfillment of Being. An unfathomable God cannot be identified with Being. God both is Being and transcends Being. He transcends therefore the distinction between Being and nothingness, and out of nothingness He created all beings.

We could say also that God is personal, in the sense that He is conscious and spiritual, that He knows and loves. But we can also say that He is not personal, in the sense that He is not "conscious"

and "spiritual" in the way that we are. He knows, but not in the way that we know. He loves, but not in the way that we love. According to the *via positiva* we could say that God is Being and personal; according to the *via negativa* we should say that he is neither Being nor personal as we conceive. God is personal and God transcends personality. We should say with Teilhard de Chardin that God is hyperpersonal.

In Taoism as well as in Buddhism, there is a common tendency towards Nothingness or Emptying as the most profound experience, going beyond even the experience of worshipping a personal God. This differs from the Christian emphasis on God as the *summum bonum* and the fulfillment of human beings in God as the destiny of all beings. For Lao Tzu, Tao is even more ancient than God as Lord of the realm of beings, for Tao manifests both being and nothingness. Being is there to manifest the traces and limits of realization, whereas nothingness is to manifest the marvelous possibilities. The unceasing dialectic between both leads to the gate of Tao, transcending all forms of realization. This is somewhat similar to the Heideggerian Ab-grund,31 always departing from all foundations. In Heidegger's eyes, the Christian conceptual framework is more like what he called "onto-theo-logy":32 on the one hand, it affirms Being as the ontological foundation of all things, on the other hand, it affirms God as the theological foundation of Being. On the contrary, Buddhism is more like a kind of anti-foundationalism: the emptying of all emptying is without any foundation and continues to depart from all foundation, in order to keep the human spirit as free as possible.

Man-God Communion and Experience of Nothingness

But, even if the Taoist experience of nothingness is most profound in its potentialities, still this does not mean that there is no God as fulfillment of being. Even if our freedom is so radical that not a single human discourse, no philosophical, scientific or theological doctrine could serve as foundation to our existence, still this does not mean that we are foundationless. There must be a certain foundation of Being, although the foundation itself is unfathomable and all our founding discourse should be deconstructed in order to keep the human spirit and its foundation free.

Taoism tends not to identify the Ultimate Reality with Being. It is also reluctant to recognize a personal God. It seems that for Taoism, as is in the case of Buddhism the personalization of God is a sign of inferiority when compared with the rich experience of impersonal Tao.33 Tao self-manifests into all things and resides in them, becoming thereby the natural laws, of which there are three: first, structural laws: all things are structurally constituted of opposite but complementary elements such as Ying/Yang, Rest/Movement, and the like; second, dynamic laws: the exhaustion of one state of affairs goes dialectically to its opposite state of affairs; third, teleological laws: the dialectical movement of the opposites aims finally at returning to Tao itself. These three natural laws operate despite human willingness and are therefore impersonal. In some sense, being impersonal is richer than being personal.

In Christianity, God created nature and its laws. Besides, God himself is everywhere in the world. God is impersonal not only in the sense of his unfathomableness, but also in the sense of his immanence in the lawfulness of the natural world and in the irreducible justice of the human world.

Still I think it is more human to think that God is personal who knows and loves and to whom we can pray. Although there is also a profound meaning in God as impersonal, unflexibly maintaining this thesis might also fall into a cult without feeling in which there is no personal

interaction and dialogue. This state of mind into which an impersonal interpretation of God and Tao is in danger of falling is something similar to what Jesus described:

What description can I find for this generation? It is like Children shouting to each other as they sit in the market place. "We played the pipes for you, and you would not dance; we sang dirges, and you would not mourn."34

For us human beings, to say God is personal is to say that God knows and loves and could be prayed to in our heart. But this does not mean that He knows, loves and listens to our prayers in our *human, too human* way. It is in this sense we can say that God is not personal but hyperpersonal, which means not that God does not know and love, but that he knows and loves in a hyper-excellent way. Especially in the Christian tradition of mysticism God is the Mystery of all mysteries. In the mystical experience of God there is a void of soul and a certain moment in which we enter the darkness of the soul, as St. John of the Cross would characterize it. There, in contemplative prayer, one enters into a mysterious, passive phase of experience losing oneself in an overwhelming rhythm which is not at all an interpersonal experience. In any case, God transcends the distinction between personality and impersonality. God is personal as well as hyperpersonal. In this contrast there emerges a tension of experience in which our relation with God becomes more and more profound.

Christian mysticism differs from Taoism in the fact that it recognizes not only the impersonal, passive, profound experience of nothingness, but also a personal love and dialogue between man and God, leading towards their mutual communion. Also in Christianity, there are various rich forms of communion, as concretized in the Covenants between humankind and God, communion among people, prayers, meditation, religious rites, the sacrament of communion, mystical grace, etc. This means that man could return to a harmonious relation with God through everyday life, religious rites and mystical experiences. The main purpose of these forms of communion is to return to the original harmony between man and God, which serves as the foundation of harmonious relations between humans and their fellowmen, and between humans and nature. In this way a life of harmony is optimized and human potentialities are fully unfolded.

Words of Conclusion

The human being's search for harmony must begin from this human world. Among all human relationships, an individual has to conduct himself as a human striving, on the one hand, for the excellence of one's natural ability and, on the other, for the harmonization of relations. This means that the Confucian ethics of virtue is essential for maintaining a harmonious life.

On this point, Christianity is quite the same as Confucianism. In the *Old Testament*, the rule set in the Garden by God to Adam and Eve is a rule by covenant, that is, a rule for the maintenance of the relationship between God and Human beings. The moral obligations concretized in the Ten Commandments result from the Mosaic covenant between God and Israel. Respect for the justice of God constitutes the reason for Israel's obedience to the obligations expressed in the Ten Commandments. These are not to be considered as heteronomy, as some scholars maintained in criticizing Christianity. Any distinction between autonomy and heteronomy still belongs to the ethics of obligation, in which there is priority of norm over virtue. But in Christianity, the truth is quite the contrary. And this is more evident in *the New Testament*, in which Jesus said, "If you love me then obey my order." Here the relation of love is in priority over the obedience of order. Obey, in order to love. Love is the essence of Jesus's commandment. Faith, hope, love, justice, wisdom, temperance, etc., are all important virtues in Christian ethics. In short, Christian ethics is

an ethics of virtue which emphasizes the perfection of human good and the fulfillment of good relationships.

Nowadays, when utilitarian and deontological ethics cannot provide meaning for human life in the valley of nihilism, it is for the common spiritual resources of Christianity and Confucianism to emphasize the priority of virtue over utility and obligation. Virtue is seen in these grand traditions as both the development and fulfillment of the goodness originally existing in human nature, both as the excellence of human ability and as the realization of good relation-ships. Obligation is considered as necessary only when it helps to form and achieve a virtuous life. Obligations are never taken at their face value, but exist for the formation of virtues. Human excellence and good relationships always are presupposed in the observance of obligations.

But Confucianism is accused quite often of being too occupied with human affairs. To this, Taoism has rightly pointed out the need to decentralize human concern in the form of concern for nature and to re-situate humankind in Nature. It is still more important to trace back our original relation with Tao, the ontological source of all creativity, lest our ethical dynamism degenerate into social conflict and disorder. By returning back to union with Tao, humankind finds an infinite source for its creativity and is thereby rendered more spontaneously human.

But, as Christianity points out, the union with Tao could not be a losing of one's self in an anonymous logos, or a union with a spontaneous but impersonal nature. The Ultimate Reality should be above impersonal determinism; it must be personal or hyperpersonal with whom one could have intersubjective dialogue and interpersonal communion.

Through a Confucian ethics of virtue, an individual could realize harmony with his fellowmen; through Taoist life praxis, human beings eventually could achieve harmony with nature; through multiple Christian ways in everyday life, religious rites or mystic grace, an individual could return to his original harmony with God. In thus deepening these three levels of existential relations, keeping each free and in peace, together they could form a maximum degree of harmony. Upon the existential relationship and the inner dynamism towards this ultimate harmony can be based a viable value system suitable for this time of rapid change and radical social conflict.

Notes

1. A.N. Whitehead, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1919), pp. 60-63.

2. M. Heidegger, *Identitat und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Max Niemeyer, 1972), p. 19.

3. Recent new elaboration by A. Badiou in *L'Etre et l'evenement* (Paris:Edition du Seil, 1988).

4. For me the philosophical concept of the other is best elaborated by Levinas in his *Totalité et infini*. I see it also as an example of the metaphysics of relationship.

5. *The Discourses and Sayings of Confucius*, translated by Ku Hung-ming (Taipei: Prophet Press, 1976), p. 145, some corrections by myself.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138, some corrections by myself.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

8. *The Works of Lao Tzu*, ch. 75.

9. *Ibid.*, chs. 30, 31.

10. M. Heidegger, *Holzwege (*Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 336; "Uberden Humanismus," in *Wegmarken (*Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1964), p. 159.

11. M. Heidegger, *Unterweg zur Sprache* (Tubingen: Neske, 1959), S. 198.

12. Lao Tzu, *Tao Teh Ching*, Ch. 1.

13. *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press: 1968), p. 80. Italics added by myself. Concerning the last sentence, I use the alternative translation in the footnote of Burton.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

17. See my *Annäherung an das taoistische Verständnis von Wissenschaft. Die Epistemologie des Lao Tses und Tschuang Tses,* in F. Wallner, J. Schimmer and M. Cost, eds., *Grenzziehungen zum Konstruktiven Realismus* (Wien: WUV Universitatsverlag, 1993).

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

19. I have developed Taoist practical methodology for knowing Tao in *Confucianism, Taoism and Constructive Realism,* pp. 43-58.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

22. *Genesis*, 1:27, in *The Jerusalem Bible, The Old Testament*, p. 16.

23. "Therefore, when Tao is lost, there comes *Teh* (Creative Power). When *Teh* is lost, there comes *Jen* (Love). When *Jen* is lost, there comes *Yih* (Righteousness). When *Yih* is lost, there comes *Lih* (the Ritual)." Lao Tzu, *Tao Teh Ching*, Ch. 38.

24. In Christianity, "hell" indicates this definitive state of self-exclusion from communion with God and with the blessed. *Catechisme de l'église catholique* (Paris: Mame/Plon, 1 992), p. 271.

25. St. Augustine, *Confessions,* translated by R.S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Classics, 1961), p. 4. Italics in the text.

26. St. Augustine, *Confessions,* translated by R.S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Classics, 1961), p. 1.

27. *John*, 4, 21-24 in *The Jerusalem Bible, The New Testament* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 153.

28. *John*, 10, 34-35 in *Jerusalem Bible, New Testament*, p. 170, In *Psalms*, 82,6, it reads "I once said, `You too are gods, son of the Most High, all of you.'" *Jerusalem Bible, Old Testament,* p. 867.

29. In *Ps.* 118, *Serm.*, 18, 4, quoted from F. Copleston, A *History of Philosophy, Vol. Il* (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1960), p. 63.

30. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* I,29, 2; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 25.

31. M. Heidegger, "Wozu Dichter," in *Holzweg* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1938), p. 248

32. M. Heidegger, *Identitat une Differenz* (Pfallingen: Gunther Neske, 1957), pp. 60-63.

33. In Taoism as religion, there is God in Heaven (*Tian Dih*) similar to the Christian God; in Buddhism there is also some tendency of divinization of Buddha in Mahasamghikas.

34. *Matthew,* 11, 16-17, in *Jerusalem Bible, New Testament,* p. 32.

Part V
Communication Between Cultures

20.

The Change of Society and the Exchange of Values

Zhang Qingxiong

Science, technology and economy connect all inhabitants of the earth, and humankind is experiencing a global crisis in ecology, politics and economy. Such problems as environmental pollution, the gap between the rich and the poor, inequality between men and women, political and economic oppression are troubling us more than ever, and a global ethic is indeed necessary to deal with those problems. However, we cannot avoid the problem of how it is possible to arrive at a consensus concerning ethical values among the people whose political and economic interests, cultural traditions and social institutions are different. This is the main issue with which the following article deals. Its response is that human beings have the same structure of consciousness, exist in similar life-worlds, and together confront global problems, so that they can share their historic experiences, communicate their information, exchange their ideas, and jointly set up new ethical standards. Moral practice demands that we develop a transcendent spirit, namely one capable of transcending various kinds of selfishness.

Inasmuch as all the main traditions of human culture encourage a transcendent spirit we can expect that human beings can reach a moral consensus and put it into practice. Values (ethical ideals and standards) come from and guide our social life. Values are contingent upon present social institutions, but they also go beyond the ordinary limits of the present institutions and cause their transformation. In a changing world the people's concepts of what is right, worthwhile or desirable are changing. The change of political and economic institutions causes changes in people's concepts of value, whereas the change of people's concepts of value causes changes in institutions.

Values are plural and it is necessary to achieve a coherence and harmony among different values. Although the values of different cultures differ, still we can find some resemblances; although people's concepts of value have been changing all the time in history, nevertheless we can discovery something relatively stable. It is important to distinguish what is changeable and what stable concerning value. Through reflection and dialogue we can reach a consensus regarding a basis for a stable set of values.

Values tell us what we should do; they are not descriptions of fact, but guides of action. We perform a task, because we think it valuable; when it leads to a good life, we continue, otherwise we revise our concepts of value. However, the real situation is very complicated, for different people have different answers to what is a good life, because their interests and experiences are not the same. An idea or action is valuable insofar as the conditions are fit for it; it is meaningless to talk about values without regard to the real situation.

Concepts of value are closely connected with social institutions: people in a feudal society usually regarded a high social rank as honor; people in a capitalist society especially admire money. Nowadays Chinese society has been transforming from a planned to a market economy; correspondingly the Chinese people have been changing their concepts of value. The consciousness of a market economy as free competition, making one's own decisions and individual responsibility are gradually growing among the Chinese people. However, the social institution is not the only factor that determines the concept of value and we always can find some people whose concepts of value transcend the social institutions of their time.

In a feudal society some people disregard high social rank; in a capitalist society there are some people who dislike riches. Philosophers such as Socrates and Wittgenstein rose above the ordinary limits of their time, not only in their thoughts but also in their conduct. New concepts of value can cause a transformation of an old social institution. The voice for new value often is very weak at the beginning, but grows stronger and at last overcomes the domination of the old ideas and establishes a new institution. Hence, in history we see the concept of political equality coming into being in the feudal society where political privilege was characteristic, and the concept of social welfare and insurance emerging in a capitalist societies that gave priority to free competition.

We must not overlook that the conflicts of different values kept company with conflicts of interest and that due to their many did not accept new concepts of value. In the past we paid a disastrous price for the conflicts between new values and established interests. People inherit their concepts of value largely from the traditional culture which became such only after its doctrines had been practiced. Confucian thought became Chinese culture because it has been carried out by Chinese people for more than two thousand years; its values have been institutionalized both in family life and in political activity and are manifested also in literature and the arts. As customary forces they still affect us, but while recognizing their traditional efficacy, we see that people tend to modify their ideas of value according to their practical experience.

As values are tied to everyone's concrete life, they should not be talked about only in the abstract. One forms one's values finally on the basis of one's personal encounters. Some people attach a great deal of value to safety and trust, while the others put a high value on enterprise and adventure. Usually children, the aged and the disabled need social protection, whereas youths, adults, the intelligent and the strong prefer to have more opportunities. Some hold persistently to their concept of value, while others change their values several times in their life along with the development of their personal experience and ability. Therefore we need to keep a balance of different values in a society, and social institutions can regulate the combination of various values such as freedom, equality and security by means of education, praise or punishment, etc. What would be the best combination is a very complicated issue, probably to be worked out through reflection on historic experiences and the dialogue among different individuals and communities. We believe human beings can find a good solution, even though the way is zigzag.

In recent times Chinese society has undergone a great change. Old institutions have been abolished, whereas the new ones are far from perfect. We see conflicts between the old values and new institutions, between traditional values and modern values. The smooth transition into a new economic and social order depends on an open-minded attitude to different opinions. Only a democratic manner of dealing with divergence can give peace and satisfaction.

Nowadays science, technology and economy connect all inhabitants of the earth, while humankind experiences a global crisis in ecology, politics and the economy. Such problems as environmental pollution, the gap between the extremely poor and well-off countries, the conflict between the rich and the poor, the inequality between men and women, the confrontation between those ruling and those ruled disturb us more than ever. A global ethics is indeed necessary to deal with these global problems. However, we cannot ignore the fact that in the different social systems and different national cultures the dominant conceptions of value differ, and that people with different political and economic interests insist upon different concepts of value. When we say that we can solve the conflict of divergent values by means of dialogue, we must consider the basis or conditions for this dialogue. What make it possible, and how can we successfully achieve our goal?

Differences and Dialogue on Values

Human beings can exchange their concepts of value because in a general way they have the same structure of consciousness, a similar life-world, many similar actual and historic experiences, and many common problems. We can share our experiences and ideas for dealing with our common problems.

Human beings have the same structure of consciousness; our consciousness is consciousness of something, its acts are intentionally related to a combination of intentional content and objective reference. For instance, when I see a tree my seeing is the intentional act, whose mental image of the tree is the intentional content, while the real tree in time and space is the objective reference. My mental image may be different from yours as I have my image, and you have yours. So the mental image is immanent, and to a certain degree private. However, we can talk about the same thing, because we have the same objective reference, which is one of the conditions that make intersubjective communication possible. As our language is formed on the basis of this objective reference, we can understand each other.

It might be objected that a tree is a real thing and therefore we can exchange ideas about the tree, whereas ideas of values are not real things and so we cannot exchange ideas of value. It is true that values are not real things, but still they have objective reference. The intentional content of values should be distinguished from its objective reference. The objective reference of value is not only real things, but also people's actions, behaviors and operation. Our concepts of value manifest themselves in our life-world: we work hard for valuable things; we feel sorry over bad conduct; we are glad to meet good friends; we enjoy a new opera or beautiful scenery; and we are moved and inspired by an heroic deed. As long as people's consciousness is consciousness of something, and their praxes are intentional actions, we can discern their ideas of value by observing their behavior and reflecting on our own intentions. We have empathy toward other persons, because we live together with them in a common life-world and share feelings and experiences. Intersubjective understanding is based on the combination of consciousness with bodily behavior which is intersubjectively observable.

There are various kinds of cognitive objects such as real objects (physical things), mathematical and logical objects, and such objects as ideas of value; each has its various particular cognitive approach. Empirical observation and experiment are suitable for research on physical objects. Formal analysis, deduction and inference are proper for investigations of mathematical and logical objects. Hermeneutics is appropriate for the comprehension of values. Here I do not want to deal with the problem of hermeneutics. Concerning the understanding of values I would only point out that hermeneutics has three basic moments: present life, past experience, future actions and their consequences. Interpretation moves back and forth in the three dimensions, so as to help people to comprehend what is really right, worthwhile and significant for their life.

Usually we take the present life as the starting point for interpretation, because the present life provides us with lively experiences. We know what we are seeing now, what we are thinking now, what we like or dislike now, and so on; we know how we get along with other people and the surrounding environment; we always meet some new problems and have to solve them; we need to do something to improve our life. In these cases we consider whether our actions are correct, suitable and valuable. Sometimes our ethical choices are very complicated. When our present experiences are not enough, we turn to historic knowledge for help. We need to consult all human history, which includes not only that of our nation, but also that of other nations. We must pay

attention to the consequence of our actions and always stand prepared to remove errors and make adjustments at any time.

Present experience, historic knowledge and the consequences of action are resources from which we learn values. By means of reflection and interpretation on them we distinguish between prolonged and short-term welfare, between necessary and limitless consumption, between socially beneficial and non-beneficial uses of property, between justified and unjustified uses of natural resources, and between a profit-only and a socially beneficial and ecologically-oriented market economy. The hermeneutic method helps us to understand better ethical values and leads us to recognize the ultimate meaning of human existence.

Difficulties

There are several difficulties in intercultural dialogue and intersubjective understanding which we should seriously consider.

The first difficulty: When each party in a dialogue insists upon its own faith, how can the participants reach a consensus? In the case of dialogue among different religions, Christians believe Jesus Christ; the Buddhists believe Buddha; Confucians believe the teachings of Confucius. It seems impossible to reach an agreement when all maintain their own faith and call the others to conversion thereto.

But a distinction must be made between religious faiths and ethical values. Many religious traditions hold that their faith or creed came from revelation, and therefore that we cannot reach a consensus concerning faith or creed by means of dialogue on the basis of human understanding in the empirical world. Values, how-ever, are something different. Religious faiths have great influence on ethical values, but values are constituted mainly on practical human experiences. In addition, religious faiths should stand in harmony with human understanding.

In Christianity, Thomas Aquinas affirmed that the revealed and rational truths ought not conflict with each other, for in the final analysis they all stem from God. In the Buddhist tradition, three kinds of knowledge are classified, that is, knowledge based on Buddhist holy doctrine, the knowledge based on intuition, and the knowledge based on comparison. The knowledge based on Buddhist holy doctrine, in spite of its importance, is not held to be superior to the knowledge based on intuition and on comparison, for Buddha himself established his doctrine on the basis of intuition and comparison.

In the Confucian tradition, people believe in Heaven and Divine guidance. Confucius said: "There are three things that a gentleman fears: he fears the will of Heaven, he fears great men, he fears the words of the Divine Sages" (*The Analects of Confucius*, 16:8). On the other hand, the Confucians emphasized empirical knowledge. They held that the Divine Sages established their knowledge on the basis of observation of phenomena in heaven, circumstances on earth, behavior of the body, and the process of thinking (ref. *The Book of Change*, XICI II). This means that Christendom, Buddhism, and Confucianism all stress the importance of empirical knowledge and rational inquiry. Thus we can set up an epistemological principle for intercultural dialogue without which intersubjective understanding and consensus on value are not possible.

The second difficulty: Human beings do not have the ability to know good and evil because of their deep sins; hence, practice and interpretation are useless for their moral improvement. It is true that there have been many evils in human history. In the classical Confucian book *Spring and*

Autumn we see that the first recorded Chinese history was merely one of bloody killing between monarchs, between king and administrators, between father and son, or between brother and brother.

In the Bible we see also what sinful deeds men committed. For instance, Cain, the first son of Adam and Eve, killed his brother Abel, because he was jealous of his brother. No wonder we read the sentences in the Bible: "The Lord saw how great man's wickedness on the earth had become, and that every inclination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil all the time. The Lord was grieved that he had made man on the earth, and his heart was filled with pain" (*Genesis* 6:5-6:6).

However, we should see another fact that human beings are able to know good and evil, even though they do many evil things. When a person commits a crime, usually he knows his guilt. For example, at the moment a person lies, he knows he intends to deceive. Owing to ignorance we may do some false things, but we will not do so when we are instructed or well informed. The Chinese scholar commented: Confucius wrote *Spring and Autumn*, so the rebellious administrators and bandits feared. This means that they knew their guilt, for otherwise they would not fear that their misdeeds would be exposed. The story of "original sin" in the Bible is of great significance. The event that Adam and Eve ate the fruit of wisdom symbolizes the beginning of human sin and suffering, on the one hand, and the beginning of human knowledge of good and evil, on the other. Since everyone has the ability to know good and evil, it is possible to awaken a human being from his evil state and for him to become a new moral person.

The third difficulty: Human beings are selfish. Their selfishness prevents them from doing good works and accepting good instructions, even though they know good and evil. This is a strong argument against the possibility of intersubjective understanding and intercultural dialogue. Indeed, human beings have different interests. Usually they put their own interests first and when these conflict with moral principles, often they are unwilling to observe moral principles. I would not deny these facts. However, we should consider some other facts which show that people transcend their individual interests. These unselfish deeds give us the hope for political and economic coexistence and ethical consensus. Human beings can change their ethical values on the following grounds.

Firstly, ethical values should not be in conflict with the total interests of humanity, inasmuch as ethical values serve the fundamental interests of human beings. On this basis obligatory ethics can be combined with utilitarian ethics, and a common ethical code can be established. When all people in a country observe this common ethical code, the people certainly will have a prosperous and secure life. When all nations in the world observe this common ethical code, world peace and prosperity will be guaranteed.

Secondly, human beings can go beyond the limits of individual interest to a certain extent. We see that a mother usually loves her child; many individuals gladly help their relations or friends; many people contribute their money and other belongings for victims of a natural calamity, the disabled and the poor. This means that people have a transcendent spirit in some degree. This transcendent spirit proceeds from what is near to distant domains. Although this benevolence is shown only in a limited relationship, still it should be praised. While we see the evil side of human conduct, we should see also the good side and encourage this transcendent spirit through ethical education.

Finally, all great cultural traditions in the world advocate the transcendent spirit. In the tradition of Christianity this transcendent spirit is epitomized in Jesus's redemptive action. He devoted his life for the salvation of humankind. To the Christians who have used the cross as a

symbol of their faith, it has seemed that in his willing-ness to suffer death for the redemption of his fellow men and women Jesus has given to them their clearest insight into the quality of the redemptive love of God himself.

In the Buddhist tradition a transcendent benevolence (love without attachment) is encouraged. Buddha charged his disciples to love all humanity with a mother's love:

"As a mother, even at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son, so let him cultivate love without measure toward all beings. Let him cultivate toward the whole world — above, below, around — a heart of love unstinted, unmixed with the sense of differing or opposing interests"(*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. X, Part 2, *The Sutta Nipata*, translated by V. Fausboell [Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1881], p. 25).

It should be noted that the transcendental Buddhist spirit of salvation is embodied by Bodhisattvas. Especially in China and Japan, these have been regarded as beings who, out of love and pity for suffering humanity, transfer their merit, as need arises, to those who call upon them in prayer or in devotional reflection, so that they postpone their entrance into Nirvana, even readily falling into hell.

In the Confucian tradition, benevolence (*ren*) has been postulated as the first principle of the universe and of human life. Confucius said: "No people with lofty ideals and benevolent minds will ever seek life at the expense of benevolence; and it may be that they have to give their life in order to achieve benevolence" (*The Analects of Confucius*, Book 15:8).

Thus it can be seen that all three great religions advocate the transcendent spirit. Inspired by this spirit people rise above the ordinary attitude for human life and society, and do things not primarily referring to their own interests, but in consideration of the welfare of the whole of humankind and of future generations. This transcendent spirit is the essence of all truthful religions. Owing to this the religions have developed into notable cultures. This presents a striking contrast to secular culture which is so much involved in profit-oriented economic activity that it has become a vulgar culture. Our sentiments and ideas of value need to be fostered by a notable culture for our social institutions are forever changing.

What remains stable in the ever changing societies is this transcendent spirit. Without this, human beings would fall into ruin our conflicts of interest. With this spirit, intersubjective understanding and intercultural exchange is possible. Human beings have the same structure of consciousness, exist in a similar life-world, confront together global problems, and are inspired by the humanitarian spirit, so that they can share their historical experiences, communicate their thoughts, exchange their values, and jointly set up a better ethical code. Here the key lies in the transcendent spirit. Moral practice requires that we develop altruism, namely, transcend various kinds of selfishness. Given that all main traditions of human culture encourage the transcendent spirit, we can expect that human beings can reach moral consensus and have a glorious future.

21.

Lifeworld and the Possibility of Intercultural Understanding

Zhang Rulun

In our times, intercultural understanding becomes increasingly important for the future of human beings. However, the more we try to understand different cultures, the greater becomes the problem of whether different cultures really and rightly can understand each other.

At first glance, it seems absurd and foolish to raise such a question, especially for me, a Chinese professor of Western philosophy. How can I conceive that it is impossible for me to understand what I study and teach? As a Chinese philosopher, however, I know in our tradition there are no such concepts as being, essence, transcendence, reason and many other basic concepts of Western philosophy, and no such things as ontology, epistemology, dialectic, aesthetics, or even philosophy. By what means then can we understand Western philosophy, or further, Western culture?

Like the Western tradition, one of the primary thrusts of our tradition has been to reduce, absorb or appropriate what is taken to be "the Other" to "the Same," which means as well "the Universal." For early modern Chinese philosophers, Western philosophy, like physics and chemistry, is not an absolute Other, but rather "the Universal," which means also "the Same." Consequently, people try to find "the Universal" (ontology, epistemology, dialectics, etc.) in our tradition, and elucidate Chinese thought in terms of Western philosophy.

The legitimacy of this practice is founded on the belief that there is only one world, one reality. The only world is the natural world given by the modern idea of scientific realism. This world is intended as a mathematical, causally ordered "in-itself," and what is given in experience is constituted as the caused appearance of this underlying substrate. Sciences claim that the world they describe is an "objective" world, and this objectivity implies universal intersubjective verifiability. Therefore, we have the same world, the same mind, the same truth.

The Chinese believe the world to be given, not constructed. Therefore, it is very difficult for the Chinese to understand the active and constructive character of the scientific view of reality. This is also why it is so hard for them to understand transcendental philosophy correctly. However, so long as people believe we have only one world and the same mind, the problem of intercultural under-standing itself could not be a problem in any authentic sense.

Husserl's theory of the lifeworld undermines the above-mentioned belief. According to this doctrine, the world of science is not the final one. It is founded on the lifeworld in which we live. The lifeworld is prior to the world of science in three senses. First, the lifeworld is prior historically, both in human history in general and in the development of the individual. Further, the lifeworld is universally given, whereas the world of science is not: not all cultures or persons have the natural world as described by modern science. In contrast, every culture has its own lifeworld and possesses its own everyday, practical experiences of all things. This is the case as much for societies with modern science as for those without it.1 The third and much stronger sense of priority which Husserl attributes to the lifeworld is priority in the order of *Seinsgeltung*. That is, he argues that the world as posited and described by the sciences is a high-order construction attained by abstraction, idealization, and (in the case of the natural sciences) induction from the concrete intuitive bases provided by the lifeworld. Thus, if there were no lifeworld with Evidenz-grounded existential validity for us, then neither could the world of science have existential validity

and so "be" for us: the abstract or theoretical entities of the sciences could not be thought and given in intentional acts. Therefore, the lifeworld is the foundation of the world of science.

However, the lifeworld is not merely a sensible world, but a full-fledged cultural-historical world. It contains all the sedimentation of past cultural-historical and ideal activities, and hence varies more or less dramatically from one culture and period to another. For this reason, there cannot be a common lifeworld, but plural and different lifeworlds, each intentionally referenced ("relativized") to a special intersubjective community as the group for which this world is "there." This means that different peoples have different lifeworlds. Statements of this position are found even in Husserl's major published works,2 but in his personal manuscripts the plurality of concrete lifeworld is asserted repeatedly in the clearest and most unambiguous terms. For example, in manuscript A V9 of 1927 entitled "Umwelt und 'Wahre' Welt," Husserl writes:

Thus for the Zulu, the things we know and experience as sciences, scientific works and literature, are simply not there as books, journals, etc., although the books are there for the Zulu as things, and possibly as things imbued with this or that magical property; that is, with interpretations which in turn are not there for us. If we take what presents itself in the subjective consensus (*subjektiv-einstimmig*) of experience, or in the consensus of experience nationally or socially in the historical community, if we take this to belong to the concrete world of experience of this human community, then we must say: every such human community has a different concrete world.3

If so, how and to what extent can it be possible to understand other cultures? Husserl asserts the limited intersubjectivity of many objects of the concrete world in manuscript A V 10 of 1925, entitled "Zur Beschreibung der Umwelt":

"We do not share the same lifeworld with all human beings. Not all humans `on the face of the earth' have in common with us all the objects which constitute our lifeworld and determine our personal acting and striving, even when these persons come into actual contact with us, as they can at any time. . . . Objects which are there for us — although admittedly in changing, now harmonious, now conflicting apprehensions — are not there for them, and this means, the others have no apprehensions, no experience at all of them as these objects. This is the case even when they see them, and as we say, see these same objects of ours. . . . If we add a Bantu to this human community, then it is clear that faced with any of our works of art, he does see a thing, but not the object of our surrounding world, the art work. He has no opinion, no apprehension of it — as this object, the art work — that is in 'our' world as the David of Michelangelo with the 'objective' determinations belonging to this work."4

But this does not mean that Husserl holds that since certain elements of one lifeworld are not elements of another, *Wechselver-staendigung* of interculture is impossible. The very contrary is the case. According to Husserl, the concrete lifeworlds nonetheless contain a universal structure or nucleus of experience, and there exists sufficient common ground between the two lifeworlds to construct a path from this to the hitherto "inaccessible" meaning structures and intentional objects. For example, in the case of the old-fashioned Zulu and the book, the existence of language and communication even in a lifeworld without writing could provide such a ground. Thus the Zulu would understand what language and communication are and what signs are, and on this basis could come to (the intentional constitution of) written language, and to a book as a form of communication employing this language. The book would then belong to his lifeworld much as to any lifeworld with writing and books. Nevertheless, the question is: can the fact that by means of

language and communication people can arrive at the same understanding of some objects such as books justify that there is a general structure of lifeworlds?

It is clear that the intercultural understanding is not merely understanding of such objects as books or art works. It is not too difficult to find enough examples where intersubjectivity or *Wechselverstaedigung* is impossible even where we have ideal, or at least maximally favorable pragmatic conditions for understanding. Religion can provide many examples of this sort. As in the case of the Zulu, Husserl frequently points out that the lifeworld of "primitives" is populated by demons, spirits, and other fantastical beings — beings which have communal *Seinsgeltung*for them, but not for Westerners. Of course, a modern Western anthropologist can come to an excellent appresentation of the lifeworld of the primitive, including its spirits, and "mythical" gods and beasts. Similarly the Zulu or any people from non-Western cultures could arrive at an understanding of how the wine and wafer are constituted in the intentional life of a Christian. But it is one thing to have an understanding of a foreign lifeworld, and quite another to regard it as one's own. Intersubjectivity and *Wechselverstaendigung* in the relevant sense require not merely the former, but also the latter. The latter not only means to comprehend the meaning of an alien lifeworld, but also to live in it. A person who appresents the inten-tional life of alien cultures while failing to constitute its world as real for himself may indeed understand the other traditions, but does not necessarily agree with them. Nor does the content of each lifeworld offer any certain way of enabling us to resolve this disagreement and arrive at the same understanding of all things. At best consensus would consist in acknowledgment of the incommen-surability of lifeworlds: these beings belong only to our lifeworld, and those to others, without a demand or need for a resolution of this difference. In other words, there is no longer an objective reality in the strict sense of "there for everyone," but only in the subjective-relative sense of "there for the we." Consequently, the Zulu might not cease to perceive the book as embodying his ancestor's spirits while he could come to perceive it as a medium for written communication.

Similarly, I cannot see why I must perceive the world as constituted of monads while I understand what the monad means in Leibniz's philosophy. Given Husserl's theory of the lifeworld, it should be that intercultural understanding is possible in an authentic sense, if it means to understand the other cultures as the Other; otherwise it is impossible, because we cannot transcend our lifeworld or remove its constraints upon our understanding. Even if the lifeworld is the horizon against which all things stand out and without which they could not appear to us,5 the "fusion of horizons" should be limited. After all, there is no common lifeworld, and the difference between lifeworlds cannot be eliminated. In fact, Husserl is aware of this and recognizes that the lifeworld is itself relative. He writes in the *Crisis*:

[The lifeworld] is the spatio-temporal world of things as we experience them in our pre- and extra-scientific life and as we know them to be experienced. . . . Things: that is, stones, animals, plants, even human beings and human products; but here everything is subject-relative (*subjektiv-relativ*), even though normally in our experience and in the social group united with us in the community of life, we arrive at 'secure' facts'. . . . But when we are thrown into an alien social sphere, that of the Negroes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that are for them fixed, generally verified or verifiable, are by no means the same as ours.6

Yet Husserl argues that while the concrete lifeworlds of each human community may vary, nonetheless the various lifeworlds share a common general structure. This shared structure of all lifeworld experiences can provide the foundation for the formation of high-order concepts and

evidences (e.g., concerning physical bodies, numbers, geometrical shapes) of universal intelligibility and verifiability. Thus, he continues in the *Crisis* passage:

The embarrassment of the relativity of the lifeworld disappears as soon as we consider that the lifeworld does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative.7

Indeed, the natural sciences presuppose that despite cultural-historical differences there is basically a single normal human experience of the spatio-temporal realm of sensible bodies. Thus the empirical verifications carried out by a member of a particular lifeworld could in principle be carried out by a member of any lifeworld, and the judgments of natural science are (at least potentially) of universal intersubjectivity. Similarly, the mathematician and the logician presuppose that the concepts employed in their judgments are universally accessible, and that the judgments themselves can be re-enacted again and again, in any historical period or cultural context — and always with exactly the same meaning and always attaining the same *Evidenz*. But if mathematical and logical concepts are themselves formed by abstraction from and idealization of the concrete intuitive objects of the lifeworld, then the assertion of the universal intersubjectivity of mathematics and logic also presupposes that there is a common structure running through all lifeworlds.8

Nevertheless, ironically, the position is valid only under the condition that the world of science is given, not constructed, that is, it is the primordial world. But that would contradict Husserl's doctrine of the lifeworld, since a common character of logic, mathematics or natural sciences is their constructiveness. In the final analysis, they are something like the rules of a game which are accepted universally. That is why their judgments are intersubjectively valid, unless we can verify that there is only one world and that natural sciences are the mirror of it. And, as David Carr argues, the plausibility of the claim that a universal structure actually exists is seriously undermined once we realize that the lifeworld includes not only things and persons, but also the sedimentation of historically contingent philosophies, religions, sciences, and other cultural formations. These penetrate so deeply into our way of apprehending reality that not only the content, but also the very structure of experience is affected. Thus even at the most basic levels of sensible perception, lifeworlds may differ fundamentally depending upon the theories and interpretations prevalent in them. "It becomes harder and harder to distinguish between the world as experienced and the world as interpreted by this or that theory. The theory has become part of our way of experiencing."9 In fact, there are different spatio-temporal concepts relative to different cultures and different historical periods.

A common structure transcending all theoretical and cultural-historical elements and running through all lifeworlds can hardly be verified not only empirically but also theoretically. The fact that there is no population without experience of space and time does not mean that different peoples have the same experience of space and time, nor can it verify that the Zulu has the same world view as has the Westerner. The universal validity of the results attained by the sciences only illustrates that human beings have some common experiences which make the intersubjective intelligibility and verifiability of scientific principles possible, but not that there is a "general structure" running through all lifeworlds which can definitively guarantee that the people from different lifeworlds finally come to the same understanding. Granted that there is a common structure or layer of spatio-temporal experience running through all lifeworlds, it can be only the general foundation for the sciences, but not the basic lifeworld stratum, because the lifeworld is

not the natural world, but a cultural-historical world. In the last analysis, as mentioned above, the world of science is not a given world, but a constructed one. The fact that the people from the different lifeworlds receive it as well as mathematics or logic only illustrates that they can share the same understanding of some objects as they can share the same understanding of the matters of mathematics or logic. But it does not prove that beneath their different lifeworlds there is a common structure and thus they are bound to understand the Other as the Same or the I.

It is obvious that the concrete lifeworlds overlap each other only in part, not as a whole. It is the overlapping parts that constitute the foundation which enables us to reach beyond our particular culture and understand and communicate with representatives of different cultures. However, it does not mean that we will arrive at the same understanding with them. No degree of dialogue or experience will enable us to share a single concrete lifeworld in its full sensible givenness. At most consensus here would mean acknowledgment of relativity on both sides: the constitution of our sensible lifeworld as our world, and not theirs. Even though we can call the overlapping parts of different lifeworlds their common structure, this cannot eliminate their differences and become the foundation of their commensurability. Of course, the common structure beneath different lifeworlds in the Husserlian sense does not designate their overlapping parts. In fact, it is just a theoretical construction by Husserl. However, it obviously contradicts his idea of the plurality of lifeworlds.

Furthermore, Husserl's presupposition of a common structure of lifeworlds suggests that he would not allow for a complete incommensurability of lifeworlds. In the final analysis, however, Husserl's justification of the common structure depends upon the solipsistic tendencies of his phenomenology, according to which the transcendental self is primary. On the one hand, for Husserl the world is a "universal mental acquisition . . . , having developed and at the same time continuing to develop as the unity of a mental configuration." As such it is a sense formation of a universal, ultimately functioning subjectivity.10 On the other hand, even where the Other disagrees with me, this disagreement itself and its ground must be capable of being given to me as a phenomenon. In the final analysis, the Other is constituted by me. Although it permits the Other to remain the Other, I constitute the Other after the I as the transcendental ego. It is I that bestows the sense of the Other's being. Husserl's justification for according the primacy to the self follows from the principle of all principles: my own intentional life is immediately given, whereas the intentional life of the Other is appresented on the basis of my own. One of the guiding aims of the crisis thematic is to elucidate phenomenologically the lifeworld itself on the basis of the original sense-bestowals of transcendental subjectivity. Thus the commensurability of lifeworlds is actually founded on a subjective structure, not a universal or intersubjective one. It follows that for Husserl the intercultural understanding could only be to understand the Other as the Same, not as the Other. The general structure by various lifeworlds in reality can only be a subjective one of a certain lifeworld.

In the face of a rising tide of irrationalism and nationalism, both political and philosophical, Husserl appeals for rationalism and "Europeanism" in his writings during the 1930's. According to Husserl, the crucial feature which distinguishes "European" rationality from the more natural-pragmatic rationality of other cultures (including those he classes as "quasi-philosophical," such as the Indian and the Chinese) is its goal-idea of absolute truth, i.e. truth which is the same for everyone and for all times, and ultimately grounded.11 Thus the culturally imperialist-sounding rhetoric of the *Crisis* suggests that Husserl's attempt to place Europe "as a spiritual shape" at the telos of human civilization is in reality to claim the universality of European culture. Given this aim, the construction of the general structure shared by different lifeworlds is necessary

theoretically for Husserl, but it can never be justified if we insist on the original difference and plurality of lifeworlds. It seems quite obvious that often, and with good will, we look for a sameness or likeness in our encounter with other cultures and with persons from those other cultures -- but a sameness that, in actuality, tends to assimilate the Other to oneself. If the intercultural understanding is to look for the sameness, what is its necessity and significance for us? It would be meaningless to discuss the possibility of this kind of intercultural understanding, because it would be absolutely possible anyway, but its necessity and legitimacy would be in question. Given the incommensurability of concrete lifeworlds, real intercultural understanding is possible only when we understand the Other as the Other, not as the Same. Yet if we, like Husserl, presuppose a common structure running through all lifeworlds which consists in the fact that the transcendental ego, this null-point of subjectivity, must justify all "objective" validity, it is impossible for us to understand the Other as the Other. We necessarily reduce the Other to the I of the Same. By contrast, acknowledging the radical alterity of the Other does not mean that there is no way of understanding the Other. Incommensurable languages and traditions are not to be thought of as self-contained windowless monads that share nothing in common. Our linguistic horizons are always open. This is what makes possible intercultural understanding, and sometimes even a "fusion of horizons" possible.

Conclusion

To summarize the results of our discussion, the difference and incommensurability of lifeworlds make intercultural understanding necessary and fruitful, if the goal of the intercultural understanding is above all to understand the Other, not the I. The supposition of a common structure running through all lifeworlds is unjustifiable both empirically and in principle. Acknowledging the presupposition of such a common structure cannot eliminate the difference of lifeworlds; but necessarily leads to the claim by some culture to universal validity. The incommensurability of lifeworlds does not mean that the intercultural understanding is impossible.

There are always parts overlapping and crisscrossing which provide a foundation for us to use our linguistic, emotional and cognitive imagination to grasp what is being expressed and said in "alien" traditions. But we must do this in such a way that we resist dual temptations. One would be facilely to assimilate what others are saying to our own categories and language without doing justice to what is genuinely different and may be incommensurable. The other would be simply to dismiss what the "Other" is saying as incoherent nonsense. We must refuse any culture's claim to universality, if we insist on the plurality of lifeworlds. Intercultural understanding should enable us to learn more about the Other, and then about the We ourselves as well. Intercultural understanding should be dialogue, not monologue.

Notes

1. *Husserliana* VI, 125.
2. See, for example, *Husserliana* I, 160-3; and *Husserliana* VI, 142.
3. Quoted from Gail Soffer, *Husserl and the Question of Relativism* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), p. 151.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 151-2.

5. David Carr, “The Lifeworld Revisited,” in *Husserl’s Phenomenology: Textbook*, edited by William R. McKenna and J.N. Mohanty (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, University Press of America, 1989), p. 297.

6. *Husserliana* VI, 141; English translation from *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, translated by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 139.

7. *Husserliana* VI, 142; English translation from *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 139.

8. See *Husserliana* VI, 385.

9. See David Carr, “The Lifeworld Revisited,” in *Husserl’s Phenomenology: Textbook*, p. 307.

10. *Husserliana* VI, 115; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 113.

11. See *Husserliana* VI, 327-331.

22.
On the Unity of Pluralistic Values

Yu Xuanmeng

The Problem

"What is value?" is a difficult problem to explicate. "What is the basis of Value?" is even more difficult, yet, it is a hot topic in our time. Here we shall discuss the phenomenon that theoretically value is both a hot and a difficult problem. As all know, axiology was not a separate discipline until one and a half centuries ago, though there is much that is relevant in ancient writers. The rise of axiology is modern, especially Neo-Kantian times. It is after World War II that the discussion concerning value gained unprecedented intensity. No one would conclude that our ancestors were not living with values or that they lacked the awareness of values, nor have we reason to say that the way of life and social structure in ancient times were unchangeable, so that our ancestors would not have had the occasion to change and renew their ideas of value, for that was not true in history. What we can assure ourselves is that, due to the development of technology, the way of life in our time has changed at so rapid a pace that the idea of value itself varies as never before. That is to say, the pluralization of value is one of the remarkable characteristics of our time.

Pluralization of value means the co-existence of various criteria for valuation in the same time and the same place. One thing that should be made clear here is the distinction of pluralization from diversification. We can list all kinds of value, as that of the economy, of ethics, of art, of law, of science, etc. Diversity of value is just the description of these many sorts of value in different areas. In contrast, by plurality of value, we mean that the criteria by which people make all kinds of evaluations are differentiated, so that people cannot evaluate the same thing with a unitary criterion. In daily life, people usually use such words as "good," "benefit," "beauty," etc., and such contraries as "bad," "evil," "ugly," etc., which are the fundamental words to evaluate some persons or things. If it happens that people do not evaluate the same person or thing with the same criterion, for instance, if some say the same thing or person is good or beautiful, while others say it is evil or ugly, then obviously what the words "good" and "beautiful" mean for the two sets of people is different. Such various criteria of evaluation are what we mean by pluralization of values; and an axiology which holds that pluralization is the only reality and denies the necessity and possibility of a unity of value is what we call value pluralism.

Value pluralization is major cause of many problems in our time with both active and negative aspects. Negatively, it is the source of various contradictions and conflicts, for behind the value pluralization stand people with different ideas, traditions and actual interests. Contradiction and conflict exist either potentially or actually, the difference being only one of degree. Sometimes we can find them among individuals, sometimes among small groups or communities, among different regions and nations, and even among all kinds of international groups. The end of the Cold War shows that people begin to recognize the need to restrict the scale and form of conflict, but still lack a way thoroughly to eliminate the origin of conflict. Actively, recognition of value plurality is, in some sense, a result of the development of democracy. At first, the value criterion prevailing and functioning in a society were determined only by a few powerful persons or the ruling class, which would never allow pluralist values. Later, though democracy of the majority was advocated,

still it was not a time of real value plurality, for at this stage people did not recognize the rights and needs of the minority, especially of the weak and the less favored. Only when the interest and will of the less favored is respected and tolerated is it a time of real values plurality. A sign for such a time is presented by John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*.1 This is why value pluralism is so obvious in our time.

In short, in a time of value pluralism, on the one hand, all kinds of cultures and interests strongly claim their own rights and appeal for respect so that social life is now more active and varied in style than ever before; even in pursuing modernization, and aim shared by the most developing countries, people still make a clear distinction between modernization and Westernization. On the other hand, people also are puzzled by value pluralism. The initial motive is to respect each sort of value. Being sad when even only one person is displeased, people would like to accept or tolerate the other's idea of value. But what of the opposite value? Even if the conflict between opposed values does not take place in public life, it must be inside people's minds so long as the opposite values are not integrated into a higher and more universal ones.

From my point of view, namely, that the weak and the less favored should not be neglected, the substitution of pluralism for monism is progress. But theoretically, value pluralism is a relativism, for it recognizes the legitimacy of only the concrete, separate and relativist values, while neglecting or denying the universal aspect of value. What we mean by universal value is the ultimate good, the most beautiful; in metaphysical language, it is the most perfect being. In the above sense we also call universal value absolute value. The absolute value represents the human being's supreme requirements, as well as its fundamental interest. Without absolute value, there would be no lasting criterion for pluralistic, relative values. In time their own ground of existence would be lost for lack of an ability to resolve the conflict among them.

I am clearly aware that, the key problem with my point of view is to demonstrate the existence of the absolute value, i.e., its reality and effectiveness. This I tried to do in my paper "In Search of Value."2 There I tried to show that both the positive and ontological approach fail to demonstrate the existence of absolute value (indeed positivism is itself a relativism). The new way in which I tried to find absolute value was through phenomenology and the way of traditional Chinese philosophy. I maintained that the human being's continuing pursuit of a better life manifests an unremitting pursuit of the absolute value, which in turn gives us the evidence of the existence of the absolute value. Absolute value is the project of the human being's essential possibility; it is also the demonstration of the meaning of life.

In this paper I would like to treat the same issue from another angle, that is, how the absolute or the most universal value is necessary for unifying the various relative values. This is a way of history and theory. But how could one use the way of history in times that lacked value pluralism? My answer is that, to lack the theory of value pluralism, is not to say there were no different values in old times, for the difference between individual and social value is universal to all times. To work out how our ancestors integrated individual and social value might throw light on our issues.

History

It is not difficult to distinguish individual value from social value, for the stress of each is different. If the two really need to be integrated into one universal higher value, we might use the case to indicate also the need for a unity of pluralistic values. In dealing with the problem, I shall take Chinese history as an example.

As a matter of fact, each person is at the same time both his own unique self and an element of society, and a harmony of the two is essential for every individual. So no doctrine would be accepted unless it gives people some way to harmonize the two. In the earlier period of Warring States of ancient China, there was a doctrine named by Yang Zhu school, "The principle of the philosopher Yang was: each one for himself! Though he might have benefited the whole empire by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it."3 Yang proclaimed his idea strongly, which shocked the people at his time,4 but it left no way for people to deal with the contradiction between individual and social values; it vanished as an historical relic so that we can recover it only through some other writers. The contrary is the fictional "Gentlemen State" in the novel *Jing Hua Yuan* (Beautiful Romantic Stories Reflected in a Mirror) by Li Ruzhen of the Qing Dynasty. There, everyone did everything for others in the style of gentlemen; even in the market, people bargained and quarreled, not for each one's own benefit, but for the opposite. This is real altruism, but since there is no room for individual value, we have never seen it come true. So Chinese people call this a "strange story from over the seas" i.e., sheer fiction, impossible in reality.

In history, Confucianism and Taoism are two of the most influential doctrines prevailing in China. One of the reasons for this is that neither of them dodged the contradiction between individual and society, but tried to find a way to harmonize the two.

Confucianism was the main trend in the past. As the leading force it put more stress on social value. The famous saying of a politician in the Song Dynasty, Fan Zhongyan (989-1052 A.D.): "Care first for what the empire cares, enjoy later what the empire enjoys" could be taken as a typical attitude of Confucianism towards social value. It does not mean that Confucians do not care about their own interest. In fact, they knew very well that if their will came true and they obtained some position and power through the imperial examination system, at the same time they would gain wealth and reputation. This was the way for Confucians to harmonize individual and social values.

Of course, as only a few from the large number of Confucians could succeed in the imperial examination, there was another creed for most of the Confucians who could not get official positions. The creed was that of Mencius: "When the men of antiquity realized their wishes, benefits were conferred by them on the people. If they did not realize their wishes, they cultivated their personal character and became illustrious in the world. If poor, they attended to their own virtue in solitude; if promoted they made the whole empire virtuous as well."5 That is to say, as a true man, even though he did not win merits throughout the empire, he should try to let his excellent virtue be known to all. We find the same meaning in the Confucian saying: "The superior man dislikes the thought of his name not being mentioned after his death."6 So we understand, Confucianism did not give up individual value, but it realized it in social value. Even as a common person with no official position a Confucian should influence people around him or her by his or her excellent character. This way individual and social value are harmonized into one. The complete expression of this harmony is summarized in an important Confucianist classic *The Great Learning*, which says:

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their

thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole empire was made tranquil and happy. From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of every thing besides."7

In the process of pursuing value, Confucians would begin from the cultivation of the person and end at making the whole empire tranquil and happy. So an active attitude towards social life is carried forward by Confucianism, which says: "Heaven, in its motion, gives the idea of strength. In accordance with this, the superior man is moved to ceaseless activity."8

In contrast to Confucianism, the attitude of Taoism towards life is generally considered rather negative. Taoists always tried to transcend secular society, and though they were actually clever and excellent persons, they did not like being mentioned by contemporaries. This does not mean that they did not have their own evaluation towards social life, or dodged the problem of unifying individual and social values, but their way of doing this is really different from that of Confucianism. First of all, Taoism maintained that society was then in troubled times. Zhang Zhi's many descriptions of the disabled show that penalties at that time were very cruel. Under the circumstances, Taoists, especially Zhang Zhi, naturally took survival as their fundamental aim. Compared with survival, they thought that reputation and wealth was not worth pursuing. Going further, they even thought that the pursuit of reputation and wealth would do harm to one's body and mind, and even involve one in fighting which might cause death. In order to escape fighting, they tried every means to eliminate the distinction between right or good fame and wrong or ill fame.

A rough glimpse of Taoism gives the impression that Taoism would give up all kinds of contention, struggle and fighting, but they would never give up fighting for their survival, though their way was "not contending," "doing nothing" (inactivity) and "holding on to what is weak." The reason one should hold on to weakness when fighting was given by Lao Zi in several metaphors: "Nothing under heaven is softer or more yielding than water; but when it attacks things hard and resistant there is not one of them that can prevail. For they can find no way of altering it."9"When he is born, man is soft and weak; in death he becomes stiff and hard. The ten thousand creatures and all plants and trees while they are alive are supple and soft, but when they are dead they become brittle and dry. Truly, what is stiff and hard is a `companion of death; what is soft and weak is a `companion of life'."10 So Lao Zi maintained that "the soft overcomes the hard;"11 "by this very inactivity, everything can be activated,"12 and so on. Here we should make clear that for Taoism the real meaning of "inactivity" or "doing nothing" meant to do things not according one's overly strong wishes, but according to Tao. So Lao Zi said: "For it is the way of Heaven not to strive, but none the less to conquer."13 "For heaven's way is to sharpen without cutting, and the sage's way is to act without striving."14 Since there are a lot of ideas dealing with strategy and tactics, some people even take Lao Zi as a book on the art of war.

The difference between Confucianism and Taoism is obvious. Each has its own way of integrating individual and social values with the difference that Confucianism stresses social value more and Taoism individual value more, or more accurately the fundamental value of survival in society. Since both have a unity of the individual and society, either of them could be accepted and put into practice by the people.

What is more noticeable is that, despite the difference of the two great doctrines, Confucianism and Taoism co-existed in China over the long past, and later mingled more with each other. It seemed that the two doctrines united in a higher level which formed the main trend

of the cultural spirit of China, especially after the Song Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.). We find from history evidence that intellectuals in China actually took Confucianism and Taoism as two legs in their practical life. When a person succeeded in his cause and was satisfied, Confucianism would encourage him to better and greater success; when one failed or even fell into a very difficult position, one could take Taoism to distract oneself and live in solitude with tranquility. The successes were admired, the recluses were also respected. The latter might not be understood by the Westerners, but an intellectual walking on these two legs could in some sense live with a difficult situation and would always adjust well whether advancing or retreating. As a result, people with different careers could all feel at ease and justified, and could find positive meaning in different ways of life. The above situation reflected the unity of the Confucian and Taoist views of value against a broader back-ground. The unity of the two was not the result of a theoretical elaboration, but of a choice of life. In fact, an individual might be full of honor or disgrace, good luck or bad luck throughout life, but as a person he should live out in society whatever happened to him. On this ground one could harmonize and integrate pluralistic values. Actually, included in the integrate value horizon of ancient China were not only Confucianism and Taoism, but also Buddhism, which would be the subject of another paper.

Theory

The above demonstration is focused on the harmony and unity between social and individual values. Could this also be the reason for the unity of pluralistic values? Pluralistic values also means for many the values of different regions, countries and peoples, in short, the values of different groups or communities with common interests. But if one fully analyses "group value" one finds that it also could be divided into different values which in the final analysis are specialized into the various concrete values of individuals. At base then, value pluralism is essentially value individualism. So we maintain that the unity of pluralistic values is the unity of individual and social values.

The need for a unity of pluralistic values lies in the need for a unity of individual and social values because there are no sheer individual values for the human person in its essence which includes sociality; the unity of individual and society is grounded in the human essence. What man's essence had been supposed clear, but human possibilities have been extended greatly in our time and seem not to be covered by the previous universals. Hence, universals have been criticized strongly, or even totally denied, to be replaced by relativism in all fields. Therefore it is necessary to raise theoretically the problem of the human essence and its unity of individuality and sociality.

Many authors have dealt with this unity, and above all the essence of the human being; usually people would ask the question "what is a human being's essence," by which the questioner expected in answer a certain fixed "whatness." But if a man's essence were exactly "who he is," he would be a different "who" in different circumstances, that is, a professor, a friend, a father, a son, a kind person, a lucky person, a respectable person, and so on. So he is never a fixed "whatness."

The different circumstances do not mean that one has many different outside worlds, but that these are different relationships between him and the same outside. Karl Marx said: "The essence of man is not some intrinsic abstraction possessed by a single person, rather, in its reality, it is the sum of all social relationships."15 Being a social revolutionary Marx stressed man's sociality. More broadly, one's essence should reflect also one's relation with the total circumstances, including both society and nature.

A further question naturally concerns the origin of the relation-ship between man and his circumstances. Part of the relationship is given to a person without his own choice, such as when and where one comes into the world, to whom one is son or daughter, etc. Part of the relationship is established separately or cooperatively with others. For instance, when there are several possibilities one will be what one chooses to be, but in many in other cases, one cannot choose separately, as in the case of marriage. In daily life most probably one should always act together with the others. Even when one acts without a second person beside one, for the most part one should be aware of the existence of others. For instance, when one picks up a purse, whether one hands it to the police or conceals it, it must remind one of some other person as the owner.

Two key terms of Heidegger generalize the above idea: "Being-in-the-world" and "Being-with."16 The first term describes the structure of *Dasein* in which one reveals both oneself and the world around one. As one is who he is, one must be in the structure of "Being-in-the-world." The second term describes the way of *Dasein*'s Being in daily life, namely, for the most part as Being together with others; that is, *Dasein* accepts the other's way of Being. As we have said before, man is who he is, but if his way of Being is the same as others, he should be with others

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own *Dasein* completely into a kind of Being of "the others," in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the "great mass" as they shrink back; we find "shocking" what they find shocking. The "they," which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.17

We can understand that the everydayness they unfolded from the structure "Being-in-the-world" in the way of "Being-with" is one's very sociality. If *Dasein* is a way of "Being-with," then sociality is the unfolding of *Dasein*, i.e., sociality is everyone's own intrinsic character. If so, the unity of sociality and individuality is not a problem, for the two are integrated originally in *Dasein*. On the contrary, pure individuality is a problem, for the pure individual is only a theoretical abstraction. Because we cannot live outside the world, we cannot but live as Being-with.

People might argue that, Heidegger distinguishes "authentic" from "inauthentic," taking the former as the positive way of life and the latter as negative. But "because *Dasein* is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic — that is, something of its own — can it have lost itself and not yet won itself."

It is clear that every person is both himself and "they" (from other's point of view) in so far as he lives in society. Of course that does not mean that there will be no difference among persons, for the proportion of "self" and "they" united in one person is different. But it is enough for us to maintain that individuality and sociality must and should be united or integrated into one — into a universal value. Everyone could recognize this if only he reflects upon his own personal experience, rather than according to the logic of theory.

As pluralistic values are particular forms of social value, they also should be unified into one that is higher and more universal.

Conclusion

A. Due to the development of technology, communication among people throughout the world is more frequent, which means that for each person the world has enlarged. But since there has not been sufficient time for people to harmonize and unify the pluralistic values of the different parts of the world, we are in a situation of value pluralism.

B. Though for its own reason value pluralism arises in our time, it is a temporary phenomenon. It is not the ultimate reasonable case; sooner or later it will be integrated. We should pursue such universal value actively for the sake of establishing a new inter-national order and uniting people all over the world.

C. A more urgent task is for us to pursue the ultimate and most universal value, not only because value pluralism strongly prevails, but because this does not help to resolve the conflicts among different nations and peoples.

D. The development of communication among people is necessary in order to harmonize pluralistic values; for this each person and group could accept the newly opened world as their own world. This will be the new stage for all of humanity to compromise various values.

Notes

1. "The priority of fair opportunity, as in the parallel case of the priority of liberty, means that are must appeal to the chances given to those with the lesser opportunity." Furthermore when John Rawls presents his "two principles of justice," he writes: "First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." He sums up the General Conception as: "All social primary goods — liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect — are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored." See John Rawls *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), par. 46.

2. The paper was presented in a colloquium co-sponsored by The Institute of Philosophy, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, August, 1996.

3. *The Works of Mencius*, 13.26, tr. James Lege (Hunan Publishing House, 1992).

4. "The words of Yang Zhu and Mo D fill the empire. If you listen to people's discourses throughout it, you will find that they have adopted the views either of Yang or of Mo." *The Works of Mencius*, 6.9.

5. *The Works of Mencius*, 13.9.

6. *The Confucian Analects*, 15.20.

7. *The Great Learning*, tr. James Legge, see *The Chinese/English Four Books*, pp. 3-5 (Hunan Publishing House, 1992).

8. *Book of Change*, tr. James Legge (Hunan Publishing House, 1993).

9. *Lao Zi*, ch. 78, tr. Arthur Waley (Hunan Publishing House, 1994).

10. *Ibid.*, ch. 26.

11. *Ibid.*, ch. 36.

12. *Ibid.*, ch. 48.

13. *Ibid.*, ch. 73.

14. *Ibid.*, ch. 81. The first sentence in this translation could be read also as: "For Heaven's Tao is to benefit without injuring."

15. Karl Marx, *An Outline about Fenerbach*, 6. My English translation, from the Chinese.

16. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

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